National Shipbuilding Strategy

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 8th February 2017 Westminster Hall

[Douglas Chapman (Dunfermline and West Fife) (SNP)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Evans. I stand before you with the sense that we have been here before, and indeed we have. It is déjà vu on a grand scale, because at Defence questions, during Westminster Hall debates, in answers to urgent questions and in ministerial statements, the Government have had the chance to put at rest the minds of the various parties interested in the shipbuilding strategy. Yet again, we find ourselves hoping that the Minister will give us something more than the usual scorn sometimes reserved for SNP Members.

Any time I tire of waiting for answers, I simply remind myself that many people have been waiting much longer, whether they be the men and women who serve us in the Royal Navy or those in the yards on the Clyde and at Rosyth. That is not to mention the average taxpayer, who demands nothing more from the Government than that their money is well spent on equipment that actually works and the assurance that the Government are doing their utmost to fulfil their most basic duty—defending our homeland.

In 2021, it will be two decades since HMS St Albans slipped from Yarrows on the Clyde and became the last-of-class Type 23 frigate, meaning that the state that has always prided itself on being a maritime power will not have built a single frigate for the best part of 20 years. Furthermore, as the first-of-class Type 23, HMS Norfolk, left that same shipyard in 1990, it found that the mission for which it had been specifically designed had all but ended. It is quite incredible that in 2017, we are still unable to see a signed contract to begin the replacement of the Type 23s, which are a cold war platform. No one I have spoken to through my work on the Select Committee on Defence, whether fellow members, academics, shipbuilders, trade unionists or even civil servants, sees that as an acceptable way forward, yet here we are.

Its cold war mission may have ended, but the Type 23 has certainly done all that was asked of it, and more. Let us not forget that the range of tasks the Royal Navy has undertaken in the post-cold war era has dramatically increased, yet paradoxically, as the senior service’s task list is increasing, the number of frigates and destroyers available to it has sunk to an historic low. It is that paradox that I hope the Minister will help me with today. Although the Ministry of Defence has long been able to exploit the convoluted and confusing history of the Type 26s and Type 31s, there is no way to hide its failings. I will make it easy for the Government by posing three straightforward questions that I hope they will take in good faith and respond to appropriately.

First, and most simply, when will we see the national shipbuilding strategy? Secondly, the MOD has made much of 2017 being the year of the Navy, but 2023 is a much more appropriate choice, as that is when the MOD completes the purchase of 24 F-35B planes to fly from the carriers, and when HMS Queen Elizabeth becomes fully operational. Will the Minister reassure us that the Royal Navy will be able to form a fully functioning carrier group with Type 26s, Type 45s and the requisite Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service ships? Thirdly, on a related note, various media outlets have reported in recent days on the bandwidth problems in the procurement budget, which were highlighted in a National Audit Office report. So far as the equipment plan is concerned, how will the shipbuilding strategy ensure that surface naval ships are prioritised in procurement decisions?

When the Government committed to the national shipbuilding strategy as part of the 2015 strategic defence and security review, many of us thought we were reaching the end of a long journey with respect to the modernisation of the Royal Navy. How wrong we were. Early studies of what in 1994 was called the “future surface combatant” certainly thought outside the box. A whole range of options were considered, including a radical trimaran hull design. After a decade, the FSC had become the “sustained surface combatant capability”, which had as many as three designs. It was not a concept that would survive the financial crash. Indeed, by 2009, it was possible for my friend the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who chairs the Defence Committee, to call for a future surface combatant that was as “cheap as chips”. How did we get from as “cheap as chips” to building £1 billion frigates in less than a decade?

I contend that the blame lies squarely at the door of the MOD. One thing has become clear from the numerous conversations I have had with both management and unions at BAE Systems: it is a global company with a world-class workforce that is able to turn its hand to whatever design and specification is provided by the MOD. Up to this point, it has done that. Quite simply, the MOD’s unerring ability to change horses midstream has added to the cost, timescales and uncertainty of the ongoing naval procurement programme.

That continued after the shipbuilding strategy announcement in 2015. The initial reassurances we were given were replaced with disquiet last spring, when no contract for the Type 26s was signed. When The Guardian broke the story in April about potential job losses at the Clyde yards, there was a crushing realisation that, yes, it had happened again. Any hope that a refreshed team in the main building over the summer would lead to clarity on the Type 26 or the shipbuilding strategy did not last long. When the Minister repeatedly assured us in the Chamber that we would see a strategy by the autumn statement, we knew she was using alternative facts. When my colleagues and I on the Defence Committee released a report that concluded

“it is now time for the MoD to deliver on its promises”,

I imagine we already knew that it had no intention of doing so—although I am interested to know if that report played any part in delaying the strategy, or if Ministers simply chose not to tell Parliament of their intentions.

It was not entirely clear, when Sir John Parker’s independent report was announced, whether informing Parliament was part of the original strategy. When the report was finalised, we thought that it would be the formal strategy going forward. There is plenty to agree with in Sir John’s report. Many of its findings chime with my experiences of MOD procurement, namely that there was a

“vicious cycle of fewer and much more expensive ships being ordered late and entering service years later than first planned”,

and:

“The Government must drive cultural and governance changes in Defence that inject genuine pace into the procurement process with a clear grip over requirements, cost and time.”

