Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 13 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Today, we will continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings. The selection for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and amendments have been grouped together for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any part of the debate.
Clause 19
Public interest considerations
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—
“(3AB) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the elimination of violence against women and girls, that due regard be given to circumstances arising from a person who seeks to enter or remain in the United Kingdom being a victim of violence against women and girls, including domestic abuse (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021).”
This amendment inserts a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s Article 8 rights is justified.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 104, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—
“(3B) In determining for the purposes of subsection (3A)(c) whether a person is of good character, the court or tribunal must apply the guidance issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the good character requirement in paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981, as that guidance has effect from time to time.”
This amendment would require the new “good character” consideration to be applied in the same way as the good character requirement for naturalisation as a British citizen.
Amendment 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.
This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.
Amendment 106, in clause 19, page 17, line 7, leave out “serious”.
This probing amendment would apply the “no weight” rule to private or family life established while a person is in any form of breach of a condition of their leave, not just a ‘serious’ breach.
Clause stand part.
Siân Berry
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. My amendment would introduce a public interest test for survivors of violence against women and girls, domestic abuse and sexual violence into the considerations. I will also speak to the matter of leaving out the clause. I will start with the clause and what it does.
The clause will fundamentally alter the balance that has long existed between article 8 rights and the public interest by restricting the courts’ ability to assess the individual circumstances of each case. Our courts and tribunals carefully balance the right to private and family life against the public interest in an effective immigration system. Our judiciary performs that task every day, helping to deliver justice, uphold the rule of law and guard against abuse. Yet the clause assumes that the balance is being struck wrongly, without the Government having demonstrated that. The main evidence is only a 2022 internal sample of Home Office decisions.
The existing statutory framework already strongly favours the public interest, in particular in deportation cases. While preserving the ability to consider individual circumstances, the clause will replace that with a more prescriptive framework. Here are my views on the main changes in the clause: first, it will require courts to predict whether a person will remain financially independent. That is an inherently speculative exercise, because it fails to consider the uncertainties of ordinary life, including illness, disabilities, caring responsibilities or economic downturns. The effect is likely to discriminate most heavily against disabled people, as well as those with long-term health conditions and caring responsibilities.
Secondly, the clause will discount genuine family life, because of immigration status. Family life formed while a person was here with no leave to remain would be given no weight at all, and family life formed while people’s status was precarious would be given little weight. Precarious migration status covers everyone with anything short of indefinite leave to remain or citizenship—care workers, skilled workers, international students, refugees and partners on the family route.
Under the earned settlement proposals, the qualifying period to become eligible for settlement would be extended to a baseline of 10 years, and in some cases 15 or even 20 years for refugees. Many people will therefore remain on in a precarious position for years, during which the relationships they form and the children they raise would count for little or nothing under the clause. The reality is that family relationships do not cease to exist or be formed just because an immigration status is uncertain.
Strasbourg accepts that precarious status can reduce the weight that is given to family life, but it has not said that it counts for nothing. In an important case, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation—even when the applicant had remained without leave for years—because of the impact on her children. With a “No weight” rule, as in clause 19(4), there will be no space to assess such cases and to retain flexibility. It will weaken protection for children.
Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, when courts assess a child’s best interests they do not look at one factor in isolation—they examine the full picture: a child’s age, health, education, friendships, cultural identity, family circumstances, personal development and connection to the UK—and the children are not defined by a checklist; yet clause 19 would introduce a closed checklist, under which it would be unreasonable
“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”
they would receive no education abroad, face “very significant obstacles” to integrating in the new country, or suffer
“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”.
Each is a very high bar. Remarkably, the Government’s impact assessment describes those factors as a “non-exhaustive” list, but subsection (7) uses the phrase “if and (only if)”. It is very clearly a closed list. The Bill therefore goes even further than the Government say they intend, in terms of its effect on children.
I am also concerned that the clause applies to British children too. As drafted, it could result in a British child with a migrant parent either being separated from their parent or having to leave the UK to preserve the family unit. That results in two-tier British citizenship. The Government’s own impact assessment lists family separation among the consequences of these reforms, and says—with little humanity—that the new test will allow decision makers
“to consider whether parents can maintain their relationship with a child from outside the UK”
or whether a British child can
“successfully adapt to life abroad”.
The existing framework is not perfect, but it already places substantial weight on the public interest and has safeguards allowing courts to consider the facts of each case. Clause 19 risks upsetting that balance. At its heart, the issue here is a simple one: do we trust our courts to weigh the facts before them, or do we seek to predetermine the outcome through statutory presumptions? I believe that the existing approach better serves both justice and the rule of law, and for that reason clause 19 should not stand part of the Bill.
Amendment 61 would reduce the harm of this clause, if it remains, by inserting a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s article 8 rights is justified. In my view, without the amendment the Bill will remove or weaken application grounds or causes of appeal relied on by many women living in abusive or exploitative conditions, making them even more vulnerable. That may leave victim-survivors at risk of being refused leave to stay, removed or deported for factors that are a direct consequence of the abuse to which they have been subjected.
To bring that point home, I will provide some examples from organisations that are currently supporting such women. My first example shows how the stricter public interest considerations risk undermining evidence for financial dependency and contact with the criminal justice system being usual results of an experience of violence against women and girls. Julianne was living in another country when she began her relationship with a British man. While visiting him in the UK, she became pregnant with his child and he encouraged her to stay, promising to support her and secure her immigration status. Trusting those assurances, Julianne stayed and became an overstayer. Once her status became insecure, her partner’s behaviour changed dramatically. He subjected her to domestic abuse, isolated her from friends and family overseas, and exploited the fact that she had no support network in the UK. The abuse escalated after the birth of their child.
Julianne eventually fled with her child after a violent assault. She sought medical treatment, reported the abuse to the police and received emergency support from the local authority. Traumatised and destitute, Julianne was left to navigate a complex immigration system alone, as she had been unable to secure legally aided advice and could not afford to pay for a solicitor. She lives with the constant fear of removal. I have changed Julianne’s name.
Julianne had a pathway to regularisation as the parent of a British child; however, if clause 19 becomes law the barriers to regularising her immigration status would be raised significantly, potentially preventing her from qualifying to remain in the UK as the parent of a British child. Re-emphasising the weight of financial independence without reliance on state support and public services will create pressure on victim-survivors like Julianne to stay in abusive and exploitative situations instead of leaving and claiming support, as she did.
Women who have been subject to economic and immigration abuse will be penalised due to their lack of financial independence. The public interest considerations would weigh heavily against Julianne because she accessed support from the local authority while protecting herself and her children from domestic abuse, and because no weight would be given to her family life, as it was established when she overstayed. Without amendment 61, there would be no discretion to consider the role her abuser played in causing her to overstay.
In respect of the redefinition of family, I have a further example of where limiting family life to core cohabiting family and replacing a judicial assessment with a checklist will ignore nuances and external factors forcing a family not to cohabit, such as coercive and controlling behaviour. More broadly, women who are convicted of criminal offences would also be put at increased risk of deportation, as a high evidential standard is needed to prove a disproportionate impact on them or a family member.
That includes women who are coerced or pressured into criminal activity—those driven to engaging with the criminal justice system due to unmet needs, such as being unable to afford food or having unaddressed mental health problems, and those who retaliated against the person abusing or exploiting them, or who had a counter-allegation made against them falsely. All those women are vulnerable and deserving of protection and support, not the further punishment of possible deportation.
My second case study is Blanca. Blanca came to the UK with a visa to work, and while here, she married a British man and had a baby. He had a good job, so they agreed she would stop working, and they then had two more children together. Over time, he became more controlling. Although the children’s benefits were registered in her name, he controlled the payments and did not give her access to the money.
As Blanca did not have her own income, he gave her money for the family’s food, but he would demand that she provide receipts and the exact change. If she bought anything he considered unnecessary, he would be angry and make her return it. That included sanitary products, which Blanca found humiliating and confusing. He also became verbally and later physically abusive towards Blanca, and she became more and more scared of him.
One day, when she was in the supermarket, her period started. She did not know what to do, and she was scared of her husband seeing that she had bought something he thought was unnecessary. She stole a box of sanitary pads, but on her way out of the shop, she was stopped by security who reported her to the police. She was charged and later convicted of theft.
If part 2 of the Bill were fully implemented, Blanca’s conviction would put her at high risk of deportation. No consideration would be given to the abuse that she experienced, which pushed her to commit the crime, nor would it be given to her vulnerability and trauma. In addition, as she did not have lawful status for much of the time she was in the UK, her private and family life may be deemed to hold no weight—or, at best, little weight—if it were held to have been established when she arrived with precarious status.
The Committee can see that clause 19 has all these knock-on effects into further parts of the Bill, and that this additional public interest consideration is necessary. I hope the Committee will discuss and support amendment 61, if clause 19 is to remain in the Bill. I am happy for this to be a probing amendment, if the Government will consider these risks and make their own similar changes to the Bill later.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. As we discussed in the last sitting, clause 18 asks who counts as family, but clause 19 asks what weight that family should carry against the public interest. The clause goes to the heart of public concern, as it considers people who build a life here, while they have no right to be here, only to rely on that recently constructed life as a reason to stay in the UK indefinitely.
I will speak to amendments 104 to 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and I, as well as amendment 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, and clause 19. The Opposition support the broad direction of travel in which the Government are going with the clause; however, to our reading, much of it is unfortunately drafted in a way that means it will be all too easy for the courts to set aside. Furthermore, the evidence behind the clause has not yet been published. I will take the Committee through both aspects.
First, clause 19 amends section 117B of the 2002 Act, which deals with the public interest considerations that apply in every article 8 case. Subsection (2) replaces the requirement to be financially independent with a three-part, forward-looking test, which is that a person must be, and is
“likely to remain, financially independent…able to house themselves…without reliance on state support”
and is not
“reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term”.
Subsection (3) adds a new public interest in people who have not been convicted of an offence anywhere, have co-operated with the immigration authorities and
“are otherwise of good character.”
Subsection (4) changes “little weight” to “no weight” being given to a
“private or family life established by a person”
who is here without leave, or with leave obtained by deception, or who is in “serious breach” of its conditions. Subsection (5) extends “little weight” for precarious status to family life as well as private life. Subsections (6) and (7) tighten the rule on parents with qualifying children. There must now be
“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”
on a child who stays, and it is unreasonable
“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”
one of three conditions is met.
On the evidence base, the Home Office told the Committee that 71% of those newly granted article 8 leave
“had entered illegally or overstayed”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 73, Q130.]
and that grants made in 2025 cost the taxpayer an incredible £4.9 billion. If those figures are correct, the case for this clause is overwhelming and undeniable; however, the Committee has not seen the evidence behind them. If the Government want the House to legislate on the strength of the 71% and the £4.9 billion cost figures, it is our view that they should publish the sample, definitions and method before Report.
On financial independence, subsection (2) is, in our view, right in principle. The Library records that the Home Office’s aim is
“increased refusals or unsuccessful appeals in cases where applicants impose avoidable burdens on public resources”.
I certainly think the public will agree, but the test is a prediction about the future, and the Bill says nothing about how it is to be made. In its evidence, the Law Society told us:
“No detail has been provided on how the elements of this test are to be determined”.
Over what period will future reliance be assessed? What evidence will be required, and will guidance be published before commencement?
There is a further difficulty, which is whether this subsection will be able to survive the courts. Again, according to the Law Society,
“the Government’s human rights memorandum at paragraph 27”
acknowledges that the new criteria are
“likely to result in discriminatory outcomes for…older or disabled people”.
The Bar Council makes the same point. A test that the Government themselves expect to operate unequally is one that will in all likelihood be litigated under the Equality Act 2010 and perhaps article 14—and one that the courts may well soften as a result. I ask the Minister: what mitigation does the Government propose to avoid that?
On good character and amendment 104, subsection (3) sets out a new public interest in people who have not offended, have co-operated with the authorities and are “of good character”. Again, we support the direction of travel, but “good character” is not defined in the Bill or the explanatory notes, which seems an extraordinary gap, though I recognise that it is quite difficult to define it in the Bill. This is another example of the Government potentially setting themselves up for failure in the Bill. The Bar Council says that it hands the Home Office
“a general evaluative test that is highly subjective in scope”.
The Law Society and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association made similar points in their evidence. An undefined test is an invitation to future litigation.
There is a ready answer, though, to which I shall point the Committee: the good character guidance used in naturalisation decisions, which is detailed and demanding, with periods that taper according to the length of sentence. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government will apply that guidance here? Amendment 104 would add that to the Bill. What will count as a failure to co-operate with immigration processes—absconding, the destruction of documents, ignoring a claim notice under clause 11, et cetera? It would be helpful to understand what the Government’s understanding is.
On amendments 105 and 106, the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from the weightings under section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act. The Law Society says that the change
“appears to be an attempt to bar a full proportionality assessment”,
and sets up a conflict with the duty on the Home Secretary and the courts to
“act compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.”
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Dr Murrison. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire has dealt with this point eloquently, but I wish to speak briefly on clause 19 and the Opposition amendments.
Obviously, I support what the Government are trying to achieve here, but I think they could go a little further in the drafting. When we talk about public interest, that goes to the heart of the whole issue and problem we have in this country of trying to tackle immigration—in particular, legal immigration and asylum claims. What is in the public interest? The problem is that the system we have has strayed so far from the public interest. Although the clause gives a legal definition, it is also a meaningful way of translating and understanding a political, social, economic and public problem. It is in the public interest that we do all we can to tackle the current volume of asylum and immigration claims. It is not a unanimous position, but very few in Parliament, and very few in the public at large, would disagree with the fundamental point that we need to bring down the level of immigration, asylum claims and illegal boat crossings.
On the public interest consideration, the topic of the right to family life picks up from the Committee’s discussion last week. The right to family life stems from the European convention on human rights and is a qualified right, meaning that it does not stand towering above all other considerations. It is my view, and a commonly held view—in fact, a view that was given by the Minister—that the right has strayed too far. Over many years, jurisprudence has allowed an expansive interpretation that has taken the family life core protection to cover a far wider set of circumstances. It is now used as a routine tool by those who wish to remain in the UK when the threat to or infringement of their family life, as a fundamental human right, is not really an issue. Clause 19 is part of the framework that seeks to attack that use.
We are where we are partly because of a set of legislation—with a convention at its core—made by Parliament over the years, including the Human Rights Act 1998 and other Acts, that has sought to define and in some cases limit, in others not, what we mean by the right to family life and the public interest. Those laws have been unsuccessful in doing that. The intention was there, but the drafting was insufficiently certain—though to some extent that is inherent in all legislating in this place—to ensure that the courts interpret the legislation as narrowly as Parliament intended. The Government have gone some way to try to be restrictive, as they think they have been in this clause, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire points out, some changes to the wording can be made. His amendments 105 and 106 seek to deliver those. The clause states:
“No weight should be given”;
but stating that no weight must be given would get rid of a door that is ajar to the courts to interpret the clause more expansively. The amendment slams that door by inserting the word “must”, so that there is no leeway for a clever legal argument that “should” gives sufficient leeway for a court effectively to make a decision that runs against what the legislation is trying to deliver.
I do not take the view that judges or indeed lawyers—on the whole, as a profession, broadly speaking—should be demonised for making decisions that use loopholes in the law. If this place fails to make the law certain and fails to close those loopholes, the fault comes back to Parliament and the Government who brought the legislation through Parliament. Here is the opportunity to tighten it up—that is the purpose of a Bill Committee: to tighten up wording through the fair scrutiny process.
The Opposition’s amendment 106 relates to a measure where the Government were perhaps not trying to completely close the door. It may be something that they deliberately left open. Amendment 106 would change proposed new section 117B(4)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in clause 19(4) of the Bill. I will quote proposed new paragraph 117B(4)(b) for Hansard, though it may appear out of context:
“they are in serious breach of a condition attached to their leave to enter or remain.”
The Opposition amendment seeks to leave out the word “serious” so that the provision applies to someone simply in breach of a condition.
My suspicion is that the Government want to leave a set of breaches of a condition that would not affect someone’s leave to remain. The Opposition’s position is that, if someone has breached a condition, that should mean the fundamental failure of any claim to remain that cites a right to family life. To me, the amendment would provide the certainty needed and deliver on what the public expect of us to tackle a significant problem in this country—the large number of claims that go beyond the original intention behind the right to family life.
The problem with leaving the word “serious” in the legislation is that it will be open to the court to make a decision about whether a breach is serious enough. Without any specific guidance or checklist in the legislation, the court will consider seriousness as a relative word or concept in an appellant’s case to not be returned to another country. A case could be made based on circumstance that family life is fundamentally important to someone and that sending them home would split up a family. They may paint a picture of the environment at home that could be very alien to us as a free and democratic society. Suddenly, that “serious breach” question might lead a court to conclude that a serious breach in the abstract becomes quite a minimal one when compared with an applicant’s story of hardship.
My concern is that the word “serious” will become a flexible term to be interpreted by the court. It will always be measured against the relative hardship of the claimant, who will of course state their case at its strongest in order to leverage the flexibility of the word “serious”. I struggle to see why the Government would not want to add in certainty, unless they particularly want to create an avenue where people can still make the right to family life claim. It would be extraordinary if they did, given all the rationale they have provided for bringing forward this set of provisions and the Bill in the first place. The Minister should be very clear about whether she sees this as a disagreement around drafting, or whether she is seeking—I am sure that she would have a reason for it, though I would disagree with it—to have an avenue of flexibility in the Bill, and why.
There is provision in the clause, and rightfully so, for particular circumstances in relation to children. Children are in a very special category because of their dependency and vulnerability. There are a number of situations laid out, but subsection (6) in particular deals with situations where there would be
“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child.”
We do not want to see people deported or removed when that would have a significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child. There are protections are built in here. Others may say that this is a particularly draconian provision, but I see some protections there and in paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new subsection (7) that are widely accepted and uncontroversial, and I wanted to draw attention to them.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.
The clause addresses a basic question: when someone asks to stay in this country, what does the public interest expect of them? The Government’s answer is one that I suspect most of our constituents would recognise: that the person pays their way, does not rely on the state to put a roof over their head, does not commit crimes, co-operates with the authorities and is of good character. Those are reasonable expectations and we welcome much of the clause.
The clause’s strength, however, comes down to a handful of words. Proposed new subsection 117B(4) of the 2002 Act says:
“No weight should be given to a private or family life”
that is built up while someone is here unlawfully, on leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions. Think about who that covers—someone who came here illegally, lied to get a visa or broke the conditions on which this country let them in. When the time comes to remove them, that person asks a court to weigh a life built up in that time against their removal.
We agree with the Government that weight should not be given. However, “should” is the language of advice; “must” is the language of law. The Government have already moved from “little weight” to “no weight”, and I welcome that—amendment 105 simply finishes the job. If the Government mean that no weight must be given, let the statute say, “No weight must be given”. In this area of law, a door left ajar is an invitation.
Moreover, the no weight rule applies only where someone is in serious breach of their conditions. What is serious? Is it working beyond the hours that their visa allows? Is it claiming benefits that they are not entitled to? Is it overstaying their visa by a month? The Bill does not say, so a tribunal will decide case by case, which will bring us back to the very weighing exercise that the Government say they want to end. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee what the Home Office understands a “serious breach” to mean, and whether it will be defined in guidance.
Amendment 104 deals with good character. Proposed new subsection 117B(3A) says it is in the public interest that people seeking to stay here are of good character, but clause 19 does not say what good character means. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire that there is already a well-established test in the good character requirement for British citizenship set out in Home Office guidance. Amendment 104 says that the court should apply that test. It would be strange if the bar to stay in this country were lower than the bar to become a citizen of it, and stranger still for every tribunal to invent its own version from scratch.
The clause asks the right questions. Our amendments ensure that the answers carry the force of the law. The Government have chosen “no weight” over “little weight”, and that is welcome; let them finish the job by replacing “should” with “must” and telling us what they mean by “good character” and “serious breach”. I commend our amendments to the Committee.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate on the clause and amendments in this grouping.
Before moving on to the amendments, I will give some background on what the clause will do. The balance between an individual’s family rights and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system has shifted, and it needs to be reset. Without greater clarity from Parliament on how that balance should be struck, the domestic interpretation of article 8 has expanded beyond what our international obligations require, resulting in inconsistent decision making and high volumes of article 8 grants to people who cannot meet the rules to come or to stay in the UK.
More than half of those who stayed in the UK for family reasons last year did not meet our criteria to be able to stay here, instead relying on their article 8 rights. That undermines public confidence in the immigration system and the rules-based international order. It also comes at a significant cost to the UK taxpayer. As has already been mentioned, the average net lifetime fiscal cost for each first-time grant is £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted on the basis of article 8 in 2025 alone.
Colleagues have asked about the evidence base behind those figures, so I will give a bit more information about it. We undertook a deep dive cohort analysis to examine a representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications, in order to support the policy development of these measures in the Bill. Further details are in the impact assessment. I am afraid that the unpublished internal sample that was referred to will not be made available due to the personal data sensitivities involved, but we will obviously keep under review any further analysis that we would be keen to share with the Committee throughout the course of the Bill, for example other statistics that have been mentioned.
This trend has been driven by high volumes of people who have arrived illegally or overstayed in the UK, at 71% of first-time grants, or by people who are unemployed and are making a minimal economic contribution—76% of first-time grants. It is clear that the system is not functioning fairly and effectively. That is why the British public feel exasperated that such exemptions are being abused to enable people to circumvent the system.
Clause 19 will help to restore a fairer balance between an individual’s right to family life and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system. It will provide a clearer statutory framework that places greater emphasis on compliance and contribution, resulting in more consistent and robust outcomes. These reforms will realign UK legislation with Strasbourg, ensuring that our domestic approach to article 8 is within and, crucially, not beyond our international obligations, as it is now.
Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)
Clause 19 introduces some quite fundamental changes, which I fully support, but is the Minister confident that it will still meet the requirements of the European convention on human rights? That is the litmus test.
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. That is why the drafting of clause 19 has been very clear and specific, which I will say more about later.
It is important that we comply with our international obligations. We have a proud history of doing so—we helped to devise, draft and create these obligations—but we also have a history of overinterpreting them. It is not a free-for-all, but it is important that we act within the requirements we are obliged to meet and do not go beyond them. That is what the provisions in the Bill seek to achieve.
That includes a clarification that judges must consider the economic impact on the taxpayer of allowing people to remain in the UK, including by considering whether they can support themselves and their family. It is only fair to all those who work hard in this country to be financially independent and to house themselves, and who are not overly reliant on public services, that they do not see others who otherwise have no right to be here imposing avoidable burdens on society and public services.
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
Will the financial independence test be individualised, will it be evidence-based in its assessment, and will it recognise barriers such as credit history, references and guarantors? Furthermore, will a survivor’s use of refuge or public funds to escape abuse count against them?
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions and I will say a lot more about those issues when I respond to the contributions by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. However, we are absolutely clear that we are not going to penalise people for experiencing hardship. These reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children, but it is vital that we make it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight in any consideration. This is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards. That is critical.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Having listened to some contributions, particularly from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I think that most fair-minded people would be concerned that these reforms could have a detrimental impact on children. Can the Minister confirm whether or not these reforms remove protections for children?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend raises a critical issue that is, of course, dear to all of our hearts. Again, I will say more about it later, but these reforms absolutely do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will continue to remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making, as they should be. The reforms in clause 19 ensure that children’s interests are considered alongside other important factors, including compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system.
Anna Turley
Forgive me, but I have not addressed these issues yet, so if the hon. Gentleman can be patient for a little longer—I am sure he will have more questions afterwards—I would like to make some progress, if I may.
The clause also introduces character and conduct as a factor in the public interest test. This will require judges to have regard to harmful conduct, including criminality below the deportation threshold and outside the mandatory suitability refusals. This is an important element of tackling abuse and takes us one step towards a fairer system that the public can have confidence in.
The clause further reduces avenues for abuse by requiring that no weight—instead of little weight, as now—should be given to an article 8 claim established when someone is here illegally, or legally but only by deceiving the Home Office, or if they have seriously breached the conditions of their permission to be in the UK. That will enable us to more effectively enforce our immigration rules and prevent people from unfairly benefiting from time spent in the UK in violation of our rules, and will avoid the creation of perverse incentives for people who are here unlawfully to try to deliberately establish article 8 claims.
Although it is right that essential protections for children are retained, it is not right that adults who abuse our immigration system are almost guaranteed to be allowed to stay if they can prove a parental relationship with a child in the UK. Currently, there is no need to carry out a full balancing exercise if there is a child. This is the main source of successful article 8 claims, two thirds of which result in residence rights being granted.
The clause clarifies which factors should be considered when determining whether it is in the public interest to remove the parent of a qualifying child from the UK, and introduces a provision to assess the impact of removing a parent where a child remains in the UK.
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for amendment 61, which sets out a new public interest consideration, under which specific regard would be given to the circumstances of victims of violence against women and girls when assessing whether interference with an individual’s article 8 right is justified. Of course, we absolutely recognise and take seriously the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, and the devastating impact that it has on victims. However, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary.
Clause 19 already preserves a case-specific assessment in which courts and tribunals can consider all relevant facts and evidence, including experiences of domestic abuse, violence and exploitation, and the safeguarding concerns that the hon. Lady mentioned in her case studies. The holistic article 8 assessment that the clause retains ensures that protections exist for vulnerable people and that support remains available for those who genuinely need it. In addition, existing provisions in the immigration rules, including “Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse” and the migrant victims of domestic abuse concession, provide specific protections. Those safeguards are there to ensure that victims’ experiences are properly recognised and taken into account.
I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 104. I understand the intention behind it, but I am afraid that the Government do not consider the amendment to be helpful. I agree that good character is an important consideration in article 8 cases. Including that factor in the public interest test ensures that protections are focused on those who have acted responsibly. That is an important element of creating a fair system that the public have confidence in and that is not open to abuse. The clause establishes that and requires the courts and tribunals to have regard to harmful conduct, including that below the deportation threshold and outside mandatory suitability refusals. We will set out further detail on that in published guidance and the immigration rules.
Let me be clear that the existing guidance, including the guidance mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, will be a useful comparator and will play an important role in shaping this. We do not want to be tied exclusively to the 1981 guidance, but want to develop ours further. Our approach will therefore reflect that already taken in nationality legislation, where good character is not exhaustively defined on the face of the Bill but is addressed through the guidance.
Siân Berry
I am very interested in the fact that the Minister has just talked about going further on good character in some guidance. Will that guidance take into account factors that might otherwise weigh against the character of someone making an appeal if they have been exploited or abused? Is that the kind of thing that the Minister is thinking about in terms of deviating from the 1981 guidance?
Anna Turley
The guidance will set out very clearly what we will ask the courts and tribunals to have regard to in relation to harmful conduct. We will also make sure, as I have already mentioned, that there is sufficient protection regarding issues around domestic violence. That will be in our immigration rules, and it is in our existing provisions. We will ensure that courts and tribunals consider all relevant facts and evidence. I place this on the record in Committee: we will expect experiences of domestic violence, abuse and exploitation, and safeguarding concerns to be a key part of that.
To go back to amendment 104, our approach will reflect the approach already taken in nationality legislation, so that good character is not exhaustively defined in the Bill, but addressed through guidance. Everything raised by colleagues in Committee will be on the record.
Joe Robertson
Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but it is important for cases to be considered on a case-by-case basis. We can be as specific as possible, but the reality is that courts and tribunals have to maintain the flexibility to determine cases based on the individual facts and circumstances before them. It is important that our drafting enables that.
Blake Stephenson
I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?
Anna Turley
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but we absolutely cannot bind the courts’ hands in this situation. The reality is that they have to be flexible. We can set a very clear steer—that is on the record, in the Bill and in legislation—but it is important that we allow the courts flexibility, because their role is to establish the facts, case by case.
David Smith
I was going to make the same point that the Minister has just made to some degree. It seems to me that the key terminology in the clause is “no weight”. Can she say more about what that will mean in practise?
Anna Turley
As my hon. Friend rightly flags, “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s private or family life established in the time that they were in the UK without permission. That is a clear definition for the court. Applying the “no weight” rule to all breaches of leave could mean minor or technical breaches leave cases open to challenges of disproportionality.
Amendment 106 is in a similar vein. Although we agree that non-compliance must have consequences, it is appropriate that we distinguish between serious breaches and less significant or technical non-compliance, because we always have to have proportionality. Removing “serious” would considerably widen the provision and could require the same approach to be taken to conduct of very different gravity. The Government’s reforms already substantially strengthen the public interest side of the article 8 balancing exercise. The inclusion of “serious” helps to ensure that the reforms are focused on the cases of greatest concern.
Blake Stephenson
In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s attempts to define this, but it is important to say that we are keen not to include specific definitions in the Bill, as we are worried that they could result in disproportionate outcomes. Our approach is to be robust, targeted and, crucially, legally sustainable. We do not want to allow ourselves to be open to challenge.
Tom Gordon
The Minister talks about not wanting to include specific definitions in the Bill, but some stakeholder groups are concerned that the Bill does not rule out British children being subject to the child test. Would she not consider including such a provision in the Bill to ensure that it does not end up forcing a British child out of the country?
Anna Turley
Again, we have to look at each case on its individual merits, and we cannot bind the court’s hands in such a situation; the family rules will be taken in their entirety.
Tom Gordon
Can I press the Minister a little further on that point? To give a direct quote, can the Minister guarantee that no British child will be expected to leave the country of which they are a citizen as a result of this clause?
Anna Turley
I am not going to rule that out here in the Committee, but I can come back and clarify that point for the hon. Gentleman. My expectation is that if someone is deported, and they wish to take their child with them, they are perfectly entitled to do so. It is not for the Government to say that the child has to stay in this country, rather than moving with their family. I will not rule that out here in the Committee.
In conclusion, clause 19 tightly defines the public interest test to ensure that individual rights are properly balanced against the public interest in effective immigration control, and to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system.
Siân Berry
Further to the discussion with the Minister about ensuring that victims of abuse and sexual violence are protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.—(Blake Stephenson.)
This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Blake Stephenson
I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) Where a person has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years—
(a) the first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply, and
(b) the third set of exceptional circumstances applies only where there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in subsections (4) and (5).”
This amendment would restore the current rule that a foreign national sentenced to four years or more cannot resist deportation by relying on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” exceptions and must show very compelling circumstances over and above them.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—
(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or
(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”
This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.
Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert
“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”
This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).
Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”.
This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.
Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”.
This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.
Clause stand part.
New clause 45—Deportation of foreign offenders—
“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 32, for subsections (1) to (3) substitute—
‘(1) In this section
“foreign criminal” means a person—
(a) who is not a British or Irish citizen, and
(b) who is—
(i) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, or
(ii) charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.’
(3) In section 33, omit subsections (1)(b), (2), (3) and (6A).
(4) In section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, omit all instances of the word ‘knowingly’.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign national who is convicted of an offence or who is charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.
New clause 66—Automatic deportation: forced-marriage offences—
“(1) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(c), for ‘Condition 1 or 2’ substitute ‘Condition 1, 2 or 3’.
(3) After subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Condition 3 is that the person has been convicted of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offence of forced marriage: England and Wales).’”
This new clause would amend section 32 of the UK Borders Act to create a separate basis for automatic deportation where a person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, concerning forced marriage.
New clause 67—Particularly serious crime: National Security Act 2023 offences—
“(1) Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) After (5ZB) insert—
‘(6) A person is presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if—
(a) the person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence listed in the National Security Act 2023; and
(b) the person is not, by virtue of the conviction, a person falling within subsection (2).’”
This new clause would make any conviction of an offence under the National Security Act 2023 an automatic deportation offence, as is currently the case with offences under Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Blake Stephenson
On Thursday 15 October, the Government were kind enough to accept Opposition amendment 96 to clause 17; I hope the Minister will look at these amendments with the same open mind, because of all the clauses in part 2, this is the one that the public care the most deeply about. People expect that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes in this country will be deported, and they do not understand why family life—often family life formed while the offender was here—so frequently stands in the way. It is frankly unacceptable.
Our reasoned amendment on Second Reading made the point that this Bill
“does not ensure all foreign criminals and illegal immigrants will be deported”.—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 679.].
Clause 20 is where that concern is tested. My case is that, although the clause contains real improvements, which we support, it also makes the position easier for the most serious offenders. Either way, it leaves the final word where it is today: with the judge’s assessment of proportionality.
The clause does four things. First, it extends the deportation rules in section 117C of the 2002 Act from foreign criminals to everyone liable to deportation, including those deported because it is conducive to the public good. Secondly, it replaces the current structure of a single rule, that deportation is required unless its effect on the person or their family would be disproportionate. Thirdly, it replaces the sentence length threshold of 12 months and four years with a sliding scale: the more serious the offending and its impact on society, the greater the public interest in deportation. Fourthly, it provides that deportation will be disproportionate if, and only if, one of three sets of exceptional circumstances applies: long residence and integration, an unduly harsh effect on a partner or child, or other very compelling circumstances, and the interference cannot be justified by the public interest.
I turn first to what the clause gets right, because I want to be fair to the Government in this Committee. Extending the rules to all deportation cases is a genuine tightening, and for that reason the Opposition support it. There is a reasonable legal argument that the new structure restores the balance test that the courts took away. Dr Chris Rowe of Swansea University argues that after the Supreme Court’s decision in KO (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the unduly harsh exception came to operate as an unqualified right, which we heard about in earlier Committee sittings. If the effect on the family was harsh enough, the strength of the public interest did not matter. He argued that clause 20(3) would be effective in restoring a balance against the public interest. If that is correct, it is a real improvement for so-called medium offenders.
Once again, however, I cannot help but notice what kind of improvement this is. On Dr Rowe’s own analysis, clause 20 brings domestic law back to what the Strasbourg case law requires, but does not go beyond it, and for the most serious offenders, the clause appears to move in the wrong direction. Under the current law, someone sentenced to four years or more cannot rely on the long residence or unduly harsh exceptions on their own; they must show very compelling circumstances over and above them. Clause 20 removes the sentence thresholds altogether. Justice, which, I should say, supports the change for very different reasons, describes the effect precisely in its evidence, stating that the Bill
“flattens out the application of the exceptions, so that all three apply, regardless of the length of a person’s sentence.”
The House of Commons Library briefing says that it is “not clear” how the new rules are stricter for people sentenced to more than four years.. Does the Minister accept that under clause 20, the most serious offenders gain access to exceptions one and two? If so, why? What reasons could the Government have for loosening the rules for the worst-offending foreign criminals? Presumably, the Government are trying to achieve the opposite.
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
I completely understand the thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s argument and the good intentions behind it. We do not want those who seek to harm our nation or our citizens to have leave to remain. However, my concern regarding the Opposition amendments, which have been tabled with those good intentions, is that they come with such a prescriptive list. Over time, different crimes and offences will evolve that we want to include, so is there not a fear that such a prescriptive list will not protect us in the long term, as opposed to leaving the Bill with a slightly wider scope, as was intended?
Blake Stephenson
I thank the hon. Gentleman for supporting the general thrust of what we are trying to achieve with the amendments, and I accept his point. By having a narrow list, we may constrain future opportunities and changes, and we need to be flexible. However, it is important that the Committee expresses its view that these crimes are abhorrent. Although it is a narrow list, this place can of course legislate further in the future, as life changes. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his general support and I understand his point, but given the gravity of these crimes, it is important that this Committee is very clear that they are totally unacceptable.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
I think there is broad agreement on the principle behind the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, but is he seriously suggesting that, for every additional crime that we decide needs to be added to his inexhaustible list, we must come back to the House and somebody has to sign off on it?
Blake Stephenson
We are here to legislate, so I do not think it is unreasonable for us to be defining what is right and wrong. Perhaps we can leave it to the Minister to respond.
The unfortunate reality is that, with this Bill, the Government are falling into the very same trap that the previous Government fell into. The legislation may be designed to work around the constraints imposed by the ECHR, but it will ultimately run up against the very same problems. The courts will default to the positions that they have consistently taken, enabling individuals with no right to remain in this country to delay or prevent their removal. Indeed, when the Bill fails to enable the Government to address the extensive range of grounds for resisting removal that flow from the ECHR, will the Minister finally accept that—as we have long argued—the real problem lies outside the drafting of the legislation, however robust it might be, and however robust the Government intend it to be today?
As I have already noted, the Minister described discussions about leaving the ECHR last week as unnecessary and counterproductive. If she genuinely believes that deterrence must sit at the heart of the response to these challenges, I struggle to see how removing the ability of foreign criminals to rely on the convention to delay or prevent their removal could reasonably be considered as either unnecessary or counterproductive.
The Opposition will not oppose clause 20. Extending these rules to all deportation cases and restoring the balance against the public interest are steps in the right direction that we support. However, the clause removes the clear lines that protected the public from the most serious offenders, and it gives these criminals access to exceptions that cannot be used today. We will seek to press amendments 107 and 108 to a vote, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the various questions I have asked.
Siân Berry
I will speak very briefly on clause 20, specifically subsection (4). At present, it will expand the scope of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that it automatically applies to everyone whose deportation the Home Secretary has decided is conducive to the public good, regardless of the objective seriousness of their offence, under the Immigration Act 1971 and its use of the word “deems”, which I think is very important.
I hope the Minister can answer three questions on the clause. First, do the proportionality qualification and the exceptions in the clause offer any protection for those whose criminality is as a result of exploitation or abuse, particularly those who face immigration-related domestic abuse and have been convicted of crimes related to that? On that theme, the new clauses tabled by the official Opposition would clarify the word “serious” so that some offences would be considered serious automatically. I see the point they are trying to make, but if we made that automatic, it would not be possible for those who are exploited and drawn into criminality to face a proportionate, human-rights-based public interest test. I do not support those new clauses, nor do I support amendments 108 to 111.
Siân Berry
I am asking the Minister these questions, so it would be marvellous if we could wait to see how she answers them.
Thirdly, does that approach not allow the Home Secretary to unilaterally stack the deck against an appellant in an appeal, on an arbitrary basis? Does that take away from the objective seriousness of the offence that they have committed? Does the approach therefore impermissibly limit the ability of the appellate body to decide an article 8 ECHR claim on its merits, as is required under the Human Rights Act 1998?
Joe Robertson
Clause 20 deals with cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation. The issues I have with the clause are broadly twofold. One issue is around the drafting, which has a number of serious deficiencies. That is not about whether the Government are getting it wrong or right on what they are trying to achieve, but about having certainty on what the legislation will do when it comes to people having to make decisions. My second issue is disagreement with what the Government are trying to achieve.
Under proposed new section 117C, which I will try to deal with as precisely as I can,
“(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”
That deals with the public interest and its definition. Let us put aside the “unless”, which clearly opens an avenue for the court to examine whether the effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate, and deal with that public interest element. Proposed new subsection (1) says that “the public interest...requires” the deportation of those liable to it, which directs the court to define “public interest” as one thing. However, the Bill tries to define what that public interest is in proposed new subsection (2). It sets out “more serious” factors that point towards a greater public interest in a person’s deportation. It does not matter what those factors are, but they are in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c).
Why on earth does the court need direction in assessing the extent of the public interest when it is being directed to consider that public interest simply “requires their deportation”? It seems entirely meaningless to start directing the court as to what public interest might mean in terms of giving weighting to the factors in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c) when the court is being told to simply deport under the public interest. I fail to see how it has any relevance whatsoever, and it is potentially distracting from what the Government are trying to achieve.
I will now deal with the “unless” element, because that is entirely separate. Proposed new section 117C says that deportation is required
“unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”
The court decision makers are given some help on what “disproportionate” would mean, which is entirely sensible. I disagree with some of the elements that the court should consider, but it is sensible to give the decision makers some direction.
I will stick to the drafting of paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new section 117C(4). Paragraph (a) says that exceptional circumstances apply where a person
“has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life”.
Given that provisions in relation to children, not just in this Bill but generally in the way we do law in this country, are different from provisions in relation to adults, that provision needs to be clear about whether it means a person has been resident in the United Kingdom for most of their adult life or their entire life from birth. Although it may suggest entire life from birth, I can see a court assuming it means adult life because we deal with children separately. It would therefore be much easier for someone who is, say, aged 24 and has been in the country for only three or four years to say that they have been a resident for most of their life, because provisions for children are separate. That is an avenue that could be exploited through a lack of drafting, unless the Government mean adult life. I think they should mean entire life, and they should be specific about what they mean.
Secondly, paragraph (b) says that exceptional circumstances apply where
“the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom”.
How on earth is a decision maker or a court supposed to determine whether someone is or is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK? We could have an entire PhD thesis on the extent of somebody’s social and cultural integration. We may all have views on what it means to be socially and culturally integrated. There may be some common themes around our views, but there will be much disagreement about the specifics when trying to make a decision about an individual case.
Of course, the decision makers are not there to do some highly resourced, detailed investigative study into someone’s circumstances. They will basically be relying on assertions. Surely it is open to someone saying, “I’ve lived here for a number of years. I speak English to a degree and I can go about normal daily life without endlessly causing friction or hardship, and I am therefore sufficiently socially and culturally integrated into the UK.” Or is the court supposed to examine the way they dress or eat, who they mix with and how often, the cultural background of the people they mix with or their religious traditions? Not only is it opening a can of worms, but it is quite offensive to have the state investigating someone’s social and cultural integration in order to make a yes or no decision.
According to this provision, a court—the decision maker—is not to make a decision about someone being reasonably well integrated or showing signs of cultural integration; someone is either socially and culturally integrated, or they are not. I just cannot see how the Government can possibly expect a decision maker to open up such an investigation. And that would be only one part of the integration inquiry.
Proposed new subsection (4)(c) then talks about
“very significant obstacles to the person’s integration in the country to which they are proposed to be deported.”
Having run the analysis and come up with a view about an individual’s cultural and social integration into the UK, the decision maker has to run a similar test on their ability to integrate into the country to which they are supposed to be deported—a theoretical test, because it might be somewhere they have not been for some time—where it is even harder to make some sort of value judgment, because it is a country that the decision maker could have absolutely zero experience of living in, and so they will, again, be reliant on assertions.
The test in that case is not even the same as in proposed new subsection 4(b), where the person must be “socially and culturally integrated”; at subsection 4(c), it is the person’s “integration”—there is no qualification of cultural and social integration. In this country, they could be socially and culturally integrated, but not integrated in a wide range of other ways; yet in the country that they are proposed to go to, any integration issues, not just social and cultural ones, could be a “significant” obstacle to integration. I do not understand why the definition is narrower on the question of a person’s integration—albeit far too broad for a court to tackle—for assessing the situation in this country and much wider for the situation elsewhere.
There are serious drafting issues here. We cannot merely just see where it all comes out in the wash, saying Home Office officials are very capable and all that sort of stuff. We have seen the problem with the number of appeals. Some of these provisions will genuinely need the court to tackle the interpretation issues, in the normal way that we do common law in this country, through test cases. These provisions will require an unusual set of test cases, through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to get judicial interpretation and assistance for the courts to apply thereafter, but, as we have seen in test cases, it is rarely one case that sets a new environment for the lower courts and decision makers to adhere to, but a series of them.
This is not only going to require an extraordinary amount of time to understand terms that the Government just need to deal with at this stage through the legislation process, but it will take years; any individual case that goes all the way up to the Supreme Court on how the court interpreted “socially and culturally integrated” will take a long time in and of itself—months into years. Where we may have challenging cases that seek to overturn what, for example, the Court of Appeal has said, by using the Supreme Court, we are talking years on years.
The Government are creating massive scope for backlog and uncertainty, and a huge opportunity for the legal profession to run a high volume of case law—it would be genuinely interesting, but would completely undermine the Government’s intention, which is to tackle backlogs, speed up the system and stop the endless need for judicial interpretation. That is what has led us to where we are, which is broader and broader interpretation.
Matt Vickers
Let us be absolutely clear about what this group of amendment is about: it is about whether a foreign national who comes to this country and commits a serious crime found to be worthy of a long sentence gets to stay here. The British public have a simple answer to that question, and so do we: they should go. The principle at stake is straightforward: if someone is a guest in this country and they rape, rob, deal drugs or abuse a child, they have forfeited the right to remain here—not after years of appeals or after a tribunal has weighed their family life against the lives of others that they have wrecked. They should go.
On Second Reading, the Government told the House that clause 20 would make it easier to remove foreign criminals and that deportation should go ahead outside of a limited number of truly exceptional circumstances. The trouble is that the clause does not match them; for the most serious offences, it does the opposite. Behind every one of these cases is a victim: a woman who lies awake wondering whether the man who attacked her is still living a few streets away, or a family who were told that justice had been done, only to learn that the offender is now fighting to stay.
My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire explained how the law works today. Since 2014, someone sentenced to four years or more for rape, armed robbery or dealing drugs on our streets has been unable to hide behind their family or how long they have lived here. Those exceptions are simply not enough; someone has to show very compelling circumstances over and above them. That is a high bar, and it is meant to be. The worse the crime, the narrower the door.
Clause 20 takes that line away. The four-year threshold is gone. Someone serving 10, 15 or 20 years can now walk straight into the argument that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. Today that route is closed to them, but under this Bill, it is opened. Let us think about what that means. The victim found the courage to give evidence, the jury convicted, the judge handed down a long sentence and then, at the end of all that, the defender gets to say that deportation would be too hard on them.
The Minister will tell us not to worry, because subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C says that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest. That goes to one of the oldest questions in lawmaking: do you legislate with a rule or with a standard? A rule says four years, and that settles it; a standard says to weigh everything up and decide case by case. Rules give certainty; standards give discretion. In this area, discretion has been a gift to lawyers and a source of deep frustration to the public.
That is precisely why Parliament chose a rule in 2014. The whole purpose was to narrow the discretion of the courts because the balance they were striking was one the public simply did not recognise. Clause 20 hands the scales back, and we all know where weighing exercises end up: in front of a tribunal, then an appeal, then another appeal. Can the Minister point to a single line in proposed new section 117C that stops someone sentenced to four years or more relying on the “unduly harsh” exception? I have read it several times and I cannot find one.
Between 2015 and 2022, around 420 foreign offenders a year won human rights appeals against their removal. That is more than one every single day, and that is with the four-year rule still in place. The Home Office does not even publish how many had sentences of four or more years. If the Government are so confident that the clause is tougher, let them publish the numbers. Amendment 107 would put the four-year rule back, and amendment 111 would keep the existing rules on how a sentence is counted, so that the system works.
Then there is amendment 109: it is only a few words, but they tell us everything. Today, a serious offender must show very compelling circumstances “over and above” the exceptions. Clause 20 changes that to circumstances “at least as strong”. “Over and above” means more; “at least as strong” means the same. That is not tightening the test but loosening it. When Parliament changes the wording of a test, the courts are entitled to presume that it meant to change the meaning, so a tribunal reading “at least as strong” will quite properly conclude that this House intended a lower bar. We would be legislating for exactly the outcome the Government say they want to avoid. Parliament chose those words in 2014, and the courts have applied them ever since, so why change them? Did the Home Office mean to lower the bar, or did nobody notice? Neither answer should give this Committee much comfort. Amendment 109 would put the original words back.
Amendment 108 goes further than the current law; we make no apology for that. Sentence length is a rough guide to how dangerous someone is, but it is not the whole story. Guilty pleas get discounts, and the facts of individual cases mean that some very dangerous people get less than four years. Amendment 108 says that, for the worst offences, the type of crime settles it. If someone is convicted of a specified violent, sexual or terrorist offence or a sexual offence against a child, long residence and family routes are off the table, whatever the sentence. Let me put that plainly: a foreign national who has sexually abused a child should not be able to stand in a tribunal and argue that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. What about the harshness inflicted on the child?
Melanie Onn
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s points, but that is not what the Bill provides for; it certainly does not allow for what he suggests. We have had some silly games with semantics. Does he agree that this is a broad catch-all of very serious crimes, including those he is talking about?
Matt Vickers
We are saying that the Bill puts in place choices based on how long someone has been sentenced. We are saying that if someone is sentenced to more than four years, they should not be eligible. If someone commits specific offences, such as sexual offences against a child, they should not be able to rely on the exceptions. That is exactly where we are at.
Ben Goldsborough
Would the hon. Gentleman’s amendment not have the unintended consequence of creating a ranking system? Many of my constituents are concerned about the extremely high-level crimes that the Opposition rightly note, but an individual may commit a series of low-level crimes. This ranking proposal may have the unintended consequence of that not being considered and the individual getting let off the hook.
