Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)
Jess Brown-Fuller ExcerptsThursday 23rd April 2026
(3 months ago)
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Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I will speak to amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.
We have had a discussion about this provision. The amendments seek to give a right to renew an application for permission to appeal orally, and to allow grounds for appeal to raise issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as issues of law. Clause 7 currently suggests that a person can only appeal in writing on matters of law, which means that a person is going to have to construct a proper legal argument. The problem with that is that the majority of people in the magistrates court are unrepresented.
It is wrong to say that this is comparable with Crown court cases going to the Court of Appeal, or the higher courts having to deal with the issue of leave to appeal—for example, as in judicial review. Magistrates courts tend to have some very “minor” offences leading to some quite serious repercussions. When I say “minor”, I am talking only in terms of sentencing, because we must remember that offences that we call minor can have a significant impact on a defendant’s life—for example, even drink driving, which does normally not carry a custodial sentence, certainly carries a disqualification.
That is also often a mandatory disqualification so that no discretion is given to the magistrates as to whether they should disqualify somebody. If someone is the sole breadwinner, or has care of a disabled person, and they feel that this conviction was wrong, they will not have the right to appeal—because very rarely will somebody charged with those matters will be getting legal aid.
However, in the Crown court, most people will have legal aid or be using legal advice at some point, because the trial will normally be conducted by solicitors or lawyers. Therefore, they are already being paid and if there is an appeal against either conviction or sentence, they already know what they are talking about and what they need to quote—the legal jurisprudence that they need to refer to, to prove their case—along with the issues with examining the witnesses or the evidence that has been given. They are then able to say, for example, that a particular witnesses’ evidence was not credible or that a witness said contradictory things or different things in their statement to the police compared with during the trial. They can do that because they have conducted the trial and they can forensically examine what happened—not only what legal direction the judge gave, but the factual evidence that came out during the trial. In the magistrates court, most people are not represented, so they cannot argue all those things.
To take away the automatic right to appeal is, therefore, a change to the fundamental basic rights of an individual. Let us remember that the state has all the might and all the resources, and that professionals will be prosecuting—whether they are lay prosecutors, Crown prosecutors or independent lawyers. On the one side, there will be the state represented by legal professionals; on the other, there will be the lone individual coming up by themselves to be subject to trial. If they are then not satisfied with the conviction or the sentence, they must then think how to legally write an appeal. That is putting a lot of pressure on them.
As Members of Parliament, many of us will have met many constituents who are quite reluctant to even write to us. I often say to constituents, “Please can you drop us an email?” and they say, “Well, I don’t know how to use a computer, and I don’t have the internet at home.” We then make a face-to-face appointment so that they can explain themselves. That is not unusual because a lot of people are not able to write very well and would not be in a position to construct a coherent legal argument as to why they should have their appeal in the Crown court.
Sometimes, when we are talking about possible efficiencies and saving money, we forget about individuals. People who come before the criminal justice system tend to be from poorer backgrounds and are often less well educated. Some of them may well be unemployed. A lot of them have other issues going on in their lives. Therefore, the fact that they can appeal to the Crown court automatically in the current system is an immense safeguard for them.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
The hon. Member is making an important point that we have not really discussed on the Committee. It is estimated that half the prison population have a reading age of less than 11; that is to say, they are counted as functionally illiterate. We have seen a decline in prison education. How does she expect all these prison inmates to be able to negotiate or navigate an appeals process?
Yasmin Qureshi
That is exactly the point I am trying to make. I think we sometimes forget, sitting in our rarefied environment, that a lot of the people out there—our citizens—are not well educated or able to write a proper paragraph or construct an argument. Sometimes they can just about get two or three simple sentences together. As they often do not have legal representation, allowing them to automatically appeal against a sentence or conviction is a really important safeguard for them. The Crown court and Court of Appeal criminal division is not the right comparison, because in most Crown court cases people have full legal representation who will be able to advise on this.
The other thing we found is that apparently 40% of appeals are successful. Think about that: four out of 10 appeals are successful. If people do not have a right to appeal, they have to find a way to make a legal argument on matters of law, which they know very little about. Asking them to do that is basically letting four out of 10 people be convicted or receive a sentence that could have an impact on their lives.
On sentences, when a conviction happens, even if it is in the magistrates court, it fundamentally affects people’s lives. It could mean that they are not able to get a job again or are dismissed from the job they have. If someone’s job involves driving and they are disqualified because of drink driving, that will be an extra burden on them, but it is not just that. Even if someone gets a suspended sentence or community service order for what we call smaller offences, a lot of people are not able to do that. Taking away their right to appeal is, with respect, very harsh.
Legal aid has already been reduced considerably over the years. I have to put the blame for that on the Conservatives, because they massively cut legal aid while in government. They also massively restricted the rights of judicial review. In that respect, I have to hold the Conservatives a bit responsible for what they did in 14 years in power. I am very grateful that the Labour Government have put money into legal aid—that is great—but I ask them to please give that to the magistrates court as well.
I have travelled in different parts of the world where the justice system is perhaps a bit haphazard or where there is not much trust in the state’s justice system, for whatever reason. It does not necessarily have to do with the wealth of a country; there are very wealthy countries where the state is much more authoritarian and the institutions are almost stacked against the individual. The one thing that people really love about the UK, apart from our beautiful country and everything else, is our judicial system. I am not just saying that; it is the most respected system in the world, especially our criminal justice system, because people feel that they have protection at the point that their liberties are being taken away.
Think about a conviction for shoplifting: people say, “Oh, shoplifting,” but even if someone takes a bottle of milk out of a shop, they may get a conviction and there will be hundreds of jobs that they can never apply for. For a lot of people who rely on shop work or other manual jobs where they may come across money, it means that they are never going to get a job. If they get a conviction in the magistrates court for theft, that is devastating for them. The Theft Act refers to the “intention of permanently depriving”. That is quite important, because people make mistakes, but intention has to be proved, because the Theft Act requires it. It is not just taking the thing; it is the intention to permanently deprive. How do we define “permanently deprive”? A layperson would not know how to construct that argument, but a lawyer would.
Jess Brown-Fuller
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq.
Clause 7 and schedule 2 will restrict the right to appeal the decision of a magistrates court to the Crown court, and will change the process that those appeals go through. Currently, a defendant has an automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court against either conviction or sentence; in either case, the appeal is a hearing before a judge and two magistrates. The Bill will instead introduce a requirement for an application for permission to appeal based on written grounds. A Crown court judge will decide whether to grant permission, and the appeal hearing would be heard by a single judge. Instead of a rehearing, the appeal would be only on the issues on which permission is granted. If the appeal is against conviction, the judge must allow the appeal if the conviction is unsafe. If so, the judge may order a retrial in the magistrates court.
It is not unreasonable to have a conversation about the appeals process, especially as there is a small amount of evidence of the system being abused by a very small minority of defendants who believe that the appeal will be successful on the grounds that the victim or witnesses will refuse to go through the experience again. I absolutely recognise that, and we need to put essential safeguards into the criminal justice system to provide greater protection for those victims. We will be getting to the crux of that issue over the next days in Committee.
However, clause 7 and schedule 2 are blunt instruments that will harm access to justice. We cannot ignore the fact that although a very small number of cases from the magistrates—less than 1%—go to appeal, more than 40% of those are successful at appeal. Given that the magistrates court will be hearing more complex cases that carry higher sentences, the measures will increase the risk of miscarriages of justice. Touching the appeals process at this point is unnecessary when it is currently sparingly used. The Criminal Bar Association has argued:
“Access to justice will be harmed. Who is going to find the lawyers who have time to review transcripts of evidence and prepare grounds of appeal? Who is going to pay them for that work? What about the defendants who were ineligible for Legal Aid, because of the lower cut off for eligibility?”
We discussed the eligibility cut-off in the previous clause.
JUSTICE has raised similar concerns, stating that replacing the automatic right of appeal with a multi-stage permission system
“is complicated and highly likely to be inefficient”,
and will fail defendants who cannot navigate these processes, as laid out articulately and clearly by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.
The current process means that appeals are heard by a judge and two magistrates. The opportunity for magistrates to sit with a Crown court judge to hear appeals is an important one, as it helps with the training of magistrates and drives up standards. Under the Bill, there are no circumstances in which lay justices would sit with professional judges. We are debating a number of amendments, some of which seek to restore the conditions we have right now—retaining the automatic right to appeal—and some that go further, although I think the shadow Minister suggested that he would not press them all to a vote.
I would appreciate the Minister’s explaining whether she thinks the processes being put in place by clause 7 and schedule 2 are compatible with the principles of access to justice that she has laid out previously in Committee. I remain gravely concerned that the measures will have a huge impact on the most vulnerable in society.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am happy to have you back in the Chair today, Dr Huq. I wish to oppose the clause and the schedule. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for pointing out so clearly that the restrictions on appeals will push down hardest on the least advantaged people and will compound injustices in wider society, as well as the injustices put in place by other clauses.
I will not reiterate in detail the evidence we heard, or the speeches I made previously, about the risks of more errors due to the speedier but rougher and readier justice of the magistrates courts being applied to more cases, or the risks arising from higher sentences. However, clause 7 adds yet more risk to the potential harm from reducing the right to select a jury trial in clause 1 and the restrictions put in place by other clauses. This is counterproductive for the overall courts workload, too.
As others have pointed out, the clause will introduce a multi-step process. We heard in oral evidence from Emma Torr of Appeal that the
“multi-step process…will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.”
She also pointed out that the Law Commission had carefully considered the matter last year in a consultation paper that ran to 700 pages. She said:
“Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 83, Q174.]
In our oral evidence sessions, we heard clear views about the lack of legal aid in magistrates courts for people without representation to meet fairly the test set for appeals. Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE told us:
“Without a lawyer being present, and of course without there even being the right to appeal directly, you are leaving a whole load of defendants, who may well be wrongly convicted or may get the wrong sentence for the crime they have committed, floundering…I simply don’t know who will inform these people about how they will put grounds of appeal together, what grounds of appeal even are, how you formulate those, what key points you need to make in them to persuade a Crown court judge sitting alone in a room with just some evidence papers and how to put your best case forward.” ––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86, Q184.]
These are serious matters of injustice. I do not know how the least advantaged defendants will be able to do anything to use the application to the High Court for judicial review, which seems to be the only remedy that the Minister has put forward to us today. I do not know how many miscarriages of justice are acceptable to the Minister, but I believe that these measures must not form part of the Bill, because of the impact that they will have on the right to justice for too many people.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move amendment 17, in schedule 2, page 52, line 5, leave out “on payment of a fee” and insert—
“to victims of criminal offence without a fee within 14 days of a request”.
This amendment would make magistrates’ court transcripts free for victims and requires that such transcripts are provided within 14 days of a request.
I first acknowledge that the Government have made steps to improve access to court transcripts after robust negotiations in both Houses and on various Bills, most recently the Sentencing Act 2026, the Victims and Court Bill and now this Bill.
I also put on record the exemplary effort made by my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who has been campaigning to ensure that court transcripts are made available for free for victims of crime, after her constituent was quoted thousands of pounds to access the transcript of her own court case. Nobody should be priced out of seeing their own story.
Why are transcripts important? For many victims, they choose not to attend the entirety of a hearing or trial. Even if they do, there is so much to take in. Being able to process the events of the court case provides a valuable opportunity to better understand why decisions were made and hopefully enables them to move on with their lives.
The Committee had the privilege of listening to the testimony of Charlotte Meijer, alongside other victims, Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott and Morwenna Loughman. I would like to remind Members of a few of the things that Charlotte said. She said:
“For me, having transparency really changes things. We talk about justice and the system being closed, so if we have more recording and transcripts, it will really help people. There is something that is not in the Bill that I would love to see; I have fought for the last three years for sentencing remarks to be made free, which we did earlier this year, but I believe that is not going to extend to magistrates courts. If they are now being recorded, my belief is that they should also be free in that way.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 25, Q49.]
Charlotte spoke about her experience. She did not feel that she could listen to the trial after she had given her evidence, because it was a very small bench and the defendant’s family and friends were sat there. She did not feel like she could go and sit and listen, so she left, but she had indicated that she would like to be there for the sentencing or the hearing. However, she just got a call from her independent sexual violence adviser telling her that he had been found not guilty. She was not given the opportunity to hear that. Charlotte continued:
“For my healing, and for me to be able to move on, I just needed to understand what was said in court, so I went to ask for the transcripts, of which of course in the magistrates courts there are none.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 26, Q51.]
It is important for victims of crime and victims who see their perpetrators found not guilty to have the opportunity to process that by seeing what happened, whether they were in the room or outside it. The transcript can also be a tool for those who choose to apply to the unduly lenient sentences scheme, which I am pleased that the Government have agreed to improve significantly, after working alongside Baroness Brinton in the other place.
I recognise the concerns raised by the Government, particularly about the cost of producing transcripts and the processing time for redaction, which is all currently contracted out. I am pleased that they have agreed to a proactive trial of AI in courtrooms to improve transcripts, and to a move to record all magistrate hearings. I know that that approach has cross-party support; I have been in the Chamber with many Labour MPs and MPs of other parties who have made exactly the same arguments that I am making now, that providing free court transcripts is a key step towards transparency.
The Minister knows that we have worked collaboratively on reducing the scope in other Bills and have called on the Government to provide judicial summings-up and the route to verdict, including for those whose defendants are acquitted, because there is still a process that they need to go through. I am keen to work with the Government on this. I hope that as the Bill progresses through the House, we can continue the good work that has started on court transcripts.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendment 17, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. I acknowledge the progress that we have made on the issue; it has not been as fast or as good as personally I would like, but it has absolutely been progress. The hon. Member has laid out some of the important points.
The idea that we will record these proceedings and that the transcripts will exist, but that the victim cannot have them, is obviously not sustainable. If they do not exist at all and nobody has them, that is one thing, but when they are available and some people might be accessing them—defendants, for example—it is really not reasonable that victims cannot, for all the reasons that we have discussed in relation to the Crown court. The existence of recordings will make that less of an excuse. Again, the interaction of different elements of the Bill, with longer sentences, restricted appeals and more serious cases being heard, builds an even stronger case for victims to have access to the transcripts.
The hon. Member for Chichester mentioned the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As we talked about in the context of Crown court appeals and the current use of the scheme, it is pretty hard to appeal an unduly lenient sentence if we do not even have access to the route to sentencing that the judge laid out to explain why they gave the sentence that they did. In my understanding, we have a later amendment that asks for an expansion in the use of the scheme in order for it to be meaningful. We talk about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but people cannot access it in the magistrates court, even though we are about to put more serious cases into that court. At the minute, people are able to access the scheme when a case is heard in the Crown court. For those reasons, we enthusiastically support the hon. Member’s amendment.
Sarah Sackman
It is context specific, which is exactly why we have a study: to test the level of accuracy. Accuracy is really important; we do not want a lot of judicial time to be taken up reviewing the accuracy of transcripts before they can be put out. That would not be a good use of judge time, which should be spent running trials and getting them concluded. In some contexts, most obviously in family law, redaction is really important.
Jess Brown-Fuller
On the shadow Minister’s point, does the Minister agree that, especially for victims of serious crime, there can often be things in court transcripts that might, without giving addresses, clearly describe the location where something happened? Although the shadow Minister is right to say that anybody can attend a trial, that could be used subsequently to retraumatise somebody, because they would be aware of exactly where something happened. It could also identify someone’s address, for example if it refers to the corner shop at the end of their road: even if the address may be redacted, the detail is not always. Does the Minister agree that redaction plays a really important part in protecting vulnerable witnesses and victims?
Sarah Sackman
Yes, I do. This is why we have to get this right. As I say, we are firmly committed to improving transparency across the system and making a success of it, but those changes have to be balanced against the operational realities and the financial realities in which our court system operates.
Proposed new section 108S of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, to be inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, will already provide the power for the rules of court to provide free transcripts to any person the Secretary of State directs. The amendment is therefore not required, as the intended effect will already be achieved under the current drafting.
We have taken significant steps to strengthen transparency, including expanding transcript provision, so that all victims who want them will be able to request free transcripts of Crown court sentencing remarks directly relevant to their case from as early as spring 2027. That is a meaningful step forward for victims. In cases of public interest, Crown court sentencing remarks are already published online, and broadcasters are able to film sentencing remarks in the Crown court with the agreement of the judge.
