Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill
Lord Sharpe of Epsom ExcerptsTuesday 27th June 2023
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 View all Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 138-II Second marshalled list for Report - (23 Jun 2023)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I put on record my thanks to my noble friend Lord Johnson of Lainston, who took the Bill through its first day of Report last week, and my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy for his work in the run-up to today’s debate. I extend my thanks to noble Lords for the constructive debate we have had so far on the Bill, both in Committee and in separate meetings. This collaboration has resulted in comprehensive and much-needed legislation—
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Bull) (CB)
Would the Minister like to move that we move on to this item of business before he moves his first amendment?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(10) The Secretary of State may not make regulations under subsection (7) unless the Secretary of State has—(a) consulted the Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice, and(b) given a notice containing the relevant information to the Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice.(11) Consultation under subsection (10)(a) must include consultation about any effects that the Secretary of State considers the regulations may have on—(a) a person in Scotland or Northern Ireland (as the case may be) applying for the forfeiture of cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet that is subject to a crypto wallet freezing order, and(b) a sheriff or court in Scotland or a court in Northern Ireland (as the case may be) considering such an application or making an order for such forfeiture. (12) In subsection (10)(b) “relevant information” means—(a) a description of—(i) the process undertaken in order to comply with subsection (10)(a) in relation to the Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice (as the case may be), and(ii) any agreement, objection or other views expressed as part of that process by the Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice (as the case may be), and(b) an explanation of whether and how such views have been taken into account in the regulations (including, in a case where the Secretary of State proposes to make the regulations despite an objection, an explanation of the reasons for doing so).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for certain consultation requirements to apply before regulations may be made under inserted section 303Z42(7) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (forfeiture orders).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
As I was saying, I put on record my thanks to my noble friend Lord Johnson of Lainston and my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy, but I also extend my thanks to all noble Lords for the constructive debate we have had so far on the Bill, both in Committee and in separate meetings. It is nice to be able to say that more than once. This collaboration has resulted in comprehensive and much-needed legislation. As my noble friend Lord Johnson set out, the Government listened to the views of the House during the passage of the Bill and have moved to address many of its concerns in the amendments tabled for Report.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I reiterate what the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, have said: there has been a co-operative approach to this Bill, which I think will make it a better Bill. I was going to make exactly the points that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just made about the need to build in a way of feeding back to Parliament, particularly given that crypto assets are a very turbulent technology; it is a very turbulent industry. We know about the criminality endemic within these types of so-called assets. The point has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that Parliament needs to find a way, through flexibility and feedback, to make sure that the appropriate regulations are kept in place.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their brief points in this debate. Broadly speaking, I agree with all the points that have been made. It is important to maintain a high level of flexibility, because this is a very fast-moving space technologically as well as with regard to the use of these assets in the broader economy and for other purposes. I agree with everything that has been said. Obviously, these amendments allow us to maintain a high degree of flexibility, so I ask noble Lords to support them. There is not much point in saying anything else at this point.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
(3) Provision made by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may in particular refer to a list of countries published by the Financial Action Task Force as it has effect from time to time.”Member’s explanatory statement
This removes the power to make regulations about enhanced customer due diligence by reference to a list of high-risk countries published by the Treasury. Instead it allows regulations to refer to a list of countries published by the Financial Action Task Force (the regulations could also refer to that list subject to specified exceptions).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
(a) in subsection (2), for the first “which” substitute “made during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 is passed if the instrument”; (b) in subsection (9), for the words from “if” to the end substitute “if they only make provision prescribing high-risk countries by virtue of paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 2”.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that regulations made within 6 months of royal assent are subject to the made affirmative procedure if all they do is make provision about countries in relation to which enhanced customer due diligence measures are required to be taken; regulations made after that period are subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and my other amendments to clause 187 correct the definition of “economic crime” to include encouraging or assisting an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act, which replaced the common law offence of incitement in England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, corporate criminal liability is a topic that many across the House care deeply about—
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(ba) constitutes an offence—(i) under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (England and Wales and Northern Ireland: encouraging or assisting crime) in relation to a listed offence, or(ii) under the law of Scotland of inciting the commission of a listed offence,”Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement to my first amendment to clause 187.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my other amendments to clause 187.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“Attributing criminal liability for economic crimes to certain bodiesAttributing criminal liability for economic crimes to certain bodies
(1) If a senior manager of a body corporate or partnership (“the organisation”) acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority commits a relevant offence after this section comes into force, the organisation is also guilty of the offence.This is subject to subsection (3).(2) “Relevant offence” means an act which constitutes—(a) an offence listed in Schedule (Criminal liability of bodies: economic crimes) (“a listed offence”),(b) an attempt or conspiracy to commit a listed offence,(c) an offence—(i) under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (England and Wales and Northern Ireland: encouraging or assisting crime) in relation to a listed offence, or(ii) under the law of Scotland of inciting the commission of a listed offence, or(d) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a listed offence.(3) Where no act or omission forming part of the relevant offence took place in the United Kingdom, the organisation is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) unless it would be guilty of the relevant offence had it carried out the acts that constituted that offence (in the location where the acts took place).(4) In this section—“body corporate” includes a body incorporated outside the United Kingdom, but does not include—(a) a corporation sole, or(b) a partnership that, whether or not a legal person, is not regarded as a body corporate under the law by which it is governed;“partnership” means—(a) a partnership within the meaning of the Partnership Act 1890;(b) a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907;(c) a firm or other entity of a similar character to one within paragraph (a) or (b) formed under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom;“senior manager”, in relation to a body corporate or partnership, means an individual who plays a significant role in—(a) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the activities of the body corporate or (as the case may be) partnership are to be managed or organised, or(b) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment sets out circumstances in which liability for an offence committed by a senior manager may be attributed to a body corporate or partnership.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, my apologies again for my early start on this; my enthusiasm keeps getting the better of me today.
As I was saying, corporate criminal liability is a topic that many across the House care deeply about, and one where the Government are committed to making significant reforms. I thank noble Lords for the robust and constructive debate we had in Committee on this topic and for the ongoing engagement which many noble Lords have afforded me in the weeks leading up to this debate.
I reiterate the Government’s commitment to reforming corporate criminal liability and tackling fraud. Since this Bill was introduced, significant steps forward have been taken. I hope, with the further government amendments to which I will speak shortly, noble Lords will recognise that we have gone to great lengths to strengthen the Bill in this area. In addition, government action continues outside of this Bill. The recently published Fraud Strategy further demonstrates the ongoing work across government and with partners to take action to tackle fraud.
I will speak first to government Amendments 104, 105, 106, 109, 138, 139, 140, 144 and 145, which introduce new clauses to this Bill to reform the identification doctrine. As noble Lords will be aware, the identification doctrine is outdated and ineffective in the way in which it holds corporates to account, given the breadth of business we see in the 21st century. Companies have grown tenfold since the “directing mind and will” test was devised in the 1970s. As companies have grown, their operations and governance have become spread across different areas, making it incredibly difficult to pinpoint the directing mind of a company, particularly in a large organisation. Individuals with significant authority can escape corporate liability by asserting that the directing mind and will is elsewhere.
Meanwhile, there is an unfairness here. Smaller companies, perhaps with one or two directors, have much more easily identifiable directing minds, meaning that corporate liability is more easily attributable and a prosecution is more likely to be successful. It is this inequality in the law that we need to address. The government amendments place the identification doctrine on a statutory footing for economic crimes for the first time, providing legislative certainty that senior managers are within the scope of the rule.
Under these new measures a corporate will be held liable if a senior manager has committed an offence under the new schedule, or if they have encouraged or assisted an offence by another, or have attempted or conspired to commit an offence under the schedule. The corporate will be criminally prosecuted and, if convicted, will receive a fine, in addition to any sentences imposed for individuals who are separately prosecuted and found guilty of the same offence. The reform will apply to all corporate bodies and partnerships established in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
These amendments build on the extensive work and consultation conducted by the Law Commission in this area. Building on feedback from prosecuting bodies, business representatives and Members of both Houses, some tweaks have been made to the Law Commission’s proposal to ensure the reform is applicable to the widest set of cases. Under the Government’s reform, economic crime is defined according to a new schedule in the Bill—introduced via Amendment 109—which reflects existing Schedule 10 but without those offences that principally apply to a corporate body, such as failure to prevent bribery.
For the purpose of these amendments, “senior management” will be defined in accordance with the well-established definition provided for in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. This model considered the senior managers’ roles and responsibilities within the relevant organisation and the level of managerial influence they might exert, rather than their job title.
The clauses tabled by the Government also seek to capture instances where a senior manager commissions or encourages a lower-ranking employee to do their “dirty work” by making it clear that the corporate can also be held liable where the senior manager encourages or assists a listed offence in the schedule.
To be clear to the House, subsection (3) of the new clause introduced by Amendment 104 ensures that criminal liability will not attach to an organisation based and operating overseas for conduct carried out wholly overseas simply because the senior manager concerned was subject to the UK’s extraterritorial jurisdiction; for instance, because that manager is a British citizen. Domestic law does not generally apply to conduct carried out wholly overseas unless the offence has some connection with the UK. This is an important matter of international legal comity.
However, some offences, wherever they are committed, can be prosecuted against individuals or organisations who have certain close connections to the UK. Subsection (3) makes sure that any such test will still apply to organisations when the new identification doctrine applies. Extending the identification doctrine test to senior management better reflects how decision-making is often dispersed across multiple controlling minds, mitigating the ability to artificially transfer, remove or create titles to escape liability. This is a positive step to increasing lines of clear governance and accountability in corporations.
Looking forward, although these government amendments are a strong step to improving corporate criminal liability laws, they are not the final step. The Government have committed in the Economic Crime Plan 2 and the Fraud Strategy to introduce reform of the identification doctrine to apply to all criminal offences. This will take place when a suitable legislative vehicle arises.
I move on now to the government amendments on failure to prevent fraud. In Committee, the Government tabled amendments which introduced a new corporate offence of failure to prevent fraud. Under the new failure to prevent offence, a large organisation will be liable to prosecution where fraud was committed by an employee for the organisation’s benefit and the organisation did not have reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place. The new offence will help to protect victims and cut crime by driving a culture change towards improved fraud prevention procedures in organisations and by holding organisations to account through prosecutions if they profit from the fraudulent actions of their employees.
Following this, noble Lords have raised further points with me on where the Government clauses could be strengthened. I have listened to the points raised, and the Government have tabled further amendments on the definition of large organisations and the treatment of subsidiaries. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for bringing this point to my attention.
As I have set out on many occasions, the failure to prevent fraud offence is designed to balance the fraud prevention benefits with minimising burdens on small business. Amendments 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122, 123 and 124 will help prevent companies from avoiding responsibility by moving high-risk operations into subsidiaries that fall below the size threshold for the offence. They will also ensure that groups of companies with significant resources are incentivised to take steps to prevent fraud.
First, we have made a clarification to ensure that an assessment of whether an organisation meets the size criteria, and is therefore in scope of the offence, is made cumulatively across the parent company and its subsidiaries—that is, the group—rather than being based on each individual entity. We then have to consider where liability would attach within that group. The group itself is not a legal entity so cannot be liable. It may be more appropriate for the subsidiary or the parent to be accountable directly, depending on the circumstances. We have therefore clarified that whichever of the individual entities within a group was responsible for the fraud can be directly liable for a failure to prevent fraud, in the same way as any other entity in scope of the offence.
Additionally, we have clarified that an employee of a subsidiary can be an associated person of its parent or owning company. That makes it more feasible to attach liability to the parent company should the approach of targeting the specific subsidiary be inappropriate. A test would still have to be met that the fraud by the subsidiary employee intended to benefit the parent, and the parent would have the defence that it was reasonable to take no steps to prevent the fraud—for example, if the structure was such that the parent had no say over the activities of the subsidiary.
Finally, Amendment 120 ensures that the views of the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments are taken into account before any future changes to the offence threshold based on organisation size.
I hope noble Lords will recognise that this is a hugely meaningful package of amendments. I recognise that a number of noble Lords will have hoped the Government would go further, particularly around the threshold in the failure to prevent fraud offence. However, I stress that we have already taken tremendous strides forward. The Government firmly believe that our reforms to the identification doctrine; the introduction of a failure to prevent fraud offence covering around 50% of economic activity; measures to prevent avoidance via subsidiaries; and our existing ability to identify and prosecute fraud more easily in smaller organisations will cumulatively have the desired effect of tackling and deterring economic crime, without unnecessarily imposing billions of pounds of burdens and bureaucracy on actual or potential small businesses. I hope noble Lords can recognise the great progress we have made, and I beg to move.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for his opening remarks and for the advance that the Government have made on two fronts. The first is by clarifying the senior management officers within a company; in doing so, they have clarified the way in which the identification doctrine can be applied in modern Britain.
As I have said on previous occasions, I have an interest to declare. I will not specifically recite it again because I did so in Committee, at Second Reading and, I think, on the three or four previous pieces of legislation into which a failure to prevent amendment could have been inserted—but of course it was not the right Bill, the right vehicle or the right time, and in fact it was just not right. So here I am again.
