Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (Consequential Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 13 October be approved. 15th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, keeping the public safe is a top priority for the Government. Deprivation of citizenship, where it is conducive to the public good, is reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK or whose conduct involves very high harm. It is key to our ability to preserve the UK’s national security. Noble Lords will recall that the deprivation measures in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 attracted much considered and thorough debate. This House and the other place agreed that in cases where the Secretary of State intends to make a deprivation order on the grounds that it is conducive to the public good, without giving notice, an application must be made to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which will consider the Secretary of State’s reasons not to give notice.

Implementation of this process requires amendments to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, which are made and amended by the Lord Chancellor. To create the necessary power to amend these rules we first need to amend the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, which is the purpose of this instrument. Today, we are taking a significant step toward implementing the safeguards created in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 that this House agreed to. I therefore trust that noble Lords will support the draft regulations and I commend them to the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining this statutory instrument. As he said, deprivation of citizenship, particularly without notice, is a very serious issue. We fought hard to get the safe- guards in the Nationality and Borders Act in place. We are concerned about any move away from open justice, but we understand that there may be circumstances where a refusal of entry as a worker may require a hearing before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. My reading of the other regulation is that it is a technical change, and on that basis we support these regulations.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we opposed the clause in the Act that sought to extend the power of the Secretary of State to deprive citizenship without giving a reason or telling a person that it has happened. We voted to remove that clause, as we were not convinced by the Government’s arguments that the power they were seeking was just and proportionate. However, we supported significant amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has just pointed out, which were accepted by the Government, to add safeguards to the process. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for his leadership on those amendments. As far as that is the case, we accept that the regulations before us today comprise one of those necessary and proportionate safeguards being implemented.

I remind the Chamber that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, restricted the range of circumstances in which notice can be withheld, introduced various judicial safeguards and said that the Secretary of State should review those safeguards. The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“This instrument is the first stage in establishing”


the process of application to SIAC and:

“Once the procedure rules are made … applications … can commence.”


We would like to know the timeline for this. How many other stages are there, given that the Government say this is the first stage and given the controversy there was about the introduction of this power and the fact that the House voted for the inclusion of these safeguards, which enabled the clause to be passed? When are all these safeguards going to be put in place? Can the Minister explain what the current procedure is? Is there any use of this power at the moment without these safeguards?

With those brief comments, we support this SI as proposed by the Government.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for this short debate. I appreciate the strength of feeling about deprivation of citizenship, but I feel I need to repeat what I said earlier: maintaining our national security is a priority for this Government. On the specific point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, this is very much about the mechanics of how a deprivation decision is conveyed to the individual concerned, and it recognises that it may not be possible to give notice in certain exceptional circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked specific questions about when it starts. I cannot answer him at this moment, so I will write on that point, and to explain more clearly exactly how it happens now, if that is acceptable.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. Given the importance of this issue, will he place a copy of that letter in the Library? I think all noble Lords would like to know those answers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Absolutely; I am very happy to do that.

Given that we seem to have arrived at a conclusion, to finish, this instrument is the first step in creating the important safeguards which will hold the Government to account in relation to decisions to deprive a person of citizenship without giving them notice. As I said earlier, a separate instrument amending the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003 will be laid in due course, but for now I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Offensive Weapons Homicide Reviews) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 13 October be approved. 15th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, keeping people safe is the Government’s top priority. We must use every tool at our disposal to stop lives being lost to serious violence. Offensive weapons homicide reviews were introduced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 to support local agencies in working together to identify lessons that will help prevent future deaths. The Act places a duty on the relevant review partners to conduct an offensive weapons homicide review in certain circumstances where a person aged 18 or over dies and an offensive weapon was used. It is the intention to pilot these new reviews for a period of 18 months, beginning in early 2023, in specified areas in London, the West Midlands and Wales before any national rollout.

The regulations provide that the relevant review partners will be the local authority, police, and integrated care boards in England, or local health boards in Wales, from the area where the death occurs or, where the location of death is not known, where the body of the person is found. The regulations are intended to provide them with the detail they need to establish when a review must be carried out. The regulations clarify that not every homicide involving an offensive weapon will necessarily require a review. It will be necessary for one or more of the review partner agencies to have or reasonably be expected to have relevant information about the circumstances or background of the victim or suspected perpetrator that is likely to be pertinent to the purpose of the review. This will ensure that resources are not directed to cases where little or no relevant learning is likely to be found. It will also capture homicides where the identity of the victim or a suspected perpetrator is known, ensuring that homicides with circumstances that suggest that lessons can be learned to help prevent future homicides should qualify.

The regulations will allow the Secretary of State to direct which partners are the relevant ones to conduct a review, should there be uncertainty in any case. While we do not expect this power to be used often, it is important in ensuring that there are no instances where there is nobody responsible for leading the review. The regulations also make it clear that a review is not required where the death is a

“death or serious injury matter”

within the meaning of Section 12(2A) of the Police Reform Act 2002. This will exclude deaths caused by a police officer who, in the course of their duties, uses an offensive weapon and an individual dies. This will be subject to an investigation by the relevant police force or the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Finally, the regulations allow the review partners to delegate specified functions to one of themselves or to another person, including a third party, to lead or chair the review.

Reducing homicide and serious violence is a top priority for the Government. These draft regulations, in supporting the introduction and piloting of new offensive weapons homicide reviews, will deepen our understanding of serious violence, improve our response to it and, ultimately, save lives. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I join the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in thanking the Minister for the withdrawal of the SI with respect to serious violence prevention orders. He is to be commended for that, and we are very grateful that he has thought again about it.

We supported these provisions to extend homicide reviews to offensive weapons cases during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act and we welcome that the provisions are being piloted before being rolled out. We also welcome the fact that the Act requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the operation of the pilot before a further rollout can take place. Again, that is a very sensible way forward for this legislation.

To build on some of what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked, the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“It has been estimated that 72 OWHRs may take place across the pilot areas throughout the 18 month pilot.”


It would be interesting to know how the Government have worked that number out, and again, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked, how the various pilot areas have been identified by the Government.

On funding, the Explanatory Memorandum states that the number of anticipated reviews

“includes a 20% optimism bias to ensure funding for all necessary reviews is available. Costs to the Home Office per review have been estimated as £1,222 to each of the three relevant review partners (totalling £3,666) and £8,688 for an independent chair.”

Again, how have those figures been arrived at? For clarity, can the Minister confirm that the review partners will be fully funded by the Home Office for their work on such reviews, and does that include staffing costs?

One of the issues raised during the Bill’s passage was that recommendations made in existing reviews, such as domestic homicide reviews or indeed the under-18 reviews that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just referred to, are too often not acted on or shared as they should be to force change and create improvement. That is the whole point of the reviews: to inform practice and for people to learn.

I know that the Government intend to establish and fund the Home Office oversight board to oversee the introduction of the offensive weapon homicide reviews and to monitor and implement recommendations. The Explanatory Memorandum references the funding of the oversight board. However, can the Minister give us any other details about the crucial point? Once the review has happened and various recommendations have been made, how are those recommendations to be followed through so that the learning from the review is implemented by all the various partners? It would also be interesting if the Minister could say a little more about what the membership of that oversight board is likely to be and whether there are any functions that he could share with us. On relevant review partners, they can appoint a lead agency or an independent chair to take forward the review. Will all relevant review partners involved in a particular case be required to agree to this course of action?

I will address just a couple of specifics from the legislation—I know it is unusual in the Chamber, but this is effectively an SI that would normally be in Grand Committee. Part 2 of the legislation deals with the duty to arrange an offensive weapons homicide review. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made a really important point: who triggers the review? It is not clear to me from reading Part 2 of the legislation who does it. It just talks about all the various partners. However, somebody has to say that there should be a review and seek to have one take place. I do not know whether the noble Lord or any other Members of your Lordships’ House noticed that, but I could not see it. Unless I have misread it, not understood it or not seen it somewhere, I cannot see who triggers that review. That is important for the reason that the noble Lord mentioned. If it is a chief police officer, what happens if, bluntly, they do not want to, or it is the local authority and it does not want to, or it is the health body, which is the other statutory partner, and it does not want to because it is not in its interests?

For reasons of transparency, the difficult questions sometimes need to be asked. People would rather they were not asked, and it is not clear to me from reading Part 2 who has the duty to do that and what happens if they do not fulfil that duty when other partners think they should. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain that to us.

As I said, given that this is equivalent to what would normally take place in the Grand Committee room, I want to ask about the conditions that may trigger a review obligation. The conditions are that

“one of the following has been located— … the body of the person who died”;

I understand if the body of the person who died is located, but, for the second trigger, it says,

“or part of the body of a person who died.”

I am not trivialising this, but what do we mean by a part of a body? Without going into detail, fairly obviously, there is a difference between the whole of a top half and a toe. Again, I am not trivialising this, but it would be helpful for our understanding of the legislation to know what a “part” means.

I join the Minister and, no doubt, every Member of your Lordships’ House, in saying that we all want a reduction in the level of homicides, for whatever reason. Hopefully, a review of what has happened with respect to homicide through the use of offensive weapons will inform practice in future which will lead to a reduction in the number of homicides. On that, can the Minister tell us what is the trend at the moment for the number of homicides using offensive weapons, so that we have some understanding of the scale of the problem?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Once again, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions and questions, and I shall do my very best to answer all the points raised.

Both noble Lords asked about the pilot areas. It will perhaps help if I clarify what the areas are and how they were chosen. In London, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, highlighted, they are the boroughs of Barnet, Brent, Harrow, Lambeth and Southwark. In the West Midlands, they are Birmingham and Coventry, and in Wales it is the South Wales Police force area, which includes Swansea, Neath, Port Talbot, Bridgend, Rhondda, Merthyr Tydfil, Cardiff and the Vale of Glamorgan. The pilot is being focused on the local authorities within those three areas that, combined and based on historical data over the past five years, it is estimated may expect approximately 50 to 75 homicides of adults involving an offensive weapon during the pilot. I fear I cannot answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about coterminous borders with police and crime commissioner areas, but I will endeavour to find out whether there is an answer and, if there is, I shall write to him.

