Financial Services and Markets Bill (Ninth sitting)
Thursday 3rd November 2022
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 View all Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 November 2022 - (3 Nov 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I wish to say from the beginning that I will push the new clause to a vote. I move the new clause in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy). As we heard in evidence, buy now, pay later companies offer consumers the opportunity to spread payments, but they remain unregulated. They represent a large, growing and unregulated form of debt, the growth of which was fast-tracked during the pandemic. Because the loans are initially interest free, consumers lack the key consumer credit protections they receive with other products, which potentially puts them at risk.
We know that buy now, pay later products drive people to spend more money because the providers tell us so. That risks pushing people to spend money that they do not have, without adequate protection against mis-selling. In the cost of living crisis, millions more consumers have turned to this form of credit to make ends meet. As with all forms of high-cost credit, regulation is critical to ensuring that buy now, pay later can be a constructive way for consumers to manage their financial situations.
Labour put forward a proposal to that effect in 2020, which the Government voted down. In 2021, the Financial Conduct Authority called for regulation, and the Government did a U-turn. Now, over two years later, consumers are still waiting for those vital protections, but there is little sign that the Government recognise the urgency to act. In the meantime, the industry has rapidly expanded, so the risks to consumers have grown, which has further increased the need to intervene.
In 2021, Citizens Advice reported that 41% of buy now, pay later users had struggled to make a repayment. One in 10 have been chased by debt collectors, rising to one in eight among young people. Some 25% have fallen behind on another household bill in order to pay a buy now, pay later bill. Those effects of this form of credit were echoed in research by StepChange. Its data shows that 40% of buy now, pay later customers took negative coping actions to cover the debt that they had accrued through this service, including using credit to repay credit, falling behind on housing payments or utility bills, asking family or friends for help, and cutting back to the point of hardship. The figure is 40% for buy now, pay later and 21% for users of other forms of credit.
With Christmas approaching, it is likely that more consumers will be driven to use buy now, pay later and risk unaffordable debt. Equifax data from Christmas 2021 showed that 9% of Christmas shoppers in 2020 used buy now, pay later to spread the cost of presents, and that a quarter of all 18 to 34-year-olds plan to use buy now, pay later to buy presents this Christmas. Last year, one in five people using buy now, pay later said that they felt pressure to buy presents for family and friends, and roughly a quarter—27%—said that they would struggle to afford Christmas without its help. These trends are only likely to increase. The Equifax data shows that two in five users report missing at least one payment in the past, and half of them say that they have been hit with extra fees as a result.
New clause 1 therefore requires that urgent action be taken now to ensure that consumers are protected against being sold unaffordable debt by these companies. It would ensure that some key protections form part of the regulation. That includes ensuring that buy now, pay later users have access to the Financial Ombudsman Service, that there are credit checks before use, and that users are protected by section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Those changes would bring buy now, pay later products into line with other forms of credit and ensure that our consumer credit landscape could not be pulled apart by other forms of credit demanding bespoke arrangements.
Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
I add my voice to those supporting new clause 1. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle for her speech on this very important issue and my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow, who has long campaigned to bring buy now, pay later credit companies into some form of regulation. Obviously, their emergence has been assisted by the shift to online shopping, which we all have experienced and which was turbocharged during the lockdowns.
The consumer credit legislation that protects customers from taking on unaffordable levels of debt and paying over the odds for credit, in a way that is often quite opaque, did not anticipate the existence of online shopping or the explosion in the kind of credit that is now easily available to those who roam the internet or look at TikTok and see lovely things that are just within reach. I speak as someone who has been around for quite a while and whose parents used to put money away in shops so that they could afford Christmas presents, before consumer credit exploded in the way that it did. The Consumer Credit Act tried to make that fair and to regulate it. This is another switch in velocity, capacity and the availability of things, and it is very difficult to discern what the price is when you take something out.
We are now in an instant gratification culture, rather than the place where we said, “Put money away months before and hope you can afford to get the Christmas presents you want for your kids.” It is now a case of instantaneous availability—literally a click on a website. Klarna and various other of the buy now, pay later organisations are everywhere that it is possible to spend money. It is very difficult to imagine how that might be adding up—what the price of it actually is—when a person is in the middle of a purchase, particularly a younger person who is used to that kind of instant availability. It is very difficult for anyone to argue sensibly that the people who are clicking and making those purchases have a good idea of the price of the credit and the burden of the repayments they are taking on.
New clause 1 seeks to bring the new fintech ways of getting access to consumer credit—if I can put it that way—within the existing consumer protections in the Consumer Credit Act 1974, which admittedly is now pretty long in the tooth. Clearly, it is important for those to whom we give the job of protecting consumers to think in detail about how that can best be done, but it is pretty difficult to argue that we should allow the current circumstances to persist. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that.
It is important that people have time to think about what they are doing and that the pricing of credit is obvious at the time of the click, so that people can make genuine decisions and not feel that they have been conned, that the price is wrong or that they have got themselves into a vortex of increasing costs that were not in front of them at the time. The consequences of allowing an entire generation to have access to that kind of consumer credit without protections are too dire to contemplate.
I hope the fact that this Parliament has always put consumer protection at the heart of what it does and legislated for that purpose will prevail, and that the Minister will think about how we can sensibly and quickly bring this part of the growth industry of credit, including consumer credit, into the protected space.
Harriett Baldwin (West Worcestershire) (Con)
Thank you, Mr Sharma, for allowing me to contribute to the debate on new clause 1. My colleagues on the Treasury Committee have raised a very interesting and topical subject for us to debate regarding the best way forward. I must declare an interest, as someone who has bought things on the internet and has used this convenient way of paying for them. Clearly, when we have the FCA in front of us, we need to ask how it is approaching regulation in what has been an area of innovation, where fintech has really come to the fore.
It will be very interesting to hear the Minister’s reply to the points that have been raised, and what he sees as the best way forward. That innovation is supporting our retail sector, but at the same time, consumers deserve to know what they are getting into and to have good information when they make decisions. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments.
Siobhain McDonagh (Mitcham and Morden) (Lab)
I, too, support new clause 1, not because I wish to stop buy now, pay later as a form of credit or to restrict people’s choice, but because I want people to fully understand what they are getting into before they do it. I did not understand what Klarna was. I like the Space NK website as much as the next woman who likes to spend too much money on skin products, but I could not quite understand why all of a sudden, about two years ago, Klarna was mentioned as a means of buying now and paying later. I thought, “How terrifying. If you cannot pay that ridiculous price this month, how are you going to pay that ridiculous price next month?”.
My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow has done some brilliant work on this issue. Buy now, pay later is the form of credit for the under-30s. They use it more than store cards or credit cards. It is often used on clothing websites, primarily by young women who buy different sizes to see which dress they actually want.
Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
I rise to support the new clause moved by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle.
Some things do not change. The technology might, but the need for continuation of consumer protection does not. I heard Members talk about parents using buy now, pay later. I remember buying a sideboard with my sister in the ’80s using the old-fashioned financial system of paying money every week—that took a long time to pay back. That reality does not change, and this form of credit is now happening with single items, whether they be trousers or shoes, or make-up, which raises a whole range of diverse issues. We cannot lose sight of the fact that most people who might utilise the service in my constituency might not know that they do not have the appropriate consumer protections. The SNP will support the new clause if it is pushed to a vote.
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Sharma. I start by paying tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow, as others have done, for tabling the new clause and for her relentless work in the House to highlight the risks that unsecured credit poses to the most vulnerable in society, including many of my constituents in Kilburn. I also pay tribute to her successful campaign for better regulation of payday loans and companies. I am sure everyone has heard her speak on that campaign in the Chamber at some point.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull and Hessle said, we are disappointed that the Bill has failed to address buy now, pay later regulation. For years, the Government have promised to regulate the sector, but have not done so, which has left millions of consumers without protection. I recognise that many of my constituents, particularly the young, value buy now, pay later products, because they allow people to pay for expensive products over time. However, the products can also result in debt building up quickly and easily. That is why it is so important that the sector is properly regulated, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mitcham and Morden outlined.
An investigation by the FCA, the Woolard review, which reported in February last year, found that many consumers simply do not know that buy now, pay later products are a form of credit, which means that some people do not consider the risks associated with taking out such products and may not look at the products as carefully as they might have done otherwise. That should be deeply concerning to all of us here, and it has left the most vulnerable, financially excluded people at risk of getting trapped in a cycle of debt. The review made it clear that there is an urgent need to regulate all buy now, pay later products.
We are almost two years on from the review and nothing has been done—no action has been taken. The Government’s consultation concluded in June, and this Bill was the perfect opportunity to bring forward provisions to regulate the sector. Will the Minister explain why the Government have chosen not to do so? It is not just consumers who are in desperate need of regulation. As shadow City Minister, I have engaged with the main players in the buy now, pay later sector in recent months. They too have called on the Government for proper regulation to provide certainty for businesses and to keep bad actors out of the market. I hope the Minister will explain why his Government have chosen to leave consumers unprotected and have ignored calls from the sector by failing to include this regulation in the Bill today.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Andrew Griffith)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn. I would like to add my recognition for what the hon. Member for Walthamstow has achieved, particularly when it comes to payday loans.
The debate on this clause is not about the ends. Rather, it is about the means and the best way of proceeding from here to an end that, as we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire, is common to both sides of the Committee. However, there is a difference. The Government will not be supporting this amendment. I want to make it clear that we are trying to find the best path on which to proceed, and we are trying to get this important area right.
The amendment would require the Treasury to make regulations to bring buy now, pay later products into regulation within 28 days of the Bill’s passage. I contend that that would be breakneck speed. I hear and understand the frustration of colleagues that the legislation has taken a certain amount of time to mature, but it is also an innovative product and something that provides real utility to millions of people. It is important that we get this right.
The challenge for us in bringing forward appropriate regulations in this domain is that we must ensure we give no succour to the greater evil of informal or illegal credit. As we look to regulate the credit market, we have to acknowledge that what we do not regulate creates a floor, beneath which nefarious providers operate—for example, those whom the hon. Member for Walthamstow has been vigilant in cracking down on.
I understand the desire to move at pace, but I do not accept that nothing has happened. The FCA has significantly moved the dial on this, although there is more to do. It is our contention that we should do it in a thoughtful way and by consulting with the sector, which is supportive of endeavours to bring forward the right amount of legislation.
We also acknowledge that to many people credit can be a valued lifeline. Like the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire, I remember being sent to do the weekly grocery shop, and that shop provided credit of a buy now, pay later form. As a growing family, and particularly at certain moments of the year, we had a more-than-average amount of groceries. It was a real lifeline. It was a way to spread the cost in a measured way. We should recognise that we must be very careful of the unintended consequences.
Dame Angela Eagle
I am glad to hear that the Minister was helpful to his mother when growing up by doing the grocery shop. He has just made a subtle point about unintended consequences of unregulated lenders—nefarious was the word he used. We would all associate ourselves with that. I wonder if the Minister would talk about speed, given that he does not agree with a month. When does he expect this process to bring forward the wherewithal to incorporate this kind of lending into regulation? Is it his view that the price and consequences of the interest rates that are attached to lending like this should be presented far more upfront when it comes to the button being clicked?
Andrew Griffith
I will address both of those points. In terms of timing, the Government published, as the hon. Member knows, a consultation on the proposed approach to regulation in October 2021; I acknowledge that was some time ago. The response to that consultation was published in June 2022. The Government are now developing the necessary legislation and intend to consult on that draft legislation soon. The Government aim to lay secondary legislation in mid-2023.
The hon. Member talks about price, and I will defer to her expertise if this is the case, but my understanding is that the category that is defined as “buy now, pay later” is required to be credit-provided for no more than 12 months, in no more than 12 instalments, and interest free. So although I am an addict for data, and I believe that transparency is—in most markets—the best oxygen, in this case it is clear and established that this product category is not allowed to charge interest. That does not mean that it does not have charges; there is hidden small print, and I understand and support the need for that.
Dame Angela Eagle
I accept what the Minister has said, but the price here is not an interest rate, it is actually what happens if one does not make the payments. It is the consequences of falling behind that are the issue rather than an interest rate.
Andrew Griffith
I think that the hon. Member and I are at common cause in terms of what we are talking about. To make a wider point, I think we would all understand and aspire to a culture that was “save first, and buy later”. What we are talking about are societal changes. We live in a society where too many people have early recourse to debt and where we perhaps do not have the level of financial education that we would like. That is something that I discussed yesterday with the Money and Pensions Service.
There is a great deal more work to do. I would like to champion that in my relatively new ministerial role. Although it is important that we regulate, and although we have to recognise that, however much we try to work upstream, there will be people who are exploited or simply vulnerable, or who are not operating on the sort of level of financial resilience that they should be. I know the Treasury Committee spends a great deal of time on that; it is a concern to me and the ministerial team in the Treasury. That is an area that we can collaborate and work on; it need not be something that we divide over. That is particularly pertinent to younger people.
As well as committing to move forward with regulation, we commit to do so in a measured way, in the right way and at the right time. That also brings into consideration wider initiatives about financial education in general.
Emma Hardy
I want to press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss new clause 5—Essential banking services access policy statement—
“(1) The Treasury must lay before the House of Commons an essential banking services access policy statement within six months of the passing of this Act.
(2) An ‘essential banking services access policy statement’ is a statement of the policies of His Majesty’s Government in relation to the provision of adequate levels of access to essential in-person banking services in the United Kingdom.
(3) ‘Essential in-person banking services’ include services which are delivered face-to-face, and may include those provided in banks, banking hubs, or other service models.
(4) The policies mentioned in sub-section (2) may include those which relate to—
(a) ensuring adequate availability of essential in-person banking services;
(b) ensuring adequate provision of support for online banking training and internet access, for the purposes of ensuring access to online banking; and
(c) expectations of maximum geographical distances service users should be expected to travel to access essential in-person banking services in rural areas.
(5) The FCA must have regard to the essential banking services access policy statement when fulfilling its functions.”
This new clause would require the Treasury to publish a policy statement setting out its policies in relation to the provision of essential in-person banking services, including policies relating to availability of essential in-person banking services, support for online banking, and maximum distances people can expect to travel to access services.
Tulip Siddiq
I would like to say from the outset that I will push new clauses 4 and 5 to the vote.
New clause 4 would require the Treasury and the FCA to conduct and publish a review of the community need for, and access to, essential in-person banking services, and enable the FCA to ensure that areas in need of such services receive them, and to make sure that banking services have a minimum level of access.
New clause 5 would require the Treasury to publish a policy statement setting out its policies in relation to the provision of essential in-person banking services, including policies relating to availability of such services, support for online banking and maximum distances that people can expect to travel to access banking services.
Of course Labour welcomes the fact that, after years and years, we finally have a Bill that introduces protection for access to cash. However, the Bill has some serious gaps that we are concerned about. We have already debated in a previous sitting the Government’s failure to guarantee free access to cash, but this Bill also does nothing to protect essential face-to-face banking services, which the most vulnerable people in our society depend on for financial advice and support.
Analysis published by the consumer group Which? found that almost half the UK’s bank branches have closed since 2015. That has cut off countless people from essential services. In its written evidence to us, Age UK called for the Bill to be amended to protect the in-person services that older people rely on, such as the facility to open a new account or apply for a loan, to ensure that banking services can meet their needs.
However, it is not just older people who struggle without support. Natalie Ceeney, chair of the Cash Action Group, who many Committee members will know, warned us at our evidence session of the significant overlap between those who rely on access to cash—around 10 million British adults—and those who need face-to-face support. She said that
“every time I meet a community, the debate goes very quickly from cash to banking. It all merges. The reason is we are talking about the same population.”––[Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 49, Q98.]
She is completely right: it is the most vulnerable, the poorer people in society and the older members of society, who depend on that extra face-to-face help, for instance in making or receiving payments, or dealing with a standing order. These are the people who will be left behind if this question about banking is left completely unaddressed. Nor should we forget those without the digital skills needed to bank online, people in rural areas with poor internet connection, or the growing number who cannot afford to pay for data or wi-fi as the cost of living crisis deepens.
As the FCA warned in its written evidence to us, the powers granted to the regulator by this Bill do not extend to the provision of wider banking services beyond cash access. That is why I hope the Minister will today commit to supporting new clauses 4 and 5, which will give the FCA the powers it needs to protect essential in-person banking services.
Just to be clear, Labour is not calling for banks to be prevented from closing branches that are no longer needed—far from it. Access to face-to-face services could be delivered through a shared banking hub or other models of community provision. We also recognise that banking systems will inevitably continue to innovate, which is a good thing. Online banking is a far more convenient way for people to make payments and manage their finances. However, we must ensure—indeed, as constituency MPs we have a duty to ensure—that the digital revolution does not further deepen financial exclusion in this country.
That would require protecting face-to-face services and putting in place a proper strategy for digital exclusion and inclusion. Banking hubs or other models of community provision must be part of that solution. These spaces have the potential to tackle digital exclusion through their dedicated staff, who can teach people how to bank online and provide internet access for those without it. I was delighted to hear this week’s announcement from the Cash Action Group that the sector will be launching additional banking hubs on a voluntary basis, but if we want to ensure that no one is left behind—the most vulnerable in our society—these services must be protected by legislation. I ask the Minister to support these two new clauses.
Siobhain McDonagh
I rise to support new clauses 4 and 5, which we know are supported by our constituents. No matter what kind of constituency we represent, whether it is wealthy, rural or urban, people are desperate for face-to-face services. Recently, in Mitcham town centre, Barclays and Halifax have closed. I stood outside both branches for a week during their opening hours, asking customers why they wanted face-to-face services and if they used online banking. In both cases, about 50% of customers had no access to online services, either because they did not know how to access them or were too frightened to use them because they were concerned about being scammed. That is an enormous concern, but it is completely rational and understandable, when we consider how many people are scammed.
This is about those quintessentially un-financial market issues of community and human contact. The closure of our banks and building societies is symptomatic of so much more—of our town centres being destroyed, of people feeling excluded from progress and the new society, and even of their feelings of loneliness. I am not suggesting that it is the banks’ job to resolve issues of loneliness, but we can talk about these issues as much as we like; people crave human contact to give them the confidence to use financial services and their bank accounts.
The branch staff do an enormous amount for our communities by protecting some of our most vulnerable constituents from doing things they really should not do, such as giving their life savings to people who they have never met who have offered to marry them. So much goes on in our banks and building societies, but it is only through the closure of banks in my town centre that I have understood what is really happening. Banks are retreating from branches on the high street but also from phone services. The number of banks that will allow people to do things by phone is reducing. Anyone here who has tried to contact their bank by phone knows that unless they have a significant amount of credit on their phone, they will not get through any time soon.
Emma Hardy
I thank my hon. Friend for the incredible speech that she is making. Looking at the Royal National Institute of Blind People briefing, does she agree how important it is for visually impaired or blind people to be able to access telephone and face-to-face banking services?
Siobhain McDonagh
Absolutely. As always, I agree with my hon. Friend. I think we will see an even greater explosion of financial fraud if there is an ever-quickening closure of branches in our town centres, and even more reductions in the ability to access services by phone. Unless there is regulation, we can appeal to the best motives of banks and building societies, but I understand that they are challenged. They have new competitors that do not have the infrastructure of the branches or staff. They are doing everything online, but they are doing it for a particular segment of society that does not, and will not, include everybody. We really have to grapple with that.
The work by the CASH Coalition has been excellent, but unless there is pressure from regulation, that will not happen. The idea that we all have to wait for the last bank in our town centre to close before we can even start thinking about a banking hub is as good as useless. I am only saying things that every member of the Committee knows, and that we know the consequences of. We have an opportunity today to do something about it on behalf of our most vulnerable constituents.
Dame Angela Eagle
It is a pleasure to follow the powerful speeches of my hon. Friends the Members for Hampstead and Kilburn and for Mitcham and Morden on this important issue. It is not an issue that affects most people, who have been able to make the switch to online banking and find it more convenient—although it has to be said that there is an increasing level of worry about online banking services because of the increasing prevalence of fraud and scams. We dealt with that in earlier parts of the Bill, but we touched only the very edge of it, as the tide of the problem rises. I am sure that we will come back to the issue many times in future Bills.
A significant number of our constituents cannot participate, for whatever reason, in the IT and tech changes that have made banking available on our phones and computer screens, and that allow us to chat to various bots that put us through to the places where we need to go. I do not know whether the Minister has had occasion to phone a bank recently or, to be honest, any other service after the pandemic, but it is one of the most frustrating things that anyone has to do. It seems there is only one phone line for all the telephone access points. One has to hang on listening to appalling music for hours on end.
Dame Angela Eagle
We will have to come in a Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Bill to outlawing the appalling music that one has to listen to when trying to access any kind of service, private or public, by phone. We have to remember that many people cannot hang on the phone forever. They cannot afford to, and they are the people who tend to need the most help. They may have pay-as-you-go phones that run out quite rapidly. They may be unable to afford to hang on at the whim of an artificial intelligence bot, or the fewer and fewer actual human beings at the other end. They cannot access even ordinary banking in the way that the majority of people do. As I have said, that can be for a number of reasons. All Members present may get to a stage in our lives when we cannot either, and when we cannot remember our PIN numbers.
Dame Angela Eagle
We already have trouble with our PIN numbers, but many people’s memories fail as they get older, or they may be in the early stages of Alzheimer’s or other dementias. They cannot remember things, they cannot deal with the security issues that are required to make banking in this way safe, and they cannot go and ask somebody to help them.
Emma Hardy
On that point, will my hon. Friend flag to the Minister that, if a bank machine does not have buttons and is just a touch screen, it is very difficult for blind and partially sighted people to know where the numbers are, so as to put their PIN in correctly? That is another reason why face-to-face banking is so important.
Dame Angela Eagle
My hon. Friend makes an extremely good point: tech developments sometimes leave people behind. That is not usually deliberate; sometimes it is thoughtless. However, we in Parliament must ensure that all citizens in this country are able to participate in what is, increasingly, effectively a utility, even though it is not in public hands—I make no comment one way or the other about that. Being unable to access banking services for whatever reason is a real disadvantage, whatever an individual’s age or time of life.
That is a primary reason why we must ensure that what the market cannot provide, regulation provides. I am interested in what the Minister has to say about that. This issue will get bigger as more and more services go online. Regulation cannot happen merely at the end of a process, when access has completely disappeared. Even in some places where bank offices still exist, not everybody can access them. As a Parliament, we are people who point our regulators in particular directions to deal with emerging issues, and this is an important one. I look forward to what the Minister has to say.
Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. I will make a short speech. It is more of a speech of curiosity. I listened very carefully to my next-door neighbour, the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden, who said what most members of the Committee would probably say. She will know as well as I do that everybody looks at my constituency and thinks “leafy Wimbledon suburbia”. But she will also know that parts of south Wimbledon, of Raynes Park and of Morden town centre, which we share, have exactly the problems that she spoke about.
I may have misheard the hon. Lady, but she said that she did not wish to compel banks to stay open, or did not think that we necessarily could do so, and she spoke therefore about the establishment of banking hubs. What I am curious about is how banking hubs would be established. Are we saying that, as part of getting or maintaining a banking licence, there should be a contribution to a social fund, so that banking hubs can be established around the country? Are we saying that that levy should be extended, particularly because some of the harm that we are talking about is the rise of online banking? Should online banks make a contribution to the cost of those banking hubs? Or are we saying—I think it was said that the hubs should be inside local authority areas—that local authorities should offer them, for instance in town centres?
That is a genuine point of curiosity. As in previous discussions with the hon. Members for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, for Wallasey, and for Mitcham and Morden—my next-door neighbour—there is huge sympathy for ensuring that our constituents, including vulnerable constituents, have access to banking services. But we need to more tightly define the practicality of how we ensure that they have that access.
Siobhain McDonagh
I am completely open-minded about how the hubs are paid for, but they have to be paid for from the banking sector itself. I would not wish to put the responsibility on already overstretched local authorities. Many high street banks have had decades of loyal support from these customers, and they cannot just walk away from that responsibility and ignore them. They have been good, loyal customers. There should be a banking hub, but not at the point that the last bank closes. We need to have a view towards what happens in the future. There can be collaboration about sites, but there needs to be access to those services.
Stephen Hammond
That is extremely helpful in setting out the thought processes behind the new clause. One of the issues that the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn might wish to clarify is that, if the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden is correct, the new clause has to contain the stipulation that to get a banking licence in the United Kingdom, one needs to pay a certain amount of social levy so that banking hubs can be established. For me, that is the issue with the clause. I therefore suggest that the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn might want to take it away and bring it back on Report, or have a discussion with the Minister about exactly how the levy that the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden is effectively talking about is to be established. This new clause does not make that clear, and therefore, frankly, the practicality of the new clause—notwithstanding that we all agree with its intent—is clearly flawed.
Andrew Griffith
I once again note the strength of feeling on both sides of the Committee. The hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden has spoken in a number of debates on clauses of the Bill about the importance of bank branches to our constituencies and local communities. When I visit her constituency to see the opening of the new cash machine, perhaps I will be able to review the provision for myself.
Andrew Griffith
The Government do not support the new clause, but if I may make eyes at the Opposition, I would be very open to accepting an amendment about appalling hold music, as suggested by the hon. Member for Wallasey. That is something to look forward to—I am not sure I should say that in front of my Whip, but one has immense sympathy with the point made.
There are very real issues here, which no one disputes. I am familiar with the sobering challenges that the hon. Member for Wallasey talked about. I know from my meetings with charities that one in three of us will end up with dementia. The RNIB has done fantastic work for those with impaired sight or sight loss, and Age UK does lots of great work in our constituencies—very practical work, as well as raising these issues. I am very open to meeting representatives of all three organisations, so I am happy to give that commitment: they are on my long list of people to meet in this role.
Notwithstanding the wider debate about the role of statute in protecting bank branches from closure, I am keen that we harness the positive uses of technology to try to solve problems. We know that voice recognition can help people who are partially sighted, and the internet now has a great deal more regulation—every website now has accessibility options for people with sight issues—so there are things we can do to close that delta. The point about the importance of the consumer voice is also very well made and understood. It is very important that we make sure there is the right level of consumer representation and consumer voice across our entire financial regulatory system, rather than its representatives solely being producers or practitioners.
Emma Hardy
This might not be strictly within the scope of the new clause, but will the Minister take away the point about the problems with touchpads when people pay for things in shops? With flat surfaces, it is incredibly difficult for visually impaired and partially sighted people to know which buttons they are pressing when entering their PIN number. It is one of those cases where, as the Minister has said, technology advances and does not mean to discriminate against people, but it is causing difficulties.
Andrew Griffith
I do understand that point, and I will take it away. We are all challenged by the wonderful two-factor authentication that even the parliamentary authorities require of us as we log in, and I understand that as we move from analogue to digital, some really important protections are sometimes lost.
The availability of alternative channels by which customers can access their banking means that this issue is quite distinct from access to cash. We have talked about access to cash, and we understand the significant steps forward presented in the Bill and the new duty on the FCA. That is very positive. Where a branch is the only source of cash access services, the closure of that branch will be within the scope of the powers, which starts to address the issue of branch closure. We are giving the FCA powers to do its job. As we know, the purpose of the Bill is to give the FCA powers, not for Parliament to be overly prescriptive. In that circumstance, the FCA could delay the closure until some other reasonable provision for access to cash applied.
Tulip Siddiq
The Minister mentions the FCA, and I also want to take the chance to respond to the earlier comments by the hon. Member for Wimbledon. I am not endorsing a specific model—this is something to consider—but the proposed banking hub could work in exactly the same way as the current banking hub model, which is funded by the sector and regulated by the FCA, which also ensures that sites provide in-person services as well. If the Minister is willing to talk further on the provisions in the new clause—the hon. Member for Wimbledon was generous in suggesting that he would do so—I would be happy to explore banking hub models with him.
Andrew Griffith
There is a great deal of good evolution. I suspect that members on both sides of the Committee would say that it has come quite late in the process, but nevertheless there has been evolution in the banking hub solution—that dynamic, sector-led initiative—as well as the work of the Post Office, which offers in-person facilities for a wide range of, if not all, transactions. There may be a gradient of availability, but post offices that offer a certain range of services to deal with the most common and frequently made transactions are almost ubiquitous. The need to travel for more complex needs would not be an unsurprising feature in this market.
I welcome the initiatives developed by the Cash Action Group, Natalie Ceeney and UK Finance, and implemented by LINK, which are making the local assessments to determine where shared solutions are most appropriate. The industry has committed to shared bank hubs in 29 locations across the UK. Yesterday, it committed to a further four, in Luton, Surrey, Prestatyn, and Welling in south-east London. There is a good rate of change coming now, albeit from a low base.
The Government’s perspective is that while many people need and prefer to use in-person banking services, at this time it would not be proportionate to legislate to intervene in the market. Instead, we want to see the impact of closures understood, considered and mitigated wherever possible by the array of initiatives that have been put forward. I will continue to work with the sector, the FCA and other stakeholders from both sides—I mentioned some earlier—on this important issue.
Dame Angela Eagle
The Minister says that it is not enough of a problem at the moment to legislate. Why might that be the case? This is not going to become less of an issue. As more people get to the stage where they cannot access services, I suspect it will get worse rather than better. Could he give the Committee an idea of his thinking about how bad the situation would have to get before regulation would be appropriate? We must make certain that we do not leave millions of people behind and shut them out of access to necessary banking services.
Andrew Griffith
While taking nothing away from the hon. Member’s view, and indeed her experience in this space, I do not entirely share her pessimism that it is a one-way street and that the problem will only get worse. Solutions will be deployed. The rate at which banking hubs can be deployed, the sorts of services that people use, and technology will all evolve. I talked earlier, as she did, about some of the challenges of an ageing society in which loneliness is prevalent, both in urban and rural areas. There are initiatives, both community-led and technological, to help with some of that. We do not decry in any way the statement that there is a problem. I do not think that Members have heard that from me, or from any Government Members. The aim is to proceed in a proportionate manner.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
The Minister talks about how he wants the impact of closures to be understood in the decision-making process. Understood by whom? The banks are telling us why they want to close their branches: they are saving money. The FCA is saying, “The banks are closing their branches to save money.” Our constituents know what it means to lose a bank branch. There is nothing new here. We understand why banks are closing their branches: they want to save cash. They do not want to continue a local service for our constituents, so what does the Minister mean by “understood”? Understood by whom—the banks, the FCA or our constituents?
Andrew Griffith
Ultimately, the banks are downstream of the widespread issue that is the change in consumer behaviour. We have heard both in evidence and in comments made in Committee that 86% of transactions are now digital. The use case of going to a bank branch has evolved rapidly in my lifetime and the lifetime of all Committee members. That is the ultimate macro issue that we are dealing with. Is that issue understood? I think it is.
Solutions could be brought to the table, in terms of both a greater toolkit for the FCA and greater prominence and scrutiny of the FCA as it uses the existing toolkit and the new powers in the Bill. There are also industry-led solutions, which having perhaps started slowly are increasing at greater pace. Proportionality is about giving those developing trends time to mature to see what models can be developed, while accepting the underlying need for action.
I therefore ask the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn to withdraw the motion.
Tulip Siddiq
After listening to contributions from Members on both sides of the Committee, I would like to have a conversation with the Minister about the new clause. I will bring it back at a later stage, but for now I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 6
National strategy on financial fraud
“(1) The Treasury must lay before the House of Commons a national strategy for the purpose of detecting, preventing and investigating fraud and associated financial crime within six months of the passing of this Act.
(2) In preparing the strategy, the Treasury must consult—
(a) the Secretary of State for the Home Office,
(b) the National Economic Crime Centre,
(c) law enforcement bodies which the Treasury considers relevant to the strategy,
(d) relevant regulators,
(e) financial services stakeholders,
(f) digital platforms, telecommunications companies, financial technology companies, and social media companies.
(3) The strategy must include arrangements for a data-sharing agreement involving—
(a) relevant law enforcement agencies,
(b) relevant regulators,
(c) financial services stakeholders,
(d) telecommunications stakeholders, and
(e) technology-based communication platforms,
for the purposes of detecting, preventing and investigating fraud and associated financial crime and, in particular, tracking stolen money which may pass through mule bank accounts or platforms operated by other financial services stakeholders.
(4) In this section ‘fraud and associated financial crime’ includes, but is not limited to authorised push payment fraud, unauthorised facility takeover fraud, and online and offline identity fraud.
(5) In this section, ‘financial services stakeholders’ includes banks, building societies, credit unions, investment firms, Electric Money Institutions, virtual asset providers and exchanges, and payment system operators.”—(Tulip Siddiq.)
This new clause would require the Treasury to publish a national strategy for the detection, prevention and investigation of fraud and associated financial crime, after having consulted relevant stakeholders. The strategy must include arrangements for a data sharing agreement between law enforcement agencies, regulators and others to track stolen money.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Tulip Siddiq
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We fully support the provisions in the Bill that enhance the protection for victims of authorised push payment scams, but we feel that an opportunity has been wasted to do something on fraud prevention. UK Finance, the financial services trade body, recently published data that revealed that the amount of money stolen directly from hard-working families and businesses’ bank accounts through fraud and scams hit a record high of £1.3 billion in 2021. That is bad enough at the best of times, but even worse during a cost of living crisis. We need to get to grips with new types of fraud such as identity theft and online scams, which have seen criminals get rich at the public’s expense, with people’s life savings stolen and their economic security put at risk.
The current approach to fraud will always leave law enforcement agencies one step behind the criminals, who are exploiting new financial technologies and bank accounts to steal and hide the public’s money. The Opposition want to see enforcement agencies given the powers that they need to crack down on digitally savvy criminals, and to track stolen money through payment system operators, electronic money institutions and cryptoasset firms. If the Government are serious about tackling fraud, they will support our new clause to allow regulators and enforcement agencies to pursue criminals and bring them to justice wherever they hide their stolen money, and to protect people’s financial security.
New clause 6 would put in place a single, dedicated national strategy to tackle fraud. It would deliver a co-ordinated, interagency response across the Treasury, the Home Office, the National Economic Crime Centre, law enforcement agencies, the major banks and wider partners in financial services, telecommunications and social media centres. It would put in place a data-sharing agreement to help investigators and the sector prevent fraud and track stolen money. That agreement would extend beyond the banks to include social media companies, fintechs, payment system operators and other platforms that are exploited by tech savvy criminals. That is important, because for too long, tackling fraud has been solely the banks’ responsibility. That approach is completely outdated.
Mike Haley, the chief executive of CIFAS, said in evidence to the Committee:
“Provisions that facilitate greater data and intelligence sharing, particularly on suspicions of fraud and financial crime, would have the biggest impact in helping to prevent this type of crime. It is a crime that is at scale and at speed in the online environment. To be able to share the mobile numbers that are being used, the devices and the IP addresses at speed across the whole of the environment—payment providers, fintechs and telcos—would be enormously powerful. This is a volume crime, and we need to have prevention at the core of any national strategy. That would have a massive positive impact.”––[Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 68, Q129.]
The new clause would facilitate that sharing. Does the Minister agree with Mike Haley? If so, will he commit the Government to introducing a fraud strategy with data sharing at its heart?
I am sure, because I have heard the Minister speak so many times in this Committee, that he will tell us to be patient; he will say that change is coming. However, the millions of people who have fallen—or will fall—victim to fraud cannot afford to be patient any more. We cannot drag our feet over this. Scams will continue to rise, and countless more lives will be destroyed or lost. We need to make sure that the outdated way of tackling fraud is challenged once and for all. I ask the Minister to support the new clause.
Dame Angela Eagle
It is a pleasure to talk about this extremely important issue. The Treasury Committee produced a long and detailed report on this issue, with a series of recommendations. I hope that the Government will work cross-departmentally to put those into effect. Data sharing certainly featured in our views in that inquiry.
It is hard to contemplate the size of the explosion in fraud, how little of it is captured, and how few of the perpetrators are brought to justice. That is partly because of the massive number of chances for fraudulent activity to be perpetrated, which have come with changes in access to banking and digital capacity. They range from push frauds, fraudulent emptying of bank accounts and credit card cloning, all the way through to the text messages that we all get regularly on our phones.
The text messages tell us, for example, that we have recently been near someone who has covid—the message is purportedly from the NHS—and we need to give them our banking details so we can pay £1.75 for access to a PCR test. We have all seen them. I am getting a load now on energy support—probably everyone is getting them—which say that the Government’s support for energy bills has to be applied for and that we have to give these people our banking details. These are very plausible texts, which many people fall for. There are phone calls as well, purportedly from the bank, and emails too. This is a sophisticated level of fraud that is psychologically very well organised.
Emma Hardy
One message worth highlighting that I received was, “Hi mum, I’ve lost my phone. Please send some money to this number.” I rang both my daughters to ask, “Is this from one of you?”. They both said it was not. This “Hi mum” one that is going round at the moment has caught many people out. These messages play on emotions and can make people deeply concerned when they receive them.
Dame Angela Eagle
It makes people deeply concerned and it makes them do things that they obviously live to regret in the fullness of time.
Increasingly, there are also phone calls from fraudsters pretending that they are the fraud police and that the person’s bank account has been accessed for fraudulent purposes. It is very difficult to keep up with the level of activity on our phones—we are being bombarded every day—and that is without considering the scamming that the FCA is fighting, day in, day out, on products offered online, such as pensions, insurance and investment products, all of which regularly lie beyond the regulatory border, but can lead to massive amounts of financial loss if they are believed. It is also without considering the areas where younger people tend to get their financial advice, such as TikTok and other places, where we probably—it has to be said, Mr Sharma—do not spend that much of our time.
The windows for getting to people with these kinds of fraudulent intents and sophisticated frauds widen constantly. The capacity to deal with them does not widen as regularly and, by definition, legislation is much slower than the innovation of these people.
We have asked the authorities that are tasked with fighting fraud what they are doing about it. The Treasury Committee has taken evidence on the topic, and we were struck by how fragmented those fighting fraud are across Departments and by how process-related, rather than output-related, the evidence from the authorities was. They said things like, “We have 150 different things that we are meant to do by 2023, and we have done 91% of them,” but fraud is still massively increasing all the time.
We need a system—a national fraud strategy—that looks at the output of fraud, rather than the processes or tick boxes by which the different anti-fraud authorities, which are fragmented all the way through, justify what they are doing. In reality, even if there is lots of work going on, the outcome is not nearly what we would want to see. Levels of fraud are rising significantly, affecting more and more people, and there are fewer and fewer successes in dealing with it.
It ranges from very sophisticated money laundering kinds of fraud—we are not talking about money laundering here, but we could talk about it for a very long time, and about the way banking structures seem to facilitate it—to lower levels of fraud. There is fraud that is perpetrated from outside our country’s boundaries and there is sophisticated money laundering activity. We are talking about frauds that are ruining the lives of the many constituents who fall victim to them. Many people do not get compensation when they have been conned into sharing their bank details and have had their bank accounts emptied or their credit cards cloned, because they have had a hand in it in some way. I know that the authorities work closely with the banks to create circumstances in which compensation can be given when there is no fault, but there are big blurred lines.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
If the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn presses the new clause to a vote, I will certainly support it. I declare an interest as the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on blockchain.
To build on what the hon. Member for Wallasey said, in subsections (2)(f) and (3)(d) and (e), we have a huge opportunity to help the Government by ensuring that there is a strategic overview of how fraud impacts on the technology sector. The problem is not necessarily the technology but the people utilising it. Distributed ledger-type technologies, for example, are used to access investments and assets, but those who are supposedly selling assets are taking advantage of technology that a lot of younger people use.
Critically, I hope that the Government hear the concern that there might be no strategic overview of how such technology can be manipulated. The tech is fine, but we must consider that manipulation—particularly of closed distributed ledger technologies and closed blockchains—and how it can block out the people who actually buy into those systems. I hope that the Government hear what has been said on the new clause.
Emma Hardy
I support the new clause. I refer the Minister to the evidence given by Mike Haley, the chief executive of CIFAS. In respect of fraud, he said:
“Absolutely, there should be a national strategy, and prevention should be at its core.”
He said that the Home Office was looking at
“publishing a national strategy; it has been much delayed and it is very much anticipated.”
One reason for including a national strategy in the Bill is the need for that strategy to be introduced as quickly as possible.
Mike Haley also said that he would like that strategy to be
“more ambitious, and to cover the public and private sectors, as well as law enforcement.”
He made the very good point that
“fraudsters do not decide one day, ‘We only go after bounce back loans because that is a public sector fraud.’ They will go after a loan from the NatWest bank, or a mortgage.”––[Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 68, Q130.]
He highlighted the inability to share information and said that some people might say that GDPR was preventing them from sharing information. He went on to say:
“It is a crime that is at scale and at speed in the online environment. To be able to share the mobile numbers that are being used, the devices and the IP addresses at speed across the whole of the environment—payment providers, fintechs and telecos—would be enormously powerful. This is a volume crime, and we need to have prevention at the core of any national strategy. That would have a massive positive impact. ”––[Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 38, Q129.]
Our witnesses called for a national strategy that looks at crime seriously and that is more ambitious than that suggested by the Home Office and broader in scope. Although many of the frauds relate to small amounts, they are numerous and they cause people significant harm. When the Minister responds, I would like him to recall that oral evidence and the reason why our new clause calls for a national strategy.
Andrew Griffith
I will be brief. The Government are committed to tackling fraud, and we recognise that it goes far wider than financial services. There absolutely should be a national strategy, and there will be.
The Government recognise that tackling fraud requires a unified and co-ordinated response from Government, law enforcement and the private sector better to protect the public and businesses from fraud, reduce the impact on victims, and increase the disruption and prosecution of fraudsters. That is why the Government, led by the Home Office, which is the right body to be the lead, but with full Treasury input, will publish a new broad-based strategy to address the threat of fraud. I hope the Opposition will welcome that. The Government intend to publish it later this year.
Andrew Griffith
Indeed.
The Government will work with industry to remove the vulnerabilities that fraudsters exploit, we will work with intelligence agencies to shut down fraudulent infrastructure, and we will work with law enforcement to identify the most harmful offenders and bring them to justice. We will also ensure, with all partners, that the public have the advice and support they need. That should reassure the Committee that a clear strategy to tackle fraud will be forthcoming and that the new clause is unnecessary.
I note the Opposition’s concerns about data sharing, which are specifically referenced in the new clause. I reassure them that the Payment Systems Regulator has work under way with industry participants to enhance data sharing to prevent fraud. The PSR’s managing director, Chris Hemsley, did not raise any legislative barriers to data sharing for that purpose when he gave evidence to the Committee recently.
I will rise to the challenge put down by the hon. Member for Wallasey to turn the tide on fraud, because we all must acknowledge that it is a critical policing issue in this day and age. In that spirit, I hope that she will join us to ensure that her colleagues reverse their opposition to the Public Order Bill, which is tying up hundreds of thousands of police hours that could usefully be spent prosecuting the challenge of fraud. I also hope that she supports our initiative to cut red tape in policing and to end woke policing, so that we no longer arrest people for Twitter posts, we do not send the police off to dance the Macarena at carnivals or Pride events, and they no longer take the knee. If the hon. Lady is as serious as we are about tackling fraud, she has to acknowledge that there is a need to think about how we allocate our resources.
Dame Angela Eagle
After what I thought was quite a consensual debate, it is slightly unworthy of the Minister to resort to those comments in the week when there has been an inspectorate report about the misogyny, behaviour and culture of a lot of the police force. That needs to be reformed so that all members of our communities, whatever their age, gender or ethnicity, can trust the police; we all want to see that.
Will the Minister admit that so-called woke policing is not an issue in fraud? The issue is fragmentation. Woke policing was not raised during the great number of Treasury Committee evidence sessions about the fraud, so it was unworthy of him to make those points at the end of his speech. We need a system that is not fragmentated and that is focused relentlessly on output, and where there is cross-departmental working and proper funding, as well as data sharing, so that we can crack down on something that all of us want to see driven out of our system.
Andrew Griffith
I would never want to be unworthy in the hon. Lady’s eyes, so I am distressed that my offer to build consensus about how the police could best deploy their resources has, at this first stage, been rebuffed.
I ask the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn to withdraw the motion.
Tulip Siddiq
The Minister was doing so well and I was hoping we could go through this sitting without hearing the Conservatives say the word “woke” once, but unluckily that has now been crossed off my bingo sheet.
I will press the new clause to a vote, because I want to hold the Minister to account and ensure he does not push this commitment too far down the road, and because every person in the sector I have spoken to has stressed the importance of legislative change when it comes to data sharing.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Seventh sitting)
Thursday 3rd November 2022
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 View all Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 November 2022 - (3 Nov 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 10 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 10 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Kevin Hollinrake)
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 32, page 22, leave out lines 8 to 12 and insert—
“(1) This section applies in relation to a person who has, at any time on or after the day on which section 32(2) of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2022 comes fully into force, become a person subject to relevant financial sanctions and who remains so subject.”
This amendment and Amendment 3 would mean that a person who is subject to sanctions is disqualified under the GB directors disqualification legislation only if those sanctions relate to asset-freezing.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 93, in clause 32, page 22, line 12, after “force” insert
“, or a person who is suspected of the facilitation of the evasion of sanctions by a person so designated.”