I shall speak to my Amendments 110 and 125A, which at the appropriate time I will move to a Division unless the Government persuade me otherwise. I am not engaging here in party politics or even in a rebellion. I am doing nothing by surprise; anyone who has followed discussions on economic crime over the last 13 years will know precisely what I am going to say. Indeed, my noble friend the Minister is adept at moving from one corridor to the next to avoid having a yet further conversation with me about my favourite subject. He has also heard all my jokes before, but not every Member of our House has had that advantage so it may be that, unless the Government accept my amendment, my little Aunt Sally will have another canter around the course. However, I will take things in stages.
First, I thank the Government, as I hope I have done —and I mean it sincerely—for their Amendments 104 to 106 and 109—essentially, the modernisation of the identification principle, so far as it goes. We are now slowly catching up with the Americans; they did something similar to this in 1912, but this is the United Kingdom and we must not rush.
Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)
My Lords, I start by acknowledging the great progress that has been made on the failure to prevent process through the debates in the House of Commons. There was significant movement there, which we of course welcome.
I say at the outset that if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, is minded to divide the House on Amendments 110 and 125A, he will have the support of these Benches. There are very good reasons for that, as have been outlined in the debate today. The statistics, particularly the 0.5% figure, are startling. Surely, we all need to take this incredibly seriously if, as the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, said, we are serious about tackling the wider fraud issues, which seem to be growing daily. The numbers of people we all know personally who are affected by this shows the sheer extent of the problem.
I will make the very strong point that the issue of costs and burdens on SMEs has been overemphasised. If these processes are tightened in the way proposed, those very businesses will themselves be protected by the action taken on other companies. In particular, I completely support the extension to the money laundering provision in Amendment 125A.
We have had a really good debate throughout our proceedings on these measures. It would be so disappointing if, at this final stage, we did not go the full distance we can at this point, recognising, as we know, that more will need to be done in the future. We have the opportunity now and we should seize it.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to today’s debate on corporate criminal liability and for their continued engagement on this subject. These conversations have been robust and constructive and have helped the Government immensely in the development of the clauses —developed, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, without any reluctance at all.
I turn to Amendments 135 and 125G on senior manager liability, tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. As he has noted, senior managers hold a higher level of responsibility than ordinary employees in conducting business because they take important decisions on the corporate policy, strategy and operation of the company. The extension of the identification doctrine to senior management in Amendment 104, which I spoke to previously, recognises this. To reflect the heightened responsibility of a senior manager in the actions of a corporation, powers are available already to prosecutors to hold a senior manager liable where a company conducts an economic crime offence.
Under the fraud, theft and bribery Acts and the money laundering regulations 2017, senior officers, including managers, are liable if they consent to or connive in fraud, theft, bribery or money laundering regulatory breaches. This extends as far as the senior manager knowingly turning a blind eye to offending, extending beyond the usual law on accessory liability for other crimes. If a senior manager is guilty of the offence and liable, they can be proceeded against and punished accordingly, including by imprisonment.
Additionally, in the regulatory space, the senior managers and certification regime is in place to improve good corporate behaviour and compliance in the sectors regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority, placing specific requirements on senior managers to encourage positive corporate behaviour.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“Power to amend list of economic crimes
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Criminal liability of bodies: economic crimes) by—(a) removing an offence from the list in the Schedule, or(b) adding an offence to that list.(2) The power in subsection (1) is exercisable by the Scottish Ministers (and not by the Secretary of State) so far as it may be used to make provision that would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if contained in an Act of that Parliament.(3) The power in subsection (1) is exercisable by the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland (and not by the Secretary of State) so far as it may be used to make provision that—(a) would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly if contained in an Act of that Assembly, and(b) would not, if contained in a Bill for an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly, result in the Bill requiring the consent of the Secretary of State.(4) The Secretary of State may from time to time by regulations restate Schedule (Criminal liability of bodies: economic crimes) as amended by virtue of subsection (1) to (3) (without changing the effect of the Schedule).”Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for new Clause (Attributing criminal liability for economic crimes to certain bodies).
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend. If I do not speak at length, it is not because I do not think it a very important amendment but because I am trying to infect the rest of the House with some brevity—unsuccessfully, I suspect. This is an important amendment and we have seen movement in other regimes. We have seen movement in the United States; we are seeing movement in the European Union; and I think we have seen movement in the House of Commons on the Procurement Bill, to which we have started to see changes in attitude. I hope we will hear from the Minister shortly that the Government are prepared to move, in order that we can bank a step in the right direction along this path. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say, and I hope this amendment will not have to be pressed if we hear what we want to hear.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for this amendment, for his constructive engagement throughout the passage of the Bill through this House and, of course, for his typically thoughtful and powerful introduction. I also pay tribute to noble Lords from all sides of the House, and Members in the other place, for continuing to pursue this important issue and engage with the Government on a cross-party basis, not least the APPG on Anti-Corruption and Responsible Tax. I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government are supportive of mechanisms to deprive sanctioned individuals, where appropriate, of their assets, with a view to funding the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. More broadly, the Government want to drive further transparency on assets held by sanctioned persons in the UK.
On 19 June, the Government announced four new commitments which reaffirm that Russia must pay for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine. This includes new legislation, laid the same day by the Foreign Secretary, to enable sanctions to remain in place until Russia pays compensation for damage caused. In this announcement the Government also confirmed that we will lay new legislation requiring persons and entities in the UK, or UK persons and entities overseas, who are designated under the Russia financial sanctions regime to disclose any assets they hold in the UK. The Government are firmly committed to bringing forward this secondary legislation, subject to the made affirmative procedure, and to introducing this measure before the end of 2023, subject to the usual parliamentary scheduling. This will strengthen transparency of assets and make it clear that the UK will not allow assets to be hidden in this country.
Sanctioned individuals who fail to disclose their assets could receive a financial penalty or have their assets confiscated. This demonstrates our continued commitment to penalising those who make deliberate attempts to conceal funds or economic resources. The new power builds on and strengthens the UK’s existing powers around transparency of designated persons’ assets. HMG already use the annual review of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, known as OFSI, to collect and detail assets frozen under UK financial sanctions. Additionally, relevant firms such as banks, other financial institutions, law firms and estate agents have an ongoing obligation to report to OFSI if they know or reasonably suspect that a person is a designated person or has committed offences under financial sanctions regulations, where that information is received in the course of carrying on their business. Those firms must provide information about the nature and amount of any funds or economic resources held by them for the customer.
The designated person reporting measure will act as a dual verification tool by enabling the comparison of disclosures against existing reporting requirements that bite on relevant firms. This will tighten the net around those who are not reporting and are evading their reporting requirements.
On asset seizure, prosecutors and/or law enforcement agencies can currently apply to confiscate or permanently seize assets where someone has benefited from their offending, or the assets have links to criminality, by making use of powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Importantly, the new measures will also give His Majesty’s Government the ability to impose fines. Overall, this designated person reporting measure will be focused on strengthening the UK’s compliance toolkit while giving options for penalising those who seek to hide their assets.
The noble Lord’s amendment includes a specific provision which would require the designated person also to report assets which were held six months prior to the designation. The Government are still fully developing the non-disclosure measure and I can assure the noble Lord that we are carefully considering this suggestion. Although not retrospective in terms of regulating or criminalising conduct that occurred before the measure came into force, requiring designated persons to provide a snapshot of their assets at a historical point in time is necessarily more onerous than a forward look requirement. The Government will need carefully to consider the design of the measure and the proportionality and additional value of so-called retrospective reporting to ensure that it is operationally deliverable and legally robust. This will include working with relevant law enforcement agencies to determine how such information would be used.
Before laying these regulations, the Government will complete their ongoing evaluation of possible operational or implementation challenges to help ensure the successful delivery of this measure. For example, investigating non-compliance will require significant resources from the enforcing agency. We want to ensure that it has all the capability, skills and resources to succeed.
I note the interest in and strength of feeling on this issue. The Government will continue to work collaboratively and constructively with interested parties in the lead-up to bringing forward the legislation, including on reporting assets which were held prior to a designation. We will continue to engage with the civil society organisations that have campaigned for this measure, and I would be happy to work with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and other parliamentarians to keep them informed of progress ahead of it being formally introduced.
Again, I am grateful to the noble Lord for bringing this issue forward for debate and for the continued interest and engagement of many stakeholders. I hope that, given the reasons I have outlined and the action the Government are already taking, he will consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for the manner in which he has addressed this issue and the House this evening. He was right to pay tribute to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Anti-Corruption and Responsible Tax; I would link with that the specific work of Dame Margaret Hodge MP, the Royal United Services Institute and many of those in civil society to which the Minister has referred. I was especially pleased to hear what he said about working collaboratively with those organisations that have been involved in taking this amendment forward.
I do not underestimate the importance of what the Minister has said to the House. He said that he will look at the outstanding issue of the six-month retrospective period; although he gave no guarantees or assurances on that front, at least we will be able to discuss and examine it further. However, he has agreed to introduce secondary legislation before the end of the year—not “at a time to be agreed” or some possibility of legislation coming in the next nine or 10 months, but by the end of this year. I welcome that very much. He also told the House that it would be done under the affirmative procedure, which will give us the chance to come back again. Significant progress has been made on this and I am very grateful to the Minister. I am very happy to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“SCHEDULECRIMINAL LIABILITY OF BODIES: ECONOMIC CRIMESCommon law offences
1_ Cheating the public revenue.2_ Conspiracy to defraud.3_ In Scotland, the following offences at common law—(a) fraud;(b) uttering;(c) embezzlement;(d) theft.Statutory offences
4_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1968—(a) section 1 (theft);(b) section 17 (false accounting);(c) section 19 (false statements by company directors etc);(d) section 20 (suppression etc of documents);(e) section 24A (dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit).5_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969—(a) section 1 (theft);(b) section 17 (false accounting);(c) section 18 (false statements by company directors etc);(d) section 19 (suppression etc of documents);(e) section 23A (dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit).6_ An offence under any of the following provisions of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979—(a) section 68 (offences in relation to exportation of prohibited or restricted goods);(b) section 167 (untrue declarations etc);(c) section 170 (fraudulent evasion of duty).7_ An offence under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 (forgery, counterfeiting and kindred offences).8_ An offence under section 72 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (fraudulent evasion of VAT).9_ An offence under section 46A of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 (false monetary instruments).10_ An offence under any of the following sections of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—(a) section 23 (contravention of prohibition on carrying on regulated activity unless authorised or exempt); (b) section 25 (contravention of restrictions on financial promotion);(c) section 85 (prohibition on dealing etc in transferable securities without approved prospectus);(d) section 398 (misleading the FCA or PRA).11_ An offence under any of the following sections of the Terrorism Act 2000—(a) section 15 (fund-raising);(b) section 16 (use and possession);(c) section 17 (funding arrangements);(d) section 18 (money laundering);(e) section 63 (terrorist finance: jurisdiction).12_ An offence under any of the following sections of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—(a) section 327 (concealing etc criminal property);(b) section 328 (arrangements facilitating acquisition etc of criminal property);(c) section 329 (acquisition, use and possession of criminal property);(d) section 330 (failing to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering);(e) section 333A (tipping off: regulated sector).13_ An offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (fraudulent trading).14_ An offence under any of the following sections of the Fraud Act 2006—(a) section 1 (fraud);(b) section 6 (possession etc of articles for use in frauds);(c) section 7 (making or supplying articles for use in frauds);(d) section 9 (participating in fraudulent business carried on by sole trader);(e) section 11 (obtaining services dishonestly).15_ An offence under any of the following sections of the Bribery Act 2010—(a) section 1 (bribing another person);(b) section 2 (being bribed);(c) section 6 (bribery of foreign public officials).16_ An offence under section 49 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (possession, making or supplying articles for use in frauds).17_ An offence under any of the following sections of the Financial Services Act 2012—(a) section 89 (misleading statements);(b) section 90 (misleading impressions);(c) section 91 (misleading statements etc in relation to benchmarks).18_ An offence under regulation 86 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017.19_ An offence under regulations made under section 49 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (money laundering and terrorist financing etc).20_ (1) An offence under an instrument made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 for the purpose of implementing, or otherwise in relation to, EU obligations created or arising by or under an EU financial sanctions Regulation.(2) An offence under an Act or under subordinate legislation where the offence was created for the purpose of implementing a UN financial sanctions Resolution. (3) An offence under paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (freezing orders).(4) An offence under paragraph 30 or 30A of Schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 where the offence relates to a requirement of the kind mentioned in paragraph 13 of that Schedule.(5) An offence under paragraph 31 of Schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.(6) An offence under regulations made under section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (sanctions regulations).(7) In this paragraph—“EU financial sanctions Regulation” and “UN financial sanctions Resolution” have the same meanings as in Part 8 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (see section 143 of that Act);“subordinate legislation” has the same meaning as in the Interpretation Act 1978.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment sets out the list of offences in relation to which liability may be attributed to the body in accordance with Clause (Attributing criminal liability for economic crimes to certain bodies)(1).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and my amendment at page 178, line 2 substitute the term “subsidiary undertaking” for “subsidiary”, for consistency with my amendment at page 178, line 3.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(1A) The reference in subsection (1) to a relevant body does not include a relevant body which is a parent undertaking (as to which see section (Large organisations: parent undertakings)).”Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for new Clause (Large organisations: parent undertakings).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“Large organisations: parent undertakings
(1) For the purposes of section 188(1) and (1A) a relevant body which is a parent undertaking is a “large organisation” only if the group headed by it satisfied two or more of the following conditions in the financial year of the body that precedes the year of the fraud offence—
Aggregate turnover | More than £36 million net (or £43.2 million gross) |
Aggregate balance sheet total | More than £18 million net (or £21.6 million gross) |
Aggregate number of employees | More than 250. |
This amendment and my amendment at page 179, line 35, enable certain parent undertakings to qualify as a “large organisation” for the purposes of the offence of failure to prevent fraud.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(5A) “Parent undertaking” has the same meaning as in the Companies Acts (see section 1162 of the Companies Act 2006).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is supplementary to new Clause (Large organisations: parent undertakings).
Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)
Amendment 128 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker has a straightforward, clear ask: within a year of the Bill passing, the Secretary of State must publish a report on economic crime and investigation. It must include the performance of the framework for investigating crime, et cetera, and an assessment of the roles of the Serious Fraud Office in particular. Important elements mentioned in the amendment include the adequate resourcing of staff and the strategy for fees, which we have discussed elsewhere.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, for speaking to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lord Agnew of Oulton for his amendment. These amendments seek to add further parliamentary scrutiny on economic crime matters.
However, I have been clear throughout the previous debates on this topic that it is the Government’s view that there is already more than sufficient external scrutiny in the areas outlined by the noble Lords. These amendments are therefore duplicative, and if accepted would lead to agencies and government departments being caught in resource-intensive reporting requirements that would have no real benefit to parliamentarians, detracting from their core roles of tackling economic crime. I have noted what my noble friend has said, and the Government are of course more than committed to doing the things he suggests.
Amendment 128 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would require the Government to issue a report on the performance of agencies and departments in tackling economic crime. I am aware of the strength of his feeling on the resourcing, performance and co-ordination of operational agencies. I hope that the sessions we have facilitated for him with Companies House and the Serious Fraud Office will have gone some way to reassuring him on this.
I can also reassure him and the House that the Government are ensuring that the response to economic crime has the necessary funding. The combination of 2021’s spending review settlement and private sector contributions through the new economic crime levy will provide funding of £400 million over the spending review period. The levy applies to the AML-regulated sector and will fund new or uplifted activity to tackle money laundering, starting from 2023-24.
In addition, a proportion of assets recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 are already reinvested in economic crime capability. Under the asset recovery incentivisation scheme—ARIS—receipts paid into the Home Office are split 50:50 between central government and operational partners, based on their relative contribution to delivering receipts. In 2021-22 this resulted in £142 million being redistributed to POCA agencies. That should provide the necessary reassurance on resourcing and funding. Given what I hope to have shown is a significant amount of reporting, external scrutiny and indeed funding and resource, I ask the noble Baroness, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, not to press Amendment 128.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I refer to a comment made by another Minister at the Dispatch Box that we will come back to economic crime and fraud again and again. I have no doubt about that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 125.
National Security Bill
Lord Sharpe of Epsom ExcerptsWednesday 21st June 2023
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 22, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 22A.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, as well as Motion A, I will also speak to Motions B, C and D.
It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. I thank noble Lords for their support so far. The vast majority of this Bill has now been settled, and measures that are vital to our national security will now be available to our security and intelligence services and to law enforcement. This new toolkit will facilitate the tackling of state actors who threaten the safety and security of the UK. The Government are busy working towards the implementation of this legislation, but there is only so much that we can do without Royal Assent. I ask noble Lords to bear this in mind through any votes that we may have.
Starting with the amendment that has been tabled in lieu of Amendment 122, the Government have listened to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, regarding the updating of the ISC’s memorandum of understanding, or MoU. The concerns raised by the noble Lord are that the Prime Minister has not attended a session of the ISC since 2014 and that the MoU is out of date. As I said the last time that this issue was debated, the ISC MoU is under regular review and the ISC is always welcome to review and suggest revision to it. The amendment tabled to force this process is therefore unnecessary.
This amendment cannot compel the Prime Minister to attend a session of the ISC, which I suspect is the amendment’s true driver. However, the Security Minister recently met with the chair of the ISC to better understand the committee’s concerns and find an agreeable resolution to the issue. In that meeting, he committed to attending an evidence session of the ISC to discuss the powers taken in the National Security Bill in greater detail and the plans for implementing the legislation. The Minister also committed to giving the ISC further updates on the progress of implementation through quarterly written updates.
I remind the House that, under the Justice and Security Act 2013, there is already provision in place for the review and amendment of the MoU where there is agreement between the Prime Minister and the ISC. Therefore, although I understand the spirit behind the amendment, it will not provide for anything new in practice. I believe that the Security Minister’s offer of attendance at a session and to provide regular written updates about the implementation of the Bill shows that the Government take the committee and its concerns seriously.
We have responded to the concerns raised about the ISC MoU in respect of the Bill, but the Bill is not the mechanism to address wider concerns. I ask noble Lords to recognise this. I also note that the Home Secretary is giving evidence to the Iran hearing in July and appreciates the ISC’s critical role in scrutiny of the intelligence and security community.
I turn to Motion A1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to propose an amendment in lieu of Amendment 22, which concerns donations to UK political parties from foreign powers. I thank the noble Lord for recently meeting with my noble friend Lady Scott, the Minister with responsibility for elections. I turn to the substance of the amendment: it creates a duty on political parties to write an annual policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers and a duty on political parties to provide the Electoral Commission with an annual report on donations received by foreign powers. I will set out the reasons why the Government oppose this amendment.
First, on the annual return to the Electoral Commission, as I have said before, accepting a donation from a foreign power, whether directly or indirectly, is already illegal. The amendment does nothing to assist parties in identifying illegal donations. Taken together, this renders the reporting of such activity to the Electoral Commission as an annually submitted blank page. This is not a helpful addition to the transparency framework surrounding political donations and, on that principle, we oppose its inclusion.
Secondly, the requirement to publish an annual policy statement lacks utility. Political parties are already required by law to take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of a donor and whether they are permissible. To reiterate, foreign powers are not permissible donors. The existing law also prohibits impermissible donors seeking to direct money through permissible proxies, and it is an offence knowingly to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. The legal framework is clear, and requiring the publication of a policy statement adds nothing.
Thirdly, given that the amendment will not add value, we do not think that it is reasonable or proportionate. It is worth highlighting that political parties are not banks or security services: they do not have the means to undertake sophisticated forensic accounting. While these services can be obtained through the private sector, they are likely to be cost prohibitive. Political parties are not global corporations: there are over 380 parties currently registered with the Electoral Commission, many of which are predominantly made up of volunteers. This amendment would add burdens on political parties and could risk disincentivising parties from accepting donations, which could, in turn, harm our democracy.
There is also a point on convention here. As far as we are aware, political parties have not been engaged on their views for this proposed amendment. The Government do not unilaterally change laws relating to political parties without such consultation taking place. It could lead to inequitable outcomes and, as such, is another reason why the Government oppose the amendment.
For all of these reasons, the Government’s position is that this is the wrong way to go about preventing threats from foreign powers to our political system, which I know that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is concerned with.
During engagement with noble Lords and throughout previous stages, concerns have been highlighted about donations from companies and unincorporated associations. I would therefore like to set out the framework that we are operating in. Only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. To be a permissible donor, companies must be registered in the UK, incorporated in the UK and carrying out business in the UK.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this relatively short debate. It was remiss of me earlier not to praise our security services, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, did, so I will correct that omission now. I also thank in particular the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Carlile, for the spirit in which they discussed and spoke to their Motions.
There is obviously a fundamental disagreement on the burden that this Bill would place on political parties, and indeed on whether the laws stand up to “intellectual analysis”; I believe that was the phrase used. I think I have made a strong case already that all of the matters under discussion are already illegal. However, there are one or two points that perhaps deserve clarification, so I will go into those briefly.
On overseas electors, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, it is a long-standing principle first introduced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998 that if you are eligible to vote for a party in an election then you are also eligible to donate to that party.
On unincorporated associations being used to funnel donations to political parties, there are a number of existing rules that make sure that ineligible foreign money is prohibited from entering through proxy donors. Permissible donors cannot give donations on behalf of impermissible donors. It is right that unincorporated associations that carry on business mainly in the UK and have their main office here can donate to political campaigns. I have already said this, but I will say it again: unincorporated associations that are making political contributions are already subject to additional controls compared with other types of donors. If they make political contributions or donations over £25,000 within a year, they must notify the Electoral Commission and provide it with information about how they are funded.
On the questions raised about the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the Government responded to the committee’s report Regulating Election Finance in September 2021. The Elections Act 2022 contains measures that closely link to the recommendations made in that report—for example, the new requirement on political parties to declare their assets and liabilities over £500 on registration, and a restriction of third-party campaigning to UK-based or otherwise eligible campaigners. However, as the Government’s response stated, the recommendations in the report deserve full consideration. As noble Lords will be very well aware, electoral law is complex, and more work is required to consider the implications and practicalities of all the committee’s recommendations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also referred to a report in the newspapers today. I obviously cannot comment on the details of the individual case, but the Government absolutely recognise the risk posed by those who wish to evade the rules on donations. I think this story demonstrates just seriously the Government take that risk.
I am not sure there is very much point in me saying anything else. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Balfe and Lord Anderson, that we are not Ukraine. Self-evidently, there are very robust laws already in place.
If I was ungracious to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, in a previous debate, I would like to apologise for that.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a number of party-political matters. Obviously, I am here to speak on behalf of the Government so I will not address those, but I suggest that he writes to the party.
I now move on to Motion C1 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I join him in praising the work of the ISC, on which the noble Lord, Lord West, sits. Of course, we agree with much of what has been said. However, His Majesty’s Government consider the current MoU to be sufficient to allow the ISC to discharge its statutory oversight duties of the agencies and the wider intelligence community. The MoU is subject to continuous review and His Majesty’s Government welcome the ISC proposing changes that it would like the PM to consider.
The ISC has a broad remit over security and intelligence policy, as set out in the Justice and Security Act and the accompanying memorandum of understanding between the ISC and the Government. Those documents also set limitations where, for example, there would be a conflict with current operations or where it would be duplicative of the work of other jurisdictions. We believe that those guiding principles are working effectively and would seek to maintain them but, as I just said, the Government would welcome the ISC proposing changes it would like the PM to consider. It also shows the respect the Government have for the work of the ISC that the Security Minister has made the commitments that he has.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that I do not believe I was glib in my remarks about the Prime Minister earlier. Obviously, I am unable to comment on the PM’s diary, but I have said this before and made the commitment at this Dispatch Box: I will make sure that No. 10 is well aware of the discussions that we have had in the Chamber today.
With that, I am afraid that I do not think there is much point in me saying too much else. I beg to move.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
We in the ISC have tried to get movement on the MoUs being changed. There is no doubt—all ISC members feel this way—that we are being thwarted in getting this to happen and we do not really understand why. The Minister makes it sound as though this is a nice process that is happening. It is not, I am afraid. It is not happening, which is extremely worrying.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Obviously, I will make sure that those concerns are reflected to my right honourable friend the Security Minister, who will see the committee fairly soon. As I have just said to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, clearly I will make sure that this debate is widely understood in the appropriate places.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate; I am particularly grateful to the Minister for his great courtesy. I say to him, with great respect, that he has answered mostly questions of his choice that were not directly relevant to the points I made. In my experience over the years, the repetition of a weak defence is capable of convincing only the defendant and nobody else.
I thank those who spoke. It is worth mentioning their names for a particular reason. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was powerful, as ever. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, made some powerful additional points. The noble Lord, Lord West, is always the right person to have on the bridge with you if you can arrange it; he spoke powerfully about the views of the ISC. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, speaks on matters of the constitution with great political and academic knowledge, and has done so for many years. I have always respected the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, whom I have watched in the other place as well as here, for the wisdom of his views. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has yet again made another powerful speech in your Lordships’ House. Interestingly, the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, was the only Member on the Conservative Back Benches to speak in this debate—a factor that I take to be of significance.
Taking all that into account, it is my intention to invite the House to agree to my Motion by expressing its opinion.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 26A and 26B.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 122, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 122A.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 153A.
Stop and Search
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Lord German (LD)
My Lords, we on these Benches look at this Statement in respect of whether it will produce the outcome the Government are seeking, which is, of course, a reduction in knife crime. Regrettably, I believe this Statement is one which ramps up the rhetoric that strong-arm actions will put an end to knife crime. That rhetoric needs to be tested against the evidence to see whether it works.
Police stop and search is an intrusive power that is used disproportionately against visible minorities. You are seven times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white, if suspicion is required; and 14 more times more likely to be stopped and searched if no suspicion is required. The proposal in the Statement from the Home Secretary is based on suspects of violent crime and talks about the implications for the black community, but there is a danger that these figures can be easily misinterpreted. There is a difference between a few people committing a large number of offences and a large number of black people being involved in violent crime. I suspect that the reality is the former. Perhaps the Minister could confirm that when referring to the figures in the Statement.
More than that, the Government’s own research suggests that stop and search is not an effective deterrent in reducing offending. Operation Blunt 2, from 2008 to 2011, demonstrated that ramping up stop and search in order to reduce knife crime has little or no effect, but Operation Trident in the early 2000s demonstrated that where police and the black communities worked together to reduce black-on-black shootings, there was a significant increase in prosecutions and a reduction in the number of offences. Also, the Government’s own evidence, which they chose to look at in respect of the use of stop and search, produces at most a static response, but often, it shows that simply increasing the use of that power is unlikely to reduce crime. That was the Government’s own evidence in the research they commissioned.