Matt Vickers
The other provisions in the Bill make the case that people can be sent down, depending on the harshness of the sentence. We are saying that if it is over four years, or if someone commits a sexual act against a child or a terrorist act, there will be no ifs or buts, and those exceptions will not apply. There will still be space under the other provisions of the Bill to take action.
An attempt to deport a Sri Lankan paedophile convicted of assaulting three teenage boys was delayed over claims that it would breach his human rights. People look at such cases and wonder whose side the system is on. On Second Reading, the Government cited the case of grooming gang leader Shabir Ahmed. If they accept the principle there, they should accept it here.
Last year, I tabled a new clause to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill to stop the Human Rights Act 1998 being used to frustrate deportations. The Government voted it down, 14 votes to two. Today, we are asking for far less: simply that they do not make the current law weaker.
The Government say they want deportation to be the rule. Our amendments would make it the rule. An immigration system must rest on public consent. Every time a serious offender stays because the law gave them one more argument, that consent wears thinner. Lose it, and the system loses legitimacy. Every member of the Committee has constituents who have lost faith that the system is on their side. They are not asking for a finely balanced weighing exercise; they are asking for their safety and that of their children to come first. This group of amendments does exactly that, and I commend them to the Committee.
Anna Turley
I thank hon. Members for a very full discussion of the amendments. I have a lot to respond to, so I hope colleagues will bear with me while I try to pick up on all the points and make as much progress as I can.
I think all of us in this room will share a real commitment to the clause and this group of amendments. The clause is a huge priority; it really underlines the issue of the deportation of foreign national offenders and the exemptions through which they have sought to remain in this country. As the hon. Member for Stockton West expressed, the issue causes huge concern, fear, anxiety and outrage. This is such an important clause and such important part of the Bill and of what we are trying to do.
I also put on record the Government’s commitment on this issue; that is not to make a political point, but we have deported more than 60,000 foreign national offenders since we came to power at the 2024 elections—the highest number in a decade, and 41% higher than in the previous two-year period. I say that not to make a political point, because we are in Committee, but to underline our determination and commitment on this issue, should there be any doubt, given some of the concerns raised by Opposition Members, about our absolute determination on this issue. It is extremely important to us.
Clause 20 reforms the application of article 8 in deportation cases, restoring a proper balance between individual rights and the public interest. The current framework contains different, sentence-based tests, which act as exceptions to deportation. Where a person can meet the private and family life exceptions, or the higher test, which applies for the most serious offenders, they will not be deported. That means that, in some cases, deportation can be avoided by meeting the family or private life exceptions, without the court conducting a full consideration of all factors weighing in favour of the public interest in deportation.
The clause addresses that by requiring the courts to conduct a full proportionality assessment before it can find that deportation would be disproportionate. The public interest will therefore be considered in every deportation case before an article 8 breach can be found, rather than only in some categories of case, as at the moment. Judges will be able to block deportation only in certain exceptional circumstances. The clause retains important existing concepts, including “unduly harsh”. I appreciate some of the concerns expressed by Opposition Members, which I will come to, but the concept is well understood by the courts and supported by extensive case law.
Under the new framework, showing that deportation would have an unduly harsh effect is insufficient—without further consideration—to demonstrate a breach of article 8 and will no longer be the point at which an article 8 claim succeeds automatically. That is a fundamental change. The court will now have to go on to consider whether the interference with private or family life can be justified when weighed against the public interest in deportation. The new framework establishes a clear statutory framework for assessing whether deportation will be disproportionate, requiring proper weight to be given to factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offending, the person’s immigration status, the economic impact of allowing them to remain in the UK, and the wider public interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime.
The effect of the reforms is to establish a clearer and more consistent framework, in which deportation may be avoided only in truly exceptional cases. For the record hereafter, I clarify that emphasis in Committee. A person will still receive an individual assessment of their circumstances, but the courts will be required—I emphasise “required”—to give proper weight to Parliament’s view that deportation is strongly in the public interest.
Before I speak to the amendments, I will refer to some of the points made in the debate. I was asked whether the clause weakens provision for more serious offenders. No, it does not; they must still meet the same tests as other offenders, and face a proportionality test. The clause provides that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation. Again, I will say more on that when I come to the specific Opposition amendments.
I was asked why sentence thresholds are being removed. We do not need sentence thresholds if we are going to treat all deportation cases the same. The courts can still, and indeed must, take account of sentences and seriousness of offending in considering proportionality. That is required on the face of the Bill by subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked, why not cover family deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971? The key point is that the exclusion of section 3(5)(b) is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than the deportation framework.
The hon. Member for Stockton West made a number of points. On his point about the House of Commons Library briefing, those with a sentence of over four years would previously need to establish that they meet very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. Now they must establish that they meet an exception and that their deportation cannot be justified. We would expect such cases to fail the proportionality assessment even if they meet the exception. Our provisions enhance those deportation provisions.
I would also like to refer to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. He criticised proposed new section 117C of the 2002 Act. It is important to make it clear that the public interest is in deportation unless it is not justified. That is enhanced in proposed new section 117C(2) by making it clear that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest is. The hon. Gentleman is right that the first exception under proposed new section 117C(4)(a) means the person’s whole life, not just their adult life. That is the same as under existing law. To his points on social and cultural integration, the onus is on the applicant to establish that. Again, that is already covered in existing legislation. Caseworkers are experienced in how to deal with that and familiar with that understanding.
I want to make some more points on the “unduly harsh” test. Again, that is in existing legislation. The Supreme Court has already interpreted it extremely narrowly. On the issue of court latitude, which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised, proposed new section 117C makes it clear that deportation is in the public interest and, as I have said, that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest will be. It is important that courts have a clear steer on Parliament’s view of public interest, and the process of the Bill will establish that. To resist deportation, someone must meet the exceptions and establish that their deportation cannot be justified in the light of the public interest. Deportation can therefore be resisted only in clearly defined and limited circumstances.
I will move on to the amendments, and I hope to provide a bit more clarity. Amendments 107, 109 and 111 seek to impose a higher threshold for deportation for foreign criminals who receive a custodial sentence of four years or more, or who commit certain more serious offences. The amendments would require such persons to demonstrate something more than meeting the private or family life exceptional circumstances test. There should be no suggestion that we are seeking to lower the threshold for foreign criminals who are given sentences of more than four years. That is misplaced.
Clause 20 amends the current deportation framework by introducing a full proportionality exercise before an article 8 breach can be found. That will ensure that the courts are required to consider and take account of the overall public interest in deportation. All foreign nationals subject to deportation will now have to meet a two-stage test to succeed in their article 8 claim. The first stage of the test requires the person to satisfy one of three exceptional circumstances tests. Where that exceptional circumstances test is met, they must also show that the interference with their private or family life rights—as demonstrated by an exceptional circumstance—cannot be justified. The second stage of the test requires a full proportionality exercise, weighing all the factors in favour of deportation.
As I have said, clause 20 specifically states that the greater the severity of offending, the greater the public interest in deportation. That is clear. It will make it less likely that the interference with article 8 rights will outweigh the public interest in deportation. We expect the courts to give significant weight to the public interest in deporting persons with long custodial sentences and those who have committed serious offences. I also clarify for the record that exceptional circumstances are not exceptions to deportation. Now, when someone demonstrates an interference with their family or private life, they will no longer automatically avoid deportation. There will be an assessment of the public interest test—
11.25 am
The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).
Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.
Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [HL] (First sitting)
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public, and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to please switch electronic devices to silent and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. I also remind all Members to speak slowly, loudly and clearly and, ideally, to look up while they speak. That is to support Members who are hard of hearing.
We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication. I call the Minister to move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee. The motion can be debated for up to 30 minutes.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
I beg to move,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 20 October) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 20 October;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 22 October.
2. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 5; Schedule 1; Clauses 6 to 9; Schedule 2; Clauses 10 to 13; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 14 to 17; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
3. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 22 October.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I thank all hon. Members who are taking part in the proceedings of this Committee. I have nothing substantive to add to the debate that was had yesterday on this matter. Therefore, I commend the motion to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Keir Mather.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room. Members are responsible for declaring any interests, in accordance with the code of conduct, at the start of proceedings and when speaking or tabling amendments. Do any Members wish to declare interests?
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
I declare an interest as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for the future of aviation, travel and aerospace. I have met many stakeholders through the process of the Bill.
Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)
Similarly, I am chair of the all-party parliamentary group for wheelchair users, and clearly the Bill covers some aspects of that work.
Samantha Dixon (Chester North and Neston) (Lab)
It may not be a matter of interest, but for the record and for transparency, my niece works in the aviation industry.
Noah Law (St Austell and Newquay) (Lab)
I declare an interest as the chair for the all-party parliamentary group on aviation.
The Chair
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses and schedules have been selected and how amendments have been grouped together for debate. The Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group will be called first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate if they wish to speak in the current debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during the proceedings.
At the end of the debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or the new clause or seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment to a vote—that includes grouped new clauses—that is at the Chair’s discretion. My fellow Chairs and I will use our discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses following the debates on relevant amendments.
I remind Members that decisions are taken in the order in which they appear on the Bill. That means that some amendments may be decided on considerably later than the point at which they are debated. I hope that explanation is helpful.
Clause 1
Air transport and airport services: rights and duties
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) When making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to promoting economic growth.
(1B) In complying with subsection (1A), the Secretary of State must in particular consider the impact of the regulations on—
(a) the competitiveness of air transport service providers and airport operators,
(b) investment in the United Kingdom aviation sector, and
(c) the burdens imposed on air transport service providers and airport operators in complying with the regulations.”
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth before making regulations under clause 1, with particular reference to the competitiveness of the aviation sector, investment, and the regulatory burden on businesses.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 6, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) When making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the Regulation Action Plan, published in March 2025, target of reducing the administrative costs of regulation on business by 25% by the end of the 2024-2029 Parliament.
(1B) Regulations under subsection (1) must not impose administrative requirements on air transport service providers or airport operators the costs of which are disproportionate to the consumer protection objectives the regulations seek to achieve, having regard to the target referred to in subsection (1A).
(1C) In this section, ‘administrative costs’ means costs incurred by air transport service providers or airport operators in complying with information, reporting, documentation or other procedural requirements imposed by regulations under this section.”
This amendment requires the Secretary of State, when making regulations under clause 1, to have regard to the Government’s target of reducing the administrative costs of regulation on business by 25% by the end of the Parliament.
New clause 2—Purpose—
“(1) The purpose of this Act is to—
(a) promote the international competitiveness of the United Kingdom aviation sector;
(b) support economic growth in that sector; and
(c) protect the rights and interests of consumers of air transport and airport services.
(2) The Secretary of State must, in taking any actions under the provisions of this Act, have regard to this purpose.”
This new clause inserts a purpose clause into the Bill requiring the Secretary of State and the CAA to have regard to the promotion of the international competitiveness of the United Kingdom aviation sector and economic growth in that sector.
Alison Griffiths
Taken together, amendments 5 and 6 and new clause 2 address a single question: what is the Bill intended to achieve for British aviation? Amendment 5 would require Ministers to consider economic growth, competitiveness, investment and the regulatory burdens imposed on the sector. Amendment 6 would hold the Government to their own target for reducing the administrative cost of regulation. New clause 2 would place the Bill’s overarching purpose at its forefront: supporting a competitive, growing aviation sector while protecting consumers.
Economic growth, competitiveness and investment must be at the heart of this Bill. That is why amendment 5 is so important. It would ensure that, when Ministers exercise their considerable powers contained in this Bill, they are required to consider the consequences for growth, competitiveness and investment—I know that that is a rarity for them, but they may as well start today. How on earth can businesses be expected to make long-term investment decisions when the Government cannot even provide them with clear and consistent direction? Above all, the industry needs the confidence to expand and the certainty to invest, and a Government who are useful and whose policies are conducive to that goal, rather than being all over the place with myriad positions. Amendment 5 would clearly fulfil that goal, ensuring that Ministers consider the consequences for growth. I hope that the Minister will support it.
It is bizarre that we have to debate amendment 6 at all. The Opposition have not pulled the target in it out of thin air; it is the Government’s own target. They set it, not us. The Minister cannot ramble on in the usual way that his colleagues do about a poor inheritance; his Government made this commitment themselves. Yet bizarrely, when this matter was raised in the other place, the Minister there refused to back it—shameful, really. Do Ministers simply not care about the costs they are piling on to British businesses? Of course not. When we examine their record—regulation upon regulation; standard upon standard; requirement upon requirement—it is clear for all to see, especially the businesses that have suffered and been forced to curtail plans to grow, expand, hire and succeed. That is why we have tabled amendment 6: we are simply asking Ministers to stick to the target they set themselves.
Finally, new clause 2 would place an overarching purpose in the Bill. As we have argued throughout the consideration of this legislation, growth must be our north star in aviation policy. We want Britain to have a thriving and internationally competitive aviation sector, with airports and airlines able to invest, expand and succeed. That ambition is entirely compatible with protecting the rights and interests of passengers. Indeed, a successful aviation sector depends on passengers having confidence in the services they receive. New clause 2 would therefore make it clear that the purposes of the Bill are to promote the international competitiveness of the United Kingdom aviation sector, to support economic growth and to protect consumers. I struggle to see why the Government would object to putting those balanced and reasonable aims in the Bill.
Amendments 5 and 6 and new clause 2 form a coherent package. They would establish a clear, pro-growth purpose, require Ministers to consider the effect of regulation on investment and competitiveness, and hold the Government to their own target for reducing administrative costs. I hope that the Minister will support them.
Keir Mather
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I welcome the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, to her place. It will be a pleasure to work alongside her as the Bill makes it progress through the House.
The hon. Lady’s amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to promoting economic growth when making regulations under the clause. Let me be clear that economic growth remains a crucial priority for this Government. Sustained growth is essential to raising living standards, supporting good jobs and funding our public services. That is why the potential impact on growth is already firmly embedded in policy development. Growth assessments require Departments to consider how proposals can maximise positive impacts and minimise negative ones, and form an essential part of the collective agreement process before new policy is introduced.
Growth is therefore considered throughout the development of policy, rather than only at the point when regulations are made. That scrutiny is reinforced through the options and impact assessment process, which requires careful consideration of the effects on business, trade and investment, the ease of doing business in the UK, and wider economic growth. The substance of the amendment is therefore already addressed through established and rigorous processes. Putting a further duty in primary legislation would not strengthen that consideration; it would duplicate obligations and processes that already apply. For that reason, I cannot support the amendment, and I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it.
Amendment 6, also tabled by the shadow Minister, returns to the question of how the Government should account for regulatory burdens when exercising the powers under the clause. The Government’s position remains clear: reducing the cost of regulation to business is a firm, cross-Government commitment. That work is already being pursued in a co-ordinated and systematic way, including through regular reporting on changes to administrative burdens, collated and published across Government. The issue is therefore not whether those costs should be controlled, but whether the amendment would add anything useful to the framework already in place.
The evidence for this Bill is also important. As the published impact assessment makes clear, its measures are expected to reduce costs to business over time. In particular, improvements to the safety rule-making framework will provide greater clarity, consistency and efficiency. The Bill therefore advances, rather than cuts across, the objective that amendment 6 seeks to promote. Nor would it be appropriate to place the Government’s 25% target in primary legislation. Doing so could bind Secretaries of State in future Parliaments to a target set for the present circumstances, even when subsequent policy or economic developments warrant a different approach. The Government are already acting on the amendment’s underlying objective, and the Bill itself is expected to deliver efficiencies for business. The proposed statutory provision would add rigidity, not stronger protection. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendment, and I ask the hon. Lady not to press it to a Division.
Finally in this group, new clause 2 was also tabled by the shadow Minister. It would insert a purpose clause requiring the Secretary of State, when acting under the Bill, to have regard to competitiveness, growth and consumer protection. The Committee will be familiar with the Government’s position on Second Reading and in the Bill’s consideration in the other place. I will therefore focus briefly on why we remain unable to support the new clause.
The Government share the objective of supporting a competitive and growing aviation sector. Those aims already inform wider Government policy and decision making, and the Secretary of State sets out strategic priorities to the Civil Aviation Authority each year, including on the importance of supporting economic growth. The question is whether a purpose clause is the right way to secure those aims. We do not believe it is. New clause 2 would give particular prominence to a fixed and incomplete list of considerations governing every exercise of the Bill’s powers. Notably, that list does not include safety, despite its fundamental importance to aviation and the Bill.
Ministers must retain the flexibility to balance consumer protection, growth, competitiveness, safety and any other relevant factors in the light of the evidence. The explanatory statement for new clause 2 suggests that the duty would extend to the Civil Aviation Authority, but the drafting itself does not do so. In any event, the CAA is already subject to the statutory growth duty, requiring it to have regard to economic growth proportionately, so the new clause is unnecessary to growth and potentially restrictive in wider effect. The Government approach allows decisions to remain evidence-led, proportionate and responsive, without elevating an incomplete set of objectives above other vital considerations. I therefore ask the hon. Lady not to press the new clause to a vote.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his enthusiasm—it is not yet shared by those on the Government Benches, but perhaps that will come in time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. Here we are with yet another Transport Bill Committee. People often say that transport is a boring, unsexy topic—
Olly Glover
Well, indeed. Yet the Government are dedicating so much legislative time to it, which rather undermines that thesis.
I also note that a number of Government Members have already served their time in Transport Bill Committee jail, and now they are here again. I hope that is a sign of investment in their futures, rather than a punishment, because some would argue that being on a Public Bill Committee sometimes feels like a punishing, if necessary, duty—although I am sure the Minister would not endorse such seditious sentiments.
I will defer to my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam on the substance of these amendments, but I will just say a little about the Bill as a whole and how I hope the Committee will operate. We broadly support a large amount of the Bill, but there are some aspects that we have concerns that. Perhaps there is a little too much faith being placed in the abilities of the CAA without enough oversight of it. We would also like to see some protections for consumers and the communities affected by aviation expansion. Of course, those communities include everybody on the planet, because of the significant environmental impact that aviation has, but I will say more on that as we as we go.
As for this Committee, of course, the normal arrangement is for the Government to reject all ideas that are not their own. At this stage, however, I lay down a challenge to those on the Government Benches: could it be different this time? The new Prime Minister has indicated his willingness to embrace Liberal Democrat ideas on occasion. For example, yesterday he warmly embraced our policy of banning people listening to things on their phone in public without using their headphones. I hope the new culture initiated by the Prime Minister will be embraced by the Minister and that the Government will perhaps accept at least one of our ideas in this Committee. That is my hope; we shall see if it happens.
Edward Argar
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I rise to support amendments 5 and 6, and new clause 2, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton.
May I say at the outset that it is a pleasure to again be serving on a Public Bill Committee relating to transport and to be opposite the Minister, who is an extremely decent and able Minister? In previous Public Bill Committees, even when he said no, he managed to say no to the Opposition’s suggestions in a very nice and gentle way. Let us see how he does this time.
It is also a pleasure to serve again opposite the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford—we served on the Railways Bill Committee together—and the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. May I also take this opportunity to congratulate the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield on his elevation since we last sat on a Public Bill Committee together? It is well deserved, and I wish him all the very best in his new role.
The Minister has set out his opposition to the amendments and the new clause. Although I entirely agree with him about the importance of retaining a focus on safety, consumer protection and consumer rights, which is what the Bill is about, that does not necessarily sit in contradiction to what my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton said about economic growth. It is important that we keep that in mind.
The Minister might wish on a future occasion to come back to the point about costs, but I ask him now to reflect on pages 25 and 32 of the impact assessment, which show that the monetised benefits are the two aspects that are rated red because of the costs; they are both rated as negative, because of the costs on business and the broader costs. I heard what he said about the longer-term opportunities for this legislation to drive growth. Nevertheless, I would be grateful if he addressed that point—if not in relation to this set of amendments, then perhaps in relation to a future set of amendments, where it is in scope to do so—if he does not catch the Clerk’s eye in a negative way while doing so.
Keir Mather
Just to respond briefly to a few of the points raised, I agree with the shadow Minister and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston that economic growth and safety are not necessarily in conflict with each other. The question is, however, whether the amendments as drafted offer too prescriptive a lean towards economic growth while not duly factoring in the question of safety. When we exist in a system where economic growth is considered right through the gamut of policy development, it does not appear proportionate to me to include one to the exclusion of the other when it could be argued that the other is equally important and in some instances more important.
The right hon. Member raises a fair point about the costs to business of regulatory alignment. He is right to point to the impact assessment, and he is also correct in the sense that the initial compliance costs of adapting to new regulations create negative costs for business. I am still of the view, however, that over the long term the Government are abiding by a target to reduce administrative burdens for business. Overall, in the longer term, the Bill reduces costs. On that basis, I do not believe it is necessary to put a formal target to reduce burdens by 25% in the Bill, given the fact that, first, we might wish to go further in the future, and, secondly there are some instances in which, particularly in relation to aviation safety, we might want over a short period of time to increase the amount of regulatory compliance that is required to adapt to new and changing circumstances in the aviation sector more broadly.
Thirdly, the right hon. Member raised a point about binding successors. I might have been overly literal in my remarks. If so, forgive me. It is true that the measure does not formally bind the hands of a successive Government. The question, however, is whether setting out a purpose clause is unduly prescriptive in terms of what it does and does not lay out for future Governments. I have of course been encouraged by the Opposition Front Benchers to bear all those principles in mind. I have an overall pseudo-ideological position on how legislation of this kind should be developed, and think it is better not to fill Bills with things on their face that take away flexibility in future.
That said, the points around growth and reducing regulatory burden are significant. I thank Opposition Members for the way they have raised them; however, I do not feel the way that they are presented in the drafting of the amendments enhances the quality of the Bill, and I again ask for them to be withdrawn.
Alison Griffiths
I am grateful for the Minister’s response, but I do not think he has sufficiently addressed the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston and the points made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I think a north star is critical for the Bill. It is all very well to have a Bill, but without a purpose, what is it there for? That is an important point that we need to take into account.
On the flexibility that the Minister referenced, my right hon. Friend has already made the point that he would not be removing any flexibility in agreeing to our amendments. I also point to our new clause 2. The Minister appears to think that it negates safety at the expense of competitiveness and growth. I reiterate that its purpose is to
“protect the rights and interests of consumers of air transport and airport services.”
I cannot see how that could be construed as downplaying safety. With your permission, Mr Turner, I will press all three provisions to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Olly Glover
I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) Regulations under this section may not reduce the standards of service and protection available to passengers and consumers of airport and air transport services compared to any provision which those regulations replace.”
This amendment ensures that regulations made under this section do not make provision setting out lower passenger and consumer standards than current regulations.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 25, in clause 1, page 2, line 9, at end insert—
“(2A) The regulations must include provision prohibiting a carrier from seating members of the same booking in such a way that any child under the age of 16, or any adult requiring care, is not seated adjacent to, or within immediate proximity of, at least one accompanying adult or carer included in that booking.
(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), an "accompanying adult or carer" means a person who is—
(a) a parent or guardian of the child,
(b) a carer responsible for the child or adult requiring care during the journey, or
(c) any other adult who has legal responsibility for the child or adult requiring care,
and who is included in the same booking as the child or adult requiring care.
(2C) For the purposes of subsection (2A), an "adult requiring care" means a person aged 16 or over who requires assistance or support from another person during the journey by reason of disability, illness or any other condition affecting their ability to travel independently.”
This amendment requires regulations to prohibit airlines from separating family groups travelling under the same booking, ensuring that young children and adults requiring care are not seated away from an accompanying adult or carer.
Amendment 26, in clause 1, page 2, line 35, at end insert—
“(3A) Where regulations modify passenger standards, including but not limited to mandatory compensation provisions, and such standards depart from equivalent assimilated law or other EU aviation standards recognised by the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must ensure that the consumer protection afforded by the replacement domestic standard is equal or superior to the standard it replaces.
(3B) In making regulations under subsection (3A), the Secretary of State must keep passenger standards under continuous review to identify opportunities for enhanced consumer protection, and shall have a duty to implement such higher standards of compensation and protection wherever it is reasonably practicable to do so.”
This amendment ensures that if the UK diverges from EU aviation laws regarding passenger rights and compensation, the new domestic standards must match or exceed the level of protection currently provided by the EU.
Amendment 7, in clause 1, page 2, line 39, at end insert—
“(4A) Before making regulations under this section for the purpose of aligning United Kingdom law with any provision of European Union law or any international standard, requirement or practice, the Secretary of State must publish a statement explaining—
(a) the provision of European Union law or international standard, requirement or practice with which the regulations are intended to align,
(b) the reasons why the Secretary of State considers such alignment to be necessary or appropriate,
(c) whether, and if so to what extent, the regulations make provision that goes beyond such alignment, and
(d) the likely impact of the regulations on passengers, air transport service providers, airport operators and competition in the aviation sector.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement before making regulations under clause 1 for the purpose of aligning UK law with EU law or international standards, explaining the basis for alignment, whether the regulations go beyond it, and their likely impact.
New clause 14—Automatic Refunds: failure to honour pre-purchased seats—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, introduce a scheme to establish automatic refunds for passengers who paid for specific seats on planes but who were then allocated different seats without their consent.
(2) The scheme must ensure that the refund specified in subsection (1) is automatically refunded to the original payment method, unless otherwise agreed by the passenger and airline, within 30 days of the flight's planned departure date.”
This new clause would introduce a refund scheme for passengers who have paid for seats on plane journeys but who are then allocated different seats, without their permission, by the airline, and not require the passenger to apply for the refund manually.
Olly Glover
The amendments and new clause 14 are intended to strengthen the consumer and general citizen protections that the Bill has the opportunity to provide, should our amendments be accepted.
Amendment 24 would stipulate that regulations coming from the Bill cannot create lower passenger and consumer standards than currently exist. This is important because, whether we are debating information rights, delay compensation or the powers conferred on the Secretary of State, the test has to be the same: does the provision leave the passenger better protected or leave the door open to an erosion of the standards that they currently enjoy? The amendment does not seek to load new obligations on to the Government but simply asks that when Ministers use the powers that the Bill grants them, they cannot use them to quietly lower the bar. Where the Government take a power to make new regulations, the existing baseline of protection should not be capable of being diminished through that power.
This approach is not novel; section 20 of the Environment Act 2021 requires a Minister, before the Second Reading of any Bill touching environmental law, to confirm that it will not reduce existing environmental protection. If they cannot do so, they must say so and explain why. That single duty has kept the floor from moving. Air quality standards inherited from European Union law were carried through undiluted, and remain in force today.
Amendment 25 would put into law that family groups cannot be separated when travelling under the same booking, ensuring that children and adults requiring care are not seated away from an accompanying adult. In other aspects of life, when someone makes a booking and finds that they have been seated separately from their children or family, that is not considered acceptable; the booking has to be honoured or redress has to be made.
Even on other modes of transport, that is the case. For example, on a train, if someone reserves multiple seats in the same booking, the booking system automatically tries to seat the whole party together—although admittedly, on occasion, there is disruption, or CrossCountry decides to put on a four or five-car train, ruining all that, but that is perhaps another matter. Why do those arrangements not also apply to airlines?
This issue might be more common with some airlines than others, but they can currently get away with what they are doing because there are no restrictions. We hear far too many heartbreaking stories of passengers being treated in that way, and particularly of passengers with disabilities being treated as a lower priority.
We are glad to hear reports that the Government have been convinced of the case that we set out for this change in the House of Lords and are now considering consulting on scrapping any charges for being seated next to children under the age of 14. However, we really believe that this requires focus, so we very much hope that the Government will view amendment 25 favourably or otherwise indicate what they are going to do instead of accepting it. Subject to the Government not being willing to accept that principle, we will press amendment 25 to a Division.
Amendment 26 would require that, if the UK diverges from EU aviation laws regarding passenger rights and compensation, the new domestic standards must match or exceed the level of protection currently provided by the EU. For the reasons that I have outlined, it is important that we maintain our current standards as a minimum—of course, we want to increase them.
New clause 14 would support amendment 25 by introducing automatic refunds for a failure to honour pre-purchased seats.
Let me say something briefly about the Opposition’s amendment 7. I understand what the Conservative shadow Minister intends with the amendment, and I would be interested in hearing her case if it is about transparency and good governance; however, I feel there is a tendency on the Conservative Benches to table such amendments more when it comes to European Union matters than to others, which I find ironic given how often they accuse the Liberal Democrats of being obsessed with Europe. Perhaps they have a comparable obsession, but in a different direction.
I think I have said more than enough, and I look forward to hearing other Members’ comments.
Alison Griffiths
I will speak to amendments 24 to 26, amendment 7, which stands in my name, and new clause 14, which have all been grouped together.
Amendment 24 sets out an eminently sensible ambition, namely to ensure that any future regulations do not water down the passenger and consumer protections currently in force. That is an important principle and one that we recognise. Of course, as hon. Members know, the Opposition support a thriving, competitive aviation sector, but passengers must also have confidence that, when they travel, they will be treated fairly and the protections that they rely upon will be upheld.
That is particularly important for disabled passengers and those with reduced mobility. Far too many people still face unnecessary difficulties when travelling by air, whether regarding the provision of assistance, the handling of mobility equipment or simply being able to travel independently and with dignity. Those matters deserve serious attention. As we—and particularly my Conservative colleagues in the other place—have consistently argued, accessibility should be considered from the outset rather than treated as an afterthought.
However, I have some reservations about binding ourselves to every existing regulation, particularly where certain requirements may create perverse incentives, impose disproportionate burdens or simply fail to deliver the outcomes that they were intended to achieve. We should always be in the business of retaining the flexibility to revisit and improve regulations where necessary, while ensuring that passengers remain properly protected. We welcome the overarching objective of the amendment, but given those concerns, we will abstain.
Luke Taylor
It is a pleasure to serve in your presence, Mr Turner. As a vocal advocate of flying, it falls to me to acknowledge that, currently, flying is horrible, uncomfortable and stressful. On most occasions we arrive late, in a condition such that our initial reaction is to strip off all our clothes, shower and rid ourselves of the filth that we have been stewing in for hours in an aircraft. The fact that we all aspire to fly regularly shows that it is necessary, but there is an opportunity in the Bill to remove some of the stress, worry and discomfort in as minor a way as possible, to make the experience slightly less horrible. I will speak on amendment 25 and new clause 14, which I think are fair and proportionate attempts to reduce the stress and worry of the flying and airport experience in minor and sensible ways.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage, I hope the Government see the wisdom of protecting parents and everybody else on an aircraft from the risk of an unaccompanied minor being seated next to a stranger. It is a reasonable expectation that someone should make a flight booking that covers themselves and their children, and that they should not be split to the four corners of the aircraft, forced to worry about persuading people to change seats to have the child under some level of control. For some parents that may be a blessing, and the thought of their seven-year-old sitting next to some poor soul at the back of the plane is attractive, but I think most of us agree that we should not subject random members of the public to that.
Amendment 25 takes a reasonable and proportionate approach to address the issue. I am interested to hear from the Minister on the Government’s approach as, unless I have missed it, it does not currently appear in the Bill. We would be minded to withdraw the amendment if the reassurance from the Minister were sufficient, particularly regarding how an adult is a person aged 16 and over, and how an adult requiring care should also be covered.
Edward Argar
The hon. Member has painted a vivid picture of the realities of air travel, and he is eloquently explaining the thinking behind the amendment. I understand the intent—it is a worthy and sensible aim—but is he not concerned that the drafting of the amendment is quite tight? There may be times when an airline, because of circumstances beyond its control—the number of passengers, seating arrangements or whatever—would fall foul of the legislation because it does not allow the necessary degree of discretion.
Luke Taylor
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. There are particular booking sizes, seating arrangements and issues relating to the geometry of aircraft in respect of which conflicting groups may well mean that the mathematical problem is not solvable. There would need to be redrafting to exclude those occasions, so that we do not subject airlines to fines for failure to achieve impossible requirements.
The goal of amendment 25, which relates to new clause 14, is to stop predatory charging for seat selection to avoid families and carers being split up and to give groups, families and carers confidence that they will be sitting together on the aircraft. My hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage made the point that assigned seating is relevant to air travel and not to other modes of transport because it is different in an aircraft, where assigned seating is particularly important to ensure that passengers are in the right part of the cabin, to be able to identify passengers with allergies or meal preferences, or because of things like weight allowances. The amendment reflects the need to protect the passenger—the consumer—as the Bill has rightly been introduced to do, in a proportionate way.
New clause 14 relates to the fact that passengers can sometimes choose a particular seat, whether in an exit row, by a window, or at the front or back of the plane, perhaps because they want to make a connection and so be able to leg it off the flight at the very first opportunity when they land. Airlines may choose to offer that product, and that is okay. However, what they cannot do is make families and carers pay that premium fee to ensure that they are able to support loved ones and, potentially, to protect other passengers from their eight-year-old flicking his porridge or scrambled eggs across the aisle. Amendment 25, together with new clause 14, would prevent that.
It is entirely within an airline’s ability to issue automatic refunds when services are not delivered. The right hon. Member for Melton and Syston argued that airlines might not be able to deliver due to the geometry or combination of passenger preferences, which is okay, but on occasions when an equipment change or groups mean that passengers have to be moved and the product they paid for is not available, the refund should be automatic. I agree with the premise that a new clause or amendment must be proved to be necessary—this new clause is necessary because the systems are able to do that today, but it does not happen. It is down to the consumer to chase an airline for a refund. They have to go through the rigmarole of emailing and potentially deploying their AI refund bot to get that fee returned.
Depending on the Minister’s response to amendment 25 and new clause 14, we will choose whether to push them to a vote or withdraw them.
Keir Mather
Let me start by saying that I agree with the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage that we must maintain a high level of consumer protection in aviation. The intention of clause 1 is to strengthen and enhance air passenger rights through secondary legislation, which is why the Government added clause 3 in the other place following discussions with Baroness Grender.
Clause 3 provides an important safeguard that requires the Secretary of State to have due regard to the desirability of strengthening passenger rights when exercising the clause 1 power. However, requiring all future reforms to be equal or superior to current standards could have unintended consequences. A balanced package of reforms may strengthen protections in some areas while making proportionate adjustments in others.
Amendment 24 could prevent such a package from proceeding, even when it would improve outcomes for all passengers overall. Although I agree that the Bill should be used to strengthen passenger protections, rather than reduce them, clauses 1 and 3 already provide the right framework for balanced, evidence-based reform, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw amendment 24.
Olly Glover
I thank the Minister for his comments. We are content not to press all the amendments, except amendment 25. The Minister has given some assurances about the Government’s future intentions, which are good but not quite enough. With the Chair’s permission, we would be a grateful for a Division on amendment 25.
Alison Griffiths
We would like to press amendment 7 to a vote. I do not consider the Minister to have sufficiently addressed our concerns around the reasons and impact of the provisions in the Bill.
Olly Glover
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 25, in clause 1, page 2, line 9, at end insert—
“(2A) The regulations must include provision prohibiting a carrier from seating members of the same booking in such a way that any child under the age of 16, or any adult requiring care, is not seated adjacent to, or within immediate proximity of, at least one accompanying adult or carer included in that booking.
(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), an ‘accompanying adult or carer’ means a person who is—
(a) a parent or guardian of the child,
(b) a carer responsible for the child or adult requiring care during the journey, or
(c) any other adult who has legal responsibility for the child or adult requiring care,
and who is included in the same booking as the child or adult requiring care.
(2C) For the purposes of subsection (2A), an ‘adult requiring care’ means a person aged 16 or over who requires assistance or support from another person during the journey by reason of disability, illness or any other condition affecting their ability to travel independently.”—(Olly Glover.)
This amendment requires regulations to prohibit airlines from separating family groups travelling under the same booking, ensuring that young children and adults requiring care are not seated away from an accompanying adult or carer.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alison Griffiths
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 1, page 2, line 42, leave out
“that include provision of the kind mentioned in subsection (3)(e) or (f)”.
This amendment would ensure that all regulations made under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure, rather than only regulations containing provision of the kind mentioned in subsection (3)(e) or (f).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 9, in clause 1, page 3, line 1, leave out subsection (7).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 5 and would require all regulations made under clause 1 to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 10, in schedule 1, page 23, line 9, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”.
This amendment ensures that regulations made under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.
Clauses 1 to 3 stand part.
Alison Griffiths
I shall also speak to amendments 9 and 10, and I will finish by briefly addressing clauses 1 to 3 stand part. The amendments concern a very straightforward principle: that Parliament ought to have a proper opportunity to scrutinise the regulations made under this legislation. The proposals would ensure that the relevant regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure, thereby requiring the approval of both Houses of Parliament, so they would preserve scrutiny, accountability and fair process for all concerned. Given the breadth of powers in the Bill, that is an entirely sensible safeguard. Who knows who the next Secretary of State might be?
The regulations will have important and wide-reaching consequences for airlines, airports, passengers and the sector as a whole. Surely the Minister agrees that it is right for Parliament to have a meaningful opportunity to examine such decisions before they take effect. It was disappointing that when similar amendments were debated in the other place, the Government declined to accept that basic principle.
I turn briefly to clauses 1 to 3. We support the objective of strengthening passenger protections, particularly for disabled passengers and those with reduced mobility. Clause 2 provides for consultation on several important issues, including assistance for disabled passengers, protections for those with allergies, complaints procedures and the provision of suitable wheelchairs. We welcome these practical steps, and look forward to the consultation producing timely and effective action.
Clause 3 places the welcome principles of dignity, equal access, appropriate assistance and independent travel at the heart of the new framework. The importance of those objectives makes proper parliamentary scrutiny of the regulations all the more necessary. That is precisely what amendments 8 to 10 seek to secure, and I hope the Minister will support them.
Keir Mather
I thank the shadow Minister for her amendments 8 and 9. Taken together, they would require regulations made under clause 1 to be subject to the affirmative procedure. As such, I will address them together.
I agree that regulations made under the Bill’s powers must receive proper parliamentary scrutiny. The question is not whether Parliament should scrutinise them, but what level of scrutiny is proportionate to their nature and effect. Clause 1 deliberately provides for a split approach, ensuring that Parliament’s time is focused where the potential impact is greatest. Some regulations may make only minor or technical changes—for instance, updating the name of an organisation—and it would not be proportionate to require an affirmative debate in every such case.
By contrast, regulations creating criminal offences or financial penalties could have a significant effect on businesses and individuals, and the Bill rightly reserves the affirmative procedure for those measures. The amendments would therefore apply the highest levels of scrutiny, irrespective of the substance of the regulations, placing unnecessary demands on parliamentary time without improving oversight.
Noah Law
Does the Minister find it as curious as I do that the Conservative party tabled amendment 5? It is all about having a smaller state, more effective regulation and competition in the aviation industry, but requiring the affirmative procedure for such matters would put us out of whack with other markets.
Keir Mather
My hon. Friend is right to point to the fact that a number of other amendments tabled by Conservative Members centre on creating an agile, dynamic aviation sector that is flexible in responding to the needs of consumers. There is an important consideration that relates to proportionality, but I do not believe that it is adequately applied in the amendments in this case.
We need to be able to enforce new consumer rights in aviation in a way that is proportionate but also effective and flexible. Creating the balance between reserving affirmative procedures for important matters that relate to things such as financial penalties or criminal sanctions is right to ensure that the oversight is there. However, the Secretary of State put in place by the Prime Minister and the majority party should be able to make regulations in an effective way that does not require Parliament to have an affirmative debate, so that we can keep an effective regulatory system that best serves the interests of the travelling public. That point was well made by my hon. Friend. The Bill’s approach is targeted and proportionate, so I ask the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton to not to press amendments 8 and 9.
Amendment 10 would require regulations co-ordinating the concurrent exercise of direct enforcement powers by relevant authorities to be made, again, under the affirmative procedure. I recognise the importance of ensuring that Parliament applies the right level of scrutiny to delegated powers. The key point, however, is that these regulations will not create or extend enforcement powers. Instead, they will govern how existing powers are co-ordinated among authorities. The affirmative procedure would therefore not be proportionate to their limited function.
The regulations will be administrative in nature, providing a practical framework for cases in which more than one authority can act. They may, for example, cover information sharing, notification arrangements and the process for determining which direct enforcer should exercise its powers in a particular category of case. Those operational arrangements are important, but they do not warrant the highest level of parliamentary procedure. That approach is also consistent with established precedent: comparable powers to co-ordinate concurrent enforcement under competition legislation are already subject to the negative procedure. The Bill therefore provides a tested, proportionate and appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendment, and I ask the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton to withdraw it.
Having addressed the amendments, let me turn to clause 1, which is central to the Government’s aim of strengthening consumer protections. It enables the Secretary of State to make regulations relating to passenger rights. Existing passenger rights regulations sit within assimilated EU law, and primary legislation is required to update that. The clause creates a power to update and amend existing legislation via secondary means. It allows for regulations across a range of issues, including but not limited to delays and cancellations, denied boarding, price transparency, accessibility for disabled passengers and people with reduced mobility, and liabilities relating to injury, baggage and cargo.
Clause 1 also provides for effective enforcement to ensure that passenger rights are backed by meaningful remedies. It would enable the Government to introduce dispute resolution arrangements and powers for the Civil Aviation Authority to secure compliance, and, where appropriate, financial penalties and criminal offences. The power is subject to important safeguards; any regulations creating criminal offences or financial penalty regimes will require the approval of both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Clause 1 therefore establishes the framework needed to keep aviation consumer protections effective, proportionate and fit for the future, and I commend it to the Committee.
Alongside that, it is logical to discuss clause 2, which works in tandem with clause 1. Clause 2 will ensure that air passenger rights legislation provides appropriate protections for disabled passengers and passengers with reduced mobility.
Daniel Francis
Shortly after the election, the Government set up the aviation accessibility task and finish group. Clearly, a lot of work in the Bill builds on that. Disabled passenger groups want to see those measures introduced, so can the Minister confirm that clause 2 will require a consultation to be carried out within 12 months of the Bill being passed, and that he will then publish the outcome of that consultation so that we can continue to build on the work of the task and finish group?
Keir Mather
I thank my hon. Friend for his contribution not only here but across a range of accessibility issues in transport, particularly relating to aviation. He is right that a consultation will be undertaken as part of clause 2 within 12 months of Royal Assent. The purpose of that is to ensure that where consumer rights legislation is improved, it is done so with the unashamed ambition of making sure that people who travel with disabilities have equal access to the benefits of aviation and have a dignified and welcoming experience wherever they travel in the United Kingdom. That is exactly what this clause is designed to facilitate.
Clause 2 will place a statutory obligation on the Secretary of State to consult on those accessibility issues, which will help to identify what changes to passenger rights legislation may be needed. The consultation must start within a year of Royal Assent, and any resulting reforms can be implemented through the regulation-making power in clause 1. The Government must consult on a non-exhaustive list of issues, including compensation for breaches of assistance requirements, protections for passengers with allergies, complaints handling and the provision of wheelchairs suitable for use on aircraft.
Preet Kaur Gill (Birmingham Edgbaston) (Lab/Co-op)
I strongly welcome the provision on wheelchairs. From personal experience, a damaged wheelchair can leave someone unable to work or get around their home, and that obviously affects personal care. Alongside compensation, can the Minister say how the Government will encourage prompt repairs and perhaps temporary replacements?
Keir Mather
I thank my hon. Friend for asking about how we can create a system by which those who may have responsibility for damaging mobility aids have the requisite responsibility for compensation and the process. It has been raised with me that, if a person’s mobility aid is damaged in transit when they fly, not only is the compensation not requisite—we will turn to that later in the Bill—but the process of claiming compensation and getting a new mobility aid is often torturous. It places too much pressure on the individual, and it is not done with requisite reflection on the fact that they have as much right to travel as anybody else and deserve not to have their means of accessibility damaged or broken by a private provider. Clause 1 will allow us to set out in more detail how we will deal with the kind of matters that my hon. Friend describes, but she raises an ancillary question about how the overall process should work. That was very well made. I will take that away, reflect on it and report back to her.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
I appreciate the contribution already made about the provision for individuals who require wheelchair accessibility. Could the Minister elaborate on how we will protect travellers with allergies? As someone with personal experience of travelling with a child with an allergy, I know how stressful that can be.
Keir Mather
I know about my hon. Friend’s experience, and she outlined to me some of the challenges that go beyond the health risk of travelling with people with allergies and the difficulties that they face. One of those is ensuring that the right food is provided on aeroplanes. If someone is on a long-haul flight and it suddenly becomes clear that the staff do not have allergy-friendly food for them, that can make a travelling experience, which might already have been stressful, all the more difficult.
Through the consultation, the clauses that I am currently addressing will allow people with allergies to directly feed into how the consumer rights system should be designed to most adequately address their concerns and give them equal access without fear of being denied the requisite food, safety or the ability to fly alongside their friends and family. Clause 2’s consultation requirements will allow that to happen, and clause 1 will empower the Secretary of State to make those changes in an agile and definitive way that will quickly provide change so that people can fly with confidence.
The Government must consult disabled passengers, persons with reduced mobility and the organisations that represent them, alongside airlines and airports—which, I must say, do a lot of good and pioneering work in this space, and this framework will allow them to go further. Clause 2 also provides that the Government may consult with others as appropriate. That may include the CAA, passenger rights advocates and groups, or wider industry stakeholders. This will enable a genuinely pan-disability approach grounded in lived experience and expert evidence.
The Government added clause 3 during the Bill’s passage through the other place following constructive engagement with peers on how the Bill could do more to strengthen air passenger rights and promote accessibility. Clause 3 will support the Government’s aim of using clause 1 to enhance and strengthen air passenger rights in the future. It requires the Secretary of State to “have due regard” to the desirability of strengthening air passenger rights when considering whether and how to make regulations under clause 1, particularly where those rights affect disabled passengers and persons with reduced mobility.
Clause 3 also establishes a clear set of principles to guide future policy development. They include that passengers should be “treated with dignity”; that disabled passengers should have access to air travel that is “equal or comparable” to that enjoyed by other passengers; that any accessibility assistance provided should meet the individual’s need; and that independent travel should be “facilitated wherever possible.”
Taken together, clauses 2 and 3 help to ensure that accessibility is embedded in the future development of passenger rights policy and remains a central consideration when the powers in clause 1 are exercised. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Alison Griffiths
I commend the Minister for his points about accessibility and disability, and as I mentioned, that is something that the Opposition support. However, I was somewhat flummoxed, nay dumbfounded, to hear Government Members and the Minister conflate parliamentary scrutiny with agility, growth and flexibility in an entirely negative way. They seem to think that this can go forward only without sufficient parliamentary scrutiny of what will become an Act with considerable ministerial powers.
The Opposition’s position is absolutely that parliamentary scrutiny is the essence of our democracy. With a Bill with such significant powers, it is entirely appropriate that there should be much greater parliamentary scrutiny. We can demonstrate that that is not at the expense of agility and growth, so we will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider new clause 13—Wheelchair passports for air travel—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a wheelchair passport scheme (a ‘wheelchair passport’) for disabled passengers travelling by air to, within or from the United Kingdom.
(2) A wheelchair passport issued under this section must record the passenger's mobility and assistance requirements, including the type, dimensions, and weight of any wheelchair or mobility aid used, and any other information relevant to the safe and dignified handling of the passenger and their equipment.
(3) Regulations under this section must make provision for—
(a) the form and content of a wheelchair passport, including requirements that it be available in accessible formats;
(b) the secure storage and transfer of data contained in a wheelchair passport; and
(c) the process by which a passenger may apply for, update, or appeal a decision relating to a wheelchair passport.
(4) The Secretary of State must ensure that the wheelchair passport scheme is interoperable, to the greatest extent practicable, with equivalent schemes operated by other countries or international bodies, including the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
(5) A carrier who fails to comply with a wheelchair passport issued under this section is to be treated as having committed an accessibility failure for the purposes of this section.
(6) The Secretary of State must take all reasonable steps to promote the adoption of a common international wheelchair passport standard through engagement with the IATA by December 2028.
(7) Regulations in this section are to be made by statutory instrument.
(8) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to establish a wheelchair passport scheme enabling disabled passengers to record their mobility and assistance needs in a single portable document accepted by all air carriers to, within or from the United Kingdom to facilitate their travel needs.
