Criminal Courts: Independent Review

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Westminster Hall

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts: Part 1.

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Despite the title of this debate—which I will immediately concede is less than exciting—it focuses on a serious problem with significant consequences. The criminal courts of England and Wales are under very significant strain. That is translating to very long delays from early hearings in criminal cases to the hearing of trials. I was at my local Crown court a couple of weeks ago and the delay there was at least 18 months. It is as bad or worse elsewhere.

That delay is not just an administrative problem; it has real, human consequences. It means a longer wait before a victim of crime or a witness in criminal proceedings can see the case resolved and move on with their lives. Of course, the longer it takes to get to trial, the harder it is to remember detail and to give the best evidence possible. For a defendant—and it is worth recalling that not every defendant is found guilty—the case continues to hang over their head along with, in some cases, the threat of potentially losing their liberty. A defendant in custody awaiting trial adds to the pressure on the prison population for longer than they should if the eventual outcome of their trial is acquittal or a non-custodial sentence. We can see that in the statistics: remand prisoners made up 11% of the prison population in 2018 but that figure was up to 20% in 2024.

There are other consequences of long periods on remand. Remand prisoners are not convicted so no work is done on their rehabilitation in prison. Time spent on remand counts towards an eventual prison sentence but spending longer on remand means a greater proportion of the eventual sentence—in some cases, the majority of the sentence that is ultimately handed down—is served without any rehabilitative work being done to reduce the likelihood of reoffending. Substantial periods on remand also mean that there are more cases where a custodial sentence is imposed at the end of it but the whole sentence has already been served on remand, so the offender is released immediately after the trial. That can be hard to understand and accept for victims and the public, who have to watch that offender walk free from court despite their conviction.

Long delays in the criminal courts should worry us all. They certainly worry the Government, who have commissioned Sir Brian Leveson, a very senior and experienced judge, to review the operation of the criminal courts and recommend improvements. Part 1 of his review was published on 18 June and deals with the policy changes that he believes may improve the situation. I have no doubt that Ministers will have been considering those recommendations carefully and will take up some or all of them, but we in Parliament should consider them carefully too. That is why I sought this debate.

I have worked with Sir Brian in a variety of roles and have huge respect for his insight and judgment. The report that he published is 378 pages long; I cannot do justice to all of it in this debate—you will be grateful to hear, Mr Efford—but I do want to say something about his analysis of the problem and some of his solutions.

First, I will discuss the problem and the reasons for it. Those interested only in political attack lines will always be able to find them, but this issue deserves deeper analysis. Of course more resources will be important, and Sir Brian makes that clear, but previous reductions in funding can be at least partly explained by periods of reduced demand. The number of cases received by the Crown courts fell, for example, during the nine years I was in government from 150,000 in 2010 to 102,000 in 2019. The open caseload, which is the number of cases begun in the Crown court but not yet completed, fell from 55,000 in 2014 to 33,000 in 2018, but it has increased significantly since, standing at a historical high of 75,000 in 2024. As Sir Brian set out in his review, there are many reasons for that.

It is true that the system has not yet entirely recovered from the covid pandemic, but the other reasons are more structural. Central among them is that the type of cases being heard matters as much as the overall number of cases. The criminal courts are now hearing a greater proportion of cases involving sexual offences or fraud, which are more complex and take longer to resolve, so the length of the average Crown court trial has doubled between 2001 and 2024. The complexity of trials has also been increased by the greater volume of digital evidence, including from mobile phones.

All of that leads Sir Brian to conclude that we cannot go on as we are, and I think he is right. We all know how difficult it will be for the Government to find significant extra resource for the criminal court system. Even if they could, it would not be enough to address the very different workload and ways of working that the system now deals with so, as Sir Brian urges us, we should look at structural change. As I said at the outset, his review makes many recommendations that I do not have time to discuss, but I hope that the Government and the Minister, who I am delighted to see in her place, will look carefully at his proposals to end release under investigation instead of bail, which I think is sensible, and the increased standardisation of out-of-court disposals.

I want to focus on Sir Brian’s recommendations in three areas. The first is how we can encourage guilty pleas, where they are appropriate, to be entered earlier. If a guilty plea is how a criminal case should and will be resolved, the earlier it is given the more quickly victims and witnesses can be reassured that they will not need to relive their experiences by giving evidence, and the more quickly valuable and scarce court time can be allocated to other cases, so that is a change worth pursuing.

