Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code H) Order 2023

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code H) Order 2023.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this order was laid before this House on 12 December. Following the horrific terrorist attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019, the then Home Secretary commissioned the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, to review the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements, commonly referred to as MAPPA, used to supervise terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders on licence in the community. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, hereafter referred to as the 2022 Act, established three new powers for counterterrorism policing: a personal search power, a premises search power and a power of urgent arrest. These powers were established in response to recommendations made by Mr Hall KC following his review of MAPPA.

This order relates to the new power of urgent arrest, which was inserted into the Terrorism Act 2000 as new Section 43B of that Act by the 2022 Act. The new arrest power came into force on 28 June last year. The Government have also taken this opportunity to make a small number of updates to the code to reflect changes previously made by primary legislation, including ensuring that relevant terminology within the code is up to date.

As set out by the Government during the passage of the 2022 Act, the new power of urgent arrest applies across the UK. The power enables the police to arrest without warrant a terrorist or terrorism-connected offender who has been released on licence and is suspected to have breached their licence conditions when it is considered necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a terrorism risk, to detain the offender until a recall decision is made.

Section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, commonly referred to as PACE, requires the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice in connection with the exercise by police officers of statutory powers to arrest a person and the detention, treatment, questioning and identification of persons by police officers. We have prepared a revised PACE Code H, which relates to the detention and treatment of people arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000; it applies across England and Wales. This order seeks Parliament’s approval to bring the revised code of practice into force.

The primary update to PACE Code H is the incorporation of the new urgent arrest power provided for by Section 43B of the Terrorism Act 2000. A terrorist offender who is detained under new Section 43B must, unless recalled to prison or otherwise detained under any other power, be released if a decision is made not to revoke their licence and accordingly the offender is not recalled to prison. A terrorist offender must also be released from police detention if a recall decision has not been made by the end of the relevant period, which in relation to terrorist offenders who have been released on licence under the law of England and Wales is six hours, beginning with the time of the arrest.

The Government have updated PACE Code H to reflect this new arrest power, including by ensuring that there is clarity for the police on the length of time for which the terrorist offender on licence can be detained, and their rights upon first being detained, such as their right to have one named person informed of their whereabouts and their right to consult and communicate privately with a solicitor. The revised PACE Code H also reflects that there is no requirement to caution a terrorist offender on licence who is arrested under Section 43B, as they will not have been arrested on suspicion of committing a criminal offence and so will not be questioned or interviewed by the police under caution while being detained under this power. The Government plan to collect data from police forces on the use of this targeted power, as we routinely do for other police arrest powers, and make this data publicly available through future statistical publications.

The Government have also updated PACE Code H to reflect other changes already made to primary legislation by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, hereafter referred to as the 2019 Act. The 2019 Act amended provisions in Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to specify in the legislation that, on first being detained, a detainee must be informed of their rights to inform a named person of their detention and consult a solicitor. The 2019 Act replaced provisions in Schedule 8 that would enable a senior officer, in certain exceptional circumstances, to direct that the detainee has to consult their solicitor in the sight and hearing of another officer with one whereby a senior officer can, in these exceptional circumstances, require the detainee to consult a different solicitor of the detainee’s choosing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support this statutory instrument, which revises the PACE code of practice H to reflect the introduction of a new power of urgent arrest by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. As the Minister outlined, this power enables the police to arrest without warrant and detain a previous terrorism or terrorism-connected offender who is suspected of presenting a further terrorism risk to the public. It also updates Code H to reflect changes made by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

As the noble Lord said, the horror of the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in 2019 and a subsequent attack in Streatham is a reminder of the harm that terrorist-risk offenders are capable of. Following these attacks, the Government commissioned the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, to review MAPPA, which is used to supervise such terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders. The creation of the power of urgent arrest was recommended as part of this review.

We supported the introduction of this power during the passage of the PCSC Act and we support it now. We believe it is vital to have the right safeguards in place. With the introduction of such powers comes the possibility of unintended consequences or missed opportunities. I look forward to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation considering the effect of the introduction of these powers, as well as the other new powers introduced to improve the management of terrorist offenders on licence, and the 2019 powers that Code H now includes.

I was just reflecting on my memory of the attack in Streatham, which is not that far from where I live. I have no inside information on it other than what I read, but I read in the papers various bits of speculation about the officers who were tracking that terrorist offender, who was out on licence; they observed a crime being committed and intervened, and the offender was killed. The speculation I read in the press was about how that process was managed and the huge resource-intensiveness of tracking such people when they are out on licence. Can the Minister say anything about whether this change to the codes of practice within Code H is partly a result of the large resource implications of tracking such offenders when they are out on licence? However, we support the changes.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked me, first, in essence, where is the guidance for the police pre arrest? Of course, the guidance is operational in nature, so it will be issued by Counter Terrorism Policing and the College of Policing, which will issue it internally. Any guidance for officers is of a highly tactical and operational nature and will therefore obviously have to sit within the police’s own guidance rather than a government-issued code of practice.

On how to determine whether an individual is on licence for a terrorist offence, this will be understood through close working by Counter Terrorism Policing and the Prison and Probation Service, which will include information-sharing and briefing about terrorist offenders on licence. If they breach their licence and are recalled, a warrant will be out for their arrest. Obviously, policemen can find out whether an offender is out on licence by checking their details on the police national computer, which will flag it.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about potential operational constraints on the police because of potentially large numbers involved, obviously, I hope that there will not be a large number of people subject to these powers, but I am quite sure that if Counter Terrorism Policing and more routine and—shall we say, traditional?—policing come up against capacity issues, we will certainly hear about it and come back to debate this in further detail. I fear that I cannot supply any better detail than that at this point. However, I will have a dig and, if I can find anything, I shall come back to the noble Lord in writing, if that is acceptable.

[Lord German (LD)]

Just before the Minister moves on, reflecting on the answer he just gave me about the internal guidance, is that guidance publicly available? If so, has it already been written and where can we find it?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not know whether it is publicly available; I am afraid I shall have to find that out as well and come back to the noble Lord. I should be somewhat surprised if it is, but you never know.

In closing, I reiterate that this order provides for the revised PACE Code H, which relates to the detention and treatment of people arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 and applies across England and Wales, to be brought into force. This revised PACE Code H will govern the fundamental principles to be observed by the police when exercising the new urgent arrest power in Section 43B of the Terrorism Act 2000 and will help preserve the effectiveness of and public confidence in the use of police powers of arrest. The updated code will also reflect various changes made to primary legislation by the 2019 Act, as well as other minor updates to ensure that the terminology in PACE Code H is up to date with wider legislative changes. I can pre-empt writing a letter to the noble Lord, Lord German: I fear the guidance is for internal police use only, so it is not public. That said, I thank both noble Lords for their broad support for this SI and I commend it.

Motion agreed.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the amendments for the Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order:

Clauses 1 to 16, Schedule 1, Clauses 17 to 23, Schedule 2, Clause 24, Schedule 3, Clause 25, Schedule 4, Clause 26, Schedule 5, Clause 27, Schedule 6, Clauses 28 to 39, Schedule 7, Clauses 40 to 43, Schedule 8, Clauses 44 to 51, Schedule 9, Clauses 52 to 54, Schedule 10, Clauses 55 to 58, Schedule 11, Clause 59, Schedule 12, Clauses 60 to 65, Schedule 13, Clauses 66 to 70, Schedule 14, Clauses 71 to 73, Schedule 15, Clauses 74 to 88, Schedule 16, Clauses 89 to 92, Schedule 17, Clauses 93 to 100, Title.

Motion agreed.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I just gently remind the House of the rules of debate on Report, which say:

“On Report, no Lords Member may speak more than once to an amendment, except: the mover of the amendment”.


Intervening repeatedly on other Members is not really in keeping with the rules of debate on Report.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, at Second Reading and in Committee there was much discussion on the meaning of “serious disruption”, and many noble Lords spoke to the need to provide a clear definition in the Bill. I thank all noble Lords who have participated in what has been a fascinating debate. At Second Reading, I agreed with many of the comments made by your Lordships and committed to take the matter away. What we are debating today is the matter of thresholds, as all noble Lords who spoke noted. The debate is not about whether these measures ban protests: quite simply, they do not, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his comments emphasising that fact. We are trying to ascertain the point to which protesters can disrupt the lives of the general public. This Government’s position is clear: we are on the side of the public.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for tabling his amendment, which provides a definition of “serious disruption” for offences in the Bill. I agree with the purpose of his amendment but do not believe that the threshold is appropriate. The Government want to protect the rights of the public to go about their daily lives without let or hindrance. I do not believe that his amendment supports this aim; therefore, I cannot support it. I make no secret of what the Government are trying to do. We are listening to the public, who are fed up with seeing, day after day, protesters blocking roads: they make children late for school; they make people miss hospital appointments; and they make small businesses struggle. Any change in law must address this, and I do not believe that the noble’s Lord’s proposed threshold does.

In this vein, I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which also provide a definition of “serious disruption”, but for the specific offences of locking on, tunnelling and causing disruption by being present in a tunnel. His amendments follow the judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal following the Colston statue case. The court found that the right to protest does not extend to acts of criminal damage that are violent or where the damage is to more than a minor or trivial degree:

“We cannot conceive that the Convention could be used to protect from prosecution and conviction those who damage private property to any degree than is other than trivial.”


We agree with the judiciary and believe that this threshold should be consistent across the statute book. Although the court concerned itself with the matter of damage to private property, the same principles apply to obstructing the public from enjoying their right to go about their business without hindrance. That is why the Government support the noble and learned Lord’s amendments; I am very pleased we were able to surprise him in that regard. They provide a threshold for “serious disruption” that is rooted in case law. I thank him for tabling this amendment and, indeed, for explaining it in such a detailed and precise way. It provides both clarity to the law and a threshold that addresses the public’s frustration with disruptive protests.

I will now speak to government Amendments 48 and 49. The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service has asked for further legislative clarity on police powers to manage public processions and assemblies. These powers are conferred by Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 for processions and Section 14 for assemblies. They allow the police to place reasonable and necessary conditions on protests to prevent specific harms from occurring. One of these harms is

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

These two amendments provide clarity to this phrase for both Sections 12 and 14. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was quite right in anticipating that I would be quoting Sir Mark Rowley, who said:

“I welcome the Government’s proposal to introduce a legal definition of ‘serious disruption’ and ‘reasonable excuse’. In practical terms, Parliament providing such clarity will create a clearer line for police to enforce when protests impact upon others who simply wish to go about their lawful business.”


These amendments, supported by the police, prioritise the rights of the law-abiding majority. First, they carry over the noble and learned Lord’s definition of “serious disruption”. Secondly, they define the meaning of “community”. Thirdly, the police may consider the absolute impact of the disruption caused to the public. Fourthly, they allow the police to consider the cumulative disruption caused by protests. Finally, they allow the officer responsible for managing the protest to place conditions on more than one connected procession or assembly. In answer to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that these are too complicated, I say that the Home Office will work closely with the NPCC and the College of Policing to ensure that appropriate guidance and training are developed. Mirroring the definition of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, will provide consistency across the statute book. As I have said, this is welcomed by the police. I point out that the definition specifies that the disruption is caused by physical means only.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, raised in the Policy Exchange paper the use of “minor” in the definition. These amendments protect the daily activities of the public; it is clear that the public are fed up with the disruption caused by protesters, and that is what these amendments address. Many protests that do not disrupt the lives of others occur on a regular basis. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a very good point: that we should not allow the protesters themselves to determine the scale of disruption. Many protesters are able to express themselves and place pressure for change without blocking roads.

Currently the term “community” is undefined. The police should be able to use their powers to protect anyone who is detrimentally impacted by serious disruption from protests, not just those who live, work or access amenities where the protest occurs. The police must consider the absolute disruption caused to the public, as opposed to the disruption relative to what is typical for an area. The measure will give officers the confidence that they can use to respond to disruptive protests, even in areas routinely subject to spontaneous disruption such as traffic jams. To prioritise the rights of the public, the amendment allows the police to consider the cumulative impact of protests and separate protests. It is wrong that the public must repeatedly put up with disruptive protests, in part because each time there is a new protest, the police must consider the level of disruption afresh and in isolation from what has previously happened and what may be planned. If multiple protests cumulatively ruin the daily activities of a community, they must be considered collectively. Following from this, if the police are to manage the collective impact of protests, they must be able to apply the conditions on separate but connected protests. For example, a large protest campaign made up of multiple small protests that disrupt a large area should be subject to blanket conditions. Allowing the police to consider the cumulative impact of protests by requiring them to manage each individually complicates the operational response unnecessarily. Collectively, these measures will allow the police to protect the public from the disruptive minority who use tactics such as blocking roads and slow walks. The public are clear that they want the police to protect them from these tactics. In turn, the police have asked for clarity and law to confidently and quickly take action and make arrests where appropriate. The Government have listened to both, and I hope this House does the same and supports the amendment.

