Oral Answers to Questions
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years ago)
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Sarah Green (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
Fraudsters should have no space to operate, and later this year we will publish our renewed strategy on how we protect the public and businesses, reduce the impact on victims, and increase the disruption and prosecution of fraudsters.
Sarah Green
The Minister knows that fraud accounts for more than a third of all crime. Last year, Thames Valley police in Chiltern and South Bucks, which covers my constituency, had 194 Action Fraud victim care reports. One constituent told me, with great distress, that they had stopped reporting scams, because they think that Action Fraud has become a crime reporting agency and is no longer a crime investigation agency. We need a new service dedicated to effectively tackling online fraud, not just recording it. Will the Minister commit to establishing a new online crime agency to do just that?
Damian Hinds
I can confirm to the hon. Lady that we are making constant improvements to Action Fraud through the City of London police, and are also investing in a wholly new Action Fraud system for 2024. In the meantime, I encourage her constituent and all our constituents to report fraud. One particularly striking statistic is that more than 76,000 scams have been automatically taken down as a direct result of our constituents forwarding scam emails to the suspicious email reporting service.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
In 2021, fraud and computer misuse increased by 47%. In 2020, an estimated 99.99% of total cyber-crime went unpunished. Just weeks ago, academics at the University of Oxford estimated that during covid alone, £37 billion—or one third of the total NHS annual budget, and twice the annual budget for policing—is likely to have been lost to fraud. When working families are facing rising energy costs and a cost of living crisis, and are paying more and more taxes and more for services, can the Minister tell me why, under this Tory Government, gangs of criminals are getting a free run at the public purse?
Damian Hinds
Gangs of criminals certainly do not get a free run, and we will be investing and doing more than ever before to bear down on fraud. During the covid era—the trend had started already, but it accelerated then—while other forms of crime got depressed, there was a boost to some of this distanced crime that people do over their computers. Crime overall across the world is changing, and our response must change in a way that is commensurate to that. We must ensure that we take the most effective action. Part of that is the spending review commitment that has just been made; there is also the new economic crime levy, which represents an additional £400 million over this spending review period.
Andrew Selous (South West Bedfordshire) (Con)
Dame Caroline Dinenage (Gosport) (Con)
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
Easter saw Border Force maintain a secure and effective border, with minor inbound border control disruption, in a period with one of the highest levels of international travel in the past two years. Before Easter, in February and March 2022, more than 85% of queue measurements were under 45 minutes for non-EU passengers.
Julie Elliott
I thank the Minister for that response. I recently wrote to him regarding the experience that my constituents, the Collins family, had at Newcastle airport when returning from holiday at a quarter to 11 at night a week or two ago. The father is a British-born citizen, and the mother has settled status and is of German origin. The children are both British and German citizens. They describe Border Force, which was not allowing the little boy, Nico, who is five years old, into the country, as being “hostile” and “unpleasant”, and as having an “unsympathetic manner”. That is not the way that anyone should be treated by Border Force, certainly not a five-year-old child. The child had his German passport; his British passport was waiting at home. When the family showed Border Force an email that they had received saying that, they were eventually allowed in—a five-year-old child, who is a British citizen, was eventually allowed into his home. What has the Minister to say? I think an urgent investigation and an unreserved apology to the Collins family are required.
Damian Hinds
I thank the hon. Lady for bringing that experience to the Floor of the House of Commons. I am, of course, sorry that any such distress was caused to a family, and particularly to a child so young. She will understand that it is difficult for me to talk about a particular case at the Dispatch Box without having all the facts available, but I will be happy to follow up with her separately.
Dame Caroline Dinenage
It appears that travellers are experiencing severe delays not only at passport control, but with processing passport applications and renewals. Although I fully understand that the Minister has set out the pressures that staff are facing, can he reassure me that backlogs will be addressed and airport issues will be sorted out before my constituents go on their summer holidays?
Damian Hinds
I reassure my hon. Friend that, in spite of the fact that there has been a surge in demand, as she would expect considering the patterns that we have seen in the past couple of years and the fact that international travel is now returning, that is absolutely something that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who leads on passport issuing, is across to ensure that the necessary capacity is there.
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)
Passport delays are affecting our constituents’ ability to take holidays and take up jobs abroad. There are ever-lengthening queues at passport control, and generous constituents who signed up for the Homes for Ukraine scheme are having their first experience of the Home Office’s chaos. When will the Home Secretary realise the impact that her Department’s appalling record on managing the gateways into and out of our country is having on the UK’s reputation, here and across the world?
Damian Hinds
I take extremely seriously the experience of passengers coming through British airports and seaports. There is a distinction between outbound and inbound—
Damian Hinds
No, there really is. When we talk about Border Force and passport control, that is about inbound. As I said in my answer to the hon. Member for Sunderland Central (Julie Elliott), there are times when queues grow, and I do not like to see that happen. Sometimes it is because of factors beyond our control, such as so-called flight bunching when lots of flights arrive together or when flights are late. Border Force is working extremely hard to try to project demand as best it can to ensure that the staffing is there, and it is taking considerable measures to match up to that demand.
Virginia Crosbie (Ynys Môn) (Con)
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
Tackling economic crime is a key Government priority. We have expedited legislation—the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022—to crack down on Russian dirty money and corrupt elites in the UK. We have also set up a new dedicated kleptocracy cell in the National Crime Agency to target sanctions evasion and corrupt assets hidden in the UK.
Kevin Hollinrake
I thank the Minister for that answer. GPT Special Project Management was fined roughly £28 million by Southwark Crown Court last year for bribery offences. The key whistleblower in that case was my constituent, Ian Foxley. He has had 11 years without a single penny in income because he blew that whistle, as nobody will employ him now, of course. Does my right hon. Friend agree that if we want to crack economic crime, we must incentivise whistleblowers to come forward, and protect them when they do? Will he listen carefully what my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) says tomorrow in introducing her 10-minute rule Bill, when she will set out the case for whistleblower reform?
Damian Hinds
My hon. Friend is right about the value of whistleblowers, who should be able to come forward without fear of recrimination. We have continued to improve the whistleblowing framework, including by extending eligibility for protections and introducing a reporting requirement for prescribed persons—the bodies to whom people can make a whistleblowing disclosure. My hon. Friend has campaigned consistently on this matter and is expert in it, and I am keen to meet him to discuss his points further.
Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
Computer Misuse Act 1990
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years ago)
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The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
It is a pleasure to serve under your expert chairmanship, Sir Mark. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Dr Wallis) for securing today’s debate and bringing this important issue to Westminster Hall. I am also grateful to all colleagues who have taken part. It strikes me that this is a good example of bringing to bear on Parliament not just opinions or political points but real depths of expertise from the outside world. I think it has been a very good debate.