Those of us who have practised in the criminal courts know that there is only so much we can do to persuade a guilty defendant to plead guilty—some will always hold out until the day of the trial in the hope that the witnesses against them fail to turn up; I am afraid that delays in hearing the trial make that more likely—but Sir Brian makes three recommendations in particular that might help. Those recommendations are that the discount on sentence for an early guilty plea should be increased from one third to 40%; judges should give defendants more information on what their sentence may be if a guilty plea is forthcoming; and the plea hearing should be delayed to allow defendants to receive fuller advice before entering a plea. I suspect that the first two will receive the most attention, but I believe the third may have the most effect.

Making sure that defendants know how much shorter their sentence may be if they plead guilty rather than are found guilty, and increasing that difference with bigger discounts for early guilty pleas, may well change some minds, but must not and is not intended to constitute inappropriate pressure to plead guilty when not guilty. Defence advocates, of course, have a clear professional duty to advise their clients not to plead guilty if they do not accept their guilt, but discussions between defendants and their advocates about the evidence and the law are very often constrained because they happen only at court on the morning of the trial. It is often that that truly restricts the prospects of realistic pleas at an earlier stage, so allowing more time for that advice to be given is vital.

Such advice has to be accompanied, though, by changes that will make it more likely for that extra time to be productively used. If, as I hope they will be, the Government are attracted to the idea of delaying plea hearings for that purpose, it will also be important to ensure that advocates are properly incentivised, including through fee structures, to conduct conferences with their clients in advance of the plea hearing. Where the client is in custody, allowing access to the client—preferably in person, but via video link if not—must also be made easier than it is now, or appropriate advice will not be delivered early so that appropriate pleas can be delivered early.

It is also worth saying again—these points have been made many times by many people, as the Minister knows—that early advice on the prosecution case and the available defences cannot be given if the prosecution evidence has not been served on the defence in time to allow it to be properly considered. Late disclosure by the prosecution remains a fundamental problem, as does the timely production of defendants in custody at court.

The second area of Sir Brian’s review I want to focus on is the proposed rebalancing of work between the Crown court and the magistrates court. It is important to recognise that, as Sir Brian points out, the bulk of criminal cases are dealt with by magistrates already—around 90%, in fact, with only 1% of criminal cases being resolved by jury trial. Nevertheless, because a magistrates court trial is both quicker and cheaper than a jury trial in the Crown court, it makes sense in resource terms to shift the balance further in the direction of magistrates where there would be no injustice in doing so.

Sir Brian suggests that that can be done in a number of ways. Some are fairly straightforward: for example, we could increase the financial threshold for trials of criminal damage cases in the magistrates court from £5,000 to £10,000. Of perhaps more significance from a policy perspective is the suggestion of removing the automatic right to appeal a magistrates court conviction in the Crown court and replacing it with a permission to appeal process, and that of removing the right to choose a jury trial altogether for offences with a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment or less. In the circumstances, I have no substantive objection to any of those proposals, but in relation to the last of them, I invite Ministers to consider the discrepancy it would create between, on the one hand, trials of offences for which sentences of up to two years’ imprisonment could be imposed taking place in magistrates courts and, on the other, sentencing powers for magistrates remaining limited to 12 months’ imprisonment, which Sir Brian does not seek to change.

I am sure that Ministers will also want to factor in the capacity of magistrates courts to do the extra work, as there is a backlog there too, and consider whether a neater way of rebalancing the caseload towards magistrates courts would be the reclassification of some offences as summary only. They will also want to factor in, of course, the need to ensure that lay magistrates have access to good-quality legal advice when hearing cases.

On changing access to jury trial, the important point is an obvious one, but one that is worth making for context. As things stand, not every criminal charge entitles a defendant to a jury trial. We already restrict the right to jury trial, so this debate is about moving the threshold for eligibility for jury trial, not about abandoning a principle of jury trials for all.

I should say that I have great faith in the jury system. I have sought to persuade juries for the prosecution and for the defence in Crown court trials, and I have heard many jury verdicts, and I have retained throughout my confidence that, in general terms, this is a good system for determining guilt or innocence. However, that does not mean that we should refuse to contemplate any change or to recognise the pressure on jury trials for some of the offences that occupy large amounts of court time.

[Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)]

I just wondered whether I might pose the fact that the backlog has been created and exacerbated by problems in the criminal justice system, and that it is certainly nothing to do with the time a jury trial takes to be completed. Jury trial has been statistically proven to be fairer to ethnic minorities and people who are more vulnerable. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not therefore agree that jury trial is definitely the way we should go in some cases? I accept his point that not every case has the right to go to jury trial.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the point the hon. Lady is making, and to be fair to Sir Brian, he is not suggesting that we remove jury trial in all cases; he is very much talking about a subset of cases in which he thinks it is worth restricting that right. However, she is right that we must balance the clear advantages of jury trials, in terms of the interests of justice, with some of the structural and organisational challenge the system undoubtedly faces. To go back to the first point I made, Sir Brian is clear that the current situation cannot persist for much longer without significant change. All the changes we might consider will have downsides as well as upsides, but we must be prepared to contemplate change of some sort.

