Draft Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Consequential Provision) Regulations 2022

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2022 General Committees

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Consequential Provision) Regulations 2022.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Sharma.

Following the horrific terrorist attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019, the Home Secretary commissioned the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, to review the multi-agency public protection arrangements—commonly known as MAPPA—which are used to supervise terrorist and terrorism-risk offenders on licence in the community.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 established three new powers for counter-terrorism policing: a personal search power, a premises search power, and an urgent power of arrest. These powers were taken in response to recommendations made by Mr Hall following his review of MAPPA. The draft regulations relate to the new power of personal search, the creation of which was also recommended by the Fishmongers’ Hall prevention of future deaths report. The personal search power was inserted into the Terrorism Act 2000—it is new section 43C of that Act—by the 2022 Act. The new search power commences tomorrow, 28 June.

As the Government set out during the passage of the 2022 Act, the new search power will apply across the UK, enabling the police to stop and search terrorist and terrorism-connected offenders released on licence who are required to submit to the search by their licence conditions. The officer conducting the stop and search must be satisfied that it is necessary to exercise the power for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.

The Government are clear that sensitive powers of stop and search should be subject to a code of practice setting out the basic principles for their use. Section 47AA of the Terrorism Act 2000 imposes a requirement on the Secretary of State to prepare a code of practice containing guidance about the exercise of search powers that are conferred by that Act. The draft regulations amend section 47AA so that it extends to cover the new search power inserted into the Terrorism Act by the 2022 Act. Subject to Parliament’s approval, this consequential amendment will create a requirement for the Secretary of State to prepare a revised code of practice that includes guidance on the exercise of the power conferred by new section 43C.

In anticipation of section 47AA being amended, I can confirm that we are already in the process of engaging relevant stakeholders and updating the code of practice to reflect the new section 43C stop-and-search power. We plan to lay an order next month, alongside the draft revised code of practice itself, for Parliament’s consideration and approval. As such, Parliament will have the opportunity to review and debate the revised code and its contents in due course.

The draft regulations being considered today simply relate to the technical and consequential matter of whether to amend section 47AA of the Terrorism Act 2000 to enable the Government to update the relevant code of practice in the manner I have outlined. I very much hope that hon. and right hon. members on both sides of the Committee will be able to support them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

I thank the colleagues who have spoken. I acknowledge what the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire says about the importance of consultation with the devolved Administrations. To the hon. Member for Bolton South East, I say simply that we are committed, as she knows, to tacking terrorism in all its forms. This power to conduct a search will apply to any terrorist offender who is subject to the relevant licence condition, which is irrespective of someone’s religious background or ethnicity. The legislation is clear that such searches cannot be conducted unless the police officer is satisfied that the search is necessary for the purposes of protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for her comments. I echo what she says about the importance of the work of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and I assure her that the effectiveness of such legislation is continually reviewed.

In conclusion, I thank all colleagues for their presence here at this important scrutiny session—

[Yasmin Qureshi]

Maybe I misheard the Minister, but did he say that when somebody is searched, that search will be recorded, and also that the records will show the ethnicity and religion of the person? That is the information I was talking about. Perhaps I misunderstood him, but I would like clarity on that.

[Damian Hinds]

Of course, the code itself will be laid before Parliament in due course and the House will have, in a session such as this, the opportunity to debate it. I can assure the hon. Lady that that sort of recording is indeed part of the process.

I reiterate that the regulations provide a technical consequential amendment to section 47AA of the Terrorism Act to reflect the introduction of the new personal search power and to ensure it is governed by a code of practice. I emphasise again that today’s regulations will not amend the content of the relevant code of practice, and our draft revised code, as I was just saying, will shortly be laid before Parliament subject to its approval. As such, I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Monday 20th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Paul Holmes (Eastleigh) (Con)]

15. What steps her Department is taking to ensure national security.

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

Our national security is the first responsibility and priority of the Government, and we are ensuring that our world-class security and intelligence services and counterterrorism police are supported in their work with the tools and the legislative framework they need to keep us safe. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to them for all they do.

[Chris Clarkson]

When it comes to the Rwanda policy, the Labour party is all over the shop. The left hand does not know what the far left hand is doing. The other day the Leader of the Opposition’s spokesman said that they could not rule out maintaining this policy, while the shadow immigration Minister told the BBC that they would definitely scrap it. While the Labour party works out if it has a policy at all, can I ask my right hon. Friend for an assurance that we will be working to break the vile business model of people traffickers by making sure that the Rwanda flights get off the ground soon?

[Damian Hinds]

My hon. Friend is quite right that we hear plenty of opposing from the Opposition, but not much proposing: they complain, but they do not have a plan. Our partnership with Rwanda is strong and supports a proportionate, humane approach. We are determined to deter the wicked people smugglers and the great damage that they bring to human life.

[Paul Holmes]

The MI5 director general recently said:

“It must be right that Parliament looks at modernising the powers the State has to protect us all from the full range of today’s threats.”

Can my right hon. Friend confirm that we are heeding the director general’s advice, and that our National Security Bill will protect us from a range of emerging threats, including cyber-attacks and interference in elections?

[Damian Hinds]

I can. May I take the opportunity to thank my hon. Friend for all his work in support of our national security while he was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Home Secretary in the Department?

The National Security Bill will keep pace with the changing threat and will make the UK an ever harder target for states that seek to conduct hostile acts against us. It will be an offence for foreign powers to improperly interfere with the UK’s democracy. The Bill will address the serious threat from state-backed attacks on assets, including sites, data and infrastructure critical to the UK’s safety or interests.

[Margaret Ferrier (Rutherglen and Hamilton West) (Ind)]

Has the Home Secretary considered the dangers to freedom of the press that the National Security Bill presents? Many of my constituents are concerned that measures that could prevent journalists from publishing stories of public interest are undemocratic.

[Damian Hinds]

No, I do not see a danger to journalistic freedoms. Indeed, the Government are taking stringent steps to ensure, for example, that in the Online Safety Bill journalistic rights and freedoms are absolutely to the fore, because of the vital and irreplaceable role that a free and sometimes boisterous media plays in underpinning and challenging us in our democracy.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Canada, one of our Five Eyes partners, recently announced sanctions against Alexander Lebedev as one of 14 people who

“have directly enabled Vladimir Putin’s senseless war in Ukraine and bear responsibility for the pain and suffering of the people of Ukraine.”

I have asked this question of the Government six times now, but I have not had anything resembling an answer: did the Prime Minister meet Alexander Lebedev without officials and without close protection during the Salisbury poisonings in April 2018—yes or no?

[Damian Hinds]

I do not know the detailed contents of either individual’s diary. What I can tell the hon. Lady and the House is that this Government have acted on sanctions against Putin-linked elites—the people who have propped up and supported that regime—without fear or favour. That extends to more than 1,000 individuals, entities and subsidiaries, and we will do more as required.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 1 December 2021 to 28 February 2022

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Thursday 16th June 2022 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of her TPIM powers under the Act during that period.

The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.

