Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Mike Martin Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

I beg to move,

That this House recognises the danger that Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine poses to European and British security; further recognises the threat to the international order and the UK posed by China; also recognises the increasing uncertainty surrounding the reliability of the US as an ally within NATO; acknowledges the current shortfalls in the UK’s ability to deploy a credible fighting force; further acknowledges that this lack of military capability is resulting in the coercion of Britain and its interests in the international sphere; and calls on the Government to begin a programme of rapid rearmament to strengthen the defence of the UK and its allies.

The key word of the motion on the Order Paper today is “rapid”—rapid rearmament, not eventual rearmament or rearmament with an asterisk. The reason it is the key word is that the clock is not ours to choose. Three weeks ago, before the defence investment plan came out, the Prime Minister said:

“it is our intelligence assessment, and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.”

The deadline is not contested. Intelligence confirms it, NATO proclaims it—they are speaking of this in Ankara today—and our Government accept it. We must be ready by 2030.

That is why the defence investment plan is so maddening. I have read it from cover to cover—I am that kind of guy—and I cannot wrap my head around it. It fails the test of its own threat assessment. It does not go far enough, and what it does do, it does too slowly. Large parts of it are also unfunded. It is too little, too late, and there is not enough cash.

It is worth considering how this plan came into being. Lord Robertson, the lead author of the strategic defence review, wanted to have the DIP—that is, the money bit—as an annexe to the SDR. That is really good practice when making strategy: set out a vision, which is the SDR, and then set out the resources, which are the DIP. If a Government do not have the resources to deliver their vision, they need either to downgrade the vision somewhat or to increase their resources. The decoupling of the two documents by a year, with the vision coming a year ago in the SDR, and the money and resources just recently in the DIP, is the greatest failure of statecraft committed by this Labour Government in the two years they have been in office.

First, allow me to speak about the money in some detail. Quite well ventilated in the media is the £4.7 billion that quite blatantly must be found in the next Budget, in the autumn. Although the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) has said that he intends to fund defence seriously, he has not specifically said that he will find those sums in that Budget. As the Government repeatedly tell us, defence of the realm is the most important duty of any Government. So why is £5 billion of that sacred duty in the in-tray of the next Chancellor—a person unknown at this point?

Secondly, I would like to talk about these efficiency savings—£10.7 billion of them. Speaking in this Chamber, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, the hon. Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), called this the oldest accounting trick in the book. If we dig just one layer below, we can see the detail: £2.4 billion of that £10.7 billion is what the Ministry of Defence calls “high maturity initiatives”. I find that it is always worth really looking into what the MOD says, because the remaining £8.4 billion of that nearly £11 billion of efficiency savings is what the MOD calls “plans at lower maturity”. Lower-maturity plans, Madam Deputy Speaker, is MOD-speak for “we have not worked out how to deliver those savings yet.”

Thirdly, and most egregiously, is a theme that I will keep returning to: the fact that this is a DIP of two halves. The first period is from now until 2030, which is covered by the current spending review, subject to the caveats that I laid out earlier. However, the second part, which covers 2030 to 2035, has to be confirmed in the forthcoming spending review. If the future Chancellor or Prime Minister do not agree to those sums going into the next spending review—due, one assumes, in the spring of 2027—the DIP will then not exist. It will just be an unfunded piece of paper.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. The first four years—the near-term investment period—covers the period until the next election. The second half—the longer-term investment period—covers the next five years, all the way up to 2035. However, the DIP is a 10-year plan, so it should in fact go beyond 2035, and beyond two elections’ time, to 2036, which it clearly does not, because the number “2036” does not appear once in the defence investment plan.

[Mike Martin]

This actually speaks to the delay. Had the DIP come out when it was meant to, in 2025, it would have been a 10-year plan, because it would have gone from 2025 to 2035. However, the Government were unable to get their ducks in a row and the DIP was delayed by a year. If we had waited for them to rejig the plan to go up until 2036, I think we might have waited until 2040 for the plan.

This is a DIP of two halves, and the really worrying bit is that most of the investment is in the second half, which is unfunded. Let me give the House some examples. In the air domain there is £27.8 billion before 2030, and £70 billion after—unfunded. In the maritime domain there is £18 billion before 2030, and £32 billion after—unfunded. In the land domain there is £19.2 billion before, and £36 billion after—unfunded. For weapons and munitions there is £11.1 billion before, and £20 billion after—unfunded. It beggars belief. Why bother publishing a plan when, by my calculations, almost two thirds of the investments that the Government seek to make are in the second half, which is unfunded?

One of the reasons that we have pulled this plan together is to give certainty to industry, so that they know how to invest.

[Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)]

My concern is that the only British company offering to build an advanced jet trainer replacement for the Red Arrows Hawk jet, AERALIS, has gone into receivership because of the delay in the DIP, which means it will not assemble those lovely British jets in my constituency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Martin]

I think we have all heard stories of firms such as the one in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, whether in our own constituencies or in the conversations we have as Members of Parliament who are interested in defence. It has been catastrophic for British industry, and rushing out an unfunded DIP, which is effectively what this is, has not helped. It has meant that some small capital investments, one third of the total pot for the next four years, can be made by firms. However, for anything that stretches beyond 2030, nobody can be sure enough to make that investment.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a very accurate critique. Is he aware that the Treasury Committee, led by the redoubtable hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), was looking at defence funding at lunch time today, and that in that hearing, barely an hour ago, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury admitted under persistent questioning that the Government have done no work on how to get to 3.5% of GDP on defence?