Keir Mather
I will begin by addressing clause 4, which was added during the Bill’s passage in the other place to strengthen rights for disabled passengers. It removes the existing cap on compensation for wheelchairs, mobility aids and other assistive devices that are lost, damaged or destroyed on domestic UK flights. For many disabled passengers, these devices are essential to their independence and daily lives, and the current compensation limits may not reflect the true cost of repair or replacement. The clause ensures that passengers travelling on domestic UK flights are able to recover compensation that more accurately reflects the value of the equipment lost or damaged. Ultimately, the clause is about making sure that disabled passengers can travel with greater confidence that, if something goes wrong, they will not be left without the equipment they rely on or forced to absorb an unfair financial loss.
On new clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, I thank him for returning to the important issue of transporting wheelchairs during air travel. The Government agree that disabled passengers should be able to communicate their mobility and assistance requirements clearly, and that wheelchairs and mobility aids must be handled safely and with dignity. The question is how best to secure practical and long-lasting improvements, rather than placing a particular scheme in primary legislation before the work already under way has concluded.
The hon. Gentleman will know that the transport of mobility aids and wheelchairs was considered by the aviation accessibility task and finish group, and is now being taken forward through the aviation accessibility implementation group. This industry-led working group is examining mobility aid design and handling and has developed the electric mobility aids air travel pack, which gives passengers, airlines and ground handlers the information they need in advance of a journey. The group is promoting wider use of that tool and considering how passengers’ individual requirements can be captured more effectively to support a more tailored experience.
Since this proposal was debated in the other place, the Government have also acted through the Bill. We introduced clause 2 in the Lords, placing a statutory requirement on the Secretary of State to consult on accessibility matters. This issue could be considered as part of that consultation, ensuring that any future reforms are evidence based and take account of passengers’ and stakeholders’ experience. It would therefore be premature to prescribe a wheelchair passport scheme now. We should instead allow the implementation group’s work and statutory consultation to determine what measures are necessary, workable and proportionate. Should the evidence support the need for legislation, clause 1 provides a route to acting following full consultation. The new clause instead risks cutting across that work rather than strengthening it. On that basis, I hope I have reassured the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage and I ask him not to press his new clause.
Luke Taylor
I thank the Minister for his words, particularly on new clause 13. We very much welcome the Government’s movement in the other place to introduce greater protections for disabled airline passengers following pressure from a cross-party group of lords. The removal of the compensation cap for damaged wheelchairs on domestic flights is a great step forward for accessibility. For a disabled person, a wheelchair is not merely luggage; it is a vital extension of their body and their independence.
I am glad, though, to pick up the noble Baroness Brinton’s amendment on wheelchair passports. She has been a strong advocate for accessibility for many years, and we are glad to support her in her campaign. I invite all Members to read the exchanges in the Lords to see and understand the lived experience—I am sure that we will hear some of that here too—of disabled passengers struggling with complex, unwieldy and challenging circumstances at various airports around the country. I am glad that we are getting a focus on that here.
Over the past few years, the Department for Transport has discussed creating wheelchair passports, which would smooth the journey, with one brief check at check-in to ensure that the wheelchair—and, if relevant, the battery—and the passport match. Once someone had such a passport, the details could be in the airport’s system and the airline’s system forever. However, the new clause would make it clear that the Secretary of State has to work with the International Air Transport Association, and the other countries and the airlines that are part of that organisation, to make this happen, because it will not work if only the UK does it.
I note that IATA’s international guidance already provides for a mobility aid passport, but it is self-evident that that is not sufficiently well understood or implemented. The Minister talked about a mobility pack and an investigation that is being undertaken to design appropriate measures. I encourage him to refer back to the IATA mobility aid passport to understand how that can be incorporated, improved and strengthened, and to work with airlines and international organisations to make sure that the aims of the new clause are reflected in the lived experience of those who, time and again, when they approach an airline check-in desk, have to struggle through the same set of questions and the same arguments, and—again, I reflect on the experiences that were shared in the Lords—pull out the guidance that they have printed and explain it. That is just not acceptable. Whether it is through regulation, through the wording of customer protections or by making it incumbent on airlines and ground handlers to understand and implement these measures, we all need to make sure that the airline industry is implementing and improving things for those who rely on mobility aids, so that they are able to experience flying as miserably as the rest of us.
Daniel Francis
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. Shortly after my election the year before last, I was delighted to introduce my private Member’s Bill, the Aviation (Accessibility) Bill, and I welcome the fact that this Bill—and, in particular, the clauses that we have been debating—encompasses a number of its measures. Accessibility in air travel is not just a matter of convenience; it is a matter of rights, dignity and equality. It is about ensuring that everyone, regardless of their mobility or physical condition, can enjoy the freedom to travel.
I pay tribute to my fellow chair of the all-party parliamentary group for wheelchair users, Baroness Grey-Thompson, for the work that she has done on the Bill in the Lords, and for her work as chair of the aviation accessibility task and finish group, which this Government set up shortly after our election to ensure that the work on these safeguards started, and which reported back last year. As Members know, as well as being chair of the APPG I am the parent of a wheelchair user, so I live and see that lived experience on a daily basis. If you will allow me, Mr Turner, I want to place on the record my thanks to Sophie Morgan, Christopher Wood, who is with us in the Gallery, and their colleagues at the Rights On Flights campaign for their work to raise awareness of the issues that have led us to this place.
The clauses that we have already discussed will require Ministers to give due regard to strengthening passenger rights, but clause 4 will, vitally, remove the compensation limit for wheelchairs, mobility aids and other assistive devices. At present, the limit can be around £1,500, and someone can be required to battle for several months through the courts, with no real understanding of their legal rights. Many wheelchairs—even my 13-year-old’s—are worth more than £1,500 and, as I have said to the Minister, I am aware of a Member in the other place whose wheelchair is worth six times the current limit, so there really is a need to remove it.
As well as causing complexity, the current arrangements do put people off flying. Unlike the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, my daughter has not flown for 12 years, because I dread the thought of going through the process, quite frankly. Strengthening these rights will not only help people during their journeys, but encourage people to undertake them again. I welcome the measures on compensation rights for lost, damaged or destroyed wheelchairs or mobility aids.
Currently, airlines are not required to cover the full cost of repairs, and the limit for international flights will continue to be set in the Montreal convention; the limit in the Bill will be only for internal flights. There remains work to be done with regard to the Montreal and Warsaw conventions. Those longer flights fall outside the Bill, and there will continue to be some pressures for passengers travelling on them. The Minister knows I will continue to press the Government on working with international partners to press for compensation. We cannot, of course, encompass that in the Bill, but I would welcome the Minister’s comments on what we can do on that matter. The CAA is responsible for the regulation of aviation safety in the UK, but it has been inhibited by not having the power to take proper action against airlines. Taking businesses to court has been a lengthy process, so I strongly welcome the measures in clause 4.
I concur with the Minister on new clause 13 from the Liberal Democrats. We have themes 3 and 4 of the report from the aviation task and finish group on mobility aids design and handling. We continue, through consultation and the Bill, to look at how those could be incorporated. I will not name airlines, but there are good examples of airlines that are following that guidance and that are ahead of the curve. Of course, there are also airlines that frankly need to step up to the plate.
New clause 13 is well intentioned, but there is good practice out there. There is work stemming from theme 4 in the report submitted by the task and finish group. As the Minister said, there will be the consultation, as we saw in clause 2.
Luke Taylor
We accept that huge steps have been taken. As somebody who has particular experience, does the hon. Member see the challenge around training airline check-in staff and ground handlers? What does he see as the way to achieve the aims and goals that we have? We can talk about regulation and legislation until the cows come home, as we are paid to do, but how does he see implementation on the ground, as someone who lives in this world and struggles with different airlines, some of which implement measures well, while others do not? I am interested to hear how he suggests we break through that and feed that back to the working groups so that it can really understand the trick to this.
Daniel Francis
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s comments. There are themes within the aviation task and finish group report on that matter. Training is in theme 1, and passenger information is in theme 2. So there are recommendations there. There will be the consultation. We need to look at the good examples—as I said, I will not mention individual airlines, but I will tell the Minister later. We can feed that in and look at it.
However, as the hon. Gentleman referred to, there is also complexity. Under the current arrangements, we would end up with that passport being used for internal flights and for flights leaving the United Kingdom, but it would not apply to people returning on a flight from overseas to the United Kingdom. As a user, I think that that would cause some confusion. As a London MP, I know my rights on a Transport for London bus, and I quote the big red book to bus drivers if they are not upholding the rights of a wheelchair user. I know my rights on the railway. I think it would be hugely confusing to have one set of rights for a flight leaving the UK and not the same set of rights for returning.
Luke Taylor
The hon. Gentleman has invited me on to the point we raise in the new clause, about the need to work with IATA to ensure that this is part of either the mobility aid passport or a separate wheelchair passport structure, so that it protects passengers when they fly both from and to UK and EU airports. A theme to pick up on later is that it is common for aviation to be asymmetrical and that covering flights between different jurisdictions is difficult. Therefore, working with international organisations, and being rule makers and influencers rather than sitting back and being rule takers, is the right way to proceed.
Daniel Francis
The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. It is the same as the issues within the Montreal convention. We cannot put those or the issues with IATA in the Bill. We need to leave it to Government and Ministers to consult and work to strengthen those rights. That is why I would not support them being in the Bill. I support the measures in clause 4, but I ask Ministers to go away, look at the Montreal convention, have conversations with IATA and continue to strengthen rights in this area.
Alison Griffiths
I will speak briefly to clause 4. A wheelchair is clearly different from other pieces of luggage. For disabled passengers, it is what gives them their independence and allows them to travel with dignity. When an airline loses or damages someone’s wheelchair, the consequences can be serious and immediate. As such, it is only right that the passenger is properly compensated rather than being subject to the limits designed for ordinary baggage. We therefore welcome this clause’s inclusion in the Bill.
Keir Mather
I will pick up on a few points from the debate, although I do not feel I have much more to add, given the quality of the conversation between the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. It genuinely showed the Committee process at its best in terms of deliberative policymaking.
I turn first to the point raised about the Montreal convention, because my hon. Friend and the hon. Member were right to point out that the lifting of the compensation cap on damaged wheelchairs and mobility aids in the Bill applies only to domestic UK flights. That is because doing the same for international flights would require a change to the Montreal convention, which is an international treaty that the UK is party to through the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
Although my hon. Friend set out the limitations of how far the Bill can go, I reassure the Committee that I take this issue very seriously and want the UK to use its phenomenal reputation in international fora as a leader in aviation policy. I personally met the UK’s representative at the ICAO, William Gatward, and discussed its importance. We have agreed to explore ways to discuss compensation caps through the Montreal convention in the appropriate fora at the ICAO, and I would be glad to keep Members updated on that work.
I again thank my hon. Friend for his contributions. He is incredibly experienced in this field, and he is right to point out that many of the recommendations he put forward in his Aviation (Accessibility) Bill have found their way through to this piece of legislation. That is a credit to his perseverance and dogged determination to do right on behalf of the people he represents, and the people with disabilities who travel and their families across the United Kingdom.
I also thank the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam for setting out so clearly his perspective on wheelchair passports. We have had a productive conversation about where some of the limitations are, including for return flights. We are also working with that limitation when it comes to the compensation cap through the Montreal convention. However, I think it is appropriate for such issues to form part of the consultation clause in the Bill, and I would be glad to have a conversation with the hon. Member about how we take that forward. We should certainly also consider working it into IATA processes.
I think that my point in my original comments still stands, in that the aviation accessibility implementation group is exploring a lot of these issues in detail. I would like to see the outcome of those considerations before we move forward, but the Bill provides us with a lot of tools to make purposeful progress in that space once we have got to grips with its conclusions.
However, the hon. Member raised a very important and more general point about aviation accessibility in the United Kingdom—about the training of airline staff and inconsistent treatment across the domestic aviation sector. He raised that in regard to those who travel with wheelchairs and who get inconsistent treatment in terms of storage and the facilitation of their independence in travel arrangements. I visited Bristol airport and had a really productive conversation about people who travel with stoma bags fitted. There is often not enough training and awareness when they go through baggage search about the implications that that can have, and about how searches can be carried out in ways that respect people’s dignity and privacy.
The hon. Member is right to point out that people who travel with accessibility requirements or disabilities should not have to read the rulebook to members of staff. However, to look at that through a positive lens, it produces an obligation on the Department for Transport and our private sector stakeholders to think collaboratively about how we can improve consumer standards and create a minimum baseline for their enforcement, which this Bill facilitates. There is also a broader conversation about how we facilitate better training, awareness and sensitivity for airport staff who, the vast majority of times, are trying to do the right thing.
Charlie Dewhirst (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)
Another group of people who need to be considered are those with diabetes—particularly type 1 diabetes—who have medical equipment on them that cannot go through the scanner. That sometimes creates a problem at airports and other terminals. It would be really helpful to hear about any awareness-raising the Government intend to do.
Keir Mather
From travelling with a close family member with type 1 diabetes, I know about the pressure and the worry that can be caused by travelling with needles and insulin, so that should also factor into the conversations.
Amanda Hack
To add to that, travelling with an EpiPen is also incredibly problematic. Airlines often have different regulations setting out what a person should take and how they should prove that they need to carry an EpiPen. Families often need to get a receipt from their GP, which can cost up to £50, to prove that they are EpiPen carriers, so looking at this issue in the round is really important.
Keir Mather
I agree with my hon. Friend, and I will use that as a springboard to raise another piece of the puzzle: the guidance given to GPs about the advice they give patients when they are diagnosed with a particular condition.
Sadik Al-Hassan (North Somerset) (Lab)
May I kindly suggest that the guidance should also be extended to pharmacists, given that we will be supplying the medicine?
Keir Mather
My officials will be getting nervous, because we are creating lots of extra considerations. That said, I think hon. Members’ points are very well made. They speak to the fact that the provisions in the Bill—the consultation and the agility of the Secretary of State’s consumer protection-making powers—allow us to advance across a range of issues that affect not just those with disabilities or additional needs but everyone who uses our aviation sector, and to improve their rights in a meaningful and purposeful way.
I hope I have sufficiently answered the questions of the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam. I have little more to add on clause 4, other than that it will help us address an issue that desperately needs to be dealt with by ensuring that people who use wheelchairs and mobility aids can travel with confidence in the knowledge that, if their devices are damaged, they will get the compensation they deserve. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Direct enforcement of consumer protection legislation by CAA
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 11, in schedule 1, page 29, line 16, at end insert—
“(30A) After section 202 (appeals), insert—
‘202A Independent review of notices given by the Civil Aviation Authority
(1) This section applies where the Civil Aviation Authority gives a relevant notice.
(2) A person to whom the notice is given may, before bringing an appeal under section 202, request a review of the notice by an independent reviewer.
(3) The Secretary of State must appoint or designate one or more independent reviewers for the purposes of this section.
(4) A person may not act as an independent reviewer in relation to a notice if that person was involved in the decision to give the notice.
(5) On a review under this section, the independent reviewer may recommend that the Civil Aviation Authority—
(a) confirms the notice,
(b) varies the notice, or
(c) withdraws the notice.
(6) The Civil Aviation Authority must consider the recommendation and publish its decision.
(7) Where a person requests a review under this section, the time for bringing an appeal under section 202 begins from the date on which the Civil Aviation Authority publishes its decision under subsection (6).’”
This amendment would create an independent review stage before an appeal to the High Court or Court of Session in respect of direct enforcement notices issued by the Civil Aviation Authority.
Schedule 1.
Clause 6 stand part.
Keir Mather
There is a lot of talking from me about this part of the Bill. I thank hon. Members for their contributions so far. Clause 5 is another part of the Government’s objective of strengthening consumer protection in the aviation sector. It will give the CAA the tools it needs to enforce consumer law effectively.
The CAA’s current powers are not strong enough, and court processes can be slow and resource-intensive. The clause brings the CAA into line with other regulators, such as the Competition and Markets Authority, by allowing it to investigate breaches and take direct enforcement action where appropriate. That means that, when passenger rights are breached, the CAA will be able to act quicker and secure better outcomes for consumers.
The clause also includes mechanisms to ensure oversight of the CAA’s enforcement activity, which were strengthened in response to scrutiny in the other place. The Bill now requires the CAA to report on the use of the powers, and that information will be laid before Parliament, ensuing appropriate scrutiny and accountability. This measure will strengthen consumer protection in the aviation sector by enabling quicker and more effective enforcement, improving compliance with consumer law and giving passengers greater confidence that their rights are protected when travelling by air.
Amendment 11, tabled by the shadow Minister, would introduce an independent review of a CAA direct enforcement notice before the existing right of appeal to the courts is exercised. I agree with the underlying principle that organisations must have a clear and independent means of challenging the CAA’s decisions. That safeguard is important, but the statutory right of appeal already provides it. The amendment would instead add an administrative stage ending only in a non-binding recommendation. That could delay resolution and increase complexity, particularly where a party then proceeds to court in any event. It would also create an uneven framework by adding a review process for CAA notices, but not equivalent notices issued by other direct enforcers. There is no clear case for that distinction.
The CAA is best placed to assess compliance with air passenger rights in the first instance. Where its decision is challenged, the court offers independent scrutiny and a binding outcome. A further non-binding review would add process, not meaningful protection. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendment, and I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw it.
Schedule 1 gives effect to clause 5, which provides the Civil Aviation Authority with direct consumer enforcement powers. The schedule provides the CAA with the detailed investigatory and enforcement powers needed to exercise those functions. It enables the CAA to investigate suspected breaches, take direct enforcement action and impose penalties where appropriate, while also providing for appeals and reporting requirements. The schedule is therefore an essential part of the new enforcement regime established by clause 5, setting out the detailed powers and procedures needed for it to operate effectively, and I commend it to the Committee.
Finally in this grouping, clause 6 ensures that the CAA can effectively enforce existing safety and consumer requirements relating to air carrier identity. It does so by bringing existing legislation relating to air carrier identity requirements within the CAA’s consumer enforcement framework. This legislation sets out requirements for passengers to be informed of the identity of the air carrier operating their flight and requires the Secretary of State to maintain a list of air carriers banned from operating in the United Kingdom. Clause 6 does not create new requirements for passengers or airlines; rather, it strengthens the enforcement of existing regulation, ensuring that passengers have the information they need and that measures designed to protect passengers and maintain safety standards can be effectively enforced.
Olly Glover
I want to say a bit about the Conservative amendment 11, which would introduce an independent review stage before an appeal went to the High Court or the Court of Session. We on the Liberal Democrat Benches feel that it is a sensible amendment. We are somewhat perplexed by the logic of the Government’s not being keen on it, given that in the Railways Bill the Government put in an extremely high bar for any legal action against a decision taken by Great British Rail or the Office of Rail and Road.
Using the same principle, logic would suggest that the Government should welcome opportunities to avoid litigation and protracted court procedures—opportunities that, to us, would quite sensibly introduce an element of peer review to ensure that the enforcement action or notice taken by the CAA made sense before it got to the courts. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on why, given that context, he thinks this amendment does not make sense.
Alison Griffiths
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his support, and indeed the Minister for recognising that the underlying principle is absolutely the right one—that this is an important safeguard, to use his words. It is not administrative, as he argued; we should be ensuring that the CAA is not judge and jury.
Clause 5 and schedule 1 give the Civil Aviation Authority new enforcement powers, while clause 6 brings the existing rules on banned air carriers and informing passengers which airline will operate their flight within the consumer protection enforcement framework. We support those provisions and the principle of effective enforcement, but we believe that the process needs an additional safeguard for those affected by the CAA's decisions. As such, we have tabled amendment 11, which stands in my name.
The Opposition have tabled the amendment to ensure that there is a more sensible and balanced process for reviewing enforcement notices issued by the Civil Aviation Authority. As the Bill is currently drafted, the route for challenging these decisions is through an appeal to the High Court or Court of Session. I must say I think that that is quite unreasonable. Surely there should be an opportunity for an independent review of the decision before businesses are expected to embark on potentially costly and lengthy court proceedings. That is precisely what our amendment seeks to achieve.
We are simply suggesting that an additional check should be available, allowing an independent reviewer to consider whether a notice could be confirmed, varied or withdrawn before the matter proceeds to court. That would provide greater certainty and clarity for those affected, while helping to ensure that the process was fair and proportionate. Importantly, it would not prevent anyone from pursuing an appeal through the courts if they remained dissatisfied. It is an entirely sensible safeguard; I hope the Minister will now recognise the merits of the amendment and support it.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Members for Didcot and Wantage and for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton for their contributions. In the first instance, if redress to the courts is still available when somebody against whom there is an enforcement action is dissatisfied, that speaks to the fact that having these enforcement abilities does not quite result in an effective way of removing the need for the court process.
There is also the point about the arrangement that exists through the Railways Bill on how we make decisions between GBR and the ORR. This is direct enforcement of protections, which is important both for the aviation safety regime and for consumers who fly; it is not a determination on commercial matters. In a railway context, GBR needs to have a strong ability to be able to work in a holistic way to support track and train together.
The point still stands that this would create an uneven framework. It would add a review process for CAA notices, but no equivalent would be issued by other direct enforcers. The CAA is best placed to assess compliance with passenger rights, reflecting on the gravity of some of the issues we have already discussed, but there is a question around making sure that CAA action is not disproportionate.
Like the CMA, the CAA will need to make clear how it is going to use its powers. It will have to follow a set of rules to ensure that its actions are proportionate and correct. On that basis, I do not believe that the level of oversight set out by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, in her amendment is proportionate. I urge her to withdraw it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Direct enforcement of consumer protection legislation by CAA
Amendment proposed: 10, in schedule 1, page 23, line 9, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”.—(Alison Griffiths.)
This amendment ensures that regulations made under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Charlie Dewhirst
Given the time constraints in the programme order, Mr Turner, what is the best way to proceed?
The Chair
We will stop dead on 11.25 am. The learned Clerk has a form of words for me to read, which I expect will appear in front of me at the right time. We will start consideration of the sixth group of amendments.
Clause 7
Review of airport drop-off charges
Keir Mather
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 7, page 6, line 31, leave out “six” and insert “12”.
This amendment would increase the amount of time available to complete the review of the impact of airport drop-off charges to 12 months.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 6—Airport drop-off charges: duty to publish proposals—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, publish proposals for a cap on airport drop-off charges on users of airport services in the United Kingdom.
(2) The cap contained in the proposals published under subsection (1) must be £5.
(3) In this section, ‘drop-off charge’ means any charge levied by an airport operator on a vehicle entering a terminal forecourt or designated kerbside area for the purpose of setting down one or more passengers.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish proposals for a £5 airport drop-off cap at UK airports.
Government amendments 2 and 3.
Keir Mather
It is a shame that we are running out of time just as we hit such an exciting part of the Bill: the Government amendments relating to the review of airport drop-off charges. As the Committee will be aware, the Bill was amended in the other place to require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the impact of airport drop-off charges on users of airport services and to publish that review within six months of Royal Assent. Let me be clear at the outset that the Government are committed to undertaking that review. We recognise that airport drop-off charges are an issue of interest to passengers, parliamentarians and others, and we agree that it is important to establish a clear evidence base to inform any decision making.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the Minister for being typically generous in giving way. I suspect that all in the room will have received complaints from constituents about either very high charges for dropping off—I had one recently at East Midlands airport—or fines related to opaque regulations about dropping off at airports. Nothwithstanding the exact wording here, is the Minister open to reflecting on not just drop-off charges, but penalty notices associated with drop-off areas and charges at airports?
Keir Mather
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that challenge and for not encouraging me to pre-empt whatever the terms of any particular review might be. That being said, I believe that the general basket of issues requires close attention, one of them in the broader terms to which he speaks: transparency for those who pay airport drop-off charges. That could relate to penalties as much as to the process of paying, to signage at the airport or to other provision such as free public transport. I expect that matters of that kind would be of interest as part of the review.
We do not believe, however, that the six-month timetable attached would allow sufficient time to carry out a meaningful and robust piece of work. There is currently no single, comprehensive source of evidence for the impacts of airport drop-off charges across the United Kingdom. A credible review will require engagement with airports, passengers, accessibility groups and other stakeholders, alongside research and analysis of the available evidence. A rushed review would risk producing limited findings and would not do justice to the concerns that have been expressed.
The Government amendment therefore extends the period for completing the review from six months to 12 months after Royal Assent. That additional time will allow the Government to undertake a more thorough and evidence-based assessment. While the detailed scope of the review will be developed in due course, it could include, as I said, consideration of other issues such as affordability, accessibility, travel behaviour and the experiences of different groups of passengers. It could also examine the role that revenue from drop-off charges plays in supporting airport operations and infrastructure, and the extent to which such charges encourage modal shift so that customers use public transport and other sustainable transport options when travelling to the airport. In doing so, however, it is important that the wider context should be recognised.
Most UK airports are privately owned and operated businesses. Decisions about parking and drop-off arrangements are generally commercial matters for airport operators. We know that parking revenue is often used to support investment in airport infrastructure and services to the benefit of airport users. Parking and drop-off arrangements are also subject to consumer protection legislation. The Government amendment ensures that Parliament will receive the findings on the impact of the charges, based on a strong and credible evidence base.
Sporting Events Bill [HL] (First sitting)
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 20 October) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 20 October;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 22 October;
(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 7; Schedule 1; Clauses 8 to 10; Schedule 2; Clauses 11 to 13; Schedule 3; Clauses 14 to 16; Schedule 4; Clause 17; Schedule 5; Clause 18; Schedule 6; Clauses 19 to 25; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 26 to 30; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 22 October.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
The Chair
Copies of the written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. This shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. A Member who has put their name on the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the current debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during proceedings.
At the end of a debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. They will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendment in a group, that is at the Chair’s discretion. I remind Members that the selection list shows how amendments and new clauses have been grouped for debate. Any Divisions on amendments and new clauses take place in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper.
Clause 1
Sporting events framework
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
“(f) Schedule (Delivery authority provisions) (“the delivery authority provisions”).”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert—
“(c) the delivery authority provisions.”
New clause 1—Delivery authority regulations—
“(1) Regulations under section 2(2) which apply the delivery authority provisions to a sporting event may establish a delivery authority.
(2) A delivery authority established under this section is to be a body corporate.
(3) The general functions of a delivery authority are to—
(a) prepare for the sporting event,
(b) make arrangements in preparation for or in connection with the use or management before, during or after the sporting events of premises and other facilities acquired, constructed or adapted in preparation for the sporting event,
(c) ensure that adequate arrangements are made for the provision, management and control of facilities for transport in connection with the sporting event, and
(d) ensure the safety of individuals participating in or attending the sporting event.
(4) The regulations may—
(a) appoint a delivery authority as a local planning authority,
(b) apply the following provisions in relation to a delivery authority as they apply to an urban development corporation—
(i) section 149 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (power for Secretary of State to make order appointing urban development corporation as local planning authority), and
(ii) section 33 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (power for Secretary of State to disapply Part 2 of the Act to urban development corporation).”
New clause 2—Delivery authority: transfer schemes—
“(1) If the Secretary of State thinks it expedient in order to enable a delivery authority to carry out its functions, the Secretary of State may make a transfer scheme.
(2) In this section “transfer scheme” means a scheme providing for the transfer to delivery authority of specified property, rights and liabilities of another public body at a time specified in the scheme.
(3) A direction of the Secretary of State under subsection (2) shall specify a date by which the transfer scheme is to be submitted.”
New clause 3—Delivery authority: dissolution—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by order make provision for the dissolution of a delivery authority.
(2) An order under this section may, in particular—
(a) provide for the transfer of property, rights or liabilities of a delivery authority to—
(i) the Secretary of State, or
(ii) any other person;
(b) make provision enabling a person to receive anything transferred under paragraph (a) (and that provision shall have effect despite any other enactment or instrument);
(c) establish a body corporate;
(d) make consequential, incidental or transitional provision which may, in particular—
(i) provide for anything done by or in relation to a delivery authority to have effect as if done by or in relation to another person;
(ii) permit anything (which may include legal proceedings) which is in the process of being done by or in relation to a delivery authority when a transfer takes effect, to be continued by or in relation to another person;
(iii) provide for a reference to a delivery authority in an instrument or other document to be treated as a reference to another person;
(iv) amend an enactment.
(3) Before making an order under this section the Secretary of State shall consult such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State may not make an order under this section providing for the transfer of property, rights or liabilities to a person unless the person has consented to the transfer.
(5) An order under this section—
(a) may transfer rights and liabilities relating to employees, but
(b) shall not affect the operation of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981.
(6) The Secretary of State may not make an order by virtue of subsection (5)(a) unless satisfied that sufficient notice has been given to enable compliance with any applicable requirement of those regulations.
(7) An order under this section—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) shall not be made unless a draft has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
New schedule 1—The Delivery Authority Provisions—
“Part 1
Constitutions
Membership
1 (1) The Secretary of State must—
(a) appoint the members of a delivery authority, and
(b) appoint one of the members as Chair.
(2) The Secretary of State must aim to ensure that a delivery authority has neither less than 7 nor more than 11 members at any time.
(3) In appointing members of a delivery authority the Secretary of State must have regard to the desirability of their having experience relevant to—
(a) the nature of a delivery authority’s functions, and
(b) the places in relation to which they are likely to be exercised.
Tenure
2 (1) A person shall hold and vacate office as Chairman or other member of a delivery authority in accordance with the terms of appointment (subject to this Schedule).
(2) The Chair or another member of a delivery authority may resign by notice in writing to the Secretary of State.
(3) The Chair or another member of a delivery authority may be removed from office by the Secretary of State on the grounds that the Secretary of State thinks that the Chair or other member is unable, unfit or unwilling to discharge the functions of the office.
(4) A person who ceases, otherwise than by virtue of sub-paragraph 3, to be Chair or another member of a delivery authority may be reappointed.
Staff
3 (1) A delivery authority must appoint a chief executive.
(2) A delivery authority—
(a) may not appoint a person as chief executive without the Secretary of State’s approval, and
(b) may (subject to sub-paragraph (a)) appoint the Chair as chief executive.
(3) A delivery authority must appoint a finance director.
(4) A delivery authority may not appoint a person as finance director without the Secretary of State’s approval.
(5) A delivery authority may appoint a director of transport.
(6) A delivery authority may not appoint a person as director of transport without the Secretary of State’s approval.
(7) A delivery authority may appoint other staff.
Committees
4 (1) A delivery authority may establish a committee.
(2) A committee—
(a) must include a member of the delivery authority,
(b) may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, include one or more persons who are not members of the delivery authority, and
(c) may not include staff of the delivery authority.
(3) A committee of a delivery authority may establish a sub-committee.
(4) A sub-committee—
(a) must include a member of the delivery authority,
(b) must include a member of the committee that established the sub-committee,
(c) may include one or more members of other committees,
(d) may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, include one or more persons who are members neither of a committee of the delivery authority nor of the delivery authority, and
(e) may not include staff of the delivery authority.
Status
5 The Authority shall not be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown or as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown.
Part 2
Proceedings
Delegation
6 A delivery authority may delegate a function to—
(a) a member,
(b) an employee,
(c) a committee, or
(d) any other person.
7 Where a function is delegated to a committee, the committee may delegate it to—
(a) a member of the delivery authority,
(b) an employee of the delivery authority,
(c) a member of the committee,
(d) a sub-committee, or
(e) any other person.
Secretary of State: guidance and directions
8 (1) In exercising its functions a delivery authority must—
(a) have regard to any guidance given by the Secretary of State, and
(b) comply with any direction given by the Secretary of State.
(2) A direction may, in particular—
(a) require the delivery authority to accept or assume specified duties, rights or liabilities under contracts,
(b) require the delivery authority to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before taking action of a specified kind,
(c) require the delivery authority to provide information,
(d) relate to the employment of staff, or
(e) with the consent of the Treasury, relate to—
(i) the form of accounts, or
(ii) methods and principles for the preparation of accounts.
Self-regulation
9 A delivery authority may, subject to this Schedule—
(a) regulate its own procedure and that of its own committees and sub-committees (and in particular may specify a quorum for meetings), and
(b) enable committees and sub-committees to regulate their own procedure (including, in particular, the specification of a quorum for meetings) subject to any provision made by the delivery authority.
Conflict of interests
10 A member or employee of a delivery authority who is involved in the exercise of the delivery authority’s functions in relation to land may not participate in deliberations or decisions of the delivery authority acting as a local planning authority in relation to that land.
Reporting
11 (1) The Secretary of State may require a delivery authority to submit a report on the exercise of the delivery authority’s functions at any time.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a copy of each report received under this paragraph.
Saving
12 The validity of proceedings of a delivery authority, a committee or a sub-committee is not to be affected by—
(a) a vacancy among its members, or
(b) a defect in the appointment of a person as Chairman or member.
13 The Secretary of State may by order make any consequential provision to this Schedule as is necessary.
Part 3
Money
Income
14 (1) The Secretary of State may give financial assistance to a delivery authority if he thinks that other sources of financial assistance will or may be insufficient for a purpose.
(2) Financial assistance under sub-paragraph (1)—
(a) may take the form of grants, loans, guarantees or indemnities, and
(b) may be given on conditions (which may include conditions about repayment with or without interest).
15 A delivery authority may accept gifts.
16 The power under paragraph 14 may only be exercised if the House of Commons has approved the financial assistance by resolution.
Remuneration, &c.
17 (1) A delivery authority may pay to the Chair, another member or a member of a committee or sub-committee—
(a) such remuneration as the Secretary of State may determine, and
(b) such travelling and other allowances as the Secretary of State may determine.
(2) A delivery authority may pay to or in respect of the Chair or another member such sums as the Secretary of State may determine by way of, or in respect of, pensions, allowances or gratuities.
(3) If the Secretary of State thinks that there are special circumstances that make it right for a person ceasing to hold office as Chair or member of a delivery authority to receive compensation, the delivery authority may pay to the person such compensation as the Secretary of State may determine.
18 (1) The delivery authority may pay sums to or in respect of a member or former member of staff by way of or in respect of—
(a) remuneration,
(b) allowances,
(c) pensions,
(d) gratuities, or
(e) compensation for loss of employment.”
Mr French
I am pleased to open the first day of the Committee on the Sporting Events Bill for His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. As always, it is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Allin-Khan. I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and the widespread engagement I have undertaken with stakeholders, including at events, while shadowing the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.
I appreciate that some of these amendments were moved in the other place and defeated, but we remain of the view that there is a need for a mechanism to enable the creation of a delivery authority for major events such as the world cup or the Olympics, with a northern bid mooted. In a desperate bid to stay in Downing Street, the former Prime Minister, Mr Starmer, included in his final King’s Speech a commitment to introducing a sporting events Bill. Luckily for us, even stopped clocks are right twice a day. As hon. Members will know, in years gone by His Majesty’s Government have introduced event-specific legislation for major sporting events, including the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 and the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Act 2020.
We agree that this Bill is a welcome step towards a coherent framework that will enable one of the UK’s best exports to be even better. However, it was the Government’s intention that this framework should be used only for sporting events that do not regularly take place and that are likely to attract significant international interest and bring social and economic benefits to the UK. Thankfully, the Government were defeated in the other place, and we will now consider the framework as applicable to regular sporting events such as the British grand prix at Silverstone or golf’s original championship, the Open. These events already make vast contributions to the country, both economically and socially, and should be given the support framework to continue to do so.
Hon. Members will know that primary legislation created the Olympic Delivery Authority to work alongside the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games, and it was responsible for the redevelopment of the Stratford area, the construction of the sporting venues, and the infrastructure and transport planning. That required, as indeed will many of these events, significant cross-sector efforts bringing together national governing and representative bodies such as the British Olympic Association or the Football Association, local government, including the host cities, and central Government Departments. There may also be a need, as there was for 2012, to build new stadiums, purchase land and improve transport links so that spectators can get there. As it stands, new primary legislation would be required if there was a need to establish such a body for an international event. That undermines the aim of the Bill, which is to have a permanent framework for major sporting events to ensure their most efficient delivery.
These amendments, new clauses and new schedule would create a mechanism for the Secretary of State to establish a delivery authority if they believe it necessary, depending on the event itself. They would not compel the Secretary of State to create a delivery authority, but they would give the Secretary of State the ability to do so without undertaking the whole process that this Bill aims to avoid.
Under new clause 1, a delivery authority would:
“(a) prepare for the sporting event,
(b) make arrangements in preparation for or in connection with the use or management before, during or after the sporting events of premises and other facilities acquired, constructed or adapted in preparation for the sporting event,
(c) ensure that adequate arrangements are made for the provision, management and control of facilities for transport in connection with the sporting event, and
(d) ensure the safety of individuals participating in or attending the sporting event.”
Moreover, our proposals would set out the constitution of any delivery authority that a Secretary of State may create. That includes a membership of between seven and 11 people, the appointment of a chair and chief executive, and the procedure for removing members. Part 2 of the new schedule would provide procedural rules for delegation by such authorities, and it would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report on the authority’s progress. Finally, part 3 would allow the Secretary of State to provide the authority with financial assistance, if necessary, by resolution of the House.
I hope the Minister understands why we have tabled these amendments. If she believes that, once enacted, the Bill will negate the need for any further primary legislation, surely it must try to cover the likely requirements of future events. Some of these events, particularly the largest irregular events, will require a delivery authority to support them in delivering for our country. That is why I commend these amendments to the Committee.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. I thank all hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for taking part.
The UK is a world leader when it comes to hosting major sporting events, and the economic and social benefits of these occasions are felt across the country. This framework Bill has a range of powers, including on ticketing, transport, advertising, trading and unauthorised association. This will help to improve our competitiveness when bidding for major sporting events, helping to bring more iconic sporting moments to the UK. The Bill will enhance our competitive advantage, showing international event owners that we understand what is needed to host global sporting moments and that we are event-ready.
The Government amendments seek to refine the Bill following its amendment in the other place to ensure that, where there is strong evidence of need, the Bill can also be applied to support our brilliant and important domestic sporting events, as we will discuss later in Committee.
The 2028 UEFA European championship will be the first major sporting event to benefit from this Bill, with games hosted across Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Birmingham, London, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Dublin. The tournament is projected to bring a sixfold return on public investment. Forty per cent of tickets will be offered in the most affordable categories, and the Government-backed community programme will prioritise grassroots participation in communities across the country. The tournament shows that major sporting events do far more than entertain; they drive economic growth, foster national pride and inspire young people. The Bill will ensure these benefits are felt for generations to come.
The shadow Minister’s amendments seek to place on the face of the Bill a model for a dedicated delivery body. While the Government recognise the intent of these amendments, we do not believe they are needed. First, setting up a delivery authority with the proposed powers has typically been the exception, not the rule, when it comes to delivering major sporting events. In fact, the last time a bespoke delivery authority was set up on a statutory basis was more than 20 years ago for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic games. The Olympic Delivery Authority was granted powers that corresponded to specific objectives, including to support the massive undertaking of building new venues, ensuring public transport readiness and overseeing land procurement.
Conversely, a special-purpose incorporated company was established by the five relevant football authorities to deliver Euro 2028. That is an appropriate approach, not least because the tournament overwhelmingly relies on existing stadia and infrastructure, without the need for bespoke statutory powers. On the rare occasion that a delivery authority is warranted, its nature and scope must similarly be determined by what is targeted and proportionate for the specific needs and requirements of an event in order to maximise effectiveness, efficiency and value for money. As such, although many of the shadow Minister’s recommendations are eminently sensible, the amendments would unfortunately take away from the flexibility we need by prescribing a fixed model in legislation, and particularly one with more sweeping powers than may be warranted in every scenario. Where greater oversight is required, the Government already have the requisite ability to establish an appropriate delivery body that is subject to appropriate additional parliamentary scrutiny—the Olympic Delivery Authority was regularly subject to such scrutiny.
For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments. The Opposition have set out our position and our concerns. We absolutely understand the Minister’s point regarding Euro 2028. The amendment was primarily aimed at the likes of the Olympics. In light of the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
“(f) Schedule 6 (‘the industrial action provisions’)”.
This amendment inserts industrial action provisions, which would ban strikes by certain workers, including transport workers, when the sporting events framework is applied to a sporting event.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 8, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert—
“(2A) Where an appropriate national authority applies one or more of the parts of the sporting events framework to a sporting event by regulations under this section, the appropriate national authority must also apply the industrial action provisions.”
This amendment requires the appropriate national authority to apply the industrial action provisions when they apply one or more other parts of the sporting events framework to a sporting event.
New clause 5—Industrial action regulations—
“(1) This section applies in relation to regulations under section 2 which apply the industrial action provisions.
(2) The regulations must specify the period during which the industrial action provisions apply.
(3) The period in subsection (2) must not be shorter than the minimum period.
(4) In subsection (2), the ‘minimum period’ means the period—
(a) beginning on the day on which any part of the sporting events framework is applied and has effect in relation to a sporting event, and
(b) ends on the day on which all provisions of the sporting events framework cease to apply to the sporting event.”
This new clause defines the minimum period in which the appropriate national authority must apply the industrial action provisions.
New schedule 2—Industrial action provisions—
“Part 1
Offences
Industrial action transport offences
1(1) It is an offence for a transport worker to engage in any industrial action at any time during the specified period.
(2) It is an offence for any person to—
(a) arrange for any industrial action to be carried out by a transport worker,
(b) permit the carrying out of such action, or
(c) induce a transport worker to engage in industrial action,
at any time during the specified period.
(3) In this paragraph, a ‘transport worker’ means an employee of a transport service anywhere in the United Kingdom.
(4) The following are to be considered as transport services for the purposes of this paragraph—
(a) airport operation services;
(b) bus services;
(c) light rail services;
(d) passenger railway services.
(5) In this paragraph—
‘airport operation services’ has the same meaning as in section 88 of the Civil Aviation Act 2012;
‘bus services’ has the same meaning as in section 162 of the Transport Act 2000;
‘light rail services’ means passenger railway services provided on or in respect of any of the following light rail systems known at the time this Act comes into force as—
(a) Blackpool Tramway;
(b) Docklands Light Railway;
(c) Edinburgh Trams;
(d) Glasgow Subway;
(e) London Trams;
(f) London Underground;
(g) Manchester Metrolink;
(h) Nottingham Express Transit;
(i) Sheffield Supertram;
(j) Tyne & Wear Metro;
(k) West Midlands Metro;
‘passenger railway services’ means—
(a) services for the carriage of passengers by railway by a person providing services—
(i) under a franchise agreement within the meaning of section 23(3) of the Railways Act 1993 (“the 1993 Act”),
(ii) under, or secured under, the duty in section 30(1) of the 1993 Act,
(iii) under an agreement to which one of the persons listed in section 24A(4)(a) of the 1993 Act is a party, or
(iv) under, or secured under, section 173(1) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, or
(b) the refuelling of any locomotive or other rolling stock used for the services mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) by the person providing those services.
(6) Services relating to the following are not passenger railway services for the purposes of this paragraph—
(a) a train operation service using a railway which the Office of Rail and Road determines in accordance with regulation 2A(1) of the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 is a heritage, museum or tourist railway that operates on its own network;
(b) a train operation service that starts or terminates outside Great Britain.
(7) In this paragraph—
‘services for the carriage of passengers by railway’ has the same meaning as in Part 1 of the 1993 Act (see section 82(2) of that Act);
‘locomotive’, ‘network’, ‘rolling stock’, ‘station’, ‘track’ and ‘train’ have the meanings given by section 83(1) of the 1993 Act, but in applying the definitions in that subsection, references to ‘railway’ in the definitions are to be treated as having the meaning given in sub-paragraph (d);
‘railway’ has the meaning given by section 67(1) of the Transport and Works Act 1992 but includes a “tramway” within the meaning of that section;
Industrial action local authority offences
2(1) It is an offence for a relevant local authority worker to engage in any industrial action at any time during the specified period.
(2) It is an offence for any person to—
(a) arrange for any industrial action to be carried out in a relevant local authority area, or
(b) permit the carrying out of such action,
at any time during the specified period.
(3) In this paragraph—
‘relevant local authority worker’ means an employee of a relevant local authority;
‘relevant local authority’ means any local authority which has responsibility for the provision of one or more services in an area in which a specified sporting event, or an event that is part of the sporting event, is to be held;
‘relevant local authority area’ means the geographical area in which a relevant local authority has jurisdiction;
‘specified period’ means the ‘minimum period’ specified in regulations under section (Industrial action regulations).
Part 2
Enforcement
Penalties on conviction
3(1) A person guilty of an offence under this Schedule is liable—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;
(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding £50,000.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this Schedule in Scotland is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £20,000;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.
Power to impose financial penalties
4(1) The appropriate national authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if the appropriate national authority is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has committed an offence under this Schedule in relation to the sporting event.
(2) The amount of the penalty is to be decided by the appropriate national authority, but must not be more than £20,000.
(3) Only one financial penalty may be imposed in respect of the same conduct.
(4) No financial penalty may be imposed in respect of any conduct if—
(a) the person has been convicted of an offence under this Schedule in respect of the same conduct,
(b) criminal proceedings for an offence under this Schedule in respect of the same conduct have been instituted against the person and the proceedings have not been concluded, or
(c) criminal proceedings for an offence under this Schedule in respect of the same conduct have been concluded and the person has not been convicted.
(5) A person may not be convicted of an offence under this Schedule if a financial penalty has been imposed under this paragraph in respect of the same conduct.
Notice of intention to impose financial penalty
5(1) Before imposing a financial penalty on a person under paragraph 4, an appropriate national authority must give the person a notice (a “notice of intention”) stating that the authority proposes to do so.
(2) The notice of intention must be given before the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the first day on which the authority has sufficient evidence that the person has committed an offence under part 1 of this Schedule.
(3) The notice of intention must set out—
(a) the amount of the proposed financial penalty,
(b) the reasons for proposing to impose the financial penalty, and
(c) information about the right to make representations under paragraph 6.
Right to make representations
6(1) A person who is given a notice of intention may make written representations to the appropriate national authority which gave the notice about the proposal to impose a financial penalty.
(2) Any representations must be made within the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice of intention was given to the person.
Final notice
7(1) After the end of the period mentioned in paragraph 6(2) the appropriate national authority must—
(a) decide whether to impose a financial penalty on the person, and
(b) if it decides to do so, decide the amount of the penalty.
(2) If the authority decides to impose a financial penalty on the person, it must give a notice to the person (a ‘final notice’) imposing that penalty.
(3) The final notice must require the penalty to be paid within the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice was given.
(4) The final notice must set out—
(a) the amount of the financial penalty (which may be less than the amount specified in the notice of intention, but cannot be more),
(b) the reasons for imposing the penalty,
(c) information about how to pay the penalty,
(d) the period for payment of the penalty
(e) information about rights of appeal, and
(f) the consequences of failure to comply with the notice.
Withdrawal or amendment of notice
8(1) The appropriate national authority may at any time—
(a) withdraw a notice of intention or final notice, or
(b) reduce an amount specified in a notice of intention or final notice.
(2) The power in sub-paragraph (1) is to be exercised by giving notice to the person on whom the notice was given.
Appeals
9 (1) A person to whom a final notice is given may appeal against—
(a) the decision to impose the penalty;
(b) the amount of the penalty.
(2) The appeal may be made—
(a) in England and Wales, to the First-tier Tribunal;
(b) in Scotland, to the sheriff;
(c) in Northern Ireland, to a county court.
(3) An appeal under this paragraph must be made within the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the final notice is given to the person.
(4) If a person appeals under this paragraph, the final notice is suspended until the appeal is finally determined, withdrawn or abandoned.
(5) An appeal under this paragraph—
(a) is to be a re-hearing of the appropriate national authority’s decision, but
(b) may be determined having regard to matters of which the authority was unaware.
(6) On an appeal under this paragraph the First-tier Tribunal or the court may quash, confirm or vary the final notice.
(7) The final notice may not be varied under sub-paragraph (6) so as to make it impose a financial penalty of a greater amount than the appropriate national authority could have imposed.
Recovery of financial penalty
10(1) This paragraph applies if a person fails to pay the whole or any part of a financial penalty which has been imposed on a person in accordance with this Schedule.
(2) In England and Wales the appropriate national authority which imposed the penalty may recover the penalty or part on the order of the county court as if it were payable under an order of that court.
(3) In Scotland the penalty may be enforced in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff of any sheriffdom in Scotland.
(4) In Northern Ireland the authority which imposed the financial penalty may recover the penalty or part on the order of a county court as if it were payable under an order of that court.
(5) In any proceedings relating to a financial penalty, a certificate that—
(a) purports to be signed by or on behalf of the person with responsibility for the financial affairs of the authority which imposed the penalty, and
(b) states that payment of the financial penalty was, or was not, received by a date specified in the certificate, is evidence of the facts stated.