However, we are now getting to a stage at which the report, far from being too little, too late, is too much, much too late. It will once more allow Ministers to take us around the houses and hope that we forget that they are running out of time to fulfil previous promises made to the House, the Royal Navy and the men and women on the Clyde.

While there is

“no precedent for building two ‘first of class’ RN frigates in one location in the UK”,

there appears to be no real alternative to the Clyde, as I am sure we will hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens). Let us get on with signing the Type 26 contract and ensure that the Type 31 is ready to go as soon as possible.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Can the hon. Gentleman shed any light on what the Type 31 is? There have been generalised views of what it will do and what it will be, but I understand that there are no plans and no actual specification. Is the Type 31 not one of those pipedreams that seems to be put out there to reassure the industry, when actually there is a lot of work to be done not only to design it, but to find out where it fits into the broader naval strategy?

[Douglas Chapman]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. We are constantly told that the Type 31s are also for the export market. I have asked parliamentary questions on whether the Government could provide details of their homework on what that export market might look like. I am afraid that, to date, there are no answers. We need to make progress with the information we have, which is why we are questioning the Minister today.

Anyone who has taken an interest in this matter will know that BAE Systems has two possible designs. It is important that we get on with picking one, so that we can ensure—to follow up on the hon. Gentleman’s point —that we have an exportable product that we can take to market. However, we are falling behind. The Franco-Italian Aquitaine class frigates are already in service with La Royale and have been exported to Egypt and Morocco, so we are already missing the export boat with regard to the Type 31s.

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[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Evans. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman) on securing this very important debate. He raises some very interesting points. Certainly I have been trying to get answers to them through parliamentary questions, but we are getting the usual stonewalling from the Ministry of Defence, which has become a habit in recent times.

The important thing is to ask this question: what is the status of Sir John Parker’s report? It was announced in the 2016 Budget, which stated:

“The government has appointed Sir John Parker to lead the national ship building strategy, which was confirmed in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.”

It also stated that the report would be published in the autumn of 2016, which in MOD-speak means anytime between December and the following June. The press release stated that it was a Treasury-led, not a MOD-led review. That is important. It was announced by the right hon. Member for Tatton (Mr Osborne) when he visited Portsmouth naval base.

The report was published, strangely, not as a Government report but as Sir John Parker’s own report. The jungle drums in the MOD tell me that there was a bit of concern about whether the Secretary of State would put his name to this report, and he decided not to. That has left the report in limbo in terms of what influence and status it will have in the forward thinking about not only our naval shipbuilding strategy, but our wider industrial strategy.

I am also concerned about how this matter fits into broader defence industrial strategy. I asked the Minister on 12 January when we would publish a defence industrial strategy, only to be told that there are no plans to publish a separate defence industrial strategy, but that the national shipbuilding strategy—Sir John Parker’s report—would be added into a broader cross-Government piece of work on industrial strategy. That is important because we have basically abandoned having a separate industrial policy and strategy in this country. That is important because of the jobs that are relied upon and the important capabilities that we need in this country. The Government seem to have just mashed that into the rest of wider industrial policy.

A basic question needs to be asked about shipbuilding: do we want sovereign capability to produce complex warships in this country—yes or no? It is a very simple question that the Government need to answer to give reassurance about the future of the jobs—which the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife raised—and the technical expertise. The problem is that people look at a warship and think that the bulk of the cost and expertise has been met on the outside. It has not. The main value and technology in it are the skills that go into designing it and into systems integration. Our supply chain goes way beyond the Clyde—there is a national footprint of companies in leading-edge technologies. We need to ask whether we want those skills in this country or whether we will just buy from abroad.

When I was first involved in shipbuilding in the late 1980s, the then Government competed at different yards. We had Swan Hunter, Yarrows and Cammell Laird around the country and the Government used to compete contracts between them. At the end of the day, it was pork barrel politics as to who got the contract and that ultimately meant that Swan Hunter closed. Clearly, the strategy after that was to concentrate complex warship building in one yard. That made absolute sense. That one yard is on the Clyde, whether we like it or not. There is no other way of doing it.

The concern I have about Sir John Parker’s report—there are some points in it that I agree with—is that it is a bit naive. It has looked at building the carriers, which are on a huge scale in terms of block modular build, and then more or less said that we can start building Type 26s and others in a modular format. Well, I am sorry but I do not think we can—no disrespect to my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr Hepburn). These ships are on a different scale. We need one yard to do the integration—the actual build. The idea that we are going to build them around the country to try to get some competition goes back to an argument we had in the late 1990s. I come back to the basic question of whether we actually want complex warship building in this country.

