Rwanda: Asylum Arrangements Treaty

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 21st November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have for ratification of the proposed asylum arrangements treaty with the government of Rwanda, as announced by the Prime Minister on 15 November; and whether they intend the treaty to be subject to scrutiny by Parliament for 21 days under the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government will lay a treaty before both Houses of Parliament in due course. This will enable Parliament to consider Rwanda as safe, in conjunction with new legislation announced by the Prime Minister. We will follow standard procedure as per the CRaG Act.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

I am grateful for that Answer and for the confirmation that this time, the treaty will be put through the CRaG process. That will mean that Parliament will be able to scrutinise the agreement and consider the relevant policy considerations, and indeed the financial implications, unlike the memorandum of understanding, which the International Agreements Committee of this House previously said was deeply concerning because that scrutiny was not available. Can the Minister also tell us when the CRaG notice will be given so that that process can start, and when the relevant Minister will come to the committee to give evidence?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I do not have that detail because the Bill has yet to be presented to Parliament. However, as I understand it, the timeframe is 21 days after laying, when both Houses are sitting, for the treaty process to take effect.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, for the purposes of assessing the safety of a country, a theoretical commitment to treaty obligations is not sufficient? What counts is the performance of those obligations, which requires a period of assessment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend asked me a very similar question yesterday and I will give a very similar answer, which is that I am unable to predict what is likely to be in the legislation that is yet to be presented to Parliament.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, will my noble friend confirm that, if a committee of this House—the International Agreements Committee or indeed the relevant committee in the other place—under CRaG, were to make a report for debate, the Government would not proceed to ratification of the treaty unless and until that debate had taken place?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, the noble Lord is asking me to speculate on something that has not yet happened, and I am afraid I do not see the point of that.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, are the Government intent on making any payment to the Government of Rwanda for converting their MoU into a treaty, and have the Government provided any support to the Rwandan Government in the last 12 months for the training of their officials in the immigration department?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, as I said yesterday, in answer to the second part of the noble Lord’s question, the answer is yes. As regards the costs, I have no knowledge of that.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, this proposal is both an expensive distraction and a delusion. Is it not true that even the far-right Prime Minister of Italy has proposals that would mean processing offshore but with Italian immigration officers, and those adjudged to be legitimate asylum seekers would then be returned to Italy? If we cannot manage something the far right in Italy can, what sort of people are we?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not sure I would characterise the Prime Minister of Italy as far right, to be perfectly honest.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

This is a personal opinion, my Lords. Having said that, of course, I am also not going to speculate about what other countries may be doing. I notice that a number of other countries are exploring possibilities very similar to those we are looking at.

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

My Lords, have not the Falkland Islands been considered as an alternative to Rwanda, and what progress has been made with that proposal?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I read that story in the papers, and I have no idea.

[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

My Lords, did not the Supreme Court make a finding of fact that Rwanda had broken similar agreements in the past with the Government of Israel and that the state of the Government in Rwanda did not give rise to any confidence that they would comply with the agreement we have made? How does a treaty affect that at all? Are the Government capable of taking any steps that make the Government of Rwanda look more capable, and are the Government searching for another safe country that can be trusted, which seems to me the only way in which this policy can possibly be continued with any hope of success?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that gives me an opportunity to reflect again on what the court said:

“changes and capacity-building needed to eliminate the risk”—

of refoulement—

“may be delivered in future, but they were not shown to be in place when the lawfulness of the policy had to be considered in these proceedings”.

The fact was that those proceedings considered one day —14 June 2022. Much has changed since then, so I think we should wait to see what the legislation says.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday, the Minister could not answer a number of questions regarding the proposed treaty ratification process—its consents legislation —despite his usual courtesies. Was he aware that the same day he was speaking, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was pictured carrying the returns (removal to Rwanda) Bill into Downing Street with the date of 19 November on it? I think we could do with knowing whether the Minister was aware of the contents of that Bill. Can he confirm that the Bill will have a proper, full ratification process, not contain suggestions such as the Falkland Islands, which we have heard about, as a fallback position, and also respect international law—or does he need to consult the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, before he answers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would also note that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked me an incredibly unhelpful question on another subject yesterday, so that is a win double. Actually, I was not aware of any of the contents of whatever may or may not have been in the folder of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that entirely legal immigration, encouraged by his Government, is roughly eight or 10 times the number of illegal migrants, to which this Question is addressed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I am aware of that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The Minister did not answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Clarke. According to the Telegraph, Lord Sumption warned that a new treaty would not prove the country was safe, as Rwanda does not have the institutional strength to observe its own treaty obligations. What changes have happened to give the Government the belief that it has the strength to fulfil its treaty obligations?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, the noble Baroness is speculating as to what may or may not be in the legislation, which no one has yet seen—apart, perhaps, from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. However, I would also note that there are 135,000 refugees in Rwanda as we speak.

[Lord Popat (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as the Prime Minister’s trade envoy to Rwanda. I was appointed in 2014 by the then Prime Minister, who I am delighted to see on our Front Bench today—my noble friend Lord Cameron. In dealing with Rwanda for the past nine years, I have found the Government to be very honest, transparent and forthcoming. I am sure my noble friend will agree that whatever agreement we reach with the Rwandan Government, they will show due respect for it, but, most important, for the asylum seekers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend very much indeed for that question, and I agree with the sentiments behind it. The Rwandans have behaved with great dignity in the face of some provocation.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, in answering the question from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, the Minister did not give the answer that I think we were hoping for. I know that it is not the Minister’s department, but when the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone—he is probably here—was in the Department for International Trade, “the Grimstone rule” was agreed. It said that, where a committee asked for a debate, it would be given. I hope that the Minister’s department will act as honourably as the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, did when he was a Minister and that that debate will be given.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will certainly make sure that the noble Baroness’s comments are reflected back to the department.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, it may have escaped the Minister’s attention that a schedule to the then Illegal Migration Bill had Rwanda down as a safe country. It also listed another 20 or so countries that the Government deemed safe through that legislation. What assessment have the Government made of those countries in the light of the Supreme Court’s judgment?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the Supreme Court’s judgment was specific to Rwanda, so we should leave it at discussing Rwanda for now.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, given that so many other countries have issues similar to our own, can my noble friend the Minister update the House on any conversations about an international agreement, perhaps under UK leadership, to deal with this issue on a wider basis?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As we discussed at the Dispatch Box yesterday, those sorts of discussions are clearly going to have to take place at some point. Again, that question would perhaps be more appropriately directed at my noble friend the Foreign Secretary.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, can the Minister indicate whether the provisions in the new Rwanda treaty will adhere to the ECHR, which underpins our Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as I say, I cannot comment on the specifics at the moment. However, I reiterate the Prime Minister’s commitment to stopping the boats and removing barriers if necessary. The detail and implications of doing so will be considered carefully; of course, that will take the GFA into account.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, that concludes Oral Questions for today. We now come to some formal business, so if any noble Lord would like to leave, now is the time to do it.

Illegal Immigration

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, this Statement is welcome; of course, we could have had it last week, but that was not to be the case. However, that has allowed us the whole weekend to understand slightly more the Government’s intentions—at least some of the Government’s intentions, some of which are being challenged. It means that we have to examine this Statement very carefully. The Statement says that the Government of course “respect the Supreme Court”, but we are being asked to suspend belief—to convert black into white on the say-so of the Government.

Are the Government intending to implement legislation that simply allows them to make an opposing declaration to that of the Supreme Court on the safety of Rwanda for refugees? To what extent is that respecting the Supreme Court’s decision? Do the Government agree with the Supreme Court that, in order to see their Rwanda policy in operation, they would need to disregard the ECHR and the United Nations system of international treaties, including the refugee convention, the United Nations convention against torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and also change not just the Human Rights Act but also domestic asylum legislation from 1993 and 2002?

Further, the Supreme Court judgment states about the Rwanda system that

“necessary changes may not be straightforward, as they require an appreciation that the current approach is inadequate, a change of attitudes, and effective training and monitoring”.

Therefore, in the past 12 months, have the UK Government provided any effective training to Rwandan officials?

Thirdly, this Statement says that arrivals are down, decisions are up, returns are up—we are getting on with the job. Believe that if you wish. Small boat arrivals are down on last year, but if you remove Albanians—clearly, we must accept the policy that returns those who are not genuine asylum seekers to their safe home country—total numbers are up from 2022. Going by the recent annual grant rates, 75% of those who crossed this year would be granted asylum. Of course, because clauses of the Illegal Migration Act have not yet been brought into force, the Government will have to hear this backlog of cases. The current backlog of cases is 122,585, taking legacy and flow numbers together. In addition, government figures show that small boat arrivals represent only 37% of people claiming asylum, up to June 2023.

What actions are being taken to ensure that those from high grant rate countries have a safe way to travel to the United Kingdom to claim asylum: for example, an Iranian female political protester, a Russian anti-war activist, a young man at risk of forced conscription from Eritrea, and so on?

Finally, I note that the Statement says:

“we are not going to put forward proposals simply to manufacture an unnecessary row”

for short-term political gain. Good luck with getting people to agree to that.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, it goes without saying that Wednesday’s outcome was not what the Government wanted to see, but we have spent the last few months planning for all eventualities and we remain completely committed to stopping the boats.

The core part of our policy—to relocate those who entered illegally and have no right to be here to another country—remains lawful. We have also made progress on other fronts of our plan to tackle the small boats—which I will come back to in a minute—but crossings are down, the backlog is being cut, and it is interesting to note that countries across Europe have seen what we are doing and are interested in following suit.

The Supreme Court recognised that changes may be delivered in future which would address the issues it raised. The Prime Minister has spoken to President Kagame of Rwanda and both countries reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to deliver on our landmark partnership. We will work with Rwanda to address the Supreme Court’s concerns by setting out strong assurances in a new treaty binding in international law. However, we are also going a step further. As has been noted, the Prime Minister has announced that we will take the extraordinary step of introducing emergency legislation to enable Parliament to confirm that, with our new treaty, Rwanda is safe.

As to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on the various newspaper-based speculation about what people, including the new Home Secretary, may have said, I will not speculate but I note that he did not recognise the phrase that I think the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, described as colourful, and therefore I wish to take him at his word. What the current Immigration Minister thinks on this, I do not know.

When people know that if they come here illegally, they will not get to stay, they will stop coming altogether and we will stop the boats. Illegal immigration destroys lives and costs British taxpayers billions of pounds a year. We need to end it, so we will do whatever it takes.

However, as the new Home Secretary has pointed out, the Rwanda plan has only ever been one tool in our toolbox, and we have other schemes to drive down these numbers. We are tackling illegal immigration at every stage of the journey of a would-be illegal migrant, and our plan is working. Last year, the Prime Minister signed the largest ever small boats deal with France—I believe that 22,000 crossing attempts have been prevented because of the close co-ordination between British and French officials, and that is in 2023 alone.

Cutting-edge surveillance technology is in play, and we have beefed up security infrastructure, such as more CCTV at key border crossing points along the channel. We have ensured that there are more French officials and officers patrolling French beaches, and, as I said, they are working closely with their UK counterparts. So that is less money that British taxpayers have to spend on hotels, less profit for the criminal gangs and fewer people to process—fewer people also, I should add, putting their lives at risk. That sends a clear message to those who want to cross that we will stop them.

The noble Lord referred to the fact that we now have a returns agreement with Albania, and seemed rather dismissive of it, but the fact is that so far during 2023 we have returned more than 4,600 people in just 10 months. He should be applauding that. We are targeting the movement of goods, such as dinghies and engines, that are used to facilitate the crossings in order to undermine a key component of the smugglers’ business model. Apart from Albania, we have expedited returns arrangements with countries including France, Turkey and Italy. We have increased the number of illegal-working raids by almost 70%. We have cut the asylum legacy backlog by more than 59,000 cases. We have freed up hundreds of hotel beds with the use of alternative sites. We have announced the closure of the first 50 asylum hotels and we have passed the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which is the most ambitious immigration legislation in decades. It makes it clear that the only route to asylum in the UK is via one of the safe and legal routes that are in place.

Noble Lords asked about treaties and why this was not considered at the start. The fact is that a memorandum of understanding is a common mechanism for establishing an arrangement or partnership between countries. The Supreme Court was clear that Rwanda entered into the partnership and signed the MoU in good faith, and both countries remain committed to the partnership. We always knew that the partnership would face challenges, but we have been clear that we will do whatever it takes to deliver it.

On the Supreme Court’s decision and conclusion, the Prime Minister has said that we respect the Supreme Court’s decision. The rule of law is fundamental to our democracy, but it is also of fundamental importance that we stop the boats. I have of course taken note of the comments of Lord Sumption, but at the moment the only fact that is changing is that that MoU is being, shall we say, converted into a treaty. I do not know the details of that piece of legislation, but I have little doubt that we will be discussing it all at considerable length.

Something else that the Supreme Court said which I think is worth pointing out is that

“changes and capacity-building needed to eliminate the risk”—

it was talking, of course, of refoulement—

“may be delivered in future, but they were not shown to be in place when the lawfulness of the policy had to be considered in these proceedings”.

