Courts and Tribunals Bill

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

It has been a positive debate in terms of the exchange of ideas, and there have been some fantastic contributions. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Members for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet) and for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) for the very personal way in which they made their cases. There is consensus that for victims, the current waits are terrible and an experience that they should not have to go through. It is not only damaging for them as individuals, but some of them drop out as a result. We see perpetrators who would have been found guilty walking away and escaping justice, and we see defendants who would have been found innocent having to wait too long to have the accusations over their head removed.

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Mullan]

Not yet.

We must have a serious discussion about why that is. It was disappointing for those who sought to put forward a credible analysis of what has happened that the Justice Secretary and most Labour Members did not mention the word “covid” once. In reality, the backlogs in the Crown court under this Government before covid were lower than those we inherited from the previous Government.

It is fair to say that for many years—25 years, as we heard from the hon. Member for Congleton (Sarah Russell)—it has been accepted that not enough political attention has been paid to our justice system. The question is, what do we do about it? There is no single answer to that question, because there is no single problem. A whole variety of things are going wrong in our justice system. We are seeing late pleas because of insufficient early advice, faulty courtrooms, a lack of reports from probation services, and problems with prison transport. All those problems, and others, cause the delays and other issues.

The central recommendation of the Leveson report was for more sitting days— 130,000—and that will require more venues, more court staff, more prosecution staff, more solicitors and more barristers. However, as I have mentioned, there are simpler things that we can do ahead of that, and we need look no further than Liverpool Crown court under the leadership of Andrew Menary. At a time when the national average wait from charge to trial is 321 days, that court manages an average wait of 206 days. As far as I am aware, neither the Justice Secretary nor any of his team has visited Liverpool Crown court to speak to the judge and hear how he does that. In fact, he achieves it partly through the use of early guilty pleas. Nationally, we lose court time because too many people—31%—plead guilty on the day of a trial. In Liverpool, the proportion is just 6%. Those are not bold reforms. They are not measures that allow a Secretary of State to give a grand speech and consider himself a great reformer. It is just hard work, or what one Member described as “pretty boring” stuff that gets the job done.

As was pointed out by the hon. Members for Warrington North and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), these reforms will not only fail to achieve what the Government claim they will; they will be an overbearing, destructive distraction from that sort of hard work. And what will the Government gain? Certainly not what they claim in the impact assessment, which is full of assumptions and fantasies, and certainly not anything that might be described as modelling. The Government want us to believe that 24,000 Crown court days will simply be converted into 8,500 magistrate days, but they have no evidence for that claim. They want us to believe that trials without juries will be 20% shorter, but they have no evidence to support that claim either.

[Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)]

Has the shadow Minister seen today’s statement from the Institute for Government, which has backed the Government’s modelling and overturned its previous position? He might want to reflect that in his comments.

[Dr Mullan]

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman read the entire statement. What the institution actually said was that the modelling

“relies on several assumptions—some of which are highly uncertain.”

Did he read that part of the statement? I do not think he did, because it claims that there will be reductions of only 2% in trial time as a result of these reforms.

What are we being asked to give up? We are being asked to give up 800 years of English legal history. A sledgehammer is being taken to the cornerstone of our system, and to fundamental rights. Thousands of accused people risk spending years in prison, losing their livelihoods, losing their families, losing their homes, and not being able to make the simple request for a forum of their peers to make that decision—a part of the justice system that is trusted and supported more than any other. That is perhaps why it is being defended so robustly by those within it. Just today, thousands of retired judges and retired and working legal professionals asked the Justice Secretary to think again. What has been the Government’s response to that? It has been to denigrate the role of jury trials.

We have had the appalling sight of the Lord Chancellor comparing three years in prison to a scraped knee. We have heard the Minister for Courts say that being accused of an offence of sexual assault, which could be considered either way at the moment, was not serious—an accusation that, if proven, would lose someone their livelihood. It is shameful and desperate stuff from a desperate Government. In contrast, what did the Prime Minister say? He said:

“The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.”

Now he asks us to upend that balance in a historically unprecedented way.

Of course, we can talk about the facts and figures, as woeful and thin as they have been, but at the end of the day, these decisions come from political instinct and a deep sense of what is right and wrong. That is not shallow; it is based on knowledge and years of experience —the sort that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) have. That experience told them, before they saw the figures, that the Government’s approach was not going to work. They have been proven right by the figures.

Is it any surprise that the Prime Minister does not understand this? Time and again, we have seen that he is absolutely devoid of any sort of deep political instinct. His only instinct is to chop and change his mind as it suits him on any particular day. No wonder he has been, more than any other Prime Minister in recent history, an agent of the civil service. He has forgotten the golden rule that civil servants advise and Ministers decide. The Conservatives have said yes to more resources, to efficiency and to the hard work of getting things done, but we have said no to eroding a fundamental right, no to more overbearing state power, and no to gutting and scouring away the mechanism by which all of us watch the watchmen.

The Courts Minister tells us that the Bill has been introduced on a point of political principle, whereas other Members have argued that it is a matter of necessity and resource. Too often, Labour Members have said yes to a Prime Minister to whom they should have said no. They have an opportunity tonight to say no to the Prime Minister when it counts. Let us hope they have the courage to do so.

Court Reporting Data

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Justice if he will make a statement on the implications for open justice of the impending deletion of the Courtsdesk court reporting data archive.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

I am committed, as are this Government, to greater transparency in our justice system. I am also committed to putting the dignity of victims first. As Courts Minister, I have a concern that people should know what goes on in our courts. It is a way of enhancing transparency and of informing and educating the public, and that is why His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service has made and continues to make information available to accredited journalists so that they can keep the public informed about what is taking place in our courts.

In 2020, a company called Courtsdesk entered into an arrangement with His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to conduct a pilot providing a new service. That agreement, made under the previous Government, was essentially to take some of the data that we routinely provide—and continue to provide—to journalists, and to re-provide it in a more accessible and easier to search form.

HMCTS was working to expand and improve the service by creating a new data licence agreement with Courtsdesk and others to expand access to justice. It was in the course of making that arrangement with Courtsdesk that data protection issues came to light. What has arisen is that this private company has been sharing private, personal and legally sensitive information with a third-party AI company, including potentially the addresses and dates of birth of defendants and victims. That is a direct breach of our agreement with Courtsdesk, which the Conservatives negotiated.

I believe that everybody in this House would agree that that agreement should be upheld. The Government take our data protection responsibilities seriously. It is for that reason that we decided to stop sharing data with Courtsdesk, a company that was prepared to put victims’ personal data at risk. We instructed it to remove that data from its digital platform. This is about preserving dignity for those who are in our justice system, be they those accused of crime or victims going through the court process. I know that the whole House would agree that that is incredibly important.

Let me be clear: the cessation of our agreement with Courtsdesk does not change the information available to the public about what carries on in our courts, nor does it change the information available to journalists. I recognise that the sort of service that Courtsdesk provided was useful for journalists, because it collated the information and presented it neatly. It is for that reason that officials in my Department are continuing to work, as we had always planned to do, on an alternative platform that allows us to make the information available, but to maintain the guardrails on data protection. I hope to update the House on that in coming weeks. As I conclude, this decision—

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[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. The hon. and learned Lady will know that she had three minutes, which she has used. I call the shadow Minister.

[Dr Mullan]

Here we are again. Not even one week after this Government had to be forced to release the Mandelson files—looking out for themselves and not for victims—we are back with a Government who preach transparency and practise the opposite. The pattern is clear. They will not release migrant crime data. They fought our efforts to institute a grooming gangs inquiry every step of the way. That campaign was fuelled by journalists uncovering what was happening in our courts. What are the Government now intent on doing? Delete, delete, delete. They want to make it harder for journalists to report the truth. What is it that they are worried about? Could it be that they want to hide the fact that thousands of criminals will escape justice under their Sentencing Act 2026? Could it be that when they erode our rights to jury trials, they do not want the public to hear about the results? Can anyone draw any conclusion other than that they are determined to escape accountability for their damaging policies?

The Courtsdesk project has been a huge success. Introduced by the shadow Home Secretary, it has revolutionised the transparency of our courtrooms. Courtsdesk reports that more than 1,500 journalists have used the platform. That is why so many journalists are rallying in support. What of the apparent data breach that the Government are using as an excuse for this? Have they engaged with Courtsdesk? No, they have not. There has been not one single meeting, despite multiple requests to the Minister. It is not just officialdom that is to blame. The Courts Minister has been written to by Courtsdesk and several major media organisations. She has been told directly how important this system is.

This is a Minister who comes to the House and professes how vital magistrates courts are to the Government’s plans to take a sledgehammer to jury trials. She needs to tell us why she and her officials have refused even to meet Courtsdesk. What assessment have they made of the impact of this decision on open justice? Delete, delete, delete; stonewall, ignore and deflect—that is the character of this Government in their operations. We will not stand by and let them do the same in our courts.

[Sarah Sackman]

I am afraid that the bombast we have just heard is not just inaccurate but dangerous, because it suggests that there is anything like a restriction on open justice. Let me be absolutely clear: there has been no deletion of any court lists. [Interruption.] Excuse me. There has been no deletion of any court lists, which is the nature of the data that has been provided.

Let us be absolutely clear: we had an arrangement with Courtsdesk, which we accept provides a useful service. [Interruption.] What Courtsdesk did, which the shadow Minister does not seem to think is a problem, is to pass that information on in breach of the agreement—no doubt for commercial purposes—to an AI company. That information included defendants’ addresses and dates of birth. I do not think anyone in this House would think that such things should be provided to anybody other than accredited journalists, yet they were provided to an AI company.

We then asked Courtsdesk to delete the information that it held. As of yesterday, I understand that it still has not done so. It accepts that it has acted in breach of its agreement. It threatened the Ministry of Justice with legal action, which it has not chosen to take forward. We are saying that when a company acts in breach of an agreement, putting vulnerable people and parties at risk, it is very serious. I take data protection seriously, but there has been no obstruction to journalists being able to access through the usual channels the lists that we are talking about. That access remains open today, and it remains open to journalists to contact HMCTS.

Indeed, we want to put this system on a securer footing with the necessary guardrails. [Interruption.] I will repeat, because the shadow Minister is muttering through my entire response, that no one has deleted any court records. Everything that he refers to in relation to serious sexual historic crimes remains accessible. Case law remains accessible, and the court lists remain accessible.

Open justice is vital, but I will not have a wild west of private companies acting in breach of agreements with Government and passing sensitive data on to third-party AI companies. That will not do, and the shadow Minister knows that if he were in my position, it would not have been acceptable to him either.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I want to be really clear that the data held by Courtsdesk is not an archive of criminal court case files. A number of Members have mentioned the importance of criminal court case records, which are held in a variety of places, not least the National Archives. They continue to remain available. The court lists, which I accept are important, continue to be available to the public—a member of the public can look them up now. Enhanced listing, which has a bit more information, remains open to journalists. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that it is important to have transparency and open justice, and for reporters to have the ability to expose what goes on in our courts. That is why I want to make the data open to more people, but we will put it on a safer footing to ensure that data breaches like this do not occur again in the future.

[Dr Mullan]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. We obviously benefit from enormous privilege in this House, because we are able to say things without any worry about what might happen legally. The Minister said several times in her statement that Courtsdesk has admitted that it breached the data-sharing agreement. Courtsdesk has been absolutely clear with me that it has never admitted that it breached the agreement. I wonder if the Minister might want to take the chance at least to caveat what she said in the Chamber.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

In a world where so many people walk on by or look the other way, I believe it is vital to the rule of law that our whole society gets behind people who are willing to stand up and be counted. We are joined in the Gallery today by one such person—Mark Hehir, a bus driver. Mark leapt to the aid of a passenger who was robbed, and the police said everything he did was entirely lawful, but his employer, Metroline, sacked him. More than 120,000 people have signed my petition giving their full support to Mark. Does the Justice Secretary agree that Mark is a hero who deserves our support?