The issue is not just the capability. There is naivety among some people who think that they can order these ships like ordering their next car. They decide what colour they want, go to the showroom and say, “I will have a blue one and we will have a yellow one next year.” That is not how this happens. These are very complex warships and pieces of defence equipment. We need to retain not only the technological capability but the skill base in the yards and in industry, and we need a drumbeat of work going through to ensure that we do that. A classic example of when we got that wrong is when the Conservative Government in the 1990s took us out of submarine building. That led to all the problems we had trying to regenerate the capacity in Barrow for the Astute programme. Unless we keep that drumbeat going, we will get into a situation whereby we cannot rely on the fact that when we need a complex warship, there is one there to be delivered. We cannot turn these skills and capabilities on and off like a tap when they are needed.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

One of the real dangers is exactly what the hon. Gentleman describes. As the yards in Glasgow await the commencement of the Type 26 project, engineers—highly skilled workers who can work in many different fields—will not wait around forever.

[Mr Jones]

The hon. Lady makes a very good point. The issue is not just about generating the skills in the first place—the key investment that companies need to make in apprenticeships and other things. This is now an international market. There are perhaps engineers working on the Clyde who, if there is no work, will move elsewhere in the world. In some cases, they will not come back to the industry. We found that with the Astute programme; nuclear engineers left and trying to get them back, or regenerating those skills and expertise, was very difficult.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent point. Critically, the Canadian suppliers were actually in Glasgow the other week looking for such people to take to north America.

[Mr Jones]

Again, the hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. This is an international market and these skills are very sought after. This comes back to my point that if we want this capability in the UK, we have to nurture and protect it and the only way to do that is by having a throughput of work.

The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife raised the issue of the Type 26. The delay is adding to that uncertainty. The wider piece really concerns me. To give the impression that we are going to have that drumbeat of work, we have had the Type 31 inserted into the programme. I have studied in detail to try to find out what the Type 31 actually is; no one has been able to tell me yet. It is a bit like the mythical unicorn—everybody thinks it exists, but no one has ever seen one. If the MOD can say that there is a budget line for it, it should please identify that—in the current procurement there is no budget line for it at all in the programme.

[Chris Stephens (Glasgow South West) (SNP)]

Was the hon. Gentleman concerned, as I was, to read in an article in The Daily Telegraph a suggestion from a Ministry of Defence source that there is no budget for Type 31s and that they might not even happen?

[Mr Jones]

As people know, I am a bit of an anorak on this subject and I actually study the MOD accounts, but I still cannot find where this budget line is. Another point that has never been answered is what this ship will actually be used for. I am not sure where it fits into any naval strategy. Will it be able to meet, for example, Britain’s NATO capabilities? Will it have capability to fulfil those roles? If it has not got the air defence capability, it will not. The other thing that people have completely missed is that this is about not just building the ship, but running it afterwards. We all know that there is a crisis in recruitment and manpower in the Royal Navy. Again, where is the budget line for not only building but running this generation of ships?

The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife makes a very important point. The Government say that the great thing about the ships is that they are exportable; I am sorry, but we are bit behind the game on this. He rightly identifies at least two other nations that have product out there.

There is another point about strategy. This is about not only skills but the defence of our country, because if we have the gap between the Type 23s going out and the Type 26s coming in, there will also be a gap in the nation’s capability. I understand that there is an ongoing extension programme for some Type 23s, but we need clarity, because if there is a gap, we will not be able to protect the carrier groups or some of our other capabilities.

That leads me to the wider piece about the Government’s strategy in this area. The Prime Minister argues that she is batting for Britain and that Britain is the key market, but we have a situation in which the Ministry of Defence, obviously leant on heavily by the Treasury, is happy to have multimillion-pound contracts with the United States—the Apache and P-8 contracts, to name just two—with no commitment whatever that proportionate workshare will come back to the UK economy. I asked the Minister a written question about the Apaches, and I think Boeing said that 5% of the programme’s value will come back into our supply chain. That point is important not just for the number of jobs, but to keep the capability that we need in this country. I cannot imagine for one minute the United States doing something similar, even before President Trump took office, and things will get even worse now. Exporting highly paid jobs and capability from this country is inexcusable. I do not want to see the same thing happening in shipbuilding, so that we will perhaps just buy ships off the shelf from the United States or anywhere else.

A few weeks ago I asked the Minister in a parliamentary question what she was doing to monitor whether Boeing, for example, would put enough jobs into the economy. She fudged the answer, saying, “We don’t monitor this area.” I am sorry, but that is inexcusable. What really irritates me is that if a British company sold a piece of defence kit to the United States of America, there is no way that we would not have to give guarantees about workshare and jobs in the United States. My fear is that without joined-up thinking on shipbuilding, if we are not careful, a time will come when the Treasury says, “Isn’t it cheaper just to buy these from abroad—from the United States or somewhere else?” We would then lose not only the sovereign capability that is so important to this country, but the skill base and jobs that come with that.

I come to my final point. It is about time that the Ministry of Defence fessed up that it has a huge problem, which is only partly of the MOD’s making, because this is actually a Treasury issue. The National Audit Office report is clear about the procurement budget. The Ministry of Defence is falling into an old habit—as a former Minister in the Ministry of Defence, I know this is easy to do—of just pushing the budget sideways, which is what has happened with the defence budget. However, there are other pressures on the day-to-day in-service budgets. Ships are being laid up, for example, because the cash is not available to run in-service services. In addition, there is a huge black hole—it was highlighted in the NAO report—that the MOD has to deal with. We are not talking about separate money; it will have to find £8 billion over the next 10 years for the defence estate. All that falls within the defence budget, so if does not come out of one place, it will come out of another.