On the one hand, we have the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock, pulling in one direction, as mentioned by the noble Lord Ponsonby, in wanting stop and search to be based on collaboration, listening and engagement; and on the other we have this Government pulling in the opposite direction, by increasing the number without that necessary collaboration. So, do the Government believe, against their own evidence, that if stop and search goes up, crime will come down? Have the Government considered the lessons learned from Operation Blunt 2? Secondly, do the Government agree that if a community views police activity as unfair, public trust and police legitimacy are weakened?
Finally, how do the Government intend to ensure, as the Statement says, that “every community” is
“able to trust in stop and search”.—[Official Report, Commons 19/6/23; col. 570.]?
How is that going to be brought about? How can it be brought about without the necessary collaboration which was part of the Casey report? I would be grateful if the Minister addressed those issues, because without that certainty, it is more likely that the rhetoric will fail and we will not enable the desired outcome which all of us want, which is to achieve a reduction in knife crime.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord German, for their remarks. I defer to the extensive front-line knowledge of this subject of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby; I know he does a great deal of work on this. I shall make a few general remarks and then address some of the questions that have been posed.
It is not just my view but the view of the police that stop and search is fundamentally about saving lives and keeping the public safe, and that, where used proportionately and judiciously, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, it works, and I will attempt to provide the statistics that prove that. For example, since 2019 more than 40,000 weapons have been seized through stop and search and 220,000 arrests have been made. The 2021 inspectorate report concluded that the vast majority of stop and search decisions are based on reasonable grounds. That is potentially thousands of lives saved and countless violent incidents prevented.
The noble Lord, Lord German, referred to Operation Blunt 2, which I think he said took place between 2008 and 2011. In 2010, this was written, and I agree with it:
“If serious violence can be prevented, then police officers must be empowered to conduct blanket stop-and search-operations which target the most likely individuals. Yes, it is a draconian power; yes, its use should be limited. But there are circumstances where such powers are absolutely necessary”.
That was the noble Lord’s colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, writing in the Daily Mail in 2010, and I agree with him.
To those who claim that it is a disproportionate or racist tool, I say that we must be honest about what this means for victims. Black people are four times more likely to be murdered than white people, and they are more likely to be victims of knife crime than young white men—that is the disproportionality that we are focused on stopping. It is important that we look at the matter with a cool head and on the basis of the evidence.
The emerging picture based on London suggests that, when we adjust the data to consider the proportion of suspects in an area and its demographics, rather than considering the data for the country as a whole, the disproportionality of stop and search falls away hugely. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary referred to this as
“a more sophisticated approach to calculating disparity”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/6/23; col. 570.]
I urge noble Lords to consider and reflect on those facts, while acknowledging that more work needs to be done on the methodology.
Of course, it is right that the powers are used in a responsible and measured way, which is why engagement with communities has to be respectful, as both noble Lords noted. It is right that the powers are subject to the highest levels of scrutiny. We now see very few complaints about individual stop and searches. Training on legal and procedural justice has improved, and we have seen confidence levels increase.
As outlined in the Statement, the Home Secretary wrote to all chief constables, and one of the things she asked of them was to be “proactive” in publishing body-worn video footage. That will obviously protect officers who conduct themselves properly, but it is also designed to instil greater public confidence, which is the linchpin of our model of policing by consent. The Government are looking carefully at strengthening local community scrutiny.
Transparency is of course vital, as is community engagement. We want every community to be able to trust stop and search, and we want to present a clear picture of the stop and search landscape that shows the good work being done on the front line. The Government will amend the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code A to make clear when the police should communicate when suspicionless powers are used in a public order and Section 60 context. Suspicionless stop and search must be used responsibly, but we cannot do without it.
We are also mandating data collection on stop and search, to which I referred, as part of the annual data requirement for the government statistics bulletin that is published every year. We collect more data on stop and search than ever before, and this is posted online, enabling police and crime commissioners and others to hold forces to account for their use. Disparities in the use of stop and search remain, but they have continued to decrease for the last three years.
I said that there will be a more sophisticated approach to calculating disparity in the Metropolitan Police Service, which is where about 40% of stop and searches take place—I note the noble Lord’s point about various regional disparities in methods. I do not know the precise answers to his questions about regional engagement, but I will endeavour to find out and report back as soon as I am able.
I do not have the statistics to hand on body-worn video, and in fact I do not know whether the data is collected—I certainly hope it is. I would like to look into that further and report back to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. The fact is that there is broad cross-community support for this in principle, especially for searches for weapons, but we acknowledge and stress that this is contingent and fragile. So, to that end, this transparency is absolutely necessary.
I was asked about the serious violence strategy and the various programmes and what have you that the Government have put in place. The Government made £110 million available this financial year, 2023-24, to tackle serious violence, including murder and knife crime. This includes funding for a network of 20 violence reduction units, delivering early intervention and prevention programmes to divert young people away from a life of crime, and bringing together local partners to tackle the drivers of violence in their areas. VRUs follow a public health approach and have reached over 215,000 vulnerable young people in their third year of funding alone.
There is further investment in our Grip hotspot policing programme, to which I have referred from the Dispatch Box before. It operates in the same 20 areas as VRUs and is helping to drive down serious violence by using data processes to identify the top serious violence hotspots. Those two programmes alone have prevented an estimated 136,000 violent offences in their first three years of operation.
We invested £200 million over 10 years in the Youth Endowment Fund, which provides funding for over 230 organisations that have reached over 117,000 young people since it was set up in 2019.
Finally, we have introduced the serious violence duty, which requires public bodies to work collaboratively, to share data and information, and to put in place plans to prevent and reduce serious violence within their local communities based on a public health approach to tackling the scourge of knife crime. Objectively, it is not right to say that the Government have not updated their serious violence strategies and processes.
I remind the House that serious violence reduction orders are being trialled; they have been since April. For the edification of the House, six SVROs have been issued—five in Merseyside and one in the West Midlands. Four of those are live in the community and two will become live when the offenders are released from prison. Officers will now proactively stop and search those with an order, deterring them from carrying weapons and making it more likely that they will be caught if they persist in doing so. It is obviously too early to assess the success or otherwise of this program but anecdotal evidence so far from the Merseyside Police would suggest that it is proving a very useful tool.
I am proud of this Government’s achievements on policing: we have a record number of police officers, more than ever before; 100,000 weapons have been seized since 2019; and crime is falling—in fact, serious violent crime has fallen by 40% since 2010.
As I have said before from the Dispatch Box, percentages are a very dry way of looking at this. We all have to bear in mind the points I made in my opening paragraph of remarks that this is really about individuals. The fact is that the disproportionality around stop and search should be borne very carefully in mind when we look at the proportion of those who are most badly affected and most likely to become victims.
I hope that I have answered the main questions. If I have not, I will come back to them.
Lord Hayward (Con)
My Lords, I live in a street in inner London which is well known to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, as he went to school via it. On Thursday night, I chaired the selection of the impressive Festus Akinbusoye, the police and crime commissioner of Bedfordshire. He knows only too well how you can achieve from an ethnic minority in the police community. On Friday, I had seven police cars and ambulances outside my house, dealing with a machete attack in the house next door. The police dealt with the case in an exemplary manner but, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, identified, there is the risk of alienation. From the pictures I have, not one of the policemen dealing with that case was non-white. Is it really surprising, when it comes to stop and search, that there is alienation among the ethnic communities, when one faces that sort of position? Could my noble friend the Minister identify what efforts are being made to improve the diversity of police forces across the United Kingdom?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank my noble friend for his question, and I am delighted to hear him describe the police’s activities as exemplary. I have three points to make on this subject.
First, the police themselves, in particular the Metropolitan Police, have said that they need to do a good deal more in this regard, and I certainly trust them to do that. The Metropolitan Police, under Sir Mark Rowley, should be given time to make the changes we all want to see.
Secondly, I emphasise again that young black men are disproportionately more likely to be victims of serious and violent crime, but the 2021 report by the inspectorate concluded that the vast majority of searches were conducted on reasonable grounds. It is for the police to make sure that their powers are understood and to explain themselves carefully. The expanding use of body-worn cameras, to which we have referred, will go a long way to help that. As I said earlier, we should all accept and acknowledge that community support is there in principle, although it is contingent and fragile. These measures will go a long way to solidify that while trust is being restored.
Finally, I am pleased that my noble friend has mentioned Festus Akinbusoye. He is an excellent PCC, and I am sure that he will become an excellent MP in due course. He has long been a supporter of mine, and it is a great pleasure to return the favour.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My Lords, I hope the Minister will agree with me that the all-too-common stereotype of knife crime being simply a black issue is dangerously counterproductive, and that when the Home Office says that stop and search works, it is a statement that is more in search of a headline and, in practice, needs to be heavily qualified. The figures show, I believe, that stop and search on its own is a blunt and ineffective tactic. What we need to do is understand better the root cause of this sort of crime and the reasons why some of our young people feel that they need to carry a knife. There are many causes, of course, but I would suggest that lack of faith in the police is an important one, particularly among those who suffer from this type of crime. In large part, this is driven by what the Independent Office for Police Conduct found to be the “disproportionate impact” of stop and search on black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. When making a Statement about suspicionless stop and search, how can the Minister fail to make any reference to the well-evidenced racist and discriminatory use of it when we know that this leads to less, not more, confidence in policing?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I am afraid that I disagree with the noble Lord in his assertions. Earlier, I gave statistics on the number of knives that have been removed from the streets and the number of crimes that have been prevented because of stop and search. I will give some more examples. In Manchester, the chief constable, Stephen Watson, has said that a 260% increase in the use of stop and search over a defined period correlated with a 50% reduction in firearms discharges and a fall in the number of complaints. I think that there has been a concerted effort to improve; my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said this the other day in the House of Commons. We need to improve the way in which stop and search is applied but also understood; to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, it has to be applied judiciously, proportionately and legitimately.
On the proportionality side, I go back to my original comments. Young black men are disproportionately likely to be the victims of crime. There are disparities in the use of stop and search—they remain and we acknowledge them—but it is positive that they have continued to decrease from nine and a half times in 2017-18 under the 2011 census data to 4.9 times in 2021-22 under the 2021 census data. I also referred to the changing methodology in collecting these statistics, which brings the numbers down even further. However, as I say, that methodology is very much in its initial stages. We will work more on it and will, I am sure, hear more about it.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, was not the exhortation by the Home secretary to chief constables an example of the Executive getting involved in operational matters? It seems to me completely straightforward that it was. Is that not wrong in terms of the way our policing should work?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
No, I do not think it was. She has written to all chief constables and asked them to provide strategic leadership and direction when it comes to the use of stop and search powers. That is not operational. She asked them to ensure that every officer is confident in the effective and appropriate use of all stop and search powers, including the use of suspicionless powers. That is not operational. Investigating instances where somebody is obstructing or interfering with the use of these powers and, if necessary, making arrests is not operational. As I have also said, she asked them to be proactive in publishing body-worn video footage, which will protect officers who conduct themselves properly and will also lead to instilling greater public confidence.
Nottingham Incident
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Baroness Harris of Richmond (LD) [V]
My Lords, I, too, thank the Government for bringing this Statement from the other place yesterday, and I echo the strong remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I am sure we all share in the grief of those who stood at the moving vigil yesterday for the two young people who were so tragically murdered in Nottingham. We on the Liberal Democrat Benches also extend our heartfelt sympathy and support to their grieving families and friends, as well as to the relatives of the school caretaker who was also brutally murdered, and to the people who were injured in the van attack. These were shocking incidents.
We understand that the suspect may have a history of mental health issues, so are the Government asking about this in connection with him, and when might we be told if this is the case? If so, I wonder what this might say about our mental health services in the country. Clearly, if this suspect was suffering from mental health issues, a considerable amount needs to be done now to make sure that this awful incident will never happen again.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, first, I express my deepest sympathy for the families of Grace O’Malley-Kumar, Barnaby Webber and Ian Coates. Our thoughts and prayers are with them, their families and friends and all those affected. I also express my sympathy to the three others who were injured, one of whom I believe remains in critical condition, and obviously I wish them all a very speedy and complete recovery.
I acknowledge the close connections of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, with the city of Nottingham and the fact that he is actively involved with Nottingham University. I ask him to personally convey the thoughts and sympathies of the whole House and the Government Front Bench on this. I took his points very much to heart, and what he said about Nottingham was very powerful, but of course it goes beyond Nottingham: it unites all of us, not just one city, notwithstanding the fact that I thoroughly endorse the sentiments behind Nottingham Together.
The noble Lord asked me a number of questions, particularly around police resourcing for this investigation, and so on. He will know that I am unable to comment on ongoing operational matters. I note that the police have been granted an extra 36 hours to question the suspect following an application to magistrates, and the Home Secretary is of course being regularly updated by the police and other agencies on the ground. That really is as much as I can say about the ongoing investigation, as I am sure he will appreciate, and I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, that I am afraid I cannot speculate as to the nature of the suspect.
The noble Lord also asked me about the victims and the victim support that is available to the families. The families of all the victims are being supported by specially trained officers. Perhaps I could digress from my brief for one moment to say that I watched the fathers of the two deceased 19 year-olds speak, and I do not know how they did it. I commend their bravery. The university is supporting the students’ families and friends as well as staff and the student body. It is working closely with the authorities on the ongoing investigation into the incident.