[Mike Martin]

All I will say is that the defence of the realm is the most serious issue for any Government.

[Dave Doogan (Angus and Perthshire Glens) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman is very kind to give way again, as he is right in the middle of unpicking the DIP thread by thread. Does he agree that we need to look at the manifest, substantial disappointment that we and everyone in uniform see in the DIP now that it has been announced, and try to reconcile that with how delayed it was? What does he think the Government were doing, given that there are so many black holes and missing spaces in the DIP? What does he think they were debating over the 11 months that the DIP was delayed?

[Mike Martin]

The original sin is divorcing the strategic defence review from the DIP—divorcing the vision from the resources. For the past year, the Department has been arguing first with itself about whether it can downgrade some of the things in the strategic defence review—there are a couple of instances where that has happened, which I will come on to—and then with the Treasury to get more money to fill the gap. Effectively, it wrote a vision that was far too grand for the money that was ever going to be available.

Let me turn from the money to the metal and have a look at some of the capabilities. I could give a very long speech on military analysis about which capabilities should be in or out, but I will not do that. I think it would test—[Interruption.] I know that right hon. and hon. Members would like me to do that; perhaps I will set up a Substack or something.

Let us look at the Royal Navy—the senior service. At the turn of this century—as someone born in 1982, I still feel weird saying that—the UK had 20 frigates. By the end of this year, we will have five. Pre-DIP, they were scheduled to go out of service in 2035. In a little-noticed line in the DIP, we are bringing forward that date. All five frigates, which have well exceeded their service date, are going in 2033. Their replacements, the Type 26s and the Type 23s, will come into service—you guessed it—in 2030-35. We therefore have old ships retiring on a fixed schedule and new ships coming in on an unfunded one. My back-of-a-fag-packet maths—probably the same quality of analysis goes into the MOD under this Government—shows that we will have three frigates in 2030, the year, according to our intelligence assessments, of maximum Russian threat against NATO. We need a frigate to protect our cables, another to get the carrier group out to sea, and another for our deterrent. According to the rule of three—for every three ships, we have only one at sea at any one time—that is nine frigates. If anything kicks off in the middle east or anywhere else, there is no contingency plan. We can see straightaway that there is a huge gap—the frigate gap, as many call it—and the DIP has made it much worse.

The picture with our current Type 45 destroyers and their replacements is not much better. Our Type 45s primarily provide air defence. One was parked in the Thames estuary to defend the Olympics in 2012 because we do not have any other air defence. They go out of service from 2035. Their replacements are supposed to be crewed common combat vessels such as mother ships. Various autonomous ships, which provide missiles, sensors or underwater and above-water support, are meant to be arranged around them. A whole fleet of different ships is therefore meant to replace the destroyers and some other elements of our Navy. That is the hybrid Navy that was much touted last week in the media coverage of the DIP.

I am totally in favour of moving towards autonomy as fast as we can. However, it is worth saying that the maritime domain, particularly the High North, is the most difficult in which to do autonomy. I have spent a lot of time at sea and I can tell hon. Members that everything breaks all the time. There is a reason why the maritime domain is the last to be autonomised. We started with air because that is predictable and quite easy to do, although the aircraft still do not fly in bad weather. We then moved to the ground stuff for picking up casualties and dropping off ammunition. However, the new ships—the common combat vessels—are simply PowerPoints at the moment, yet we expect to move from PowerPoints to power projection on the high seas in nine years with not just one class, but several classes of ships that have to work together. That seems quite risky to me. If we take what is happening to the frigate fleet and what is happening to the destroyer fleet together, it is fair to say that the DIP spells the end of the Royal Navy as we know it.

[Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)]

rose—

[Al Carns (Birmingham Selly Oak) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mike Martin]

I will give way to the former Minister.

[Al Carns]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, from sail to ironclad, ironclad to dreadnought, dreadnought to highly capable frigate, we need to make the next generational leap? If we find ourselves caught in programmes that deliver last year’s capability, we will remove any wriggle room or space to make that jump into autonomy and automation.

[Mike Martin]

I agree with everything that the hon. Member has just said, and I thank him. However, all I am highlighting is that, on past performance, going from PowerPoints to ships at sea in nine years with several classes of ship seems extremely risky. Moreover, the DIP sets aside only £1.3 billion in the first funded period to set up those ships. The remainder of the investment falls beyond 2030. I want to move to autonomy because it is the right thing to do, but that seems like an incredibly risky bet.

[Calum Miller (Bicester and Woodstock) (LD)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mike Martin]

I will make some progress because I am having eyes made at me by Madam Deputy Speaker.

The DIP commits £8.6 billion to the global combat air programme, which is the sixth-generation fighter jet that we are building with Italy and Japan. Realistically, we will get the jets in service sometime after 2040. They are manned fighter jets. I ask hon. Members to cast their minds forward to beyond Putin’s death—he will probably be buried by that point—and ask themselves whether, in 2040, humans will be flying fighter jets. I think the answer is no. The Minister is a former pilot, so he will always argue for humans in fighter jets, but I will present my argument.

