(2 days, 22 hours ago)
Commons ChamberListen to that.
Order. I do not need any help from the Government Front Bench. This is a very important statement that really does affect Members of this House.
As I have repeatedly made clear in this House, Ministers and special advisers were not involved in any aspect of the production of the evidence, and I stand by that statement today. The Prime Minister has also made clear that he was informed of the CPS’s decision only a matter of days before the case collapsed. There is nothing that the Prime Minister or any other Minister could have done at that point that would have changed the law and the policy under the previous Government between 2021 and 2023. Those who have read the DNSA’s statements will know that they clearly articulated the threats posed by China based on the previous Government’s policy at the time, detailing the damage caused by the alleged offences. Ultimately, it was an entirely independent decision by the CPS to discontinue the case, and the CPS has confirmed that it came under no outside pressure to do so.
Like Members from all parts of the House, I remain very frustrated that this case will not be heard in court. We wanted to see the trial go ahead. I have made it clear on many occasions that the decision not to proceed was an independent decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has given assurances that there was no Government interference in that decision.
I note that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy will be undertaking an inquiry on the case and intends to hold public evidence sessions. The Intelligence and Security Committee has also indicated that it will investigate. We welcome the launch of the inquiry and the investigations, with which the Government will, of course, fully co-operate. I have already set out the range of activity that this Government are taking to combat the Chinese espionage threat, and I hope that that is well understood. Let me also provide the House with the reassurance that the Government will take all necessary action to keep the UK safe and secure.
Last Wednesday, the Prime Minister told this House that no Minister or special adviser was involved in the handling of the China spy case, yet The Sunday Times has since reported that the Home Secretary had
“heard that the case might collapse and had made representations to ensure the evidence put forward was as ‘strong as possible’.”
So I ask the Minister: when did the Home Secretary become aware that the case might collapse, and what representations did she or her proxies make about the evidence and to whom? Why has the House been told—including just now—that Ministers and advisers were not involved in any way when The Sunday Times reports that they were?
The Sunday Times also reported on a key meeting that took place on 1 September—a meeting that the Government originally denied took place. Is it true that Jonathan Powell chaired that meeting? Did that meeting discuss the CPS view that the evidence provided to that point was inadequate, and the possibility of providing further evidence in the case? Will the Minister agree to publish the minutes of all meetings in which this case was discussed and the correspondence relating to it?
The Sunday Times reported that following the meeting, the Attorney General’s Office was asked to speak to the CPS. Did anyone from the AGO speak directly or indirectly to the CPS after that meeting? Can the Minister confirm that Dan Chugg from the Foreign Office was at the 1 September meeting, and that it was the same Dan Chugg who approached the Lord Speaker with a proposed deal in which the Chinese ambassador would be allowed back into Parliament? The Sunday Times also reported that the DNSA is understood to have acknowledged privately that the decision not to say that China is an ongoing threat was political in nature. Is that true?
Finally, the current Government’s position has been that all the evidence provided related to the previous Government’s policy, but we now know that that is categorically not true. In paragraph 8 of Matt Collins’s third statement, from August this year, which he copied and pasted from the Labour manifesto, he stressed the importance the current Government attach to a “positive relationship” with China, weakening the evidence compared with 2023 and bringing in current Government policy, contrary to what we have been told in recent weeks. Why have the Government been providing this House with inaccurate information, and why did Ministers know what the CPS wanted but refuse to give it to the CPS?
With great respect, a lot of what has just been said does not actually relate to the urgent question that was initially asked by the shadow Home Secretary. I have to say, the Opposition’s position is confusing. They initially criticised the Government for intervening. Then—[Interruption.] I will answer the question. I am answering it. I think it is important that on these matters of national security, we try to debate things in a reasonable and sensible way. That is the approach that this Government will seek to take. If Members opposite—[Interruption.]
Thank you, Mr Speaker.
The Opposition’s position is confusing. They initially criticised the Government for intervening. Then, when it became absolutely clear that we had not done that, they criticised us for not intervening. They asked for greater transparency, then when we provided it they accused the Government—wrongly—of hanging people out to dry. Given that this urgent question relates to the activities of the Home Office, I am not at all clear why the shadow Home Secretary thinks it is appropriate—given accusations that have been made previously about hanging officials out to dry—to name an official in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. How does that relate to the urgent question that was asked? [Interruption.]
Order. I think I need to help a little bit. It is in order to mention another Department. You cannot ringfence this and not refer to other people. It might not be comfortable, but the fact is that a question has been asked that is within order, and that is what matters.
I am grateful for your guidance, Mr Speaker. I am simply pointing out to the shadow Home Secretary that Conservative Members have previously criticised Ministers and the Government for, to use their words, hanging officials out to dry, and now the shadow Home Secretary has just named twice an official from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. [Interruption.]
Order. I have said to the Government Front Bench that I do not need any chipping in. I certainly do not need it from all along the Opposition Front Bench.
Order. Mr Philp, you have had the benefit of an urgent question. I have had the benefit—some might say—of listening to you, so I want you to have the benefit of listening to the Minister.
The shadow Home Secretary would be well advised to listen to the points being made. I am seeking to respond to the questions that he and other right hon. and hon. Members have raised. I am trying to do that in good faith, and I would be grateful for the opportunity to do so.
I remind the shadow Home Secretary that we are here today only because the previous Conservative Government did not move quickly enough to fix the glaring holes that existed in our national security laws. The charges in this case, as I hope is well known, were brought under the Official Secrets Act 1911. This antiquated legislation was drawn up before the first world war, and the Conservatives began reviewing it in 2015 because it was widely known that it was not fit for purpose. But it took eight years for them to introduce the National Security Act 2023. Fortunately, the law has now been updated, with cross-party support, but not in time to protect our Parliament from Chinese espionage. If the Conservatives had acted more quickly and the National Security Act had been in place when these alleged offences happened, the prosecution would likely have proceeded. [Interruption.]
Order. Look, I am trying really hard. People who hold positions should know better.
Let me make this point crystal clear: no member of this Government, nor any special adviser, was in any way involved in the evidence submitted to the CPS or the decision by the DPP not to proceed with the case.
There was an important omission from the shadow Home Secretary’s remarks. As hon. Members will know, the first substantive witness statement was provided under the previous Government, when the right hon. Member was a Home Office Minister, yet neither he nor the Leader of the Opposition have taken the opportunity to say what involvement Conservative Ministers and Conservative special advisers had in the main tranche of the evidence.