The Department for Education remains in regular contact with all the various education settings in Nottingham that have been directly impacted by this horrific attack. It has offered its full and ongoing support. Immediate help and support is vital in ensuring that the community can begin to cope and recover. We thank the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, as well as Nottinghamshire Victim Care and the local community for their calm and proactive response in the wake of the incident.
To go further on the noble Lord’s points, I say that Nottinghamshire Victim Care is currently offering support to anyone who has been negatively impacted by this incident. In addition, the Ministry of Justice-funded Homicide Service was formally stood up to offer its major criminal incident support. From 1 June, the Homicide Service was expanded to include support for those bereaved. Obviously, as the investigation is ongoing, it is entirely possible that other agencies may become involved but, again, I cannot speculate beyond that.
Finally, I join the noble Lord in paying tribute to the police and other emergency services. As far as I understand, it was a very rapid response, and obviously they are doing their very best to bring this investigation to a successful conclusion. I would again like to align myself with all the remarks that have been made.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, I join all noble Lords in paying tribute to the emergency services and the people of Nottingham and offer my condolences to the friends and families of the victims of this terrible atrocity.
I will say more about the students in a moment, but I pay particular tribute to Mr Coates and his friends and family. From what we have learned about Mr Coates in the last 24 hours, he sounds like a remarkable man, a remarkable citizen and a proud citizen of Nottingham. Clearly our thoughts are with those who were injured as well during the attack in the city.
I have never had the honour to represent the people of Beeston, so I have studiously never spoken for them before. I hope it is not considered disrespectful in these tragic circumstances. The main campus of Nottingham University borders Beeston and, over the years, more students have chosen to live in the town. I feel that, alongside the heartfelt condolences of the people of Beeston to the families and friends of Barnaby Webber and Grace O’Malley-Kumar, the people of Beeston would also want to reassure parents around the country whose sons and daughters are studying at Nottingham, and may be living in Beeston, that it is a safe town. Its residents offer students, wherever they come from, a warm welcome. That will clearly be something that they would hope to continue. As my noble friend has already done, I join him in supporting all that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said. I hope that my noble friend is able to agree with me.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am absolutely able to agree with my noble friend and I welcome her remarks. I am sure that she and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will work together in due course on making sure that future students have a very warm welcome when they arrive at Nottingham University. This gives me an opportunity to mention that Mr Coates, who has been referred to, was four months from retirement, which seems particularly poignant. I read the comments of his sons and was very moved.
Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the comments of all the Members who have spoken, especially my colleague on the Front Bench, who knows Nottingham well. I know Nottingham only a little. I have been to speak at its university on a few occasions.
Sometimes, tragedy can bring out the best in people. What we have seen in Nottingham since this atrocity has brought out the best of what I believe Nottingham to be. The university itself seems to lie at the heart of this tragic event. Although the Minister will not comment on operational matters, am I right in thinking that the arrested suspect is now thought to be a former student of the University of Nottingham, which only throws into greater relief the fact that the university lies at the heart of this? If the Minister cannot confirm that, I will leave it for another occasion. Otherwise, I think the whole House will want to associate itself with everything that was said.
Like the Minister, I saw those two fathers. I am a father; I do not ever want to be in the position of having to do what they had to do. They are very brave.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The noble Viscount is right. The Prime Minister put it well when he said that it is every parent’s worst nightmare, or words to that effect. I am sorry to say that I cannot confirm anything at all about the suspect, but I entirely agree with the noble Viscount’s remarks about people being brought together.
The Lord Bishop of Durham
My Lords, I begin by conveying apologies from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham, who has rightly decided that being on the ground in Nottingham today is more important. He will speak at the vigil this evening; in fact, he has been present at all the vigils that have taken place thus far. He wants the House to know that he would have liked to have been here to speak, but he cannot be in two places in once and felt that being in Nottingham was more important.
Although not for as long as it has been for the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, this issue is also very personal to me. I am a graduate of the University of Nottingham and lived in Nottingham for three years after graduating. I was also the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham’s predecessor for three and a half years. So Nottingham and its university are places very close to my heart.
One thing that has emerged is the strength of the local community—the way in which the faith communities and charity sector work together, and the strong relations between them, the city council, the county council and the university. The question that has arisen in my colleague’s mind is: given the extensive extra pressures being placed on a large number of these bodies, might consideration be given to offering the university and the city financial support so that they can support all those who, not just in the immediate term but in the coming weeks and months, will be offering counselling, support and encouragement?
Obviously, we all feel deeply for the families of Barnaby, Grace, and Ian Coates. As noble Lords have already mentioned, the fathers were amazing yesterday. Grace’s father said, “Make sure you look after those around you”. Can we do everything to support Nottingham in pursuing that?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank the right reverend Prelate for those remarks. I have to say, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham should not apologise to the House; he should be thanked for being in Nottingham with the people who are suffering at the moment.
It was remiss of me not to mention the faith communities, so I thank the right reverend Prelate for that reminder. I am more than happy to praise them and the support they will give from the victims’ care point of view. As regards resourcing, I went through in some detail the resources that are available, and they will continue to be made available.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I refer to my policing interests in the register.
This was a tragic and appalling incident. As everyone has said, our sympathies are with all those who have been affected. However, it has demonstrated the importance of the emergency services working together and having effective protocols, and of the community’s follow-up, which will involve the local authority, faith communities and community organisations.
The Minister has, quite properly, been careful not to speculate on the reasons behind this, and so on. However, will he perhaps agree with me that it does not really matter whether this was an incident resulting from mental health problems or terrorist initiation, or something completely different of which we know nothing? The impact on those who are caught up in an incident like this is exactly the same, as are the longer-term consequences for the wider community. That is why it is so important that all the services—the emergency services but also the public services—work together and prepare for incidents of whatever sort. I hope that will continue, and that it will continue to be resourced.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I of course agree with the noble Lord. The impact on victims and their families is obviously the same, whatever the reason the suspect did what they did—I do not know the answer to that and I cannot speculate. However, the police should of course thoroughly investigate this incident and get to the bottom of exactly what happened, because obviously, that will be of use in informing future decisions and so on.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)
My Lords, I had not intended to contribute to this Statement, but I would like to thank my noble friend the Minister for giving us the chance to talk about it.
We all have a political hinterland, and mine very much includes Nottingham—it is a political place for me. I spent a lot of my time there and in 1979 I was the candidate for the European election in Nottingham. I narrowly lost, so I do not have the proud hinterland the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has of having represented the people of that city. I know that it is not a problem city—thank goodness it is not—but it is very sad that such an incident has occurred. It shows how a strong community can respond to such situations, and it reinforces the view, which I think all of us in politics share, wherever we sit in this House and wherever we speak from, that we want to build strong communities that can withstand grief, sadness, shock, horror: all the things that have come through this incident.
I thank my noble friend for giving us the chance, through this Statement, to say these things.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank my noble friend for that. He may not have been elected to represent the people of Nottingham, but he does so very well now.
Illegal Migration Bill
Lord Sharpe of Epsom ExcerptsWednesday 14th June 2023
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Illegal Migration Act 2023 View all Illegal Migration Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 133-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee - (12 Jun 2023)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments today, and I thank all noble Lords for their comments.
Amendment 132 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require the Home Secretary to commission an independent management review of the efficiency of UK Visas and Immigration in processing visa applications, and of Immigration Enforcement’s work in removing from the UK those whose right to remain has expired.
I recognise that we should always be striving for maximum efficiency, and indeed effectiveness, in everything we do. In that regard, I agree with my noble friend Lord Kamall. But making decisions quickly and accurately is obviously in the best interests of the individual concerned, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, and represents value for money for the taxpayer; and, where there is misuse of the UK’s generous immigration system, so is ensuring that that is dealt with effectively. I am sure that noble Lords will join me in thanking the commitment of countless staff across the immigration system who uphold fairness and professionalism while making complex decisions every day. As regards the backlog, I do not have the precise figures to hand, but I note that the Home Secretary was speaking this morning in front of the Home Affairs Select Committee and was quoting some of those statistics, if noble Lords would like to refer to that.
Paying external management consultants to look into the efficiency of these Home Office operations would be unnecessary and not, I suggest, a good use of public funds. Reports by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, the National Audit Office and others continue to provide insights into how current operations can be improved, including by identifying and disseminating good practice. We also publish quarterly immigration statistics, including on asylum and returns, which help to shine a light on current performance and inform parliamentary scrutiny of the work of the Home Office.
I agree wholeheartedly that we need a culture of continuous improvement to enhance the efficiency, accuracy and fairness of our decision-making processes in respect of visa applications and the efficiency and effectiveness of our enforcement immigration operations. I am not persuaded that legislating for an independent management review is the most efficient way to go about this, but I of course welcome the intent behind the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Lord Scriven (LD)
The Minister mentioned the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration reports. The 2021 report indicated four key issues: a shortage of technical specialist staff; inadequate training for asylum interviews; low morale and high turnover of staff because of lack of career progression; and the removal of the 2019 standard service to decide 98% of straightforward cases within six months. Recommendations have been made; how many have been implemented?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am afraid I do not have answers to the noble Lord’s questions. I will have to come back to him on them, if he will permit me to do so.
Amendment 134, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and Amendment 149, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, bring us back to the question of the publication of the impact assessment for this Bill. I will take this opportunity to remind noble Lords that the equality impact assessment for the Bill was published on 10 May. Unfortunately, on the economic impact assessment, I can but reiterate what my noble friend Lord Murray has said on a number of occasions: namely, that it will be published in due course.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
On the subject of impact assessments, I am sure that my noble friend meant to ask where the child rights impact assessment is. It should have been available and shaped the decisions affecting children made during the Bill process, yet we still do not have a copy of it.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I think that that question has been asked and answered by my noble friend; I cannot update the House on that at the moment.
As my noble friend set out on Monday, we will provide an update to the House before the first day of Report.
Lord German (LD)
In talking about this matter, could the Minister address the issue of why the Cabinet Office has issued guidance which the department has clearly ignored? Is there a need for the Cabinet Office to give guidance to Ministers on how they should produce legislation? If so, why have the Government not followed that advice?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, the answer lies in the words the Home Secretary used this morning in front of the Home Affairs Select Committee. She said:
“We will be publishing it in due course”.
I am sorry to repeat those words again. She added:
“The issue is that there are many unknown factors … upon which the Bill’s success is contingent … For example, … the delivery of our Rwanda agreement. We are currently in litigation and those timelines are out of our control. We need to conclude our litigation relating to our Rwanda agreement. Once we have a clear view of the operability of Rwanda confirmed by the courts, then we will be able to take a very firm view about the economic impact of this Bill. … I would also say that to my mind it is pretty obvious what the economic impact … will be. We will stop spending £3 billion a year on … asylum cost”.
The Bill
“will lead to the cessation of 45,000 people in hotels and £6 million a day. To my mind, those are savings that we cannot ignore”.
I am afraid that I am unable to improve on that.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
The Minister has just asserted that he cannot improve on those words. I put on the record, on behalf of His Majesty’s Official Opposition—other noble Lords can speak for themselves—that that is disgraceful.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am sorry to upset the noble Lord opposite, but that is the best I can do.
Amendment 138, again put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is similar to his earlier amendment on returns agreements. It anticipates the debate we will come to later today about action to tackle people smuggling. As I do not want to pre-empt my noble and learned friend’s response to later amendments, I will keep my remarks brief at this stage. Suffice it to say that I support the broad intent of this amendment—namely, the need to strengthen the cross-border law enforcement response to modern slavery and people trafficking—but you do not advance such co-operation by setting out in a public document the UK’s negotiating strategy to agree co-operation agreements with other countries.
Moreover, there are also existing established channels which the NCA and others use when working with their counterparts to tackle human trafficking. Where new bilaterals or multilaterals are needed, we will pursue these, but, as I have said, there are well-established mechanisms which already support cross-border co-operation in this area.
In answer to the noble Lord’s questions about specific figures, I am afraid that I do not have those to hand; I will make those available to him later.
Amendment 135, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, looks to the Government to publish an assessment of the likely impacts of the Bill on the use of contingency asylum accommodation and the costs associated with any necessary increase in the use of contingency asylum accommodation. The Home Office is committed to ending the expensive use of hotels for asylum seekers, costing nearly £7 million a day. We recognise the need to take urgent action and will look at all available options for looking at reducing the use of hotels, including alternative sites and vessels. Asylum seekers will be in basic, safe and secure accommodation appropriate for this purpose, while providing value for money for the taxpayer. We are working closely to listen to the local communities’ views and to reduce the impact of these sites, including through providing on-site security and financial support.
Amendment 139, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, effectively seeks to transfer responsibility for the UK asylum system—the national referral mechanism, which considers and provides safe and legal routes and other similar functions—to the FCDO. She acknowledged that this is a probing amendment and put her case. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, gave a rather better explanation than I will give, but I will attempt to explain the status quo. The Home Office is responsible for all aspects of control of the UK border. Managing and controlling legal and illegal migration into the UK, including processing asylum claims and the designation and operation of safe and legal routes, are part and parcel of this strategic function. Different parts of the system cannot, and should not, be considered and managed in isolation.