The Government need to be honest about where they are with the equipment budget. The Opposition got lectures from the incoming coalition Government about how frugal they would be, in terms of ensuring that they did not over-commit on defence, but they are clearly doing that now. The shipbuilding strategy needs to be published soon. If we are going to answer yes to the question, “Do we want a sovereign capability for shipbuilding in this country?”, we will have to put the money behind it and ensure that the work is of a nature that allows the industry to develop its skills and retain that capability.

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[Steven Paterson]

Yes, I think that is a concern that many of us have—that the priorities identified in the risk assessment done for the document I have quoted are not being followed in Government spending. Perhaps that is why there has been delay after delay in the project.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does the hon. Gentleman also recognise that the Dreadnought programme is putting money into the Scottish economy? A success story in that regard is that Babcock is doing the missile tubes at Rosyth.

[Steven Paterson]

If we are going to take the SDSR process seriously and look at the assessment of what we need for the defence of the country, we must deal with tier 1 threats first—that is why they are tier 1 threats. Clearly, if we are to meet the threats identified, the shipbuilding programme is essential.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens) noted, the Government promised that 13 Type 26 frigates would be built on the Clyde, then revised that substantially, to eight, with five multi-purpose frigates. At paragraph 90 of its report on the 2% level of spending by the Government, the Defence Committee correctly identifies the risk to the Type 31 programme:

“Should...the ‘concept study’ to investigate the potential for a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigate be unsuccessful, we wish to be informed at the earliest opportunity of the MoD’s contingency plans to deliver the extra ships to satisfy the total originally promised.”

The Government’s response to those concerns merely indicates a willingness to keep the Committee informed. We are looking for some more concrete answers from the Minister today. Furthermore, we still await confirmation that the frigates will be built on the Clyde. Should that not occur, it will be a betrayal of the Clyde workers, as my hon. Friend said. They would be entitled to feel betrayed; it would threaten the yards’ capacity to deliver complex warships in the future and would undermine the UK’s ability to meet the challenges identified in its own national security strategy and the SDSR.

My second concern is that the shipbuilding strategy will not be affordable. I am concerned that there will be further backtracking on the commitments. It is fine to have a strategy, with many large new procurement projects, but if there is no money to actualise the strategy, what is the point in the exercise? According to the National Audit Office’s report “The Equipment Plan 2016 to 2026”—which the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), among others, has already alluded to—the price of the plan has ballooned by 20%, to £82 billion, in a single year. That means that the Department has allocated all headroom previously set aside in the plan, removing all the flexibility to accommodate additional capability requirements. That is why we need reassurance today.

Given that the Type 26 project started at a projected cost of £343 million per hull, according to the 2015 major projects report, and is now £1 billion per hull, according to oral evidence to the Defence Committee, the MOD does not have, and never has had, a proven track record of acquiring big-ticket items on time and on budget. Rather than dealing with those pressures in the past, it has pushed the programmes further down the list and allowed service dates to slip, exactly as has been described today.

[Mr Jones]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is added pressure on the defence budget because of Brexit, in terms of the value of the dollar, which is made worse when we procure large-ticket items from the United States?

[Steven Paterson]

The hon. Gentleman must have read my mind, because I am coming on to say that point 18 of the NAO report summary states:

“Changes in foreign exchange rates, such as those that happened after the EU referendum, can pose a significant risk to the Plan’s affordability in the future. As at 10 January 2017, the pound was 21.4% below the exchange rate with the US dollar and 4.2% below the exchange rate for the euro used in the Department’s planning assumptions. Approximately £18.6 billion of the Plan is denominated in US dollars and £2.6 billion in euros over 10 years.”

That will have a major impact.

I understand that the Department has a certain amount of protection against foreign exchange rates in arranging its finances, but does it not worry the Minister that such a large amount of the plan is predicated on foreign exchange rates, with the Government appearing to be gambling that the rate will not go up further? Given the Government position that economists cannot be trusted, which is what many current Ministers said during the recent referendum—and going by even a cursory look at the financial predictions before Brexit—can we really have any confidence that the envisaged programme can be afforded? That is why we need reassurance today.

The shipbuilding strategy is long overdue and, given the current state of the Department’s books, it is badly needed to provide clarity for those working in shipbuilding and those monitoring our national defence readiness going forward.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for an obviously irresistible invitation. I hope I will be able to take him up on it in the not-so-distant future. For the record, I say to the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr Hepburn) that I am in Newcastle tomorrow. I look forward to meeting a range of manufacturers. I will not specifically be meeting A&P Tyne on this occasion, but I met A&P in Falmouth only last week.