The Prime Minister has confirmed that no Labour Ministers or special advisers were involved with the provision of evidence for the case. Last Wednesday during Prime Minister’s questions, the Prime Minister asked the Leader of the Opposition to confirm whether that was also the case under the previous Government. I was in the House last Wednesday, and I think that I heard the Leader of the Opposition confirming from a sedentary position that she did know the answer to that question, but the Conservative party has refused to confirm if any Conservative Ministers or special advisers were involved in the provision of evidence under the previous Government. I wonder if any of the former Ministers in the Chamber can provide the answer.
As Ministers have repeatedly said from the Dispatch Box, the Government are extremely disappointed that the case did not proceed to trial. I gently say to Opposition Front-Bench Members that they need to stop throwing mud and start coming to terms with what happened on their watch.
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Commons ChamberWith your permission, Mr Speaker, I want to update the House on the facts surrounding the collapse of the trial of Christopher Berry and Christopher Cash. However, following the Home Secretary’s statement, I also want to take the opportunity to express my deepest sympathies for the victims and families of those affected by the abhorrent terror attack that occurred at Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur. Tragically, two members of the UK’s Jewish community lost their lives. They remain in the thoughts of the whole House at this very difficult time.
I also express my gratitude for the rapid reactions of emergency responders, the security services and members of that local community. Two days later, a mosque in Peacehaven, East Sussex, was targeted in an arson attack. Fortunately, no one was injured. My thoughts, and I am sure the thoughts of the whole House, will be with members of that local community as well. We remain united in standing against hate in all its forms.
As I told the House in September, the Government remain extremely disappointed by the outcome of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry case. I understand the strength of feeling across the House and share the deep frustration at the fact that these individuals will not face trial. While the decision not to proceed was an independent one made by the Crown Prosecution Service, the Government remain gravely concerned about the security of our democratic institutions and are crystal clear that our Parliament must and will be protected from espionage. That is why I am today announcing that MI5’s National Protective Security Authority will be taking further steps to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I will set out more details on that in a moment.
Since I addressed the House on 15 September, there has been correspondence between hon. Members, the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service. There has also been widespread—and, at times, wholly inaccurate—reporting in the media. I will address the details set out by the Crown Prosecution Service and the basis on which the Government provided evidence to support the case, but first let me underline a fundamental point that has too often been overlooked in recent days, including by the Conservative party. The CPS brought these charges under the previous Government, and under the legislation that was in place at the time: the Official Secrets Act 1911—an antiquated law that is clearly no longer fit for purpose in addressing the complex and sophisticated nature of the state threats that we face today.
It has been clear for many years that the legislation has not kept pace with the modern state threats that we face today. It was evident that the Official Secrets Act was no longer fit for purpose as early as 2015, when Conservative Ministers tasked the Law Commission with reviewing this antiquated legislation—10 years ago. In 2020, the Law Commission and the Intelligence and Security Committee of this House were both clear that the legislation, drafted before the first world war, needed to be updated as a matter of urgency. It referred to espionage as
“any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information…which…might be…useful to an enemy”.
Those terms are archaic in the modern threat landscape that we now face. That is why the Labour party supported the passing of the National Security Act 2023 on a cross-party basis, closing the loopholes that have been exposed by this case.
The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), and the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), about this case, and it is welcome that these facts have been set out. The DPP has made it clear that charges were brought in April 2024 based on the law as it stood at the time of the offences. The deputy National Security Adviser—a senior official with very extensive experience in matters relating to national security—provided a witness statement in December 2023, under the previous Government. Further witness statements were requested and provided in February and July of this year.
All the evidence provided by the deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offence and the policy position of the Conservative Government at the time of the offence. Every effort was made to provide evidence to support this case within those constraints. The decision on whether to proceed with the prosecution was ultimately taken by the Crown Prosecution Service, which was hamstrung by antiquated legislation that had not been updated by the previous Conservative Government—[Interruption.]
Order. I say to both Front-Bench teams: please, this is a very important and serious matter. We could do without the side chatter.
Despite the evolving nature of the state threats that we face, the DPP has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government, or any senior civil servant or special adviser working within it. I want to be clear again today, as the Government have been before, that suggestions that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or restricted the ability of witnesses to draw on particular bits of evidence are all untrue. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so.
What has changed is the CPS’s assessment of the case law. The DPP has explained that in a separate case—the Crown v. Roussev—the High Court ruled on the threshold for evidence needed to prosecute under the antiquated 1911 legislation. In the light of this new judgment, the CPS independently decided to seek further evidence. But the fact remains that it was not the policy of the Conservative Government to classify China as a threat to national security. As the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) said as Foreign Secretary, summing up China in one word as a threat was
“impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise.”
I have listened with interest in recent days to advice from former Conservative Ministers on how the UK should now define our approach to China, but I must remind them and the House that what matters is what their policy was in government. The previous Government set out their position on China in the 2021 integrated review, in which they described China as a “systemic challenge” to UK security. In the integrated review refresh of 2023, they described China as an “epoch-defining challenge”. As the Prime Minister has explained, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to the assessment made by the CPS. Ministers cannot retrospectively change policy that existed under the Conservative Government and, as stated before, the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official.
At this moment of profound global change and insecurity, these matters have led to discussion about this Government’s approach to China, so let me set that out for the House. We must tackle the threats that China poses, which range from cyber-security attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hongkongers in the UK. This Government are unequivocal that the first duty of Government is to keep people safe. We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, yet we must also be alive to the fact that China presents us with opportunities. It is the world’s second largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, the UK’s third largest trading partner. The only way to act in the UK’s best interest is to take a long-term and strategic approach. That means working in close co-ordination with Five Eyes and wider allies to build collective resilience to the threats that China poses, investing in our intelligence services and being unequivocal about our position on human rights. It also means developing a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising on our national security. Let me set out the recent actions that the Government have taken to strengthen UK security against state threats, including those posed by China.
MI5’s national protective security authority has today launched new guidance to protect the UK’s democratic institutions from foreign interference. The guidance will help Members in this House and the other place, Members of the devolved legislatures, local councillors, mayors and elected representatives’ staff to better understand the nature of the threat. It also provides simple, effective steps for at-risk individuals to take to protect themselves, their teams and the integrity of our democratic processes. The guidance will kick-start a wider cross-Government action plan that is being driven through the defending democracy taskforce to reduce foreign interference and espionage threats to UK democratic institutions. It will be delivered in close co-ordination with the parliamentary security authorities. I urge all Members of this House to be alert and follow the guidance, and to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses.