As for the proportion of homicides, that is a very good question. In 2021-22, there were 709, so it is up to about 10%, notionally, covered by the areas of the pilots. I would say that the homicide levels of recent years have been affected by the pandemic, and the numbers are skewed by mass victim incidents, to some extent. In 2020-21, obviously Covid-affected, there were 568 homicides. In 2019-20, there were 716, but 39 of those involved the lorry in Essex. The numbers are a bit confused in that way. I will endeavour to find out how many involved serious weapons, because, unfortunately, I do not know the answer—I apologise.

Both noble Lords asked about the relevant review partners and how they were identified. As I said, homicide reviews are intended to be an important tool in helping local partners tackle serious violence and homicide. When a death occurs in an area, it is right that the review partners in that area are involved in the review of the death. They will provide the local intelligence and help spot local patterns and trends and identify opportunities to intervene and prevent future deaths. Local partners are most likely to be involved in the lives of those involved in the death, to have information relevant to the question of whether a review is required and to identify opportunities for interventions in future.

We therefore think it important that the responsibility for establishing and conducting these reviews rests with local partners. By reducing ambiguity as to who those partners are, we are ensuring that the reviews begin as soon as possible following the death, while Section 29 of the Act provides the assurance that, if individuals involved in the death live or lived in other areas, an input is required from those other areas; that relevant information can be disclosed to them for the purpose of the review.

In terms of what happens if one of the review partners refuses to conduct a review, again, I am afraid that I will have to write to noble Lords because I am not quite sure of the answer.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is a really important point, so I thank the Minister for referring to it, but who starts the process? The Minister talked about somebody refusing to take part, but who kicks the process off? Who says, “We should have a review”? Is it any of them? I do not understand the process for that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand the question. I will write to the noble Lord on that, if I may, to make sure that I do not get it wrong; I think I have the answer, but I would not want to give incorrect information.

Both noble Lords asked how the Home Office oversight board will work. It will be a non-statutory committee composed of experts in safeguarding, homicide, serious violence and public protection. They will oversee the local delivery of the offensive weapons homicide reviews, monitor the implementation of any findings and support the dissemination of learning both locally and nationally. We are currently in the process of appointing the chair and first member of the board with the final six members due to be in place for early 2024, ready for when the first OWHR reports are received.

The purpose of the oversight board is to oversee the local delivery of the reviews; to ensure consistency in criteria and approach by reviewing and assessing completed reviews; to draw together the reviews at a national level to assess and disseminate common learnings, themes, issues in service provision and areas of good practice at set intervals; to monitor the regional and national application of learning and the implementation of recommendations in policy, approach and delivery; and to share best practice and wider insight through learning events and opportunities. The membership will include representatives from areas such as local government, public health, the police, education, the voluntary and community sectors, probation services and the Crown Prosecution Service, as well as a representative from one of those areas with experience of working in Wales.

Both noble Lords asked about the funding for the reviews. The Home Office will provide the funding for the relevant review partners and the work they carry out to deliver an offensive weapons homicide review during the pilot. It will also meet the cost of the oversight board that I have just described. If the policy is rolled out nationally, the funding arrangements will be confirmed after the pilot. The costs of a homicide review vary as every homicide has a unique set of circumstances; each review will have to account for these. Based on existing reviews, we estimate that a homicide review will have an average cost of £12,354. We also anticipate that the Home Office oversight board will cost approximately £230,000 over the course of the 18-month pilot. Review partners will receive funding to cover the cost of work that they carry out in establishing and running these homicide reviews during the pilot, and details of how the budget will be allocated will be confirmed as the pilot is designed with local partners.

I think I have answered the questions I am able to—

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am slightly confused about the figures that the Minister gave. I think he referred to the death of a large number of migrants in the back of a lorry skewing the homicide figures. I asked about the proportion of offensive weapon homicides in the pilot areas compared with the number of offensive weapon homicides in total, unless—I think this would be rather unusual—in the case of the deaths in the back of a lorry, the lorry was considered to be an offensive weapon, which I am sure it is not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, that is not what I meant to imply. I do not have the numbers on homicides involving offensive weapons; I have committed to write to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on that, so I will of course copy the noble Lord in.

I thank noble Lords for their constructive and helpful questions. These regulations represent an effective, balanced approach for offensive weapons homicide reviews. By improving our understanding of the circumstances, drivers and causes that lead a person to take another person’s life, we can, I hope, improve our ability to tackle homicide and ultimately save lives. On that basis, I commend the regulations to the House.

Motion agreed.

Football Spectators (Relevant Offences) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Football Spectators (Relevant Offences) Regulations 2022.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this is a simple but important measure, which will ensure that those convicted of football-related offences involving class A drugs can be subjected to football banning orders. We had been on a long-term downward trend when it came to football disorder. However, we have just had a football season which saw more football-related arrests than in any of the previous seven seasons. Sadly, it is clear that, after pandemic restrictions were lifted, some football fans have concertedly pushed at the unlawful boundaries of safety and security, and this includes taking cocaine while attending football.

The police have been clear that they have seen an increase in drug-fuelled disorder at regulated football matches. This backs up the conclusions of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, who was commissioned by the Football Association to undertake an independent review surrounding the completely unacceptable disorder by England football fans seen at the Euro 2020 final. The noble Baroness found that cocaine use was rife during Euro Sunday, and witnesses on the day were terrified by the reckless and aggressive behaviour of some fans. Unfortunately, this trend has continued since the Euro 2020 final. A recent study found cocaine traces on nearly all tested toilet cisterns at a major football ground, and the police have found it necessary to carry out matchday operations to seize drugs at football matches and arrest individuals. Cocaine use is highly harmful to both the user and those around them. There is a clear nexus between those who are under the influence of class A drugs and those who have propensity to cause trouble.

A football banning order is an effective tool to help to combat this rise in football-related disorder. We want to be clear that anybody causing trouble at football matches is liable to a ban from all regulated football matches for between three and 10 years. Football banning orders have historically proved successful in preventing known troublemakers continuing to offend and deterring others from offending. This is an important point: we want to prevent offenders attending matches and deter others from future offending. Watching football is not a crime, obviously, but commit crime at football, spoil the match experience for everyone else, and you are not welcome and will be prevented from attending.

The instrument contains a measure to address this; it will ensure that those who turn up to football matches in possession of class A drugs or intending to supply class A drugs to others will be subject to football banning order proceedings following conviction. This will give the police an effective tool to combat the rise in drug use seen at football matches. Police data shows that there were over 140 reported arrests for drug offences during the 2021-22 football season. We cannot allow decent football fans to be frightened of attending matches, or football stadia to become unsafe.

I reassure your Lordships that this order has the backing of the Football Association, the Premier League, the English Football League and the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for football policing. I know your Lordships will recognise the detrimental effects that class A drug supply, possession and use can have at a football match, and I hope that your Lordships support this measure to combat these offences that have contributed to a rise in football-related disorder. I commend this order to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the statutory instrument and thank the Minister for introducing it so clearly. I regret that it is necessary. It is depressing that, according to the official statistics published by the Home Office on 22 September, the incidence of football-related disorder is at its highest level for some years—a fact that the Minister referred to. There were 2,198 football-related arrests under Schedule 1 to the Football Spectators Act 1989 in the 2021-22 football season—around 59% higher than those in the 2018-19 pre-Covid season and comparable to the levels seen in the 2011-12 and 2013-14 seasons. A new factor is the incidence of drug-taking at football matches, hence the reason for this order.

Those of us who were involved with the efforts of the football bodies and the Government to tackle what was described as hooliganism associated with the game in the 1980s and 1990s knew that alcohol played a huge part in many of the events that shamed English football at that time. Your Lordships may have seen that there is currently a three-part series of programmes on Channel 4 on Monday evenings which centre on the Italia 90 World Cup. They remind us how dire the reputation of English fans at home and abroad then was.

We had hoped that this was all behind us, but quite obviously that is not so. That impression is reinforced if one studies the excellent independent report produced for the FA by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock, on the events surrounding the Euro final at Wembley on 11 July 2021, to which the Minister referred. This was the subject of a Private Notice Question I asked on 6 December—almost a year ago now—in which I said:

“She makes it clear in her report that we shall never know for sure how close we came to a huge disaster involving major loss of life, caused by 6,000 ticketless fans outside the stadium who were ready to storm inside had England won the penalty shootout.”—[Official Report, 6/12/21; col. 1641.]


Contained in the noble Baroness’s report were a number of comments about drug-taking. For example, page 26 says:

“Eyewitness accounts given to the media in the immediate aftermath of Euro Sunday state that there was use of drugs, in particular cocaine, among the crowd. These are supported by the Review’s survey, which suggests illegal-drug taking must have been widespread and taken place in plain sight. More than 3,500 respondents (47 per cent) said they saw illegal drug taking when they arrived at Wembley.”


As the noble Baroness pointed out, and the Minister has confirmed today,

“Football Banning Orders (FBOs) can be given to supporters in relation to alcohol misuse. Offences include ‘possession of alcohol or being drunk while entering/trying to enter a ground’. But there is no equivalent provision for drugs”—

so far. As the Casey report says on page 117,

“drug use in football stadiums is a growing concern for football and policing officials.”

She cites the finding of cocaine traces on almost all the toilet cisterns of a major football ground.

Unsurprisingly, the noble Baroness said in recommendation 5 that

“the Home Office should consider … ensuring that the FBO regime to ensure drugs-related disorderly behaviour is treated in the same way as alcohol-related disorder”.

This SI implements that recommendation, and therefore I welcome it. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that the Government are taking equally seriously the other recommendations contained in the noble Baroness’s outstanding report.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument, which we support. I declare an interest as a sitting magistrate who has fairly regularly put in place football banning orders for various reasons. As the noble Lord said, this is about adding the possession or supply of class A drugs at football matches as a reason for giving a football banning order.