The hon. Lady is also right that people have come to see jury trials as considerably advantageous in the delivery of justice, particularly for some of our fellow citizens. However, it is also right to recognise that although we cannot blame jury trial for all the mess we are in, jury trials do take longer than other trials. I am afraid that we will exacerbate the pressure on the criminal court system if we do not at least look carefully at the prospects for restricting those sorts of trials, in addition to other changes.

[Tessa Munt]

The point I would make, of course, is that a jury is free, and paid judges are not. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman have any observation to make about that? The cost is a problem, is it not?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Lady is right, and juries are cheap—that is undoubtedly the case—but they do not sit without a judge, and I am afraid that we pay the judge for a jury trial, just as we would for a judge-only trial. I do not think that the financial saving, in that sense, can be left out of account, and there is not much difference, in terms of what the judge is paid, whether they are hearing the case on their own or with a jury. The only difference may be that we will make better use of that judge, because the trial will complete more quickly, and they will be able to get on to other business more quickly. However, I understand the point that the hon. Lady makes.

[Sir Ashley Fox (Bridgwater) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that Sir Brian’s proposals to change access to jury trials represent a distinct restriction of freedom for citizens facing trial, yet he does not offer convincing evidence that that will save an enormous amount of time or speed up the trial process, and that that lack of evidence causes concern to many practitioners?

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

Yes. My hon. Friend makes a really important point. Again, to be fair to Sir Brian, it is not within his capacity to do all the analysis necessary to follow through his recommendations and to understand quite what the effect on the system will be. However, I agree with my hon. Friend’s point. As I was about to say, we have to balance the advantages that Sir Brian sets out with the disadvantages that would undoubtedly arise from his proposals. It is hard to do that in an informed way if we do not know exactly what the resource benefits will be of implementing these proposals.

Let me come on to the third area of recommendations that I want to discuss, regarding the removal of a right to jury trial, particularly in complex fraud cases, where trials can take months and where, apart from anything else, the impact on the lives and jobs of jurors can be immense. As I have suggested, this is not a new idea by any stretch of the imagination, but I am not yet certain that it would be right to conduct all such trials without a jury.

Many who practise in this area, and some judges, continue to believe that juries can consider these cases thoroughly and fairly and reach appropriate verdicts, even when the evidence is complex; indeed, I have seen that for myself. The argument is made that these cases are really about dishonesty, and that it is the job of counsel and of the judge to make the issues and the evidence clear to a jury. All of those are reasonable arguments, and those of us who believe in the jury system instinctively baulk at the idea of restricting it. However, I go back to the central premise of this report: the system is under intolerable pressure, and something must be done about it.

If it can be established—this goes to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox)—that complex fraud trials are indeed the cause of much of that pressure and, crucially, that judge-only trials would help substantially to relieve it, then given the relatively even balance of arguments for and against this change, which have been made for decades, it is perhaps a least worst option worth considering.

Sir Brian’s proposal to allow most defendants to opt for a judge-only trial if they wish is of course much less controversial and well worth pursuing, as it does not inhibit the right to a jury trial if a defendant still wishes to have one. The only caveat is that we must avoid the complexity of allowing different defendants in the same case to have different types of trial. If all defendants in one trial cannot agree on a judge-only trial, I am afraid that all must be tried by a jury. Any other approach would lead to multiple trials, which could and should have been avoided because of their impact on witnesses, who would have to give evidence repeatedly, and because they would reduce or eliminate the benefit of judge-only trials in using up less court time.

As I said, there is too much in this review of the criminal courts for me to be able to talk about everything, and there are some important recommendations that I have not been able to mention—perhaps others will. I want to finish where I started, with the reason this review was commissioned and the inescapable context of it: our criminal courts are under incredible pressure, and there must be a policy response to relieve it. Otherwise, we may see the expectation of fair and swift justice, which underpins our society, erode or even fail. That is not something that we—Government or Parliament—can allow to happen. If Sir Brian Leveson’s proposals are not to be adopted, others must be. On that crucial question, I look forward to hearing what colleagues and the Minister have to say.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

As the Minister says, she will have to consider each of Sir Brian’s proposals, although she will know that he says that they are to be taken as a “package” and not with a “pick-n-mix” approach. Is that something that the Government accept? Will they take the view that it is either all of Sir Brian’s recommendations or none of them, or not?