We are focused on driving improvement for the longer term, exploring how technology, including AI, can reduce the cost of transcript production in future and make it more widely available. That is why we are undertaking a study into the use of AI transcription in court hearings. All this work will provide this Parliament and future Parliaments with an evidence base for future decisions about how transcript provision could be expanded in a way that is operationally sustainable and delivers real-world benefits for victims, including in the magistrates court, over time, as recording capability expands.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Lady raises a valid point. All sorts of work needs to be undertaken about the use of social media in courtrooms, whether by juries or other participants, and where that is and is not appropriate, particularly in the context of reporting restrictions that are put in place for a good reason. But on this point, we think that the amendment is not needed. We can continue to make progress informed by an evidence base. For those reasons, although we are in real consensus on the principle of this, I urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw her amendment.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I appreciate the Minister’s constructive collaboration on this issue, but as it is my job to hold the Government’s feet to the fire, I will press amendment 17 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)
Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts(3 months ago)
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Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Rape Crisis has pointed out that current practice ignores the fact that women are often subjected to multiple instances of sexual violence in their lives. Survivors have told Rape Crisis that they feel disbelieved, blamed and retraumatised when they simply try to seek justice. SafeLives and End Violence Against Women are both in favour of the reforms in clause 10. It is worth pointing out that black and minoritised women are disproportionately harmed in the criminal justice system by misuse of bad character evidence.
Office for National Statistics data shows that one in two adult survivors of rape have been raped more than once. The National Police Chiefs’ Council strategic risk assessment 2023 identified that 25% of victim survivors were repeat victims of violence against women and girls. The drafting of clause 10 reflects calls from a coalition of women’s rights groups for section 100 to be amended in this way. It was drafted and supported by the Centre for Women’s Justice, and the Liberal Democrats are pleased to support it.
Sarah Sackman
I welcome the support from Members across the Committee for clause 10. A proper evidential basis is defined in the Bill as ensuring that there is material before the court that shows both that the complainant made the previous allegation and that the previous allegation was false. I do not want to elaborate on the test, and thereby in any way tie the hands of the judge hearing the evidence in the case. The tests and the clear structure set out in the Bill will enable and empower the judge to test whether there is an evidential basis for the claim and whether it has probative value and relevance to the issues at hand. The judge will then be able to take a view on whether it can be included and put to a witness.
There will always be cases where the evidence is relevant to the proceedings, both for the prosecution and for the defence. There is certainly no hard rule excluding it altogether.
Dr Mullan
Clause 12 addresses an important aspect of protection: the use of screens in the courtroom. We must start from the position that special measures are not a luxury or optional administrative add-on; they are often essential to ensuring that the justice system remains capable of hearing evidence properly. We want to enable people to give evidence in the proper way, and victims and vulnerable witnesses must be able to give their best evidence—we always want people to be able to give their best evidence in court—without avoidable distress, intimidation or re-traumatisation.
For many, the prospect of being in the same physical space as the person who harmed them is a primary barrier to their participating in the justice system at all. Clause 12 will strengthen and clarify current provisions by creating a clearer statutory footing for the use of screens. Specifically, when a witness is providing testimony via live link or through a pre-recorded cross-examination, the clause will require the court to consider whether a screen should be provided. Crucially, the clause clarifies that that protection should operate in both directions: not just preventing the witness from seeing the accused, but shielding the witness from the accused’s gaze as well. That increased clarity is intended to support consistency in practice across the country.
For many victims, particularly those of sexual violence or domestic abuse, the physical presence of the accused is a source of profound distress that can affect their memory and the clarity of their evidence. The current application of these measures can be inconsistent, leading to what practitioners describe as a postcode lottery. By establishing a presumption in favour of screens unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice, the law recognises the practical reality. However, we must ensure that that presumption is not merely a tick-box exercise, but achieved effectively through things such as either-way screens.
We must recognise, as we have at several points in Committee, the challenge presented by the fabric of some of our courtroom buildings and their facilities. Evidence provided to the Committee—this is also highlighted by Sir Brian Leveson—suggests that malfunctioning equipment and poor infrastructure continue to create problems, specifically in relation to using special measures. A stronger use of screens can be mandated but, if the physical layout of the court and its facilities are insufficient, that will hamper the clause’s benefit.
What survey or review have the Government undertaken, or do they plan to undertake, to ensure that there are no physical barriers to the use of screens in this way? I suspect that, on a physical basis, it is easier to have screens just in one direction rather than two, and it probably involves different equipment and facilities. It would be good to get the Minister’s view on any barriers that might practically limit the intention of this measure.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Clause 12 stipulates that when a direction allows evidence by live link or pre-recorded cross examination, screens must also be provided unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice, such as due to preventing the adequate testing of evidence. It also clarifies under a special measure direction that a screen may be used to prevent either the witness from seeing the accused or the accused from seeing the witness. The Liberal Democrats welcome the clause.
Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses are entitled to a number of additional measures to protect them from defendants. When the Law Commission conducted a review of these measures in relation to sexual offences cases, it came up with a number of recommendations, although the Government have chosen not to take forward some of them, such as introducing automatic entitlement for sexual offence complainants or providing complainants with independent legal advice on their entitlement to special measures.
It would be helpful to understand from the Minister why the Government chose not to introduce those recommendations, which would have turned special measures into almost standard measures. The blanket introduction of these measures would save administrative time and cost. I recognise that this is anecdotal, but the judges I have spoken to have said that if they get a request for special measures, they never refuse it.
Surely by reversing the onus and introducing the special measures as standard, we would still provide an opportunity for victims to opt out of those measures if they have a particular desire to see, or to look into the eyes of, their defendant, but if they did not wish to do so, they would be, at the very minimum, provided with protections. If this was the standard approach, it would also give more women—this affects mostly women—the confidence to come forward knowing that their court experience is going to protect them.
On a recent visit to Chichester Crown court—I thank the Minister for committing to reopening that court fully—His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service talked about creating videos for those who are coming to give evidence, with the opportunity to have a virtual walk-through of the court. If vulnerable witnesses and victims were able to watch a walk-through to see exactly what measures could be put in place as standard to protect them, I imagine that would provide much more reassurance than saying, “This is what you are seeing, but there are also additional special measures that you can apply for.”
Introducing these measures as standard would also take away the stigma of being associated as a vulnerable witness. We talk a lot about victims. Some victims do not want to be described as victims; they want to be described as survivors. We talk about vulnerability. If we had these measures as standard, we would be acknowledging that vulnerability is expected, but that there is no stigma around it and that the courts have mitigated it, without being asked to do so.
The measures are backed by various victims groups, such as Women Against Rape, and by the Victims’ Commissioner. It would be helpful if the Minister could highlight whether the Government plan to go further and make these special measures standard.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for the points she raised. In many respects, they are well made, and they consider people’s choice architecture—for want of a better phrase—their understanding of what they might be entitled to request, and whether we should default to providing all the special measures or maintaining, as we say we should, a tailored case-by-case assessment of the needs of the witness or the complainant. It is a tricky one.
We want to make sure that, where there is a proper basis for it, special measures can be provided to those who need them and where the judge agrees that they are needed. The hon. Member is right that in the vast majority of cases, the request for special measures or to give evidence by video link is approved— it is almost always approved—but there might be cases when, for reasons of trial fairness, that is not the case. The tailored approach is one that we regard as proportionate.
This also relates to the points made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about court layout and some of the physical constraints that exist within some of our Crown courts. We do not want a postcode lottery. We want consistency, which is what so much of the Bill is designed to achieve. However, we also have to acknowledge that in some of our Crown court centres, the physical constraints are real. That does not necessarily relate to screens, but it might relate to the entrance and exit. For example, there are limitations on the ideal situation of a complainant being able to avoid having to pass a defendant, which might be undesirable for all sorts of reasons. There are some courtrooms in which that simply is not possible without huge capital investment to change the physical structure.
Hon. Members have raised legitimate points and I understand the thinking behind them. We think that in the circumstances, and given that victims have a wide range of needs, a tailored approach, based on a detailed needs assessment, is the most effective approach, but we will continue to consider the situation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Witness to be accompanied while giving evidence
Sarah Sackman
I understand the point. In the circumstances, I would prefer to take officials’ advice and check that the legislation is doing what it intends to—providing a consistent practice of professional witness support, while maintaining trial fairness. I do not want to misdirect myself or the Committee.
Jess Brown-Fuller
My understanding of the legislation is that an independent supporter would be a recognised professional, but that does not exclude someone who may have a relationship outside their recognised profession with the person they are independently supporting. I wonder if clarification could be introduced—similar to what I think amendment 70 tried to achieve—to ensure that any relationship outside the professional role would have to be declared in front of the court. That would make it clear that, ideally, the only relationship between a witness and the independent supporter should be a professional one, and that any other one would have to be declared.
Sarah Sackman
I think all of that is right, but I would prefer to take the matter back to the Department and check that we have a common understanding. I do not want to do this on the hoof if I do not have the full information before me. I think that is the intention—the presumption is that it applies only to professional supporters. I suppose it is ultimately up to the court if a family member sits with the person, if that is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.
Dr Mullan
As the Minister points out, this clause interacts with the issue of transparency in the justice system. I recognise that the Minister thinks it attempts to strike a balance by clarifying the categories of people who may not be excluded, such as representatives of news organisations, witness supporters and approved researchers. The aim is to ensure that, while a witness may be shielded, the trial remains professional and legitimate.
However, we do not want the measure to have the unintended effect of narrowing public scrutiny, including by ordinary members of the public, who the Minister will accept are not necessarily there to intimidate or have any impact on the witness—they might not be even connected to the case. It should be assumed that people in this country can just turn up to a courthouse and watch a case, as they currently can, and as I have in the past.
Sad to say, but we have seen recently that practical transparency can be very difficult to achieve. We had the whole debacle with the Courtsdesk archive, which hugely assisted transparency in our legal system. The Opposition certainly do not feel that the Government’s initial response to that demonstrated that they were as committed to transparency in the justice system as they should be. It was only the effort of Opposition Members and media campaigners that secured a U-turn. We must ensure that these powers are used only when the interests of witnesses genuinely outweigh the public’s right to witness proceedings—although I note that the clause does not create an automatic entitlement for persons to be excluded.
We have discussed the availability of transcripts, and it would not be unreasonable to link the two issues. If people are excluded, I do not see why that could not become a trigger for making available those elements of the evidence that the public are for that reason unable to hear at first hand. I do not think the Minister is suggesting that the people in the gallery cannot hear the evidence; it is just about the impact on the witness of them being there. If that is happening and we accept that that is a break from the norm, it would be reasonable to say that transcripts of the elements that were not open to public scrutiny should be more widely available.
If the powers are enacted, it is important that the Government monitor their use going forward. They should have a clear position that they would be open to reforming or even removing the powers if they think they are not operating as intended.
We will not oppose these measures, but the Lords will want to look at them and ensure that we are excluding as little as possible. I accept the Minister’s point that, at the minute, nobody is getting excluded because of worries about how the provision operates, but that does not mean that we should just accept a new way of doing things when it could be better refined. If the Minister could clarify the point about transcript availability, it would demonstrate some good faith by ensuring that people can see for sure that we are not attempting to stop people from hearing what is going on in a courtroom.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I seek clarification from the Minister about the reference in clause 14 to
“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.
Earlier, the hon. Member for Reigate raised the practice of live tweeting from court proceedings. I would appreciate it if the Minister set out her understanding of who would come under “a representative of a news gathering or reporting organisation”. With the rise of social media, and with more people getting their news online on things like X, we can have lots of news organisations with self-professed journalists or online commentators who are acting in the interests of providing online journalism, but who do not hold any form of accreditation or any official role as a journalist. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain who legitimate members of the press will be under this measure. Will they have to be recognised journalists? Will they have to have a press pass? Or can they say, “I’m here, in the interest of journalism, to live tweet the events because I am a self-employed journalist”?
Sarah Sackman
I am grateful for those questions and comments, because, through clause 14, we are seeking to strike a balance. At the moment, in the instance that I gave an example of, the balance is all one way. Of course we want open justice, but that is not the same, as can be the case, as having essentially a mob of people in the gallery whose mere presence is almost certainly intended to intimidate witnesses. Empowering the court to exercise discretion, while retaining the presence of at least one person connected to the defendant and protecting those representatives of newsgathering or reporting organisations, strikes the right balance.
On the question about everyone being a citizen journalist now, subsection (4)(b) refers to
“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.
It refers to those who carry accreditation because they are a member of an organisation, not those who are self-appointed. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member for Chichester with clarification about that. When we talk about reporting restrictions and how they operate, they generally operate in connection with qualified journalists who are subject to the codes of conduct that go with that job. Indeed, that is something that arose with some of the issues in relation to Courtsdesk, because those who make use of that facility and that information, as opposed to the material that the public are entitled to see, are investigative journalists. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member with clarification, and if we think the legislation needs tightening up for the reasons she has outlined, then that can be looked at in the future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Editing of video recorded cross-examination and re-examination
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 17, page 30, line 10, at end insert—
“(3) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the commencement of this section, lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the resources required to give full effect to the repeal of subsection 2A in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989.—
‘(1) The report under subsection (3) must include—
(a) an assessment of the level of legal aid provision necessary to ensure that parties in child arrangements proceedings are able to obtain timely and effective—
(i) advice, and
(ii) representation
particularly where allegations of domestic abuse or safeguarding concerns are raised;
(b) an evaluation of the capacity of the family courts, including—
(i) the number of judges,
(ii) court staff, and
(iii) available hearing time,
to undertake robust risk assessment and fact-finding processes in line with Practice Direction 12J;
(c) plans to address any shortfalls in judicial training, including—
(i) training relating to coercive control,
(ii) domestic abuse dynamics, and
(iii) child safeguarding.
(d) proposals for investment in the family court estate and technology to ensure—
(i) the repeal operates effectively, and
(ii) decisions are consistently grounded in the welfare and safety of the child.’”
This amendment requires the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 16—Protective relocation and presumption of reasonableness—
“(1) This section applies to family proceedings in which—
(a) a parent (‘the relocating parent’) has relocated, or proposes to relocate, with a child; and
(b) it is alleged that such relocation has adversely affected, or is intended to affect, the child’s relationship with another party.
(2) Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), ‘documented advice’ includes advice, guidance, or referral from—
(a) a police force;
(b) a local authority exercising social services functions;
(c) a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC); or
(d) an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA) or equivalent specialist support service.
(4) The presumption in subsection (2) can be rebutted if the other party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the relocation is not reasonable or not in the best interests of the child.
(5) In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the court must have regard to—
(a) the nature and impact of the domestic abuse;
(b) the circumstances in which the advice or referral was given; and
(c) the welfare of the child as the court’s paramount consideration.
(6) The court may disapply the presumption in subsection (2) where it is satisfied that—
(a) the evidential basis for the documented advice is insufficient; or
(b) it is otherwise necessary to do so in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.
(7) In this section—
(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;
(b) ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18;
(c) ‘family proceedings’ has the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”
This new clause introduces a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child, undertaken in reliance on documented advice from authorities or support services in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is shown.
New clause 20—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—
“This section applies in family proceedings in which—
(a) party A alleges that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse, and
(b) the court is invited to consider whether a party A has engaged in conduct intended, or having the effect of, undermining a child’s relationship with another party.
(1) Where this section applies, the court must determine, as a preliminary issue, any allegation of domestic abuse before considering any allegation falling within subsection (1)(b).
(2) The court must treat the determination of allegations of domestic abuse as a matter of priority and, so much as reasonably practicable, must not proceed to determine any issue relating to the child’s relationship with either party until such allegations have been determined.
(3) Where the court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse against another party or the child—
(a) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by the child to spend time with party B constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse; and
(b) the court must not consider any allegation that party A has engaged in conduct falling within subsection (1)(b) unless satisfied that the presumption in paragraph (a) has been rebutted.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b), the presumption may be rebutted only where party B demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.
(5) Subsections (2) to (5) apply only where the allegation of domestic abuse meets such minimum evidential threshold as may be prescribed by rules of court.
(6) Notwithstanding the above, the court may disapply the presumption in subsection (4)(a), or the requirement in subsection (2), where it is satisfied that to do so is necessary to secure the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration.
(7) In this section—
(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;
(b) references to a child are to a person under the age of 18;
(c) references to ‘family proceedings’ have the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”
This new clause requires courts to determine domestic abuse allegations before considering claims of parental alienation. If abuse is proven, a child’s reluctance to see the abusive parent is presumed a justified response. This presumption must be rebutted before the court can entertain allegations of alienating behaviour against the protective parent.
New clause 31—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—
“(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by a child to spend time with a party against whom the child, or a party representing the child, has made allegations of domestic abuse constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse.
(2) The presumption in subsection (1) may be rebutted only where the accused party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.”
This new clause provides that, in family court, where a child refuses or is reluctant to spend time with one party as a result of an allegation against that party of domestic abuse against the child, the court must presume the reluctance or refusal is reasonable.