We welcome the work that the police have done with the football authorities to reduce violence and drug-fuelled behaviour at games, although I note the figures that the Minister and my noble friend Lord Faulkner gave about the deteriorating situation in recent years. As my noble friend said, it used to be so much worse back in the 1990s.

When was this matter first raised? Was it really as a result of the European final that it came starkly to the attention of Ministers, or were there concerns before that? Also, is there any evidence of similar concerns or problems with other major sports, such as cricket or rugby? Obviously we are talking about football banning orders, but how wide does this problem go?

Has there been any wider work done on why these problems seem to be worsening? Is it because of drug use, or are there other problems behind it? Is this being investigated by the Home Office? Is it that drugs are more generally available? There has been an increase in drug-related deaths in England and Wales in recent years, and we know that communities and children’s lives are being blighted by county lines gangs. What is being done to tackle the supply of drugs reaching fans and to ensure that police forces have the resources to support specialist drug enforcement teams and take action on recognising child criminal exploitation?

A football match should be a safe, accessible, enjoyable experience for fans of all ages, so what wider work is being done by the Home Office to encourage safe and positive environments for sports fans? We of course support the statutory instrument, but my questions go a bit wider, to other sports and to how this impacts on drug policy as a whole. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and particularly note the widespread support for this measure, which is as it should be. I am sure we all agree that there is no place for class A drugs or the disorder they give rise to at football matches. This simple, practical measure to tighten the law will ensure that the football banning order regime properly encompasses those who commit drug offences related to football. I take particular note of the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on the dangers of cocaine misuse.

I will try to address some of the specific points that your Lordships raised. The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, quoted the statistics; I will go into a little more detail on those. Official statistics for the 2021-22 season show that there were 2,198 football-related arrests, which is a substantial increase—59%—on the last complete pre-Covid season. It is important to note that football-related arrests had previously been on a long-term down trend, reducing by some 50% since the 2010-11 season to record lows. Last season’s arrests total was comparable with the 2013-14 season. There were also 170 dedicated football officer-related incidents of supporter drug use during the 2021-22 season.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, also referred to the Channel 4 documentary on Italia 90. I have not seen it—I am still mentally scarred by our loss to Germany, of course—but I will definitely watch it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the Minister concludes, does he not agree that drug offences are fairly unique in that a drug crime is recorded only when police make an arrest? Therefore, the more effort the police put into the enforcement of offences involving possession or supply of drugs, the worse the problem appears in terms of the statistics. The emphasis should be on reducing the disorder that results from drug-taking rather than placing any reliance on the number of people arrested or convicted of drug offences at football grounds, because that could be the product of enhanced police enforcement rather than an increase in use.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is almost certainly right, although I cannot prove or disprove that either way. But as I said, a considerable and comprehensive report was written after the disturbances at Euro 2020 which highlighted these issues, so it would be logical to conclude that police upped their activity and I would imagine that that led to an increase. However, I cannot prove that, and if I am wrong, I will of course notify the noble Lord. In the short term, I commend the regulations to the Grand Committee.

Motion agreed.

Alcohol Licensing (Coronavirus) (Regulatory Easements) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Alcohol Licensing (Coronavirus) (Regulatory Easements) (Amendment) Regulations 2022.

Relevant document: 13th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this instrument, which was laid before Parliament on 22 September, contains measures to provide ongoing support to the hospitality sector, which endured an immensely difficult period during the pandemic and is now grappling with cost of living concerns. As your Lordships are aware, the Government recently announced the energy bill relief scheme, which will provide a discount on gas and electricity bills for business customers, including those in the hospitality sector. This follows a number of measures to support the hospitality industry and other businesses during the pandemic and since Covid restrictions eased.

During the pandemic, we provided a package of financial support to businesses, including the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, the Eat Out to Help Out scheme, and a business rates holiday for retail, hospitality and leisure businesses. We also introduced a number of regulatory easements through the Business and Planning Act 2020. Among those were temporary measures to make obtaining a pavement licence quicker and easier for those who wished to set up chairs and tables outdoors. Parliament has already agreed to extend those measures, and they will run until September next year.

A complementary measure on alcohol licensing gave a temporary off-sales permission to 38,000 licensed premises in England and Wales that did not have one. There were also measures which increased the number of temporary events notices that licence holders were allowed to give in a calendar year. Those provisions remain in place until December next year.

The instrument I propose today is relatively modest. It is an extension of provisions in the Business and Planning Act to allow sales of alcohol for consumption off the premises to licensed premises that did not have that permission for a further year, until 30 September 2023. In the intervening time there will be a consultation on long-term arrangements.

I assure the Committee that officials consulted the National Police Chiefs’ Council about the effects that the temporary off-sales permission has had. The view of the police then was that it had not caused any increase in crime and disorder.

I know that your Lordships will appreciate the impact that the pandemic and the cost of living have had on the hospitality industry, and I hope that you will support these measures to aid its recovery. I commend this instrument to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations. I understand that many people were very concerned about going to on-licensed premises—going to the pub—because of their concerns about catching coronavirus. My personal experience of socialising in central London—very limited, because I am always here doing work—is that most restaurants and pubs seem to be very busy. I am not sure whether the Minister can tell the Committee whether that is universal or a phenomenon just in central London, but that is my experience.

My understanding of the previous regulations is that they were to try to compensate pubs that had only an on-licence for that lack of trade so that people who were anxious about catching Covid could instead get their alcohol to take away—they could take it home or even, when the weather was more clement than it has been for the last few days, drink it outside. The only thing I would ask is this. Why do the Government think that that particular Covid support, which is what these regulations are about, should continue? What evidence is there that people are still nervous about socialising in an enclosed space and that it is therefore necessary for on-licensed premises to be able to sell to people to take away?

If this provision is simply for other reasons—the noble Lord mentioned increased energy prices having an impact on on-licensed premises in particular, but there is also the cost of living crisis, with people feeling that they cannot socialise as much as they did in the past because of the pressure on household budgets—why not have an alternative measure? The noble Lord talked about consultation on more permanent measures, but, bearing in mind that the police say that there has been no adverse impact on giving on-licensed premises the ability to sell alcohol to take away, why has a permanent change not been brought forward, rather than what appears to be the rather spurious extension of coronavirus-specific regulations that we have before us?

I appreciate that civil servants, particularly in the Home Office, have been very busy with other things in recent months, and it may be that the easy route was simply to extend the coronavirus regulations, but we need to move on from the impact of the pandemic and the virus and be more honest. If we think that this is a good thing in the long term, we should have a permanent change in the law. I know the Minister said a consultation is being conducted on it. That would be more honest than extending coronavirus regulations that, by this time, should have come to an end.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

One of my principal questions was going to be whether this is the easy route, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, put it, and whether there is a long-term review of the law. It may be appropriate to keep the changes in some cases and not in others, so I would be grateful if the Minister will respond to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

We support this change. We have been told that, as far as the NPCC is concerned, there has been no increase in anti-social behaviour as a result of these measures. Did the consultation go beyond the NPCC? Were local police forces consulted? Are there variations in different parts of the country?

I too have experience of occasionally going to social events in central London, and it is true that the bars and restaurants seem to be extremely busy. However, in other parts of the country or other parts of London, many restaurants and pubs are shut because of the impact of the pandemic, as well as changing habits. How much variation across the country have the Government seen? Is this blanket approach appropriate and how should it be looked at over the longer term? Does the Minister have any updated information on the impact of Covid on the hospitality sector and its recovery? One reads extensively of the hospitality sector still struggling because, in spite of our experiences in central London, the numbers are not back to where they were, and this is proving a problem.

Have any local authorities raised any concerns about extending these changes? Are there any extra costs or burdens on local authorities? Finally, were any local communities consulted? Did they have views on the extension of these licences?

The central question is that asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about how this temporary change, which we approve of, fits into a wider review of provisions that were brought in during the pandemic, some of which may continue while others do not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who contributed. I am thankful for their general support for this measure and their recognition that we should be looking to support our hospitality industry, which has suffered a tumultuous few years and continues to feel the after-effects of the pandemic; I will come on to that in a second.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned the fact that this a temporary measure and asked why it is not being made permanent, since it extends the off-sales provision only until next September. Let me go into some detail regarding what has happened since the pandemic.

Police: Vetting, Misconduct and Misogyny

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker]

To ask His Majesty’s Government how they plan to respond to the report of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on vetting, misconduct, and misogyny in the police service.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his Question. This report contains extremely concerning findings about policing culture and vetting processes, which are falling short of the standards expected and damaging public confidence in the process. Forty of the recommendations in the report are for policing itself to adopt, for chief officers and the College of Policing respectively. Chiefs have committed to addressing the recommendations in full and the Home Office will consider and respond to its three recommendations in due course.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for the reply, but today we learned from the police inspectorate’s report of extraordinary failures in the vetting of applicants to join the force. Is it true that at a time when confidence in the police is being undermined, hundreds, indeed thousands of officers are on our streets who are guilty of serious offences? How has that happened and when was the Home Office aware of it? Is it acceptable that officers with convictions for robbery, indecent exposure and domestic abuse, and links with serious and organised crime, have been accepted? How is it possible that we read of unwarranted stops of women by officers as a result of the so-called booty patrols? This is happening now. It is not historic—it is not “Z Cars” or “Dixon of Dock Green”—so the need for action is urgent. What are the Government, with the police, going to do in practice? The time for reviews is over. It is action that is needed, is it not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