To take one example, as we have previously debated, our capacity to admit people to the UK through safe and legal routes is impacted by the level of illegal migration, so hiving off aspects of immigration policy and operations to a separate department is a recipe for confusion, disjointed policy-making and ineffective operations. The migration and borders system is highly complicated and this change would serve only to add unnecessary complexity. However, I assure the noble Baroness that the Home Office already works closely with other government departments, including the FCDO, on all cross-cutting matters to ensure that relative interests are considered accordingly during the development and implementation of immigration and asylum policy, and it will continue to do so.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister. He was quite right about this being a probing amendment to demonstrate the importance of the joined-upness of this being over here and that over there. I am equally grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who is doing his old department a great service in dodging that particular bullet. The Minister talked about respective competencies and so on, so the Foreign Office should keep doing foreign affairs, including negotiating treaties, for example. Why did the Home Secretary and the Home Department negotiate the Rwanda pact, as opposed to leaving treaty negotiation to the Foreign Office? That came into my mind because the Minister mentioned the Rwanda agreement in the context of the impact assessment. Just to help him, I suggest that the impact assessment should be provided on the basis that the Government believe they will succeed in the litigation, so the impact assessment could be produced without delay on the predication that the Government are confident that their litigation will succeed.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I will certainly ensure that the noble Baroness’s points are noted in the department.
Finally, Amendment 139FD would place a duty on the Home Secretary to publish quarterly statistics on the Bill’s operation after it is enacted. Again, I have no issue with the basic premise underpinning the amendment. We already publish a raft of immigration statistics on a quarterly basis and I have no doubt that these regular publications will be augmented to report on what is happening under this Bill once it is commenced. We will consider carefully what data it is appropriate to record and publish as part of our implementation planning. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and his Front-Bench colleagues in the other place will not be slow to press the Government for the kind of data referenced in the amendment.
I and my ministerial colleagues, in particularly my indefatigable noble friend Lord Murray, have heard loud and clear the calls from around the Committee that the economic impact assessment for the Bill should be available to your Lordships before the start of Report. My noble friend has committed to updating the House before the first day of Report and I have already read out the Home Secretary’s comments from this morning. However, having had this opportunity to debate the issue again, together with the other issues addressed in these amendments, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, on the question of a secret plan or no plan, the announcement that came out the other day—it was almost not an announcement —that the provision about two classes of asylum seekers in last year’s Bill had been ditched suggests that there is no plan. On the question of external management consultants, I am not a particular fan of management cons; there has not been a success story so far, has there? My noble friend Lord Scriven’s reference to the ICIBI report was absolutely on point: reports from the ICIBI, the National Audit Office and so on do not seem to lead to any change, so one has to try something.
I am left with a very big query: why can the impact assessment not cover variables? It should address the “what ifs”. As I am reminded, it is required to provide options, and over the years I have seen so many impact assessments that do provide options: “if such and such, then so and so”. The Home Office is well on the way to out-Rumsfelding Rumsfeld. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts(10 months, 4 weeks ago)
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Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 27 April be approved.
Relevant document: 38th Report the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument).
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for attending this debate. These regulations amend Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, which grant the police the power to place necessary conditions on public processions and assemblies to prevent specific harms from occurring. One of these harms is serious disruption to the life of the community. These regulations do not create new powers but define this harm.
Once in force, these regulations will ensure that public order legislation is clear, consistent and current. They will carry over a definition of “serious disruption” which has already been approved by Parliament and provide greater clarity on the circumstances in which the police can exercise their powers to manage public processions and assemblies. Most importantly, they have given the House of Commons the opportunity to consider these measures.
Without these changes there is potential for confusion over what is the lawful extent of protest activity. The police and public will have to grapple with one threshold for criminal offences in the new Public Order Act and another for the use of discretionary police powers in the 1986 Act. With these changes, it will be easier for all to understand when disruption from a protest is no longer legitimate.
The provisions in these regulations are broadly similar to those brought to the Public Order Act 2023 as a government amendment during its passage through Parliament. The only difference is that these regulations do not allow the police to place blanket conditions on multiple protests. I will detail exactly what the regulations do shortly.
The government amendment was narrowly defeated by 14 votes in this House, and was not considered by the elected Chamber. This vote occurred before the vote for adopting the current definition of “serious disruption” in the 2023 Act, which was approved by both Chambers. As both Houses have agreed on a definition, we are sensibly extending it across the statute book and bringing further clarity to public order law. That is something which has been sought by senior police officers and by many in this Chamber today.
The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has said:
“The lack of clarity in the legislation and the increasing complexity of the case law”—
the increasing complexity that the case law is making between the right to protest and the rights of others to go about their daily lives free from serious disruption—
“is making this more difficult and more contested”.
The delegated power being used existed prior to the introduction of the Public Order Act 2023. The power was available for the Government to use during the passage of the Public Order Act 2023. These delegated powers were scrutinised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which recommended that a definition of “serious disruption to the life of the community” be included on the face of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, coupled with a power to amend the definition by affirmative procedure regulations. This recommendation was accepted and implemented in full.
It is entirely right that the Executive use powers conferred by both Houses of Parliament to allow the elected Chamber to consider the proposed change in law. The other place has now had the opportunity to consider these measures and has approved them following debate on the Floor of the House yesterday.
The Motion of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is highly unusual, and seeks to strike down legislation passed by the elected House and undermine sensible changes which bring clarity and consistency to the law. During the passage of the Public Order Act, the Government listened and responded to the strength of feeling in Parliament on many issues. Changes were made on many of those issues, including serious disruption prevention orders, protections for journalists reporting on protests, and others.
The need for clear powers to improve the management of highly disruptive protests has been well rehearsed, but I will reiterate them quickly. The current Just Stop Oil slow-walk campaign has resulted in the use of over 13,770 police officer shifts, diverting police attention away from local communities. Financially, this has cost the taxpayer £4.5 million in just six weeks, and this is in addition to the £14.5 million it cost last year. These near-daily protests—as of yesterday, I think it was 156 separate protests in six weeks—have pushed the public to their limit. We have seen people taking matters into their own hands. Therefore, as a Government, we must do what we can to empower the police to respond swiftly and effectively.
Given the scale and impact of the disruption caused by slow walks and sit-ins on roads, it is in the public interest to clarify these police powers as a matter of urgency. The Government have always been clear that the delegated powers were needed to be able to respond quickly to evolving protest tactics. The intensive use of slow walks across London has proven that. Once in force, the regulations will provide the police with the legal clarity they need to protect the public from this tactic.
As I have already mentioned, these regulations do not grant new powers to the police, but clarify the extent of existing ones. Therefore, it was deemed disproportionate to carry out a full public consultation. Targeted engagement with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Metropolitan Police Service and other police forces was the appropriate approach. All have welcomed clarity in the law. The Metropolitan Police Service specifically welcomed clarity on how the police should consider serious disruption in relation to imposing conditions.
The regulations achieve this by making the following clarifications. First, these regulations will clarify that the police may consider the cumulative impact of concurrent and repeated protests in the same area when assessing whether “serious disruption to the life of the community” may occur. Although a single protest may not in itself cause serious disruption, it is undeniable that a community subjected to repeated or concurrent protests will suffer due to the compounding effect of multiple protests.
Secondly, they allow the police to consider the absolute disruption caused by a protest. That is to say, police should be able to consider the disruption a protest may cause, regardless of what disruption may be common in an area for other unrelated reasons. Without these regulations, “serious disruption to the life of the community” is often considered with reference to what is regarded as normal for a given area, rather than the nature of the disruption caused at that moment in time.
Thirdly, the regulations define the term “community” to mean,
“any group of persons … affected by the procession”,
or assembly, and not just those who live or work in the vicinity of that procession or assembly. This change clarifies that a broader definition of community is to be used when interpreting the meaning of “serious disruption to the life of the community”. This definition better reflects the modern way of life in major cities.
Finally, as I have previously mentioned, the instrument aligns the definition of “serious disruption” with that in the Public Order Act 2023, simplifying protest law. During the passage of the Public Order Act, the appropriate definition of “serious disruption” was debated at length. I would again like to thank all noble Lords for what was an exceptional debate with high-calibre contributions from all sides.
I remain of the view that the definition rooted in protest case law proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, strikes the right balance between legitimate and illegitimate protest. This definition has been scrutinised and approved by both Houses of Parliament. It should now be carried across to the Public Order Act 1986 to ensure consistency across the statute book.
As well as aligning public order legislation, the regulations also bring further clarity by building on the non-exhaustive list of examples of serious disruption to the life of the community to include
“the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities”,
such as making a journey. This provides legal clarity that it is entirely appropriate for the police to place necessary conditions on protests that are obstructing the public from going about their daily business.
Finally, I remind the House that the Government are legally required to publish a report on the operation of amendments made to Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The report must be published and laid before Parliament by 28 June 2024. I can confirm that this paper will also report on the operation of the changes made by this statutory instrument.
In summary, the regulations are necessary changes to the law to ensure that public order legislation is clear, consistent and current. They will improve the protection of the public—who this Government support —against the minority of protesters who repeatedly trample on their rights. Current and former police officers, as well as Peers and Members of the other place on both sides of the debate, have called for public order legislation to be both easy for officers to interpret and specific. This statutory instrument achieves these objectives. I beg to move.
Amendment to the Motion
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, we on these Benches associate ourselves with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on the tragic events in Nottingham.
Like the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Lisvane, I will not say much about the substance of the SI. If the Home Office had realised that the Public Order Act 1986 needed to be amended before the Bill had left the other place, we would not be here now.
I want to talk about the constitutional issue, described by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, of a Government changing primary legislation by means of secondary legislation within months of this House having voted against that primary legislation. As we have heard, this is unprecedented, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put it, a constitutional outrage.
On Monday, this House will have the Second Reading of the British Nationality (Regularisation of Past Practice) Bill. This primary legislation retrospectively changes primary legislation by means of a two-clause fast-tracked piece of primary legislation. Not only is this the proper way of amending primary legislation but it shows that it can be done quickly and easily. There is no need for the will of this House, expressed through a recent Division, to be overruled by means of secondary legislation when a single-clause fast-tracked Bill could have done the same job without creating an unconstitutional precedent.
Noble Lords opposite may say that it is no big deal, but the Prime Minister said that his Administration would have
“integrity, professionalism and accountability at every level”.
I will return to the issue of integrity in a moment, but failing to amend the 1986 Act in the other place clearly shows a lack of professionalism, and failing to correct the mistake by means of primary legislation shows a clear lack of accountability because, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, scrutiny of secondary legislation is cursory.
On integrity and the Boris Johnson resignation honours row, Michael Gove, a senior Government Minister, said yesterday on the BBC Radio 4 “Today” programme:
“The appropriate procedure was followed”.
He went on to describe it as
“a process we are all familiar with as part of the constitution … it is appropriate to look at all these processes. They all have their own coherence in accordance with past practice and due process … All Governments work according to precedent … those are protocols that govern this particular procedure, and I think Governments overall have been criticised sometimes for departing from due process. I think it was appropriate and right that the Prime Minister and the Government followed due process in this way … I know it’s old fashioned to want to use precedent and independent institutions to establish how all these sorts of things should be decided, but then precedent and independent institutions are, I think, the two of the constitutional bulwarks that are important”.
This House is an independent institution, and this SI breaks long-established precedent. In answer to a question about changing precedent in connection with resignation honours, Michael Gove said:
“The inference of the question is that we should alter precedent, and that we should in some way say to independent institutions that they should operate in a different way from which they have been constituted. I think what we have here are the existing constitutional machinery working as it was designed to do”.
So there we have it: a Conservative Government who believe that independent institutions should not operate differently from how they have been constituted, and that precedent should not be altered apart from when it suits them. That is the very definition of a lack of integrity.
This House voted against the provisions in this statutory instrument by a majority in a Division on primary legislation in February this year. There is no precedent to overturn a decision of this House on primary legislation by means of secondary legislation. I am reminded of the words of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, addressing the amendment to deny the Illegal Migration Bill a Second Reading, which he considered unconstitutional. He said:
“I do not think that any Member of this House who respects its values and its role could possibly go through the Lobbies and vote for that amendment”.—[Official Report, 10/5/23; col. 1801.]
I adapt his words and apply them to this situation: I do not think that any Member of this House who respects its values and its role could possibly go through the Lobbies and vote to allow this statutory instrument to pass.
Noble Lords on the Labour Benches will be complicit in undermining the status of this House if they do not vote for the fatal amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that the Official Opposition will respect convention and not vote for the fatal amendment. Why, when the Government have not respected convention? I say to the noble Lords, Lord Reid and Lord Rooker: of course it is right that the other place should have the final say, but if we vote down this statutory instrument, the other place can introduce a one-clause Bill to achieve exactly what this statutory instrument is trying to achieve in a non-constitutional way.
If, as appears ever more likely with each passing day, there is a change of Government at the next general election, noble Lords on the Conservative Benches will have created a precedent that they are likely to regret for many years to come, when the incoming Government use this precedent to undermine the will of this House in future. We will vote for the fatal amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to what has been a fascinating and powerful debate. Before I start my response, I join the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his remarks about the situation in Nottingham. As he did, I thank the emergency services and express my sympathies to the victims and their families.
I am obviously going to refute the allegation that this is in some way unconstitutional, or indeed an outrage. I have already set out why the Government have brought forward the measures, and the fact that it is indeed proper. The sequencing of debates and votes during the passage of the Public Order Act 2023 meant that the House of Commons was unable to consider the measures. Now that the elected House has approved the measures, we must respect its will and do the same—a point that has been made powerfully by a number of noble Lords.