I will speak collectively to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. These measures do two things to the locking-on and tunnelling offences. First, they lower the threshold of the offence so that acts capable of causing serious disruption are not in scope. Secondly, they alter the mens rea so that only intentional acts, and not reckless ones, are in scope of the offence. It is clear that the public do not want to see police officers sit by while criminal protesters disrupt their lives; lowering the threshold would mean that the police will have to do so. Why should an officer stand by and watch someone lock on or dig a tunnel that is clearly going to cause serious disruption to the public? As for the mens rea, as I have said already, the Government are concerned with the disruption caused to the public. It does not matter whether it is caused recklessly or intentionally; what matters is the impact it has on people’s daily lives. For all these reasons, I encourage all noble Lords to support the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and those by the Government and reject the others.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Can the Minister deal with the issue of “be capable of causing” as opposed to actual disruption?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I did deal with that when I was talking a little about the tunnelling and locking-on offences. Why should the officer stand by and watch someone lock on or dig a tunnel that is clearly going to cause, or be capable of causing, serious disruption to the public? Certainly in terms of tunnelling, I think that is very clear.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

21: Clause 4, page 3, line 28, after “a” insert “relevant”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendments in the name of Lord Sharpe of Epsom at page 4, line 14 and page 4, line 15 provide that the offence in Clause 4 may be committed only in relation to a tunnel that was created for the purposes of, or in connection with, a protest.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

29: Clause 4, page 4, line 14, at end insert—
“(5A) In this section “relevant tunnel” means a tunnel that was created for the purposes of, or in connection with, a protest (and it does not matter whether an offence has been committed under section 3 in relation to the creation of the tunnel).”Member's explanatory statement
See the amendment in the name of Lord Sharpe of Epsom at page 3, line 28.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

30: Clause 4, page 4, leave out line 15 and insert “References in this section to the creation of an excavation include—”
Member's explanatory statement
See the amendment in the name of Lord Sharpe of Epsom at page 3, line 28.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging and fascinating debate, and some would say that this may be the House of Lords at its best.

I shall first address the amendments moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey. She has come late to the party, and I have to say that I think that her amendments have suffered for that reason. Her amendments have not been tested against the Human Rights Act in any way; we do not know what the House of Commons would think about them, and we do not know what the Supreme Court would think about them. Of course, that is in contrast to Amendment 45, where we have a good view of the House of Commons’ likely view, as well as that of the Supreme Court, and as far as we know it is HRA compliant. So I think the noble Baroness has difficulties with her amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, spoke to his Amendment 44 and spoke about the lack of use of public space protection orders. I thought that we heard very effectively from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about how public space protection orders had not in practice been put to any great use. In fact, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, in his speech also explained why they were not suitable for protecting individuals, as opposed to the rights of groups. But I have to say that I think that the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, betrayed himself at the end of his speech when he spoke about the lack of evidence of public disorder, which he prayed in aid for having a review. I have to say that I am not thinking about public order —I am thinking about the individual women who are going to get these services and are being intimidated through cruel protest, in many ways.

I turn to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, to which I also have my name. I pay tribute to her for all the work that she has done on this matter; I know that she has been in constant discussion with Members of the other place and the Government, and this really is as good a chance as we have to get something on the statute books in good time. As I say, I pay tribute to her. I am also pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has welcomed these efforts.

One of the most influential speeches was from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who talked about the practicalities of policing a 150-metre zone and local authorities being reluctant to put in place public space protection orders. He also talked about the ingenuity of protesters potentially being able to get around the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Morrisey. That was perhaps one of the most influential contributions this evening. I hope that the noble Baroness tests the opinion of the House and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I echo other noble Lords who said that this has been a wide-ranging and fascinating debate. As has been referenced and as noble Lords will be aware, through a free vote in the other place, Clause 9, which establishes buffer zones outside abortion clinics in England and Wales, was added to the Bill by 297 votes to 110. I said during the Second Reading of the Bill and in Committee that the Government will respect the will of the House of Commons.

At the time of introducing this Bill in the House of Lords, I signed a Section 19(1)(b) statement under the Human Rights Act 1998. This was because, at the time, we believed it was more likely than not that Clause 9 would be found to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. We have considered this again following the Supreme Court’s judgment in relation to the Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) Bill in Northern Ireland. We now believe that Clause 9 is more likely than not to be compatible with the convention. However, we must be clear that while we can draw some parallels between Clause 9 and the Bill in Northern Ireland in relation to the balance of rights, they are not directly comparable. In particular, the threat levels from protests are different in Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Bill does not cover private property. It is also worth noting that the legislation in Northern Ireland is not yet in force. There have been no prosecutions, so it is difficult to make any assessment regarding enforceability of the Bill in Northern Ireland.

Clause 9 was described at the time in the other place as a “blunt instrument”, as others have noted. There is always a balance to be struck between the rights of protesters and the rights of others to go about their daily business free from harassment and disruption, as we have heard debated in relation to many of the other clauses of this Bill. People’s rights to gather, express their views and practise their religious beliefs are protected under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. People’s rights to privacy in accessing healthcare services are protected under Article 8. All these rights are qualified, and it can be appropriate to infringe on them sometimes—for example, to protect other rights or prevent crime.

The Government committed to work with noble Lords across both sides of this debate to make Clause 9 clearer and more enforceable. I thank those noble Lords who took the time to meet me and discuss this issue, and I can assure them that all views were taken into careful consideration and constructive conversations were had on all sides.

The Government have decided to step back and will take a neutral stance during this debate. I committed, as I said earlier, at this Dispatch Box to respect the will of the House of Commons, and I think the best way to do that is to allow the House of Lords to express its will. This clause will undoubtedly be tested in the courts. But this evening, we are offering a free vote to noble Lords on the Government Benches—although I cannot speak for the other Benches—so that noble Lords can vote with their conscience on where the balance of rights should lie.

The Government believe that all the amendments on the Order Paper today would more likely than not be found to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. With that, it is now for the House to decide which amendment, if any, they wish to support.

[Baroness Morrissey (Con)]

Given that, even if my amendments were passed, the whole clause would be overturned by a majority of support for either Amendment 44 or Amendment 45, I will save a few minutes of your Lordships’ time and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Police and Crime Commissioners: Accountability Arrangements

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 25th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach]

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they have any plans to change the accountability arrangements for Police and Crime Commissioners.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government undertook a two-part review of police and crime commissioners, to strengthen their accountability and expand their role. Delivering these recommendations will sharpen their transparency and accountability and ensure they have the necessary tools and levers to be strong local leaders in the fight against crime and anti-social behaviour. PCCs continue to be directly held to account by the public at the ballot box.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer and for his written reply I received this morning on the vexed question of whether the accountability of police and crime commissioners includes, by law, the need to inform the police and crime panel of senior appointments so that the panel can interview and form a view, even when the senior appointment is interim. The Government’s view is that an interim senior appointment is in exactly the same position as a full appointment for these purposes. So I ask the Minister: is he aware that, in my county of Leicestershire, there have been six—yes, six—chief executive appointments in 19 months, four of them interim? The interim chief financial officer has been in place for 14 months. Not one of the interim appointees has been before the police and crime panel. Does this not show a complete contempt for accountability?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is completely right. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act provides that any reference to the chief executive or chief finance officer of a PCC, in any legislation,

“includes a reference to a person acting as chief executive, or chief finance officer”.

In other words, there is no distinction, in our view, between acting or permanent appointments. My officials have spoken with the chair of the Leicestershire police and crime panel; it is the department’s understanding that representations have been made by the Leicestershire panel to the PCC insisting that formal notice of the interim CEO appointment be given to the panel as soon as possible, to enable the proper scrutiny to take place.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, a disgraced policeman, Mike Veale, has featured quite often in Oral Questions in your Lordships’ House. A few years ago he deliberately smeared the reputation of Sir Edward Heath. Asked recently why this notorious man’s gross misconduct hearing, announced in 2021, has been indefinitely postponed, the PCC for Cleveland said:

“It is complicated, it is interwoven with other things and there is an order of things that I cannot supercede.”


How can this impenetrable goobledegook possibly be reconciled with proper public accountability? When a member of the public asked the same question last August, he was told that a review was taking place. After two attempts to find out about the progress of the review, he was told just yesterday that “Once information about a hearing is published, we will notify you.” How can these curt, dismissive comments possibly be acceptable? Why has the Home Office done nothing to make this PCC properly accountable?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have to say—and it will not please my noble friend—that the misconduct hearing of Mike Veale, who is, as noted, the former chief constable of Cleveland, is a matter for the Cleveland police and crime commissioner, and the management of the hearing itself is the responsibility of the independent, legally qualified chair appointed to it. It would be inappropriate to comment further while those proceedings are ongoing. As to why this has lasted longer than the normal 100 days of an officer being provided with a notice, it can be extended when the legally qualified chair considers it is in the interest of justice to do so, and I believe that is the case here.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, on 21 December in response to an earlier question by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, described the situation as very concerning. That was in respect of the issue which the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has just reminded the House about. Since then in the press it has become evident that the Leicestershire PCC has paid out £56,000 in compensation after an ethics group claimed it had been dismissed unfairly, so does the Minister believe that recall legislation should be considered for PCCs?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the potential benefits and disbenefits of a recall mechanism were considered by the two-part review that I referenced in my Answer. It was decided that that would be to create a whole new body of bureaucracy and unnecessarily expensive. Ultimately, the public have the right of the ballot box, if you will, to determine the outcome of the PCC.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, given the concern there has been about the vetting of candidates for the police forces and the uneven procedure of granting face- to-face interview after assessment for candidates, does the Minister believe that there is now a need for a tighter role and concern for making sure that the best practice in the appointment of police officers is now part of this scheme which rests either with police and crime commissioners or the central Minister concerned?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As the noble Lord will be aware, after referencing a number of conversations that have been had in the House over the past few days, all of those things are happening with regard to vetting, police officer recruitment and so on.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, will my noble friend not accept that our noble friend Lord Lexden has made an extremely important point and made it very well indeed? The Minister in response really gives the impression of an incompetent and impotent Home Office. We really must have a proper inquiry into this man Veale, and he must be properly dealt with expeditiously.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I thank my noble friend for that. I am afraid I rather impotently have to go back to the comment I made earlier: it would be inappropriate to comment further while these proceedings are ongoing. However, of course I understand, and I accept that my noble friend Lord Lexden has made an extremely valid point and continues to do so.

[Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as I recall, the original reason for setting up police and crime commissioners was to create more accountability, because the police and crime commissioner would be more visible in the community and very well-known. In fact, the opposite has been proved true because the turnout at votes shows apathy and ignorance. Then there is the question of the cost of setting up the offices of police and crime commissioners and their deputies and the salaries and everything else that goes with it. Can the Minister tell the House what this has added to the policing bill annually?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot answer that specific question, but I can and will say that the public profile of PCCs means they are scrutinised in a way that anonymous police authorities were not. I think the fact that we have this conversation on a relatively regular basis is proof of that. Ultimately, PCCs are directly elected by the communities they serve, and the public will have their say in due course. The noble Lord raised a point on turnout. In 2021, the turnout figure was 33.9%, a 6.5% increase from 2016 and a significant increase on 2012.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, on 21 December, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, my noble friend was willing to describe the current circumstances as “disturbing”—this was previously indicated. We have now seen a further month and four days pass, so could my noble friend please indicate when “disturbing” becomes “unacceptable”?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, they are disturbing; they are concerning; they are all of those things. I cannot say they are unacceptable at the moment because, unfortunately, the responsibility for this particular misconduct hearing lies with the Cleveland police and crime commissioner.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the Minister was quite dismissive about police authorities, but I have some experience of them. They were in fact not anonymous; they were mostly councillors, who were elected directly by their constituents and known extremely well, and they actually did talk to people. PCCs do not; they are quite remote, and the Minister has also pointed out that they are held to account at the ballot box every four years. I can quote an example in Dorset where the PCC and the local MP have generated a lot of public dismay about their relationship, and yet the voters cannot do anything about it until next year, can they?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I would have thought that councillors are also elected once every four years as a rule, so I am not sure what the difference is there. The fact is that police authorities were anonymous, notwithstanding the noble Baroness’s evident fame on the police authority where she was. I would also say that, through part 2 of the review, we are undertaking a fundamental assessment of the whole panel system, and there is a considerable degree of transparency that has been introduced into the way the police and crime commissioners communicate with their constituents.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I make it eight questions that the Minister has fielded so far today, all of them pretty hostile to what he has had to say, including a number from his own side. These include those of two Members, the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Lexden, who have persistently raised the issue that I will not repeat, which seems to have general support from the House. Can I give him some friendly advice? Unless he sorts out some of these questions from the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Bach, he is going to go on and on having to suffer this pain on a relentless basis.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure the noble Lord that I actually enjoy it enormously, but I am going to have to go back to my earlier comment that it would be inappropriate to comment further while the proceedings are ongoing. The noble Lord knows that I will continue to say that until the proceedings are no longer ongoing.