In the SDSR we announced our plans for a naval programme of investment. We are investing in two new aircraft carriers, which are currently being completed at Rosyth. We are investing in new submarines to be based in Scotland at Faslane. We have announced our plans for frigates. We are building five new offshore patrol vessels on the Clyde at the moment. We have ordered new aircraft, including the maritime patrol aircraft, the P-8, which will be based at Lossiemouth. Scotland is clearly doing well out of defence, and the UK is doing well in defence with Scotland, and 2017 is the start of a new era of maritime power, projecting the UK’s influence globally and delivering security at home. I do not have time in this debate to list all the different ships we have deployed across the world’s oceans.

I know the appetite of Members for publications. They will have all read the 2016 equipment plan, which we published last month. It laid out the plans in more detail and announced that the total amount that will be spent on the procurement and support of surface ships and submarines over the next decade amounts to some £63 billion. It is all part of the continued modernisation of the Royal Navy in the coming years, which will be underpinned by our national shipbuilding strategy. It is very much our intention that the strategy will be a radical, fundamental reappraisal of shipbuilding in the UK, with the aim of placing UK naval shipbuilding on a sustainable long-term footing. It will set the foundations for a modern, efficient and competitive sector, capable of meeting the country’s future defence and security needs.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Can the Minister point out in the Budget where the budget line is for the Type 31?

[Harriett Baldwin]

The hon. Gentleman will have read the equipment plan. I do not have the exact quote here, but clearly we have a very ambitious equipment plan. We are expecting to spend some £63 billion on ships, support and submarines.

I want to convey to Sir John Parker the thanks of all Members who have spoken today for his excellent report. He is clearly a highly respected expert. Importantly, he has taken an independent approach to the report. He has had a high level of engagement with stakeholders. Members asked about his engagement. He has visited all key industry leaders and all the companies across the UK that design and build ships, including in Northern Ireland. He has visited small and medium-sized businesses in the supply chain. Industry stakeholders were engaged at all levels. He brought strong strategic direction and guidance to the work, for which we are immensely grateful. He also met trade bodies, trade unions, Ministers, civilian and military officials and, indeed, the hon. Members for Glasgow North West (Carol Monaghan) and for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens). He has been thoroughly engaged with everyone.

I have not got much time left, so I will speak very briefly about exports, which a range of Members raised. The report makes an important recommendation about exports. We have already started that work, working closely with the Defence and Security Organisation in the Department for International Trade. Members can expect to hear more about that in the coming weeks and months.

The Type 26 programme is a key element of our investment plans. To meet our needs, we require eight to replace the eight anti-submarine-focused Type 23 frigates. Members will be aware that the Defence Secretary announced in November last year that, assuming successful completion of the negotiations, we expect to sign a contract for the first batch of the eight planned Type 26s and cut steel on the first ship this summer. That would give BAE Systems on the Clyde work until the early to mid-2030s. Commercial contract negotiations are intense and ongoing, so I cannot make any more information available to the House today. The investment will sustain shipbuilding skills at the shipyards on the Clyde and continue to provide opportunities in the wider supply chain around the UK. The ships will provide an anti-submarine warfare capability, which is essential for the protection of our nuclear deterrent. SNP Members had a bit of a political pop at me, but they would do well to remember what I have just said. Their two political obsessions—Scottish independence and ending our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent—would be two of the worst things that could befall the Scottish shipbuilding industry.

Briefly on the Type 31e, Sir John recommended that a new class of lighter general purpose frigate should be given priority. He was clear that it should be designed to be exportable, but capable of incorporating the needs of the Royal Navy. A lot of work is under way on that in the MOD. It is in the pre-concept phase, and further information will be made available in the national shipbuilding strategy.

In summary, the MOD is working with colleagues across Government and with industry to examine Sir John Parker’s report and its recommendations in full. I recognise that Members value the shipbuilding jobs in their constituencies, and I assure them that the Government are committed to an industrial strategy that will increase economic growth across the country and refresh our defence industrial policy.

Awards for Valour (Protection) Bill (First sitting)

Kevan Jones Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons & Committee Debate: House of Commons
Wednesday 1st February 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Gareth Johnson]

Perhaps I could move on then.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman is taking a pragmatic approach. As a former Veterans Minister, I know that this could go on for pages and pages. Is he confident that the provisions cover the main area of medals? Most medals awarded by foreign Governments to members of our armed forces are not allowed to be worn but I think there are some exceptions whereby they are allowed to be worn, with the Queen’s permission. Are they included in these provisions?

[Gareth Johnson]

The list covers purely those awards sanctioned by Her Majesty and the Defence Council, as opposed to, for example, the Légion d’Honneur, which has been won by veterans from this country. Of course, if someone had legitimately been awarded the Légion d’Honneur and was wearing it, there is nothing wrong with that. They would be committing an offence only if they were wearing a medal or award that is in the schedule, with intent to deceive. If it were a foreign medal, it would not be covered by this schedule, which relates only to awards that have been given by Her Majesty, previous monarchs and the Defence Council.

[Mr Jones]

I think it would if the Queen had given permission. I am trying to rack my brains to think of them. There are a couple, I think, that are allowed to be included. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that it is only the ones that the Defence Council or the Queen have authorised to wear? If it is a foreign medal that has been given the Queen’s permission, it would be in the scope of this.

