Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [Lords]

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 3rd December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

The Scottish National party welcomes the aims of the Bill, with some caveats, and the Scottish Government believe that investigations and proceedings relating to serious offences in Scotland could benefit from the use of overseas production orders as a quicker and more streamlined process for obtaining electronic data. Notwithstanding the Minister’s point, which I am sure we will discuss further in Committee, we also welcome their lordships’ amendment that provides safeguards against UK service providers being required to produce evidence in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed.

However, we are concerned about the lack of proper safeguards for journalistic material, and I hope that we will be able to strengthen the measures in that important area in Committee. Although I welcome the fact that an order must be for specific, targeted information, the fact that it will in all likelihood be able to access bulk datasets to retrieve that information is disappointing and goes against the strong points made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) during the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I shall return to those issues a little later.

The ability to apply for an overseas production order through the domestic courts will make the process for gaining cross-border access to electronic data faster and more reliable than the current processes, which rely on mutual legal assistance treaties. MLAs have been criticised for being too bureaucratic and time-consuming. The UK’s deputy national security adviser on intelligence, security and resilience to 2018, Paddy McGuinness—not the one we are all familiar with—explained in an interview how the current process causes difficulties for UK investigators and prosecutors. He stated:

“It does not make sense that criminals plotting a major drug deal, a murder, a kidnap, trafficking people or sexually abusing a child in the UK can have their communications intercepted if they communicate via text message, but if they use a US company’s services their data should be out of reach of UK law enforcement.”

Those of us who sat through the Committee stage of the Investigatory Powers Bill will never forget the fact that electronic information is becoming increasingly important to the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, including terrorism. The companies that provide services that generate or store this data, such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, are often located outside our jurisdiction. This puts the data beyond the reach of existing domestic court orders, which either cannot be made when the data is not in or accessible from the UK, or cannot be served extra-territorially. According to Access Now, a digital rights campaign group, there has recently been a “huge growth” in MLA requests to access online records such as subscriber details, email content, metadata and social media from companies such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo and Twitter, which treat the vast majority of their data as being located in California and therefore subject to Californian jurisdiction.

According to the Home Office’s own figures, as of 2016—the figures are now out of date—the UK was party to 40 bilateral MLA agreements. As we have heard, the MLA process can be slow, requiring significant Government-to-Government liaison. This can cause lengthy delays, which can cause problems for investigations and prosecutions. Lord David Anderson, the then independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has spoken of the severe delays in the process and recommended that the Government should seek to address deficiencies in access to material from overseas service providers and

“take a lead in developing and negotiating a new international framework for data-sharing among like-minded democratic nations.”

Detectives investigating serious offences, including murder, have commented that it is taking an “inordinate amount of time” to access evidence from Facebook. Cressida Dick has said that UK police forces have faced a “very protracted procedure” in cases where they have had to access information from organisations such as Facebook. Just recently, she stated:

“I absolutely think that in certain instances...law enforcement in the UK ought to have vital evidence which might bring someone to justice.”

The delays that detectives currently face are unacceptable and it is clear that the system needs to be improved. Lord Anderson spoke in his summing up about the international frameworks, and I would like the Minister to explain further why, Brexit aside, he was not interested in participating in the European protection order.

I move on to the amendment made in the Lords to clause 1, with which we wholeheartedly agree. It provides that in any agreement on overseas production orders and the provision of electronic data under the terms of the Bill, assurances must be obtained from the other country concerned that the death penalty will not be applied. Article 2 of the European convention on human rights—together with protocol 139, to which the UK is a signatory—provides for the total abolition of the death penalty. It is therefore regrettable that the Government tried to resist this amendment in the other place. We—and, I am sure, Labour Members—will resist any Government attempt to draw back from this position in Committee.

While we broadly welcome the Bill, we are concerned about lack of safeguards for journalistic material. We believe that the provisions in the Bill are inadequate in protecting confidential journalistic material. This could threaten the pursuit of journalistic inquiry and undermine the democratic institution of a free press. We are not alone in this, as the BBC has also raised concerns.

Clause 12 provides for a journalist to be given notice of and made a party to an application that pertains to their confidential journalistic material, but this does not apply to non-confidential but none the less sensitive journalistic material, which is at odds with the domestic situation as outlined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The system proposed in the Bill will allow for a significantly reduced opportunity for journalists to engage in arguments about what is, and is not, suitable for disclosure, removing the opportunity for a journalist to make submissions on the issues that this gives rise to in the context of their work. Where on-notice applications are permitted in cases of confidential journalistic material, the Bill is currently silent as to whether or how any submissions will be taken into account by the judge. No further information is outlined on what this process would involve or how much information the journalist would be able to access; nor is it clear that sufficient information would be disclosed to enable them to respond appropriately. Additionally, it is unclear whether any advice or support would be provided to a journalist in those circumstances. Under clause 13, a journalist cannot inform anyone of the application or its contents, and no provision is made for this information to be disclosed to a legal adviser or representative.

The BBC has some further asks. It wants the Bill to require that notice is given in all applications for journalistic material, not just in those involving confidential material; to ensure that the evidential value test mirrors the current law in both terrorism and non-terrorism cases; to ensure that confidential journalistic material is protected, as under the current law for domestic applications; and to ensure that the Secretary of State can enter into reciprocal arrangements only with countries that provide at least as much protection. I suspect that we will be looking at this further in Committee.

The other area that we will be seeking clarity on during the Bill’s later stages is the potential use of bulk datasets. As I have said, the SNP has argued strongly against the retention of bulk data sets, the vast majority of which are harvested from mainly innocent citizens. We argued that it is incumbent on the Government to prove that there is an operational case and that the powers are necessary and to ensure that the safeguards are rigorous. It would therefore be rather remiss of us to allow legislation to pass without the requisite safeguards around the accessing of such data.

To conclude, the MLA treaty system is not working in the modern age. Vast amounts of electronic data goes through Facebook, Twitter and other organisations, and a quicker and more streamlined process for obtaining data is required to investigate serious offences efficiently in the modern world. The ability to apply for an overseas production order through the domestic courts would make the process for getting cross-border access to electronic data faster and more reliable than currently. The Minister was uncharacteristically generous—I mean the Government, not him personally—in working with the Opposition when the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill was in Committee, and I hope that will be repeated with this Bill so that we can move on together.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 28th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

It is now my challenge not to talk out the Bill.

It is a pleasure for me to close the Third Reading debate on this important Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said, the measures in it will prevent young people from accessing dangerous weapons such as knives and acid and causing irreparable damage with them, not only to the lives of others but to their own lives.

I am genuinely grateful to all right hon. and hon. Members from all parties—particularly those from Northern Ireland—for their valuable contributions and for the debates that we have had on the Bill. We have had a series of constructive debates, and at times like this the House is at its best, so I thank hon. Friends and colleagues for their contributions.

Particular thanks must go to my hon. Friends who served on the Bill Committee and scrutinised the Bill line by line. It was an absolute pleasure to serve with them in doing that important work. I also thank the Parliamentary Private Secretaries. We do not often get the chance to thank them, but they are the ones who make sure that the political wheels run smoothly. Of course, I also thank the officials, who have done an incredible amount of work on the Bill. [Interruption.] I am being prompted, but I had made a note, so now that I have finished thanking the officials I thank the Whip, the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool North and Cleveleys (Paul Maynard), because I know which side my bread is buttered. I also thank those in the Whips Office for their hard work on the Bill. Every time that we excited and enthusiastic Ministers put policies and legislation before the House, it is the Whips Office that has to deliver it, and I am extremely grateful for the help I have had on this Bill.

I extend my thanks to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Louise Haigh), the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) and the hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Vicky Foxcroft) for their contributions, not only today but in Committee, and for the constant attention that they pay to this really important issue. I hope that the hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford will keep pressing her case for a debate at tomorrow’s business questions.

I also thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) for his perspective in the debates. It has been a pleasure to work with him and, indeed, the Scottish Government on the Bill.

Let me end this Third Reading debate by drawing the thoughts of the House back to the people whom the Bill is intended to help and protect. I thank every single victim of knife crime and corrosive-substance attacks, as well as every family member who has been affected, sometimes devastatingly, by serious violence. It is for those people that we put the Bill and the other measures in the serious violence strategy at the forefront of our thoughts, as well as for the communities that we all represent, who really do want us to ensure that our laws are up to date and that we have in place the strategy to keep our country safe.