[Mr Lammy]

Mark is of course a hero and deserves our support. I am following this case very closely.

[Dr Mullan]

I welcome those remarks, and I am sure the public will want us to work across the parties on these issues, but this is not an isolated case. I have heard from employers themselves, shop workers and bus drivers that they want to do the right thing, but the law inhibits them from doing so. The Conservatives will be bringing forward proposals to introduce good samaritan protections in civil law for both employers and employees. Will the Secretary of State work with us to get that on to the statute book?

[Mr Lammy]

These issues have a bearing on the Department for Business and Trade, so we necessarily have to work across Government. However, in a bipartisan manner, I and my Ministers will of course be happy to work with the hon. Gentleman on this issue.

Sentencing Bill

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Jake Richards]

My hon. Friend, a member of the Justice Committee, always makes thoughtful contributions on justice issues, but in particular on IPP. A balance must be struck between public safety and ensuring rehabilitation. The Government think that the Bill has gone some way to doing that, but there is always room for further review and assessment as we proceed, and Lord Timpson, who is leading on this piece of work for the Government, will continue to engage with the Justice Committee on the issue.

I am very grateful for the improvements that have been made to the Bill during its passage in the House of Lords. I hope, particularly given the undertakings that I have given on the provision of sentencing transcripts, that all parties will be able to support the Government’s amendments in lieu of Lords amendment 7. They represent a major step forward for transparency and for victims.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

There is no doubt that our justice system faces significant challenges. I have always acknowledged that, and during recent debates on a wide range of issues, from sentencing to prison capacity to probation to jury trials, there has been cross-party acknowledgement that for decades, under a number of Governments of different colours, not enough investment or political priority has been given to our justice system. That, however, should not and must not serve as an excuse for this Government to make changes to our justice system that damage it and fail to address the challenges before us. There are alterations that elements of the Ministry of Justice have always wanted to make. We should not let them use the excuse of the current challenges to finally slip them through the net. That is what we see happening in the Bill, in relation to the proposals on jury trials and, even more clearly, in relation to measures that are to the detriment of victims.

I welcome elements of this Bill, and I will discuss some examples. The Minister mentioned the restriction zones and the domestic abuse markers, but these measures are overwhelmingly outweighed by the fact that at the heart of the Bill is a catastrophic blow to victims’ search for justice: it will let thousands of rapists, paedophiles and serious violent offenders out of prison earlier. The Minister mentioned the independent sentencing review; I remind Members that it gave absolutely no consideration whatsoever to what victims and the public think of the proposals on sentencing. The report is an insult to victims and their families, as many have told me directly.

During the Commons stages of the Bill, every party other than Labour joined the Conservatives in voting against these dangerous proposals, including the Liberal Democrats. In fact, a number of Labour MPs bravely abstained. It should be a matter of deep shame for Liberal Democrat Members that they have since joined Labour in voting to let rapists, paedophiles and serious violent offenders out of prison earlier, especially as they have previously articulated why this is wrong. It is a complete betrayal of victims of serious crime and their families.

This is likely to be my final opportunity to say that I am confident that Labour MPs will come to regret these elements of the Bill, and will find it difficult to explain themselves when victims see perpetrators of crimes such as rape, child sex offences and child grooming leave prison—sometimes having served only a third of their sentence—because of MPs’ support for these measures. I will do whatever I can to ensure that victims know who made those choices, although so many alternatives were available to them. However, I have to accept that this Government’s majority, with the help of the Liberal Democrats, has for now ended the campaign against this change, so we should consider the Lords amendments that are before the House today.

As I know that the public greatly value constructive cross-party working, I will begin with an important issue on which we were able to secure Government support. Lords amendment 1 would ensure that when a police officer, prison officer or probation officer, including a former officer, is murdered because of their service, a whole life order is the starting point for sentencing. This proposal originated from the Opposition, and I am grateful to the Government for accepting the principle, following my meetings and campaigning with Paula and Neil Scott, whose son Lenny, a former prison officer, was murdered because he refused a bribe from an inmate.

Parliament has long been clear that those putting themselves in direct danger by confronting and standing up to the most dangerous people in our society should have the greatest possible protection from our law: a whole life order. We had previously legislated to that effect through the introduction of a mandatory whole life order for those who murder police and prison officers who are undertaking their duties, but the case of Lenny Scott highlighted a gap in the law. Lenny was brutally murdered, years after his service as a prison officer, in revenge for handing in a phone that he found in a prison cell search. He had moved into a new phase of his life, and was enjoying work, the gym, and time with his children and the rest of his family, but he was shot in a car park late at night, simply for doing his job. Lenny’s mum told me that she knew something was wrong when Lenny did not come home that evening. She even went out in the middle of the night to look for him, only to have the police arrive at her door at 1 am with the devastating news.

It has been a true privilege to work with Paula, and with Lenny’s dad, Neil. I extend my sincere thanks to Lord Timpson in the other place, and to the Minister, for taking the time to meet them both, and for agreeing to work with them further to see what else we might do to improve protections for our prison officers. I am sure that the Minister will agree that it was clear from the meeting what decent, moral people they are, which explains the sort of person that Lenny was. I am also very grateful to Lord Timpson for bringing fresh thinking to this area by including probation officers in the measure. They too must work closely with dangerous, violent offenders, and sometimes stand up to them to protect the public. They face the same dangers, so they should get the same protections.

Although our wider focus must always be on preventing crime and protecting the public, it is right that clear gaps in the law should be addressed when they arise. The Opposition therefore support Lords amendment 1 in lieu of our amendment, and I know that Lenny’s parents, family and friends have been delighted to see its progress in the House. In my time working with victims on campaigns, I have learned the pitfalls of naming a law after an individual case—there are always others who might warrant the remembrance of their experiences in the naming of a law—but Lenny’s family have every right to call this measure “Lenny’s Law”.

I will now consider amendments that attempt to deliver much-needed reform, but which are simply insufficient. Lords amendments 2 to 5 all concern the relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the Sentencing Council. Between them, they provide guidelines for specific scenarios in which the Lord Chancellor does not approve the Sentencing Council’s business plan; conditions for withdrawing consent to the Sentencing Council’s issuing of sentencing guidelines; and conditions for withholding consent to a request from the Sentencing Council to issue allocation guidelines, if it is necessary withhold that consent in order to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system. We saw in the debacle of two-tier sentencing just how far the Sentencing Council has strayed, and these measures will not fundamentally correct that. The official Opposition have made it clear—I will restate it—that our firm policy position is that we would abolish the Sentencing Council, restore power to elected Ministers who are directly accountable to the public, and give Parliament a role when it comes to sentencing guidelines.

The functions of the Sentencing Council in delivering consistency through sentencing are well recognised, and it is not our intention to do away with the functions that will be restored to the Lord Chancellor’s Office, but we believe it is for the Justice Secretary to be responsible for our sentencing guidelines, not a group of unelected individuals with no direct accountability to the public and limited accountability of any kind. Consultation with the public is not the same as accountability to the public, and we are clear that Parliament should have the power to act. Therefore, while these amendments are not a point of contention in the Bill’s progress and we will not divide the House on them, I raise them to point out that they would not be part of a Bill introduced by a Conservative Government, as we would abolish the Sentencing Council entirely and fully restore accountability.

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[Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)]

This Bill delivers the long-term, joined-up, sustainable reform that our criminal justice system desperately needs. I will comment on amendments 1 to 7 and 14, which will strengthen the Bill. We inherited a system on the brink, with prisons close to running out of places, courts paralysed by backlogs, police forced to operate with one hand tied behind their backs, trust broken and fear raised—a breakdown of law and order that left communities such as mine in Portsmouth paying the price.

In Portsmouth and across the country, the justice system is struggling under the weight of an unprecedented backlog. Crown courts in England and Wales now have between 77,000 and 78,000 outstanding cases waiting to be heard. Ten of thousands are open for a year or more, and some defendants are waiting for up to four years before trial dates are even available. Those delays mean that victims in my city and beyond are denied timely justice, eroding confidence in our courts. The Sentencing Bill and wider reforms are a crucial step towards tackling the backlogs, speeding up justice and ensuring that offences are addressed without further delay.

The Conservatives talk tough on crime, but their record tells a very different story. They increased sentencing lengths without building the capacity to support them, and in 14 years added just 500 prison places. When the system finally broke, they released tens of thousands—[Interruption.] They released 10,000 offenders early, largely in secret, shattering public confidence in justice. This Government are working hard to fix their mess. We believe in prisons. Many offenders must go there and some for a very long time. We have already opened 2,500 places and we are on track for achieving 4,000 by 2031—the biggest expansion since Victorian times.

We also have to be honest about the challenge. We cannot just build our way out of a Tory prison crisis. We owe it to the British public to reduce crime and the number of victims. That is why the Bill reforms sentencing, so that punishments can cut crime and rehabilitation can help reduce crime and the number of victims. That includes tough, credible and visible punishments in our community. Offenders will be closely monitored through tagging, restrictions on where they can go, and strict conditions that curb their freedom. Courts will be able to impose no-go zones, banning offenders from entering specific areas such as town centres, retail zones, building sites or industrial estates where they have previously offended. Those are not soft options. They are enforceable restrictions backed by modern technology with real consequences if they are breached. This approach is vital for crimes that devastate working people.

I would particularly like to mention the horrendous, life-changing crime of tool theft. In Portsmouth and across the country, tradespeople have told me this story time and time again. When tools are stolen, it is not just about the property they lose; it is about income lost, jobs cancelled, damage to reputation and families pushed into financial stress overnight. In some cases, it has led to our tradespeople taking their own lives. I have campaigned relentlessly on this issue, working closely with tradespeople, industry bodies, police, insurers and retailers. Together, we made the case that tool theft must be treated as a serious and repeated crime. As a result of that work, the Bill and these amendments will deliver real change for victims. Repeat tool offenders will now face tougher sentences in court and in our communities.

[Dr Mullan]

Does the hon. Lady accept that, as a result of the Bill, the vast majority of those offenders will only have to serve a third of their sentence, instead of half?

[Amanda Martin]

We are clearing up the mess left by the Tories. People are still waiting for their day in court. It is not okay for a crime to be committed and for there not even to be a sentence for four or five years. If the shadow Minister would like to intervene again, I will give way.

[Dr Mullan]

Would any single one of the tool theft victims the hon. Lady is taking about agree that those offenders should serve only a third of their sentence?

[Amanda Martin]

They will be serving longer than under the Conservatives, who did not care about tradespeople or construction crime. Repeat tool theft offenders will now face tougher sentencing because of a Labour Government, including tagging on release, strict movement restrictions, robust unpaid work and no-go areas that stop them returning to the places where they targeted working people. This is about disrupting criminal behaviour, protecting livelihoods and showing that Labour is the only party that stands squarely with those who work hard and play by the rules.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank my hon. Friend for reminding us that the heart of this amendment are victims and their ability to understand what has come in the sentencing remarks. So much happens in a court trial, whether it means reliving past trauma or confronting a perpetrator, and listening to proceedings can feel like a foreign language for many. Others, who choose not to attend the sentencing hearing, have no knowledge of what was said. That is why having consistent free access to transcripts is vital. It provides an opportunity to process the events of court proceedings afterwards or to read them for the first time. For many, this can provide closure and an opportunity to move on, but it is also the route for appealing a sentence if they believe it to have been unduly lenient.

Providing victims with court transcripts free of charge would markedly improve experiences for victims and survivors, but I do have some questions regarding the Government’s amendment in lieu. Could the Minister provide some clarity as to whether the term “victim” is applied as per the definition used by the victims code and whether, in the case that a victim is unable to personally request sentencing remarks—such as victims without capacity or victims who are children—immediate family members of victims are included within the provision?