Rape: Operation Soteria

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what are the most recent rape (1) reporting, (2) prosecution, and (3) conviction, rates in England and Wales; and how many forces have rolled out Operation Soteria.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the most recent statistics show that 70,600 rape incidents were recorded by the police in the year to June 2022; there were 2,326 prosecutions for rape and 1,019 convictions. Nineteen police forces and nine CPS areas are participating in Operation Soteria and informing the development of new national operating models for the investigation and prosecution of rape. These models will be available to all forces and CPS areas from June 2023.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that Answer, but recent Home Office research, including under Soteria, revealed a dismal picture of police attitudes towards rape complainants and whether they are at fault for the crimes committed against them. British women are reeling from Couzens and Carrick. Is it not time that the Government took this problem out of the long grass and legislated for police vetting, training and disciplinary reform?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke from the Dispatch Box last week on the review into dismissal processes. We talked a lot then about vetting and the various changes that have been made to both the vetting processes and the vetting verification processes, which are being advanced. Operation Soteria pioneered a new model which will effectively put the needs of victims above those of suspects. The initial evidence is that it is working. Avon and Somerset Police was one of the pioneering forces; it has reported an increase in its adult rape charge rate from 3% to over 10%. I do not think that is good news but it is progress.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

Does all this not underline the need for urgency in sorting out the deep-seated problems which are constantly coming back from the Metropolitan Police? My noble friend referred last week, and has mentioned again today, to a review lasting four months, I think it is. We need changes now. Home Office officials should have been working towards a conclusion—a conclusion that we should reach before the lapse of four months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that. As I explained from the Dispatch Box last week, the Home Office believes it is necessary to obtain evidence and make sure this is an evidence-based review in order to deliver the correct outcome for those police forces. As regards the Met, I attended a speech given by the Met Commissioner last week. He indicated the change in the Met’s thinking towards serious sexual offences, saying:

“we are targeting men who prey on women and children. The figures are far from where we would like them to be but the number of rapists we bring to justice is increasing.”

He went on to expand on some innovative use of data and technology which is helping him. I think the Met is making serious progress.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister not agree with me and Professor Betsy Stanko, who carried out a review of rape investigation in the Metropolitan Police, that victim satisfaction is the most important measure for judging police performance against rape? Is it being measured?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I can only go back to quoting the statistics that I just gave to the noble Lord. I have not heard of the professor who the noble Lord refers to. As I said earlier, the pioneering police forces in Operation Soteria are reporting an improvement in these cases, though I think it is probably a little too early to tell. I of course agree that the victims should be paramount in this.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, Operation Soteria sounds fantastic and I support all of its aims, but the fact is that there is a long way to go, is there not, particularly within police forces? For example, in the year up to last April, nine in 10 formal allegations against Greater Manchester officers resulted in no misconduct action. That is a huge gap in culpability and responsibility. Are the police getting more funding for this?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we have put a lot of funding into the police, as the noble Baroness will know. The Ministry of Justice has allocated significant funds towards victims’ groups, and so on and so forth. In the year ending June 2022—and this comes off the back of the last rape review—the police recorded an increase in rape offences of about 20% compared to March 2020. Eighteen months into implementing the rape review action plan, we have seen some improvements: the number of adult rape cases referred by the police to the CPS was up 96%; the volume of adult rape cases charged by the CPS was up about two-thirds; and the number of adult rape cases reaching court was up 91%. Progress is being made—not quick enough, I agree.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, for the Minister’s information, Professor Betsy Stanko wrote the Operation Soteria report. One of the things she recommended in that report was the improvement of data quality. It may sound mundane, but it is at the heart of improving police force quality and the response to sex and rape allegations. One of the central points she made was that the data was unevenly recorded across the country. Does the Minister agree that this should be seen as a priority to try to do better for victims, who are not getting the justice they deserve?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord and thank him for the clarification—the professor predated me, obviously. Operation Soteria is bringing together all aspects of policing and CPS work with regards to rape cases. It is elevating the status of the victims above those of the suspects, which I would argue is long overdue. As part of that, and in order to validate the work of the operation, it is clear that data collection has to be uniform across the country. It will be available to be rolled out in June, as I say, across all police forces, but it is showing signs of improvement.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, Operation Soteria is described as having exposed the underbelly of policing, which, as we know from the David Carrick statement only last week, is not a pretty sight. I welcome the Minister’s comments about the national rollout. I also endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said about proper policing and vetting. In addition to that, would the Government please consider discipline reviews, taking the legal process out of it and restoring discipline back to police chiefs themselves?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As the noble Baroness will be aware, that is part of the terms of reference of the review into dismissals that was announced last week, as I talked about at the Dispatch Box. It will deliver its results in four months. I have to tell the noble Baroness to wait until then.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, following on from a question that several noble Lords have asked, could the Minister give us further assurance in this House about the importance of victims’ voices being heard, and that they are heard to be satisfied with what is being done by the police force investigating the crimes against them? If there is an issue with the quality of data, can he advise the House that, when we are looking at that, we will look at what the victims are saying?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Absolutely—I can give that assurance. I am also going to go on to one of the reasons why it was a little difficult in the past to prosecute some of these cases; it was to do with the attrition of victims from the process. In the year ending June 2022, 62% of adult rape offences ended up not being supported for further police action because the victim withdrew. There were a number of complicated reasons for that but, obviously, it is necessary to collect the data which supports that.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Professor Betsy Stanko’s report on Operation Soteria, which was published on GOV.UK last month, had two other key findings in addition to those mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. She found that investigators and other police staff lack sufficient specialist knowledge about rape and other sexual offending. She also found that disproportionate effort has been put into testing the credibility of the victim, and that there is a need to rebalance investigations to include a more thorough investigation of the suspect’s behaviour. Can we see action on both of those points?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Action is being taken on both of those things. The noble Lord is completely right about specialist knowledge, and this finding is now being applied in South Wales Police and the Met, two of the pioneering forces in Operation Soteria. Structural changes have been introduced in Durham, another of the pioneering forces. That has improved shift patterns, supervisor ratios and so on, which will enhance officer and organisational capability.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, one reason why so many victims pull out of proceedings is the backlog in cases being heard. Could the Minister talk to his colleagues in the Ministry of Justice and point out to them again that the danger of these backlogs and the damage they do go right back to why the figures on rape are so poor?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will happily do that.

Police Conduct and David Carrick

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, I associate myself with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said. He probably said it a lot better than I could have done. I preface my remarks by saying that the vast majority of police officers, as the noble Lord mentioned, are hard-working, caring, decent and law-abiding. These remarks do not refer to them.

The most galling thing to me is how, again and again, serving police officers feel that they can act with impunity, and even boast about their illegal, corrupt and misogynistic behaviour. Never mind losing the trust of the public, they have lost my trust—something I once believed was unshakeable. But never mind that, our Home Secretary is going to order another review—I am sure that is going to do a fat lot of good.

We have here a caucus of individuals who are out of control, taking the mickey and biting the hand that feeds them. When a police officer believes that they can get away with rape and murder, where do you go from there? With David Carrick, you can add another allegation as well: depravity. Some of the things that he did are too distressing to even talk about. We can improve the vetting, of course, but what is to stop the old rotten culture spreading to the new intake of officers who are coming along? At least the leadership have made a start, by re-examining over 1,600 existing sexual abuse allegations.

We learn that the police are literally a law unto themselves. I was surprised to learn that there are no national rules on vetting, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned, or standards—for example, in recruitment. I ask the Minister why not. Surely a lack of consistency was going to be very unhelpful. The public just see the uniform wherever they are.

Since 2016, getting rid of bad apples has become more and more long-winded and legalistic, with an independent legal chair on misconduct boards. I understand that this is to be reviewed. Perhaps restoring the power of the chief constable to dismiss, with a robust appeals system, is the way to go. Where does the safety of the public figure on the scale of importance? It took 17 years of suffering before the force got rid of Carrick—17 years of missed opportunities, despite his nickname, “Bastard Dave”. Incidentally, Wayne Couzens’ nickname was “the Rapist”.

That brings me to my final point. Plenty of people must have known that Carrick’s behaviour was out of order and out of control, but no colleague for 17 years dobbed him in or reported him, as far as we know. Why did he succeed in escaping justice scot free to wreak even more suffering? In fact, it was worse than that: he was even promoted. It looks to me like cosy, collaborative complicity—a toxic culture protecting its own. That is the core of what needs to change.

Will there be a review of culpability of senior staff, who should have stamped on this laddish, and worse, culture? Unless someone gets a grip to expose all the other Carricks who are out there, how can I and so many other people feel safe with the police service ever again?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, for their remarks. I start by echoing my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, who the other day said that this was

“a dark day for British policing and the Metropolitan police, as an officer admitted being responsible for a monstrous campaign of abuse”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/22; col. 179.]

I am sure the whole House will want to join me and the Home Secretary in expressing our deepest sympathy to the victims, but also in thanking them for their courage in coming forward. It is intolerable for them to have suffered as they have. They were manipulated, isolated and subjected to horrific abuse.

We should also acknowledge, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, that, every day, thousands of decent, hard-working police officers perform their duties with the utmost professionalism. It is inevitable that those police officers will feel very let down by the latest offence. I am sure that they too deserve some of our sympathy.

I shall go into the specific questions that have been asked of me, but, of course, I agree with the tone of all the remarks that have been made so far. On vetting, noble Lords may have heard on the radio this morning that the Home Secretary has written to the chief constable of the College of Policing, Andy Marsh. He has been tasked with putting the guidance on vetting on a statutory footing by the end of February—the 2007 guidance is not statutory; it is only that: guidance. Importantly, it is worth reminding the House that HMICFRS published a report on this matter last year. The end of February is a new target. Previously, when this was a set of deadlines that forces had committed to meet, it was to be done by the end of October, so it is a significant, and entirely justified, improvement in timing.

The HMICFRS has also been tasked with re-inspecting all the forces by the end of April. Finally, the National Police Chiefs’ Council will ask all forces to check on to the police national database. The Met is already doing it, and it is obviously overdue that that programme should continue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, asked about the police uplift programme and vetting. Obviously, with such a large increase in officer recruitment, there are concerns about the vetting process, but the Government have ensured that all forces have been supported as they recruit officers and work towards meeting the 20,000 additional officer target—as noble Lords will know, that is well on track. That includes funding to deliver significant improvements to recruitment processes and improve infrastructure. A recent review of vetting capacity carried out by the uplift programme in October 2022 showed that, of the 36 forces that responded, 25 had increased capacity in vetting units between February and October of last year, totalling an additional 185 staff in those units—an increase of 33%.

Both noble Lords referred to the dismissals process. Last week, I answered a Question on this—coincidentally, I had a letter in preparation for the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who asked it, because the terms of reference for that review were published yesterday. That review will look into whether the current system is fair and effective at removing officers who are not fit to serve in the police. It will include looking at the composition of misconduct panels, including the role of legally qualified chairs just referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, any trends in the use of misconduct sanctions, and consistency of decision-making in cases of sexual misconduct and other violence against women and girls. The Government expect the review to be completed in approximately four months. I imagine that I will be asked why we need another review, but it is important to stress that we have to look carefully at the evidence to ensure that any change to the system is effective. I agree that it needs to happen urgently, but I think four months is a very reasonable timeframe in which to conduct this work.

The questions on the culture of policing are obviously extremely important. There is no doubt that there is a huge amount of work not only for the Met but for the wider policing community to restore and rebuild trust and confidence among the general public, particularly among women and girls. I know that some important work is being done. For example, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary visited the force in Kent. In her opinion, it is leading from the front; it has instituted a whole raft of operational measures to support victims of serious offences and rape, and I hope that we hear more about that soon. Noble Lords will also be aware that both the Angiolini inquiry—the terms of reference for part 2 of which were published either today or yesterday; I cannot remember which, I am afraid—and the Casey review continue to look at this issue. Part 2 of the Angiolini inquiry will look specifically into the culture around Carrick.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me whether all officers who have a sexual or violent allegation made against them should be suspended. There is no place in policing for officers who perpetrate such crimes—that goes without saying—so all allegations should be dealt with robustly. We believe it important that forces have the option to suspend officers while they investigate such incredibly serious allegations, but they must remain as operational decisions which must continue to be taken by chief officers, having given full consideration to all the circumstances. I believe there are good reasons for that.

The noble Lord asked me about statistics, especially annualised statistics on police misconduct. For allegations that commenced after 1 February 2020, which were finalised in the year 2021-22, 0.6% of all allegations against police officers fell into the category of sexual misconduct. That includes abuse of position for sexual purpose. The Independent Office for Police Conduct publishes data annually on public complaints against the police. In 2020-21, 109 of 109,151 allegations made related to sexual conduct; this accounts for 0.18% of all complaint allegations. The College of Policing publishes annual statistics on those dismissed from the police. In 2020-21, of 257 officers who were dismissed—the statistic was broken down into well over 200 categories; there may be more than one reason for a dismissal—abuse of position for sexual purpose was a factor in 38 of those dismissals. Those are the best statistics I currently have.