When we dig into GCAP, we find that it is a crewed rather than an uncrewed system because that is what our Japanese partners wanted.

[Amanda Martin]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Mike Martin]

I am afraid that I will not because I want to make progress.

We are privileging a good diplomatic relationship, which would weather the storm of our pulling out of GCAP, over military capability. We must consider whether we want manned fighter jets in 2040 or a Royal Navy right now. Do we want frigates and destroyers in the next four years? Do we want to transition effectively, in a funded way, to a hybrid Navy, or manned fighter jets in 2040?

The same story is repeated wherever we look: deep precision strike missiles are due in the early 2030s; nuclear-enabled F-35As are due in the early 2030s; putting 76,000 soldiers in the British Army to reverse the Tory cuts is an investment through to 2035. [Interruption.] I know that hon. Members were waiting for that—I had to get one little elbow in the ribs. Time and again, the capability that the threat demands by 2030 is scheduled for after 2030, funded by a spending review that has not happened and has been signed off by no one.

That leaves one final question: does the current Prime Minister believe his own threat assessment? If he does and he is not funding it—not putting his money, or our money, where his mouth is—that is highly negligent. Perhaps he does not believe his own intelligence chiefs’ assessments and those of his partners. In that case, he should tell us. I fear that future generations will look back at this Labour Government’s approach to defence with their heads in their hands.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I impose an immediate six-minute time limit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bailey]

Not at the moment.

Let us jump forward to tech. It is not about how much we spend but about how we spend it, as we heard repeatedly in the debate. It is about how we rearm and get to warfighting readiness. The DIP will energise the transformation of our armed forces and target resources to reflect how war is waged today. We will sequence the delivery of a NATO-first transformed and integrated force powered by modern technology. Through the DIP, AI autonomy and uncrewed systems will receive the sustained increase in support that reflects their strategic importance.

I will pivot to the remarks made by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells about the hybrid Navy. The DIP speeds up the transition to the hybrid Navy. I have a great deal of respect for him, but it is incoherent to talk about future manned flight but talk down an autonomous fleet. On my visit to Portsmouth only last week, a member of our Royal Navy said “Never again” as we walked past a Type 45, and made it clear that the work on the Type 83 had stopped a significant time ago—it is an incoherent conversation. For the Type 23, every refurbishment takes two to three years and costs us £100 million, while £115 million has given our nation the autonomous capability that we are rolling out in the middle east. That is how incoherent the hon. Member’s argument is.

[Mike Martin]

I specifically said that I am fully in favour of moving to autonomy as fast as we can. All I questioned was whether we could go from a PowerPoint concept for multiple vessels to their being at sea on operations within nine years. That is all I questioned—not the idea that we need to move to autonomy.

[Mr Bailey]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I agree that this will be testing, but we must take up the challenge, and we need people like him on the Defence Committee to ensure that we are held to account while we proceed with delivery.

The DIP also speeds up the transition to: a digitally enabled Army that is 10 times more lethal; the next generation of combat air, including a potent mix of crewed and uncrewed air power; a new uncrewed systems taskforce to rapidly develop and deliver field autonomous capabilities; and Europe’s biggest drone testing site in Swindon. I remind those who do down our nation and say, “We aren’t building enough” that at the moment we are providing 150,000 drones a year to Ukraine.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

I will not list the constituencies of all the hon. and right hon. Members who have contributed; they know who they are and I thank them very much.

Three themes came out of this debate that were interesting and bear repeating. First, we are already in a war and it is happening in different ways and it is happening below the threshold, but the threshold is moving about and we need to think about that. Secondly, there is the point about national resilience, the economy and the industrial base. In an age of drones that get depleted, with a cycle in which the drone model changes every six weeks, it is about how quickly we can build stuff. Nations win wars, and we need our economy to reflect that. Thirdly, we need to trust the public and tell them not just about the threat that we face but about the current state of our armed forces and where they need to get to.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House recognises the danger that Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine poses to European and British security; further recognises the threat to the international order and the UK posed by China; also recognises the increasing uncertainty surrounding the reliability of the US as an ally within NATO; acknowledges the current shortfalls in the UK’s ability to deploy a credible fighting force; further acknowledges that this lack of military capability is resulting in the coercion of Britain and its interests in the international sphere; and calls on the Government to begin a programme of rapid rearmament to strengthen the defence of the UK and its allies.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mike Martin Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

My hon. Friend is quite right to highlight the High North, and the defence investment plan positions our armed forces to focus on its protection, alongside our allies in NATO and the JEF. Through the Scotland defence growth deal and our intention to launch two defence technical excellence colleges, which we have invited the Scottish Government to match fund, we are continuing to support Scotland’s defence industry and provide it with the highly skilled workforce that it requires.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

Protecting British interests in the High North requires a strong Royal Navy. Under the current DIP, the Type 45s will go out of service in 2035 and be replaced by some CCVs and other uncrewed systems that currently exist only on PowerPoint. The idea that it will be nine years from PowerPoint to power projection stretches credibility somewhat, so will the Minister stake her personal credibility on confirming that these systems will be delivered on time and that we will not have a gap in our air defences in the High North?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am sure the hon. and gallant Member will agree that the changing nature of warfare means that we must change to meet it. Having a focus on uncrewed systems and AI is critical, and I welcome the vision set out by the First Sea Lord.