[Dr Mullan]

Since I cannot ask the Minister myself, I might ask the hon. Lady if she agrees that we also need clarity on whether deceased victims’ family members will have a right to transcripts?

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The victims code lays out that if a victim is deceased, the immediate family—parents or siblings—would be included. That is why I asked that question of the Minister.

Subsection (3)(c) of the amendment in lieu allows the Secretary of State to provide exceptions to the requirement to provide a transcript of sentencing remarks. What sort of exceptions do the Government anticipate, and as per subsection (3)(d), what sort of information may be omitted from a transcript? If the Secretary of State does not plan to use sweeping powers to except or omit, why are such provisions included in the amendment? The previous Government ran a very limited pilot of free court transcripts. Will this Government publish a detailed review of that pilot?

We believe that this provision could and should go much further, and as per the campaign by my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park and Baroness Brinton in the other place, we have tabled an amendment to the Victims and Courts Bill that would mean that all transcripts are provided free of charge, including judicial summaries and bail decisions.

The Lady Chief Justice recently spoke to the Justice Committee about a pilot with HM Courts and Tribunals Service on the use of AI for transcripts, especially in the asylum and immigration courts. She described it as a “great success”, so I would be keen to understand if the Government will work with the Liberal Democrats to progress this work. We do appreciate the growing cross-party support on this issue and the work of all in the other place to achieve this important first step today.

We also welcome the Government committing to a statutory annual report into the state of prison capacity and, importantly, the Probation Service. This is an important mechanism for oversight that will improve long-term assessments of the health of our justice system. We were very happy to see the Government accept our amendment to remove clause 35 from the Bill, which did nothing to address the crisis in our justice system and was totally at odds with the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. We welcome the amendments tabled by the Government to strengthen protections in relation to the Lord Chancellor’s approval of sentencing guidelines.

We have been supportive of many of the provisions in the Bill aimed at addressing some of the key failings in our crumbling justice system. Our courts, prisons and the Probation Service are all at breaking point, and without urgent intervention they are at risk of failing completely. The Bill offered an opportunity to ease some of the pressures our system faces, where currently the needs of victims, offenders and the system more widely are too often ignored. We also need to ensure that our prison system is one of rehabilitation—one that ends the cycle of reoffending and reduces long-term pressures. All of the Liberal Democrats’ work on this Bill has been in that vein, in order to get the legislation into a better place to achieve those aims.

To conclude, we realise the mess that our justice system finds itself in. We have always aimed to work collaboratively and productively in a cross-party way to ensure that we can begin to turn the tide on this crisis, and we will continue to do so. We need a sustainable solution, which includes cutting reoffending, tackling the court backlog to reduce the number of people in prison on remand, and properly resourcing our Probation Service, which will no doubt feel the impact of this legislation most acutely. The Bill contains a number of proposals that Lib Dems have campaigned for as part of the wider package of reform, but it still could go much further to ensure that it is fit for purpose to protect victims and safeguard our justice system for the future.

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[Jake Richards]

Today is a pivotal day. Subject to agreement from this House and from the other place, the Bill will complete all its stages and shortly become law. I want to take this opportunity to thank my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Scunthorpe (Sir Nicholas Dakin). Although I was the Minister to take the Bill through the House, his painstaking work in developing the policy was fundamental and he deserves great credit.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin); at every opportunity, including this debate, she rightly raises her campaign to clamp down on tool theft and she is a fine champion for her constituents. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster Central (Sally Jameson). She brings huge experience to debates on these issues. We are taking measures to give prison staff further protections, but I am happy to speak with her about what more the Government can do.

We have aired the debate on the Sentencing Council before. The Conservative position was developed by the former shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick).

[Dr Mullan]

It was a team effort.

[Jake Richards]

The hon. Member says, “It was a team effort.” I am not sure about that. The Conservatives’ position is an example of real constitutional vandalism. It has never been the case that this Bill would threaten the independence of the judiciary. Our amendments, and the proposal set out in this legislation, ensure that there is a democratic lock around sentencing and that there is a role for this place, but that the Sentencing Council remains independent. That is absolutely the right thing to do.

I welcome the degree of consensus on transcripts. The Conservative position on this amendment, at the back end of last week and then early this week, seems to have changed a few times. Our amendment in lieu strikes the right balance. If anyone could seek a free transcript of sentencing remarks, we might be in the position where our court staff, who have a big job in getting a grip of the backlog, spend all their time issuing transcripts.

Let me turn to the issues raised by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller). We have to look into the question of what happens with transcripts when victims are either children, deceased or where there is a lack of capacity. It may be that the victims code does that already for us, but we have to get it right and we will ensure we do so as the policy is developed. She mentioned her concerns about exceptions and omissions and asked me to ponder on examples when those exceptions could be engaged. Of course, this may be relevant when there are issues of national security or public safety, but one would hope that such circumstances would be extremely exceptional. It is important, though, that those provisions are in the Bill.

We believe that our amendments will allow for more openness. They are ambitious but also realistic, considering where the technology is at the moment and the pressures on our court system. Do we want to go further when we can? Absolutely. We believe in the fundamental principle of transparency and openness in our justice system, and where we can, we will.

Jury Trials

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Emma Foody]

Absolutely. I agree with my hon. Friend. I am immensely frustrated at the rhetoric on that point.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

Were backlogs higher or lower in 2010 than they were in 2019, before the pandemic?

[Emma Foody]

Unfortunately, I did not hear the apology that should have preluded the question, for the absolute carnage the Conservatives left in our courts on their watch. They have shown no recognition or contrition for what they left behind. In every single one of those cases there is at least one victim unable to access justice. [Interruption.] I am glad that Opposition Members find it so amusing. They would find it much less amusing if they were at the other end of the justice system. Every victim is waiting to move on. Every witness is stuck in limbo. Every defendant is entitled to have their case heard, within a reasonable time, to repay their debt or to begin to be rehabilitated.

I speak about this issue not just as a Member of Parliament, but as a former member of the judiciary, having sat as a magistrate. I have made the decisions in courtrooms that I knew would have a lasting impact on people’s lives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I am pleased to wind up this Opposition day debate on the Prime Minister and Justice Secretary’s ill-considered, poorly evidenced and rash plan to curtail one of our cornerstone rights—the right to a trial by jury—which the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) colourfully described as one in which the bottom fell out of the Government’s argument.

I disagree with the Prime Minister and the Justice Secretary on very many issues, but today, for once, I find myself in fulsome, wholehearted agreement with not just the Prime Minister and the Justice Secretary, but the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards). I agree with all three of them that jury trials are a crucial, vital part of our justice system that should be protected wherever possible. Even with this Prime Minister, who has an unrivalled reputation for having opinions that last as long as they remain popular with whoever’s vote he is seeking at a particular point in time, we are in the extraordinary position where the Government are now putting forward a proposal that the Justice Secretary, the Justice Minister and the Prime Minister himself all previously argued vigorously against.

In fact, I am going to indulge in a degree of parliamentary plagiarism—I am going to let them do the hard work of writing at least some of my speech for today. First, I will hand over to the Justice Minister, who previously said on the issue of limiting jury trials:

“Instead of weakening a key constitutional right, the government should do the hard work…We all have the right to be judged by our peers when the prospect of imprisonment from society is before us. To take that right away would be a wholly draconian act.”

Next, let me ask the Justice Secretary to take over. He said:

“Jury trials are fundamental to our democracy. We must protect them.”

He also said:

“Jury trials are a fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.”

I could not have said it better myself.

Finally, although I appreciate that he is a busy man, I will lean on the Prime Minister’s carefully considered words. He said:

“The general and overriding presumption should be jury trial, with very, very limited exceptions”,

and,

“The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.”

That question of balance is at the heart of the matter. The Minister, as well as Labour Back Benchers—thin on the ground though they have been—have rightly pointed out that we have criminal trials without juries. That is a fact, but it is no argument for these measures. If that is the Government’s argument, we could simply do away with jury trials entirely without anyone being concerned. It is and has always been a balance, but as the Justice Minister, the Justice Secretary and the Prime Minister understand—or understood at one point at least—altering that balance should be considered only when there is no other option.

To draw a comparison that illustrates the seriousness of the matter, during the pandemic—at the heart of the crisis that was widely accepted to be the biggest challenge to face our nation since world war two—jury trials continued. In fact, it was during world war two that we last saw proposals anything like as radical as those we are considering today, but even they did not come close to this proposed curtailment. During that time, we reduced the number of jurors from 12 to seven in most cases. When our nation was under attack and every element of life was turned over to the war effort, we modified but fundamentally retained the right to jury trials.

I am pleased to say that the meeting of minds between me and the triumvirate who are making this decision is only the beginning; I find myself in common cause with 37 Labour MPs today. It is fair to say that the Mother of the House, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), as well as the hon. Members for Leeds East (Richard Burgon), for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey) are very far from me on the political spectrum, but, like other colleagues, they are clear that these proposals are wrong, and I wholeheartedly agree. When there are 37 names on a signed public letter, any decent Whip would know that there are at least the same number lurking in the background, not willing to go public but rushing to answer the phone call from the Whips at the weekend to say that they are not happy with the proposals.

What do those 37 Members say? They say that the proposal is “madness”, that it

“will cause more problems than it solves”,

and that

“the public will not stand for the erosion of a fundamental right, particularly given that there are numerous other things the Government could do to more effectively reduce the backlog.”

That final point takes us right back to the issue of balance. The Government have quite simply failed to articulate why these proposals are the only way forward. They might have received a more sympathetic reception had they strained every sinew to tackle the issue and truly exhausted all other options since their election.

As our motion acknowledges, the courts are under unprecedented pressure—no one disputes that. The delays are too long, victims are waiting too long for justice, and defendants are left in limbo. Prior to the pandemic, the Crown court backlogs were lower than those that we inherited from the previous Labour Government—I do not remember Labour MPs being concerned about that at the time—but then covid hit and placed unprecedented strain on the criminal justice system, leaving a long and difficult legacy. The result was an enormous reduction in court capacity that led to backlogs shooting up in a way they never had before.

I remind the ouse again that even during that challenging time, there was cross-party support for the guiding principle that jury trials should continue. After the pandemic, England and Wales resumed jury trials faster than many comparable countries, following one of the shortest suspensions anywhere, because they were treated as a priority. The previous Government opened, and extended the use of, 20 Nightingale courtrooms, increased the number of judges and raised the judicial retirement age to retain experience in the system. In a short number of years, we increased the number of sitting days by more than 20,000—an unprecedented level. Despite that, the loss of capacity could not simply be undone.

[Catherine Atkinson]

In the light of the shadow Minister’s comments about sitting days, does he condemn the Conservative cut of nearly 15% of sitting days in 2019 and congratulate this Labour Government on increasing the number of sitting days?

[Dr Mullan]

As the shadow Justice Secretary outlined, there has not been enough investment in the justice system over many decades. I also want to make it clear that the claim about a record number of sitting days is a bit of a statistical anomaly, because, as the Government know, there was a change in how sitting days are measured. Using the historical measure to make the comparison, we matched that number of sitting days—and perhaps even surpassed it. Of course, we uncapped sitting days for a number of years during the pandemic. This Government have failed to do that, and they have failed to rapidly increase the number of sitting days, which the Institute for Government said makes things more difficult. As I said, there is no dispute about whether there are long-standing issues, as Members across the House acknowledge. The question is what to do about them.