[Gareth Johnson]

If it is a foreign medal, it would not be. Trying to keep the list down to a manageable level is difficult enough with British medals. To try to include all medals from around the world as well would make it unworkable. It covers civilian awards such as the George Medal, the George Cross and the Queen’s Gallantry Medal. Quite often those awards are given to military personnel in any event.

The schedule does not cover awards from around the world. It was very tempting, when drafting the Bill, to include knighthoods and OBEs. The list goes on, frankly, and one has to decide where to draw the line. The line I have decided to draw is on awards for valour that have been sanctioned by Her Majesty the Queen.

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[Gareth Johnson]

Because they are not awards for valour—that is it in a nutshell. These kinds of characters tend to wear a collection of medals; it is rare that just one medal is worn. The examples that we have had are of people who have worn a couple of dozen medals. It is absolutely ridiculous. I have not served in the armed forces, but anyone who has will immediately be able to recognise that it simply does not add up and therefore the person’s delusions are quite often picked up. It is rare that they would just wear one or two medals to claim their bravery.

[Mr Jones]

There is a common area that has been completely missed, which is NATO campaign medals. They are worn quite often, especially if we consider the 1980s, when we were not in the Afghanistan and Iraq phases and many servicemen would have got those medals.

[Gareth Johnson]

There was a discussion about the NATO Medal. It was felt that it did not come under the risk and rigour criteria, if I remember correctly.

There is nothing to stop the Secretary of State adding medals to the legislation at a later date. We have a Minister of State here. If there are omissions from the list—I do not believe that there are, but if there are—they can be added at a future date. There will be occasions when circumstances change and British forces are asked to serve in arenas that we are unaware of at the moment. Medals are likely to emanate from that. This is a moving beast and will have to modernise from time to time.

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[Mr Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. May I congratulate the hon. Member for Dartford on bringing forward this Bill? It clearly plugs a loophole. This was an offence until 2006. May I profess guilt and say, as a veteran of the Committee that considered the Armed Forces Act 2006—a massive piece of legislation—that this got missed? I have read the Ministry of Defence’s explanation for that. I do not quite accept it. I think it was just one of those things that got missed off. Members on both sides of the Committee on which I served would have supported these provisions being in that Act. The Bill therefore brings the law back to where it should be. People say, “Is it about numbers?” No, it is not about numbers—this is wrong. If people are wearing a medal that they are not entitled to, I do not care whether it is one or two a year, or one a year—it is wrong.

As a former Veterans Minister, I know from meeting the men and women of many campaigns, how proud they are of the hard work, dedication and personal sacrifice they have made in many cases to earn the right to wear those medals. It is completely unacceptable that anyone should try to wear medals and to impersonate the great courage and service of those men and women. It is a very important issue. As I say, the number is small, but I do not care—it is right to introduce these provisions.

The approach the hon. Gentleman has taken to listing the medals is correct. I have scars, as a former Veterans Minister, about medals. I am sure the Minister gets those now. It is not just the national campaign—there is a whole variety of things that people want medals or decorations awarded for. The only way to do it is the way the hon. Gentleman has done it—to be very prescriptive; although comprehensive, I think it covers that.

The caveat at the end allows the addition of medals. For example, I raised the issue of NATO. If that becomes a problem, I am sure those could be added. Perhaps that is the best way to deal with that. I also think his approach in allowing family members to wear medals is correct and common sense.

There is the growing issue of replica medals. I do not know how to get round that, even with the Bill, which covers the actual medals themselves. People will always try to get round that. I think that framing a law that outlaws them would be virtually impossible. The hon. Gentleman is making the best attempt to cover all the circumstances.

There is another common-sense aspect to the approach in the Bill—it is about the intent. I am sure that hon. Members are aware that there are some people with mental illness who claim to have served in the military. There are many people in our prisons who have never served but, for whatever reason, perhaps of mental health, claim to have served. In some of those cases, they are genuinely convinced they have served. However, they would not be caught by the Bill because it takes a common-sense approach in terms of intent.

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman again on bringing forward the Bill. Let us hope that it closes the loophole in the law, which unfortunately I and other members of the Committee that considered the Armed Forces Bill in 2006 did not spot.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I would include standing for elected office. I remember a case, when I was a Minister, of a Liberal Democrat who claimed to have a record in the military that did not stand up to a great deal of scrutiny.

[The Chair]

We do not want to go beyond the scope of the Bill.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 30th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I can confirm that as of 1 October 2016, some 9% of the naval service strength was female—the departmental recruitment target is 15% by 2020. The Royal Navy has a number of initiatives to encourage recruitment and address the retention of female officers, including having more focused career management and increased access to flexible ways of working.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

In the 2015 SDSR, and again last December in the first annual report on the SDSR, the Government were very clear that the sea trials for HMS Queen Elizabeth would begin this spring, but in response to a parliamentary question last week, the Minister informed me that the trials would now take place this summer. What are the reasons for that? What will the operational service date be for HMS Queen Elizabeth?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I can confirm that she will commence her sea trials this summer and enter into the same programme so that she can sail into Portsmouth later this year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

I am not sure whether my right hon. Friend is referring to the Ajax programme, but I can confirm that we have taken extensive steps to ensure that a significant portion of the manufacturing processes of the Ajax vehicles takes place in south Wales, and we will continue to work with our suppliers to ensure that we get significant UK content in all our procurement.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

What are the reasons for the delay in the HMS Queen Elizabeth’s sea trials, and what will its in-service date be?