Proceeds of financial penalties
11 Where a relevant enforcement authority imposes a financial penalty under paragraph 4, it may use the proceeds for the purposes of any of its functions.
No protection if union induces industrial action
12 Where industrial action is prohibited during a specified period under this Schedule, an act done by a trade union to induce or attempt to induce a person to engage in industrial action is not protected from any proceedings in tort.
Part 3
Interpretation
13 In this Schedule—
‘industrial action’ means action taken by workers against their employer in furtherance of a trade dispute;
‘specified period’ means the ‘minimum period’ specified in the regulations as required by section [Industrial action regulations];
‘strike’ means any concerted stoppage of work;
‘trade dispute’ has the meaning given by section 244 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.”
This new Schedule establishes the industrial action provisions, referred to in Amendments 7, 8 and NC5, and sets out penalties for breaching them.
Mr French
The amendments, new clause and new schedule in this group are designed to make sure that maliciously timed strikes do not undermine the entirety of a major sporting event, as defined by the Bill. Any event covered by the framework established by the Bill is, by the definitions in clause 3, likely to be of
“significant international or national interest”
or
“likely to bring social or economic benefits to the United Kingdom or a part of it.”
Industrial action during such an event would wholly undermine the objectives of the Bill.
Amendment 7 would ban strikes by certain workers, including transport workers, when the framework is applied to a sporting event. Amendment 8 would require the “appropriate national authority” to apply the industrial action provisions when it applies one or more other parts of the sporting events framework to a sporting event. New clause 5 defines the minimum period in which the appropriate national authority must apply the industrial action provisions. New schedule 2 sets out the industrial action provisions referred to in amendments 7 and 8 and new clause 5, and sets out the penalties for breaching those provisions.
Taken together, the amendments seek to establish provisions related to industrial action as a core part of the sporting events framework established by the Bill. I am sure that Labour Members may sit upright a little when they hear these amendments, but I assure them that the amendments have been tabled in the spirit of the Bill and its intended outcome. They would apply only to sporting events operating under the framework.
However, in the mind of the Opposition, the amendments are not optional extras or measures to be applied to some events and not others. They would form a mandatory part of the framework itself. Through the Bill, the Government seek to establish a permanent framework so that the United Kingdom does not have to improvise or pass new primary legislation every time we host a major event and welcome people from across the world to our country. As it stands, the Bill provides for the protection of ticketing arrangements, advertising rights, trading around venues and commercial rights, under the provisions on unauthorised association. Crucially, the Bill does not protect against one of the most visible and damaging risks to any major event: the disruption caused by strikes.
Hon. Members will know the damage that such actions cause. Last September’s tube strikes caused near-total shutdown, costing Transport for London an estimated £20 million to £25 million in lost fare revenue alone, and imposing an estimated £230 million of direct cost to the wider economy, equivalent to 700,000 lost working days. Those impacts included workers unable to reach physical workplaces, lost productivity and hits to hospitality and high street spending. We cannot risk that affecting the United Kingdom’s ability to host a major sporting event such as the world cup or the Olympics.
Even the Foreign Secretary, the then leader of the Labour party, said ahead of the 2012 Olympic games,
“This is a celebration for the whole country and must not be disrupted.”
I am sure hon. Members will also remember the 2022 Commonwealth games, when ASLEF and the RMT deliberately targeted those hoping to attend by announcing walkouts on the railways either side of the games. More recently, in May this year, staff at Edinburgh and Glasgow airports voted in favour of walking out during the Commonwealth games in an effort to force a new pay deal. As the unions involved well knew, such a walkout would have had a significant disruptive effect on the operational and commercial viability of those games. Unfortunately, these are not hypothetical risks. They are a recurring and increasing phenomenon under Governments of different colours. The Bill must therefore make sure it cannot be left to chance.
The punishments for breaches would be comparable to those the Government have drafted for the ticket touting, advertising and trading offences elsewhere in the Bill. I hope the Committee will agree that any conduct that threatens the integrity of major sporting events hosted across the United Kingdom ought to be penalised, and that we should not treat conduct, including politically motivated strike action, that threatens to close down events entirely any less seriously.
There are, of course, limits to the provisions I seek to include in the Bill. The ability to prevent strikes would apply only for the specified period tied to the duration of the new framework in relation to a particular sporting event, on which I have also tabled amendment 9. It would apply to transport workers nationally, since they are mobile by definition, but also to local authority workers only in the area where an event is being held. It would apply only where the national authority has chosen to apply the sporting events framework. New schedule 2 would provide for a full enforcement code, notices of intention, the right to make representations, a final notice with reasons, and the right of appeal as appropriate. All of that mirrors the safeguards attached to the ticket touting provisions already in the Bill.
The Committee will know just how valuable major sporting events are, not just to the economy but to our society as a whole. They drive investment into the country and grassroots sports. We cannot let that be undermined by unions playing politics or holding the Government to ransom over pay deals. When we have secured a major event, we owe it to the athletes, the spectators and the millions who tune in to ensure that these events can run smoothly as planned.
Stephanie Peacock
Amendments 7 and 8, new clause 5 and new schedule 2, tabled by the shadow Minister, would prevent transport and local authority workers from engaging in industrial action linked to sporting events during specified periods. That includes creating offences relating to participation in and organisation or inducement of such action.
As the Committee will be aware, the Government repealed the minimum service legislation and a number of other restrictions on the right to strike via the Employment Rights Act 2025. The amendments would reintroduce a significant restriction on the ability of workers to take industrial action, and the Government have been clear that we will not support such restrictions. The Government do not consider it right to arbitrarily determine that certain sporting events should strip workers of their right to take industrial action. Events in the UK must operate in conjunction with our employment legislation and must not seek to carve out core components of employment rights.
We are committed to establishing a new model for industrial relations that is fit for the 21st century, and that includes a new industrial relations framework that establishes expectations for how workers and employers should conduct themselves, engage with one another and work together in the interests of the workforce, the economy and the wider public. Before I sit down, I declare an interest as a member of a trade union. On the basis of the points I have made, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw amendment 7.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 14, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert—
“(c) the single sex protections provisions.”.
New schedule 3—The Single Sex Protection Provisions—
“Protections for participants in major sporting events
1(1) Before the Secretary of State may make regulations under section (2), the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the organiser of the sporting event will—
(a) provide that all competitors in the sporting event compete against those of the same biological sex in the interests of fairness and safety;
(b) provide that all competitors and officials in the sporting event are able to use—
(i) single sex accommodation based on their biological sex;
(ii) single sex changing and washing facilities based on their biological sex;
(iii) single sex toilets based on their biological sex.
Protections for spectators of major sporting events
2 (1) Before the Secretary of State may make regulations under section (2), the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the organiser of the sporting event will—
(a) provide that all spectators, or any person attending the sporting event are able to use—
(i) single sex toilets based on their biological sex;
(ii) single sex changing and washing facilities where necessary based on their biological sex.
Interpretation
3 In the application of this Schedule to a sporting event by regulations under section (2), references to ‘single sex’ means sex as defined in the Equalities Act 2010.”.
This new Schedule, with Amendments 13 and 14, add single-sex protection provisions to the framework to ensure the provision of single-sex competitions and facilities at major sporting events.
Clause stand part.
Mr French
Clause 1 will introduce a common legislative framework for major sporting events held in the UK. The framework covers five aspects of sporting events: ticket touting, advertising, trading, unauthorised association and transport. The legislative provisions for those five aspects are set out in schedules 1 to 5.
Amendments 13 and 14 and new schedule 3, all of which are in my name, would add single sex protection provisions to the framework. They propose establishing a duty to ensure provision of single-sex competitions and facilities for major sporting events taking place under the framework established by the Bill. They also set out that where the rules of a sporting competition are framed by reference to the gender or sex of the participants, that reference must be to biological sex.
The noble Minister, Baroness Twycross, attempted to argue that these amendments were not necessary when they were tabled in the other place because
“events to which the Bill’s framework will apply must comply with existing legislation and guidance.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 24 June 2026; Vol. 857, c. 732.]
Unfortunately, although the law has been clear for some time, there are still organisations, including those the Minister has responsibility for—thankfully only a few—that are not complying with the law as clarified by the April 2025 judgment in For Women Scotland Ltd v. The Scottish Ministers.
We have all heard of the inspirational case of the eight female nurses who successfully appealed against the County Durham and Darlington NHS foundation trust’s policy and management’s dismissal of their concerns. An employment tribunal found that the trust violated the nurses’ dignity and created a hostile, humiliating and degrading environment, and upheld the claims of harassment and indirect sex discrimination. That was almost a year after the law had been clarified.
These cases continue to arise despite the law being clear. If the noble Minister was right, they no longer would and the law would be sufficient. Even though it has now been more than 18 months since the decision in the For Women Scotland case was handed down and the law clarified, some organisations are dragging their feet in undertaking their legal duty to protect women’s and girls’ spaces, particularly in a sporting context.
Across the world, sports governing bodies are coming around to biological reality. In March 2026, the International Olympic Committee banned trans and intersex athletes from competing in female events at the 2028 summer Olympics and future Olympic games. The IOC president stated that the new policy was “based on science” and made because
“it is absolutely clear that it would not be fair for biological males to compete in the female category.”
However, domestic governing bodies have been hamstrung by the Government, who delayed publishing updated guidance from the Equality and Human Rights Commission. In fact, the Minister for Women told the EHRC that it must “tone down” its guidance, which is designed to protect women and girls and single-sex spaces.
That is why my amendments are essential. Any organiser of a major sporting event would have it before them as part of the framework that all competitors in a sporting event must compete against those of the same biological sex, where designated, in the interests of fairness and safety, and that all competitors and officials in the sporting event must be able to use single-sex accommodation, single-sex changing and washing facilities and single-sex toilets based on their biological sex.
The amendments would also mean that all spectators, or any person attending the sporting event, could use single-sex toilets based on their biological sex and single-sex changing and washing facilities, where necessary, based on their biological sex. That is necessary because neither Labour nor the Liberal Democrats are able to commit to protecting single-sex spaces for women and girls. We know that girls already spend an average of 90 minutes less per week than boys playing sport and that the drop-out rate for girls at 14 is twice that of boys. Moreover, more than twice the number of girls feel uncomfortable changing for physical education compared to boys.
Respondents to the 2024 BBC elite British sportswomen study who were not comfortable with transgender participation in elite women’s categories outnumbered those who were by 10 to one. Comments included:
“It makes it too much of an unfair playing field, regardless of what sport you are competing in”
and
“Putting them in women's sport is literally like going back in time and putting women at the bottom of the pile again and having to rebuild women back up again.”
That is why the Conservative party is fully committed to ensuring that women and girls have safe single-sex spaces that encourage their participation in sport from a young age and throughout their lives. We want to make sure that there can be no wiggle room for misinterpretations or clever loopholes. In doing so, we will safeguard the integrity of women’s and girls’ sports so that they have a chance to take part on a level playing field after years of exclusion and preferential treatment against them. Women who play sport must be able to compete in a fair and safe sporting environment. My amendments would make sure that that would be the case.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 1 introduces the framework provisions in the Bill, designed to help the UK deliver its commitments to event owners and ensure that we remain a credible and competitive host of major sporting events. Delivering such commitments usually requires time-consuming, event-specific legislation. This Bill changes the game: any of the framework provisions can be applied, as needed, to any qualifying sporting event through secondary legislation.
The framework provisions will help to protect commercial rights and the experience of fans by criminalising the unauthorised resale of tickets and by preventing unauthorised advertising and trading around sporting events. The provisions will ensure that we can deliver on our obligations to event owners and protect commercial investment by preventing unauthorised association with an event, ultimately maintaining the UK’s position as an attractive host of the biggest events. Finally, provisions to manage transport and traffic in England will help us ensure that fans get to events safely, efficiently and reliably. Taken together, those provisions signal the UK’s commitment to hosting excellence, and ensure that we are ready to welcome the world.
I now turn to amendments 13 and 14 and new schedule 3, tabled by the shadow Minister. I understand that his intent is to ensure that the Bill’s framework provisions can be applied only when major sporting events ensure single-sex competition, facilities and accommodation. Any events to which the Bill’s framework will apply must comply with existing legislation and guidance. The legislation applicable here is the Equality Act 2010, which sets out how people are protected from discrimination. It also sets out certain circumstances where people can be treated differently due to their sex, which, as clarified by the Supreme Court, means biological sex, and the provision of facilities and sport are included in that.
Organisers and facility owners may lawfully restrict changing spaces, toilets, and accommodation to biological sex, where proportionate, to achieve a legitimate aim such as privacy and dignity. The law is clear: to ensure fairness or safety in sport competitions designated as women’s competitions, participation is determined based on biological sex. That would apply to all events in scope of the Bill as they are all competitive sporting events. An explicit statutory duty in the Bill is therefore unnecessary.
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert “(but see subsection (3A))”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 24.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 21, 23 to 31, 42 and 43.
Government new clause 14—Fees.
Stephanie Peacock
As the Bill passed through the other place, we heard a strong case from peers and sporting bodies alike that a small number of our world-class recurrent events could face the same delivery, commercial protection and hosting challenges as itinerant events in the future. The Government have heard and agree with the intent.
Domestic sporting events, as referred to in the Bill, contribute significant economic and social value to the UK. However, the Bill, as currently amended, is too broad in scope, with “domestic appeal” potentially covering the majority of the professional sporting calendar. Without safeguards to ensure that the framework is applied in a proportionate way, the clause risks giving eligibility for protections to an extremely large pool of events and having a disproportionately wide effect on local businesses and communities.
Even restricting the scope of “domestic sporting event” rightly requires clarity on how the Government will extend the provisions to events that currently operate independently of our operational support. That is why we have brought forward this package of Government amendments. Amendment 28 removes the addition of “national” interest; as I have set out, national interest could be deemed to have an extremely broad interpretation such as frequently held seasonal competitions. There are already two framework conditions. The first is that the sporting event must be held wholly or partly in the United Kingdom. The second is that the sporting event must be of significant international interest and be likely to bring social or economic benefits to the UK—or the event must be of “strategic value”, helping us secure other events that meet those criteria.
Government amendments 23 and 30 introduce a third framework condition that must also be met by recurrent events, referred to in the Bill as “domestic sporting events”. Those are defined under Government amendment 25 as
“a sporting event which is of a kind that is regularly held wholly or partly in the United Kingdom”.
The third condition requires organisers of domestic sporting events to apply to the appropriate national authority requesting that the framework be applied. The event organiser must set out evidence that it is appropriate to apply the framework to its event. The Secretary of State or devolved Governments may then consider such events on a case-by-case basis, notably considering such matters as the prominence of the event within its field of sport and the frequency of such events. That is a necessary distinction for a cohort of domestic sporting events that currently are both numerous and run independently of Government.
The independent events are not routinely subject to Government evaluation that could otherwise inform a decision to extend the provisions. The amendment places the responsibility on an event to articulate the case for inclusion and evidence that provisions of the Bill will support their enduring economic and social value. The requirement to make an application was an amendment from the other place, which we have further refined in this way. That allows the Government to ensure that they are satisfied that the application of framework provisions would be appropriate and proportionate.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
The Minister well knows that Trent Bridge is in my constituency of Rushcliffe. What category would an event such as the Ashes fall into? It is an internationally significant event, but it is a roaming event that goes to different locations. Would it fall into a different category?
Stephanie Peacock
Any sporting event can apply and must meet the evidence-based threshold. On Royal Assent, we will publish the application process. I am happy to follow up in writing with my hon. Friend, but the event will be able to apply and make a case. That will then be on a case-by-case basis.
A further safeguard to ensure the proportionality of applying these measures is set out in amendment 31, which adds a sunset provision that ensures that regulations applying provisions to recurrent events may not run past five years. That will ensure that no event should benefit from these provisions in perpetuity without adequate assurance that the criteria are still met and that the event still warrants these benefits. That does not limit the potential duration of access to these provisions, but it does introduce points of parliamentary review. When we debate the detail of the framework provisions later in group 12, I will set out additional safeguards that the Government consider necessary to ensure their application to domestic events is workable and proportionate.
I turn to Government amendment 24. After extensive exploration, the Government believe that the Bill’s transport provisions do not and would not offer additional provisions to domestic sporting events. They have clear event ownership and engage with the relevant local authorities on the transport planning required. Existing legislation meets the needs of time-limited events, with powers for local authorities to appropriately accommodate their transport requirements. Extension of the provision would not materially add to the Government’s support of them. We do not exclude this lightly, but we will not pursue legislation that we believe is not materially useful.
Finally, I turn to new clause 14. As the Committee has heard, great care has been taken to ensure that the application of the framework provisions to recurrent events is proportionate and workable. In this context, we are mindful of the potential burden on enforcement authorities who could be called on to carry out enforcement of the advertising and trading offences under the Bill. We have listened to the views of local authorities on that point; that is why new clause 14 introduces a mechanism for enforcement authorities to recover from event organisers the additional costs they have incurred in connection with enforcing the advertising and trading offences for recurrent events.
Local authorities will be able to require an event organiser to cover the additional costs that it has incurred in exercising functions related to the advertising and trading offences for recurrent events. That includes activities associated with applying the provisions to an event, such as the costs of administering an authorisation process and engagement with local businesses.
Anna Sabine (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)
I intend to press to a vote all the amendments relating to the additional condition to be met in the case of domestic sporting events set out by Government amendment 30. I also want to speak to Government amendment 28 and press that to a vote.
In the other place, Liberal Democrat colleagues pushed for the Bill’s scope to be extended so that the sporting events framework could be applicable to all major domestic events. That amendment received great support from the industry, with bodies including the England and Wales Cricket Board, Formula 1, the Lawn Tennis Association, the Football Association, the London Marathon and the Rugby Football Union signing our letter to push for this amendment, which was voted through.
I was pleased that the Minister accepted that amended scope on Second Reading. However, I am concerned that these Government amendments will not deliver it. I understand the Government’s intention—not every premier league match should receive the specific benefit of this Bill—but Government amendment 28 will remove “national interest” from the sporting events framework. That will significantly change the intended scope that the Liberal Democrats pushed through in the other place. This matters in particular for women’s sports and emerging sports, where a national profile has to be built before they can attract international attention. I am seeking clarification: can the Minister confirm that major national events such as Wimbledon will remain covered by the provisions in this Bill?
Mr French
This group of Government amendments is part of the changes the Government seek to make in relation to the application of the sporting events framework. I am grateful to the Minister and her officials for taking the time to discuss these, and her thinking behind them, last week. As we have heard, they include changes that define a domestic sporting event; mean that the sporting events framework could be applied to a sporting event only if it is likely to be of significant international interest; provide for an additional condition that must be met in the case of domestic sporting events; provide that regulations under clause 2 that relate to a domestic sporting event cease to have effect after a certain period of time; and mean that transport provisions cannot be applied to a domestic sporting event.
The Minister has assured me that there is broad support among stakeholders for these tweaks that the Government are seeking to make. But they also include new clause 14, which
“would insert a new clause after clause 21 (maximum penalty amounts etc) which would enable a certain bodies to charge fees in connection with certain costs which are incurred by those bodies in relation to the advertising offence or the trading offence.”
The Minister may be aware that the Sport and Recreation Alliance wrote in last night—I suspect to a number of MPs on this Committee—because it is concerned that that sets a precedent where the victim of an offence will be required to pay for the enforcement of that offence.
The Minister will be aware of the concerns in the sporting world for major events around the Home Office’s ongoing engagement with the police—for example, about how costs are split and tried to be forced on to more sporting bodies. We are concerned about that. I am particularly keen to hear what reassurance the Minister can provide the Committee that that precedent will not open the door to further charges being placed on the ability of sporting bodies to host major and domestic events. More broadly, I am pleased that the Government have seen sense and agreed with the spirit of the changes made in the other place. However, I understand the comments made by the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset; I am keen to hear the Minister’s response and what assurance she can provide the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful for the contributions from the hon. Members for Old Bexley and Sidcup and for Frome and East Somerset, and for the time they spent last week discussing the matter. As I acknowledged in my opening remarks, the Government have listened, and we acknowledged that we needed to go further. As I set out, certain conditions will need to be met in order for recurrent events to receive the protections: they must be wholly or partly held in the United Kingdom, be of significant international interest and be likely to bring social or economic benefits.
Andrew Lewin (Welwyn Hatfield) (Lab)
The Liberal Democrat spokesperson referred to Wimbledon, an event that attracts clear international interest. I have been watching the tournament for 30 years, and there are players from all across the world. I hope the Minister can reassure us that that is precisely the type of event that will be protected under the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
My hon. Friend has done my job for me: I was just coming on to that point. The event must also be of strategic value to help us secure other events, but, to answer his specific question: yes, we would anticipate Wimbledon, the Open, Silverstone and the London marathon being the sorts of events that would be protected. I discussed this matter with the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset last week, and as I outlined in answer to an earlier intervention, a wide range of events can apply, but they must meet an evidential threshold to receive those powers. It is worth noting that they may not want all of the powers in the Bill; they may simply want some of them.
In answer to the shadow Minister’s point about new clause 14, I have outlined the reasons why we included it. There is a balance to be struck, but we do not believe that the burden should fall on British taxpayers.
James Naish
I have a small point that I do not think is covered in this clause, but maybe the Minister can confirm that. For people in my constituency, which has three international venues close by, parking and the cost of parking enforcement are very important. Will the Minister consider support for local authorities that take on that extra burden when major events come to town?
Stephanie Peacock
For those itinerant events, there are transport provisions in the Bill, but this group of amendments relates to recurrent events. We have exempted them from the transport provisions, having been in consultation and conversation with both the event organisers and local authorities, because they already have transport plans in place. I absolutely acknowledge that sporting events at any level can cause challenges, particularly with transport—I have seen that in my own area of Barnsley—so perhaps I can pass on my hon. Friend’s comments to the relevant Transport Minister. I hope that I have answered hon. Members’ points.
Amendment 22 agreed to.
Amendments made: 21, in clause 2, page 2, line 11, after “section” insert
“in relation to a sporting event”.
This amendment contains a drafting refinement.
Amendment 23: in clause 2, page 2, line 12, leave out from “if” to end of line 13 and insert
“—
(a) the first and second conditions in section 3 are met, and
(b) in the case of a domestic sporting event, the third condition in that section is also met.”
See the explanatory statement to Amendment 30.
Amendment 24: in clause 2, page 2, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (2) may not apply the transport provisions to a domestic sporting event.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would mean that the transport provisions cannot be applied to a domestic sporting event.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 2, page 2, line 18, at end insert—
“(5A) Regulations made by an appropriate national authority under this section may not have effect for a period that is longer than 50 days.”
This amendment sets the maximum period in which the sporting events framework could be implemented in relation to a particular event.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 10, in clause 2, page 2, line 21, leave out subsection (b).
This amendment would ensure that all regulations applying the sporting events framework are subject to the affirmative procedure.
Clause stand part.
Mr French
I will start with what clause 2 seeks to achieve, which is the application of the framework to major sporting events. The clause establishes how the sporting events framework can be applied to individual sporting events. It will give the Secretary of State and the relevant devolved Governments powers to apply ticket touting, advertising and trading provisions, while the Secretary of State can also apply unauthorised association and transport provisions. However, those powers can be used only where the event meets the conditions set out in clause 3. Regulations made under the clause can also cover connected events, such as cultural events, that are held in connection with the main sporting event; the clause also establishes the scrutiny procedures for such regulations.
Amendment 9, which is in my name, would set a
“maximum period in which the sporting events framework could be implemented in relation to a particular event.”
As it stands, there is no limit to the time for which regulations made under the Bill can be in effect. We think that that is a clear omission. As designed, the framework applies to specific and time-limited events. It therefore seems strange, if not wrong, for those regulations to extend beyond the life of the event that they are there to regulate.
Amendment 9 proposes a single flat period of 50 days as a sensible time limit for the powers. As hon. Members may know, the London Olympic and Paralympic games spanned 45 days, the UEFA European championship runs for approximately one month and the FIFA world cup takes about 39 days from the first match to the final whistle. Our amendment’s balanced approach gives organisers a generous margin within which to operate, while also giving Parliament and the public reassurance that those powers will not accidentally remain in place beyond the event’s needs.
I am sure that the Minister will echo the comments of the Minister in the other place and say that they understand the need for flexibility. However, further to the question that my noble Friend Lord Parkinson asked the Lords Minister, I would be interested to know what event the Minister has in mind that may require a longer period, particularly as she has now tabled Government amendment 31, which provides a time limit for domestic sporting events. Can she explain to the Committee why one event would need a time limit but the others would not, given that they are covered or set to be covered by the same framework? If flexibility is key, I hope that my amendment will help to provide the solution. I hope the Committee agrees that it would help to dovetail the intentions of the Bill and the practicalities of regulation alongside the practical realities that occur once an event has finished.
Amendment 10, which is in my name, would ensure that all regulations applying to the sporting event framework are subject to the affirmative procedure of both Houses. As drafted, the Bill stipulates that the affirmative procedure applies only to the first set of regulations establishing the framework for a particular event; any subsequent regulations that amend, extend or otherwise modify that framework would be subject only to the negative procedure.
My amendment would remove that distinction, ensuring that all regulations made under clause 2 are subject to affirmative procedures. The principle is straightforward; we are talking about a framework that could have significant implications for the rights and obligations of businesses, event organisers, local authorities and members of the public in connection with major sporting events.
As my noble Friend Lord Moynihan highlighted in the other place, the arrangements for the Olympic games in Paris extended to issues such as artificial intelligence and facial recognition. These matters warrant proper parliamentary scrutiny, not simple notification after the fact. I hope the Committee agrees that Parliament should have the opportunity to debate and approve all regulations made under the clause, not just the first set.
I agree with my noble Friend Lord Parkinson, who said:
“I hope by the time we get there, this experiment with time-limited guillotines on secondary legislation will not still be in place.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 June 2026; Vol. 857, c. 490.]
That was such an eloquent comment—I should be clear that it was his, not mine.
In its delegated powers memorandum, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport argues that the subsequent regulations are likely to contain operational or technical detail or address unforeseen changes in how an event is delivered. On that basis, it considers the negative procedure appropriate to ensure an effective mechanism for making changes during the delivery of an event.
However, as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has rightly pointed out, there is no restriction on the scope of those subsequent regulations. The first set may apply only one aspect of the framework to an event, with a later set introducing the remaining provisions. Alternatively, subsequent regulations could make significant changes to arrangements already in place.
It is difficult to see the logic in requiring Parliament to approve the initial application of the framework while allowing subsequent regulations, potentially making equally significant changes, to proceed without the same level of scrutiny, or indeed any scrutiny. If the Government’s argument is ultimately one of administrative convenience, I would suggest to the Minister and the Committee that that is not sufficient justification for reducing parliamentary oversight of powers with such potentially far-reaching consequences.
I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 2 provides the mechanism by which the framework established in the Bill can be applied to individual events. Major sporting events differ in scale, in geography and in the specific operational challenges they present. It is therefore right that the Bill does not seek to impose a one-size-fits-all regime in every case.
Clause 2 will enable the framework to be tailored to the circumstances of a particular event, applying only those provisions that are necessary and proportionate. There is no appetite to put measures in place that are not needed. This is a practical approach, but it is also responsible; the power is not open-ended. Regulations may be made only where the conditions in the framework are met, and all regulations made using the powers under clause 2 will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
The clause also provides important clarity about the way the Bill operates across the UK, because it has been developed in close collaboration with our colleagues in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is right that we look to ensure that every corner of the UK can benefit from this legislation. Devolved authorities will be able to apply provisions relating to ticketing, advertising and trading to events taking place in their territory.
Of course, when it comes to ticketing, we appreciate that a UK-wide approach is most desirable; I will say more about that when we come to clause 5. Only the Secretary of State will have the power to apply provisions concerning unauthorised association as this is a reserved matter. The transport measures apply to roads and areas in England only and can be applied by the Secretary of State; the Bill does not contain equivalent measures for the devolved nations as transport is a devolved matter and the devolved Governments were content that they already had adequate provision. Transport co-ordination across the UK will continue through close engagement with the devolved Governments and delivery partners, ensuring that arrangements reflect the different legal and operational frameworks in each nation while supporting coherent UK-wide delivery of major events.
In short, clause 2 will provide the Bill with both its practical effect and its necessary flexibility. It will also ensure that flexibility is balanced by safeguards. Regulations may be made only where the framework conditions are satisfied. Having carefully considered the points made in the other place, we introduced amendments to ensure that each use of the powers in the clause for an event must be subject to debate.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments, and particularly her reference to the amendments tabled since the debate in the other place. We will take the Government’s words in good faith and will not seek a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 25, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, at end insert—
“‘domestic sporting event’ means a sporting event which is of a kind that is regularly held wholly or partly in the United Kingdom”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
The amendment defines “domestic sporting event”.
Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Framework conditions
Amendment made: 26, in clause 3, page 2, line 34, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) This section has effect for the purposes of section 2(3).”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 30.
Anna Sabine
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 3, page 2, line 35, leave out “two” and insert “three”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 16.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 16, in clause 3, page 3, line 3, at end insert—
“(3A) The third condition is that the live coverage of the sporting event is made available—
(a) free of charge to all persons in the United Kingdom with access to a television or internet-connected device, or
(b) on a platform licensed by Ofcom which is accessible without subscription to members of the public in the United Kingdom.”
This amendment adds a condition for Sporting Events to be covered by this Bill, to include making the sporting event free to air.
Amendment 17, in clause 25, page 19, line 19, leave out from “event” to end of line 20 and insert—
“(i) that takes place wholly or partly in a relevant part of the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the live coverage of which is made available—
(A) free of charge to all persons in the United Kingdom with access to a television or internet-connected device, or
(B) on a platform licensed by Ofcom which is accessible without subscription to members of the public in the United Kingdom.”
This amendment would require that any event receiving financial support from the UK Government must be broadcast free to air as a condition of that support.
Clause stand part.
Clause 4 stand part.
Anna Sabine
Any sporting event falling under this Bill, and especially any sporting event receiving financial support from the Government, should be free to air. Sport is a huge part of our culture. We will get to the topic of tickets later in this debate, but the reality is that it is expensive to see sport live. We can all agree that being able to watch England play football at the world cup should be free for everyone to watch on TV. Our amendments would ensure that everyone can watch a sporting event that falls under the Bill and that, especially when Government funding is going towards that event, it is free to do so.
Public service broadcasters have pioneered free-to-air coverage and have demonstrated that it has significant social value. Televising the Lionesses, for example, has been huge for girls, who are increasingly taking up football after watching it on live TV. Research by the Women’s Sport Trust shows that whether sport is free-to-air has a direct impact on how many people are watching women’s sports. These amendments would ensure not only that every fan can watch their team play, but that emerging sports funded by the Government or provided for through the Bill are accessible for all to see.
Mr French
Clause 3 sets out the conditions that must be satisfied before the framework can be applied to a sporting event. The event must take place wholly or partly in the United Kingdom and must meet either the significance or the strategic priorities.
To meet the significance priorities, the sporting event must be likely to be of significant international or national interest, the sporting event organiser must have asked for the framework to be applied and the event must be likely to bring social or economic benefits to the whole or part of the UK. This clause sets out the criteria that may be taken into account in determining whether a sporting event is likely to be of significant national or international interest. They include the scale and reputation of the event, the number of people expected to attend the event from outside the UK, and the amount of media coverage expected outside the UK.
To meet the strategic priority, it must be proven that hosting the sporting event will improve the UK’s chance of securing hosting rights for events that meet the significance priorities. I think all Members will recognise the international challenges when bidding for such events. That is something that goes across parties and will often involve successive Governments, with one Government starting the bid and then another Government hosting the event.
Clause 4, which is entitled “Restrictions on application of framework”, sets out safeguards to ensure that powers over sporting events respect the devolved authorities. Before applying provisions that fall within the legislative responsibility of a devolved authority, the Secretary of State must obtain the relevant devolved authority’s consent. At the same time, the clause sets out that devolved authorities may only make regulations covering matters within their own legislative competence. Where ticket touting provisions are applied, the event must also take place at least partly within the relevant devolved territory.
Amendments 15 and 16, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, would require all sporting events hosted under the Bill to be made free to air. Understandably, that has raised a number of concerns among sporting bodies. Before I get into the details of why the amendments would not just upset the apple cart but risk cutting the apple tree down completely, I will start by disagreeing with the terminology “free to air”. As my noble Friend Lord Hayward pointed out in Committee in the other place, we must pay £180 each year for a television licence. These events are therefore never free to air.
Secondly, a review of the listed events regime is probably better placed to achieve the expansion of sports coverage—I do agree with the intentions of the proposal—than a blanket ban, which would be likely to have unintended consequences because of the complexities of global broadcast deals. At a glance, it may well look like an attractive proposition, designed to appeal to Liberal Democrats across the home counties. However, although we all agree that we want as many people as possible to enjoy major sporting events, good intentions and good headlines do not make good policy. These amendments would risk doing real damage to the very sports that they are meant to support.
Broadcasting revenue is an essential source of funding for British sport. It does not simply benefit the elite clubs and athletes at the top of the game. That revenue flows down the sporting pyramid, supporting community clubs, grassroots facilities and the next generation of—we hope—world-beating British sporting talent. The Liberal Democrats should be under no illusion about the scale of the financial risk that they are proposing. For example, the Premier League’s current domestic broadcast deals with Sky and TNT Sports are estimated to be worth £6.7 billion over four years, and the English Football League’s deal with Sky is worth another £1 billion over five years. Those agreements demonstrate the enormous value that broadcasters place on live sport, and the income that British sport stands to lose if we undermine the commercial model that supports it.
The question for the Liberal Democrats is simple: if their amendments put that income at risk, who will replace it? Where will the money come from to support sports clubs, maintain facilities and give young people the opportunity to participate in sport? I appreciate that their amendments start with major events hosted under the framework for which the Bill provides, but once the precedent is set and the likes of UEFA cannot sell their broadcast rights at market value, the effects will begin to pass from the international competitions to the feeder domestic competitions. What will the impact be on participation if that happens? I can answer for them: it will begin to fall, and once it does, it will be incredibly difficult to recover. It is all very well to demand that sporting events be made free to air. That is popular—I understand it—but someone still has to pay for the rights to broadcast them. If broadcasters cannot justify the cost of acquiring those rights, the financial consequences will not be confined to the boardrooms of elite sport; they will be felt throughout sport, including the community clubs and grassroots organisations that rely on this investment.
The Liberal Democrats should recognise that the current system already delivers significant benefits beyond elite sport. In the 2024-25 financial year, UK sports invested a record £213.2 million of broadcast revenues into sport under the voluntary code of conduct. The Premier League, meanwhile, invested £1.6 billion into the wider game in the previous broadcasting cycle. Those figures matter. They demonstrate that commercial broadcasting agreements can generate substantial investment across British sport. We should be looking at how to build investment in sport, not introducing blanket restrictions that risk undermining it at any level. That is particularly important when grassroots sport is already facing significant financial pressures under this Government. The Liberal Democrats should not seek to add further uncertainty to the financial foundations of British sport through amendments that could jeopardise the broadcasting revenue upon which it depends.
Let me be clear once again: I want more people watching major sporting events—I want children to be inspired by our greatest athletes, families to enjoy the biggest occasions and British sport to reach the widest possible audience—but we must recognise that accessibility and financial sustainability are not mutually exclusive. We can encourage wider access without imposing a blanket requirement that risks diminishing the value of the rights that help fund our sports.
The answer is to review the listed events regime, make the most of the commercial broadcasting agreements, encourage investment in grassroots sports and ensure that the success of our biggest sporting events benefits communities across the country. Broadcasting revenues are an essential part of that sporting ecosystem, without which it would wither away. These amendments offer a superficially appealing solution that is undoubtedly popular, without adequately addressing the clear consequences.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset for tabling amendments 15 to 17 and for her thoughtful points. The amendments seek to add a further condition that the Secretary of State and devolved Governments must consider to be met in order for the provisions of the Bill to be applied to a sporting event or an event to rely on the funding power. In either case, the additional condition is that live coverage of the event must be made available free of charge to the public in the United Kingdom, either directly or through an Ofcom-licensed platform accessible without subscription.
The Government recognise the intent behind the amendments and are committed to ensuring that major sporting events are as accessible as possible to people across the United Kingdom, but we cannot accept them. Decisions relating to the broadcast coverage of sporting events, and particularly to those recurrent events delivered wholly independently of Government, are key commercial matters for broadcasters, event organisers and the holders of the broadcasting rights. Broadcasting rights provide essential income for national governing bodies and sport broadcasting rights holders, which enables them to invest in their sports and future events; indeed, the shadow Minister outlined in detail some of the relevant figures. The amendments would place tighter controls on their ability to generate much-needed broadcasting revenue, and could negate the wider economic benefits that the Bill provides for.
The current listed events regime is designed to ensure that sporting events of national significance are available to as wide an audience as possible, by prohibiting their exclusive broadcasting without prior consent from Ofcom. In any event, we would expect broadcasters and sporting rights holders of specific events to think carefully about the balance between generating much-needed revenue and ensuring access to coverage for viewers, ensuring the growth and development of the sport.
Clause 3 sets out the conditions that a sporting event must meet before the Bill’s framework provisions can be applied to it. We have had a thorough debate on this matter already, and I hope the Committee agrees that it is not necessary to revisit those points.
Clause 4 ensures that the Bill operates coherently across the United Kingdom while respecting devolved competence and territorial scope. The clause makes it clear that the Secretary of State cannot make regulations applying provisions on ticketing, advertising and trading to a sporting event in an area of devolved competence without the devolved authority’s consent. Similarly, the devolved authorities may exercise these powers only where the matter falls within their legislative competence. Where ticketing provisions are applied, the event in question must take place at least partly within the territory of the devolved authority making the regulations. The clause is an important part of ensuring coherence when applying the powers in a Bill that will ultimately strengthen our ability to secure and host world-class events throughout the UK.
Anna Sabine
I do not represent a home county, and I would like to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 5 deals with the important issue of ticketing. It is integral to the framework provisions in the Bill, and in particular to delivering the requirements of major sporting event owners when we seek and secure events hosted in the UK. The ticketing provisions in the Bill are time-limited and designed to ensure that tickets can be resold only with the authorisation of an event owner or organiser.
Clause 5 provides that any regulations applying the Bill’s ticketing measures must specify the period for which those measures apply. That will ensure that the provisions can be applied in a way that reflects the circumstances of each event, including the point at which tickets are expected to go on sale. The clause also requires regulations to specify the part or parts of the United Kingdom to which the provisions will apply. That is important, given that these provisions fall within devolved competence.
We expect the effectiveness of the provisions to be significantly reduced if there is inconsistency in their application, or gaps in territorial coverage that could be exploited. That is precisely why clause 5 is so important. It provides a mechanism by which the Secretary of State may apply the provisions on a UK basis where the consent of the devolved Governments has been secured. The Government’s strong preference is, of course, for a coherent UK-wide approach. Such an approach will provide greater certainty for event organisers, stronger protection for fans and a more effective basis for enforcement.
Clause 6 is a practical, functional element of the Bill. Regulations applying the ticketing provisions to an event will need to designate one or more persons to grant authorisation for ticketing activity, such as the sale and resale of tickets. Only a person who is suitable can be designated to grant authorisations. In effect, that means someone who has the primary right to sell tickets to an event, which we expect would include only an event owner or organiser. The event owner or organiser could then determine who is authorised, based on commercial arrangements.
As unauthorised public resale will be a criminal offence, the Government expect that accessible authorised channels will be made available for the resale of tickets where people can no longer attend an event. Conditions may be imposed on an event owner or organiser who can authorise ticket sales—for example, to require them to maintain a register of platforms that can legally sell tickets.
Before I conclude, it is worth touching on our manifesto commitment to ban ticket touting, with a nod to new clauses 10 and 11, tabled by the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset, which we will consider later. We understand and share the objectives that underpin those new clauses, which is why the Secretary of State affirmed on Second Reading our intention to treat the Bill as a priority and ensure that we get it on the statute book.
We will introduce a price cap on the resale of tickets for all live events, including those captured under the Bill, and there will be strict obligations on ticket resale platforms to ensure compliance. That will ensure that, regardless of the event, fans are treated fairly and can have confidence in the operation of the ticketing market. Fans should take further confidence from the fact that UEFA has already confirmed that there will be no dynamic pricing for Euro 2028, and that more than 40% of tickets will be available in the most affordable categories.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Exceptions to the ticket touting offence
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 6—Exception for charitable auctions—
“(1) The ticket touting offence does not apply in relation to the sale of an event ticket in an auction conducted—
(a) by a charity, or
(b) by a person other than a charity, provided that the proceeds of the event ticket’s sale are given to a charity.
(2) In subsection (1), ‘charity’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Charities Act 2011.”
Clause stand part.
Mr French
As we are debating ticket touting regulations, particularly in relation to football, it is probably right that I disclose that I attended the FIFA world cup in a private capacity and bought my own ticket, just in case we get a mention of FIFA.
Clause 7 allows regulations to specify activities that are exempt from the ticket touting offence. In doing so, it gives the appropriate national authority the flexibility to accommodate legitimate activities that should not be prohibited. My amendment 11 and new clause 6 are relatively small changes that would enable the charitable resale of tickets.
I am sure the Committee will agree that a charity auction for a ticket is not ticket touting and should never be treated as such. I understand that the noble Minister in the other place recognises that fact, but she has asserted that
“it would not be appropriate to include such a blanket exception as this could undermine the Bill’s objectives.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 June 2026; Vol. 857, c. 476.]
I am not sure which objective my amendments would undermine. One of the premises under which the Government have brought forward the Bill is that major sporting events are both an economic and a social good for the United Kingdom. Charities are key vessels for delivering social good, so why are the Government intent on hamstringing good causes and charities, and why are they prioritising FIFA’s ability to resell tickets at a hugely inflated price, instead of the money going towards a good cause or charity?
The problem is that there is confusion among the Government. In one part of the Bill, which we will debate later today, they say that profit is wrong and that ticket resale sites such as Viagogo and StubHub should not be able to make significant profits from the services that they offer—in fact, they should not be allowed to provide those services in this context. However, the Bill as it stands eliminates the ability of charities to auction off a ticket to generate funds for a good cause. Instead, the noble Minister has said that
“charities looking to raise money for themselves would be able to apply for authorisation to auction tickets. This request would be considered on a case-by-case basis.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 June 2026; Vol. 857, c. 552.]
How impractical! Do the Government really expect a local charity or a good cause to be able to navigate an as-yet-undefined application process, and to compete against the likes of UEFA or FIFA and their international infrastructure, simply to auction a ticket to a sporting event in aid of a chosen charitable cause? It is ridiculous to expect the vast majority of charities, which are often small, to be able to do that. In practice, it creates a ban on auctions taking place, which will be to the detriment of charities. That is why I have tabled amendment 11 and new clause 6.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 7 deals with the important issue of exceptions to the ticket touting offence, which ensures that proportionality, where required and appropriate, can be applied to the way the offence operates. It is important to clarify that the offence does not prohibit the transfer of tickets at face value between friends, family and associates. Clause 7 enables regulations applying the ticketing provision to specify exceptions to the offence, which may include activities carried out by charities for charitable purposes, including the auctioning of tickets to raise money. This ensures that the Secretary of State or a devolved authority can consider what is proportionate and right for each event.
Although I note that no exception was provided in the legislation for London 2012 or Birmingham 2022, I have asked my officials to discuss this issue further with UEFA before we bring forward regulations next year. I am confident that we can agree on an approach that supports the work of our fantastic charity sector, particularly local charities in our host cities, which speaks to the points made by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup. His amendment 11 and new clause 6 would put on the face of the Bill an exception to the ticket touting offence where a ticket is sold by auction and the proceeds go to charity.
I fully recognise the spirit of the hon. Member’s amendments, and we listened carefully to the concerns raised in the other place about the potential impact of the legislative framework on charitable fundraising. That is precisely why the Government introduced amendments to make it clear that the ability to create exemptions to the ticket touting offence can be used, but through regulations. In relation to activities carried out by charities for charitable purposes, we believe that what is needed is not a wholesale exception but a proportionate approach. The amendment tabled by the Government in the other place sends a clear signal of intent. Where it is appropriate to do so, exceptions for charities can and will be made in regulations. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 11 and new clause 6.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 12, in schedule 1, page 24, line 20, at end insert—
“(4A) It is not an offence under this paragraph for a person (‘A’) to advertise that an event ticket is available for purchase from another person (‘B’) unless A knows, or ought to know, that B is touting an event ticket.”.
This amendment mirrors a defence in the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Act 2020 to ensure that the offence of advertising that an event ticket is available for purchase does not apply strict liability.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 56.
Amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 26, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) An authorisation under this paragraph must include a secondary ticketing condition.
(2B) A ‘secondary ticketing condition’ is a condition that requires a person granted a ticketing authorisation under this paragraph to have and maintain a mechanism through which an event ticket can be transferred or sold to another person.”.
Government amendments 57 to 60.
Schedule 1.
Mr French
Amendment 12 mirrors one of the defences in the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Act 2020, which ensures that the offence of advertising that an event ticket is available for purchase does not apply strict liability. That means that it would not be an offence under the Bill for a person to advertise that an event ticket is available for purchase from somebody else, unless that first person already knows, or would be reasonably expected to know, that the second person is in fact touting a ticket to an event. This is a rather small and simple change that would improve the protections for those who would, under the current drafting, be inadvertently guilty of committing a crime.
It is unreasonable to expect everybody in the first person’s shoes to know the entirety of the story of the second person and how they came about the ticket. If somebody is knowingly advertising a touted ticket, of course they should face the full and proper penalties provided for in the Bill. I hope the Minister and the Committee will agree that the amendment would make a small and simple change to avoid trapping unsuspecting persons in a legal mess because they have been misled or did not know about somebody else’s actions.
Amendment 3 would add a requirement for any person granted a ticketing authorisation under the relevant paragraph to have and maintain a mechanism through which an event ticket can be transferred or sold to another person. The principle behind the amendment is straightforward: people who purchase tickets to major sporting events should not be left out of pocket if their circumstances change and they are no longer able to attend.
Life happens. As MPs, we all know that. People fall ill, family commitments change and work or travel arrangements can fall through. It cannot be right that a fan who has paid good money for a ticket should have no reasonable means of transferring it to somebody else. We of course recognise the importance of protecting fans from ticket touting, excessive resale prices and fraudulent activity. Those are legitimate concerns. However, there is a clear distinction between organised touting for profit and an ordinary supporter who simply wishes to recover the cost of a ticket they can no longer use.
As Lord Fuller said in the other place, not only does the Bill as drafted prevent the honest sale or transfer of a ticket, but it fines someone £50,000 “for trying it”. In my view, that is unacceptable. Under this Government, a person might get less of a punishment for burglary. A properly managed transfer or resale mechanism can help to protect consumers, give organisers greater oversight of who holds a ticket, and reduce the incentive for fans to turn to unofficial platforms or the black market, where the risk of fraud may be considerably greater.
This part of the Bill is seemingly stuck in the past as it fails to consider the ways fans can be protected from scammers with modern techniques, including proving identity and interoperability, which automatically validates and authenticates tickets. It is my understanding that the resale sector is calling for that, but the ticket sales and distribution companies are refusing to engage with it. Will the Minister speak to her ministerial colleagues in her Department and the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade, and update me on discussions that the Government are having with the sector about introducing interoperability between ticket distribution companies and resale sites? That would hopefully allow resale companies to prevent ghost ticketing, and would facilitate a regular exchange between consenting adults—no more fake tickets sold and no more disappointed fans. Will the Minister undertake to ensure that her colleagues do that, and will she write to me after the Committee? If the Government’s aim is to protect consumers—I am sure it is—fans who no longer need their ticket must be able either to resell it or transfer it with little difficulty. The Bill currently allows fans only to sell their tickets back to the organisers, and there is then no cap on the resale value.
Stephanie Peacock
I will speak first to schedule 1, and then I will speak to the hon. Gentleman’s amendments. Schedule 1 sets out the scope and detail of the ticketing offence and the enforcement measures available. Principally, it sets out the criminal ticketing offence, which will apply only in the part or parts of the United Kingdom that have been specified in the regulations. As this is a devolved area of competence, the Secretary of State can apply the ticketing offence to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland only with their consent.
An event ticket is defined as anything that is or claims to be a ticket to the sporting event in question, including any opening or closing ceremonies or connected events, such as official cultural programmes, where those events are specified in regulations.