[Sarah Sackman]

As the right hon. and learned Member laid out, and as Sir Brian laid out, it is a highly complex system with lots of moving parts. The overall objective is to bear down on the backlog and reduce these delays. We must consider the totality of Sir Brian’s recommendations in careful detail and establish whether they do enough to achieve that overall objective. If we think they do not achieve that objective, it will be necessary to consider other ways to reduce the backlog.

We will put forward a holistic package, but I will not comment at this stage on whether it will include the entirety of these recommendations. That is something we will have to consider very carefully. Ultimately, as I said, our objective is to deliver swifter justice for victims and bear down on the backlog. How we achieve that has to be led by the evidence, and this is an important component of that, which is why I answered the hon. Member for Bridgwater in the way that I did.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I thank all Members who have contributed to this debate. In particular, I thank the Chair of the Justice Committee for rearranging his Committee’s diaries so that its members could do so. This has, I hope, been a constructive debate, not least for the Minister to add to her considerations. I hope she will forgive the damage I do to her career prospects by saying that I am glad she is in a position to do it, and I know that she will approach it with the requisite seriousness that the process demands.

The Minister is right to say that there is a degree of consensus—we all agree there is a problem. As she knows, the curse of this place is that we tend to identify a problem and ask an expert to help us find a solution, but when they do so, we do not always have the courage to implement the solutions that are put to us.

I hope that we find that courage, because it may be that some of these solutions are controversial and have significant downsides, but the burning platform that Sir Brian has described is undoubtedly there. Therefore, we must act and must find a way of doing so with as much consensus as possible, and I know that is the approach that the Government will seek to take over the coming weeks.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts: Part 1.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Report stage
Friday 20th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Maureen Burke) and many others who have given brave testimony of their own personal experience in this matter. I join the tributes to the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater), who I think has conducted herself with decency, dignity and compassion throughout this process. But I have heard her and others say that the decision we have to make today is whether or not we are in favour of the status quo, and I respectfully disagree. Our job as legislators is to consider rigorously the proposed legislation before us, and those who propose it bear the burden of persuading us that this is the right change to make, and not a change that may bring problems as big or bigger than those we are trying to solve.

I have spent nearly 30 years in this place that makes our laws and practising in the courts that administer them. I have had ministerial responsibility for sentencing and for the Crown Prosecution Service. I have faith in our system of laws, but I have also seen the limitations on our ability to avoid the negative consequences of the laws we make, however hard we try.

So very often the legislative decisions we take are about a balance of risks. In this case, the risk of not changing the law is that we leave some of our constituents in pain where it could be avoided, and expose their loved ones to the fear of prosecution for acts of love and mercy. I acknowledge that risk, and I have felt the anguish and desperation of those who want this Bill to pass for the very best of motives. But good people can come to different conclusions on the balance of risks here, and I think that we take a bigger risk in changing the law. That is because of the signal we send in the legislation we pass.

Signals sent by changes in the law matter. When Parliament changes the law, it brings consequences for those who break the new law, but it also intends to change behaviour. Creating new criminal offences, increasing maximum sentences or even strengthening regulations are acts that we hope everyone will take notice of and behave differently as a result, because they recognise that Parliament, on behalf of society as a whole, is signalling its disapproval of certain actions or practices. If that is true for legislation that makes unlawful what was previously lawful, why should the same not be true for legislation that makes lawful something that was previously unlawful? We are sending a signal there too: that society, through Parliament, believes that something we used to think was unacceptable is now acceptable—in this case, that assisting someone to die is now something of which we approve. I believe that is bound to have an impact on those who, in great distress at the end of their lives, may already be thinking that it would be better if they were out of the way.

I do not want to live in a society in which anyone, including the terminally ill, is encouraged in the belief that their life is not valuable and valued to their very last moment. Though it is not its intent, I fear that the Bill brings such a society closer. That is why I cannot support it.

Recalled Offenders: Sentencing Limits

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Thursday 15th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Nicholas Dakin]

My hon. Friend is exactly right to point to that planning application going forward. It is excellent news, and shows that we are cracking on with the job.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

Although the Government should have volunteered to defend their position, I accept, having held ministerial responsibility for the prison estate, that they had no good options at this point. Does the Minister accept that the problem with what he is choosing to do is that the return to prison for breach of important licence conditions is there to be a deterrent, and if we reduce that deterrent, we run the risk of more people breaching licence conditions, which would make the overcrowding problem worse? If he chooses that path, will he consider increasing the deterrent effect by ensuring that, following a 28-day return to prison, there are other restrictions on a prisoner’s freedom, such as electronic tagging?

[Sir Nicholas Dakin]

I certainly hope that all those things will be looked at by the independent sentencing review. The mandating of the 14-day fixed-term release was a measure taken by the previous Government. We are extending that to 28 days for sentences of up to four years because of the situation that we face, to ensure that we do not run out of prison places in the interim.

Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Committee of the whole House & Report stage
Wednesday 30th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 6, leave out

“different personal characteristics of an offender”

and insert

“an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort.”

[The Second Deputy Chairman]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 3, page 1, line 7, at end insert—

“(2A) After subsection (7) insert—

‘(7A) In the case of guidelines within subsection (4) about pre-sentence reports, the Council must, after making any amendments of the guidelines which it considers appropriate, obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing sentencing guidelines as definitive guidelines.

(7B) In any case to which subsection (7A) applies, the Secretary of State may—

(a) consent to the issuing of guideline as definitive guidelines,

(b) refuse consent for the issuing of guidelines as definitive guidelines, or

(c) direct the Council to issue the guidelines in an amended form as definitive guidelines.

(7C) Where the Secretary of State has consented to the issuing of guidelines under subsection (7B)(a) or has directed the Council to issue guidelines in an amended form under subsection (7B)(c), the Council must issue the guidelines as definitive guidelines in the appropriate form”.”

This amendment stops sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports coming into force unless approved by the Lord Chancellor.

Amendment 2, page 1, leave out line 10 and insert—

““a particular demographic cohort’ may include those related to—”.

Amendment 4, page 1, line 13, at end insert—

“(d) status as part of a group that may have experienced trauma from experiences of racism or discrimination—

(i) inter-generationally and relayed to the defendant, or

(ii) as a result of important historical events which may have had a greater impact on those from specific groups and cultures.”

This amendment would ensure that sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports cannot include a defendant’s status as part of a group, particularly not if this involves considering events that may not have impacted the defendant personally.

Clauses 1 and 2 stand part.

New clause 1—Independent review—

“(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review to be carried out of—

(a) the effects of the changes made to section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 by section 1, and

(b) sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports.

(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Sentencing Council, appoint a person with professional experience relating to pre-sentence reports to conduct the review.

(3) The review must be completed within two years of the passing of this Act.

(4) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review, the person must—

(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and

(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.

(5) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report sent under subsection (4)(b) within one month of receiving the report.”

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

It is worthwhile at the outset of all debates on this Bill to restate that it is about pre-sentence reports that give information to sentencers that may be used in sentencing decisions, not about the passing of sentences themselves. Specifically, the Bill is about the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council to sentencers about the circumstances in which a pre-sentence report should normally be asked for, and about the sort of information about an offender which such a report may provide and which may be appropriate to consider and take into account before deciding on an appropriate sentence in that offender’s case.

There has been broad agreement—I see the Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), in her place, so I will not say unanimity—that an offender’s ethnicity, race, culture or faith are on their own not that sort of information and that the Sentencing Council was wrong to suggest that pre-sentence reports should be awarded on that basis. I would argue that is because, even if there may be points to make about the treatment or experience of members of the ethnic, faith or cultural group to which the offender in question happens to belong, what is relevant to the sentencing of that offender can only be the treatment or experience to which the particular offender has themselves been subject, not whether they have arisen in the cases of other members of the same group who are not before the court. That is effectively the impact of amendment 4 in the name of the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan). That is why the Government are right to seek to exclude even from the process of asking for a pre-sentence report—let alone from passing sentence itself—the making of decisions based only on membership of such a group. That is after all what the Government have said this Bill is for.

These groups are described in the explanatory notes to the Bill as “particular demographic cohorts”. Paragraph 8 says,

“The Bill is intended to ensure that Sentencing Guidelines are drafted in such a way as to prevent differential treatment and maintain equality before the law. It does this by preventing the creation of a presumption regarding whether a pre-sentence report should be obtained based on an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort, rather than the particular circumstances of that individual.”

Despite that explanation in the explanatory notes, the Bill goes further than that by prohibiting the Sentencing Council from including in a sentencing guideline any

“provision framed by reference to different personal characteristics of an offender.”

That is what clause 1(2) says in inserting language into the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. I think that language is significantly wider in impact than reference to membership of particular demographic cohorts—undesirably so, in my view. That is why I have tabled amendment 1, which would adopt the language used in the explanatory notes.

Let me explain why I think that would be preferable. My starting point is that I do not believe all personal characteristics are inappropriate to consider in a sentencing decision. There is, of course, much more to be considered in a sentencing decision than simply information about the offender, particularly the seriousness of the offence and its consequences, but relevant information about the offender is needed as part of the process. It surely cannot be right, then, to prohibit the Sentencing Council from encouraging sentencers to find out more about some of the personal characteristics that are relevant in reaching a more informed and therefore better sentencing decision—for example, a physical or learning difficulty, or a brain injury from which an offender will not recover.