It is, and I agree with the noble Lord entirely that it is completely unacceptable to have those people in our police forces. The fact is that the chiefs need to take immediate action to ensure that vetting is prioritised in their forces and the public can therefore have confidence in them. It is the responsibility of the individual police forces; they are responsible for their own vetting decisions, which they should take in accordance with guidance from the College of Policing. Frankly, I agree with the noble Lord: it is incredibly disappointing—worse than disappointing —that, despite some progress, previous warnings about vetting have not been acted upon. Chiefs must make clear to the vetting units the high standards they expect from them. There is no excuse for poorly recording the rationale in the vetting decisions.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this is yet another devastating report on the police service—devastating particularly for female victims, who will be wondering whether they can trust the officer who arrives when they call the police, and devastating for the majority of decent hard-working police officers, who have again been let down by successive Conservative Governments and their own senior officers. Every single time there is mass recruitment in the police service, more of the wrong people slip through the vetting net, and police misconduct, corruption and criminality increase. It happened in the mid-1970s and in the mid-2000s, and it is happening again now. Will the Government tell the police that quality is more important than quantity, and will they give police chiefs the legislation they need to enable them to deal effectively with corrupt officers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not entirely sure I share the noble Lord’s analysis of the quality problem. The fact is that a new online application process has been introduced, replacing an old assessment centre system called SEARCH. The new process operates according to national guidelines and it has been reasonably successful so far. Some 83,500 candidates were invited to complete the assessment; 58,000 have had their results marked and 42,500 have been successful—that is 73.55%. It is not just online; all the candidates have to pass each stage of the recruitment process, which includes assessment centres, vetting, medical assessments and fitness tests—there are lots of face-to-face aspects of the process. I am not convinced that an uplift in numbers affects quality.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, when asked about these matters the noble Lord says repeatedly that police vetting, discipline and recruitment must be left to chief constables themselves, but should there not be a legislative framework for this? The Government are very ready repeatedly to legislate for extra police powers but not for what the public deserve, which is a rigorous legislative scheme for recruitment, vetting and discipline.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is the way the system is currently set up. As I say, the Home Office is not trying to absolve itself in this regard, but the fact remains that the vetting processes, which vary to some extent across forces, are the responsibility of chief constables.

[Lord Dear (CB)]

My Lords, I remind Members of the House of my previous service in senior positions in a number of police forces in this country. The report in the newspapers this morning will fill all of us with concern—indeed, dismay. The findings of the inspectorate report are horrific. There will be many factors behind this, but I ask a question on one factor only: the need for staff training to develop leadership. The Home Office disbanded the Staff College—and this is nothing to do with the College of Policing—some 12 years ago. It was not re-established, and it badly needs to be so. Do His Majesty’s Government have any plans to re-establish the Staff College?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Not as far as I am aware, but I defer to the noble Lord’s specialist knowledge on this subject and I will take the question back to the Home Office.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in his first Prime Minister’s Questions last week, Rishi Sunak chose to close the session by bragging and baiting the leader of the Opposition—to braying from the Tory Benches—saying that there are 15,000 new police officers on our streets. When he did so, how much did he know about the scale and nature of this—that hundreds, perhaps thousands of those people may have passed through flawed vetting processes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have no idea what the Prime Minister knew or did not know.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

What is the role of the police and crime commissioners in dealing with a matter such as this?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As my noble friend will be aware, and as we debated extensively earlier this week, police and crime commissioners, along with chief constables, are responsible for setting out individual forces’ ways of dealing with and performing on these matters.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

I ask the Minister gently about the decision to get rid of police officers during the first eight years or so, from 2010 onwards. Now that the Government have changed their policy, there is a need to get a lot of police officers in as quickly as possible in order to tackle crime. Does the Minister not think that those early decisions, in Budget after Budget, to take money away from police recruitment were terrible mistakes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I obviously cannot answer that. I do not know if it was a good idea or not. The fact remains that the recruitment drive, as part of the police uplift programme, is delivering a large number of police officers. To reassure the House, there is no evidence to suggest that this is responsible for any adverse decision-making in vetting.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, is not the essence of this report contained in the third paragraph of the foreword, which says:

“Some police officers have used their unique position to commit appalling crimes, especially against women. Some forces have repeatedly failed to implement recommendations – from us and other bodies – that were designed to prevent and detect such behaviour”?


Who is responsible for ensuring that the police implement these recommendations?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is a matter for individual forces. I am pleased that the HMICFRS report and its recommendations have been accepted in full. The National Police Chiefs’ Council chair made the point in the report that chief constables, supported by national bodies, will act on these recommendations and put the problems right. We cannot risk predatory or discriminatory individuals slipping through the net because of flawed processes and decision-making. The noble Lord’s question is completely right; this is shocking, and I hope they do something about it with extreme speed.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, clearly, there is a significant problem here. There is a system-wide failure if, as the report says today, officers were satisfactorily transferred between forces

“despite a history of attracting complaints”.

Moving a problem from one force to another does not solve it. Will the Government take urgent steps now to deal with these matters systematically and coherently?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, the noble Baroness is right: it is not right that these people get transferred across forces. I think I have outlined in previous questions the large number of people who are currently on barred lists. The forces are working on this, and it is a matter for chief constables to enforce. As I just said in my previous answer, they have accepted the need to do so speedily.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

Following the noble Baroness’s comment about transfers to other police forces, can my noble friend tell us whether the Police Federation has had anything to do with this?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not know; I cannot answer my noble friend.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, the subject of this Question takes us back to many of the areas we covered in both the Domestic Abuse Act and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, so there is a strong sense of déjà vu all over again. The Minister has made much about it being up to individual police forces to take what action they consider appropriate. I suggest to him, on the basis of this report and others, that they are not assuming their individual responsibility with any degree of similarity or with great efficiency. I listened to BBC Radio 4’s “Woman’s Hour” this morning, which is very informative. Is the Minister aware that an ex-head of the Greater Manchester police force, when asked what advice he would give to the young female members of his own family regarding interactions with the police, was unable to answer the question, saying, “I’m not quite sure”?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I did not hear the programme to which the noble Lord refers, but that is obviously very shocking indeed. The body responsible for vetting guidance is the College of Policing, which will consider any areas where vetting can be strengthened and respond accordingly. This is done within a national application framework, so it is hoped that this will be corrected, as I say, with extreme speed.

[Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean (Lab)]

My Lords, listening to the Minister’s answers, one could be forgiven for coming to the conclusion that he is saying that the Government have no responsibility for this. I find that quite extraordinary. Why can the Government not bring forward a legislative framework to ensure that these sorts of police abuses cannot occur?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have outlined the current system; that is all I am doing. I am not saying that the Government are not very concerned by this report, but the simple fact of the matter is that the Government do not have responsibility for operational policing.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister just said that that is the current system. Are the Government satisfied with the current system, and if not, what are they are going to do about it?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

It is not in my gift to do anything about it, but I will take the noble and learned Lord’s suggestion back to the Home Office and make sure that there are further discussions on the outcome of this report, and indeed this discussion.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, it is frequently said, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”, but on this occasion it is broke and it does need fixing. Will my noble friend take that message, from all sides of this House? In particular, will he reflect upon the very sensible suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, who really does know what he is talking about?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reassure my noble friend that I did say I would reflect on the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and I intend to do so.

[Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)]

The Minister is very well regarded in the House. He is on a difficult one today, but would he express a personal view on what he believes should be done in regard to the question from my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Does the Minister feel that the time has come for a royal commission? Every day in this House we have a new fundamental problem—police and crime commissioners, police reporting, police culture or the question of whether there are too many differing police forces. Is it not time for a fundamental look at the relationship between government, the police and any other related body, to try to re-establish the reputation, which we have long gloried in, of our police forces in this country?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

What I would say—and this is a personal opinion—is that it is very clear that the nature of policing is changing dramatically and has done over the past 20 years. We have just heard about the technological changes that have taken us all by storm over the last decade, and about the vast number of reviews, reports and so on. It seems to me that there is a case to be made to bring many of these strands together and do some new thinking.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

What, if anything, is being done to see whether there are serving officers in the police today who may be in the category of those regarded by the whole House, and indeed the nation, as a complete insult to police officers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord asks a very good question. Nine forces were—this is appalling English—deep-dived into by the HMICFRS. All nine chief constables have been alerted to the specific case studies that were raised and they are expected to act on this with extreme speed.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

There are 43 forces; the others are not immune from this problem.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, they are not. Indeed, there was considerable data sampling across the rest of the forces, so a very similar process will be undertaken with the rest.

National Security

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as a former senior police officer with more than 30 years’ experience, I am acutely aware of the issues of national security, both physical and cyber threats. I welcome the appointment of the right honourable Tom Tugendhat MP as Minster of State for Security. He has a long and distinguished record in this area. He is clearly and quite rightly concerned about the threats facing Members of Parliament, those who work with us and the country as a whole from extremists and hostile foreign states.

It is regrettable that other members of the Government, past and present, appear not to have taken national security as seriously as the Member for Tonbridge and Malling is doing now. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, the last but one Prime Minister had a meeting with a former member of the Russian KGB when he was Foreign Secretary, on his own, in a foreign country, without reference to officials. The previous Prime Minister had her phone hacked; and the current, and second but one, Home Secretary—the same person—used her own mobile phone to receive and transmit restricted documents. Does the Minister agree that the actions of senior members of his own party have damaged, rather than promoted, national security?

We on these Benches agree that the Security Minister’s initiative is welcome, if not overdue, and we agree that this must be a united effort involving all of us, working with our security and intelligence agencies and the police. Having visited both MI6, where representatives of MI5 were also present, and GCHQ, I know that we have outstanding security and intelligence services, but without Members of this and the other place taking security seriously—particularly members of the Government, not least Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries—their efforts will be undermined.

As the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said in the House this week, it is not just the potential for leaks of our own highly sensitive information, as there is a risk that our security partners in other countries will not share vital intelligence with us because they fear that our security is not tight enough. Can the Minister confirm that from now on members of the Government will set an example by their own behaviour in relation to protecting national security, rather than providing counterexamples that jeopardise national security?

It is not only democracy that is at stake if hostile foreign Governments seek to influence or disrupt the democratic process, but the security of each and every citizen and the economic well-being of every business and industry in the UK. I am glad that an adult has been put in charge of this task force; I just hope that those who he is surrounded by will do as they are told.