James Naish
During the 2012 games, there were a considerable number of test events, and also dress rehearsals for the opening and closing ceremonies and warm-up events. Would they be covered by the schedule?
Stephanie Peacock
We will set it out in regulations. It depends on what event it is. I anticipate that those examples would be included, but it will be for this House to decide when it debates the regulations for each event.
It will be an offence to sell, offer to sell, expose for sale or advertise that a ticket to an event is available for purchase in certain circumstances. That includes where such activity is carried out in a public place, including a secondary ticketing platform or online marketplace, whether or not there is an intention to make a profit. To prevent abuse, selling an event ticket includes the giving away of such a ticket to someone who pays, or agrees to pay, for other goods or services. That includes event tickets included as part of an offer when purchasing other goods or services.
The penalty levels are designed to ensure that there is a sufficient deterrent to the ticketing offence. A person found guilty of the ticketing offence on summary conviction in England and Wales is subject to an unlimited fine; in Northern Ireland, to a fine of no more than £50,000; and in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding £20,000. On conviction on indictment in Scotland, they would be subject to a fine. The variations in penalty reflect differences in the judicial systems and legal frameworks across the UK. As an alternative to prosecution, enforcement authorities will be able to impose financial penalties without having to go through the courts.
As ticketing offences are not confined to the UK, we must be able to deter ticket touts acting outside our borders. That is why a UK national, an individual habitually resident in the UK, a body incorporated under UK law or a partnership in Scotland can commit an offence whether or not they are in the UK, or a part of the UK where the offence has been applied. It is also an offence for a non-UK person to carry out ticketing activity in the course of business outside of the UK, or in any part of the UK where the offence has not been applied, provided that the UK connection condition is met. That is crucial to ensure we can take action against activity that affects UK interests. Someone has a UK connection if they have a place of business or carry out business in the UK, or if they direct their activity to people in the UK. Enforcement authorities will have the power to impose a financial penalty of up to £20,000 as an alternative to prosecution. While the level of penalties is at the discretion of the enforcement authority, they can be of no more than £20,000. The process for imposing a financial penalty is clearly laid out: there will be the right to appeal to a first-tier tribunal, and penalties may be recovered through existing civil procedures.
Government amendment 56 addresses a drafting omission by providing that the Bill’s reference to the sale of an event ticket also includes reference to giving an event ticket as a prize, which is the long-standing intention of the provision and ensures that we can satisfy our hosting commitments. It prevents businesses from looking to gain exposure by giving away event tickets as prizes, unless they are authorised to do so—for example, they could be an official sponsor. Ultimately, the amendment will ensure that large businesses cannot exploit their considerable reach and public profile to benefit commercially from the interest and excitement surrounding an event to which they have made no contribution.
Government amendments 57 to 60 ensure that, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, a financial penalty imposed by an enforcement authority for a ticket touting offence can be recovered without having to seek an order from the county court. This provides flexibility to accommodate different arrangements for the recovery of unpaid financial penalties, and it makes it clear that such penalties are treated as if they were payable under an order of the county court. This approach aligns with recent legislation, such as the Employment Rights Act 2025, and reduces the potential administrative burden for the enforcement authorities associated with the recovery of unpaid financial penalties.
Amendment 12, tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, seeks to create a defence for the ticket touting offence that mirrors the provision in the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Act 2020. However, the position in this Bill is different, and that matters. Under the 2020 Act, someone could publicly sell a ticket at face value, provided that they were not acting as a business. As a result, to avoid committing an offence, someone advertising a ticket on behalf of another person had to determine whether the ticket was being sold above face value or in the course of business. A person could avoid liability if they did not know, and had no reason to know, that the ticket was being sold in the course of business for profit.
That may sound reasonable in theory, but in practice it created difficulty. If that defence was raised, enforcement authorities had to prove that the person advertising the ticket knew, or ought to have known, that it was being sold commercially or for profit. That introduced uncertainty, complexity and a clear opportunity for evasion. Under this Bill, the rule is clear. It applies to all public resale activity, including resale on online platforms. If a ticket is to be resold publicly, it must be authorised by the event owner or organiser.
Amendment 3, which was also tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, would require any person authorised to carry out ticketing activities to establish a mechanism for tickets to be transferred or resold. The Bill already gives us the ability to place conditions on those who sell or authorise the sale of tickets. That power could be used to include a requirement to provide an authorised resale platform, so the Bill already gives us the means to secure the outcome that the amendment seeks. We will seek assurances from event organisers at the outset that there will be an official resale platform, so that people who can no longer attend can resell tickets legally and safely.
I also want to reassure the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup that we are not currently aware of any major itinerant sporting event organisers that do not operate an official ticketing resale platform. Regardless, the Bill ensures that fans can transfer spare tickets to friends, families and associates at face value, or advertise them through private social media channels. For those reasons, I commend Government amendments 56 to 60 to the Committee, and I kindly ask the hon. Member not to press amendments 3 and 12 to a vote.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments. As I say, we were hoping to stop a situation in which an innocent member of the public shares a Facebook post that says, “X person has a ticket for sale for this game. Are you interested?”, but is then accidentally caught up in the Bill’s provisions and faces significant penalties. I have listened to the Minister’s comments, but the Opposition still have concerns, so I will look to press amendment 12 to a vote.
Likewise, on amendment 3, we want fans to have the opportunity to resell tickets if they are no longer attending. I also listened carefully to the Minister’s comments on the amendment, and I appreciate them, but our overall concern is that we will end up with a structure where the event organiser effectively has a monopoly that removes fans’ ability to transfer tickets easily. We are slightly concerned about what that could mean for ticket resale prices, if there is not a cap on the likes of FIFA being able to push up prices on fans, so we will also push amendment 3 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Clauses 9 and 10 stand part.
Government amendments 61 and 62.
Schedule 2.
Government amendments 45 and 48.
Stephanie Peacock
Sponsorship is a critical revenue stream for sporting event owners. Clause 8 protects these commercial rights by preventing advertisers from ambushing an event to compete for brand exposure against official sponsors. Advertising activity as defined in schedule 2 is:
“anything done wholly or partly for the purpose of promoting a product, service or business specifically to members of the public…who are in a restricted advertising zone, or…who are watching or listening to a broadcast of the sporting event.”
The clause ensures that advertising restrictions are applied flexibly and proportionately, reflecting operational requirements. Regulations must make clear the places and periods to which the restrictions apply. A place may be specified only if it is being used for the sporting event itself, is used in connection with it—such as a fanzone or transport hub—and is in the vicinity of those locations, such as key spectator routes.
Proportionality is the underlying principle here, as it is across the Bill. The clause limits restrictions to no earlier than 10 days before or later than five days after the event, restricting advertising zones and covering activity in the airspace above it and on waterways close enough to the zone to be seen from within it. This ensures that the provisions are effective in practice. The Government will work closely with local authorities, event organisers, businesses and community groups to minimise the impact on existing businesses and local communities where these regulations are applied.
Clause 9 deals with advertising authorisations. The clause provides a clear mechanism to allow advertisers—for example, a media owner operating in a restricted advertising zone—to apply for permission to continue advertising activity while the restrictions are in place. We have made it clear in the Bill that the power to grant authorisations should be exercised only by a suitable body. In practice, that means a public body or a time-limited private body, such as a local organising committee, set up to deliver a major sporting event.
Clause 10 enables exceptions to the advertising offence to be set out in event-specific regulations. Among other things, exceptions may apply to activities carried out for a specified purpose, which could mean selling or distributing a newspaper, or by a specified description of a person such as an event organiser or sponsor, or in connection with existing advertising law. We will come back to that point later in Committee.
James Naish
The Minister will be acutely aware that for a lot of athletes, sponsorship is a key form of income. How will that type of sponsorship be covered in the regulations?
Stephanie Peacock
Perhaps I could write to my hon. Friend on that point, or perhaps come back to him later in Committee.
The ambition of the Bill is to establish an effective legislative environment for sporting events held in the UK, but as I said on Second Reading, I am equally clear that we must protect small businesses. Government amendments 45, 48, 61 and 62 help to do so by addressing the impact on those who are already permitted to advertise in a restricted zone. That means that authorising decisions are required to take into account whether an applicant is already permitted to advertise. That is an important safeguard.
We are acutely aware of the practical effect that these restrictions could have, especially for advertising space owned by a small business such as an independent local newsagent. That is why a decision to authorise is required to take into account whether an applicant is a small business or microbusiness. A microbusiness is defined as one with fewer than 10 staff, and a small business as one with at least 10 but fewer than 50 staff. That definition is widely used and provides a clear and consistent basis for decision making.
Mr French
Clause 8 requires regulations to identify the restricted advertising zones and the periods during which advertising restrictions apply. These zones must relate to event venues, locations used in connection with the event or their surrounding areas. For events involving devolved authorities, these zones must remain in their jurisdictions. The clause sets out that restrictions may begin no earlier than 10 days before the event and must end no later than five days afterwards. It allows regulations to address fixed penalty notices for offences and how advertising restrictions apply to locations such as airspace and waterways.
Clause 9 allows regulations to designate one or more persons to authorise advertising that would otherwise be prohibited. The designated person may be the authority making the regulations or another suitable representative appointed by the authority. That enables legitimate advertising by sponsors and other approved parties within restricted advertising zones. We all understand why that is so important when bidding for major international tournaments. It is normally a requirement that sporting bodies have for those international competitions. Designations of a representative may include conditions such as maintaining a register of granted advertising authorisations and making that available to the public, or reporting back to the appropriate national authority.
Clause 10 allows regulations to exempt specified types of advertising from the advertising offence. Exceptions may relate to the purpose, location, person or method of advertising, and may cover cases of charity promotion, event-authorised advertising and certain electronic communications. Existing lawful advertising arrangements may also be taken into account. Before creating exceptions, the relevant authority must consult the local authorities in which the restricted advertising zone would be and any other appropriate persons, which is appropriate given the impact that major events have on local communities.
I want to reiterate the question asked by the hon. Member for Rushcliffe, because I had also written it down. What does the Minister think the relationship will be like for existing sponsorships, particularly of athletes? In football and athletics, it is often shoe sponsorship—Nike, Adidas and so on. How will those existing sponsorships or advertising deals, which are a key source of revenue for all athletes, be impacted by the regulations? I am happy to have the answer in writing if the Minister does not have it with her.
The group of Government amendments to clauses 8 to 10 and schedule 2 relating to advertising at sporting events requires the designated authorising person to take into account existing advertising licences when determining whether to grant an advertising authorisation. The amendments also require the designated authorising person to take into account whether a person is a small or micro business when determining whether to grant an advertising authorisation. Government amendments 45 and 48 define a small business as having between 10 and 50 members of staff, and a micro business as having fewer than 10. The amendments seem entirely sensible to us. I appreciate that there were concerns shared from across the House, but the Minister and I had a conversation last week in private and the amendments appear sensible.
Stephanie Peacock
I will speak briefly to the hon. Gentleman’s point about unauthorised associations and restrictions. An unauthorised association will apply only to commercial activity likely to suggest to the public that a person has an official connection with an event, such as an official sponsor rather than a competing team or athlete. It is for the event owners to determine and enforce their own policies and procedures regarding athlete sponsorship and associated promotional activity. I am happy to write to the Committee to clarify that point if that would be helpful.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 9 and 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Advertising provisions
Amendments made: 61, in schedule 2, page 31, line 24, leave out sub-paragraph (4) and insert—
“(4) In determining whether or not to grant an authorisation under this paragraph, a designated authorising person—
(a) must have regard to any existing advertising licences, and
(b) may have regard to—
(i) any agreements entered into (whether by the appropriate national authority or another person) for the purposes of the sporting event, and
(ii) any other matters that the person considers relevant.”
This amendment would require existing advertising licences to be taken into account by a designated authorising person when determining whether to grant an advertising authorisation.
Amendment 62, in schedule 2, page 31, line 29, at end insert—
“(4A) In determining whether or not to grant an authorisation under this paragraph in respect of a person or description of person, a designated authorising person must also have regard to whether the person is, or the description of person includes, a small or micro business.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would require a designated authorising person to take into account whether a person is a small or micro business in determining whether or not to grant an advertising authorisation.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 11
Trading regulations
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 32, in clause 11, page 8, line 19, at end insert—
“(7A) Subsection (7B) applies where, in the case of a non-domestic sporting event, persons are prevented from carrying out a trading activity that they would otherwise be entitled to carry out in accordance with a licence granted by a local authority were it not for the trading provisions being applied by the regulations.
(7B) Where this subsection applies, the regulations must include provision requiring specified public authorities to take whatever steps the public authority considers reasonable for mitigating any adverse impacts caused to such persons as a result of their being prevented from carrying out the trading activity.”
This amendment would mean that, where regulations apply the trading provisions to a non-domestic sporting event, then in certain circumstances the regulations must require specified public authorities to take reasonable steps to mitigate any adverse impacts that applying the trading provisions to the event will have on licensed traders.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 33, 40, 46 and 47.
Clauses 12 and 13 stand part.
Government amendments 63 to 65.
Schedule 3.
Stephanie Peacock
This group deals with restrictions to trading, which the Bill defines as selling, offering or exposing an item for sale, providing or offering to provide a service for gain or reward, providing public entertainment for gain or reward, and appealing for money or other property. Such restrictions are required to protect commercial rights when enabling the safe and easy flow of spectators in and around event locations.
Clause 11 mirrors much of clause 8, which deals with advertising restrictions in respect of trading. It requires regulations applying trading restrictions to specify where they apply and for how long. A place may be included in a restricted trading zone only if it is used for, or in connection with, a sporting event or if it is in the vicinity of such a place. Again, that limits restrictions only to locations where they are needed. The clause sets the same limits on timing as those that apply to advertising—no earlier than 10 days before an event and no later than five days after. In most cases, it is more likely that restrictions apply from the day before a venue is in use to the day the activity concludes.
The clause also enables regulations to clarify when a person is to be treated as doing something in, or being in part of, a restricted trading zone. That means, for example, that the trading offence may be applied to waterways or airspace, helping to ensure that event-specific requirements and local circumstances can be properly taken into account. Regulations may provide further detail about giving fixed penalty notices, such as their form, payment and fine levels, while also allowing that approach to be disapplied where appropriate. Importantly, trading restrictions must be underpinned by proportionality, and there are distinctions between how that is applied in relation to one-off events and recurrent events, as I will discuss. However, in common, they ensure that trading provisions meet the needs of sporting events while minimising disruption to those living and working nearby.
Government amendments 32, 40, 46 and 47 do just that. For itinerant events, where traders with an existing licence granted by a local authority are unable to trade as usual, due to the application of the regulations, those regulations must confer a duty on specified public authorities to take reasonable steps to mitigate any adverse impacts on such traders. In practice, that would establish a clear expectation that options are proactively explored, such as alternative trading arrangements, for those unable to continue trading inside a restricted zone.
Government amendment 33 introduces further safeguards. It makes clear that a condition imposed on a designated authorising person in regulations, such as a local authority or event organiser, may include a requirement to put in place a review process. That would allow an applicant dissatisfied with a trading authorisation decision to request a review.
Clause 12 provides the mechanism to authorise trading activity that would otherwise be an offence under the Bill. Regulations may designate one or more suitable persons, such as a local authority or non-departmental public body, to grant authorisations for trading activity. However, only a public body would be suitable for that role. Those with an existing trading licence may be able to apply for authorisation. For itinerant events, it is right that the authorising person must continue to take into account whether somebody has an existing trading licence when determining an application to trade. The important matter of exceptions to the trading offence is dealt with in schedule 3, covering premises adjoining a highway and included on the face of the Bill to ensure that deliveries and services provided to local residents and businesses are unaffected by the restrictions.
Clause 13 enables further exceptions to the trading offence to be set out in regulations and tailored to the needs of each event. There is precedent for that. The Bill sets out that such exceptions may include providing a public service, facility or amenity, such as a public toilet or ATM; providing a transport service, such as taxis and private hire services; and providing services relating to motor vehicles, such as a petrol station.
The Bill also provides for the necessary safeguards to ensure that exceptions take account of local circumstances and event-specific needs. The Secretary of State must consult the relevant local authorities for each area in a restricted trading zone, along with any other person the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult, such as event organisers and local businesses.
Government amendments 63 to 65 ensure that there will be no disproportionate impact from trading restrictions arising from recurrent events. It is right that we take a different approach here and go as far as possible to protect existing traders who operate in their vicinity. For recurrent events, the Bill will now provide a blanket exception to the trading offence for traders in a restricted zone who already hold a licence granted by the local authority. That is an important protection. It means that locally based traders who operate from the same location throughout the year, such as a long-standing independent food seller, will have greater certainty and a fair opportunity to continue to benefit from the economic activity that domestic sporting events can bring.
As there is no such exception for itinerant events, Government amendment 64 makes it clear that, for those events, existing trading licences must be taken into account when applications for authorisation are determined. That is an important safeguard designed to help ensure that existing traders, especially those licensed by the local authority, can continue to operate at itinerant events wherever possible.
Schedule 3 accompanies clauses 11 to 13 and sets out the detailed framework for the trading offence, along with provision for authorised trading and the issuing of fixed penalty notices. Those measures will help ensure that major sporting events can be delivered safely and smoothly, while protecting spectators and supporting a consistent, well-managed event environment. The schedule creates a time-limited criminal offence of carrying out trading activity or arranging for, or permitting, such activity in a relevant public part of a restricted trading zone, unless it is authorised or an exception applies.
To ensure proportionality, the trading restrictions apply only in what the Bill defines as a “relevant public part”. That includes highways, publicly accessible buildings used for sporting events, buildings generally used as carparks or transport hubs, or any place other than a building that is accessible to the public.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments today, and when we discussed the issue last week during the pre-Committee briefing. The Government are rightly seeking to balance the commitments required to host major international sporting events with the rights of existing local traders. Those are not easy to balance, and unfortunately, I am sure that there will be disputes when we get to such events in the future. However, even though I have concerns about what enforcement may look like, I appreciate what the Government seek to do.
The Government amendments define a non-domestic sporting event, and mean that where regulations apply the trading provisions to a non-domestic sporting event, they must, in certain circumstances, require specified public authorities to take reasonable steps to mitigate any adverse impacts on already licensed traders. Once amended, the Bill will also provide that, in the case of a domestic sporting event, the trading offence does not apply to trading activities carried out in accordance with a trading licence granted by a local authority. Moreover, the amendments provide that the conditions that may be imposed on a designated authorising person include requiring them to arrange for their authorisation decisions to be reviewed and to define a public authority for the framework.
Following my discussions with the Minister last week, I am pleased that the amendments have been tabled. They will affect locally based traders that operate from the same location throughout the year, such as the long-standing independent food seller and, as the Minister said, burger vans—saying this might get me cancelled by the Conservative party, but I am more of a hot dog guy—[Interruption.] Yes, I should resign; I am sorry! It also means that alternatives are proactively explored to help traders who cannot remain in situ because of the legal commitments required to host the likes of the European championship or the world cup. On the face of it, the amendments are sensible, particularly given the Government’s concession in allowing domestic but recurring events to apply to use the framework.
Amendment 32 agreed to.
Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Persons granting trading authorisations
Amendment made: 33, in clause 12, page 9, line 10, at end insert—
“(d) arrange for a decision to grant, or to refuse to grant, a trading authorisation to be reviewed.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would provide that the conditions which may be imposed on a designated authorising person include requiring the person to arrange for their authorisation decisions to be reviewed.
Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Trading provisions
Amendments made: 63, in schedule 3, page 35, line 28, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Amendment 64, in schedule 3, page 35, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) In determining whether or not to grant an authorisation under this paragraph in relation to a non-domestic sporting event, a designated authorising person must have regard to any existing trading licences.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Amendment 65, in schedule 3, page 36, line 9, at end insert—
“(3) In the case of a domestic sporting event, paragraph 1(1) does not apply in relation to a trading activity which is carried out in accordance with a trading licence granted by a local authority.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would provide that, in the case of a domestic sporting event, the trading offence does not apply to trading activities carried out in accordance with a trading licence granted by a local authority.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Rachel Hopkins.)
Sporting Events Bill [HL] (Second sitting)
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 15 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 14, page 10, line 8, leave out “specify”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 79.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 35 to 37.
Clause stand part.
Clause 15 stand part.
Government amendment 38.
Clause 16 stand part.
Government amendments 66 to 79.
Schedule 4.
Stephanie Peacock
Sponsorship is a critical revenue stream for sporting event owners. If sponsors believe that their rights can be undermined by rival businesses creating an unauthorised association with the event, the commercial value of UK-hosted events diminishes. These provisions protect against inventive marketeers seeking to benefit financially from such events without making the necessary commitments. Clause 14 requires regulations for an event to specify the time period when the unauthorised association provisions apply. Opportunities to exploit major sporting events commercially begin as soon as those events are awarded to the UK. We must therefore put these provisions in place as soon as is practicable.
However, proportionality is important. The Bill includes protection for business activities that may create an unauthorised association with an event. They would protect the use of a company or domain name provided that the business had used it before the date set in regulations and it continues to be used in the same way. That date could be before the regulations are made, such as when the UK is publicly announced as the host. Regulations must also designate one or more persons to undertake enforcement. There will usually be only one designated enforcer, but the Bill provides flexibility for joint enforcement rights, which might be needed where commercial rights are exercised by an event owner and a local organising committee.
Clause 15 requires regulations to designate one or more persons to grant authorisation to associate with an event. In practice, that is likely to be an event owner or organiser. This is how official partners will be able to legally associate with an event. Clause 16 enables regulations to specify further exceptions to the prohibition beyond those already in schedule 4 to ensure proportionality and protect honest business use.
Amendment 38 in my name makes it clear that the power to create further exemptions to regulations may be used to exempt small and microbusinesses. This approach maintains flexibility to apply an exemption for small and microbusinesses in regulations, ensuring that we can satisfy individual event requirements. That said, I am clear that local businesses should be able to benefit from these events. Exemption or not, I want event owners to know that I do not consider that a local bakery selling football-themed cupcakes during Euro 2028, for example, is likely to suggest to everyday members of the public that the business has an official association with the event.
Schedule 4 sets out the scope of the prohibition on unauthorised association, exceptions and remedies and relief available to enforcers. Businesses will be prevented from engaging in the unauthorised use of a representation, such as marketing and selling Euro 2028-themed products in a way likely to suggest to members of the public that there is an official association. If there is a breach, an enforcer can seek remedies through the civil courts. The courts will be able to grant any relief that is available to enforce a property right, including damages or an injunction. They will also be able to make orders related to goods and documents that create an unauthorised association.
To protect the use of existing intellectual property rights, there are exceptions for the use of a registered trademark or design, or any other intellectual property right, provided that that right existed before the unauthorised association provisions come into force. That means that anyone who has an existing intellectual property right will be unaffected by these provisions.
As I have touched on already, there are also exceptions for continued business activity and providing certain types of factual information when providing goods or services. That would enable a hospitality venue to announce that it was screening an event, for example. There are a number of other exceptions, including reporting on and sharing information about a sporting event. Where there is a breach, a court will have a number of options to make it right. For example, following an application, a court may order that goods are surrendered to an enforcer or that infringing branding is removed. As a last resort, a court could order that goods or documents be destroyed.
Amendments 66 to 70, tabled in my name, are technical amendments that clarify when enforcement action can be taken against the use of a trademark or design that someone has submitted for registration. They make it clear that enforcement action can be taken only if the application is subsequently refused, withdrawn or abandoned. For itinerant events, the application must have been submitted before the unauthorised association provisions come into force. Amendment 71 provides clarity and assurance for event organisers, businesses and regulatory authorities about the registration and revocation of trademarks and designs. It ensures that the unauthorised association prohibition does not prevent a person from registering a trademark or design, or provide grounds for declaring a registered trademark or design to be invalid.
I now turn to amendments 34 to 37 and 72 to 79, tabled in my name. With the inclusion of recurrent events, we have carefully considered additional proportionate safeguards for businesses in respect of these events, given they may take place year in, year out. First, the amendments establish clear time limits within which provisions can be applied to domestic events: no more than 28 days before a domestic event begins and no more than seven days after it ends. That is the period in which events are most likely to be commercially exploited. Secondly, the amendments introduce blanket protections for the use of intellectual property rights. For example, that means that a business using a registered trademark or design before or after the unauthorised association provisions are applied to a recurrent event will not be captured.
Finally, the amendments set out how activity carried out by a business before the unauthorised association provisions begin to apply—and continued in the same way after—will not be affected. That would ensure, for example, that Wimbledon farmers’ market can continue to operate unaffected. These provisions will ensure that recurrent event organisers can take action against what matters: big businesses carrying out marketing activity to exploit the public interest and excitement surrounding an event to which they have made no contribution. There have been recent examples of activity that, had these powers been in place and applied to recurrent events, would likely not have been permitted. It would, of course, not be appropriate to name those large, well-known companies, because at the time, those marketing stunts and campaigns were not restricted. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
Welcome back, everyone. Clauses 14 to 16 and schedule 4, as the Minister outlined, incorporate issues around unauthorised association regulations. Again, I think that most of the amendments the Government have tabled are about trying to ensure that there is a proportionate approach to the regulations and how they will impact other traders and different communities. That is a principle that the Opposition will not necessarily oppose.
The Minister may be aware, however, that representations were made last night by the Sport and Recreation Alliance raising concerns about amendment 76 in particular and what it sees as an unlevel playing field between domestic events and international events. The domestic events that we are talking about today clearly make a significant economic contribution, and there are significant concerns around unauthorised association with their brands and trademarks. The request—and I think it is a fair one—from the sports bodies, as part of the briefing paper, is for the Government to publish guidance alongside the Bill. Will the Minister consider publishing such additional guidance to reassure the sports bodies that they can mitigate some of the concerns in the briefing paper?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those points, and the constructive way in which he made them. Towards the end of my contribution, I outlined why we have taken a different approach for recurrent versus itinerant events. Recurrent events are most likely to be subject to marketing activity to exploit the public interest and excitement at particular times. I have obviously chosen not to give examples, because it would not be fair on the companies, as it was perfectly legitimate when they did the marketing stunts and campaigns. I will certainly take that request away. Perhaps I can write to the hon. Gentleman about further guidance, but we are in regular conversation with the sector, and we are always happy to have those conversations.
Amendment 34 agreed to.
Amendments made: 35, in clause 14, page 10, line 9, at beginning insert “specify”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 79.
Amendment 36, in clause 14, page 10, line 11, at beginning insert
“in the case of a non-domestic sporting event, specify”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 79.
Amendment 37, in clause 14, page 10, line 13, at end insert—
“(2A) In the case of a domestic sporting event, the period specified in accordance with subsection (2)(a) must—
(a) begin no earlier than 28 days before the day on which the sporting event begins, and
(b) end no later than 7 days after the day on which the sporting event ends.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would place restrictions on the period during which the unauthorised association provisions may apply to a domestic sporting event.
Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Exceptions to the prohibition on unauthorised association
Amendment made: 38, in clause 16, page 11, line 14, at end insert
“(including, for example, activities carried out by a small or micro business)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would clarify that regulations applying the unauthorised association prohibition to a sporting event may provide for an exception for activities carried out by a small business or micro business.
Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4
Unauthorised association provisions
Amendments made: 66, in schedule 4, page 38, line 39, leave out
“was made before the relevant commencement date”
and insert “is made”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 76.
Amendment 67, in schedule 4, page 39, line 5, leave out “a” and insert “the”.
This amendment makes a drafting clarification.
Amendment 68, in schedule 4, page 39, line 5, at end insert—
“(8A) In the case of a non-domestic sporting event, the application mentioned in sub-paragraph (8)(a) must have been made before the relevant commencement date.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 76.
Amendment 69, in schedule 4, page 39, line 7, leave out
“trade mark or design before the determination of”
and insert “representation unless”.
This amendment and Amendment 70 clarify that in a case where paragraph 1(9) of Schedule 4 applies, the court may not grant relief, or make an order under paragraph 4(4), in relation to a representation that involves the use of a trade mark or design, unless the application for registration of the trade mark or design is refused, withdrawn or abandoned.
Amendment 70, in schedule 4, page 39, line 8, at end insert
“is refused, withdrawn or abandoned”.
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 69.
Amendment 71, in schedule 4, page 39, line 8, at end insert—
“(9A) Nothing in this paragraph prevents, or provides grounds for declaring invalid, the registration of—
(a) a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act 1994;
(b) a design under the Registered Designs Act 1949.”
This amendment would ensure that the prohibition on unauthorised association does not prevent, or provide grounds for declaring invalid, the registration of a trade mark or design.
Amendment 72, in schedule 4, page 39, line 33, at beginning insert “Subject to sub-paragraph (1A),”.
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 76.
Amendment 73, in schedule 4, page 39, line 35, leave out
“before the relevant commencement date”.
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 76.
Amendment 74, in schedule 4, page 39, line 38, leave out
“before the relevant commencement date”.
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 76.
Amendment 75, in schedule 4, page 39, line 39, leave out from “right” to end of line 40.
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 76.
Amendment 76, in schedule 4, page 39, line 40, at end insert—
“(1A) In the case of a non-domestic sporting event—
(a) the trade mark mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) must be registered before the relevant commencement date;
(b) the design mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) must be registered before the relevant commencement date;
(c) the intellectual property right mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) must subsist immediately before the relevant commencement date.”
This amendment, together with Amendments 72 to 75, would mean that in the case of a domestic sporting event, the prohibition on unauthorised association is not breached by the use of a registered trade mark or design (whenever the trade mark or design is registered), or the exercise of an intellectual property right (whenever the right subsists).
Amendment 77, in schedule 4, page 40, line 1, leave out “(1)(a)” and insert “(1A)(a)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 76.
Amendment 78, in schedule 4, page 42, line 23, leave out from “to” to end of line 24 and insert
“be read in accordance with sub-paragraph (1A);”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 79.
Amendment 79, in schedule 4, page 42, line 28, at end insert—
“(1A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(d), references to the relevant protection date—
(a) in the case of a domestic sporting event, are to the day on which the specified period begins;
(b) in any other case, are to the date specified in the regulations as required by section 14(2)(b).”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would mean that, in the case of a domestic sporting event, the relevant protection date is the first day of the period during which the unauthorised association provisions apply to the event.
Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 17
Transport regulations
Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 17, page 11, line 27, at end insert—
“17A Rural event impact assessments
(1) Before making regulations under section 2(2) which apply the transport provisions to a sporting event, the Secretary of State must ensure that a rural event impact assessment has been carried out where the event is to take place wholly or partly in a rural area.
(2) For the purposes of this section, an event is to be treated as taking place in a rural area where the Secretary of State considers that—
(a) the event takes place in an area in which there are limited alternative routes for road users;
(b) the closure, restriction or diversion of roads in connection with the event is likely to result in materially longer journeys for persons living, working or carrying on a business in the area; or
(c) such other criteria as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State are met.
(3) A rural event impact assessment must assess the likely effect of the sporting event, including any proposed traffic restrictions, road closures or diversions, on—
(a) the availability of alternative routes;
(b) the length and accessibility of alternative routes;
(c) access for carers;
(d) persons who require access to employment and who may suffer financial loss as a result of being unable to arrive at their place of employment;
(e) local businesses, including small and micro-businesses;
(f) residents and persons who ordinarily travel through or within the affected area; and
(g) such other matters as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) The assessment must identify and consider measures for mitigating any adverse effects identified under subsection (3), including measures designed to—
(a) maintain reasonable access for residents and businesses,
(b) prioritise access for carers and persons providing essential care,
(c) minimise disruption to persons travelling to or from employment,
(d) minimise disruption to small and micro-businesses,
(e) take account of the absence or limited availability of alternative routes in rural areas, or
(f) provide reasonable access for emergency and essential services.
(5) The Secretary of State must not make regulations under section 2(2) applying the transport provisions to a sporting event to which this section applies unless the rural event impact assessment has been considered and determined to be acceptable by an independent person or body appointed or designated by the Secretary of State.
(6) The person or body appointed or designated under subsection (5) must be independent of the sporting event organiser.
(7) Before an assessment is determined to be acceptable under subsection (5), the independent person or body must have regard to representations from—
(a) each local authority whose area is likely to be materially affected by the event,
(b) any mayor of a combined authority or other directly elected mayor whose area is likely to be materially affected by the event, where the Secretary of State considers that consultation with that mayor is appropriate, and
(c) such other persons or bodies as may be specified by regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe criteria for determining—
(a) which local authorities and mayors are to be consulted for the purposes of subsection (7),
(b) the matters to be considered by an independent person or body in determining whether an assessment is acceptable,
(c) the form and content of a rural event impact assessment, and
(d) the measures which may be regarded as appropriate mitigation measures for the purposes of subsection (4).
(9) Where a local authority or other relevant public authority has already put in place measures which address the matters required to be considered under this section, the rural event impact assessment may take those measures into account and need not require equivalent measures to be put in place again, provided that the independent person or body is satisfied that those measures are adequate having regard to the likely impact of the event.
(10) Where a sporting event is recurring, the Secretary of State may by regulations provide for a rural event impact assessment to cover more than one occurrence of the event, provided that the assessment is reviewed where there is a material change in—
(a) the scale or nature of the event,
(b) the proposed traffic restrictions, road closures or diversions,
(c) the affected road network, or
(d) the circumstances of the affected communities.
(11) Regulations under this section—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require a rural event impact assessment before transport regulations apply to sporting events in rural areas likely to cause significant disruption due to limited alternative routes. The assessment would consider impacts on residents, carers, workers, small businesses and essential services, with mitigation measures approved by an independent person or body.
It is wonderful to have an opportunity to say something other than “abstain”. Amendment 20 would require a rural event impact assessment before transport restrictions are put in place for a major sporting event. While this might seem niche, it is a direct result of something that recently happened in Dorset.
Road closures for sporting events can cause disruption anywhere, but in rural areas the consequence can be very serious. There is often no alternative route, and a diversion that may add 20 minutes in a city can add hours in the countryside. I have received several examples from constituents who struggled with road closures during a recent sporting event in Dorset. In one case, carers were repeatedly given conflicting instructions about how to reach a vulnerable resident. Despite assurances that they would be allowed through, they were stopped and diverted several times. As a result, my constituent’s father was left in bed in his own faeces for several hours.
This amendment would simply require organisers and the Government to consider those impacts before transport restrictions are imposed. It would look at access for carers and emergency services, and the effect on local businesses and workers, ensure that arrangements for access to affected areas are effective, and allow essential carers and emergency services to reach those they support, whether realistic alternatives exist or not. It should also require independent scrutiny and consultation with affected local authorities.
This is not about preventing events from happening—far from it. Major sporting events bring real benefits to rural areas. It is about ensuring that proper planning prevents unnecessary disruption. I hope that the Government will support the amendment.
Mr French
I am grateful to the hon. Member for tabling amendment 20, which raises an important point about the impact that major sporting events can have on our rural communities. I am very sorry to hear about his constituent’s issues.
Major sporting events can bring significant benefits to local economies, supporting businesses, creating jobs and attracting visitors to areas that might not otherwise receive that level of attention. However, we must also recognise that in rural areas, the transport arrangements needed to accommodate an event can have a disproportionate impact on those who live and work nearby. Where there are few alternative routes, road closures and traffic restrictions can make it difficult for residents to go about their daily lives; for carers, as we have heard, to reach those who depend on them; and for local businesses and essential services to operate normally. It is right that those impacts are properly considered when transport regulations are being developed in consultation with local people.
Organisers and the relevant authorities should seek to minimise disruption whenever possible, while recognising that some restrictions may be necessary to ensure the safe and successful delivery of a major event. I would be interested to hear from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that the genuine concerns of rural communities are taken into account when these arrangements are made. Does she believe that existing processes are sufficient to achieve this, or that the Bill already provides sufficient safeguards in this respect? Ultimately, we all want to see major sporting events succeed, but that success should not come at the unnecessary expense or suffering of the communities that host them.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Member for West Dorset for tabling amendment 20, and I recognise the importance of protecting rural communities from avoidable disruption during major sporting events. I echo the shadow Minister’s comments about the terrible situation in which his constituent’s father found himself.
I do not believe that the amendment is necessary, and I will outline why. However, I am happy to take some of the points that have been raised across the Committee on this issue and reflect them to the relevant Transport Minister, or perhaps a Minister in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. Of course, the Bill deals specifically with major events, but I appreciate that lots of sporting events of different levels cause disruption to local areas.
Matt Turmaine (Watford) (Lab)
Will the Minister outline the type and scale of events that are likely to meet the threshold for implementing a transport plan, or for organisation or local authority applications to apply?
Stephanie Peacock
The transport plan is England-only. In our conversations with the devolved nations, they decided that they did not need the power as they were already well equipped. The transport plan is England-only and applies to itinerant events, which are the big major events like Euro 2028. We have chosen to exempt the transport provisions for recurrent events because we believe that, where such events are already established, they have well-established relationships with local authorities and transport authorities.
Of course, that does not mean that they go without challenges, as has been outlined by a number of members of the Committee, so I am really happy to reach out to the relevant Transport Minister—I believe it is my hon. Friend the Member for Selby (Keir Mather)—and reflect some of those points. I have seen those challenges with smaller sporting events in my own constituency, and I recognise that sporting events of every level can cause disruption. I am very happy to take both those points away.
I will respond in a little bit more detail to amendment 20, which the hon. Member for West Dorset outlined so thoughtfully. We believe the Bill provides a proportionate framework within which local impacts can be considered, and we want the event to take into account the affected road network and the characteristics of the area. The issues identified in amendment 20 include alternative routes and access for residents, carers, businesses and emergency services. They are—or should be—already considered by local authorities, highways authorities, event organisers and transport planners to establish planning and traffic management arrangements.
Where secondary legislation is proposed for a particular event, those impacts would also be considered through the usual policy and regulation-making process. The amendment would duplicate existing arrangements for ensuring that impacts are considered, while adding cost, delay and uncertainty. It would also risk giving an external body a veto, in effect, over the use of transport provisions, even though the Secretary of State, as decision maker, is already accountable to Parliament and subject to the usual public law duties and challenge.
The Government’s approach provides flexibility for both rural and urban areas, allowing those closest to the affected communities to shape mitigation. It is quite hard to justify the additional statutory protection for rural communities when this applies to communities of all kinds, although I appreciate that the challenges the hon. Gentleman outlined are often unique to rural areas. For those reasons, we cannot support amendment 20, but I have very much heard the points he has made.
Edward Morello
I am grateful to the Minister for her comments and for her commitment to write to her colleagues in the Department for Transport. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That clause 17 stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 17 and schedule 5 work together to provide a practical transport framework for major sporting events where extra co-ordination is needed. The basic point is straightforward: major sporting events can place real pressure on local roads and transport networks, and those impacts do not stop at local authority boundaries.
Schedule 5 provides the framework for dealing with such impacts, allowing transport plans to be prepared, reviewed and revised, where needed, and it provides for temporary road traffic measures to support the safe and effective operation of an event. That framework is practical and proportionate. It requires consultation with the relevant authorities, including local traffic authorities, local authorities and the police so that local knowledge is built from the start. The powers are also temporary and time-limited. They are there to deal with a specific transport impact of a major sporting event, not to create a permanent change in how local roads are managed.
Clause 17 complements that framework; it recognises that some events will affect more than one local traffic authority area, and that effective traffic management may therefore require authorities to work across boundaries. The clause allows regulations applying schedule 5 to designate one or more local traffic authorities for the purpose of paragraph 3. In practice, that ensures that the temporary traffic arrangements can operate in a joined-up way where an event affects more than one area. However, I will be clear about the safeguard: a local traffic authority may be designated only with its consent. This is not about taking powers away from local authorities, or about overriding them; it is about enabling co-operation on an agreed basis, where that is needed to manage the real-world impacts of major sporting events.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
When one authority consents, but a neighbouring authority does not—I have the River Trent as a genuine administrative boundary between Nottingham city and Nottinghamshire county council—what are the provisions? In that scenario, the county might say yes, but the city no. If that is not clear, will the Minister consider the matter further?
Stephanie Peacock
My hon. Friend makes a fair point. Whenever we plan major sporting events, we want to do it with consultation and in collaboration. We would have that ongoing conversation. I will come on to outline the reserve backstop power if that simply cannot happen. He provided a hypothetical, which is hard to comment on—I can speak to him in slower time outside Committee—but we have a backstop power if we cannot get agreement.
Schedule 5 contains a reserve backstop power for the Secretary of State. That exists for a straightforward reason: if essential temporary traffic measures are needed for an event, and a local traffic authority has been asked to act but has failed to do so within the period set out in the schedule, there must be a way to ensure that the measures will still be put in place. The backstop is not the normal way of working; it is a fall-back to protect delivery where necessary. Taken together, schedule 5 provides the framework, and the clause helps that framework work properly across local boundaries. They are practical and proportionate provisions, with consultation, consent and clear limits built in.
Mr French
I echo the comments of the Minister, who outlined why the clause and schedule 5 need to work together. As we have heard, it is important that neighbouring authorities seek to work together to ensure that sport and transport regulators and major sporting events are joined up.
We have all seen, in various host cities, the new phenomenon of athlete lanes to ensure that participants and spectators can get between venues. That is vital. In 2012, I remember one lane of the Blackwall tunnel was shut. That was quite controversial in the build-up to the games, but in my memory at least, it worked fairly well to allow London 2012 to go ahead in great fashion for the country, as we all know.
My only real question for the Minister on this clause is to do with her comments about ensuring that local authorities have their say and are consulted. Does she have any thoughts about how a local authority would then consult local residents? That picks up on the earlier amendment 20 about ensuring that local residents can have their say. We all recognise that if someone lives next to a major sporting stadium, they will get disrupted once or twice a year, or more if there are more fixtures, as with a football club. For the likes of Wimbledon, people have a fortnight of pain. How would that work in terms of consulting residents who are perhaps not used to the more regular disruption during a major championship?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s comments. It is for local authorities to consider how they speak to their local residents. For example, in my area of Barnsley, sadly, we are not hosting any Euro 2028 matches, but I know that my local council has area forums, which divide into much smaller areas than just the borough of Barnsley. They provide a mechanism for residents to meet councillors directly. That is broader consultation.
At the very beginning of this morning’s sitting, I listed the host cities for Euro 2028. They will all consider not just the benefits, but how they work with local residents to ensure not only that they can take part fully, but that as much of the disruption as possible is mitigated. I hope and expect that local authorities will talk to residents in a meaningful way.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 18
Enforcement of offences
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 18, page 11, line 35, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) a Northern Ireland department;”.
This amendment would provide for any Northern Ireland department to be an enforcement authority for the purposes of Part 1.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Schedule 6.
Stephanie Peacock
I have said that offences under the Bill are aimed at deterring action. However, where that is not the case, careful consideration has been given to the manner of enforcement. The clause provides for enforcement of the ticket touting, advertising and trading offences in the Bill. It sets out who can undertake the enforcement action, such as local trading standards authorities in England, Scotland or Wales, the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland, or the Competition and Markets Authority in respect of the ticketing offence.
Enforcement roles and responsibilities, however, may vary between events and it is appropriate for a Bill of this nature to provide flexibility. That is why regulations can set out additional enforcers on a case-by-case basis, provided that they are public authorities. For events that involve complex operational planning or significant public funding, it may be more appropriate to confer enforcement responsibility on a local organising committee that has been established as a time-limited non-departmental public body to deliver an event.
Clause 18 provides for the use of investigatory powers under schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015. That is a well-established suite of investigatory powers that trading standards officers in particular will be familiar with. The clause also provides for the use of powers available under part 3 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 in relation to the ticketing offence. The use of enforcement powers should be proportionate and tailored to the local context. That is why regulations can impose additional conditions on their use under the clause—for example, introducing additional safeguards. To support cross-boundary enforcement and mutual aid arrangements, a local weights and measures authority in England and Wales may enforce an offence in a part of England and Wales outside that authority’s area. Similarly, a local weights and measures authority in Scotland may enforce an offence in a part of Scotland outside that authority’s area.
I want to say a brief word about funding, because I know how important that is. These are time-limited offences, and enforcement costs are expected to be low. Costs will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and for itinerant events, they may be factored into the event budget, which is typically split between central Government and host city authorities. We addressed the funding position as it applies to recurrent events earlier.
Schedule 6 sets out the investigatory and enforcement powers available to enforcement officers in relation to ticketing, advertising and trading offences. Most of the powers are familiar. They are based on powers available under schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act and are used by enforcement officers in other contexts. A small number of additional powers are drawn from previous sporting events legislation to ensure that enforcement can be timely, proactive and proportionate.
Paragraph 2 makes clear when seizure and detention powers may be used in relation to offences under the Bill: to prevent an offence from taking place, to stop it continuing, or to secure goods or documents as evidence. Paragraph 3 provides additional search and seizure powers in public places where an enforcement officer reasonably suspects that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence. It is intended to deal in particular with itinerant traders who are not operating from premises. These are targeted powers. They do not allow an officer to search a person, and items may be seized only when that is reasonably necessary to stop or prevent an offence from being committed or to preserve evidence.
Schedule 6 provides for powers to deal with unauthorised advertising where seizure may not be practical or effective. In those cases, there will be temporary powers to conceal, deface or destroy infringing advertisements, so that prompt action can be taken—for example, where a billboard can be covered rather than removed. As under the Consumer Rights Act, it will also be an offence to obstruct or impersonate an enforcement officer. Finally, the schedule provides for compensation where property is damaged as a result of unlawful enforcement action or where unreasonable force is used. Regulations must also provide a mechanism for resolving disputes about entitlement to compensation or the amount payable.
It is vital that the Bill works effectively across all parts of the United Kingdom. That is why, at the request of officials in Northern Ireland, we have introduced Government amendment 39 to enable enforcement of the ticketing, advertising and trading offences to be undertaken by any Northern Ireland Department, rather than just the Department for the Economy. That simply ensures that the Bill operates effectively in Northern Ireland.
Clause 18 maintains flexibility for an enforcement authority to designate other public authorities as enforcers in regulations. That flexibility helps ensure that enforcement arrangements can be tailored appropriately to each jurisdiction and event.
Amendment 39 agreed to.
Amendment made: 40, in clause 18, page 12, line 27, leave out subsection (10).—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on 47.
Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 19
Exceptions for internet service providers
Question proposed, That clause 19 stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 20 to 22 stand part.
Government amendment 41.
Clause 23 stand part.
Government amendment 44.
Clause 24 stand part.
Stephanie Peacock
This group deals with the supplementary and general clauses, which broadly relate to the enforcement of offences under the Bill, as well as two minor and technical Government amendments, which I will turn to first.
Amendment 41 has been introduced at the request of the Welsh Government, following our close engagement as the Bill has developed. It ensures that if the Senedd wishes in future to change how the powers operate in Wales, it can do so through its own legislation where the matter is devolved. The amendment simply makes the Bill work properly within the Welsh devolution settlement, and it aligns with several recent Acts that confer concurrent powers.
Amendment 44 is a technical amendment to clause 24 that addresses an omission in the Bill by including district councils in the definition of “local authority” in England. The Bill gives all relevant local authorities a voice in shaping the regulations that provide exceptions to the advertising and trading offences. The amendment will require the Secretary of State to consult any relevant district councils in England before exception regulations are made. That is important, as those authorities play a role in licensing street traders, providing consent for advertising and engaging with local businesses.
Clause 19 provides for the liability of internet service providers in relation to the ticketing, advertising and trading offences and the prohibition on unauthorised association. In line with the UK Government’s existing approach to intermediary liability, it ensures that an internet service provider will not incur liability by storing or hosting user-generated information if, when the information was provided, the provider did not know that it constituted an infringement and, upon finding out, promptly removed it or disabled access to it.
Clause 20 provides that where a ticketing, advertising or trading offence under the Bill is committed by a body corporate with the consent of an officer of that body, or is attributable to neglect on their part, both the individual and the company will be liable to have proceedings brought against them.
Mr French
On internet service providers and what the Minister has just said, how does she envisage this working for social media companies? Say that, in the middle of Euro 2028, a load of illegal black-market sites suddenly appeared. How would the Government look to enforce the legislation?
Stephanie Peacock
That is a very good point. If I may write to the hon. Gentleman, I would be very happy to do so.
Clause 20 has also been drafted to capture Scottish partners and partnerships. It also clarifies that where a ticketing offence is committed by a body corporate or Scottish partnership outside the part of the UK where the offence applies, an officer or partner can be found guilty only if they are a UK national or habitually resident in the UK.