This amendment seeks to expand the criteria for disqualifying individuals from being company directors to include people suspected of facilitating evasion of UK sanctions by sanctioned individuals, in addition to sanctioned individuals themselves.
Government amendments 2 and 3.
Amendment 83, in clause 32, page 22, line 20, at end insert—
“11B Designated persons: requirement to notify the registrar
(1) This section applies in relation to a person who becomes a designated person as defined by section 9(2) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 on or after the day on which section 32(2) of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2022 comes fully into force.
(2) If the person changes any details relating to any company on the register in the three months prior to the person becoming a designated person, the registrar must inform the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation and the National Crime Agency of the changes made.”
This amendment requires Companies House to notify the OFSI and NCA if a designated person has changed any details relating to a company in the three months prior to their designation.
Clause stand part.
Clause 33 stand part.
Government amendments 4, 5 and 6.
Clause 34 stand part.
Clause 35 stand part.
Kevin Hollinrake
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Elliott.
Government amendment 1 is one of six amendments that the Government have tabled to clauses 32 and 34. Before I discuss the Government amendments and those tabled by the Opposition, it is worth explaining what clause 32 does in order to understand better the purpose of the Government amendments.
Currently, individuals subject to an asset freeze—designated persons under the regulations that contain prohibitions or requirements of the sort referred to in section 3(1)(a) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018—can continue acting as a director. They can also be involved, directly or indirectly, in the promotion, formation and/or management of a company. It is not appropriate for asset-frozen individuals to be company directors. It would be perverse for a person who is forbidden from dealing with their own funds or economic resources none the less to be free to direct a company.
Clause 32 prohibits individuals subject to an asset freeze from acting as directors, and does so by amending the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 to prohibit individuals subject to an asset freeze on or after the day the provision comes into force from acting as directors of companies or directly or indirectly taking part in or being concerned in the promotion, formation or management of a company. Such individuals will only be permitted to take part in such activities with the leave of the court.
An individual in breach of that prohibition will be committing an offence, the maximum penalty for which will be two years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. It will be a defence for the person if they did not know and could not reasonably have known that they were subject to an asset freeze at the time that they acted as a director or were involved in a promotion, formation or management of a company. The provision will take effect in England and Wales, and Scotland; clause 34 makes the equivalent provision for Northern Ireland.
Government amendments 1 to 6 all work to the same purpose. Collectively, they will ensure that new director disqualification measures impact those who should be prevented for public policy reasons from acting as directors, namely individuals who are subject to an asset freeze. The amendments will also ensure that we do not disproportionately and unnecessarily extend measures to categories of people whose sanction status has no bearing on whether they are fit to act as company directors. The narrower definition introduced via the amendments includes only designated persons subject to asset-freeze measures of the sort described in section 3(1) (a) of SAMLA.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Could I trouble the Minister to explain a little more about what categories of people who are sanctioned should therefore allowed to be designated as unqualified as directors under the legislation? He has said that amendments are an attempt to narrow the definition to assets-based, but is he therefore saying that someone who is sanctioned for human rights abuses should nevertheless be able to be qualified as a GB director?
Kevin Hollinrake
I will go on to describe the categories. As the hon. Gentleman knows, an assets freeze is a type of financial sanction. Only those sanctions are relevant to someone’s ability to manage, form or promote a company. Non-asset freeze financial sanctions, such as securities and money market instrument prohibitions, can apply to a broader category of person beyond designated persons, for example, all persons connected to a particular country. To subject entire populations of countries to the directorship ban is grossly disproportionate. It would also be operationally unenforceable, as only designated people appear in published sanctions lists.
Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)
I do not understand that. I do not know whether the Minister can explain it in ordinary language. It sounds to me like people with other financial interests will not be subject to this measure. I am sorry if I am being clueless, but I just do not understand what is being excluded at this point, and therefore what is included in this very welcome amendment.
Kevin Hollinrake
As I said in my explanation, for sanctions such as securities and money sanctions, those market instruments can affect entire populations; they do not just affect an individual. Those kinds of broad actions affect whole populations.
Kevin Hollinrake
The right hon. Lady can intervene again if she wants further clarification.
Dame Margaret Hodge
If someone has some ownership in the securities market—I am not a financial expert, so I do not know whether I am understanding this right—and one took action on the assets, that would have an impact beyond the individual. Is that what we are being told?
Kevin Hollinrake
No, that is not what the right hon. Lady is being told. If someone has ownership, they have an asset, and therefore if that asset is frozen they are a designated person. It is just that the instruments themselves can affect the broad category of people who may or may not own assets. What we are trying to do is target people who actually own the assets.
Dame Margaret Hodge
I am very grateful. This is really to understand it. If somebody is sanctioned, are they the sort of individual we would want to be a director of a company?
Kevin Hollinrake
It is not a person who is sanctioned. What we are trying to say is that everybody who is subject to an asset freeze is a designated person—exactly the kind of person the right hon. Lady would want to see sanctioned. Rather than getting into a to-and-fro debate, perhaps we can write to her and explain the situation in layman’s terms.
Kevin Hollinrake
Furthermore, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office does not currently designate people in relation to non-asset freeze financial sanctions. Although that may change in the future, a directorship ban may not necessarily be the most appropriate measure to impose on those designated for non-asset freeze financial sanctions.
Stephen Kinnock
On the point about the FCDO not sanctioning anything apart from asset freezes, does it not impose travel bans? Is a travel ban not a non-asset freeze type of sanction?
Kevin Hollinrake
Yes, that is right. What we are focusing on in the Bill is people who are subject to asset freezes, not travel bans. Hon. Members can argue that other people should be banned from being the director of a company, but we do not think this is the appropriate place to make that restriction.
Stephen Kinnock
Are the Government saying that if somebody has been sanctioned and given a travel ban but not an asset freeze, they are still a fit and proper person to be a director of a British company?
Kevin Hollinrake
The point is that they may be or they may not be. Putting a broad ban in the Bill just because somebody is subject to a travel ban is not the appropriate way to do it, in terms of whether they are a fit and proper person to run a company.
Stephen Kinnock
Are the Government seriously arguing that somebody who has been sanctioned by the FCDO and given a travel ban but not an asset freeze is still a fit and proper person to be a GB director? If the Minister is saying that the Bill is not the proper place to deal with that issue, where in our legislative framework will it be made clear that somebody who has a travel ban under FCDO sanctions is not a fit and proper person to be director of a British company?
Kevin Hollinrake
What we are talking about here is financial sanctions. These matters relate to companies and financial sanctions, not to travel sanctions.
Let me explain these points further. Not automatically imposing these measures on potential future scenarios will give the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office the flexibility it needs to impose the most appropriate and meaningful conditions on people designated for financial sanctions beyond asset freezes. Without these amendments, director disqualification measures introduced by the Bill would automatically apply to anyone against whom the designation power under section 9 of SAMLA 2018 is utilised—for example, transport or immigration sanctions, or any future measures that His Majesty’s Government choose to design. Although those are extremely serious matters, such sanctions ought not by necessity impact on the person’s ability to act as a company director. Furthermore, should there be a future need to extend director disqualification measures to people subject to those broader sanctions, that can be done via future legislation as and when the need arises.
Dame Margaret Hodge
I am genuinely sorry to interrupt, and I am looking at the Minister for Security as well. It seems to me that if we consider the behaviour that somebody has done to be so bad that we want to sanction them in whatever way—through a travel ban, asset freeze or other mechanism—surely in those conditions we do not think they are a fit and proper person to start a business? I cannot see the logic of this; I cannot see where the pressure is coming from to have a distinction between the two, and why we should want it. Why are we putting this down? Why should somebody who has been guilty of a human rights abuse, who may not have an asset that we can sanction, still need to be defined as somebody who is not a fit and proper person to set up a company here? We do not want them to do that, do we?
Kevin Hollinrake
I think the best way forward on that is for myself and the Minister for Security to have a conversation. We can set out some of the reasons why that is the case in more detail in writing, as I promised to do earlier. We can then have a further discussion from there.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)
When the Minister writes to my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking—which I am sure will be copied to all members of the Committee—it would be helpful to understand who would have been in scope in the original drafting, what specifically changed and who would be out of scope in the revised drafting. It would be clearer for us to know whether it has narrowed correctly, whether it is a tightening—and we should be happy with it—or whether, inadvertently, in dealing with one matter it has excluded others who might be useful to draw into the scope of the provision.
Kevin Hollinrake
That is perfectly reasonable. I tried to set out those kinds of example earlier, so I am very happy to clarify that in a letter to both the hon. Lady and the right hon. Member for Barking. Our position is that somebody might be subject to a travel ban for a number of reasons, and that does not necessarily exclude them from being a fit and proper person to run a company. Now, Members may think of some reasons why that individual should not be a fit and proper person, but I will set out why that person may still be fit and proper, and then we can all either agree, disagree or find a way of dealing with it.
Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)
It seems that if somebody is subject to a travel ban, they will fail pretty much every “know your customer” rule for every financial institution in the country. Indeed, we have set out regulations precisely to ensure that there are those tripwires. How will a company director be able to fulfil their duties? If the Minister cannot answer now, perhaps he can set that out in the correspondence to follow.
Kevin Hollinrake
That is exactly what I have already agreed to do. We will move on from that point, but, briefly, there will be instances where that person is not necessarily described as unfit or not proper to run a company, but we will set that out.
Amendment 83, tabled by the right hon. Member for Barking, introduces enhanced data sharing provisions to enable Companies House to more proactively identify and exchange information regarding suspicious activity with partners, including with law enforcement agencies. That is in addition to existing information sharing gateways and arrangements.
The Government believe it is better and more flexible to allow relevant operational agencies to formulate their own preferred approach to information exchange, rather than to define it inflexibly in primary legislation—[Interruption.] The right hon Member for Barking looks at me quizzically. I think she has picked up on one particular situation where she wants Companies House to act in a certain way, but she must agree that we could pick up myriad different situations where we might want Companies House to do something if we sat down and made a list. I am sure she does not want to get into the micromanagement of what Companies House should do in every circumstance. There will be millions of different things we expect Companies House to do. We prefer to give Companies House the objective of promoting the integrity of the registers and then hold it to account through the objectives and the provisions of the Bill. Specifying every single condition that we expect Companies House to operate in a certain situation is the wrong thing to do.
Liam Byrne
The last Bill Committee I had the pleasure of serving on was for the Data Protection Act 2018, which implements the general data protection regulation and prescribes all manner of protections for data privacy. This is our worry. When the new duty set out by the Minister for Companies House clashes with GDPR legislation, how do we resolve those clashes of principles to allow Companies House to share the data they need to share with the people they need to share it with in order to pinpoint the bad guys?
Kevin Hollinrake
That is a fair point and it is covered in the Bill, which seeks to make it easier for Companies House to share information proactively with other organisations or, indeed, commercial organisations and vice versa. Here, we are talking about specifying the exact circumstances in which that should happen, which we think is the wrong approach.
I now turn to amendment 93, which seeks to expand the criteria for disqualifying individuals from being company directors to include people suspected of facilitating evasion of UK sanctions by sanctioned individuals, in addition to the sanctioned individuals themselves. Any person enabling or facilitating the evasion of certain sanctions would already be committing an offence, for example, under regulation 19 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The maximum penalty on indictment is seven years in prison or a fine. Those are already dissuasive measures to ensure compliance with sanctions.
It is not appropriate and proportionate to apply director disqualification and offences to an individual who is only suspected of facilitating the evasion of sanctions. It is not clear what would constitute such suspicion and at what point a person would be prohibited to act. That could mean exposing an individual to criminal liability in circumstances reliant on suspicion alone, which I am sure the right hon. Member for Barking would not want to see. The uncertainty of what would constitute the criminal offence and potential interference with presumption of innocence has implications for the rule of law. I therefore ask hon. Members not to press their amendment.
I will now speak to clause 33. New section 11A of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, introduced by the Bill, prohibits individuals subject to relevant financial sanctions, such as asset freezes, from acting as directors of companies. The clause limits the scope that prohibition by disapplying it for building societies, incorporated friendly societies, NHS foundation trusts, registered societies, charitable incorporated organisations, further education bodies and protected cell companies. The Secretary of State may, by regulations, repeal any of the subsections in the section, therefore applying the prohibition on individuals subject to an asset freeze from acting as directors in any of the organisation types in the clause. That allows the Secretary of State to apply those measures only to company directors in line with the policy focus of the measures in the Bill, without that unnecessarily applying to other entities currently not in scope. That will take effect in England and Wales and Scotland. Clause 35 makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland.
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 32 raises important questions about who we should and should not allow to hold positions of power and responsibility in UK companies.
Currently, under the 1986 Act, the circumstances in which a disqualification order can be imposed are strictly limited. For the most part, they involve individuals with a criminal record for breaches of company legislation involving UK companies. Clause 32 expands the disqualification criteria to provide an explicit prohibition on any sanctioned individual serving as a company director. That is entirely proper, but the Opposition’s question is: why are the Government not going any further? They have considered who should be banned from serving as a company director, but the decision to add only those specifically designated under UK sanctions legislation feels like a missed opportunity.
We tabled amendment 93 to better understand and probe the Government’s thinking and to explore how additional changes could contribute to the Bill’s aims. The amendment is largely self-explanatory: it would add to the criteria those who aid and abet sanctioned individuals, or so-called “enablers” who help sanctioned individuals to evade our laws. The Minister will be aware of the army of lawyers, accountants and other so-called service providers who are in many ways doing Putin’s dirty work in London. In our view, it is crucial that they are caught in the net that the Bill seeks to cast.
Kevin Hollinrake
I totally agree with the hon. Gentleman that we need to clamp down on the enablers of dirty money, but does he understand the point behind the provisions? There are serious penalties for somebody convicted of breaking sanctions—up to seven years in jail—but his amendment seeks to penalise somebody who is not convicted but merely suspected of facilitating that kind of activity. Does he understand why that is a difficultly for the Government?
Stephen Kinnock
I do understand that; the Minister makes a valid point. As I was saying, this is what one might describe as a probing amendment to try to get from him a sense of the proactive action the Government are going to take to go after those enablers.
Dame Margaret Hodge
The Minister is quite right to say that the powers are there, but I hope he agrees that a way to facilitate this would be to introduce a new criminal offence of failure to prevent economic crime. In that case, the enablers to whom my hon. Friend refers could be caught and rightly punished for their role in colluding or facilitating economic crime.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank my right hon. Friend for that extremely useful and eloquent intervention. That is absolutely the case, because the enablers are, by definition, experts in knowing how to play and game the system. We know it is going on, but they are notoriously difficult to track down. If we put the onus on industries to act proactively to prevent this sort of activity, that changes the game and makes prevention much more of a duty. I agree with the Minister that we cannot punish people if they are only suspected, but we can have a proactive ex ante approach. I would be grateful to hear his thoughts on that. In many ways, the amendment was designed to illicit a response from the Minister on what my right. hon Friend has just so rightly described.
The Minister has already pointed out that specifically designated individuals represent just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the scale of economic crime in the United Kingdom. There are any number of others who seek to exploit weaknesses in our laws and our ability to enforce them—for example, by creating opaque corporate structures to hide kleptocrats’ assets. Adding to the criteria those who help to facilitate the evasion of sanctions by designated individuals—not necessarily as our amendment suggests, but through a more root-and-branch, proactive ex ante approach—is one way the Government could really improve the Bill. I would appreciate the Minister’s thoughts on that. Restrictions on company directorships, as envisaged by amendment 93, should go much further.
Clause 33 extends the provisions of clause 32 to sectors other than companies—for example, building societies—and clauses 34 and 35 extend the same provisions to Northern Ireland. We support those clauses and, of course, amendment 83, which was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking.
At various points in recent years Ministers have outlined a number of specific proposals, which now appear to have fallen by the wayside. It seems reasonable to expect that all companies should have at least one director who is an actual human being. We do not have to be experts to intuit how easy it is to abuse the existing system, which allows a company to name another company as its director provided that at least one human being is on its board. In the Government’s own words in a 2021 consultation paper:
“Evidence suggests that the use of corporate directors can muddy the waters around ownership and provide a screen behind which to conduct illicit activity…More generally the opacity they create can weaken corporate governance by preventing individual accountability.”
The Government even went so far as legislating in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 to enable the Secretary of State to impose a ban on corporate directors. After more than seven years, however, regulations to implement that have yet to be published. In fact, clause 37—on which my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston will speak shortly—makes some changes to the relevant section of the 2015 Act. The apparent intent of the changes, which is to make it easier for corporate directors to be held to account for their action, is certainly welcome, but what is not clear to Opposition Members is why the Government have decided to amend the primary legislation—namely, the 2015 Act—when, as we understand it, the secondary legislation to implement the ban on corporate directorships under that Act has still to be introduced. Perhaps the Minister will shed some light on that.
Another glaring omission is the issue of nominee directorships. As long ago as 2013, the Government raised that as an issue that company law reform should deal with. Again, the Government’s own words provide us with a useful summary of the problem:
“Where a company is being used to facilitate criminal activity, the individuals who really control the way that the company is run will likely want to avoid making this information public. They may use ‘nominee directors’ to do this. Nominee directors are individuals who go on the public record as the director of the company to be, effectively, a ‘straw man’ or ‘front man’ for the company. The beneficial owner ‘stands behind’ the nominee and controls the way that the company is run”,
de facto. The failure to address that in legislation remains a cause for serious concern.
Kevin Hollinrake
I am not sure I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. Irrespective of who the directors are, if people of significant control are exerting such influence, they will have to be named and have their ID verified under the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
My understanding is that the regulations under the 2015 Act have not yet been put in place. Our question is: why are the Government not implementing those regulations but instead seeking to introduce the provisions in the Bill? That is simply a point for clarification and explanation. We welcome the fact that ID verification is provided for, but we are trying to get to the bottom of who a nominee director is and who actually controls a company. It would be useful to understand what happened between 2015 and 2022 to prevent the implementation of the regulations.
Kevin Hollinrake
Two separate things are going on. The Bill enables regulations to ban corporate directorships unless the corporation itself has all its directors named and they are all actual persons and ID-verified. It will do exactly that. The other point that I think the hon. Gentleman is talking about is people who sit behind companies and influence them but might not be named in those companies. If people do that, they are persons of significant control; under the definitions in the Bill, someone does not have to own 25% of the shares of a company to be a person of significant control, but they have to be named and ID-verified.
Stephen Kinnock
I will stand up and then allow my right hon. Friend to intervene.
Dame Margaret Hodge
As I understand it, if the owner of a company is an opaque company in the British Virgin Islands or another one of our tax havens, the ability to get behind that and see the person of significant control is pretty nigh impossible, so there is still a mechanism there. People could intentionally set up a company in the UK that is totally owned by a company established in the BVI. That information is not currently on the public register, although we are anxiously waiting for it to be so in 2023. There is no way of getting the persons of significant control verified, because it is outside our control.
Stephen Kinnock
I will now stand up and allow the Minister to intervene on me.
Kevin Hollinrake
There are two separate things going on here: ownership and directors. We were talking about directors, and the right hon. Lady is now talking about ownership, which is a slightly different thing, but we will talk later about ownership and how that information has to be made public under this legislation.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the Minister; I think he has just provided clarification that he is confident that there is now a ban on the use of nominee directors as a front to obscure true beneficial ownership. We are grateful for that absolute reassurance. There was perhaps a misunderstanding on our side of some of the technicalities in the Bill that I am seeking to probe, so I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification.
It is worth noting that the World Bank published a report just a few months ago that explained how, under current UK law, nominee directors of UK companies can neglect their duties by failing to submit accounts and certify companies as dormant, even though tens of millions of pounds are passing through those accounts. A crucial point is that the impunity of delinquent nominee directors is especially pronounced if such nominees are not UK residents. On the rare occasions that they are questioned, such directors tend to make the legally false argument that because they are only nominees they have no responsibility to know anything about the company, let alone control its actions.
The lack of progress on this issue—certainly until the Bill’s introduction—has raised concerns with us. Again, perhaps the Minister will say a little more about the Government’s thinking. What does he think has been the impact of not implementing the regulations from the 2015 Act? Can he reassure us with absolute confidence that the issue of delinquent nominee directors will be eradicated by the passing of the Bill?
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
The hon. Gentleman is making a really important point about nominee directors. Is he aware of a “File on 4” programme —I believe it was aired last year—about nominee directors being recruited via Facebook groups and paid to take on that role? Is he concerned that it may still be possible to do that? Does the Bill need to do more to clamp down on the recruitment of nominee directors who get some money for taking on that role?
Stephen Kinnock
The hon. Lady raises an extremely important point and illustrates the absurdity of the situation we have got into. There seems to be a “wild west” approach to running corporate affairs in the UK and it is simply not acceptable. I thank her for that intervention and reiterate my hope that the Minister can give us an absolute reassurance that the issue of nominee directorships will be dealt with firmly and clearly in the Bill, without any loopholes. I also hope he will share any other thoughts he may have on the matter.
Liam Byrne
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott. I am sorry that I have not checked the sartorial guidance for the Committee, but I assume it is okay for me to speak without a jacket on. I defer to the Chair if she wants me to clothe myself more adequately.
Liam Byrne
The Minister probably did not intend to set hares running, but he certainly has with his suggestions this morning. I know he will be alive to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on illicit finance that was published under the chairmanship of the right hon. and gallant Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), who is now the Minister for Security, but I wish to share some of its headlines to underline a point that was wholly missing from the Minister’s presentation.
Let us start with the really bad news. First, the Select Committee concluded that
“assets laundered through the UK are financing President Putin’s war in Ukraine.”
Secondly, the report said:
“The Government’s unwillingness to bring forward legislation to stem the flow of dirty money is likely to have contributed to the belief in Russia that the UK is a safe haven for corrupt wealth.”
It is very welcome that the Government introduced sanctions and have brought forward this Bill, but I am afraid the Foreign Affairs Committee came to the conclusion that our sanctions regime was “underprepared and under-resourced.” We on the Select Committee found that there was not the capacity in the FCDO to match the speed and power of the sanctions regime brought into force by our American colleagues and, indeed, the EU. That is why the House was treated to the spectacle of a piece of enabling legislation that allowed us simply to copy and paste the sanctions regime from other countries into UK law.
There is a serious worry that the FCDO is not equipped to drive through the requisite disqualification of directors at the speed at which it should if it takes decisions on sanctions. I hear what the Minister says about creating some—I guess he would say—safeguards against the automatic suspension of directors, but in the absence of such a regime there is a real concern about an enforcement gap, because the FCDO sanctions and compliance team simply does not have the capacity to work things through with Companies House to ensure that the consequentials are followed through and that directors are disqualified when it is appropriate.