I thank the SNP spokesman, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), and the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), for the constructive way that they engaged with the important discussion. I reassure everybody that it will feed into the review, which I will come back to later. I confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend that I would be pleased to meet with him and a group of colleagues to discuss the issue further—I look forward to it.
As the Minister for Security and Borders, I am keenly aware of the scale of the cyber-crime threat facing our citizens and businesses. Keeping them safe is a key priority for the Government and our operational agencies and I take this opportunity to thank all those who work tirelessly to protect the public.
The threat from cyber-crime has intensified over the last couple of years. As the hon. Member for Halifax said, the pandemic meant that even more of our lives were spent online, and, inevitably, criminals have sought to exploit that shift. The statistics bear out the scale of the threat, with computer misuse now accounting for an estimated 15% of all crime. That opportunism is despicable and underlines how crucial it is that we have a robust and effective response. The Computer Misuse Act is primarily about hacking into someone else’s computer, but clearly there are more crimes that involve misusing computers for criminal means—most fraud, for example. Later today we have the Second Reading of the Online Safety Bill, which is an ambitious and forward-looking piece of legislation that will tackle online harms around fraud and fraudulent advertising.
I turn to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) about protecting individuals and small businesses. I reassure him that comprehensive advice is available from Cyber Aware. We encourage everybody to act on that, starting with three key things: protecting email security with a password made up of three random words; using two-factor authentication where that is available; and keeping operating systems up to date—often when an update comes around it is to see off some weakness that has been found.
I want to note important steps taken by industry that can make what hacking yields of less utility—things such as the banking sector’s deployment of the confirmation of payee system. We have sector charters in place with key industries, including retail banking. While Northern Ireland has a different policing arrangement, in this part of the UK we have the regional and national cyber-resilience centres, supported by policing, to help give extra support and guidance to small businesses that may have less wherewithal to invest in cyber-security expertise.
I also want to respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Simon Fell) about skills; he is absolutely right that although the issue is about machines, it is ultimately about people. It is people who improve our defences. There are key pathways and standards in the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education system, including under the cyber-security technologist umbrella and more broadly with the introduction of T-levels. Indeed, the critical T-level is digital business services, which includes a minimum of nine weeks of industry placement. I strongly encourage firms operating in the area—in cyber-security and in-house digital technology—to support that to make sure we all work together to bring on that next generation of experts who will help keep us all safer.
Mr Steve Baker
The Minister has prompted me to recommend a book called “Peopleware”. It is a classic in software engineering and is all about people and how they develop software. One of its points is the orders of magnitude difference between different categories of competence in software engineering. It raises some interesting issues that I am sure he and his officials would find helpful.
Damian Hinds
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I shall add that to my bedtime reading list, which is not uncrowded at present. I will look forward to getting to that.
In the last year, we saw a number of high-profile ransomware attacks around the world, including attacks on local authorities and schools in the UK. The National Cyber Security Centre has reported that in just the first four months of 2021, it handled the same number of ransomware incidents as for the whole of 2020. The National Cyber Security Centre has improved our understanding of the threat and provides a unified source of advice and support to Government and business.
I am afraid that the threat posed by cyber-attacks continues to grow in scale and complexity. That is why the national cyber strategy, mentioned by a number of colleagues and published in December, sets out how the Government will invest £2.6 billion over the next three years to develop a whole-of-society approach to increasing national cyber-security and resilience, including reducing the risk and opportunity for cyber-crimes and disrupting cyber-criminals. As part of that funding, we will continue to invest in the law enforcement cyber-crime network at national, regional and local level. In the face of such a broad and complex threat picture, law enforcement agencies must have the powers they need to investigate online criminality. It is also essential that we have robust legislation in place to enable action to be taken against the perpetrators.
My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) was right about how much has changed since 1990, and my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness pointed out that the world is more interconnected than ever. Next year, it will be even more interconnected again. All that is correct and we must make sure we are up to date and up to pace. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman) pointed out, it is also the case that over the last 30 years, the Computer Misuse Act has generally proven to be a far-sighted piece of legislation for tackling unauthorised access to systems. As the threat has changed, so too has the Act, which has been updated a number of times—most recently in 2015, where the offence of unauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious damage was introduced.
We are firmly and fully committed to ensuring the legislative framework that underpins our efforts to address cyber-crime remains relevant and effective. That is why last May the Home Secretary announced a review of the Computer Misuse Act. The Home Office subsequently launched a call for information, which marked the first step in that process. The purpose of the call for information was to seek views of interested stakeholders across the piece, including in industry, academia and the agencies, on the Act and the associated investigative powers available to law enforcement. The Home Office has received responses covering a range of interesting and complex issues and we are grateful to those who have sent in their views. We are considering the feedback submitted and continue to engage with partners to determine whether changes are needed. We will provide an update on the initial findings of the review shortly.
I want to touch on a couple of key points directly relating to the Act that will influence the approach we take on defences. First, the Act is based on the principle that the owner of the computer and computer data has the right to say who can access it. I want to stress that point, which was made repeatedly during the development of the Act. Authorisation to access a system is the prerogative of the owner. It is that person who is responsible for the operation of the system and bears the cost of securing it.
Equally, the Government are rightly seeking to ensure that system owners take more responsibility for the security of their systems and the content held on them. Therefore it is right that the system owner has the protection of the law from those who obtain or attempt to obtain unauthorised access to computers and their data. We encourage firms to agree to having their systems tested for vulnerabilities by third parties but the fundamental point is that it is the choice of the legal property owner to determine that.
Secondly, we need to ensure that the Act continues to criminalise those who take unauthorised action against computer systems and provides the legal basis for relevant legal authorities to act.
In launching the review, we have been clear that we are open to changes to the Act that enhance our approach to that threat. However, I must also emphasise that any such changes should be well-considered and well-evidenced. We must guard against taking any action that would undermine the ability of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to investigate criminals and prosecute them.
I have heard the views of Members on defences. My hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness identified the nuance very well, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe did the nuance of the registration of industry professionals. We are still considering the question of defences, but I am sure that Members would agree with me that we cannot put in place measures that would act as a mechanism for criminals and state actors to hide behind. That is why we need to tread cautiously. An ill-conceived defence could leave prosecutors with the burden of trying to prove a negative, for example, in needing to prove that cyber-attacker X was not, in fact, intending to protect a computer system when they attempted to access it without permission.
It is also worth pointing out that there are already defences in the Act that apply to cyber-security activity. If a person has the authorisation of the system owner to access the system, no offence is committed. In addition, any decision on prosecution is a matter for independent law enforcement and prosecuting agencies who take into account all relevant facts of the case. We must also ensure that any changes to the Act do not permit or encourage retaliatory cyber-activity, sometimes known as “hack back”. There is a danger that such a defence could embolden so-called hacktivists, or commercial entities who wish to offer such services, if they believe their actions could be protected under the law. The UK does not condone unlawful cyber-attacks of any kind.