Clause 21 enables the Secretary of State or a devolved Government to increase the maximum level of fixed penalty for the advertising and trading offences up to £1,000. A devolved Government can increase the maximum level in their jurisdiction only, and the Secretary of State may increase the level UK-wide with consent. The Secretary of State will also be able to increase the maximum fixed penalty above £1,000, and the maximum financial penalty for the ticketing offence, to reflect changes in the value of money over time, such as inflation. Regulations under the clause are subject to the negative resolution procedure.
Clause 22 requires regulations that apply the advertising and trading provisions to make guidance or other information available on the way in which those provisions will be applied to a specific event. That will ensure that those who could be affected understand the impact of the provisions and the potential options available to them. We expect the guidance to be made available no less than six months before an event, with local authorities and other delivery partners playing an important role in ensuring that it reaches those who are most likely to be affected.
Clause 22 also provides that regulations that apply the ticketing, unauthorised association and transport provisions may make provision for guidance or other information about their application. Regulations under the clause may specify who is responsible for providing that guidance or information, such as an event organiser or a local authority, and any matters that should be included, such as mitigations available at a local level. Regulations may also require the guidance or other information to be shared with persons of a specified description, such as street traders or advertisers with an existing licence in an affected area.
Clause 23 makes consequential amendments to schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act and part 1 of schedule 15 to the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act. That is to enable enforcement authorities under clause 18 to use the investigatory and enforcement powers in schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act to enforce the ticketing, advertising and trading offences. The clause also amends the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act to enable the Competition and Markets Authority, local weights and measures authorities in Great Britain and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland to use the enforcement powers in part 3 of that Act for ticketing offences, as infringements that harm the collective interests of UK consumers.
Clause 24 is an interpretation clause: it simply serves to define terms used in this part of the Bill. None of the definitions presented in this clause are unusual or controversial. They include terms such as “local authority”, “advertising” and “trading licences”, and are included simply to provide clarity and precision.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 20 to 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Consequential amendments
Amendment made: 41, in clause 23, page 15, line 36, at end insert—
“(A1) In Schedule 7B to the Government of Wales Act 2006 (general restrictions on legislative competence of Senedd Cymru)—
(a) in paragraph 9(8)(b) (exceptions to restrictions relating to reserved authorities), insert at the appropriate place—
‘the Sporting Events Act 2026;’;
(b) in paragraph 11(6)(b) (exceptions to restrictions relating to Ministers of the Crown), insert at the appropriate place—
‘the Sporting Events Act 2026;’.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would provide for the restrictions on the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru under paragraphs 8(1)(c) and 11(1)(a) of Schedule 7B to the Government of Wales Act 2006 to be disapplied in relation to the concurrent powers conferred by the Sporting Events Act 2026.
Clause 23, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Interpretation
Amendments made: 42, in clause 24, page 17, line 20, at end insert—
“‘domestic sporting event’ has the meaning given in section 2(7);”.
This amendment provides for a definition of “domestic sporting event”.
Amendment 43, in clause 24, page 17, line 23, at end insert—
“‘the event organiser’, in relation to a sporting event, means the person responsible for organising the event;”.
This amendment provides for a definition of “the event organiser”.
Amendment 44, in clause 24, page 17, line 29, at end insert—
“(ia) a district council;”.
This amendment would alter the definition of local authority, in relation to England, so that it covers district councils.
Amendment 45, in clause 24, page 17, line 42, at end insert—
“‘micro business’ means a business with fewer than 10 staff;”.
This amendment provides for a definition of “micro business”.
Amendment 46, in clause 24, page 17, line 44, at end insert—
“‘non-domestic sporting event’ means a sporting event which is not a domestic sporting event;”.
This amendment provides for a definition of non-domestic sporting event.
Amendment 47, in clause 24, page 18, line 10, at end insert—
“‘public authority’ means a person who exercises functions of a public nature;”.
This amendment provides for a definition of public authority.
Amendment 48, in clause 24, page 18, line 10, at end insert—
“‘small business’ means a business with at least 10 but fewer than 50 staff;”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This provides for a definition of “small business”.
Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Power to give financial assistance
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 5, in clause 25, page 19, line 36, at end insert—
“(4A) The power under subsection (1) may only be exercised if the appropriate national legislature has approved the financial assistance by resolution.”
Amendment 6, in clause 25, page 19, line 41, at end insert—
“‘the appropriate national legislature’ means—
(a) in relation to England, the House of Commons;
(b) in relation to Scotland, the Scottish Parliament;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, the Northern Irish Assembly.”
Clause stand part.
Mr French
Clause 25 will give the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Departments the power to provide financial assistance for sporting events and connected purposes, such as legacy programmes and social initiatives, in their respective territories. Potential recipients will include public bodies, national governing bodies and organisations established to deliver sporting events. Assistance may take different forms such as grants, loans, guarantees or indemnities, and will be provided subject to conditions and contracts.
Amendments 4 to 6 would prevent the financial assistance provisions in clause 25 from becoming a blank cheque for successive Governments to fill out as they see fit. It is a well-established principle that financial measures must be subject to approval by Parliament. Paragraph 33.2 of “Erskine May” says that the “basic constitutional principle” of financial procedure is that
“the Crown requests money, the Commons grant it, and the Lords assent to the grant.”
It continues:
“In more modern terms, the Government presents to the House of Commons its detailed requirements for the financing of the public services; it is for the Commons, acting on the sole initiative of Ministers, first to authorise the relevant expenditure”.
Hon. Members who know their history understand that the role of Parliament developed gradually. Our ancient predecessors in the Saxon Parliament were involved in financial matters such as the setting of Danegeld, and after a rebellion by the barons, Magna Carta was sealed by King John at the beginning of the 13th century. Clauses 12 and 14 of Magna Carta limited the King’s ability to levy certain forms of taxation without first summoning a council, or Parliament, to establish common consent.
I will stop the history lesson there, because it will get the deputy leader of the Conservative party quite excited at the thought that I am trying to steal his crown, and I will not detain the Committee with a further elaborate history of Parliament—there are much more eloquent and qualified people to do that. The point I am making, which the Government must remember, is that they must come to us in this place with their proposals for the expenditure; it is then up to us, as representatives of those who will be most affected by taxation, to give our collective consent.
The provisions of this Bill deliberately circumvent not only that established precedent, but the legitimacy and primacy of this place. We do not know exactly which events the Bill will be applied to in future or how much financial assistance the Government of the day may wish to grant those events. Clause 25 is an open-ended financial commitment that potentially spans many decades into the future. It is not unreasonable to imagine a Prime Minister who comes in without standing in a general election, who has no fiscal discipline and who leaves a multibillion-pound black hole that needs filling. Whether that be the current Prime Minister or previous Prime Ministers, we want to make sure that we have future-proofed the Bill for all eventualities and all Governments.
Unsurprisingly, the Bill is not accompanied by a detailed assessment of how much the Government propose to spend as a result of clause 25. The nature of an open-ended framework Bill such as this one means that that is unknowable. If the Government cannot tell us how much the Bill will cost in the long term—though we know the estimated cost of the Euros in 2028—it is reasonable and necessary to make sure that legislative consent is required for each instance of financial assistance granted under it. That will help us ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny of each measure and, we hope, guarantee that fiscal probity is baked into the legislation. All my amendment seeks is to apply a sound and long-standing constitutional principle that the appropriation of public money should be agreed by the House of Commons, which is elected by our constituents. I hope that the Minister and the Committee agree. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I will speak to clause 25 and then respond to the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup.
Clause 25 introduces a bespoke funding power for sporting events held in England, Scotland or Northern Ireland. It provides a legal mechanism to ensure that support for sporting events has a clear statutory underpinning through a single dedicated power to fund an event and its associated activities. It will remove the current piecemeal reliance on powers from multiple other Acts such as the Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937 or section 50 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020. It will provide greater clarity and transparency on the legal basis for providing financial assistance, and will ensure that we can support the efficient and successful delivery of sporting events and their associated activities, an objective that has broad cross-party support.
In practice, the Secretary of State will have a single, dedicated power for future funding of sporting events in England, while Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Departments will be able to do the same for Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. The Welsh Government have confirmed that they do not require an equivalent power. Crucially, we know what it costs to deliver a sporting event from the ground up, and recognise that the magic of such events often goes far beyond the playing field. That is why the clause will enable us to fund not only the operational delivery of sporting events themselves but associated activities, whether they are feasibility assessments, cultural Olympiads or legacy programmes to maximise benefits for local communities. Where appropriate, the clause also enables us to attach conditions to funding, whether by requiring repayment with interest or post-event impact assessments.
The Government fully agree that, when it comes to public money, transparency and accountability are non-negotiable, but amendments 4 to 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, are unnecessary. Clause 25 is not intended to create a blank cheque. I appreciate his enthusiastic defence of his amendments and the history that he drew upon, but the clause is a legal mechanism to ensure that support for sporting events has a clear statutory underpinning. Robust mechanisms are already in place. The supply and appropriation legislation enables Parliament to debate and approve spending plans, including allocations for major sporting events. That is in addition to scrutiny by parliamentary Committees, including the Public Accounts Committee and the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. Any such spending is also subject to the usual accounting officer responsibilities. In the case of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport spending, the Department’s permanent secretary is accountable to Parliament and must ensure that spending accords with the “managing public money” principles of regularity, propriety, value for money and feasibility.
Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has secured and delivered almost 150 major sporting events, many with the support of Government investment. Requiring such scrutiny, especially without thresholds, could place a disproportionate burden on parliamentary resources and risk delaying the provision of urgent financial assistance where needed. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw the amendment.
Mr French
Dr Allin-Khan, I am sure you will be delighted to know that I will not come in with another chapter of Saxon or parliamentary history. However, the Opposition remain concerned about oversight and the role of Parliament in dictating and determining how much money is spent on sporting events. That is not to say we are not in favour of such events; we just believe that Parliament has a role to play in scrutinising any future funding commitments. I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Edward Morello
I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 19, line 27, at end insert—
“(2A) In the case of a sporting event that is a one-off sporting event of significant international or national interest, the power under subsection (1) may be exercised for the purpose of securing community benefit in areas hosting the sporting event.
(2B) Community benefit under subsection (2A) may include—
(a) the repair of potholes and other defects in roads;
(b) the repair, maintenance or improvement of pavements and footways; and
(c) the renewal, repair or improvement of road markings.
(2C) The provision made under subsection (2A) must, so far as reasonably practicable, be directed towards improvements which provide a lasting benefit to the community and remain available for use after the sporting event has ended.
(2D) In determining the amount and conditions of financial assistance under subsection (2A), the appropriate national authority must engage with affected local authorities including on the condition of roads, pavements, footways and road markings in areas materially affected by the hosting of the sporting event.
(2E) In this section ‘one-off sporting event’ means a sporting event which is held in the United Kingdom on a non-recurring basis, including the Olympic Games, Paralympic Games, Commonwealth Games, Rugby World Cup or FIFA World Cup.”
This amendment would enable Government financial assistance for major one-off sporting events to support improvements to potholes, pavements, footways and road markings in communities hosting the event.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 19, in clause 25, page 19, line 27, at end insert—
“(2A) In the case of a sporting event that is a one-off sporting event of significant international or national interest, the power under subsection (1) may be given for the purpose of securing improved mobile electronic communications coverage and capacity in areas hosting, or materially affected by, the sporting event.
(2B) Financial assistance under subsection (2A) may be used for—
(a) the installation, improvement or upgrading of mobile communications infrastructure;
(b) the installation or upgrading of mobile phone masts, small cells and associated equipment;
(c) the provision of additional network capacity to address increased demand arising from the sporting event; and
(d) associated works necessary to provide or improve mobile electronic communications coverage for residents, businesses, visitors and emergency services.
(2C) The provision made under subsection (2A) must, so far as reasonably practicable, be directed towards improvements which provide a lasting benefit to the community and remain available for use after the sporting event has ended.
(2D) In determining the amount and conditions of financial assistance under subsection (2A), the appropriate national authority must have regard to the existing availability, coverage and capacity of mobile electronic communications networks in areas materially affected by the hosting of the sporting event.”
This amendment would enable Government financial assistance for major one-off sporting events to support improvements to mobile communications infrastructure and network capacity in communities hosting the event.
Edward Morello
These amendments are about ensuring lasting benefits for communities hosting major sporting events. Events such as the London 2012 Olympics have shown the potential for sporting events to bring investment and improve local infrastructure. We should ensure that communities hosting future events have the same opportunity.
Amendment 18 would allow the use of Government funding to improve local roads, repair potholes, maintain pavements and renew road markings in areas affected by major sporting events. Amendment 19 focuses on mobile phone coverage and capacity. Large events put enormous pressure on local networks, leaving residents and businesses struggling to get signal when demand increases. The amendments would ensure that public and private investment in major sporting events benefits the wider area, not just the venue itself. Better roads and more reliable mobile coverage can improve daily life, support local businesses and help communities to prepare to host future events.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Member for tabling these important amendments, which aim to ensure that the Bill’s funding power can be used to deliver lasting benefits to communities affected by one-off sporting events.
As I set out in debate on the previous group, that power neither creates additional funding nor establishes a new route for securing public money; it simply provides the legal underpinning for the lawful delivery of funding that has already been agreed through existing processes and against existing criteria. Amendment 18 seeks to ensure that funding can be channelled into improving potholes, pavements, footways and road markings, while amendment 19 would ensure that the power may be used to improve mobile communications, infrastructure and network capability.
In both cases, the hon. Member’s objective is clear: to secure benefits for local communities that endure beyond the sporting event. The Government fully recognise the importance of that objective. Indeed, that is precisely why we invest in legacy programmes, which may include the types of infrastructure improvements envisioned in the amendments. Although the amendments are well-intentioned, they risk going beyond the intended scope of the funding power. As made clear in the explanatory notes to the Bill, clause 25 is intended to support the operational delivery of sporting events and associated activities. Elements of the amendments would push that power beyond its proper limits, as their link to enabling sporting events or related activity is tenuous.
However, if any improvements in the areas highlighted in the amendments are necessary for the event to take place, clause 25 is broad enough to allow for that, making the amendments redundant. Given the wide range of issues that sporting events may contend with, we have deliberately not been prescriptive on the specific forms of support that may be provided under the power. The amendments would cut across that principle by singling out particular categories of support without clear evidence for doing so. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw amendment 18 and not to press amendment 19 to a vote.
Edward Morello
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 14
Fees
“(1) Where regulations under section 2(1) apply the advertising provisions or the trading provisions to a domestic sporting event, a relevant authority may require the event organiser to pay fees to the authority in connection with some or all of the relevant costs incurred by the authority in relation to the event.
(2) In imposing such a requirement, a relevant authority must have regard to the need to secure that the total amount of fees paid does not exceed the relevant costs incurred by the authority in relation to the event.
(3) ‘Relevant authority’ means—
(a) a local authority;
(b) an enforcement authority.
(4) ‘Relevant costs’ means—
(a) where the relevant authority is an enforcement authority, the costs incurred by the authority in connection with enforcing the advertising offence or the trading offence;
(b) where the relevant authority is a local authority, the costs incurred by the authority in exercising its functions in relation to the advertising offence or the trading offence.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would insert a new clause after clause 21 (maximum penalty amounts etc) which would enable a certain bodies to charge fees in connection with certain costs which are incurred by those bodies in relation to the advertising offence or the trading offence.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Advertising offence: exceptions for newspapers and periodicals
“(1) The advertising offence does not apply to an advertising activity carried out in a restricted advertising zone if that activity consists of selling, distributing or providing a current newspaper or periodical.
(2) The exception in subsection (1) does not apply to the selling, distribution or provision of a current newspaper or periodical—
(a) in the street if the selling, distribution or provision is done in a manner that causes undue interference or inconvenience to persons using the street;
(b) if the version of the newspaper or periodical sold, distributed or provided has been created for the purpose of sale, distribution or provision only to, or principally to, members of the public who are in, or in the vicinity of, a restricted advertising zone; or
(c) which is accompanied by any item if the whole or principal purpose of including that item is to promote a product, service or business specifically to members of the public who are in, or in the vicinity of, a restricted advertising zone.”—(Mr French.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 4 would ensure that Parliament has a proper say over the scope of restrictions being imposed, rather than leaving too much discretion in the hands of Government. It would provide a specific exemption to the advertising offence for the sale, distribution and provision of current newspapers and periodicals within restricted advertising zones, subject to sensible safeguards against abuse.
This measure is not without precedent. It draws on the Birmingham Commonwealth Games (Advertising and Trading) Regulations 2021, which included exemptions of this kind. We have now also seen the Scottish Parliament take a similar approach in the UEFA European Championship (Scotland) Act 2026, which incorporates exemptions into primary legislation instead of relying on secondary legislation and regulations. As the Opposition have argued in this place and the other place throughout its passage, this framework Bill often contains insufficient detail about the circumstances in which exemptions from the advertising offence should apply.
As I am sure the Committee would agree, newspapers and periodicals have a significant role, and their ordinary sale and distribution should not inadvertently fall foul of restrictions that are designed to prevent unauthorised commercial advertising around major sporting events. The safeguards in new clause 4 are also important. It would not create a blanket exemption for publications specifically produced to target spectators in restricted advertising zones, nor would it permit promotional inserts designed principally to advertise products or businesses to those attending the event. The new clause seeks therefore to strike a sensible balance between protecting legitimate newspaper distribution and preserving the effectiveness of advertising restrictions.
Ultimately, if Parliament is to approve a framework that could be applied to a wide range of major sporting events, it should also have a meaningful role in defining the exemptions to the offences that the framework creates. No Government should be given such broad powers to determine that through secondary legislation later. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response, and I hope that the Minister will explain why the exemptions should not be set out clearly in the Bill itself.
Stephanie Peacock
The shadow Minister raises an important point about the proportionality of advertising measures when it comes to the sale of newspapers and periodicals in a restricted zone. I reassure him that the Bill already provides a broad power to narrow the scope of the advertising offence through regulations.
In keeping with precedent, our intention is to bring forward an exemption in regulations for newspapers, magazines and periodicals, as was the case for London 2012 and the Birmingham Commonwealth games. We believe that regulations are the best place for that, as we must make sure that the Bill works in tandem with existing laws across the UK. That approach ensures that all exemptions are relevant, proportionate and applied in a way that reflects specific event requirements, local circumstances and consultation with affected stakeholders.
On that basis, and as we are aligned in all but the mechanics by which the outcome is secured, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw the motion. As we discussed in our conversation last week, it is a balance between having too much in the Bill and it being a framework Bill allowing powers to be switched on and off depending on the event. It is about being event-ready when we are bidding for events, but not being too prescriptive. I totally hear the shadow Minister’s points—we intend to do just that through regulations.
Mr French
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Review of Government’s economic policies on the hosting of major sporting events
“Within the period of six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must prepare, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament, a report assessing the impact of His Majesty’s Government’s economic policies on the ability of the United Kingdom to attract and host major sporting events.”—(Mr French.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 7 would require a review of the Government’s economic policies on the hosting of major sporting events within six months of the passage of the Bill. As the Committee should be well aware, hosting major sporting events is not simply a question of having world-class venues, passionate supporters and a strong sporting heritage; it is also about whether the country remains an attractive and competitive place to do business.
Under this Labour Government, businesses are facing higher employment costs, including an increase in employer national insurance contributions and the national living wage. Many venues, hospitality businesses and other organisations involved in delivering major sporting events are also contending with higher business rates, energy bills and wider operating costs.
As the Minister will know, major sporting events require significant investment—often years in advance and from successive Governments. Organisers need confidence that the costs of employing staff, operating venues and delivering events will remain manageable. If the United Kingdom continues to become a more expensive place to host these events—as it has done over the past two years under this Government—international organisers may, given the competitive landscape, simply take their business elsewhere.
The Government should not underestimate what is at stake. Major sporting events bring visitors to our towns and cities, support jobs across hospitality and tourism, generate income for local businesses and showcase Britain to the world. Like the Olympics, they can also inspire the next generation to participate in sport, leaving a lasting legacy well beyond the final whistle. The Government cannot reasonably claim to want the economic benefits of hosting these events while ignoring the impact that their own decisions and tax policies may have on our ability to secure them.
The new clause would not prescribe a particular economic policy or prevent the Government from pursuing their wider objective. It would simply require the Government to assess the consequences of their decisions and consider whether they were making Britain more or less competitive as a destination for major sporting events. That should be a matter of basic probity. We should be looking at the cumulative impact of taxation, employment costs, business rates and other economic pressures, rather than considering each in isolation. To do that would be naive and self-defeating, and would undermine the entire purpose of the Bill.
I hope that the Minister will recognise the merit of the new clause. If we want Britain to remain a leading destination for major sporting events, we need to understand the barriers that the Government may be creating and take those findings seriously.
Stephanie Peacock
New clause 7 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the impact of the Government’s economic policies on the United Kingdom’s ability to attract and host major sporting events. The UK is a trusted, innovative and highly experienced host nation, offering a stable and trusted environment, strong delivery partners, leading experts, world-class facilities and an economy that is showing strong international resilience in the face of global challenges—that matters. It is one reason why the UK continues to be such an attractive place to host major events. We have a world-leading reputation not just for excellence in event delivery, with a proven track record of staging complex events to the highest standard, but for our economic stability. The Chancellor’s approach to the public finances—delivering good growth in every postcode, underpinned by stable public finances and fiscal discipline—has been endorsed by the International Monetary Fund and is already yielding results.
Our future pipeline of sporting events is clear evidence of that global reputation. Despite growing international competition, we have continued to secure major events: the grand départ of the Tour de France and the Tour de France Femmes in 2027 and UEFA Euro 2028. We have submitted competitive bids for the World Para Athletics in 2029 and of course the 2035 FIFA women’s world cup, and the feedback from event owners continues to highlight their strong desire to host here.
I have heard at first hand about the challenges facing the sector—especially rising costs and high consumer expectations—and I am committed to tackling them. I reassure the Committee that the Government are working closely with the sector, not just in sport but across the major events industry, to understand how best we can support their growth, respond to shared challenges and encourage greater collaboration across sectors. We know that the UK’s competitive advantage does not rest solely on the levels of funding that it provides or the wider economic landscape, but on the strength of our overall offer.
I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw his new clause.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments. This is probably one of the few occasions we have not agreed today. The broader landscape for businesses that would need to be involved and to host events is extremely challenging—I am sure that her inbox is similar to mine in that regard. The introduction of the hospitality tax, the tourism tax and the like are significant pressures on businesses that would normally be in a position to benefit from hosting such tournaments.
That does not diminish our brand. As the Minister rightly highlights, we have a successful track record of delivering major events—I am not seeking to talk down the country in that regard—but the Opposition have serious concerns about the economic impact of this Government’s policy on the ability to host events in the future. We will press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 8 would require the Government to publish their major sporting events strategy within three months of the passing of the Act. The new clause seeks to answer a fundamental question about why we are here: where does this begin? The Minister will know that her Department promised this House and the sectors it represents a major events strategy. That strategy has yet to appear.
How can the Government and this Department establish a cohesive, multi-sector major events strategy if one of those sectors already has a plan in place? I appreciate that this is being rushed through because of Euro 2028, but the sporting sector will now have an advantage over other sectors. Those other sectors will have to circumnavigate the plans already in place for sport. We want all the sectors that DCMS covers to be able to benefit from a major events strategy, but by proceeding in the way they have, the Government are going to make that all the more difficult in agreeing on one, holistic strategy with competing interests.
The Government have made their decision, however, and I understand that instead of having a major events strategy or Bill for all the sectors they seek to represent, the Government have taken the legislative slot available to them and have proceeded with this Bill now. They are not necessarily wrong to do so, but they could have done so in a more strategic way. Regardless, we are here now, and my new clause is designed to ensure that the Government, who have delayed countless announcements and strategies over the past two years, cannot do so again on this sporting strategy.
The Minister in the House of Lords promised that it was
“the Government’s intention for the major events strategy to be published by the spring.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 July 2026; Vol. 858, c. 652.]
Unfortunately, intentions are not good enough for some of the only remaining growth industries after this Government’s hammering of businesses. To ensure that there is no more dither or delay to this long-promised strategy, the new clause would ensure that the Government must bring it forward in accordance with their own timeline. I hope the Minister agrees that it will simply enable her and other Ministers to ensure that the strategy is prioritised within her Department and that it will be published without unnecessary delay.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for tabling the new clause and for recognising the importance of the upcoming UK national events strategy. We have committed to publishing the strategy by spring 2027, as he outlined. As a Government, we are committed to supporting the whole events ecosystem, from community events to major events, spanning culture, sport, live music, ceremonial and business events. The strategy will recognise the importance of events in driving economic growth, telling our national story and projecting the best of the UK across the world. Events connect communities, bring people together and create a unique sense of pride in place. The strategy must be created in partnership with our world-leading events industry, the devolved Administrations and local government to consider how we can work collaboratively to capitalise on these opportunities. I am happy to brief the hon. Member in more detail if he would like to arrange a time for us to discuss it.
I welcome the important work of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee to shine a light on issues impacting the major events sector. From its evidence, I heard at first hand the importance of a more joined-up approach across Government and working collaboratively with industry on the implementation of different regulations and laws. The evidence that the Committee heard, however, did not include a universal call for more legislative powers to support the safe and successful delivery of events.
Over the summer, I convened two roundtables with the events industry and ministerial colleagues from the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which reflects the commitment of the Government to working collaboratively with the events sector. My officials convened more than 60 stakeholders from across industry in Sheffield last month to seek further feedback on their priorities for the strategy. It is vital that we do this collaboratively and in partnership with industry and national and local government partners.
I hope that the hon. Member will recognise that the timing of this Bill is driven by the need to respond to time-critical legal and commercial guarantees required to host major sporting events such as Euro 2028. It would not be right to limit the level of engagement with industry to tie the timing of the strategy to the Bill. We look to the business managers in the Commons as to when the Bill will proceed to Report, but it is eminently possible that we will have Royal Assent by the end of this year or early next year. I know that the hon. Member’s new clause seeks the publication of a major sporting events strategy within three months of Royal Assent. Given that I have committed to spring 2027, I hope that we will be aligned on that. I therefore respectfully ask that he withdraw the new clause.
Mr French
I have heard the Minister and I take her at her word. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Strategy for bidding for the FIFA World Cup
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the passing of this Act, publish a feasibility study and bidding plan for the United Kingdom to bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2042.
(2) Within one year beginning on the day on which this Act is passed and each subsequent year until the 2042 FIFA World Cup is allocated, the Secretary of State must lay a statement before Parliament to update on the progress of the bidding plan.”—(Anna Sabine.)
This new clause creates a duty on the Government to prepare a UK bid to host the FIFA World Cup in 2042.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Sabine
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We all know what happened the last time England hosted the world cup. Not only does hosting the world cup appear to result in English victory, but it boosts the economy, brings fans together and inspires people around the country. We see the framework in the Bill as an opportunity to give fans what they want: the world cup hosted right here in the UK in 2042. To make that a reality, we need a proactive strategy, and that is what the new clause would provide: a duty on the Secretary of State to publish a feasibility study and a bidding plan.
Stephanie Peacock
I share the hon. Member’s enthusiasm for the United Kingdom hosting the FIFA world cup in 2042. As we have not hosted the tournament since 1966, this Government are absolutely keen to see it return here one day.
We know that major sporting events, especially world cups, have a unique power to foster social cohesion, spark regional pride and unite divided communities. That is why the Government committed in our manifesto to hosting major international and cultural events with pride. It is why this Government have backed the bid for the 2035 FIFA women’s world cup to be hosted in the UK. Hosting on home turf would be a monumental moment in our sporting history, driving growth and leaving a lasting legacy for women’s sport and football more broadly.
However, it is important that we follow appropriate processes to select which events we back. The new clause would effectively legislate for preferential treatment and an expectation of public expenditure on one particular event. As much as I would love to commit today to launching that bid, we will perhaps save it for another day. I cannot accept the new clause, but I share the hon. Member’s enthusiasm and the sentiment behind it.
Anna Sabine
On that basis, and with much enthusiasm in return, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Prohibition of ticket touting and regulation of resale platforms
“(1) A person commits an offence if the person resells, or offers to resell, a ticket for a major sporting event at a price exceeding the original cost.
(a) For the purpose of subsection (1), the original cost of a ticket is the original ticket price plus any unavoidable fees, including service charges.
(2) A person operating a ticket resale platform must not charge service fees exceeding a statutory cap prescribed by regulations.
(3) A person commits an offence if the person resells, offers to resell, or lists for resale a number of tickets exceeding the number they were entitled to acquire in the initial primary market sale for that event.
(4) A person who operates a ticket resale platform has a legal duty and strict obligation to—
(a) monitor listings on the platform, and
(b) enforce compliance with subsections (1), (2), and (3) to ensure the rules are adhered to on the platform.
(5) The Competition and Markets Authority may impose a financial penalty on any person or ticket resale platform found to be breaching the provisions of this section, up to an amount not exceeding 10% of their annual global turnover.”—(Anna Sabine.)
This new clause implements ticket touting protections by making it illegal to resell major sporting event tickets above original cost, capping resale platform service fees, placing legal duties on resale platforms to monitor and enforce compliance on their sites, and empowering the Competition and Markets Authority to enforce penalties of up to 10% of global turnover.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 11—Prohibition on fee-gouging and surge pricing—
“(1) In relation to any sporting event designated under this Act, no person may—
(a) charge, through a ticket resale platform, a transaction fee exceeding 10% of the face value amount;
(b) charge a purchaser in the primary market a transaction fee exceeding 10% of the face value amount;
(c) engage in surge pricing.
(2) In this section—
‘primary market’ refers to ticketing activities with an authorisation granted under Schedule 1, paragraph 3; and
‘surge pricing’ means when prices are adjusted rapidly and frequently in response to changing demand.”
This new clause caps transaction fees for primary sales and secondary resale platforms at 10% and bans surge pricing for every sporting event designated under the Act.
Anna Sabine
No fan should miss out on watching their favourite team play, but at the moment that is the reality every single time tickets come on sale. I am sure many of us know the heartbreak of waiting in an online queue for hours with no luck, only to see tickets pop up minutes later on resale sites at extortionate prices because bots and serial bulk buyers got there first.
Every year, fans lose £145 million to greedy touts. It is clear that the system is broken and is not working for the everyday fan. Labour promised in its manifesto and in the King’s Speech to tackle ticket touting, which we welcome—and yet here is a Bill with the framework to deliver that, and the Government are choosing to kick the can down the road.
Fans should not have to wait for change. That is why the Liberal Democrats want to make it illegal to resell tickets above face value. We want to ban surge pricing and cap resale platform fees at 10%. The Sporting Events Bill is the perfect vehicle to make those changes, and that is what new clauses 10 and 11 would do. I urge the Government to back them.
Stephanie Peacock
When I addressed clause 5, I noted our commitment to specific ticket touting legislation that will go further than the amendments tabled by the hon. Member. We know that for too long the joy of attending live events has been marred by unfair practices in the secondary ticketing market, most notably the systematic activities of ticket touts.
The Government are fully committed to tackling industrial-scale touting once and for all, improving transparency around pricing practices and putting more money into fans’ pockets through the ticket tout banning Bill. That Bill will introduce a price cap on the resale of tickets for all live events, including those captured under this Bill, to ensure that genuine fans can recoup their costs when they can no longer attend an event. It will also provide strict obligations on ticket resale platforms to ensure compliance.
The time-limited ticket provisions in this Bill are designed to satisfy event owner requirements. The Bill is therefore not an appropriate vehicle for wider reform of the secondary ticketing market. These are significant issues and are best addressed through the planned dedicated legislation. When it comes to surge pricing, businesses are already required by law to provide fans with clear and accurate pricing information before purchase and to ensure that fans are free to make decisions without undue pressure or manipulative practices that might distort their choices. I know that hon. Members will have heard the words of the Secretary of State on Second Reading about how committed this Government are to introducing the legislation.
Anna Sabine
I thank the Minister for her comments and I hear what she says, but in the absence of planned, timed legislation to take the matter forward, we would like to press the new clauses to a vote, starting with new clause 10.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Anna Sabine
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Some 30% of children aged 11 to 17 spend their own money on gambling, and up to 2.7% of adults could be considered problem gamblers. Behind those figures are real people whose mental health, finances, family life and relationships are being harmed. The Liberal Democrats have long been calling for reforms to protect people from gambling harms, and we believe that the events covered by the Bill should be free of gambling advertising, marketing and sponsorship. This new clause is the right thing to do, as it will help prevent the harms that gambling is causing by keeping adverts out of major events hosted in the UK.
Mr French
I will declare an additional interest, given the nature of the new clause: I am also the shadow gambling Minister, and in that capacity I attend a number of events with the racing community throughout the year.
The new clause seeks to prevent gambling, advertising, marketing and sponsorship at sports events covered by the Bill. I understand the intention behind it, but we believe that it is short-sighted and would strip sports of vital sponsorship funding. When I think about how the Bill might work in future, I think of the likes of the grand national, which could qualify. Preventing regulated gambling advertising would have a huge impact on the sport of racing, and particularly on the grand national.
We have previously had a Westminster Hall debate about gambling advertising, and there are of course legitimate concerns about the exposure of children and young people to it. Responsible gambling must remain a priority, but I do not believe that a blanket prohibition on gambling sponsorship at major sporting events is the right approach, especially given that the rise of illegal black market sponsorship throughout social media poses a greater threat to all consumers, and particularly to younger people.
As we have heard, sponsorship plays an important role in funding sport at every level. Commercial partnerships provide revenues for clubs, competitions and governing bodies, helping to support the events that millions of people enjoy and the wider sporting structures on which grassroots participation depends.
Gambling companies are among the commercial partners that contribute to that funding. Removing their ability to advertise or sponsor designated events would have serious financial consequences not only for major competitions, but potentially for the wider sporting economy and broadcasters as organisers seek to replace that income from other sources. In recent weeks, Betfred has withdrawn its long-term sponsorship of rugby league, leaving serious questions about where that funding will come from in future, especially for the women’s game.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset for tabling the new clause, which would prohibit gambling advertising, marketing and sponsorship at major sporting events. The Government support the sporting sector’s commercial freedoms and right to enter into sponsorship arrangements. The licensed gambling sector has provided vital financial support to sports through these arrangements, which are constructed within a robust regulatory framework that ensures that advertising is socially responsible and does not promote excessive or harmful gambling.
In 2024, we welcomed the introduction of the sponsorship codes of conduct across all major sports, which promote social responsibility, support reinvestment in the sports and strengthen safeguards for children. Sporting bodies have reviewed how the codes are working in practice, and the Government welcome their ongoing commitment to reviewing and strengthening the codes. We also welcomed the Premier League’s ban on front-of-shirt gambling sponsorship, which will help to reduce the prominence of gambling advertising in football. Advertising remains one of the clearest ways in which licensed operators can distinguish themselves from the illegal providers that pose a threat to British consumers, which is why the Government recently consulted on banning unlicensed gambling sponsorship and physical advertising within sports and other sectors.
The Government recognise that the relationship between sport and gambling must be handled with care, particularly because of the impact it can have on children, young people and vulnerable people. We will consider the fullest possible range of evidence before taking any further policy steps. Any additional restrictions must be thoroughly evaluated to avoid unintended consequences. We continue to support the sporting sector’s commercial freedoms while working with the Advertising Standards Authority, the Gambling Commission, the Betting and Gaming Council and sporting bodies to further raise standards. Let me be clear: the purpose of the Bill is neither to alter the regulation of gambling advertising nor to limit the benefits sponsorship arrangements can bring to the sector. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.
Anna Sabine
I thank the Minister and the shadow Minister for their comments, but we respectfully disagree. The Liberal Democrats would like to press our new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Edward Morello
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 13 would ensure that major sporting events that receive Government funding or special statutory support deliver a lasting benefit for community sport. If public money is being used to support a major sporting event, some of that benefit should reach local schools, grassroots clubs and community facilities. In West Dorset, that could mean better facilities, more opportunities for children to play a sport and more support for local clubs.
We have seen this model work through the legacy funding for women’s rugby following the women’s rugby world cup. After the Red Roses’ historic world cup win, £14.55 million was allocated to support the legacy of women’s rugby. The number of girls playing age-grade rugby has increased by 35%. That funding has also helped clubs improve their changing facilities, many of which were built when rugby was predominantly played by men and do not provide the facilities that women and girls need. Improving those facilities can make a real difference to whether people feel able to take part.
The same approach could help to support other groups who face barriers to sport, including disabled people, children in deprived areas and young people who lack access to equipment or local facilities. The new clause would make sure that major sporting events leave a lasting benefit to local communities. I hope that the Government will support it.
Mr French
I am sympathetic to the intentions behind new clause 13, and I thank the hon. Member for West Dorset for tabling it. The new clause, as we have heard, seeks to ensure that major sporting events receiving Government financial assistance or special statutory support deliver a lasting benefit for community sport itself. The hon. Gentleman outlined a number of concerns and challenges that grassroots sports clubs face, and we want to increase participation across the country.
Major sporting events should be about more than what happens over a few days or weeks of competition. They offer an opportunity to inspire the next generation, encourage people to become more active and strengthen the sporting infrastructure that communities rely on long after the final whistle. As we have heard, that is particularly important for children and young people in deprived communities and for groups with traditionally lower levels of participation. We should be asking how the excitement generated by major events can translate into more opportunities for people to take part in sport in their communities.
However, we must also recognise that hosting major sporting events is a significant undertaking. Organisers face substantial costs and complex commercial and logistical challenges, as we have already discussed today. Any requirement attached to Government support must therefore be proportionate, realistic and tailored to the nature of the event. We should avoid creating unnecessary bureaucracy or deterring organisers from bringing major competitions to this country.
Nevertheless, where public money or statutory support is provided, it is reasonable to ask what lasting benefits will be delivered in return. That could include partnerships with local clubs, opportunities for schoolchildren to participate, investment in community facilities or programmes designed to reach those who are currently least active. The important thing is that those commitments are meaningful and achievable, rather than simply box-ticking exercises.
That is why, when in government, the Conservative party invested more than £1.5 billion in grassroots, school and elite sports, from an unprecedented £400 million investment in grassroots sport to £300 million in emergency funding to support community sports clubs and grassroots organisations. But perhaps the programme that we Conservatives should be most proud of is the PE and sport premium, introduced to help inspire a generation after the London Olympics. That was worth around £600 million between 2023 and 2025 alone, and it has totalled almost £3.5 billion paid directly to schools since its introduction in 2013.
This Government, on the other hand, have, I am afraid to say, cut funding, with £57 million cut from the opening school facilities fund, £35 million cut from investment in grassroots cricket, £11 million cut from the multi-sport grassroots facilities programme and £25 million cut in real terms from grassroots sports investment compared with the previous Conservative Government.
I would welcome the Minister’s views on how the Government intend to ensure that the benefits of major sporting events extend beyond the events themselves and reach the communities that need them most, given that the Government she serves in continue to cut funding for grassroots sport.
Anna Sabine
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset for tabling new clause 13. In my constituency of Frome and East Somerset, we have loads of fantastic community sporting groups. I recently visited the Frome Flyers and the Somer Valley Strikers, two women’s walking football clubs in my constituency that represent everything that is great about local community sport.
Community groups could benefit enormously from increased funding, and that is exactly what the new clause would deliver. As my hon. Friend said, there are clear examples of major international events leaving lasting community benefits when local funding is built in, particularly for women and girls and disadvantaged groups in sport. This Bill is our chance to make sure that international events do more than bring a few weeks of business to a host area; they should leave a lasting legacy for the people who live there. The new clause simply makes sense, and I hope that the Government will support it.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for West Dorset for tabling this important amendment. I fully recognise the issue that he raises, and the Government share his commitment to maximising the positive legacy of the major sporting events that we support. However, we do not believe that the new clause is necessary, as the Bill already provides for the outcomes that he seeks to achieve while retaining the flexibility to adapt our approach to the specific event in question. I will outline some of the reasons why.
First, the likelihood of bringing social and economic benefits to the United Kingdom or part of it is already one of the criteria for consideration when considering whether the framework can be applied to a major sporting event. That would encompass the sort of community participation and wider local benefit that the hon. Member is seeking to secure. Secondly, clause 25 of the Bill is also clear that funding can be given subject to conditions, which could include requirements relating to these important issues, where appropriate.
More broadly, the vast majority of major sporting events that could fall within the scope of the Bill would already have social impact embedded within them from the outset. In the case of itinerant events, the gold framework is clear that when seeking investment from the Government, event organisers must have meaningful plans in place to generate positive social impact for communities around the country, including to drive up levels of physical activity and participation.
Also, many recurring events already support significant community engagement. To give just a few examples, Wimbledon annually contributes nearly £50 million to the work of the Lawn Tennis Association, the London Marathon Foundation has distributed over £120 million in grant funding since its inception in 1981, and the British grand prix generates more than £100 million annually for the local economy.
Critically, the evidence is clear that the best legacy programmes are developed through engagement with the communities they are meant to support, enabling us to target support and funding where they are truly needed. That is why we think the current system works; it recognises that one size does not fit all and provides flexibility that the new clause would reduce.
Helen Grant (Maidstone and Malling) (Con)
I welcome the Bill’s focus on legacy and, of course, the Minister’s genuine enthusiasm for women participating in sport. As a former Minister for Sport, I know how great major sporting events can be for people and for our country. However, they do not automatically ensure more female participation, more women coaches and more women on boards. A good example is that a football competition might result in five new 5G pitches, but if subsequently those pitches are booked out for 90% of the time by boys and men, that will not move the diversity and inclusion dial or do anything about the gender gap. Therefore, it would be very good to hear how the Minister will actually address those issues. If she does not feel that it is appropriate to respond in complete detail today, I would be more than happy to have a chat with her later, or of course she could write to me.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the former Minister for her contribution; she makes a really important point. That is why, as the Minister for Sport, I set up the women’s sport taskforce, and I am happy to invite her to attend one of the taskforce’s meetings. It would be very useful if she could share the expertise that she obviously gathered when she did the job that I currently do.
Through that taskforce, we are looking at practical ways to support women in sport. I will give just one example from our grassroots funding; we want to double priority slots. The hon. Member for West Dorset also gave some really good examples from the women’s rugby world cup. I was delighted to attend four matches at that tournament, but I also visited a grassroots rugby event just up the road from me in West Yorkshire. I did so with my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley (Yvette Cooper), who was then the Foreign Secretary and is now the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, as the event was in her constituency. We went to see at first hand the effect that the women’s rugby world cup was having on getting girls into rugby.
Consequently, I totally take the point that the hon. Member for Maidstone and Malling made, and I appreciate that we want to see the dial on diversity and inclusion move more quickly, which is why we are doing things in that regard through our allocation of money for grassroots funding. However, I am happy to write to her and indeed to continue the conversation.
I will bring my comments to a conclusion by addressing some of the other points that the hon. Member for West Dorset made. As I have said, we welcome the intention behind the new clause. However, we respectfully suggest that the Bill already provides the right framework to secure the benefits he seeks to achieve without imposing additional statutory tests that might reduce flexibility. Of course, the first major sporting event that we hope to use this Bill for is Euro 2028. We have already established that there will be £45 million of social impact, with £23 million being given by the UK Government.
I do not recognise the picture that the shadow Minister—the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup—painted of our approach to grassroots sport. We have put £400 million into grassroots sport and £500 million into major sporting events, with £250 million going in through Sport England.
On the PE premium, there are certainly examples of where it works well, but sadly too many kids are not active. Indeed, 50% are not meeting the chief medical officer’s guidelines. That is why we make no apologies for taking a different view. Of course, however, that issue falls outside the scope of the debate that we are having today.
Edward Morello
I thank the Minister for her comments, and the shadow Minister and all other Members who contributed. Given the perilous state of community sports in my constituency and across the UK, it is incumbent upon us to drive as much money as possible down to those grassroots clubs and community centres, so the Liberal Democrats would like to divide the Committee on new clause 13.
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 26, page 20, line 11, after “State” insert “or a devolved authority”.
This amendment and Amendments 50 to 53 enable the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, or a Northern Ireland department to by regulations make provision that is consequential on this Act. Such regulations may only contain provision which is “within devolved competence” (see clause 24(3)).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 50 to 53.
Clause stand part.
Government amendment 54.
Clauses 27 to 29 stand part.
Government amendment 55.
Clause 30 stand part.
Stephanie Peacock
These Government amendments and the final clauses provide the practical provisions needed to ensure the Bill is implemented effectively and operates as intended. Amendments 49 to 53 have been developed following engagement with the devolved Governments and demonstrate the Government’s commitment to ensuring that this UK-wide framework operates effectively while respecting the responsibilities of the devolved institutions. It is right that where consequential changes are needed within devolved competence, the relevant devolved Government should be able to make those changes directly.
Without these amendments, the UK Government could be required to make consequential regulations on behalf of a devolved Government, even where the use of the framework otherwise engages only devolved matters. The powers are therefore practical, proportionate and consistent with the devolution settlements. They will allow each Government to take responsibility for the operation of the framework within its own area of competence. A devolved authority may make only provision that is within its devolved competence, and the power may be used where the change is consequential on the Bill. Where regulations amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure in the relevant legislature.
Government amendment 54 is a consequential drafting change that ensures that the de-hybridising provision captures regulations made via the affirmative procedure. Government amendment 55 seeks to remove the privilege amendment inserted in the Lords. Parliamentary procedure requires such an amendment where a Bill originating in the Lords has financial implications, to recognise the Commons’ primacy in matters relating to taxation and charges on public funds.
Turning to the final provisions, clause 26 gives the Secretary of State a standard power to make consequential changes to existing legislation where necessary as a result of the Bill, with appropriate parliamentary scrutiny attached. Clause 27 sets out the general provisions that apply to the Bill’s regulation-making powers, including providing detail on the procedures that will govern regulations made under the Act. Clause 28 provides that the Bill extends across the United Kingdom, reflecting its purpose of supporting the delivery of major sporting events in all four nations. Clause 29 provides for commencement two months after Royal Assent. Finally, clause 30 gives the Act its short title: the Sporting Events Act 2026. These are sensible and necessary amendments and provisions.
Mr French
I will be very brief because I appreciate that this is the last part of the Bill. I recognise the points that the Minister made, and working together and ensuring the accountability of the devolved Administrations is vital for all major sporting events, not least the 2028 UEFA European championship. They are going to be across a number of the British Isles, which is a great thing for the whole of the United Kingdom to hopefully partake in and benefit from. Going forward, we would like to see some detail on some of the queries we have raised today. I appreciate the Minister’s offer to follow up with a meeting to talk through some of the various aspects within the Bill that we have discussed. His Majesty’s official Opposition have tried to approach the Bill in a manner that I hope is respected and understood by the Government. We have tried to improve it rather than delay or stop it for the sake of it. We think that the Bill can help deliver major sporting events for the country and the whole UK to benefit from going into the future.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful for the way in which His Majesty’s Opposition have approached the Bill and the Bill Committee. I am happy to continue the conversation with the shadow Minister if he would like. I made an offer to talk about the event strategy, but I am indeed happy to talk about the broader major events and, indeed, the roll-out of the Euros. There were some specific questions put to me about unofficial resale and how the Competition and Markets Authority will enforce that, but I am happy to write to him on some of those specific points. I thank him for the constructive way in which he has approached this.
Amendment 49 agreed to.
Amendments made: 50, in clause 26, page 20, line 12, at end insert—
“(1A) Regulations made by a devolved authority under this section may contain only provision which is within devolved competence in relation to the devolved authority.”
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 49.
Amendment 51, in clause 26, page 20, line 13, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) Regulations under this section may amend, repeal or revoke provision made by—
(a) an Act passed—
(i) before this Act, or
(ii) later in the same session of Parliament as this Act, or
(b) devolved primary legislation passed or made before this Act.”
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 49.
Amendment 52, in clause 26, page 20, line 17, leave out from “section” to end of line 18 and insert
“that amend, repeal or revoke provision made by an Act or devolved primary legislation are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 49.
Amendment 53, in clause 26, page 20, line 20, at end insert—
“(5) Section 24(3) (meaning of ‘within devolved competence’) applies for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of Part 1.
(6) In this section—
‘devolved authority’ means—
(a) the Scottish Ministers,
(b) the Welsh Ministers, or
(c) a Northern Ireland department;
‘devolved primary legislation’ means—
(a) an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
(b) a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru, or
(c) Northern Ireland legislation.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
See my explanatory statement to Amendment 49.