Let us be clear about how many of the unacceptably long waits are the result of a wait for a jury trial. The Justice Secretary has rightly been criticised for quoting statistics about victim drop-out rates in a deeply misleading way. We do not want to see any victims drop out for any reason, or any long waits, but fewer than 10% of drop-outs occur post-charge, and that figure is coming down. It is not helpful to understanding this issue for Members to cite waits of six or seven years that in fact relate to the delay from alleged offence to sentencing. Yes, waits for trial from point of charge are too long, but that is just part of the picture.

Jury trials are not a quirk or a happenstance for how we deliver criminal justice in this country; they are a foundational principle of our justice system reaching back to Magna Carta. For more than 800 years, ordinary men and women have been trusted to sit in judgment, to weigh evidence, and to decide guilt or innocence. That public participation is not a flaw in the system; it is one of its greatest sources of legitimacy. Removing juries, even for a narrow category of cases, let alone the radical changes before us, alters the relationship between the citizen and the state, and replaces collective judgment with individual arbitrary authority.

[Catherine Atkinson]

In light of the shadow Minister’s comments, does he think it was wrong of the then Conservative Government, through the Criminal Justice Act 1988, to make offences such as criminal damage and common assault summary only, removing juries for those offences?

[Dr Mullan]

I wonder whether the hon. Member was listening to my speech. I have said throughout that the issue is one of balance. As the Prime Minister, the Justice Secretary and the Minister have said, we must tread carefully; for the hon. Member to draw comparisons between minor changes and wholescale huge reductions in the use of jury trials shows that she fails to understand that the issue is one of balance. The obvious flaw in the argument being made by the Government in support of these measures—that they are to tackle what we should all consider a temporary problem—is that the measures are permanent. There is no plan to reverse them when the backlog is down, as the temporary measures in world war two that I mentioned were reversed.

[Mr Adnan Hussain (Blackburn) (Ind)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that curtailing jury trials will not solve the delays but simply push the backlog back to the appeal courts? Worse still, it risks creating a two-tier justice system where those who can afford to appeal will do so, and those who cannot will be left behind.

[Dr Mullan]

The hon. Member is pointing out one of many flaws in the arguments that the Government have put forward to justify their case, and they simply have not made it. Court sitting days are still being wasted. Yesterday alone, more than 50 Crown court rooms sat empty.

Let us be clear: while the Government lean heavily on at least some of what has been proposed in Sir Brian Leveson’s review, they need only to have looked into the bowels of the MOJ to unearth those exact ideas. That is because—this will come as little surprise to Conservative Members—we have been here before with Labour Governments. As Justice Secretary when Labour was last in office, Jack Straw also proposed removing the right to a jury trial for either-way offences. As is the case today, rightly, Members of both Houses and people from across the political spectrum united to stop those proposals. We can do away with the pretence that this is purely the workings of an independent figure. I am afraid that Sir Brian has become a shield for defending these ideas—a shield that Labour Members lacked last time around, and that they obviously hope will make the difference this time.

We are right to fear that this is the thin end of the wedge. Thanks to leaked plans, we know what the Justice Secretary wanted to do, which was to go much further than even these proposals by removing jury trial for sentences of up to five years. Where will the Government go next if they succeed with these proposals?

It is also impossible to ignore the wider context. A number of my constituents have raised with me, and other Members of the House, the point that while the Government argue that fundamental legal safeguards must be set aside, they are spending £1.8 billion on a nationwide mandatory digital ID system. The Criminal Bar Association, the Bar Council and the Law Society have all warned against the proposals. They have been clear that restricting jury trials will not solve the backlog, and risks distracting from the real work that needs to be done: fixing the basics, investing in infrastructure and people, and making them function efficiently.

I close by going a little closer to home. Rudyard Kipling, who lived in my constituency—you can find a statute of him in the village of Burwash—said in his 1911 poem, “The Reeds of Runnymede”, about the centrality to British freedom of trial by jury—[Interruption.] I will finish with this, Madam Deputy Speaker, if Labour Members could stop their chuntering. He said:

“At Runnymede, at Runnymede,

Your rights were won at Runnymede!

No freeman shall be fined or bound,

Or dispossessed of freehold ground,

Except by lawful judgment found

And passed upon him by his peers.

Forget not, after all these years,

The Charter signed at Runnymede.”

Conservative Members have not forgotten. Let us hope that enough Labour Members have also not forgotten either.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Tuesday 16th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

This week, the Government pledged action on violence against women and girls—an issue that I know many Members across this House care deeply about, including many Labour Members—but this so-called earned progression model will see thousands of rapists, child groomers and paedophiles let out of prison earlier. Shockingly, last week a Government Minister said that the reason why they could not be excluded from the model was that it would increase the risk of inaccuracies in release calculations. Does the Minister think that a single victim of rape should expect the offender to be let out of prison earlier because the Government cannot calculate the release date properly?

[Jake Richards]

We will not take any lessons about violence against women and girls from the Conservatives. Prosecutions for rape went down under the last Conservative Government, but we are taking action to protect women and girls. I will repeat this point: the scenario we faced last summer was that when those who committed the worst offences were convicted, there was not space in prison to keep them behind bars. That is wholly unacceptable, and this Government will never let that happen again.

[Dr Mullan]

The House will have heard that the Government are refusing to exclude those types of offenders. I am pleased to say that a number of Labour Members share my discomfort about the measures that the Government are taking; in fact, the hon. Member for Amber Valley (Linsey Farnsworth) tabled an amendment to exclude existing offenders from the measures. Why does the Minister think that she did that?

[Jake Richards]

I speak regularly with my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Linsey Farnsworth), who was an experienced Crown Prosecution Service prosecutor. When I speak to her, she tells me that the worst scenario for prosecutors who are trying to keep our streets safe is prisons being full, so that offenders cannot be kept behind bars. That was the situation in this country under the last Government, and we are fixing their mess.

Draft Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2025

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2025 General Committees

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the purpose of this statutory instrument. Having reviewed it, the Opposition will not be opposing the instrument this evening.

Each amendment is limited in scope and responds to specific gaps that have been clearly identified. One of the clearest areas where that is the case is the provision for self-employed individuals and those employed directly by private individuals. As the explanatory memorandum explains, the final report of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse recommended enabling self-employed people working in sensitive roles with children to obtain checks against the DBS children’s barred list.

I understand that the Government’s subsequent progress update confirmed that, by the end of 2025, self-employed people and those employed by private individuals will be able to access high-level DBS checks. We fully recognise the importance of those recommendations, and I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed whether they are still on track for that. Forgive me if those checks have already been made available, but if they have not, are we on track for the end of the year? At present, an individual carrying out a role within an organisation can be subject to the appropriate enhanced or barred list check, while a self-employed person doing identical work cannot.

That inconsistency is neither sensible nor safe. It is also worth recognising that this direction of travel is not new; the previous Conservative Government accepted the principle of the IICSA recommendations and began the process of reviewing the supervision exemption and considering widening access to barred list checks.

The changes relating to electronic monitoring contractors are justified and a proportionate response to risk. Staff working with monitoring technology occupy positions of trust, and allowing fuller disclosure checks will help to reassure the public that the system is robust and that those carrying out that important work meet the necessary standards of integrity.

Likewise, enabling the Department for Work and Pensions and its contractors to require disclosure of spent convictions for registered healthcare professionals reflects the sensitive nature of the work that those professionals undertake. They are individuals who assess vulnerable claimants, often with access to personal and medical information; it is appropriate that they are subject to the same safeguarding standards expected in the NHS and other comparable roles.

Taken together, these changes strike the right balance between supporting rehabilitation and ensuring public protection. They are targeted, proportionate and consistent with public expectations and existing safeguarding frameworks. My questions for the Minister are about the implications for the volume of checks that we might expect as a result of more people being suitable for them, and whether he can update us with important contextual information. In my local area, for example, some people experience significant delays and sometimes wait so long for checks to be completed that job offers fall through.

We support these changes, but while they might be well intended and sensible, the Minister is introducing yet more checks into the system, so it is important that he outlines whether there are any issues in the current system—which I think there are—with people getting checks. If he is introducing more, he needs to keep them on a tighter rein. I know that the process is devolved to each local police force, but it would be good if the Minister gave an overview of how well he thinks it is currently performing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

Will the Minister write to me, in conjunction with the Home Office colleagues, with an overview of where he thinks performance is across the different areas?

[Jake Richards]

That might be a question for Home Office colleagues to respond to, but I will look into it, and if I can respond, I certainly will.

Question put and agreed to.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Tessa Munt]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 5, Clause 11, page 10, line 4, at end insert “by—

(i) a recognised news publisher, within the meaning of Part 3 of the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 56 of that Act), or

(ii) a person in the course of working for such a publisher.” .—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This amendment clarifies that the journalism exemption from the offence of misleading the public only applies to media entities and those that work for them.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 2, clause 11, page 10, line 35, at end insert—

“(10) A prosecution for an offence under this section shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director for Public Prosecutions.”

This amendment requires the Director of Public Prosecutions to consent to the prosecution of anyone for the offence of misleading the public.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss clause 11 stand part.

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Sir Roger.

As we all know, clause 11 creates the new offence of misleading the public, which is intended, quite rightly, to capture the most serious and culpable instances where public officials knowingly or recklessly provide false or misleading information to the public. The motivations behind the clause are entirely understandable. In the past, we have seen, through scandals and tragedies, how deeply harmful it can be when institutions withhold the truth or put out statements that they know to be false.

However, there is no doubt that, as the Minister herself said earlier, this is a new area of the law. She referred to the fact that politicians often debate what does or does not count as misleading information. Members of the Committee grumbled when I raised this issue at our first sitting, using the live example of what we have been going through in the last couple of weeks, but we have also heard how contentious legislating in this area can be in relation to the media and the role they play. This is a novel area and one that we have to tread carefully in, recognising that we are not able to anticipate fully how this offence will be used, not just by current prosecuting authorities but by different actors under a different regime, or by private citizens. We also know that there have been attempts to prosecute individual politicians for offences of misleading people, so this is very much a live issue. With an offence of this seriousness that is framed in this way, we must ensure that it is applied proportionately, fairly and with great care. That is the purpose of the amendment; it is to ensure that no prosecution under the clause can be brought without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Although clause 11 sets out a structured test for what counts as being “seriously improper”, and the explanatory notes make it clear that the offence is intended to target only the most egregious conduct, the reality is that the clause interfaces with the political environment in a way that few other offences do. “Misleading the public” is a phrase that, regrettably, is used daily in our political discourse. Accusations of “misleading the public”, made fairly or unfairly, are frequently levelled in debates, campaigns and correspondence. Therefore, we need to be absolutely certain that this new criminal offence cannot become a vehicle for politically motivated complaints, vexatious charges, over-zealous private prosecutions, or attempts to use the criminal law to litigate policy disagreements. Requiring the personal consent of the DPP is a well-established constitutional safeguard in precisely this kind of context. It would ensure that decisions to prosecute are taken objectively, independently and at the highest level.

It is not only political actors that we must consider. Senior public officials, regulators, police chiefs, NHS managers or anyone else in a position of public authority might find themselves being accused of misleading the public in complex and fast-moving situations. Often, such situations involve imperfect information, operational pressures or competing obligations. The clause rightly makes it clear that accidental or inadvertent misleading of the public should not be criminalised. However, we must ensure that establishing the threshold for a prosecution remains firmly under the control of the independent prosecuting authority, and not subject to either the ebb and flow of public anger or the risk of tactical litigation.



Some may reasonably argue that the CPS would in practice be involved by discontinuing prosecutions and bringing them under the Director of Public Prosecutions, but that in itself could create a storm for an individual subject to that action. That is why we think a tighter safeguard should be required.

It is not in the amendment, but I would like to ask the Minister about what thought has been given to whether prosecution should be subject to the Attorney General’s permission. Forgive me: I do not know if that is already part of the legislation; I do not think it is, but the Minister will know. For example, when it comes to public order offences—another potentially contentious area—we ask the Attorney General to give permission for prosecution to serve as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of measures.