Some responses to the call for information set out proposals for a review of sentences, and we have also had suggestions for new powers for law enforcement agencies to take action against criminals online. We are considering them as part of the review, including whether sentencing guidelines are needed to ensure that the harms caused by those committing Computer Misuse Act offences are appropriately considered during sentencing.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked a direct question and yes, state threats in this area are absolutely a prevalent and growing issue. I know she would not expect me to give a commentary on a specific security matter, but I want to reassure her and the House that the Government take extremely seriously the question about state capability in this area.
There is absolutely no doubt that the UK needs a Computer Misuse Act that is fit for purpose and can rise to the challenges of the present day. As colleagues know, the Home Office is engaged in a review that is charged specifically with ensuring exactly that.
The context of the war in Ukraine makes that work more important than ever, as the shadow Minister said quite rightly. I am acutely conscious of that, but we cannot rush this. That would only serve to help our adversaries. We are, therefore, approaching the exercise with the careful consideration that the public would expect and which these sometimes complex issues demand. Through the review, and as part of business as usual, we are listening attentively to law enforcement agencies and National Cyber Security Centre experts on what is most likely to enhance our national cybersecurity. Of course, we are also studying the approaches of other countries.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend for securing the debate, which has been interesting and insightful. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to outline our activity in the space and, as I said at the start of my remarks, I look forward to meeting my hon. Friend and colleagues to discuss it further.
Oral Answers to Questions
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 2 months ago)
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Dr Jamie Wallis (Bridgend) (Con)
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the importance of the review of the Computer Misuse Act. Since my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary launched that review last year, a number of very good and important suggestions have come forward, which we are currently reviewing. Meanwhile, of course, we continue always to update our approach, including to the National Cyber Security Centre and, more immediately, to the online safety Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
In the evidence the Home Secretary gave to the Home Affairs Committee on 2 February, she said that a major obstacle for accepting more people under Operation Warm Welcome for Afghans fleeing the Taliban was the lack of suitable accommodation because of Home Office contracts. The Select Committee has been warning about this for some time. I think that the Home Secretary has announced a bespoke humanitarian policy for those Ukrainians fleeing—[Hon. Members: “No, she hasn’t.”] Oh, perhaps she has not; I am sorry there is not a statement to clarify that. What I want to know is: what is she going to do about the lack of accommodation that the Home Office provides for asylum seekers and refugees in this country?
Esther McVey (Tatton) (Con)
Constituents in Tatton are increasingly concerned about the growing number and range of online fraud and scams, and the ability of Action Fraud to deal with them. Many of those crimes originate outside the UK, with some from hostile states such as Russia. What is the Minister doing to counter that?
Damian Hinds
My right hon. Friend is right, and we share her constituents’ concern. We are looking constantly to upgrade and improve Action Fraud, and I encourage her constituents to carry on reporting those instances of fraud. Together with the rest of our constituents, their forwarding of dodgy emails to report@phishing.gov.uk has so far led to 73,000 scams being removed.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
Will the Home Secretary publish her review into the tier 1 gold-plated visas? Will she suspend all tier 1 visas for people who have connections with the Putin regime, and will she look into the veracity of applications for British citizenship by Russian oligarchs who are connected with Putin?
Firefighters’ Pension Scheme
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 2 months ago)
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The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Jane Hunt) on securing this debate. I am grateful to her, and I welcome the opportunity to address the House on the important issue of firefighters’ pensions. The Government hugely value the unique roles that our firefighters undertake and it is only right that their pensions remain among the best pension schemes available in the public sector. Our brave firefighters keep us safe. They do the most extraordinary job day in, day out, in the most difficult situations.
The Government also recognise that the cost of providing public service pensions must be fair to the schemes’ members, the employers and the taxpayer. It is important that the costs of public service pensions are understood and fully acknowledged by Government so that they remain affordable and sustainable for generations to come.
Jane Hunt
I absolutely understand that, but this is about the discretionary element. As I see it, there is only one instance of this happening. The Prime Minister said at the time that the fire service could look at this, but the fire service does not believe that it can do so because of the rules and regulations. It is the discretionary element that I am interested in.
Damian Hinds
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. There is some limited ability under the rules for fire authorities to exercise some discretion on some decisions. That would involve, for example, determining whether a person was on duty or not at the time of an injury or death. However, the rules of the 1992 scheme do not provide a fire authority with the discretion to pay a pension to an individual who does not qualify for it.
Jane Hunt
The point is that Mr Wilkens was on the 1992 scheme at the time and that, due to his age, he was being tapered over to the 2015 scheme. If he had not been that age, he would not have been tapering at the time and might already have been on the scheme, in which case his partner would immediately have got the pension.
Damian Hinds
I am grateful for that clarification, and I will come on to that point in a moment.
My hon. Friend has spoken movingly of the sad circumstances of the case of Ms Melanie Perry, whose partner Mr Wilkens passed away in 2016 and who did not qualify for any survivor pension entitlement. I appreciate that this is an extremely sensitive matter. It is the current legislation underpinning the firefighters’ pension schemes that provides the qualifying criteria for an individual’s pension entitlement and therefore sets the parameters on what payments can be made by an employer out of the pension scheme. On the death of a scheme member, the 1992 firefighters’ pension scheme, of which I understand Mr Wilkens was a member, provides benefits to the surviving spouse or civil partner. These benefits do not extend to unmarried partners. As my hon. Friend will know, that was quite common among pension schemes of that time.
It has been the position of successive Governments not to make retrospective changes to public service pension schemes, and that has not changed. A new pension scheme was introduced for all newly recruited firefighters in April 2006. While the 2006 scheme has a higher retirement age than that of the 1992 scheme, it does provide survivor benefits that extend to unmarried partners. At the time the 2006 scheme was introduced, fire and rescue authorities offered existing 1992 scheme members the option to transition to the 2006 scheme if they wanted to benefit from the modernised scheme design. I understand that a letter was sent to Mr Wilkens from his employing fire and rescue authority in August 2006 providing this option. Ultimately, it appears that Mr Wilkens did not take this option.
Jane Hunt
The Minister has mentioned the 2006 changes. At the time of Mr Wilkens’ passing in 2016, he and his partner had been together for 10 years, so that letter would have come at the beginning of their relationship. I think we can therefore forgive them for not taking up that offer at the time.
Damian Hinds
I understand my hon. Friend’s point.