I remind hon. Members that any Divisions on new clauses will come later.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Amendment 14 would require the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. It would necessitate a report being laid by the Government on the impact of repealing the presumption of parental responsibility. We are in favour of clause 17, but the amendment focuses on the impact of the provisions on legal aid and the capacity of family courts, judicial training and investment in the family court estate. Repealing the presumption of parental responsibility will lead to a need for more legal advice, as well as changes in hearings and court practices. It is important that the Government report on those changes to the House. We hope that they accept the need for a report.
Clause 17 will repeal the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989. The presumption was originally introduced to ensure that both parents could maintain a relationship with their children after separation. However, there have been long-standing campaigns to repeal the presumption, with evidence emerging—I say emerging, but it is long-standing evidence—that children could be left at risk of harm. The change will mean that the courts will no longer start from the assumption that parental involvement is always in the child’s best interests.
A key campaigner for this change, working with Women’s Aid, is Claire Throssell, who the Committee had the opportunity to hear from during the evidence session. Claire’s children, Jack and Paul, were killed by their father, who locked them in the attic and set fire to the house. If there was any moment that we all will remember for a very long time, it was Claire holding the images of her children before the incident and afterwards. I commend her for her bravery and for the way that she was able to speak so clearly not just for herself, but for all the families who have experienced devastating bereavement in that way—fighting for the children who will come after.
A family court judge, guided by the presumption, decided to allow Claire’s ex-husband unsupervised access to their children, despite evidence that he had threatened to harm both her and them. Since Women’s Aid first reported on the issue in 2004, 67 children have been killed by perpetrators of domestic abuse through contact arrangements, with 19 further child deaths documented in the decade to September 2024 alone.
The Lib Dems are in favour of the shift in law away from the presumption of parental involvement. Although the Bill seeks to repeal the presumption, there is a pro-contact culture in the family courts, as described by Farah Nazeer of Women’s Aid, who we also heard from in the evidence session. Will the Minister lay out what will be done to support the cultural reform of the family courts to ensure that this is a pivotal moment for victims of domestic abuse, who for so long have had their concerns around their children’s safety dismissed?
Claire spoke to that point in the evidence session. When I asked her what she believed the next steps should be, she said:
“What I would like to see moving forward is an understanding of what it looks like without presumption of contact; what good practice looks like; understanding trauma; understanding what coercive control is; understanding emotional abuse. We all understand physical abuse—it is there; we see it. What we do not understand is the emotional abuse and the scars that we carry. We must always look from the position of actually seeing a child, hearing a child, believing a child, protecting a child, and we must go from this basis.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 58, Q110.]
New clause 16, which I also tabled, is a probing amendment that I will not press to a vote, but I wish to discuss it further. It would introduce a rebuttal presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child in the context of domestic abuse, undertaken in reliance on and with documented advice from authorities or support services, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is known.
New clause 16 would allow a parent to relocate with a child if they have evidence or advice from a domestic abuse support service or authority. It would require the court to assume that the move is reasonable and place the burden on the other parent to prove that the move is not in the child’s best interest.
The new clause is aimed at making it easier for victims of domestic abuse to leave their situations safely, and to prevent them from being forced to remain near their abusive ex-partners. Currently, the legal framework does not adequately distinguish between a parent who removes a child to protect them and a parent who removes a child to punish the other party. Our new clause would not remove safeguards in respect of alienation, but would instead shift the dial towards believing and protecting victims of domestic abuse.
The new clause is supported by Fair Hearing, which shared multiple examples of its work with courts that failed to give proper weight to the relevance of domestic abuse in relocation decisions. In one such case, a mother who had experienced severe physical, sexual and psychological abuse had been forced by her partner, during the relationship, to move with their children to an isolated rural area. After leaving him, she sought permission to return to her home town, where she had family support and greater safety. The court none the less required her to remain in an isolated cottage near her abuser, failing to give proper weight to the impact of the abuse, or to her need for safety and support. Cases of that kind illustrate the consequences of a framework that, in its operation, too often treats a survivor seeking to relocate for safety no differently from any other parent seeking to move for lifestyle or preference reasons.
I make the point to the Minister that this could happen to any of us. So often, abuse does not start on day one, when the partner suggests that we move somewhere lovely and will be really happy there. I am a very long way removed from the version of myself who made the decision to follow a boy three hours away from my family in my early 20s. He turned out not to be the great guy I thought he was when I made that decision. I escaped from that situation, but had I stayed and ended up having children, the idea that I would have been trapped in a city that was not mine, away from my family, who were my support network, is too scary to bear. I remind the Minister that it could happen to literally any one of us.
Wider campaigns from Women’s Aid, SafeLives and Refuge have focused on ensuring that survivors can relocate to escape abuse. As subsection 2 of the new clause outlines:
“Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.”
Under the new clause, the documented advice would include evidence from a police force, social services, a multi-agency risk assessment conference or an independent domestic violence adviser. We look to work closely with the Government on this issue, and I hope they recognise the need to go further, but I will not push new clause 16 to a vote.
I will speak briefly to new clause 20, also tabled in my name, which would introduce a statutory presumption that where domestic abuse is alleged, the court must make findings on the allegations before considering any claim that a parent has sought to undermine the child’s relationship with the other party. If one parent alleges domestic abuse and the other alleges alienating behaviour—that is, influencing the child against them—the court must decide the domestic abuse allegations first. The court cannot move on to contact issues until that is decided. If the court finds domestic abuse, a child’s reluctance to see that parent is presumed to be justified. That presumption can be overturned only with evidence. If abuse is proven, courts cannot consider claims of alienation until the alleged abusive parent proves the child’s resistance is not due to abuse.
Campaigners have long argued that the family courts have been used by abusers to retraumatise victims and have over-prioritised contact between parents and children. It is estimated that around 60% to 90% of child arrangement cases in the family court feature allegations of domestic abuse. In 2020, the report entitled “Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases” highlighted serious issues with how the family court system addresses domestic abuse in child arrangement cases. It said that those issues were underpinned by a pro-contact culture, silo working, an adversarial system and resource constraints.
A 2023 report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner stated:
“Victims and survivors and their advisors reported concerns that raising domestic abuse as an issue often risked the retaliatory use of so-called ‘parental’ alienation narratives by parties against whom domestic abuse had been alleged as a counter-claim, leading to worse outcomes for adult and child victims and survivors.”
Five years on from the harm report, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that despite overwhelming evidence of domestic abuse in most cases, a pro-contact culture and a failure to recognise abuse still contribute to decisions that may put children in harm’s way.
This can be considered a probing amendment; I will not press new clause 20 to a vote. We will be looking to work closely with the Government to make progress in this area. The new clause would tilt the dial slightly towards victims of domestic abuse by ensuring that courts properly examined cases before considering issues of alienation. It would prioritise the safety of victims of domestic abuse, whether partners or children, by requiring these allegations to be addressed first.
It is also sometimes argued that children resist contact with certain parents because of manipulation. Our proposal would ensure that courts did not assume that manipulation first, but it would also have safeguards. It would not allow domestic abuse organisations to submit evidence; instead, it would be the authorities, social services and an independent domestic violence adviser who would do that. A minimum evidential threshold would also have to be met.
Dr Mullan
I want to begin by acknowledging the gravity of what we heard in evidence in Committee. As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, pointed to, the evidence from Claire in relation to her children will stay with all of us. It was so moving and so upsetting for anyone thinking about how they would feel in that scenario. There was also the testimony of other parents who have lost children, and survivors of domestic abuse, who felt let down by a system that prioritised contact over their safety. That testimony matters. The Committee has a duty to take it incredibly seriously and give it the maximum possible weight.
We also have a duty to legislate carefully, however, and when it comes to legislating I do not think there are many areas of human frailty and human complexity that are more complicated than this. As anyone with any experience of the family court—and of life generally and the interactions between families who split up—will agree, all these things are incredibly complicated. When we seek to be prescriptive about how exactly a court should or should not seek to do things, that is fraught with risk and potential unintended consequences, just as today we are discussing the unintended consequences of a measure that may have been brought in for good reasons.
We must think very carefully, therefore, when it comes to the repeal of section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989, and particularly about whether we think that will achieve what it promises. I make no apologies for saying that I want to consider this in some detail and that we will want to follow the discussions on it in some detail as the Bill progresses. Although we are not seeking to oppose the repeal at this stage, it is certainly not something—as opposed to some other measures—that is without the need for further scrutiny.
I want to say plainly that the courts, social services and CAFCASS have made serious mistakes in the past—importantly, both before that provision was inserted in 2014 and since—and those serious mistakes have cost children their lives. However, the question before us today is whether repealing the presumption will fix the mistakes or whether it might distract from the need for much deeper reforms and more complex and difficult work than can be achieved by a simple measure in a Bill.
Let me deal with the most important point: the presumption introduced in 2014 does not give any parent an automatic right to contact. It is important that we recognise that. It does not override the paramount principle in the law. I think we probably all remember the evidence given by one of the barristers in Committee, who was clear that while they thought the presumption could be repealed, the law as it stands does not allow the desire for a parent to have contact to override the welfare of a child. It also does not override the welfare checklist, or require courts to make an order that places children at risk.
The presumption establishes a starting point that, where it is safe to do so, children should generally benefit from the involvement of both parents. That starting point can be rebutted, but it expressly does not apply where a parent’s involvement would put the child at risk. In its written evidence, Both Parents Matter describe it as a “statutory benchmark”, not a straitjacket.
Rebecca Paul
No, I’m okay.
I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.
I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.
People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.
What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.
I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Am I right in thinking that the hon. Member agrees with me that, when we are trying to legislate for what the most complex part of our justice system—families—that is an incredibly hard job? We all know from personal experience that the one thing that binds us all is that we have a family; we might disagree on whether they are good ones or bad ones, and whether we get on with them or not, but we all came from somewhere, and they are complicated things.
Across the House, we all share the desire to ensure that we recognise the complexity of family relationships and protect those most vulnerable in our society by making sure that people do not have the right to still have contact with their children when they have done things that mean that they absolutely should not. However, we also recognise that systems are abused, and we see that in all directions; people will always find ways of getting around systems, or of using the criminal justice system to retraumatise or to hold on to some form of control. Does the hon. Member therefore agree with me that, while what we are trying to do here is really complex, we are all doing it for the right reasons?
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with the hon. Member. I appreciate the fact that she has tabled these amendments and that she recognises that it is not easy to strike this balance, particularly when we are trying to address abuse and alienation cases and it is sometimes hard to know what situation we are dealing with.
We are trying to come up with a system that protects as many people as we possibly can, but I think we also have to acknowledge that it will never be perfect. If anyone thinks that we can change one bit of law and then all of a sudden nothing horrible will ever happen again, I am afraid to say that these awful things will always happen, and things will always go wrong. It is about trying our best to have a framework that gets the balance right.
I will stop there—I have probably made my point. This has been a really good debate, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about some of the points I have raised.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I recognise that the amendment is limited in scope because the Bill is limited in scope, especially when it comes to the family court. Perhaps rather cheekily, I was trying to get a report on the general health of the family court system because so many organisations tell Members across the House that they are really concerned about a lot of the systems sitting in the family court, not just the parental responsibility piece. I remain hopeful that we will see family court legislation introduced, as the Minister will be aware that I have requested in multiple oral questions in the Chamber.
I am aware that the report required by the amendment would be specifically about the repeal, but we need a health check of our family court system because a lot of people are sounding the alarm about the concerns they have with that system.
Sarah Sackman
The family justice strategy, which will be forthcoming in July, will address a lot of what the hon. Member asks for. It will set out where the Government think reform is needed, and it will bring together what we are already doing with our child-focused courts programme, which is accompanied by a £17 million investment. We believe in that model, which we think has huge merit. It will be available to people regardless of where in the country they live.
More generally, we are introducing the funding that the Lord Chancellor has allocated to sitting days for family hearings, the targeted recruitment of more judges, more fee-paid judges, the greater use of virtual hearings—which can be a supportive measure for people giving evidence, not just an efficiency measure—and training.
The hon. Member for Chichester will know that the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has also undertaken detailed work in this area through her “Everyday business” report, which talks to some of the resourcing constraints faced by the family court. That work forms part of the commissioner’s report on a family court reporting mechanism, which is designed to provide ongoing evidence-based scrutiny of the family court’s response to domestic abuse in particular, and to highlight where systemic improvements are needed, so we have other accountability measures shining that light. If the hon. Member for Chichester awaits the strategy—she will no doubt want to take a look and critique parts of it—I think a lot of it will address some of the concerns she raises.
As I said, before proposing the repeal of the presumption, we carefully assessed the impact it would have. We do not overstate it, but it is important because the change affects the judicial process, not the underlying reasons why families come to court. Because we do not expect it to increase case volumes, case length or demand for legal aid, we think that the current arrangements can meet it, but there are so many other improvements that we want to drive.
Jess Brown-Fuller
This has been a robust and important debate, and there are strong feelings on both sides of the argument. As I said earlier, we are legislating in a complex area. I think the shared opinion is that the intention is correct. Some of the questions that have been asked are legitimate, but I know the Minister is keen to work collaboratively. I will not press my two new clauses to a vote—they are probing amendments to open up the conversation—but amendment 14, which would require a report as a health check for the family courts, is important, so I will press it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)
Jess Brown-Fuller ExcerptsTuesday 21st April 2026
(3 months, 1 week ago)
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Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Clause 3 and its various parts outline how trials can take place without juries. The Liberal Democrats have always fundamentally opposed the move to remove the right to a trial in front of one’s peers and the introduction of single-judge trials. To be clear, we do not accept the status quo and neither does anyone who I have spoken to in the legal profession or courts. The backlogs are totally unacceptable and they are failing victims, defendants and the people working in the criminal justice system. But no one in that system thinks that the fault lies with the jury trial system. In fact, Sir Brian stated that in our recent evidence session.
The decision is being made without any decisive modelling that would demonstrate that it would have the intended effect. There is also a timing issue with the proposal to restrict the use of a jury. Nationally, we have seen an intense displeasure with our democracy, and faith in politics and our political system is at an all-time low. It is fractured and deeply distrustful. When we have mistrust in our political system, it seeps into our justice system. Around six in 10 people express a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in juries delivering the right verdict compared with around four in 10 for courts and judges more generally.
Clause 3 proposes something that will risk a great deal without the evidence that shows it will actually work. That is why it is so strongly opposed. The Government instead should be implementing evidence-based reforms to target inefficiencies, including but not limited to negotiating the failed prisoner escort contract, introducing victim-led intensive case management across the regions, and investing in rehabilitation to reduce reoffending. They could also explore reducing the court backlog by running two trials in a day in select courtrooms instead of one, making more efficient use of time by nearly doubling the hearing time per sitting day and accelerating the throughput of cases. They could also develop and implement a more ambitious strategy to reduce delays in rape and serious sexual offences cases, or implement their own manifesto pledge to introduce speciality RASSO courts, which we will no doubt debate at a later stage of the Bill.
I am confident that the Minister will say, as she did in the evidence session, “Why is the backlog not coming down if we can make the system work better?” She put that question to Caroline Goodwin KC, Claire Davies KC and Samantha Hillas KC, saying,
“I have not seen any evidence that it can be reduced absent reform from the circuits.”
Caroline Goodwin came back with:
“The reality is that we have not been able to do this. Because there has been a consistent cap on sitting days, judges have not been able to open up court days. They have not been able to run blitz days where they can really take hold of a case and shake it and say, ‘Right, what is going on?’ We have not had any great directives to the CPS to say, ‘When you’re charging these cases, you need to review these very thoroughly.’ Throughout this entire time, the criminal Bar and the entire justice system has been brought to its knees. So if you are saying, ‘Is there any empirical evidence that this doesn’t work on your circuit, Ms Goodwin?’, we have not been able to do it.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 48, Q94.]
Why do we believe that we need to protect the safeguard of a jury trial while still reforming the criminal courts in other ways? The Lammy review in 2017 found that black and Chinese women were convicted at higher rates than white women in magistrate courts but not by juries. The Criminal Bar Association commissioned an independent study of criminal barristers; of the 2,029 who responded, 94% raised concerns about the lack of diversity in the Crown court bench division and 88% were against the introduction of a Crown court bench division altogether.
If we take the figures in the impact assessment that the Government have provided at face value, the proposal will save 5,000 sitting days per annum. That is around 3.5% of the Crown court workload. That means that rape complainants or victims who are currently waiting years for their own trial to be heard might see their cases brought forward by about a week. On the Government’s own estimates, the changes will not start taking effect until after the next general election. It is not providing a solution to the current crisis. Indeed, the impact assessment was based on a premise that it compared “do nothing” with the effects of all of the Government’s measures proposed in the Bill, but nobody is proposing “do nothing”. Radical investment and reform is already taking place and is welcomed. The Government were right to introduce removing the cap on sitting days and encourage blitz courts in a number of courts in the different regions. That has cross-party support and will bring down the backlog by more direct means.