Defence Investment Plan

Mike Martin Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend is right to raise those concerns about the threat we face every single day from cyber. In my previous role, I spent a lot of time ensuring that we were co-ordinated across Government—across the Cabinet Office, the Home Office and other Government Departments. This defence investment plan provides the resource to make sure that we have the right capabilities to meet the emerging threat that we are dealing with on a daily basis. Cyber is a key part of that threat. What I have done is refocus and sharpen some of the capabilities in order to be able to deploy them sooner than would otherwise have been the case. There is always a balance between the shorter and the longer term, but I am confident that this plan gives us the right capabilities when we need them.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

This is a tale of two DIPs. The first DIP is covered by the period in the current spending review, up to about 2030, and the second DIP is the bit beyond that, from 2030 to 2035. The first has detailed spending commitments, and the latter has quite vague spending commitments. The former has small investments and the latter has big investments. I will give two examples: air has £28 billion versus £70 billion, and land has £19 billion versus £36 billion. On behalf of the Government, whoever might be in it by that point, can the Secretary of State confirm to the House that the Treasury has guaranteed that those figures will be in the next spending review—that is, that the Defence section of the next spending review has already been written?

[Dan Jarvis]

With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, it is not for me to make guarantees on behalf of other Government Departments, including the Treasury. I am sure that he will understand that. I do not think that any Minister outside the Treasury would be in a position to make that guarantee.

I know that the hon. Gentleman thinks carefully about these matters, so the guarantee that I can give him is that in the time I have had available, I have looked very carefully at the mix of capabilities contained within the plan and made a number of changes in order to deliver capabilities that I thought were required sooner rather than later. Has that involved making some difficult choices? Yes, it has. Has it involved cutting some capabilities? Yes, it has. But what I have to do is do right by defence and be satisfied that we have the resource available and the right capabilities in place to allow us to operate alongside our allies in a very dangerous world.

That is not an easy process, as I hope the hon. Gentleman will acknowledge. I hope he will also acknowledge that today’s investment plan represents an important step forward, but as I have said consistently, there is still a requirement to spend more on defence.

Armed Forces Bill

Mike Martin Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Danny Kruger]

The word “strategy” can be put on all sorts of things. I am talking about what a strategy actually is. It is a plan of action that proceeds from an objective and a doctrine about how to achieve that objective. That is what we lack as a country. We have not done grand strategy in this country for decades.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

A strategy is not a plan. A strategy is about ways, ends and means. The ways are the plan. The means are the resources. The ends are where one is going to.

[Danny Kruger]

I am conscious that the hon. Gentleman is an academic in this space. The point that I am making is that we need an overall vision for our country, a doctrine of how to achieve it and then a set of actions—working together, which I understand to be a strategy, how we deploy different assets, the different policies we have, and the different means to the ends that we have identified in pursuit of our overall objective. I do not think that any of us in this House can accurately define what that is for our country, and that is a source of great regret.

I applaud everything that the Government are trying to do to improve conditions for our armed forces. It would be great if the money were to be forthcoming as well, but there is something bigger and more profound than the questions about specific posture, kit or even deployments. It is: what are we trying to do as a country?

I want to finish by suggesting a strategy. It might sound bold and simplistic, but it is only bold because we are so weak and diminished as a country. Our strategy should be to rejoin—not the EU—the club of great powers. Currently, the great powers are the United States and China, of course, but also Russia, India and Japan. Those are the countries that recognise each other in those terms. They are great powers not because they are good—very obviously China and Russia are very bad—but because they make the weather in the world, and Britain does not, despite our country’s most incredible assets, opportunities and strengths.

The reason for setting out this objective to be a great power is not just for national pride or self-esteem but for a simple reason: a country that is not a great power is subject to those that are. Sovereignty and capability are vital in the age of tech, a high demand for energy, rare earths and high-tech skills. That is what a country needs in this age.

What does great power status look like? I do not want to join the EU. I think that would be a disaster economically and pointless from a security perspective.

Defence Investment Plan

Mike Martin Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question. I have seen for myself the skill and experience of the workers at Samlesbury and Warton in supporting our Typhoon operations and building parts for the F-35 programme. One lesson we can take from the war in Ukraine—a key learning recommended in the strategic defence review—is that we look at the growth of autonomy in particular. We can see that already in how drones have massively changed the frontline, the fighting doctrine and the force structure required to deter and fight in the 21st century. That is true on land, in the maritime domain and in the air domain. A key part of the DIP will be to provide the latest technology for our forces, and to support our industrial base to not only build more of those capabilities in Britain, but ensure we can export them to our allies, too.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

I would just like to add my view that releasing the DIP when the House is not sitting is totally unacceptable, as my colleague the Chair of the Defence Committee and Mr Speaker said. I think the whole House agrees with that. As well as ruling out publishing the DIP on Friday, will the Minister rule out publishing it next week? After the shambles of the SDR release, the Defence Committee was promised early access to the DIP—the DIP was specifically mentioned. The Defence Committee is unavailable next week, so judging what was said then by the Secretary of State, they will not be able to release it next week. The Defence Committee is unavailable, so can the Minister confirm that the DIP will not be coming out next week?

[Luke Pollard]

I am not sure the hon. Gentleman is suggesting we delay the DIP further, but I understand his argument. We will publish the DIP before the NATO summit. That commitment has been made by the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary, and we will do that.