On that note, it is my absolute pleasure to send this Bill elsewhere. I hope that it goes with the best wishes and best intentions not only of every colleague present, but of the victims whom we seek to serve and represent.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Speaker has ruled several times that the convention of Members notifying other Members before visiting their constituencies applies to Ministers on official visits. I was deeply disappointed today to find out that the Scottish Secretary and the Prime Minister no less have visited Bridge of Weir in my constituency and that I have yet to receive a notification. The Scottish Secretary found time to tweet about his visit to Bridge of Weir just over two hours ago, to which I replied, asking for notification. He has not complied with that request. Clearly, paragraph 10.10 of the “Ministerial Code” applies in this case.

The sad thing is that the Prime Minister said earlier in answer to my question at Prime Minister’s questions that she knew nothing about Home Energy and Lifestyle Management Systems’ green deal mis-selling, which affects hundreds of people in my constituency. Had I been made aware of the visit, I could have scheduled meetings with the constituents affected, at which she could have learned a lot more about this terrible issue. Can you advise me, Mr Deputy Speaker, what recourse I have when the ministerial code is broken and Ministers fail through their answers in their obligations to Members and this House?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

It is the convention for any Member going to another Member’s constituency to carry out political business to inform the Member concerned, whether that be the Prime Minister or whoever. Please, do the right thing by colleagues and always inform the Member you are going. You do not have to meet the Member, but at least let us keep with convention. That is the advice that I would give. I am sure that hon. Gentleman will remind the Secretary of State when he catches up with him and has a debrief on his constituency, and I am sure that it will be a great pleasure for him to receive that debriefing.

UK Entry Visas

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Monday 19th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Nokes]

As I have said, it is important that we assess each application on its own merits and on the information provided by individual applicants. It is important that we enable academics to come here, but it is also important that applications be completed in a timely manner and with all the information that we have requested.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North mentioned the future for visitors from the European Union and the reciprocal arrangements for UK travellers going to the EU. On 13 November, the European Commission published a proposal to grant UK citizens visa-free travel to the EU after the UK’s withdrawal. This is conditional on the UK also granting reciprocal and non-discriminatory visa-free travel for all EU member states. We welcome the Commission’s proposal, which reflects the future relationship that we want to have with the rest of the EU. In our proposals, we have made it clear that we want to ensure reciprocal measures with the EU on visa-free travel for tourists and short-term business visitors.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Caroline Nokes]

No, I have given way several times this evening.

In conclusion, let me reassure hon. Members that the Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that we have a visa system that balances protecting our borders and national security with ensuring that people are welcome and are able to visit, to study and to work in areas where we need their skills. As we leave the EU, we will remain an open and tolerant country that recognises the valuable contribution migrants make to our society and that welcomes those with the skills and expertise to make our nation better still. We will control immigration so that we continue to attract the most talented to work or study in Britain while managing the process properly so that our immigration system serves the national interest. We are carefully considering a range of options for the future immigration system and will set out proposals very shortly. We will want to ensure that any decisions on our long-term arrangements are based on evidence and on engagement.

Question put and agreed to.

Immigration: DNA Tests

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

1st reading: House of Commons
Thursday 25th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sajid Javid]

That is a good question. I do not have the information at hand, but I would be very happy to write to my hon. Friend.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

My constituent Maria, who has dual nationality, has been resident—indeed, a teacher—in the UK for 41 years and has been married to a UK national for as long as I have been alive, but she is unable to obtain a UK passport in her married name, by which she has been known in this country for four decades. She has been told that, if she changes back to her name of 40 years ago, she may be able to obtain a passport. Will the Home Secretary look at her case, and exercise some of the common sense that has been lacking thus far?

[Sajid Javid]

I have listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has said about his constituent’s situation. If he sends me further information, I shall be happy to take a look.

Draft Data Retention and Acquistion Regulations 2018

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2018 General Committees

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham.

My colleague, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), opposed many of the measures in the Investigatory Powers Act during the Bill Committee and questioned whether many of the proposals were lawful. Now we know the answer, as it relates to what is in the 2016 judgment. Despite having opposed many of the measures in the 2016 Act, we have always said that we could support such measures if the Government proved the proportionality and necessity of the proposals. That has not happened as yet.

The Government’s response to the consultation talks about serious crime and says that data

“is used in 95% of serious and organised crime prosecution cases handled by the Crown Prosecution Service Organised Crime Division, and has been used in every major Security Service counter-terrorism investigation over the last decade.”

That is a fair point—95% is a high percentage—but in talking about the ruling it says that

“Member States can legislate for a regime which permits the targeted retention of communications data for the purpose of fighting serious crime, and the judgment sets out conditions that such legislation must satisfy in order to meet the requirements of EU law.”

I hope the Minister can address this in his conclusion, but in terms of the definition of serious crime, the proposed subsections 60A, 61 and 61A outlined do not sufficiently limit acquisition of communications data for an “applicable crime purpose” to,

“the objective of fighting serious crime”,

which is required in order to comply with the judgment in the case of Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others. That is because the proposed section 86(2A) defines serious crime so broadly. The definition covers any crime by a body corporate; any offence

“which involves, as an integral part of it, the sending of a communication or a breach of a person’s privacy”;

and any offence that carries a penalty of at least 12 months’ imprisonment for offenders aged 18 or over.

Serious crime will be captured by the definition in proposed new section 86(2A); of course it will. However, the fact that an offence was committed by a body corporate or involves a communication or breach of privacy bears no relation to its seriousness and therefore takes us no further in limiting the acquisition of data to the objective of fighting serious crime. The minimum sentence definition will encompass the vast majority of criminal offences and apply regardless of the circumstances of the offence. In our opinion, the definition should be much narrower, taking into account the particular circumstances of the offence. The definition of serious crime should be met only when a person can reasonably expect to receive a sentence of significantly more than 12 months.

We opposed the 2016 Act’s far-reaching bulk powers to acquire the personal and private data of our constituents; the regulations do not address our concerns. I appreciate that the UK Government have moved on the issue, having been forced to do so by the Watson ruling, but we would have welcomed their taking the opportunity to address our concerns via the regulations. Sadly, they have chosen not to do so. I am keen to hear the Minister’s reply about the definition of serious crime.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 11th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Johnson]

Again, I agree profoundly.

The Bill is the result of a thorough review carried out by not just the Government but the security services of how we can best protect our citizens. I believe that we can best protect them by ensuring that the Government, the police and the security services have to hand all the tools that they need to deal with the modern threats that are posed to this country.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I echo the comments made by both the Minister and the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) about the anniversary of 9/11 and the Westminster Bridge inquiry, and all who have been affected by those tragic events.

As we have heard from the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), the first job of any Government, whether in London or in Edinburgh, is to keep their citizens safe. It is clear that we need to take action to update legislation in these difficult times of high-level terrorist threat combined with the constant march of technology and online communication. I fully appreciate the difficulty of keeping legislation current, answering the calls of the police and security services for further powers and maintaining the balance of freedom and civil liberties that we expect and enjoy. Of course, while we are supportive of the Government’s efforts, it is incumbent on any decent Opposition to offer amendments to improve the Bill and ensure that the Government get that balance right.

In Committee, we submitted many amendments that, sadly, the Minister was not wise enough to accept. However, he was wise enough to make some concessions to the Opposition. Amendment 2, for instance, would remove the requirement to view documents or records containing information likely to be useful to terrorists on three or more occasions—the three-click policy. We have some serious concerns about the impact that that may have on innocent individuals who have no interest in, intent to engage in, or wish to encourage terrorist acts. I am glad that the three-click policy has been removed, but I fear that it has simply become a one-click policy.

The previous policy was arbitrary and unworkable, given that the clicks could occur in an unspecified window of time, did not have to relate to the same content on each occasion and did not require any terrorist intent for the offence to be committed. As I did in Committee, I accept the Government’s point that more people now stream material online than download it to a computer or other device, and in that context it is vital that we continue to review our counter-terrorism approach.

The Government had argued in relation to clause 3 that the three-clicks requirement was intended to identify a pattern of behaviour; this amendment runs completely counter to that objective. As had been asked for in Committee, the Minister has included a reasonable excuse defence for this new one-click offence. I would like the Minister to address concerns raised by many, not least my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), who say that it is possible that the wording will have the perverse impact of narrowing the reasonable excuse defence available to people charged with the offence, as the courts are likely to reason that, in legislating for a reasonable excuse without including lack of terrorist intent within that excuse, Parliament did not intend for lack of terrorist intent to be an available excuse for this offence. We have to ensure that the clause does not criminalise people who may view these documents with no nefarious intent, such as academics and journalists.