Among the measures that we in the House have previously invented are some of the provisions that I took through in the UK Borders Act 2007. We basically wrote into law the automatic consideration of sanctions such as the suspension of directorships. Many Opposition Members would be an awful lot more confident that bad people would be disqualified from directorships if they were sanctioned if we had some kind of legislative provision that created a duty, and therefore a burden, on Ministers and their officials to automatically consider people for the suspension of their directorships if a sanction of any description was imposed upon them.
This Committee is a chance for us to air different points of view about how we ensure that, as the Minister wants, London is a world capital of clean trade. I put this case before him so that he can reflect on it and perhaps come back to the Committee with further thoughts.
Dame Margaret Hodge
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Elliott.
I rise to speak to amendment 83. I did not quite understand the Minister’s attack on or dismissal of it on the basis that it was somehow an attempt to provide a detailed way for authorities to act. That is way beyond what we are attempting to do; all we want to do is make sure the authorities are aware. The Minister and I know, from working in this policy area for a long, long time, how poor all the enforcement agencies are at sharing information. When whistleblowers and others provide information about wrongdoing, too often that falls between the various enforcement agencies, gets lost and nothing ever gets done. We are not here to tell those agencies how to carry out their work, but to ensure that there is better communication.
The amendment addresses some of the issues my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill just raised. It tries to strengthen the sanctions regime against individuals and to stop those individuals moving their assets before they get sanctioned. Under the FCDO, the sanctions process inevitably takes a long time and people know they are about to be on the sanctions list, so they have time to rearrange their affairs so their assets cannot be frozen.
All the amendment would do—it is very simple—is put a duty on Companies House to tell the enforcement authority, whether that is the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the National Crime Agency or whoever, about any changes that may have occurred in the accounts held by Companies House of individuals who have been sanctioned and whose assets have been frozen in the three months prior to those sanctions being put in place. That is crucial, but why?
In July 2022, OFSI and other UK Government agencies, together with the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce, issued a red alert, which I hope the Minister has had a chance to look at. His colleague, the Minister for Security, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), will certainly have done that. It sets out the evasion tactics that individuals use and that enablers, whom my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon mentioned, take to support that evasion. The action that designated individuals take, supported by their advisers, includes the transfer of assets, such as shareholdings, to trusted proxies, such as relatives or friends. To quote the red alert, they will
“sell or transfer assets at a loss in order to realise their value before sanctions take effect”
and they will
“divest investments to ensure ownership stakes are below the 50% threshold”
needed for sanctions.
There are numerous other examples—the red alert includes a list of about 15 such examples—of ways that people avoid sanctions and avoid their assets being taken. The individuals may seem to have got rid of their assets, but they will retain control. They will have simply hidden their control and the form that that control takes, but in reality they will still have control. In some instances, assets have been transferred or directed to jurisdictions where sanctions are not in place, such as China, Brazil, India or the United Arab Emirates, or have been converted into cryptoassets, which we will come to later in our discussions about the Bill.
I came upon such tactics in the case of Usmanov, as we have discussed before, who dodged the sanctions, particularly in relation to his Mayfair mansion—I cannot remember how many millions that is worth. The shares in his London property firm were transferred to his Russian business empire on 21 February, less than a fortnight before he was sanctioned. The transfer involved property owned by Klaret Services UK Limited being sold to Russia’s largest iron ore company, Metalloinvest, in which Usmanov has a 49% share. That is just below the 50% threshold, although it is in Russia. That transfer is legal—he was able to act legally and within our law—and he was able to do it because we were so slow to sanction.
The sanctions against Usmanov did not cover his companies, so when he transferred the Mayfair property to a company, a different mechanism would have had to be adopted to capture its owner. As he had a 49% share in that company, it would have been difficult to pursue that. Both the shareholding in the company and the transfer mattered. Under our amendment, Usmanov would not have got rid of the property. Companies House would have had to give the enforcement agencies information about the transactions that had been undertaken in the three months prior to the sanctions, and those agencies could have taken action on it.
Kevin Hollinrake
I always listen to the right hon. Lady very carefully, so she can be sure that I have been listening. I am keen to tie up—as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, put it—any loopholes that we identify in the legislation. That is one of the purposes of Committee stage.
Broadly, I think the Committee and the wider House would accept that our sanctions regime, and the supervision regime at Companies House, are not fit for purpose today—that is why we are legislating. Clearly, the actions taken by Russia in recent months have further highlighted the work we need to do and the reform we need to put in place. The comments are welcome, and I think we are all trying to get to the same end point; we just want to make sure people do not suffer unintended consequences in the process.
I think the right hon. Lady said that Companies House is very poor at sharing information. That is probably a little unfair. Currently, it is not there to share information, other than by putting things on a public register for people to seek out; that has been its role in the past. Today, it is a register—we might call it a dumb register—and that is what we are seeking to change. We are seeking to give the registrar responsibility for promoting the integrity of the registers so that people can rely on the information in them and, as it says in the registrar’s objectives, to minimise unlawful activities and the facilitation of unlawful activities.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Obviously, Companies House has not had to do this to date; it has just been a library of dud data, really. What I was drawing to the Minister’s attention—I am sure he agrees with this—is that all the enforcement agencies working in this territory are poor at sharing information. That is why the stuff we get from whistleblowers so often falls through the middle somewhere and does not get tackled. That is why we should put a duty on the agencies to share information; we would not tell them how to do it, but just say, “This is really important if we are to bear down on wrongdoing.”
Kevin Hollinrake
I am still not sure I agree. Of course there are elements of our enforcement agencies that we are all frustrated by at times, but to my mind nobody goes to work to do a bad job. People are doing their best, often in very difficult circumstances. We all agree that we need to hold our enforcement agencies to account and properly resource them. What we are trying to do is provide them with more powers and ability, and then hold them to account for the use of those powers.
Liam Byrne
The Minister is being characteristically generous. As he reflects on the huge wisdom of the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking and perhaps returns to the Committee with some of his own, could he share with us how many of the 1,200 individuals and 120 businesses that have been sanctioned since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have had directorships suspended?
Kevin Hollinrake
I do not know the answer to that question. When the Bill has received Royal Assent, it will facilitate exactly that process. At the moment, Companies House does not have the powers we would like it to have to bring that about. That is exactly what we are debating.
On amendment 83, I think the right hon. Member for Barking implies that Companies House knows of the changes with a company on an ongoing, dynamic basis. That is not how things work. Companies House does not have access to information until a company files an annual return. Companies do not provide information to Companies House on a daily or even monthly basis. That is not how it works.
Dame Margaret Hodge
But under the legislation, companies will have to provide information on changes of directorships and so on within 28 days, we hope—we had this argument yesterday—so Companies House will have that. I am not expecting it to go through 4 million companies, but there must be a way that the information can be highlighted by the IT system and, if we know a director is somebody who has been sanctioned, that information can be shared. Under the legislation, if a company has changed a directorship, as Usmanov did, it will have to provide that information within 28 days or whatever, and surely that will be there to share.
Kevin Hollinrake
A change of directorship, yes, but I do not think that is the situation the right hon. Lady was describing. She was talking about a movement of assets, as I understand it. I do not know the detail of the case she is talking about—[Interruption.] May I finish? If she is trying to prevent a person from moving assets around on the basis that Companies House needs to know about that as it is happening, that situation cannot be delivered. Companies can move assets around without asking the permission of Companies House or notifying it, so her amendment does not serve any purpose in that regard.
The right hon. Lady is absolutely right that any information that Companies House is made aware of and deems to be pointing to some kind of risk should be shared with the relevant agencies. We all agree with that point, and the Bill allows Companies House to do that for the first time. That is what we are trying to facilitate, but directing it to act in a certain way on a certain piece of information will lead us down a million rabbit holes, and we do not have the time or the ability to implement that through the Bill. We have to give it the powers and then let it get on with it while holding it to account against those broader objectives.
Alison Thewliss
My reading of the amendment is that it relates to a person changing any details relating to any company in the register in the three months prior. One of the red flags that Graham Barrow raised when he gave evidence was companies that switch their name backwards and forwards multiple times within a short space of time. Surely that would be a useful red flag for Companies House to report on, and the amendment would empower it to do that.
Kevin Hollinrake
That situation would be covered under the Bill because company naming is part of it. That is a different thing from what the right hon. Member for Barking was describing. She was taking about the movement of assets, and Companies House would not have access to that information on a dynamic basis. It clearly would have information on a name or director change, and it can act as it deems appropriate, in terms of notifying authorities or making further enquiries about what the company is doing.
Seema Malhotra
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I feel that we have allowed this conversation to get a bit more complicated than it needs to be on one specific point in relation to amendment 83, and I think the Minister has made it slightly more complicated too.
I understand that the Minister may be wondering whether a huge scope of things have happened in the three months prior to a person becoming a designated person. Does he agree that proposed new section 11B(2) could be tighter so that where it says, “If the person changes”, it specifies changes to owners, directors or other information relating to the company on the register in the three months prior to the person becoming a designated person? There should be a way, through the design of the computer systems, which is being undertaken as part of the transformation in Companies House, for the registrar to trigger an automatic alert when somebody becomes a designated person to inform the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation and the National Crime Agency that something had happened on the record in the previous three months. That would therefore not require a huge amount of resource and labour, but there would be a useful report and trigger if the Bill required the registrar to do that.
Kevin Hollinrake
I do not disagree with that, but my point was not that it would be too much work for the registrar; I never said that at all. My point was that may well be that the Companies House registrar looks at the amendment—she may be listening to this debate—thinks, “It’s a really good idea to do that,” and builds that into her systems. As legislators, we could direct Companies House to do a million things, but surely we should give it the power to share this information in a way that provides the most appropriate risk alert processes. We should let it get on with it while holding it to account for the broader objectives. We should not micromanage Companies House.
Seema Malhotra
I thank the Minister for giving way. I do not think this is a case of micromanagement, and nor are we asking for hundreds of things. We are making a specific request, based on specific research. I think an automatic alert could be triggered, and perhaps the Minister—
Seema Malhotra
I will just finish my point. Should the registrar be watching this debate and decide that an automatic alert is a good idea, does the Minister agree that the power of information sharing would enable the registrar to consult the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation and the National Crime Agency should a relevant change have occurred in the previous three months?
Kevin Hollinrake
As I have already said, such information-sharing is exactly what the Bill facilitates. It may well be that Companies House decides that that is exactly the right trigger to share information with the OFSI. Our view is that we should not direct Companies House in that level of detail as to how the registrar should perform her wider duty. We will continue to disagree on that point if the hon. Lady presses her amendment.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the Minister for allowing me to intervene where I should have done in the first place. On the quantum that we are considering, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill has just said, 1,200 individuals and 120 businesses have been sanctioned since Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. We are not talking about a huge number. Perhaps the terms of the amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking could be more tightly drawn to make it clear that it is not about every movement of assets and everything a company has done, but simply designed to ensure that if there was a change of director or change of address, the registrar should share that information with the other relevant agencies. The quantum is quite small, so would the Minister consider that proposal?
Kevin Hollinrake
I think we need to move on, and I think the hon. Gentleman is missing the point as well. This is not about my deciding whether the proposal is right or wrong, or whether Companies House has or has not got the resources. For me, it should have the resources that it needs. However, it is for the organisation itself to determine the best way to alert other authorities to the risk. That is the principle at issue here, and it is one to which I will strongly adhere.
The argument about enablers has been well made, and we have referred to corporate criminal liability and the failure to prevent that. As the Committee is aware, I have been a key advocate in introducing such liability for fraud and other offences. Members may have noted the details of a case this morning, in which the current offence of failing to prevent bribery was a key element in the case against Glencore, which has pleaded guilty to that offence. The Serious Fraud Office launched a successful prosecution against Glencore and, although the number of times it has proceeded against a company is far too few, that prosecution shows that the current legislation can be effective. I am keen to discuss that further in our proceedings.
On travel bans and securities, Committee members might find it useful to sit down with officials to discuss those measures, so that they then understand why those things might not mean that a person is not a fit and proper individual to be a director of a company. I would be happy to extend that opportunity to members of the Committee.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central spoke about nominee directors and associated abuses. Under the terms of the Bill, any director, nominee or otherwise, who acts outside the terms of the legislation and is subject to the control of another undisclosed person could be put in jail for two years. That is exactly what we are seeking to do and to clamp down on such inappropriate use of companies.
In terms of what the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill said—is it right hon. or hon?
Kevin Hollinrake
Quite right, too; the right hon. Gentleman was Chief Secretary to the Treasury—I will go no further. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is not responsible for the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation—that is a function of His Majesty’s Treasury—which determines how the sanctions regime works once people are sanctioned. The OFSI ensures that the regime works effectively. It is fair to say that when that organisation was established fairly recently, it was not ready for the amount of work it had to do. It has been scaled up to make it a more effective organisation, which has been discussed in the context of resources generally.
Liam Byrne
Let me give the Minister a bit of feedback from my time as Chief Secretary to the Treasury. If a spending Minister comes before the Chief Secretary to say: “I’m really sorry, but we have a legal duty to do this”, it is an awful lot easier for them to win the case for the resource that they need than when they do not have the weight of that legal duty on their shoulders. Therefore, automatic consideration of a sanctioned individual for suspension of a directorship is a good thing to enshrine in a legal duty. I am trying to be helpful to the Minister, because I want him to be able to win arguments with the Treasury for the resources that he needs to achieve the objectives we both share.
Kevin Hollinrake
Yes, but we have to make careful use of our resources, otherwise there would be no money left.
We agree that sanctioned individuals should not be allowed to be directors of companies. That is what we are talking about, so there is no disagreement. Our disagreement is about how we share information between different agencies, and whether we should tell them how to do it, or they should do it themselves. We are parliamentarians; we are not experts in financial crime or how the financial system works. Wherever we can, we should leave it to the experts to determine the best way to share the information between agencies and—the important thing we are doing here—give them the powers to do that.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
We now come to amendment 83, which has just been debated. Does Dame Margaret Hodge wish to move the amendment formally?
Dame Margaret Hodge
I just wish to tell the Committee that I will write to Companies House and see what response I get from the chief executive or director. Subject to that, at this stage, I will not move the amendment.
Clause 32, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Disqualification of persons designated under sanctions legislation: Northern
Ireland
Amendments made: 4, in clause 34, page 23, leave out lines 13 to 17 and insert—
‘(1) This Article applies in relation to a person who has, at any time on or after the day on which section 34(2) of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2022 comes fully into force, become a person subject to relevant financial sanctions and who remains so subject.’
This amendment and Amendment 6 would mean that a person who is subject to sanctions is disqualified under the NI directors disqualification legislation only if those sanctions relate to asset-freezing.
Amendment 5, in clause 34, page 23, line 23, leave out ‘designated person’ and insert ‘person subject to relevant financial sanctions’.
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 4 and 6.
Amendment 6, in clause 34, page 23, line 23, at end insert—
‘(4) In this Article —
“designated person” has the meaning given by section 9 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;
“person subject to relevant financial sanctions” means a person who is a designated person for the purposes of any provision of regulations under section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 that imposes a prohibition or requirement for a purpose mentioned in section 3(1)(a) of that Act (asset-freezing).’—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
See Member’s explanatory statement for Amendment 4.
Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Disqualified directors
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 37 to 43 stand part.
New clause 35—Person convicted under National Minimum Wage Act not to be appointed as director—
‘(1) The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) After Clause 5A (Disqualification for certain convictions abroad) insert—
“5B Person convicted under National Minimum Wage Act not to be appointed as director
(1) A person may not be appointed a director of a company if the person is convicted of a criminal offence under section 31 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 on or after the day on which section 32(2) of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2022 comes fully into force.
(2) It is an offence for such a person to act as director of a company or directly or indirectly to take part in or be concerned in the promotion, formation or management of a company, without the leave of the High Court.
(3) An appointment made in contravention of this section is void.”’
This new clause would disqualify any individual convicted of an offence for a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay National Minimum Wage, from serving as a company director.
Kevin Hollinrake
Before I turn to the new clause, I will set out the intentions and effect of the clauses in the group. As part of the reform of Companies House, it is necessary to update the provisions regarding company directors. Most crucial to that is the introduction of a prohibition on people acting as company directors when they have not had their identities verified and reported their directorships to Companies House. That is a critical part of improving the integrity of the companies register. Accordingly, it is appropriate to provide teeth to ensure compliance with those obligations. The Bill will also create grounds for director disqualification if the person fails to verify their identity.
On new clause 35, all businesses, irrespective of their size or business sector, are responsible for paying their staff the correct minimum wage. The vast majority of responsible employers make sure they get it right. I assure the hon. Members for Aberavon and for Feltham and Heston that the Government take enforcing the minimum wage seriously, and we are clear that anyone who is entitled to be paid the minimum wage should receive it. We take robust enforcement action against employers who do not pay their staff correctly. Every area of regulation affecting businesses, whether it is employment practices or environmental impacts, has its own enforcement and penalty frameworks.
It is not entirely clear why we should single out breaches of the national minimum wage—important though it is—as being worthy of leading to disqualification. Nor does it immediately follow that someone who has breached their regulatory obligations in one of those areas should automatically be considered unfit to be a company director in the round. Having said that, I have some understanding when it comes to the new clause. There have been 16 people convicted under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. I want to do some further research on that to see what has happened to those people and their director qualification or disqualification. That might inform debate more clearly.
I draw hon. Members’ attention to the fact that the greater flexibility in the Bill over the use of Companies House fees will cover the company investigation teams at the Insolvency Service, allowing the Government the potential to expand their work and go after a greater proportion of rogue directors. I respectfully ask hon. Members not to press the new clause.
Dame Margaret Hodge
This is a question of clarification: if a director is disqualified, can he or she still act as a shadow director?
Kevin Hollinrake
It depends on how the right hon. Lady defines a shadow director. If she is implying that they are a person of significant control influencing others, which I guess is what she means, I will point her to the definitions of a person of significant control. They are those who hold
“more than 25% of shares in the company…more than 25% of voting rights in the company…the right to appoint or remove the majority of the board of directors”
that might influence or control a company through other means. That means that the person is still covered under the legislation; if a person is exerting that control, they should be designated as a person of significant control and ID verified, as discussed previously. Any person who became disqualified before the clause comes into force and is disqualified at that time will also cease holding the office of director.
Clause 37 amends some yet to be commenced provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on when a corporate director can act and minimum age requirements for directors. The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 amended the 2006 Act to establish—as the hon. Member for Aberavon said—that company directors should, in future, be natural persons except where they have met specific requirements determined by regulations. We will bring forward those regulations following the enactment of the Bill to establish the exemptions to the general natural person director rule. After a transition period, companies must ensure that any corporate directors on their boards are compliant with the regulated exemption criteria. Where they fail to do so, those director appointments will be void once the transition period ends.
The clause makes it clear that should any non-compliant corporate director continue to act in the capacity of either a de facto or shadow director after the end of the transition period, they will be held liable for the consequences of their actions as they would be if they were a validly appointed director. The clause makes a similar clarification in respect of the principles that will apply in respect of an individual who does not meet minimum age requirements for a company director. In such instances, the appointment would also be void, but those who continue to purport to act as a director or operate in a shadow capacity will continue to be exposed to personal liability none the less.
Clause 38 repeals the power for the Secretary of State to require that companies with disqualified directors who have been given permission by the court to act as a director make a statement to the registrar confirming that permission. The power is no longer required, because the Bill introduces new requirements to provide statements about disqualification and permissions to act in sections 12, 12A, 167G and 790LA.
Clause 39 introduces a prohibition on an individual acting as a director unless their ID is verified or exempted from that requirement under the regulations. It establishes a duty on a company to ensure that unverified individuals do not act as directors unless they are exempted from the ID verification requirement. Failure to comply with the duty constitutes an offence committed by the company and every officer of the company who is in default.
Clause 40 will make it a criminal offence for a person to act as a director unless their appointment has been notified to the registrar. It will be a defence for a person to prove that they reasonably believed that the notice of their appointment had been given to the registrar. The actions taken by an unverified director, or a director whose appointment has not been reported to the registrar, will remain valid to ensure that third parties who have relied on the actions of an unverified director are not unfairly disadvantaged.
We want there to be consequences for not complying with ID verification obligations, and clauses 41 and 42 help us to achieve that. The clauses allow for the disqualification of individuals where they are persistently in default of the ID verification requirements for directors and people with significant control, or where they have been convicted by consequence of such contravention. Clause 41 legislates in respect of Great Britain, with clause 42 legislating to create equivalent powers for Northern Ireland.
Finally, clause 43 makes amendments to section 246 of the Companies Act 2006 regarding addresses on public record. It is consequential to other amendments to no longer require companies to hold their own local registers of directors.
The Chair
Before I call Seema Malhotra, I remind the Front-Bench spokespeople that they need to indicate to the Chair that they want to speak.
Seema Malhotra
Thank you, Ms Elliott. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship.
I will speak for the Opposition on clauses 36 to 43, and I will say a few words about our new clause 35. We welcome what the Minister said, and we do not propose to push the new clause to a vote today, but I want to put some of our comments on the record. It would be useful if the Minister could clarify when he might want to come back and continue the conversation, subject to being able to look at further data on those who have been convicted under the legislation.
As we have established, clause 36 inserts proposed new sections 159A and 169A into the Companies Act, so that those who are disqualified from being a director under UK law cannot be appointed as one. New section 169A also says that a person who has been appointed as a director ceases to be one if they are disqualified. The two new sections appear straightforward, but has the Minister considered whether the provisions could be extended to ban the appointment of directors who may have been disqualified outside the UK? The Government could pursue that by extending the definition of directors disqualification legislation in new section 159A(2) to cover the analogous disqualification regimes in such jurisdictions as the Secretary of State may designate in regulations. That would allow the UK Government to specify or choose countries that have disqualification regimes that we would be happy to rely on. It seems that it might be a useful consideration, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.
On clause 37, section 87 of the 2015 Act contains amendments that have not yet been brought into force. It requires all directors to be natural persons, and it contains provision for circumstances in which people under 16 can become directors. We support the clause, which would amend the provisions to ensure that persons remain responsible for their acts as directors—I think we have had a brief conversation on this—even though they are no longer legally considered to be directors. That is important, because the practical consequence of the clause is that if a person continues to act like a director, even if they have officially been removed from office, they can still be legally responsible for any breaches of the law that they commit as a director. That could be on wrongful trading or other matters. We welcome the clause. It is an important provision to ensure that shadow directors remain liable for contraventions of the Companies Act 2006. We recognise the need for clause 38 and support it.