I make the point that the lawfulness of the policy that needed to be tested dated back to June 2022, more than a year ago. So, in answer to the noble Lord, Coaker, about what we have done since, the answer is that we have taken considerable measures since the Court of Appeal’s judgment in terms of getting skills and people into Rwanda to help them with their processes.

The noble Lord asked me about commencing parts of the Illegal Migration Act. We are moving ahead with operationalising other measures in the Illegal Migration Act, which will make it easier to remove people with no right to be here—for example, those who have travelled from fundamentally safe countries. On the cohort to which he referred who arrived under the new terms, I believe that they are still expected to be returned to Rwanda, but, obviously, at some point that will be tested in this House and the other House, so, as yet, there is no point in speculating as to how that might happen.

The ECHR has also come up. It is clear that this was a judgment from our domestic courts, not the ECHR. We always said that our plan will deliver the changes necessary to take away the incentive for people to risk their lives through illegal crossings, while complying with our international obligations. But, as the Prime Minister said, if people continue to put obstacles in the way of this policy, we will remove those barriers. As I said, we have already started the process on the treaty to address the Supreme Court’s concerns. The Prime Minister’s announcement of emergency legislation was clear, but I do not know what the content of that legislation will be.

Lastly, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for his hard work, professionalism and absolute dedication to stopping the boats. He is a friend, he was an excellent colleague and I am going to miss him.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, first, I too praise the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, at least for his determination with this Bill and the courtesy that he showed to the whole House at all times. However, why do the Minister and the Government not see that the proposal of a treaty with Rwanda would produce a document that would be yet another historically worthless piece of paper? Rwanda, on the facts and merits, has been found to be unsafe and, once somebody was sent to Rwanda, there would be no realistic possibility of enforcing their rights, whatever they were, through the Rwandan courts.

Secondly, does the Minister not agree that the ignominious squabbling among senior and former members of the Government is demeaning a serious subject on which we all have merited concerns, apart from a few who seem to regard it as trivial? Is it not now time for the Government to set about a doubled programme which would produce value, in cost terms, of dealing with the people in the backlog, wherever they are, as quickly as possible, by increasing the number of officials and putting the relevant courts and tribunals around the country so that they can deal with these cases on a day-by-day basis? Does he not agree that most of these cases could be dealt with within a few days if they were properly managed?

Finally, does the Minister agree that the Government should put all people who are de facto refugees back into the refugee system so that they can be dealt with according to the law and not by some artificial construct?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has asked me a number of questions. There is another one in there inviting me to speculate about something. Again, I will not do that. I do not know what will be going into the treaty or how it will look, so there is very little point in me commenting on that.

I do not regard the subject as trivial. It is of fundamental importance to the country and to Parliament. I respect the fact that we can debate it and look forward to many more debates on it. As regards the arguments that are allegedly going on behind the scenes, I am afraid I have not seen any evidence of that. How they are being leaked and whether they are happening, I do not know—but of course passions do run high on this subject.

The noble Lord asked another question. I have totally forgotten what it is, but I am sure that somebody else will remind me and I can then answer it.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Putting them back in the refugee system.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot comment on that at the moment, but, again, I am sure we will come back to it in due course.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that whether Rwanda is or is not a safe country is a matter of fact and that to displace such a finding of fact by the Supreme Court using a statute is very hard to reconcile with the rule of law? Perhaps I may make this suggestion. If we must have this Bill, we could have a delayed implementation date, to be triggered only by an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament, with that debate to be preceded by a report of a Joint Committee of both Houses advising on whether Rwanda is a safe country.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend, regarding the Supreme Court’s decision, that as of 14 June 2022 it did indeed regard it as a fact that there was a risk of refoulement. However, that is a fairly narrow interpretation of the rest of the system that is currently set up in Rwanda. Again, I will not speculate on how things may change. I also note that the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that there were cases where it could see the situation changing in the fullness of time. I expect that this is the area we are looking to explore.

As regards my noble friend’s suggestion of an affirmative SI, I am happy to take that back and enter that into the conversation that is taking place.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is of course quite right that when the facts change or, to put it better, are emphatically revealed by the Supreme Court, wise people change their minds. They do not attempt to legislate to change the facts. Will the Minister acknowledge that, contrary to various statements that have been made in this House by Benches opposite, the Supreme Court acknowledged the special role and expertise of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in evaluating the facts—that is, the safety of countries?

As for treaties, does the Minister agree that, whatever new treaty comes, there is a treaty in this area. It is a very well-established treaty called the refugee convention. It is so well established that aspects of it are arguably now part of customary international law. I know that the Minister cares about the rule of law. If the Government are going to disapply or abrogate the European Convention on Human Rights, will he encourage his colleagues to counsel what effects there might be on the behaviour of the Russian Federation and others—and those currently in jeopardy, including Ukrainian prisoners who are relying on interim orders for their lives and protection from the Strasbourg court?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Of course, I agree with the noble Baroness. The Supreme Court did acknowledge that the UN has a role to play in this; indeed, it was heavily referenced in the Supreme Court’s judgment. I also accept that a treaty already exists regarding refugees; that is incontestable. As regards what might happen regarding the ECHR, I have already said that that was not part of any of the discussions around this particular decision. This was a domestic court’s decision. I think it is a few steps away to discuss the ECHR, and the noble Baroness is well aware of my views on the subject.

[The Lord Bishop of St Albans]

My Lords, we on these Benches are quite clear that we cannot have open borders, that we must stop people risking their lives, and that we need to stop the people smugglers. But we are also clear that we cannot export our moral responsibilities towards those seeking sanctuary on to the shores of another country, be it Rwanda or anywhere else. This is such a long-term, complex, worldwide problem that we need a long-term strategy for tackling this refugee crisis, in concert with our global partners, so while the Government are proposing some immediate new laws, what are they doing to address the scale of the problem, to provide long-term certainty? Will the Minister commit to developing and publishing a long-term strategy so that we can all try to engage with this in a much more measured way?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the right reverend Prelate for those comments. I agree with his point that it is obviously also morally wrong for criminal gangs to profit from this evil trade, and to ship people across the Channel at incredible risk to themselves. In fact, I think we are very close to the anniversary of that particularly unpleasant tragedy that happened in the Channel last year. As regards this problem of illegal migration becoming long-term, the right reverend Prelate is of course right. There are many drivers of this, and it therefore seems likely to me that the world will have to get together to address the various things that are driving these movements of people—what makes people so desperate to leave their homes—and try to do something about it. So far, it seems to have eluded the world, but I sincerely hope the right reverend Prelate is right, and that we can do something about it sooner rather than later.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure that the Minister fully answered the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Will he now explain how a treaty or indeed legislation declaring Rwanda safe will solve the problem, given that the Supreme Court said that it was not the lack of

“good faith of the government of Rwanda”

that was the problem, but

“its practical ability to fulfil its assurances … in the light of the present deficiencies of the Rwandan asylum system”?

Presumably, they can make whatever binding commitments they like in a treaty, but the issue is the practical ability to deliver. Also, given that the Home Secretary says that the Government take their

“obligations to the courts very seriously”,

how can they change the law to “do whatever it takes”? What does “whatever it takes” actually mean?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would not try to explain that. I do not know what will be in the new legislation. I do not know how it is worded; I do not know what the intention is for it, so I cannot answer any of those questions, for obvious reasons. I do not know whether it will solve the problem; I sincerely hope it does, for obvious reasons. One thing I would expect to be in a treaty—I am just speculating—is that it will be enforceable in some way. Whether that is through the Rwandan courts or through other international means, I really do not know. But we are going some way to try to address the Supreme Court’s concerns.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend accept that we need a solution that is accepted across the political parties, particularly as there will be a general election within the next 14 months? Is there not an overriding case for saying that if ever a Bill needed pre-legislative scrutiny by a Committee of both Houses, it is this Bill?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord probably makes a good point, but my understanding from reading the likely timetable is that parliamentary time would not allow.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that his noble colleague told me several times—times beyond count, really—that I was totally wrong when I said that the Government’s attempts to send people to Rwanda were contrary to the refugee convention? So will he be very kind and tell me that now it has been upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court that view was correct? He will know that the Prime Minister has described the European Court of Human Rights as a foreign court. Does the Prime Minister regard the International Court of Justice, whose compulsory jurisdiction we accept and on which court we have no judge, as a foreign court?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was not present in the debate when the noble Lord said he was right, so I am not going to say whether or not my noble friend was right because I do not know what he said. As regards the Prime Minister’s views on the International Court of Justice, I am afraid I do not know as I have not asked him.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister more or less said that the Government had no intention of leaving the European Convention on Human Rights—he is shaking his head. In which case, are the Government aware that if they tamper with the ECHR, they are also tampering with the Good Friday agreement, which is linked to it? Is the Minister furthermore aware that there is still the Human Rights Act that the Government are talking about getting rid of? There is the 1951 refugee convention. There is the convention against torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There is a range of conventions, treaties and agreements. Are the Government saying that they are all liable to be changed as a result of the Supreme Court decision?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I did not say what the noble Lord asserts about the ECHR. I said that I do not know. The fact is that this decision was a domestic decision, not a European one. I am well aware that the ECHR is a cornerstone of the Good Friday agreement, and of course we recognise the significance of that. However, I reiterate that the Prime Minister has committed to stopping the boats and to removing barriers if necessary. The detail and any implications of doing so would obviously be carefully considered at the time.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

Has my noble friend had any luck in securing the conviction of so-called human rights lawyers who tell illegal migrants to throw away their passport and pretend that they come from a war zone when they do not or tell them to say that they are subject to child trafficking or modern slavery? Surely these people should be convicted and should not be part of the legal system in any way whatever.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If my noble friend is right in his assertions, yes, they should be convicted, but I do not what has happened with prosecutions and convictions in that space. I will endeavour to find out.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Does the Minister recall that the International Agreements Committee criticised the form taken for the previous agreement with Rwanda—a memorandum of understanding—and thought it should have been a treaty, partly because it was so weighty and partly to provide this House and the other place with an opportunity to scrutinise it properly. I think this new agreement will be scrutinised properly in this House so I am very glad that it is taking the form of a treaty, which will enable us to do that. The Statement said that it will be amended

“to make it clear that those sent”—

to Rwanda

“cannot be sent to any country other than the UK”.

That is what the Home Secretary said in the other place. How is that consistent with our Illegal Migration Act, which says that those who come illegally, in its terms, to this country can never be admitted to this country, will be sent to Rwanda and will be processed there by Rwanda for asylum in Rwanda?

The Minister said that other countries are seeing what we are doing and following suit. With respect, that is not the case. We are the only country that is saying, “If you come by a route that we do not like, we refuse to look at your claim”. We are telling people they may claim asylum in Rwanda but they can never come back here. No other country is doing that. Other countries are considering outsourcing the process and having the processing done abroad, but then the people could go on claiming asylum in the country they intended to go to. How does the Minister reconcile the statement that these people will never be sent to any country other than the UK with the Act, which we spent so long debating here and which I thoroughly disagreed with, that says they can never be sent back to the UK?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

First, I agree with the noble Lord about the International Agreements Committee and the previous comments made there. The fact is that the International Agreements Committee is now getting its wish. Legally enforceable treaties should be the vehicle of choice; obviously, it will be scrutinised in both Houses of Parliament. As regards the apparent anomaly between what the Home Secretary has said and what the noble Lord has just pointed out, to respond to that would be to speculate as to what will be in the forthcoming legislation when I simply do not know. I will make sure that point is well made, and I hope to come back to the noble Lord with a strong answer very soon.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the Supreme Court quite rightly emphasised the importance of the experience of the UNHCR, which had been disregarded. Are the Government now consulting with it and with other relevant NGOs?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the UNHCR was not disregarded by the Court of Appeal; that was really the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision. It very much took the court at its word. As I already said, the Government have made a lot of effort to pre-empt the Supreme Court’s decision by doing some of the things that were suggested by the Court of Appeal. Having said all that, we of course maintain close co-operation with all our international partners whether they be states, NGOs or whatever.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, on 15 November, last Wednesday, the Home Secretary told Parliament in the other place that the Government have

“for the last few months”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/11/23; col. 649.]

been working in Rwanda, building capacity—of decision-makers, I presume—and trying to amend the agreement with Rwanda. Since the Appeal Court decision in June this year, the Government have known that our courts thought there was a real risk of claims being wrongly determined in Rwanda, resulting in asylum seekers being wrongly returned to their country of origin. Can the Minister help me? Where in our deliberations on the then Illegal Migration Bill was either the House of Commons or our House told that this training was going on because the Government thought that real risk needed to be engaged with, or that the treaty that had been entered into was being renegotiated? If we were not told, why not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was not present in all the debates regarding the Illegal Migration Act so I cannot honestly answer that question: I do not know whether we were told. I do not know whether the subject came up, whether it was a subject for discussion or any of those things. I am not sure it was relevant to the debates—maybe it was, maybe not; I do not know. I will endeavour to find out and come back to the noble Lord.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, has the Minister seen the suggestion of Lord Sumption that the Rwanda scheme would be more acceptable if more of the assessment were done by British officials rather than Rwandan officials? Will he undertake to look into that in any review of the situation?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend makes a good point. I will absolutely take that back. We have been capacity building in Rwanda—the noble Lord just referred to it—and I know that a lot of that work is ongoing.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, press reports at the weekend stated that, between 2020 and 2022, 100% of asylum claims by people from Afghanistan and Syria were rejected by the Rwandan authorities while almost 100% of asylum claims by people from Afghanistan and Syria were accepted by the UK authorities. How can the Government maintain that Rwanda has been treating asylum seekers fairly in the light of these statistics?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it does not matter whether the Government assert that we have been treating them fairly; the fact is that the Supreme Court has ruled otherwise. As I said, we are capacity building; we are working with the Rwandans. We are working on a new treaty. I am sure that the noble Lord’s concerns will be addressed in the fullness of time.