I appreciate that time is running on, and I am probably talking far too much. I would like to reiterate that the Government are committed to the safety of the public. I was going to talk at some length about our violence against women and girls strategy, but I do not really have time.

The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, asked about who, effectively, will be the agent of change in the police culture. It would like to commend Sir Mark Rowley, who I spent some time with last week, and his senior team, including Dame Lynne Owens and various others who have been on the news this week talking about these awful subjects. Sir Mark has been in post only since September. He is committed to doing the right thing, and I think that he is utterly sincere in that and the right man for the job. He deserves all our support, so I wish him well and hope that he manages to complete his task with extreme speed.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his response; it was entirely appropriate. As his colleague in the other place said:

“This is one of the most egregious cases of police misconduct in the history of the Met, perhaps in the history of British policing.”


I struggle with the term “misconduct” when we are talking sustained, sadistic rape and serious sexual assault. In a matter of a few weeks, we have had awful disclosures of racism and misogyny in the uniformed services on whom we depend in London, both the fire service and the police, which indeed raises questions about culture and recruitment. I will ask the Minister a specific question: why was the data and intelligence on this police officer and others not collected? Given that the police depend on collecting data and intelligence to stop crime—particularly terrorism—why are they not collecting data and intelligence on themselves? Why were these complaints not collated, so that somebody could notice that this police officer was out of control and behaving in a completely horrible and inappropriate fashion? It seems that there is a huge gap in management and operations.

I agree with the Minister that the commissioner is deeply committed to dealing with this deeply rooted misogynistic culture, but why is the commissioner against independent scrutiny and support of the progress to deal with these huge culture changes? Why has he not announced that there will be no more recruitment or appraisal of officers without independent input to ensure that that scrutiny has its eyes open to the risks and does not have its eyes closed by the culture that already exists in the Met?

Finally, Dame Vera Baird, the former Victims’ Commissioner, said it would be appropriate for his pension pot to be taken away because he was a serious offender. She asked:

“What does it matter if he was on duty or not?”


He used his status as a police officer to perpetuate these awful crimes, so, apart from the fact that there must be some question mark over his pension pot, she said:

“I hope his victims will be compensated without having to go to court.”

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness that “misconduct” is not the right word for this; this is serious and violent crime. She is 100% right on that.

I cannot answer the questions in detail as to why the Met failed in its responsibilities on the collection and assessment of data, but the noble Baroness is absolutely right that there were serial failures, which unfortunately were repeated very often. I will add go into some detail: Carrick was the subject of five complaints from members of the public between 2002 and 2008, none of which was of a sexual nature. He came to the Metropolitan Police Service’s attention nine times prior to October 2021 for off-duty matters; the earliest was in 2000, prior to his police service. He was not charged with a criminal offence on any of those occasions, but his case history clearly revealed a pattern of behaviour which should have raised concerns, regardless of the outcome of individual incidents.

The Metropolitan Police’s processes did not properly identify the risk and he was granted clearance when he was vetted on joining the Metropolitan Police in 2001, and again in 2017—that was six years later than when he should have been re-vetted after 10 years’ service. There is no excuse for any of that; these are just unfortunate and simple facts. I am confident that Sir Mark, as the noble Baroness reiterated, is the right man to root this out and to sort it out, and I have no doubt that he will. I cannot answer the specific questions as to why he is reluctant to do certain other things, but I can ask him and perhaps report back.

I apologise for this long answer. The noble Baroness also asked me about his pension. The forfeiture of a police officer’s pension is a matter for the Pension Supervising Authority, and, for officers in the Metropolitan Police Service, that is the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime—MOPAC.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, I have been sitting on an advisory panel for the Metropolitan Police’s ongoing review of PaDP, the armed unit where Wayne Couzens and David Carrick worked. I absolutely do not doubt the determination of either the Government or Sir Mark Rowley; he is obviously determined to try to root out dangerous and toxic officers. But he needs tools to do that. As it stands, it is an impossible situation, and I really hope that the review they speak of will be robust. Let us face it, the bottom line is that the bar to dismissal needs to be severely and significantly lowered for police officers. At the moment, it is vague and open to interpretation what constitutes serious misconduct and grounds for dismissal; it is absolutely far too woolly, and that needs to change. We well know that charges of domestic abuse, rape and sexual misconduct never get anywhere near court, let alone conviction; so these things are not being picked up in the way they should be.

When the new systems are put in place—I sincerely hope they are; I give full support to what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said about a full overhaul of the regulatory system—they should include discretion, common sense and, as we have just spoken about, an ability to join up the dots on these individuals. That may sound easy, but it will not be. It needs a proper restructure, resource and a complete overhaul; if we do not do that, I am afraid that nothing will change.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I entirely agree with my noble friend. One of the reasons for setting up the dismissals review is that Sir Mark Rowley has publicly requested that we look into this, to make his life, and those of other chief constables, potentially easier in this regard. It was also partly a review of the interim report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey.

I happen to have the terms of reference in front of me, and I think it is worth going through them in a little detail; I will try to keep this reasonably brief. The terms of reference are to:

“Understand the consistency of decision-making at both hearings and accelerated hearings … Assess whether there is disproportionality in dismissals and, if so, examine the potential causes. Establish any trends in the use of sanctions at both hearings and accelerated hearings … To review the existing model”—


which I have already talked about a bit.

“Ensure that forces are able to effectively use Regulation 13 of the Police Regulations 2003 to dispense with the services of probationary officers … Review the available appeal mechanisms for both officers and chief constables”—


I know that subject that exercises many noble Lords.

“Consider the merits of a presumption for disciplinary action against officers found to have committed a criminal offence … Review whether the current three-stage performance system is effective”.


That is a very comprehensive set of terms. As I have already said, the review will be delivered back to us for consideration in four months, and I certainly hope that its recommendations will be acted on in full, in order, as I said at the start of this answer, to deal with Sir Mark Rowley’s request and to respond to the interim review from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, we have been here before; this is not the first time we have debated the issue in this Chamber. I have been here for nearly 10 years, and it has been debated several times, so I am sadly not convinced that determination is what is needed—there definitely needs to be an overhaul. I support all the comments that have been made.

My small knowledge of the police from the outside, and from having discussed this with many officers and former officers, is that it is impossible that there was not a lot of gossip about Carrick before now—and, before him, about Couzens and many others way into the past. Senior officers must have known and must, at some point, have turned a blind eye. That is what disturbs me the most, because this issue is not only about new recruits and officers on the street but about senior officers. It goes to the root of the problem: deep misogyny, which of course is not only in our police but in wider society, which is why it is so difficult to eradicate. The Minister has made good points on the collection of data and so on, but what makes him think that this will be any different from every failure in the past to reform the police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for those remarks. I am not going to speculate on the whole “blind eye” situation; that would be unwise given that the case, as the Lord Speaker mentioned earlier, is still very much ongoing even though there has been a plea of “guilty”.

That affords me an opportunity to talk a bit about the strategy on violence against women and girls, which is a government priority. We have taken firm action to tackle these crimes; that includes delivering more than 127 commitments, worth over £230 million, that were made in the tackling violence against women and girls strategy and the domestic abuse plan. We are implementing the Domestic Abuse Act; introducing new offences, such as threats to disclose intimate images, controlling or coercive behaviour, stalking and forced marriage; introducing new schemes allowing women to check whether their partner has a violent history; supporting Greg Clark MP’s Bill in the other place, which will create a specific offence of public sexual harassment; and launching a national communications strategy, Enough.

Those are all words; obviously, we have to deliver on those words. There is more to do. I hope to be able to say more about that from this Dispatch Box in due course. On what will be different this time, I think that the team in place is absolutely committed to making this happen; that includes in the police force and among other stakeholders, including this one.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

I slightly hesitate to say what I am about to say but I am going to say it, although I do not want to draw crude comparisons between the police force and the Armed Forces as institutions. I know that there is much about the Armed Forces that we need to sought out because of cultural behaviours, misbehaviours and those sorts of things. However, helpfully, I would like to ask the Minister whether the role of quality leadership in mitigating these sorts of problems can be looked at in the review.

I ask this because the recruitment and training models in the police force as opposed to the Armed Forces are very different. In the Armed Forces, we recruit at two different levels: we recruit soldiers, sailors and airmen; and we recruit officers, for officer training, based on their potential leadership qualities. We reinforce leadership training and betterment throughout their careers. In the police force—although I am not an expert—they just recruit police officers. Yes, they have some fast-trackers with degrees, but I do not think that leadership potential is highlighted as an especial criteria for entry.

As I say, I do not want to make a crude comparison. My own gut instinct—in the Armed Forces, dare I say it, we deal with some quite raw recruits and put them in some quite difficult positions, so it is not surprising that sometimes some of it goes wrong—is that investment systematically throughout the recruitment, training and career development of officers in the Armed Forces does much to instil the right cultures and disciplines. I therefore think that it is worth looking at that in any review.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes some extremely good points, if I may say so. They echo some of the points from the noble Lord, Lord Dear, a couple of months ago when I was answering a Question, which piqued my interest. He raised the subject of the closure of the Bramshill police college, which trained police officers for senior leadership and ensured a degree of consistency across forces. As a consequence of that Question, which was asked of me a couple of months ago, I had a chat about this issue with Andy Marsh at the College of Policing, where a leadership academy is being established. Progress is not particularly fast at the moment—there are all sorts of reasons for that—but conversations will be ongoing because it has certainly piqued my interest. I have the Policing Minister’s agreement to continue to pursue this particular subject.

On the Metropolitan Police specifically, Sir Mark Rowley is setting up a leadership academy. The noble and gallant Lord raised the subject of degrees and what have you; I think that there is a problem with the consistency of delivery of degree services across police forces. It is certainly true that there is a problem of consistency of leadership across police forces. The noble and gallant Lord also hinted at an interesting point, towards the end of his question, about the types of officer that are now recruited. Obviously, the skills required to break up a fight in a pub and those required to tackle online crime are very different. They really ought to provoke some serious thinking about who, how and why we recruit.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his points about the violence against women and girls strategy. The measure of that, of course, will be whether we stop losing 140 women a year at the hands of domestic abuse attackers.

Although PC Carrick was a Metropolitan Police officer, he lived in my hometown of Stevenage. I express my great thanks to Hertfordshire Constabulary for the very thorough investigation that it carried out into this issue. I join noble Lords in expressing my shock at the disgraceful and troubling revelations regarding this case and others. I worked in policing for many years. I feel deeply for the thousands of officers out there who do amazing things in our communities every day and who will feel so badly let down by the appalling conduct of PC Carrick and the other cases that we have heard about. They have damaged the trust and confidence of the communities that our good officers serve.

With the Met Commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, saying that he has a further 800 officers suspended or on limited duties because they are under investigation for serious misconduct, what reassurance can the Minister give about the liaison between the Metropolitan Police and the surrounding areas and forces where these potential offenders may live?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I echo the noble Baroness’s comments about the vast majority of serving officers who do such a fantastic job, whom I have already referenced. As the noble Baroness says, their work is undermined by situations such as this. As regards liaison with the surrounding areas, I am afraid that I really do not have the answer to that question. I shall ask Sir Mark and see whether he is willing to say something in public on that subject.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, this is the 75th anniversary of the arrival of the “Windrush”, which we will have a debate on later today. For years, there have been many complaints from certain communities and officers who have left the force, talking about the cultural problems around ethnic minority policing. Can my noble friend assure the House that this assessment of culture will be wide enough to cover that matter?

Can my noble friend also go back and ask for some urgent advice for women? Many of these situations involve off-duty or plain-clothes police and occur when women might be on their own. What is the advice to women in particular, and vulnerable people, if they are approached by somebody in plain clothes, either on or off duty, and they produce their warrant card? We are left in a serious situation here of not knowing whether to trust that person.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure my noble friend that the review into police culture will be a review into all the police culture. I can confidently say that because I know it to be the case. As I just referenced when talking about the terms of reference on the dismissals process, there is a specific question there on proportionality, which very much relates to the matters that she has just raised.

On guidance for women, it would be difficult for me to comment on the operational guidance that is handed out but I remember that, after the appalling Sarah Everard case, there was some updated guidance given by the police. I cannot remember exactly what it was, I am afraid, but I shall refer back to it and come back.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

A point has occurred to me as a result of this extremely interesting and powerful debate. On the question of vetting, who does it? What rank are those who conduct the vetting and what training do they have in vetting? If you want to join a merchant bank in this country, you are subject to vetting of a very effective nature. If that is the beginning of the mistakes, surely that is a place where there must be a much more effective way of deciding who is eligible, by reason of experience and ability, than has been the case so far.