HM Passport Office Backlog

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

While 98.5% of UK passport applications are being processed within 10 weeks, it is clear that some of our constituents have not received the level of service that they rightly expect. I assure colleagues that the efforts to improve delivery of passport services continue. The further 550 staff still to be added going into the summer will further increase the capacity for processing applications and build on the record numbers being processed now. HM Passport Office’s current projection suggests that by the end of this month more applications will have been processed in 2022 than throughout the whole of the previous year.

I am grateful to colleagues across the House for their contributions to this debate. We heard from the hon. Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson), my hon. Friend—and almost neighbour—the Member for Eastleigh (Paul Holmes), and the hon. Members for City of Durham (Mary Kelly Foy), for Blaenau Gwent (Nick Smith), for Weaver Vale (Mike Amesbury), for Bradford East (Imran Hussain), for Blackburn (Kate Hollern), for Lewisham East (Janet Daby), for Birmingham, Hall Green (Tahir Ali), for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss), for Bedford (Mohammad Yasin), for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Gerald Jones), and for Newport West (Ruth Jones). Many of them, including the hon. Member for Newport West, rightly paid tribute to staff working in HMPO offices. I echo what they said to hard-working staff working in difficult circumstances.

Many colleagues across the House rightly asked what we have done and what we are doing on resourcing to make sure that the operation is commensurate with the task at hand. I can tell them that 650 additional staff have been added since April 2021 and 550 more are being recruited. The hon. Member for City of Durham helpfully outlined the use of agency staff and overtime in order to increase the capacity. I think at one point she was suggesting that we should not be deploying extra agency staff and overtime, which would of course make matters worse. The telephone operator, Teleperformance, has also added hundreds of staff, and other suppliers have increased their capacity, too. We have opened an eighth service counter and run extensive proactive communications, including issuing 5 million reminder texts to people with passports expired or soon to expire.

A couple of colleagues asked whether staff working from home is causing delays, and it is not. Whether staff work from home or from the office does not impact on the capacity within the digital system, which is accessible from home. The hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) asked from the shadow Front Bench specifically about courier services. I can confirm that through constructive work with FedEx, which is the parent company of TNT, delivery delays have been resolved and TNT is currently delivering within the contractual service levels.

In anticipation of the surge in demand and to provide greater resilience to the delivery network, a percentage of domestically delivered passports are now also arriving via HMPO’s partner for international deliveries, which she will know is DHL, with supporting documents being returned by Royal Mail. More than one Opposition MP asked about the TNT contract. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on such commercial matters from the Dispatch Box, but I will say that the relationship between the Passport Office and FedEx is constructive and the current performance is as required.

The hon. Member for Halifax also asked about Sopra Steria and the back-office processing. I confirm that it has doubled its workforce supporting Her Majesty’s Passport Office since the start of 2022, alongside opening up a number of new processing centres. Its efforts have enabled the registration of applications and supporting documents on our system and the return of supporting documents to keep pace with the unprecedented demand.

The question of privatisation or otherwise has been raised multiple times in the debate. Again, to be clear, elements of the process, such as the printing and the delivery of the passports, are already contracted to private suppliers. We are committed, naturally, to ensuring that public services are run as efficiently and effectively as possible, and that gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to our hard-working staff.

We are living through the aftermath of a pandemic that has been at once an unprecedented medical and healthcare shock, an unprecedented peacetime economic shock and an unprecedented travel and movement of people shock. It is one with multiple uncertainties, adverse turns and false dawns. It has disrupted supply chains, interrupted business continuity and thwarted projections at every turn throughout this country and throughout the world. It has specifically thrown the travel trade off course and everyone’s planning of its usual pattern far off course.

In 2020, there were roughly 4 million passport applications in this country. In 2021, it was about 5 million. This year—2022—we project it will be 9.5 million. In the face of this enormous change, everyone’s focus has been on trying to make sure that Britain—our constituents—can get back travelling, whether that is taking their hard-earned holidays or doing that business travel, which underpins our national prosperity, or those visits to be with loved ones, both in the happiest of times and in the saddest of times, when their personal in-person support is so important.

Amid the overwhelming volumes, it is true that sometimes things have not been fast enough and call waiting times have been too long, and I am sorry for that, but it is not for want of will, effort or commitment. I pay tribute to the dedicated staff of Her Majesty’s Passport Office working under this pressure.

I also want to say a word about the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster). I must say that I am rather disappointed by the wording of the motion. What is happening with passport applications is an entirely legitimate, worthwhile and relevant subject for debate, but it is quite wrong to channel that into a personal criticism of him. He is an extremely engaged and active Minister working with officials to deal with these unprecedented issues. I have heard many accounts, and we have heard more today, of his personal work to help to expedite some of the most difficult cases by doing casework out of hours and at weekends for hon. Members on both sides of the House.

[Mary Kelly Foy]

My constituent went to Durham passport office to collect his passport only to be told that there was an issue with the photo that had previously been approved. He has just been to deliver new photos, but staff told him that they have no record of his interview, despite the Home Office telling me two hours ago that it was on the system. He flies to America on Monday. What do I tell him?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. This is the Minister’s winding-up speech; it is not the place for a new speech. I let the hon. Lady finish because—[Interruption.] Do not argue with me. I let her finish because she was speaking on behalf of a constituent, and it matters, but that is not how we conduct debate.

[Damian Hinds]

I think the hon. Lady will appreciate that it is impossible—literally impossible—for me to comment on the details of that case and the particular issue with the photograph and so on from the Dispatch Box of the House of Commons, but if she speaks to our colleagues in the hub in Portcullis House, or with me or the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay after the debate, we will be sure to pick it up.

The difficulties that we have heard about today absolutely must be taken with great seriousness, and that is happening. I assure hon. Members that we will continue to look at ways to further improve performance. I also remind them that 98.5% of UK applications across March, April and May were processed within the published processing time. Indeed, the overwhelming majority were processed more quickly than that, with more than 91% of those completed in May having been processed within six weeks.

I certainly do not seek to minimise the frustrations that have been raised by hon. Members on both sides of the House during the debate, but I assure the House that everybody at Her Majesty’s Passport Office is completely focused on meeting the needs of customers ahead of their long-awaited and hard-earned summer holidays.

Question put.

Draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2022

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Monday 13th June 2022 General Committees

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2022.

This statutory instrument will give effect to the draft code of practice that covers the exercise of counter-terrorism port examination powers under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. The powers were amended by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

Counter-terrorism officers who use schedule 7 port examination powers must do so in accordance with the relevant code of practice. While the code largely reflects the primary legislation, it also includes further procedural guidance for those exercising the powers and additional safeguards for those subject to them.

In passing the Nationality and Borders Act, the House approved amendments to the powers under schedule 7 that have necessitated changes to the code of practice. The code now reflects the amended provisions under schedule 7, which allow officers to examine individuals away from port areas in the following circumstances: first, the individual must either be detained or in custody under relevant provisions of the Immigration Acts; secondly, the individual must have arrived in the UK by sea and been apprehended within 24 hours of their arrival; and, thirdly, a period of five days beginning on the day after their apprehension must not have expired.