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[Mr Deputy Speaker]

No problem.

[Gavin Newlands]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I fully accept the central point that the Minister is making, but he has failed to convince us on the question of proportionality and on the necessity for the new clause. I should also point out that Safaa was not radicalised or groomed by someone who had returned; she was radicalised and groomed by someone overseas. In conclusion, I urge the Minister to commit to this review of the Prevent strategy.

[Sir Edward Davey]

Across the House, we share a determination to tackle terrorism. Seventeen years ago today, I was visiting my grandmother. She was watching the television and she showed me what was happening in the appalling attacks in the United States. We in this House also know about the atrocities that happened just 100 yards away on Westminster Bridge recently. So we all want to ensure that we can do whatever we can to keep our people safe and to fight against the scourge of international terrorism. The question tonight, however, is whether the new clause and the new Government amendments will help to protect us. We have seen a huge number of laws added to the statute book, quite rightly, to help us and our security services in the attack that we are making on terrorism and in the fight back, but I am not yet convinced that this new clause and these amendments will add to the successful work that has been going on.

I say to the Minister that I reach that conclusion reluctantly, but I should like to put forward my arguments, because I am not alone in this. Skilled independent commentators have reached a similar judgment to the one that I have reluctantly reached. My first argument in relation to new clause 2 is that it is not needed. Clause 5, with which we agree, will quite rightly expand extraterritorial jurisdiction. We have seen this before, and clause 5 takes those measures further to ensure that terrorist offences committed abroad can be prosecuted in the United Kingdom. That is sensible stuff. New clause 2 wants to go further, however. Rather than being primarily concerned with terrorist acts abroad, it seeks to criminalise the whole concept of going abroad. In other words, it is not about the actions of a person but about locations.

The Minister, in his usual rational way, tried to reassure us that this was not meant to apply to aid workers or journalists, and I presume that it would not apply to people who wanted to visit sick relatives and who might even risk going to a war-torn country to do so. He referred to proposed new subsection 58B(2), which is found in new clause 2, which offers that defence, but the way I read it, the person charged will have to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for entering a designated area. That is not quite what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box, and although I did not intervene at the time, I do not think that people will be innocent until proven guilty, and that should worry the House.

The other issue is one of common sense. If a terrorist or freedom fighter who has returned is accused of going to such an area, they could no doubt make a reasonable excuse defence. They could say that they were an aid worker, and the Government would then still have to prove that they have evidence that the person was doing something wrong and was not an aid worker. I am not absolutely convinced that the Government have got this right, and I will go on to quote the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, who supports my view.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Neill]

I promise to keep my remarks short. Two important matters have been raised, and I take on board the force of the shadow Minister’s arguments in favour of the value of the European arrest warrant. My right hon. Friend the Security Minister will know that, in the last Parliament, the Justice Committee produced a report on the legal implications of Brexit, which included a strong case for retaining access to the European arrest warrant and its arrangements.

It is important that we stress the value of the European arrest warrant to our crime-fighting arrangements. It is particularly significant, of course, that the National Crime Agency, giving evidence to our Select Committee at the time of the report, stressed the value of the European arrest warrant. All the legal practitioners stressed its importance, and the Minister recognises that the European arrest warrant arrangements are infinitely superior to those that were available under the Extradition Act 1989.

It has sometimes erroneously been said by one or two Members of this House that the European arrest warrant can be used disproportionately, and my right hon. Friend the Minister will know that, since the reforms to the operation of the European arrest warrant back in 2013, that disproportionality has been removed and the UK is actually an overwhelming beneficiary of the proper use of the European arrest warrant.

The Prime Minister made it clear at the beginning of this negotiation process that it is her objective to achieve this, and I am sure my right hon. Friend the Minister will be able to say that whatever the mechanism, whether in the Bill or not, the Government are committed to maintaining access to the EAW and to the rest of the supporting mechanism of criminal justice arrangements, such as data sharing, information sharing and intelligence sharing, the European criminal records information system and other schemes. All those will necessarily be a crucial part of the Government’s negotiating strategy. Whether or not it is mentioned in the Bill is not the point—the Government are reaffirming their commitment.

Legal professional privilege is an important issue to be considered. Unless I am wrong, there are sometimes arrangements for counsel, such as in relation to some of the specialist tribunals dealing with these matters, to be specially cleared and vetted. Perhaps my right hon. Friend the Minister will take that away and consider whether further application of that scheme might offer a sensible and proportionate way forward.

[Gavin Newlands]

It is a great pleasure to follow the irrepressible Chair of the Justice Committee, of which I am a member.

Before I discuss access to lawyers under legal professional privilege, it would be churlish of me not to thank the Minister for tabling amendments 6 and 7, versions of which both the shadow Minister and I tabled in Committee. The amendments will essentially ensure that public demonstrations cannot be subject to any financial charge under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. It is vital for our democracy, now more than ever, that the right to assemble, and to do so without charge, is protected.

Without going over the ground covered fairly extensively from the Labour Front Bench, I put it on the record that I share the concerns voiced by the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) about the Northern Ireland border stops and the huge sensitivity of this issue. I genuinely hope that the Minister will look at that, take it away and come back having addressed it.

The Bill as it stands restricts access to a lawyer for those detained under schedule 7. Specifically, it would restrict the right of an individual to consult their legal representative in private, away from a relevant officer. Being able to speak with a legal representative in private is a fundamental right, which should not be infringed. Indeed, in oral evidence, a whole cast of people backed us up. Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland spoke about the fundamental importance when he said:

“If we want people to be in a position where they can freely discuss matters with their legal representatives, we have to preserve this value. It is key to the rule of law that people can discuss matters openly with a legal representatives so that the solicitor, advocate or barrister is in a position to advise properly on what avenues are open to the person. Clearly one would want to ensure that that was adequately protected.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 49, Q103.]

Richard Atkinson from the Law Society of England and Wales also raised concerns, suggesting that the proposal risked the excellent reputation across the world of UK justice systems. He said:

“The cornerstone is legal professional privilege. That is not access to a lawyer; it is the confidential nature of discussions between a lawyer and their client. That is the cornerstone that has been in existence for hundreds of years and that is held out internationally as a gold standard that we have in this country. That is what is being undermined by this Bill saying that a police officer can stand and listen to the consultation that is going on between the client and the lawyer.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 28, Q63.]

Access to a lawyer—fundamental access to justice—is something we should not compromise on. This is not about constraining the powers of the hard-working men and women who work at our borders; it is acting on the concerns that were expressed to us, to ensure that correct and proper due process is followed.

I suspect that the schedule has been drafted as a result of concerns that lawyers and legal advisers could be exploited and manipulated in some way, as has been outlined. However, as was pointed out, it is not unknown to our criminal justice system; we already have powers in place to deal with such occasions. For example, in code H of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which deals with counter-terrorism cases, if there is a concern about an individual lawyer, there is provision for the suspect to have the consultation with that lawyer delayed, but to be offered the services of another lawyer in the meantime, so the suspect is not devoid of legal advice. We should protect that access at all costs. I accept that the Government propose the changes with the best of intentions, but we have pointed out that there are ways for it to be done without eliminating or infringing on the basic principle under the rule of law.

I express my support for the Liberal Democrats’ new clause 1, to which I have added my name. One of the greatest threats to our national security currently is, of course, Brexit and the fact that we face losing our seamless access to multilateral information-sharing tools. As we have heard, organised crime and terrorism do not respect borders and it is essential that Police Scotland—in fact, all the police services in the United Kingdom—can access the information systems, support and technical expertise available through Europol, not only to make Scotland safe, but to contribute to making Europe safer. As the hon. Member for Torfaen said, the recent naming of two suspects in the Salisbury incident and the issuing of a European arrest warrant showed just how vital this tool is to protecting the UK from threats, and why it must be maintained.

Following our exit from the EU, there is a major risk that any new arrangements that are put in place will be suboptimal to those at present. Further to that, there is also an issue with data sharing between the UK and the EU, as the EU will most likely require the UK to maintain data protection and privacy laws that can be deemed equivalent to those in force in the EU. We must ensure that our law enforcement agencies can continue to have the same access to Europol as they currently enjoy.

There is also a need to preserve stability in the law. Repealing legislation and preparing new legislation to fill in gaps arising from leaving the EU will compromise a significant part of domestic legislation that is passed at, or following, a withdrawal. Any future arrangements must take into account the autonomy of Scottish criminal justice institutions and provide a continuing basis for the direct co-operation that currently exists between law enforcement agencies in Scotland and their counterparts.