Is there any independent element to vetting? We know—we can point to ourselves—that, when it comes to the issue of discipline, we now have a substantial element of independence. Indeed, we had two recent cases when a noble Lord and a noble Baroness were suspended. If we look at the document upon which those suspensions took place, we see just how substantial the independent element is in our discipline procedures. Can the Minister ensure that any review deals properly with the whole question of the quality of vetting, and that every sympathy is expressed to the extent that there should be independent contributions to both vetting and dealing with complaints?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord raises a good point. I think that I have dealt with this to some extent by talking about the Home Secretary’s letter and instructions to the College of Policing as regards vetting standards and to how they are going to be upgraded to the statutory code of practice. There is authorised professional practice guidance—I do not know what it contains and I am afraid that I do not know who is responsible for vetting, but the people who do it work to very professional guidelines, as set out by the College of Policing. The other important thing to remind the House of is that the Home Secretary has tasked the HMICFRS to re-inspect all police forces by the end of this April.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for contributing to this relatively short debate. Let me first address Amendments 112, 117 and 120A.

Amendments 112 and 117 seek to impose on the Secretary of State a duty to implement the recommendations of the ISC’s report on Russia and to produce a report setting out the action taken. The Committee will already be aware that the Government published their response to the Russia report on the same day that the report itself was published, 21 July 2020. All the recommendations that could be identified within the report were addressed.

On the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, a majority of the ISC’s recommendations had already been implemented by the Government before the report was published: for example, those covering co-ordination of government work on Russia, close working with international partners, and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity. The then Home Secretary reiterated this in a Statement made in the other place on 17 January 2022. I also say that there is ongoing engagement with the committee on these recommendations. The Bill is itself a part of that response, by introducing effective new tools and powers for the police, and security and intelligence agencies, to use against the sophisticated range of threats and actors that we face in the modern day.

I turn to Amendment 118, explained by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as a probing amendment. Section 3(2) of the Justice and Security Act already provides, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has just noted, for the ISC to make reports

“as it considers appropriate concerning any aspect of its functions.”

This provides the ISC with the ability to report on aspects of the Bill which fall within its remit. Furthermore, the amendment as proposed might be taken to imply that the ISC requires explicit legislative nomination to conduct oversight work on a relevant area of security and intelligence policy. The Government therefore cannot support this amendment.

Amendment 120A seeks to mandate the Prime Minister to update the memorandum of understanding between the ISC and the Government. The Committee will be aware that the MoU is subject to continuous review, as again noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. We welcome the ISC proposing changes that it would like the Prime Minister to consider, whether due to this legislation or other aspects of its security and intelligence remit. The Prime Minister will consider the proposed changes in due course. The MoU itself states that it is important to avoid duplication. Some of the organisations that the ISC has proposed that its remit should include are very new, and there are discussions under way regarding whether they are best overseen by other parliamentary Select Committees.

I am sure that answer will not particularly please the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, but I hope he would accept that it is a reasonable answer, given the current state of affairs.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise for interrupting. I am sure the Minister recognises the damage which was done to the relationship between the ISC and Parliament, and to maintaining public trust, by the various manoeuvres while Boris Johnson was Prime Minister. There was the delay in the publication of the Russia report and the attempt to have a chair appointed by the Prime Minister rather than elected by the committee, et cetera. We need to be reassured—and by “we” I mean Parliament and the interested public—that the ISC has a very clear and respected role, and is not subject to the whims of changing Prime Ministers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect, this is a different Government and we have moved on. The ISC very much has the respect of certainly this part of the Government. If I may say so, I have answered the principal question that was being asked: the Prime Minister will indeed consider the proposed changes in due course.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I understand that the Minister is saying that the Prime Minister will review it, but does he agree with me that it would help if the Prime Minister actually met the ISC? The Intelligence and Security Committee annual report states:

“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work, report on key issues … However, the Committee has not had a meeting with a Prime Minister since December 2014. In the previous Annual Report, we stated that we would seek a meeting with the Prime Minister this year; unfortunately, despite requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response from the Prime Minister. The Committee urges the Prime Minister to meet with it as a priority.”


May I ask the Minister to take that message to the Prime Minister? If he is looking at reviewing the MoU in due course, it might help him to meet with the committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very fair point. I will certainly make sure that that message is conveyed. As I have said, the Government do not think it would be appropriate at this point to mandate the Prime Minister to update the MoU as proposed, therefore we cannot support this amendment.

I now turn to Amendment 113. The Committee will be aware that the Government committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. The Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January setting out the findings of that review, including that the review had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route who were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity and/or being engaged in serious and organised crime. The Government have set out the findings of the review of the operation of this route and acted to close it. I think it was in February 2022. I therefore submit that the amendment is not necessary.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, was selectively quoting back to me various aspects of the WMS. I might selectively quote back to him—I suppose I am quoting myself here. I also said:

“Given the importance of ensuring the independence of the law enforcement process I am unable to say more on the operationally sensitive work being taken forward in this area. Whilst unable to comment specifically due to operational sensitivity of work - as an example of the range of actions we are taking I can say that we have already sanctioned 10 oligarchs who had previously used this route as part of our extensive response to Russian aggression in the Ukraine.”


I think that gives answers as to why we have perhaps not commented in the detail the noble Lord would like.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has also accused me of not talking enough about certain states and talking too much about our allies. He, I think, suggests that this is for party-political reasons. I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, would think so little of the Government Front Bench in this House. I gently remind him that, when I am talking about our allies, I am usually responding to questions he has asked me.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I am afraid I do not have all the stats he asked for about Russian money, but I will endeavour to find them. I do not know if they sit within the Home Office, but I will find out where they are, and I will happily write to him.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise if I have gone—as the Minister is advising me—a little far. The point I am making is that the lack of distinction in “any foreign power” is one of the fundamental faults in this Bill. The ISC Russia report on several occasions refers to the threats mainly coming from China, Russia, Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That is what I understand as well, although I am well aware that there are other potentially hostile states. One of my strongest memories is watching a demonstration outside the Libyan embassy and a policewoman being shot. These things happen; there are hostile states out there. However, that does not mean we cannot distinguish between allies with whom we work and open societies, and those from which there are likely to be threats. It is very important that we do so.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

This Bill does exactly that. We have been talking about FIRS over the last couple of days—the foreign influence registration scheme. There are different tiers specified in that. There is no doubt that this Bill acknowledges where our principal threats come from. Other countries, unfortunately, are also sometimes used as proxies. That is another discussion we have had at considerable length from this Dispatch Box with various noble Lords who have raised that point. I think it has covered very widely exactly what the nature of the threats are and where they come from.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this is an amendment which I really did not think it should be necessary to debate, on ministerial appointments by a Prime Minister, where that appointment may raise issues to do with the safety, security and interests of the United Kingdom. The amendment seeks clarification from the Government on the ability for there to be transparency in the operation of the Ministerial Code, but also where there is concern about ministerial appointments.

This is not a partisan point, because we know as a matter of fact that a Home Secretary was sacked because of a significant security breach. The guidance on security of government business was breached considerably, and Liz Truss sacked Suella Braverman, who admitted a breach of government security guidelines. I recognise that none of the material that was shared on a private email system was marked “secret”, so with regard to national security considerations, on the face of what was sent to an incorrect recipient but also what was intended to be sent, it was not secret or top secret. They were not classified documents, and I respect that fact. However, the recipient’s employer—because one of the emails was sent to a member of staff of an MP—replied to Suella Braverman saying:

“Simply asking my team to delete this email and ignore it is not an acceptable response to what appears, on the face of it, to be a potentially serious breach of security … You are nominally in charge of the security of this nation, we have received many warnings even as lowly backbenchers about cyber security.”


The fact that that Minister was then reappointed for political purposes within a matter of days has been well rehearsed. The Minister has responded to this issue in Questions in the Chamber, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also responded, saying:

“Everyone deserves a second chance.”—[Official Report, 22/10/22; col. 1558.]


I know for a fact that not everybody who will fall foul of some of the significant offences under this Bill will receive a second chance—or that some officials will receive it. But it would be useful to know whether there are security concerns about the appointments of Ministers.

The second thing I say concerns something that did not happen but could easily have happened. A Member of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Lebedev, was appointed under considerable concern about security situations. He was appointed to Parliament by Boris Johnson. He could very easily have been asked to be a Government Whip or a Minister: that is not a stretch of the imagination. What is the situation then, when security concerns have been raised about the appointment of a Member to Parliament but there is no mechanism for transparency about concerns about ministerial appointments? I do not besmirch any existing Ministers: these are two factual situations; one is regrettable, of course; and the other has not happened but could easily have happened. Therefore, my amendment seeks clarification as to what mechanisms are in place for it to be transparent when there have been concerns about an individual being appointed to a ministerial position, so that those concerns can be made public. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for speaking to Amendment 114, which seeks to require the Cabinet Secretary to publish information concerning ministerial appointments in scenarios where officials have indicated that the appointment of a particular individual

“may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom including because of potential influence from a foreign power”.

The Government cannot accept this amendment because the appointment of Ministers is a matter solely for the Prime Minister, in line with his role as the sovereign’s principal adviser. It is critical to the functioning of government that any conversations that occur around appointments are able to take place in confidence. There is a long-standing practice to protect that confidentiality. Without the ability to speak freely on matters that will be personal and sometimes sensitive, particularly where they may include matters of security, the ability of officials to provide meaningful advice ahead of an appointment will be critically undermined. The National Security Bill is concerned principally with the conduct of state actors working for foreign powers or with an intention to benefit a foreign power. Not only is the Bill not the appropriate vehicle for such a change but the Government also firmly believe that any information relating to ministerial appointments and procedures is not appropriate for publication. The Government therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister, and I am not entirely surprised by his response. I think the Government’s concerns regarding confidentiality and protecting Civil Service advice were addressed in the amendment. In fact, it explicitly states that information would not be provided within the memorandum, but that security considerations had been raised should be in the public domain. I hear what the Minister said; we will explore this in the other avenues. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

121: Clause 92, page 63, line 11, after “63” insert “specifying a foreign power, or a person other than a foreign power, who is not specified immediately before the regulations are made”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that regulations under clause 63 attract the affirmative procedure only if they specify a foreign power or other person not already specified. Regulations revoking a specification will be subject to the negative procedure.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

124: Clause 95, page 64, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for any provision of this Act other than section 20 to extend (with or without modifications) to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.(1B) An Order in Council under subsection (1A) may make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment confers power to extend the Bill to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Clause 20 is excluded from the power because clause 20 is extended to the Sovereign Base Areas by clause 95(1)(b).

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 124 creates the power to extend any provision in the Bill with or without modification to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus by way of Order in Council. The provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920 extend to the sovereign base areas, and this amendment will allow provisions of the Bill to be extended to the law of the sovereign base areas. This would ensure that harmful activity that the Bill addresses can be prosecuted in sovereign base areas when conducted there.

Clause 20, which provides for the aggravating factor to apply to some service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006, has been excluded from this power given that it is already being extended to the sovereign base areas though Clause 95(1)(b).

I end by putting on record that the Government consider that any references in this Bill to the sovereign base areas will not in any way undermine the provisions of the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. I therefore ask the Committee to support the inclusion of this amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have very little to say with regard to the government amendment. I recognise the Government’s sensitivity to the ongoing issue of the politics within Cyprus.

As this is the last group in Committee, I thank the Ministers today, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Murray, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for their willingness to engage. As my noble friend Lord Wallace indicated, there is a lot of work to be done in persuading the Committee that the measures in the Bill will meet the Government’s intent. There are some key areas of the Bill where we are looking for more information. I think the noble Lord, Lord Murray, indicated on an earlier group that he is reflecting and that there is more to follow. We await the correspondence from the Ministers. We are very happy to meet Ministers before Report. I say from these Benches that it might be advisable for the Government not to be in a rush to schedule Report, so that there can be proper thinking on the many aspects of the Bill about which we have highlighted problems.

Banks: Forged Customer Signatures

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka]

To ask His Majesty’s Government, further to the reply by Lord Sharpe of Epsom on 30 June 2022 (HL Deb cols 755–6) relating to allegations of banks forging customer signatures, what steps they have taken (1) to investigate and to prosecute banks for forging customer signatures, and (2) to compensate the victims.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the National Economic Crime Centre has concluded its assessment into the materials submitted to it in relation to allegations of signatory fraud by banks and will communicate its findings to relevant parties imminently.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I note that the Minister has not given any definite date for that. As usual, the Government are soft on corporate crime in the City, and thousands of innocent people have lost their homes, jobs, pensions and savings. Is it not time that we had a public inquiry into the Government’s support for the City in these crimes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a number of fairly grave and unfounded allegations. The relevant experts in the NECC have been assessing the extensive material provided; he knows how extensive it was. The NECC has extended its review as new material has been supplied, but, recognising the complexity of fraud cases, I hope that all noble Lords will understand the length of time that this has taken. As I say, the NECC is in the process of notifying the complainants at the moment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that both the regulators and the enforcement agencies are seriously underresourced in tackling wrongdoing in the financial services sector? Will he support our proposals to distribute the fines from financial services-related prosecutions to the regulators and agencies in order to beef up their capacity?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, no, I do not accept that the enforcement organisations and the regulator are underresourced with regard to these matters. The Government are increasing law enforcement investigative capacity to tackle fraud. The 2021 spending review allocated a further £400 million to tackle economic crime, including another £100 million for fraud, which includes greater fraud investigative capacity in the NCA. There are a number of other sources of funding and government efforts and initiatives on this subject that I could go into, but the answer would be a long one.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, rather than an independent investigation of fraud at HBOS, the Government have passed the buck to HBOS’s parent company, Lloyds Banking Group, to investigate. In April 2017, Lloyds appointed Dame Linda Dobbs to conduct a review, and a report was promised within a year. Nearly six years later, there is no report and no compensation for victims. Is the Minister satisfied, or is he rather ashamed? What prevents that inquiry being launched?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister is neither satisfied nor ashamed. I do not know the circumstances of that particular case. I am unable to comment on individual cases, but I will make further inquiries.