My final, more general point about clause 11, which we touched on earlier, is about the maximum sentence of two years. What are the Minister’s thoughts on whether there have been any common law versions of a prosecution for this sort of thing in which someone was given a sentence of more than two years? Are the Government sure that this is not unnecessarily constrained compared with the current common law position, which is unlimited? I appreciate that the offences in question are normally more to do with misconduct rather than misleading, but it would still be helpful to get that reassurance.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. We agree wholeheartedly with the intention behind the amendment, and I can assure him that the Bill achieves that intent. Schedule 3 makes further provision regarding clause 5 and clause 11 offences. Paragraph 2(2) sets out that,

“Proceedings for an offence under section 11 may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”

With that clarification, I hope the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment. Hopefully, I can answer some of his other queries as we move through the debate.

Clause 11 creates a new offence of misleading the public, which is designed to capture the most serious incidents of misleading the public, such as the behaviour seen after Hillsborough, where officials intentionally spread a false narrative to protect their reputation and caused harm as a result. That, as the shadow Minister rightly states, is punishable by up to two years in prison. We all know the harm that caused and how, three decades on, families are still fighting for justice and accountability for what the spreading of that narrative did. The Independent Office for Police Conduct report on Tuesday was clear: a lie was told; a false narrative was spread to protect reputations and avoid consequences. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that no family ever has to go through what those families went through and continue to go through. I can only imagine how hard that report was to read and the pain that they continue to feel.

The new offence will ensure that when a public official has misled the public, there is accountability. To have committed the offence, an authority or official must have acted with the intention to mislead the public or been reckless as to whether their actions would do so. By reckless, we mean a person acting with the knowledge that there is a risk that they might mislead the public and taking that risk without reasonable justification. It does not include accidental mistakes or inaccuracies. They must have known or ought to have known that their act is seriously improper.

It will be for the judge and the jury to determine whether that test has been met, but clause 11(3)(a) sets out minimum conditions that must be present: that the act—

“involved dishonesty that was significant or repeated…in respect of matters of significant concern to the public”.

That will avoid capturing minor instances of lying or misleading on trivial political or private matters. The act must have caused or have the potential to cause harm. Harm, as we have already discussed, is broadly defined, including economic, physical or psychological harm, including distress. The purpose of this is to avoid capturing inconsequential matters, such a Minister lying about where they went to university or competing in a chess tournament or a local government official overstating their council’s performance. Although these sorts of lies should entail professional consequences, we do not think they meet the bar for criminal sanctions. The individual must also have departed significantly from what would have been expected of them in carrying out their functions. This is to ensure that where it may be necessary to mislead someone as part of a person’s job—for example, as part of an undercover police operation—that is not captured.

This clause as introduced does not apply to devolved matters. We have written to all the devolved Governments to request that the offence be extended in their jurisdiction in line with the other provisions on duty of candour, which apply across the UK. The Northern Ireland Executive, the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government have all confirmed their agreement to extend the offence, and we will be extending the offences accordingly. We hope to bring forward amendments on the territorial extent on Report to ensure full coverage for the United Kingdom.

Subsection (4) also excludes any act done for the purposes of journalism. That is to avoid capturing public service broadcasters and those working for them who would otherwise meet the definition of a public official. That is to ensure that the offence does not impinge on press freedom or existing regimes for media regulation. Although behaviour that meets the threshold for the scope of the offence would clearly be unacceptable, we do not believe that this offence is the appropriate vehicle for determining the veracity of media reporting, as we have already discussed.

Subsection (6) includes a reasonable excuse defence, with specific defences for the exercise of functions by the intelligence services and armed forces on active service. That is necessary to make it clear that when officials can prove that they misled the public to protect national security or this country’s defence operations, they are not subject to criminal sanctions. I stress, however, that this will not prevent the successful prosecution of members of the security services or armed forces who mislead the public for any other purposes, such as personal gain or to protect their reputation.

This is a transformative offence that will ensure that when something goes wrong and public officials lie to the public, there are serious consequences. It will act as a powerful deterrent against the sorts of state cover-ups that we have sadly see all too often.

The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle asked me about offences which potentially attract two or more years in prison. I will write to him on that and come back on the specifics, as well as on his question about the Attorney General. With that, I commend clause 11 to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for explaining the clause to us. She has provided the reassurance that we are looking for, and I look forward to receiving further material in writing. I recognise that the Government are attempting to craft an offence that has a high threshold and does not interfere with the wide range of situations that people might seek to apply it to, but I worry that we might end up seeing such questions tested in the courts repeatedly before there is a settled view on what they translate into in reality. I am not sure that it will be as simple as we might think in reality. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Offences under Part 2: related provision

[Ian Byrne]

I beg to move amendment 56, in schedule 3, page 44, line 27, after “national,” insert “or”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

Despite not relating directly to the Bill, the matter of pensions has come up in Committee a couple of times. We do need to explore that, because there are many situations where people walk off into the sunset. It seems to me that the one lever we still have over people is their pensions. Have the Government considered how such a provision might be used in the future? The Opposition will be looking at it.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will happily raise that issue with the Pensions Minister in our discussions.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby for tabling the amendments. I hope to be able to provide some clarification. Amendments 56 and 57 seek to ensure the same extraterritorial extent applies for the offences of failure to comply with the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public.

The intended effect of amendment 56 is already achieved in the Bill as drafted. In schedule 3, paragraph 1(1), the disapplication does not apply if any the criteria of sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) are met. It is already an “or” list, not an “and” list. That follows the standard parliamentary drafting convention. To add an unnecessary “or” between sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), when that is already the meaning, would risk putting the position in doubt in other legislation across the statute book and could cause confusion.

Paragraph (1)(2) refers only to the clause 5 offence because the clause 11 offence applies only in England and Wales. A case could not be heard by a court in Scotland or Northern Ireland. However, as I confirmed earlier, we have in principle agreements to extend clause 11 offences to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and we are working with the devolved Governments to draft amendments, which we intend to bring forward on Report, so that the offence is UK-wide.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will speak to each of the clauses in turn. Clause 12 will introduce the first of two new statutory offences to replace the common law offence of misconduct in public office. In its 2020 report, the Law Commission recommended that the common law offence should be abolished and replaced with two new offences that broadly replicate the coverage of the common law offence. In acting on those recommendations, the Government do not intend to change significantly the type of conduct the criminal law will capture. Like the common law offence, the new offences are intended to capture only wrongdoing at the most serious level.

The clause establishes the new offence of seriously improper acts, and is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful misconduct under the common law offence. The seriously improper acts offence is committed when a person who holds public office uses that office with the intent to obtain a benefit for themselves or another person, or to cause detriment to someone else. They must know or ought to have known that any reasonable person would regard their act as seriously improper.

The offence can capture a wide range of conduct. “Using” an office can include both acts and omissions. “Benefit” and “detriment” mean any benefit or detriment including, but not limited to, financial gain or loss, protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, and benefits or detriments of a physical or sexual nature, whether temporary or permanent. When we talk about protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, we intend to capture serious situations where someone uses their office in the way that we associate with the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster: the manipulation of evidence in order to protect the reputation of a person, including an organisation, or the spreading of allegations about other people, designed to damage their reputation.

The clause is about not the usual back and forth of everyday politics, but severe abuses of power that undermine the very basis of public service. An act is seriously improper if a reasonable person would consider it so. There is a list of factors that the jury must consider to make that determination, including the extent to which the act involved an intention to mislead or be dishonest by withholding, covering up or misusing information. A defence is available if the person can show that they had a reasonable excuse for their action—for example, a public office holder has to disregard one fraudulent benefits claim to uncover a more serious, larger scale benefits fraud. The offence is indictable and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. That puts it on par with similar statutory offences, such as bribery and fraud.

The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence. That is to safeguard against the risk of spurious claims against public officials, including politicians. We have already heard examples of that. It will ensure that only cases that are serious in nature and justify criminalisation are prosecuted. It does not require the personal consent of the director—consent can be delegated—so it should not cause any undue administrative burden.

The clause will ensure that serious misconduct and corrupt behaviour by those in public office will continue to result in criminal sanctions, and that those who abuse positions of public trust are held to account for their actions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 13 establishes the new offence of breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury. It is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful neglect of duty under the common law offence. The new offence is committed when a person who holds public office either causes or creates significant risk of causing someone else to suffer critical harm, in breach of a duty to prevent other people from suffering such harm. They must know that they are under such a duty, and their act must fall far below what could reasonably have been expected of them in the circumstances. The offence requires that the person be under a duty to prevent critical harm that arises by virtue of the public office that they hold. That means that the offence can be committed only by public office holders whose roles inherently involve a duty to prevent critical harm—for example, service personnel, firefighters and the police. It does not apply to public office holders whose roles do not put them under a duty to protect the public from critical harm.

The offence is made out only if the public official knows or ought to know that they are subject to that duty. The breach of duty must cause either critical harm or a significant risk of that harm materialising. It will not capture cases where a negligible or insignificant risk of harm is caused. The breach of duty must also have been intentional or reckless. These are both very high criminal thresholds. To act recklessly means to proceed in full awareness of the potential outcome and in circumstances where it is unreasonable to take the risk.

Only the most serious breaches of duty are captured by the offence. The requirement that the act must fall far below the standard that could reasonably be expected of the person in the circumstances ensures that minor or honest mistakes and legitimate but risky operational decisions made in challenging circumstances will not be captured. For example, a law enforcement officer having to decide in the moment whether to take a particular risky operational decision would be caught by the offence only if they intentionally recklessly breach the duty, their act falls far below the standards reasonably expected of them in those circumstances, and they have no reasonable excuse for their actions.

The offence will be triable on indictment only and will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. That is commensurate with other offences where a failure of duty leads to serious or critical consequences, such as gross negligence manslaughter. As with the offence in clause 12, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence in clause 13. That is to guard against the risk of spurious claims being made against public officials in this position and to ensure that only the most serious cases are prosecuted.

Clause 14 clarifies the territorial application of the new offences in clauses 12 and 13. It makes clear that a public office holder can commit the seriously improper acts or breach of duty offences by their actions either within England and Wales, or in other UK territories such as Scotland or Northern Ireland. The offences in clauses 12 and 13 may also be committed by acts done outside the United Kingdom provided that, at the time of the act, the public office holder is either a UK national or habitually resident in England and Wales. The clause ensures conduct like this could be caught by the new offences.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to make some brief points. I welcome the maximum sentences, which are clearer and in a more natural range, and there is not the uncertainty that I think we still have with the misleading the public offence.

I want to ask the Minister about the role of MPs, however, because she will know that our privilege to speak in the Chamber, including to make allegations of defamation, is unfettered. We can say things that do damage people’s reputations and that cause all sorts of issues, but we are immune from civil procedure. I am not sure how the common law has dealt with equivalent sorts of scenarios, but I can imagine an MP trashing the reputation of a business and that business going under, causing huge harm to an individual who then feels as though they should be able to have a say through this route.

I think we all agree that, although it can be abused, that privilege is really important to the operation of our democracy. Even if not now—the Minister may not have considered this before—it would be helpful to have a written note on the Department’s view about the potential misuse of that privilege to say whatever we want in Parliament, without restriction.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am happy to clarify that for the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

This is one area of the Bill where we need some clarity about how exactly it will operate. Before becoming an MP, I worked for a patient advocacy organisation, so I saw at first hand just how challenging inquests can be for patients’ relatives. I spoke to so many families who had to sit and watch while a portrayal of events, which they had no ability to challenge, was given at an inquest. I am sure that many Members have dealt with individuals who have had an experience with a coroner, outside of the big national scandals, that was not as they would want it to be. There is an underlying challenge that coroners are very different from other public bodies, agencies and office holders, because to some extent they can just do their own thing. That makes it very hard to achieve a consistent approach.