That will allow officers to examine those who, following their irregular arrival in the UK, have been moved from a port location or are encountered inland. In short, those who have arrived irregularly by sea will now be subject to the same powers as if they had arrived through conventional means, adding a further protective layer to our existing precautions. The draft code before us includes changes to cover the exercise of that amended power, as well as several other minor changes to clarify language around existing safeguards.

The code was subject to public consultation earlier this year. In response to feedback, we clarified officers’ responsibility to inform those being examined that the purpose of the examination is not to gather evidence or information on any potential immigration offences.

The UK and its citizens continue to face the threat of terrorism from those who are intent on harming and dividing us. The provisions within this statutory instrument will support the police in their tireless efforts to keep us safe from such threats. I commend the draft order to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

I thank all members of the Committee for this important scrutiny sitting and our debate. Several important points were made by the hon. Member for Halifax who speaks for the Opposition, the hon. Member for Falkirk of the SNP and the right hon. Member for North Durham, and I will address them now.

We have to look realistically at the situation we are dealing with: the vast majority of people who arrive on small boats have no documentation with them to indicate who they are or where they are from. Enabling officers to examine those who are being processed for immigration purposes away from the ports, as well as at the ports, means that we can fulfil our duty to safeguard national security, while allowing those individuals to be moved from a port environment to more appropriate facilities.

We do not publish statistics on the results of schedule 7 examinations, because to do so would risk disclosing whether a stop was targeted, and that is an operational matter for the police. I reassure the right hon. Gentleman, however, that there is extensive record keeping and analysis, as he might imagine.

[Mr Jones]

That is reassuring, but does that go to Ministers? It is important for Ministers to have at least oversight of what is going on. If there are blips in statistics, he or she could then at least intervene and ask the questions why.

[Damian Hinds]

I reassure the right hon. Gentleman that such operations have extensive ministerial oversight, and rightly so.

On a number of previous occasions, a well-rehearsed debate on the powers under schedule 7 has been considered in depth, as colleagues know. For now, I reiterate only that those powers have been absolutely integral to the work of the police in detecting and disrupting terrorists for more than two decades. The police do that—I reassure everyone—in a way that is compliant with article 6. Oral answers, as colleagues know, are of course excluded from criminal proceedings.

The hon. Member for Halifax asked specifically about locations and what should be in scope. The key practical operational point here is that people will be in custody or immigration detention, so scope should not arise in general as an issue.

Various colleagues asked about training, and we continue to work closely with the police to ensure that the independent reviewer’s recommendation on training is included. I am grateful to the hon. Lady and others for mentioning the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, because it gives me another opportunity to put on the record my thanks to him for his extremely diligent work.

The code of practice has long been clear that selection of a person based solely on ethnicity or religion is unlawful. It also directs officers to exercise the powers fairly and responsibly, with respect for the people to whom they are applied. All examinees are provided with details of how to make a complaint should they wish to do so, and those detained for more than an hour are entitled to private consultation with a solicitor.

It is important to note that, to date, no independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has suggested that the existing schedule 7 powers are being applied inappropriately. We will continue to work with the reviewer to ensure that the powers are applied proportionately and in the most effective and targeted way, and to minimise disruption to those subject to their use where possible.

I hope that my comments have underscored the importance of the powers and of the code of practice that provides guidance and safeguards on their exercise. I thank all members of the Committee—right hon. and hon. Friends and colleagues from the Opposition parties—for their presence today for this important scrutiny debate. I also thank you, Ms Elliott, and everyone else who has enabled the debate. Keeping the UK safe is the Government’s foremost responsibility, and the provisions within this draft statutory instrument will support that vital endeavour. I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

National Security Bill

Damian Hinds Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

National security is the first and foremost responsibility of any Government, and for that reason I warmly welcome the thorough, insightful and eloquent fashion in which colleagues on both sides of the House have made their contributions this evening. I join the Home Secretary, Opposition Front Benchers and colleagues from right across the House in putting on the record at the start of my remarks my admiration for our security services and for law enforcement, particularly at the end of this most marvellous jubilee celebration.

The threat of hostile activity from foreign states is persistent, but it is not consistent. As a result of technological change and the greater interconnectivity of the world, among other factors, that threat manifests in ways more diverse and often more sophisticated than ever. We must therefore equip our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies with modern tools and powers commensurate to that challenge, and this Bill enables us to do exactly that. This is not just about the here and now. The Bill is designed to be future-proof, so that we can harden our resilience against these threats today and for years to come. We have a responsibility to ensure that our systems and laws are agile, effective and robust, and that is what this legislation is about.

The bulk of the Bill is about countering state threats, and a critical aspect of parts 1 and 2 is the link between the activity covered and the foreign state. That is vital in ensuring that the provisions in the Bill are appropriately constrained to state threats and do not capture legitimate activity or non-state criminality, as has been mentioned a number of times during the debate. The foreign power condition could be met in two scenarios: first, where an activity is carried out that a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, is for or on behalf of a foreign power, and that includes a wide range of different types of relationship, including activity at the request or direction of a foreign state; and secondly, where an activity is carried out with the intention to benefit a foreign power, and that includes cases where a person’s primary motivation may be, for example, financial, but where there can be virtually certain knowledge that a foreign power will benefit.

Three new offences in the Bill will combat the modern threat from state-linked espionage and related harmful conduct. Those are a new protection of trade secrets offence, which might otherwise be known as economic espionage; a new assisting a foreign intelligence service offence; and an offence of obtaining, or disclosure of, protected information where it is for, or on behalf of, a foreign power and where the individual ought reasonably to have known that their conduct was prejudicial to the safety and interests of the United Kingdom.

Let me turn to the points made by colleagues in the debate. I will try to get through as many of them as possible, but I will concentrate particularly on the themes that came up a number of times. Let me start with something that is not in the Bill—I will have to beg your indulgence, Mr Deputy Speaker—although I would say that it is in scope for the debate because it came up so many times, and that is the Official Secrets Act 1989. Colleagues will have heard the Home Secretary say earlier that we continue to look at the 1989 Act, acknowledging the difficult aspects therein. We wanted to prioritise and press ahead with the wider package of measures before us to tackle state threats and to be able to do so now.

I also want to talk specifically about the public interest defence, which was raised eloquently by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) and others, but before I do I just want to clarify how all these different things fit together. We talk about whether we are or are not reforming the Official Secrets Act, but of course there are four Official Secrets Acts, and we are reforming the Official Secrets Acts of 1911, 1920 and 1939—we are not, in this Bill, reforming the Official Secrets Act 1989. The Law Commission’s recommendations on a public interest defence came in the context of discussing overall reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and they have to be seen in that context.

It is important to note that using the term “public interest defence” does not of itself mean that, on balance, something is in the public interest. I suggest to the House that the existence of any public interest defence would without doubt lead to more unauthorised disclosures. It is impossible for an individual at that moment to have the full picture of what harm could come from their disclosure. That point can be exploited by people who have malicious intent.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

My word, what choice! I will give way to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland).

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend. He is right to caution against the danger here, but a carefully calibrated reverse burden defence deals with the mischiefs that he rightly outlines. None of us wants to see Julian Assange and his type carry sway here; we just think that we need to do something before it is done to us. That is the point.