[Lord Woodley (Lab)]

My Lords, I struggle to read these facts out; they are quite unbelievable. As the Minister is well aware, the Lloyds Banking Group is accused of forging customers’ signatures. Since 2010, it has paid fines of £468 million, on 42 separate occasions. Yet it is allowed to fund the City of London Police—the very people who investigate banking and financial fraud. Can the Minister explain why the Government permit crooked banks to fund the police and how the resulting conflicts of interest are managed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, those are yet more grave allegations that are partially unfounded. I have said already that this Government are doing a great deal with regard to funding the police and making changes to the way in which fraud is dealt with and investigated. We all recognise that this is a very serious crime; it needs to be dealt with.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, will those parts of the review that are partially well founded be made public? They are serious and of major public interest.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have just said, I am afraid that I am unable to comment on individual cases. I do not know the circumstances of this particular case, but I will find out more.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, these victims of fraud by banks have been waiting nearly four years, following the initial statement from the Minister and others that they would look into this issue. One can only say that, if the banks were the victims of fraud, they would act a lot more quickly than they do when it comes to acting on behalf of their customers who are alleged to be the victims of fraud. I think what they want to hear from the Minister is what “imminently” means? Does it mean next week? Does it mean next month? Does it mean next year? These victims have been waiting too long for justice. It is about time the Government told the banks to get a move on.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is not the banks which need to get a move on. As I said earlier, the decision has been communicated to some of the complainants, but the Treasury Select Committee, certain remaining complainants and other relevant parties are not yet aware of the outcome. We should expect all necessary persons to be notified in the appropriate manner; beyond that, it would be unwise of me to comment on operational matters.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, stronger regulation means taking stronger powers to the Executive, which means a stronger and bigger stream of statutory instruments and secondary legislation coming through this House. Will my noble friend encourage his colleagues in the Government to support moves by Parliament to get stronger resources and have the capacity to scrutinise and control this stream of legislation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very sensible point. However, fraud falls within the Financial Conduct Authority’s objective of reducing the risk of financial crime, which impacts its consumer protection objectives. Obviously, the FCA will not hesitate to take the appropriate action against firms which do not meet its standards.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, since the Minister has just raised the Financial Conduct Authority, should it not have a clear objective to prevent fraud, rather than it just being under consumers? Much of this fraud has been perpetrated against small and medium-sized businesses, which are not covered by the consumer protections.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes an interesting point, which I will happily take back to those who are responsible for overlooking and overseeing the FCA.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, is it not the case that all our regulators are toothless tigers? What is needed is more resources and a change in legislation to give the powers to protect the public.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I do not believe that they are toothless tigers. As I have said a number of times regarding capacity and resources, a great deal is being done. There will be significant improvement to the National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit over the course of this year, and I would be happy to answer more questions on that.

[Lord Greenhalgh (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister recognise that it is not the banks that we should be aiming at but the fraudsters themselves. The City of London Police, the Metropolitan Police and the National Crime Agency do a fantastic job. However, in some ways, Action Fraud should be renamed “No Further Action Fraud”, because we need more resources. This crime is getting greater. Let us not turn our fire on the banks but go after the fraudsters.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I completely agree with my noble friend that we should look at the fraudsters. Regarding Action Fraud, we are providing £10 million to the City of London Police this year to support the upgrade in the Action Fraud service. A project is under way to transform the Action Fraud website, where the public can report fraud and cybercrime. That is part of the continuous improvements to the national service, which will be fully upgraded by 2024.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, why are the Government taking so long to produce the promised national fraud strategy? Also, why is less than 1% of police activity concentrated on dealing with financial fraud?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Regarding the national strategy, the noble Lord makes a very good point. I committed at the Dispatch Box that it would be out before the end of last year. However, I can confirm that it is being discussed cross-departmentally and is imminent. If noble Lords are interested, I am happy to set up a briefing so that we can discuss it in greater detail as soon as it is published.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister says that the reason for the delay is that fraud is complex. It is, but why is banks forging the signatures of their customers complicated?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have not seen the 10,000 pages of evidence in the 26 lever arch files, but expert investigators have, and it is their opinions that we are waiting for.

National Security Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

82: Clause 62, page 43, line 23, after “an” insert “agreement or”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that agreements can be “foreign activity arrangements”.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this group responds to the amendments tabled in relation to the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and separate amendments tabled regarding guidance on the scheme, impacts of the enhanced tier on the higher education sector and the exemption for legal activities. In addition, it introduces a number of minor government amendments to the scheme, which I will cover shortly.

Before I address the amendments and clauses specifically, let me say that we are not yet able to publish a policy statement relating to the power taken in Clause 77(1), which we committed to do in the Bill’s delegated powers memorandum. The Government are in the process of carefully considering feedback from industry and the important scrutiny in this House. As such, we believe that publishing a policy statement now would only muddy the waters when the Government’s focus is rightly on listening to Peers’ concerns.

It is the first duty of government to protect its people, the country they live in and the integrity of their democratic institutions. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme will play an important role in delivering on this agenda. Dialogue between policymakers and the rest of society is an essential feature of our democratic system. It provides parliamentarians and Ministers with important information and expert analysis, helping us to become more informed. It allows decision-makers and the public to be exposed to diverse opinions and voices, including from the international business sector. It can be a positive contribution to healthy and robust public debate, and will continue to be welcome in the UK.

However, when communications or disbursements are not transparent, it can lead to corruption or give certain groups an unfair advantage. It can be seen as a way for powerful interests to exert excessive influence on political and governmental processes, potentially at the expense of the British public. It is particularly important to be able to identify foreign influence. The UK Government and the British people are entitled to know when foreign interests seek to influence public policy and public opinion. We should be able to identify foreign influence and evaluate those contributions properly, including the aggregate impact over time. Some foreign lobbying presents risks to national security. Members of the Committee will have heard Ken McCallum, in his annual threat speech in November, discussing the challenge from state threats. He said:

“The West is in a contest in which our security, values and democratic institutions are at stake.”


The Intelligence and Security Committee discussed political influence and state threats in its 2020 Russia report, calling for a scheme like the one delivered through the political influence tier of FIRS, which we are debating here today. The political influence tier of FIRS will play a role in strengthening openness and transparency in those processes, with the additional aim of deterring foreign powers that wish to pursue their aims covertly through agents and proxies. Noble Lords will be aware that some foreign states increasingly seek to influence how we think, vote and feel. Such states view themselves as being in a long-term contest with the West and take a much broader view of what they are interested in than simply national security matters. Covert political influence from state actors can damage our democratic processes, institutions and wider societal cohesion.

The foreign influence registration scheme will require those acting covertly with malign intent to make a conscious choice between registering their activity and publicly declaring their provenance, or not registering and risking prosecution. This raises the cost of conducting such activity and will be a significant deterrent to those who seek to harm our democracy.

Before we move on to the main debate, I will very briefly explain the government amendments in this group. Amendments 82, 89, 99, 100, 101 and 102 make minor technical changes to ensure consistency in the use of “arrangement” and “agreement” across the foreign influence registration scheme provisions. These amendments will assist with the clarity and understanding of the scheme.

Government Amendment 92 amends the existing provisions regarding public communications in the political influence tier of FIRS. This amendment provides that where a public communication is reasonably clear that it is being made by a foreign principal on its own behalf, it will not need to be registered. The Bill already provides an existing exclusion from registration requirements where it is reasonably clear that the public communication is made at the direction of a foreign principal. This is in keeping with our commitment to ensure that the scheme is proportionate and does not impose any unnecessary burdens.

During the last day in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, raised a number of questions regarding the foreign power condition, which we dealt with at some length last week, and the foreign influence registration scheme. I thank her for her letter and will deal with the core of her questions now, to ensure that this is on the record. On the question of whether a member of this House will need to register when entering arrangements, the responsibility to register under the political influence tier of FIRS will lie with the foreign principal carrying out the activity in the United Kingdom, or with the person in an arrangement with the foreign principal to carry out activities in the United Kingdom. There will be no requirement on the person whom the foreign principal is seeking to influence to register activities. As such, Members of this House would be required to register only if they entered into arrangements with foreign principals to carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom. This applies equally for arrangements with any foreign entity, including political parties in government or in opposition.

There was also a question in relation to the foreign power condition of why “a governing political party” has been included in the meaning of “a foreign power”. It addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. The noble Baroness posed the question of what constitutes a governing political party. It is right that this will vary in different countries. Clearly we cannot legislate for every different administrative structure. Rather, in criminal proceedings where this was an issue, the prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a political party was the governing political party based on the facts of the case. Therefore, any political party with no members holding posts in the Government would not be in scope. The definition in Clause 30(2) means that a political party is a governing party only if individuals within that party hold posts in the Government or part of the Government. For example, the Democratic Party runs the US Administration and sets the direction of government policy. It is therefore the governing political party in the US.

To omit Clause 30(1)(e) as the noble Baroness suggested and to rely entirely on the other aspects of the definition of “a foreign power” risks creating a loophole whereby sophisticated state actors could claim to act on behalf of the ruling party but not the Government. To be clear, foreign powers, including governing political parties of a foreign Government or their members acting in their capacity as a member, do not have to register their own activities. However, those in arrangements with foreign entities—including governing political parties—to carry out political influence activities in the UK will need to register those arrangements.

I will be listening very carefully to the remarks made on this group and will respond to the amendments directly in my closing comments. I look forward to this important debate.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in his opening statement, the noble Lord said that the Government plan to publish a policy statement and that the reason they were not doing so now, in anticipation of Committee, was that they did not want to muddy the waters. Can I ask the noble Lord whether he plans to publish that policy statement and make it available before Report?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is certainly my intention, yes.

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[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not having participated in this debate earlier but, like other speakers, I have been provoked by listening to the contributions. The speeches tonight appear to be about either excluding certain categories or, in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, trying to include a category in the scope of the Bill. The fact is that, if you start to specify organisations or types of organisations, you will include every organisation in the country, whether a business or arts organisation, a charity, a political party or any other group of people, because any organisation can host people who seek to bring influence of one form or another. It is the behaviour, not the organisation, that is the problem here. To suppose that registering organisations will defeat covert practitioners from seeking to exert influence is naive to the point of being dangerous. As many have suggested, the solution is to go away, redraft and come back with a shorter Bill that does not try to include every organisation, not only in this country but in every other country—any one of them could host a malign influence.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their important amendments in this group and for the extensive and interesting debate. I would be very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and others from other political parties, as she wishes. As soon as the reply to her letter is written, I will circulate it.

I assure the Committee that I have heard the strength of feeling on this issue and the calls to remove the political influence tier completely. I will be taking this back to the department to agree the next steps required to address these concerns ahead of Report, while balancing the need for a mechanism that protects us all from malign foreign influence in the UK. At the risk of upsetting the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, further information will follow.

I should say this: there should be no doubt that those who comply with the registration requirements under FIRS, by being clear and open about whom they represent, are supporting the resilience of the UK and its institutions in the face of state threats. There is no suspicion around those who register with the scheme; they are doing the right thing. However, as I said earlier, this has been an extremely valuable debate and I am grateful for all the thought and expertise that went into these contributions. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that we are not singling out the Dutch; we are merely citing an example. This is about foreign influence.

I start by addressing the amendments tabled on the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. I have listened carefully, and several interesting points have been made. I have heard the concerns raised about the unintended consequences of the political tier, and the Government will consider these points carefully ahead of Report.

Today, we have heard calls to remove this part of the Bill and focus instead on amending existing lobbying laws. These laws have been designed to be suitable for the supervision of domestic lobbying where British citizens and residents have a right to participate in the political process, but they are inadequate for foreign influence, where the impact of undue influence presents a greater risk to our democracy, and therefore greater regulation is required.

This is reflected internationally, and it is not unusual for countries to have distinct lobbying and foreign influence provisions. For example, the US has a Lobbying Disclosure Act as well as foreign agent registration requirements. Similarly, the Australians have a lobbying register that is separate from their foreign influence transparency scheme. I hope that that goes some way to answering the queries on this from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis.

The United Kingdom is well behind these countries in understanding the impact of foreign influence, and both tiers of the scheme are required to rectify this. FIRS will allow the Government and the public to understand better the scale, nature and extent of foreign influence on our democratic institutions.