I would also like to briefly highlight the perversity in the cut-off of three years. Let us take the case of a 20-year-old student charged with unlawful wounding, where someone’s face was gashed by a glass thrown in a bar. Under the sentencing guidelines, if they were of good character they would face imprisonment of between two and three years. That conviction would be life changing and that young defendant would not qualify for trial by jury under these proposals. Let us take exactly the same case, but involving a 40-year-old defendant with a long criminal record who has been to prison before. Because of their record, the likely sentence for the same offence would exceed three years and they would get trial by jury, whereas a young man with no convictions would not. I ask the Committee to reflect on the perversity created by changing the threshold.
I conclude by reiterating that clause 3, which sets out how the Crown court should allocate a case for trial without a jury and the procedure, should not be included in the Bill, and I shall vote against its inclusion.
Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak to the new clause that is tabled in my name, which I do not intend to push to a vote. It would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the impact of clause 3 after 12 months, and again after no later than 36 months. At its heart, the new clause is both modest and reasonable. It does not seek to block the Government’s proposals outright, nor does it attempt to rewrite the substance of the Bill. It simply asks that we understand the impact of the changes we are making and that we are accountable for them.
As Members across the House know, clause 3 introduces significant changes to the operation of the courts, particularly through the insertion of the new provisions into the Senior Courts Act 1981. Those provisions mark a clear shift in how justice is delivered. When we make changes of this scale, we have a duty not only to legislate, but to reflect on their impact and remain accountable for the consequences.
The Law Society of England and Wales has raised concerns that reforms to court processes must be carefully monitored to ensure they do not inadvertently undermine access to justice, particularly for those who already face barriers in navigating the legal system. These concerns are drawn from the experience of legal practitioners working day to day in the courts, particularly in cases involving litigants in person who often are trying to navigate complex procedures without legal representation. It has also emphasised the importance of evaluating how such changes operate in practice, including their impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and on the capacity of the courts to deliver justice effectively.
The society has made it clear that such changes can have unintended consequences that are often felt most by the people who already struggle to access justice. That goes directly to public confidence in the justice system. Surely, trust and perception in the justice system are just as important as the legal framework itself. Concerns have also been raised by the Family Services Foundation, which highlights how procedural changes can disproportionately affect vulnerable individuals and families already facing complex challenges. That reflects its work with the families involved in the court system, where even small procedural changes can have a significant impact on people who are already dealing with instability, stress or crisis situations.
New clause 29 would ensure that Parliament receives clear evidence-based assessments of how the provisions are working in practice. Crucially, it would require that the assessments consider the impact on two groups: people from ethnic minority backgrounds and white British individuals living in lower-income households. As highlighted in earlier stages of the scrutiny of the Bill, there is a lack of clear statutory review built into the provisions, in particular in clause 3.
Some may ask, why specify those groups? The answer is simple—because justice is not experienced equally by all. We know all too well through evidence, lived experience and countless testimonies that people from ethnic minority communities often have lower levels of trust in the criminal justice system. That shapes how justice is perceived and whether it is seen as legitimate. For ethnic minority communities, this is fundamentally about trust in the justice system and perception of fairness.
Equally, we must recognise that socioeconomic disadvantage can profoundly affect a person’s experience of the courts. White British individuals from lower-income households are also more likely to feel marginalised by systems that appear distant, complex or unresponsive to their circumstances. If this House is serious about fairness, we must be serious about understanding how reforms affect those who are most at risk of being left behind.
New clause 29 does not assume the outcome. It does not claim that the provisions of clause 3 will necessarily have a negative impact, but it does recognise that without proper review, we simply will not know. That in itself would be a failure of our responsibility as legislators. The timeline set out in the new clause—a review after 12 months and a further review no later than after 36 months—strikes a careful balance. The reviews allow for early identification of any emerging issues, while also ensuring that long-term effects are properly understood. Importantly, the reviews would be laid before Parliament, ensuring transparency and enabling this House to scrutinise the findings. If the changes are working well, a review would demonstrate that; if they are not, a review would give us the opportunity to put things right.
I urge Members across the House to support new clause 29, not as a challenge to the Bill, but as a practical step towards fairness, transparency and accountability in our justice system. This House should be confident in reforms, but it should also be confident in knowing when to pause, assess and reflect. That is all that the new clause asks for.
Yasmin Qureshi
The Institute for Government also said that juries do not take up that much time—they save more time. The point is that, without too much difficulty, we could get the courts up and running and working for extra sitting days. Essentially, if we had more court sitting days, we would not have the backlog; it is not the juries that are causing the backlog.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Does the hon. Lady recognise that the 2025 Criminal Bar Association study noted that one in five barristers are considering leaving the criminal Bar, not because of the ineffectiveness of jury trials but because they have to work in crumbling buildings, because there is a significant administrative burden associated with passing on information to the CPS and because of the number of ineffective cases that then do not go ahead? Does she agree that if we tackle the inefficiencies in courts, we are more likely to improve our retention of criminal barristers and encourage some of them to come back into the profession because the system will work better?
Yasmin Qureshi
I entirely agree. The state of some of the courts in this country is sad. They are completely neglected, which creates a lot of challenges.
Victims and Courts Bill
Jess Brown-Fuller ExcerptsMonday 20th April 2026
(3 months, 1 week ago)
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Lorraine Beavers (Blackpool North and Fleetwood) (Lab)
I stand here today proud of my constituent Katie Brett, who joins us in the Gallery. These changes to the unduly lenient sentence scheme are being brought forward because of her campaigning, following the most traumatic ordeal for her and her family, and I am proud to welcome the fact that this Labour Government have listened and acted.
For too long, victims and bereaved families felt that the justice system was not on their side. Measures to force offenders to attend sentencing hearings are right. Families should not be denied the chance to see justice simply because an offender refuses to face up to what they have done. The stronger protections for children, especially in cases of sexual violence, are also badly needed, but I want specifically to welcome the changes that the Government are proposing to the unduly lenient sentence scheme.
Katie’s little sister, Sasha Marsden, was just 16 years old when she was brutally murdered, raped and set on fire. It was a crime as horrific and evil as it is possible to imagine, and the pain her family have lived with ever since is something most of us cannot even imagine. After everything they had already been through, Katie and her family then faced another injustice: they had only 28 days to challenge the sentence, and they were not even told that they had the right to do so. That was so very wrong. A trial like that would be deeply traumatic for any family. In Sasha’s case, her family heard all the awful details of what she had endured in the final moments of her young and precious life, and no one in that position is ready, within a matter of days, to get to grips with a complex legal process and start to fight again.
Twenty-eight days is not long enough. It is not a real right for any family; it is a barrier. That is why Katie has shown extraordinary courage. Through her campaign for Sasha’s law, she has spoken not only for her own family, but for many others who felt shut out by the system. Katie’s campaign was clear: more time for bereaved families and victims to challenge sentences that they believe are unduly lenient, and clear information so they know that that right exists in the first place.
I am pleased that this Labour Government have heard the arguments and are acting to put things right. They have listened to campaigners and to families. I thank the Minister for her constructive engagement to ensure that the Government get the change right, and for ensuring that victims have been listened to at every stage of the process. This change will make a real difference to people at the worst moment of their lives. Crucially, the injustice that Katie suffered would not have happened had these changes been in place. It shows what the Government can do when we put victims first, and when we believe that justice must be matched by decency and compassion. The justice system should reflect the reality of trauma, grief and loss.
Finally, I want to place on the record how proud I am that I played a small part in helping Katie make today happen, and to thank the Government for listening. Twenty-eight days was not enough. Victims and bereaved families must be properly informed, and a better system is being brought forward as a result. For Katie Brett, for Sasha Marsden, and for so many other families, the changes will not remove the grief, but they will make the system fairer, more humane and more just. There is of course always work to do on the criminal justice system, but victims should not have fewer rights than perpetrators. These changes go some way to correct that injustice, and I will be proud to vote for them today.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
I begin by thanking Members from across both Chambers for their work in getting this legislation to where it is today. I especially thank the Government for their engagement with me and my colleagues in the Lords, in particular the Minister, who I have met multiple times to discuss various issues in the Bill.
A key cornerstone of our justice system must be the support and protection of victims and survivors, ensuring that those who have suffered at the hands of others can go on to live a life without fear and not be defined by the actions of those who harmed them. That will happen only by putting their voices at the heart of the justice system, ensuring that justice is served quickly, with properly funded support, protection from perpetrators and rehabilitation of offenders to reduce reoffending. There are countless examples of that failing to happen, which is why the Liberal Democrats have welcomed the intention of and many of the measures in the Bill.
We are pleased with the Government’s commitment to undertake a study into the use of AI transcription in criminal courts in order to explore whether that can reduce both the costs and time involved in the provision of transcripts to victims. My colleague Baroness Brinton in the other place and I have both tabled amendments to the Bill aimed at expanding the provision of transcripts for victims at various stages, in part inspired by the tireless work of my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who I thank once again.
It should never be the case that victims, many of whom might not have even been in the court room to hear the sentence handed down, are asked to pay thousands of pounds to access their transcript. The opposing argument to our amendments is about the costs of redaction in producing the transcripts, but it is clear that there are technological solutions in today’s age and we therefore welcome the Government’s recognition that more action is needed. We will continue to push for greater provision of free transcripts in the Courts and Tribunals Bill, which is currently in Committee.
I thank the Government for their commitment to review the provision of service to families whose relatives have been murdered abroad. That follows an exemplary amendment first tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mr Reynolds) due to issues faced by one of his constituents. The provision of supporting information for families going through those horrific circumstances clearly has some issues, but the commitment in the other place to a joint review into those provisions between the Ministry of Justice and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is welcome. We look forward to the result of that review, at which point we will consult with victims’ groups in ensuring that the provisions work satisfactorily.
I will take the opportunity to mention to the Minister again that, as she will be aware, the Murdered Abroad annual conference is on 13 June and I know that the organisers—
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am pleased to hear that the Minister will be attending because I know that the organisers were keen to engage with her so that they can continue to see progress.
I turn now to Lords amendments 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E, 5F, 6B and 6C, all of which impact the unduly lenient scheme. Again, I thank Baroness Brinton in the other place for her tireless work on these amendments with the Government, and the late Helen Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner, and the Victims’ Commissioner for London. I also want to specifically pay tribute to the bravery of Tracey Hanson and Katie Brett, whose campaigns on these issues, in the light of their own families’ experiences, have no doubt played a pivotal part in the Government’s commitment to these amendments.
Tracey going through the trial of the murder of her own son, Josh, with no knowledge of the unduly lenient scheme, is exactly the example that I hope these amendments will address and are testament to her tireless efforts and the memory of her son. As the hon. Member for Blackpool North and Fleetwood (Lorraine Beavers) so eloquently expressed, Katie’s tireless campaigning for her sister, Sasha, is an extraordinary example of someone fighting an injustice not for themselves, but for others in the future who may suffer a similar loss. In particular, amendments 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E and 5F allow out-of-time applications to be made up to six months after sentencing. That is vital for families who are unaware of the scheme who did not submit an application prior to the 28-day limit and will benefit many who experience the same heartache and pain as Tracey.
The Government’s provision in amendments 6B and 6C of a statutory duty for victims to be informed of the unduly lenient scheme is vital, and should provide victims with a clearer picture of the options that they are entitled to following sentencing. The Minister was right to say that many of the campaigners have not just asked for an extension; it is about victims knowing what is available to them and ensuring that there is a mandatory commitment that they are told that the scheme is an option available to them after sentencing. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me recently and then coming forward with these amendments, and we are pleased to support them.
Finally, I turn to Lords amendments 4B and 4C regarding private prosecutions. I am sure many across the House will agree that the ability for criminal prosecutions to be brought forward outside of the regular processes of the authorities, providing an alternative method for charities and commercial organisations, is essential in delivering justice for many victims whose cases have not been taken on by the state. That is especially pertinent against the backdrop of stretched resources facing the police and the Crown Prosecution Service.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)
Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts(3 months, 1 week ago)
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Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak in support of amendment 43, tabled in my name, and to amendments 25 and 12. Again, on this issue the Opposition and the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden have alighted on the same challenge or issue—the same thing we think is unfair. We have gone about our amendments in different ways, but we recognise the same issue. As we heard, the amendments address the retrospectivity built into the Government’s approach.
The Bill makes it clear that the new allocation regime will apply not only to future cases, but to existing Crown court cases that are due to begin on or after the specified day on which the measures are implemented. In other words, cases that are already in the system, in which defendants may have made decisions on the basis that they expect a jury trial, could be reallocated to a judge-only trial. Our amendment 43 would prevent that by ensuring that the new regime applies only to cases in which the first magistrates court hearing takes place after the change, and not to cases already in the pipeline.
The Government say the change is merely procedural and can therefore be applied to ongoing cases, but that understates what is happening. To change the allocation part-way through proceedings would not simply be technical; it would alter the ground beneath the defendant’s feet. In written evidence, JUSTICE shared our concerns, saying:
“The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.”
It pointed to the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s legislative standards, which state:
“Retrospective legislation is unacceptable other than in very exceptional circumstances”
and
“must have the strongest possible justification”.
It is worth considering that legislative guidance, which states, first, that enacting legislation with retrospective effect should be avoided. Secondly, provisions that have retrospective effect should be drafted as narrowly as possible. Thirdly, individuals should not be punished or penalised for contravening what was, at the time, a valid legal requirement. Fourthly, laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake. Fifthly, laws should not deprive someone of the benefit of a judgment already obtained. Sixthly, laws should not prevent a court from deciding pending litigation according to its merits on the basis of the law in force at the time when proceedings were commenced. Seventhly, retrospective legislation should be used only when there is a compelling reason to do so. Eighthly, a legislative power to make a provision that has retrospective effect should be justified on the basis of necessity and not desirability.
Having heard those points, we can immediately see the issues. On the principle that laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake, it is clear that that liberty is absolutely at stake in these matters.
On necessity, we have repeated throughout the debate that the Government, in our eyes, have completely failed to make the case successfully that the measures in the Bill are the only way to drive down the backlogs. This morning, we debated the fall in backlogs in some areas seen in the latest published data; that happened without the measures in the Bill, and without other measures that we all think are necessary to help to drive down the backlogs. To our eyes, the retrospective element clearly does not meet the test of exceptional circumstances or necessity.
JUSTICE says that, given that the curtailment of jury trials will have a marginal effect on the backlog, it cannot see how retrospective applications can be justified, and I agree. It argues that it is deeply unfair for defendants who elected for a Crown court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not even exist when they made that choice. Defendants who have opted for a jury trial may be incarcerated on remand awaiting trial by jury. Had they known that this would never materialise, they may well have opted for a magistrates trial and already been released.
There is, then, a risk that the reallocation of cases that are already in the Crown court caseload to the bench division will be subjected to judicial review. There is clearly no ouster clause in the provisions. How do we know whether many of those affected might decide that they should challenge the decision in the courts? JUSTICE suggests that it could happen with each and every case in the backlog that is allocated to trial without jury. This would require additional hearings and the preparation of representatives for every affected case already in the backlog, creating further delays and placing unnecessary burdens on the defendants and the prosecution who, as we have all accepted, are already under significant pressure.
What did the Prime Minister say about retrospective measures? We have already covered what the Prime Minister previously thought about the importance of jury trials, which he seems to have forgotten, but what did he say about retrospective measures? He said that
“they are usually a very bad idea”.
That is a direct quote from our Prime Minister. He said they were usually a very bad idea, yet here is his own Government enacting one.
Of course, we know what the Deputy Prime Minister thought about this issue. He appeared before the Justice Committee on Tuesday 16 December last year. He was asked about this issue by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), who said:
“There are currently in the region of 17,500 prisoners on remand in this country. Will these reforms apply retrospectively?”
What did the Deputy Prime Minister say? He said: “No.” The Committee must have to assume that that was his view of the right thing to do at the time. Why else would he have said no? It is reasonable for us to ask the Minister to explain why the Deputy Prime Minister has changed his mind.
Of course, the Minister herself has already been asked about this in the Justice Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) pointed out that a defendant committed to trial in the Crown court will expect a jury trial. He said,
“you will relook at cases that have been committed for trial at the Crown court and push some of them through the swift court—that is what you are telling me.”
The Minister replied:
“I think that is something we have to look at.”
My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said to her:
“So when the Lord Chancellor said it will not be retrospective, that was not a wholly accurate answer.”
The Minister replied:
“I think the answer he was giving was in the context of a question around the impact on remand hearings; I think that was the context in which he may have addressed that.”
My hon. Friend replied:
“No, he said the changes would not be retrospective, and now you are giving me a slightly different answer. If someone elects to go to the Crown court at the moment, it is on the assumption that there will be a trial by jury. What you are saying is that it might not be; they might be diverted to the swift court.”