The relevance of that information is not just in forming a fuller picture of the offender to be sentenced, but in assisting a sentencer to know whether that offender is capable of carrying out aspects of a community order, including work in the community, which the sentencer may want to consider as a potential sentencing option. It is worth underlining of course that the ordering of a pre-sentence report—whatever it says when it is produced—does not bind the hands of a sentencer to do as it recommends, but in reality, without one a sentencer’s options are often more limited. That is why guidance on when to ask for a pre-sentence report matters.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

I defer to my right hon. and learned Friend’s experience, but is there not an argument for every case to have a pre-sentence report in order to truly understand what an individual has faced and whether there are any mitigating factors? I appreciate that that could create a backlog for these services, but is it not one possible solution to the problem that the Sentencing Council was worried about—namely, that different cohorts might have different sentencing outcomes?

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My hon. Friend makes a fair point in relation to offenders who hover on the border between community sentences and custodial sentences, but he will know that, in the Crown court at least, the majority of such offenders already have a pre-sentence report. Of course, there are also offenders who come before the courts for sentencing and it is blindingly obvious either that a custodial sentence will follow, or that neither a community sentence nor a custodial sentence is realistically in prospect, so I do not think it right to say that we should have a pre-sentence report in every case, but there is already in law a presumption that pre-sentence reports should be ordered unless it is unnecessary to do so. What we are seeking to do here is respond to a very specific set of circumstances that have arisen as a result of a Sentencing Council decision. As he may have heard me say on Second Reading, I do not think that the Sentencing Council handled this well, and as a result we are having to do something that we would otherwise not have to do.

Sentencing offenders is, in all circumstances, a difficult business. The fact that different offenders receive different sentences, even for the same offence, is not necessarily evidence of a defect in sentencing practice as a result of guidelines or otherwise, but is more likely a reflection of the reality that every case and every offender is different. We should not, I suggest, try to stop judges reaching the appropriate conclusion, assisted by Sentencing Council guidelines, in each case before them.

[Ms Diane Abbott (Hackney North and Stoke Newington) (Lab)]

Nobody is trying to stop judges sentencing in individual cases. All the Sentencing Council was seeking to do was ensure that judges and magistrates had the maximum amount of information before coming to a decision on the sentence.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

Yes, I think the right hon. Lady is right that that is what the sentencing guidelines were aiming at, but I am afraid that the way in which they were phrased rather missed the mark, in my view. It is perfectly true to say that it is a good thing in most sentencing cases to get as much information as possible, but the sentencing guidelines have, as she will appreciate, particular influence on sentencers, who are obliged to follow them unless doing so is not in the interests of justice. The tone that is set by the Sentencing Council in the guidelines that it drafts gives a good indication to sentencers about the sorts of things that they ought to take into account in sentencing. As she heard me say—I think this is an important point to make—we are talking about the ordering of pre-sentence reports and not about sentencing itself.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Nicholas Dakin]

My hon. Friend echoes much of what the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde) picked up on earlier. Probation is a significant part of the landscape. That is why we are onboarding 1,300 more probation officers over the next year.

The Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), raised issues about the impact of the guidelines on existing guidelines. We expect that other guidelines will be affected by the Bill, including offence-specific guidelines related to mitigating and aggravating factors, which set out guidance about pre-sentence reports for specific cohorts. We will continue working with the Sentencing Council on the implementation of the Bill. We have had constructive discussions and will continue to do so.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick referenced, the Bill’s explanatory notes point out, existing precedent is not changed where the courts have determined that pre-sentence reports are necessary or desirable. Such cases include: Thompson, where the Court of Appeal recently emphasised the importance of reports in sentencing pregnant women or women who have recently given birth; Meanley, in which the court referenced the value of pre-sentence reports for young defendants; and Kurmekaj, where the defendant had a traumatic upbringing, a vulnerability and was a victim of modern slavery. The Bill narrowly focuses on the issue at hand, putting beyond doubt the principle that we all stand equal before the law of the land.

Clause 2 is concerned with details about how the Bill will be enacted. The Bill will apply to England and Wales only, and its measures will come into force on the day after it passes. The Bill may be cited as the Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Act 2025 once enacted.

I thank the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) for tabling his amendments and for the very thoughtful and comprehensive way in which he dealt with them. Amendments 1 and 2 would replace the term “personal characteristics” with “demographic cohort” to describe the type of provision about pre-sentence reports in sentencing guidelines that the Bill will prohibit. The Government have considered the proposed change to the wording very carefully and would like to take the opportunity to briefly explain the Government’s approach.