I refer noble Lords to the multiple calls in the other place at the point of the Bill’s introduction for a scheme to require transparency around political influence activities. Members of the other place have signalled their agreement that political transparency is essential. We also heard from the director of regulation at the Electoral Commission, who said in oral evidence:

“Any registration scheme that brings more transparency around who is seeking to influence those involved in our democracy can only be to the benefit of the confidence of voters.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 44.]


I know that noble Lords will agree that the British people need to be able to trust the institutions that serve them. It can only be right that the UK public and our democratic institutions are protected from covert foreign influence and better informed as to the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs. I emphasise to noble Lords that the public, and Parliament, should know when these foreign political influence activities are taking place. Transparency is a source of strength. That is why we have included provisions in the scheme to make certain information public.

Those who register under the scheme will be playing an important role in supporting our efforts to strengthen the resilience of our democratic system and political institutions. While we are keen to work with business and other sectors to ensure a workable and easy-to-use scheme, the regulation of foreign communications or disbursements should not of itself be controversial for the reputable end of industry.

I reassure the Committee that the registration requirements will not be burdensome. Registering will require filling in a short online form. The scheme will not prohibit any activities carried out by foreign entities or on their behalf where these have been registered in line with the scheme’s requirements. We intend to consult widely and convene expert panels to produce targeted and practical guidance. That will be published ahead of the scheme going live to ensure that the public and business are clear on the requirements.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked about NGO workers abroad. The scheme will require the registration of political influence activities where they are to be carried out within the UK at the direction of any foreign power or foreign entity, or where they are to be carried out by a foreign entity itself. Where the activities do not take place within the UK, they will not be caught by the scheme. I think this also answers the question from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the Ukrainian situation.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He may be missing a point but will correct me if I am wrong. The collection of funds for that scheme, along with a lot of the organising activity, is done within the United Kingdom. As the Bill stands, that surely means there has to be registration.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, as I have just said, I do not believe that it does. If I may, I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord.

I will now turn to the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I commend her for the spirit in which they were made. The first of these, Amendment 89A, looks to constrain our definition of “foreign principal” in the political influence tier of the scheme. She is quite right to point out that the current definition includes all foreign powers and foreign entities, but I will explain why the scheme has this breadth and the ways we have constrained the scheme to compensate for it.

The amendment seeks to include only those foreign entities that are controlled by a foreign power, rather than all foreign entities, in our definition of “foreign principal”. In the development of the scheme, we considered this as an option. However, we have worked closely with our Australian partners and reviewed their submission to the parliamentary review of the foreign influence transparency scheme.

The Australians originally took a very broad definition of “foreign principal” to their Parliament. This was, through its passage, constrained to something akin to my noble friend’s amendment. However, this has caused the Australians significant challenges regarding compliance and enforcement. For FIRS to function as it should, it shall need to be crystal clear to people whether or not they are working for a foreign principal. With certain foreign entities, it can be very difficult to determine ownership and governance structures, and nearly impossible for a small business or individuals to know whether they are working for an entity owned or controlled by a foreign power. In their submission to their parliamentary review, the Australians have recommended that the “foreign principal” definition is broadened, in keeping with our proposals. To provide balance with the broad definition of “foreign principal”, we have drafted a narrower definition of “political influence activity” compared with the US and Australian precedents.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. He has just mentioned for the second time the compliance burden. Earlier on, he said very reassuringly that all that would be required to register was the completion of a form. But does the Minister understand that one reason why so many people are so anxious about these provisions is that it is not simply a question of filling in a form? In addition, once you have done that, there is the ongoing and, apparently, permanent obligation to comply with any information notices, which can be given at any time, requiring information of any sort to be provided to the Government. This is against the background of an absence of statutory guarantees regarding confidential information, except for lawyers and journalists, and not even—I think I am right in saying—any indication in the Bill as to whether this register will be public. The Minister has spoken a great deal about transparency.

How is that consistent with a United Kingdom that welcomes foreign engagement? Can the Minister understand how reluctant responsible directors and trustees will be to advise engagement with United Kingdom Government authorities against the background of those potentially very onerous provisions, which are liable to cause administrative problems and render it impossible for them to keep private what is always intended to be private?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure the noble Lord that the Minister absolutely understands exactly where he is coming from. I will come on to the confidentiality aspects of the question he just asked in a second.

The process will require information about those party to an arrangement, as well as a description of the arrangements and activities to be undertaken. We would not expect a detailed account of every activity to be undertaken either as part of an arrangement or by a foreign principal, but the full process will be set out in regulations, which will be laid before Parliament.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Are those regulations to be laid before Parliament before the completion of the Bill, or will we have to wait until after it becomes an Act?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lord on that shortly.

I will go on to the commercial sensitivity aspects—in effect commercial confidentiality, mentioned just now by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. We believe that ensuring that information can be publicised where it relates to the carrying out of political influence activities will help to strengthen the resilience of the political system, but Clause 77(2) allows the Secretary of State to specify or describe information or material that is not to be published. We intend this to include where publishing the information would, for example, threaten the interests of national security, put an individual’s safety at risk, or result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. The registration system will allow a person to flag where they think they meet such an exemption, which will not be considered by the scheme management unit.

In accordance with our data protection obligations, we intend for the information to be published to be limited to what is necessary to achieve the transparency aims of the scheme, particularly where that information is personal. I have heard all the concerns and, as I said, the Government will give further consideration to these points ahead of Report.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

That commitment is welcome. The Minister referred to the lack of a regulatory burden; I am following the point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised. However, the Government’s impact assessment says, in effect, that everybody needs to be familiarised with it because they will not know whether they are in scope. It says at paragraph 37, which I quoted earlier:

“Due to the offences and penalties associated with non-compliance with the scheme, organisations that are ultimately out of scope will still need to be aware of the FIRS”.


When it comes to domestic charities and NGOs, the impact assessment’s higher estimate of how many people will have to familiarise themselves with FIRS is 105,000 people. It will be an enormous regulatory burden on the domestic charity sector as to whether it knows to comply with it. Simply stating that it is a small online form is insufficient. On that point, I wonder why the Government have no estimate at all of how many small and medium-sized businesses will be captured by this.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has pre-empted the remainder of my speech to some extent, which I am afraid goes on for rather a long time; I apologise in advance for that. I will come on to the charities aspect in a moment. On the regulatory burden, I think I have been reasonably clear as to the simplicity we intend when it comes to complying.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would extend my noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendment to charitable activities, as was just described again by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I once more thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his scrutiny of the scheme. In essence, the question is: why is there not a charity exemption in the scheme and will this not make it harder for charities to carry out legitimate activity here in the United Kingdom? We believe that the ability of charities to campaign on issues relevant to their charitable mission is very important and crucial to our democracy. The scheme will not prevent this. It will ensure that the public are informed about the role played by overseas entities in this work, however.

We have also taken steps to minimise the potential burden on charities conducting legitimate activity as a result of FIRS. For example, making a public communication, campaign information or requests for support by a charity will be registerable only if it is not reasonably clear from the communication that it is made at the direction of a foreign power or entity. If such a communication is published for or on behalf of a foreign charity in its own name, it would not need to be registered. If it is published by a UK charity or PR firm at the direction of a foreign charity, it would not need to be registered if it is reasonably clear from the communication that it has been made at the direction of the foreign charity. I hope that is reasonably clear and has given some reassurance to the charitable sector.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

For the avoidance of doubt, have scientific societies in this country that are charities been consulted by the Government in respect of the legislation in any shape or form?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I assure the noble Viscount that I shall come to the substance of his comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, shortly.

I turn to the probing amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that provides for a public health emergencies exemption to the political influence tier. I agree that where an event such as a coronavirus pandemic arises, it is imperative that the sharing of key information does not face unnecessary regulatory red tape.

The scheme does not intend to impede the sharing of information relating to public health emergencies. Governments speaking to other Governments, and experts speaking with other experts, will not be caught by the scheme. Only where communication is carried out to influence a political matter will it be registerable. Where it is done to influence a political matter but the information is shared as part of an arrangement with the UK Government, the UK arrangements exemption will apply and no registration will be required. We would be happy to consider further the point that the noble Lord raised. As an aside to one of his other points, I say that the enhanced tier will be used only for those countries or entities responsible for the greatest state threats. I do not know how many that will be.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Does the Minister accept that issues of public health can often be highly political? One of my colleagues at the London School of Economics who was looking after a number of exchange students in what was then the Soviet Union was expelled from the Soviet Union for having collected some dust in a part of Ukraine where it was rumoured that there had been a nuclear accident. We all know that the provision of public information about Covid-19 in China has become highly political and highly sensitive. We cannot quite put things into neat categories in the way he suggests.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not think that I am putting it into a particularly neat category; I think I am leaving a large amount of room for this to be taken on a case-by-case basis. I repeat: only where communication is carried out to influence a political matter will it be registerable. Where it is done to influence a political matter but the information is shared as part of an arrangement with the UK Government, the UK arrangements exemption will apply. I think that covers it completely.

I turn to Amendment 88 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Wallace, and Amendment 97 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, as they both raise the important issue of guidance for higher education and other sectors. We recognise that clear, targeted guidance will be essential in support of the public’s understanding of the scheme’s requirements. I hope that the Committee will be reassured by what I said of our plans to convene expert panels to help develop the guidance. That will ensure that the requirements are clear for universities and higher education institutes. Throughout the development of this scheme, we have listened to the views of organisations from the university sector. We will continue to do so as we design bespoke guidance.

Therefore, I do not think that the proposed amendments are necessary. Although it is essential that the guidance is published ahead of the scheme going live, putting time limits on publication following the Bill’s passage may hamper the engagement we wish to carry out in producing the most helpful and targeted guidance.

Amendment 104, which is another amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, seeks to ensure that the higher education sector is not unnecessarily burdened by the enhanced tier of FIRS. I assure him that this has been considered in relation to FIRS. There is a clear difference between it and the National Security and Investment Act, the academic technology approval scheme, and the export control regime. The Government are clear that FIRS fills an gap in our current toolkit.

The focus of the enhanced tier is to provide scrutiny to the UK activities directed by foreign powers, and foreign power-controlled entities, where the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the UK. In the limited circumstances where there is a risk of duplication, we will work closely across government departments and potential registrants to keep the burden of registration to a minimum and inform our approach to using this tier of the scheme.

In essence the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, were asking whether this scheme would interfere in the work of academia and broadened it out to further bodies, such as the British Academy, as referenced by the noble Baroness, and the scientific bodies referenced by the noble Viscount. There is no intention for this scheme to interfere with the work of academia, or with relevant international collaborations. We have considered the feedback of the academic and higher education community on this point. Under the specified persons tier, a UK university would need to be acting at the direction of a specified foreign power or a specified foreign power-controlled entity before registration requirements could apply. It would not be enough for a foreign power or entity to simply provide funding in support of an activity at a university, for example through subsidy or donation. Nor could responding to a generic request from a foreign power or entity be considered as “acting at the direction of”.

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[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

I will reflect on what the Minister says when I read Hansard. I am glad that bodies such as the British Academy will be consulted, and I hope that the named organisations I mentioned earlier will be consulted. If we take the case of an international conference, held in one of many states around the world, is it the Government’s view that that international conference, which may or may not be sponsored officially by a Government but nevertheless takes place in what may be considered an unfriendly country, brings about the type of involvement in this scheme on the part of individual people attending, or does it not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thought I was very clear on the precise specified persons tier here. A UK university would need to be acting at the direction of a specified foreign power or a specified foreign power-controlled entity before registration requirements could apply. I think that covers the set of circumstances just outlined by the noble Viscount.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The Minister spoke about universities. Did he mean the academics—any academic within the universities?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes.

Amendment 103 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to remove the exemption from the registration requirement in FIRS for lawyers providing legal activities. While I welcome the challenge, removing this exemption would risk undermining long-standing protections the UK has afforded to the provision of confidential legal advice and the equitable administration of justice. The exemption is available only to lawyers carrying out legal activity and so would not apply to other individuals carrying out legal activity.

I also reiterate what was said in Committee in the other place: that this exemption does not completely exempt legal professionals from engaging with the scheme. It does not cover all the activities that could be undertaken by a legal professional as part of an arrangement with a foreign principal. Activities that are not strictly legal activities, such as lobbying, for example, may still need to be registered. So, for example, if a lawyer were to enter into an arrangement with a foreign power to lobby a UK government Minister or parliamentarian on the UK’s foreign policy towards that foreign power, that would be registrable. The fact that the individual is a lawyer is not sufficient in and of itself to exempt them from registration.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I heard what the Minister said about lobbying and the additional aspect of lobbying by law firms, but why is any exemption needed beyond what is contained in Clause 74, which covers legal professional privilege effectively—legal proceedings and so on—so that no confidential information needs to be divulged? Why is it not necessary that a law firm is acting for a foreign power or an entity controlled by a foreign power? Why should that be exempt?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I explained this in reasonable detail. It goes back to the sort of work the lawyers carry out. As I say, it is the long-standing protections that the UK has afforded—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

All the Minister is saying, in a highly circular way, is that it is in here because it has always been in here in some other forms of legislation. I do not think that is much of an answer.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

In that case, I am very sorry to disappoint the noble Lord. I apologise for having spoken at such length.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am not sure whether the Minister has picked up my point about arbitration. I am very sorry that I did not put down an amendment to direct attention to this, but it is quite an important point because London is a preferred seat for arbitration and many cases involving foreign powers and foreign-controlled activities. I have done a handful of arbitrations, but each one of them is within that category.