As a matter of security, we cannot afford an operational break in our access to EU cross-border tools, because they are part of the day-to-day work of the police force. Just today, the Lord Advocate of Scotland, giving evidence to the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee, said:

“I don’t think it controversial to observe that leaving that regime without replacing that regime would significantly and adversely affect our capabilities. From a professional criminal justice point of view, the realistic issue is the extent to which this can be mitigated.”

The Government’s dangerous Brexit plans, such as they are, may well leave us outside the European arrest warrant and key agencies such as Europol. I cannot insist enough that that would be incredibly dangerous to the future security of Scotland, the United Kingdom and, potentially, the EU. We must be able to share vital information to keep people safe from terrorism, human trafficking and organised crime. Leaving the European arrest warrant is yet another potentially disastrous Brexit bonus that we could all do without. I wholeheartedly support new clause 1.

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[Gavin Newlands]

I would like to echo the thanks expressed by the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) to our police and security services and all those who put themselves in harm’s way to keep us safe. We owe them a debt of gratitude. I also thank the Clerks in the Public Bill Office for their assistance during the passage of the Bill. This is the first time I have been in charge of a Bill for the Scottish National party. I also thank the individuals and organisations that provided evidence—[Hon. Members: “We can’t hear you.”] Is that okay? Have I got you now? Right, thank you. I also thank the Opposition Front-Bench team for their collegiate approach during the Bill Committee’s deliberations.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I do not agree with it, but I want to hear it.

[Gavin Newlands]

I appreciate that.

The Minister himself, despite the late tabling of new clause 2, has been open to improvements suggested by the Opposition, and I thank him also.

The SNP supports the Government in their attempt to modernise this crucially important legislation, and we appreciate the need to combat the constantly evolving threat from international terrorism in the modern digital world, but we must be extremely careful about how this is executed. We are fully aware of the challenges that we face from increasingly sophisticated criminals and terrorists, and we are in favour of giving law enforcement agencies and the security and intelligence agencies the powers they require to keep our communities safe, but those powers must be subject to stringent checks and safeguards if we are to maintain the balance of security and civil liberties that we currently enjoy.

While stressing that we support the Government’s aims, I remind the Minister that they have awarded themselves, and the police and security services, an enormous amount of power in the last three years, not only—potentially—in this Bill, but in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Immigration Act 2016, to name but two. Sadly, more often than not the Government have simply not got the balance right between civil liberties and the extension of intrusive powers.

If Scotland were independent—and that time is coming—we would no doubt be drafting and enacting more legislation to deal with the increased threat of terrorism. Luckily, that legislation would not be drafted by me, but I cannot help wondering how similar our measures would be. I should like to think—in fact, I am positive—that we would ensure that our Ministers, our police and our security services had the necessary powers, without impinging too much on civil liberties. That, I am sorry to say, often seems to be an afterthought in the case of this Government.

Draft Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice and miscellaneous amendments) order 2018

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Monday 16th July 2018 General Committees

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Bailey.

I should say at the outset that it is not my intention to divide the Committee. However, during the rather arduous scrutiny of the Investigatory Powers Bill a couple of years ago, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and, to be fair, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), scrutinised the Bill in some detail and raised concerns time and again about the retention of data being far too widely drawn in the Bill, with far too few safeguards. We said during the passage of the Bill that these powers would not survive legal challenge. The Government thought differently and ploughed on regardless.

It is a shame that the Government’s failings on investigatory powers have been admitted only after the matter was taken to the European Court of Justice. It is to be welcomed, however, that there will be a cut in the number of cases, through increased protections, in which communications data can be accessed by the authority. We have to remember that the Court ruled that EU law precludes EU countries from passing law that

“provides for general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication”

in order to help fight crime. The Court also said that EU law does permit national law makers to, “as a preventive measure,” require traffic and location data to be retained on a targeted basis, but only where the objective of the data retention rules is to fight “serious crime”.

The Scottish National party has always accepted that security powers are extremely important and must always be shown to be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. In our view, the Government have a way to go in making other aspects of the investigative powers proportionate and lawful. As this instrument mainly tightens provisions, we will not oppose it.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Seventh sitting)

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Tuesday 10th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the Committee Room. Copies of written evidence the Committee has already received are also here. I should just mention that there has been, with the agreement of the Chair, a slight change to the groupings, and amendment 43 to schedule 3 has been included with amendments 24, 25 and 42.

Schedule 3

Border Security

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 24, in schedule 3, page 46, line 37, at end insert,

“provided that the person is at all times able to consult with a solicitor in private.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 43, in schedule 3, page 46, line 37, at end insert—

“(7A) The examining officer may require that the detainee consult only a solicitor who has been approved by the Law Society for providing advice to persons detained under the provisions of this schedule.”

Amendment 25, in schedule 3, page 47, line 29, leave out paragraph 26.

This amendment would delete provisions in the Bill which restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under Schedule 3 for the purpose of assessing whether they are or have been engaged in hostile activity.

Amendment 42, in schedule 3, page 47, line 31, leave out “and hearing” and insert “but not hearing”.

[Gavin Newlands]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again this morning, Mrs Main.

We have already had a wide-ranging debate on schedule 3, with more to come. Amendments 24 and 25 would delete provisions in the Bill that restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under schedule 3. Specifically, they would retain the right of an individual to be able to consult their legal representative in private, away from a relevant officer.

As I mentioned in my previous contribution, being able to speak with a legal representative in private is a fundamental human right that should not be infringed. In oral evidence, Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland spoke about the fundamental importance of this:

“If we want people to be in a position where they can freely discuss matters with their legal representatives, we have to preserve this value. It is key to the rule of law that people can discuss matters openly with their legal representatives so that the solicitor, advocate or barrister is in a position to advise properly on what avenues are open to the person. Clearly one would want to ensure that that was adequately protected.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 49, Q103.]

The Law Society of England and Wales also raised concerns, suggesting that the proposals risk the excellent reputation across the world of the UK justice systems—I add the plural to Richard Atkinson’s words. In oral evidence—an aspect of this quote has been raised before—he said:

“The cornerstone is legal professional privilege. That is not access to a lawyer; it is the confidential nature of discussions between a lawyer and their client. That is the cornerstone that has been in existence for hundreds of years and that is held out internationally as a gold standard that we have in this country. That is what is being undermined by this Bill saying that a police officer can stand and listen to the consultation that is going on between the client and the lawyer.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 28, Q63.]

For a full house of views on that, Abigail Bright of the Criminal Bar Association said:

“That is deeply concerning and wholly new. ‘Radical’ is a well-chosen word here; it is a radical departure from anything known to English law. My view, and the view of the specialist Bar associations, is that it is unnecessary and undue, and that it would not in any way be a serious improvement on the powers available to law enforcement agents.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 58, Q129.]

In my view, if the schedule is left unamended, it risks infringing a basic, fundamental right that has been in place for hundreds of years, as the legal profession says. It is unnecessary and undue, and it would not be a serious improvement on the powers available to law enforcement. Access to a lawyer—fundamental access to justice—is something we should not compromise on.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main.

We had a wide-ranging debate on this issue in Committee last week. I want to raise the specific issues in amendments 42 and 43 and to support what the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North said about the importance of legal professional privilege. It is obviously a cornerstone of our criminal justice—indeed, our justice—system and is admired around the world as a gold standard, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out.

However, in the cases we are talking about, it is not as if we must have a trade-off between two purist positions. In my view, there is a simple, practical solution to the problem before us, which should satisfy the Government’s concerns about people who are detained passing on messages to others through a lawyer who either acts knowingly or is not in the know. I responded to the Minister on that point last week.

Legal professional privilege is circumscribed by the codes of conduct that govern lawyers in our country. No lawyer can be a party to an illegal act, and they have, of course, to be very mindful of money laundering regulations. The practical solution I suggest in amendment 43 is that the Law Society approve solicitors to provide advice to persons detained. Such solicitors would be subject to the professional code of conduct, which would plug the gap in the legislation as it stands, with people simply not having access to a lawyer at all.

I put that suggestion to Richard Atkinson, the co-chair of the Law Society’s criminal law committee, in the 26 June evidence session. I said:

“From what you are saying, there is a practical solution for any legitimate concerns there may be. There is also a situation—in a police station, for example—where you can have a duty solicitor or lawyer made available. That person could be someone of particular standing and reputation in whom we could all have faith and whom we would not have those concerns about.”