The Government also remain steadfast in our commitment to holding Chinese state-linked actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage. In September, the NCSC co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I can reassure the House that we continue to keep all tools under review, and will act as necessary to reduce their threat.
The Government are also committed to legislating to further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference. That specifically includes a new elections Bill to strengthen safeguards against covert foreign political funding, and involves taking forward the recommendations from the independent reviewer for legislation on state threats.
Let me finish by reiterating this Government’s unwavering commitment to national security and to keeping our country safe. We will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm, and to ensure that the UK is best placed to tackle state threats, including those emanating from China. I commend the statement to the House.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question, because the targeted intimidation and harassment of elected representatives is completely unacceptable. The defending democracy taskforce works to ensure the safety and security of all electoral processes and democratic institutions, and to strengthen democratic society. We are conducting a review of the harassment and intimidation faced by elected representatives. The taskforce has also concluded a review of transnational repression, and we have updated Parliament on that. I hope this will be a shared endeavour, right across the House.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberThis morning, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to proceed with the prosecution of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who had been charged with espionage for China under the Official Secrets Act 1911. Members right across the House will be aware that the charges related to allegations of Chinese espionage within Parliament and will want reassurance, as will you, Mr Speaker. Many Members will be as extremely disappointed as I am that there will now not be a trial.
The decision not to proceed with this prosecution is an independent one for the CPS to make in its role as the UK’s independent prosecuting authority. However, I want to be clear that the Government remain gravely concerned about the threat of Chinese espionage. Parliament and our democracy are sacrosanct, and any attempt by any foreign power to infiltrate or interfere with parliamentary proceedings is completely unacceptable. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will therefore set out the measures the Government are taking to tackle any residual risks arising from this case and outline the wider approach the Government are taking to protecting our democracy and countering state threats, including those from China.
The decision of the CPS related to charges under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which was the relevant legislation in force at the time. It is well known that state threats legislation had not kept pace with the changing threats we face. The Official Secrets Act was passed to counter the threat from German spies before the first world war. It referred to espionage as obtaining
“any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information”
that
“might be…useful to an enemy”.
Clearly, that language—drafted well over 100 years ago —does not reflect the types of espionage or state threats we face in the modern day, nor the breadth of states that engage directly in that activity.
For that reason, the UK passed and has now commenced the National Security Act 2023 with cross-party support. That legislation, which replaced the Official Secrets Act 1911, brings new criminal offences and powers to bear against the full range of modern-day state threats. Moreover, the National Security Act is state agnostic, removing the unhelpful “enemy” language from the Official Secrets Act and focusing on the malign activity we are all concerned about.
The Act also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government brought into force on 1 July. FIRS encourages transparency, strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions against covert influence, and gives our intelligence agencies and law enforcement additional tools to detect, deter, disrupt and prosecute state threat actors. It requires that any foreign influence in our democracy, including from China, be declared. We can now be confident that should cases of espionage or state threats be uncovered in the future, we will be in a much better position to prosecute them under the new National Security Act.
This case hits at the heart of our democracy, so let me be clear: the Government will not tolerate any state threats to the UK and its democratic institutions. We will robustly challenge China when necessary, as we would challenge any country for unacceptable behaviour on our soil. I can confirm that the Foreign Office has démarched the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in London to make clear that we will not tolerate any activity that interferes in our democracy. MI5 is considering the provision of additional advice to those most at risk of being targeted by state-led espionage, and the Government are taking robust action to counter state threats and continue to build up the UK’s resilience.
In April, we established a new cross-Government state threats unit to better co-ordinate our response to state threats. As I set out following the recently completed review of transnational repression, new training modules on identifying and countering state threats are being offered to all 45 territorial police forces through the College of Policing and are mandatory for counter-terrorism policing officers. We have committed to legislate as soon as parliamentary time allows to take forward the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. That includes creating a new proscription-style tool for state threats.
As the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) set out in his statement to the House following the conclusion of the China audit, we are investing £600 million in our intelligence services to support them in detecting and disrupting state threats to the UK. In September, the National Cyber Security Centre co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I know there will be calls to go further, and I reassure the House and the country that we will keep all tools under review and act as necessary.
As you are aware, Mr Speaker, the safety and security of our Parliament is of the utmost importance. That is why the National Protective Security Authority will issue new protective security guidance to parliamentarians and political staff on protection against foreign interference and espionage. That guidance outlines the potential risks we all may face in our day-to-day work, and how we can all better protect ourselves. I urge colleagues to read and follow the advice once issued. I also urge Members to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses. It allows the NCSC to alert individuals if it identifies evidence of malicious activity on their personal devices or accounts, and swiftly advise them on steps to take to protect their information.
The strategic defence review was clear that China presents a sophisticated and persistent challenge. As the national security strategy reinforced, instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years. As I have set out, we are addressing those threats, but there are also opportunities we need to grasp as we navigate our complex relationship with China. The last Government did not describe China as an enemy, and this Government do not think our relationship can be simplified down to a single word. Instead, we are taking a consistent, long-term approach to China, firmly rooted in the UK’s global interests.
I finish by paying tribute to our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. They operate often in secret, often in the shadows and often at great personal danger, but they have our enduring gratitude. While we are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, the legislation it relied on has already been changed. Should we need to go further, we will not hesitate to do what is necessary to keep our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.
I hope that my hon. Friend knows that this Government hugely appreciate and respect the relationship we have with Hongkongers. Through the processes in place, we will absolutely ensure that nobody, be they a Hongkonger or any other nationality, is extradited for reasons of political expediency. I can also point her to the important work, which we take incredibly seriously, on transnational repression. I previously made a statement to this House, and I hope that she and others understand the seriousness with which we take these activities. We are working closely with our international allies, and we are doing everything we can to ensure that the UK is a hard target for these threats, wherever they might originate.
As always, I am very grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement.
For years, the Chinese Communist party has worked to undermine the democratic institutions and values that underpin our society. This House is all too aware of the warnings, not least from the Intelligence and Security Committee’s excoriating report on China. That report made it clear that the previous Government lacked a coherent strategy for dealing with the threat posed by the Chinese state and that insufficient resources had been committed to meet that challenge. We expect to see better from this Government.