In 2010, the coalition Government established the Independent Public Service Pensions Commission, chaired by Lord Hutton of Furness. The commission undertook a comprehensive review of the main public service pension schemes, including the firefighters’ schemes. Following the review, public service pensions underwent a significant period of change with the introduction of new, reformed unfunded pension schemes from April 2015. At that time, full and tapered protections were afforded to those scheme members who were closest to retirement. For firefighters, this included those who were within 14 years of their normal pension age.
In 2018, as my hon. Friend alluded to, these protections were found by the courts to be unlawfully discriminatory in respect of the firefighters’ and the judicial pension schemes on the grounds of age. In effect, the courts found that younger pension scheme members suffered a disadvantage as a result of the Government’s efforts to protect those nearest to retirement from the impact of the reforms. The Government accepted that ruling and that the remedy to remove the discrimination should apply to all public service pension schemes. The Government are now in the process of removing the discriminatory elements. This is a careful and complex process to get right.
The deferred choice underpin, referred to by my hon. Friend, will be introduced by the Government via the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Bill currently before Parliament and will be enacted by regulations to be laid by the Home Office. It is the Government’s intention that the underpin will give the beneficiaries of deceased members the opportunity to choose from which pension scheme to receive their survivor benefits for any service during the period 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2022.
From the information provided, it appears that Mr Wilkens’s pension would qualify for that remedy. The impact of the remedy on Mr Wilkens’s survivor benefits will not be known until the remedy is fully implemented by October 2023. At that stage, fire and rescue authorities will start the process of contacting all those entitled to the remedy with details of their options, as the statutory pensions administrator for each area.
In closing, I thank my hon. Friend again for securing this important debate and for the elegant way in which she made her points in the House this evening.
Question put and agreed to.
Draft Passenger, Crew and Service Information (Civil Penalties) (Amendment) Regulations 2022
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 2 months ago)
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The Chair
Before we begin, I remind Members to observe social distancing, and to wear masks when they are not speaking. I call the Minister.
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Passenger, Crew and Service Information (Civil Penalties) (Amendment) Regulations 2022.
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for being here, and welcome the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, in particular. I look forward to our working together on matters of national security, and of course being scrutinised and held to account by her on behalf of the official Opposition.
The regulations make two amendments to the Passenger, Crew and Service Information (Civil Penalties) Regulations 2015. First, they delete a sunset clause which would otherwise mean that the 2015 regulations ceased to have effect from the 31 March. Secondly, they extend the scope of the 2015 regulations to include channel tunnel rail operators.
All carriers operating scheduled services to and from the UK are required to provide complete, accurate and timely passenger, crew and service information to the Home Office. Those requirements are made in accordance with paragraphs 27 and 27B of schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. The same requirements may be made by a constable under section 32 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006.
The information, known as advance passenger information and passenger name record data, forms a key component of the United Kingdom’s border security arrangements. Processing of these data allows Border Force and police to carry out border control checks before individuals depart from the UK, before individuals are able to depart to the UK, and before they arrive in the UK. People wanted by police can be apprehended before leaving, while individuals who pose a security or other threat to the UK may be prevented from travelling here, through the no fly scheme, or detected upon arrival in the UK. The same capability enables the effective targeting of individuals carrying illegal drugs and criminal cash, and the disruption of organised immigration crime using scheduled flights.
The 2015 regulations introduced a civil penalty regime whereby the Secretary of State may require a carrier to pay a penalty if the carrier fails to comply with these requirements; the maximum penalty is £10,000 for each breach. Before the introduction of the civil penalty regime, there was only a criminal offence under section 27 of the Immigration Act 1971, with a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment. That criminal penalty remains in place, as it should for the most serious failure to comply with the requirements. The civil penalty was introduced because of the challenge of successfully prosecuting overseas operators in particular for failing to comply with a requirement to provide passenger, crew or service information where that information was being provided from the operators’ systems overseas.
In practice, the approach to civil penalties has been, and continues to be, one of collaborative engagement. To date, no carrier has needed to be given a penalty notice under the 2015 regulations. There have been several instances where the civil penalty regime has been invoked, formal enforcement action for non-compliance has been initiated, and formal notices of potential liability given, but so far, in all cases, that has been sufficient to secure carriers’ compliance, meaning penalties have not been required.
Removing the sunset clause will also preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty regime which, alongside the passenger, crew and service information requirements, is a permanent and ongoing element of the UK’s border security arrangements. Extending the civil penalty regime to Channel Tunnel rail operators ensures parity in the application of both criminal and civil penalties to all carriers operating scheduled international routes and required to provide this information.
The amendment maintains the necessary deterrent to help ensure operators continue to meet their obligations to provide complete, accurate and timely information about individuals intending to travel to and from this country, the processing of which is a key component of our border security arrangements.
Damian Hinds
Again, I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for their presence here today and for, I hope, their support for the regulations, which will ensure the continued provision of complete, accurate and timely information about individuals travelling to and from the UK, whether by air, rail or sea. I look forward to the hon. Lady’s letter.
Question put and agreed to.
Oral Answers to Questions
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 3 months ago)
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Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con)
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
I am conscious of the statement to follow, but my hon. Friend is right that those are concerning matters. In truth, they are not restricted to a single British politician or a single party. The security briefings that he mentioned continue to play an important role.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
Ruth Edwards (Rushcliffe) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend share my concern that, last year, the British public had £78 million stolen from them by clone scammers and people posing as legitimate companies online? Will she work with colleagues from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to set out in law robust identity checks that all online platforms should have to make, before letting people take out advertising on their site?
Damian Hinds
My hon. Friend is right about the scourge of fraud and its prevalence online. We brought fraud into scope for the draft Online Safety Bill. I am conscious of the issues that she mentions about advertising and we continue to work with colleagues from DCMS on that.
Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)
In our communities, we have asylum seekers who are ready and willing to work in sectors that are experiencing acute shortages, such as fruit and veg picking and HGV driving, but those occupations still do not appear on the shortage occupation list. When will the Government widen that list, or will they simply sacrifice the economy for their hostile immigration environment?
UK Anti-Corruption Strategy: Year 3 Update
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 4 months ago)
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The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
Today I am pleased to be publishing the third annual update to the UK anti-corruption strategy 2017 to 2022 which covers the year 2020. As part of the strategy, the Government are committed to providing an annual written update to parliament on progress.
It is particularly pertinent that we are publishing this update as countries are gathering to assess progress with implementation of the UN convention Against corruption. This serves as a reminder to us all of the need for domestic and international action to address the evolving threat from corruption. This month we also saw the UK join our US partners in their summit for democracy, which similarly focuses on actively tackling the corruption challenges at home and abroad.