The Government’s objective is to help ensure equality before the law so that offenders are treated according to their own particular circumstances and not by virtue of their membership of a particular group. To ensure that the Bill prevents sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports including provision framed by reference to any specific personal characteristics of an offender, we have used the term “personal characteristics”. The Bill sets out that personal characteristics include race, religion or belief, or cultural background. However, this is not an exhaustive list. We accept that personal characteristics and personal circumstances have, over the years, been elided in different court judgments, and we are clear that it is intended to cover a wider range of characteristics including sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status.

The right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam has rightly noted that the term “demographic cohort” is used in the Bill’s explanatory notes. However, the use of the term was not intended to narrow the definition of personal characteristics, and I believe it does not, though I note that he believes that it might do. Rather, it is a different term used to describe individuals who share certain personal characteristics.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I accept that the Minister is trying to give us clarity, so for the purposes of clarity is it the Government’s view that all personal characteristics can also be described as personal circumstances?

[Sir Nicholas Dakin]

No, that is not the Government’s view. “Personal characteristics” is a term that is understood and applied in other contexts, whereas “demographic cohort” is a term that, on balance, the Government feel is more imprecise and would ultimately need to be defined with reference to a group with shared personal characteristics. Therefore, I understand where the right hon. and learned Gentleman is coming from, but from the Government’s point of view, the amendments do not add anything to the drafting of the Bill and risk causing further confusion. As he pointed out in his helpful contribution, there is a danger of getting into detailed semantics, which probably does not help any of us.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I take on board the Minister’s warning, and I am not sure whether this will make it any better. I think he is saying that the term demographic cohort is a subset of personal characteristics, but personal characteristics are not the same as personal circumstances. Is that right?

[Sir Nicholas Dakin]

If we had used the phrase demographic cohort, we would have to define what that means, whereas personal characteristics is a phrase that already has a level of definition and is therefore preferred by the Government.

I turn to the similar issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick. We carefully considered whether the Bill should be narrower than referring to personal characteristics—for example, an offender being from a cultural minority—but in the end we felt that was not helpful.

As such, while I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam for suggesting alternative wording, the Government remain of the view that, having considered it carefully, the term personal characteristics is the most appropriate way of capturing the issues raised by the guideline.

--- Later in debate ---

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Judith Cummins)]

I call Sir Jeremy Wright to wind up.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I think—in gratitude to all those who have spoken—that we have got to a place where the Minister has told the House that there is some territory, which at the moment is being described as “personal characteristics”, into which the sentencing guidelines may not trespass. That is not the same as specifically referring to someone’s personal circumstances, and is a broader area than the question of whether they are a member of a particular demographic group.

Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 22nd April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

The Lord Chancellor has just given us, very helpfully, the list of matters that might be relevantly considered in a pre-sentence report. As she has said, however, one of the items on that list is “personal circumstances”, and that is what the Bill will remove from the Sentencing Council’s discretion. May I ask her why she has not used in the Bill the language that is included in the explanatory notes? Paragraph 8 states that the Bill will

“prevent differential treatment… It does this by preventing the creation of a presumption regarding whether a pre-sentence report should be obtained based on an offender’s membership of a particular demographic cohort”.

That strikes me as a much narrower exclusion, and perhaps one better targeted at the problem that the Lord Chancellor has, in my view, rightly identified.

[Shabana Mahmood]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right. That is why we have offered the additional context in the explanatory notes. Personal characteristics and personal circumstances have, over the years, been elided in different court judgments, and the different definitions of the two have sometimes slipped. I wanted to make it clear in the Bill that we are constraining the Sentencing Council’s ability to create guidance for PSRs in relation to personal characteristics. We refer in the Bill to race, religion, culture and belief, specifically to ensure that the Sentencing Council understands that we are targeting this part of the offending section of the imposition guideline. It will then have its own interpretation of how personal circumstances and personal characteristics should apply. I would expect this to be analogous to protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010, in terms of the way in which the courts are likely to approach the question of what a personal characteristic is for the purpose of the Bill.

However, I wanted to make the intention behind the Bill very clear to the Sentencing Council, and to everyone else. It is tightly focused on the offending section of the imposition guideline and leaves the wider question of personal circumstances untouched. As I will explain later in my speech, there is helpful Court of Appeal guidance on circumstances and on other occasions on which a PSR should normally be required, and nothing in the Bill will affect the Court of Appeal precedents that have already been set.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It is important in this debate to be clear what we are talking about and what we are not. The part of the guideline produced by the Sentencing Council that led to this legislation relates to the circumstances in which a pre-sentence report is produced, not to the passing of a sentence itself. It is also important not to overstate the problem. As we have heard, there is already law that says there should be a pre-sentence report in almost all cases, unless it is unnecessary, and most offenders being considered for either a community or custodial sentence—in the Crown court, at least—already have one.