We are faced with a case in which two men, one of them a parliamentary researcher with close links to senior MPs, were accused of serious offences under the Official Secrets Act, only for the Crown Prosecution Service to drop those charges due to insufficient evidence. In this context, the decision is deeply worrying. It raises serious questions about the UK’s capacity to detect and prosecute espionage linked to hostile states, particularly China. So what specific issues with the evidence led the CPS to conclude that the threshold for prosecution was no longer met?
More broadly, what does this outcome say about our preparedness to respond to threats from foreign intelligence services operating on our soil, and even within the corridors of this Parliament? The Government must make protecting our democracy a national security priority. That means implementing the recommendations of the ISC’s China report in full, and ensuring that we are not left exposed to foreign interference simply because our systems are not equipped to respond.
Finally, the Minister again today committed to introduce legislation for a proscription mechanism for state and state-linked bodies as soon as parliamentary time allows. Could he update us on the timeline for bringing this forward and what its scope will be?
My hon. Friend raises an important point about our allies. Many of the threats and challenges we face are shared ones, which is precisely why the UK Government convened the five countries ministerial conference last week. We were proud to host our allies from the Five Eyes nations, with which we work very closely, along with other important international co-operation arrangements. We do work very closely with our allies to ensure that, collaboratively and collectively, we are best able to guard against the threat we face.
I can give my hon. Friend an assurance that we will seek to ensure that the new guidance is in place as soon possible. I also point to the fact that I wrote to all Members of this House just before the recess with advice on protective security and other matters. However, should any Member feel that they need additional support, we will work very closely with you, Mr Speaker, and the Parliamentary Security Department to ensure that they get it.
The Minister made the point that the charges brought were under the old legislation, the Official Secrets Act, which has now been superseded. Has he made an assessment of whether the charges would have proceeded had the new offences been in place at the time the charges were brought? Will he be working with ministerial colleagues, law enforcement and others to look at whether new offences are needed in this case and in others?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who raises an important point. I can give him and his constituents the assurances he seeks. The Government take these threats incredibly seriously and we will do everything we need to do to keep the public safe. On behalf of the Prime Minister, I chair the Defending Democracy taskforce. The Prime Minister recently renewed the mandate of that cross-departmental mechanism, which ensures that we are able to provide a whole-of-Government approach to the threats we face. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. These are not party political issues. I have always believed that these are matters that should be a shared endeavour. I will want to work with him and Members right across the House to ensure that, collectively, we keep ourselves safe.
I call the Member who has been heavily involved in this, Alicia Kearns.
I will be responding in a personal capacity, but may I start by thanking you, Mr Speaker, for the support you have given to us over the past two years? I also place on record my gratitude to our intelligence community and counter-terrorism police, who are exceptional.
From a securities perspective, today’s events are disastrous. They will embolden our enemies and make us look unwilling to defend our own nation, even when attacked in this place, the mother of all Parliaments. I am relieved that the National Security Act will make it safer and easier in future to prosecute foreign spies, but I urge the Minister to reform the Treason Act so that traitors are prosecuted and face justice, put China in the enhanced tier, and support private prosecution.
It remains unclear to me why Chris Cash and Christopher Berry cannot be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. The evidence shows a clear line between those two, the United Front Work Department and the politburo—the very top of the Chinese Communist party. The information shared was prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK, and I believe it put Members at personal risk. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) was told by agency heads that the evidence was overwhelming and the case beyond doubt. Counter-terrorism police this morning agreed and said the same to me—that the evidential standard had been met at the time of charges.
My question for the Minister is simple: if officials, the security services and the police agree that the case was a slam dunk, why has the Crown Prosecution Service not been able to get it over the line? If the CPS was not confident, why, given the compelling evidence, did it not put it to a jury and test it? Whoever is responsible for this decision—whether the Director of Public Prosecutions, an official in his own Department or the Attorney General—they have weakened the defence of our country today and I am desperately sorry to see it.
I hold the hon. Gentleman in the highest regard, so I hope that he will not mind me gently pointing out to him that I could not have been clearer in my earlier remarks about how seriously we take these issues. We will work very closely with allies and partners right around the world to ensure that we do everything we can to guard against the threats that we face.
I call Alicia Kearns on a point of order. May I just say what a pleasure it is to see you back?
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Anyone who wishes to demonstrate about the humanitarian situation in Gaza or the actions of any Government, including our own, has the absolute freedom to gather with others and voice their views, provided that they do so within the law, but supporting Palestine and supporting a proscribed terrorist organisation are not the same thing. The vitally important issue of Palestinian rights should not be co-opted by one organisation that has shown that it is willing to use violence in pursuit of its cause. The clear advice and intelligence given to the then Home Secretary earlier this year was that Palestine Action satisfied the relevant tests in the Terrorism Act 2000 and should be proscribed.
Some of those holding placards in support of Palestine Action may not know the extent of its activities. It has conducted an escalating campaign involving intimidation and sustained criminal damage, including to Britain’s national security infrastructure. Some of its attacks have involved the use of weapons, resulting in alleged violence and serious injuries to individuals. Palestine Action’s members have been charged with violent disorder, grievous bodily harm with intent, actual bodily harm, criminal damage and aggravated burglary—charges that include, in the assessment of the independent Crown Prosecution Service, a terrorism connection.
These are not the actions of a legitimate protest group, and for a Government to ignore expert security assessments, advice and recommendations would be highly irresponsible. Were there to be further serious attacks or injuries, questions would rightly be asked about why action had not been taken.
The Metropolitan police has confirmed that a total of 890 arrests were made at a demonstration in central London on Saturday. Most of those were under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for displaying articles in support of Palestine Action. Thirty-three people were arrested for other offences, including 17 assaults on police officers. As the Metropolitan police has pointed out, that was in stark contrast to the 20,000 people who peacefully marched and attended the Palestine Solidarity Campaign demonstration.
Demonstrations of this scale require a significant policing response. The new Home Secretary joined the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police on Saturday to observe the force’s operations and express her backing for the officers working tirelessly to enforce our laws and to maintain order. The fact that some officers were subjected to violence and abuse is utterly shameful.
It is completely understandable that people rightly feel very strongly about the situation in Gaza. But supporting or being a member of a proscribed terrorist organisation is a criminal offence and will never be acceptable, regardless of the wider context. We all want the suffering in Gaza to end and the remaining hostages to be returned. We all want to see peace. I say to the House that we must keep our focus squarely on achieving those aims and not on one harmful group that refuses to abide by our laws and threatens our public safety.