Abortion Clinics: Safe Access Zones

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government will issue non-statutory guidance to ensure that law enforcement agencies have a clear and consistent understanding around enforcement, and that abortion service providers and protesters are clear as to what is expected under the new law. The Government will launch a public consultation on the contents of the guidance at the earliest possible opportunity, and following consultation we anticipate commencing Section 9 in the spring of 2024.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, there is a great deal of foot-dragging in this. Both Houses supported the Public Order Act six months ago, which was to protect women accessing legal healthcare for their necessary rights. Yet in these months the most cruel demonstrations are going on outside clinics—for example, people wearing bodycams and holding out posters saying that babies are being murdered there. I do not see that a consultation is necessary; I urge the Minister not to delay the will of Parliament any longer but to get on with it and protect women from these very cruel demonstrations.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I quite agree with the noble Baroness—it is totally unacceptable for anybody to be harassed or intimidated simply for exercising their legal right to abortion services. Personally, I find that very depressing to see. However, in terms of the public consultation, this is new legislation on an emotive topic, and there are strong views on all sides of the debate. Determining the appropriate balance will not always be straightforward. Therefore, to make sure that the legislation can be implemented effectively—that is the point—the Government have decided to launch a public consultation on the non-statutory guidance for safe access zones.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, we need to take account of the fact that the previous Home Secretary voted against safe access zones and has a history of opposing abortion rights. The noble Lord needs to give us an example of where—when the will of Parliament is so clear, as it is in this case—it has been necessary to have this kind of public consultation. We are very familiar with pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation in this House, but why are we seeing months-long delays? Can the noble Lord please give us a timeline?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I say to the noble Baroness that I already have: it will be commenced by the spring of 2024, and I am very happy to commit to making sure that that happens. The guidance is not straightforward because of the broad nature of the prohibited behaviours. For example, it is a criminal offence to intentionally or recklessly influence, which means that members of the public, the police and prosecutors will benefit from being aware of what could be criminalised within the zones. I totally take the noble Baroness’s point: I want to see this happen as soon as possible too.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that these women will be in a very fragile state of mind, and it is highly undesirable that they should be subjected to coercive behaviour by the opponents of abortion?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I completely agree.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

Can the Minister confirm whether the Home Office plans to be in touch with local councils, abortion care providers and the police in coming weeks to discuss how these zones are best implemented?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I say, there will be a public consultation, and I hope that all those whom the noble Baroness mentioned will engage with the consultation process.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Will the noble Lord guarantee that Section 9 will be in force and implemented before the next general election?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That would invite me to speculate as to when the next general election might be.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

Can my noble friend tell the House what advice will be given to police in the interim period to deal with those causing harassment and intimidation at the gates of abortion clinics?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend will be aware that a number of powers already exist, particularly around public space protection orders, which have been issued in a number of cases. Some guidance is already being deployed to local authorities, which have the powers to impose those public space protection orders where harmful behaviours are having, or are likely to have, a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality. There is plenty that the police can do already, but, as I say, the commencement will be by spring 2024.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, when will the consultation period end?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that it has not started yet; it will start imminently—and I mean imminently. The draft is ready; it is just a question of bureaucratic dotting of “i”s and crossing of “t”s. As soon as that is done, I will come back to the House to update your Lordships on the precise timelines of the consultation.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I am assured by the Minister’s own commitment to this legislation; he has made a clear statement. However, the concern that I have—having argued and voted for this legislation—is that the victims are still worried. They are already terrified sometimes when having this treatment and are further intimidated by some of the protests. Does the Minister agree that the consultation, important as it is, should not take so long? It is not very complex to implement; we have implemented greater criminal changes far more quickly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

First, I associate myself with the noble Lord’s remarks about the victims; I completely agree with everything that he said on that subject. I have tried to explain why the consultation will take the time that it will. I would like it to be concluded as speedily as possible, and I promise to come back to the House and update on that timeline.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, anti-abortion protesters and groups were spreading their misinformation and distressing images when I was at university, which is more years ago than I care to admit. Their horrific images stay with me to this day. They are still trying to intimidate women outside abortion clinics all these years later—so what is there to consult on? Does the Minister agree that the Government should stop the intimidation and the additional suffering that those women are going through once and for all?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree, but I also say that the protesters should stop their intimidation now and leave those women well alone, as the noble Baroness suggests. I have tried to explain the context of the consultation and the reasons for it. There is nothing more to say on that at the moment.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, although no one could defend intimidation or harassment, there are those who quietly pray. This came up when we debated the subject earlier in the year, and considerable concern was expressed in a number of quarters of the House. Can my noble friend assure me that the consultation that will follow will take account of those who merely stand quietly and pray silently?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend should probably consult some of the providers to find out the precise types of behaviour happening outside their clinics. Plenty of examples are available online. The most recent I saw was on 4 November from BPAS. However, training will have to reflect Article 9 of the ECHR; as the House knows, that is around the freedom of expression and manifestation of religion and belief. I also say that those rights are heavily qualified.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, having spent many an hour debating the clause, I think it requires careful consideration. I want to talk about context. First, people have been arrested for praying outside abortion clinics. However wacky we might consider it, that is a free-speech matter. Secondly, as the police do not seem to be able to know what intimidation is—whether outside a Labour MP’s office or on the streets in terms of anti-Semitism—I hope the consultation will be as helpful as possible so that they arrest the right people and do not end up policing easy targets instead.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness invites me to speculate on operational policing. As we discussed many times from this Dispatch Box recently, I cannot and will not do that. What I can say is that, in my understanding, some of the context around previous arrests is that they are more to do with breach of PSPOs than with the behaviour that she describes. In that case, I think it was repeated breach of a PSPO, so I am not sure that she is completely correct in her assertion, but I take her point.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister spoke earlier about the need for the guidance to address an appropriate balance. He spoke a few moments ago about the relevance of freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Was not the whole point of the parliamentary debates earlier this year to specify in legislation where the balance lay? Surely it is therefore time to get on with implementing it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, I have tried to explain the context. I do not think those two things are entirely mutually exclusive. The fact is that some of the language in the law is relatively unusual. Therefore, the consultation is necessary to make sure that people are aware of what it is.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that people who wish to pray can do that at home or in church? They do not have to do it outside an abortion clinic. Does he further agree that plenty of people around the world have found solutions to this problem? Why do we not implement the same legislation that other countries have to protect these women?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

We have legislation which we are discussing now, and I am not going to go against the will of Parliament and suggest alternative forms of legislation. The noble Lord is quite right: people are perfectly at liberty to pray wherever they wish. Intimidating behaviour, however, crosses the line.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the number one priority of any Government is to keep our citizens and our country safe. The Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill seeks to make a set of targeted amendments to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which I shall refer to throughout as the IPA.

The measures in this Bill will support the security and intelligence services to keep pace with a range of evolving threats against a backdrop of accelerating technological advancements. Such advancements provide new opportunities for terrorists, hostile state actors, child abusers and criminal gangs. They also mean that data is generated in more places, in more formats and by more different entities than before. The security and intelligence services need to identify nuggets of threat in increasing quantities of data.

Importantly, the Bill will also ensure that we maintain and strengthen the world-leading safeguards that underpin the use of the powers in the IPA. The measures in the Bill are narrow and relatively modest in scope, which reflects the strength of the existing legislation, but they are none the less critical to the task of protecting national security and countering other serious threats.

It may be helpful to briefly remind the House of the parent legislation that this Bill seeks to amend. The IPA provides a clear legal framework for the security and intelligence services, law enforcement and other public authorities to obtain and utilise communications, and data about communications. These powers and the resulting capabilities are essential in supporting these public authorities in carrying out their statutory functions, including detecting and preventing terrorism, state threats and serious crime.

But since 2016 the nature of the threats we face has evolved, and we need to ensure that the UK’s investigatory powers framework remains fit for purpose. The use of these powers is underpinned by the IPA’s robust and world-leading safeguards—including the double lock for most of the powers, whereby a judicial commissioner must approve the decision by the Secretary of State to issue a warrant under the IPA. All use of the powers must be assessed as necessary and proportionate, with strong independent oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The right to seek redress is available to anyone via the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

I emphasise that this Bill is about delivering focused and targeted changes to the existing regime and not about creating new powers beyond those to which Parliament has previously given its agreement during passage of the IPA.

This Bill follows the publication of a statutory report on the implementation of the IPA in February this year by the previous Home Secretary, and a subsequent independent review by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which was published in June this year. These reports set out the operational case for change and have informed the contents of the Bill. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his considered review of the IPA; he was instrumental in its initial design as the author of A Question of Trust during his tenure as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.

Building on the areas of focus identified in the Home Office review, the noble Lord’s report focused on: the effectiveness of the bulk personal dataset regime; criteria for obtaining internet connection records; the suitability of certain definitions within the Act; and the resilience and agility of warrantry processes and the oversight regime. His review helpfully highlighted several areas in which the IPA could be improved, and we are pleased to say that this Bill aligns nigh on entirely with his recommendations.

Your Lordships may note that there is one area of the Bill that the review by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, did not touch on: the changes to the notices regimes. This was subject to a separate public consultation, and the Government are grateful to those who responded for helping to shape this element of the Bill.

I will turn now to the main elements of the Bill. Part 1 deals with bulk personal datasets, more commonly known as BPDs, and makes changes to the way in which the intelligence services may use them. Building on the findings of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the Bill provides a narrow group of provisions to: create a set of new safeguards for the retention and examination of BPDs where there is low or no reasonable expectation of privacy; allow for the extension of the duration of a BPD warrant under Part 7 of the Act from 6 to 12 months; and make clear that agency heads can delegate certain existing functions in relation to BPD warrants. Under the current regime, all BPDs—including those that are publicly or commercially available—must be subject to the double-lock warrantry process and strict examination safeguards.

While these safeguards are in many cases entirely appropriate, that is not always so, particularly where a dataset is publicly available and widely used. This has a detrimental effect on the agility of the agencies, particularly where these datasets could be used to develop new capabilities. It also inhibits their ability to work flexibly with allies and partners in academia or the private sector.

Creating a new regime for datasets that have low or no expectation of privacy will increase operational agility while ensuring that proportionate safeguards are in place, including prior judicial approval. This change will be an important step in preventing our agencies falling behind our adversaries.

The Bill also seeks to insert a new statutory oversight regime for examination by the intelligence services of third-party BPDs. Under the new measures, an intelligence service may examine a dataset on a third-party’s systems without taking control of the set itself. However, if the dataset is not publicly or commercially available to other users, the new warrantry process and requirements will apply. The regime will be subject to safeguards such as the double lock already in other parts of the IPA.

Part 2 will make changes to the role and remit of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and their supporting functions. The Bill will enhance the world-leading oversight regime in the Act, including the role of the IPC. The changes will ensure that the regime is resilient and that the IPC can effectively carry out their functions. This will maintain and enhance the robust, transparent safeguards in the regime.

In addition to putting oversight of third-party BPDs on a statutory basis, the proposed amendments to the oversight regime aim to increase resilience and ensure that it remains fit for purpose. As highlighted in the then Home Secretary’s review, the IPA does not provide an easy mechanism to manage change. This has caused issues regarding the resilience and flexibility of the IPC and the wider IPA oversight regime, such as during the Covid-19 pandemic. The Bill therefore seeks to place the ability to appoint deputy investigatory powers commissioners and temporary judicial commissioners on to a statutory footing, to provide resilience where there is a shortage of judicial commissioners.

The Bill will also formalise some of the IPC’s non-statutory oversight functions—for example, their oversight of compliance by the Ministry of Defence of the use and conduct of surveillance and covert human intelligence sources outside the UK. The measures also provide greater legislative clarity in respect of the error-reporting obligations imposed on public authorities. The IPC has been consulted on all these measures and has endorsed the approach to ensuring that the oversight regime remains fit for purpose.

Part 3 makes changes to Part 3 of the IPA, which relates to powers for public authorities listed in Schedule 4 to the IPA to acquire communications data. CD is the data around the communication rather than the content of that communication. Section 11 of the IPA made it an offence for a relevant person within a relevant public authority to “knowingly or recklessly” obtain CD from a telecoms operator or a postal operator without lawful authority. The Bill will set out examples of the acquisition routes that amount to lawful authority. This will provide greater clarity to public authorities that they are not committing a Section 11 offence when acquiring CD from a telecommunications operator under those routes.