Clause 39 introduces provisions that would provide that an individual cannot act as a director of a company unless their ID has been verified or they benefit from an exemption specified by the Secretary of State. In addition, it provides that breaching that would be a criminal offence for the director, the company and every other responsible officer, punishable by a fine. In practice, it would mean that once the clause comes into force, individuals should not take any actions on behalf of the company in their capacity as director until they verify their identity. We welcome and support the clause. We agree that that is a positive step in ensuring that directors are who they say they are. Hopefully, it will also mean that people will be less likely to commit or even attempt to commit economic crimes.
Questions remain on the implementation and enforcement of identity verification, some of which we have discussed previously. We recognise that there are ongoing concerns. Martin Swain of Companies House said that we are still in the “design phase” for ID verification. It is difficult to be clear on the implications of the legislation we are passing without having clarity over ID checks. When will they be operational? What can we expect to be in them? How quickly will we and the registrar expect them to be completed? Will the Minister confirm that they will be of the highest standards? Nick Van Benschoten of UK Finance said in his evidence to the Committee on verification standards that one of the key points is that they
“fall short of minimum industry standards.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 7, Q3.]
I am sure the Minister will want to ensure that ID verification will be of the highest standard.
I would like to press the Minister on the part of the clause that grants the Secretary of State the power to exempt certain directors from not acting until their identity has been verified. I am seeking clarity on why the measure is needed. Will it be for categories of people or individuals? Finally, will any use of the exemption be transparent and reported on? I think we have raised before the need to ensure there is sufficient clarity and accountability on the use of the powers.
Clause 40 makes it a criminal offence, punishable by a fine, for someone to act as a director unless their company has notified the registrar within 40 days. We welcome that, but I would like the Minister to clarify subsection (5), which allows a defence for a director who can prove they reasonably believed their company had been given notice of a director’s appointment. In the interest of working with the Government on this, may I ask the Minister for assurances on what would constitute proof of reasonable belief in this instance? Would it be possible to provide an example of where an exemption from sanctions might be applied? The Minister may want to write to me.
We welcome clauses 41 and 42. I realise we may be coming to the end of the sitting, so I will speak to clause 43 in detail later.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Scott Mann.)
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Eighth sitting)
Thursday 3rd November 2022
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 View all Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 November 2022 - (3 Nov 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Clauses 37 to 43 stand part.
New clause 35—Person convicted under National Minimum Wage Act not to be appointed as director—
“(1) The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) After Clause 5A (Disqualification for certain convictions abroad) insert—
‘5B Person convicted under National Minimum Wage Act not to be appointed as director
(1) A person may not be appointed a director of a company if the person is convicted of a criminal offence under section 31 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 on or after the day on which section 32(2) of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2022 comes fully into force.
(2) It is an offence for such a person to act as director of a company or directly or indirectly to take part in or be concerned in the promotion, formation or management of a company, without the leave of the High Court.
(3) An appointment made in contravention of this section is void.’”
This new clause would disqualify any individual convicted of an offence for a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay National Minimum Wage, from serving as a company director.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Robertson. I will continue to speak to this group, finishing with a few remarks about clause 43 and our new clause 35.
We welcome clause 43 and recognise that it reflects new circumstances that arise from the Bill’s abolition of local registers of directors, set out in clause 50. We have further questions on that, which we will deal with when we come to later clauses.
On new clause 35, let me put our argument on the record. I thank the Minister for his comments, which I hope suggest that we will move on in some form, perhaps with the data he comes back with. Will he update us on when he expects to come back to us, so that we can come to a conclusion, and perhaps on an alternative way to make progress on the matter, during the passage of the Bill?
The reason my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon and I tabled new clause 35 is to include provision such that persons convicted under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 cannot be appointed as company directors. There are real questions about whether we would want an employer who wilfully neglected or refused to pay the national minimum wage to a worker who qualified for it to be the director of a company after the Bill comes fully into force. The new clause would strengthen a lot of the measures in the Bill, because we are talking about people we hope to trust to undertake their responsibilities as a director.
The Bill introduces a substantial amount of regulation about who can and cannot serve as a company director as a result of criminal or potentially criminal practices, so this feels like the right place for consideration of such a measure. I will welcome the Minister’s comments and I look forward to continuing to work with him as we make progress.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Kevin Hollinrake)
It is a pleasure to speak with you in the Chair, Mr Robertson.
I am not quite clear when I will be able to get the information that we should have before we look at the matter in new clause 35. I think it is right to identify the scale and nature of the problem before we legislate, but I am certainly keen to do so, not least in my role as the person responsible for labour frameworks and markets.
I will respond to one or two of the comments of the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston. We already have power to ban directors disqualified overseas, under section 5A of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. We can and have taken steps to disqualify directors who have been convicted of relevant foreign offences. On exemptions, I think we dealt with exemption from identity verification in a previous sitting. This will be set out in regulation, but that will probably include people who have already had their ID verified, for example.
The hon. Lady also asked about the defence of “reasonably believed” in clause 40. That would cover a situation where somebody had broken the rules but perhaps did not know that the rules had been broken. That would of course be subject to some kind of investigation, and the person could say, “It wasn’t me who submitted the return. I am not guilty of an offence.” It is a defence that somebody believed the information had been submitted correctly when actually it had not. I think that is a reasonable provision, which investigators would be able to take into account before taking forward a prosecution.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 37 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Registrar’s power to change a director’s service address
Amendment made: 7, in clause 43, page 31, line 10, at end insert
“(but see subsection (4A)).
(4A) Subsection (4)—
(a) does not limit the service address that may be registered for the director under regulations under section 1097B (rectification of register), and
(b) ceases to apply in relation to the director if a new service address is registered for the director under those regulations.’”—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
Where a director’s service address is moved to their residential address under section 246 of the Companies Act 2006, subsection (4) imposes restrictions on further changes. This amendment ensures those restrictions do not bite on further changes under new section 1097B (inserted by NC5).
Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44
Register of members: name to be included
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 45 to 48 stand part.
That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
A core purpose of the companies register is to provide details of company ownership. Users of the register, such as those who use it to confirm basic information about a company or to carry out due diligence work, have reported some problems with the way company ownership data is recorded. These clauses introduce measures to increase the usefulness of the information held on the members of UK companies. Collectively, they will mean that users of the register have more certainty about who they are doing business with, building confidence in the integrity of the companies register and preventing bad actors from exploiting it.
Clause 44 amends sections 112, 113 and 115 of the Companies Act 2006, which concern the provision of information relating to the members of a company. The clause provides that in the case of an individual, the requirement to enter a name in the register of members and the index of members means entering the individual’s forename and surname. In the future, entries will have to read “Joe Bloggs” and not “J. Bloggs”. The clause is necessary because there is currently no definition of “name” for members in the 2006 Act or associated regulations.
Clause 44 also provides that in the case of an individual usually known by a title, the title may be entered in the register of members and the index of members instead of the individual’s forename and surname. The 2006 Act currently allows directors to state their title instead of their forename and surname, or in addition to either or both of them, but it does not contain equivalent provision for members. The clause provides that if a person’s name or title is entered in a company’s register of members in a form that does not comply with the new requirements, that does not affect the person’s becoming a member of the company. It may well be that that was not the fault of the member themselves.
The objective of the clause is to increase transparency rather than introduce a condition around name format into the concept of membership. If a company fails to comply with the requirements of section 113 and/or section 115 of the 2006 Act, an offence is committed by the company, and every officer in default, so non-compliance can be pursued.
Clause 45 inserts into the 2006 Act new section 113A, which will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations to change the information required to be entered in a company’s register of members. Regulations could, for example, require all members to provide an address. Currently, the initial members, or subscribers, of a company are required to provide their name and address, but those who become members later are only required to provide their name.
As reforms are implemented to Companies House and the companies register, it is possible that further opportunities to improve information on shareholdings will be identified, on which the Government would want to act swiftly. For example, law enforcement may identify additional types of information that the registrar could require that would help in the prevention and detection of crime.
The power in clause 45 will align the position for members with that for directors and people with significant control, in respect of which there are already powers to amend the required information. Information provided in a company’s register of members is provided to Companies House via the company’s confirmation statement. This power will increase the usefulness of the information on the companies register.
Clause 46 amends section 125(1) of the Companies Act 2006, which gives the court the power to rectify the register. Without the clause, the court may order the rectification of the members register only in relation to names. The clause broadens the rectification power so that it is available in respect of any information on the members register. It means that a person aggrieved, any member of the company, or the company can apply to the court for rectification of the members register if the register does not contain necessary information, or if it contains unnecessary information. It is conceivable that information other than names may be included in a company’s register of members in error.
Given that clause 45 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that require additional information to be entered in a company’s register of members, it is crucial that the rectification power is broadened. Information provided in a company’s register of members is provided to Companies House via the company’s confirmation statement. A wider power to rectify the members register will increase its integrity and, by extension, that of the company’s register as a whole.
As well as introducing measures to increase the transparency of company ownership, the Bill will introduce measures to prevent the abuse of personal information held on the Companies House register. Proposed new section 120A of the Companies Act, inserted by clause 47, allows the Secretary of State to make regulations that empower the registrar to order a company to refrain from using or disclosing individual membership information, except in specified circumstances. Members of a company will then be able to apply to the registrar to request that the order be made to the company.
Clause 47 also amends sections 114 to 116 and 120 of the Companies Act, so that where a company is ordered not to use or disclose member information, other obligations that would otherwise require that information to be inspectable by the public are switched off. The clause also provides that if a company fails to comply with an order for the restriction of the use or disclosure of information, an offence is committed by the company and every officer of the company who is in default. Adding such an offence is proportionate given the serious risk that individuals who have applied for protection face.
Clause 48 amends the Companies Act to remove the option for private, non-traded companies to elect to keep information about their members solely on the central register maintained by the registrar. The effect will be to require private companies that previously chose to keep information only on the central register to maintain their own register of members. It will be the sole responsibility of the company to update and maintain its register of members. The register of members is separate from the register of companies, which is maintained by the registrar.
Clause 48 also inserts a new transitional provision in relation to the abolition of the option to elect to keep members registers at Companies House rather than locally, requiring companies to enter in their register of members all the information that would have been required had the election never been made. Such companies will then be required to provide any updates to the registrar about their members via the confirmation statement. The clause also makes various consequential amendments to other sections of the Companies Act, which are in schedule 1.
Clause 48 also clarifies that, while the provisions relating to the central register were in force, the information about the members of a company that elected to hold membership information on the central register is to be considered prima facie evidence about the members of the company. However, from the point that the central register is abolished by the Bill, the prima facie evidence about the members of a company can be found in the company’s own register, held under section 113 of the Companies Act 2006.
Seema Malhotra
I thank the Minister for his comprehensive walk through these clauses, which I am sure he wrote overnight. It was very helpful. I have a few questions, but I will start by speaking to clause 44, which amends the Companies Act 2006 so that for individuals entered in a register of members, commonly denoting shareholders, “name” refers to a forename and surname. I have made the point before that it is quite staggering that we have not had such specification of the information that should be required. We absolutely welcome this measure and the encouraging of greater transparency of company shareholders.
We support the clause, but it seems to be countered by moves that arguably encourage less transparency of shareholders. In particular, the withdrawal of the central register, with information held only by the company rather than centrally, will make it harder to have public access and knowledge of who shareholders are.
It is important for us to emphasise why transparency continues to be so important. Transparency International has noted that, until now, shareholder information has been extremely limited and difficult to access. That has been a core factor in the UK’s unwanted reputation as a hub for dirty money and economic crime. The lack of any substantial rules and regulations around shareholder information reduces the reliability of the information published by Companies House and, in turn, of the totality of information about a company held by Companies House. We have tabled amendments to later clauses, but I wanted to make that broader point. While we talk separately about directors, officers and shareholders, in the end we are talking about entities working together as a whole, and wanting transparency about activity, and who is involved in it, as a whole.
Clause 45 concerns the power to amend required information. As the Minister outlined, the clause allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to specify changes to the information that must be entered in a company’s register of members. This is an important clause, and I have a couple of questions for the Minister. First, is there any consideration of what information may be required? I think there was some suggestion about the addresses of company members. In the Minister’s opinion, would the clause provide for a potential future decision by the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals to request identity verification and perhaps directors’ IDs from shareholders with shares of less than 5%?
I wonder whether this should be among the requirements for transparency of shareholder information in the Bill, which specifies changes to information that must be entered. If there are measures that could be brought forward, should they not be in the Bill rather than in future regulations? Is it a case of simply saying, “We will go as far as we think is relevant now and leave the option open for additions later”? Where the Minister thinks there could be further measures later, it would be interesting to debate whether some of them could be brought forward.
The Minister clearly set out the arguments for clause 46, and we support the expansion of the court’s powers.
Clause 47 relates to the register of members and the protection of information. As the Minister outlined, the clause would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring a company to refrain from using or disclosing individual membership information except in specified circumstances. I was not fully clear who may make applications to the registrar not to use or disclose information. There may well be good reasons for such a request, but what individuals do the Government have in mind and in what circumstances could such a direction be made? Procedures in the future may result in less transparency, and for good reason, but it is important that we understand the reasons for that and that they are on public record as we consider the Bill.
It is possible that transparency is countered by the implementation of the Bill and the subsequent legislation for which it makes provision. That may reduce transparency by backdoor means, as it were, and reduce its scope to apply to those very individuals whom we may want to subject to such transparency. I am sure that the Minister understands why we want to probe that issue.
Clause 48 concerns the removal of the option to use the central register. Given all the measures relating to transparency and shareholder information, I am concerned about their total effect. The important principle running through the Bill is increased transparency in terms of publication and searchability, but the Bill also provides for private companies to exercise the option not to be on the central register. Perhaps I have not followed all the detail relating to the disclosure of shareholder information, but after the Bill’s implementation, I think there will be less publicly available shareholder information and not more. I look forward to the Minister’s response to those concerns.
Kevin Hollinrake
I think I have noted all the points raised by the hon. Lady. She is absolutely right that, in future, the Secretary of State could, through regulations, elect for the collection of more information from shareholders or any other relevant parties. We must all acknowledge that we do not want to put undue burdens on people who are trying to go about their normal, legitimate, bona fide commercial business. We are trying to strike a balance to ensure that we get the information from those we need it from, who may be acting for nefarious purposes.
On the hon. Lady’s point about the circumstances in which someone may want to remove details from the public register, that individual could be a celebrity, who would not want their address held publicly, or someone who fears domestic abuse. Those are the types of cases and circumstances that may arise. The information would still be held, just not in public. The law enforcement agencies would still have access to it, but the general public would not. When making such an application for removal, an individual would have to demonstrate evidence of risk, and could not simply say, “I want that information removing.” The registrar can refer cases to law enforcement agencies if she is in any doubt about whether the application has been made for bona fide reasons. She can also revoke a removal, if she feels that she has been given false information. I think they are reasonable provisions, and that judgment will be exercised.
On updating the register, the hon. Lady has tabled amendment 104, which we will consider in the next group. Perhaps we will have a good debate about that then.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 45 to 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 49
Membership information: one-off statement
Seema Malhotra
I beg to move amendment 104, in clause 49, page 34, line 32, after “time” insert “and annually thereafter”.
This amendment would require a confirmation statement with company membership information as set out in clause 49 subsection 2 to be submitted annually.
The clause requires a company to provide a full list of shareholders when the first confirmation statement is filed after clause 44(3) comes into force. As I said, the clause is a welcome step in increasing the transparency of shareholder ownership and information, which we support strongly. Nevertheless, as has been said, the provisions in the Bill on shareholder information could and should go further. That is the context in which we tabled the amendment.
The amendment would provide that the confirmation statement about the company membership under this clause is submitted not only on a one-off basis but annually. The principle of shareholder information being submitted is one we support fully. If the Government believe that should be a one-off, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why it need not be annual.
As I have mentioned, opaque shareholder ownership is a significant barrier to ensuring transparency and tackling economic crime. An example that has been cited already is Savaro Ltd. In August 2020, tonnes of ammonium nitrate exploded in Beirut port, killing more than 200 and wounding thousands more. The reported owner of the chemicals was a UK-registered private limited company called Savaro Ltd. The data provided by Savaro Ltd gives an insight into the poor quality of shareholder information held at Companies House and how that hinders investigation. Transparency International highlighted how, to identify the shareholders, it had to go back to 2015 for documents that named Status Grand as the sole owner.
Instead of identifying shareholders annually, companies only have to say that no shareholders have changed. The information is hidden in PDF documents, so it is unnecessarily time-consuming to establish who held shares in an entity at a particular point in time. Savaro is a clear example of how annual shareholder data, which the amendment would provide for, could assist considerably in investigating even criminal activity in UK companies.
Let me pre-empt the Minister’s pushing back on the amendment. One common argument against companies providing shareholder names annually is that it would prove too onerous a task for UK companies, but in answer to a written parliamentary question that I tabled his predecessor outlined that the average number of shareholders in UK companies in 2021-22 was only 2.15. The average number of directors was 1.59, so the number of shareholders was not that much higher. To argue that it would be onerous for the majority of companies to provide shareholder information does not seem so credible when set against the low average number of shareholders by comparison with company directors, as set out in the Government’s own data.
I urge the Government to consider this important amendment and hope the Minister will respond positively on how we might move forward with the sentiments and arguments behind it.
Kevin Hollinrake
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her amendment. Clause 49 requires companies to provide to the registrar a one-off snapshot of relevant membership information when the first confirmation statement is due following the clause’s commencement. The amendment would require companies to provide that relevant membership information annually thereafter. The hon. Lady—or is she right honourable?
Kevin Hollinrake
It is only a matter of time. The hon. Lady cited the disturbing case, which I too read about, of Savaro Ltd in Beirut. It may be helpful for me to clarify how the clause as drafted works with existing company law. Companies are already required to provide a confirmation statement at least annually, which records changes in membership information in the previous period. One of the principles behind the confirmation statement is that companies should not be required to resubmit information that has already been filed on the register. Through the process, companies are required to either confirm the information submitted previously or provide Companies House with any updates to a variety of information, including the information contained in their register of members.
For example, if information submitted previously about a company’s members needed to be updated, or there were new members to disclose information about, the existing confirmation statement process already requires the disclosure of that information. Clause 49 introduces a requirement for companies to file a one-off snapshot of relevant information. That will be the means for companies to provide full names for all their members, as required by clause 44. That will give Companies House the starting point to display the information in a more user-friendly way. That information will then be maintained through existing confirmation statement requirements—annual updates, in effect.
The hon. Lady makes a good point about the usability of the information and the different PDFs being held. Companies House is looking at that. The Government would welcome suggestions on how best to display the information—a simple table would be preferable, in my view—which is to be determined as part of the implementation. That will involve user testing in the usual way to ensure that the information is displayed in a user-friendly way, as the hon. Lady seeks. Although I appreciate the intent behind the amendment, it would serve only to duplicate existing requirements, and would introduce the requirement to deliver potentially the same information on a yearly basis in cases where there had been no change in membership. I would therefore be grateful if she could withdraw it.
Seema Malhotra
I thank the Minister for his comments and his recognition of the important sentiments behind the amendment, which I will withdraw. I think some of the measures he outlined regarding the format of the information on Companies House and searchability will go a long way to addressing the point. I hope that we will be able to continue a dialogue on that, perhaps under his guidance about how we can best engage, to ensure that what is published is searchable and meets the important sentiments of transparency, so that frankly we never have another Savaro Ltd. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
Clause 49 is linked to clause 44, to which I spoke a few seconds ago and which introduces new requirements in respect of the names information to be provided to the company in relation to its members, for inclusion by the company in its register of members. Currently, information on shareholders can be contained across multiple filings. The clause requires certain companies to provide the registrar with a one-off list of all shareholders, including their names and how many shares they hold. The first confirmation statement will be due after the new names requirement in clause 44 comes fully into force.
Collecting that information via a one-off snapshot will improve the usefulness of the information on the register by enabling Companies House to display the information in a more user-friendly way. Companies will then confirm the information submitted previously, or provide any updates to Companies House—via the existing confirmation statement process—on the information contained in its register of members.
Seema Malhotra
I have no further points to add.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Abolition of local registers etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 69, in schedule 2, page 148, line 40, at end insert—
“167GA Unique identification number for directors
(1) On receipt of notification of a person becoming a director, the registrar must allocate that director a unique identification number, unless such a number has already been allocated to that person.
(2) Any information supplied to the registrar under or by virtue of this Act about a person who has been allocated a unique identification number under subsection (1) must include that number.”
Amendment 68, in schedule 2, page 150, line 36, at end insert—
“167KA Limit on number of directorships held
(1) Where notice has been given to the registrar that a person (P) has become a director, the registrar may determine that P may not hold that directorship.
(2) The registrar may make a determination under subsection (1) if the registrar considers that P holds an excessive number of directorships.
(3) The factors that the registrar may take into account in making a determination under subsection (1) are the experience, expertise and circumstances of P.
(4) If the registrar makes a determination under subsection (1), P may not hold office as a director of the company.”
Amendment 70, in schedule 2, page 150, line 39, after “167G,”, insert “167GA”.
This amendment would provide for penalties to apply to anyone failing to provide their unique identification number (see Amendment 69) to the registrar.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
In last year’s consultation on the powers of the registrar, the Government asked stakeholders for their views about the requirements for companies to hold their own registers and to deliver the information contained in them to Companies House. Stakeholders were also asked whether the election regime, by which companies can choose to keep their registers only at Companies House, should be retained. They were clear that centralising certain registers with Companies House could reduce burdens on businesses. In response, the Government said that we would continue to consider updating the registers regime accordingly.
The Government have decided that, where possible, a single source of information about companies is preferable, and that that source should be Companies House. In future, the definitive registers of directors, secretaries and persons of significant control will, in all cases, be held by the registrar rather by companies themselves. Clause 50 introduces schedule 2, which contains the amendments to the Companies Act to implement that policy by setting out the requirements and processes that will apply upon the abolition of local registers and the existing election regime. The changes will apply to registers of directors, of secretaries and of persons of significant control.
Schedule 2 sets out the detailed requirements necessary to give effect to the new regime for companies’ registers. The schedule is necessarily long and detailed because of the complexity of re-engineering the existing system to repeal obligations to maintain local registers and replace them with a regime that will result in the population of central registers. What have largely been a range of duties for companies to maintain records are broadly being transposed into an analogous set of obligations to report that information to the registrar. In many instances, companies are currently obliged not only to maintain registers but to notify the registrar of changes to them. The eradication of local registers will therefore serve to ease burdens on business.
However, it is worth drawing attention to a number of areas in which the new registers regime will involve new reporting obligations for companies. Proposed new section 167G will replace section 167 of the Companies Act 2006 and introduce additional requirements on companies. When notifying the registrar of a new director, companies will be required to make statements to verify the director’s identity and that the individual is not disqualified or otherwise ineligible to be a director.