Order. I do not know who is doing the speeches, but I am going to crack down on Ministers and shadow Ministers if they do not keep to three minutes. I have to get Back Benchers in. Does the Minister agree to stick to the time in the future?
Order. I believe the advice was corrected to two minutes. [Interruption.] That is correct. I do not want my department to be blamed.
I am genuinely grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing these issues to the House. They are important, and it is right that Ministers are held accountable for them.
I am sure that the whole House will agree with my hon. Friend’s remarks about violence and intimidation, which have absolutely no place in our politics. She will be aware that there is a significant body of work taking place across Government, co-ordinated by the defending democracy taskforce, to ensure that all our elected representatives are able to do their duty and represent their constituents without fear or favour. The Government take that very seriously indeed.
My hon. Friend made a number of points, and I will struggle to respond to all of them. She will understand that the police are operationally independent of Government, but of course we remain in regular contact. It is important to take this opportunity to thank the police for their important work. They come under a huge amount of scrutiny—rightly so—but I think we saw at the weekend an impeccable police operation in which brave officers stood and did their duty, at least 17 of whom were allegedly assaulted in the line of duty.
The final thing to say to my hon. Friend relates to drawing the distinction, as she will well understand, on the absolute right of anybody in our country to express their concern about the desperately difficult situation in the middle east and more specifically in Gaza. The ability to go to the streets and join others in expressing individual or collective concern about unfolding events, be they in this country or further afield, is a cornerstone of our democracy. This Government would never do anything to get in the way of that. It was interesting that tens of thousands of people took to the streets this weekend and were able to express their concern in an entirely lawful way.
My hon. Friend asks about whether we are seeking to review any elements of the Terrorism Act. It is worth pointing her to the recently published article by Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who said with regard to tackling Palestine Action that
“There is no way ordinary criminal law would be effective against funding, training and recruitment.”
The Government must ensure public safety, and that is what we will seek to do.
I take the opportunity to acknowledge the difficult job that the police do. In my experience, recently and over a longer period, the police have done an excellent job, often under very difficult circumstances. It is important that we consider proportionality. These operational judgments have to be made by the police, often on the ground and often under pressure or in difficult circumstances. It is also important that we consider that we would not tolerate the kind of activity that we have seen in recent days and weeks from an organisation that was motivated, for example, by Islamist extremism, or by an extreme right-wing ideology. Similarly, we cannot tolerate that activity from Palestine Action, and this Government will support the police in doing the difficult job that we have asked them to do.
The right to peaceful protest is a cornerstone of a liberal democracy, but events over the weekend have set a dangerous precedent and risk having a chilling impact on free speech and legitimate protest in the UK. The arrest of 857 protesters under terror laws, following hundreds of arrests under the same powers last month, is deeply alarming. The Lib Dems warned that that would be exactly what happened when the Conservatives expanded terrorism powers in 2018. There is no doubt that those using violence, antisemitic abuse or hate speech must face the consequences, but those crimes are already covered by existing law. It cannot be right that simply displaying a placard in support of a proscribed organisation, while peacefully protesting, can result in a conviction and up to six months in prison. Will the Minister urgently review terrorism legislation, specifically as it is impacting the right to protest peacefully, to ensure it is proportionate and contains the nuance that it so clearly needs?
My hon. Friend has a long-standing interest in and concern about these matters. I give her an absolute assurance that the law is being applied fairly. I say to her—I know that she will agree with this—that nobody is above the law. It is important to think about how we collectively seek to respond to those who behave in a similar way but underpinned by very different causes, such as extreme Islamist terrorism or an extreme right-wing ideology. If people were demonstrating on behalf of those organisations in the same way that we have seen people demonstrating in support of Palestine Action, I think people would absolutely want the police to act in the way that they saw them act over the weekend. I say again: the law is being applied fairly; nobody is above the law; and the police need to be able to ensure that they are able to enforce it without fear or favour, and that is what I think they did over the weekend.
The burden of policing these protests is falling on certain forces more than others. That was also the case during the disorder last summer. Can the Minister give some reassurance that the Home Office is providing the support that is needed to those forces to ensure that they can manage the protests and so that their doing so does not distract from day-to-day policing?
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) for tabling these amendments, which propose two changes. First, amendments 1 to 5 would remove attempted unauthorised entry from the scope of the offence. Secondly, amendment 6 would bring the Act into force two months after it receives Royal Assent, rather than by commencement regulations made by statutory instrument.
It is absolutely essential that the Bill explicitly covers both attempted and successful unauthorised entry. We have seen widespread issues involving ticketless fans at football matches attempting to force entry and tailgate at high-profile matches, including the 2024 champions league final, premier league fixtures and at the Euro 2020 tournament. These forms of attempted entry place significant demands on stadium safety and security personnel and, at times, require police intervention. Maintaining provisions for attempted unauthorised entry ensures that law enforcement can act before a breach occurs and thus maintain safety and security at football matches across the country. It also enables the imposition of preventive football banning orders against persons involved in attempted entry. Banning orders are an effective deterrent against those who may seek to compromise public safety.
I turn to amendment 6. The Bill is designed to allow the measures to come into force by regulation on a date shortly before the start of the domestic football season. This approach will ensure that all organisations involved in safety and security operations are prepared to implement the new offence. A fixed date two months after Royal Assent may not coincide with the football calendar or allow sufficient time for training, communication and co-ordination. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member for Christchurch to withdraw his amendments.
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on the series of national security-related arrests that took place on Saturday 3 May. Protecting our national security is the first duty of Government, and it is a testament to our world-leading law enforcement and intelligence services that, through their tireless commitment, so many plots against the UK have been thwarted. I pay tribute to them again today for the work that they have done not just this weekend, but in recent weeks and months, on these important operations.
The two operations that took place across multiple locations this weekend were significant and complex. They were some of the largest counter-state threats and counter-terrorism actions that we have seen in recent times, and I am sure the whole House will want to join me in thanking the police, the security services and other partner agencies across the country, who showed their professionalism and expertise in carrying out these operations to keep our country safe.
Right hon. and hon. Members will understand that these are complex investigations. The police and the security services need time and space to be able to pursue their investigations, and our first priority must be to protect the integrity of that work so that we do not cut across those investigations and operations at a crucial time. However, these are serious matters, and the House will rightly want to remain informed. I will therefore outline as much detail as I am able, and I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will understand that there is a strict limit to what I can say at this stage, given that investigations are now ongoing.