The Bill will additionally make targeted amendments to ensure that public sector organisations are not unintentionally prevented or discouraged from sharing data in order to meet their statutory duties and obligations when administering public services or systems. Part 3 also makes a clarificatory amendment to the definition of CD in Section 261 of the IPA, to make it clear that subscriber data or data use to identify an entity will be CD.

Part 3 also makes changes to allow bodies with regulatory functions to acquire communications data. The use of regulatory powers under the IPA is limited to organisations such as Ofcom and the Information Commissioner’s Office for their regulation of telecoms operators. The Bill seeks to amend the IPA to expand the definition of regulatory powers to include public authorities with wider, lawfully established and recognised regulatory or supervisory responsibilities. The effect of this change will be such that authorities will be able to acquire CD using their own statutory powers and not rely on IPA powers. However, where the CD is being acquired with a view to using it for a criminal prosecution, authorities must use their IPA powers to acquire that CD.

Targeted changes will also be made to support the use of internet connection records by the NCA and intelligence agencies. The Bill will add a further condition which allows the service in use and time period to be specified within the application without the requirement that they are unequivocally known. This will enhance the ability of the NCA and the intelligence services to identify serious criminals, including paedophiles and people traffickers, helping to protect victims and counter threats to the UK’s national security.

Part 4 will ensure the efficacy of the existing notices regimes in the face of technological changes and the complex commercial structures associated with the modern digital economy. These measures have been carefully calibrated to address these issues in a proportionate way. Furthermore, the notices regimes have existed since the 1980s, and these reforms are just the latest iteration of that regime. This is not about introducing any new powers. The Bill will create a notification requirement which will allow the Secretary of State to place specific companies under an obligation to inform the Secretary of State of proposed changes to their telecommunications services or systems that could have an impact on lawful access. I wish to be clear that this is not a blanket obligation on the tech sector. It will be placed on companies on a case-by-case basis and with full consideration of the necessity and proportionality justifications of doing so each time.

Furthermore, the notification requirement does not give the Secretary of State any powers to intervene in the rollout of a product or a service or to veto such a rollout. It is intended to ensure that there is time for appropriate consideration of the operational impact and potentially for discussion with the company in question about possible mitigations. This notification requirement has replicated the existing notices standards wherever possible and is itself already part of the wider notices regime, where the Government are able to require companies under notice to inform us of relevant changes which affect their ability to provide assistance under any warrant, authorisation or notice.

The Bill also amends the effect of a notice during the review period. A notice must go through the full double-lock process before it may be issued to a company. On receipt of that notice, a company may request a review of that notice. Currently, the notice has no legal effect during the review period. The Bill amends this to require the company to maintain the status quo during the review period. This will mean that the company does not have to take any steps to comply with elements of the notice, other than to maintain its existing services at the point it is given the notice. The result will be that the company cannot take any action that will negatively affect the level of lawful access for our operational partners during the review period. This is without prejudice to the final outcome of the review and ensures that this outcome cannot be pre-judged.

The Bill also makes a clarificatory amendment to the definition of a telecommunications operator. This makes clear that large companies with complex corporate structures which together provide or control telecommunications services and systems fall within the remit of the IPA. It also clarifies that a notice may be given to one entity in relation to the capability of another entity. It does not seek to bring new companies into the scope of the IPA. Furthermore, the Bill creates a new safeguard for the renewal of notices. This will require a notice to be put through the full double-lock process after two years, if it has not been varied, renewed or revoked in that time.

Finally, Part 5 includes several minor changes to the IPA to ensure sufficient clarity and resilience within the regime. This includes increasing the resiliency of the triple lock, which is the additional safeguard for targeted interception and equipment interference warrants relating to members of relevant legislatures, such as this Parliament. Clauses in Part 5 will allow for the Prime Minister—in the event that they are unavailable—to delegate their responsibility for providing the triple lock to named Secretaries of State. This change is purely about ensuring resilience in the authorisation process and does nothing to alter the existing power or introduce any new power.

I conclude by highlighting the opportunity that the Bill affords us and the impact it will have on the safety and security of the UK and its citizens. Without making changes now, the ability of our agencies to tackle evolving threats—including terrorism, state threats, and serious crime—will be increasingly constrained. In the face of greater global instability and technological advancements, now is not the time for inaction. I welcome the further scrutiny that noble Lords will provide. From looking at the list of speakers, I am in no doubt that they will start with a typically insightful debate today. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. There have been many expert and valuable contributions to today’s debate. I particularly thank the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Fox, for their broad and very constructive support for the Bill. Obviously, I very much thank—again—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his work. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Murphy and Lord Evans, and particularly the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who I thought was very eloquent, for their contributions. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for provoking the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller—a thing I am always very reluctant to do.

The support was more qualified from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, but I hope to assuage his concerns in my remarks and will certainly endeavour to deal with some of the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, who asked whether we were trying to avoid detailed scrutiny. The answer is: absolutely not. The Bill was ready, having followed the detailed and expert scrutiny of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—and, of course, we could not pre-empt what might be in the King’s Speech. In the case of this Bill, parliamentary time currently allows. We have engaged extremely extensively and, frankly, the country needs it. That is a very compelling set of circumstances behind introducing the Bill now.

I feel I ought to take issue with the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said that the country, or all countries, “need a Snowden” occasionally. As I understand it, it has been alleged that people died because of the activities of Snowden, so I am not sure that that is a generally fair point.

I will deal with the questions raised in as much detail as I can in the time available and will start with bulk personal datasets and, in particular, privacy. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, gave an excellent speech on this subject, but obviously there are concerns so let me do my best to assuage them. The Bill creates a new regime for the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets where there is a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. The nature of these datasets means that individuals to whom the data relates would have low or no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the datasets so, for example, an individual may have consented to the data being made public or the data has already been manifestly made public by the individual. That includes categories of datasets such as public and official records, news articles, content derived from online video-sharing platforms, and publicly available information about public bodies.

For example, a dataset that is likely to meet the test of having no or only a low expectation of privacy is the Companies House register, a government register of company information that is open to the public to search online and download. I have noted the recommendation of Big Brother Watch and I read it in some detail. I think it is based on a misunderstanding but perhaps it is worth going back into the reason why we are making these changes now. The way the existing regime was designed did not foresee the exponential increase in the use of, complexity of and changing nature of data. The scale and different kinds of data that are now available is unrecognisable in comparison to the picture in 2016. It did not foresee the extent to which cloud and commercially available tools would make analysis of datasets possible, the extent to which publicly available data would increase in value for the intelligence agencies compared to sensitive data which used to be obtained through traditional covert powers, and the extent to which intelligence agencies would need vast quantities of publicly available data to train machine learning models.

The intelligence agencies have been inhibited from maximising opportunities when compared with the private sector and academia, as well as our adversaries, as a result of the gold-plating of some of the Part 7 regime. It is important to note that the datasets would not necessarily be authorised under the new regime in Part 7A solely by virtue of their being publicly or commercially available, and that is particularly important when considering datasets which have been hacked and/or leaked.

On the subject of safeguards, there are of course safeguards in place to prevent misuse of the powers in the Bill. The safeguards that will apply to bulk personal datasets with low or no expectation of privacy will be calibrated to reflect the intrusion that is likely to arise from their retention and examination, ensuring that the rights of the individuals to whom the data relates is adequately protected while also enabling the intelligence services to make more effective use of these datasets. This will include requiring prior judicial authorisation on whether a category of datasets or an individual dataset can be considered to meet the test for authorisation under the new Part 7A regime; that is, that they meet the test for low or no expectation of privacy.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the Bill creates an obligation on the head of an intelligence service to stop any activity that relies on any data discovered in a BPD where the low or no reasonable expectation of privacy assessment no longer applies. The safeguards are being recalibrated to ensure that the regime better reflects the threats and opportunities of the modern world, but they remain robust, with the important protection of judicial approval at their heart.

Internet connection records were referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Strasburger, among others. They asked why there are no specified time limits for the period that internet connection records can be sought under the new condition. The driver for this change is to enable the intelligence services and the National Crime Agency alone—I will come back to the National Crime Agency—to carry out target detection to identify previously unknown high-harm offenders. The current requirement for unequivocal knowledge of the time a service is accessed, which service is accessed, or the identity of a person, before an internet connection record can be sought is preventing this from happening. So, it is important we do not create similar conditions under this proposal which will continue to restrict this critical investigative work.

These investigations will be targeted and case-specific, so it is not possible to include a time limit which could work across the range of investigations being undertaken. However, I can reassure noble Lords that requests will be time-bound based on the specifics of the case and they will be driven by intelligence, not used as speculative fishing exercises. Furthermore, the new condition is also limited in terms of the purposes it can be utilised for. It can, and I stress this, be used only for national security and serious crime purposes. It is important to note that there are several other safeguards in place, including a requirement for the request to be both necessary and proportionate. A request that sought records over a very long period of time is highly likely to be neither necessary nor proportionate, and all ICR requests are subject to independent ex post facto oversight. All ICR requests are valid for only one month and an application must be renewed at the end of that period.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked why this is being extended to the NCA. I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, initially proposed that the new condition should extend only to the intelligence services, although I understand that he now sees value in it being extended to the NCA because the NCA plays a vital role in protecting children from sexual exploitation and abuse, so it is essential that it has all the tools at its disposal to counter that particular threat.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, asked about roaming data, and in particular subjects of interest using a foreign SIM card. On that example, in the circumstances where a subject of interest was using a SIM card obtained in a third country and was therefore using international roaming while in the UK, under the proposed amendments an exception for this data will be made, allowing UK telecoms operators to retain it under a retention notice which has been double locked. This will then allow operational partners with the appropriate authorisation to access the retained data when necessary for the purpose of prevention and detection of crime and, again, protecting national security.

On the subject of the notices reforms and the tech companies, which I think most noble Lords referred to, some tech companies have expressed concerns in public fora in advance of the Bill’s publication that these measures may place onerous or burdensome obligations on an operator, could undermine security or could allow the Secretary of State to prevent technical or relevant changes. I assure all noble Lords that these concerns are misplaced. The Bill does not introduce significant changes to the existing powers, ban end-to-end encryption or introduce a veto power for the Secretary of State regarding the rollout of new technologies and security measures by companies, contrary to what some tech companies have incorrectly speculated. Rather, we are making a series of adjustments to ensure that the notices regime continues to be effective in the face of modern technologies and the structures of companies in the modern digital economy.

None of the measures in the Bill seeks to reduce the competitiveness of UK tech firms, or indeed to discourage innovation. Careful consideration has been given with regard to these measures, striking a balance to ensure that the law enables us to mitigate the risks posed by changing technology, while still promoting technological innovation and the legitimate interest in increased privacy of the majority of our citizens.

These measures do not create any new acquisition powers but will maintain the efficacy of long-standing powers. We therefore do not anticipate that they will put disproportionate burdens on businesses. Rather, they formalise processes that are already in place.

The Government support technological innovation and advances and have always been clear that we support strong end-to-end encryption, as long as it does not come at a cost to public safety. Together with our international partners, we believe that tech companies have a moral duty to ensure that they are not blindfolding themselves and law enforcement to abhorrent crimes such as child abuse and terrorism on their platforms. These amendments will not introduce significant changes to the existing powers, ban end-to-end encryption or introduce a veto power for the Secretary of State regarding the rollout of new technologies and security measures.

On a question asked of me by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, with regard to notices and the pre-clearance requirement, these amendments do not introduce a requirement for pre-clearance for the Secretary of State regarding the rollout of new technologies and security measures by companies. Fundamentally, the changes to the notice regime are about ensuring that the decisions on public safety are made by Ministers and are subject to judicial oversight as Parliament intended and as the public would expect, to keep them safe.

On the triple lock, noble Lords—in particular the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Murphy—asked for clarification as to whether the Prime Minister could delegate an authorisation requiring the triple lock to anyone they wanted to. I can reassure noble Lords that that is not the case. The Bill proposes that the Prime Minister will designate in advance a group of Secretaries of State who could authorise the warrant on his or her behalf. The alternative approver would need to be a Secretary of State and not the same Secretary of State who authorised the warrant at the earlier stage of the triple lock. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance on the restrictions that will be in place under this clause. Restricting the decision on suitable deputies is for the Prime Minister to decide, but it is clear that there needs to be sufficient resilience in the system to ensure that there are enough alternative approvers with the necessary experience.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, also asked me about ISC oversight and parliamentary oversight. He will be aware that the Intelligence and Security Committee examines the policies, expenditure, administration and operations of the UK intelligence community, and sets its own agenda and work programme. Obviously, it will maintain that oversight function for the measures in the Bill, but I can tell the noble Lord that the Security Minister will spend some time with him on the subject of the Bill next week, which I hope will assuage any concerns.

I need to go into the subject of safeguards in more detail in light of the speeches given by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. I assure noble Lords that the measures contained in the Bill, and in the IPA, are underpinned by a robust and world-leading safeguards regime. They are not failing.