The Minister agreed with that, saying: “That is right, yes.” That can be interpreted only as a suggestion that there was no difference with or without a jury as they are still in the Crown court—an extraordinary response.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said:
“Minister, if you have been committed to trial in the Crown court at the moment, you are expecting to have a jury trial, and what you are telling me is that once these changes take effect, you will divert those people committed but whose trial has not started into the swift court.”
The Minister agreed, saying: “Yes”. My hon. Friend said to her:
“That is not what the Lord Chancellor said before Christmas.”
The exchange concluded with the Minister making this point:
“It is a change in relation to the procedure that applies to those cases. They are still getting a Crown court trial under the new proposals.”
We are back to an argument that we have revisited a number of times. When the Minister is pressed on a disadvantage in one form or another of having a trial without a jury, she insists that it does not make much of a difference as they will still get a trial that, in her view, has all the merits of a trial with a jury, to some extent. We made some progress on that earlier today, when the Minister acknowledged that there is something special about a jury trial. If there is something special about it, she must surely accept that those people who do not get one are missing something special and are therefore in some way disadvantaged.
JUSTICE is not alone in its criticism of the retrospective element of the proposals. As I have said previously, Mr Robertson, the founder of the chambers that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Attorney General all practised at—someone they surely give some weight and credibility to—is critical about this. He writes:
“Those charged by police with offences currently carrying a right to elect a jury trial will go through newly devised ‘allocation proceedings’ where they will lose that right if it appears to the court to be more suitable to have a non-jury trial or if it appears to the court that the value of the property involved exceeds a sum to be set by the government.”
By that, I think he means in relation to the severity of the case.
Mr Robertson goes on:
“This means, for all 80,000 cases in the backlog, more time—days perhaps—will have to be set aside for novel pre-trial proceedings featuring arguments about suitability and value of stolen property. There will be legal challenges to the government’s proposal that such legislation should apply to defendants who have already been charged or are awaiting trial. Applying these changes retrospectively amounts to a fundamental injustice, undermining legal certainty and the long-standing principle that individuals should be tried according to the rules in place at the time of the alleged offence.”
He is right, is he not?
Mr Robertson is not alone. The Bar Council says:
“The application of this proposal retrospectively inevitably will face a constitutional challenge. The Criminal Bar Association estimates that up to 30,000 cases will be affected. Not only is this extraordinarily unfair to those who have already elected the Crown Court, understanding that it is a jury trial, it interferes with legal certainty and runs the risk of tying the courts up in appeals, further increasing the backlogs.”
I hope that the Minister can reflect, as always, on those clear views, as well as the views of thousands of other legal professionals, academics and former judges, that provisions in the Bill are not necessary to bring the backlog down, and therefore should not be enacted retrospectively. They are fundamentally unfair, unconstitutional and against the usual practices of this place when it comes to retrospective legislation. I hope the Minister will support our amendment to make sure that the measures are not applied retrospectively.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Although I have proposed the removal of clause 3 in its entirety—we will come to the arguments for that later in proceedings—I will speak to amendment 12, tabled in my name, which seeks to remove subsections (2) to (4) of the clause. Those subsections provide that cases can be assigned to be heard by a judge alone, even if the case has already been assigned to be heard in front of a jury.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendment 40 in my name and to consider other related amendments. At this point, we are considering in more detail the allocation decisions, how they work in practice and the likely legal risks and pitfalls inherent in the new process.
I will begin by laying out the process that will exist. The Bill will introduce a Crown court bench division where cases are tried by a judge alone. To ensure that jury trials remain in place for certain crimes, only triable either-way cases that are assessed as likely to receive a custodial sentence of three years or less will be allocated for trial in a bench division. Indictable-only offences cannot be tried there.
To determine whether a triable either-way case should be allocated for trial in a Crown court bench division, a Crown court judge will assess whether the offence or offences to be tried are likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less. That decision will be taken at the first opportunity for the defendant to enter a plea in the Crown court using a plea and trial preparation hearing. If cases involve multiple defendants, judges must assess eligibility based on the highest likely sentence of any one defendant. Offences to which defendants have pled guilty are not included in the assessment of a likely sentence, and youth defendants are not exempt from the bench division.
The bench division will operate as a lower tier in the existing Crown court—that is important. The Bill will not create a separate jurisdiction or intermediate court. The usual Crown court procedures will apply in the bench division, including the appeal route from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. Judges sitting in the bench division will also retain the full sentencing powers of the Crown court and may impose sentences of more than three years where appropriate, even if the allocation was initially based on the likelihood that they would not do that.
The Bill and explanatory notes are clear that no new appeal route is created for decisions to allocate a case to the bench division. It is important to set out the distinctions between different types of allocation decisions both now and in the future, if these proposals are passed. There are some elements of allocation decisions at present that we would all agree are not subjective, but based on offence classifications. I may be wrong, but I do not imagine there remains much debate about allocation decisions in those scenarios. Summary and indictable-only offences will be heard in the magistrates court or the Crown court based on that classification, though there are some exceptions that I will ask the Minister to clarify later.
Under the Government’s proposed reforms, there are similar black and white scenarios, with summary-only remaining with the magistrates and indictable-only going before a judge and jury. However, we will continue to have decisions on either-way offences, which consider the subjective—the not black and white—consideration of what the likely sentence length is. The consequences for defendants are entirely new territory for criminal defendants for the offences concerned.
Of course, defendants may disagree with allocation decisions at present, and may want to stay in the magistrates court, but the court may decide that they must be heard in the Crown court. However, importantly, as I understand it, a defendant cannot actually legally challenge that decision through judicial review. I am not a legal expert, and if the Minister receives advice that that is wrong, I would welcome that clarification, but as I said, my understanding is that judicial review would not be possible in that scenario. I also understand that it would not be the case in relation to the Crown court where the allocation would take place. Importantly, as I pointed out at the start, this will be taken in the Crown court, not some new or different court, so we should read across the rights and procedures that already exist in the Crown court.
As I understand it, triable either-way offences, if heard in the Crown court, are then in legal terms considered to be a trial on indictment. If a triable either-way offence is tried in the Crown court, it becomes a trial on indictment as if it were an indictable offence as per the other offences that are always indictable. Again, I am happy for the Minister to say whether that is the case, but that is my understanding of it.
Why is it important? Because there are constraints on the use of judicial review in relation to a Crown court trial on indictment. Under sections 28 and 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, no appeal by way of case stated or judicial review is possible in respect of matters relating to trial on indictment, so it will not be available with regard to any decision relating to the conduct of a Crown court trial on indictment. These measures, in this important way, are specifically taking away an existing legal right: the right to challenge an allocation decision. That cannot be right, fair or reasonable, and I am not even confident, as it is not mentioned, that I have seen in any of the Government publications related to this that it is something the Government have recognised they are doing.
It is also potentially a mistake in another way: in relation to the efficiency and smooth running of the courts that the Minister is seeking to achieve. At conviction, the defendant can apply for leave to appeal in the Crown court. At that stage, is the proposal that the defendant will be prevented from appealing the allocation by the judge, so a defendant might argue that a judge could act unlawfully on allocation with no appeal safeguard?
I have not had my attention drawn to an ouster clause. More generally, there is the provision that there is no specific appeal to the decision in isolation, but not an ouster clause in terms of the appeals that are allowed in the Crown court. I am confident that there will be legal arguments about that, at least to start with, until common law settles the matter. It would be extraordinary for the Government to introduce such a clause. We might find examples where a judge in the Crown court has completely incorrectly and legally unjustifiably allocated a case, and when that is brought up as part of the appeal at the point of conviction, be told that that is not a matter on which the court can have an opinion. I think that would be extraordinary.
Does the Minister think it would be right, if it forms the basis of an appeal against allocation happening after conviction, for the Court of Appeal to be constrained from having the power to return the case for trial by jury if it agrees the allocation decision was unlawful? I cannot believe that she would think that was right. Therefore, we create the exact opposite effect of what we are seeking to do—to make the best possible use of Crown court time—particularly in relation to barristers and other people working across the courts, by not allowing an earlier appeal. That is with regard to both appeals that take place and, more importantly, where a whole new trial may have to be ordered before a jury because it is found that the initial allocation decision was wrong.
Consider the scale on which that may happen—hundreds of cases may suddenly have to be retried. If, for example, the measures are in place for seven, eight or nine months, there is no onus or expectation regarding at what point a defendant—a convicted criminal at that point—might seek legal advice and then successfully choose to challenge an allocation decision. That would then be heard by a court, and then that court of appeal will make a ruling as to whether the circumstances under which that person was allocated were unlawful and a retrial with a jury is required.
If any other case has been allocated under those same circumstances that the appeal court determines are unlawful, every single one of those who had been convicted would have the right to say that the precedent has been set that the way they were allocated was unlawful and has to be retried. That could happen six months, a year or two years in. We are talking about a huge potential reallocation and retrial of all cases if the Minister insists that there should not be an appeal on the right of the allocation decision.
A separate initial safeguard—an appeal against allocation at the stage that it happens—is not only the right thing to do to ensure that an existing right is not eroded, but the more efficient way to approach these things. The amendment is sensible, rational and will provide greater confidence in the new court that the Minister is insisting on creating, and its processes.
I ask the Minister to clarify an important matter of law in relation to the allocation decisions in the first place—just the sort of thing that might be appealed if it is not clarified by the Minister during the passage of the Bill or through amendments to the legislation. We are clear about the idea of summary offences that go to the magistrates court. Indictable-only offences will have a trial with a judge and jury. In a number of cases, however, the offence is triable either way, but provisions that this House has introduced mean that in particular circumstances it can be tried only on indictment.
Some examples of that are three-strikes class-A drug trafficking offences, three-strikes dwelling burglary offences, dwelling burglaries involving violence or threats of violence, and the minimum mandatory sentences for firearms offences. Those were decisions taken by Parliament to say that, while the offence more generally could be tried either way, these cases in those circumstances are too serious to be heard by a magistrates court; they must be heard by a judge and a jury.
What are the consequences of the Bill on those scenarios? Will the Government respect the will of Parliament in relation to considering those cases to be more serious, as the Government accept for those cases that retain a jury trial, and that they should therefore remain with a jury trial? It is important that we have clarity on this issue specifically because, as I said, it is something that would almost certainly be subject to appeal if clarity is not provided.
I finish by reiterating the point that, if the Government refuse to accept our amendment, they will be actively legislating away a right to appeal allocation decisions that currently exists in our system. They will be actively choosing to do that if they are unable to insert a similar right through other means, such as through our amendment or an amendment at a future stage. I think it is important that the Committee reflects on that, and I hope the Minister can agree.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I will speak to amendment 18, tabled in my name, which seeks to ensure that a defendant has the right to appeal against a judge’s decision to allocate a case for trial by judge alone, whether because of the likely sentence length or because the case is assessed to be complex or lengthy. I will also be supporting amendment 40, tabled in the name of the shadow Minister, and amendment 28, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.
As stated, triable either-way offences, with potential sentences of up to three years, could be tried in the new Crown court bench division swift court. I argue that cases where a defendant may receive a sentence of up to three years are not minor offences; we are talking about life-changing sentences. Often in this category, we are talking about possession with intent to supply, actual bodily harm, death by careless driving, or section 20 unlawful wounding or grievous bodily harm, including where there is a grave injury. We must safeguard those sorts of cases against rough justice—an issue that much of the legal profession has warned could arise. It is vital that the Government provide an appeal system against decisions on whether to allocate a case for trial in front of a judge or jury.
I would like some clarification from the Minister: when we talk about summary offences, indictable offences and then triable either-way offences, are the measures being introduced in this Bill removing the concept of triable either-way offences? Are we then moving all those categories of offences into what are described as summary offences—these offences that carry long, life-changing sentences?
Briefly, amendment 28 would add a procedural requirement, but it is an important one because it would mean that the court could not simply decide, on the papers, to move a case to a judge-only trial; both parties would have to have first been given the opportunity to argue the point at a hearing, and only if both sides expressly gave up that right could the court proceed without one.
That goes back to the point that I raised earlier about the Canadian model, which I know the Government have been exploring and have spent time in Canada looking at. There, people have the right to elect a judge-only trial, so there is still an element of choosing what that looks like. That is not what this Government are proposing; they are proposing that there be no choice in the system, and that there be no legal precedent for it. I would appreciate the Minister’s answer to that.
Yasmin Qureshi
I will speak to amendment 28, regarding page 9, line 20 of the Bill. Essentially, the amendment states that, if the prosecution and defence waive their right to a hearing, the court can then make a determination under proposed new section 74AB of the Senior Courts Act 1981. That proposed new section, which will be introduced by clause 3, contains provisions regarding what the court must look at when determining allocation, such as whether a jury trial is to be declined. It is a fairly self-explanatory amendment, but a vital safeguard.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I accept that it might be a mischaracterisation to describe it as rough justice, but does the Minister agree that in this case it will be summary justice, which by its very definition is rougher around the edges, because it is summary?
Sarah Sackman
I am happy to sit down with the hon. Member again to clarify what she means by summary. There is no curtailment of the trial. All the elements of the trial happen in exactly the same way: the prosecution presents its evidence; the defence presents its evidence; witnesses are cross-examined; the evidence is tested. It is not summary in that sense—but if she wants to come back on that, I am happy to give way.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I appreciate the opportunity to come back on that. That poses another question: if judge-only trials are going to take the exact same amount of time, how will this speed up the court backlog?
Sarah Sackman
As we have heard extensively in evidence, whether from Sir Brian Leveson, the three experienced judges or our international comparators, including the Attorney General for Ontario, it does save time in a number of ways. The most compelling characterisation I heard was from Clement Goldstone, the recorder of many years’ experience from Liverpool. He said:
“in my experience it is wrong to confine the savings, or the assessment of the savings, to empanelling and swearing in a jury. That is where it begins.
Every sex case, I suspect probably nationally, now comes before the court with a direction that there will be no witnesses before 2.15 pm on the first day or, if the case is starting at 2.15 pm, until 10.30 the following morning. If there is no jury, there is no bar to the evidence starting within 10 or 15 minutes... Half a day, at least, will be saved on every sex case that is heard in the Crown court. That is before you start with time lost as a result of jury sickness, or a juror being delayed”.
He went on to say—and we heard this from the Canadian witness as well—that
“It is also easier to call a witness out of order if you are not trying to take a jury through in the order in which the evidence would otherwise be called.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Bill Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.]
He said, in terms, “I do not accept that there will not be a significant amount of time saved.”
It is not right to call a judge-only trial summary. It is not right to call it rough justice, and it is also not right to say that time will not be saved. Substantial time will be saved.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 3, page 6, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) A trial conducted without a jury will be heard by one judge and two magistrates.”
This amendment implements the recommendation of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts to have cases heard in the Crown Court Bench Division by a judge and two magistrates.
Sir Brian Leveson and the Minister, on the many occasions on which we have discussed this issue, have been very clear that the proposals set out in the independent review of the criminal courts were not to be treated as a pick and mix. Sir Brian was clear that it was meant to be a package of reforms, alongside stating that juries are not the cause of the backlog; I want to make sure that that is on the record.
But the Government have indeed chosen to pick and mix from Sir Brian’s recommendations, because he never proposed a judge sitting alone in the Crown court bench division. He proposed including a lay element, with two magistrates sitting with the judge; the magistrates would have equal decision-making authority on matters of fact, evidence and sentencing, while the judge would retain responsibility on rulings of law. The purpose of having two was to enable them to outvote the judge on matters of fact and, importantly, to maintain public participation and legitimacy in the absence of a jury.
Sir Brian referred to that in part 1 of his review. He said:
“In a similar vein, the inclusion of two magistrates in the composition of the bench would also ensure that the CCBD would satisfy the expectation of”
being judged by “one’s peers.” He continued:
“I...will not revisit those arguments here. I do, however want to acknowledge the diversity of the current magistracy, which I believe goes some way to satisfying this expectation and would help ensure a fair and balanced representation in the CCBD.”
The magistracy has done an excellent job of improving its diversity, although one could argue that there is still more work to do. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, has said:
“It seems to me that if one is going to reduce the involvement of the general public, as members of a jury, in the relatively low-level cases that go to the Crown court, maintaining public involvement through the magistracy is a good course to follow. It also has the great advantage of simply replicating a constitution and jurisdiction that exists in the Crown court at the moment. When there is an appeal from the magistrates court against conviction or sentence, including an appeal against conviction in an either-way case, it is heard in the Crown court by a judge and two magistrates.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 75, Q159.]