Richard Atkinson replied, “Absolutely. Again, code H”—he was referring to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—

“allows exactly for that. If there are specific concerns about a lawyer, the duty lawyer or solicitor can be called to come and advise. That maintains privilege and maintains the defendant’s access to advice at that point.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 27, Q56.]

This proposal would not involve a large number of cases. The Minister will recall his own questions to Richard Atkinson, when he asked whether a lawyer would be required every single time there was a stop, which clearly is not the point. The provisions apply only when we get to the questioning stage, as set out in the evidence.

The right to private legal advice can be maintained if we adopt the idea that solicitors approved by the Law Society can provide that advice. The arguments that the Minister made against the proposal last week—that those lawyers would somehow inadvertently hand on information—are incredible. These lawyers would be subject to training in this area and would have to act with the highest professional standards. Nor would it be a restriction on the right to confidential legal advice to have a limited number of, say, panel lawyers who are able to provide it.

I urge the Minister to go back and look at this proposal for Report stage. The Government’s concerns can be allayed if they put in place a practical scheme that would be limited only in terms of the number of people who would have to deal with it but that would have the crucial effect of maintaining the very important principle of legal professional privilege, upon which our criminal justice system is based.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

Let me get to the next bit, which is also about the right not to be overheard—for legal privilege to be protected—and the idea that that is somehow absolute. It has never been absolute. The justification for that not being absolute was that the last Labour Government introduced paragraph 9 of schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which says:

“A direction under this paragraph may provide that a detained person who wishes to exercise the right…may consult a solicitor only in the sight and hearing of a qualified officer.”

The principle of, effectively, allowing the law enforcement agencies to do that, subject to chief officer authorisation, is not a new precedent that we are setting, as the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North seems to suggest. It has existed for 18 years. The last Labour Government viewed that as important enough for it to happen when it applies to TACT offenders in a police station setting, never mind in a schedule setting. That is where that policy idea came from. It has not been rustled up in the last year. It has been around for 18 years.

If I was arrested tomorrow morning and taken to a police station, rather than the border, and I wanted to consult a solicitor, I would find that, if there were reasonable grounds—or stronger than that—and the chief officer gave permission, that discussion could, on a very few occasions, be listened to. It is not at all about “inadvertently”; it is about the few individuals, who, as I witnessed in the early ’90s, exploit that relationship for the simple purpose of tipping off or undermining or disposing of evidence. Under those circumstances, the power has already existed.

I bring the hon. Member for Torfaen back to the point of this schedule stop. What is this stop really about? The verbal evidence given is not admissible in court, and this is not the same as sitting in a police station. This is about effectively establishing the intent, the identity and the basic details at the time of a border stop.

Given that we are a free and open society, it is at our border that we are most vulnerable. Once someone is within our community, because of the way we live our lives, quite rightly, they have free movement and free everything. I am delighted that those are our values, but if we are to keep that special, and maintain that freedom within the United Kingdom, we have to be able to give that power for the simple purpose of establishing the intent—the who and the what—at our border.

The new schedule applies to hostile state activities and to people who come here to attack and undermine the very state that allows us to enjoy those freedoms. That does not put in peril the strength of our justice system and the right to a lawyer and to a fair trial—I am a Scot, and we take a slightly different philosophical view on the right to a jury, which is a very Norman thing in England and Wales. That is why I believe that these measures are proportionate and necessary to keep us safe, and I do not believe that going back on the principle established 18 years ago would keep us safe; in fact, we would be unpicking well-established law.

Funnily enough, in my two years as Security Minister, I have had lots of representations on the use of schedule 7 and whether people have a right to compensation, whether the schedule is abused, and whether we should be cleverer and faster in using it, so it does not impinge on people’s journeys. I have not yet had a representation in those two years to ask for paragraph 9 of schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to be undone. Therefore, the Government will not accept these amendments and will leave the schedule to stand, for the purpose of screening the who, what, where and when at our border and of taking into account the large amounts of data some of these individuals carry on their way into this country.

[Gavin Newlands]

In the debate on the previous group of amendments, I indicated that I would keep my powder dry until this group. I have listened carefully to the Minister, but in making the point that each suspect should be able to consult a lawyer of their choosing, he seems to be arguing against some of the provisions in his own Bill. For that reason, I wish to press my amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Main. I echo what the Minister said, and I thank him for taking a constructive approach to the Bill—he said on Second Reading that he would do that. I add my thanks to the Doorkeepers and the Hansard writers. I am very grateful to the Clerks, in particular, for dealing with the numerous amendments I emailed in.

I thank you, Mrs Main, and Ms Ryan for your excellent chairing of the Committee. I am very grateful to all the officials for their contribution to the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North for working so constructively, and the witnesses for giving us very helpful evidence and cause for debate throughout the Committee.

[Gavin Newlands]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Main. This is for the hat-trick. Thank you for allowing us to sit without ties. I thank you and Ms Ryan for chairing the Committee and for being so patient with us at certain times. I thank the Clerks, the Doorkeepers and the various officials. I add my thanks to the witnesses who came to the oral evidence session and those who submitted written evidence and briefing papers, which helped Members to draw up amendments.

I thank the Minister for being open—not quite as open as I would have liked, but open none the less, compared with other Ministers I have sat opposite in previous Bill Committees. I also thank the other Front Benchers for their assistance and co-operation.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 5th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again, Ms Ryan. I shall speak in support of new clause 2 and amendment 44.

The new clause would largely do similar things, with an addition in our case. It would implement the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and would require an officer to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that an individual is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism before they could detain an individual for up to six hours under Schedule 7. In addition, it would institute safeguards with regard to electronic devices.

The issues concerning this schedule are topical, given that some of it has been drawn in response to the Skripal incident in Salisbury in March. Obviously, in recent days there has been another incident, which is under investigation. The Bill was introduced with the intention of

“giving the police new powers to investigate hostile state activity at the border.”

The press release that accompanied the Bill stated:

“Using the new power, the police or designated immigration or customs officer will be able to stop, question, search and detail an individual at a port, airport or border area to determine whether he or she is, or has been engaged in hostile activity.”

On the face of it, there is little to disagree with in terms of the sentiment. Obviously, it is right and proper that we are able to take action on those who look to enter our country to do our country or its citizens harm. The authorities that do that do an incredibly important job and we should be grateful to them and ensure they have the necessary powers, but as drafted, these powers are concerning due to the lack of a reasonable grounds test for suspecting that an individual may be entering the UK to cause harm. They are therefore open to abuse and there is not enough assurance for officers working at our borders.

In addition, the Bill fails to protect any individual who has been designated a suspect. The arguments against these search and detail powers have been rehearsed over the years, but we should not dismiss the concerns that have been raised about racial profiling and how these powers allow for an element of discrimination in our society.

New clause 2 would implement the sensible recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and would require an officer to have reasonable grounds for suspecting an individual. It would provide greater clarity on when someone should be detained and would eliminate the chances of an individual’s personal belongings being searched and retained. It would therefore protect any individuals suspected of carrying out such an offence and also offers protection to the relevant officer on the border by providing greater clarity as to when they should detain a potential suspect. I urge the Minister to give new clause 2 and amendment 44 due consideration.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Minister and I discussed some of these powers privately, and I welcome the chance to discuss them again. He is aware of a number of cases that I am concerned about regarding detention or stopping and searching at borders. I make it absolutely clear that, when needed to protect public safety—whether from hostile state activity or from those travelling abroad or entering this country to commit acts of terrorism—the powers must absolutely be there to enable searching, detention and other necessary processes to deal with that and to keep the public safe.

However, there are two crucial points. The first is that, wherever possible, action should be taken before we have to detain or search or interdict somebody at a border, particularly if that person is leaving the UK. We should, if possible, detain them at their home or interview them elsewhere—voluntarily or otherwise—because if we get to the stage at which somebody attempts to board a plane or a ship or a Eurostar or whatever, there will be a risk both to public safety and of unnecessarily detaining or disrupting the travel of individuals who are not guilty of any offence.

The second point, which the Minister is aware of, is that we need to be aware that individuals may travel with family members or other individuals who are in no way connected and should not be under the reasonable suspicion that may be directed at that individual. What steps are being taken to ensure that information and processes are being shared to ensure that such detentions, searches and interdictions take place at the earliest possible opportunity? What arrangements are there to ensure that relevant information is shared, wherever possible, between airlines or other forms of transport, the Border Force, the Passport Office, the security services, the police and others to ensure that those things I mentioned are done at the earliest stage? I will move amendments on that issue later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gavin Newlands]

I beg to move amendment 21, in schedule 3, page 46, line 17, leave out “and 26”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 22, in schedule 3, page 46, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (3).