This update highlights the progress made against the anti-corruption commitments in 2020 and focuses on a number of key areas:
securing the public commitment with all Crown dependencies and inhabited overseas territories to implement publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership information. This will help strengthen the international effort to counter illicit finance;
extending the remit of the national fraud initiative and helping local authorities to undertake bank account and active company checks;
reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems to make them more transparent, independent and proportionate;
securing endorsement from G20 Ministers of a G20 call to action for countries to combat corruption in the covid-19 response and recovery;
publishing a review of procurement risks in local government that improves understanding and strengthens our response; and
publishing the Green Paper on procurement reform with specific proposals to further strengthen transparency and integrity across Government.
This update covers activity made against the Government’s commitments in the Strategy during 2020. Activity in 2021 will be reported on in the Year 4 Update due to be presented next year.
The year 2020 has been dominated in so many ways by the covid-19 pandemic.
The challenging global environment has required the whole of Government to respond to the pandemic focused on public health. Whilst recognising 2020 was a challenging year, this update provides more details and highlights achievements which have gone beyond the original strategy commitments as well as an explanation for those off-track commitments.
The Government will continue to implement their strategy commitments to combat corruption and to promote integrity and transparency at home and overseas. There is still much work to do and it is important to recognise that a number of broader issues are considered as we look ahead. The Government will update Parliament on progress made in 2021 in the fourth annual update due next year and I am pleased also to announce that Government have started to develop the successor to the strategy which expires at the end of 2022. In addition, a policy statement in response to the “Upholding Standards in Public Life” report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the review into the development and use of supply chain finance in Government by Nigel Boardman will be published in due course, in the new year. Alongside this the Government will be providing an update to its work to reform the business appointment rules.
I have written to the devolved Administrations as the update is of direct interest to them.
Finally, I would also like to thank the ongoing work of the Prime Minister’s anti-corruption champion, my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), throughout this period.
A copy of the update will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and also published on gov.uk.
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Draft Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2021
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
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The Chair
Before we begin, I remind Members that they are expected to wear face coverings and to maintain distancing as far as possible. This is in line with current Government guidance and that of the House of Commons Commission. Please give each other and members of staff space when seated and when entering and leaving the room. I remind Members that they are asked by the House to have a covid lateral flow test twice a week if coming in to the parliamentary estate. That can be done either at the testing centre in the House or at home. Members should send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Similarly, officials in the Gallery should communicate electronically with Ministers.
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2021.
Good morning, Ms Rees. Thank you for that introduction and for your reminders to us all. The order provides for the continuation of the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers, or terrorism prevention and investigation measures powers, for a period of five years.
The Government take all necessary steps to protect the public. The threat we face from individuals and groups who wish us harm is significant and enduring. It is vital that we have the tools necessary to keep our country safe. Although it is right that our first response to terrorism-related activity should be to prosecute or deport those involved, this is not always possible. This is why we continue to require the powers conferred on the office of the Home Secretary in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
Section 21(1) of the Act states that the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers will expire at the end of five years from the date the Act was passed. Because of the continuing threat to the UK from terrorism, and following consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the director-general of the Security Service, there can be no doubt that TPIMs remain an essential component of our toolkit to manage the threat from terrorism.
The Act provides the Secretary of State with powers to impose a TPIM notice on an individual if the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act are assessed by the Secretary of State to have been met, namely that she reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity, and that she reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to impose such measures on the individual. In addition to the power to impose a TPIM notice, the Secretary of State has powers to extend and vary a TPIM notice that is in force, and to revive a TPIM notice that has been revoked.
Since the introduction of the Act in 2011, 24 TPIMs have been imposed. As of the last published set of figures on 21 October, five TPIMs were in force. If the TPIM powers are not extended, those five dangerous individuals will be at large without any measures in place to reduce the risk they pose to the public. TPIMs are imposed as a tool of last resort when the Security Service judges there are no other means, or that a TPIM notice is the only satisfactory means, to manage that risk.
It may be helpful for me to provide some background on the TPIM powers. They are civil preventative measures designed to manage the threat posed by individuals who cannot be prosecuted for a terrorism-related offence—or deported in the case of foreign nationals. There is no question but that TPIMs are extraordinary measures. That is why the 2011 Act provides for broad judicial oversight, including: a requirement for High Court permission to impose the measures, except in urgent cases, where the notice must be immediately referred to the Court for confirmation; an automatic review hearing in each case, unless the individual requests the hearing be discontinued; and rights of appeal for the individual against the refusal of a request to revoke or vary a measure.
The TPIM legislation also places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult on the prospects of prosecuting an individual before measures may be imposed, and a duty to keep the necessity of measures under review while they are in force. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, which amended existing and introduced new TPIM measures, also reintroduced a requirement on the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation publicly to report on the operation of the TPIM Act. The Act has been extended once already, in 2016. Unless a new order is made under section 21(2)(c), the powers in the Act will expire at midnight on 13 December. Just as was the case five years ago, it is essential that we have now all the necessary powers to protect the public from terrorism-related activity.
Having consulted as required by the Act, the Home Secretary has, due to the significant terrorist threat facing this country, decided to make this statutory instrument to provide for the continuation of TPIM powers for a further five years—the maximum period allowable in the legislation. It is essential that our counter-terrorism strategy enables us to tackle the full spectrum of activity. TPIMs have been endorsed by the courts and successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, while the police and Security Service believe they have been effective in reducing the national security risk posed by those subject to the measures.
Our message is clear: we remain steadfast in our determination to defeat terrorism and we will take every necessary action to counter the threat from those who hate the values that we cherish. The safety and security of the public is our No. 1 priority. I commend the order to the Committee.
Damian Hinds
I thank all members of the Committee for being here today. I also thank the Opposition speaker, the hon. Member for St Helens North, not only for his kind words, which I reflect back at him, but more generally for his constructive approach and specifically for his and the Opposition’s support for this important measure. He is quite right that the Opposition’s most important role is to hold the Government to account and to make sure measures are subjected to scrutiny, whereby we end up with better laws and better public administration. We greatly appreciate that and we know it can be done constructively and co-operatively when it comes to matters of the utmost importance that affect our national security.
The hon. Gentleman says he wants TPIMs to be robust, impactful and agile. That sums up the objectives well. The 2011 Act was updated by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, as he mentioned, to improve our ability to monitor and manage the risk posed by terrorist offenders and individuals of concern outside custody. That allows for more effective intervention. As he also said, if the powers are not extended, those essential changes will not be effective and our ability to manage the risk posed by individuals will be severely compromised. Subject to the agreement of the Committee and the other place, the order will come into force on 13 December.