[Damian Hinds]

I hear what my right hon. and learned Friend says, and I fully acknowledge not only his legal expertise overall, but specifically how much thought he has put into this subject and how he has written upon it.

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sir John Hayes]

Will the Minister give way?

[Damian Hinds]

Yes, and then I can deal with both questions at once.

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the Minister accept then—this point was made in the debate—that having the independent statutory commissioner receive information, so avoiding it being put into the public domain, is as important a part of the package as the public interest defence itself?

[Damian Hinds]

I give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes).

[Sir John Hayes]

I am grateful to the Minister. I hear what the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) says. It is a compelling case, although I do not agree with it. The Official Secrets Act 1989 deals with the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information by civil servants; giving information to journalists; a WikiLeaks-type disclosure dressed up as being by a guardian of liberty or some such other nonsense. This Bill does not deal with that unless those people are working directly for a foreign power. They might not be working directly for a foreign power, but they might be aiding a foreign power or acting indirectly for such a foreign power, and surely that needs to be included in the Bill.

[Damian Hinds]

I will come back to my right hon. Friend’s point in a moment. To the point that the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) made, our position is that a public interest defence is just not the safest and best way for people to make disclosures, for some of the reasons I gave a moment ago.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

Will the Minister give way?

[Damian Hinds]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will not.

The existence of a public interest defence could mean that damage from the original disclosure could be compounded by further disclosures that had to be made to argue against and defeat that use of the public interest defence. That could itself then in turn be misused and mean that in some circumstances, even where there were egregious breaches of the law, in effect they could not be prosecuted. That is why, to respond to the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, it is important that we look at the safe and proper channels and methods for making disclosures, where that is important, and there are times when it is. We are looking carefully at that.

To come back to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings—this is an important point in general—the defences in part 1 of the Bill provide law enforcement with several options for prosecuting disclosures where the person is acting for or on behalf of a foreign power or where the disclosure would materially assist a foreign intelligence service. That can include bulk disclosures. To be clear, with this Bill, the maximum sentence for an indiscriminate disclosure—a bulk data dump—will be higher than it is today if that act is done for a foreign power or the disclosure would materially assist a foreign intelligence service, even if not procured by that foreign intelligence service itself.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Damian Hinds]

I must ask the right hon. Gentleman to forgive me—

[Mr Jones]

Why?

[Damian Hinds]

Oh go on then, one last time.

[Mr Jones]

I am intrigued by what the Minister has just said. Which Act will we use? Will we use this new Act, or will we use the Official Secrets Act 1989? They are clearly mutually contradictory.

[Damian Hinds]

Prosecuting authorities have to make judgments. The Bill is specifically about national security, but within that it is about countering state threats. It gives us a whole new set of tools and weapons to add to our arsenal, and, notwithstanding the right hon. Gentleman’s body language, I think that that is much to be welcomed.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) asked a specific question about police stations. Because of the new arrest power in the Bill that can last up to 14 days, the Secretary of State may be required to designate specialist sites to meet the operational need, but I want to reassure my hon. Friend that this has nothing to do with extraordinary rendition. The provision mirrors those in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Acts to ensure that appropriate facilities are available. However, it is not possible to designate such a place outside the United Kingdom. The Government are clear about the fact that torture, mistreatment and arbitrary detention are contrary to human rights law.

[Mr Steve Baker]

Will my right hon. Friend give way? I did ask another question on this point.

[Damian Hinds]

I have not finished my speech, but go on.

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. The other question was, where are these sites, and why are they necessary? What is the standard of the places in which people are being detained? I could name some forts and other secure places owned by the Army. Is that what we are talking about, and if so, why?

[Damian Hinds]

I do not think that this is an appropriate forum in which to discuss the detail of such measures, but I hope I can reassure my hon. Friend on that particular point. As I have said, this is to allow for cases in which such capacity is required owing to operational need, and it cannot be outside the United Kingdom.

A number of Members on both sides of the House have referred to the so-called STPIMs. These are a tool of last resort to prevent, restrict and disrupt an individual’s involvement in state threats activity. In the most serious cases, that could include restricting where an individual can reside, whom they can associate with, and where they can work and study. An STPIM will be used when intelligence exists to confirm that highly damaging threat activity is planned or being undertaken but prosecution is not realistic. As my hon. Friend said, with such measures it is extremely important to have the appropriate safeguards.

I want to reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) that STPIMs will not be imposed through ministerial decision making alone. There will be a process through the courts. A decision by the Secretary of State to impose an STPIM, once they are satisfied that the five conditions set out have been met, will be referred to a judge, and the court’s permission will be sought before an order can be made. The court is specifically tasked with checking that the ministerial decision is not flawed.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and others spoke about civil legal aid for terrorists. Through the Bill, we will take action to restrict access to civil legal aid in England and Wales for individuals convicted of terrorism or terrorism-connected offences since 2001. However, I can assure my right hon. and learned Friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) and others who have spoken about this that the restriction of access of civil legal aid applies only to offences involving a sentence of more than two years. In any event, all individuals subject to the restriction can apply for exceptional case funding, and applications will be assessed according to the legislative framework of whether an individual’s human rights may be breached without legal aid. The type of terrorism offence that had been committed would not have bearing on the exceptional case funding decision.

I need to spend a couple of minutes going through the amendments to the Serious Crime Act 2007, an important subject that a number of colleagues have brought up, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe. The context, of course, is that our intelligence and security services and armed forces do and must work in close partnership with international partners to maximise UK capabilities and their ability to protect national security on our behalf. A key part of that is sharing intelligence and data to support joint objectives.

However, it is possible that such intelligence, when shared in good faith and in accordance with all domestic and international law, could still be capable of contributing, even in a very small or indirect way that was not intended at the time it was shared, to an international partner’s engaging in activity that the UK would not support. The Serious Crime Act 2007 creates an offence where an act is done that is

“capable of encouraging or assisting…an offence”.

That means that in this scenario there is a risk of individuals facing criminal liability, even when they have operated in good faith and in accordance with the guidance and proper authorisation.

Put simply, the Government believe it is not fair to expect the liability for that unforeseen eventuality to sit with an individual officer of our intelligence services or member of the armed forces who is acting with wholly legitimate intentions. Instead, the liability should sit with the UK intelligence community and the military at an institutional level, where they are subject to executive, judicial and parliamentary oversight. The amendment at clause 23 therefore removes that liability for individuals, but specifically only where the activity is necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the security and intelligence services or the armed forces. It does not remove liability at an institutional level for any activity.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

As my right hon. Friend knows, I think there is no dispute across the House that some protection should be available for individuals in those circumstances. The question we have been asking is how different what clause 23 provides for is from what already exists in law. Clause 23 will ask for consideration to be given of whether there has been a proper exercise of a function. That must logically, therefore, relate to the behaviour of an individual, must it not?