One of the features of an arbitration is the confidentiality of the process and the fact that the process exists at all. There are some cases where parties do not want it to be publicised that they are engaging in this process, because it would raise all sorts of questions, particularly at the home state of the foreign activity, the foreign-controlled entity or the foreign power itself. It is rather important to be sure that the ground is properly covered.

As an arbitrator myself, and a lawyer-arbitrator, I favour the exemption provided by paragraph 5, but I do not think it goes wide enough. That is my point: it would seem very strange if I, as a lawyer for a team of three arbitrators, did not have to register, but if the noble Lord, Lord Patel, was with me as an expert in his field, he would have to do so, and an engineer or an architect would have to do so as well. That really destroys the exemption. It is a serious point to look at, though I quite agree that it is a point of detail. I apologise for not having drawn attention to it specifically before.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was about to attempt to address the question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but unfortunately he is not going to like the answer, which is that I do not know. I will have to look into this and come back to him.

I appreciate the concerns that have been expressed by all noble Lords, and I thank all those who participated in what was clearly a very healthy and important debate. We will reflect carefully on the comments raised prior to Report. For the moment, and to that end, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Since the Minister said he would go away and reflect on this debate, which may bring about substantial changes to what the Government are doing, what would be the point of his moving his amendments for the remainder of this part? It would save the Committee quite a bit of time if he did not move these amendments to the rest of the part that he said he is now going to consider.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure it would save a huge amount of time, would it?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It depends how long the Minister takes to move his own amendments. When he sums up his own amendments that he will be moving, he will be saying, “I am now going away to reflect on these and come back before Report”, so there is very little point in doing that.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 83 provides that the Government must lay secondary legislation to define “specified persons” within 60 days of Royal Assent. A specified person under this Bill is a person who engages another for foreign activity arrangements. The purpose of the amendment is to probe who that could involve and whether they must be representative of a national Government or state. This amendment is further intended to probe the unintended consequences of the FIRS scheme and to illustrate that the legislation as drafted creates uncertainty as to who it applies to.

The Government have also tabled amendments as part of this group to clarify that activities being carried out must be registered at the time that they are carried out. A separate government amendment in this group limits the circumstances when affirmative procedures must be used in relation to defining “specified persons”, removing a layer of scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, government Amendments 85, 86, 87, 94, 95 and 96 are minor and technical amendments that will make it clear that a current—rather than a previous—registration, is required to meet the registration requirements of either tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. This will mean that, where previously registered activities are resumed, a current registration will be required rather than a person within scope of the scheme being able to rely on the fact that the activities had previously been registered. This will support the need for the register to remain accurate and up to date, providing the best possible insight into the scale of foreign political influence activities, and activities of specified entities.

Government Amendment 121 ensures that that the clauses are as clear as possible and accurately reflect our intent. To specify an entity on the enhanced tier, the Secretary of State will have a regulatory making power as per Clause 63. Under subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 92, this power to specify will be subject to an affirmative procedure. The amendment adds wording to clarify that the affirmative procedure applies where a new entity is being specified. Where an entity is being de-specified, or an already specified entity is being re-specified—for example, because it has changed its name—a negative procedure will apply, under Clause 92(4). This will ensure that both the specifying and removal of entities from the enhanced tier will be subject to the necessary level of parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 83 seeks to require the Secretary of State to define “specified persons” within 60 days of this Act being passed. “Specified persons” are defined within Clause 63 of the Bill; I therefore interpret this amendment as being intended to set a requirement on the Government to specify any entities to which the enhanced tier will apply within 60 days of the Act being passed. The specification of a person will mean that individuals or entities will have to register any arrangements with the specified person to carry out activities in the UK. It will also set a requirement for specified entities themselves to register their own activities. I am sure the House will recognise that these are far-reaching requirements, and it is therefore vital that the designation of a specified entity is done following appropriate consideration and on the basis of circumstances that exist at the time, and the most up-to-date and comprehensive evidence. A blanket requirement to designate all specified entities within 60 days would impede the careful case-by-case basis consideration that is required and would be a disproportionate approach to the specification of persons under this tier. I therefore do not believe that this amendment is necessary, and I encourage the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

85: Clause 65, page 44, line 29, leave out from second “the” to end of line 30 and insert “activities are registered with the Secretary of State by the specified person.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the activities being carried out must be registered at the time they are carried out.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

89: Clause 66, page 45, line 19, after “an” insert “agreement or”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that agreements can be “foreign influence arrangements”.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

90: Clause 68, page 46, line 29, at end insert “a person listed in Schedule (Public officials);”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a reference to the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe after Schedule 13.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 90, 91, 93, 98, 122 and 123 insert senior leaders in the police and military, the mayors of London and of combined authority areas, and police and crime commissioners to the list of postholders who, if communicated with, trigger a requirement on the person doing the communication to register under FIRS.

State actors who pose a threat can and will seek to identify and target individuals who are relied on to inform decision-making by government. These amendments will require foreign principals, and those working on behalf of foreign principals, to be transparent where they are seeking to influence decision-making and political processes through the postholders listed. Requiring registration of these activities will shed light on the scale of the attempts to carry out this type of influencing and will allow for prosecutions where such activity is not registered. It will also provide a layer of protection for these postholders by providing a deterrent to hostile states seeking to act in this way to advance their own malign agendas and allow for postholders to inform themselves of who is communicating with them and why.

The existing list of potential targets of lobbying in Clause 68(2)(a) already includes senior officials. We consider that senior military and police officials fall into a similar category to senior civil servants; they are experts who are able to provide advice to Ministers on matters relating to government decisions.

Mayors are often senior political figures within their respective political parties whose views are likely to carry significant weight with Government Ministers, including when they are making government decisions. I hope that goes some way to answering the questions related to this matter from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in an earlier group. Mayors, alongside devolved and central Governments, form an important part of the UK’s political establishment and, as such, we believe it is appropriate to capture them within a scheme focused on political influencing activity.

Similarly, in their capacity as elected officials, police and crime commissioners also form a part of the UK’s political establishment and may be identified as being in a strong position to influence contacts within Westminster regarding government decisions.

We have listened to the concerns about the breadth of the FIRS scheme, but we do not believe that adding these individuals would disproportionately expand the scheme. This is because communication with these individuals will be registerable only when it is for the purpose of influencing one of the existing persons or matters at Clause 68(3); for example, communication with a combined authority mayor for the purpose of influencing a local government decision, as opposed to a UK government decision, would not require registration.

These measures seek to tackle scenarios where postholders are being targeted by foreign principals seeking to indirectly influence government decisions and other political processes. While we consider it important to include these postholders, it is vital that the scheme remains proportionate. For this reason, we have taken the decision to limit these additions to the mayors of London and combined authority areas, as opposed to all mayors, and limit the ranks of the police and military officials included to the most senior.

These amendments also amend the power to add further to this list. Amendment 98 provides that the Secretary of State can by regulations specify a person “exercising public functions”, rather than

“persons exercising functions on behalf of the Crown”,

as in the original drafting. This reflects the fact that the list is not only of persons who are exercising functions of the Crown but includes persons carrying out wider public functions. This amendment will allow the necessary flexibility to future-proof the list of those who may be targets of political lobbying. Any regulations made under this power will be thoroughly scrutinised by Parliament through the affirmative procedure. I ask the Committee to accept these amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

On the extent of the schedule of those to be included, unless I have misunderstood or misread, there does not appear to be any reference to senior members of the security and intelligence services, who I do not think fall into any of the other categories. Could the Minister explain whether I have misunderstood or if that is a deliberate exclusion, and what any reasoning might be?

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I think that this falls foul of the issue that was raised before. I respect the Minister’s viewpoint of wanting to have a broad scheme without being specific because, as soon as you get specific, loopholes are created because you start listing one and excluding others. However, that is exactly what proposed new Schedule 13 is going to do—including the situation where the leader of Glasgow is excluded while the leader for Tyne is included. So, if the Minister can clarify those points, I would be grateful.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will have a go. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, very much for those comments. These amendments simply seek to add senior leaders in the police and military, the Mayor of London, mayors of combined authority areas and police and crime commissioners, as I have said, to the list of potential targets of communication by or on behalf of foreign principals.

I refer back to a statement I made in my opening remarks. We think it is important to include these postholders but we wish for the scheme to remain proportionate. For that reason, we have taken the decision to limit these additions to the mayors of London and combined authority areas, as opposed to all mayors, and limit the ranks of the police and military officials to include the most senior. The point about the mayors is surely a good one: they are politically elected and members of political parties. They therefore have significantly more political influence, I would argue, than the Lord Mayor of London, for example.

As regards the definition—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

What about the corporation? I am grateful to the Minister, but there is a quite considerable amount of executive authority in the City of London Corporation when it comes to what could well interact with the interests of the United Kingdom. So perhaps the Minister might reflect on that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will absolutely reflect on that but, as I say, they are not politically elected persons, as the noble Lord will know. As regards his example of a foreign defence contractor talking to somebody of the rank of brigadier, having had our lengthy discussions earlier I would have thought that they would be captured under the corporate side of the Bill. The effect of this amendment would be that foreign principals, or those in arrangements with them, would be required to register communication with these postholders, as well as those in the existing list, if it were conducted for the purpose of influencing one of those persons listed in Clause 68.

In answer to the other question about senior members of the security services, I believe that is captured under “senior civil servants”, but I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord. For now, I ask that the House agrees this amendment.

Amendment 90 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

91: Clause 68, page 46, line 30, leave out sub-paragraphs (i) to (vi)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the list of persons in clause 68(2)(a). Those persons are now listed (with additional persons) in the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe after Schedule 13.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

93: Clause 68, page 47, leave out lines 26 to 41
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes definitions that are no longer needed in clause 68 because the terms they define have been removed by Lord Sharpe’s amendment to clause 68, page 46, line 30.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

94: Clause 70, page 48, line 15, leave out from second “the” to end of line 16 and insert “activities are registered with the Secretary of State by the foreign principal.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the political influence activities being carried out must be registered at the time they are carried out.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

98: Before Schedule 14, insert the following new Schedule—
“SchedulePublic officialsMinisters
1 A Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975).2 A Northern Ireland Minister (within the meaning of section 68).3 A Scottish Minister.4 A Welsh Minister (within the meaning of section 68).MPs etc
5 A member of either House of Parliament.6 A member of the Northern Ireland Assembly.7 A member of the Scottish Parliament.8 A member of Senedd Cymru.9 An employee or other member of staff of a person within any of paragraphs 5 to 8.Local government
10 The Mayor of London. 11 A mayor for the area of a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.Political parties
12 An officer, trustee or agent of a UK registered political party (within the meaning of section 68).13 A member of such a political party who exercises executive functions on behalf of the party.Election candidates
14 A candidate at an election for a relevant elective office (within the meaning of section 37 of the Elections Act 2022).15 A candidate at an election for a relevant Scottish elective office (within the meaning of that section).Civil servants
16 (1) A member of—(a) the Senior Civil Service;(b) the Northern Ireland Senior Civil Service;(c) the Senior Management Structure of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service.(2) A person who serves the government in a position in the civil service of the State and whose appointment to that position meets the requirements applicable to that position set out in section 15(1) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (special advisers).(3) A person appointed to a position in the Northern Ireland Civil Service by a Northern Ireland Minister (within the meaning of section 68) and whose appointment to that position meets the conditions set out in section 1(3) and (4) of the Civil Service (Special Advisers) Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (c. 8 (N.I.)) (special advisers).Military personnel
17 (1) An officer subject to service law who is of or above the rank of commodore, brigadier or air commodore.(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “subject to service law” has the same meaning as in the Armed Forces Act 2006 (see section 374 of that Act).Police
18 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of a police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996.19 A police and crime commissioner.20 A person of one of the following ranks of the metropolitan police force—(a) Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(b) Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(c) Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(d) Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.21 The Commissioner of Police for the City of London or an Assistant Commissioner of Police for the City of London.22 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.23 The chief constable or a deputy chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland.24 The chief constable or a deputy chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police. 25 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the British Transport Police Force.26 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.Persons exercising public functions
27 (1) A person exercising public functions who is specified by the Secretary of State in regulations.(2) “Public functions” means functions of a public nature—(a) exercisable in the United Kingdom, or(b) exercisable in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom by a person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Schedule expands the list of persons, communication with whom is capable of being a political influence activity. It includes the persons previously listed in clause 68(2)(a), and additional persons.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

99: Schedule 14, page 180, line 7, at end insert “foreign activity arrangements or foreign influence”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the exemption for UK arrangements applies to agreements and arrangements within the meaning of “foreign activity arrangement” or “foreign influence arrangement”.