The Government cannot shirk their commitment to fair justice free from bias. If these changes are to be implemented, they should include the safeguard of two magistrates in the Crown court bench division. I would appreciate the Minister’s outlining why the Government have departed from Leveson on the point. Is it because there is a concern about finding enough magistrates to fill the roles? Is it because the magistracy will already be overwhelmed by the additional cases given to it as a result of the new sentencing powers outlined in this Bill? Or is it because the Government believe that having the lay element provides no additional safeguard in the interests of fair justice? Through the amendment, we seek to implement the recommendation of Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts.
Joe Robertson
The hon. Member for Chichester has set out the reasoning behind her amendment very well. If the amendment were agreed to, it would not go anywhere near restoring jury trials, but it would plainly be an improvement. The leading argument in its favour is that it is what Sir Brian Leveson recommended. The Government have repeatedly cited Brian Leveson’s review, and rightly so—that is what the Bill flows out of—but as the hon. Member for Chichester says, it cannot be a pick and mix. The Government cannot cite Leveson on the one hand and ignore him on the other.
Quite aside from the fact that the opinion expressed in the independent review has been ignored here, there are objectively good reasons why a trial heard by a judge and two magistrates is preferable to a trial heard by a judge alone. For a start, there would be three decision makers rather than one; with a jury there are 12, but clearly three is better than one. But it is not just a matter of numbers. Magistrates could be viewed, and certainly have been viewed, as a hybrid of jurors and judges. They are not judges, and they are not legally qualified people. They bring the quality that jurors bring—varied life experience—to the decision-making process. Of course, in a magistrates court, they are guided in the law by a legally qualified clerk.
It is fairly obvious that magistrates as a group are less diverse than the population of the United Kingdom, from which jurors are drawn, but at least they represent a greater diversity and variety of experience than judges. Judges all share one thing: they went to law school, they are legally qualified and they have had a career that is privileged—that is not a criticism, but I do not think it is an unfair word to describe a judge’s career. Magistrates have a greater variety of life experience. To bring magistrates into the decision making alongside a judge, as Sir Brian Leveson envisaged, would be to bring at least some element of a jury trial: the quality of being unjaded by a career in law and being unencumbered by the experience of being a well-paid legal professional.
I struggle to support the amendment, because it does not go anywhere near maintaining the system that we have today, but it would at least be a small improvement. It is an obvious point, but judges sit alongside magistrates today; it is a tried, tested and understood approach, not an obscure or novel one. Indeed, appeals are often heard in that way, as I understand it, because there is added rigour in having a magistrate sitting alongside a judge.
Of course, having a judge sitting alongside magistrates is an improvement on having magistrates alone, because judges bring professionalism from their legal training and experience of the law as part of the judiciary. There is a benefit there, although of course the benefit is already delivered by the Government’s own amendment, notwithstanding that it is worse than what we have today.
I commend, or at least understand, what the hon. Member for Chichester is trying to achieve. It comes from a good place, but unfortunately—this is not her fault, but the Government’s—it does not go anywhere near maintaining the status quo, which in my view is plainly greatly preferable both to her amendment and to the Government’s approach.
Sarah Sackman
As ever, my hon. Friend raises a very good point. Overall in the country, 14% of our magistrates are drawn from black and minority ethnic communities. The picture is not bad in the midlands, which my hon. Friend takes a particular interest in. The reality is that we are not in a position to pay our magistrates, but it touches on another consideration in this context. As I have said, I fully accept that magistrates would add a community element to the Crown court bench division, but it is also true to say that in relation to longer and more complex matters, which necessarily are what we are talking about when we are talking about the Crown court bench division, the type of magistrate who can give up their time for the length of time needed to hear longer trials—for weeks at a time—is, I would suggest, inevitably skewing towards the less diverse end of the magistracy.
The other point to make, in addition to the practical one, which I have been transparent about throughout, is the normative one. If I can put it colloquially, the Government make this policy choice because we believe our judges can do it. We believe they can do it for the reasons that I have reiterated in earlier parts of the discussion: their integrity, impartiality and ability to manage the court efficiently. And we see parallels—international comparators. I will again draw on Canada, where this is done to good effect while maintaining the fairness and integrity of the trials.
Introducing a requirement for magistrates to sit alongside judges would risk delaying the implementation of these reforms and, with that, delaying the benefits to victims, defendants, complainants, witnesses and the wider justice system. The Government’s view is that in that time the backlog would continue to grow and remain unresolved, and we cannot have that. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw her amendment.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I recognise the comments made by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. I agree that the amendment would not go towards restoring jury trials, and I will continue to push for jury trials to remain at their current thresholds. However, in the absence of the Government budging on that issue, I will continue to table amendments as we go through this process, and I know that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle echoed those points.
The Minister rightly talked of the pressure in the system that must be met. We all feel that deeply across the House; no party represented on the Committee thinks the status quo is acceptable, or that a good version of justice is being served for anyone who is sitting in that backlog, or who is being told that their case will not be heard until 2029. However, the Minister also recognised that the lay element is really important, which surely strengthens the argument that she would not be doing this if she had capacity in the magistracy. If the magistracy was running at full volume, or at its numbers from 15 years ago, she would be including that lay element in the Crown court bench division.
There is a balance to be struck, and the balance should not see our fundamental justice system reduced or degraded in any way. It is something that we should be proud of in this country, and we should protect its core principles. I will push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sarah Sackman
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is no longer in her place, and the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for their amendments.
I will begin with amendment 26. The defendant’s interests are already embedded into decision making on mode of trial reallocation. Parties are given the opportunity to make representations on reallocation, meaning the defence can draw the court’s attention to how the factors in the Bill intersect with a defendant’s interests, including the impact of delays to proceedings. Parties are also able to override a judge’s decision to reallocate to a jury trial if they both consent to remain in front of the Crown court bench division judge-alone, allowing, for example, a consensus for swifter justice to prevail.
At the same time, clause 3 requires the court itself to have regard to the interest of complainants—victims—when deciding whether reallocation would be appropriate. Those interests would be properly weighed by the court alongside the other factors set out in the Bill.
Finally, an additional “interests of justice” factor would be superfluous, not least because many of the factors that already fall under an “interests of justice” test, such as delays to proceedings and the impact on witnesses, are already taken account of. Introducing such a broad and undefined factor would risk undermining the structured and calibrated framework that Parliament is being asked to approve. It would also reintroduce uncertainty into the decision making that the clause is designed to make clear and workable in practice—not just the clause, but any accompanying criminal procedure rules. I have faith in our judiciary to make informed and robust decisions on the mode of trial reallocation. As such, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw her amendment.
Turning to amendment 44, where an indictable-only offence is added to a bench division case, it will always be reallocated to jury trial. Where a jury trial has started, it can never be reallocated to the bench division. The principles of natural justice encompass the right to a fair trial, the rule against bias and the duty to act fairly. All of those elements are preserved in these reforms. The amendment would not add any substantive protection beyond those safeguards already in place.
Jess Brown-Fuller
On a point of clarification, in the instance where a jury trial may begin but the case is adjourned for any reason, could it be reallocated to the Crown court bench division at a later date when it is rescheduled, or would it continue to have a jury trial?
Sarah Sackman
Under the provisions, where a jury trial has started, it cannot be reallocated to the CCBD.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I am just trying to get some clarification about when a jury trial “has started”. If a jury trial is listed on a day but the case is adjourned, it does not go ahead. Cases can be adjourned for many different reasons—the defence or the prosecution could not be ready. In that instance, where the case is adjourned to be relisted on a different day, would the defendant maintain their right to a jury trial or could it be reallocated to the bench division?
Sarah Sackman
What circumstances does the hon. Member envisage would trigger that reallocation? The allocation has been made—it has been allocated to a jury trial. She is right that it has not yet commenced, which is the point I was dealing with, but the circumstances we are dealing with here fall into two broad categories: first, where the nature of the offences in question changes; or secondly, where new evidence comes into play mid-trial, which is so material as to lead to an application to reallocate, or even to a judge of their own volition deciding that the seriousness necessitates reallocation. I cannot see, where it has been allocated already but has not yet commenced, why that would be triggered. But maybe I have missed something.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting)
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Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq.
I speak in support of amendments 23, 39 and 24 which, taken together, would do something simple but important: they would build a measure of flexibility back into the clause, so that jury trial is still available where the cause of justice requires it. The Minister should think carefully. As drafted, the clause creates a very blunt regime: unless the court predicts a sentence of more than three years, the trial is to be conducted without a jury. The amendments would go a small way towards softening that rigidity and making the system less arbitrary, more proportionate and hence more just.
With the amendments, two different Committee members take two different approaches to delivering the same outcome of additional flexibility in the clause. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, is broad in nature, setting out an additional condition for jury trial when needed to ensure natural justice, whereas the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden takes a more granular approach to the problem by listing the specific circumstances that might warrant the need for jury trial, again to ensure fairness. Both approaches seek to achieve the same thing.
I will speak to each amendment in a little more detail, starting with amendment 23. Clause 3 is currently built on one single condition for preserving jury trial in relevant cases: whether the defendant is likely to receive a sentence of more than three years if convicted. Amendment 23 would change the wording from “the condition” to
“one or more of the conditions”.
This is the gateway to allow amendment 24, which lists various conditions, to work.
The amendment matters because it opens the door to a more sensible approach, in which sentence is not the only thing that counts. That is exactly the right approach. When we deal with a constitutional safeguard as important as jury trial, the Committee should be wary of a system that turns entirely on a single mechanistic threshold. Human beings and criminal cases are not that neat, and Parliament should not pretend that they are. The amendment is therefore modest, tidy, entirely sensible and the necessary first step to add judgment, flexibility and common sense to a clause that has far too little of all three.
On amendment 24 and its list of conditions, the Government’s model under the clause is to ask the court at an early stage to forecast the sentence that would likely be imposed if the defendant were convicted. If the forecast is more than three years, there is a jury; if it is not, there is none. That is far too crude a test to bear the full constitutional weight that the Government want to place on it. The Bill itself exposes the weakness in the logic, because although the allocation decision turns on a prediction about a sentence above or below three years, the Bill also expressly states that nothing prevents a court sitting without a jury from later imposing a sentence of more than three years. In other words, even the Bill recognises that the initial prediction may not tell the whole story; if that is so, why should that prediction be the sole basis on which a person loses the right to jury trial?
Amendment 24 is so worth while because it states that in deciding whether a defendant should still have a jury, the court should not only look at the likely sentence but be able to consider whether: the defendant is of good character; they have previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence; they are treated as rehabilitated; conviction would cause significant reputational or professional harm; the gravity or complexity of the case might increase; and other exceptional circumstances. That does not strike me as radical. It is simply an attempt to make the law reflect reality and be less prescriptive. Additional flexibility makes for better outcomes.
One of the strongest parts of amendment 24 is the recognition it gives to good character and to those who have not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence. I raise this because the Government’s crude threshold risks producing perverse results. The people who may be hit hardest by clause 3 are precisely those who are newer to the justice system, those of previous good character and those for whom a conviction would be utterly life-changing.
The Bar Council illustrated the point starkly in written evidence with the example of a 19-year-old student charged with possession with intent to supply after a small amount of Spice was found in their room—I am sure Members will remember my reciting that specific example in Committee on Tuesday. Because they are of good character, the likely sentence under the guidelines may be low enough that they lose jury trial altogether, even though the charge could destroy their future. Meanwhile, someone with previous convictions may be more likely to cross the sentencing threshold and so keep the right to a jury. That is exactly the sort of absurdity that amendment 24 tries to avoid.
That is wholly consistent with the broader critique of the Bill. Conservative Members have repeatedly argued that the Government are treating this as an administrative exercise, when in fact people’s lives are at stake. The shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), put it clearly on Second Reading when he said that the Government were proposing to remove fundamental rights
“without a mandate, without a case and without any evidence”.—[Official Report, 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 207.]
The Opposition also challenged Ministers on taking away jury trial for offences that cost defendants their jobs, their homes and their families. Amendment 24 responds precisely to that point.
I note the inclusion in amendment 24 of cases in which the defendant would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected. That is important because the seriousness of a case cannot be measured by custody alone. A sentence of under three years can still destroy a person’s livelihood, strip them of professional standing, end a career built over decades and permanently alter family life. The Government keep speaking as though anything beneath their threshold is somehow low level. The Opposition have rightly made the point that even where a sentence is below three years, the consequences can be catastrophic. Amendment 24 simply recognises that reality.
There is an obvious point of fairness here, too. If the state wishes to prosecute a person in circumstances where conviction may ruin their livelihood or reputation for life, it is hardly excessive to say that jury trials should at least remain available. That is an ancient constitutional right and the Government should, even now, think very hard before removing it.
I also support paragraph (f) in amendment 24, which deals with cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity might increase. Again, this is simply common sense. Criminal cases often evolve, evidence changes, witnesses come forward, and issues that initially looked straightforward become anything but in the crucible that is the courtroom.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
The hon. Lady is making an excellent point about the complexity of cases changing throughout. A legal professional recently shared with me the story of what was an assault case, but the victim passed away during the trial, so they are now dealing with hearing evidence of potential brain trauma injury. Does the hon. Lady agree that that case deserves the complexity of a full Crown court trial because the case has changed as the trail has developed?
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with the hon. Lady. She has set out a good example of the type of things that happen in reality. Life is not tidy, and unexpected things happen. As we look at the Bill and whether a sentence is over or under three years, it is easy to think in simple terms but, in reality, people who work in the justice system—I have not done so, but I have spoken to people who do—understand the movement and flexibility that is required. That is why amendment 24 works really well by taking that into account. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who drafted it, clearly has real-world experience of what actually happens in a courtroom.
The Bill already recognises elsewhere that there can be a relevant change of circumstances requiring the court to revisit allocation, so the Government’s own drafting accepts that these matters are dynamic rather than static. If that is so, why would we not want to build in a bit more foresight at the front end as well? Paragraph (f) in amendment 24 is not some wild departure from the structure of the Bill; it sits comfortably with the Government’s own recognition that allocation decisions can become unsound as a case develops. It is simply a more prudent and realistic approach to cases in which the true seriousness may emerge only over time.
Finally, the reference in amendment 24 to “other exceptional circumstances” is extremely important. No statute, however carefully drafted, can predict every factual scenario. That is especially true in criminal justice, where the facts and human consequences of a case can vary enormously. A residual exceptional circumstances test is therefore not a weakness; it is a mark of maturity in the law. It recognises that Parliament should not force judges into injustice. If the Government truly believe in justice rather than mere throughput, they should have no objection to preserving a narrow, exceptional route to jury trial where justice plainly demands it.
Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, deals with the alternative, broader approach to building flexibility into clause 3. It is an especially important amendment because it puts the issue in the clearest possible terms: those of natural justice. The amendment says that a trial should still be conducted with a jury where the defendant demonstrates that to be tried without one
“would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
That is an extremely modest safeguard. It would not wreck the clause; it would merely build in additional protection through allowing an element of judgment to decide the mode of trial. It would not restore the right to a jury trial in every either-way case; it simply says that where the injustice is plain, a jury trial must remain available. I struggle to see how any Government serious about fairness could object to that.
This is an issue of paramount importance on our side, and I hope on the Government’s side too. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle tabled amendment 39, as well as amendments elsewhere in the Bill—in relation to clause 1, in relation to reallocation under clause 3, and in relation to clause 4—to seek to protect natural justice. We will keep making these points. If Ministers insist on creating judge-only routes, they must at the very least accept a residual safeguard based on natural justice.
For all the reasons I have outlined, I support amendments 23, 39 and 24. They would deliver the additional safeguards needed, so I urge the Government to adopt either the Opposition’s amendment or the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.
Sarah Sackman
I think there is some consensus here. We are all extolling the virtues of our system. As the Minister with responsibility not just for courts, but for legal services more generally, promoting our legal services and courts around the world, I am very proud of that. Being proud of our system in England and Wales, however, does not mean that there are not things that we can learn from other jurisdictions, particularly where they are producing better outcomes in timeliness or in the treatment of minorities, women, rape and serious sexual offences. It is why I went to Canada to learn from practitioners and judges there. We will take the lessons from wherever we find them. I will pick up later on the point about regional differences, because we must always learn lessons, whether internationally or closer to home.
Jess Brown-Fuller
We heard oral evidence from Doug Downey, who talked about the Canadian system. He also talked about how the right to elect is a protected characteristic of their justice system. The difference is that they have the right to elect a judge-alone trial. Did the Minister explore the option of maintaining the right to elect, but allowing defendants to choose whether they would like to have their case heard in a Crown court bench division with a judge alone?
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Member asks a typically great question. We did think about it. I am well aware that the right to elect exists, once a defendant is in the superior court in Canada. We considered whether the right to elect to go before the Crown court bench division should be included as part of the reforms. The reason we did not, and the reason why these reforms are predicated on the consistent principle that it is for the court to determine mode of trial, is partly about the balance we wanted to achieve within the system between defendant rights and the rights of other participants—I am wary of using the word victim—or complainants within the system.