Proposed new section 790LB will permit that the notification of a new person with significant control, which is required under proposed new section 790LA, is accompanied by a statement confirming that the individual’s identity is verified. If a statement is provided in relation to a registrable relevant legal entity—a legal entity that itself has significant control in a company—it must specify the name of one of its relevant officers and must confirm that their identity is verified. The notice must be accompanied by a statement from the relevant officer confirming that they are the relevant officer of the registrable relevant legal entity.
On amendment 68, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, given that in our consultation on potential reforms for inclusion in the Bill the Government considered the possibility of including a cap on directorships, I am sympathetic to the underlying intention of the amendment. Approximately three out of four respondents to the consultation opposed a cap. The Government chose not to proceed with one, believing it preferable to verify identities and provide more accurate linkage of records, thereby providing a more accurate picture of involvement with companies. That reasoning stands today.
Analysis of the companies register, together with comparison against other data sets and the reporting of anomalies from obliged entities, will assist in identifying circumstances in which we believe the number of directorships poses a risk of criminal activity. That information will be shared with the relevant enforcement and supervisory bodies.
The amendment proposes a form of fitness test rather than a cap. I acknowledge that this removes some concerns about the bluntness of such a cap and addresses some of the concerns raised by respondents in our original consultation. However, in return the amendment undermines the agency of company owners to act independently and in their own interests when appointing people to run the business they own. It places the registrar in the position of being a higher authority for such appointments. Would they ever have at their disposal the evidence to make a negative determination? What would be the implications of a negative determination on the actions taken by a validly appointed director up to the point of such a determination?
The possibilities in this policy area were given careful consideration as part of the Government consultation. We have not identified a legislative proposal along the lines of 68 amendment that is workable or appropriate. It would undermine business confidence in the UK if companies could not be sure whether their director appointments would take effect. We believe that the new and existing powers to analyse and query information and on identity verification, along with the enhancement that will be brought to linking people across multiple roles and the wider data-sharing possibilities for the registrar, all serve to strengthen our capacity to identify possible grounds for concern. Such concerns can be reported to the relevant agencies, investigated and acted upon, including by pursuing the disqualification of directors, if appropriate. I hope I have clarified why we do not believe the amendment should be taken forward.
Amendments 69 and 70 will be redundant once the expanded power under section 1082 is exercised, as amended under clause 66. The effect will be that all individuals who are under a duty to verify their identity will be assigned a unique identifier when they successfully complete identity verification. This will include all directors, who will commit an offence if they act as a director without having their identity verified.
Seema Malhotra
Will the Minister clarify what he said? Will all directors be given a unique identifier?
Kevin Hollinrake
Yes, that is in clause 66. Further detail about the use and allocation of unique identifiers will be set out in regulations made via the affirmative procedure, so Parliament will have sufficient opportunity to scrutinise them. There is no need, therefore, for the inclusion of a penalty for directors who fail to provide the registrar with their unique identifier. It will be the registrar who issues a director with a unique identifier, not the company or the director. I hope my explanation has provided further clarity on why the amendments are not needed. I urge the hon. Member not to press the amendments to a vote.
Seema Malhotra
May I ask your advice on procedure, Mr Robertson? Should I speak now on clause 50, the amendments and schedule 2, or should the SNP amendments be moved first?
Seema Malhotra
Thank you, Mr Robertson.
The importance of clause 50, which relates to schedule 2, is obvious and requires no further comment. The Minister’s description of schedule 2 as long and detailed was on the button. Its length is understandable given the changes it is making by abolishing the requirement for companies to maintain their own registers of directors, registers of directors’ residential addresses, registers of secretaries and registers of people with significant control. Instead, that information will be held centrally by the registrar, with the important provision that companies have a duty to update the registrar of any change to the information.
We welcome the proposed changes in clause 50, but I want to comment on amendments on 68, 69 and 70 tabled by my SNP colleagues, to which I am sure they will speak. Amendment 68 would limit the number of directorships that one individual may hold. Where notice has been given to the registrar that a person has become a director, the registrar may determine that they should not hold that position, if the registrar considers that they hold an excessive number of directorships. That may be achieved by setting a cap on the number of directorships held and it might be possible to override that limit if there were good reason, and a simple means introduced by which that application and argument could be made to the registrar. Such a proposal could be implemented sensibly to bring about the benefits that it offers, especially in the light of some of the abuses committed.
From our evidence sessions and debates in Committee, we have learned that individuals with multiple directorships are a massive red flag in terms of potential criminal activity. In evidence to us on 27 October, Bill Browder said:
“Why is it okay to have a person be a director of 400 companies? That does not make any sense to me. Why should there not be some limitation—maybe 10? Ten companies is a lot of companies—but 400 companies, or a thousand companies?”
––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 74, Q151.]
A limit on the number of directorships could easily be set in legislation and that would not stop people conducting their lawful business, but it would make it harder for criminals to use the system and our company structures to launder money and act as drivers of economic crime. It is worth reflecting on the fact that the evidence for that change came from a range of professional bodies. They also said that if they were directors of four, five, six or seven companies, how would they have the time to undertake their responsibilities with the required due care? The Minister referred to the consultation on this issue and said that three out of four of those consulted opposed a cap. Can he give us clarification on the year of that consultation? There are some questions about how we might interpret some of the responses, given the number of respondents and how many responded to all the questions.
In the light of that, I will make a few other remarks. The Association of Accounting Technicians, a registered charity based in London that acts as a professional body for accounting technicians worldwide, echoes Mr Browder’s assessment. In September 2020, it published an article recommending a cap of 15 directorships for one person, but it recognised, I think as we all do, that it is a difficult balancing act. We do not want to stop legitimate, lawful and productive activity, but we want to have a way of putting a stop to mechanisms that are easy to abuse. The AAT noted that there was a cap of 15 in Ireland, a general cap of 20 in India, and a cap of five in France that applies to public companies only.
Bodies that responded to the Government’s consultation made other interesting comments. There was a wide range of views on the cap, from two to 100 I think, with many suggesting between 15 and 25. This is an important conversation in the light of the scale and nature of economic crime, how it is changing, and the scale of abuse of our company structures. Some action has been undertaken in slightly different contexts, with less clarity about what has been happening with Russian money, Russian oligarchs and the connection to our international security. This year has really helped to challenge and expose much of that, albeit six years after legislation on economic crime was first promised. The point is that we have reached a place where our eyes are wide open now—or definitely wider, if not open completely.
Some of the wider comments and contributions to the Government’s consultation may well be worth going back to, in the light of what other countries do seemingly without impeding their economy or their companies’ activities. India is a good example of a nation whose trade is growing and that has a real focus on both domestic growth and international trade. I worry that we are closing down some of these debates, when this is a time to review them, perhaps with a slightly more open mind.
Seema Malhotra
The Minister asks a fair question. He is not necessarily stating a cap. Given what has come out in the consultation, and what has been in the articles about whether there should be a cap and what would be right for British companies, it is certainly open to further conversation. It is interesting that in the Government’s consultation many were suggesting between 15 and 25, which is in the ballpark of what has been happening in other countries. The make-up of our economy could be slightly different. We have to understand it in the round, and in the context of our economy, but it is a question of a scale of 400 to 1,000.
If the Minister is saying that there might be a level at which there starts to be a red flag, and implicitly that Companies House may implement the legislation, perhaps Companies House and the registrar will say, “Maybe we’ll just do a procedural check if we have 25-plus directorships.” I do not know. That is where data and analytics help, rather than a ballpark figure. It must be within a considered understanding of how our economy works, and how and where legitimate business is carried out, with a view from directors as well. We might find that it is an easier answer to reach, because it does not have to be one that only we, as Members of Parliament, comment on; it has to be informed.
We are not arguing for a hard cap. We are saying that, as the logic of the SNP amendment outlines, rather than managing on a case-by-case basis, having a way to manage risk structurally and procedurally is an important response to the evidence, the nature of use that we have seen and the situation we find ourselves in today. There is room to learn from the experience of other countries.
Amendment 69 would insert a provision into schedule 2, requiring that:
“On receipt of notification of a person becoming a director, the registrar must allocate that director a unique identification number, unless such a number has already been allocated to that person.”
Amendment 70 follows from that, and would provide penalties for anyone failing to provide their unique identification number to the registrar. We support the spirit of the amendments, but I refer the Committee to our amendments 102 and 103, which we will be speaking to in later debates. Our amendments take a slightly different approach and place a duty on the registrar to give every director a unique identification number, which is published on the registrar’s website. I think that approach is tighter.
I hope in his response that the Minister will be clear about what the registrar is required to do versus what they can do, and what will be and will not be published on the unique identifiers for directors.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
I rise to speak to amendments 69, 68 and 70. These are connected amendments to schedule 2. I appreciate the point about clause 66, but we will get to that when we get to it, and we are here now.
The evidence from various witnesses last week, which I have heard over many years, is that the Companies House register is a mess. The amendments seek to tidy it up to some extent. A unique identifier that follows a person all the way through, from becoming a director of a company to perhaps resigning as a director of that company and going on to be a director of a different company at a later stage, would help to trace that person through the Companies House system.
I have mentioned in previous debates that there are three Alison Thewlisses on the Companies House register. They are all me, but they appear three times, and nobody would necessarily know that they are the same person. It would make sense to have a unique identifier attached to me as a person so that people can easily find and trace my history as a company director.
I looked up the Minister on the Companies House register. He is there five times. There are five Kevin Paul Hollinrakes out there in the world. It would be useful for companies doing due diligence or for people seeking to look at somebody’s directorship history if there was only one Kevin Paul Hollinrake on the register and we could see a complete picture of all those registrations over the course of his life and career.
That is the main purpose of the amendments—to make registrations traceable and to make the system easier for users and for me, if I want to be a company director, to provide the correct information. I could say, “I am already a director—here’s my number; just add it on to the previous things I have.”
Amendment 70 seeks to prevent people getting around that system and trying to register themselves perhaps by using their middle name or a different name, as if they were a different person. The unique identifier, once allocated to a person, should always follow that person through the system. If I try to register with my middle name or a married name rather than my maiden name, the system should pick it up. That is often an issue for women in the system. They might look very much like two separate people, with a married name and a maiden name, but they are in fact the same person. That unique identifier within the system would help trace people through, simplifying it for everyone.
Kevin Hollinrake
The hon. Lady has obviously read clause 66, “Allocation of unique identifiers”, which I think is what she is seeking to achieve. What about that clause does she not like?
Alison Thewliss
Broadly, I support clause 66. The amendments are not to that clause, but to schedule 2, to tighten it up and to improve it in any way we can. I accept what the Minister says. Labour, too, has an amendment to tighten the provisions, and I dare say I will support that as well, when we get to that stage, because all such amendments are to press the Government to tighten things up and to improve the Bill.
On amendment 68 and the number of directorships held, in evidence we heard Bill Browder suggesting the scenario of a drunk Latvian having their passport taken and being registered as a director in hundreds and hundreds of companies. Bill Browder said rightly:
“Why is it okay to have a person be a director of 400 companies?” ––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 74, Q151.]
Clearly, that is ridiculous. There is no way that someone could fulfil their obligations as a director if they were the director of 400 companies at once. It would be impractical to suggest that anyone could.
Also, Thomas Mayne said:
“On the point about directors, there certainly should be”
a limit—
“it is crazy that you have these people with 1,000 companies.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October; c. 79, Q162.]
It really is.
I do not want to put a specific number in the Bill—that would be something for Companies House and regulations to decide—but we clearly all understand what an excessive number of companies is. Four hundred is excessive and 1,000 is ludicrous. Perhaps the cut-off could be at 20 or 30, although even at that I would struggle to say that someone could make a good job as a company director keeping an eye on all those companies. It is worthwhile looking at the issue, because it is a red flag in the system: if one person is registered to multiple companies, that is a red flag, and it should be something that triggers Companies House to look into them in more detail.
Seema Malhotra
The hon. Lady is making a powerful argument. The Minister asked her what she thought was not sufficient about clause 66. Does she agree that arguing for a unique identifier is about ensuring that it actually happens? The wording of proposed new paragraph (d) in clause 66(2)(c) is to
“confer power on the registrar…to give a person a new unique identifier”.
It is a power, rather than a duty. That seems to be at the heart of the disagreement—is it a power or is it a duty?
Alison Thewliss
I agree. I do not want to go too far on clause 66, as we have not reached it, but this is about ensuring that something is in the Bill, that it is hard and fast that it happens, rather than having a suggestion, something that the registrar might like to consider, or some kind of “have regard to”. It needs to be there and specified. That is what we are trying to achieve.
Proposed new subsection (3) in amendment 68, on what Companies House should take into account in making its determination under the clause, specifies the “experience, expertise and circumstances” of a director. If someone has long-term experience of running companies that actually existed and have filed accounts, there is something tangible there and then Companies House can say: “Oh yes, that person has 30 directorships, but they are active in all those directorships, and we know what they are.” However, if someone has no active activity that Companies House can fill in, that becomes a red flag under amendment 68. It would give Companies House a degree of discretion. Wherever it might want to put the number is also a factor.
The Minister is trying to suggest that having such a check would be an inhibition to business. I do not believe that, and I am interested to hear what evidence the Minister has to suggest that such a limit on directorships would inhibit businesses in any way. As the Labour spokesperson, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, mentioned, other countries have such a rule. Those restrictions are in place elsewhere around the world, so the comparison would be interesting: do they feel that businesses, directorships and the involvement of people in companies are inhibited by having such a rule? We are proposing a change to the Bill to help Companies House do its job, to help it with the red flags and to give it an action to take once it has seen the red flags and identified them through something such as holding multiple directorships.
Kevin Hollinrake
Let me quickly respond. The shadow Minister wanted to know the date of the consultation that the three out of four figure came from. It happened between 2019 and February 2021, so it was pretty recent.
The issue of whether there should be a cap and where it should be set has been raised by both hon. Members. We think it is wrong to set a cap. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asks the interesting question of, “Why do we need all these companies, and why do they need to be registered?” We believe that it is ours not to reason why. We believe in freedom and that people should be allowed to live their lives as they choose. We do not seek to put restrictions on people for no good reason.
Kevin Hollinrake
I will go on. We think there may be a nefarious reason why a person is a director of many companies. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central mentioned red flags in her speech, and that is exactly how we see this operating. It may well be that Companies House determine that there is a cap of 20, and when somebody gets to 20 directorships, then they become a risk. It may then look further into what that person is doing and share that information with law enforcement agencies. We would rather leave it to the discretion of the registrar to determine where the red flags should be, rather than impose it through the Committee.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central took the opportunity to google my directorships, and she found that incredibly easy to do. Just type in “Kevin Hollinrake directorships” and it lists all my directorships.
Kevin Hollinrake
It is my name and all my directorships are listed underneath.
Kevin Hollinrake
I am sure it is on Companies House right now. There are 20 records. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central would maybe say that I cannot be director of any more companies, as I am already director of 20, but I have valid reasons for being directors of all those. I can promise her that none of it was for criminal purposes. The hon. Lady may say there should be a limit, but we think that basically we should leave it to the discretion of Companies House and the registrar to do the right thing—set the red flags where most appropriate and then identify risk and act accordingly.
Alison Thewliss
The Minister talks about not wanting to look at someone’s motivation for having, say, 400 company directorships. It is really is a case of, “There might be a reason, but we’re not going to ask about it. Why should we?” I think Companies House should be inquisitive about somebody who has 400 directorships, but the Minister is not tasking it to be inquisitive through the legislation. Tasking Companies House to be specifically inquisitive on that point is important, because the Bill does not put a duty on it or give it the right to be inquisitive.
Looking at the Companies House register, it appears that the Minister is listed five separate times—with one appointment, with zero appointments, with one appointment, with another appointment and with 18 appointments. They all appear as separate entries, not as one single person. A unique identifier would seek to grab those entries and put them in one place. That would make more sense. It would make it more traceable. I gave the example of myself being in there three separate times with three separate directorships, which are from very different points in time. If the entries were all in one place, it would be a neater and tidier way of logging them.
The Chair
Does the Minister wish to speak again? No, okay.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Abolition of certain local registers
Amendment proposed: 69, in schedule 2, page 148, line 40, at end insert—
“167GA Unique identification number for directors
(1) On receipt of notification of a person becoming a director, the registrar must allocate that director a unique identification number, unless such a number has already been allocated to that person.
(2) Any information supplied to the registrar under or by virtue of this Act about a person who has been allocated a unique identification number under subsection (1) must include that number.”—(Alison Thewliss.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Kevin Hollinrake
The clause would make amendments to the Companies Act 2006 to streamline filing obligations and remove unnecessary burdens, and to provide more protection of personal information than is currently the case. Clause 50 will remove the option for a company to elect to hold its register of directors or its register of people with significant control solely on the central register—the one held by the registrar.
Currently, when companies elect to hold their registers at Companies House, personal information, such as a date of birth, is publicly available on the register. That is because the election regime replicates what would happen if a member of the public asked to view the registers at the company’s registered office. When the election regime is removed, clause 51 will ensure that date of birth information is protected from public inspection, in the same way as dates of birth from non-elected filings are protected. The clause also provides that information such as dates of birth provided prior to 10 October 2015 will not receive automatic protection in the same way. Other provisions in the Bill will enable individuals to apply to protect historic information when it still appears on the public register.
The clause will amend the Companies Act 2006 to streamline and protect personal information of individuals that could otherwise increase the risk of identity theft or other fraud. It clarifies the extent of that protection, which, with some exceptions, will be applied to documents received from 10 October 2015.
Seema Malhotra
As the Minister mentioned, the clause amends the Companies Act in relation to individuals’ dates of birth and when they can be restricted from disclosure. The measures are important for occasions when the disclosure of someone’s date of birth would be inappropriate or unnecessary, so we support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Filing obligations of micro-entities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
This group of clauses will improve the quality and value of financial information on the companies register.
Clause 52 will require a micro-entity company to file both its balance sheet and profit and loss account with the registrar. It removes the current option available for a micro-entity to omit—or fillet out—its profit and loss account when filing its accounts with Companies House. Clause 53 will require small companies to file a profit and loss account, and a directors’ report, when filing their accounts with the registrar. Clause 54 ensures that clauses 52 and 53 operate as intended by amending references to the existing small company and micro-entity filing obligations in the Companies Act 2006.
Clause 55 requires any companies seeking an audit exemption to provide an additional statement from their directors. That will help to deter fraudulent under-reporting by companies and, where a company director has provided a false statement, provide additional enforcement evidence that can make it easier to successfully prosecute directors. Finally, clause 56 removes the option for small companies, including micro-entities, to prepare and file a set of abridged accounts.
Collectively, the clauses will ensure that more financial information for micro-entities is publicly available on the register, helping to inform better business and lending decisions. They will ensure that the company’s turnover—one of the three eligibility criteria that determine the size of the company and what it must file with the registrar—is publicly available. The clauses will also provide greater transparency of micro-entity accounts, which will help to deter fraudulent or criminal activity and make such activity more easily identifiable.
It is crucial that we strike the right balance between transparency and burdens on business. As micro-entities already file a copy of their annual accounts for other purposes—tax returns with His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, for example—the changes will not be overly burdensome for them.
Seema Malhotra
I thank the Minister for his comments. We welcome the measures in these clauses.
As the Minister said, clause 52 updates the filing requirements for micro-entities. A company is a micro-entity if it has any two of the following criteria: a turnover of £632,000 or less, a balance sheet of £316,000 or less, or 10 or fewer employees. The technical definition of a small company is any company that has any two of the following criteria: a turnover of £10.2 million or less, a turnover of £5.1 million or less, and 50 employees or less. Although we use the terms micro and small entities—in terms of the scale and size of other companies, that is significant—they can be larger than the terms indicate. That increased transparency from clause 52 is important.
We welcome clause 52 as a reflection of the fact that insufficient information is filed from those micro-entities to give a true and fair view of their financial position. The minimal disclosure requirements at present have also made them attractive to fraudsters who want to present a false picture.
There were 1.3 million micro-entity accounts filed in 2019-20. It is the most common choice for account filings. The Government’s December 2020 consultation on improving the quality and value of financial information on the register noted:
“Fraud investigation bodies have reported that micro-entity accounts are often used by companies that are investigated in money laundering cases.”
It is therefore absolutely right to tighten things up and seek greater transparency in the accounts and financial positions of companies’ activities. However, that raises the important question of whether any further work might be needed on micro-entities, although that question is for another debate.
On roll-out time, the Bill’s impact assessment suggests on page 76 that familiarisation time will be needed to get micro-entities up to speed with the changes, but there should not be significant additional costs, as companies already collect and submit additional information to HMRC in tax filings. In the light of what we and the Minister have said, we want moves that stop the criminal behaviour, but do not impede ordinary, good, productive and lawful business, so the measures are welcome. We want to see them come into force as soon as is practicable. The Secretary of State may make a determination later about when to bring the requirements into force, but perhaps the Minister will indicate today when he expects the Government will want the new requirements on micro-entities to become operational.
We welcome clause 52 as a necessary means to ensure that small businesses that are not micro-entities file full accounts to the registrar—which, again, will increase transparency and the availability of information. Clause 54’s consequential amendments seek to ensure that clauses 52 and 53 function as intended.
I want to make a few comments on clause 55. Perhaps the Minister can clarify the exemptions from audit requirements under this clause. When a company seeks an exemption from the requirement to have its accounts audited—for example, because it is a small company with £10 million or less in turnover—the clause would require directors to make a statement confirming that the company qualifies for an exemption.
I would appreciate it if, in the interest of the robustness of legislation, the Minister would expand on the clause and clarify what qualifies a company to have an exemption in that regard. The Government brought in an increase in audit exemption levels, effectively making more companies eligible for exemptions, and that goes back to the 2013 EU accounting directive, which sought to simplify requirements on companies submitting accounts and gave member states the flexibility to increase the small company accounting and audit exemption thresholds. Is there likely to be any review of those thresholds? Perhaps the Minister can enlighten me as to whether there is clear demand for that.
In the light of current circumstances—the clamping down on, and growth in, economic crime, as well as the transformations we will have seen in the last six, eight or 10 years—will the Minister tell us whether the high thresholds brought in by the Government have reduced audits and the transparency of information on the register? Have they affected the extent to which information filed by companies is trusted? Is the Minister interested in considering whether the levels for audit exemption are acceptable and right in the context of current economic crime, or does he think, in the light of the opportunities presented by the Bill, that there is reason to look at any of that again?
We welcome clause 56 as a necessary provision for improving the accuracy of information in relation to small companies.
Kevin Hollinrake
I will check the implementation date of the new rules around filing full accounts and let the hon. Member know in detail.