We have a wealth of experience on these Benches, including privy counsellors and former members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who I am sure will be only too willing to help and support the Minister with these issues.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that the first duty of the Government is the protection and security of the nation. I also echo both noble Lords’ praise for our security services, which I also have some experience of and which I think are magnificent and first-rate.

As regards the questions on the task force, I think it makes sense for me to read out what my right honourable friend the Security Minister said yesterday, because I think it answers all the questions in full:

“The taskforce will work with Parliament, Departments, the security and intelligence agencies, the devolved Administrations and the private sector. It will work to better protect the freedoms and institutions we hold dear—institutions such as this very House.


The taskforce will look at the full range of threats”—


I add “including cyber”—

“facing our democratic institutions, including the physical threat to Members of this Parliament and those elected to serve across the country”,

as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out,

“so tragically brought home by the murder of our dear friends Sir David Amess last year and Jo Cox in 2016, and the support on offer through Operation Bridger and by the police. The work of this Taskforce will report into the National Security Council and more details will be set out in the update of the integrated review”,

so unfortunately I cannot answer his question about timing.

My right honourable friend in the other place went on to say:

“This is not just a taskforce for this Government. It will be cross-departmental and inter-agency, and I will be inviting cross-party co-operation, because, as I have said, this is not just about Ministers in office, civil servants or advisers across Whitehall. This work is for all of us in this House and those who have asked us to represent their interests.”—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/22; col. 791.]


I do not think I could agree more.

I will go on to the more specific questions. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the meeting that the former Prime Minister had in Italy with Lebedev. When he was Foreign Secretary, he declared his visit to Italy, which was published under the usual transparency requirements. At the Liaison Committee on 6 July, he committed to follow up in writing, which he did on 26 July.

Both noble Lords asked about the case of the Home Secretary. I am afraid I am going to repeat an answer given by my noble friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office earlier. The Home Secretary has provided a detailed account of the steps that she took in her letter to the HASC. For national security reasons, we are not commenting on allegations about the then Foreign Secretary’s phone.

Going back to the integrated review, I say that it makes sense to remind the House that it concluded that China poses a

“systemic challenge … to our security, prosperity and values—and those of our allies and partners”,

and that the Chinese authorities adopt a whole-of-state approach in which businesses and individuals are forced by law to co-operate. We know that the Chinese authorities are actively seeking to gain our cutting-edge tech, AI, advanced research and product development. We are working to protect our national security and ensure that the UK is resilient.

The noble Lord specifically asked about the recent rather troubling stories about undeclared Chinese police stations in the UK. The reports are being taken seriously, and they are concerning. Any foreign country operating on UK soil must abide by UK law. The protection of people in the UK is of the utmost importance. For example, any attempt illegally to repatriate any individual will not be tolerated. As noble Lords would expect, Home Office officials are working closely with FCDO, DLUHC and other government departments to ensure that the UK is a safe and welcoming place for those who choose to settle here. I cannot go beyond that at this point.

Noble Lords asked whether there was a culture of Ministers using personal phones for official business. No, there is not. There are appropriate arrangements and guidance in place for the management of electronic communications within government. Ministers receive support and expert advice to help them meet their obligations in the most appropriate and secure fashion. Again, as my noble friend answered in the previous Question, government devices should, as far as practicable, be used for government business. The guidance does not rule out the use of different forms of electronic communications, however.

Our allies are obviously aware of what has happened here, but I remind noble Lords that we do take a leading role on the global stage in countering state threats. We will continue to work closely with like-minded allies and partners to defend UK interests and the international rules-based system from hostile activity. Unfortunately, as I have already stated, I cannot comment on details of any discussions where commenting publicly on threats to the UK would give an unnecessary advantage to our adversaries. I hope that answers noble Lords’ questions as fully as I am able.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, the scope of this new task force is, of course, enormous, since nowadays almost every aspect of connection and influence is being weaponised, including education, culture and issues far outside the normal security scope and outside the range of intelligence and cyberattack. We are subject, in this country, every hour of the day, to a bombardment of fake news and distortion, penetrating every aspect of our society and clearly covering our own debates. They say that the best form of defence is attack. Can the Minister assure us that this task force will also look at ways of returning in kind some of the material that pours out, in particular from the CCP in China, attacking not just democracy but our form of democracy and claiming, rather ironically, that China’s form is more precise and more effective than ours? Can he assure us that we have a full intellectual force ready to challenge the arguments at their roots in order to refute the kind of poison that is daring to try to demoralise and undermine our society?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am pleased to be able to reassure my noble friend that I can. I am going to give a long answer, for which I hope the House will be forgiving, because this is important. In 2019, we established the defending democracy programme. It is a cross-government programme, with an overarching objective to safeguard elections and referendums related to democratic processes in the UK. It focuses on delivering four outcomes. Elections are secured through the protection of their physical personnel and cyber infrastructure; the safety of elected representatives, parliamentarians, voters, candidates, campaigners and poll workers is protected; the regulation of political campaigning must be robust; the impact of disinformation, misinformation and wider information operations is mitigated and minimised.

There is also, as part of that work, the DCMS Counter Disinformation Unit, which leads the operational and policy response for countering disinformation across HMG. That has included responding to acute information incidents such as the Ukrainian conflict, Covid-19 and general elections. When false narratives are identified, the CDU co-ordinates with departments across Whitehall to deploy the appropriate response. This could involve direct rebuttal on social media or awareness-raising campaigns to promote the facts. Obviously, I cannot go into—and I do not necessarily know—what other sorts of action we take overseas, but that is certainly what we are doing here, and it is fairly robust.

[The Lord Bishop of Leeds]

My Lords, I really welcome the Statement and the very full answers that the Minister has given. It is very encouraging. However, when the Statement refers to protection that defends our democratic institutions, it is not just external threats: there are internal threats that weaken our defences, such as putting draft legislation into Parliament that threatens to breach international law. If we uphold the rule of law, we cannot continue to do that. Will the Minister give a commitment that the Government will not do this, as they did in the overseas operations Bill, the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, and so on? Just to encourage him, I suggest that a reading of President Steinmeier’s speech on 28 October to the German people sets in a very good context how a Government might approach some of the threats and the wider challenges that we face.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the right reverend Prelate for that suggestion; I will read that speech, which to date I have not. He invites me to stray into areas where I would prefer not to go. There are differences of opinion when it comes to these laws; I will leave it there.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the daily and repeated Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure are evidence of the importance of this to our national security. Is the Minister aware of the two week-old report of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy about critical national infrastructure, which is scathing about the Government’s ability to protect it? It specifically identifies a lack of leadership, an absence of co-ordination among government departments and the disbanding of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. In short, it calls on the Prime Minister to

“get a much better grip on … national security”.

When will we see the long-awaited national resilience strategy?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot answer that specifically. I have seen that report and have read a variety of newspaper reports with mounting alarm, as I am sure the noble Lord has. I think the task force will address a good deal of the noble Lord’s concerns, and I look forward to hearing what it has to say.

[Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)]

My Lords, I echo the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, but in relation to the report of this House’s risk committee, in which we found that there were real, critical vulnerabilities in our critical national infrastructure. The urgency of the Government producing the resilience report cannot be overstated. It is surely time for the Government to recognise that the front lines of battles that we face now are no longer in other countries but in our computers, our water systems and our electricity systems. They need to be taken really seriously.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that question. I am afraid I will again answer at some length, because the subject of cyber resilience is at the heart of what he, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Browne, asked me. The current state of UK resilience to cyberattack is an interesting subject, and we are making significant progress in bolstering the UK’s resilience. We stop hundreds of thousands of attacks up stream while bolstering preparedness and helping UK institutions and organisations better understand the nature of cyber threats, risks and vulnerabilities down stream.

Despite this, there remain serious gaps in the nation’s defences, as both noble Lords have pointed out, and the collective resilience-building effort must continue apace. Poor organisational practices, processes and systems, and a lack of awareness of risks and mitigations, all contribute to attacks getting through. Taking some practical and cost-effective steps, such as improving the use of account authentication, could have prevented a lot of damage. I could go on, but at this point I reiterate my praise for the work of the security services. I have seen some of their work in this area, and it is incredible.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Is it not a threat to national security to have a Home Secretary who uses inflammatory, racist language and dehumanises thousands of traumatised asylum seekers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If the noble Baroness is asking whether there was a threat to national security, I would have to say no.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, following on from the excellent question by the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, I ask the Minister to look again at some of the threats to national security coming from serious organised crime and cybercrime, and the way in which provincial police forces are responding. He touched on this briefly, but what more can the Government do to improve capacity and expertise among those provincial police forces?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that question. As he says, I think I have already partially answered it. The NCSC has helped UK institutions and organisations better understand the nature of cyber threats, risks and vulnerabilities. It has helped them to take action to secure systems and services that society depends on. It stops attacks up stream, as I pointed out. It would be wrong to go into more operational factors, but I hope my noble friend is reassured that much work is being done in that area.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the creation of the task force, but I fear I have to return to the issue of the Home Secretary. Had it not been for the fact that the Home Secretary inadvertently sent the email to someone whom she did not intend to send it to, we would never have known anything about this. Since the Home Secretary has ministerial responsibility for MI5, what do these facts do other than undermine her authority in the event that she finds similar instances in the ministry for which she is responsible?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am going to disappoint the noble Lord. I can say only what I said earlier: the Home Secretary has provided a detailed account of the steps she took, in her letter to the HASC. I am unable to comment further.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, there are many definitions of threats to national security. The Minister is right to point to some of the differences between, for example, the more immediate threats posed by Russia and the longer-term strategic threats posed by China. My noble friend Lord Browne has already referred to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s recent report on critical national infrastructure. It is a very good report and very pertinent to this question. Will the Minister assure the House that in the progress of this task force, which I support, it will also liaise with the same committee—of which I am a member—as we have just launched an inquiry into ransomware, which has aspects which directly relate to national security?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Viscount—it absolutely does have aspects which relate to national security. I go back to what I said earlier when I quoted my honourable friend in the other House. This is not just a task force for the Government. It will be cross-departmental and inter-agency and he will be inviting cross-party co-operation. The noble Viscount makes a strong case for his committee’s involvement in that area.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

The reports of unofficial Chinese police stations in the UK and other allied nations are deeply alarming and have rightly been roundly condemned by the Security Minister. If the reports prove to be accurate, and these are not immediately disbanded, is there not a very strong case for co-ordinated action across our allies to impose sanctions on the Chinese Government for doing this?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is right to point out that these reports apply not just to the UK. I believe that one suspected institution of this type has already been closed down overseas. I think he makes a strong case, but I do not know the progress of the investigation, so I cannot comment as to how they might be shut down.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

Relevant document: 1st Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the duty of any Government is to protect the safety and interests of the law-abiding majority. This means working to prevent and reduce crime, giving the police the tools they need and ensuring that those who break the law face proportionate consequences of their actions. Fighting crime and keeping communities safe is at the forefront of the Government’s agenda. That is why we have invested £17 billion in policing. It is why we are running a police uplift programme that is well on the way to recruiting 20,000 additional officers, and why we introduced the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, which received Royal Assent in April.