In response to the points raised by the hon. Member for St. Helens North and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, I reassure the hon. and learned Lady that officials are in regular contact, and rightly so. These are national matters of security that affect us all. I am conscious, however, that there is a different legal system and tradition in Scotland and we must always be mindful of that.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether we are happy with the regime’s effectiveness, and referred to the relatively small number of TPIMs in force. He asked whether that would continue to be the case. We are content with its effectiveness. The Committee will understand that I cannot comment on individual cases, but when the courts have renewed the imposition of a notice, they have all ruled that the TPIM has been imposed lawfully. The system continues to have the support of the Security Service, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. It remains a tool of last resort and is not something that any Government would want to use extensively. That said, we cannot predict the future and we must retain the flexibility and agility to do what is required.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about lone actors and how the terrorist threat has evolved and referred to the Opposition’s argument that one should look further into the development of lone acts. I reassure him that we are constantly looking at the evolution of the terror threat and its different aspects, part of which is the development of lone acts. We can make some of that analysis available to the Intelligence and Security Committee, if desired.
The hon. Gentleman and my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings also referred to the online aspect of terrorist plots—pretty much every such plot has some sort of online angle these days. That is an incredibly important front of our resistance to terrorism and mitigating that threat. The draft Online Safety Bill is important landmark legislation that specifically contains important provisions to tackle terror content. Two categories of illegal content have been identified as priority legal harms to tackle through the legislation from the very start—there will be others—namely, child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorism. The interim codes of practice have been published and are in effect.
TPIMs give the Security Service and the police powerful and vital measures to help manage the risk posed by people of national security concern. They are used as a last resort when prosecution or deportation is not available. The TPIM Act provides the Secretary of State with the power to impose measures on an individual where she reasonably believes that that individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. I urge all right hon. and hon. Members to support this essential order to keep our country safe.
Question put and agreed to.
Captain David Mockett
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
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The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
It was with great sadness that we heard yesterday of a body being found in the search for 18-year-old Bobbi-Anne McLeod. Our thoughts and prayers, and those of the whole House, are with her family. I join my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Sir Gary Streeter) in his praise and thanks of the emergency services.
I thank my hon. Friend for securing the debate on the tragic case of the late Captain David Mockett. My hon. Friend has long campaigned on the case and has shown great determination in seeking justice on behalf of his constituents, the family of Captain Mockett. I hear what my hon. Friend says about his continuing commitment in that regard. I also express my sympathies to the Mockett family for the tragic loss of their husband and father, and of a professional who was clearly highly respected in his field. Their determination and perseverance in seeking justice is entirely understandable and right, and of course we must do what we can to deliver on that.
As my hon. Friend said, the Metropolitan police counter-terrorism command, known as SO15, supported the Yemeni authorities and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as it was then known. That command has unique expertise in assisting with complex cases in other countries. In 2011, a senior SO15 officer conducted a scoping exercise on the circumstances around Mr Mockett’s death to assist the UK coroner, and he subsequently gave evidence at the inquest. The coroner concluded that the murder was most likely criminally motivated. I understand that SO15 has worked closely with the City of London police, which carried out a fraud investigation linked to the case, as my hon. Friend mentioned. The Metropolitan police assured us that, over the last 10 years, SO15 has sought to assist other agencies with the appropriate jurisdiction and will continue to do so.
It is the case that Yemeni authorities have overall responsibility for the homicide investigation and there are very limited circumstances where UK police can take primacy on an investigation into a murder overseas. The Metropolitan police is of the view that the circumstances in this case are such that UK police do not have legal authority.
My late predecessor, our friend James Brokenshire, wrote to my hon. Friend in 2020 in response to his correspondence, as he will recall. As noted in that letter, the police and the National Crime Agency are operationally independent, as he noted in his closing remarks. Ministers do not have the powers to make a request or direction to them to open an investigation. In our system, that would not be appropriate.
I am entirely sympathetic to my hon. Friend’s determination to seek justice for his constituents. I am also sure that he will appreciate the principle of the operational independence of the police and of how operational decisions and, ultimately, prosecution decisions are made. Indeed, the police must be able to operate free of political influence or interference, even in cases as tragic, emotive and difficult as this one. Where there is a case for further action, we would of course expect them to take appropriate action.
While I regret that I am not in a position to agree to the requests my hon. Friend set out in his speech, I will do—and want to do—what I can to help support David’s family. First, I can confirm that the case has been drawn to the attention of Her Majesty’s ambassador to Yemen, who can make representations about the matter to the Government of Yemen. I am also, of course, very happy to meet my hon. Friend away from the Floor of the House to discuss the case more fully, and we should be in touch on that immediately.
I would like to thank my hon. Friend for seeking this important debate.
Sir Gary Streeter
I appreciate all that the Minister has said, but is he satisfied, or could he make further inquiries, on the point I have raised repeatedly about looking at the Aviation and Marine Security Act to see whether some other kind of investigation might be pursued by the British authorities into the act of piracy, which could then have the right result in securing some kind of justice? Could he please go back to his office and look at that point for me? I would be most grateful.
Damian Hinds
Of course, I am not going to say no to my hon. Friend on that question. I do not know what the prospects might be, but, yes, of course I can do that, and specifically, when he and I meet, we can discuss it.
I was just coming to the end of my remarks, but I wish to finish by once again extending my own deepest sympathies and, on their behalf, those of colleagues in the Home Office and the Home Secretary to the family and friends of Captain Mockett.
Question put and agreed to.
Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism
Damian Hinds Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
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The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
I beg to move,
That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2021, which was laid before this House on 19 November, be approved.
This Government are committed to protecting the people of this country, and tackling terrorism in all its forms is clearly a critical and central part of that mission.
As the House will be aware, following the tragic death of our friend, Sir David Amess, last month, and the explosion outside Liverpool Women’s Hospital earlier this month, the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre raised the threat level in the UK from substantial to severe on 15 November. A severe threat level means that an attack is highly likely.
Terrorism poses a persistent and enduring threat to our way of life. Public protection must be our No.1 priority and we continue to work very closely with counter-terrorism, policing and the intelligence and security agencies in pursuit of that vital endeavour. The Government’s position towards Hamas is well-documented.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)
While my right hon. Friend is on the subject of the assessment of the terrorist threat, will he say whether there is any assessment at all of any threat to the United Kingdom from Hamas?
Damian Hinds
I will come to the reasoning for the proscription order in this case.
As I was saying, we have a no-contact policy now with the entirety of the group, but we proscribe only the military wing.
Damian Hinds
Will the hon. Gentleman forgive me for a moment? I will give way, if that is all right, a wee bit later.
We mirror the EU sanctions in our own domestic regime against Hamas, also in their entirety. The Government condemn Hamas’s indiscriminate and abhorrent rocket attacks and remain resolute in our commitment to Israel’s security. We continue to call on Hamas permanently to end its incitement and rocket fire against Israel.