Clause 26, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Regulations
Amendment made: 54, in clause 27, page 23, line 1, after “If” insert “a statutory instrument, or”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment makes a consequential change to the de-hybridising provision in subsection (12).
Clause 27, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 28 and 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Short title
Amendment made: 55, in clause 30, page 23, line 15, leave out subsection (2).—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.
Clause 30, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
Stephanie Peacock
I would like to conclude the Committee by putting some thanks on the record. Thank you, Dr Allin-Khan, for your chairship and for taking the whole Bill through Committee today. I thank all Committee members for their contributions to the Bill and for giving up their time to serve on the Committee. I thank all the stakeholders who have engaged with us along the way. We look forward to continuing to work with them as we implement the Bill. Their views have been vital in shaping the Bill before us today.
I thank the DCMS officials who have worked incredibly hard on the Bill, and the civil servants and officials from across the Government. I thank Thomas Williams from my private office, who has supported the Bill, and I am ever grateful to my head of office, Sam, and my parliamentary team. I thank the shadow spokesperson, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset, the Parliamentary Private Secretary and the Whips. I look forward to seeing the Bill progress through Parliament, and I appreciate the constructive debate that we have had today.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eighth sitting)
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—
(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or
(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”
This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.
Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert
“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”
This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).
Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”
This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.
Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”
This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.
Clause stand part.
New clause 45—Deportation of foreign offenders—
“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 32, for subsections (1) to (3) substitute—
‘(1) In this section “foreign criminal” means a person—
(a) who is not a British or Irish citizen, and
(b) who is—
(i) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, or
(ii) charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.’
(3) In section 33, omit subsections (1)(b), (2), (3) and (6A).
(4) In section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, omit all instances of the word ‘knowingly’.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign national who is convicted of an offence or who is charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.
New clause 66—Automatic deportation: forced-marriage offences—
“(1) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows
(2) In subsection (1)(c), for ‘Condition 1 or 2’ substitute ‘Condition 1, 2 or 3’.
(3) After subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) Condition 3 is that the person has been convicted of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offence of forced marriage: England and Wales).’”
This new clause would amend section 32 of the UK Borders Act to create a separate basis for automatic deportation where a person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, concerning forced marriage.
New clause 67—Particularly serious crime: National Security Act 2023 offences—
“(1) Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) After (5ZB) insert—
‘(6) A person is presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if—
(a) the person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence listed in the National Security Act 2023; and
(b) the person is not, by virtue of the conviction, a person falling within subsection (2).’”
This new clause would make any conviction of an offence under the National Security Act 2023 an automatic deportation offence, as is currently the case with offences under Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. This morning, we were debating clause 20 and amendments 107, 109 and 111, and I will pick up where I left off.
There will be an assessment of the public interest in every case before an article 8 breach can be found, taking into account not only the seriousness of someone’s offending, but other relevant factors such as their immigration status. The aim of the new article 8 test is to take a broader view of the public interest and move away from the sentence-based or offence-type focus when assessing the severity of offending.
Conservative amendment 109 seeks to elevate the test of “very compelling circumstances” in the third set of exceptional circumstances, requiring circumstances above and beyond what would be demonstrated by meeting either of the other two exceptional circumstances tests. The exceptions in the current article 8 framework are different from the three sets of exceptional circumstances, and it is through that new framework that very compelling circumstances must be viewed.
The third exceptional circumstance does not replace the current “very compelling circumstances” test and does not operate in the same way. The three sets of exceptional circumstances are intended to be exactly that: exceptional. They serve as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.
Under the current framework, the exceptions operate as exceptions to deportation. If a foreign criminal meets one of the exceptions, or can show very compelling circumstances over and above those exceptions, deportation will be prevented. Under the new framework, the third exceptional circumstance, which refers to very compelling circumstances, simply ensures that a person has a sufficiently strong article 8 claim before the courts consider whether the interference with their article 8 rights outweighs the public interest in deportation.
Meeting that threshold does not mean that deportation is automatically avoided—it is not a pass or a threshold to get over. It acts a filter to ensure that, where a person cannot meet one of the three sets of exceptional circumstances, their article 8 claim will fail without the court proceeding to a proportionality assessment. This is not a watering down of the very compelling circumstances test as it applies under the current framework. Rather, under the new framework, “very compelling circumstances” operates as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.
Amendment 110 would bring those being deported as the family member of a foreign national offender into scope of clause 20. Although the Immigration Act 1971 makes provision for the deportation of family members as a matter of policy, that is not a course that Governments have pursued in practice. Instead, where a family member’s permission to stay in the UK depends on the status of the person being deported, the usual approach is to consider their removal under administrative removal powers. Where a family member raises an article 8 claim, it will be considered under section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
The exclusion from clause 20 of section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family member should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than under the deportation framework.
The amendments are unnecessary. Clause 20 already ensures that no foreign criminal will avoid deportation simply by establishing an impact on their private or family life. Instead, every case will require a full assessment of whether any interference with article 8 rights is outweighed by the public interest in deportation, with particular weight given to the seriousness of offending. The clause therefore strengthens the deportation framework while preserving individual assessment in genuinely exceptional cases.
Before I move on, I will come back to the questions raised by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion this morning, as I did not get the chance to respond. In our debate about financial independence and public service pressures, she mentioned discrimination and concerns about vulnerability. I want to be clear that the intention is not to penalise people for hardship. The reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children while making it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight. It is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion also made points about the best interests of children. We are clear that the reforms set out in clause 19 do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making. The reforms ensure that children’s interests are considered along with other important factors, such as compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system. The reforms ensure that all relevant factors are properly weighed and that immigration decisions are fair, proportionate and consistent. Where a decision is taken to remove a child’s parent, it is ultimately for the parents to decide whether to relocate together as a family or to live separately. In every case, the Government will continue to consider fully the best interests of any child involved.
The hon. Member addressed the word “precarious” and questioned whether clause 19 would mean that little weight is given to family life in cases in which a person has anything short of settled status. Let me be clear: the reforms do not penalise people for following our immigration rules. They place greater emphasis on the public interest in fair and controlled immigration systems, with greater weight given to compliance with the rules and with the public interest test. Article 8 rights developed while someone is in the UK without settled status are given less weight, in recognition that the ability to maintain family or private life in a country where the individual does not have permanent status is naturally precarious.
I was also asked what constitutes a serious breach. We expect everyone to comply with the conditions of their permission to stay, but I want to be clear that not every breach is equal. It would not be right to treat a minor or technical breach in the same way as deliberate or repeated non-compliance, or to equate it to illegally entering or staying in the UK. Whether a breach is serious will depend on its circumstances. The nature of the breach, why it occurred, its frequency and duration, and whether the individual disclosed it and engaged with the Home Office will all be taken into consideration. Should someone who knowingly and repeatedly fails to comply with reporting requirements be treated the same as someone who misses a single appointment for a genuine reason and informs the Home Office? I think we know the answer. The distinction allows us to take a firm but proportionate approach, including where multiple breaches taken together amount to serious non-compliance.
On the impermissibility limit and whether the circumstances of offending are taken into account, proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 expressly allows for the
“nature and circumstances of…offending”
to be taken into account. I am grateful to the Committee for allowing me to clarify those points from the earlier discussion.
On new clause 45, the Government are clear that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes should be deported. The automatic deportation provisions already provide a firm statutory framework for foreign criminals who meet the relevant thresholds. They require that a deportation be made wherever the law permits. Outside the automatic deportation regime, there are legal powers to consider the deportation of any non-British citizen whose deportation is conducive to the public good. The new clause is not a proportionate or workable way to strengthen that framework. It would make any conviction, however minor, sufficient to trigger automatic deportation. If a foreign national had resided lawfully in the country for over 40 years but received an absolute discharge on conviction for a minor motor offence, the Home Secretary would be under a duty to deport them unless an exemption applied. Such deportations would likely be unworkable in practice because they would be disallowed on appeal on article 8 grounds under the European convention on human rights.
The new clause would also bring a person within the definition of a “foreign criminal” merely because they had been charged with an immigration offence before a court had determined guilt. That would be fundamentally contrary to our legal system, in which an individual is innocent until proven guilty, and it would represent a substantial expansion of the auto-deport regime. The new clause would also remove statutory exceptions and delete the word “knowingly” throughout section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. Those changes could have consequences well beyond the stated aim of the new clause, including for criminal liability, fairness and the UK’s international obligations.
Decisions to deport must be robust, lawful and capable of withstanding challenge. A measure that is drafted too broadly risks delay, additional litigation and outcomes that cannot be lawfully implemented. For those reasons, I ask Conservative Members not to pursue new clause 45.
I turn to new clause 66. Forced marriage is an appalling crime, as the Committee would agree. The Government are clear that people who commit that offence must face the full force of the criminal law and, where they are foreign nationals, deportation—I want to be absolutely explicit about that in this Committee. However, we do not consider that the new clause is the right way to achieve that aim. Under the UK Borders Act 2007, the Secretary of State is already required to make a deportation order where a qualifying foreign criminal receives a sentence of at least 12 months, subject to the statutory exceptions.
If that threshold is not met, the existing power to deport where conducive to the public good—of which I think this crime would be clear evidence—remains available. The new clause would make a conviction for one specified offence sufficient to trigger automatic deportation, regardless of the sentence imposed. It could therefore apply even when the sentencing court considers that a non-custodial sentence is appropriate. That would cut across the existing structure, which uses the sentence and other statutory criteria as indicators of seriousness.
Although I recognise the intention and understand the purpose of the new clause, it is not feasible to specify on the face of the Bill all the crimes that we would like to carry that result. We use sentences to indicate seriousness, and we would be in danger either of missing out or of diminishing other horrendous offences if we did not also put them in the Bill—I am sure that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. The new clause is also confined to the England and Wales offence and does not address equivalent offending across the whole of the UK. Automatic deportation would in any event remain subject to the exceptions in section 33 of the UK Borders Act, including our international obligations. I understand the objective of the new clause, but for those reasons, and although I acknowledge the abhorrence of forced marriage, I ask the Committee to reject it.
I turn to new clause 67. Before considering it in detail, I draw attention to the fact that, despite what is asserted in the explanatory statement provided by the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), the new clause would not achieve her aims. It amends the test for disapplying the prohibition against returning refugees to danger, rather than amending the threshold for auto-deportation. It sets out that convictions for offences under the National Security Act 2023 should be presumed to be particularly serious crimes under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Article 33 of the refugee convention already allows refugees to be returned to their country when they have committed a particularly serious crime and, as a result, constitute a danger to the community. There is no definition of “particularly serious crime” in the convention, and no universal uniformity in the interpretation adopted by other states parties. It is open to the UK to interpret the term in good faith, which requires consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words, and it is clear that national security offences are particularly serious crimes.
Article 33.2 of the refugee convention also allows refugees to be refouled where they are a danger to the security of the UK. That may include individuals who engage in unacceptable behaviours in the UK or abroad, or who undertake or espouse extremist views, as well as those who foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence to further particular beliefs or provoke others to commit terrorist acts. There is no requirement in the convention for a criminal conviction. The new clause would therefore have very little impact in practice; if anything, it would set the threshold too high. It is already Home Office policy in cases involving national security threats, or where there is a conviction for a particularly serious crime and the individual is considered to pose a threat to the community, to refuse refugee status and to seek to remove the individual from the UK.
It is imperative that any asylum seekers and refugees who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes, or who constitute a danger to UK society, do not benefit from protection status. Not only have they failed to respect the laws of the United Kingdom by committing heinous acts, but they have also undermined public confidence in the ability of the state to protect the public. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully request that hon. Members do not pursue their amendments and new clauses, and I commend clause 20 to the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 75, in clause 21, page 19, line 19, at end insert—
“(2A) In making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare and best interests of any children in respect of whom a protection claim is made or who are granted protection status.”
This amendment would require regulations under Clause 21 to take into account the best interests of children.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 51, in clause 21, page 19, line 26, leave out paragraph (c).
This amendment would leave out the provision for regulations about protection status and claims to confer rights or impose obligations on a person.
Amendment 52, in clause 21, page 19, line 34, leave out paragraph (e).
This amendment would leave out the provision for regulations about protection status and claims to make different provision for claims made on Convention or humanitarian grounds.
Amendment 137, in clause 21, page 19, line 37, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) which provide for the grant of protection status must provide that, before any further leave to remain is granted to a person with protection status, the Secretary of State must consider whether the person’s removal from the United Kingdom would still breach the United Kingdom’s obligations on the Convention ground or the humanitarian protection ground.”
This probing amendment would require regulations to provide that a person’s continuing need for protection is considered every time their protection status comes up for renewal, rather than only in targeted cases.
Amendment 53, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that a person granted protection status—
(a) must be given an initial grant of leave to remain of not less than five years, and
(b) must be eligible to apply for indefinite leave to remain after holding protection status for five years.”
This amendment would mean that people granted protection status would also be given an initial grant of leave to remain for at least five years, with the ability to apply for indefinite leave to remain after five years.
Amendment 54, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that close family members of a person granted protection status are able to apply for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom.
(3B) For the purposes of subsection (3A), ‘close family members’ include—
(a) a person’s spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner; and
(b) any child, including adopted child, of the person who is either—
(i) under the age of 18, or
(ii) over the age of 18 but dependent on the person.
(3C) Regulations described in subsection (3A) must not require the payment of any fee, charge or immigration health surcharge, nor impose any minimum income, maintenance, accommodation or financial requirement.”
This amendment would require regulations to allow close family members of people granted protection status to apply for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom, without having to pay any fee.
Amendment 74, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) may not make provision which has the effect of making the rights, entitlements or protections available to a person granted protection status more restrictive than those available to a person granted asylum or humanitarian protection before 30 June 2026.”
This amendment would reflect the commitment in the delegated powers memorandum for this Bill that the Clause 21 regulation-making powers “will not be used to reduce the entitlements currently held by refugees or persons with humanitarian protection.”
Amendment 138, in clause 21, page 20, line 32, at end insert—
“(7) Before a draft of the first statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish—
(a) a draft of the regulations, and
(b) a statement of the changes to the immigration rules which the Secretary of State proposes to make in connection with protection status, including—
(i) the period of leave to be granted to a person with protection status,
(ii) the circumstances in which a person’s continuing need for protection will be reviewed, and
(iii) the qualifying period for indefinite leave to remain.”
This probing amendment would require the Government to publish its draft regulations on protection status, together with the proposed Immigration Rules on the length of leave, reviews and the route to settlement under core protection, before asking Parliament to approve the regulations.
Clause stand part.
Government new clause 35—Core protection: protection claims and protection status.
Government new clause 36—Core protection: amendments.
Government new schedule 1—Core protection: amendments.
Siân Berry
It is great to have you in the Chair this afternoon, Mrs Barker.
Amendment 75 was tabled to the original clause 21. The Government published amendments on 13 October that removed clause 21 and added new clauses 35 and 36, a new schedule and some additional amendments linked to the new core protection status. However, the issues raised in my amendments 75 and 74—as well as in amendments 51 to 54 tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough—continue to be relevant to this debate.
Amendments 75 and 74 are focused on the broad nature of the powers in relation to conferring rights and obligations or requirements on someone with or claiming protection status. That was set out in clause 21(3)(c) and is retained in subsection (3)(c) of Government new clause 36. My concerns remain relevant, as I said. I will not press my amendments to a vote, but the Government need to consider those issues seriously and respond to my points.
Government new clause 35 will remove clause 21(6)—the sunset clause—which limited the time period for regulations to be made under the clause to one year after the Bill comes into force. New regulations can therefore be made indefinitely under that new clause, and I would like the Government to justify that change.
Amendment 75, which was tabled to the Bill as introduced, sought to ensure that regulations must have regard to the best interests of a child. No child rights impact assessment has been produced on any aspect of this corporate action model, despite the fact that the shortening of refugee leave to 30 months already applies to children and families seeking asylum for over six months.
The amendment would make sure that, before making regulations, the Government look properly at the impact of corporate action, including the short periods of leave and the long route to settlement in this—I think downgraded—protection status. I am particularly worried about this in relation to the ability to settle, make family life and all the kinds of rights that children have. When the Government do this, they need to pay particular attention to the Home Office’s legal duties under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Applied to children and young people, corporate action and the 20-year route will undermine children’s well-established need for stability, particularly refugee children as they recover and rebuild their lives following what is probably life-changing trauma and distress.
In addition, repeated immigration status reviews and uncertainty around long-term residence will drive avoidable school and college moves as families are forced to relocate at short notice or potentially lose housing as a result of insecure employment status and other impacts of this shorter period of leave and the resulting uncertainty. For children, each move disrupts attendance and their ability to get pastoral or potentially special educational support. It can set back attainment or harm social integration, particularly at a stage when continuity is most important for children and young people. Temporary leave cycles and renewal windows are inevitably going to risk coinciding with exams, including GCSEs, highers, A-levels and vocational assessments. Anxiety about imminent status decisions could undermine revision and therefore exam performance, and in some cases, young people facing disruption will miss exams completely. This must be looked at very closely.
I also want the Government to think about children who are getting ready for higher education; they are just about to become adults and are potentially looking to study in this country. Unstable status also makes it harder for young people to secure home fees and student financing. Short grants of leave could push refugees into the overseas fee category for a long time or leave them ineligible for maintenance support. The rights of children growing up in this country would be impacted because they would have university access and progression closed off to them. They might be forced to defer going to university, which might stall their integration into the community or harm their earnings potential.
I do not think that any of those impacts are in the public interest, and I want Government to at least commit today to conducting a child rights impact assessment that will look at all of these things in part 3 of the Bill before Third Reading—and certainly before any of the regulations in this part are made.
Amendment 74 would ensure that there was no regression of rights and entitlements. It is needed because the broad regulation-making powers contained in clause 21 currently have very few limitations on scope. The delegated powers memorandum says that the powers will not be used to reduce the entitlements of refugees, and this amendment would seek to reflect that by requiring that they do not reduce rights and entitlements below what was in place on the day that the Bill was introduced. The amendment merely reflects what the Government have said their intentions are: in part 48 of the delegated powers memorandum, the Government state that the measure will not be used to reduce
“the entitlements currently held by refugees”
or persons with humanitarian protection.
The amendment seeks to reflect this commitment in the Bill: that people who have already been granted protection status before the Bill is introduced retain the rights, entitlements and protections that currently exist. That would include family reunion with no additional eligibility criteria and a five-way pathway to settlement, if interpreted correctly according to what the Government have said. That clarity is very much needed for refugees who are currently in the UK and need certainty of their situation so that they can focus on developing their life in this country—integrating, earning and all the things that will help their family life and their children.
I have a question about a particular part of new clause 35. I welcome the detail in schedule 1 and I appreciate having it at this stage so that we can scrutinise the Bill. However, part 7 of new clause 35 gives the Secretary of State the power to
“revoke a person’s protection status.”
That is literally all it says. While a whole section of the immigration rules covers the situations where a person’s refugee status and humanitarian protection can be revoked, on the face of this Bill, the Government are creating a very broad ability to revoke that status, which is currently unconstrained. Why are the Government not listing suitable uses of that power on the face of the Bill?
This issue is particularly relevant because in the last few weeks other parties—not represented on this Committee—have announced their desire to revoke the right to asylum and revoke refugee status for some who have already found protection in the UK. The Government rightly stood up for the right to asylum and stood against those proposals. It would be good to have that on the face of the Bill, so that we have better protections against the risk of the power being taken over by another party or future Home Secretary who would abuse it. I would like the Government to clarify that.
Finally, it would be useful to hear how the Minister believes the change in new clause 35 will simplify decision-making processes since we have heard in oral evidence that the convention grounds cannot be done away with. Merging them with what had previously been known as the humanitarian protection grounds is potentially complex and confusing for people. Will the Government clarify how people will be told on what grounds they have been granted protection, in order to make sure that the Bill is very clear?
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
I will speak to my amendments 51 to 54. I have a number of questions that I hope the Minister will be able to answer and give more clarity and certainty on.
On amendment 51, part 3 gives the Home Secretary a very broad power to make regulations introducing core protection. The delegated powers memorandum says it is to bring the statute book in line with the new definition of protected status, but clause 21(3)(c) lets regulations confer rights and impose obligations on those claiming or holding protection, and clause 21(3)(e) lets them treat convention and humanitarian grants differently. In my view, that goes well beyond updating definitions. Could the Minister explain that?
If the powers are to deliver entitlements in restoring order and control statements, which is obviously the 30-month protection, 20-year route to settlement, no family reunion, new work and study route, then Parliament should see them during the passage of the Bill. Changing refugees’ entitlements matters for how they rebuild their lives and integrate, and for the wider points around the economy and social cohesion. That needs proper scrutiny, not a negative procedure SI.
In reference to amendments 51 and 52, if regulations will change entitlements and obligations, can the Minister set out what exactly those changes will be? If not now, will they be set out before the Bill leaves the Commons? How will those changes meet the desired outcomes and will there be further impact assessments to understand the implications of them?
Amendment 53 is about the five-year leave and settlement. Since March 2026, refugees have been granted 2.5 years instead of five. The Home Secretary insists on a minimum 20-year route to settlement, up from five. Amendment 53 would restore an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility for settlement after five years. Reviews every 30 months and a settlement route that feels out of reach makes it harder to focus on learning English, training and work. People invest in their future when they know that they have one here. The Refugee Council estimates there will be up to 1.1 million reviews in the first decade, at a cost of up to £725 million. That would add additional pressure to the Home Office, which cannot yet decide claims well the first time. The Government say that they were inspired by Denmark, but in some ways it is far more restrictive. Most of Europe grants around five years and then settlement, but Denmark allows settlement after eight years for restricted conditions.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. Let me set out the test that we will apply to this part of the Bill. Protection should be there for people who genuinely need it, when they need it. When that need ends, they should go home. That is what the public expect, and it is what the Government say they want. The question is whether this part of the Bill delivers it.
First, to give them credit where it is due, the Government now propose to replace clause 21 with new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. Instead of leaving the whole framework to regulations, Ministers propose to put the definition into the Bill itself. That is better. Amendment 132 has not been selected so the question of retaining clause 21 will come through the stand part debate, but there is still a scrutiny problem. New clause 36 keeps a power to change primary legislation with no time limit. The linked Government amendment 134 makes those changes subject to affirmative approval, but other regulations would use the negative procedure. Why should powers to confer rights or impose obligations operate on that basis? What further change does the Minister already have in mind?
I support amendment 137, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before any further leave is granted, it would require consideration of whether removal would still breach our obligations on the convention or humanitarian protection grounds. That means checking the continuing need at every renewal, not just in selected cases. Government new clause 35 would give the Home Secretary a power to revoke protection status, but a power to revoke is not a duty to review. Will the Minister carry the principle of amendment 137 into the replacement framework? When protection is no longer needed, how will departure follow?
That is why we cannot support amendment 53, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. It would require an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility to apply for settlement after five years, but the passing of five years tells us nothing about whether protection is still needed. That need should determine the approach. Nor can we support amendment 54. It would allow partners, children and dependent adult children to apply to join someone with protection status without fees, a health surcharge, an income test or maintenance or accommodation requirements. Who pays when the sponsor cannot support or house the family? What assessment has been made of the numbers and the pressure on housing, schools and GP surgeries?
On amendment 75, how would children’s interests be considered under the replacement framework? Amendment 51 would challenge the power to confer rights and impose obligations, while amendment 52 would challenge a different provision for convention and humanitarian claims. What difference does the Minister intend? On amendment 74, would the commitment not to reduce existing entitlements still apply?
I support amendment 138, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before the first regulations were put to Parliament, it would require the publication of draft regulations and a statement of the proposed immigration rules, covering the length of leave, reviews of protection and the qualifying period for settlement. Those details would tell us how this will actually work. Although the amendment was drafted against clause 21, the need for those answers does not disappear when the Government replace it. Will the Minister publish the equivalent material for the new framework before asking Parliament to approve its implementation?
What happens to existing grants, pending claims and live appeals? Will anyone have to reapply because the label has changed? What staff and resources will be needed to review protection properly without creating another backlog? We support protection for as long as it is needed. Amendments 137 and 138 ask Ministers to explain how they will check that need and show Parliament the rules. Putting definitions in the Bill is welcome, but we still need to know how the system will work.
Anna Turley
I really appreciate the contributions from all the hon. Members this afternoon. Before responding directly to the clauses and amendments that we have discussed so far, I hope the Committee will allow me to set out why this approach is being taken.
As part of the wider core protection reforms set out by the Home Secretary last year in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement, the UK’s asylum policy statement published in November 2025 set out the new approach to protection in the UK. That marks a significant change in direction away from an assumption of offering permanent protection towards protection that is granted for the duration of need, which we call “core protection”. Put simply, replacing the two categories of protection—refugee and humanitarian protection status—with one single form of protection status will simplify the asylum decision making process and prevent unnecessary and tenuous appeals.
It is important to reflect on how we got to where we are. Those two protection statuses are essentially a historical relic from separating those in danger on return to their countries of origin from those in need of protection for political or identity reasons. As time has evolved, the two statuses have become functionally identical, except in some small areas such as travel documents. That creates an administrative burden for the Home Office for no good reason. We are therefore proposing to merge those two statuses.
Clause 21 will reconcile those two statuses so that the system is administratively simpler for refugees and decision makers. In order to do that, we are also taking a limited power to deal with the existence of terms such as “refugee”, “refugee protection” and “humanitarian protection”, which exist throughout our extensive immigration and asylum statute book and will need replacing with a single term: “core protection”. Under the current system, those who qualify for refugee or humanitarian protection status are granted similar entitlements—30 months’ permission to stay and the same route to settlement. Where there are differences, such as in relation to travel documents, we are making changes to ensure that all those who are granted core protection are eligible.
One of the points raised in the debate was about whether we are more expansive than other European countries. That is absolutely right; as the Home Secretary set out in “Restoring Order and Control”, our offer to refugees is more expansive than that of other European countries. Once they are granted refugee status, the current system grants leave to remain for five years. At the end of that period, refugees can immediately apply for settlement, giving them an indefinite right to live in the UK. This application is fee-free and essentially automatic, being almost entirely absent of requirements.
When compared with that of some of our European neighbours, this approach to protection is generous. In Denmark—a country that has tightened its asylum system in recent years—residence permits are issued to refugees for just two years, and they are designed to be temporary. Settlement can typically be obtained only after eight years of residence and is subject to multiple conditions, including full-time employment, meeting an earnings threshold, language proficiency and active citizenship.
Clause 21 sets out what constitutes a protection claim and who will qualify for protection status. A person has protection status if they have been granted permission to stay in the UK because removing them would breach our obligations under the refugee convention, or if they would be at real risk of serious harm. The UK is proud to offer sanctuary to those in need, for as long as it is needed, in line with our international obligations. We believe that all those who face persecution for a specified reason, as contained in the 1951 convention, as well as those who fear torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection, and that this country should play its part.
This measure is part of simplifying the current system, which has two forms of protection status that grant similar entitlements, namely refugee status and humanitarian protection. Under the new system, individuals who qualify for protection will be granted core protection status. As such, this change will streamline asylum decision making and reduce unnecessary appeals.
Before I turn to the amendments themselves, I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Government new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. I will discuss them in detail in a moment, but it is the Government’s intention—quite unusually—that these new clauses will replace clause 21, as we have essentially updated it. I know that this is unusual, so I would just like to explain it to members of the Committee. Having included a limited power in the Bill upon its introduction, we now want to narrow that power with more detail, as we work through the technicalities of how this part will interact with what I know Members will agree is a very large volume of legislation on the statute book.
I thank the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 53 and 54 and amendment 74 respectively, and I will address some of the questions they raised before I go into their specifics. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion suggested that there was the potential here to reduce entitlement, but that is absolutely not the case. If anything, there will be a minor levelling-up of humanitarian entitlement when it comes to travel documents. So there will be no reducing of entitlement.
We do not think that the origin of the claim should matter for the grounds for protection. We believe that there should be consistency across the two, so the entitlement is therefore the same. We want to be clear that, in all the amendments we have made, there is to be absolutely no levelling-down. As we heard, the Home Secretary’s delegated powers memorandum itself was clear that the powers would not be used to reduce entitlement.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned the best interests of children, which builds on a debate we had earlier today. Of course, their interests are absolutely the priority throughout this process. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 places a duty on the Home Office to ensure that its immigration, asylum, nationality and general customs functions are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children in the UK. The Home Office takes its section 55 duty seriously, and every child matters, as set out in our statutory guidance. We are committed to ensuring that we have regard to this duty in the development and implementation of new policy, including core protection, as well as when decision makers apply these policies to children within the UK.
The hon. Member asked about a sunset clause and why we have removed that in the existing powers. The key consequential amendments to primary legislation will be on the face of the Bill through new schedule 1. However, significant additional changes will still be needed for secondary legislation, which is why that was removed.
Siân Berry
I would like further clarity on why those grounds—the reasons for which revocation could be made—which the Minister read out very clearly, are not simply added to the Bill at this point to make the situation incredibly clear.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s question. The reason is that immigration rules are not normally put on the face of primary legislation. It would be unusual to do that on the face of the Bill. I can clarify that shortly with the hon. Lady, but that is my understanding of why this is not on the face of the Bill—because it is done through the usual route of immigration rules.
The hon. Lady asked what applicants will be told and how this will support those going through the process in simplifying their decision making. The decision-making process will be simplified in all decisions that would not currently be a grant of refugee status, because they will no longer refuse refugee status and then go on to separately consider serious harm. Instead, a single decision on risk on return will be made. Officials are already working with non-governmental organisations in the sector to identify the precise wording most appropriate in a new grant letter.
The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough asked what the 30-month renewal will involve. We are committed to ensuring that our policies are sustainable and do not place unnecessary burdens on the taxpayer, and this policy is no different. In terms of resources and processing, only those who do remain on core protection will have their protection needs regularly reviewed. Reviews will be targeted based on objective country information and any other new information that comes to light, allowing us to make the most efficient use of resources. We will continue to monitor staffing levels and will deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs, as we have done in the past. The approach to reviewing status will be efficient and targeted, and we will reassess where country conditions or personal circumstances change.
Tom Gordon
I understand the point the Minister is making about targeting resource efficiently, but can she elaborate on exactly what that looks like in practice? There are lots of nice words about efficiency, but until we know what that entails, it is quite hard to believe.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising that point. He will understand that this decision making is part of the core business for the Home Office. I can come back to him during the Committee with more specific detail on what that process will look like, but it is important to reassure him that we will continue to monitor our staffing levels and deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs.
Siân Berry
It is important to know whether the 30-month process will be more like a simple renewal—like me renewing my TV licence or something like that—or whether it will be a reinterrogation of the person seeking protection all over again? Will the onus be on the Government to say, for example, that a country has suddenly become safe, that there has been a new Government, that major changes have occurred and, therefore, that we will look more closely at a number of cases, but that in countries where the situation has remained the same, we will not be looking in depth? How simple the process will be is really bothering people. Having all their circumstances reinterrogated and having to prove themselves over and over again is something people have learned to expect from the Home Office. It is up to the Minister to reassure us on this point.
Anna Turley
I appreciate the hon. Lady raising that point. I was intending to come to it; she will be pleased to know that I still have quite a lot to get through in my speech. To reassure her, individuals will need to meet the relevant suitability requirements for ongoing permission to stay. If someone is convicted of a criminal offence that meets the relevant thresholds, they will be excluded from protection and will not be eligible for core protection. If there has been a significant and durable change in their country’s situation or a change in their personal circumstances, their ongoing need for protection will be reviewed. For anyone who has returned to the country of persecution or serious harm, or obtained a national passport, their circumstances will be reviewed. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady a degree of clarity, but I am happy to go back and clarify that in more detail during the Committee—I can see that it would mean a lot to both her and the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough.
Amendments 53 and 54, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would revert to the previous position of granting five years’ leave to remain to refugees and placing them on a five-year route to settlement, and would allow automatic entitlement to family reunion. In recent years, the number of people seeking protection has significantly increased, placing unprecedented pressure on housing, public services and communities across the UK. From 2004 to 2020, between 22,000 and 46,000 people were claiming asylum in the UK each year. However, there has been a huge increase since the second half of 2021, reaching a peak of 110,000 in the year ending September 2025. Although the numbers of people claiming asylum fell to 85,891 in the year ending June 2026, it still remains high compared with levels seen in the decade to 2021.
I know that many of our constituents have huge concerns about fairness, how the system operates and whether it supports those who truly need protection. That is why the Government published a new asylum policy statement in November last year that set out significant reforms to the UK’s asylum system. Core protection is one of the key elements of the asylum reforms. Under this new policy, protection will be granted for the duration of need and will be renewable where a person remains at risk on return. Greater entitlements, including a shorter period to settlement and a route to sponsor family members, will be accessed by demonstrating contribution to and integration into UK society. Settlement will no longer be automatic. Instead, there will be a 20-year route to permanent residency, crucially with the ability to reduce that period by switching into the protection work and study route to ensure long-term commitment, contribution and integration.
As a first step towards that, the Government changed immigration laws on 5 March 2026. Any adult or accompanied child who claims asylum from 2 March 2026 onwards and qualifies for a grant of refugee status or humanitarian protection will be granted leave for 30 months. At a 30-month review, refugees with a continuing need of sanctuary will have their protection renewed, while those who no longer have a protection need will be expected to return home. The safe return review will consider whether there has been a fundamental and durable change in their country of origin.
We recognise that, when a country situation changes, not everyone will be safe. Of course, as occurs now, individual circumstances will be taken into account, and each case will be assessed on its own merits. The overthrow of one political party in favour of another might only be transitory. The changes must be such that the reasons for becoming a refugee have ceased to exist and there are no other reasons for an individual to fear returning to their country.
Siân Berry
For clarity, will the onus be on the Government to prove the change, or will it be like reapplying from scratch each time? Again, my casework shows that we are more used to the Home Office asking for chapter and verse from the applicant each time. If the Minister is prepared to promise that it will be for the Government to prove changes, that would mean a lot to many people listening.
Anna Turley
The hon. Lady pre-empts my next paragraph. To clarify for her, once the individual acquires protection status, the burden of proof is on the Home Office to demonstrate that protection is no longer required. It will be us who will demonstrate that; it will not be for the claimant to make another asylum claim, unless there are new grounds that have not been raised before. Any decision to revoke protection status will continue to have a right of appeal. As always, we will continue to uphold the fundamental principle that we will not return anyone to a country where they are at risk.
Refugees with a continuing protection need will have to wait 20 years for settlement unless they switch to protection work and study as part of the core protection model. A new, bespoke work and study route will allow access to family reunion and settlement rights, with new fees and conditions in accordance with the rules of that route. That will enable refugees to earn down the length of time before they can settle in the UK, and demonstrate that they are contributing to the UK and can support their family before they may bring their partner and children over. Further details will be set out in future immigration rule changes. This route will not include a safe return review.
Tom Gordon
I welcome the fact that the Minister says details will be set out in future immigration regulation, but there is no clarity in the Bill for people now. I asked her a number of questions about eligibility, whether the family would move on to that route together and what that actually looks like. Can she say anything about that at this stage?
Anna Turley
The hon. Gentleman will recognise that the provision we are debating gives power to the Secretary of State to make changes to immigration rules. We will make changes to the immigration rules through the usual process, so he will have the opportunity to debate them when they come before the House for affirmative resolution, but this debate is about the power. I am sure that debate will continue in the weeks and months ahead, and I look forward to engaging with the hon. Gentleman on it.
For the people who claim asylum and are granted protection in the UK, our new regime providing support for refugees will be entirely in accordance with our international obligations, but it does not exceed them. These are significant reforms. They are designed to ensure that our asylum system is fit for the modern world and, crucially, that public consent for having an asylum system at all remains. Genuine refugees will receive the protection they need. We therefore oppose the amendments.
Amendments 51 and 52, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, set out to limit the power to make regulations about protection status and claims. Due to the drafting of clause 21(3), the amendments would not prevent the Home Secretary from making such regulations about protection status and claims because the power in clause 21(1) is a broad one. However, without this explicit provision, such regulations would be more vulnerable to challenge on grounds that they were ultra vires. Government new clauses 35 and 36 will replace clause 21. They aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give the Secretary of State the power to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation. The amendments are therefore unnecessary.
The Government new clauses ensure that the key consequential amendments to primary legislation are made on the face of the Bill. However, as I am sure hon. Members will agree, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the introduction of the single concept of protection. The narrow power here is considered the most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny because any legal challenges can be debated and authorised by Parliament.
Amendments 74 and 75, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, also seek to limit the power by preventing regulations from restricting the rights and entitlements available to those with protection status and by requiring the Home Secretary to take into account the best interests of children when making regulations. The Government have tabled their own amendments to replace clause 21 and define the single concept of protection on the face of the Bill. The purpose of the single concept of protection is to create a single definition of protection claim and a single form of protection status. It will replace and amalgamate the two separate forms of protection: refugee status and humanitarian protection.
Anyone at risk of persecution or serious harm due to third-party actors on return to their home country will be granted protection status and all the associated entitlements. We recognise that all those who face persecution for a specific reason in the 1951 convention, as well as those who are at risk of torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection and the same entitlements. To the extent that we retain a power to make amendments, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the change. The power is the simplest and most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny.
As I have mentioned, the Government have already committed in the delegated powers memorandum that the power will not be used to reduce the entitlements currently held by refugees, and the Home Secretary is already under a duty to have regard to the need to safeguard the welfare of children in the UK under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The Government consider that there are ample safeguards on the exercise of the power, and the amendments are therefore unnecessary.
Amendments 137 and 138, taken together, set out to add additional requirements to clarify the powers in clause 21. In order to respond, it may be helpful to set out the purpose of clause 21 and the Government amendments I am introducing at this stage. The Government are introducing amendments to replace clause 21. These new clauses aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give a power to the Secretary of State to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 21 disagreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)
Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [LORDS] (Second sitting)
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
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The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Clause 7 stand part.
New clause 6—Airport drop-off charges: duty to publish proposals—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, publish proposals for a cap on airport drop-off charges on users of airport services in the United Kingdom.
(2) The cap contained in the proposals published under subsection (1) must be £5.
(3) In this section, ‘drop-off charge’ means any charge levied by an airport operator on a vehicle entering a terminal forecourt or designated kerbside area for the purpose of setting down one or more passengers.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish proposals for a £5 airport drop-off cap at UK airports.
Government amendments 2 and 3.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. I hope Members will agree that a planned and thorough review delivered within 12 months is preferable to a report that cannot engage substantively with the issues at hand but is delivered within six.
Joe Morris (Hexham) (Lab)
May I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to bear in mind and consider the impact on residents near airports in my constituency who are affected by airport drop-off charges? They also have hire vehicles that create a bit of a nuisance to public spaces, green spaces and gardens across my constituency.
Keir Mather
My hon. Friend is a champion for his constituents, both those affected by drop-off charges and those—he has spoken to me about this—who live in Prestwick, Ponteland and Woolsington who are particularly affected by taxi drivers not being able to use the airport in the way they want to and who end up impacting local communities. I raised that with local residents when I did a series of roundtables at Heathrow in relation to expansion. We need to manage all those impacts very carefully. People do not deserve to have disruption and nuisance on their doorstep because we are not getting the systems functioning in the way that they need to.
Government amendments 2 and 3, tabled in my name, make a related change to the commencement provisions of the Bill. As currently drafted, the review duty would come into force two months after Royal Assent; however, as the period for completing the review is measured from Royal Assent, it is appropriate that the duty itself also commences at that point, which the amendments provide for. They are technical and consequential amendments that simply ensure that the Bill is tidied and operates as intended, with the commencement provisions aligning with the revised review timetable.
Clause 7, as we have discussed, requires the Secretary of State to conduct and publish a review into the impact of airport drop-off charges on airport users. The review must be laid before both Houses of Parliament. I do not have much to add to the remarks I made when discussing Government amendment 1, but for the avoidance of doubt, let me quickly reiterate that we recognise the considerable strength of feeling that exists on this issue among passengers and parliamentarians.
Jessica Toale (Bournemouth West) (Lab)
My constituents have also raised issues around airport drop-off charges at Bournemouth airport, which have gone up to £8 this year. There are no public transport options to get to Bournemouth airport, so I hope that the Minister and the Government will take into account alternative routes to get to airports when looking at this issue in the consultation.
Keir Mather
My hon. Friend raises an important point. One of the functions of airport drop-off charges, as presently constituted, is to facilitate mode share changes at airports and to encourage airport users to take public transport where possible, but it is true that across the airports in the United Kingdom there is not consistent public transport availability. Those questions around provision and whether free drop-off spaces are provided, and the transparency with which they can be accessed, is of major importance. I thank my hon. Friend for that contribution.
Sadik Al-Hassan (North Somerset) (Lab)
In North Somerset, we have Bristol airport, which I was very glad to welcome the Minister to visit, but we have exactly the same transport deficit for a very busy airport without a mass transit system. Will the Minister talk about how it might be possible to have conversations about wider mass transit systems and their integration with airports?
Keir Mather
It was a pleasure to visit Bristol airport to see its impressive and ambitious plans to facilitate new international routes and to modernise its terminals. It wants more people to use the airport, so it is incumbent on us all to think about how we can best facilitate that. With the new Prime Minister’s increased focus on pushing power out into every local community in the United Kingdom, local mayors and local authorities will also have an enormous role to play in ensuring that we have the right public transport connectivity to our airports so that more people can benefit from being able to travel cheaply and comfortably to airports in their local areas.
Noah Law (St Austell and Newquay) (Lab)
Similarly to my hon. Friends who have just spoken, we have serious issues at Newquay airport about connectivity, so I welcome the suggestion on local transport connectivity that promoting alternative modalities will be part of the review, but to what extent will the Minister join up that review with the other work he is doing more broadly to support smaller regional airports through, for example, the review of the public service obligation, which is so necessary for airports like Newquay to be able to bid in a more flexible way?
Keir Mather
My hon. Friend is right to point to the fact that PSOs serve as a lifeline for many regional airports, and provide important economic and business connectivity to the nation’s capital from many regions of the United Kingdom, including his own, which is serving as a catalyst for regional economic growth. We of course need to think about the intersection of these questions, and how we can work with local mayors to create robust public transport systems that can get people to the places they want to go, to facilitate economic growth across the entire United Kingdom. My hon. Friend makes the point well.
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for tabling new clause 6, which seeks to require the Government to publish proposals for a cap on airport drop-off charges within six months of Royal Assent, and to specify that the cap must be £5. The Government have committed to reviewing the impact on airport users within 12 months of Royal Assent. The new clause would cut across that proposal by requiring the Government to bring forward proposals for a specific £5 cap before the review had completed, effectively predetermining the outcome before evidence had been adequately considered. For those reasons, I cannot support the new clause and ask the hon. Gentleman not to press it to a vote.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. On new clause 6, I note the Minister’s comments about the study to understand the level of public transport provision and charges at UK airports, which we obviously welcome. It is worth reflecting on the comments from a number of Government Members that a charge to encourage passengers to use public transport to access an airport, to reduce emissions, congestion and the impact on airport communities, is unfair when a public transport option does not exist for that airport. It is contradictory and confusing, and it undermines the case and the consensus that we must build that aviation is good but the impacts of aviation travel—be they emissions, disruption for nearby communities, or noise—must be mitigated and addressed.
As part of the review, I encourage the Minister and his officials, and those who are undertaking the study, to come up with a much more nuanced approach to the allowable limits for charges related to public transport provision to the airports in question. I believe we will push new clause 6 to a vote, primarily to make the point that a particular charge level cap is appropriate, but I implore the Minister to look into that nuance. It is absolutely right that we encourage modal share and push passengers to use sustainable methods of transport to get to the airport; however, where airports use a charge to increase their revenue that conflicts with the goals at alternative airports, where it is levied entirely to manage ground transportation demand and the impact on local residents.
Airport charges, it is worth noting, are not the norm across Europe. They are definitely not the norm across the world. It is our model of airport ownership that means that this has become an additional fee that, as in the two examples given by Government Members, is unavoidable. It becomes effectively an essential fee. There is an argument that suggests using public hire vehicles to travel to an airport reduces the impact on roadways because instead of dropping off and travelling home empty, or parking, that vehicle is then available for picking up passengers and returning them to another location. It should be considered that there is a possibility to have different charges for different vehicle types—public hire taxis, for example. It is not that we are against the principle; there just needs to be a much more considered approach to how it is structured.
Finally, as stated in the new clause, we believe that £5 is the right level for the charge to be set at, considering all the various cost of living challenges and the lack of alternatives in many places. We have to see that accompanied by investment in active travel and public transport infrastructure at airports, particularly those outside London, where there is lacking provision at present. Hopefully the Government are able to pull those two aspects together to balance that investment in alternatives with the nudge of that charge pushing passengers into alternative modes.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. My constituency is the home of East Midlands airport, where just a few weeks ago there was an increase for rapid drop off from £5 for 15 minutes to £8 for 10 minutes. One of the briefings that we received on the Bill identified an interesting rationale for the charges, and I am sure that will come out in the review.
I have some reflections on choice and fairness. When parking or getting a loved one to drop someone off there are a number of variables. In my constituency, just 9% of the public travel to East Midlands airport using public transport because the options are just not available. At East Midlands Parkway, the closest train station, passengers cannot get a public bus; instead there is a demand-responsive transport option. There is a free one-hour car park and the airport claims that people can get a free shuttle bus—which they can until early November, after which they will have to walk in the dark. I did that without any luggage and it took me about 14 minutes and I was quite speedy. I can imagine how inconvenient that would be for individuals who do not have the ability to pay.
The ability to pay at the point of use and simply forgetting to pay is also very much a part of my casework. When someone has dropped off a loved one at the rapid drop off, they are often doing so at unusual hours—early in the morning or late at night. By the time they get home, they have simply forgotten to pay. I have been asking the airport that a pay terminal be installed inside the airport for a person being dropped off and with the ability to pay, but it simply continues to refuse to do that. For me, it is about choice and fairness, and there does not seem to be much choice or much fairness there. The fear is that it is using the £100 penalty as a way of making up the cost.
There is also the question of whether the cost is proportionate. It is clearly too expensive. What is really frustrating is that Manchester Airports Group also operates Stansted and, as a direct comparison, 50% of people travelling to Stansted use public transport. We are talking about choice and fairness. People there can choose to use other methods, but at East Midlands airport that is simply not the case.
The other additional benefit of Stansted is that people who live within a 10-mile radius get an 85% discount on the rapid drop-off fee. There is no such discount at East Midlands airport—an airport with such poor transport links that only 9% can choose public transport as an option. Not to pre-empt the consultation, but I would welcome the Minister’s views on how we can start making sure that rapid drop off and the fairness to use it is equated with the use of public transport in the locality.
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. I am absolutely delighted that the Government have finally decided to back our amendment and that Ministers now concur with our excellent Conservative colleagues in the other place that a review of airport drop-off charges is desperately needed. I particularly welcome the Government’s slight change to the timelines, giving Ministers even more time to pore over this issue and examine precisely why these charges are soaring.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
The hon. Lady has always struck me as a master of the English language. I am sure she will therefore understand that the word “cap” does not refer to a target; it is an upper limit. There is no reason why it should induce an increase among those airports that do not feel the need for one, because those airports will have reached that decision for their own particular market. If she does believe that limits are targets, perhaps her party will withdraw its frequent opposition to such measures as 20 mph speed limits, because by that argument people only ever drive—or go—up to the cap, and therefore all other sorts of limits are harmless are well. I of course do not actually think that; I am just suggesting that is how one could logically extend her argument, if we are to view all caps and limits as in fact being targets, or incentives to hit them.
Alison Griffiths
Of course, the historical evidence is not in the hon. Gentleman’s favour. For example, universities charge education fees to the cap almost immediately, and the same is true of other things—market behaviour is such that that will happen. May I also correct his suggestion of the Conservative position on 20 mph limits? We do not want to get rid of all of them, only the blanket 20 mph limits. They need to be used precisely in order to meet their objective. That is why a blanket cap or ban makes no sense, but I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. We have already secured a review of these changes, and it makes sense to allow that work to take place before introducing further legislation .
Keir Mather
I will begin by responding to the shadow Minister. I am no physicist, but I know that a plane must fly on both its left and its right wing. I am very pleased therefore to see the consensus across the room today on the principle of a review of airport drop-off changes.