We received representations from many complainants and people who have been victims of crime, and those who represent their interests, such as the independent Victims’ Commissioner and London Victims’ Commissioner. Many felt that it was so often the defendant’s choice and right to insist on choice that was driving the process and was part of an imbalance in the process. There is both a pragmatic element to our choice, because we think that by introducing a new Crown court bench division we will save time and speed up the processing of trials, and a normative principle behind it, which is about who is in the driving seat in these decisions. We think it should be the court and not always the defendant.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)
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Sarah Sackman
Absolutely; the comment from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington was really important. In fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate also made the point about the equality impacts. The way that the measures in the Bill, and indeed our current justice system, impact on different communities in differential ways rightly concerns the Government. It is precisely why we committed to an independent statutory review, and it is why too I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling her amendment, so that the Committee will have an opportunity to discuss those important issues on a cross-party basis.
We need to ensure not only that we have the right safeguards, monitoring and data collection, but that the reforms in the Bill do not entrench a status quo that has sometimes fallen short of our collective aspirations for justice and equality, so that they can command the confidence of all communities as we implement, monitor and refine them in future, if needed.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
The Minister is making an impassioned plea for trying to equalise the system. Does she not share my concern about the Government’s proposals? Person A could be accused of sexual assault on the tube, and have never been in any criminal justice situation, while person B could have had a string of offences that they have been charged with and ended up serving prison time for. They would get a jury trial because of their past offences, but somebody of previous good character would not, under the Minister’s proposals.
Sarah Sackman
It would depend on the facts of the case. First, I do not entirely understand the rancour behind the examples. If someone has committed a serious crime that could attract a six, seven or eight-year sentence, those are indictable-only offences. I think we all agree that we would want them to have a jury trial, which they would under the proposals in the Bill, because anything likely to get a sentence of three years or more will receive a jury trial.
In the scenario the hon. Lady described in respect of the person of good character, it is right that at the plea and trial preparation hearing—the mode of trial allocation phase—the likely sentence depending on the seriousness will be looked at. In that process, the likely sentence would no doubt take into account—albeit it is a high-level assessment, in line with the sort of assessment that magistrates courts make every day—the mitigating factors, which might include the person’s good character. In bringing forward the reforms, I believe that that person will get a fair trial wherever they get it: in a magistrates court, in the Crown court bench division or, indeed, at a full jury trial if the crime is likely to get a sentence of three years or more. It is not about the person who has done the more serious crime enjoying greater rights. It is because it is a more serious crime that it gets a jury trial. That is a proportionate use of the resources in our system.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister may have misunderstood my point. If person A and person B have committed the exact same offence—they might have done it a day apart, in the same place, in the same circumstances—but person B has previous record, they are more likely to be heard in front of a jury trial. With person A, who is of good character, the offence remains the same, but the fact that person B has had previous offences means they are charged with a higher offence. The case and the evidence might be exactly the same, but they would end up with a different type of trial. Does the Minister think that is fair?
Sarah Sackman
We have an obligation to guarantee a fair trial. I believe that wherever cases are heard in this system, they will be heard fairly. It will be a different mode of trial, but it will be heard fairly. Ultimately, it comes back to a fundamental difference between us. The view has been taken by those on the Opposition Benches that, somehow, what one gets in a magistrates court—where 90% of our trials are heard—is less fair. That is in front of not just lay magistrates but district judges hearing cases. Some of the most serious civil matters such as the decisions around care proceedings—to remove children from their parents’ care—are determined by single judges. I believe that a single judge can determine cases fairly and impartially. That is the system that exists in different jurisdictions, including our own, and it works well and fairly. It is not unfair for somebody to be allocated a trial type based on the seriousness of the offence they are alleged to have committed.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Does the shadow Minister agree that to try to compare the CPS with, for example, the Criminal Bar Association is nonsense because the CPS is a non-ministerial Department? As the hon. Member has pointed out, the policy position is to agree with structural reform because they know that the system is broken. None of us is disagreeing with that today or disagreeing that there is a problem in the system that needs fixing. Of course, the CPS would say that we absolutely need to do something. However, it is not its role as a non-ministerial Department to say that it thinks that the Minister has got it wrong. What it is saying in broadbrush terms is that it agrees that something needs to be done. In contrast, the Criminal Bar Association actually surveyed all its members, because it is an independent organisation, and 88% of them came back and said that they were opposed to the reforms. They are two totally different things.
Dr Mullan
I did raise an eyebrow at the level of evidence that the individual from the CPS chose to give in relation to commenting on Government policy in that way. I have spoken to previous Justice Ministers, and that was unprecedented. Again, if we want to give validity to its views, can Government Members point to a single time that the CPS has got up and directly opposed the policy of the Government of the day? It does not do that. It is all very well and good to champion it when it agrees with this particular point, but it is nonsense if it has never disagreed with Government policy because it is a non-departmental Government body. Again, the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford is perfectly entitled to raise it, but to try to give it the weight and character of the other organisations that are lobbying, campaigning and representing does not hold up to much scrutiny—as we have seen.
Dr Mullan
I thank the Minister for explaining the measures as she understands them. I do not mind admitting that some of the explanations in the explanatory notes and the information from the Library have left us with questions about how the measure will operate. The clause refers to written indication of guilty plea, and the explanatory notes refer to this as being available to those who are pleading guilty. I do not mind admitting that the Minister is much more directly experienced with the legal system than I am, as are other members of the Committee, but I do not quite understand the idea of someone choosing the mode of trial after they have pleaded guilty. If they have indicated at the outset that they are going to plead guilty, will the hearing not be about sentencing, rather than trial? My remarks will be focused on that.
The obvious thing to ask is this. If this measure is purely about sentencing, why would anyone who has pleaded guilty ever elect to have a sentencing hearing in the Crown court, where they know there could be a higher sentence, rather than in the magistrates court, where they know there will be a cap on what sentence can be passed? Our arguments have been about the process of the trial itself, and I have touched on some of the elements other than sentencing. That is not to say that there may not be perfectly reasonable grounds for someone to object if they think the decision made was wrong. Again, these are people who have admitted guilt, so we can clearly say they are criminals. Some of them may have spurious reasons for wanting to approach the system in that way, by seeking not to go to the Crown court, but they may also legitimately think that the decision was wrong or not fair. They may well have legal advice that the decision was not consistent with the sentencing guidelines, and that they would have been expected to have stayed in the magistrates court. As we discussed this morning, a significant number of the appeals in the magistrates court are successful, although I accept that those who seek an appeal are in the minority. We all accept that the magistrates courts make mistakes.
It is important that we understand how this measure will work in practice. Can the Minister tell us how many people are objecting and using the mechanism at the moment? That is also confusing, because the explanatory note says that these provisions are not yet in place, but what is her projection of the difference this will make? What will be its material impact? The provisions have not been commenced, but the Government and civil servants must have a view about how objections would have operated and what they would have achieved, versus the right to make representations. What is the difference between those two mechanisms? A guilty person cannot insist on being sentenced in a magistrates court. If the magistrates think that someone is going to hit a higher tariff and should go to Crown court, the person can, in theory, object, as I understand it, but they cannot stop it. Before we vote on the clause, I want the Minister to explain in detail exactly how this will be different from what the Government envisioned was going to happen.
Is there a risk in theory that more things will go to the Crown court? If the Government are saying, “You can’t object,” they must think that at the minute, in theory—if the provisions were to be commenced—some people would be kept in the magistrates court inappropriately. The Government must want more of those people to go the Crown court. If they thought everyone was just going to stick in the magistrates court anyway, why would they be doing it?
Jess Brown-Fuller
The shadow Minister is clearly articulating his confusion, which I share. I believe that clause 2 is at odds with the rest of clauses 1 to 8, because it does the opposite of what those other clauses are trying to achieve. Let us say that, on the advice of legal counsel, Person A has been told that, if they plead guilty, they will most likely receive a suspended sentence. They are keen to move on with their life and therefore they are willing to enter a guilty plea, but they are then told by the magistrates that they would like their case to be heard in the Crown court, which could carry a higher tariff. At the moment, they have the right to object to their case being taken over to the Crown court, because the conditions in which they pleaded guilty have changed. By removing that right, we are making sure that people do not get to say whether they want their case heard in the Crown court, which could push more cases into the Crown court. That makes clause 2 feel at odds with the rest of the clauses, which are trying to remove things from the Crown court. Does the shadow Minister agree?
Dr Mullan
I do. In the other direction, the Institute for Government highlights that
“only around 30% of sentences of 6-12 months were handed out by magistrates”
since their sentencing powers increased from six months to 12 months. That indicates a hesitation in the magistrates courts to award higher sentences. If the Government have the objective of sending these cases to the Crown court, but there is evidence to suggest that magistrates hesitate when it comes to higher sentences, ultimately this measure will not change that.
I want to be clear, because I think that there is some confusion about what is written in the Bill and the explanatory notes. The explanatory notes say:
“The amendments remove the ability of the defendant or the prosecutor to object to the case being sent to the Crown Court for sentence”.
We are talking about sentencing, but that is not exactly what the Minister said or what the Bill seems to say. Before we are asked to vote in support of the clause, the Government need to clear this up, so that we can all understand what exactly this change will achieve that is different in theory from what was going to happen.
I appreciate that this is challenging because we are discussing changes that have never been put into operation, but that is not really an excuse. The Government should have a view of how things were going to operate, and therefore must have formed a view about how they want them to operate differently as a result of this change.
Joe Robertson
I am very happy to say that I agree with all the things the Minister said. I also agree with learning from other systems. Plainly, the English legal system, like the English language, has been successful in its ability to adapt and evolve. Without going back to the beginning of my speech, started just a few minutes ago, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that this is an evolution—or arguably a revolution. [Interruption.] Was that another intervention? I think these measures are a stage too far.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I would like to briefly refer the Committee to some remarks that Sir Brian Leveson made during the evidence session we had before the recess. He said:
“We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 8, Q9.]
Sir Brian tried to explain that a lot of people look at the evidence and say, “Yes, I will plead guilty, but I will do so after Christmas”—that was his example. He said that now, because of the Crown court backlogs, people know that their case will not be heard until 2028.
The point that Sir Brian was trying to make is that we need to incentivise those who look at the evidence of their case, and recognise that a guilty verdict is probably going to be arrived at, to put in a guilty plea. Does clause 2 not risk having the reverse effect? People will see that if they put in a guilty plea, the one opportunity they have to argue whether the case should be heard in a magistrates court or a Crown court—although I imagine the majority of them would argue that it should be heard in the magistrates court in this specific example—is taken away from them. Are we not then disincentivising people to put in a guilty plea at an early stage, when we want to see the Crown court backlog come down?
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)
Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Yasmin Qureshi
The restriction on some cases not being tried in jury trials is because the Government feel that that will help to bring down the delay in court listing. I say to the Government that the problem is not the jury system, but the fact that other provisions need to be made sufficient. I am afraid that the problem was 14 years of Conservative cuts—I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman was a Member then. The Conservative Government did not take the Ministry of Justice seriously. There was a Lord Chancellor virtually every year—in 14 years, I think we had 10 Lord Chancellors, which tells us how important the criminal justice system was to the now Opposition.
To go back to my point about clause 1, and all the other clauses that follow, I urge my colleagues and the Minister to please rethink this whole thing. Juries are not the cause of the delay in our system.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
I will speak about the Liberal Democrats’ opposition to clause 1. The main reason why clause 1 should not be included in the Bill is that it fundamentally transforms the relationships that defendants have with the justice system. It is really important to make it clear that we are talking about defendants who have entered a not guilty plea, rather than the language that has been used this morning.
In particular, clause 1 removes the defendant’s ability to object to summary trial in the magistrates court—a process that is streamlined for swift justice and should be reserved for less serious cases. In his independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson recommended removing the right to elect a Crown court trial for certain low-level either-way offences that carry a maximum sentence length of two years or less. The Bill would remove the right to elect Crown court trial for all either-way offences. Concerns have been raised publicly about that, including the quality of justice, the capacity of the magistrates court and the fairness of applying this retrospectively.
Magistrates courts also face an increasing backlog, which is currently at 379,000 cases. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, alongside a huge drop in the number of magistrates over the past 20 years—from 28,300 to now 14,600. I am very aware that the Government are embarking on a journey to try to bring more magistrates into the system, but as they increase the number of magistrates, there are also magistrates leaving the system, so it is a real struggle to increase the number.
Removing the power of defendants to elect will increase the workload of the magistrates court, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Many in the legal profession have made that point. It would also be unfair to apply this change retrospectively. Consent is the appropriate basis for the most serious cases to be tried within a summary process. Changing the provision for more serious offences—to be clear, we are talking about things like possession with intent to supply, unlawful wounding and sexual assault—risks miscarriages of justice, as more serious cases would face summary trials in higher volumes, with reduced rights of appeal.
Rebecca Paul
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. It is a pleasure once again to be locked up in a Bill Committee with the Minister. It has been a while, and I am feeling nostalgic; it is wonderful to be here with her again. Maybe one day we will be on the same side—that would be nice, wouldn’t it?
I will speak against the clause in its entirety and in support of the amendment. I start by thanking the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for her powerful contribution. What she is doing is incredibly brave. It is not an easy thing to be sat on the Government Benches with a different view. I really hope that everyone will listen to what she had to say, because I think she was balanced in her approach: she was critical of the previous Government, and did not pull her punches on where she thinks the issues arose, but she suggested some good measures and made good points that we could adopt to address the backlog. That is the one thing that we all agree on in this room: we all want to address the backlog. We can rake over the past all we like, or we can look forward and do the right thing for the British people.
Clause 1 is an egregious clause that seeks to remove one of our fundamental rights. It seeks to remove the right of an adult defendant charged with a triable either-way offence to elect for Crown court trial instead. Instead, the mode of trial will be determined solely by the magistrates courts. In practice, that means that defendants who currently have a right to trial by jury—the right to be judged by their peers—will no longer have it.
The Government have suggested that this unprecedented change to our justice system will impact only those accused of shoplifting and other petty crimes, but that is not the case. It impacts those accused of an either-way offence where the sentence would be for up to three years in prison—three years. It will impact people charged with causing death by careless driving, committing fraud, sexual assault or actual bodily harm, and many other serious offences. Those are not minor or petty by any stretch and can be life changing for everyone involved. Removing the right to jury trial for such crimes is not a minor tweak to our justice system; it takes a sledgehammer to it.
Trial by jury is an English institution, which has served for centuries to ensure that justice is done. No justice system works if it is not accepted and respected by its people. It is vital that we remember that before making changes. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater on an ideological whim is an irresponsible act. Dispensing justice is not just another process with checkboxes; it impacts people’s lives irrevocably. Decisions about how our system operates should be taken carefully and responsibly in recognition of that, and should allow an element of flexibility in the approach to get the right outcomes. That is what the amendment seeks to add.
I urge the Government to tread carefully before throwing away something that has worked for hundreds of years, and that the British people value and respect. The common-sense determination of 12 citizens is often exactly what is needed to ensure fair justice. They are not jaded or desensitised to crime, because they have not had to sit through it day in, day out for years on end. They have not seen over their whole career the worst of humanity. They are from all walks of life, bringing diversity, and often compassion and understanding to the process. The Government can of course force the change through with the numbers they have, if they so wish, but I urge them to reflect on whether that is truly the legacy that they want.
The planned limitation of the right to trial in the clause is justified by the Government as a necessary measure to get the Crown court backlog down. They defend this extraordinary restriction of our rights by arguing that the changes put victims first and at the heart of the justice system, but I remind the Government that before any verdict, there are no victims and offenders, only defendants and complainants. In this country, we are innocent until proven guilty. Justice is not just about victims; it is also about fairness for the accused, too.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)
Jess Brown-Fuller ExcerptsWednesday 25th March 2026
(4 months ago)
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Sarah Sackman
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: The reason why I started to think about that was that I have long been of the view that it would be valuable, as technology has improved, to record magistrates court proceedings—in other words, to have a record of what is said in the magistrates courts. Once one is doing that, there is no reason why one should not introduce the same sort of approach to appeals as the one used in the Crown court and the Court of Appeal criminal division.
I was particularly impressed—I use the word impressed, but I was concerned—by an argument that I heard that many minor sexual assaults that were dealt with in the magistrates courts or the youth courts, which could include rape, almost automatically went to appeal to the Crown court, on the basis that the victim would not turn up the second time and be prepared to go through the whole process again. That is a serious problem. To require victims to go through the experience of giving evidence and being cross-examined twice is unfair on them. Everybody needs to be able to move on with their lives, and that is victims and defendants as well.