Steve McCabe
I support the measure. It seems to have cross-party support, which I welcome. It seems to me that it largely closes a few existing loopholes and brings us into line with the position of our allies. None the less, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it does not close the door on Hamas participating in the political process? Were it to recognise Israel’s right to exist and renounce violence and terrorism—in effect, accept the Quartet principles—it would be very welcome.
Damian Hinds
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and for the support that he indicates for the measure. Our position on Hamas is clear and it is public. Hamas must renounce violence. It must recognise Israel and accept previously signed agreements. Credible moves must be made towards those conditions. They remain the benchmark against which intention should be judged.
Damian Hinds
I will take one more intervention and then, Madam Deputy Speaker, I suggest that I make some progress.
Tom Hunt
I thank the Minister for giving way. Last weekend, an Israeli tour guide was murdered in Jerusalem. My understanding is that the individual who committed that murder was a member of the political wing of Hamas. Surely that goes to prove that this arbitrary distinction between a military wing and a political wing is not accurate, and that, in its entirety, Hamas is a terrorist organisation and deserves to be labelled as such.
Damian Hinds
The incident that my hon. Friend mentions is a timely reminder, and our sympathies are very much with the victims and their families and friends. I will come on, if I may, to the important point that he raises about the distinction, or lack thereof, between the so-called political and military wings.
The threat posed by terrorist organisations varies depending on each group’s ideology, membership and ability to train members. Groups such as Hamas train members in terrorism, as well as preparing and committing terrible acts of violence against innocent members of the public. We have a duty to our allies, as well as to our own people, to tackle groups that inspire and co-ordinate terror on the international stage. Although we can sadly never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, we must always do all that we can to act against and mitigate the danger it poses, and to seek to keep the public safe.
Some 78 terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Thanks to the dedication, courage and skill of counter-terrorism policing, and our security and intelligence services, most of these groups have never carried out a successful attack on British soil. Proscription is a powerful tool for degrading terrorist organisations and I will explain the impact that it can have shortly. We propose to amend the existing listing of “Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades”, or Hamas IDQ, in schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to cover Hamas in its entirety.
Under section 3 of TACT 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if she believes that it is currently concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe that organisation. The Home Secretary considers a number of factors in considering whether to exercise her discretion. The relevant discretionary factors for Hamas are: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat posed to British nationals overseas; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.
The effect of proscription is to outlaw a listed organisation and ensure that it is unable to operate in the UK. Proscription is designed to degrade a group’s ability to operate through various means, including: enabling prosecution for the various proscription offences; under- pinning immigration-related disruptions, including the exclusion from the UK of members of groups based overseas; making it possible to seize cash associated with an organisation; and sending a strong signal globally that a group is concerned in terrorism and is without legitimacy.
Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)
On my right hon. Friend’s latter point, is not one of the strongest reasons for proscribing the whole organisation to strengthen the role of moderate Palestinians and the ability of the Palestinian Authority to come to a peace agreement with Israel, and to send a clear message that extremists, who do not accept the existence of Israel and want to use violence, have no place in this process? Is not that one of the strongest benefits of the proscription that my right hon. Friend is setting out?
Damian Hinds
The signalling and messaging are important, as are the practical effects of proscription. I will come briefly to the middle east peace process, and our continuing hopes for a peaceful and sustainable future for all.
It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, support or arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to wear clothing or carry articles in public that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. The penalties for proscription offences are a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or an unlimited fine. Given the wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on an organisation. That includes open source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across Government, including with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The cross-Government proscription review group supports the Home Secretary in her decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is only taken after great care and consideration of the particular case, and it is appropriate that it must be approved by both Houses.
Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that Hamas in its entirety is concerned in terrorism and the discretionary factors support proscription. Although I am of course unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide the House with a summary of the group’s activities. Hamas is a militant Islamist movement that was established in 1987. Its ideology is related to that of the Muslim Brotherhood combined with Palestinian nationalism. Its main aims are to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation, the establishment of an Islamic state under sharia law and the destruction of Israel, although Hamas no longer demands the destruction of Israel in its covenant. The group operates in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)
My intervention is further to that of the right hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), who made the key point: what assessment have the British Government made of the impact of the measure on the internal political dynamics of the Palestinian Territories? Does it weaken Hamas, as the right hon. Member for Forest of Dean said, and help the moderate forces, or is there a danger that it might strengthen Hamas’s hand?
Damian Hinds
We are of course greatly concerned with what happens in-country and in-region. We want to see progress. We want to see the Palestinian Authority extending its governance. But this measure is specifically about the entity of Hamas. It is a proscription of a body because of its involvement in terrorism, and this debate and vote must focus on that specific question.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)
Will the Minister clarify what assessment has been made of important discussions that may need to go on in relation to humanitarian issues, education and healthcare, and how that will continue in the very important work that has to be done to support people in the Gaza strip?
Damian Hinds
The hon. Lady makes a very important point. If she will forgive me, I am coming to that a little later in my remarks, and I will cover it then.
Hamas formally established Hamas IDQ in 1992. IDQ was proscribed by the UK in March 2001. At the time, it was determined that there was a distinction between the political and military wings of Hamas, and that the only part of the organisation that was concerned in terrorism, and should therefore be proscribed, was the military wing. Over the past 20 years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Tom Hunt) said, Hamas’s so-called military and political wings have grown closer together, with any distinction between them now considered to be artificial. The Government’s assessment is that Hamas is a complex but single organisation made up of constituent parts, one of which includes Hamas IDQ. It is clear that these constituent parts are not wholly independent of Hamas’s so-called political wing and that they take strategic direction from it. There is also movement of key individuals across the organisation as well as, of course, a shared ideology. It is clear that the current proscription listing of Hamas does not reflect its true structure, and that is why this order has been laid. The Home Secretary has a reasonable belief that Hamas, in its entirety, is concerned in terrorism. It is our assessment that the group prepares for, commits and participates in acts of terrorism. There is also evidence that the group promotes and encourages terrorism.
Indiscriminate rocket or mortar attacks against Israeli targets are key examples of Hamas committing this terrorism. During the May 2021 conflict, over 4,000 rockets were fired indiscriminately into Israel. Civilians, including two children, were killed as a result. The rocket attacks also targeted airports and maritime interests. Hamas also frequently uses incendiary balloons to launch attacks from Gaza into southern Israel. There was a spate of incendiary balloon attacks from Gaza into southern Israel during June and July 2021, causing fires and resulting in serious damage to property. These attacks were likely carried out by both Hamas and by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which is already proscribed. Only last summer, Hamas launched camps in Gaza that focused on training groups, including minors, to fight. In a press statement Hamas described the aim of these camps as to “ignite the embers of jihad in the liberation generation, cultivate Islamic values, and prepare the expected victory army to liberate Palestine”. This vile indoctrination of young people into the organisation’s violent ideology shows how diametrically opposed it is to our country’s core values.