Armed Forces Bill

Mike Martin Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Tuesday 2nd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Mr Martin, are you hoping to contribute today, or do we just have the pleasure of your company?

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

indicated dissent.

[The Chairman]

Marvellous. I call the shadow Minister.

Defence Readiness

Mike Martin Excerpts

Wednesday 20th May 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

Madam Deputy Speaker, you do not normally introduce me like that, so thank you very much. It is an honour to share a constituency border with you and to follow the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne), who made a heartfelt and powerful speech.

Wars are raging in Europe and in the middle east, and there are extreme tensions in the far east. Moreover, these regional conflicts are starting to knit together: Russia and China supported Iran in the middle east, and North Korea supported Russia in Ukraine. This knitting together of regional conflicts is what we saw in the 1930s in the foothills of the second world war, so there is an argument that we are now in the foothills of another global war.

It is undoubtedly true that the threats we face are increasing, yet at the same time, day by day, UK military capability is decreasing. We must rapidly rearm to narrow this gap; it is the only way that we can deter conflict. Despite that, the King’s Speech contains no programme of rearmament. The Government speak the language of urgency yet refuse even to introduce the necessary policy and legislation. As has been mentioned by Members from all parts of the House, we have been waiting for the defence investment plan since last autumn, and we were promised a defence readiness Bill in this King’s Speech, but where is it?

As an island nation, our Navy is of the utmost importance, but it is also on its knees. While HMS Dragon took a week to deploy to the Mediterranean, the French sent an entire carrier group—an aircraft carrier, eight frigates and a submarine. How did they do that? On paper, France and the United Kingdom have comparable fleets, but in practice France achieves about 80% availability for its escort vessels, while we achieve only 50%. Through better maintenance, France achieves a better outcome. Capability on paper is worthless if it cannot deploy.

It gets worse. We started this year with seven frigates. HMS Richmond will be decommissioned this year, and HMS Iron Duke was withdrawn from service this month. That leaves us with five frigates. Furthermore, three build slots in Glasgow intended for new frigates have been ceded to Norway, because of the lack of guaranteed investment due to delays in the defence investment plan. That is a real-world example of Government inertia affecting our defence.

Putin exploits weakness, and he shies away from strength. It pains me to say it, but our Navy does not project strength, and Putin will continue to mount increasingly flagrant violations of our territorial waters until our Navy is strong enough to make him think twice. Will it take the severing of a data cable to cause us to act?

Moving from the sea to the land, the Ministry of Defence was unable to confirm to the Defence Committee whether it is able to deploy a battlegroup—1,000 soldiers—to the continent of Europe. That comes back to my point about projecting strength. Putin knows that if he were to test article 5, the 900 British soldiers in Estonia would be at extreme risk. We have no ability to deploy reinforcements, and the King’s Speech does not do anything to change that. There is a gaping hole in our deterrence, and every day it goes unaddressed, the risks to our forces already deployed and our nation at home grow.

Our artillery systems have halved in number since 1997. Our precision deep-fire capability has been cut by a third. We have just 14 155 mm artillery systems, although I note that the Government have recently announced a new order. Poland donated 100 systems to Ukraine and rebuilt its own inventory at the same time. It donated and replaced; we just donated, which is why we have 14 artillery systems left.

Meanwhile, warfare has changed, and the UK has not adapted. During a recent NATO training exercise, a British brigade was effectively wiped out by four Ukrainian drone operators. That is not an indictment of our soldiers, but a reflection of modern warfare. We cannot allow that situation to become a reality.

The picture I have painted is one of systematic underfunding across all domains, and unless we rapidly rearm, we will be unable to deter. If we want to deter and to lead in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, we probably need an Army of about 100,000, with reserves of 50,000, a fleet of 50 ships and about 250 combat aircraft, with crewed systems surrounded by autonomous systems and one-way effectors. That is the capability we must be talking about if we want to lead and deter in the Euro-Atlantic.

[Dr Murrison]

I am following the hon. Member’s remarks with a great deal of interest. He mentioned the reserves, and I am a reservist. Would you give the Government credit where it is due for carrying over the Armed Forces Bill, which will advance the age of retirement for reserves to 65, and agree with me that we can probably go further in looking at people, especially the reserves, who are skilled in particular areas and may be able to help us address the challenges of the future, rather than those of the past?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Dr Andrew Murrison, you know better than to use the term “you”.

[Mike Martin]

I served on the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, and as well as increasing the scope of who can be called up, it creates a consolidation of different types of reserves and allows zig-zag pathways for specialists who can come in and out of the reserves, so it is absolutely a step in the right direction.

One thing that is missing at the moment might create the political space for an increase in defence spending. I was slightly waylaid by the right hon. Member who intervened, but I should have said that to lead and deter in the Euro-Atlantic area, we are talking about a 50% increase in defence expenditure, not £1 billion here or £2 billion there. A 50% increase in defence is the scale we are talking about.

[Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mike Martin]

I will not, if that is okay, because we are short on time.

To create the political space for some of these trade-offs, because that is a huge amount of money—£30 billion extra every single year—we need to have the national conversation on defence that was announced in the strategic defence review, but has been notable by its absence. That is why I, together with the hon. Members for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) and for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) and Field Marshal Richards in the other place, have formed the all-party parliamentary group on rearmament. We hope to raise public awareness not just of the threats, because I think the public understand the threats we face, but of the lack of capability, and the diminishing capability, in the UK military.