While that Act has given the police some of the tools they need better to manage disruptive protests, we were frustrated in our attempts to implement the full suite of measures needed to ensure that the public can go about their daily lives free from serious disruption or harm. The Public Order Bill therefore builds on the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act to bolster our ability to crack down on disruptive and dangerous tactics of the kind we are seeing deployed all too frequently.

Specifically, the Bill targets acts by a minority of people that cause serious disruption to the hard-working majority, such as those we have seen in recent months that have brought roads to a standstill, blocked emergency services and forced thousands of police officers away from the critical work of protecting their communities. In October alone, the Metropolitan Police made more than 650 arrests in relation to Just Stop Oil activity in London.

When speaking about some of this disruption, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley noted that his force’s response over 11 days of protests had been the equivalent of more than 2,150 officer days. That, I am sure noble Lords agree, is a striking number. It encapsulates why it is so crucial that we act. The police perform a unique role in our society; theirs is undoubtedly a job with many different strands. These include public order, but it cannot be right that so much of their time and resources are taken up by tiresome and disruptive stunts that, far from advancing the protesters’ cause, serve only to infuriate everyone else.

Peaceful protest is a fundamental part of our democracy. We will never agree on everything, which is why vigorous but sensible debate is something we hold so dear. What we cannot and should not accept is a situation in which the lives and livelihoods of decent, law-abiding citizens are impeded by the actions of a selfish and reckless few. The public are fed up with what they see happening day after day, and who can blame them? It is now up to us, as parliamentarians, to act in their best interests and get this crucial Bill on the statute book.

I will now speak to the measures set out in the Bill. First, the Bill introduces a new criminal offence of locking on, accompanied by a further criminal offence of going equipped to lock on, criminalising the tactic of intentionally causing disruption by locking on to busy roads, buildings or scaffolding. Locking on is as risky as it is disruptive, endangering not only the protesters but the police removal teams. I was therefore pleased to hear the leader of the Opposition confirm last week that his party would press ahead with tougher prison sentences for protesters who glue themselves to roads.

Secondly, the Bill introduces a new criminal offence of tunnelling, being present in a tunnel and going equipped to tunnel, making it clear that the protest tactic of building and occupying tunnels in order to disrupt legitimate activity will not be tolerated. HS2 has been targeted on multiple occasions with tunnels that have caused enormous cost to the project, with three removal operations alone costing in excess of £10 million. But it is not just about the costs. Tunnelling is dangerous and reckless, endangering not just those who occupy the tunnels but the responding emergency workers. We cannot wait to act until someone is seriously injured or worse.

Thirdly, the Bill establishes new offences for obstructing major transport works and interfering with key national infrastructure, reflecting the serious impact of such acts and our determination to tackle them. I have already touched on some of the disruption to projects such as HS2. HS2 estimates that sustained protester action has led to additional costs to the project of more than £146 million, an amount projected to rise to £200 million by the end of next year. The offence of obstruction of major transport works therefore ensures that all stages of construction and maintenance will be protected from disruptive action, while the key national infrastructure offence will ensure that our major transport networks, energy and fuel supplies are protected.

The new offences in the Bill are accompanied by an extension of stop and search powers for police to search for and seize articles connected to protest-related offences such as locking on and tunnelling.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

I absolutely agree with what the Minister says about the police being given these new powers, which are long overdue, but does he agree that once they have them, it is incredibly important that they use them? There have been examples of the police—not the Met but other forces—adopting a “softly, softly” approach that has encouraged the people who have been locking on and causing disruption.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree, of course, with my noble friend and I am sure we will come on to that subject in some detail later.

In its report on the policing of protests, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services concluded that stop and search powers will improve the police’s ability to prevent serious disruption, and we agree. I want to be clear to noble Lords that existing safeguards around the use of stop and search powers, including statutory codes of practice, use of body-worn video to increase accountability and extensive data collection will continue to apply.

Next, the Bill lowers the rank of officer to whom the commissioners of the City of London and Metropolitan police forces can delegate powers to prohibit or set conditions on protests. The rank is being lowered from assistant commissioner to commander. This retains senior level involvement but will allow the most senior officers more time to focus on the challenges that the Metropolitan Police Service faces. It will bring London forces into line with forces across England, Wales and Scotland, whose chief officers can already delegate their powers to the commander-equivalent rank of assistant chief constable. The Bill also extends to the British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police existing powers to manage public assemblies in Part II of the Public Order Act 1986.

The Bill contains two other measures, as well as an addition from the other place. First, it establishes a new preventive court order, the serious disruption prevention order, which may be sought either on conviction or following an application by a chief police officer. This is targeted at protesters who are determined to repeatedly inflict disruption. The courts will be able to place conditions on individuals to prevent them engaging in criminal acts of protest and causing serious disruption time and time again. These conditions could include curfews or electronic monitoring but, most importantly, they will be for the courts to decide, not the Government. The threshold for the imposition of these orders is appropriately high and I trust our police and courts to impose them only where necessary.

The second measure provides a Secretary of State with a specific mechanism to apply for an injunction in relation to protest activity that causes, or threatens to cause, serious disruption to key national infrastructure, or to access to essential goods or services. An injunction could also be sought where the protest activity has, or is likely to have, a serious adverse impact on public safety. This does not affect the right of local authorities or private landowners to apply for an injunction but gives a Secretary of State an additional route to act in the public interest where the potential impact is serious and widespread. For example, a Secretary of State could have applied for an injunction on behalf of the various local authorities affected by the recent Just Stop Oil protests that obstructed roads across London.

Finally, on a free vote with cross-party support, an amendment was inserted into the Bill by the other place on Tuesday 18 October. Clause 9 establishes buffer zones around abortion clinics where interference with people accessing or providing abortion services would be an offence. The Government will consider how to implement and deliver this amendment. Noble Lords may have seen a Written Ministerial Statement which I issued last week, in which I indicated that I was presently unable—before introduction—to sign a statement of compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. I would particularly welcome your Lordships’ engagement on this clause.

I conclude my opening remarks by saying that there are inevitably differences of opinion, which we will come to consider throughout the course of this debate. But I hope all noble Lords recognise that blocking ambulances, preventing cars carrying sick children from passing, or damaging artworks is completely unacceptable, whatever the cause. That sort of behaviour is not only breathtakingly selfish; it pulls the police away from the people and places that need them the most. This cannot continue. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions throughout this debate. I will endeavour to respond to the points that have been made. For the record, I refute the assertion that this is some sort of battle in the culture war, not least because I am fond of tofu.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has just asked for a list of the various Bills. I commit to write on that, and will obviously study Hansard carefully. If I miss the specific questions of any other noble Lord, I will also write on those, but I will endeavour to get to all of them.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti, Lady Jones and Lady Blower, have argued that the Bill will have a chilling effect and cause peaceful protesters and bystanders at protests to be criminalised. I respectfully disagree and say that that is not the case. The right to protest peacefully, as my noble friend Lord Sandhurst just noted, is a fundamental part of democracy and that will never change. Protesters can continue to have their voices heard but, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham noted, they will not be allowed to wreak havoc on the lives of others while doing so.

At this point I would like to quote the chief constable for Essex Police, Mr Harrington, who said recently that

“concerns about the climate—however real—cannot justify actions that seriously disrupt and endanger the lives of others”.

I would agree with that, much though I share the concerns of those climate protesters. I think most of the House shares those concerns and the Government, as has been argued on many occasions in this Chamber, are doing a lot of work on the subject.

A number of noble Lords brought up the fact that they believe the Bill to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. We have been clear that we believe the measures in the Bill are compatible with the ECHR in the main, with the exception of Clause 9; namely the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association. However, these rights are not absolute. They do not extend to wreaking havoc on the lives of others.

Several noble Lords, including the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord McAvoy, and my noble friend Lord Frost have argued that there are existing powers for the police to use and that the Bill is therefore unnecessary. I respectfully say that recent events demonstrate that this is not the case. As helpfully explained by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, we have seen instances where the current legal measures are insufficient to prevent serious disruption or to hold disruptive protesters to account, even in cases where disruption has incurred unjustifiable costs of over £10 million.

In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about new and evolving tactics by protesters I will this time quote chief constable Chris Noble from the NPCC, who said:

“There have been some very novel … and highly disruptive tactics; that is reflected on the contents page of the Bill”.


He subsequently said that protesters

“are very aware of some of the legal gaps, inadequacies and shortcomings”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Order Bill Committee, 9/6/22; col. 5.]

It is worth pointing out that Chris Noble leads at the NPCC on protests.