I will first outline the facts around the events on Saturday 3 May. Throughout the day, counter-terrorism police undertook a series of arrests relating to two separate investigations. In total, eight men were arrested by the Metropolitan police’s Counter Terrorism Command. Five men were arrested on suspicion of preparation of a terrorist act, contrary to section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006, as part of a proactive investigation in the areas of west London, Swindon, Rochdale, Stockport and Manchester. All five men are Iranian nationals. While four of the individuals remain in police custody, the fifth has now been bailed with strict conditions.
As part of the investigation, police officers carried out searches at a number of addresses in the Greater Manchester, London and Swindon areas. Investigations continue, with searches and activity still under way at multiple addresses across the country. The investigation relates to a suspected plot to target specific premises. Police officers have been in contact with the affected site’s representatives to make them aware and provide relevant security advice and support. However, the police have also been clear that for reasons of operational security and public safety, they are not—and I am not—able to provide further information on the target at this time, and I urge Members not to speculate about the site.
In a separate police investigation, two men were arrested at two different addresses in north-west London, and one man was arrested at an address in west London. All three were arrested under the National Security Act 2023. These three men are also Iranian nationals, and remain in police custody. I can confirm to the House that these are the first Iranian nationals arrested under the National Security Act.
The operations to execute these eight arrests under both counter-terror and counter-state threat powers—in different parts of the country, and in the space of 24 hours—were intensive. They involved a range of different organisations, including different police forces, counter-terror police, the National Crime Agency, and our security and intelligence services. These operations were co-ordinated through the world-leading Counter Terrorism Operations Centre, which brings together and co-ordinates the UK’s agencies, alongside the agencies of our Five Eyes partners, to detect and tackle national security threats. I welcome the work of the previous Government to establish CTOC in 2021, and this Government have continued to support it and invest in it since taking office.
The significant point about both counter-terrorism and counter-state threats powers is that they allow the police to intervene early to prevent and disrupt threats, not just respond after events have taken place. This is crucial for public safety, but it also makes the investigations more complex, and that is why the police need the time and space to pursue them now, so we will not be providing a running commentary on the work that they are doing. However, what now follows is an incredibly complex set of investigations, involving hundreds more officers carrying out forensic searches, collecting vital evidence across different sites across the country and securing witness statements, backed up by the continued efforts of our security and intelligence agencies. This is careful, painstaking work.
At this stage in the operations and investigations, it would not be appropriate for me to speculate on or comment further on the details of these two cases and the motivations behind any of the threats that were posed. However, the House will be aware that these operations come against a backdrop of complex, interconnected threats to the UK, where state threats and counter-terrorism as well as serious and organised crime are intertwined together.
For 20 years, the greatest focus of our national security work was on terrorism—primarily from Islamist terrorism, with additional threats from Northern Ireland-related terrorism and other areas—and those threats have not gone away. Fifteen terrorist attacks have taken place since 2017, and there have been 43 late-stage disruptions of terrorism plots, but alongside that we have seen a serious, growing and complex challenge from state threats. Last year, Sir Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, said that MI5 state threat investigations had increased by 48% in the previous 12 months. He added that, since January 2022, the police and MI5 had responded to 20 Iran-backed plots presenting potentially lethal threats.
In March, I told Parliament that the UK is facing a growing and evolving threat from malign activity carried out by a number of states. My statement in March outlined the Government’s response to the unacceptable threat that we face from the Iranian state, and the steps we are taking to ensure that our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to disrupt and degrade Iran’s malign activity on UK soil. We have delivered on the commitments made. I announced that the whole of the Iranian state, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, would be placed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. I laid the regulations to make this happen in the House on 1 April and committed to bring the scheme into force on 1 July. I trust that all Members will vote in favour when those regulations are debated shortly.
Let me be clear: anyone in the UK who works for the Iranian state must declare it or they will be committing a serious criminal offence. We will also go after the criminal networks and enablers that Iran uses to carry out its work. Last month, the Government sanctioned the Foxtrot network—a network involved in violence against Jewish and Israeli targets in Europe on behalf of the Iranian regime. Training and guidance on state threats activity is now being offered by Counter Terrorism Policing to all 45 territorial police forces across the UK.
The independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, was asked by the Home Secretary to review the parts of our counter-terrorism framework that could be applied to modern-day state threats such as those from Iran. The Home Secretary specifically asked the reviewer to look at a state threats proscription tool, so we are not held back by limitations in applying counter-terrorism legislation to state threats. Jonathan Hall has now completed his review and will publish it shortly, and the Government will not hesitate to take action in response to Mr Hall’s advice.
As we continue to support the police and the security services in their investigations, I can also tell the House that the Home Secretary has instigated a series of security assessments that are being done or refreshed in the light of the cases this weekend and the further information surrounding them, which will ensure that the Government can respond robustly and comprehensively to any wider national security issues raised by these cases.
Working alongside our international allies to counter state threats is central to our success. The Foreign Office is engaging with our closest allies to outline the disruptive action that has taken place and will be considering potential future response options as the investigation progresses. The Home Secretary remains in close contact with my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who is committed to doing everything necessary to protect the country from these threats and to bring to bear all the diplomatic tools at our disposal.
The Home Secretary and Ministers will provide an update on the national security position when we are able to do so, following both these operations and investigations and the wider security assessments that are under way. The Government will not hesitate to act robustly to respond to these plots at the appropriate time, but first, we must allow the investigations to continue. Our police, security and intelligence agencies are the best in the world and stand ready at all times to take action to keep our country safe. I am sure they will have the support of the whole House as they continue this vital work. I commend this statement to the House.
My hon. Friend raises a very important point, and I can give him the assurances he seeks. The Government have been very carefully considering the matter of transnational repression. The Home Secretary and I will have more to say in the near future, but I can give him absolute assurance that we have been thinking carefully about these matters and take them incredibly seriously.
I thank the Minister for updating the House and for advance sight of his statement. I also add my thanks to the security services and the police for all their work to keep us safe.
Over recent years Members have been called to this Chamber to discuss plots to commit acts of terror on Britain’s streets at the hands of the Iranian regime—but consecutive Governments are yet to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation. In opposition, the now Foreign Secretary said:
“The IRGC is behaving like a terrorist organisation and must now be proscribed as such.”