I have a number of questions. First, who exactly will decide whether the public authority’s costs are reasonable? The chief coroner was very clear that she felt that coroners were not equipped to do that, and even if they were, it would take time and resources. We all need to understand what the process will be. Importantly, will there be a mechanism for someone to challenge that? If the coroner is not personally engaged with everything that this Government are trying to do with the Bill—as we are sympathetic to—and they do not make any reasonable attempt to control a public body’s costs in line with what we are asking of them, what is the route for challenge?

I have heard concerns from people who work on the frontline of a public body. Sometimes, the reputation of the organisation is defended, but conversely, the reputation of an individual can be at risk in these sorts of situations—I go back to my experience in healthcare. We would not want a perverse scenario where the organisation throws an individual under the bus and makes no particular effort to ensure that their role is adequately explained and defended—accepting that we do not necessarily agree technically that it would be defending, but rather inquisitorial.

Complex family arrangements were raised in the evidence sessions. How exactly does it work if the parents are divorced? The Minister touched on that towards the end of her speech, and mentioned that another family member must not have applied for funding. Again, would there be a limit? Could every single individual family member get help? How would that be determined? The question that politicians always have to come back to is that of funding. Is this new funding that has been allocated to the Ministry of Justice outside of its existing budget, for what we imagine would be a significant increase in legal aid spending? Will the Minister reassure those people who have an interest in other areas of legal aid spending that they will not be reduced as a result of this new area of legal aid spending? I just want to understand where the money has come from.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful for those questions. On who will police the spend, it will not be for the coroner to police it; it will be for the public bodies themselves. They will be under an obligation, because they will also be funding the legal aid for the bereaved families, depending on which public authority or arm of government it comes under. If it is health, for example, that Department will fund the legal aid costs of the bereaved families; if it is the Prison Service, the funding will come from the Ministry of Justice; if it is police, it will be the Home Office, and so on.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for clarifying that, but it still leaves the question whether additional money has been allocated to the individual areas of Government spending.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

No, there is no new money for this legislation. Therefore, we hope that the spending that public authorities carry out for inquests will match how much they have to fund for the bereaved families. We hope that this will also be a deterrent against arming up officials when going towards what should be an inquisitorial process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Lady is bang on the money, literally. I cannot tell her how frustrating it has been as a Minister trying to figure out a way forward on this—trying to figure out the cost to the public purse and the taxpayer—when we do not have that data. This will enable us to have the data on exactly how much is being spent by public authorities and Government Departments on legal aid.

This is taxpayers’ money. We heard evidence from the bereaved families that one of the biggest kicks in the teeth for them was that they as taxpayers were funding the legal support for the public authorities that were accused of having a hand in the death of their loved one. That is totally perverse and unacceptable.

[Dr Mullan]

I asked how a coroner would be challenged if they were not adequately policing this. In practice, if a public authority is not doing this in the way that we would want it to, how does the Minister envisage that it will be held to account and costs driven down?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome that point. We have put new powers in the Bill for the coroner to challenge public authorities if they are acting inappropriately. What they bring forward has to be proportionate and reasonable. There are powers on the coroners there. They have to compile a report and complain to the relevant bodies or those individuals with the power to take action against the public authority for not acting in accordance with the guidance set out by the Lord Chancellor or the provisions in the Bill.

[Dr Mullan]

But that is kind of circular, because it takes us back to the coroners. Are the coroners in a position to do that? It is not something they have to do at the minute. As we heard in evidence, judges do that—it is part and parcel of their work—but it is not part of what coroners do. What are we doing in terms of support, information and guidance, and then monitoring that they actually do it?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I have a very close working relationship with the chief coroner, as the hon. Member would probably expect given my role. We work together very closely, and we have had significant conversations about how to work together going forward and about the implementation of the Bill, which will be crucial to its effectiveness. It is important to recognise that coroners, although distinct in their nature, are the judiciary. They are independent and they do have relevant expertise in this regard. I will be working closely with the chief coroner on implementation.

I am not sure whether the hon. Member heard what I said about annual reporting, but any experiences of a public authority failing to abide by the coroner’s instructions will have to be put into the annual report that the chief coroner will provide to the Lord Chancellor—all of this has to be captured—and we will not hesitate to name and shame those who are failing to abide by the duties in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Byrne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston cannot be here to move the motion because of her father’s illness. She really wanted to be here, and I fully support the new clause, so I am going to speak on her behalf.

New clause 1 proposes a post-legislative assessment, within 12 months of the passing of the Act, of how its provisions on the duty of candour and equality of arms are increasing public confidence in public authorities. Specifically, it would examine whether the internal processes of public authorities are fit for purpose in identifying and investigating failures as they first arise after major incidents. The assessment would also consider the role of the independent public advocate in evaluating how public authorities respond to affected individuals and bereaved families following such incidents.

The report would have to explore whether the powers of the independent public advocate should be extended to facilitate the gathering of information to support inquiries and investigations, to ensure that public authorities and officials act in accordance with the duty of candour. It would also have to examine the case for empowering the independent public advocate to instigate an independent panel, similar to the Hillsborough independent panel, and assess the costs compared with non-statutory and statutory inquiries.

The new clause would ensure that, soon after the Act comes into force, Parliament would receive a clear, evidence-based assessment of whether it is delivering on its aims, and whether the role of the independent public advocate should be strengthened to secure faster truth, greater transparency, and better support for bereaved families after major incidents.

When Hillsborough Law Now launched in 2022, it not only supported the measures in the Bill but called for the establishment of an independent public advocate with powers to set up independent panels like the Hillsborough independent panel. For more than two decades, the legal system failed to deliver truth or justice to the Hillsborough families. In some cases, it even facilitated the propagation of a false narrative, including by officers named in the IOPC report published this week.

It was the Hillsborough independent panel, which was established in 2009 and reported in 2012, that finally set the record straight. I wholeheartedly support that statement. Its process was non-legal, document-based and grounded in transparency rather than adversarial proceedings. In two years it achieved what the legal system had failed to do in 24. One of the key lessons of Hillsborough is that the legal system can fail. The two witnesses, Jenni Hicks and Hilda Hammond, spoke powerfully on behalf of this new clause, and the need to look at how panels in the style of the Hillsborough independent panel can help to achieve justice. I want to put on record that I thought they spoke really eloquently. We cannot claim to have learned the lessons fully unless we provide bereaved families with access to a similar process at an earlier stage.

The Public Advocate Bills introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston in the Commons in 2016 and by Lord Wills in the Lords in 2014, set out to create an independent public advocate with meaningful powers, including the authority to instigate independent panels akin to the Hillsborough independent panel. The intention was to give bereaved families a route to truth and transparency at an early stage, and to ensure that public authorities could be held to account quickly and that failures in process could be addressed before they became entrenched.

However, the office of the independent public advocate, as currently established under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, does not yet carry the powers originally envisaged, as the independent public advocate outlined in last Thursday’s evidence session. I think she is open to having more powers to achieve what my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston is looking to set out with the new clause. As it stands, the office of the IPA lacks the statutory authority to gather evidence from those affected, and it cannot initiate independent panels to collate information and assess public authorities’ actions.

I cannot say it strongly enough: the Hillsborough independent panel uncovered what happened at Hillsborough because it had access to the police documents and the reports, so it could see the scale of how some police officers had changed the evidence of those who were at Hillsborough. I include in that my own father, whose report of his experience at Hillsborough was changed beyond all recognition. When he eventually saw what the police had put down for him, it caused him great distress, along with many others. What my right hon. Friend has outlined in the new clause is so important, and without the powers in it the advocate cannot replicate the approach that finally succeeded in the case of Hillsborough, when transparency, document disclosure and independent oversight finally brought truth, in a fraction of the time that the legal system had taken.

The gap in the powers has real consequences today for families who experience disasters or major public incidents. If we are serious about learning the lessons from Hillsborough and other tragedies, which I believe we are, we need to ensure that the independent public advocate has the appropriate authority and resources to act effectively, and that Parliament can scrutinise whether the office is delivering on its intended purpose. New clause 1 would provide for that, and I support it fully. I urge the Minister to consider what my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston laid out in the new clause, and to discuss how we move forward on it.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of some of the sentiment and principle of the new clause, particularly subsection (1)(a) on understanding the impact of the provisions. As discussed, some of this is very novel and we will not always be sure how it pans out. I am not necessarily convinced that “within 12 months” is the right timescale. Thankfully, these things do not happen that often, in the scheme of things, and I am not sure that 12 months is quite enough time to see whether the new system has bedded in, and for there to be examples that we can review. I do not support the timetable, then, but it is important that the Government have a clear strategy for assessing and understanding how everything works in practice.

[Tessa Munt]

I have to disagree a little with the hon. Gentleman. A year is probably a good time in which one can make an initial assessment. We can then recognise what is happening on an annual basis.

With reference to our earlier discussion, might the Minister consider the annual report be the appropriate vehicle to look at what is spent on legal fees, and how that might reduce or increase? It will probably not increase. I believe the IOPC spent £80 million in the span of time for which it considered Hillsborough. If we get the new system right, sums like that £80 million will be reduced to very little, because the IOPC will be able to do its job swiftly and accurately, and to inform the Minister exactly what it has saved out of that £80 million pot, which was ridiculous.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Thursday 4th December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Tessa Munt]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 5, Clause 11, page 10, line 4, at end insert “by—

(i) a recognised news publisher, within the meaning of Part 3 of the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 56 of that Act), or

(ii) a person in the course of working for such a publisher.” .—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This amendment clarifies that the journalism exemption from the offence of misleading the public only applies to media entities and those that work for them.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 2, clause 11, page 10, line 35, at end insert—

“(10) A prosecution for an offence under this section shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director for Public Prosecutions.”

This amendment requires the Director of Public Prosecutions to consent to the prosecution of anyone for the offence of misleading the public.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss clause 11 stand part.

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Sir Roger.

As we all know, clause 11 creates the new offence of misleading the public, which is intended, quite rightly, to capture the most serious and culpable instances where public officials knowingly or recklessly provide false or misleading information to the public. The motivations behind the clause are entirely understandable. In the past, we have seen, through scandals and tragedies, how deeply harmful it can be when institutions withhold the truth or put out statements that they know to be false.

However, there is no doubt that, as the Minister herself said earlier, this is a new area of the law. She referred to the fact that politicians often debate what does or does not count as misleading information. Members of the Committee grumbled when I raised this issue at our first sitting, using the live example of what we have been going through in the last couple of weeks, but we have also heard how contentious legislating in this area can be in relation to the media and the role they play. This is a novel area and one that we have to tread carefully in, recognising that we are not able to anticipate fully how this offence will be used, not just by current prosecuting authorities but by different actors under a different regime, or by private citizens. We also know that there have been attempts to prosecute individual politicians for offences of misleading people, so this is very much a live issue. With an offence of this seriousness that is framed in this way, we must ensure that it is applied proportionately, fairly and with great care. That is the purpose of the amendment; it is to ensure that no prosecution under the clause can be brought without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Although clause 11 sets out a structured test for what counts as being “seriously improper”, and the explanatory notes make it clear that the offence is intended to target only the most egregious conduct, the reality is that the clause interfaces with the political environment in a way that few other offences do. “Misleading the public” is a phrase that, regrettably, is used daily in our political discourse. Accusations of “misleading the public”, made fairly or unfairly, are frequently levelled in debates, campaigns and correspondence. Therefore, we need to be absolutely certain that this new criminal offence cannot become a vehicle for politically motivated complaints, vexatious charges, over-zealous private prosecutions, or attempts to use the criminal law to litigate policy disagreements. Requiring the personal consent of the DPP is a well-established constitutional safeguard in precisely this kind of context. It would ensure that decisions to prosecute are taken objectively, independently and at the highest level.