[Damian Hinds]

My right hon. and learned Friend anticipates my next point to some extent. In instances where an individual has operated in good faith in compliance with domestic and international law and all proper process, they would then not face the risk of liability under the 2007 Act for something they could not have foreseen. In effect, we are adding greater certainty and specificity to an existing defence—the reasonable defence contained within that Act—by detailing scenarios where the offence will not apply, whereas the current defence is untested and imprecise.

The amendment means that, where an individual is working properly on behalf of our intelligence and security services and armed forces with an international partner to protect national security, they do not personally risk criminal liability if their work is later found to have been capable of contributing to unlawful activity in a way they would not have intended. That risk should remain with the Government, the services and the armed forces at corporate level, and that is what this amendment seeks to ensure.

A number of colleagues have raised the question of disinformation. They are correct that information operations are now a firm feature in the set of devices available to hostile states. There is direct disinformation, where talking points are put out on those states, on foreign affairs or on our domestic politics and society, but there is also the terrible technique of indirect disinformation, which is not necessarily intended to make anybody believe a particular line or narrative, but is simply aimed at causing division and discord in our country, to undermine our democracy and the cohesion of our society.

This Bill deals with people who carry out disinformation for a foreign state, but I want to be clear that legislation on the material itself belongs in the Online Safety Bill. We are looking at how to amend that Bill to account for disinformation material where that disinformation amounts to foreign interference, so that it can be treated as illegal material.

[Liam Byrne]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and appreciate the way in which he is stepping through these points. Is an offence created by the provider of a social media platform if it enables someone to spread harmful messages? Does it count as a proxy, in effect?

[Damian Hinds]

The right hon. Gentleman tempts me to open up a very wide debate, somewhat outside the scope of Second Reading. He is absolutely right to identify the significance of disinformation and wider information operations as undertaken by foreign states and the obvious role of social media in that. The American election of 2016 remains the textbook example—there are plenty of others around the world. What I have set out is the way in which the Bill deals with people doing that on behalf of foreign states. As for platforms’ responsibility for what they do with the material and the steps that they must take—he will know about the principles in the Online Safety Bill not only to remove material but to minimise its presence in the first place—that is rightly subject matter for the Online Safety Bill.

Finally, on the foreign influence registration scheme—this has been raised by many colleagues across the House, including my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely), the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and others—as the Home Secretary indicated when opening the debate, we are committed to introducing a foreign influence registration scheme through a Government amendment. It is important that we take time to ensure that such a scheme is effective and proportionate in the way in which it counters state-threat activity and protects UK interests. That was a clear message in the public consultation, and we continue to review requirements in the light of Russian attempts to undermine western and European state stability.

If I may say so, my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight illustrated rather well the great complexities of trying to deal with this subject. I absolutely commit to communicating with the Opposition parties and the Intelligence and Security Committee as we introduce this measure. We want to do it as soon as possible, and we absolutely recognise the importance of scrutiny in both Houses. However, I want to make it clear that we cannot commit to doing that for the beginning of the Committee stage; but we want to do it as soon as possible thereafter.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The Minister will recall that when I asked for a commitment from the Home Secretary about a Committee of the whole House, she indicated that he might be able to give that commitment when responding to the debate. Will it be a Committee of the whole House?

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

I hear the request from my right hon. Friend. That is a question partly for the business managers and the usual channels, who have heard the request and have to balance it against all the other things that they need to balance for the operation of the House. Overall, I can assure him that I have heard colleagues—him and others—on the importance of having time for scrutiny.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the Minister give way again?

[Damian Hinds]

Very briefly.

[Dr Lewis]

We have nearly half an hour. I do not know why this Minister is making such a fuss about the urgency to conclude a debate that is scheduled to run until 10 o’clock if necessary.

For some very unclear reason, the Government decided to introduce what should be a major plank of the legislation not at the beginning, so that we could include a proper debate on Second Reading, but through an amendment, when the process was under way. All we want to know is that the whole House can debate properly something that we have not yet seen, so there must be a Committee of the whole House, otherwise we will have only the meagre opportunity offered by Report. He should not be blasé in dismissing that suggestion.

[Damian Hinds]

I do not think that I have been blasé in the slightest. I have spent my winding-up remarks trying to cover as fully as I can the various themes—[Interruption.] I have taken quite a few interventions, including, I think, from the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), which was important. The decision about the timetabling of debates on the Floor of the House is not mine fully to make. In terms of this debate, I am not trying to rush things at all. Normally, Ministers would take the same amount of time, broadly speaking, as Opposition Front Benchers, and I am simply trying to follow those conventions.

[Dr Lewis]

One last time: the Minister has taken a lot of interventions about the matters that are in the Bill, but there is a whole tranche that is not in the Bill that will be introduced in an amendment, and he has only briefly touched on that. That is inevitable, because it is not in the Bill. When that tranches comes into the Bill, the whole House should have an opportunity properly to debate it.

[Damian Hinds]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. As I have said, I have heard those points, as, I am sure, have the business managers.

In closing, I want to repeat my earlier thanks to everybody for their insightful and eloquent contributions to this debate. I thank the Opposition and the Scottish National party for the spirit and the attitude with which they have taken part in this debate. I look forward to further debate and scrutiny from them and from colleagues across the House as we go through Committee. These are issues of the very greatest importance for our country and for the Government. The stakes are high. It is about protecting our security and our prosperity. It is about preserving our democracy and our way of life. It is about keeping our citizens safe. This Bill will enable us to achieve those most critical of aims and I commend it to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.



National Security Bill (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the National Security Bill:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 13 September 2022.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Scott Mann.)

Question agreed to.



National Security Bill (Money)

Queen’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the National Security Bill, it is expedient to authorise:

(1) the payment out of money provided by Parliament of:

(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by a Minister of the Crown; and

(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided; and

(2) the payment of sums into the Consolidated Fund.—(Scott Mann.)

Question agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sarah Green (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)]

4. What steps her Department is taking to tackle fraud.

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

Fraudsters should have no space to operate, and later this year we will publish our renewed strategy on how we protect the public and businesses, reduce the impact on victims, and increase the disruption and prosecution of fraudsters.

[Sarah Green]

The Minister knows that fraud accounts for more than a third of all crime. Last year, Thames Valley police in Chiltern and South Bucks, which covers my constituency, had 194 Action Fraud victim care reports. One constituent told me, with great distress, that they had stopped reporting scams, because they think that Action Fraud has become a crime reporting agency and is no longer a crime investigation agency. We need a new service dedicated to effectively tackling online fraud, not just recording it. Will the Minister commit to establishing a new online crime agency to do just that?

[Damian Hinds]

I can confirm to the hon. Lady that we are making constant improvements to Action Fraud through the City of London police, and are also investing in a wholly new Action Fraud system for 2024. In the meantime, I encourage her constituent and all our constituents to report fraud. One particularly striking statistic is that more than 76,000 scams have been automatically taken down as a direct result of our constituents forwarding scam emails to the suspicious email reporting service.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister, Naz Shah.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

In 2021, fraud and computer misuse increased by 47%. In 2020, an estimated 99.99% of total cyber-crime went unpunished. Just weeks ago, academics at the University of Oxford estimated that during covid alone, £37 billion—or one third of the total NHS annual budget, and twice the annual budget for policing—is likely to have been lost to fraud. When working families are facing rising energy costs and a cost of living crisis, and are paying more and more taxes and more for services, can the Minister tell me why, under this Tory Government, gangs of criminals are getting a free run at the public purse?