The action we are taking is not a commentary on the ongoing tensions in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, nor is it a departure in any way from the Government’s long-standing position on the middle east peace process. We continue to support a negotiated settlement leading to a safe and secure Israel alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state. This decision is based on the Government’s assessment that Hamas, in its entirety, is concerned in terrorism and that proscription is a proportionate action to take, and nothing more. Having concluded that the distinction maintained in the list of proscribed organisations is artificial, it is right that this is addressed. Hamas, in its entirety, is a terrorist organisation. We must be clear on this to avoid conferring legitimacy on any element of the organisation.
It goes without saying that this Government do not provide any assistance to Hamas or the Government structure in Gaza that is made up of Hamas members. However, to answer the point made by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), this proscription will not prevent aid from reaching civilians in need. In Gaza we have strong controls in place to monitor spending and ensure that aid sent into the region reaches its intended beneficiaries.
To conclude, the enduring and wide-ranging nature of the threat from terrorism demands an agile approach and a comprehensive strategy. That includes confronting groups that participate in and prepare for acts of terrorism or unlawfully glorify horrific terrorist acts. We must use every tool at our disposal to prevent them from stirring up hatred and division in our communities. We will never be cowed by those who hate the values we hold dear. The safety and security of the public is our No. 1 priority, and I commend the order to the House.
Damian Hinds
The Home Secretary and I strongly believe that the proscription of Hamas IDQ should be extended to cover the entire organisation. Subject to the agreement of this House and the other place, the order will come into force on Friday 26 November.
Before continuing, I extend my thanks and pay tribute to the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), for the tone and content of what he said, and for his support and that of his right hon. and hon. colleagues for the order. I join in the praise that he rightly gave to our counter-terrorism police, the rest of the policing family, the agencies and everybody who works so hard to keep us safe.
I shall try to address what the shadow Home Secretary said, starting specifically with the proscription review group. As he will know, it is a cross-Government group, chaired by the Home Office, that supports the Home Secretary in her decision making on proscription issues and remains active.
I absolutely reassure the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) of the rigour of the process on this and every occasion. We constantly keep the list of proscribed organisations under review. The evidence for that is that over the past two years we have proscribed the extreme right-wing terrorist groups Sonnenkrieg Division, Feuerkrieg Division and Atomwaffen Division, as well as the militant white-supremacist group called the Base. We have also added four aliases to the list of proscribed organisations, as well as this order to extend the proscription of Hamas.
There was a question about whether there should be more consultation in respect of a proscription. Proscription is an Executive tool based on assessment from security departments and across Government. The proscription regime itself is scrutinised by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who makes annual reports on how the Government use their counter-terrorism powers. Of course, in debating this order today, we have an opportunity to consider it specifically.
Jonathan Edwards
Successive incumbent independent reviewers of terrorism legislation have all argued for the introduction of timeliness in respect of proscription orders; are the British Government considering that?
Damian Hinds
We keep proscription—including not only whether organisations that are not proscribed should be but whether the proscription of those that are remains the correct and proportionate approach—under constant review.
The shadow Home Secretary and others asked implicitly—in fact, the hon. Member for Stirling (Alyn Smith), who spoke for the SNP, asked explicitly—why now? It is because we keep the response to terrorism under continual review. It is entirely appropriate that we take all available opportunities to strengthen the UK’s response to domestic and international threats. The extension of the proscription of Hamas is part of that response. As I have said, the group in its entirety is assessed to be concerned with terrorism, with the lines that the Government had previously drawn between its constituent parts now being assessed as artificial.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) spoke movingly and with great passion about the terrible case of 26-year-old Eli Kay. Ultimately, it is a reminder of what we are discussing here—the end result of terror and why it is essential that our Government and Governments around the world be constantly attentive to the threat of terrorism and do what is required to mitigate that threat.
A number of colleagues across the House spoke about the position of NGOs and related matters. Implicitly, the question is, would this stop the work of UK NGOs or others in location? The shadow Home Secretary asked about that, as did the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David), the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) and others. The Government recently published guidance to support our NGOs to operate overseas in high-risk jurisdictions while complying with the counter-terrorism legislative framework and sanctions regime. A specific section refers to proscription, including how to operate around what are known as sections 11 to 13 offences. That is guidance, and we encourage our NGOs to seek legal advice in relation to specific activities and ensure compliance with terrorism legislation.
The UK will continue to work with international partners and NGOs to support the people of Gaza, including through our long-standing support of the United Nations—
Crispin Blunt
I think we would all be grateful for clarity on one specific issue. If those of us who want to continue to engage with people whom we know are members of Hamas and who are in leadership positions—in order to try to draw them into peace negotiations, the unification of the Palestinian position and all the other things that we should be trying to do as parliamentarians engaged in that process—have made it clear that we have no support for Hamas as a movement, will we be at risk of prosecution?
Damian Hinds
I think my hon. Friend will appreciate that I am not in a position, standing at the Dispatch Box, to give guarantees about unspecified activities in which he or others may or may not be involved in the future. This is an order specifically to proscribe this organisation in its entirety. The legislation is clear about the activities that that covers, including support for the organisation, and particular ways of using emblems and so on in support of it, or in ways that would reasonably be considered to be in support of it, and I direct him to that guidance.
Let me come back to what I was saying about NGOs. We will continue to work with international partners and NGOs to support the people in Gaza. It is important to stress that a number of donor partners already list Hamas in its entirety and still continue to deliver significant humanitarian development programmes in the region. Specifically on the point raised—not with me, but with her colleague, the hon. Member for Stirling (Alyn Smith)—by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford) about her charity work on breast cancer, for which I commend her, and more widely on the position of smaller NGOs, I am happy to follow that up with her separately if that is helpful.
Finally, a number of colleagues raised the overall position of the middle east peace process. The UK’s long-standing position on that has not changed. We support a negotiated settlement leading to a safe and secure Israel living alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state, based on the 1967 borders, with agreed land swaps, Jerusalem as the shared capital of both states, and on a just, fair, agreed and realistic settlement for refugees. Proscription is not targeted at any particular faith, social grouping or ideological motivation. It is based on clear evidence that an organisation is concerned with terrorism as assessed by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre.
We are clear that, based on the available evidence, it is appropriate for the Home Secretary to exercise her discretion to proscribe Hamas in its entirety. It is our duty to support the order to protect the public from the noxious ideologies that Hamas holds. That being the case, I urge hon. and right hon. Members across the House to support the order.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2021, which was laid before this House on 19 November, be approved.