In terms of the audit exemption, the threshold is currently £10.2 million. We will always keep that under review, because we are trying to ease the burden on business while ensuring that nothing untoward is happening. Having been through the process myself, I know that auditing a business is very extensive, exhaustive and expensive. It is absolutely right that we seek to reduce burdens on business whenever we can, while also putting appropriate checks and balances in place.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 53 to 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 57
Confirmation statements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
The clauses in this group will help the registrar to fulfil their new objectives, as set out in clause 1. Clause 57 obliges companies to notify the registrar of additional information that is required to be delivered under new requirements brought in via the Bill. Companies will have to do this before, or at the same time as, delivering their annual confirmation statement. The new information of which companies will have to notify the registrar will be to confirm the company’s lawful purpose. If it is the company’s first confirmation statement, as it is a newly incorporated company, the company will need to notify the registrar of any changes that have happened between its application for incorporation and the incorporation taking place.
The annual confirmation statement is a fundamental aspect of that data. It provides an opportunity for a company to focus its attention on the statutory requirements that it has to meet, and it also re-establishes the benchmark against which a company is assessed by others, including the registrar.
Clause 58 ensures that the registrar will have up-to-date information that will allow them to uphold the investigations and sanctions regime more effectively. The accuracy of the information provided in the confirmation statement is obviously of key importance, given that making false statements, or failing to deliver confirmation statements, may result in an offence being committed.
Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)
What happens if it is a false statement? Who will uncover that?
Dame Margaret Hodge
I ask the question for a reason. I did not intervene during the previous debate, but the Minister might know—I certainly do—that thousands and thousands of microbusinesses are supposed to put their annual accounts in to HMRC, but do not do so, and nobody ever goes after them. There therefore may be thousands and thousands of businesses that put in false statements. Given the anti-regulatory stance that the Minister has displayed today, I am just interested in knowing who will actually check the statements and what will happen then.
Kevin Hollinrake
I am very disappointed that the right hon. Lady regards me as anti-regulatory. I want a system that allows good, bona fide businesses to go about their daily business without unnecessary checks and balances. We cannot control everything that goes on in our society but, in the main, businesses are lawful, and undertake lawful and legitimate commercial activity.
If the right hon. Lady expects a world in which we check every single filing, nobody will be doing any commercial work in our society. The only people we will have will then be box-checkers, and where would the tax revenue come from to pay for all the things that both she and I want in our society?
We must have a proportionate balance between regulation, the cost of resourcing regulators and the needs of law enforcement agencies. That is why our belief, which I know is not entirely hers, is that we need to take an intelligence-based approach to regulation. That is the most effective way to do it.
Seema Malhotra
I think we all agree that we do not want to do things that impede lawful activity—that is not a matter for debate, really. The question is whether the systems will be strong enough. They do not have to be burdensome; there are ways in which systems can have automatic checks, and be underpinned by clear roles and responsibilities. The question of who would know whether there are errors in a confirmation statement, and how that would be checked, is quite an important one for ensuring that we are not—
Kevin Hollinrake
I do not disagree. I agree with the hon. Lady about automation, but checking every single document and every single file would be ludicrously burdensome, because 99% of those filings would be legitimate documents. I speak as somebody who has been an authorised person under the FCA, so I know how many checks, and double-checks, someone in such a position has to make. The vast majority of people who the FCA regulates do a bona fide, legitimate job.
We are trying to find the people who are not doing so, and what we are trying to do through the Bill is to allow the sharing of information and the cross-referencing of information to identify all the red flags—the hon. Lady talks about automation—and then trigger alerts that can be investigated. I think that we all agree about that, and that is the approach that we are taking.
As I was saying, these measures will all ensure that companies, once formed, will reassert to the registrar via their annual confirmation statement that the company’s intended future activities are lawful.
Clause 59 will oblige a company to notify the registrar via its first annual confirmation statement of a change in its principal business activity if such a change takes place between the company’s application to be incorporated and the incorporation taking place. That addresses the fact that there is currently no duty to notify the registrar during the incorporation process. This new obligation builds on the existing obligation in section 853C of the Companies Act 2006, whereby companies have to notify the registrar of a change in principal business activities via their annual confirmation statement.
Clause 60 amends section 853J(4) of the Companies Act so that the framing of criminal offences is consistent with similar provisions in this Bill. It also makes the same amendment to section 853L(1), which concerns the offence of failing to submit a confirmation statement on time. It will clarify that every officer of the company who is in default can commit the offence, as well as every director of the company. It also corrects an irregularity with the framing of the offence, which currently imposes strict liability on all the company’s directors and secretaries, regardless of whether they are in default—in other words, regardless of whether they authorised, permitted, participated in, or failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent, the contravention. I hope right hon. and hon. Members agree that it is important that these measures reach the statute book.
Seema Malhotra
We welcome clause 57 which, as the Minister said, prescribes the company’s duty to notify the registrar about certain events and provide certain information in advance of and at the same time as the delivery of the annual confirmation statement. That is obviously very important.
We have already debated some of the issues that clause 58 addresses. It is obviously an important clause, and the Minister has outlined that the approach is to hope for accuracy, based on risk assessments and red flags. We understand that, but it still does not feel as strong as we need it to be. It does not feel clear and strong on detecting issues, and it does not give the registrar a clear expectation of what the Minister intends. It felt a little like the Minister was just hoping that everything would work out. We should be clearer about what steps should be taken on detection, prevention and enforcement, and ensure that that is as strong as possible through the passage of the Bill. That is incredibly important, because we know that those are weak areas.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill made the very important point that we need to clarify what is expected of the registrar. They will be subject to many different demands, and in some ways it will make their life easier if they see in Hansard that there is a clear expectation from the Government, the Minister and the House about what is to be done. That would aid the call for greater resources, as it is frankly a way of making savings from enforcement later, and increasing the speed of detection will considerably lower the cost of economic crime. I hope that the Minister recognises that I am putting these comments and questions to him in the hope of detecting ways of tightening up the message about what we expect, in order to better implement the Bill and its stated goals.
We welcome clause 59, which I think we referred to earlier. Clause 60 will align terminology around existing offences relating to confirmation statements. The Minister outlined the detail of that. I raise a similar question as previously, because I seek clarity from him on what it will mean in practice for companies that breach the new provisions around confirmation statements. What is the result of failure to comply with the provisions, and who will be held to account? Clarifying that would be quite helpful. It would also be helpful to understand whether the Bill will allow for retrospective penalties, should information on the confirmation statements turn out to be misleading, and perhaps purposefully misleading.
Kevin Hollinrake
The hon. Lady raises some good points on retrospective penalties. I will find out that information and come back to her.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 58 to 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61
Identity verification of persons with significant control
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 27—Reporting requirement (identity verification)—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the progress of establishing identity verification procedures in relation to proposed officers and persons with initial significant control.
(2) The first report must be published within three months of this Act being passed.
(3) A further report must be published at least once a year.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of each report before Parliament.”
This new clause would add a requirement on the Secretary of State to report on the progress of establishing identity verification procedures for proposed company officers and persons with initial significant control.
Kevin Hollinrake
I am aware that hon. Members have tabled amendments in relation to ID verification in the groupings to follow, but I will first speak to the first clause in this chapter. Clause 61 introduces requirements for people who own or control companies to undergo ID verification to improve the reliability of information on the company register. The UK was the first G20 nation to introduce a public beneficial ownership register of companies: the people with significant control register, which has more than 5.8 million entries about people with significant control over entities on the company register. The clause will apply ID verification requirements to persons with significant control and relevant legal entities on the register. It is a vital clause.
If a company has not voluntarily delivered a statement confirming that the identity of a person with significant control is verified, the registrar will direct such a person with significant control to make an identity verification statement within 14 days. A company might be owned or controlled not only by individuals, but by legal entities—for example, other companies. To be a registrable relevant legal entity, a legal entity must meet certain conditions, and be subject to its own disclosure requirements. It is registrable in relation to a company if it is the first legal entity in the company’s ownership chain.
Where there is a registrable relevant legal entity in relation to a company, and the company has not voluntarily made an identity verification statement for that RLE, the registrar will direct such a relevant legal entity. That direction will require the entity to make a statement within 28 days, naming its verified relevant officer. The statement by the RLE must include a statement made by the relevant officer confirming that they are a relevant officer for the entity. That will prevent individuals from being notified without their consent or any relation to the entity.
The clause creates a duty on persons with significant control to maintain their verified status as long as they are registered with the registrar. The RLEs will also be under a duty to maintain a verified relevant officer as long as they are registered with the registrar. That is to ensure that a verified individual is always traceable for each RLE. Failure to comply with the registrar’s directions or to maintain a verified status is an offence under the clause.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Robertson. I think it is safe to say that we are coming to one of the most significant and consequential aspects of the Bill.
Clauses 61 to 67 take up a full 15 pages and provide a framework for the verification of the identities of individuals listed on the register of people with significant control, whom I will henceforth refer to as PSCs. Since its launch in 2016, the PSC register—more colloquially described as the register of beneficial owners of UK companies—has made important progress towards corporate transparency, but it remains very much a work in progress.
Much of this Bill is rightly concerned with closing loopholes in existing legislation and, as it stands, the PSC system has loopholes that are big enough to drive a coach and horses through. Even if we could rely on the good faith of all those who register, we would still be stuck with the fundamental problem of the 25% ownership threshold. The ease with which that can be used to circumvent the registration requirement—for instance, simply by splitting ownership shares between four people, who may all be family members—has been extensively discussed and is well documented.
During last week’s evidence sessions, my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking rightly drew attention to the case for a threshold set much lower than 25%. In response, Professor Elspeth Berry argued that although the threshold should certainly be lowered, even
“a zero percentage could be considered.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 27 October 2022; c. 103, Q194.]
That is the case, given how many different and probably more relevant ways there are of measuring corporate control in the modern business environment.
The Government will likely argue that 25% is a widely used international standard, but we should be clear about what that means. Nowhere is it suggested in any of the international frameworks to which the UK is a party that 25% ownership is anything more than an example of how a country might seek to define beneficial ownership. In fact, many jurisdictions set ownership thresholds much lower than that. Some jurisdictions—including Belize and Jersey, which are not exactly known as paragons of corporate transparency—use a 10% threshold. The Government’s failure to take the opportunity provided by the Bill to revisit the definition of beneficial ownership is, to put it mildly, a disappointment.
I will now look more specifically at ID verification. Clause 61 is the first of a series of clauses in which the Government enable new powers to be introduced to ensure that information on PSCs can be verified. Subsequent clauses stipulate that full details of the verification regime will be set out in regulations at a later date.
The Opposition find the absence of substantial details on verification procedures in the Bill perplexing. It is now more than three years since the Government launched the first of what turned out to be no fewer than four separate consultations on proposed reforms to Companies House, which included proposed ID verification powers. It is not at all clear why, after all this apparent effort, Ministers are still unable to set out specific plans in legislation. Perhaps the reason is that they have been struggling to make a decision and stick to it.
In the first consultation document back in May 2019, the Government stated fairly unambiguously that they believed that Companies House should be given responsibilities for ID checks. That view was reiterated in subsequent consultation documents published in February 2021, which seemed to indicate that the Business Department is better at flogging a dead horse than at drafting legislation. More than a year passed before the Government finally published a White Paper. By that time, Ministers appeared to have gone lukewarm on handing responsibility for ID checks to Companies House, with a shift in emphasis towards outsourcing the checks to third parties that are collectively known as trust or company service providers. Somewhat confusingly, they are now referred to in the Bill as “authorised corporate service providers”, or ACSPs.
That is extremely problematic, for a whole range of reasons. First and foremost, TCSPs represent a highly fragmented sector, making supervision of their activities very difficult indeed. Some may be supervised by professional bodies—for example, if they provide accountancy or legal services—while others may be supervised by HMRC. In some cases, there is no supervision at all, leading RUSI’s Helena Wood to compare the sector to the wild west. Ministers now propose to place an enormous amount of trust, faith and responsibility on the shoulders of TCSPs, about which they know very little.
Speaking to the Treasury Committee earlier this year, Graeme Biggar, the then director-general of the National Economic Crime Centre, said:
“We are developing a plan with HMRC and the Treasury to have both more supervision of, and more enforcement against, company formation agents. We are on it, but it is not the most developed of our plans. We have really got to do more work on that.”
It would be excellent if the Minister could give us an update on the progress of the work that Mr Biggar referred to in that evidence.
As things stand, it is hard to imagine what the Government were thinking with the proposals in these clauses. This is not just a case of sharing responsibilities for supervision between the public and private sectors, as is already the case in the legal, accountancy and some other sectors; this is about outsourcing a set of tasks to the least regulated, least understood and potentially least reliable part of the entire financial services industry. The Government’s own assessment in their national risk assessment was that TCSPs pose a high risk of being used for money laundering purposes. A previous risk assessment said:
“Ineffective AML supervision leads to inadequate compliance with the rules, and low and poor quality reporting of suspicious activity”.
For at least the past seven or eight years, official reports and media coverage have documented the involvement of UK-based TCSPs in the efforts of oligarchs, many of whom are Russian, to conceal their wealth in opaque webs of corporate structures. It should be clear by now that the Opposition have serious concerns about the proposal to outsource ID checks to the sector. We have therefore tabled new clause 27, which would require annual reporting on the progress towards establishing verification procedures, in order to probe the Government’s rationale for the policy. I hope that the Minister will take seriously the concerns I have just outlined, and that due consideration will be given to whether the policy is really in the interests of tackling economic crime and improving corporate transparency.
May I just ask you for clarification, Mr Robertson? Do you wish me to stop there or—
Stephen Kinnock
I would be very happy to pause and provide the Minister with an opportunity to respond, if he wishes to do so, on clause 61.
The Chair
As you wish. I will bring Alison Thewliss in next, but we can come back to you, Mr Kinnock.
Alison Thewliss
I wholeheartedly support Labour’s new clause. There is an awful lot more that needs to be done to tighten up the measure on verification. Nick Van Benschoten, in his evidence, said:
“On the verification measures, one of the key points is that they fall short of minimum industry standards. Verification of identity is necessary but not sufficient. A key thing we have noted is that the Bill does not provide for order-making powers to allow Companies House to verify the status of directors or beneficial owners, and for that sort of requirement on company information agents and so on. That seems an odd gap.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 7, Q3.]
I wholeheartedly agree with that. It is the key part of the Bill. If we are not going to verify people on the register, there is almost no point in having the legislation. It is the verification that is crucial.
Hand in hand with that are the fines for not complying with the verification. I draw the Minister’s attention, again, to the people with significant control over Scottish limited partnerships. There has been one fine of £210 since the rules came into place. That is no kind of deterrent whatsoever. The rules need to be here, the verification needs to be right, and the sanctions for not complying must be enforced. I would say that even the sanctions are far too low.
Leaving trust and company service providers to verify identity leaves the door wide open to abuse. There is already abuse, and the Government’s position in the Bill is to continue to allow that to happen. As the hon. Member for Aberavon said, trust and company service providers have been identified in numerous Government documents as being the gap that allows money laundering and international crime. That cannot be allowed to continue in the Bill. If the Government leave the door open for the trust and company service providers, they will continue to abuse the system and the register will continue to be full of absolute guff.
I raised the issue of verification in the House, albeit, I appreciate, with a different Minister, the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster). He suggested that a decision had not yet been made on how the verification system would work. My suggestion was that it go through the UK Government’s existing verification scheme, which is used for passports, driving licences and tax returns, because that system is already up and running. The response suggested that that had not yet been decided.
However, it was drawn to my attention today that Companies House has already put out a tender for a verification system. A tender went out on 10 October and closed on 24 October for an “authentication digital delivery partner”, looking for people to come and work on this system. I am curious to know why, when we have not yet got this legislation in place, the Government have tendered the contract and closed the application process for the company to build the system.
I would be grateful for some clarification from the Minister on exactly what the status is of that £3.7 million contract, which Companies House has already put out to tender. Why has it gone out before the Bill has concluded if Companies House does not know what it is building yet, and when amendments are still being tabled? I appreciate that the Government want to move at speed, but putting the cart before the horse in this way seems quite wrong.
We would like the verification to be strengthened, but if the Government have already instructed a contractor on what it will build, why are we even here this afternoon?
Dame Margaret Hodge
I seek your guidance, Mr Robertson: we are talking about clause 60, are we not?
Dame Margaret Hodge
Yes; the others come later.
After the excellent speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon, I will speak briefly. I have two things to say. We will come back to the issue of shareholders, data and the threshold, which is really important, and I will certainly come back to the issue of trust or company service providers, because Labour Members all think that it is key to get that right if we are to have any credibility about the integrity of the list.
I want to talk about new clause 27. The Minister has said a number of times that he does not want to impede business. I do not think any Opposition Member wants to impede business either. We want to have smart regulation, not too much regulation. The purpose of this debate is to ensure that the regulation is indeed smart. At the moment, there are too many flaws.
The Chair
For clarification, we will not vote on new clause 27 until later in the proceedings, and probably not today. We are discussing it now. In view of the fact that new clause 27 has already been raised, would you like to speak to it now, Mr Kinnock?
Stephen Kinnock
I have made the points that I wish to make about new clause 27.
Kevin Hollinrake
As an overriding point, we all know how important the integrity of the ID verification system is. I completely agree with that and we need there to be confidence in it.
On the point raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, it is not right that a tender has gone out already. A request for information has been put out to determine some of the characteristics of the suppliers to learn what services they provide, but a tender has not gone out. Once determined, the ID verification system will be brought to the House to be approved by affirmative resolution. There will be opportunities for debate at that time to make sure it is fit for purpose, both in the framework and how it will be operated.
On the comments the hon. Member for Aberavon made about persons of significant control, first, I think he makes the exact case that we would make. A 25% threshold is pretty much the global standard, but even if it were lowered, people could find ways around it—even if there were a 0% threshold, as was suggested by Professor Elspeth Berry. That is why the definition of a person of significant control is not solely about the percentage of the shareholding of a company. There are five definitions, including one I that believe will interest the hon. Gentleman, which is somebody who, other than by shareholding,
“has the right to exercise or actually exercises significant influence or control”
over a company. Therefore, there could be zero shareholding and they would still be a person of significant control. How is that enforced? If directors allow that to happen and do not declare that they have a person of significant control, they are liable for a fine and a custodial sentence of up to two years. We do deal with that in a reasonable way.
Some valid concerns have been expressed about company formation agents. I am happy to write to the National Crime Agency to ask what it has done about them. However, not all company service providers are company formation agents; there is a distinction. A company service provider may well be a large accountancy practice, such as Deloitte, PwC or KPMG. The hon. Member for Aberavon stated that such organisations know very little about their clients and offer a blanket service, but I do not think that is fair. My accountants can verify my ID and they know a great deal about me, I can promise the hon. Gentleman.
Of course we must make sure that the system is robust, and I acknowledge that there are some concerns about the supervision of those registered as supervised for money-laundering purposes. Of course we must be sure that the system is right. As hon. Members are aware, I think, the Treasury is looking at means of improving the regime to ensure that the supervision is much better, and it needs to be. The difficulty is—we will have more debate about the issue in forthcoming sittings—whether we want to get everything perfect in the system before we start ID verification, or whether we start ID verification. In my view, it is essential that we get that ID verification done as quickly as possible. Waiting until the AML supervision regime is absolutely perfect would be a mistake, in my view. The two things should happen concurrently.
I understand the reasoning behind new clause 27. I completely agree with the idea of giving confidence to Parliament that the matters are being taken forward. I am happy to commit to return to Parliament to communicate by whatever means is preferable—written ministerial statement or oral statement—what progress has been made to ensure that Parliament has the information that it needs to hold Companies House and other agencies to account.
The Chair
The Minister is finished. If someone else wishes to speak, they can stand in the normal way and indicate.
Dame Margaret Hodge
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will return to Parliament, but new clause 27 is designed to ensure that there is an annual report to Parliament. That means that our successors—certainly mine—will be able to hold Companies House to account over time. He knows that accountability is absolutely vital to ensuring the integrity of the system.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Procedure etc for verifying identity
Stephen Kinnock
I beg to move amendment 108, in clause 62, page 47, leave out lines 14 and 15.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 109, in clause 62, page 47, leave out lines 18 to 20.
Amendment 78, in clause 62, page 47, line 20, at end insert—
‘(2A) No verification statement may be made by an authorised corporate service provider until the Treasury has laid before Parliament a report confirming that the Treasury’s review of the UK’s anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regulatory and supervisory regime has been completed.’
This amendment prevents an authorised corporate service provider from making a verification statement prior to the completion of the Treasury’s review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.
Amendment 107, in clause 62, page 47, line 20, at end insert—
‘(2A) The regulations must make provision for the evidence required to verify an individual’s identity for the purposes of subsection (2)(a) to include—
(a) an identity document with a photograph of the individual’s face; and
(b) an identity document issued by a recognised official authority.
(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A)(b) above, “a recognised official authority” includes—
(a) a department or agency of the UK government;
(b) a department or agency of any of the devolved nations;
(c) a department or agency of the government of another country;’.
Amendment 110, in clause 62, page 47, leave out lines 34 to 37.
Amendment 111, in clause 62, page 47, line 43, leave out from “registrar” to the end of line 44.
Amendment 112, in clause 62, page 48, leave out lines 4 to 26.
Clause stand part.
Stephen Kinnock
I have spoken at some length about the Opposition’s concerns about the provisions in clauses 62 and 63 to authorise third-party trust or corporate service providers—or authorised corporate service providers, as they are described in the Bill—to carry out ID checks on the Government’s behalf. Amendments 108, 109 and 110 to 112 would simply remove those provisions from the Bill in the hope of prompting a rethink by the Government.
I should like to explain the thinking behind the amendments tabled by me and my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston. The purpose of amendment 107 goes back to what I have said about the surprising lack of specific details on the proposed verification process. As I have said, it is not as though the Government have not had enough time to think through what procedures might be necessary; four consultations have already taken place on the topic. Amendment 107 would incorporate into the Bill requirements for some form of official identification, including photo ID, to be submitted to the registrar. That should not be controversial. In fact, the amendment would merely reflect international best practice guidelines, including those published by the Financial Action Task Force, the IMF and the World Bank, among others, and the commitments made in the Government’s own White Paper.
Dame Margaret Hodge
It is a pleasure to rise to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson, and I do so to speak to amendment 78. The amendment is part of a batch of amendments that we will get to later. I hope that hon. Members will bear with me if I speak longer on amendment 78, so that amendments 79, 82 and 83 will not require a long explanation.
This is one of the most important series of amendments that we have placed before the Committee. The purpose is to ensure that we close any loopholes, so that we do not find ourselves back in debate in a couple of years’ time, bemoaning the fact that we failed to create watertight legislation and that we do not have the information and data that we need to hold businesses to account.