Amendment 38, in schedule 3, page 46, line 27, leave out from “would” to the end of line 28 and insert

“create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person or persons.”

Amendment 40, in schedule 3, page 46, line 28, at end insert—

“(3A) Where the examining officer believes that there is an immediate risk of physical injury to any person or persons under subparagraph (3), they must allow the detainee to consult a solicitor by telephone.”

Amendment 23, in schedule 3, page 46, line 33, leave out sub-paragraph (6) and insert—

“(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply if the examining officer reasonably believes that the time it would take to consult a solicitor in person would create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person.”

Amendment 39, in schedule 3, page 46, line 34, leave out from “would” to the end of line 35 and insert

“create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person or persons.”

Amendment 41, in schedule 3, page 46, line 35, at end insert—

“(6A) Where the examining officer believes that there is an immediate risk of physical injury to any person or persons under subparagraph (6), they must allow the detainee to consult a solicitor by telephone.”

New clause 3—Access to a solicitor—

“(1) Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 7 leave out ‘Subject to paragraphs 8 and 9’.

(3) In paragraph 7A—

(a) leave out sub-paragraph (3),

(b) leave out sub-paragraph (6) and insert—

‘(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply if the examining officer reasonably believes that the time it would take to consult a solicitor in person would create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person.’

(c) in sub-paragraph (7) at end insert ‘provided that the person is at all times able to consult with a solicitor in private.’

(d) leave out subparagraph (8).

(4) Leave out paragraph 9.”

This amendment would delete provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000 which restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under Schedule 7.

[Gavin Newlands]

The amendments would delete the provisions that restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under schedule 3 for the purpose of assessing whether they have engaged in hostile activity. However, in doing so, the amendments would add an important safeguard that would ensure that that would not apply if the examining officer reasonably believed that the time it would take to consult a solicitor in person would create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person.

In addition, new clause 3 would amend schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 with regards to access to a lawyer. It acts on the concerns that have been expressed to us by many different organisations and respected individuals. As we have heard, this section of the Bill would allow an individual to be detained for a significant period of time without reasonable grounds.

Notwithstanding the Minister’s points about the varied forms of intelligence that are received, the amendments are not about constraining the powers of the men and women who work at our borders, but acting on the concerns that have been expressed to ensure that correct and proper due process is followed. During the evidence session, we heard from Richard Atkinson that the schedule was of “great concern” to him as

“It fundamentally undermines what I would consider to be a cornerstone of our justice system—legal professional privilege.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 26, Q55.]

We will come on to that in more detail in the next set of amendments.

In addition, during the oral evidence, Abigail Bright of the Criminal Bar Association also had concerns about

“having no access to a lawyer, on the face of it for no good reason”

and

“why the rights of a suspect, who is potentially an accused person, should be diminished”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 58, Q128.]

I suspect that the schedule has been drafted as a result of concerns that lawyers and legal advisers could be exploited and manipulated in some way, as has been outlined. However, as was pointed out, that is not unknown to our criminal justice system and we already have powers in place to deal with such occasions. For example, in code H of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which deals with counter-terrorism cases, if there is a concern about an individual lawyer, there is provision for the suspect to have the consultation with that lawyer delayed but to be offered the services of another lawyer in the meantime, so the suspect is not devoid of legal advice.

Access to legal advice is a cornerstone of the British justice system—as a Scottish National politician, I should say the English and Welsh justice system and the Scottish justice system, before I get chided—and one that we should protect at all costs. I accept the Government propose the changes with the best of intentions to keep us safe but, as we have pointed out, there are ways that that can be done without eliminating or infringing on the basic principle of the rule of law.

The amendments provide a degree of flexibility to the authorities while ensuring that individuals can still access and make use of proper legal representation. Specifically, amendment 23 would, as I have outlined, provide that an individual can be prevented from consulting a lawyer in person only where the officer reasonably believes that the time it would take to secure a solicitor’s presence would create an immediate risk of physical injury to an individual or group of people. Those are important safeguards when there is valid suspicion about waiting for a lawyer to meet a client. Public harm can be caused by the wait, but at the same time there is an issue in the majority of circumstances of protecting someone’s basic right of access to a lawyer.

New clause 3 would amend schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. It would delete provisions restricting the access to a lawyer of people detained under schedule 7 to the same Act. I respect the concerns that the Minister has outlined, but I think that they were alleviated in the oral evidence given by Max Hill a couple of weeks ago. By tabling the amendments and new clause I am trying simply to maintain access to justice.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North; I also want to speak to amendments 38 to 41, which I tabled. They follow the same general tenor as the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, in that they are practical suggestions for maintaining the right to access to a lawyer. Amendment 41 is about consultation via telephone.

I will not discuss the amendments in the next group now. They have far more to do with the right to consult a solicitor in private. None the less, that issue is also at the heart of the amendments in the group we are now considering. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North has already referred to the evidence given by Max Hill, and I commend the evidence of Richard Atkinson, too. He chairs the criminal law committee of the Law Society, and I am sure that the Minister recalls a conversation with him on this very issue.

The Minister put the practical point to Mr Atkinson about whether access to a lawyer would be requested on every stop at the border. However, that is not what is at the heart of the amendments. The Minister asked Mr Atkinson whether he thought

“that when a Border Force person, a customs person, seeks to detain you for an hour or however long to examine and question you further, they, too, should have access to a lawyer”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 29, Q66.]

That was about when the stage of being questioned was reached. The Minister mentioned a series of stages—whether it was a screening stop or another type of stop; but what I am talking about applies when questioning starts, when legal advice would be a necessity. We are not talking about the thousands of stops that are made. We are talking about particular circumstances that would be analogous to the position in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

I also commend Mr Atkinson’s evidence in terms of seeking practical solutions to deal with the Government’s concerns and still maintain our cherished right of legal professional privilege. As I have said, Ms Ryan, I will not talk about that in principle now, as I will do so on the next group of amendments. However, Mr Atkinson suggested several ways in which the balance could be maintained. He said the consultation could be delayed; if there were concerns about a particular lawyer, the services of a different one could be offered; and advice could still be given within the sight of examining officers without necessarily being given within their hearing.

I recognise the issue of immediate physical threat, as well. However, I urge the Minister to look at the matter practically, and not to sacrifice legal professional privilege but to take note of the practical solutions by which we could deal with concerns about individuals abusing the right to consult a lawyer by, for example, consulting someone who is not a lawyer or passing on information. I accept that there is a risk and I accept what the Government say, but we should turn our minds to finding a practical solution that maintains legal professional privilege.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I do not propose to take this particular group of amendments to a vote at this stage, but I say to the Security Minister that the first of the two explanations given—that somehow solicitors bound by a code of conduct would be unwilling and unaware stooges passing on information to third parties—is not particularly credible. I do not think the distinction between a police station and a border security stop is particularly strong either, and I urge the Minister to look again at the practical steps around this. However, it is not my intention to push the amendments to a vote at this stage.

[Gavin Newlands]

I have to say that I remain somewhat unconvinced by the Minister’s arguments, and we may choose to revisit some of these amendments on Report, but at this stage I will keep my powder dry until the next group of amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Maynard.)

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to all the amendments together, Ms Ryan, which I think will assist the speed of business in Committee this morning. The Opposition support the aims of clause 3, as I made clear on Second Reading. A clear problem with the law is that the Terrorism Act 2000 covers downloading but not streaming. As I remarked on clause 1, updates to the law need to be made to take into account technological changes. The reality is that people now live-stream many things, rather than formally downloading them. It is not right that we criminalise the downloading but not the live-streaming. That clearly has to change.

However, two major points arise on the updated offence. The first is that it has to be workable from a practical perspective. If it is not, that will clearly be a problem. The second is that the clause should not bring into our criminal law those who carry out perfectly legitimate activities, so how the offence is drawn is extremely important. It was with those two factors in mind that I tabled my five amendments. They all aim, first, to make the clause workable, and secondly, to ensure that the way the clause is drawn targets the activity that we all wish to target and to criminalise but not that which I am sure every Committee member would want to encourage.