It is not only political actors that we must consider. Senior public officials, regulators, police chiefs, NHS managers or anyone else in a position of public authority might find themselves being accused of misleading the public in complex and fast-moving situations. Often, such situations involve imperfect information, operational pressures or competing obligations. The clause rightly makes it clear that accidental or inadvertent misleading of the public should not be criminalised. However, we must ensure that establishing the threshold for a prosecution remains firmly under the control of the independent prosecuting authority, and not subject to either the ebb and flow of public anger or the risk of tactical litigation.



Some may reasonably argue that the CPS would in practice be involved by discontinuing prosecutions and bringing them under the Director of Public Prosecutions, but that in itself could create a storm for an individual subject to that action. That is why we think a tighter safeguard should be required.

It is not in the amendment, but I would like to ask the Minister about what thought has been given to whether prosecution should be subject to the Attorney General’s permission. Forgive me: I do not know if that is already part of the legislation; I do not think it is, but the Minister will know. For example, when it comes to public order offences—another potentially contentious area—we ask the Attorney General to give permission for prosecution to serve as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of measures.

My final, more general point about clause 11, which we touched on earlier, is about the maximum sentence of two years. What are the Minister’s thoughts on whether there have been any common law versions of a prosecution for this sort of thing in which someone was given a sentence of more than two years? Are the Government sure that this is not unnecessarily constrained compared with the current common law position, which is unlimited? I appreciate that the offences in question are normally more to do with misconduct rather than misleading, but it would still be helpful to get that reassurance.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. We agree wholeheartedly with the intention behind the amendment, and I can assure him that the Bill achieves that intent. Schedule 3 makes further provision regarding clause 5 and clause 11 offences. Paragraph 2(2) sets out that,

“Proceedings for an offence under section 11 may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”

With that clarification, I hope the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment. Hopefully, I can answer some of his other queries as we move through the debate.

Clause 11 creates a new offence of misleading the public, which is designed to capture the most serious incidents of misleading the public, such as the behaviour seen after Hillsborough, where officials intentionally spread a false narrative to protect their reputation and caused harm as a result. That, as the shadow Minister rightly states, is punishable by up to two years in prison. We all know the harm that caused and how, three decades on, families are still fighting for justice and accountability for what the spreading of that narrative did. The Independent Office for Police Conduct report on Tuesday was clear: a lie was told; a false narrative was spread to protect reputations and avoid consequences. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that no family ever has to go through what those families went through and continue to go through. I can only imagine how hard that report was to read and the pain that they continue to feel.

The new offence will ensure that when a public official has misled the public, there is accountability. To have committed the offence, an authority or official must have acted with the intention to mislead the public or been reckless as to whether their actions would do so. By reckless, we mean a person acting with the knowledge that there is a risk that they might mislead the public and taking that risk without reasonable justification. It does not include accidental mistakes or inaccuracies. They must have known or ought to have known that their act is seriously improper.

It will be for the judge and the jury to determine whether that test has been met, but clause 11(3)(a) sets out minimum conditions that must be present: that the act—

“involved dishonesty that was significant or repeated…in respect of matters of significant concern to the public”.

That will avoid capturing minor instances of lying or misleading on trivial political or private matters. The act must have caused or have the potential to cause harm. Harm, as we have already discussed, is broadly defined, including economic, physical or psychological harm, including distress. The purpose of this is to avoid capturing inconsequential matters, such a Minister lying about where they went to university or competing in a chess tournament or a local government official overstating their council’s performance. Although these sorts of lies should entail professional consequences, we do not think they meet the bar for criminal sanctions. The individual must also have departed significantly from what would have been expected of them in carrying out their functions. This is to ensure that where it may be necessary to mislead someone as part of a person’s job—for example, as part of an undercover police operation—that is not captured.

This clause as introduced does not apply to devolved matters. We have written to all the devolved Governments to request that the offence be extended in their jurisdiction in line with the other provisions on duty of candour, which apply across the UK. The Northern Ireland Executive, the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government have all confirmed their agreement to extend the offence, and we will be extending the offences accordingly. We hope to bring forward amendments on the territorial extent on Report to ensure full coverage for the United Kingdom.

Subsection (4) also excludes any act done for the purposes of journalism. That is to avoid capturing public service broadcasters and those working for them who would otherwise meet the definition of a public official. That is to ensure that the offence does not impinge on press freedom or existing regimes for media regulation. Although behaviour that meets the threshold for the scope of the offence would clearly be unacceptable, we do not believe that this offence is the appropriate vehicle for determining the veracity of media reporting, as we have already discussed.

Subsection (6) includes a reasonable excuse defence, with specific defences for the exercise of functions by the intelligence services and armed forces on active service. That is necessary to make it clear that when officials can prove that they misled the public to protect national security or this country’s defence operations, they are not subject to criminal sanctions. I stress, however, that this will not prevent the successful prosecution of members of the security services or armed forces who mislead the public for any other purposes, such as personal gain or to protect their reputation.

This is a transformative offence that will ensure that when something goes wrong and public officials lie to the public, there are serious consequences. It will act as a powerful deterrent against the sorts of state cover-ups that we have sadly see all too often.

The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle asked me about offences which potentially attract two or more years in prison. I will write to him on that and come back on the specifics, as well as on his question about the Attorney General. With that, I commend clause 11 to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for explaining the clause to us. She has provided the reassurance that we are looking for, and I look forward to receiving further material in writing. I recognise that the Government are attempting to craft an offence that has a high threshold and does not interfere with the wide range of situations that people might seek to apply it to, but I worry that we might end up seeing such questions tested in the courts repeatedly before there is a settled view on what they translate into in reality. I am not sure that it will be as simple as we might think in reality. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Offences under Part 2: related provision

[Ian Byrne]

I beg to move amendment 56, in schedule 3, page 44, line 27, after “national,” insert “or”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

Despite not relating directly to the Bill, the matter of pensions has come up in Committee a couple of times. We do need to explore that, because there are many situations where people walk off into the sunset. It seems to me that the one lever we still have over people is their pensions. Have the Government considered how such a provision might be used in the future? The Opposition will be looking at it.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will happily raise that issue with the Pensions Minister in our discussions.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby for tabling the amendments. I hope to be able to provide some clarification. Amendments 56 and 57 seek to ensure the same extraterritorial extent applies for the offences of failure to comply with the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public.

The intended effect of amendment 56 is already achieved in the Bill as drafted. In schedule 3, paragraph 1(1), the disapplication does not apply if any the criteria of sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) are met. It is already an “or” list, not an “and” list. That follows the standard parliamentary drafting convention. To add an unnecessary “or” between sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), when that is already the meaning, would risk putting the position in doubt in other legislation across the statute book and could cause confusion.

Paragraph (1)(2) refers only to the clause 5 offence because the clause 11 offence applies only in England and Wales. A case could not be heard by a court in Scotland or Northern Ireland. However, as I confirmed earlier, we have in principle agreements to extend clause 11 offences to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and we are working with the devolved Governments to draft amendments, which we intend to bring forward on Report, so that the offence is UK-wide.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will speak to each of the clauses in turn. Clause 12 will introduce the first of two new statutory offences to replace the common law offence of misconduct in public office. In its 2020 report, the Law Commission recommended that the common law offence should be abolished and replaced with two new offences that broadly replicate the coverage of the common law offence. In acting on those recommendations, the Government do not intend to change significantly the type of conduct the criminal law will capture. Like the common law offence, the new offences are intended to capture only wrongdoing at the most serious level.

The clause establishes the new offence of seriously improper acts, and is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful misconduct under the common law offence. The seriously improper acts offence is committed when a person who holds public office uses that office with the intent to obtain a benefit for themselves or another person, or to cause detriment to someone else. They must know or ought to have known that any reasonable person would regard their act as seriously improper.

The offence can capture a wide range of conduct. “Using” an office can include both acts and omissions. “Benefit” and “detriment” mean any benefit or detriment including, but not limited to, financial gain or loss, protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, and benefits or detriments of a physical or sexual nature, whether temporary or permanent. When we talk about protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, we intend to capture serious situations where someone uses their office in the way that we associate with the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster: the manipulation of evidence in order to protect the reputation of a person, including an organisation, or the spreading of allegations about other people, designed to damage their reputation.

The clause is about not the usual back and forth of everyday politics, but severe abuses of power that undermine the very basis of public service. An act is seriously improper if a reasonable person would consider it so. There is a list of factors that the jury must consider to make that determination, including the extent to which the act involved an intention to mislead or be dishonest by withholding, covering up or misusing information. A defence is available if the person can show that they had a reasonable excuse for their action—for example, a public office holder has to disregard one fraudulent benefits claim to uncover a more serious, larger scale benefits fraud. The offence is indictable and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. That puts it on par with similar statutory offences, such as bribery and fraud.

The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence. That is to safeguard against the risk of spurious claims against public officials, including politicians. We have already heard examples of that. It will ensure that only cases that are serious in nature and justify criminalisation are prosecuted. It does not require the personal consent of the director—consent can be delegated—so it should not cause any undue administrative burden.

The clause will ensure that serious misconduct and corrupt behaviour by those in public office will continue to result in criminal sanctions, and that those who abuse positions of public trust are held to account for their actions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 13 establishes the new offence of breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury. It is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful neglect of duty under the common law offence. The new offence is committed when a person who holds public office either causes or creates significant risk of causing someone else to suffer critical harm, in breach of a duty to prevent other people from suffering such harm. They must know that they are under such a duty, and their act must fall far below what could reasonably have been expected of them in the circumstances. The offence requires that the person be under a duty to prevent critical harm that arises by virtue of the public office that they hold. That means that the offence can be committed only by public office holders whose roles inherently involve a duty to prevent critical harm—for example, service personnel, firefighters and the police. It does not apply to public office holders whose roles do not put them under a duty to protect the public from critical harm.

The offence is made out only if the public official knows or ought to know that they are subject to that duty. The breach of duty must cause either critical harm or a significant risk of that harm materialising. It will not capture cases where a negligible or insignificant risk of harm is caused. The breach of duty must also have been intentional or reckless. These are both very high criminal thresholds. To act recklessly means to proceed in full awareness of the potential outcome and in circumstances where it is unreasonable to take the risk.

Only the most serious breaches of duty are captured by the offence. The requirement that the act must fall far below the standard that could reasonably be expected of the person in the circumstances ensures that minor or honest mistakes and legitimate but risky operational decisions made in challenging circumstances will not be captured. For example, a law enforcement officer having to decide in the moment whether to take a particular risky operational decision would be caught by the offence only if they intentionally recklessly breach the duty, their act falls far below the standards reasonably expected of them in those circumstances, and they have no reasonable excuse for their actions.

The offence will be triable on indictment only and will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. That is commensurate with other offences where a failure of duty leads to serious or critical consequences, such as gross negligence manslaughter. As with the offence in clause 12, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence in clause 13. That is to guard against the risk of spurious claims being made against public officials in this position and to ensure that only the most serious cases are prosecuted.

Clause 14 clarifies the territorial application of the new offences in clauses 12 and 13. It makes clear that a public office holder can commit the seriously improper acts or breach of duty offences by their actions either within England and Wales, or in other UK territories such as Scotland or Northern Ireland. The offences in clauses 12 and 13 may also be committed by acts done outside the United Kingdom provided that, at the time of the act, the public office holder is either a UK national or habitually resident in England and Wales. The clause ensures conduct like this could be caught by the new offences.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to make some brief points. I welcome the maximum sentences, which are clearer and in a more natural range, and there is not the uncertainty that I think we still have with the misleading the public offence.