I turn to the arguments made by noble Lords including the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Anderson, regarding the stop and search powers contained in the Bill. Stop and search powers will enable the police to proactively tackle highly disruptive protest offences by searching for and seizing items which are made, adapted or intended to be used in connection with protest-related offences, such as glue, chains and locks. Stop and search can also act as a deterrent by preventing offenders carrying items for protest-related offences in the first place, because of the increased chance of being caught.

Concerning the suspicionless powers, we believe these are necessary and reflect the operational reality of policing these protests. In the fast-paced context of a protest, it can be challenging to assert the appropriate level of suspicion needed for a suspicion-led search. In addition, the use of suspicionless stop and search is not inconsistent with the right to engage in peaceful protest, as it would be targeted only at preventing the guerrilla tactics employed by some. HMICFRS has also recognised the need for the police to be granted suspicionless powers to stop and search for articles connected with protest-related offences and, at the Bill’s oral evidence session, HM Inspector Matt Parr reaffirmed his support for these measures.

I also seek to assure noble Lords that existing safeguards for the stop and search powers that are already in place, such as body-worn video and PACE codes of practice, will continue to apply to stop and search powers provided for in the Bill. It is worth pointing out that the Home Office publishes extensive data on the police’s use of stop and search, in the interests of accountability, and will expand this publication to the use of the new powers provided for in this Bill.

I turn to the concerns about the serious disruption prevention orders raised by noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Coaker, Lord Paddick, Lord Foulkes, Lord Anderson, Lord Hendy and Lord Skidelsky, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble friend Lord Frost. Noble Lords have raised particular concerns about the orders made “otherwise than on conviction”. Serious disruption prevention orders are a proportionate way of dealing with those who cause serious disruption and misery to others. I assure the House that they cannot be arbitrarily imposed on innocent individuals.

SDPOs are used only where there is evidence of two or more instances where the individual has been convicted of a protest-related offence, breached a protest-related injunction or committed, caused or contributed to another specified protest-related activity. Importantly, it is for our independent judiciary to decide whether to impose an SDPO. They are to be used only where the courts find clear evidence that an SDPO is absolutely necessary to prevent an individual engaging in prohibited activity. The threshold for the imposition of these orders is therefore appropriately high, and I trust our police and courts to impose them only where necessary.

I turn to the arguments made by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Hogan-Howe, regarding the inclusion of a definition of “serious disruption” in the Bill. As noble Lords will be aware, no two protests are ever the same and being too prescriptive risks the ability of the police to respond to fast-evolving protest tactics, while also risking the exploitation of loopholes by those intent on causing as much disruption as possible. The notion that courts and the police interpret terms in English and Welsh law is a principle that we have long relied on to ensure that those who enforce the law are not limited by instances that a definition will not be able to capture. Nevertheless, I recognise that a clear definition could bring benefits and I recognise the strength of feeling expressed on this issue today, so I will reflect further on it. I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on his other two questions, if that is acceptable.

Throughout this debate, many views have been expressed by noble Lords regarding the insertion of Clause 9 by the other place. As the Minister there said, Clause 9 is a “blunt instrument”, and the Government believe that it would not be proportionate in its current form. However, I note that the proponent of the clause, the Member for Walthamstow, accepted that it would need to be refined in this place. I therefore stress that this measure will not prevent people expressing their views; it will prevent protesters doing so only near women accessing abortion services.

Furthermore, as noble Lords will be aware, Clause 9 meant that the Government were unable to issue a statement of compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights upon the Bill’s introduction to this House. However, the Government accept the view of the other place that the existing powers are inadequate to deal with the problem—but we cannot accept Clause 9 in its current form. However, I am happy to say yes on all three of the specific concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, about this. I invite interested noble Lords to engage and work with us on this to deliver a workable solution.

As I expected, this has been a lively and thought-provoking debate. This is clearly an issue of significant interest and importance. But the fact is that we have a responsibility to act and update our laws to reflect changing tactics. The Government will not stand by while decent hard-working people have their lives and livelihoods disrupted; we will put the law-abiding majority first. I commend the Bill to the House.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to which the Public Order Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order: Clauses 1 to 18, the Schedule, Clauses 19 to 35, Title.

Motion agreed.

Police and Crime Commissioners and Panels

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the ability of Police and Crime Panels to hold Police and Crime Commissioners to account.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the two-part police and crime commissioner review considered the role of police and crime panels and concluded that they have the appropriate powers to scrutinise police and crime commissioners. However, the consistency and quality of this scrutiny can vary. Recommendations arising from the review have therefore focused on improving panels’ understanding of their role, the application of their existing powers and strengthening the professionalism and quality of the support provided to panels.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister. Does he agree that, to do their core job of holding police and crime commissioners to account—nobody else does it, least of all the Home Office, I am afraid—it is necessary for a panel to be robust, challenging and fair? Much depends on the approach, attitude and style of the chair of the panel. Given the need for the public to have confidence in the system, would the Government consider amending the rules so that a chair of a police and crime panel cannot be from the same political party as the police and crime commissioner?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As the noble Lord will be aware, the Government believe that panels have the appropriate powers, agreed by Parliament, to effectively scrutinise the actions and decisions of PCCs and enable the public to therefore hold them to account. As I have also just said, we concluded a two-part review. In part 1 we took steps to improve and strengthen the scrutiny of PCCs by issuing new guidance and a training package for panels. Through part 2 we are undertaking a fundamental assessment of the panel support model to further improve the professionalism, quality and consistency of support provided to panels. I am very happy to take the noble Lord’s suggestion on chairmen back as part of that ongoing assessment.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, should not the police and crime panel in Leicestershire be urged to pass a vote of censure on the irresponsible PCC Mr Rupert Matthews for paying some £100,000 per year for advice from Mr Mike Veale, a discredited policeman who is facing a gross misconduct hearing? Could not that money have been spent better on front-line policing?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is not for me to comment on individual cases. However, police and crime panels must refer serious complaints and conduct matters to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Panels are responsible for resolving non-serious complaints made about a PCC’s conduct when in office. Ultimate responsibility for handling any complaints they have received remains with the panel.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the likelihood of members of police and crime panels asking difficult questions of police and crime commissioners if they belong to the same political party, bearing in mind that they will want a police and crime commissioner from their own political party to be re-elected? Is it not time to take party politics out of policing?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would argue that it is about public accountability, not party politics. We heard through part 1 of the PCC review that the public cannot always easily access information on how well their force is doing, which is obviously vital if they wish to hold PCCs to account. The review therefore recommended that the specified information order of 2011 was amended to require PCCs to publish additional information. That came into force in May 2021. There is transparency and accountability in the system, and rather more than under the old one.

[Lord Naseby (Con)]

My Lords, I remember when the original police and crime commissioners Bill went through the other place. Like other parties in the Midlands, where I come from, I wonder whether the role now pursued by police and crime commissioners is what was originally conceived. Given that worry, is it not time perhaps to have an overall look at the role of our police and crime commissioners?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

It is fair to say that the role has evolved to some extent. Whether it is appropriate to have an overall review is already under discussion.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, before the Government introduced police and crime commissioners, we had police and crime panels, just as we now have to oversee the police and crime commissioners. If that system was so bad that we needed to introduce police and crime commissioners, who cost a huge amount of money and whose ability is variable, why do we now have police and crime panels to oversee them?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I made it clear that there is a transparency and accountability issue. I am grateful to my friend Katy Bourne, the Sussex police and crime commissioner. She tells me that PCCs are more visible and approachable than the police authorities that they replaced. Many hold monthly accountability meetings with their chief constable, often online, which the public can attend and contribute to.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, surely the ultimate test of the PCC system and the panels is whether policing has improved as a result of the legislation that the Government brought in. Surely the general concern about the overall performance of police forces is an indication that the system is not working.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am obviously aware of the noble Lord’s long engagement with this subject, but I do not agree; there are lots of reasons why things have happened.

[Lord Dobbs (Con)]

My Lords, I will be perhaps a little unhelpful to my noble friend and say that I quite agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bach. Trust in the police has measurably declined in recent years. My noble friend’s predecessors have stood at that Dispatch Box and talked about the former chief constable of Wiltshire and commissioners of police in the London Met, and we have had endless examples of where the system is going wrong. Whatever system we have set up for this, is it not ultimately the Government’s responsibility to sort this out and restore trust in the police? Without that, we cannot trust in justice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for his helpful question. It is of course up to the Government, and we talked about last week’s Casey review at some length in the Chamber. The Government are doing a lot to restore confidence in the police, and of course the police also have a responsibility to do so, as Sir Mark Rowley has said.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, said, is there not example after example, across the country, of police and crime panels failing to hold chief constables and commissioners to account? Instead of the Government having review after review, is it not about time that police and crime panels were given the teeth to hold commissioners to account and, in that way, restore confidence to policing? If the Minister is so confident of the work of the police and crime panels, will he place in the Library a list of examples of where they have worked?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The Government are confident that the panels have the appropriate powers—agreed by Parliament, as I said—to effectively scrutinise the actions and decisions of PCCs and enable the public to hold them to account. Through the review process, we agreed that this scrutiny was inconsistent in some cases, and significant measures have been taken to do something about that. These include extensive engagement with members of the panels, which has proved popular; indeed, there are requests for more of that engagement.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, at the risk of asking another unhelpful question, I say that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, are on to something about the imperfections of the panels. But why not replace them with a really powerful body that could fire the police and crime commissioners just like that? We could call it the electorate. Is that not the strongest accountability of all?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Actually, that is a helpful question, because the electorate do of course have ultimate responsibility for the election of the PCCs. I am pleased to say that the electorate seem to be becoming more enthusiastic about the elections: turnout has increased every year. Obviously that is not determined by a single factor, but it is going up.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister’s definition of “enthusiasm” is certainly different from some that I could suggest. One of the main purposes of the whole system of police and crime commissioners was to get closer engagement between the public and policing. With three rounds of police and crime commissioners elections having taken place, the turnout has varied between poor and abysmal. Clearly, they are not fulfilling one of the key reasons for their having been established, so what is the point of them?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have answered the question about the point. I have the turnout figures: in 2012, it was 15.1%; in 2016, it was 27.4%; and in 2021, it was 33.9%. We cheerfully accept that those are not the greatest numbers—certainly not relative to national elections—but, in a local context, they are not bad.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

In most democratic contexts, they are pretty awful numbers. Did my noble friend see the report in the Times this morning quoting the chief constable of the West Midlands, in which he expressed great concern that crime figures were being inflated by including so-called intimidatory gestures, which resulted in no charges but created a fair amount of bureaucracy? Could this be something that the police and crime commissioners are asked to look into as a matter of urgency?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I absolutely think that it is, but police and crime commissioners are of course answerable to their electorate, so it depends on the electorate’s priorities. I imagine that the electorate of the West Midlands would share my noble friend’s concerns.