Numerous safeguards exist to prevent the misuse of investigatory powers, ensuring that they are used in accordance with the law and in the public interest. The Bill contains measures that will introduce new safeguards and improve the resilience of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. We are improving oversight and increasing safeguards to ensure that powers in the IPA are not misused.

Strong safeguards are already in place to ensure that investigatory powers are used in a necessary and proportionate way. That includes independent oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office and a right of redress through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

The powers can be used only for the statutory purposes set out in the Act, including in connection with the most serious crimes and national security. We are also taking the opportunity to strengthen safeguards in other parts of the regime—for example, by creating a new statutory oversight regime for the intelligence agencies’ access to datasets held by third parties rather than retained by the agencies themselves.

On the subject of retention, the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, talked about data being held indefinitely. However, retention of data is subject to stringent safeguards under the IPA. It can be retained only provided it is necessary and proportionate, and it is not authorised indefinitely. This is regularly reviewed, and records of holdings are subject to inspection by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, also referenced the recent TechEn judgment. The investigations carried out by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his team in response to TechEn are evidence that the oversight, transparency and safeguarding arrangements provided for in the IPA are working as they should. In the Liberty judgment of 2019, the High Court found that

“The safeguards contained within that Act are capable of preventing abuse”.


While the TechEn case outlined widespread corporate failings between the Home Office and MI5, these issues are historic and the Home Office has taken steps internally to increase collaboration with MI5 and ensure that there is appropriate resourcing in place within the relevant Home Office teams responsible for investigatory powers.

I also wish to be clear that there has been no finding by the tribunal that MI5 misused the data in question nor any suggestion of this at any time during this process. As the then Home Secretary, Sajid Javid, noted in 2019,

“none of the risks identified relate in any way to the conduct and integrity of the staff of MI5”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/5/19; col. 30WS.].

Finally, I reference the endorsement that the tribunal has provided on the robustness of the oversight regime and safeguards contained within the IPA, including the adequacy of the measures available to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. TechEn does not, therefore, suggest that the system is fundamentally flawed but shows that it works as intended when non-compliance occurs.

Many noble Lords have made important points about balance in this debate, particularly regarding privacy. I particularly note the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, whose comments were spot on. It is fair to express concern about the impact that the Bill will have. Privacy is at the heart of the IPA, and this will remain the case under this Bill. The IPA contains robust, transparent and world-leading safeguards centred around considerations of intrusion into privacy. This includes a requirement for investigatory powers to be used in a necessary and proportionate way, with independent oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and redress through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The Bill builds upon these already world-leading safeguards, further strengthening the oversight regime, as I have just outlined. I also note that in 2018, the then UN special rapporteur on the right to privacy noted that the introduction of the IPA allowed the UK to claim a global leadership role in the protection of civil liberties. I note that this was not referenced by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, but I am sure that he would like to read that notification.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made some very good points about codification of the various laws in this space. I defer to his extensive knowledge. I will also ensure that his thoughtful remarks are noted in the appropriate parts of government. Obviously there is very little that I can comment on regarding this now, however.

I have endeavoured to address the contributions made by noble Lords today. I apologise if I have missed any questions that were asked of me. I will scour the record and write if that is the case. I express my commitment to further engagement with noble Lords. I look forward to further discussions as the Bill continues its passage, as we seek to ensure it achieves the crucial objective of making our country and our citizens safer. For now, I commend this Bill to the House.

Bill read a second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House, and that it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House that they consider the Bill in the following order:

Clauses 1 to 13, The Schedule, Clauses 14 to 31, Title.

Motion agreed.

Policing of Marches and Demonstrations

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 13th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the policing of recent marches and demonstrations.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the police are operationally independent: it is their decision how they choose to police a protest and they are accountable for that. The Metropolitan Police used a range of powers to minimise disruption and disorder. On Saturday police made 145 arrests, most of which were linked to the counterdemonstration; however, the police continue to investigate other offences. The police have the Government’s full backing to use all the powers at their disposal to ensure that the perpetrators face the full force of the law. As is right, the Government will continue to hold the police to account. I think it is also right to acknowledge that Remembrance Weekend events passed without disruption.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, freedom to speak and to march and police discretion are all pillars of our constitution, but I have never before in my lifetime seen mobs marching through the streets alongside some who call for violent jihad and the death of Jews and waving swastika signs. Once the Saturday march was under way, why were the police posing with a child dressed as a terrorist while protesters rampaged threateningly outside a synagogue? Many of us call on the police to apply the law to those who are guilty of offences under Section 5 of the Public Order Act aggravated by religious and racial hatred, public nuisance and glorifying terrorism. It is a worldwide problem. Anti-Semitism is on parade. Jews cannot fix it on their own; we need people with us. Does the Minister agree that we need a cry of solidarity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I wholeheartedly agree, and I was very emphatic on that point at the Dispatch Box last week. We saw vile examples of anti-Semitism by a minority at the pro-Palestine march. The fears that our Jewish community has experienced over the weekend and the days leading up to it are shocking and disgusting, as I said last week. There is no place for hate on Britain’s streets, and the police have confirmed that investigations are ongoing.

[Baroness Uddin (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as someone who marched with hundreds of thousands of very peaceful protesters last Saturday, I witnessed not one single incitement to hatred of anyone. It was a march for peace until the EDL came on to the scene, and we all saw what happened. Will the Minister assure all those who marched for peace that they will not be chequered by the way they are being depicted as jihadis? The simple fact is that they were not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, a quick surf of the internet this morning would suggest that the noble Baroness is wrong. I suggest that trying to conflate the activities of the violent thugs who tried to invade the Cenotaph and those of the marchers, some of whom were indeed peaceful, is also wrong. The fact is that 15 officers were injured at the Cenotaph, two of whom required hospital treatment, and my best wishes go to those officers. I think the police behaved entirely appropriately in dealing with the violence, and I seriously hope that they also deal with those marchers who were doing precisely the things that the noble Baroness has alleged they were not.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, in light of the unplanned departure of the previous Home Secretary and the extraordinary and deeply concerning violent events witnessed on the streets of London this weekend, can the Minister confirm whether the new Home Secretary will use more restrained language, to ease tensions on our streets, and refrain from interfering in the operational independence of the Metropolitan Police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

On the second part of the question, the previous Home Secretary did not interfere with the operational independence of the Metropolitan Police. On the first part, I have not yet spoken to the new Home Secretary, but I wish him very well in his new role.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My noble friend is right that there has been an explosion of anti-Semitism in the capital and across the UK since 7 October. These marches are at the very least a factor in aggravating that. If the police, in exercising their judgment, feel that there is not sufficient trigger at the moment to say that there is a threat of serious public disorder, which is the current bar, is there not a case for re-examining the bar for asking for these marches to be banned, so that the cumulative effect on many members of the Jewish community can properly be taken into account?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very good point. The Home Secretary has reserve powers and some legislative tools that enable intervention and direction, but those powers may be used only in line with statutory tests and public law principles and in very exceptional circumstances. The Metropolitan Police has not asked for that sort of intervention. He is quite right that the Government have been in regular contact with the police over the use of their powers to manage protests. Where we identify gaps in the legislation, we will seek to address them. As was widely reported this morning, that is still under review.

[The Lord Bishop of St Albans]

My Lords, any violence and threat is to be deplored, wherever it comes from. I congratulate the police, who did a superb job in very difficult circumstances. Of course there will be groups of people pushing the boundaries and acting unacceptably. The danger of the media is that it gives the impression that the only game in town is the marches and demos, but many on these Benches and other Members of this House have been meeting leading Israelis and Palestinians in our local communities and finding that there are people desperately trying to reach out to others and thinking about how we can take this forward. What are His Majesty’s Government doing at the moment to mobilise some of our leading Israelis and Palestinians to try to enable talks about how we might find a more positive narrative as we go forward?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The right reverend Prelate makes an extremely good point. I commend his activities and those of his colleagues and other faith leaders in trying to find civilised solutions to this problem. I am afraid I do not know what His Majesty’s Government are doing to try to encourage the sort of interactions he mentioned, but it deserves to be mentioned, on proportionality, that the organisers of the pro-Palestinian marches have a responsibility. Peter Tatchell, whom many in the House will know, was blocked from marching with the pro-Palestinians for carrying a sign that said:

“End Israel’s occupation! End Hamas’s sexist, homophobic, anti-human rights dictatorship!”


That is pretty disgraceful. Everybody needs to exercise proportionality in this.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as set out in the register. Anti-Semitism is unacceptable in any setting, but does the Minister agree that arresting people in the middle of a mass protest can result in serious disorder and injury to police officers, as can the police attempting to prevent people who are determined to protest from doing so, as we saw with the right-wing demonstrators on Saturday?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, on this I am very happy to defer to the noble Lord’s extensive experience of policing protests of this type. It is self-evident that if you wade into a crowd, there is a chance that you will inflame tensions. The police are operationally independent and I will not judge what they did, but their approach makes some sense to me in that context.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as the right reverend Prelate did, I thank the Metropolitan Police and all the officers who were on the streets of London ensuring that Armistice Day events were not disrupted, facing disgraceful far-right violence and assaults while working to pursue appalling, vile anti-Semitism—as the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, pointed out to us—and other hate crimes. Does the Minister agree that it would have been helpful in the run-up to these events to have had a Home Secretary who calmed tensions rather than using language that inflamed some of the protests and policing that we saw? Above all, despite the Minister’s points to this House, will the new Home Secretary ensure that never again do we have a situation in which a Home Secretary of this country seems to question the operational independence of the police? Is it not one of the fundamental parts of our democracy that the police can police without fear or favour?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord. It is, as he knows, governed by a pretty rigorous protocol. I went into the details of that protocol last week, and I can do it again if anybody wants to hear it—I suspect they do not.

The previous Home Secretary is no longer in post, so debating what she did or did not say seems moot. As regards the new Home Secretary, I have not spoken to him and I do not know what he is thinking.

[Lord Austin of Dudley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is no surprise that we are seeing Nazi-level propaganda and incitement of terrorism on the streets of London when some of the organisations behind these marches have had connections with a Hamas leader who lives in the UK. What is being done to investigate the links between those organisations and proscribed terrorist groups?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot answer that question, but I certainly hope the police are investigating.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, I revert to the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. It would be a marvellous beginning for the new Home Secretary if he were to call in leaders of the Jewish community—who have the admiration and respect of us all—together with those responsible Palestinians who have a legitimate cause for concern at the destruction and deaths in Gaza. If he were to do that, using moderate language—which I am sure he would—it would help to ease tension and to bring together people who have a common cause.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am happy to reflect my noble friend’s opinion to the new Home Secretary when I speak to him.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, that the examples she gave are completely unacceptable and should be met with a firm response. The degree of anti-Semitism in the country at the moment is deeply shocking, as is the degree of racism and Islamophobia. That is something we should commonly confront, but I urge the Government to be very careful about curbing protests and the right to march through London. In 1936, when anti-fascists confronted Mosley’s mob swaggering through Jewish communities, many of the actions of those anti-fascists could have been regarded as disorderly, but they stopped them and they stopped that wave of anti-Semitism. Similarly, many of the actions I helped organise through the Anti-Nazi League in the late 1970s saved local Jewish communities and black communities from assault. Be very careful about curbing the right to march peacefully.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, we are told that two of those arrested in Paris for painting anti-Semitic slogans on French synagogues have said to the police that they were acting under orders from Russian sources. Are the Government looking to see whether there is any element of foreign interference in some of these protests? It is in the Russian interest to stir up disorder in this country, and this is a very easy way to do it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have absolutely no idea.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

One of the saddest pictures we saw over the weekend was of the two poppy sellers—an elderly couple in Victoria station—having to be gradually moved and shifted because of large numbers of loud and very angry protesters around them. What annoyed me, and I think vast numbers of members of the public, was that the police standing there did nothing to help those poppy sellers. They seemed to be more interested in supporting and helping the demonstrators. Did the Metropolitan Police Commissioner give an outright order to rank and file police that they had to go very easy with protesters but stamp down on anything else that seemed to be out of order?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I do not know what direct orders the Metropolitan Police Commissioner gave. As I said earlier, the response to the Cenotaph, where violence was being deployed, was swift and appropriate—not that it is my call to judge the police’s actions; that is for the courts. I do not know whether he gave those sorts of orders. I was at Victoria station by chance on Saturday afternoon, and I have never felt more uncomfortable in this country because of the tension. It was palpable in the air. It was disgraceful.

[Lord Mann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have visited Jewish communities across the United Kingdom over the last few weeks. Everywhere the message is the same: Jewish people and Jewish families are scared. Does the Minister agree with me that the increased police presence we have seen in Jewish communities, be it in Leeds, Manchester, London or elsewhere, has been essential in ensuring that people have been kept safe? Can we be certain that this increased presence will continue for as long as it is needed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I certainly hope so. Police forces up and down the country have stepped up their neighbourhood patrols to support local Jewish and Muslim communities, including visiting schools, synagogues and mosques. We have seen a rise in the anti-Semitism that the noble Lord describes; that is appalling. I certainly hope that the police’s response will stay in place for as long as it is needed.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my policing interests in the register. There were clearly images of people on those marches over the weekend doing appalling things. I hope the Metropolitan Police and other police forces are using those images to track down the individuals concerned and then to take action against them. No doubt the Minister will be able to confirm that this is the case. Can he also draw attention to the huge march against anti-Semitism that took place in Paris? Does he think it would be appropriate if something similar happened in this country?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The police have said that they are investigating those images so, yes, I think I can confirm to the noble Lord that this is happening. I would certainly like to see a march against anti-Semitism, and I would join it.