Trident: Test Firing

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the test firing of a Trident nuclear missile in June 2016.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Sir Michael Fallon)]

In June last year, the Royal Navy conducted a demonstration and shakedown operation designed to certify HMS Vengeance and her crew prior to their return to operations. It included a routine unarmed Trident missile test launch. Contrary to reports in the weekend press, HMS Vengeance and her crew were successfully tested and certified as ready to rejoin the operational cycle.

We do not comment on the detail of submarine operations, but I can assure the House that the safety of the crew and public is paramount during any test firing and is never compromised. Prior to conducting a Trident test fire, the UK strictly adheres to all relevant treaty obligations, notifying relevant nations and interested parties. Here, the Chair of the Defence Committee, the Opposition Defence spokesperson, and the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee were informed in advance. I can assure the House that the capability and effectiveness of the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent is not in doubt. The Government have absolute confidence in our deterrent and in the Royal Navy crews who protect us and our NATO allies every hour of every day.

[Mr Jones]

I thank the Secretary of State for his answer. He will know that I am a strong believer in this country’s independent nuclear deterrent. Major inroads have been made in recent decades in public transparency on nuclear issues, on which is important to maintain a consensus and support for our nuclear deterrent. That has included openness and publicity about test launches in Florida.

The Secretary of State will have seen claims in the press at the weekend that in the latest test the missile veered towards the United States. Will he confirm whether that was the case? Will he tell the House when he was first informed that there was a problem with the test and when his Department informed the then Prime Minister, David Cameron? Was it the Secretary of State or the then Prime Minister who decided to shelve the Department’s customary practice of publicising test launches and ordered a news blackout?

What discussions has the Secretary of State had with the present Prime Minister about the test, and why news of it was not relayed to Parliament before the debate on the Successor submarine programme last July?

Finally, I pay tribute to the members of our armed forces who for the past 48 years have maintained Operation Relentless and the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent.

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman not only takes a close interest in defence but has borne responsibility for the defence of our country and supports the deterrent. However, I must disagree with his call for greater transparency. There are few things that we cannot discuss openly in Parliament, but the security of our nuclear deterrent is certainly one of them. It has never been Government practice to give Parliament details of demonstration and shakedown operations. There have been previous examples where some publicity has been decided on a case-by-case basis and informed by the circumstances at the time and by national security considerations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I think that those who work on our behalf at Faslane are very much aware of the importance of the secrecy with which they naturally have to concur. I think they understand that obligation. Even though the hon. Gentleman does not, I think they, too, support the importance of the deterrent.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

I shall take this point of order from the originator of the urgent question if it relates exclusively to the matters that have just been under discussion, and if it is an attempt not to continue the exchanges, but to provide some new information with which the hon. Gentleman thinks the House should be favoured.

[Mr Jones]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

It has become apparent during these proceedings that US officials are now briefing more detail than has been provided by the Secretary of State today. He has hidden behind secrecy for the demonstration and shakedown, even though his own Department authorised a book by Peter Hennessy last year that gave a full description of what happens. The Chair of the Select Committee very generously suggested that the Secretary of State could come before his Committee. How can Parliament hold the Department to account on this issue if it will not even take up the generous offer that the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has already made?

[Mr Speaker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. I say simply that the Secretary of State will have heard the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the Select Committee, who is extremely diligent, extraordinarily intelligent and persistent—and I have known him a damn sight longer than the Secretary of State has known him. How the Secretary of State wants to deal with the right hon. Member for New Forest East is entirely a matter for him and his judgment, exercising it to the best of his ability. We will leave it there for now.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend’s fantastic work representing his constituents in Yeovil and the magnificent work that they do. We took delivery of the most recent Wildcat helicopter just in the last month. We look forward to working with Leonardo in Yeovil as part of a major strategic partnership agreement. It is important that my hon. Friend puts such issues about helicopter manufacturing forward as part of the industrial Green Paper that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will produce later this year.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Last week’s announcement on the Type 26 frigate was good news for Scotland. What steps have been put in place to ensure that UK SMEs and larger companies, for example those based in the north-east of England, will gain work from this contract?

[Harriett Baldwin]

The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight this fantastic news for companies up and down the country, including our shipbuilders on the Clyde. We have already announced contracts worth some £1.9 billion which are related to this programme right across the UK. Importantly, we will be publishing, alongside our prime contractor, the opportunities for the British steel industry to bid into this manufacturing opportunity.