I recently went to a school in my constituency to talk to sixth-formers, and I have asked this question in several schools since, but they all assume we have a fleet of about 50 or 100 ships. When I tell them that we have 14 frigates and destroyers—surface combatants—they are shocked. The general public do not know the state of the British military, which is entirely incommensurate with the threat we face.

In conclusion, because time is very short, our military is a paper tiger. Sooner or later, we are going to be found out, and when we are found out and the battlegroup in Estonia is overrun or an aircraft carrier is sunk, Suez will pale into insignificance. This King’s Speech falls far short of what is required.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order.

Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting)

Mike Martin Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. We are continuing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. We will begin with a few preliminary reminders. Hon. Members know the rules about food and drink. Could you email your notes to [email protected] or hand a copy to the Hansard colleague in the room? Please bob if you want to catch my eye. You can remove your jackets if you are warm; I intend to remove mine.

Clause 31

Transfers between regular and reserve forces

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 31, page 51, line 2, at end insert—

“(5) The Secretary of State must, in respect of each financial year, publish a report assessing the impact of the provisions under subsections (3) and (4) on the retention of personnel within His Majesty’s forces.

(6) The report under subsection (5) must include data on the number of personnel who have transferred between the regular and reserve forces, broken down by service and rank.

(7) The first such report must be laid before each House of Parliament within a period of 12 months after the day on which this Act is passed.

(8) Each subsequent report must be laid before each House of Parliament no later than 12 months after the publication of the last report under this section.”

This amendment would require the Government to publish an annual report on the impact of provisions related to transfers between regular and reserve forces on retention in the armed forces.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Mike Martin]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford, and I thank you for the invitation to remove our jackets. Amendment 7 was tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon. I will just briefly introduce it to the Committee.

The idea of a zig-zag career is incredibly important. Unlike previously, when the qualification needed to join the armed forces was the ability to run around a muddy field with a heavy backpack, we now live in an age in which we recognise that we need a much greater range of skills in the armed forces, and the ability to move from reserve to regular and back to reserve is incredibly important, so we welcome that the Government are introducing that. When I served, a number of people regularly moved between the regulars and the reserves—in fact, I did it myself.

However, there is a question mark as to what effect such movement has on retention. In an ideal world, we would expect it to improve, as more flexibility should mean that people are more likely to stay in the regular forces or the reserve forces. But we do not know that; this is an untried experiment, so the amendment would mandate the Ministry of Defence to provide a report to Parliament on the effect of the implementation of this clause—of this zig-zag career pathway—on retention.

Specifically, clause 31 as it stands amends the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to make it easier for personnel to move in both directions. It also amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to enable that to happen. Amendment 7 would simply add an annual reporting and accountability mechanism on top of those transfer provisions. It would not change the function of the clause, but just require the Government to enable Parliament to monitor the situation accurately. As we know, recruitment and retention is a big problem for the armed forces.

Without such a reporting requirement, the provisions could be enacted—again, we are in favour of that—but never meaningfully evaluated. As we heard in evidence, there are so many different categories of reserve forces and many different types of engagement. They have grown piecemeal over time, and one reason for that is that there is no effective oversight mechanism, looking at things in the round. Under this amendment, the reporting requirement would establish one element of an oversight mechanism.

I conclude by saying that our amendment does not seek to amend the function of the clause, which we are in favour of, but it seeks to mandate the MOD to provide a report to Parliament, so that Parliament can exercise proper oversight and scrutiny.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Good morning to you, Mr Efford, and to all members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again today. I will lead for my party in this section on reserve forces. I will begin by offering some comments on Liberal Democrat amendment 7, which relates to retention and transfers between regular and reserve forces, and will follow with a few remarks on clause 31.

In one of our evidence sessions, I raised the potential complexity when people wish to leave the regular armed forces and transfer into the reserves. That point is often a good time to catch them, as many people who have enjoyed their regular service but wish to earn their living in a different way are still often tempted to transfer to the reserves to keep their hand in and to continue to serve the nation and maintain the bonds of comradeship and friendship they have developed as regulars.

However, in recent years, that transfer has often proved to be administratively difficult. I have heard anecdotal horror stories of former regular personnel who have attempted to re-enlist in the reserves when their regular service has come to an end but have had to overcome an assault course of bureaucracy to do so. In fact, I spoke relatively recently to a reserve officer who had had to fight his way through what he described as “the Capita circus”.

The Minister sought to reassure the Committee in evidence by saying that this will be dealt with as a relatively straightforward administrative matter. That flies in the face of much of the anecdotal evidence to the contrary. If someone tries to initiate the transfer while they are still serving, it seems that the process works better, but if they leave it until after they have left the regulars, or if they perhaps have a change of heart after having left the regulars and decide that they want to re-enlist as a reservist after a few years, it is really difficult. In fact, I have been told that in some cases it is worse than if they just tried to join the reserves straight off, ab initio, as a civilian.