Metropolitan Police: Operational Independence

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 9th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat in the form of a Statement an Answer given in another place:

“Mr Speaker, since Hamas’s sickening terrorist attack in Israel, we have seen thousands of people demonstrating on our streets in the UK. Thanks to the tireless work of the police, the majority of those events have passed without incident. Sadly, however, we have seen examples of suspected criminality, including arrests for assaults on officers, racially aggravated public order offences and support for a terrorist organisation. As the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have said, it would be disrespectful and demonstrably wrong for protests to take place on Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday.

It is right that the police are operationally independent of government. This is a fundamental principle of British policing. The Metropolitan Police asked protesters to postpone, but the request was refused. The Prime Minister has sought reassurances from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner that remembrance events should be protected. It is for the Metropolitan Police Service to decide whether to apply to the Home Secretary to ban any march. An application has not been received. However, the Home Secretary will of course fully consider any application if one is made.

The police have comprehensive powers to deal with individuals who vandalise or damage our cultural monuments. It is a criminal offence for a person without lawful excuse intentionally or recklessly to destroy or damage any property belonging to another. The police have a duty to protect the public by detecting and preventing crime, including offences of this nature. The police also have powers to deal with activities that spread hate or deliberately raise tensions through harassment or abusive behaviour. This includes the power to impose conditions on protests where they reasonably believe the protest may result in serious disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of a community, or where the purpose of the protest is to intimidate others. The police can impose any condition they deem necessary to prevent these harms occurring, including setting the location, route and duration of the protest. The use of these powers is an operational matter for the Metropolitan Police Service. It has deployed significant resources to recent protests, and we have seen it take action to prevent vandalism as part of its response to protests in this area.

This weekend should be about remembering those who made the ultimate sacrifice in defence of our country. The Home Secretary, Policing Minister and I will always back the police to take action to prevent serious disruption and to take a zero-tolerance approach towards criminality.”

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Home Secretary’s article in today’s Times newspaper brands the Metropolitan Police as biased over pro-Palestinian protests, and she reportedly refused to tone down her article at the request of the Prime Minister’s office. It is extremely unusual for the Prime Minister’s official spokesman to say that the article was not cleared by their office and air their dirty washing in public. Does the Minister believe that the Metropolitan Police is biased? Does he believe that the Home Secretary’s article breaks the policing protocol? Does it constitute improper political interference? Does the Minister agree with me that the police must be given proper support to facilitate remembrance events, to continue to provide protection and reassurance to communities facing the threats of hate and extremism, and to maintain order at peaceful protests? Stoking division and undermining the police will not achieve these ends.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has raised operational independence—in effect, therefore, the policing protocol—and I shall go into that in some detail. The police are operationally independent, but the concept of operational independence is not defined by statute. However, it remains a fundamental principle of British policing. The Policing Protocol Order 2023 sets out how the various actors in the system—the Home Secretary, PCCs, mayors with PCC functions and chief constables—should exercise their roles and responsibilities. It seeks to clarify the operational independence of chief constables, noting that operational decisions on the deployment of police officers are matters for chief constables. The order also makes it clear that:

“The Home Secretary is ultimately accountable to Parliament and charged with ensuring the maintenance of the King’s Peace within all force areas, safeguarding the public and protecting our national borders and security”.


There are no plans to change the policing protocol; that is incredibly clear. I of course agree with the noble Lord that protecting our communities and keeping them safe should be the primary responsibility of the police, and it is incumbent on all of us to give them the support they need. However, we must also acknowledge that operational independence does not provide a blanket exemption from criticism about broader policing issues.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, the words of the Home Secretary have consequences for our policing and our police services and for the safety that people feel in our country. Will the Minister therefore confirm that the Metropolitan Police has followed the law and the evidence and has made a judgment which sits, and rightly so, within the operational independence of the police services? Will the Home Secretary concentrate on running the Home Department rather than running her leadership campaign? If she cannot, she should be replaced.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken about the operational independence of the police, which I think we all regard as sacrosanct. The Answer that I repeated included the line:

“it would be disrespectful and demonstrably wrong for protests to take place on Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday”.

Actually, I do not think that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister used the word “demonstrably”, but what he did say was “disrespectful”. However, he went on to say:

“part of that freedom is the right to peacefully protest. And the test of that freedom is whether our commitment to it can survive the discomfort and frustration of those who seek to use it, even if we disagree with them. We will meet that test and remain true to our principles”.

I happen to think that is exactly right and describes the country I am proud to be a citizen of.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, Peel’s fifth principle requires the police to demonstrate complete independence of policy. Of that, it is equally plain that my noble friend the Minister is well aware. Will he therefore remind the Home Secretary of this principle, since her public criticisms of the Metropolitan Police make it impossible for the commissioner to retain his operational independence or at least the appearance of operational independence, which is vital to public confidence? The Home Secretary seems either to be ignorant or to be flouting it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have already referred to the policing protocol, which governs all the actors’ principal responsibilities. We should focus on taking steps to reassure the various communities that are coming under pressure; —the police are definitely doing that. Police forces up and down the country have stepped up neighbourhood patrols to support local Jewish and Muslim communities, including visiting schools, synagogues and mosques. Sadly, we have seen a significant increase in hate crime reported since Hamas’s terrorist attack in Israel, and the Metropolitan Police has made a number of arrests to date linked with that. That shows that the Metropolitan Police is more than capable of exercising its responsibilities and is doing a good job.

Perhaps I may say from a personal point of view that the virulent anti-Semitism that we have seen makes me feel physically sick. My Jewish friends are afraid, and in this country that is disgusting.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my policing interests in the register. The tone of what the Home Secretary has said implies that she thinks that she should have received a request from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Does she therefore think, given that the threshold is set sensibly at a high level to protect freedom of protest, that the definition and the threshold should be changed, and if so, to what? What advice did she receive on the consequences of trying to prevent a march, in terms of policing resources, compared with a more targeted approach to deal with troublemakers in a march?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord invites me to speculate on what the Home Secretary thinks, which obviously I am not capable of doing. I refer him back to the comments that I have just repeated, made by the Prime Minister, and the fact that I have restated the policing protocol, which governs all these responsibilities very clearly.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, first, I apologise that I did not hear the Minister’s Statement—I was unaware that it had begun until I came into the Chamber.

To some extent, I will repeat what I said in last night’s speech. It is disappointing that all this debate is taking place in public. These are difficult decisions for politicians, as I have acknowledged in the past, and for police officers, to decide where they draw the line about either preventing protests or allowing a protest that might cause offence. It is not at all easy, particularly with such an emotional issue as the Cenotaph and Remembrance Day. There is an awful lot of passion involved on all sides.

However, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, the process is that the police should decide whether they can police this march and whether they can apply conditions which would make the march less of a problem. Only if that will not work could they then consider having a ban, providing that it meets the high threshold of serious violence. What concerns me is that the making of these fine distinctions and wise judgments is taking place in public. It seems that rocks have been hurled across the press, when I would hope that these conversations could be had privately, for better effect and for the reassurance of the public.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I commend the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Paddick, for their comments last night in the humble Address debate, when they outlined the challenges of operational policing in these contexts. I agree that, in a perfect world, these conversations should be held in private. However, this is a very difficult international situation, and passions are running high.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I draw the House’s attention to my own policing interests. Would the Minister recapitulate his comments earlier that operational independence is not an absolute, either in legislation or in practice, and that the Home Secretary is quite entitled, under Section 40 of the Police Act 1996, to direct senior police officers in the public interest, and that that will always be subject to judicial oversight?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would say to my noble friend that the powers conferred on the Home Secretary by Section 40 of the Police Act 1996 are quite specific and rarely used. The Home Secretary has statutory powers to give directions to local policing bodies, but they are limited to circumstances where she would consider that remediation is required because the force, or part of it, is failing to fulfil its functions effectively, and the police force and HMICFRS have been given the opportunity to make informed representations and proposals. As far as I am aware, that power has been used only on a couple of occasions, which were very specific. In 2012, the then Home Secretary required all forces to collaborate on the provision of air support and, in 2019, those powers were used to require Warwickshire and West Mercia police to take a little longer to unentangle themselves from their previous collaboration.

Pakistan: Evacuation of Afghans

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 9th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, the UK rightfully offered resettlement to those who had shown support and loyalty to British aims. For many who have made it here—some have come in small boats—this means being put into hotels and potentially facing homelessness. Reportedly, others who have been granted resettlement in Britain are stuck in Pakistan, facing deportation back into the hands of the Taliban. I have a number of questions for the Minister. Why have there been such delays in settling people under the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme? Has he confirmed whether any of those about to be expelled from Pakistan to Afghanistan are eligible for the ACRS? What assurances has he received from the Pakistani Government that those eligible for the ACRS will be allowed to remain in Pakistan until chartered flights can be completed? Finally, what measures is he taking to ensure that our asylum backlog is cleared and that suitable accommodation is secured for those applicants?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

The noble Lord is right: the Government have reacted decisively and swiftly to relocate people to safety in the United Kingdom following the collapse of Afghanistan the year before last. The Government remain committed to relocating eligible Afghans and their families under the ARAP scheme and the ACRS—we continue to honour this promise. The Government’s policy was to ensure that eligible Afghan families had secured accommodation in the UK before travel was facilitated for their relocation but, as a result of changing conditions on the ground, we are changing that policy. The Ministry of Defence has worked hard to stand up a total of over 700 service family accommodations for mixed purposes, or transitory and settled accommodation. I pay tribute to my friend in the other place, the Minister for Armed Forces, for his work on this. Our new plans will see approximately 2,800 ARAP-entitled personnel move from Pakistan to the UK by the end of December 2023.

The answer to the question on deportations is: not as far as we are aware. On conversations with the authorities in Pakistan, the British high commission is obviously monitoring the situation closely and is in frequent contact with the Pakistani authorities to ensure that no eligible ARAP or ACRS individuals are negatively affected while they await relocation to the UK—we are seeking assurances to that effect. On 27 October, the Foreign Secretary received assurances from Foreign Minister Jilani that they would be safe.

The noble Lord asked about the backlog. We referred to this in the humble Address debate yesterday to some extent. I will not go over old ground but, as he knows, we have increased the recruitment of decision-makers and committed to dealing with the backlog by the end of the year.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, this is a UQ, so I will be brief. The Minister in the Commons said yesterday that he was working “night and day” to make sure that the Pakistani Government stuck with the commitment not to deport those who are ACRS-eligible. Could the Minister here say how promptly we can get the ACRS people out? Will the 2,300 include everyone, or should there be more flights as soon as possible?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am not qualified to comment on the operational dimensions of this policy, but I reaffirm the commitment to make sure that everyone who is eligible, without exception, is relocated by the end of this year.

[Baroness Coussins (CB)]

My Lords, when I asked a Question on this topic on 18 October, the Minister said that there were then 3,000 Afghans in Pakistan who were eligible under ARAP and the other schemes and were awaiting relocation to the UK. Although I appreciate that some flights have begun to get some of them out, can the Minister please guarantee that every one of those 3,000 eligible Afghans and their immediate families will be relocated before the Pakistani authorities deliver them back to the Taliban in Afghanistan? One thing we can be sure of is that they are already suffering adverse conditions while they are waiting in Pakistan, and these are almost as bad as, if not worse than, those they were suffering under the Taliban: some live in hiding and are threatened.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have already made that commitment that the Government will move all those people to the United Kingdom by the end of this year. After the noble Baroness asked the last Question, the policy changed: we are no longer shipping people only when they have accommodation already approved. The object of the exercise is to get them out as quickly as we can.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, on 18 October, during the Question of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, on the ARAP scheme, I and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, raised the need for an urgent review of the rejected or rescinded approvals of settlement applications of members of the Afghanistan Commando Force 333. I understand that some of these applicants sought refuge in Pakistan, and their forced return to Afghanistan may, quite simply, mean a death sentence for them. I commend the Minister on his continued engagement with me after that Question. If he is now in a better position to answer our respective questions, can he confirm that all rejected applications or rescinded approvals are now being actively reviewed, considering the true context of CF 333’s relationship with UK forces and policies?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I confirm to the noble Lord that I remember the question. At the time, I committed to write to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. That letter is being prepared and I will share it with him in due course if he will allow me a little more time.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, there is evidence that the Taliban are pursuing ethnocentric policies by ensuring that Hazara and Indo-Tajik people repatriated from Pakistan are settled among Pashtun communities, which has long-term consequences. Are His Majesty’s Government in touch with Pakistan about what it is effecting, because there will be future consequences of this policy in Afghanistan?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I am not really qualified to answer on that matter, which I would imagine falls very much within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but I will take the question back and ask whether it can shed some light on it.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I know of an individual case of an Afghan interpreter who is safely here but his family, to my knowledge, is not. His wife and young son got almost as close as they could to the airport hotel in Kabul a year ago and I do not know whether they have got out. Is the noble Lord the appropriate Minister to write to about an individual case, or would he direct me to somebody else to make inquiries about that person, who gave great service to the military, and his family?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The honest answer is that I do not know whether I am the right person. It would depend on whether it is an immigration and visa situation or a defence-related situation, so I suggest that the noble Viscount write to me, and I will make sure that it ends up in the right place.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 25th October 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 151A and do not insist on its Amendments 151E and 151F in lieu.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, in moving Motion A I will also speak to Motion B.