Defence Estate

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, particularly for the terms in which she has been considering this matter for some time. The proposal in the strategy is, as she knows, to close Chetwynd barracks by 2021 and to move the principal units from there to Bassingbourn in Cambridgeshire. I can well understand the feeling of the local community that it wants to get on with this now—that it wants to get the Army out and the new housing in—and I will certainly undertake to have a look at whether we can speed up that timetable.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

In 1996, the then Tory Government, of which the Secretary of State was a member, sold 60,000 married quarters to Annington Homes. As part of that deal, before the MOD hands back those homes to Annington, it has to improve them. Has he established exactly how many will be passed back through this process and what it will cost the taxpayer to compensate Annington Homes?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I was not, in fact, a member of the Government in 1996—I was taking a temporary leave of absence from Parliament at that time—but I obviously recall the Annington Homes contract. The hon. Gentleman is correct that a number of these homes have to be handed back when that lease expires, but that is slightly separate from the strategy I am announcing today, and I will write to him in detail.

NATO Warsaw Summit

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend’s former service in the military, but I have to say to him, and to Russia, that NATO remains a defensive alliance and is not threatening anybody. However, given the commitments that we have all made to each other under article 5, it is very important that we reassure members, particularly those on the eastern flank of NATO, that we are ready to stand by those commitments and to come to their aid. I must remind my hon. Friend that they, of course, have seen Russia trying to change international borders by force, annexing Crimea and interfering in eastern Ukraine. It is very important that we remind members of NATO that it is committed to defending their territorial integrity, and that we send a message right across Europe to Moscow that we are not prepared to see the sovereign integrity of these countries further impugned.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The Warsaw conference underlined NATO’s concept of deterrence. Does the Secretary of State agree that for deterrence to be effective, it has to be credible, and that any suggestion that our nuclear deterrent could be delivered other than by continuous at-sea deterrence would not only lead to its credibility being questioned, but threaten the nuclear posture of deterrence by NATO?

[Michael Fallon]

I absolutely agree with that. The previous coalition Government looked exhaustively at alternative systems for delivering such deterrence. We looked at whether it could be done from the air, from land or with fewer boats, and the overwhelming conclusion of that review was that the simplest and most cost-effective form of deterrence is to maintain our existing four-boat nuclear submarine fleet. That is the purpose of the motion we will be putting before the House on Monday.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

As I said in answer to other questions on the Type 26 programme, we will enter into a contract once we have established best value for the taxpayer, and a delivery schedule that can be met by the contractor.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

After last week’s vote, these are uncertain times for UK manufacturing. One thing that the Government could do now to boost manufacturing and protect British jobs and skills would be to make a decision on Successor and bring it forward. Will the Minister say when that vote will be?

[Mr Dunne]

The hon. Gentleman will have heard the Secretary of State confirm that that will not take too long.

Yemen: Cluster Munitions

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

This is a civil war and in civil wars, difficult things happen. This is a very complex environment. Actors use whatever is available to them, in respect of the terrain that is there, to adopt positions. It is not a nice, straightforward, clinical exercise like a training event. Therefore, accidents do happen. As a result of our relationship with the Saudi Arabian armed forces, we are in a position to exert some influence on the coalition and, in particular, its leadership in respect of investigating accidents when they occur and allegations of incidents such as those that the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned. We are putting that pressure on the Saudis and they have given us undertakings that they are undertaking those investigations, and we are awaiting the outcome.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Thanks to a Labour Government, we have the Export Control Act 2002, which provides this country with a robust mechanism for arms exports not just to Saudi Arabia, but to other nations around the world. Will the Minister tell the House what pressure is being put on the Iranians to stop not only exporting weapons to rebels, but using them as a direct threat to Saudi Arabia?

[Mr Dunne]

The hon. Gentleman, who is experienced in these matters, will be aware of the coalition’s efforts to intercept matériel that foreign Governments, in particular Iran, are seeking to supply to rebels through the waters surrounding Yemen. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs met the Iranian chargé d’affaires last week to raise that specific issue. We will continue to put diplomatic pressure on the Iranians to cease their support for the rebels.

Counter-Daesh Quarterly Update

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

Absolutely. We are providing some £80 million in lifesaving humanitarian aid for those who have been forced to flee their homes. The Chancellor announced at the G7 last week that we are contributing some £300 million in loan guarantees to the World Bank’s facility to help rebuild and strengthen the economy of Iraq, and we are also contributing to the Iraq humanitarian pooled fund that will help tackle poverty and ensure stability, precisely to get back the essential services on which people depend, to encourage them to return rapidly to the areas that have been liberated.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State has spoken about the battle damage assessment that takes place after a raid. Can he explain to the House, for those who are not familiar with the process, not only about selecting targets and the legal basis, but the fact that some targets are avoided at the last minute because of awareness of the risk of civilian casualties?

[Michael Fallon]

When selecting and approving targets for deliberate strikes, we take very great care to make sure that they respect the rules of engagement that I set at the beginning of the campaign. A target that is selected may be studied for several days or even weeks to make sure that we understand the pattern of life around it— that it is a building, for example, that civilians are not using and only the military are using. We continue that surveillance right up until the last moment. If civilians are found to be in that area, the strike can be aborted right at the end. We take very good care to minimise civilian casualties. In long campaigns, however, in the messiness of war it is not impossible that there may be civilian casualties at some point. All I can tell the House is that from the evidence so far, we think we have avoided them.