[Damian Hinds]

Gangs of criminals certainly do not get a free run, and we will be investing and doing more than ever before to bear down on fraud. During the covid era—the trend had started already, but it accelerated then—while other forms of crime got depressed, there was a boost to some of this distanced crime that people do over their computers. Crime overall across the world is changing, and our response must change in a way that is commensurate to that. We must ensure that we take the most effective action. Part of that is the spending review commitment that has just been made; there is also the new economic crime levy, which represents an additional £400 million over this spending review period.

[Andrew Selous (South West Bedfordshire) (Con)]

5. What recent discussions she has had with police forces to help ensure that oil depots are able to supply fuel to petrol stations in the context of recent environmental protests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Caroline Dinenage (Gosport) (Con)]

24. What plans she has to improve airport immigration wait times.

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

Easter saw Border Force maintain a secure and effective border, with minor inbound border control disruption, in a period with one of the highest levels of international travel in the past two years. Before Easter, in February and March 2022, more than 85% of queue measurements were under 45 minutes for non-EU passengers.

[Julie Elliott]

I thank the Minister for that response. I recently wrote to him regarding the experience that my constituents, the Collins family, had at Newcastle airport when returning from holiday at a quarter to 11 at night a week or two ago. The father is a British-born citizen, and the mother has settled status and is of German origin. The children are both British and German citizens. They describe Border Force, which was not allowing the little boy, Nico, who is five years old, into the country, as being “hostile” and “unpleasant”, and as having an “unsympathetic manner”. That is not the way that anyone should be treated by Border Force, certainly not a five-year-old child. The child had his German passport; his British passport was waiting at home. When the family showed Border Force an email that they had received saying that, they were eventually allowed in—a five-year-old child, who is a British citizen, was eventually allowed into his home. What has the Minister to say? I think an urgent investigation and an unreserved apology to the Collins family are required.

[Damian Hinds]

I thank the hon. Lady for bringing that experience to the Floor of the House of Commons. I am, of course, sorry that any such distress was caused to a family, and particularly to a child so young. She will understand that it is difficult for me to talk about a particular case at the Dispatch Box without having all the facts available, but I will be happy to follow up with her separately.

[Dame Caroline Dinenage]

It appears that travellers are experiencing severe delays not only at passport control, but with processing passport applications and renewals. Although I fully understand that the Minister has set out the pressures that staff are facing, can he reassure me that backlogs will be addressed and airport issues will be sorted out before my constituents go on their summer holidays?

[Damian Hinds]

I reassure my hon. Friend that, in spite of the fact that there has been a surge in demand, as she would expect considering the patterns that we have seen in the past couple of years and the fact that international travel is now returning, that is absolutely something that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who leads on passport issuing, is across to ensure that the necessary capacity is there.

[Ruth Cadbury (Brentford and Isleworth) (Lab)]

Passport delays are affecting our constituents’ ability to take holidays and take up jobs abroad. There are ever-lengthening queues at passport control, and generous constituents who signed up for the Homes for Ukraine scheme are having their first experience of the Home Office’s chaos. When will the Home Secretary realise the impact that her Department’s appalling record on managing the gateways into and out of our country is having on the UK’s reputation, here and across the world?

[Damian Hinds]

I take extremely seriously the experience of passengers coming through British airports and seaports. There is a distinction between outbound and inbound—

[Ruth Cadbury]

indicated dissent.

[Damian Hinds]

No, there really is. When we talk about Border Force and passport control, that is about inbound. As I said in my answer to the hon. Member for Sunderland Central (Julie Elliott), there are times when queues grow, and I do not like to see that happen. Sometimes it is because of factors beyond our control, such as so-called flight bunching when lots of flights arrive together or when flights are late. Border Force is working extremely hard to try to project demand as best it can to ensure that the staffing is there, and it is taking considerable measures to match up to that demand.

[Virginia Crosbie (Ynys Môn) (Con)]

7. What steps she is taking to strengthen the effectiveness of Border Force.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

11. What recent steps her Department has taken to tackle economic crime.

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

Tackling economic crime is a key Government priority. We have expedited legislation—the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022—to crack down on Russian dirty money and corrupt elites in the UK. We have also set up a new dedicated kleptocracy cell in the National Crime Agency to target sanctions evasion and corrupt assets hidden in the UK.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I thank the Minister for that answer. GPT Special Project Management was fined roughly £28 million by Southwark Crown Court last year for bribery offences. The key whistleblower in that case was my constituent, Ian Foxley. He has had 11 years without a single penny in income because he blew that whistle, as nobody will employ him now, of course. Does my right hon. Friend agree that if we want to crack economic crime, we must incentivise whistleblowers to come forward, and protect them when they do? Will he listen carefully what my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) says tomorrow in introducing her 10-minute rule Bill, when she will set out the case for whistleblower reform?

[Damian Hinds]

My hon. Friend is right about the value of whistleblowers, who should be able to come forward without fear of recrimination. We have continued to improve the whistleblowing framework, including by extending eligibility for protections and introducing a reporting requirement for prescribed persons—the bodies to whom people can make a whistleblowing disclosure. My hon. Friend has campaigned consistently on this matter and is expert in it, and I am keen to meet him to discuss his points further.

[Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

12. What support her Department is providing to people who were evacuated under Operation Pitting.

Computer Misuse Act 1990

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Tuesday 19th April 2022 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your expert chairmanship, Sir Mark. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Dr Wallis) for securing today’s debate and bringing this important issue to Westminster Hall. I am also grateful to all colleagues who have taken part. It strikes me that this is a good example of bringing to bear on Parliament not just opinions or political points but real depths of expertise from the outside world. I think it has been a very good debate.

I thank the SNP spokesman, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), and the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), for the constructive way that they engaged with the important discussion. I reassure everybody that it will feed into the review, which I will come back to later. I confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend that I would be pleased to meet with him and a group of colleagues to discuss the issue further—I look forward to it.

As the Minister for Security and Borders, I am keenly aware of the scale of the cyber-crime threat facing our citizens and businesses. Keeping them safe is a key priority for the Government and our operational agencies and I take this opportunity to thank all those who work tirelessly to protect the public.

The threat from cyber-crime has intensified over the last couple of years. As the hon. Member for Halifax said, the pandemic meant that even more of our lives were spent online, and, inevitably, criminals have sought to exploit that shift. The statistics bear out the scale of the threat, with computer misuse now accounting for an estimated 15% of all crime. That opportunism is despicable and underlines how crucial it is that we have a robust and effective response. The Computer Misuse Act is primarily about hacking into someone else’s computer, but clearly there are more crimes that involve misusing computers for criminal means—most fraud, for example. Later today we have the Second Reading of the Online Safety Bill, which is an ambitious and forward-looking piece of legislation that will tackle online harms around fraud and fraudulent advertising.