We are here again to discuss the Bill for what I am pleased to say is, I hope, the last time. As my ministerial colleague in the other place, Kevin Hollinrake, said earlier today, the House of Commons has expressed its strong will on these remaining issues three times now. I therefore hope that noble Lords will support the Government’s Motions this evening. I will keep my remarks brief.

I start with government Motion A on the failure to prevent fraud threshold. My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s amendment would have brought medium-sized organisations into scope by exempting only micro-entities and small organisations from the offence. The Government do not support any lowering of the SME threshold that we introduced, and I will briefly repeat the reasons why.

It is already an offence to perpetrate fraud. The objective of the new offence is to ensure that there is accountability where fraud occurs in large organisations, so there is simply no need to apply any such offence to smaller organisations, and it is more straightforward to use existing powers against smaller, less complex companies. Every time an offence like this is introduced, business owners end up distracted from running their businesses by the need to assess their compliance risks, which often involves taking professional advice. We assess that the revised threshold proposed by this amendment would cause medium-sized enterprises £300 million in one-off costs and nearly £40 million in annual recurring costs.

As my ministerial colleague flagged this morning, we have future-proofed this legislation by including a delegated power to allow the Government to raise, lower or remove the threshold altogether. As with all legislation, the Government will keep the threshold under review and will make changes if there is evidence to suggest that they are required. I therefore urge all noble Lords to follow the will of the other place and support the government Motion to reinsert the SME threshold.

I move to Motion B on the amendment tabled previously by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on cost protection in civil recovery cases. The Government remain of the view that this type of amendment would be a significant departure from a fundamental principle of justice—that of the loser pays—and therefore should not be rushed into without careful consideration. Furthermore, we have seen no clear evidence that this amendment would increase the number of cases taken on by law enforcement.

However, that is not to say that this type of amendment is necessarily a bad idea. That is why we have previously added a statutory commitment to the Bill to review the payment of costs in civil recovery cases in England and Wales by enforcement authorities and to publish a report on the findings and lay it before Parliament within 12 months.

Normally, with regard to civil cost reform in England and Wales, the Government would look to consult appropriate consultees, including the senior judiciary, the Law Society and the Bar Council. Enacting this reform now without a full review would not allow judges and relevant organisations, or their counterparts in Northern Ireland and Scotland, to comment on how it would be read and applied in practice. It would therefore be irresponsible for us to rush into making such a significant change at the end of the Bill without full consideration by Government and further scrutiny by Parliament. With that, I hope all noble Lords will agree that this is the responsible approach to take and therefore support the Government’s position.

In conclusion, I encourage all noble Lords to agree with the Government’s position on both areas. It is vital that we achieve Royal Assent without delay so that we can proceed to implement the important reforms in this Bill as quickly as possible. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for their very generous remarks and I speak as well on behalf of my noble friend Lord Johnson of Lainston, who asked me to make that clear.

We agree that the Bill leaves the House in a better state. The noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Coaker, are right that the Bill makes major changes, and we agree that the enforcement agencies have a major part to play. One of the aspects of the Bill that we can now start to get on with is making sure that Companies House is appropriately resourced, as obviously it will have a major part to play in any future delivery of the aspects of the Bill that we have been discussing for more than 400 days, I believe.

We should take this opportunity to thank the enforcement agencies for their past and future efforts. We know that this is a complex area, and without them we would all be in a much worse place. But, for now, this Bill leaves this House in a much better state. I thank, as I know my noble friend Lord Johnson would, both noble Lords on the Opposition Benches, and others from all Benches, for their engagement. Throughout the passage of the Bill the Government have worked hard to ensure the right balance between tackling economic crime and ensuring that the UK remains a place where law-abiding businesses can flourish without unnecessary burdens. Having said that, I am quite sure we will return to some of these issues, as predicted—but, for now, I urge noble Lords to support the Government in their position.

Motion A agreed.

Motion B

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 161A in lieu and do not insist on its Amendment 161D in lieu.

Motion B agreed.

Sir Edward Heath: Operation Conifer

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lexden]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to establish an independent inquiry to review the seven allegations of child sex abuse against Sir Edward Heath left unresolved at the end of Operation Conifer in 2017.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

The Government have no plans to establish an independent inquiry to review the outstanding allegations against Sir Edward Heath. It remains for the local police and crime commissioner to consider whether an inquiry is necessary.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, I first express sincere thanks for the support that I, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and cross-party allies received from all quarters and parts of this House during the long period before Mike Veale, former chief constable first of Wiltshire and then of Cleveland, was found guilty of gross misconduct and barred from policing for life. In view of that July judgment, is it not imperative to carry out an independent review of the seven allegations made against Sir Edward Heath long after his death, which Veale failed to clear up after a long investigation that one of his officers contemptibly publicised on television in front of Ted Heath’s house in Salisbury? Must there not be a strong suspicion that Veale left these allegations open, neither proved nor disproved, to save face after failing to find a single shred of evidence to support any of the accusations, despite getting his officers to rifle through all of Heath’s private papers, box after box, in the Bodleian Library during an operation that cost over £1 million, paid for by the Home Office?

Finally—I apologise for speaking at some length—do we not owe it to the memory of a dead statesman, the only First Minister of the Crown ever to be suspected of such serious crimes, to get at the truth of this grave matter and settle the doubts created by the disgraced Veale?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend: it is unfortunate that Operation Conifer was not able to resolve conclusively the position in respect of all the allegations made against Sir Edward. I obviously recognise the House’s desire to find a solution, but the investigation has already been subject to considerable external scrutiny and the Government do not see the grounds for government intervention. The fact that it involved a former Prime Minister does not of itself warrant government intervention. The Operation Conifer summary closure report emphasised that

“no inference of guilt should be drawn from the fact that Sir Edward Heath would have been interviewed under caution”

had he still been alive.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is participating remotely.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, is not the news that the Northern Ireland Assembly is amending the law on anonymity in rape cases to be greatly welcomed? If the law in England had been similarly amended, it is highly unlikely that the injustices in the cases of Sir Edward Heath, Lord Leon Brittan, Sir Cliff Richard, Mr Harvey Proctor and Mr Paul Gambaccini, and in the Janner case, would ever have arisen. Is it not time to reopen the debate on pre-charge anonymity in the rest of the United Kingdom?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is quite right that these new laws have come into force in Northern Ireland, but the authorised professional practice guidance on media relations, issued by the College of Policing, already makes clear that the police

“will not name those arrested or suspected of a crime, other than in exceptional circumstances where there is a legitimate policing purpose to do so”.

In May 2018, the college updated this guidance to make it clear that it applies where allegations are “made against deceased persons”.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that many of us from all parts of this House believe it is vital that there is an independent review of the shockingly unresolved allegations against Sir Edward Heath? Is he further aware that one of the reasons for a review is that it is hard to feel complete confidence in the 2017 official review, including a senior investigating officer from Operation Hydrant, since Veale’s decisions were examined by police officers who perhaps lacked sufficient independence from him?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I say to the noble Lord that I am of course aware of this. There were three main forms of scrutiny during the investigation. There was an independent scrutiny panel to ensure proportionality; the role of the panel members was to check and test the decision-making and approach in the investigation. At the end of the investigation the panel issued a statement. The noble Lord referred to Operation Hydrant. In September 2016 and May 2017, there were two reviews which concluded that the investigation was proportionate, legitimate and in accordance with national guidance. Finally, there was a review in January 2017 by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, as it then was, of whether the resources assigned to the investigation by the Home Office were being deployed in accordance with value for money principles. The review concluded that they were.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has indicated that there will not be an independent inquiry under this Government’s watch. Given that this is an issue which needs to bring closure to both the alleged victims and to the family of Sir Edward Heath, what does the Minister suggest should be the way forward as an alternative to allowing this damaging situation to drift on?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said to other noble Lords, of course we all regret the fact that the damaging situation arose in the first place, I am sure. However, this is a matter for the local police and crime commissioner and, as recently as 2019, the then police and crime commissioner said that Operation Conifer was scrutinised by an independent review and found to have been “reasonable and proportionate”, and he remained satisfied then that this was still the case.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend is hearing the voice of the House. It is difficult to understand the reluctance of the Government to bring this matter to a clear closure. Now the police side has in some ways settled, here we have these foul-mouthed accusations from a totally unreliable source allowed to drift in the wind with no attempt to tidy up and bring closure to the whole situation. Is this not a stain on British justice? Is it not up to the Government now to take very firm action to follow the advice of my noble friend Lord Lexden, and indeed many others, and bring this matter to honest clarity, instead of leaving it in the ill-mannered way in which at present the debate stands?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have said repeatedly, I of course understand my noble friend’s concerns. But the fact is that the Government are of the opinion that the original investigation has been scrutinised to a very high degree and that no further government action is therefore necessary.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government have made it clear that they do not propose to have an investigation into the allegations against the former Prime Minister. However, there is a wider question which remains, which is how the wider system allowed Mike Veale to continue within policing and the wider policing family, despite two separate sets of allegations against him. There are also questions about the accountability of our PCCs and how they dealt with that particular situation. Does the Minister think there is a case for looking at the way disciplinary actions are expedited and sometimes abused, to maintain the public’s faith in the police force and the PCCs?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would say to the noble Lord that of course we have arrived at a situation where Mr Veale has been held to account, so the public should therefore have faith. It perhaps took too long, but he was appropriately investigated along the way. In November 2017, the PCC in Wiltshire referred two matters concerning Mr Veale to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The investigation related partly to an allegation that a mobile belonging to Wiltshire police was deliberately damaged. He was subject to a management action plan—that was felt to be appropriate after the investigation by the various authorities. So I think it is unfair to say that nothing happened to Mr Veale, but perhaps it did take too long to reach a conclusion. As noble Lords might appreciate, I would certainly agree with that.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend understand that many of us simply do not comprehend how a relatively senior police officer could have given credence to allegations that were such patent rubbish?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, with hindsight of course we can call them “patent rubbish” but, at the time, all these allegations had to be investigated; I do not think there is any doubt about that.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, while all friends and admirers of Sir Edward Heath must be very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, and others for the way they have pursued this, is it not the case that with the jailing of the man who first made these allegations and the conviction of the former chief constable for gross misconduct we can take comfort in the fact that the allegations against Sir Edward have been effectively resolved and disposed of?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it would be unwise of me to get too much into the weeds of what the original investigation looked at and the various aspects of it, but I should stress that in the two weeks after Wiltshire police made a media appeal for anyone with information to come forward, 118 people contacted them. It is definitely more than just one man’s word.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023.

Relevant document: 52nd Report from Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this instrument, which was laid before Parliament on 7 September 2023, relates to Prevent. Prevent is one of the pillars of Contest, the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy. The aim of Prevent is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It also extends to supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism. These aims could scarcely be more important.

Put simply, Prevent is an early intervention programme to keep all of us safe. To do so effectively, it requires front-line sectors across society, including education, healthcare, local authorities, criminal justice agencies and the police, to support this mission. This is why we have the Prevent duty, set out in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. It sits alongside long-established duties on professionals to protect people from a range of other harms, such as involvement in gangs or physical and sexual exploitation. The Prevent duty helps to ensure that people who are susceptible to radicalisation are offered timely interventions before it becomes too late.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I pay tribute once again to the work of the police, security and intelligence services. It is difficult but it saves lives and, as I know the Minister will agree, it helps to keep us safe. Extremism is a stain on our society. It feeds on fear, which seeks to drive us apart, and is perpetuated in the name of one extreme ideology or another. All of us on this Committee and beyond are opposed to that.

We have seen a terrorist attack on Fishmongers’ Hall, close to London Bridge, the awful attack at a concert in Manchester and the brutal murders of Jo Cox and Sir David Amess, among other shocking events, such as the bomb attack at the Dover Border Force centre. Was it not a bad mistake for the Shawcross review not to include that last incident as one of the examples of attacks listed in that report, given that it was not Islamist? It could have been included, because it took place months before the publication of the original review. The Minister will know that one of the criticisms of the review and worries about it is its supposed bias.

Ongoing threats are thwarted and ongoing action is taken by the police and security services. Can the Minister outline their view of these guidelines, as well as those of others who have to implement them, such as local authorities or education providers—schools and so on?