Although I have talked about defendants gaming the system, I do not ignore defendants who are determined to pursue a not guilty plea because they do not feel they have done anything wrong, but whose lives are on hold for years until their trials happen. I had an example of a young man who was at university and charged with rape. His university career is long since gone, and he could not get a job because he had to tell potential employers, “I’m due to be tried for rape.” The system has to change. That is what I believe, but of course it is for you to decide whether it does.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: That is easily answered: there are just too many of them. My view is that nobody should be a circuit judge unless they are capable of trying serious sexual crime—nobody. The empathy required to deal with victims is not just restricted to rape and serious sexual crimes. The make-up of cases going to the Crown court has changed over the last 10 years, so what might have been a good idea 10 or 15 years ago when there were fewer such cases does not cut it now. There are just too many cases, and that is why I did not recommend a specialist rape court.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Sir Brian Leveson: That is an interesting question. I have long since believed that there needed to be radical change. The fact is that the backlog went up in the 12 months since I was appointed in December 2024—sorry, this will be a longish answer. You would have thought that everybody would be working like mad to demonstrate that efficiency could bring the backlog down over the year following my appointment. Not only did the backlog not go down, but it went up higher than the highest projection that the Ministry had.
I have always been of the view that efficiency alone would not do it, and you were going to have to look at legislative change. If you were going to look at legislative change, it was important that you all had the chance to consider that as soon as possible, so I was perfectly content to deal with policy first and efficiency afterwards, on the basis that by the time you got around to dealing with it, you would have both reports anyway and you could look at everything together; I hope you have.
The Chair
I want to get three more people in, so pithy questions and pithy answers, please.
Sir Brian Leveson: I am sorry.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
“also stress important safeguards: tackling the lack of diversity on the bench, and ensuring judges are robustly trained in the dynamics of abuse and trauma.”
You know that over many years many different parliamentarians have tried to legislate to ensure that everyone in the judiciary has mandatory training on those important safeguards. You also know that we are always told that, because the judiciary is independent, we cannot legislate to mandate that training. What would you like to see in the Bill to ensure the important safeguards that victims have reflected to you?
Claire Waxman: I have made that point for years, regardless of these reforms. We have to improve and get reassurance around judicial training, including training on cultural competency, on understanding bias and prejudice and on the dynamics of abuse. We still see issues around coercive control, post-separation abuse and stalking. I need to be reassured that judges are being trained to the level that will give assurances to victims and to myself that they understand what is coming in front of them. We need reassurance from Government on that. I would suggest more investment in judicial training. We saw, over years—Vera will remember more than me when it happened—that the training on rape went down from three days to two days for judges. That was meant to be a temporary measure; I do not think it has gone back up. We need to make sure that we have good, robust training for judiciary and magistrates.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Claire Waxman: People in the criminal justice system need to move ahead with the efficiency measures. We need to move ahead with that so that we can start to see some of the adjournments not happening, better listing and so on. Of course, it is a desperate state. Just yesterday I spoke to a male victim of child sex abuse. He has been in the system since 2021 and in the court system for two years. He thought that he was giving evidence in the coming weeks. That has been adjourned and he has been asked his availability for 2027, 2028 and 2029. He is going to withdraw. I think Sir Brian said it—looking at structural reform came first because we know that the efficiency measures are not going to bring the backlog down quickly enough. We need to do everything together as a package of measures and we need to move ahead.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
Good morning, all. I welcome your work and the support that you offer victims—all of you, in what you have been doing. I am sure there is cross-party support for that in the room this morning. Do you think the changes in the Bill will improve the confidence of victims that, when they report crimes, they will receive justice more swiftly than they currently do and, more importantly, that the changes will also encourage more brave victims to come forward and report crimes?
Claire Waxman: There are a lot of good measures in the Bill that, if delivered and implemented well and with important safeguards, should have positive impacts for victims. We are removing appropriate cases from the Crown court, easing the burden there, and limiting the right to elect for a Crown court trial. By the way, victims view that right as an injustice. They feel that power and control is being given to the defendant, knowing full well that there is a chance they will come out of the process or that their evidence will be impacted over the years. That is something that victims regularly talk to me about. The measures around the automatic right to appeal and to make the magistrates a court of record will open up transparency in the courts and hopefully stop victims having to be called back in for a rehearing. That has devastating impacts; you cannot overestimate what it does to a victim when they think that they have gone through the process of giving evidence, and then they have to come in again.
If all those things ease the pressure and burden on the Crown court, that will give reassurance and confidence to victims who are thinking about whether to stay in the process currently. The measures Katrin talked about—putting in important safeguards around the cross-examination of rape victims—are so important. Vera and I have worked on this since 2019, because of section 41, past sexual history, and issues around cross-examination and compensation claims. That is a financial motive used to undermine the credibility of victims. Victims come out of the system and often say, “I will never report again,” but they tell their friends and families about their experiences, and that deters people and erodes public trust and confidence.
Dr Mullan
indicated dissent.
Dame Vera Baird: I see Kieran shaking his head, but there is no other way. There is a limited opportunity to give priority to cases. Obviously a very important point is whether the defendant is in custody. Most rape defendants are not in custody, because it is a “one word against the other” case, so they cannot be given any real priority for that reason. We end up very regularly with cases that took as long as Charlotte’s. That is really awful for a large number of victims. It also gives very little to the people who want this right: 64% of people who elect for trial plead guilty before they get to trial. You have to ask why they are electing for trial if they are going to plead guilty, but they have blocked up the jury list all of that time. This is about freeing up the jury list.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
The Chair
Can you respond briefly, please? I want to get Paulette in.
Claire Waxman: I can answer very quickly. It is a very good question, but unfortunately I think we have moved past the point at which we can pilot, because of where we are heading with the trajectory of the Crown court—the increase in the wait lists and how long victims are waiting. Modelling is very difficult, but we should not get stuck on percentages. The Government are saying around 20%, and the Institute for Government has now corrected its figures from 2% up to, I think, 9% or higher—to 15%. It is around the direction of travel and recognising that we have an overburdened Crown court. We need to move things out of the process.
Sarah Sackman
Q
As you have heard from previous witnesses, the primary thrust behind the Government’s measures in the Bill is to address the unacceptable delays that you have all described. However, we also have a responsibility to build back a better system. One choice that the Government made was to remove the right to elect, so that it is the court that allocates cases to the appropriate venue. We think that that makes things quicker and more efficient, but there is also a normative idea behind it that it is the court that should triage cases; you mentioned that in your remarks, Charlotte. What is your view on that reform? From a victim’s perspective, do you see sense in it, or not?
Charlotte Meijer: Definitely. Throughout the system, the victim is always on the back foot. You get told a day later—or, depending on the service that you receive, two days, three days, four days or a month later—what has gone on, but the perpetrator always knows exactly what goes on, because they have to be present and able to make decisions. Why is the perpetrator the one who can make these decisions? It makes it feel like they are in control, and that, as a victim, you are running behind to catch up.
That was exactly the case for me when I found out that he had selected a court. All of a sudden, I got a call to say, “Your perpetrator has picked a magistrates court, so that is now what will happen.” I had no choice in it. I had already had no choice for three years when he was controlling me; I had no choice for three years when he was raping me; and now I had no choice for two and a half or three years when I was in the system.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Farah Nazeer: Thank you for the question. There are a few things around presumption that could make a big difference. One is training for the entirety of the court staff, because the stories that we hear and the experiences that we support women and children through are frankly appalling. The staff are not trauma-informed and there is no understanding of what a victim is going through. The courts are weaponised and survivors are brought back to the courts repeatedly. It is an appalling process. No policy area that you work on at Women’s Aid is a picnic, but this is the worst. People describe the trauma that they go through in the family courts as worse than the trauma that they endured through the abuse that they experienced.
One thing is for the court system to understand domestic abuse, understand sexual violence, understand coercive control and be trauma-informed. That means having processes in which a survivor knows what is happening, understands what the next steps are and is supported through the system, and having separate places where a survivor can be. Some of it is quite basic, but it is really important to improving the survivor experience.
Another thing is the regulation of experts. We often have unregulated experts coming into the family courts to provide expertise and advice to the judge on what is happening in a relationship. You would not have unregulated experts in any safeguarding context; it is absolutely wild that you would have that. One thing we really want to see is regulated experts: psychiatrists and psychologists who are regulated by the appropriate body, rather than, seemingly, people who are just not.
The last thing that I want to focus on is the concept of parental alienation, which is often invoked in family courts. It is a concept that is not evidenced and is not recognised in psychiatric or medical practice, but it is often invoked as a concept to defend against claims of domestic abuse. What needs to happen is a child’s safety being put at the heart of the decision by a regulated expert, by a trained judge. If you get that right, you immediately improve the experience for survivors and children, and you improve the safeguarding around survivors and children. Those three things are absolutely critical to changing the culture and the experience and to ensuring safety.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
Q
Morwenna Loughman: Absolutely. One thing that kept me going—I was so close to pulling out multiple times—was that I had this sense that he had done it before. In fact, what I was later told—it was not admissible, but under the Bill it would become admissible—was that he had broken his ex-partner’s leg repeatedly and raped her as well. His defence barrister stood in front of the judge, the jury and me, and said, “This man has never hurt a woman.” Given that this man was out on bail and repeatedly breaching his bail conditions, brutal is the word. I cannot overstate the impact that that has on victims. It was devastating. I did not look people in the eye for two years. I wore a hat everywhere I went so I could hide my face, because he could have been anywhere. I had to move out of my home. My home became a crime scene. I lost my job. It was daily torture. I echo what Natalie Fleet said the other week in the House of Commons: that the one thing worse than being raped is waiting four years or more to hear if people actually believe you.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
There is an amendment that is going to the House of Commons today that is specifically about bail decisions and the route to verdict that juries are presented with before they go away to deliberate. Do you agree that sentencing remarks are only part of the journey that we need to be on, and that we need to be quite ambitious in ensuring victims have all the evidence in their own case, so they can start to move on and process?
Charlotte Meijer: Yes, absolutely. My campaign for all transcripts to be made available very quickly was shut down, so I have gone for little bits at a time. Sentencing remarks are an amazing change. At first, that was just for rape victims; now it is for all victims, which is great. However, if we look at RASSO cases, only 2% get a guilty verdict, so only 2% will get the free sentencing remarks. There needs to be something for the 98%.
The next thing that I have been campaigning for is the judge’s summing up, now the route to verdict, which is incredibly important. I am a not guilty verdict case, so I would not get my sentencing remarks either. It is about being able to understand. If we take that further, I believe the whole case should be available free, as it is in many other countries, or for a couple of pounds in administration costs. If we are taking it a bit at a time, the next bit would be, as you say, bail conditions and the route to verdict, to understand how someone got to that decision. That is all to aid people to understand what happened and process it a little better.
Amanda Hack
Q
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I guess there is the hope of fewer adjournments and fewer last-minute changes, which we hear about quite a lot. Any measure that could increase capacity for these kinds of cases is a measure we could get behind. Just having that—being able to plan your life and have reassurances that it will be going ahead—is important.
In the past, one of us mentioned floating trials for rape cases, which is, quite frankly, just absurd. Being able to have dedicated time to ensure that these cases do not become floating trials and that there is capacity for them to be seen in a prompt and timely manner would be welcome.
Morwenna Loughman: The first time my trial was listed, unbeknown to me and the rest of my family, it was listed as a floating trial, which means that two or more cases—in this instance, rape cases—are scheduled for the same time, on the same date and in the same court, on the assumption that at least two of you will drop over the course because it is so harrowing and re-traumatising. That is why mine got delayed right at the last minute.
We have talked a lot about the education of judges, which is absolutely essential, but we must also consider the education of juries. As I have said, they are not bastions of infallibility. The man who raped me was convicted. He was found guilty, but not unanimously. He was sentenced to 15 years, which gives an indication as to the level of injury that I sustained.
Two members of the jury found him not guilty and acquitted him of all charges. It was a majority vote; there was no unanimity, and it took them three and a half days to deliberate, even though I had received 48 injuries and he was arrested on the scene. I could go on about the extenuating circumstances. In every sense, how did it take them three and a half days to not even conclusively decide that this man had raped me?
Charlotte Meijer: I will add to that. The removal in the Bill of the defendant’s right to elect will make the victim feel empowered, knowing that the perpetrator is not in control. As I have said, there is the recording of magistrates courts, and the Bill is our hope that the waiting time will go down. That is the core reason why we are doing this. The system cannot get any worse than it is, so the waiting going down will be a significant change.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Q
Morwenna Loughman: Yes.
Jess Brown-Fuller
You also spoke about the concept of floating cases. Were you told beforehand that your case had been listed as a floating case? The reason I ask is that the legislation does not address how many adjournments we have. There is no mechanism in the legislation—I am happy to be corrected by the Minister—to address how often cases are adjourned. Listing officers will continue to list floating cases because they know that so many victims drop out of the process, or the CPS comes back and says that it does not have enough evidence to convict, and so on.
Did you have an ISVA supporting you through the process? Were you communicated with well enough? Did you know that your case could fall at that final hurdle? The most important thing is what victims such as yourselves would like to see from that process to understand that your cases could get adjourned, were they listed as floating cases.
Morwenna Loughman: I was never told that that was a possibility. Again, that fundamental lack of understanding points to a system weighted against the victim and against the complainant. You are hermetically sealed off from a system that has been designed to dismiss and re-silence you because there is this sense that you need help, or might seek help, and to be told what to say on the stand. I would not have been there for any reason other than that I had been raped, but there was this sense that I needed to be kept at arm’s length from the system. If this Bill can change how the whole justice process is seen, that is absolutely what we should be fighting for.
Court and Tribunal Transcripts
Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts(4 months ago)
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Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I thank all hon. Members who have spoken so thoughtfully on this important topic. I especially thank the hon. Member for Keighley and Ilkley (Robbie Moore) for representing the Petitions Committee; he has certainly done his homework, and I thank him for highlighting how mystified people often feel when they go through a lengthy court process only to find out that their trial has been monetised—or privatised—and that they have to spend thousands of pounds to gain access to their case.
I pay tribute to all 200,000 people across the country who signed the petition; I believe the general public got behind it so strongly because they are surprised that people are not entitled to transcripts of their own case. Justice must be accessible and visible. Trust in our justice system is built upon transparency—upon seeing the work and the reasoning behind decisions that affect so many lives. That is vital for defendants and crucial for victims and bereaved families, a point the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford (Daniel Francis) spoke passionately about. As the right hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay) says, we have achieved a consensus: this is one way that we can break down barriers for our constituents—as the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr Brash) mentioned, that is surely the most important role that we can play in this place—and make a genuine difference to people across the country who are engaging with the justice system.
The Liberal Democrats have long campaigned on this issue, particularly through the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney). Her campaigning for her constituent Juliana—a victim of rape who was told she would be charged £7,500 for her transcript—has been inspiring and has truly shifted the dial. I thank my hon. Friend for her advocacy in this area. She also highlighted an important fact: her constituent was still battling with the harms of her trauma and did not hear the case that she was the victim of; in order to be able to move on, she needed to have that document.
What is clear—reflected in much of the testimony today as well as in the national support for the petition—is that, for many victims, court transcripts are a vital part of their recovery, either personally or via therapy. However, for too long and for too many those transcripts have been out of reach, reserved for those who can afford what can be incredibly large sums.
Providing free court transcripts for victims is about giving them the support and protection that they deserve. Many trials are lengthy, take place years after the event and can be retraumatising experiences, even when victims do not attend in person. Everyone will handle such situations differently but, given that victims are among the most vulnerable in our society, they should be afforded as much support as possible to overcome those challenges. That is why consistent free access to transcripts is vital. They must be available beyond the 28 days after a trial concludes to access the unduly lenient scheme. Such measures would markedly improve the experiences of both victims and survivors.
That is why we welcomed the cross-party work in the Sentencing Bill to introduce the provision of free sentencing remarks for all victims. I again thank my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park, as well as Baroness Brinton in the other place and the various Ministers in the MOJ, including the Minister who is answering today, worked to achieve this vital first step, which we believe is a stepping stone towards providing all transcripts free of charge.
The timing of this debate could not be more pertinent, with the return this week of the Victims and Courts Bill from the Lords, now with the Liberal Democrat amendment tabled by my noble Friend, Baroness Brinton. That amendment would give victims access, free of charge, to transcripts relating to the route to verdict, extending current provisions encompassing bail decisions and judicial summaries, voiding many of the extortionate costs that we have heard about and providing victims with clarity regarding their cases. I thank the Conservatives in the other place for their support on that amendment, and I urge the Government to get behind it on Wednesday.
Without those provisions, we will continue to fail victims. As is the case with much of the Government’s rhetoric around improving technology and the use of AI on the court estate, there is little excuse not to put them in place as quickly as possible.