I turn to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) about protecting individuals and small businesses. I reassure him that comprehensive advice is available from Cyber Aware. We encourage everybody to act on that, starting with three key things: protecting email security with a password made up of three random words; using two-factor authentication where that is available; and keeping operating systems up to date—often when an update comes around it is to see off some weakness that has been found.

I want to note important steps taken by industry that can make what hacking yields of less utility—things such as the banking sector’s deployment of the confirmation of payee system. We have sector charters in place with key industries, including retail banking. While Northern Ireland has a different policing arrangement, in this part of the UK we have the regional and national cyber-resilience centres, supported by policing, to help give extra support and guidance to small businesses that may have less wherewithal to invest in cyber-security expertise.

I also want to respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Simon Fell) about skills; he is absolutely right that although the issue is about machines, it is ultimately about people. It is people who improve our defences. There are key pathways and standards in the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education system, including under the cyber-security technologist umbrella and more broadly with the introduction of T-levels. Indeed, the critical T-level is digital business services, which includes a minimum of nine weeks of industry placement. I strongly encourage firms operating in the area—in cyber-security and in-house digital technology—to support that to make sure we all work together to bring on that next generation of experts who will help keep us all safer.

[Mr Steve Baker]

The Minister has prompted me to recommend a book called “Peopleware”. It is a classic in software engineering and is all about people and how they develop software. One of its points is the orders of magnitude difference between different categories of competence in software engineering. It raises some interesting issues that I am sure he and his officials would find helpful.

[Damian Hinds]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I shall add that to my bedtime reading list, which is not uncrowded at present. I will look forward to getting to that.

In the last year, we saw a number of high-profile ransomware attacks around the world, including attacks on local authorities and schools in the UK. The National Cyber Security Centre has reported that in just the first four months of 2021, it handled the same number of ransomware incidents as for the whole of 2020. The National Cyber Security Centre has improved our understanding of the threat and provides a unified source of advice and support to Government and business.

I am afraid that the threat posed by cyber-attacks continues to grow in scale and complexity. That is why the national cyber strategy, mentioned by a number of colleagues and published in December, sets out how the Government will invest £2.6 billion over the next three years to develop a whole-of-society approach to increasing national cyber-security and resilience, including reducing the risk and opportunity for cyber-crimes and disrupting cyber-criminals. As part of that funding, we will continue to invest in the law enforcement cyber-crime network at national, regional and local level. In the face of such a broad and complex threat picture, law enforcement agencies must have the powers they need to investigate online criminality. It is also essential that we have robust legislation in place to enable action to be taken against the perpetrators.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) was right about how much has changed since 1990, and my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness pointed out that the world is more interconnected than ever. Next year, it will be even more interconnected again. All that is correct and we must make sure we are up to date and up to pace. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman) pointed out, it is also the case that over the last 30 years, the Computer Misuse Act has generally proven to be a far-sighted piece of legislation for tackling unauthorised access to systems. As the threat has changed, so too has the Act, which has been updated a number of times—most recently in 2015, where the offence of unauthorised acts causing, or creating risk of, serious damage was introduced.

We are firmly and fully committed to ensuring the legislative framework that underpins our efforts to address cyber-crime remains relevant and effective. That is why last May the Home Secretary announced a review of the Computer Misuse Act. The Home Office subsequently launched a call for information, which marked the first step in that process. The purpose of the call for information was to seek views of interested stakeholders across the piece, including in industry, academia and the agencies, on the Act and the associated investigative powers available to law enforcement. The Home Office has received responses covering a range of interesting and complex issues and we are grateful to those who have sent in their views. We are considering the feedback submitted and continue to engage with partners to determine whether changes are needed. We will provide an update on the initial findings of the review shortly.

I want to touch on a couple of key points directly relating to the Act that will influence the approach we take on defences. First, the Act is based on the principle that the owner of the computer and computer data has the right to say who can access it. I want to stress that point, which was made repeatedly during the development of the Act. Authorisation to access a system is the prerogative of the owner. It is that person who is responsible for the operation of the system and bears the cost of securing it.

Equally, the Government are rightly seeking to ensure that system owners take more responsibility for the security of their systems and the content held on them. Therefore it is right that the system owner has the protection of the law from those who obtain or attempt to obtain unauthorised access to computers and their data. We encourage firms to agree to having their systems tested for vulnerabilities by third parties but the fundamental point is that it is the choice of the legal property owner to determine that.

Secondly, we need to ensure that the Act continues to criminalise those who take unauthorised action against computer systems and provides the legal basis for relevant legal authorities to act.

In launching the review, we have been clear that we are open to changes to the Act that enhance our approach to that threat. However, I must also emphasise that any such changes should be well-considered and well-evidenced. We must guard against taking any action that would undermine the ability of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to investigate criminals and prosecute them.

I have heard the views of Members on defences. My hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness identified the nuance very well, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe did the nuance of the registration of industry professionals. We are still considering the question of defences, but I am sure that Members would agree with me that we cannot put in place measures that would act as a mechanism for criminals and state actors to hide behind. That is why we need to tread cautiously. An ill-conceived defence could leave prosecutors with the burden of trying to prove a negative, for example, in needing to prove that cyber-attacker X was not, in fact, intending to protect a computer system when they attempted to access it without permission.

It is also worth pointing out that there are already defences in the Act that apply to cyber-security activity. If a person has the authorisation of the system owner to access the system, no offence is committed. In addition, any decision on prosecution is a matter for independent law enforcement and prosecuting agencies who take into account all relevant facts of the case. We must also ensure that any changes to the Act do not permit or encourage retaliatory cyber-activity, sometimes known as “hack back”. There is a danger that such a defence could embolden so-called hacktivists, or commercial entities who wish to offer such services, if they believe their actions could be protected under the law. The UK does not condone unlawful cyber-attacks of any kind.

Some responses to the call for information set out proposals for a review of sentences, and we have also had suggestions for new powers for law enforcement agencies to take action against criminals online. We are considering them as part of the review, including whether sentencing guidelines are needed to ensure that the harms caused by those committing Computer Misuse Act offences are appropriately considered during sentencing.

The hon. Member for Halifax asked a direct question and yes, state threats in this area are absolutely a prevalent and growing issue. I know she would not expect me to give a commentary on a specific security matter, but I want to reassure her and the House that the Government take extremely seriously the question about state capability in this area.

There is absolutely no doubt that the UK needs a Computer Misuse Act that is fit for purpose and can rise to the challenges of the present day. As colleagues know, the Home Office is engaged in a review that is charged specifically with ensuring exactly that.

The context of the war in Ukraine makes that work more important than ever, as the shadow Minister said quite rightly. I am acutely conscious of that, but we cannot rush this. That would only serve to help our adversaries. We are, therefore, approaching the exercise with the careful consideration that the public would expect and which these sometimes complex issues demand. Through the review, and as part of business as usual, we are listening attentively to law enforcement agencies and National Cyber Security Centre experts on what is most likely to enhance our national cybersecurity. Of course, we are also studying the approaches of other countries.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend for securing the debate, which has been interesting and insightful. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to outline our activity in the space and, as I said at the start of my remarks, I look forward to meeting my hon. Friend and colleagues to discuss it further.