Prevent is extremely important, as is its purpose of early intervention to prevent radicalisation, extremism and, ultimately, terror. We, like others, support its actions in that regard. However, the strategy is seen by some as contentious and many feel that it is one-sided. How are the Government going to restore confidence and trust across the community in their work on Prevent and the broader counterterrorism strategy?

For example, we have seen the criticisms from the former head of counterterrorism police, Neil Basu, as well as others such as Amnesty International, of the Shawcross review. Is public confidence not increasingly important, given the current awful international situation in the Middle East and the domestic challenges it gives rise to in the UK? Have the Government reflected on these current events? Given the horror we all feel at what we have seen, is the guidance as up to date as it needs to be to reflect the current situation? Might further amendments be required in due course? Is anything planned?

As the Minister pointed out in his helpful introductory remarks, the independent review of Prevent contained 34 recommendations. Last month the Secretary of State announced that the Government had completed 10 of these, and we learned from the Minister today that 29 of them will be completed within a year. Have I understood that correctly? Does that mean the calendar year, or the end of 2024? It would be helpful to have clarification on that. That leaves five that are not going to be ready by the end of the year. Can the Minister tell us which five they are and why they will not be done over the same timeframe as the others?

One in five people arrested for terrorist offences in 2022 was aged under 18—a fourfold increase in just three years. How will the guidance contribute to combating this rapid growth in child terrorist suspects? Beyond the guidance, what else are the Government doing? Will they join us in committing to placing mental health practitioners in schools to help combat vulnerabilities that can make young people more susceptible to extremist narratives? What assessment have the Government made of Jonathan Hall’s recommendation on legislation regarding young terror suspects? How is the Home Office working with other departments to combat, for example, the terrorist threat posed by artificial intelligence, which is new but an increasing threat to us all, as we know?

Four of the nine declared terrorist attacks in the UK since 2018 were perpetrated by serving or newly released prisoners, but the review found that

“there have been delays to staff beginning Prevent training and to extremist prisoners beginning rehabilitative programmes. These delays are attributed to staffing and resourcing issues”.

Given the seriousness with which we should regard four out of nine of the declared terrorist offences having been committed by serving or recently released prisoners, what action has the Secretary of State taken since the independent review to address this and combat radicalisation in prisons?

The Minister will probably agree that Prevent is obviously just one part of a wider counterterrorism and counterextremism strategy. It is just one pillar, as the Minister mentioned, of the Contest strategy. None the less, the review and the Government’s response focus at points on targeting those most likely to commit terrorist acts, but also on wider non-violent extremism. Given that there is some confusion about the central objectives of Prevent, as outlined in this guidance, that could also lead to confusion among those implementing the guidance on what the true focus needs to be. Does the guidance make this clearer than the independent review and the government response earlier in the year—is the focus on individuals who may commit terrorist acts, or on combating wider non-violent extremism? Can the Government clarify where their emphasis and the balance lies? The counterextremism strategy as a whole has not been updated since 2015. Will the Government now confirm that this will take place? What else are the Government going to do to look beyond Prevent to combat extremism?

In February of this year, the Government stated that the ministerial Prevent oversight board would be “refreshed”, having not met since 2018. Has this refresh happened and has the board now met, or are we still waiting for it to meet?

The building of consensus is crucial, particularly around a voluntary engagement programme. The scourge of extremism, as we have seen, whether it be anti-Semitism, Islamism, or the extreme right—whatever it is—is one we all wish to see tackled. There are still very real questions to be asked and challenges for any Government to meet. But the defeat of terrorism and extremism, in whatever form they take, and doing all we can to prevent individuals and communities becoming involved in terrorism or suffering from the threat of terrorism or extremism, is in all our interests and something we all want our Government to succeed in—whichever Government we have.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his contribution. He has asked a number of questions and I will do my best to answer to them all.

Before I do that, I join the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in applauding the work of the security services and the various agencies that keep us all safe, and thank them for it. I include in that the officials in the Home Office, who are often rather overlooked when we are handing out praise to our security services, but who do a considerable amount of work and of thinking about how best to apply these rules in an operational situation. I re-assert that the core objective here is to strengthen the Prevent system, which is a vital component of the counterterrorism apparatus, and in giving my answers I will endeavour to explain why.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me about public confidence and trust in the system and raised the issue of the Dover attack. Of course, the Independent Review of Prevent was led by Sir William Shawcross. He was an independent reviewer, so he decided on the content of the report. I am unable to comment on why he made that decision or what prompted it.

It is perhaps worth digressing and looking at the state of play regarding the extreme right-wing threat we face, because that does feed into this subject. We have accepted the Independent Review of Prevent’s recommendation to ensure that a consistent and proportionate threshold is in place across all the Prevent workstreams. Prevent is now guided by the principles of the new security threat check, which is recommended in the IRP. This series of principles informs our strategic approach, which asks us to consider whether actions are proportionate against the UK’s current terrorism and extremism threat picture. That means that the Home Office approaches and products clearly show how they are relevant to meeting Prevent’s objectives and responding to the threat of terrorism.

We are also rolling out updated training so that practitioners can better understand the threat and in particular the ideological causes of terrorism. The Home Office has undertaken research on Prevent referrals to better under understand them and to improve how they are recorded. Better understanding of the threat, strengthened training and improved processes ensure that we tackle disparities.

However, the primary domestic terrorist threat comes from Islamist terrorism, which accounts for approximately 67% of attacks since 2018, about three-quarters of the MI5 case load and 64% of those in custody for terrorism-related offences. The remainder of the UK domestic terrorist threat is driven almost exclusively by extreme right-wing terrorism, which amounts to approximately 22% of attacks since 2018, about one-quarter of the MI5 case load and 28% of those in custody for terrorism-connected offences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt; I meant to include something else in my remarks. What the Minister is saying is very helpful. Can he comment—as far as he is able to—on the Home Secretary’s meeting with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police regarding how existing laws may be used with respect to what we have seen on our streets?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will get to that, if the noble Lord will bear with me.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Of course; my apologies.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As on previous occasions, there are likely to be Prevent referrals related directly to this conflict and from across the ideological spectrum. In direct answer to the noble Lord’s question about whether the Government are thinking about this, guidance has been issued on the appropriate thresholds. We have written to partners to ensure that they are aware of the escalating risks and that there is appropriate management of their Channel intervention programme case loads. Community tensions and the appropriate responses will be nuanced in each area. Prevent is continuing to work closely and intensively with local authorities and other partners, including DfE, DLUHC and CTP, to spot local risks and bolster community resilience, including encouraging interfaith dialogue.

On the Home Secretary’s meeting with Sir Mark, I was not there so I cannot give any personal reflections on what was discussed. Of course, I have seen what was in the papers with regard to Sir Mark’s cause. We are working with the police to ensure that hate crime and the glorification of terror are met with the full force of the law. Hamas is a proscribed organisation responsible for the biggest massacre of the Jewish people in one day since the Holocaust—we should not forget that. Support for it is a criminal act which carries up to 14 years in prison. The DfE’s counterextremism team is actively gathering from media sources and contributions from the CST information on claims of student group support for Hamas, and we are collaborating with the Office for Students to ensure the exchange of information regarding compliance-related issues, particularly those related to Prevent duties, and to address concerns about preventing unlawful speech on campus. It would be unwise of me to speculate on Sir Mark’s specific comments, but a raft of laws is already available to the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me about the number of recommendations in the Shawcross report. We have completed 15 of the 34 recommendations and 83 of the 120 tasks, but, as I said in my opening remarks, the Government have accepted all the recommendations of the independent review. We expect to have implemented at least 29 of the 34 within a year of publication—February next year—and the rest shortly thereafter. I am afraid that I do not know which five we will have to wait for.

The Prevent duty guidance supports several of the recommendations we have implemented, and we have introduced the new security threat check to ensure that decision-making is always informed by a proper consideration of the current threat picture. Updated training has been provided for public sector staff subject to the Prevent duty, and a further update on the implementation of the independent review of Prevent will be delivered one year after publication, in February 2024, when the majority of the recommendations will already have been implemented.

The noble Lord raised the subject of young people and what we are doing for them. One in 15 cases involves people under the age of 18, so protecting children from the risk of radicalisation sits alongside wider safeguarding duties, including tackling harms such as drugs, gangs and sexual exploitation. Prevent seeks to intervene early to support children and young people before they go too far down a road towards violence and criminality. It is not about punishment, making people suspects or placing them under surveillance, and it is not designed to impede a person’s prospects; it is designed to improve them. In line with previous statistics, we continue to see an upward trend in young people being referred to Prevent, demonstrating how vital the education sector is as part of the wider safeguarding duties to prevent young people being radicalised. The Government provide a range of support, including guidance, online training and a public-facing website to support schools in their responsibilities under the Prevent duty.

As the threat of radicalisation evolves, we have updated our training for front-line professionals to help equip them with the skills and knowledge to spot the signs of radicalisation and make a referral where appropriate. Prevent is implemented in a proportionate manner that considers the level of risk, and the Government take the threat from all forms of terrorism seriously. All referrals are assessed very carefully by experts to ensure that there is a radicalisation risk before they receive support through the Channel process, meaning that Channel provides support only to those who genuinely need it. Friends and family are often the first people to notice the changes in someone close to them that may be a sign of radicalisation, so more information is available on the police’s ACT Early website and the Educate Against Hate website. I hope that goes some way to answering the noble Lord’s questions.

The noble Lord also asked me about the fact that four out of nine incidents since 2018 have involved released prisoners. HMIC’s report recognises the significant steps taken by the sector to uplift our capabilities since the attacks of 2019-20. It shows that we have truly stepped up our counterterrorism efforts and that we are working more effectively than ever before to protect the public from terrorism, thanks to the joint work of prison, probation and police staff. The central intelligence hub co-ordinates quicker and better intelligence sharing, vastly improving our assessment of the threat from terrorists of all ideologies. Thanks to that, we can now share previously confidential and sensitive information with parole boards, so that they can make fully informed decisions about whether to release terrorist offenders from prison. On release, terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders are subject to robust risk management and stringent controls that severely limit their activity. Finally, we have also strengthened joint counterterrorism Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—MAPPA—which assess, manage and mitigate the risk of offenders.

The noble Lord is right that Prevent is only one part of the broader counterterrorism strategy. The report set out a robust approach to tackling extremism and made a significant contribution to the Government’s thinking on counterextremism, including a manifesto commitment to protect practitioners who stand up to extremists. We have carefully considered the recommendations, as outlined in our letter to Dame Sara Khan, the previous commissioner for countering extremism, and they have made a significant contribution to the Government’s thinking on tackling extremism. We have clear laws, and the police have extensive powers to tackle hate crime and the support of terrorism. In addition, we have strengthened the Prevent duty guidance to tackle permissive spaces for radicalisation, which is with Parliament for approval. We have also strengthened our approach to identifying and disrupting high- harm groups that operate below legal thresholds that radicalise others. So, we have robust laws in place on terrorist organisations and we are doing more to tackle radicalisation.

On 18 July, the Home Secretary launched Contest 2023, which is a refresh of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy. Contest 2023 outlines how we are reflecting on and adapting to the findings and recommendations of inquests, inquiries and reviews into terrorist attacks and our counterterrorism approach, and will continue to do so. It also describes the transformational updates we will make to our CT efforts to ensure that we adapt to an ever-evolving landscape.

The noble Lord asked about the ministerial oversight board. We agreed with the IRP’s assertion that that there is a need for stronger oversight of Prevent, including greater co-ordination and communication between secondary oversight boards and committees, so we committed to reinvigorate the prime ministerial oversight board. The refreshed ministerial oversight board will be chaired by the Security Minister and will begin convening later this year. The board will be attended by Ministers from key cross-Whitehall departments and senior leads from operational partners. The purpose of the board is to provide scrutiny and oversight of all Prevent work, including implementation of the IRP’s recommendations. The board will convene for the first time later this year and be chaired by the Security Minister. It is meant to meet biannually but can be convened outside that rhythm if required.

I am getting towards the end, and I apologise for the length of my response. The noble Lord asked me what action is being taken to tackle those who use artificial intelligence. The Contest strategy, which was published this year, noted that new technologies present both threats and opportunities for counterterrorism efforts. The impact of generative AI on terrorists’ and extremists’ ability to radicalise others online is yet to be fully established. The Home Office is firmly committed to understanding this risk better and to ensuring that any policy development in this area is thoroughly informed by evidence. We obviously know that bad actors could exploit generative AI to radicalise susceptible individuals to carry out attacks, so the Home Office is continually monitoring these risks to ensure that our CT system is able to respond.

AI also brings huge opportunities to better enable our counterterrorism response to terrorism activity and online radicalisation, so we are taking steps to build our knowledge of risks and to consider appropriate mitigations. That will include bringing together partners from across industry, academia and civil society. The Government are hosting an AI summit next week. The rapidly evolving nature of AI means that broad consultation will continue to be essential so that it can be guaranteed to advance in a safe, responsible and fair way.

I think I have answered all noble Lords’ questions, and I hope I have been able to do so satisfactorily. As I have set out, the new guidance will enhance the Prevent system and bolster our ability to counter terrorism and keep the country safe. I commend the instrument to the committee.

Motion agreed.