Earlier this year I asked the Minister precisely this question: does he not agree that now is surely the time? In his earlier remarks, he mentioned the review that has concluded. If now is not the time for proscription, when should the House expect a further update?
The Liberal Democrats have welcomed previous sanctions against those linked to the Iranian regime. However, I urge the Government to go a step further and look closely at whether those individuals and others with links to the regime have assets here in the UK. Will the Minister commit to carrying out an audit, so that we know where those assets are, enabling the Government to freeze them as appropriate? The Minister is right to reference the long-standing pattern by the Iranian intelligence service of targeting people of the Jewish faith and of Israeli nationality. Could he update the House on any conversations he has had with the UK Jewish community leadership, specifically the Community Security Trust, about threats here in the UK?
My hon. Friend makes a powerful and important point. He is absolutely right that the Government will never drop their guard to the threats that we undoubtedly face in countering terrorism, whether the specific threat around Islamist extremism or state threats. We take these matters incredibly seriously, and we will work to ensure that all our security services and police forces have the resources and tools they need to address the threats we face.
I thank the Minister for his statement. No one in the House should be in any doubt about the threat that Iran poses to us and our national security. How confident is he that its designation in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme will be effective? Is he looking to go further?
I am looking forward—if that is the right way to describe it—to giving evidence to my hon. Friend’s Committee in the near future. As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Paul Waugh), I confirm that the Government have done a lot of work looking at the serious but complicated issue of transnational repression. The Government will have more to say about this in the near future. I assure my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) that we take these matters incredibly seriously. We have progressed at pace the work that we inherited from the previous Government. These are not simple matters; they require a whole-system approach, and we are working carefully on them across Government through the defending democracy taskforce. I assure the House that the Home Secretary and I will have more to say in the near future.
Do we know whether these men entered the country illegally or legally? Obviously, people who enter the country legally are subject to extraordinarily sophisticated surveillance at our airports and ports, but for people who enter illegally there is no surveillance at all. It is madness that thousands are entering our country with no checks at all. Is this not a good opportunity to seek a derogation from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and say that, because of our national security, we should have the right to detain these people, arrest them and rapidly deport them?
(7 months, 4 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman has made an important point, as he always does. I can say to him that a threat is a threat, regardless of the direction from which it comes. We take all those threats extremely seriously, and we work around the clock with the police and the operational agencies to keep the public safe, wherever the threat may originate.
Strong encryption is vital for everyone’s security, but last week Apple pulled its advanced data protection services in the UK after the Home Office had reportedly demanded back-door access to its UK customers’ encrypted data. Liberal Democrats have long argued that investigatory powers must be proportionate, as any “way in” for security services can be exploited by criminal gangs or, indeed, hostile states to target innocent people. Given that rights and security go hand in hand, what steps is the Minister taking to ensure that our national security and civil liberties are properly protected? Why do the Government believe that Apple’s UK customers do not deserve the same privacy rights as every other customer in the rest of the world?
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
In our manifesto, the Government set out our commitment to redoubling efforts to counter extremism, including online, to stop people being radicalised and drawn towards hateful ideologies. A number of strands of activity have been established to progress this work, which, among other things, have led to the appointment of an interim Prevent commissioner, Lord Anderson, to drive improvements. We have published plans to introduce youth diversion orders to tackle young people at risk of terrorism.
Many documents produced across Government as part of commissioned work are not implemented and do not constitute Government policy. This work did not recommend an expansion in the definition of extremism, and there are not and have never been any plans to do so. To be clear, the leaked documents were not current or new Government policy.
As we have said repeatedly, Islamist extremism followed by far-right extremism are the biggest threats we face. Last week, the Home Secretary set out our plans to carry out an end-to-end review of Prevent thresholds on Islamist extremism, because we are concerned that the number of referrals is too low. Ideology, particularly Islamist extremism followed by far-right extremism, continues to be at the heart of our approach to countering extremism and terrorism.
But, as the horrific Southport attack shows, we also need more action on those drawn towards mixed ideologies and violence-obsessed young people. As the Home Secretary set out in the House last week, there has been a troubling rise in the number of cases involving teenagers drawn into extremism, including Islamist extremism, far-right extremism, mixed and confused ideologies, and obsession with violence. This includes a threefold increase in under-18s investigated for involvement in terrorism. Some 162 people were referred to Prevent last year for concerns relating to school massacres. Our Five Eyes counter-terror partners have also warned about the growing radicalisation of teenagers and young people.
We will continue to drive work to counter the most significant extremist threats in the weeks and months ahead, as the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister have already set out.
Yesterday evening, Policy Exchange put into the public domain the Home Secretary’s review into extremism, or at least a version of it. It contained some deeply concerning proposals that I would like the Minister to directly address.
The report apparently says that the definition of extremism, for the purposes of Prevent and other programmes, could be extended to include the spreading of misinformation, the so-called online “manosphere” and misogyny. First, does the Minister agree with Prevent reviewer William Shawcross that we need to focus the attention of Prevent and counter-terrorism policing on those with extremist ideologies and not risk diluting attention with these much wider issues? Ninety-four per cent of terrorism-caused deaths since 1999 were caused by Islamist terrorism. Does the Minister agree that combating Islamist terrorism is more important than policing the manosphere? The wider issues referenced, such as violence against women and girls and more general violence obsession, are, of course, serious. However, they are best dealt with by the police, the criminal justice system, social services or mental health services, which have the power to section people that pose a risk.
Secondly, will the Minister commit to retaining the changes to non-crime hate incidents made by the last Government? Police should not be looking into matters or recording personal data where there is no imminent risk of criminality. To do so would waste police time and infringe freedom of speech. Any move away from that will enable the thought police to stop anyone telling uncomfortable truths that left-wing lawyers do not like.
Finally, the report the Home Secretary commissioned repeats the Prime Minister’s previous smear that campaigning against rape gangs, which we now know consist of Pakistani-heritage perpetrators, is far-right. The report also says that commenting on elements of policing policy is extremist and far-right. That is nonsense. Campaigning against rape gangs is not extremist or far right, and commenting on policing, whether we agree or not with the comments, is simply the exercise of free speech. Will the Minister categorically disown those remarks, which were contained in the Home Secretary’s report?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his observations, which I entirely agree with. This Government and Ministers are always happy to come to this place to discuss and debate Government policy. The leaked report is not Government policy.
There is no place for extremism or hatred of any form in our society. It is right that the Government work with communities to stamp that out, not least after the previous Conservative Government seemed to seek out opportunities to sow more and more seeds of division.