Oral Answers to Questions

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Dr Jamie Wallis (Bridgend) (Con)]

T8. In the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, does my right hon. Friend agree with me that now is the ideal time to review and reform the 32-year-old Computer Misuse Act 1990, as recommended by the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report, and will he meet me and colleagues to discuss how reforming that legislation could not only help to tackle online crime, but unlock our national cyber-defence?

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the importance of the review of the Computer Misuse Act. Since my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary launched that review last year, a number of very good and important suggestions have come forward, which we are currently reviewing. Meanwhile, of course, we continue always to update our approach, including to the National Cyber Security Centre and, more immediately, to the online safety Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

In the evidence the Home Secretary gave to the Home Affairs Committee on 2 February, she said that a major obstacle for accepting more people under Operation Warm Welcome for Afghans fleeing the Taliban was the lack of suitable accommodation because of Home Office contracts. The Select Committee has been warning about this for some time. I think that the Home Secretary has announced a bespoke humanitarian policy for those Ukrainians fleeing—[Hon. Members: “No, she hasn’t.”] Oh, perhaps she has not; I am sorry there is not a statement to clarify that. What I want to know is: what is she going to do about the lack of accommodation that the Home Office provides for asylum seekers and refugees in this country?

--- Later in debate ---

[Esther McVey (Tatton) (Con)]

Constituents in Tatton are increasingly concerned about the growing number and range of online fraud and scams, and the ability of Action Fraud to deal with them. Many of those crimes originate outside the UK, with some from hostile states such as Russia. What is the Minister doing to counter that?

[Damian Hinds]

My right hon. Friend is right, and we share her constituents’ concern. We are looking constantly to upgrade and improve Action Fraud, and I encourage her constituents to carry on reporting those instances of fraud. Together with the rest of our constituents, their forwarding of dodgy emails to [e-mail] has so far led to 73,000 scams being removed.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Will the Home Secretary publish her review into the tier 1 gold-plated visas? Will she suspend all tier 1 visas for people who have connections with the Putin regime, and will she look into the veracity of applications for British citizenship by Russian oligarchs who are connected with Putin?

Firefighters’ Pension Scheme

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Jane Hunt) on securing this debate. I am grateful to her, and I welcome the opportunity to address the House on the important issue of firefighters’ pensions. The Government hugely value the unique roles that our firefighters undertake and it is only right that their pensions remain among the best pension schemes available in the public sector. Our brave firefighters keep us safe. They do the most extraordinary job day in, day out, in the most difficult situations.

The Government also recognise that the cost of providing public service pensions must be fair to the schemes’ members, the employers and the taxpayer. It is important that the costs of public service pensions are understood and fully acknowledged by Government so that they remain affordable and sustainable for generations to come.

[Jane Hunt]

I absolutely understand that, but this is about the discretionary element. As I see it, there is only one instance of this happening. The Prime Minister said at the time that the fire service could look at this, but the fire service does not believe that it can do so because of the rules and regulations. It is the discretionary element that I am interested in.

[Damian Hinds]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. There is some limited ability under the rules for fire authorities to exercise some discretion on some decisions. That would involve, for example, determining whether a person was on duty or not at the time of an injury or death. However, the rules of the 1992 scheme do not provide a fire authority with the discretion to pay a pension to an individual who does not qualify for it.

[Jane Hunt]

The point is that Mr Wilkens was on the 1992 scheme at the time and that, due to his age, he was being tapered over to the 2015 scheme. If he had not been that age, he would not have been tapering at the time and might already have been on the scheme, in which case his partner would immediately have got the pension.

[Damian Hinds]

I am grateful for that clarification, and I will come on to that point in a moment.

My hon. Friend has spoken movingly of the sad circumstances of the case of Ms Melanie Perry, whose partner Mr Wilkens passed away in 2016 and who did not qualify for any survivor pension entitlement. I appreciate that this is an extremely sensitive matter. It is the current legislation underpinning the firefighters’ pension schemes that provides the qualifying criteria for an individual’s pension entitlement and therefore sets the parameters on what payments can be made by an employer out of the pension scheme. On the death of a scheme member, the 1992 firefighters’ pension scheme, of which I understand Mr Wilkens was a member, provides benefits to the surviving spouse or civil partner. These benefits do not extend to unmarried partners. As my hon. Friend will know, that was quite common among pension schemes of that time.

It has been the position of successive Governments not to make retrospective changes to public service pension schemes, and that has not changed. A new pension scheme was introduced for all newly recruited firefighters in April 2006. While the 2006 scheme has a higher retirement age than that of the 1992 scheme, it does provide survivor benefits that extend to unmarried partners. At the time the 2006 scheme was introduced, fire and rescue authorities offered existing 1992 scheme members the option to transition to the 2006 scheme if they wanted to benefit from the modernised scheme design. I understand that a letter was sent to Mr Wilkens from his employing fire and rescue authority in August 2006 providing this option. Ultimately, it appears that Mr Wilkens did not take this option.

[Jane Hunt]

The Minister has mentioned the 2006 changes. At the time of Mr Wilkens’ passing in 2016, he and his partner had been together for 10 years, so that letter would have come at the beginning of their relationship. I think we can therefore forgive them for not taking up that offer at the time.

[Damian Hinds]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point.

In 2010, the coalition Government established the Independent Public Service Pensions Commission, chaired by Lord Hutton of Furness. The commission undertook a comprehensive review of the main public service pension schemes, including the firefighters’ schemes. Following the review, public service pensions underwent a significant period of change with the introduction of new, reformed unfunded pension schemes from April 2015. At that time, full and tapered protections were afforded to those scheme members who were closest to retirement. For firefighters, this included those who were within 14 years of their normal pension age.

In 2018, as my hon. Friend alluded to, these protections were found by the courts to be unlawfully discriminatory in respect of the firefighters’ and the judicial pension schemes on the grounds of age. In effect, the courts found that younger pension scheme members suffered a disadvantage as a result of the Government’s efforts to protect those nearest to retirement from the impact of the reforms. The Government accepted that ruling and that the remedy to remove the discrimination should apply to all public service pension schemes. The Government are now in the process of removing the discriminatory elements. This is a careful and complex process to get right.

The deferred choice underpin, referred to by my hon. Friend, will be introduced by the Government via the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Bill currently before Parliament and will be enacted by regulations to be laid by the Home Office. It is the Government’s intention that the underpin will give the beneficiaries of deceased members the opportunity to choose from which pension scheme to receive their survivor benefits for any service during the period 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2022.

From the information provided, it appears that Mr Wilkens’s pension would qualify for that remedy. The impact of the remedy on Mr Wilkens’s survivor benefits will not be known until the remedy is fully implemented by October 2023. At that stage, fire and rescue authorities will start the process of contacting all those entitled to the remedy with details of their options, as the statutory pensions administrator for each area.

In closing, I thank my hon. Friend again for securing this important debate and for the elegant way in which she made her points in the House this evening.

Question put and agreed to.