Police and Crime Commissioners

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions and very much congratulate my noble friend Lord Lexden as well on securing this important debate. I know that the topic has long been of interest to him, and a wide range of views have been expressed relating to the roles and responsibilities of police and crime commissioners this evening. I ought to remind the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the policy was introduced under the coalition Government. I do not believe that the model is broken, but I will come on to that in a second.

I also reassure my noble friend Lord Lexden that I am certainly not idle, but he may have noticed that I have had three bosses since he wrote his letter. I am still busily asking for the meeting that he requested. My predecessor asked for that meeting, which I am afraid was denied, but I will continue to persevere.

Before I get on to the bulk of the more general points, perhaps I may go into Operation Conifer to answer my noble friend Lord Lexden’s specific questions about that unfortunate case. Obviously I understand the strength of feeling on this matter. However, the Government have no plans to commission a review of either the conduct of the investigation into allegations made against Sir Edward Heath or the findings of that investigation. It is unfortunate, of course, that Operation Conifer was not able to resolve conclusively the position in respect of all the allegations made against Sir Edward Heath. I understand the desire of noble Lords to find a solution but the investigation has already been subject to considerable external scrutiny. I will go into that in a bit of detail.

There were three main bits of scrutiny. First, there was an independent scrutiny panel—I stress “independent”—to ensure proportionality. Secondly, there were two reviews by Operation Hydrant in September 2016 and May 2017, which concluded that the investigation was proportionate, legitimate and in accordance with national guidance. Thirdly, there was a review in January 2017 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary as to whether resources assigned to the investigation by the Home Office were deployed in accordance with value-for-money principles; the review concluded that they were. Finally, the Wiltshire PCC then referred two matters regarding Mike Veale to the IOPC. That is a lot of external scrutiny, if we are being objective about this.

I am going to talk more generally about the police and crime commissioner model and try to answer all noble Lords’ specific points. We accept that policing is a unique public service, but like any public service—I think all noble Lords acknowledge this—it needs to be transparent and accountable to the public. The introduction of PCCs in 2012 has brought real local accountability to how chief constables and their forces perform, ensuring that the public have a stronger voice in policing.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, that I have no particular knowledge of his successor; I do not know him, and I do not know what he has been doing in Leicester. I would have thought that, given what the noble Lord has said about him tonight, he is very accountable to his public. If he has behaved as described, then he deserves what is coming to him. PCCs operate in the full gaze of the media and must justify their record via the ballot box. This is in stark contrast to the invisible and unaccountable police authorities that preceded them. I will go on a little bit until we get to the review, then I will talk a little about complaints.

We are approaching the 10-year anniversary of their introduction and we think it is important to recognise the vital role that PCCs play in the public safety landscape. They work with their communities to focus on local priorities, using their convening powers to drive crime-fighting efforts in their areas and advocate for victims across the criminal justice system. PCCs have a strong involvement in work to tackle some of the most significant issues facing our society, including county lines, anti-social behaviour and violence against women and girls. There are lots of examples of that. I will go back to one from my friend Katy Bourne, the PCC in Sussex. She points out that 10 years ago, for example, only 20% of police and crime plans referenced prevention and now it is included in all police and crime plans. That is a direct, positive feature of the introduction of police and crime commissioners.

I will go on to the review, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to. It is vital that PCCs continue to be strong and visible leaders in the fight against crime. That is why in July 2020 the Government announced a two-part review into PCCs to strengthen their role, to ensure that they are accountable to the public and that they have the tools and levers to carry out their role effectively. Recommendations from parts 1 and 2 were announced by Written Ministerial Statement in March 2021 and 2022 respectively.

These measures will sharpen local accountability and improve the consistency and quality of scrutiny by police and crime panels, as we were talking about earlier, and make it easier for the public to hold their PCC to account for their record on reducing crime. They will also ensure that PCCs have the necessary tools and levers to cut crime and will turn the dial on their involvement in the criminal justice system, giving PCCs a more defined role in relation to offender management and strengthening their role in key local partnerships. Of course, the proof will be in the pudding. That is why we have retained a relentless focus on delivery to realise the benefits of these important recommendations as quickly as possible. We have moved to multi-year violence reduction unit funding to facilitate long-term preventative strategies, better enabling PCCs to develop long-term strategies for reducing crime in their locality.

We have amended the specified information order to improve PCCs’ transparency by requiring them to provide a narrative on the Government’s crime outcomes, their force’s His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services performance reports and further complaint-handling information. We have also strengthened the scrutiny of PCCs by publishing new guidance for police and crime panels, including a variety of training tools such as videos, good-practice guides and sharing best practice, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Also under discussion, and which I probably should have mentioned earlier in Questions, are regional panels. These are being looked at in terms of the police and crime panels as a way of ensuring that best practice is shared.

I take the point that publicity around the role of PCCs could be improved. I am going to get to the subject of the relationship between PCCs and chief constables. It would be important to answer the right reverend Prelate’s concerns and the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about the breakdown in communication and trust between those two roles. For a PCC to deliver to the community they serve, they need to have a strong working relationship with their chief constable. That has to recognise the operational independence of policing but also the local mandate of the PCC to deliver on local priorities.

The right reverend Prelate referred to the situation with Dame Cressida Dick. During the debate on the review of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, a week ago, I referred—at some length, I am afraid—to the mayor and MOPAC’s complex relationship with the Home Secretary in regard to this. I refer noble Lords to that in Hansard. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I do not think that anyone is blaming anyone; it is a complex relationship, and the lines unfortunately crossed on a number of occasions.

Through the PCC review, we heard loud and clear the need for clarification of the working relationships between policing system partners. This is one of the primary reasons why we consulted on the Policing Protocol Order 2011—I note the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—to ensure that we are able to support effective and constructive working relationships in the policing sector as well as possible. These responses are currently being considered, and we will update in due course.

We are also working with the sector to further develop the existing PCC and chief constable accountability guidance, which is designed to embed healthy working relationships between PCCs and chief constables, as well as outlining a framework for mediation for relationships that may be at risk of breaking down. We will also bring forward legislative amendments to make the chief constable suspension and dismissal process more rigorous and transparent, which in turn will make it fairer, ensuring that the chief constable has a voice.

I take the point about chief officer recruitment, which a number of noble Lords referred to. We want to ensure that there is a wide, well-rounded and diverse pool of candidates for appointment to chief officer ranks. We also want to ensure that there are consistent and high standards in selection processes. We welcome the College of Policing’s proposals for fundamental change to the current system, following a full independent review of progression and development to chief officer ranks. These measures will increase transparency and open up access to senior officer level development.

We continue to engage with local areas developing devolution deals to expand the mayoral PCC model, in line with the Government’s wider devolution and levelling-up agenda, and we have published our response to the consultation on giving PCCs greater powers of competence.

Time allows me to talk a little about the PCC complaints process, to which my noble friend Lord Lexden referred. Our announcement of the PCC review recommendations did not make specific recommendations on the PCC complaints system, and we are still committed to developing reforms in this area. This includes ensuring that there is clarity on what constitutes misconduct or a breach of expected standards by PCCs, deciding which body is best placed to handle certain types of complaints, ensuring that the system does not give rise to vexatious complaints and ensuring the effective handling of criminal allegations against PCCs.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

What do the Government plan to do to prevent serious misconduct hearings being indefinitely delayed, as has happened in Cleveland? What will the Government do to get clear answers to public inquiries made to the offices of police and crime commissioners, instead of the hopeless and inadequate answers that I cited?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I will disappoint my noble friend to some degree. As I said, we are committed to developing reforms in this area, and this will obviously need to look at the specific sets of circumstances to which he refers. I will make sure that my noble friend’s particular points are taken back and incorporated.

As I was saying, developing reforms include ensuring that there is clarity on what constitutes misconduct or a breach of expected standards by PCCs, deciding which body is best placed to handle certain types of complaints, ensuring that the system does not give rise to vexatious complaints and ensuring the effective handling of criminal allegations against PCCs. We acknowledge that we need a system that is open, transparent and fair for all parties when handling complaints. While we develop the reforms in this area, we have taken interim steps to assist. This includes publishing guidance to strengthen the quality and consistency of scrutiny by panels, more clearly explaining their roles and responsibilities—I note the point of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—including in relation to their remit for handling PCC complaints.

The noble Lord, Lord Lexden, also asked what legal requirements exist to ensure that police and crime commissioners answer the inquiries made to them. The actions and decisions of PCCs are scrutinised by the panels, and the PCCs must provide information and answer questions raised by their PCP, where reasonable and appropriate, in line with their duties in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Where necessary, PCCs must also respond to freedom of information requests from the public, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

We intend to legislate to deliver those recommendations from the PCC review, which require primary legislation, as soon as parliamentary time allows. We are also fully committed to delivering the remainder of our non-legislative recommendations in conjunction with the sector by the end of this calendar year, where possible.

I am afraid I do not have any time left, but I close by saying that we seem to have debated the instances—very bad instances; no one is denying that—of one or two particularly bad apples. The fact remains that there are 39 PCCs and three mayors with PCC responsibilities and, as has been recognised, we should all acknowledge that they are, in the main, doing a very good job. I take this opportunity to thank all our sector partners for their continued support.