I stress that our aim is not to be bureaucratic. The last thing anybody wants is bureaucratic regulation. However, if we do not have effective, smart regulation, we will not achieve the objective, which is shared across the House, of bearing down on illicit finance and on the abuse of our corporate structure system by ne’er-do-wells. Today, we are paying the price of those who came before us, from both political parties, who thought that by simply deregulating the whole of the financial services sector, they would encourage growth in the economy. They did encourage growth, but they also made us a destination of choice for too much illicit finance. That has come into focus with the war in Ukraine and the role of Russians in bringing their financing here. That money is used to fund Putin and his allies in the attack on Ukraine.
The Government have decided to outsource responsibility for checking the unique identification of beneficial owners. I can see why they have done so. It is quicker to do it that way than to build up the necessary resources in Companies House. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon, I would have had more confidence if we had done it in house, but that was the Government’s decision. The purpose of my amendment is not to challenge that decision. However, we need to trust the corporate service providers. We need to trust both the professionals and the others involved, whether they are lawyers or accountants, to do the job properly and honestly. At present, confidence and trust are not there.
I thought that the Government were on the same page on this issue. From all the leaks, and from all the information and intelligence about how illicit wealth from all the kleptocracies has reached our shores, I thought that they understood the role played by the TCSPs. I thought they understood the role that the TCSPs play, and therefore shared our concern that we need to get that regulatory framework right before we unleash a new system that, if it is not right, could lead to us peopling the new Companies House register with dud information that we do not want.
James Daly (Bury North) (Con)
I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a practising solicitor and a partner in a firm of solicitors. The right hon. Lady has essentially said that everybody involved in the legal sector and financial advisers are potentially dishonest. They absolutely are not. The vast amount of people involved in the sector are honest, decent people who have a lot of regulation and try their damnedest to abide by all of it. The picture that the right hon. Lady paints is not correct.
Dame Margaret Hodge
That is not what I said. The hon. Gentleman may have chosen to interpret it that way—
Dame Margaret Hodge
No, I did not. I said that none of the professions has sufficient supervisory or regulatory capabilities, policies or practices in place to pull out the bad apples. I have nowhere ever stated that that applies to everyone, but I hope the hon. Gentleman agrees that the extent of people setting up shell companies —we are talking largely about shell companies—as vehicles to move illicit finance, whether through drugs, kleptocrats or people trafficking, is shocking.
Let me tell the hon. Gentleman my most egregious story, which has been mentioned—the Savaro story. We had this terrible explosion in Lebanon, with hundreds of people killed and lots of property destroyed. We were told that it was fertiliser held in the warehouse that was going to Mozambique. A couple of months after the explosion, I was rung up by a Reuters journalist with whom I have worked down the years, who said, “Did you know it was a UK limited company—Savaro Ltd?” He went on to say that not only was it a UK limited company, but, interestingly enough, it had told HMRC it was dormant, so it had not filled in its tax returns. It was registered in the name of a company service provider, a woman who lived in Cyprus. There were two lies in the system: a lie about the company service provider, and lying to HMRC.
I gave the usual quote and was then overwhelmed by people from Lebanon contacting me, including the Bar Association, all of whom were trying to find out the origins of what had happened. It then emerged that three Ukrainian Syrians—this was before the Ukrainian war—were the real owners. There was no way the fertiliser was going to be used in Mozambique; it was going to Assad to drop as barrel bombs on the civilian population of Syria. That is the sort of shocking outcome that comes from lack of proper regulatory control.
Kevin Hollinrake
I will deal first with amendment 78, tabled by the right hon. Member for Barking. As she knows, it would place a restriction on the permitted ID verification processes set out elsewhere in the Bill. It would allow a person such as a company director or beneficial owner seeking to verify their identity through an authorised corporate service provider to do so only once His Majesty’s Treasury had completed its review of the AML supervisory regime and laid the report before Parliament. I think that if the right hon. Lady thinks about it, she will probably want to go further than that, based on her remarks. I think she wants to go ahead only once the AML regime is properly supervised generally, not just to the point where we have the report from the Treasury. We are potentially talking about getting some way down the line before we are in a situation where she would be happy with the regime.
I take on board many of the comments the right hon. Lady made. Parts of the regime are not operating as they should—I quite agree. We absolutely need to fix that. As with other amendments proposed today, I am sympathetic to the intention; however, I think that there better ways to do it.
The practical effect of the amendment would be to place a temporary restriction on the functions that legitimate businesses may carry out. That restriction is unrelated to and may be unaffected by the publication of the review to which it is linked. It is anomalous and unfair that those businesses affected will still be subject to their current regulatory obligations to carry out ID checks. However, they will be prevented from making a statement reporting to Companies House that such checks have taken place, effectively delaying the whole regime. I also draw attention to the impact of the right hon. Lady’s amendment on those people who use agents to manage their interests. I accept that some are shady characters, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North stated, the overwhelming majority are not.
Alison Thewliss
The Home Office report, “National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2020,” states:
“Company formation and related professional services are therefore a key enabler or gatekeeper of”
trade-based money laundering activity. Should that not raise more concerns for the Minister?
Kevin Hollinrake
The hon. Lady is mixing up two different things. I am not saying that some company formation agents are not shady—I have just said that. However, not all service providers are company formation agents. Many are bona fide solicitors or accountants that are household names. I think we need to keep this in perspective. The hon. Lady cites statistics on the capability of some of the sector in terms of proper supervision. According to OPBAS, 50% of professional body supervisors were “fully effective”. I think that figure should be much higher, but in its opinion 50% are fully effective, so it is not as if there are not some actors in this area that are doing the job absolutely right.
Many company directors and people with significant control that are currently registered at Companies House, all of whom will need to verify their identity under the transitional provisions post enactment, would prefer to do so by using their professional adviser. They will suddenly find that their long-established legal adviser is deemed fit by the Government to verify their identity for money laundering purposes, but unfit to report that to Companies House. The amendment would therefore create considerable inconvenience to individuals, as well as to corporate service providers.
I can assure the right hon. Member for Barking and the Committee that I will urge my counterparts at the Treasury to bring forward their consultation as quickly as officials can ready it. I also point to the powers in the Bill that will enable the registrar to keep an audit trail of the activity of agents to support the work of supervisors both immediately and following any changes from the Treasury’s review. I hope my explanation has provided reassurance.
Let me touch on one or two of the right hon. Lady’s other comments. On the light-touch financial services regulation that I think she was suggesting was responsible for the global financial crisis, this is not deregulation. This is the opposite of deregulation; we are making regulations about the verification of ID. I would also point to the penalties for wrongdoing. In certain circumstances, if someone is found guilty of the aggravated offence of false filing under these rules—I think some of the examples she gave would constitute that—the sanction would be two years in jail. That is not for fraud, but for the false filing. There are real teeth to this legislation, which will reduce the likelihood of this stuff happening in future.
The right hon. Lady’s amendment would effectively delay the whole regime we are talking about. She talks about Transparency International. As I said earlier, TI welcomes the reforms to the operation of Companies House that will effectively help to prevent money launderers from abusing the UK’s system. We need to ensure that this happens as effectively as possible. I agree with many of the concerns that she raises, but it is wrong to delay implementation as she suggests.
I turn to amendments 107 to 112. I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The procedure for ID verification, including the evidence required, will be set out in secondary legislation under the powers in new section 1110B of the Companies Act 2006 inserted by clause 62 of the Bill. The regulations will set out the technical detail of ID verification procedures, which will reflect evolving industry standards and technological developments. The regulations can specify the process of ID verification and the evidence of identity that individuals will be required to provide when verifying their identity with the registrar. The amendments, particularly amendment 107, would limit the documents acceptable for the purposes of ID verification to photographic IDs issued by Government agencies and identity documents issued by a recognised official authority. That would exclude individuals who do not have a photo ID, such as a passport, from verifying their identity.
Stephen Kinnock
It is absolutely clear that our amendment 107 uses the words “to include”. We are not limiting anything. The amendment sets out what the minimum should be. Surely the Minister agrees that an identity document with a photograph of the individual’s face and an identity document issued by a recognised official authority should be the bare minimum we would want in the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
Under the cross-Government identity proving framework in “Good Practice Guide 45”—GPG 45—a combination of non-photographic documents, including Government, financial and social history documents, can be accepted to achieve a medium-level assurance of identity. That includes birth certificates, marriage certificates and recent utility bills. The framework, which also recognises ID documentation from authoritative sources, such as the financial sector or local authorities, is routinely used to build a picture of identity. Restricting that process by defining a recognised authority as a Department or agency could therefore inadvertently disenfranchise individuals from meeting ID verification requirements. I take the hon. Member’s point that the amendment seeks to include certain forms of ID, but it might not serve the purpose that he thinks it would.
Seema Malhotra
I understand what the Minister says in relation to GPG 45. I wonder whether he has considered that, in circumstances where an identity document with a photograph of the individual’s face may not be available, for whatever reason, in some way having a photograph of the person’s face is the most important thing. Is that something he has considered as part of verification checks?
Kevin Hollinrake
All these matters need to be considered in the round when we come to the further details of ID verification. I was simply pointing out some of the shortcomings of the amendment.
In certain circumstances, non-photographic verification should also be available, to ensure that the Companies House service meets digital inclusion drivers and accessibility requirements, as set out in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport digital identity and attributes trust framework. The Companies House service must also adhere to the public sector equality duty.
The ability to verify using a range of documentation will maximise the number of service users able to verify digitally or at all. Not having that route would prospectively drive users toward assisted digital or non-digital routes, resulting in additional burden, an impact on ease of doing business, and increased cost and resource. It would also lead to far higher rejection rates, impacting company incorporations and appointments. As I said, the vast majority of companies are law-abiding, and it is disproportionate to put this burden on them.
I turn to the amendments that seek to remove parts of clause 62. Again, I have sympathy with my colleagues who are concerned about the effectiveness of the AML regime. Indeed, the measures in the Bill requiring corporate service providers to register with Companies House are intended to support the AML regime—a point raised earlier by the right hon. Member for Barking. There is a requirement for corporate service providers to register with Companies House as well as an AML supervisor. We will know who corporate service providers are registered with, and we will be able to provide their supervisors with information that will enable them to do their job more effectively. Where corporate service providers fail to act effectively, the registrar will be able to suspend or de-authorise them.
The practical effect of the amendments would be to limit verification pathways to the registrar only, preventing verification by the AML regulated sector from being acceptable for the purposes of ID verification under the Companies Act. That is unnecessary, and it would come at the expense of people and businesses conducting their activities entirely legitimately.
About half of company formations are currently submitted by third parties, very many of which take their responsibilities seriously and are highly diligent in conducting ID verification checks. They include high street accountants, regional legal firms servicing small businesses, and so on. I am concerned that preventing third parties from being able to register with Companies House and verify identities would have disproportionate consequences for those entities, possibly driving business away from them. That effect would be particularly acute where ID verification is taken as a package with company formation and other services. It is not clear how the amendments would affect the ability of corporate service providers to deliver documents on behalf of their clients if they are not required to be authorised, for example if they represent limited partnerships.
Many company directors and people with significant control currently registered at Companies House, all of whom will need to verify their ID under the transitional provisions post enactment, would prefer to do so by using their professional adviser. They would suddenly find that their long-established legal adviser was deemed fit by the Government to verify their ID for money laundering purposes under the money laundering regulations but unfit to do so under the Companies Act. The amendments would therefore create considerable disruption for individuals as well as corporate service providers. I hope that my explanation has provided reassurance and that hon. Members will consider withdrawing their amendments.
I have already described the new powers provided by clause 62. Beyond that, it is important to note that the regulations provided for by the clause can also specify the records that authorised corporate service providers will be required to keep in connection with the verification or reverification of identity. Those record-keeping obligations on authorised corporate service providers can be enforced through offences for non-compliance. Additionally, the Secretary of State can confer, by regulation, discretion on the registrar about when an individual’s identity ceases to be verified. The individual will then be required to re-verify their identity. Finally, regulations under the new sections introduced by the clause will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Stephen Kinnock
No. I have made clear to the Minister that we are deeply unhappy, particularly with the failure to take on board the recommendations under amendment 107 and the very important points my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking made.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Similarly, I will take the matter up elsewhere during the course of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 63
Authorisation of corporate service providers
Dame Margaret Hodge
I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 63, page 49, line 38, at end insert—
“(3A) When an application is made under this section, the registrar may request evidence from HMRC that a fit and proper person test has been carried out on the applicant.”
This amendment allows the registrar to request evidence from HMRC that a fit and proper person test has been carried out on a person applying to be an authorised corporate service provider.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 82, in clause 63, page 49, line 45, at end insert—
“(ba) the registrar is satisfied—
(i) that HMRC has carried out a fit and proper person test on the applicant, and
(ii) that the applicant has met the requirement of the fit and proper person test, and”.
This amendment would mean that the registrar could only grant an application to become an authorised corporate service provider if satisfied that an applicant had passed HMRC’s fit and proper person test.
Government amendment 8.
Amendment 79, in clause 63, page 52, leave out from line 42 to line 28 on page 53, and insert—
“1098G Duty to provide information
(1) The registrar must carry out a risk assessment in relation to any authorised corporate service provider to establish whether the verification of identity by the authorised corporate service provider is likely to give rise to a risk of economic crime.
(2) If the risk assessment identifies a real risk of economic crime, the registrar may—
(a) require an authorised corporate service provider to provide information to the registrar; or
(b) require a person who ceases to be an authorised corporate service provider by virtue of section 1098F—
(i) to notify the registrar;
(ii) to provide the registrar with such information relating to the circumstances by virtue of which the person so ceased as may be requested by the registrar.
(3) The registrar may require information to be provided on request, on the occurrence of an event or at regular intervals.
(4) The circumstances that may be specified under section 1098F(2) or 1098G(1) (ceasing to be an authorised corporate service provider and suspension) include failure to comply with a requirement under subsection (1)(a).
(5) A person who fails to comply with a requirement to provide information under this section commits an offence.
(6) An offence under this section is punishable on summary conviction by—
(a) in England and Wales a fine;
(b) in Scotland and Northern Ireland a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale and, for continued contravention, a daily default fine not exceeding one-tenth of level 5 on the standard scale.”
This amendment would give the registrar the power to require information from an authorised corporate service provider. This would replace the current provision in the Bill giving the Secretary of State a power to make regulations requiring the provision of such information.
Dame Margaret Hodge
I will speak very briefly. It would be nice if the Minister could agree to the amendments, which are simply there to tighten up the oversight of the bodies. Amendments 81 and 82 are connected, and would force HMRC to do what it is not currently doing and carry out proper checks on the TCSPs and monitor them properly. Amendment 79 gives the registrar the power to require information. At the moment, as I read the Bill, there is no power for the registrar to challenge any of the information provided to her by any corporate service provider.
Kevin Hollinrake
I thank the right hon. Lady for her contribution. Clause 63 introduces a requirement for third party agents who wish to provide corporate services to clients, such as incorporating companies and filing documents on their behalf, to be registered with Companies House as authorised corporate service providers. ACSPs will be required to be supervised for the purposes of the money laundering requirements at all times and to notify the registrar of any changes to supervision.
I understand and am sympathetic to the intention behind amendments 81 and 82. They are driven by concern that the UK’s AML supervisory regime is not as robust as it could be. The Government recognise that, as do I. It is being addressed by my colleagues at the Treasury, who are responsible for the supervisory regime. I am afraid, however, that the amendments would duplicate some of the regulatory obligations of HMRC, the default supervisor for corporate service providers, by adding to the role of the registrar of companies. Their effect would be to make an agency of my Department responsible for overseeing activities of another Department. Not only is that duplicative, but it is wrong for one branch of Government to mark the homework of another branch. The most efficient means to address any issues with the quality of supervision is to tackle them at source, which is work that HM Treasury is undertaking on supervisory reform. I hope I have provided clarity on why the amendments are not needed.
On amendment 79, I understand the right hon. Lady’s concerns, but I consider the amendment to be unnecessary. As I have set out, under the measures in the Bill corporate service providers will need to confirm they are supervised for the purposes of the money laundering regulations, register with the registrar and, in the case of an individual, have their identity verified before they are allowed to form companies or registerable partnerships or to file on their behalf. The ID verification checks undertaken by those providers will achieve the same level of assurance of the claimed identity as those undertaken through the direct verification route.
Dame Margaret Hodge
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Yes or no: will Companies House be able to challenge at any point information given to it by a TCSP—an authorised provider?
Kevin Hollinrake
As I understand it, yes, Companies House will have the rights and powers to do that, though we do not at this point know to what extent it will do so. The right hon. Lady spoke in a previous debate about spot checks. It would seem sensible to take that kind of risk-based approach. Certainly, an AML supervisor would have that ability as well.
Providers will be required to declare that they have completed all the necessary identification checks when they interact with the registrar. Under money laundering regulations, all agents are required to retain records, and the registrar can request further information and ID verification checks if necessary, which I think answers the question that the right hon. Lady just asked. The agent will be committing an offence if they fail to carry out the ID checks to the required standards, or at all.
Under the Bill, proposed new sections 1098F and 1098G of the Companies Act 2006, as introduced by clause 63, will enable the registrar to suspended and deauthorise an authorised corporate service provider. The Bill will allow the registrar to maintain an audit trail of agent activity and to share it with supervisors. That will serve as a prompt to supervisors to up their game. I hope that that explanation has further clarified why the amendments are not needed.
Dame Margaret Hodge
I will look in detail later to ensure that what I asked for is there, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 8, in clause 63, page 50, line 23, leave out “registered or”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This amendment would mean that a firm applying to become an authorised corporate service provider would always have to state its principal office, rather than having the option of stating its registered office.
Stephen Kinnock
I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 63, page 53, leave out from line 29 to line 5 on page 54.
This amendment removes the provision enabling the authorisation of foreign corporate service providers.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 99, in clause 63, page 53, line 37, leave out from “that” to “similar” and insert,
“has been assessed by the National Crime agency as having”.
This amendment would ensure that the judgement as to whether foreign jurisdictions have similar regulatory regimes would be in the remit of the National Crime Agency, rather than in the view of the Secretary of State.
Amendment 100, in clause 63, page 53, line 40, at end insert—
“(2A) No person who is subject to a relevant regulatory regime under the law of a territory outside the United Kingdom may become an authorised corporate service provider if there is evidence that they have been disqualified from acting as a corporate service provider in any other jurisdiction”.
This amendment ensures no corporate service provider based outside the United Kingdom can become an Authorised Corporate Service Provider if there is evidence that they have been disqualified from acting as a corporate service provider abroad.
Stephen Kinnock
Once again, I find myself somewhat baffled by what the Government are trying to get into the Bill. The provisions set out under clause 63 in proposed new section 1098I of the Companies Act 2006 would enable the Secretary of State to allow foreign corporate service providers to operate in the UK, outside the scope of the UK’s money laundering regulations. There has been such extensive coverage in recent years of the risks that that would entail that I am really quite amazed that this needs to be reiterated yet again, but, in a nutshell, any UK laws attempting to regulate the activities of company formation agents, some of which have been responsible for the most flagrant examples of money laundering and sanctions evasion according to recent reports, could well be rendered essentially meaningless by these few clauses.
I say that because, if enacted as drafted, the clauses would appear to hand the Secretary of State a blanket power to disapply the money laundering regulations to foreign agents, on no one’s authority but his or her own. We need not look too far for examples of how profoundly damaging that could be to our own laws, given how significant the divergences often are between anti-money laundering regimes in countries such as the UK, and those in overseas jurisdictions better known for their corporate secrecy than anything else. In fact, we need look no further than the UK’s own overseas territories and Crown dependencies.
Any Member who is either unaware of or in denial about the scale of the problem would be well advised to read an enlightening, although also alarming, article published by Forbes on 9 March 2022. It had the somewhat provocative title of “Evading Sanctions: A How-To Guide For Russian Billionaires”. The piece documented the use of opaque offshore corporate structures to launder literally billions-worth of assets held by Russian oligarchs in the last few months and years. What is most troubling about the account is that most of the jurisdictions that it specifically mentions as hotbeds of money laundering and sanctions evasion are UK-linked territories. It will surprise nobody that the list includes the Isle of Man, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands—in other words, the usual suspects.
I do not wish to dwell too long on the overseas territories, because I am sure there will be further discussions in the Committee when we come to debate later sections of the Bill. The point the Opposition are trying to make is simply that if we are going to allow businesses of any kind to operate in the UK, we should expect them to abide by our laws. If we start letting them off the hook, for reasons that Ministers have entirely failed to make clear, we are complicit in their actions. In short, the proposed new section 1098I would have us trust in the infinite wisdom of the Secretary of State to allow corporate service providers to operate outside the law, on the basis that those powers would be used only in cases where the relevant overseas jurisdiction has a regulatory framework with “similar objectives” to the UK’s own rules.
I frankly do not trust the wisdom of the Secretary of State to use those powers for good. I do not believe that it is at all appropriate for such sweeping, ill-defined powers to be conferred on the present or any other Secretary of State. Although amendments 99 and 100 are probing amendments that give us the opportunity to seek answers from the Minister on these extraordinary provisions, amendment 98 is intended quite simply to remove the powers from the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
Once more, I am sympathetic to the aims of the amendments. They are driven by concerns that AML supervisory regimes outside the UK may not be robust. That is why the Government are specifying that authorised corporate service providers must be subject to the UK’s AML regime. Nevertheless, it is possible that in the future the UK may become a party to an agreement—a trade agreement, for example—that would require it to accept applications from abroad where that regime is equivalent to that of the UK. I do not think the example the hon. Gentleman gave of Russia would qualify in that regard.
The power in the Bill would facilitate such an agreement and remove the need for primary legislation to implement it. I draw Members’ attention to the wording already in the Bill, in proposed new section 1098I(2), introduced by clause 63. The UK would only become a party to an agreement if it could be assured that the regime was no less effective than its own. To be confident of that parity, the Secretary of State would need to establish that a regime was the equivalent of the UK’s by considering evidence and advice from a range of sources, including the National Crime Agency. That would include the consideration for whether prospective authorised corporate service providers are disqualified under the relevant legislation.
As the legislation makes clear, the power would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and parliamentary scrutiny. While I understand any concerns expressed, I hope that Members will withdraw the amendment.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the Minister for his response. As with the previous debate, I am not particularly happy with the position, and we will look for opportunities to return to the issue during the further passage of the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 63, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
General exemptions from identity verification: supplementary
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
We debated the clause at length in the previous groupings. I do not propose to repeat the arguments, and I hope the Committee agree with the Government’s position.
Stephen Kinnock
We have no further comments to add on clause 64.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 64 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)