Amendment 5 relates to the period of time in the Bill over which the three clicks would be considered to give rise to a criminal offence. I proposed it as a safeguard on the three clicks, although I have severe reservations about the three clicks provision. It is vague, as it stands—we do not know whether it will be three clicks on the same stream or on different streams. By its very nature, it is also arbitrary. I have tabled amendment 5 to draw a period of time to the attention of prosecutors in making decisions on this new offence. I do it on the basis that I have reservations about the underlying three clicks approach in any event.

Amendment 6, on the intention to provide practical assistance, is based on something the Home Secretary said on Second Reading. The chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) intervened on him and made the sensible point that, as clause 3 stood, she was concerned that the Select Committee itself could be in trouble under that clause. He replied:

“The objective is clearly to find and punish those with terrorist intent.”—[Official Report, 11 June 2018; Vol. 642, c. 633.]

That may be right at a common-sense level, but is not quite what the three clicks approach does, because there is no intention requirement alongside it. Amendment 6 would simply introduce the intention requirement to which the Home Secretary referred on Second Reading.

Amendments 7 and 8 are about the reasonable excuse defence, which I would like to see added to the Bill. It would be an important safeguard and reassurance to academics, researchers, members of the Home Affairs Committee or anyone else who might be viewing this type of content, not—to use the Home Secretary’s words—with any kind of terrorist intent, but for perfectly legitimate reasons in studying this kind of activity and helping the rest of society to understand and defeat it. That is very important and something that we should all encourage.

Amendment 7 would also reverse the burden of proof. It should not be for the person raising the reasonable excuse defence to have to prove it. Once raised as a defence, it should then be for the prosecution to disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. I am sure the Minister will also pick up that that reverse burden is in the Terrorism Act 2000 and, in my view, it is reasonable to expect that it should also be in this Bill.

Amendment 9 would provide for a review of the operation of the clause and a report to Parliament on it. If we were to persist with the three clicks approach, Parliament would need to look at its operation carefully in terms of how it is drawn and its workability.

To conclude, I am greatly concerned by the three clicks approach. I have tabled five amendments aimed at workability and safeguards, and I hope they will be considered carefully by the Minister.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the chair again, Ms Ryan. I support amendments 5 to 8 in the name of the hon. Member for Torfaen. As has been outlined at various stages, clause 3—and the Government’s three clicks policy—has received the most attention and probably the most public criticism of any part of the Bill. Furthermore, I think the Minister knows that it is imperfect in its current guise. He has been open about the fact that the Government are not fully aligned to the three clicks policy, as the Home Secretary commented on Second Reading.

The Minister and the Government have my sympathy on this. The first job of any Government is to keep their citizens safe in these difficult times of high terrorist threat combined with the constant march of technology and online communication. It is very hard to keep legislation up to date and answer the calls of police and security services for further powers, while maintaining the balance of freedom and civil liberties that we expect and enjoy.

The SNP has serious concerns about how the policy will work in practice, and the impact that it may have on innocent individuals who have no interest in, intent to engage in, or no wish to encourage terrorist acts. It is self-explanatory that anyone who downloads or streams content for the purpose of planning or encouraging terrorist activity should face a criminal charge and, if convicted, a long sentence. Nobody would disagree with that, but this is about finding the most effective approach that targets the right individuals.

I accept the Government’s point that more people now stream material online than download it to a computer or other device, and as such it is vital that we continue to review our counter-terrorism approaches and ensure they meet the current threat level, but the Government’s approach to tackling streaming content through the three click policy is riddled with difficulty. Amendment 5 deals primarily with timing and does not take into account when a prosecution may be made.

The Government suggest that the three clicks policy is designed as a protection for those who accidentally access certain content online, but we must consider how easy it is for someone to click on a relevant source that could put them into conflict with the provision. It could catch someone who had clicked on three articles or videos of a kind likely to be of use to a terrorist, even if they were entirely different and unrelated and the clicks occurred years apart. Timing is crucial, because it would be difficult to accuse someone of being involved in terrorist activity if they had clicked on a certain source three times over a 10, 15 or 25-year period. Those concerns were echoed in the evidence session, and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill—who we should all listen to—expressed his concern about the variable threshold proposed. We should act on that independent and expert advice by introducing a safeguard that could effectively help to identify a pattern of behaviour.

Richard Atkinson, the chair of the Law Society, also voiced his concerns about the Government’s three clicks policy, stating that it could undermine or restrict those with legitimate cases, and that the lack of any consideration of timing makes the measure very vague. He said:

“To leave the law in the hands of prosecutorial decision as to whether or not it meets the public interest is a step too far. I think there is a need for greater definition around what is being sought to be prohibited.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 31, Q74.]

Amendment 5 would add the safeguard that an individual would have to view the information three times or more in a 12-month period to have committed an offence, and that position was supported by Max Hill during the evidence session.

On Second Reading many Members made clear their concerns about the lack of other safeguards in clause 3, particularly regarding intent—for example, the clause does not take into account the length of time that anybody watches a video or views a website. That point was raised by the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine on Tuesday in a question to Gregor McGill, who confirmed that the length of time that someone watches a video is not defined in the Bill, so watching a video or viewing a website for one second by mistake could be counted under the Government’s three strikes policy.

I accept the point made by Mr McGill that such breaches would be harder to prosecute, and that discretion would be applied, but as I have said, I am not comfortable with leaving such a wide area open to prosecutorial discretion. More importantly, as Max Hill said, such an offence without a test of intent is too broad and would capture too many innocent individuals. It is important that the Home Secretary accepts that a balance can be struck between liberty and security. Hoda Hashem, a law student at Durham University and one of many individuals and groups who sent helpful briefings to the Committee—I thank them all on behalf of the SNP—summed it up well by saying,

“the certainty and precision of laws are essential principles of our legal system. It allows ordinary people to know when their behaviour might veer into the realm of criminality, and it also means that the government and police cannot arbitrarily choose who to prosecute. In effect, it is wrong for the Home Secretary to argue that it would be down to the Police and CPS to fix a bad law. As a matter of principle, it is for Parliament to ensure that the laws it passes are clear enough to be applied consistently and, more importantly, predictably…If the government is serious about striking the right balance between liberty and security, the offence must include a criminal intent, or it must be withdrawn altogether.”

The Government may claim that adequate safeguards are in place to protect innocent individuals, but as we have heard, few agree with that position. That is why we support amendments 7 and 8, which have been tabled by the Labour party. The Government are asking for wide and vague powers, and we need safeguards in place to protect innocent individuals by ensuring that they are not prosecuted in the first place, and to provide for an adequate defence in the event that non-terrorists are taken to court. The stress placed on someone who was being investigated in that scenario would be extreme. Unless the safeguards are strengthened, and notwithstanding the Minister’s commitment regarding journalists and academics, it would be a brave journalist or researcher who would not be deterred or at least have second thoughts before viewing such material. Max Hill warned that thought without action must not be criminalised. We all agree that real terrorists should have nowhere to hide. We should also agree that legislating in the name of terrorism when the targeted activity is not actually terrorism would be wrong.

As we have heard, the French courts struck down a similar attempt by the French Government. In addition, a UN special rapporteur, Professor Joe Cannataci, expressed concerns about this provision, saying:

“It seems to be pushing a bit too much towards thought crime…the difference between forming the intention to do something and then actually carrying out the act is still fundamental to criminal law. Whereas here you’re saying: ‘You’ve read it three times so you must be doing something wrong’.”

In our view, amendments 5 to 8 are eminently sensible and, indeed, vital if the Government are to have any chance of surviving a legal challenge to elements of clause 3 and—almost as importantly—if they want to make good on the Home Secretary’s commitment that a balance can be struck between liberty and security.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. I thought that instead of embarking on a long prosecution of clause 3, it would be best to meet the hon. Member for Torfaen to discuss his amendments. I have said from the outset of proceedings on the Bill that my intention was to seek advice and suggestions from all parts of the political spectrum, and I felt early on that the three clicks provision presented a challenge. It opens up a whole debate about whether there were three clicks or four clicks, how far apart the clicks were, whether a time limit should apply to the clicks and so on. We were getting away from what we all agree on, which is the need to amend the legislation to reflect modern use of the internet—the streaming of online content. Partly because of technological advancements and the speed of the internet, people no longer download podcasts in the way they used to; they just click on their 4G device and stream the content. That is, of course, a problem for our intelligence services and law enforcement agencies, which often have to deal with people streaming content rather than downloading and holding it.