The delegated powers being used existed prior to the introduction of the Public Order Act 2023. The powers were available for the Government to use during the passage of the Act—these are comments I made in my opening speech. Those powers were scrutinised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which recommended that a definition of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
be included in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, coupled with a power to amend the definition by affirmative procedure regulations. This recommendation was accepted and implemented in full.
It is entirely right that the Executive use powers conferred by both Houses of Parliament to allow the elected Chamber to consider the proposed change in law. The other place has now had that opportunity to consider these measures and has approved them, following debate on the Floor of the House. So this is not defying the will of Parliament, as some have suggested, or committing a constitutional outrage. As the noble Lords, Lord Reid and Lord Rooker, pointed out, we are actually respecting it. This cannot be sent back, so to not do this now would be to enshrine a lack of clarity and consistency in protest law, as my noble friend Lady Stowell noted. That will affect the police, the public and of course protesters themselves. Any delay in this fast-moving situation risks, as I pointed out in my opening remarks, continuing to encourage the public to take matters into their own hands—a point that was very well articulated by my noble friend Lord Jackson.
To the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who knows I respect her greatly, I say that this is enabling the police to do their job with more clarity—a point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made with considerable force.
My noble friend Lord Hunt asked some very sensible and searching questions about the Explanatory Memorandum, which I would like to address. To the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, I say that the Government published the Explanatory Memorandum and have updated it. The primary focus of an Explanatory Memorandum is to provide clarity on the content of a statutory instrument’s provisions. Additionally, the vote excluding the similar measure from the Public Order Act was only held earlier in the year. All the information on the vote is readily available in Hansard.
That said, we recognise the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s criticism and the importance of transparency in Explanatory Memoranda. So I can confirm, as has been noted, that the updated memorandum has been published. It was not published before the debate in the House of Commons, but the changes to the Explanatory Memorandum are relatively minor; they do not add new information. They reference the votes and clarify the extent of targeted engagement, and are in direct response to concerns raised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. The Home Secretary set this out clearly in yesterday’s debate in the other place.
On the consultation, another subject that has been raised, I again have to refer back to my opening remarks. This statutory instrument does not create new powers. The Government have always been clear that the delegated powers were needed to be able to quickly respond to evolving protest tactics. As they do not grant new powers to the police but clarify the extent of existing powers, it was deemed disproportionate to carry out a full public consultation. Targeted involvement with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Metropolitan Police Service and other police forces was the appropriate approach. All have welcomed clarity in the law, and the Metropolitan Police Service specifically welcomed clarity as to how the police should consider serious disruption in relation to imposing conditions.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, suggested that new powers were being created and referenced the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police. As I have mentioned, and I have to stress again, these measures do not create new powers but clarify existing ones. The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, the force most affected by protest in England and Wales, has asked for further clarity in the law. I think it is very evident from the events we are seeing at the moment how significant and necessary that clarity is.
I do not think there is much point in me saying very much else in answer to the questions. I think I have addressed the majority of the issues that I did not address in my opening remarks. As I said earlier, I am grateful for the constructive and helpful questions. I will take some of these reflections back to the department and to my noble friend the Leader of the House, who is not here at the moment. These regulations are designed to ensure public order legislation is clear, consistent and current. They will also support the police in striking the correct balance between the rights of protesters and the public. I commend them to the House.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Extraction of information from electronic devices) (Amendment of Schedule 3) Regulations 2023
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 17 April be approved.
Considered in Grand Committee on 22 May.
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Walney
To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they intend to proscribe the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, the Government take the threat of the IRGC very seriously, and continue to condemn its actions. The Government will always consider the full range of powers available, including our robust counterterrorism powers, such as the proscription tool, where appropriate, to address the threat posed by Iran and the IRGC.
Lord Walney (CB)
I thank the Minister for that Answer. It is now more than four months since the House of Commons passed a resolution universally in favour of the proscription of the IRGC. This is an organisation which is committed to armed resistance against Israel—exactly the same grounds on which the Government have proscribed Hezbollah. Our intelligence services are clear that it is committed to kidnappings and killings on UK soil. There must be an argument within government not to do this. Can the Minister enlighten the House on what that is? It seems very obvious to many Members across both Houses that it should be proscribed.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
It might help if I explain what has been done. Over 300 Iranian individuals and entities have been sanctioned for activities, such as human rights violations, including 70 since October of last year. Other activities include nuclear proliferation, support to Russia and various regional activities. As an entity, the IRGC was designated in its entirety under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. More than 30 new designations of IRGC-related organisations and officials have been made by the FCDO since October 2022. The Government keep the list of proscribed organisations under review, but I go back to my earlier answer: while considering the range of available powers, we will continue to make use of the robust counterterrorism powers, including the proscription tool, where appropriate.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, that answer is simply not good enough. We have had Ministers and Prime Ministers support the objective of banning this organisation, which as the noble Lord said is a threat not only to the citizens of Iran but to citizens in this country. We have had commitments. I want to ask the Minister a more explicit question: what discussions has his department had with the FCDO on this matter? What discussions have been had with our allies who have proscribed this organisation? It is about time we acted, rather than just talked.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The Home Office has a long-standing policy of not commenting externally on proscription matters. As noble Lords will be aware, that position is informed by many considerations, including to avoid creating expectations that the Government will proscribe certain organisation, to reduce the risk that an organisation will take evasive action before a potential proscription order comes into force, to manage the risk that subsequent decisions are vulnerable to challenge on procedural grounds, and so on. As for conversations with international partners, of course we work with them. The UK’s approach to Iran is conducted in close co-ordination with key partners, including the EU and the US.
Lord Pickles (Con)
My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my declaration of interests, particularly those relating to friendship towards to Israel. Does my noble friend understand that there is a certain feeling of Groundhog Day about his answers? We seem to be going round the houses, time and again. As Members have suggested, this is an organisation that pays people who send missiles into residential areas in Israel and use children as human shields, and that pays for organisations that have murdered a British mother and her children. What more does the IRGC need to do for the Government to proscribe it? All the reasons read out by my noble friend are examples of why we should proscribe it. Why not get on and just do it?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
As I say, it remains under active consideration. I go back to what I said earlier: over 300 Iranian individuals and entities have been sanctioned for various activities, including those mentioned by my noble friend.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
The Minister has evaded the questions from the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pickles, and from my noble friend. There is clearly a huge row going on in Government— we all know that. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office seems somehow to be able to veto what the rest of government think is appropriate, which is to proscribe this organisation. Can the Minister confirm that? This shilly-shallying will produce the effect he described as being so dangerous—that of giving due warning to the organisation that proscription may be on the way.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I do not believe that it is shilly-shallying. As I said, it remains under active discussion among many departments in government.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, I want to take the Minister’s view on what active consideration means. On 26 March, it was reported that Tom Tugendhat, the Minister, met campaigners for proscription and told them that there would be proscription—that the Government were going to proscribe—but that he could not give them a date upon which that proscription was going to take place. Has such a conversation taken place? Have the Government taken a decision but are not yet ready to tell us?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am familiar with the meeting referred to by the noble Lord. Mr Beheshti met the Security Minister on 29 March, following which Mr Beheshti uploaded a video recording of the meeting and stated, as the noble Lord has just outlined, that the Government are intending to do this. The formal read-out from the meeting confirmed that, unfortunately, Mr Beheshti had misinterpreted the content of the meeting.
The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford
My Lords, in a recently published joint annual report by Article 18 and other Christian organisations, the IRGC’s increasing involvement in the crackdown against peaceful Christian activities in Iran was highlighted for the second year in a row. Other religious minorities and peaceful protesters also report violent treatment during arrest and detention, as well as the interference of the IRGC’s intelligence branch in court proceedings to ensure harsher sentences against those who are accused. I absolutely agree with the noble Lords who are pressing for proscription, but given all of this, does the Minister agree that we can and should do more, beyond proscription of the IRGC? Will the Government consider offering a safe route scheme for those from Iran who have suffered persecution in the form of arrest and imprisonment on account of their faith?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank the right reverend Prelate for her question; she raised some interesting points. I remind noble Lords that the National Security Bill, currently progressing through your Lordships’ House, will provide another significant toolkit in the fight against individuals working for state entities like the IRGC in this country—the Bill will criminalise a wide range of hostile activities. I totally accept the right reverend Prelate’s points. I cannot comment on safe routes for Iranian individuals, but I will make sure that her views are taken back.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, nothing happens inside Iran without the active complicity and knowledge of the IRGC. Will the Minister take the opportunity to condemn the “horrific wave” of executions, as described by United Nations special rapporteurs on Friday, including those of Majid Kazemi, Saeed Yaghoubi and Saleh Mirhashemi that day, after they were reportedly subjected to torture in prison? Does not this bloodlust and the IRGC go hand in hand? As the noble Lord, Lord Pickles, said, what more has to happen before there is proscription?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I absolutely join the UN rapporteur in condemning those executions.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful that the Government are keeping this matter under active consideration because otherwise there would be a real risk of a delay in a decision.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The fact is that the Minister who answered the debate in the other place on 12 January this year was unable to identify a single reason why the IRGC should not be proscribed. My noble friend the Minister is also unable to find a reason, and that is because there is none. I respectfully urge my noble friend and the Government to take the only decision available to them, and to take it soon.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, what is the practical effect of proscription in the case of the guard corps?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
That is a very good question. I am not entirely sure exactly what else it would do above and beyond what we have already done with the sanctions and so on.
Lord Watts (Lab)
My Lords, something very strange is going on in government. Most organisations have meetings to discuss problems, and then come to a conclusion and make a decision. It seems that the Government have those meetings and discussions but make no decision—why is that?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I do not accept that characterisation. As I said, the discussions of course continue, and as soon as there is something more to say I am sure that we will be back to say it.
Lord Grocott (Lab)
The exchanges we have heard are predictable and understandable, but is it not important that, in all of these kinds of discussions, we recognise the wider context in which violence takes place in the Middle East, as it does relentlessly and remorselessly? The wider context is the complete absence of any significant development in the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Until such time as that is at least moving and there is some prospect of a two-state solution—whatever the rights and wrongs of it—this kind of violence will continue.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am sure that the noble Lord is right, and I am more than happy to condemn all violence in the Middle East, wherever it comes from.
Former Chief Constables: Gross Misconduct
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Lexden
To ask His Majesty’s Government how many former chief constables are awaiting police gross misconduct hearings.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, since 2020-21, the Home Office has substantially increased the data that it collects and publishes on police misconduct as part of the police misconduct in England and Wales statistical bulletin. It is working closely with the sector to improve the overall quality and consistency of the data that it collects. This does not include cases which have been referred to misconduct proceedings where those proceedings have not concluded.
Lord Lexden (Con)
My Lords, how can it possibly be right for former Chief Constable Mike Veale to have been able to dodge a gross misconduct inquiry in Cleveland for almost two years, while tarnished officers of lesser rank have been brought to account? May I remind the House that arrangements for the Veale hearing in Cleveland were the sole responsibility of a legally qualified chair, whose name is unknown, even though the law does not permit this individual to remain anonymous. What does that say about public accountability of the police in Cleveland? Finally, when I met my noble friend the Minister and Mr Chris Philp, the Policing Minister, recently—I thank them for that meeting—I made it clear that, unless the mysterious chair has now fixed a date for the start of the hearing, I would call on the Government today to use their reserve powers under Sections 79 and 91 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to end the impasse. Is it not time that this matter was finally resolved?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, the law is not being flouted. Arrangements for the misconduct hearing of the former Cleveland chief constable Mike Veale are a matter for the Cleveland PCC and not the Government. Any questions regarding who has been appointed as the independent, legally qualified chair would need to be directed to the PCC accordingly. As noble Lords will expect me to say, I will not comment further on that particular case. However, in answer to the second part of my noble friend’s question, I can say that operational policing is, as he knows, not a Home Office matter—it is for chief constables—but he is correct that the Home Secretary has powers under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to ensure an efficient and effective policing system that protects public safety. That includes the power under Sections 40 and 40A of the Police Act 1996. However, these are for use only when either the police force or the local policing body itself is failing or will fail to discharge its functions in an effective manner. They are very much a last resort, and we do not believe that the current situation in Cleveland requires these powers to be used, as the PCC has appointed an LQC to the panel for Mr Veale’s misconduct hearing.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the meeting he arranged, but will he please guarantee that the Home Office will never again stand idly by in a situation where a police and crime commissioner, in this case Leicestershire’s, employs as it chief adviser, and then as its chief executive, a twice-disgraced ex-chief constable facing an allegation of gross misconduct—all with substantial public money? Do the Government understand how offensive this is, both to the police force in question and to the general public?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The noble Lord makes a very good point. As he knows, in the case he describes, the usual and correct procedure was not followed in that county. I am very pleased it has finally been followed, so I agree with him.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, this House owes a debt of recognition to the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, for his perseverance in this matter. Of course, there are obviously serious matters relating to the relationship between police officers and the law. I wonder if the Minister would care to comment on the words of the chief constable of the BTP, the transport police, who says:
“If I was to commit a crime, get arrested and give my details, there is no obvious system check that would flag that I’m a police officer if I didn’t choose to tell them”.