The guidance that the Sentencing Council produces on the ordering of a pre-sentence report, though, does matter. That is because such a report is designed to give sentencers more information about the person they are sentencing. Without that information, it can be very hard to apply the full range of sentencing options. That might be about whether a rehabilitation activity requirement or a programme requirement might be appropriate, or to assess capacity for unpaid work. If a sentencer does not order a pre-sentence report for a particular offender, they may not be able to impose some of the more demanding community sentences and may find themselves more likely to impose a custodial sentence as the only available and realistic alternative. It does matter whether a sentencer is being encouraged to order such a report for an offender, and any guideline suggesting that this should be more appropriate for someone of one ethnicity, faith or culture, as opposed to another, cannot be right.

I accept that the Sentencing Council was trying to do good, but in reality we do not address inequality by replacing it with a different inequality. The Sentencing Council has misjudged this issue, and the Government are entitled to come to that view too. It would have been better if legislation was not needed to resolve this issue, but the Sentencing Council, independent as we know it is, has clearly concluded that it will not do as the Lord Chancellor has asked, and that means that legislation is the only realistic alternative. However, I have concerns about the way in which the Government are going about this, particularly in the breadth of the drafting of the Bill. I mentioned in an intervention on the Lord Chancellor one specific concern, which I will not go over again in view of the time, but which we might return to in the later stages of the Bill.

I think it is worth Ministers considering whether the use of the phrase “personal characteristics” is too broad. The Chair of the Justice Committee read out some of the other personal characteristics referred to in the draft guideline, which I do not think are anywhere near as controversial. We need to keep in mind that this is about a process in which a sentencer is given information about an offender in order to determine the appropriate sentence. I do not think that information about faith or ethnic origin would fall into the appropriate category, but information about health conditions or disabilities most certainly might.

There is a danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater: not all personal characteristics should be left out of account in sentencing. I therefore ask Ministers to consider whether they can tighten the wording of clause 1(2) and (3) in particular. If they do so, I think that will avoid some rather arcane discussions about what can be properly described as personal circumstances and personal characteristics. However, I also think there is a danger of losing sight of the good work that the Sentencing Council does.

I accept that this will not be a universally popular point of view, but I do think that the Sentencing Council adds something important to the sentencing process. It is important that we do not lose sight of that, or of the fact that the guideline that has been drafted is to replace substantially out-of-date guidance. I hope that point will also be noted by Ministers.

Sentencing Council Guidelines

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

The Minister is right to stress the independence of the Sentencing Council, but would he accept that he cannot criticise the shadow Secretary of State for having a view on these draft guidelines when the Secretary of State herself did exactly that? I also ask him to consider in this debate the real purpose of a pre-sentence report. It is there to give more information about an offender, but it also enables a judge to impose a non-custodial sentence if they believe that is the appropriate course. It is hard for a sentencer to do that, unless someone has been assessed as suitable for a community penalty. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this debate, is it not important that the Sentencing Council makes clear that what is important in deciding whether to ask for a pre-sentence report is whether that extra information is needed and not anything else, including protected characteristics?

[Sir Nicholas Dakin]

That is exactly what the Lord Chancellor is saying.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Tuesday 11th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Shabana Mahmood]

My hon. Friend raises an incredibly important point. We need to make sure that the whole justice system, including what happens in our criminal courts, is as efficient as it can be. That is why I have commissioned Sir Brian Leveson to conduct an independent review of the criminal courts. He will consider how to improve the courts’ efficiency, and we will report on that later in the year. There will be, I believe, a wider role for technology to play in tagging and monitoring of exclusion zones and curfews. I want to make sure that the justice system is in the best possible position to make use of emerging technology, so that we can keep our country safe.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

The Lord Chancellor will accept that the effective use of electronic tags will not only make the criminal justice system more efficient, but mitigate the need for expensive prison places. Does she agree that two things are necessary for that effective use? First, the tags must be technically reliable; secondly, officials in her Department must have the commercial capacity to manage the contracts efficiently. If she agrees, what can be done to improve both those things?

[Shabana Mahmood]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman raises two incredibly important points. There will be a bigger role for current, new and emerging technologies in the future of our justice system, particularly in expanding the range of punishment available to us outside of prison. I want to make sure that we are at the forefront of getting the best use of our current technology and emerging tech. He is absolutely right about making sure that any commercial contracts are value for money and maintain public confidence. I am ensuring that, across the Department, we have expertise available to us, which is why the new unit that I have set up, Justice AI, will be so crucial to our efforts.