As I said, I have spoken to the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman on this issue and the Government will go away and examine a better solution to the three clicks issue. I hear the strong views about a reasonable excuse, and a debate can be had about judicial discretion. Campaigners for judicial discretion are sometimes also those who want much more prescriptive legislation that can contradict their earlier motives. If we included a list of reasonable excuses, rather than leaving it up to a judge to decide, would we end up with a list of 150? That is a matter for further debate, but I have asked officials to see whether reasonable excuses are listed in full anywhere else in statute. I understand that it may be possible to give examples rather than a full list.

I can assuage some of the fears expressed by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about section 58. First, I cannot find a record of a journalist being prosecuted under the existing section 58, which has been in existence since 2000. Over 18 years, journalists and academics have downloaded some of this content, and they have not, I understand, been prosecuted even if they have failed to provide a reasonable excuse. That relates to section 58(3) of the original Act. We have heard claims of armageddon and the fear that suddenly everyone will be arrested, but that will not materialise—it certainly has not done in 18 years. I hope that that assuages the fear expressed by the hon. Gentleman.

I do not think that simply updating the provision should be cause for concern. It is an attempt to tackle the difficult issue that modern terrorism unfortunately uses incredibly slick recruiting videos—they are grooming videos—to pull people away from the society they are in, to radicalise them and to get them to do awful things. Recently, a young man was found on the way into Cardiff—not far from the constituency of the hon. Member for Torfaen—with knives and an ISIS flag. We found no evidence that that young man had ever met a Muslim, was from a Muslim family or had been to a mosque. He had simply been radicalised by watching streamed videos online. That is the power of such persuasion, and we also see it reflected in cyber-bullying and sexualisation. It is a real issue that we have to face.

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I rise to support clause 13. It is self-evident that terrorism is a serious offence, and the SCPO regime, which has been in place since the 2007 Act, can be an important tool in dealing with terror offences.

As the Minister has set out, the SCPO will come into effect when an offender is released from custody with the purpose of preventing or disrupting their involvement in serious crime. Restrictions on travel and access to property or telephones can be part of that. The regime has worked in relation to other serious offences, and it is sensible to extend to it to terrorism.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Traffic regulation

[Gavin Newlands]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 14, page 15, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) The authority may not impose any charge where the relevant event is a public procession or assembly as defined by section 16 of the Public Order Act 1986 taking place for the purposes set out at section 11(1) of the same Act.”

This amendment would ensure that a new power to impose charges in connection with anti-terror measures at events or particular sites would not restrict protest rights through the imposition of costs that organisers are unable to pay.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 29, in clause 14, page 15, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) The authority may not impose a charge where—

(a) the order or notice is made in relation to an event which is a public procession or public assembly; and

(b) the event is taking place for one or more of the purposes set out in section 11(1) of the Public Order Act 1986.

(2B) In subsection (2A), ‘public procession’ and ‘public assembly’ have the same meaning as in the Public Order Act 1986.”

[Gavin Newlands]

Amendment 13 is straightforward, so I will not detain the Committee too long. Anti-terrorism traffic regulation orders—ATTROs—allow vehicle or pedestrian traffic to be restricted for counter-terrorism reasons. We have all seen the bollards and barriers that are set up during events to protect the organisers, spectators and those taking part. ATTROs can be temporary or permanent fixtures—as is the case at the moment outside Parliament. The amendment is not about restricting the importance of ATTROs, but ensuring that any new measures that are introduced are proportionate and do not restrict people’s ability to protest and demonstrate.

Clause 14 proposes a range of changes to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, including removing the requirement to publicise an ATTRO in advance and allowing the discretion of a constable in managing and enforcing an ATTRO to be delegated to third parties, such as local authority staff or private security personnel.

In addition, the clause would allow the cost of an ATTRO to be recharged to the organisers of an event. It states:

“The authority may impose a charge of such amount as it thinks reasonable in respect of anything done in connection with or in consequence of the order or notice (or proposed order or notice).”

The new charge would be payable by an event promoter or organiser, or the occupier of a site, and relevant events include those taking place for charitable and not-for-profit purposes. Although I see a lot of merit in clause 14, I am concerned that it will stop people gathering for demonstrations.

Amendment 13, which I hope is a common sense amendment, was tabled to address those specific concerns. It would allow an exemption to be made, so that any new power introduced through clause 14 would not restrict an individual’s right to protest on a cause that is important to them. Clause 14 certainly will not save a huge amount of money; the Library briefing on the Bill states that it could be as little as £66,000. The amendment is designed to ensure that the right of freedom of assembly and association, as protected by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights, is not violated due to the organiser of a protest being unable to meet the costs levelled against them.

Last week, Corey Stoughton of Liberty expanded on that in her evidence to the Committee. She said:

“To be consistent with the right to assemble and protest under article 10, there must be a legislative exemption for activity protected by those fundamental rights. That is an exemption that we have seen replicated in other, similar provisions in UK law…A simple fix to this would be to recognise that putting such charges on activity protected by the right to protest and assemble is an undue burden on that activity, and the cost of protecting those events has to fall on the state in the course of its obligation to protect that right.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 52, Q109.]

I agree. We have created exemptions in the past to protect our right to protest. The state must protect that right and I think most people, even Government Members, believe that a citizen’s right to protest is worth a lot more than £66,000.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I rise to support amendment 13, and amendment 29 in my name. Although the amendments appear to differ, they are essentially meant to achieve the same thing. I would not dream of entering into a competition with the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about who has the better drafted version.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I should say at the outset that although ATTROs have been available for a long time they are not a substitute for the existing public order powers to put traffic management systems in place, and for the protection of large crowds. I would not want the measures to be used as a new opportunity for imposing charges when events are held, or for concocting a spurious terrorist link to try to regain money. They are designed for occasions when there is a specific terrorist threat to an event, or when an event is likely to attract a terrorist attack. That might be said of the recent Commonwealth summit, or similar events, as opposed to a champions league football match that is in the diary, a major sporting event that everyone knows is about to happen. For such events the local authority has always had the power under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 to charge the organisers. I would not want a situation in which everything—the galas or village fetes we attend—suddenly becomes a terrorist threat, to some over-eager person.

[Gavin Newlands]

I appreciate what the Minister is saying. Will he commit, on that basis, to giving further consideration to whether we can tighten the provisions and ensure that what he has said is in the Bill?

[Mr Wallace]

I was hoping that we would get to this moment, because I have good news: I shall now have to arbitrate on whether Scotland’s or Wales’s drafting is better.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I totally agree with my hon. Friend. I will make it clear to police chiefs and to the LGA on the conclusion of the Bill’s passing that this should not become a wheeze to either not do something or to impose fines. That is important.

On reducing costs and maximising policing at events, we are also keen to enable the better use of personnel charged with protecting sites subject to ATTROs. To put this in context, the 1984 Act provides that an ATTRO may include a provision that enables a constable to direct that a provision of the order shall be commenced, suspended or revived, or that confers discretion on a constable. We want the police to be able to make more effective use of officers’ time and also of the other available resources in providing security for a site protected by an ATTRO.

To that end, subsection (9)(c) will provide that an ATTRO may

“enable a constable to authorise a person of a description specified in the order or notice to do anything that the constable could do by virtue of”

the 1984 Act. Under such delegated authority, it might be left to a security guard or steward to determine when a provision of an ATTRO is to commence or cease operating on a given day. The ATTRO might, for example, provide for a road to be closed off from 10 am to 10 pm, but a security guard could determine that, on a particular day, the road could be reopened an hour earlier.

An ATTRO’s ability to confer discretion on a constable may be utilised, in particular, to enable a police officer manning a barrier or gate that has closed off a road to exercise his or her discretion to allow accredited vehicles or persons through that barrier or gate. Subsection (9)(c) would enable another authorised person to exercise such discretion. I suppose that that is where I differ from the hon. Member for Torfaen. I want our police officers to be in a lead position at events. Freeing up constables from checking passes at barriers and handing that responsibility to a security guard enables them to better use their powers at an event. That is why we are keen to give that discretion to constables.

The clause will place on a statutory footing the power of the police to deploy obstructions to enforce compliance with temporary traffic restrictions imposed under section 67 of the 1984 Act. That section empowers the police to deploy temporary traffic restrictions in exceptional circumstances linked to the prospect of terrorism, and to deploy signs on the road indicating what those restrictions are. Those powers currently only relate to vehicular traffic, so the clause will apply them to pedestrian traffic.

[Gavin Newlands]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; indeed, I am heartened. If it makes any difference to his consideration, I am not concerned in the slightest whether he picks the Scottish or Welsh drafting—or the third way he will no doubt find—to amend the clause. With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.