From what we have heard about the extremism review report, it does not bring the right answers forward and risks being counterproductive.
Now it is up to the Government to develop a counter-extremism strategy that is strong, effective and alive to the modern challenges facing our society. That includes addressing an increasingly complex online world and its role in inciting extremism. I would welcome more details from the Minister on how the Government will do this. To be effective, the work must also properly engage communities. Will the Minister set out how communities will be consulted on any upcoming counter-extremism strategies?
(10 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The first duty of any Government is national security, and we therefore welcome the court’s decision to uphold the Home Office’s position with regard to the exclusion of H6, who can now be named as Yang Tengbo. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission concluded that there was a “basis for the conclusion” that H6
“had been in a position to generate relationships with prominent UK figures which could be leveraged for political interference purposes by the CCP (including the UFWD) or the Chinese State.”
Where there are individuals who pose a threat to our national security, we are absolutely committed to using the full range of powers available to disrupt them. When we encounter foreign interference or espionage, whether it stems from the United Front Work Department or from any other state-linked actor, we will be swift in using all available tools, including prosecutions, exclusions, sanctions and diplomacy, to keep our country safe.
Given the potential for further litigation, it would be inappropriate for me to say any more, but it is important to recognise that this case does not exist in a vacuum. As the director general of MI5 made clear in October, we are in the most complex threat environment that he has ever seen. Alongside the threat from terrorism, we face ongoing efforts by a number of states, including China, Russia and Iran, to harm the UK’s security. Our response is among the most robust and sophisticated anywhere in the world.
The National Security Act 2023, which was supported by Members on both sides of the House and which strengthened our powers to protect the UK, is central to our protection against states that seek to conduct hostile acts. To date, six individuals have been charged under the new Act, and the Government have been working hard on the roll-out of a crucial part of it: the foreign influence registration scheme, or FIRS. We will say more about that soon, but we intend to lay regulations in the new year and commence the scheme in the summer.
The Government have also set out our approach to China, which will be consistent and strategic. We will challenge where we must in order to keep our country safe, compete where we need to, and co-operate where we can—for example, on matters such as climate change. That is acting in the national interest, as the Prime Minister reiterated earlier today. However, the threats we face from foreign states are pernicious and complex. The work of our intelligence agencies is unrivalled in mitigating them, and I want to take this opportunity to pay tribute to them for the amazing work that they do to keep our country safe. Today, as ever, they will be pursuing those who wish to do us harm, including those from foreign states. We support our intelligence agencies in their efforts, and we always will—and they will know that at any point when the UK’s national security is at risk, we will not hesitate to use every tool at our disposal to keep our country safe.
I want to put two things on the record. First, it would have been easier for the Government to come to the House with a statement; obviously, there was more to say than we have allocated time for.
Secondly, I say to Sir Iain: please do not tell the media what you are going to do and how you are going to do it, and do not try to bounce the Chair into making a decision. If anybody else had put in for an urgent question, I would have given it to them—on the basis that I am not dancing to the tune of the media.
It would be helpful if the Government came forward with statements, rather than being dragged to the Dispatch Box. Hopefully, we can all learn from this, and here is a good example of how that will be done: I call Sir Iain Duncan Smith.
Mr Speaker, I apologise if that was the case.
Yang Tengbo—H6—was, in fact, not a lone wolf. He was one of some 40,000 members of the United Front Work Department, which, as the Government know, the Intelligence and Security Committee report last year said had penetrated “every sector” of the UK economy, including by spying, stealing intellectual property, influencing, and shaping our institutions. Our agents say they are now frustrated by the lack of action, but they do not seem to have the tools they need to deal with the issue. One of those tools is staring us in the face. Will the Government commit to putting China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and will they do it now? There is no need for delay.
The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, or IPAC, found that H6—Yang Tengbo—is already well known as a United Front member, and that he is known to others who are already deep in the political establishment. Parliamentarians are exposed to the United Front on a regular basis. Will the Minister remedy this today, and accept that China is our most prominent security threat and that all action must take priority?
My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), who was the previous Security Minister, has said publicly that the Home Office was ready to name China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, which would have forced United Front members like H6 to register or face serious consequences. Given that doing so is an available option, why have we not done it yet? Is it true, as is being reported by papers, including The Times, that behind the scenes the Government are now under pressure from banks, the wider business community and Government Departments not to do it?
When it comes to a member of the royal family, I simply say this: how was it that somebody who was known to the security forces was allowed to get so close to a member of the royal family without proper scrutiny exposing them?
Finally, I note that the Prime Minister said today in response to the issue that we will “co-operate where we can”, particularly on environmental issues, and “challenge where we must”, particularly on human rights issues. If the Prime Minister means that, why are we still buying from China huge numbers of solar arrays that have demonstrably been made using slave labour? Surely his statement is clearly incorrect; far from challenging China on human rights, it now appears that we are turning a blind eye. Why is that?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are working at pace with colleagues across Government, including in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, to progress these matters. There is a lot of work going on across Government to ensure that we are as resilient as we can possibly be to the threats we face from a range of actors. He can be assured, as can the House, that this Government will use all necessary measures to protect our security and ensure that our critical national infrastructure is as resilient as it possibly can be.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. By necessity, the work that our intelligence services do is in the shadows, but since coming into this role a number of months ago, I have been extremely impressed by the professionalism and dedication of those men and women who work incredibly hard to keep our country safe. We all, across the House and the country, owe them a debt of gratitude, and I will ensure that is passed on.
May I urge the Minister to introduce the FIRS scheme as soon as possible and commence it at the earliest possible opportunity? What steps has the Home Office taken to ensure the proposed new Chinese embassy, at the Royal Mint site, has proper oversight, so that we do not allow it to become a new base for spies?
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend for raising this very important issue. Our deepest condolences are with the loved ones of James, Joseph and David following their tragic deaths. I assure my hon. Friend and the families that we will do everything in our power to stop this happening again. We will of course be happy to meet the families to discuss changes made, and I would be happy to meet my hon. Friend and her constituent to discuss the matter further.
I am sure that the thoughts of the whole House will be with the families of the Reading victims and the victims of other terror attacks.
Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has said that as much information as possible should be put into the public domain as early as possible to maintain public trust. Can the Minister assure the House that he and his ministerial colleagues have always disclosed relevant information at an early stage in relation to high-profile terror-related cases that have attracted substantial public and media attention?