I pressed the Minister specifically on whether the new tri-service armed forces recruitment programme—the AFRP—contract was written in such a way as to allow the contractor to facilitate the process in an effective and efficient manner. Again, the Minister sought to offer the explanation that it could all be done via administrative procedures. I want to press the Minister on how exactly these administrative procedures are intended to apply in practice. Under the new contract, what, in practical terms, will be different from the rather cumbersome arrangements that we still have in place? In short, how will the creases in this system, which everyone agrees exist, be ironed out to make the transition sufficiently smooth that those leaving the regulars are not put off by mind-numbing bureaucracy if they wish to convert to reserve service?

Those are my comments on the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells, which he introduced very well. I now turn to clause 31.

Reserves are a fundamental part of our armed forces, as both the Minister and I can attest, having served in the reserve forces at different times in our careers—although I handed back my kit shortly after the Berlin wall came down in 1989, whereas the Minister is still undertaking reserve service. Indeed, we understand he has been on manoeuvres only recently.

However, it is a fact that compared with many other nations, we still have very small numbers of reserves, with some 26,000 in the active Army Reserve and many fewer in the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and related reserves. If we put those numbers in context and compare them with the United States, which has both an army reserve and large numbers of national guard—they are organised on a state-by-state basis and report to governors in peacetime, but they can be federalised in wartime—or the reserve elements of the Chinese and Russian armies, they pale by comparison, even though, as the Minister often likes to remind us, we had very large citizen armies in both the first and second world wars.

The Army Reserve can be augmented by what is now generally referred to as the Strategic Reserve. For the avoidance of confusion, that is former regular soldiers and officers who would be liable for recall to service with the colours in a national emergency up to and including full-scale war. Indeed, the Bill extends the provision for recalling the Strategic Reserve to up to 18 years, I believe, from leaving the colours of the regular armed forces. For the record, we very much support that measure.

When asked in evidence for his estimate of the size of the Strategic Reserve, the Minister gave a definitive figure of approximately 95,000. However, to put it in context, the 2021 census—after much campaigning over quite a few years by the Royal British Legion and some MPs who backed the proposal—specifically asked respondents whether they had ever served in His Majesty’s armed forces, and just over 2 million people positively answered the question. Since then, sadly, a number of those veterans will have passed away, but given that the question was not included in the census forms dispatched to Northern Ireland, which has historically proved a very healthy recruiting ground for our armed forces, it seems not unreasonable to assume that the current number is still probably somewhere around 2 million living veterans, or relatively close to it. Moreover, the Minister also revealed to the Committee, assisted by witnesses from the Ministry of Defence, that about 1 million of those people are still of what he called employment age. I take it that he means males aged up to about 67.

I cite those figures to try to estimate the maximum theoretical strength of the Strategic Reserve—or, in military parlance, the absolute right of arc—if all those living veterans were included. Of course, in practice they would not be if they were in their 80s or 90s. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not think we are proposing to put Chelsea pensioners in the Strategic Reserve.

We can discern from that calculation that the absolute maximum is theoretically about 2 million—assuming for a moment that we also include veterans who have also served in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, because they will have ticked the same box. If we cut it differently and include only those of employable age, the Strategic Reserve would come out at about 1 million. If we believe that 95,000 is too small a Strategic Reserve to act as a credible deterrent, particularly given the darkening international situation that we face at present, could we, as it were, draw a line or establish a set of criteria that would achieve a Strategic Reserve of somewhere between 95,000 and, for the sake of debate, a quarter of a million? That would be a much more credible figure in deterrent terms.

I ask the question deliberately to provoke debate about how we could, if we chose, expand the Strategic Reserve from the Minister’s 95,000 figure. If he cannot answer that question off the top of his head, perhaps he could write to me, to you, Mr Efford, and to other members of the Committee prior to Report about where, at least theoretically, a line could be drawn—perhaps defined by age or some other criterion—to create a Strategic Reserve of about a quarter of a million troops, rather than just under 100,000.

Moreover, if we were to consider something as ambitious as that in order to provide a greater deterrent effect, how would we track and communicate with those people, above and beyond access to the His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs database that Ministers have prayed in aid before? For instance, if we assume that quite a number of those veterans are in receipt of a military pension of one type or another, presumably they would be known to Veterans UK and at least their basic details would be recorded on the MOD’s joint personnel administration system. Could we not use that as a means of tracking down those people?

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

I mentioned some statistics about what we have now. It is circa 90,000 to 95,000 when we add in the four-year, six-year and 18-year mix that we have across our terms of service. If we then add on, say, five years times 15,000, we again get into the space of about 150,000 to just shy of 200,000.

When we look at the maths for the Army, we see that it needs about an echelon to two echelons in depth, and then it needs a training cadre to deliver that capability. That training cadre will primarily be the reserve forces we have already. Consequently, I think we have done enough to move the dial to give us a big enough number and to standardise the process. As always with these things—I am not a data expert—the trick is collecting the data and then being able to analyse it at the right time to get the right force that we need, because we may not need all of those individuals back. We may need very specific skills or individuals.

I will return to some of the tri-service changes. The tri-service transition framework will be launched this month. It aims to standardise the process for leaving, to tackle inconsistencies for vulnerable cohorts and in skills capture, resettlement, employment support and regular-reserve transfer. That is heading in the right direction.