Does the Minister think that is an issue? If it is a problem, what are the Government doing to solve it?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I join the noble Lord in praising my noble friend’s commendable tenacity on this subject. Regarding the circumstances the noble Lord describes, I was not aware of them. Of course, he will also be aware that we have launched a review, which concludes this month, into the whole misconduct and dismissals process. With a bit of luck, it will report back in the next month or two, according to the Policing Minister in the other place. It will include a number of these issues, and I hope that will be dealt with then.
Lord Cormack (Con)
My Lords, if there were a gold medal for stonewalling, my noble friend would deserve to win it. The answers that he gives are obfuscatory and reveal nothing. Will he please consider again the questions asked by both my noble friend Lord Lexden and the noble Lord, Lord Bach? Will he also reflect on the point that came up during the debate we had in the Moses Room a week or two ago? I suggested to him, and he completely ignored the suggestion, that we should have a police ombudsman in this country: somebody who can exercise the sort of authority—dispassionate and impartial—exercised by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in Northern Ireland.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank my noble friend for his praise, which is very welcome. I remember that debate in Grand Committee and I am afraid I did not ignore his suggestion; I dismissed it. In fact, a number of bodies oversee policing, including the College of Policing, the IOPC, HMICFRS and a variety of other alphabet-soup organisations.
Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]
My Lords, why can we not have anonymity in accusations of sexual offences, particularly rape? They are a special category of criminal offence where the reputations of the innocent can be destroyed, even by chief constables like Mike Veale. The law is unfair, and I have raised this issue repeatedly over the years. I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, on his unrelenting campaigning on this issue; the House is deeply indebted to him.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Obviously that strays well outside the remit of this Question and the department, but I will make sure that the noble Lord’s reflections are taken back to the appropriate people.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I will follow on from the good idea of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, about having a police ombudsman. In their original Answer to this, the Government rather washed their hands of the whole issue of police and crime commissioners, which did not seem appropriate, as this Government set them up and put in the rules, parameters and laws—rather poorly, I think, but they did so. It is therefore wrong to throw away all feelings of guilt after things have gone wrong.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness is aware, we have conducted a two-part review of PCCs. The second part is due to be enacted soon.
Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)
My Lords, behind all this is the question of Operation Conifer, in which the reputation of a former Prime Minister and statesman was deeply and horribly smeared by the lies of a convicted paedophile, whose views were described by the police as “credible”. Given the obvious misdemeanours, mistakes and mishandling of the whole case, operations within the police seem to have been incredibly slow. The noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has asked endless questions over the years and this issue has never been brought to a head. Is it therefore not time for the Government, while not interfering with police operations in detail, to endorse and set up a completely independent inquiry to bring this appalling libelling and slandering of a now-deceased Prime Minister to an end? It is totally out of accord with the normal standards of justice and fairness in this country.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Many noble Lords have raised similar, very good points in recent debates. I shared this opinion with my noble friend Lord Lexden when we met last week. Having said that, there have been four inquiries into this case and all concluded that there was nothing more to do. However, I heard my noble friend Lord Howell’s concerns and will reflect them back to the department.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I join other noble Lords in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, and my noble friend Lord Bach, who have been campaigning on these issues for a considerable period of time. The Minister’s answers are simply not satisfactory. The noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has raised time and again the misconduct of Mike Veale, the former chief constable. The Minister simply comes back with a list of regulations, sends up smoke and does not answer the question. This is a really serious matter that deserves the highest priority from the Government, but we are not getting it. When will the Minister give us the answers that the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, is demanding?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I hope very soon. The noble Lord is also aware that there are a large number of things that I absolutely cannot say—a point I have reinforced from the Dispatch Box on a number of occasions. That will remain the case until this is concluded.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Extraction of information from electronic devices) (Amendment of Schedule 3) Regulations 2023
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That the Grand Committee do consider the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Extraction of information from electronic devices) (Amendment of Schedule 3) Regulations 2023.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, the extraction of information powers introduced in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 have provided a statutory basis for police and other authorised persons to obtain information from electronic devices to support investigations.
These powers came into force last November, along with a code of practice that provides guidance to authorised persons to ensure that the powers are used appropriately and effectively. They can be exercised by the authorised persons named in Schedule 3 to the Act. This is divided into three parts, which set out the different purposes for which authorised persons may exercise the powers. It is crucial that authorised persons extract information only for the purposes set by the part of the schedule in which they are placed.
At present, the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police can extract information only for the purposes set out under Section 37 of the Act:
“preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime … helping to locate a missing person, or … protecting a child or an at-risk adult from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm”.
These regulations will amend Schedule 3 so that the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police are moved from Part 2 to Part 1 of the schedule. This change will allow these police forces also to extract information from a deceased person’s electronic device, using the power in Section 41, for the purpose of an investigation or inquest into that person’s death.
Electronic devices such as mobile phones contain a wealth of personal information and can be helpful in an investigation when someone has died in unexplained circumstances. Although data protection regulations do not apply to deceased persons, we must still ensure that information extracted from an electronic device where the user of the device has died is handled appropriately and sensitively. Additionally, an electronic device such as a mobile phone or laptop is almost certain to contain information about living people, so the authorised person will still need to be satisfied that extracting such information is necessary and proportionate.
The powers under Section 41 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, much like the powers under Section 37 of the Act, can be exercised only where the authorised person reasonably believes that there is information on the device that is relevant to the purposes set out under this section—in this case for an investigation or inquest into a person’s death. It is vital that these intrusive powers are available only to the authorities that need them. When the Bill was passed, it was not yet agreed that the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police had sufficient investigative requirement to use Section 41 powers or that their investigative needs could not be met with other existing powers.
Having taken time thoroughly to consider their case, we are now in agreement with these police forces that their investigative duties meet the requirements for use of the powers and that, without access to them, there may be a gap in their ability lawfully to extract information in these circumstances. For this reason, we are amending their position in Schedule 3 to ensure that they can investigate the death of a person as thoroughly as possible. This amendment will ensure that the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police have the same powers to extract information from electronic devices as civilian forces. It will also provide them with the ability to carry out their investigations as thoroughly as possible by giving them the ability to extract information from a deceased person’s device for the purpose of an investigation or inquest into that person’s death.
I very much hope that noble Lords will support this amendment to Schedule 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. I commend the regulations to the Grand Committee and I beg to move.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, this is a straightforward piece of secondary legislation, adding the Royal Military Police, the Royal Air Force Police and the Royal Navy Police to the list of people who can exercise extraction of information powers under Section 41 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.
First, I declare what may be a tangential interest: I have a son-in-law who flies jets for the RAF. I would never have thought about it, but it is possible that his and my family would be affected if Section 41 powers were to be used in the event of his untimely death, if that were to happen.
I have two questions to ask the Minister. They relate to the guidance in the extraction of information code of practice, which was provided in relation to the Act and as a result of the words of the Information Commissioner, who believed that this was necessary. I am pleased that it is provided.
My first question relates to paragraph 69 of the guidance, which talks about the use of a mobile phone device “around the time of” the death of the person concerned. It uses the words “the user”. Earlier, in relation to Section 37 of the Act, the code of practice talks about where people are not necessarily the owner of the phone or mobile device. It distinguishes clearly people who own a phone from people who have a phone which is owned by somebody else—something we parliamentarians know because we have a parliamentarian phone that is not our property but is used for all sorts of communication, as well as for the business of Parliament. I do not expect the Minister to have an answer yet, but could there be some clarification of paragraph 69 that refers back to the earlier information given in the code of practice to say exactly what it means about a shared-user phone?
My second question is about paragraph 90 of the code and current practice among police forces to keep up to date with technology in order to separate personal information from necessary information related to the event being investigated—the death, criminal event or whatever. Does the Minister have any information about whether police forces of all sorts are using similar technology? The real problem, which is quite obvious, is that there is a variety of technological options available to police forces and they may all be using different ones. That means that they may not necessarily be able to do what is required in the code of practice and keep up to date with
“the technology options available in their organisations”.
There may be a question here—again, the Minister may not be able to answer it now—about whether the technology available to police forces is of sufficient robustness to allow them to be ahead of the game and whether there is one piece of software that is recommended for police forces to use.
With those two questions, I am perfectly satisfied that this is a sensible piece of legislation.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I too am happy to say that this is a straightforward statutory instrument, and we are happy to support it from the Labour Party’s point of view. The SI adds members of the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police to those given the power to extract information from a device after a user of that device has died, as part of an investigation or inquest into the death, to investigate crime and to safeguard others.
I think it is fair to ask the Minister why these police forces were left out of the original Bill. Was there a particular reason, or was the consultation process not complete?
The Labour Party tabled a series of amendments to the PCSC Bill creating new checks on police powers to extract data from electronic devices. This was due to concerns about vulnerable people and the intrusive nature of these searches—in particular, for rape and sexual abuse victims, who can feel that requests for information, including digital information taken from their phone, can be overly invasive and collect highly personal information that is not relevant to the inquiry. It may make people more reluctant to come forward to the police if they know that they will get this interrogation of their phones.
I understand that this SI covers something different—cases in which the owner of the device has died—and we are happy to support this amendment. However, I would still like to ask the Minister what assurance he can give about how devices and information taken from them will be handled sensitively so as not to discourage potential victims and witnesses from coming forward.
There have also been serious concerns about digital resources and the use of digital information by the police, outlined in the report last year from His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Can the Minister give any update on what action is being taken and whether any specific concerns have been raised about the use of digital items by the forces being given additional powers today? That is a more general question; the two questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord German, are very pertinent, so I shall be interested to hear the Minister’s response on shared-user phones and what impact the measure would have on them, as well as on the interoperability of different technologies and different police forces, as I am sure that that will be a tripping block. I am sure that it is not the intention to create any problems but it is always difficult, in my experience, to get different sources of technology to work together in a seamless way. That seems to be a challenge facing businesses, police forces and everybody battling with new digital technologies. However, overall, we support this SI.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have spoken in this very short debate. I shall address all the questions asked of me shortly. Before I do that, I make the general point that the introduction of extraction of information powers in the 2022 Act and its code of practice are just the start of changes being made to improve the experiences of victims involved in the criminal justice system. These specific powers were introduced to ensure that victims and witnesses who report crime can be confident that their personal information will be handled appropriately and that their privacy rights will be respected.
As has been discussed, the amendment relates to the extraction of information from electronic devices when the device user is deceased, so some of the issues debated during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill are not available there.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked why it was not introduced with regard to these police forces in the original iteration. As I said in my opening remarks, at the time it was not agreed that the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police had a sufficient investigative requirement to use Section 41 powers or that their investigative needs could not be met with other existing powers. We have now taken the time thoroughly to consider their case and are in agreement with those police forces that their investigative duties meet the requirements for the use of the powers. In short, it is about ensuring that giving those police forces those powers is indeed the proportionate and correct thing to do, which is why it has taken a little bit of time.
On some of the more technical questions asked of me by the noble Lord, Lord German, there is a broader debate here about whether extraction of information from a personal device is always necessary, given the risks to privacy. Of course, there is a balance to be struck, which must be achieved when undertaking any investigation. All reasonable lines of inquiry must be followed to guarantee a fair trial with the right to privacy. As I said in my opening remarks, it is vital that victims and witnesses feel confident to come forward, but it is equally important that police and other agencies have access to the evidence that they need—I accept that there is no disagreement about this—including mobile data, to fully investigate crime and guarantee a fair trial.
Where information is being extracted from a deceased person’s device, the authorised person must have reasonable belief that the information on that device is relevant to an investigation or inquest into that person’s death, and be satisfied that extracting the information is necessary and proportionate. In answer to the specific question about “the device”—whether it is the owner’s own or one that just happens to be in use—I think it is any device that happens to be in the deceased’s possession. If I am wrong on that, I will of course come back and clarify. By the way, I sincerely hope that it is never a personal matter.
Lord German (LD)
Just to interrupt the Minister for a second, I was asking whether a common set of software is used across police forces.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am coming to that. There is a digital evidence programme, because the Government are determined to address the challenges associated with selectively extracting, analysing and reporting digital evidence gathered in criminal investigations, as we have been discussing.
We are supporting the Police Digital Service with £1.36 million in 2023-24 to undertake work to better understand the challenges in this area and to work with the private sector to develop and test new technologies. The evidence programme has been set up with a wide range of deliverables, including landscape reviews of force capabilities and gaps; creation of a new RASSO tech partnership board, bringing actors across policing together with the private sector—please do not ask me what the acronym RASSO stands for; development and testing of a range of private sector tech products within police forces; and, through the ACE impact lab process, working with technology companies to develop innovative solutions to key RASSO problems. The work is focused on solving the problems that victims experience and the selective extraction, analysis and reporting of digital evidence. It is fairly safe to say that all the questions asked of me by the noble Lord will be covered under that piece of work.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister again, but the acronym RASSO stands for rape and serious sexual offences.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank the noble Lord very much for that.
On the progress being made on recommendation 5 of the HMICFRS report, which relates to budgets and the funding of digital forensics, we have also set up a commissioning board, jointly led by policing and the Home Office, to enable joint decision-making around prioritisation and to increase the transparency of funding decisions, including those in digital forensics, in line with that recommendation. In addition, we are investing £11 million into providing forces with technology that will enhance their capability to carry out rape investigations quickly and to provide a better service to victims.
I thank noble Lords very much for their questions. I hope I have answered them; I think I have. In closing, I repeat my thanks for the time taken to discuss and consider these issues. I once again commend the regulations to the Committee.