I want to ask the Minister about the role of MPs, however, because she will know that our privilege to speak in the Chamber, including to make allegations of defamation, is unfettered. We can say things that do damage people’s reputations and that cause all sorts of issues, but we are immune from civil procedure. I am not sure how the common law has dealt with equivalent sorts of scenarios, but I can imagine an MP trashing the reputation of a business and that business going under, causing huge harm to an individual who then feels as though they should be able to have a say through this route.

I think we all agree that, although it can be abused, that privilege is really important to the operation of our democracy. Even if not now—the Minister may not have considered this before—it would be helpful to have a written note on the Department’s view about the potential misuse of that privilege to say whatever we want in Parliament, without restriction.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am happy to clarify that for the shadow Minister.

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[Dr Mullan]

This is one area of the Bill where we need some clarity about how exactly it will operate. Before becoming an MP, I worked for a patient advocacy organisation, so I saw at first hand just how challenging inquests can be for patients’ relatives. I spoke to so many families who had to sit and watch while a portrayal of events, which they had no ability to challenge, was given at an inquest. I am sure that many Members have dealt with individuals who have had an experience with a coroner, outside of the big national scandals, that was not as they would want it to be. There is an underlying challenge that coroners are very different from other public bodies, agencies and office holders, because to some extent they can just do their own thing. That makes it very hard to achieve a consistent approach.

I have a number of questions. First, who exactly will decide whether the public authority’s costs are reasonable? The chief coroner was very clear that she felt that coroners were not equipped to do that, and even if they were, it would take time and resources. We all need to understand what the process will be. Importantly, will there be a mechanism for someone to challenge that? If the coroner is not personally engaged with everything that this Government are trying to do with the Bill—as we are sympathetic to—and they do not make any reasonable attempt to control a public body’s costs in line with what we are asking of them, what is the route for challenge?

I have heard concerns from people who work on the frontline of a public body. Sometimes, the reputation of the organisation is defended, but conversely, the reputation of an individual can be at risk in these sorts of situations—I go back to my experience in healthcare. We would not want a perverse scenario where the organisation throws an individual under the bus and makes no particular effort to ensure that their role is adequately explained and defended—accepting that we do not necessarily agree technically that it would be defending, but rather inquisitorial.

Complex family arrangements were raised in the evidence sessions. How exactly does it work if the parents are divorced? The Minister touched on that towards the end of her speech, and mentioned that another family member must not have applied for funding. Again, would there be a limit? Could every single individual family member get help? How would that be determined? The question that politicians always have to come back to is that of funding. Is this new funding that has been allocated to the Ministry of Justice outside of its existing budget, for what we imagine would be a significant increase in legal aid spending? Will the Minister reassure those people who have an interest in other areas of legal aid spending that they will not be reduced as a result of this new area of legal aid spending? I just want to understand where the money has come from.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful for those questions. On who will police the spend, it will not be for the coroner to police it; it will be for the public bodies themselves. They will be under an obligation, because they will also be funding the legal aid for the bereaved families, depending on which public authority or arm of government it comes under. If it is health, for example, that Department will fund the legal aid costs of the bereaved families; if it is the Prison Service, the funding will come from the Ministry of Justice; if it is police, it will be the Home Office, and so on.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for clarifying that, but it still leaves the question whether additional money has been allocated to the individual areas of Government spending.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

No, there is no new money for this legislation. Therefore, we hope that the spending that public authorities carry out for inquests will match how much they have to fund for the bereaved families. We hope that this will also be a deterrent against arming up officials when going towards what should be an inquisitorial process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Lady is bang on the money, literally. I cannot tell her how frustrating it has been as a Minister trying to figure out a way forward on this—trying to figure out the cost to the public purse and the taxpayer—when we do not have that data. This will enable us to have the data on exactly how much is being spent by public authorities and Government Departments on legal aid.

This is taxpayers’ money. We heard evidence from the bereaved families that one of the biggest kicks in the teeth for them was that they as taxpayers were funding the legal support for the public authorities that were accused of having a hand in the death of their loved one. That is totally perverse and unacceptable.

[Dr Mullan]

I asked how a coroner would be challenged if they were not adequately policing this. In practice, if a public authority is not doing this in the way that we would want it to, how does the Minister envisage that it will be held to account and costs driven down?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome that point. We have put new powers in the Bill for the coroner to challenge public authorities if they are acting inappropriately. What they bring forward has to be proportionate and reasonable. There are powers on the coroners there. They have to compile a report and complain to the relevant bodies or those individuals with the power to take action against the public authority for not acting in accordance with the guidance set out by the Lord Chancellor or the provisions in the Bill.

[Dr Mullan]

But that is kind of circular, because it takes us back to the coroners. Are the coroners in a position to do that? It is not something they have to do at the minute. As we heard in evidence, judges do that—it is part and parcel of their work—but it is not part of what coroners do. What are we doing in terms of support, information and guidance, and then monitoring that they actually do it?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I have a very close working relationship with the chief coroner, as the hon. Member would probably expect given my role. We work together very closely, and we have had significant conversations about how to work together going forward and about the implementation of the Bill, which will be crucial to its effectiveness. It is important to recognise that coroners, although distinct in their nature, are the judiciary. They are independent and they do have relevant expertise in this regard. I will be working closely with the chief coroner on implementation.

I am not sure whether the hon. Member heard what I said about annual reporting, but any experiences of a public authority failing to abide by the coroner’s instructions will have to be put into the annual report that the chief coroner will provide to the Lord Chancellor—all of this has to be captured—and we will not hesitate to name and shame those who are failing to abide by the duties in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Byrne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston cannot be here to move the motion because of her father’s illness. She really wanted to be here, and I fully support the new clause, so I am going to speak on her behalf.

New clause 1 proposes a post-legislative assessment, within 12 months of the passing of the Act, of how its provisions on the duty of candour and equality of arms are increasing public confidence in public authorities. Specifically, it would examine whether the internal processes of public authorities are fit for purpose in identifying and investigating failures as they first arise after major incidents. The assessment would also consider the role of the independent public advocate in evaluating how public authorities respond to affected individuals and bereaved families following such incidents.

The report would have to explore whether the powers of the independent public advocate should be extended to facilitate the gathering of information to support inquiries and investigations, to ensure that public authorities and officials act in accordance with the duty of candour. It would also have to examine the case for empowering the independent public advocate to instigate an independent panel, similar to the Hillsborough independent panel, and assess the costs compared with non-statutory and statutory inquiries.

The new clause would ensure that, soon after the Act comes into force, Parliament would receive a clear, evidence-based assessment of whether it is delivering on its aims, and whether the role of the independent public advocate should be strengthened to secure faster truth, greater transparency, and better support for bereaved families after major incidents.

When Hillsborough Law Now launched in 2022, it not only supported the measures in the Bill but called for the establishment of an independent public advocate with powers to set up independent panels like the Hillsborough independent panel. For more than two decades, the legal system failed to deliver truth or justice to the Hillsborough families. In some cases, it even facilitated the propagation of a false narrative, including by officers named in the IOPC report published this week.

It was the Hillsborough independent panel, which was established in 2009 and reported in 2012, that finally set the record straight. I wholeheartedly support that statement. Its process was non-legal, document-based and grounded in transparency rather than adversarial proceedings. In two years it achieved what the legal system had failed to do in 24. One of the key lessons of Hillsborough is that the legal system can fail. The two witnesses, Jenni Hicks and Hilda Hammond, spoke powerfully on behalf of this new clause, and the need to look at how panels in the style of the Hillsborough independent panel can help to achieve justice. I want to put on record that I thought they spoke really eloquently. We cannot claim to have learned the lessons fully unless we provide bereaved families with access to a similar process at an earlier stage.

The Public Advocate Bills introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston in the Commons in 2016 and by Lord Wills in the Lords in 2014, set out to create an independent public advocate with meaningful powers, including the authority to instigate independent panels akin to the Hillsborough independent panel. The intention was to give bereaved families a route to truth and transparency at an early stage, and to ensure that public authorities could be held to account quickly and that failures in process could be addressed before they became entrenched.

However, the office of the independent public advocate, as currently established under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, does not yet carry the powers originally envisaged, as the independent public advocate outlined in last Thursday’s evidence session. I think she is open to having more powers to achieve what my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston is looking to set out with the new clause. As it stands, the office of the IPA lacks the statutory authority to gather evidence from those affected, and it cannot initiate independent panels to collate information and assess public authorities’ actions.

I cannot say it strongly enough: the Hillsborough independent panel uncovered what happened at Hillsborough because it had access to the police documents and the reports, so it could see the scale of how some police officers had changed the evidence of those who were at Hillsborough. I include in that my own father, whose report of his experience at Hillsborough was changed beyond all recognition. When he eventually saw what the police had put down for him, it caused him great distress, along with many others. What my right hon. Friend has outlined in the new clause is so important, and without the powers in it the advocate cannot replicate the approach that finally succeeded in the case of Hillsborough, when transparency, document disclosure and independent oversight finally brought truth, in a fraction of the time that the legal system had taken.

The gap in the powers has real consequences today for families who experience disasters or major public incidents. If we are serious about learning the lessons from Hillsborough and other tragedies, which I believe we are, we need to ensure that the independent public advocate has the appropriate authority and resources to act effectively, and that Parliament can scrutinise whether the office is delivering on its intended purpose. New clause 1 would provide for that, and I support it fully. I urge the Minister to consider what my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston laid out in the new clause, and to discuss how we move forward on it.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of some of the sentiment and principle of the new clause, particularly subsection (1)(a) on understanding the impact of the provisions. As discussed, some of this is very novel and we will not always be sure how it pans out. I am not necessarily convinced that “within 12 months” is the right timescale. Thankfully, these things do not happen that often, in the scheme of things, and I am not sure that 12 months is quite enough time to see whether the new system has bedded in, and for there to be examples that we can review. I do not support the timetable, then, but it is important that the Government have a clear strategy for assessing and understanding how everything works in practice.

[Tessa Munt]

I have to disagree a little with the hon. Gentleman. A year is probably a good time in which one can make an initial assessment. We can then recognise what is happening on an annual basis.

With reference to our earlier discussion, might the Minister consider the annual report be the appropriate vehicle to look at what is spent on legal fees, and how that might reduce or increase? It will probably not increase. I believe the IOPC spent £80 million in the span of time for which it considered Hillsborough. If we get the new system right, sums like that £80 million will be reduced to very little, because the IOPC will be able to do its job swiftly and accurately, and to inform the Minister exactly what it has saved out of that £80 million pot, which was ridiculous.

Criminal Court Reform

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lammy]

The hon. Gentleman knows that the former Prime Minister David Cameron and the former Justice Secretary Michael Gove asked me to conduct the Lammy review. In that review, I recommended that training, which was not happening in the way it should, should happen, and it is now happening. I was concerned about the diversity of our judiciary and our magistracy. That has improved, but there is more to do. In London, for example, 31% of our magistrates are now from an ethnic minority background. It is also important that, with the changes we are making, we will now get a judge’s reasoning, which lawyers such as those on the Back Benches can challenge. Where we have a jury, we do not get the reasoning, which I think is important as we look at issues of accountability.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. During the questioning, the Justice Secretary referred to the Victims’ Commissioner supporting these proposals. For the record, will he make it clear that, sadly, the Victims’ Commissioner passed away a number of weeks ago and cannot possibly have seen these proposals? He may have been referring to the incoming Victims’ Commissioner, who starts in January, but the statement she has released today makes no reference to the Justice Secretary’s proposals on changes to jury trials. I wonder if he might have inadvertently misled the House about that.

[Mr Lammy]

rose—