A lot of the changes that I have just talked about will bring immense benefit to both those in the regular service and the reserve service, by removing the administrative issues that service personnel face, and have faced in the past, when leaving and rejoining, or as they seek to move between regulars and reserves and vice versa. This is vital to the wider work that we are doing to create a new framework that will allow for a more flexible service, ensuring that we have access to the right skills and increasing retention by offering alternative forms of service. That reflects many of the recommendations in the Haythornthwaite review, which was conducted under the last Government.

I hope that what I have said provides the necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. I ask him to withdraw amendment 7 and I commend clause 31 to the Committee.

[Mike Martin]

In the light of the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Call out for permanent service

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 1, in clause 33, page 51, line 31, at end insert—

“(2B) This section does not apply to any person who was discharged from the regular services or the reserve forces for a medical reason relating to physical or mental health.”

This amendment makes former service personnel who have been discharged from the armed forces for a medical reason relating to physical or mental health exempt from being recalled to permanent service.

Amendment 20, in clause 33, page 52, line 1, leave out “65” and insert “67”.

This amendment increases the maximum age for service in the Reserve Forces from 65 to 67.

Amendment 21, in clause 33, page 52, line 10, leave out “65” and insert “67”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 20.

Amendment 22, in clause 33, page 54, line 6, leave out “12” and insert “18”.

This amendment would extend the duration of a recall order from 12 months to 18 months.

Amendment 23, in clause 33, page 54, line 43, at end insert—

“69C Prevention of recall for persons in reserved occupations

(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations to define certain categories of civilian work as reserved occupations.

(2) A ‘reserved occupation’ under subsection (1) is any category of civilian work which the Secretary of State deems as vital for defence purposes.

(3) Persons undertaking a reserved occupation may be exempted from a recall order under section 69A for which they would have otherwise been liable.”

This amendment would allow persons undertaking civilian work which the Secretary of State deems vital for defence purposes to be exempt from a recall order under section 69A.

Amendment 24, in clause 33, page 54, line 43, at end insert—

“69C Notice periods for recall

(1) Those reservists in Army Reserve Group A, or its equivalents, shall, following the coming into force of the Armed Forces Act 2026, have their standard notice reduced from readiness category R9 (180 days) to R8 (90 days)

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘Army Reserve Group A’ has the meaning defined in the Reserve Land Forces Regulations 2026.”

This amendment would increase the readiness requirement for reservists in Army Reserve Group A from 180 days to 90 days.

Clauses 33 to 35 stand part.

Schedule 5.

Clause 36 stand part.

Strategic Defence Review: Funding

Mike Martin Excerpts

Wednesday 15th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

They could have dealt with the black mould in our armed forces kids’ bedrooms. They could have dealt with the broken boilers and the leaky roofs. We have dealt with it as a Labour Government, and I am proud of that record. I am also proud that we have refitted the 1,000 worst homes, delivering those improvements so that our military families could be in a decent home by Christmas 2025. We are now starting work on the next tranche of the worst homes so that our people can live in a decent home if they serve. That is the minimum we should offer those brave men and women who serve our forces.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

Following the comments by the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), may I make a plea that we put this political blame game to one side? The fleet halved under the previous Labour Government. We all have our fingerprints on the current state of the UK military. It is unedifying for us, for this House and for the state that we are in as a nation.

I want to draw the Minister’s attention to the all-party parliamentary group on rearmament, which I recently set up with the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) and with the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), who is longer in his place, as well as with Field Marshal Lord David Richards in the other place. Our aim is to highlight not only the scale of the threat that we face but the parlous current state of the British military. Does the Minister share that aim with us? Talking about both is necessary for the national conversation that was highlighted in the strategic defence review but has not happened. Will he join us in talking about the threat, and also give an honest depiction of the state of the UK military so that our public can be informed and can tell us what they would like us to do?

[Luke Pollard]

I follow the hon. Gentleman on Twitter, so I will be very keen to see the end of the political blame game of his tweets. I look forward to seeing what he tweets next. It might be the embodiment of that spirit that we have just heard here.

The hon. Gentleman is right to talk about the munitions and stockpiles that we inherited, which were far too low for the threat that we are facing. That is the reason why we have already made announcements about increasing the amount of munitions that we are buying for our armed forces. He is also right to talk about the threat. The Defence Secretary has spoken from this Dispatch Box about the increasing threat that Russia, in particular, poses to the United Kingdom and our allies, and we will continue to do that. I am very happy to meet the hon. Gentleman and his new all-party group to have that conversation, which is an important one about how we address the underfunding and hollowing out of our forces that we inherited. I will also be able to help him understand the progress that we are now making under this Labour Government to restock and to rearm: a lot of work done, but a lot of work still to do.

Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting)

Mike Martin Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Francois]

As the title of clause 30 is “Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary”, I will ask the Minister something about the commissioner and then something about the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.

It would appear that, after some time, the Government have now announced someone to fill the position of commissioner. I wonder whether the Minister can confirm that. There are reports in the media that the appointment has been made, but I hope the Minister will put that firmly on the record and say a bit about the individual and how they came to be selected. What was the process by which they got that important job? Has the Defence Committee been involved in the appointment in any way?

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

I can help out a little with the right hon. Gentleman’s question. The post was not filled. The Government were having some difficulty in filling the post, and—

[The Chair]

Order. We are going down a rabbit hole. The Committee is not here to debate who will fill the commissioner’s role; we are here to debate the clause. Can we get back on subject, please?