On a serious note, Members have raised a number of key themes which go to the heart of why a review has been deemed necessary by the Government. That is to ensure that when consumers travel through our airports and use the drop-off facilities, they can be assured that fairness, transparency and ultimately choice about their transport mode is at the heart of their travelling experience.
The shadow Minister was right to point to the special impact that drop-off charges can have on people with disabilities who travel. I would also focus on people who travel from rural communities to airports, who might not have the public transport access that they require. It is of course worth noting that airports provide bespoke drop-off locations for people with disabilities, but that brings us to another question about signage and access to those spaces. Those points were very well made, and those sorts of issues should form part of the discussion about how this system evolves.
Speaking to new clause 6, I have a particular question about freezing a cap in aspic, at around £5. Is it proportionate and is it enough? There was a point about disparity around the country, which is worthy of further discussion. Ultimately, I identify with the point made by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about ensuring fairness and compliance with mode shift targets where public transport access to airports is poor. It is also worth reflecting on the shadow Minister’s contribution that actually a lot of planning requirements on airports need management of mode shift targets in a way that impacts directly on how those drop-off systems work. That is worthy of consideration.
Though we can have conversations about fairness, transparency and choice, drop-off charges are often used by airports to make very necessary improvements to their facilities and access. That is also worthy of consideration. The shadow Minister perhaps did not point to the work we have done more recently to facilitate airport expansion and modernisation, which helps the airport sector to grow. That being said, she is right to point to the fact that the cost stack faced by airports is of material concern, and therefore we have to be cognisant of what we do in terms of reviewing airport drop-off charges and think of them in the round when we consider how best to support the sector.
On that basis, there have been some great contributions by both Government and Opposition MPs speaking to the constituency impact of drop-off charges. The review will be designed to address some of those questions. I do have concerns about new clause 6, which mean that I cannot support it.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Directions about implementation
Olly Glover
I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 8, page 7, line 16, at end insert—
“(aa) after subsection (6) insert—
‘(6A) Where the Secretary of State makes a direction under this section, the Secretary of State must first—
(a) consult persons likely to be affected by the direction including communities in the vicinity of any airport or airspace affected,
(b) undertake an environmental impact assessment in respect of the proposed direction, and
(c) undertake a noise impact assessment in respect of the proposed direction.’”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult affected communities and complete environmental and noise impact assessments before making a direction under section 2 of the Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021.
Olly Glover
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. Amendment 27 is intended to make sure that expansions of airports and changes to aviation and flight paths are done with, rather than to, communities, and that their significant environmental impact is taken into account. At this point, there would usually be chuntering from the Government Benches about we Liberal Democrats being nimbys. However, the amendment is intended to counter precisely such sentiments, which often originate from the feeling that major decisions on infrastructure and transport are taken apart from, and done to, the communities that are most affected.
The amendment is in part about communities directly affected by noise and air pollution from airports, including those in the densely populated area around Heathrow, as well as around Gatwick, Luton and many other airports. However, the environmental impact of aviation affects us all. Despite the Government’s Sustainable Aviation Fuel Act 2026, there remains a long way to go before the aviation industry has a credible plan for decarbonisation. The amendment would make sure that where directions are issued, an assessment is made of their impact, so that people have the opportunity to see the decision making and make their voices heard. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments.
Sadik Al-Hassan
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. Before entering this House, I spent nearly two decades as a pharmacist. That gives a person a particular view of the world, as staying up to date with technology, processes and drugs is crucial to saving lives, and that is, in part, why I support the Bill, including clause 8. Surely, if it is good enough for pharmacy, staying up to date, with modern rules, plans and powers, is good enough for flying.
Clause 8 will help with a problem that my North Somerset constituency, which is home to Bristol airport, knows only too well. With around 12 million passengers using the airport and a potential expansion on the horizon, we must reform and bring up to date the 1950s framework that governs our airspace. My constituents stand to gain the most from that, including less noise overhead, greater efficiency, lower greenhouse gas emissions and fewer delays.
As with all things, there is a cost to doing nothing. Without reform, flight delays are expected to rise by 200% by 2040. We must also do all we can to help to combat climate change. The establishment of the UK Airspace Design Service will deliver the resilience and efficiency that our airspace needs. The service has begun its work in London, but will the Minister consider Bristol as a priority for the next phase? North Somerset residents have waited long enough for an airspace that works for them.
Alison Griffiths
I will speak briefly to amendment 27 and clause 8. On amendment 27, the Opposition of course believe that local communities should have the opportunity to make their voices heard when decisions may affect them—that is an important part of the process. Consultation should be meaningful and, intrinsically, there ought to be sensible, local, proportionate mitigations.
I have concerns, however, about the additional requirements that the amendment would impose. The clause addresses the implementation of airspace changes, including those that have already been approved by the Civil Aviation Authority. I question whether it is sensible to require further environmental and noise impact assessments before the Secretary of State can even issue a direction to implement those changes. Our aim ought to be to reduce the merry-go-round of regulation that impairs growth and investment; after all, modernising our airspace is absolutely vital to improving capacity, reducing delays, and ensuring that our airports can grow and expand. The last thing we should do is introduce further requirements that risk holding up improvements that have already been through the appropriate approval process.
Of course, local communities should have their voices heard and their concerns properly considered, but that must be done proportionately. We cannot allow endless assessments and procedural hurdles to strangle the growth of our aviation sector. Therefore, while I recognise the importance of local consultation and the intentions behind the amendment, I confess that I have reservations about the additional burdens it could create. For those reasons, the Opposition will abstain in any vote on the amendment.
Clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to direct that approved airspace changes and the findings of airspace design reviews are implemented. We support the modernisation of our airspace, and we want to see approved changes delivered without unnecessary delay.
Olly Glover
I have heard the debate; perhaps we need to have a whip-round to buy the shadow Minister a house underneath the flightpath and see if her view would remain the same then. I would like to press amendment 27 to a Division.
Keir Mather
The Committee will be familiar with the Government’s position in relation to amendment 27 and I do not seek to disguise the fact that it remains unchanged. The amendment addresses safeguards that, in our view, are already firmly imbedded in the airspace change process. Environmental assessment and meaningful consultation are, and will remain, fundamental to that process. Nothing in the Bill removes, bypasses or weakens the requirements to consult thoroughly or to assess noise and wider environmental impacts robustly.
Clause 8 supports the Government’s objectives of delivering airspace modernisation and ensuring that approved airspace changes can be implemented efficiently. The clause extends the Secretary of State’s existing powers to direct relevant parties to prepare, develop or review airspace change proposals.
Clause 8 adds a power to direct the implementation of airspace change proposals, once they have been approved by the CAA. That reflects the practical reality that delivering airspace modernisation requires action from a number of different organisations. While we expect industry to work collaboratively to implement approved changes, there is a risk that a single party could delay or frustrate delivery. The new power provides a proportionate last-resort mechanism to ensure that approved airspace changes are implemented. That is particularly important as the UK Airspace Design Service has begun work redesigning the complex airspace over London and the south-east. Modernising our airspace will help maintain high safety standards, improve efficiency and resilience across the network, and support reductions in emissions and noise.
Importantly, clause 8 retains the existing statutory safeguards. It only applies to an airspace change that has been through the CAA’s robust regulatory process—including consultation of those affected by it—and has then been approved by the CAA. Before issuing a direction, the Secretary of State must consult the party being directed, which also has a right of appeal. The clause therefore strengthens the framework for delivering approved airspace changes while preserving appropriate protections and oversight.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 2.
Clause 10 stand part.
Keir Mather
Clause 9 supports the reforms to the charging for air services contained in clause 10. Clause 10 allows air service charges to be imposed on a broader range of persons than under the current framework. Clause 9 therefore makes corresponding changes to the licence modifications process to ensure that existing safeguards remain effective and apply equally to all relevant parties. The clause requires the Secretary of State or the CAA to identify and consult anyone who would be materially affected by a proposed licence modification. It also introduces schedule 2, which makes additional corresponding changes to the air services licencing regime and the appeal process.
Preet Kaur Gill (Birmingham Edgbaston) (Lab/Co-op)
I support updating the framework for funding air navigation services. Will the Minister explain how the changes will ensure that costs are shared fairly among those who benefit, with proper scrutiny on charges and a clear expectation that the money supports a reliable service?
Keir Mather
My hon. Friend is right to say that where there is a broadening of who is charged, there must be a broadening of the principles that should underly a fair and transparent process by which those charges take place, and that any decisions in relation to it should be made through the lens of who benefits. I will turn to some of that later in my remarks. Together, these changes will ensure that the regulatory framework can evolve while maintaining the established rights of stakeholders affected by licensing conditions.
Schedule 2 will update the appeals framework for changes to air services licences to reflect the broader charging regime introduced by clause 10. As the Bill broadens the categories of persons who may be liable for charges for air services, the schedule will ensure that appeal rights continue to apply appropriately to those affected by licence modifications and that those affected are notified of the stages of the appeal process, providing the transparency and fairness to which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston refers. The schedule will extend appeal rights to reflect the wider range of stakeholders who may be affected by regulatory decisions, and I commend it to the Committee.
Finally, clause 10 will update the charging framework for air services to ensure that it remains fit for the future. Existing legislation allows charges to be imposed only on operators and owners of aircraft. This clause will broaden the framework so that charges may be imposed on a wider range of persons in the future. Anyone charged must still be a user or beneficiary of a service and must be consulted before charges are set. That will provide flexibility to accommodate future developments in aviation and enable charges to be imposed efficiently on new users of licensed air services, such as providers of services to uncrewed aircraft, where appropriate.
While the Government move forward very purposefully on things such as the future of flight industry group, and as we focus on beyond visual line of sight drone operations and electric vehicle take-off and landing, those benefits will be accrued. It is right that the charging regime is adapted to focus on it, but those two things must work in tandem, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston encourages me to consider. This will provide flexibility to accommodate future developments.
The clause will also make consequential amendments to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Transport Act 2000 and the appeal process operate consistently following these changes. Overall, this will provide greater flexibility to ensure that the costs of providing air services can continue to be recovered fairly as the management and use of airspace evolves, including with the emergence of new users such as drones.
Alison Griffiths
I will briefly address clauses 9 and 10 and schedule 2. Clause 9 and schedule 2 will update the licensing arrangements for air traffic services, including who should be consulted when licence conditions are changed and who should have the right to appeal. We support those provisions.
I have concerns, however, about the drafting of clause 10. As my noble friend Lord Moylan pointed out in the other place, the clause says that a person may be charged where a service is
“available for their use or benefit”,
while also saying that
“it is immaterial whether…the services…could be used by them.”
How can a service be available for someone’s use if it could not be used by them? The Government amended part of the provision in the other place, but that basic question remains unanswered. The Minister must explain clearly who may be charged under this clause and how the Government will ensure that the new arrangements do not lead to unfair or disproportionate charges, particularly for general aviation. Subject to the Minister’s response, we will not oppose clause 10, but we do expect that ambiguity to be properly addressed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly agreed to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Allocation of slots and co-ordination and facilitation of schedules
Alison Griffiths
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 11, page 11, line 12, leave out “other than excluded regulations,”.
This amendment would ensure that all regulations made under new section 34A of the Airports Act 1986, including temporary regulations modifying or disapplying slot usage requirements, are subject to the affirmative procedure.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 13, in clause 11, page 11, leave out lines 16 to 19.
This amendment would ensure that all regulations made under new section 34A of the Airports Act 1986, including temporary regulations modifying or disapplying slot usage requirements, are subject to the affirmative procedure.
Clause stand part.
Alison Griffiths
These amendments concern a very straightforward principle: that Parliament ought to have a proper opportunity to scrutinise the regulations made under this legislation. The amendments would ensure that the relevant regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure, requiring the approval of both Houses of Parliament and thus preserving scrutiny, accountability and fair process for all concerned. Given the breadth of powers in this Bill, that is an entirely reasonable safeguard. Who knows who the next Secretary of State might be?
Regulations under the clause will have important and wide-reaching consequences for airlines, airports, passengers and the sector as a whole. Surely the Minister agrees that it is right for Parliament to have a meaningful opportunity to examine those decisions before they take effect. It was disappointing that when similar amendments were debated in the other place, the Government declined to accept that basic principle. I hope that the Government can recognise today the importance of affording this House that ability to scrutinise and do its job.
Clause 11 gives the Secretary of State broad powers to amend or restate the airport slot allocation regime. We recognise that the system may need to respond quickly in genuine emergencies, but these powers must be exercised carefully and must not undermine the independence of the slot allocation process. That is precisely why the parliamentary scrutiny provided by amendments 12 and 13 is so important.
Keir Mather
With your indulgence, Chair, may I just very briefly respond to a comment that the Shadow Minister made?
Keir Mather
I appreciate it, Ms McVey. To the shadow Minister’s point about materiality and the effectiveness of use, it is my understanding that this provision was changed in the Lords to ensure that those who can be charged is restricted only to those who use or benefit from the services that are outlined in the charging regime. This balances the necessary flexibility for the future with safeguarding the internationally established user pays principle. However, I will consult with my officials after our proceedings today and if there is anything remaining that still needs to be clarified, I will put it to the shadow Minister in writing or update her at the start of the next Committee session, if that is to her liking.
I thank the shadow Minister for giving the Committee the opportunity to consider the appropriate level of scrutiny for regulations relating to airport slots. The Government’s position remains that the approach in the Bill is both proportionate and appropriately safeguarded. The power is limited to exceptional circumstances where there is either a significant threat to public health or another substantial reason, and can be used only to make temporary changes to slot usage requirements. Applying the affirmative procedure in every case would reduce the Government’s ability to respond quickly and decisively to major disruption. Experience during the pandemic and this past summer has shown that timely intervention can be critical to protecting the operation and resilience of the aviation sector. On that basis, I cannot support the amendment.
Clause 11 ensures that the Government can continue to maintain and update the UK’s airport slot framework now that temporary powers put in place following EU exit have expired. Airport slots are a vital mechanism for managing access to capacity-constrained airports. They help to ensure that scarce airport capacity is allocated in a fair, transparent and efficient way, supporting both connectivity and competition.
Alison Griffiths
I hear the Minister’s remarks. I fear that we will not agree on the important need for affirmative parliamentary scrutiny.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alison Griffiths
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 12, page 12, line 7, leave out
“CAA may by rules (to be known as ‘CAA rules’)”
and insert
“Secretary of State may by regulations”.
This amendment would provide for CAA rules to be made by regulations by the Secretary of State.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 15, in clause 12, page 13, line 14, at end insert—
“(7A) Before making regulations under subsection (7), the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out the principles underlying the exceptions to the CAA’s power to make CAA rules.
(7B) The statement under subsection (7A) must explain how those principles apply to the provision, matters or purposes specified in the regulations.”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the principles underlying the exceptions to the CAA’s delegated rule-making power, in line with the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Amendment 19, in clause 12, page 13, line 22, at end insert—
“(1A) The consultation required by subsection (1) must be carried out on a draft version of the proposed rules.
(1B) In deciding which persons to consult under subsection (1)(b), the CAA must, in particular, consider whether to consult—
(a) persons likely to be affected by the proposed rules, and
(b) bodies appearing to the CAA to represent the interests of such persons.”.
This amendment would require the CAA to consult on proposed CAA rules in draft and to consider consulting affected persons and bodies representing their interests.
Amendment 20, in clause 12, page 13, lines 34 to 36, leave out paragraph (b).
This amendment would require a consultation under section 61B(1) where a provision in the proposed rules was deemed to sufficiently minor by the CAA.
Amendment 21, in clause 12, page 13, line 34, leave out “the CAA thinks” and insert
“the Secretary of State and the CAA agree”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State and the CAA to agree that a provision was sufficiently minor before that fast-track procedure was applied.
Amendment 22, in clause 12, page 15, line 40, after “rules,” insert
“including the provision of clear signposting to related requirements contained in Air Navigation Orders and other legislation,”
This amendment would make clear that guidance about the publication of CAA rules may include provision for signposting to related requirements in air navigation orders and other legislation.
Amendment 16, in clause 12, page 16, leave out lines 11 and 12.
This amendment would prevent the CAA from having a veto over the Secretary of State’s priorities and objectives document.
Amendment 23, in clause 12, page 16, leave out lines 35 and 36 and insert—
“(1) The CAA must publish and maintain on its website an up-to-date consolidated version of the whole of the text of CAA rules.
(1A) The CAA may prepare and publish up-to-date consolidated versions of any part of the text of CAA rules.”.
This amendment would require the CAA to maintain and publish on its website an up-to-date consolidated version of the complete CAA rules, with the ability to publish consolidated extracts.
Amendment 17, in clause 12, page 17, leave out lines 11 to 21.
This amendment deletes a Henry VIII provision.
Clause stand part.
Alison Griffiths
The Secretary of State should remain at the heart of aviation regulation, providing clear direction and ensuring that the CAA’s regulatory framework supports growth, competitiveness and investment. Ministers should be setting that direction and driving the CAA towards those objectives rather than handing them over extensive rule-making powers with insufficient democratic accountability. That is why we have tabled amendment 14, to ensure that the Government retain the ability to set that direction rather than sitting on the sidelines as a passive bystander.
Amendment 15 is designed to provide clarity, explanation and to ensure that a smooth and transparent process is followed as a matter of course. It follows directly from the recommendation of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which raised concerns about the extent of the rule-making powers being handed to the CAA. We are simply asking the Government to explain the principles governing which powers should remain with Ministers and which should be exercised by the regulator. I do not think that is an unreasonable request. Indeed, when this was debated in the other place, the Minister acknowledged the concerns and promised to consider them carefully. What became of those assurances? Why has the Government not seen fit to include this perfectly sensible safeguard in the Bill?
I turn next to amendment 19, which I am inclined to support. It is entirely sensible those that affected by changes to aviation rules should have a proper opportunity to contribute to the process. That includes our airports, airlines and the wider aviation industry, which need clarity and certainty about the regulatory framework in which they operate. Giving businesses greater access to the process, and the opportunity to comment on draft rules before they are introduced, can only help them to plan ahead, make investment decisions, and ultimately grow and succeed. We want a regulatory framework that supports a thriving aviation sector, and proper consultation with those who actually have to operate under those rules is an important part of achieving that.
On amendment 20, I think the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage is rather hedging his bets, having tabled two amendments seeking to address the same issue in slightly different ways. We certainly agree with the principle that the CAA should not be able to determine entirely for itself when consultation is unnecessary. However, we think amendment 21 provides a more sensible approach by ensuring that the Secretary of State also has a say in that decision.
We support amendment 21, which is a very reasonable measure. The CAA should not be able to operate entirely off its own steam, deciding for itself when proposed rule changes are sufficiently minor to dispense with the normal consultation process. Surely it is right that the Secretary of State should have a role in that decision? Importantly, this amendment does not undermine the ambition of the clause to provide a faster, more responsive rule-making process. The fast track procedure would remain available. The amendment would simply require Ministers and the CAA to agree that a proposed change is sufficiently minor to justify using that procedure. That is hardly an onerous requirement. It simply provides an additional safeguard, ensures proper ministerial oversight and helps prevent the CAA from becoming a law unto itself.
Amendment 22 is also perfectly sensible. Signposting provides clarity and I suspect it would be particularly useful for smaller aviation businesses, which may not have the resources to navigate multiple pieces of legislation and regulatory guidance. I know that the shadow Secretary of State has received representations from those involved in gliding and general aviation, and it is important that we consider the needs of those smaller operators alongside the major airlines and airports. Anything that makes the regulatory framework easier to understand and navigate is surely a good thing. This amendment would help to ensure that the guidance accompanying the CAA’s new rulebook properly signposts related requirements elsewhere in aviation legislation. Ease, clarity and transparency are principles that we are always inclined to support, and for those reasons we will press the amendment to a vote.
I turn to amendment 16, which stands in my name. One of our key concerns throughout consideration of the Bill has been the extent to which the CAA is being given increasingly unfettered powers, with insufficient accountability to Ministers and to Parliament. It should always be the case that Government set the direction of aviation policy, with the CAA responsible for delivering within that framework. I struggle to understand why the regulator should have the final say over the priorities and objectives set by the Secretary of State. The amendment therefore seeks to tighten that relationship considerably, ensuring that Ministers retain the authority to set the direction and can be held accountable to Parliament for the decisions they make.
Amendment 23 is also very sensible. Providing greater clarity on how the CAA’s rules interact with existing legislation will be particularly helpful for airlines, airports and the wider aviation sector. Businesses need to understand the regulatory framework in which they operate, and anything that makes that framework clearer and easier to navigate should be welcomed. It appears to be a straightforward, practical measure that will help aviation businesses to comply with their obligations, and we are therefore happy to support it.
Finally, I turn to amendment 17, which stands in my name. It seeks to delete a Henry VIII provision from clause 12. We have consistently raised concerns throughout the Bill’s passage about the extent to which powers are being transferred away from Parliament, and this provision is another such example. The Government are giving the CAA substantial new rule-making powers, while also giving Ministers the ability to amend or repeal primary legislation through secondary legislation to facilitate those rules.
I appreciate that the Minister in the other place argued that that was necessary to avoid gaps in legislation and to ensure a smooth transition. However, surely a little admin inconvenience cannot be an excuse for hollowing out parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. Acts of Parliament should be amended through parliamentary process, and we should be extremely cautious about granting Ministers powers to bypass those processes. For those reasons, the Opposition have tabled amendment 17 and will press it to a vote.
I will conclude by speaking briefly to clause 12 itself. We recognise the need for aviation rules to be updated efficiently, and to keep pace with changing international standards. However, clause 12 transfers substantial rule-making powers to the CAA, and those powers must be accompanied by proper ministerial accountability and parliamentary oversight. That is why the safeguards contained in our amendments are so important.
Keir Mather
It feels like we are back in the Railways Bill with such a chunky group of amendments to work through—[Hon. Members: “Hear, Hear.”] My Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield, would be very pleased to be back in the Railways Bill, given his penchant for that particular mode.
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling her amendments. The Committee will recognise that amendment 14, the lead amendment, returns to an issue considered during the Bill’s passage in the other place: whether aviation safety rules should ultimately be made by the Secretary of State rather than the CAA. The Government’s position on this matter remains clear. The amendment would prevent the delegation of technical rule making to the CAA, which is a central purpose of the Bill.
Luke Taylor
Amendments 21 and 20 are alternative approaches to a safeguard, as the shadow Minister observed. Our preferred amendment is 21 because it gives the oversight back to the Secretary of State to confirm that that minor classification is appropriate. We prefer amendment 21 and will hopefully persuade the Government to accept it, in which case amendment 20 will be superseded.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. On that basis, I will turn to a substantive challenge that we have with amendment 21. The decision about whether a proposed rule change is sufficiently minor to justify the use of the fast-track procedure is, we believe, primarily a technical regulatory judgment. The CAA is the independent aviation safety regulator and is therefore best placed to assess the significance of proposed changes within the wider aviation safety framework. We feel that requiring ministerial agreement for every minor technical amendment risks introducing additional administrative steps that could delay routine updates without materially improving scrutiny or outcomes.
Luke Taylor
It is worth clearly defining the CAA’s role in delivering safety and process improvements. Obviously, it is down to the Minister and the Government to drive the direction they want to take. Is there a risk that the regulator, which is operating within the status quo, may consider something minor without being able to consider the direction the Government might want to take—for example, in prioritising the impact on drone operators, new technologies and innovation? Should it not therefore be for the Minister to agree whether a particular innovation or approach can be fast-tracked, or whether it requires full consultation? I think it just gives the Government and the Minister himself more opportunity to direct, which is why this would seem to be a logical process.
Keir Mather
The hon. Gentleman’s point is well made. He also notes that, as our aviation sector evolves—especially in relation to drone and beyond visual line of sight technology—we may want a more hands-on approach to determining what constitutes significant change. When a lot of these technologies first appear, it might seem as though they will not reach fruition and maturity for some time, and then they quickly become very consequential to how our airspace develops. Ministers are ultimately responsible for setting the CAA’s strategic priorities. The Secretary of State of course has the power to direct the CAA and can reserve particular functions. On that basis, the amendments are not necessary at present, given the suite of ministerial powers available when those more nuanced circumstances might arise. However, I will happily pick that conversation up with the hon. Gentleman outside the Committee to consider it further.
Amendment 22 seeks to make it explicit that guidance on the publication of CAA rules may provide for signposting to related requirements in air navigation orders and other legislation. I understand the intention behind the amendment. It is important that those who are subject to aviation safety requirements can understand how CAA rules interact with requirements elsewhere in the legislative framework. However, I feel that the amendment is unnecessary. Proposed new section 61G already gives the Secretary of State the ability to issue guidance about the publication of CAA rules.
In my view, it is unnecessary to be more specific, but perhaps we ought to have a conversation about what more routine processes we can build in to make sure that guidance is provided in a more timely way, so that the smaller operators the shadow Minister spoke of have access to the guidance they need. As the provision stands, the guidance that can be issued can address, should Ministers choose, how rules are presented and published, including appropriate signposting to related legislative requirements, without prescribing that particular approach in the Bill. We therefore consider that those matters are better addressed in that flexible way, through the guidance under proposed new section 61G.
Amendment 16, which was tabled by the shadow Minister, returns to the question of whether the CAA should have to agree the Secretary of State’s priorities and objectives. The Government’s position on that matter remains clear. The CAA is the UK’s independent aviation safety regulator, and its technical experts will be responsible for turning the priorities issued by the Secretary of State into a deliverable rule-making programme. Requiring its agreement ensures that the programme is feasible, appropriately targeted and compatible with its statutory responsibilities.
In our view, removing that safeguard would not improve accountability. Instead, it could require the CAA to pursue priorities it considers undeliverable or inconsistent with its responsibilities, undermining both its independence and the effective operation of the new framework. The requirement for its agreement does not, however, give the CAA a veto over Government policy. The Secretary of State has the power to direct the CAA in its rule making, and retains powers to reserve matters from the CAA’s rule-making functions and to legislate directly where appropriate. For those reasons, we believe that the amendment would remove the necessary safeguards without necessarily strengthening ministerial authority. On that basis, I ask the shadow Minister not to press it.
Amendment 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, would require the CAA to maintain on its website an up-to-date and consolidated version of the whole text of the CAA rules. I agree that aviation rules must be clear and accessible—all CAA rules will be published and remain available and accessible—but the question is whether the CAA should be under a legal duty to keep the entire rulebook continuously consolidated. We do not consider such a duty to be necessary.
The CAA rulebook will contain many thousands of provisions, and it is important for the authority to have flexibility in how it develops, prepares and maintains a consolidated version of the rules, which it then publishes. If the CAA is required to consolidate fully the rulebook after every change, no matter how minor, it would be required to ensure that the whole consolidated rulebook is updated even when a change affects only a small number of provisions. That would also prevent, for example, the CAA from undertaking consolidation exercises at more appropriate and proportionate intervals than in every instance that would be required under the proposed provisions. That could impose disproportionate cost and delay, frustrating the Bill’s purpose of enabling the CAA to maintain a more agile rule-making framework.
I promise, Ms McVey, that I am making good progress through my response to this group of amendments. Amendment 17 returns to the provision that enables consequential amendments to be made in connection with CAA rules. In our view, the need for that power is practical and unavoidable. As responsibility for safety rule making moves to the CAA, the Government must be able to make facilitating regulations and update related legislation so that the statute book remains coherent and the new framework can operate as intended. Without that, the provisions may become unworkable and result in significant legal uncertainty.
The power is not broad or unconstrained; it may be used only to make the secondary legislation needed to facilitate or give effect to the CAA’s rule-making function. Such powers are a well-established feature of primary legislation where necessary to manage an orderly transition to a new statutory regime. Removing the provision would therefore not provide an additional safeguard; it would risk leaving gaps in the legislative framework and prevent the transition to CAA rule making from operating effectively.
The clause itself delegates powers to the CAA to make legally binding aviation safety rules using a process that is quicker and simpler than the existing process of making secondary legislation. That will allow detailed and technical aviation safety requirements to be updated more quickly and efficiently, helping the UK to keep pace with technological developments and evolving international standards. The Secretary of State’s existing powers to legislate remain unaffected. The Bill allows the Government to reserve matters that should not be delegated to the CAA, including where issues of national security or the wider public interest arise.
Importantly, the framework includes robust safeguards. That includes a power for the Secretary of State to direct the CAA with regard to rule making. The CAA will in most situations be required to consult before making rules, to publish them transparently and to report annually on the use of its powers. The Secretary of State will also set strategic priorities for the CAA’s rule making and may direct how those functions are exercised, while not being able to dictate the content of individual rules. That gives Parliament a clearer and more joined-up view of safety rule making, replacing today’s fragmented approach. Together, the provisions create a more agile system for updating aviation safety requirements, while maintaining clear accountability and oversight. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Alison Griffiths
We have reached the conclusion that the Minister and I are probably not going to agree on the need for parliamentary scrutiny or for the holding back of Henry VIII powers in the Bill, so I will press the amendments to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
I will suspend the sitting for a 10-minute comfort break before we address the other amendments.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 14 to 16 stand part.
Government amendment 4.
Clause 17 stand part.
Keir Mather
With apologies to the Committee for continuing my grand oration, I will speak to these clauses and Government amendment 4, in my name.
Clause 13 restores powers lost following EU exit to create and amend criminal offences relating to aviation safety requirements in assimilated law. It closes a gap in the current framework by allowing air navigation orders to provide for offences relating to breaches of those requirements in assimilated law, helping to ensure that they can be enforced effectively. The clause also updates the power in respect of endangerment offences to ensure that the most serious aviation safety risks are treated appropriately. Importantly, it does not create any new offences itself, and any future use of the power would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Clause 14 provides a standard consequential amendment power to ensure that legislation operates effectively following the changes made by this Bill. It allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to update, amend or remove references and provisions elsewhere in the statute book where it is necessary as a consequence of the Bill. The power is limited to consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving changes and cannot be used to make policy changes. Any regulations made under this power must be made by statutory instrument, and where such regulations amend or repeal provisions in primary legislation, they will be subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament. In all other cases, the regulations will be subject to annulment by either House of Parliament. The clause provides the necessary flexibility to ensure that the legislative framework remains clear and consistent, while maintaining appropriate parliamentary oversight.
Clause 15 is a standard provision that sets out the extent of the Bill’s measures. Clause 16 contains provisions relating to the commencement of Bill measures, including a standard power for the Secretary of State to bring provisions of the Bill into force by commencement regulations. Leaving provisions in the Bill to be brought into force by regulations will afford the necessary flexibility to commence the provisions at the appropriate time, having regard to the need to make any necessary secondary legislation, issue guidance, undertake appropriate training and put the necessary systems and procedures in place, as the case may be.
Government amendment 4 covers a procedural matter. It removes
“the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords”,
which is currently in clause 17(2) of the Bill. The privilege amendment and its removal is standard procedure for all Bills that originate in the other place. Clause 17 sets out the short title—the name by which an Act of Parliament is commonly known and cited. With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Alison Griffiths
I will briefly address clauses 13 and 14. Clauses 15 and 16 are technical, and even by the exacting standards of Opposition scrutiny it would be a little harsh to take issue with clause 17, which simply gives the Bill its name. I shall leave those clauses alone.
Clause 13 widens the circumstances in which air navigation orders may create, amend or appeal criminal offences connected with aviation safety requirements. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how those powers are expected to be used and what parliamentary scrutiny will apply.
Clause 14 gives the Secretary of State the power to make consequential provision arising from the Bill, including the power to amend or appeal primary legislation. The Government’s own memorandum says:
“We have identified all the changes to primary legislation that we believe are necessary…and have included them in the Bill.”
They also say that the power is being retained in case something important has been missed. I would therefore be interested to hear in what circumstances the Minister expects that power to be used?
Keir Mather
In relation to when I would expect the power to be used, I will not be drawn into commenting on hypothetical situations in which that might be appropriate. However, I can reassure the shadow Minister that it is designed to allow the Bill to operate effectively. It is limited and consequential and affects only legislation that does not have a primary application. In that sense, it is both proportionate and technical in ensuring the application of the Bill.
Clause 13 pertains only to restoring powers that have been lost following our exit from the EU to both create and amend the relevant criminal offences. It closes the gap in the current framework that relates to offences that breach those requirements in assimilated law. It does not create any new offences, and any future use of the power would be subject to robust parliamentary scrutiny. There are appropriate safeguards, and that addresses a powers gap issue that has only been caused by our exit from the European Union. I would be happy to provide the shadow Minister with any other information she might require. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Independent Aviation Ombudsman
“(1) The Civil Aviation Act 1982 is amended as follows.
(2) After Section 1 insert—
‘1A Independent Aviation Ombudsman
(1) There is to be a body corporate known as the Aviation Ombudsman (“the Ombudsman”).
(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the establishment, funding, and operation of the Ombudsman, and such regulations must include provision for—
(a) the appointment of the Ombudsman by the Secretary of State, following consultation with such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;
(b) the term of office, terms of appointment, and removal of the Ombudsman;
(c) funding of the Ombudsman’s functions by a levy on operators or owners of aircraft registered with the Civil Aviation Authority and on airport operators.
(3) The Ombudsman may investigate a complaint made by—
(a) a passenger, or a person acting on a passenger’s behalf;
(b) a resident, or a representative body of residents, in an area materially affected by a decision on airspace change, flight path, or air navigation services; against a regulated person, in relation to a matter within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction under subsection (4).
(4) The matters within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction include—
(a) complaints about the service provided by an airline, airport operator, or air navigation service provider, including delay, cancellation, denied boarding, baggage, and accessibility for disabled passengers;
(b) complaints about the conduct of the Civil Aviation Authority in exercising its regulatory functions, including airspace change decisions made under the process set out in the Civil Aviation Authority’s Airspace Change Process;
(c) such other matters as the Secretary of State may by regulations specify.
(5) Before investigating a complaint, the Ombudsman must be satisfied that the complainant has first exhausted the internal complaints procedure of the regulated person, unless the Ombudsman considers it would be unreasonable to require this.
(6) Following an investigation, the Ombudsman may—
(a) make a determination in favour of the complainant, including a direction that the regulated person pay compensation, take remedial action, or both;
(b) publish the determination and the reasons for it.
(7) A determination made under subsection (6)(a) is binding on the regulated person and enforceable, on the application of the Ombudsman, as if it were an order of the county court in England and Wales and Northern Ireland or of the Sheriff Court in Scotland.
(8) The Ombudsman must, at least once a year, prepare and lay before Parliament a report on the exercise of the Ombudsman’s functions, including the number and nature of complaints received, upheld, and resolved.
(9) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.
(10) In this section—
“regulated person” means a person holding an operating licence, an airport operator, or a licensed air navigation service provider;
“the Civil Aviation Authority” has the meaning given in the Civil Aviation Act 1982.’”—(Luke Taylor.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Luke Taylor
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I thank the Minister for the meetings he has held with my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (John Milne) to discuss his new clause. However, there are still some concerns and issues that we would like to address on behalf of his constituents.
To be clear, the Liberal Democrats, including my hon. Friend, do support airspace modernisation. Communities across the country support it too, but modernisation works only if people trust the process that delivered it. At the moment, there is a risk that that trust is missing and that consent is not necessarily fully collected at the beginning of the process. Communities are asked for their views only once a draft design exists and, unfortunately, by that point—I have spent time in the aviation industry and know this full well—although choices have not necessarily been made, the direction and likely outcomes have been narrowed down to what is feasible, and there is often not a huge amount between many of the options.
The new CAP 1616 update, in force since 1 October, makes that feedback and collection of consultation and input more difficult still. Residents affected by proposed changes are not included in the earlier stakeholder reference groups, and locally agreed design principles have been replaced by national priorities. The sponsor decides who is consulted and how, and the gateways in the process have fallen from three to one, with post-implementation reviews removed. Although we understand the need to speed up the process, we feel that this has tilted too far towards expediting the process rather than allowing communities to meaningfully feed back. Before, during and after a proposal, there is no accessible independent route for a community to be heard. The only challenge available after a decision is made is judicial review, and that is not a realistic option for a village, residents’ association or group of residents wanting to bring its points forward.
Some will say that an independent review function existed, but was barely used and the CAA scrapped it. However, new clause 1 proposes something different. Low use of an old process is not an argument against producing a better one. Nor is this about slowing change: the purpose is to let communities feed in early so that problems are caught before decisions are made, rather than having to be fought afterwards. The Government have given conflicting signals on whether the Public Service Ombudsman can deal with regulatory decisions. A written answer in the other place said that it cannot, but on Second Reading, the Minister suggested that it could.
I have three questions to ask the Minister, which I hope he can respond to today. Were the PSO route and the first-tier tribunal route examined, and if not, why not? Why is aviation excluded from that tribunal? How do the Government plan to ensure in practice that communities are included throughout the process and that their voices can truly be heard?
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
I understand entirely what the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are seeking to do in new clause 1, but what assessment have they made of the financial implications of setting up this new route on a per annum basis?
Luke Taylor
That is a good question, and I think the principle there would be to shift it on to the Government to say what the assessment of the cost would be. The cost was used as a reason to push back on this, but it did not appear to have been calculated. If the cost is unknown, I would suggest that that slightly weakens the argument that it is excessive.
There will obviously be a trade-off between the cost, the delay and the additional time taken to deliver these changes with the ability of communities to meaningfully feed back. Ultimately, this is about taking communities with us, because as we have said a number of times today—and different colleagues have made this point at different stages—we have to take communities with us in the changes that we are making to airspace, flightpaths, and approach and departure routes so that everybody can feel like their input is being considered. In that way, we do not lose that public consent and engagement with the process, and people are still encouraged to apply and feed back in future consultations. I am interested in hearing the Minister’s responses to my three questions.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Horsham (John Milne) for tabling new clause 1. The Government agree that passengers and communities should have access to effective complaints and redress, but I do not believe that the case for a new aviation ombudsman has been fully made. I have had productive conversations with the hon. Member, and I understand that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam is raising this issue in order for us to tease out some of those difficulties, so I hope I can address those to some extent in this debate. Whatever I cannot address now, I can set out to the hon. Members in writing.
Alison Griffiths
I will speak briefly to new clause 1. I appreciate what the hon. Member for Horsham is seeking to achieve with this new clause, but much of what he is calling for is already addressed through the wider provisions of this Bill, particularly the new powers being given to the CAA to protect consumers and enforce passenger rights. I am therefore concerned that introducing another layer of regulation through a separate aviation ombudsman would be unnecessarily cumbersome and potentially duplicative. We should allow the measurements in this Bill to take effect before creating further regulatory structures. For those reasons, the Opposition will abstain on the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Olly Glover
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 3 would call on the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to ban the practice of surveillance pricing when purchasing airline tickets. Many people have been in this situation: they look at the details of the journey they wish to take via plane, but when they go to book it a few hours later, the price has skyrocketed. It can often seem that flight prices change constantly, with no real rhyme or reason. Information on the extent of surveillance pricing is limited, but there have been some recent suggestions that airlines are using such methods.
Earlier this year, a class action lawsuit was filed in New York against JetBlue, claiming that it uses customers’ personal data to set ticket prices. That is an example of the phenomenon of surveillance pricing: the strategy of a seller using personally identifiable online information to set prices. It is nearly impossible to know exactly when that is occurring and how widespread it is, but there is evidence that the airline industry is quite widely using those methods. Using a different device or incognito mode on a browser to book flights are well known methods to get around this, but they are not particularly customer-friendly, and not everybody will have the tech savviness to do that.
The advance of artificial intelligence means that these types of systems are only set to become more advanced, likely in ways that we cannot currently imagine and without the necessary transparency for consumers to make an informed decision about what platform they buy from. We are not the only ones voicing concerns: as well as the lawsuit in New York, Colorado passed a Bill in May banning surveillance pricing and surveillance wages. We have concerns about the privacy of customers whose data is being scraped to price in this way. Tickets should cost the same for each similarly seated passenger, although of course we understand the need for demand-based pricing. We believe that the Government need to look into this issue more, to establish how widely it is occurring and bring in measures to ban the practice, which runs counter to consumer interests. This is a matter of fairness, transparency and privacy. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for this new clause on surveillance pricing. Airline pricing should be transparent and fair, and consumers should have the information they need to make informed purchasing decisions.
Airlines operating in the United Kingdom are responsible for setting their own fares in a competitive market, but they must comply with consumer protection law and requirements on price transparency. Where pricing practices use consumers’ personal data, businesses must do so in accordance with data protection requirements.
The hon. Member is right to point to concerns that many Members and members of the public have about surveillance pricing. He is also right to say, however, that the evidence on its application is not complete. It is a fair challenge that perhaps we need to do more work to discuss this matter. Clause 1 allows for reforms to price transparency, should they be required on the basis of that work. For that reason, I do not believe that implementing this new clause at this moment is appropriate. I hope that this provides reassurance that this is a matter that we can take forward through discussion with colleagues across the House in the future, and that the hon. Member feels able to withdraw the clause.
Olly Glover
I am partially reassured by the Minister’s answer. I do not think the vote would be an enormous nail-biter, so I am content to withdraw on this occasion. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 4
Automatic Compensation
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, introduce a scheme to establish automatic compensation for delays under Regulation (EC) 2004/261 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004.
(2) The scheme must ensure that compensation for delays is automatically refunded to the original payment method, unless otherwise agreed by the passenger and airline, within 30 days of the flights’ planned departure date.”.—(Olly Glover.)
This new clause would introduce automatic delay repay for UK flights.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 9—Duty to provide information about flight delays—
“(1) An airline operator must provide passengers affected by a delay to a scheduled flight with timely, accurate and accessible information about that delay in accordance with this section.
(2) That duty requires the operator to–
(a) notify affected passengers of the delay as soon as reasonably practicable after becoming aware of it;
(b) provide an updated estimated departure time at intervals of not more than 30 minutes until the flight departs or is cancelled;
(c) state the reason for the delay so far as the operator is able to do so;
(d) inform passengers of any rights to assistance, compensation or rebooking arising from the delay; and
(e) ensure that information provided under this subsection is accessible to passengers with a disability or impairment.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations–
(a) specify the minimum information threshold to which passengers are entitled under this section, including as to its content, form and frequency;
(b) impose additional requirements on airline operators in relation to delay information for passengers with complex travel circumstances;
(c) make provision about accessibility standards for the purposes of subsection (2)(e); and
(d) make provision about enforcement of the duty under this section, including by conferring functions on the Civil Aviation Authority.
(4) Regulations under subsection (3) are to be made by statutory instrument.
(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft has been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause requires airlines operators to provide passengers with timely, accurate and accessible information in relation to delays and establishes the provision of a minimum information threshold to which passengers are entitled.
Olly Glover
New clause 4 would introduce the concept of automatic delay repay to flights. The concept exists in the rail industry, although admittedly it is somewhat inconsistently applied, as we debated previously during the Railways Bill discussions, which I am sure we all remember with great fondness and nostalgia.
At present, the law grants air passengers a right to compensation for significant delays, yet places the entire burden of securing that right upon the passenger. Passengers do not always find that a welcome experience. They must identify their entitlement, submit a claim and, in many cases, pursue it through dispute resolution or the courts. Anyone who has ever had to try to get compensation from an airline knows that it is often a long, hard-fought struggle to get what one is owed.
The scale of the issue is considerable. More than 45 million passengers departed UK airports between June and August of this year. Disruption over those three months is estimated to have cost in excess of £800 million. The consumer organisation Which? has found that airlines are retaining millions of pounds in unclaimed compensation, with thousands of passengers refused payment. Airlines already hold the information required: passengers’ identity, payment details and boarding records, and the precise arrival and departure times of the planes.
As I mentioned, the rail industry has demonstrated through delay repay that compensation can be processed automatically and at scale, for clear consumer benefit. A claims-based system disproportionately disadvantages those least able to navigate it—older passengers, disabled passengers, families with young children and those who may be less confident or have less access to digital services.
An entitlement that can be realised only by the most persistent is not an entitlement equally available to all. Passengers should not have to fight for what the law already says they are owed. It should be paid to them in full as a matter of course, except of course in the minority of cases where the delay may not be clear and so on.
Were I a betting man, I would predict the Minister saying that this legislation is not the appropriate place for this measure—if I have correctly anticipated that, perhaps he might say what he thinks of the idea and where else it might be explored.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for the new clause, which seeks to implement an automatic compensation scheme for eligible flights within six months of Royal Assent. We do share the objective of ensuring that passengers receive the compensation to which they are entitled. However, the consultation that took place in 2022 demonstrated that reform of the aviation compensation regime is complex and involves a range of competing considerations. Further work is needed assess the merits, costs and practical implications of different approaches.
The new clause would require the Government to implement a specific solution within six months, before that work has been completed and the evidence properly evaluated. Any changes should be considered as part of the wider air passenger rights and compensation framework, to ensure that it remains robust and strikes the right balance. Clause 1 will allow the Government to make reforms in this area where the evidence supports them. I therefore believe the conversation is best had in the context of that clause, once we have achieved Royal Assent. The new clause is therefore unnecessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage to withdraw it.
Chair, am I now turning to new clause 9? Should I take both new clauses together?
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for tabling new clause 9, which seeks to establish a duty to provide information about flight delays. Passengers should receive timely, accurate and accessible information when their flight is delayed or disrupted. However, many of the matters addressed by this new clause are already covered by existing legislation and regulatory oversight. Airlines are already required to provide passengers with information about disruption and, where applicable, in accessible formats. The CAA monitors compliance with those requirements and recently conducted research on airline communications with passengers during disruption. The report looked at passengers’ preferences and made recommendations to airlines, and the CAA will work closely with industry to take those forward to improve passenger communications.
While the intention of this new clause is clear, it would create a new and highly prescriptive statutory regime, including requirements for updates every 30 minutes, regardless of operational circumstances. We do not believe that duplicating existing obligations is the most effective way to improve the passenger experience. Instead, our focus should be on ensuring compliance with, and effective enforcement of, the framework already in place, while retaining the flexibility under the Bill to introduce targeted requirements in future where evidence demonstrates they are needed.
Alison Griffiths
I will speak to new clause 9. I have considerable sympathy with what the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage is seeking to achieve, and the principle behind this new clause is very sensible. Passengers deserve timely, accurate information when their flights are delayed and the industry should absolutely be doing everything possible to improve communication. However, I do have some concerns about the practical implications of requiring airlines to provide updated departure estimates every 30 minutes, particularly when delays are caused by circumstances outside their control, as we have seen with the recent National Air Traffic Services incidents. We must be careful not to impose additional costs and administrative burdens on airlines without being satisfied that those requirements are proportionate and deliver a genuine benefit to passengers. While the Conservatives strongly support its direction of travel, we have some reservations about the precise requirements in this new clause and will therefore abstain.
Olly Glover
My apologies; I should have covered new clause 9 when speaking at the beginning—that was my oversight—but both the Minister and the shadow Minister have summed it up well. All I would add on that particular new clause is that, while I understand what hon. Members have said, we are going to have to do something to improve this issue, rather than just hoping that the marvellous aviation sector sorts it. These are very long-standing problems. Technology, and information technology in particular, have moved on. It should be easier to do these things well. The Minister keeps referring to clause 1—goodness me, the heavy weight of expectation really does sit upon it; it will perhaps be the most impactful clause 1 there has ever been in a Government Bill, the way he is talking it up. We can keep an eye on that in future. I shall not push these new clauses to a vote, as we do have a few more to get through; I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 5
National Disruptive Passenger Database: Duty to publish proposals
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, publish proposals for a National Disruptive Passenger Database.
(2) The proposals under subsection (1) should include, but not be limited to, provisions that would—
(a) facilitate airlines to share information on disruptive passengers;
(b) require airlines to notify the Government of an incident involving a disruptive passenger;
(c) alert participating airlines when a person in the database books a flight; and
(d) provide airlines with an option of refusing to carry passengers flagged by the database.”—(Olly Glover.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish proposals for a National Disruptive Passenger Database.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Olly Glover
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am up and down like a jack-in-the-box. New clause 5 would require the Secretary of State to publish proposals for a national disruptive passenger database, for all the obvious reasons that we know of. Alas, when one is on a plane and there is a disruptive passenger, one tends not to have the luxury of moving to the next carriage, as one can on a train. One of the many advantages of rail travel is that fact that one has that freedom—although not always, of course, because trains are sometimes rammed or short-formed, and so on. I am not going to wang on for too long about this, because I believe that the Government have some good plans on this topic, and I will give the speaking time over to the Minister to hopefully tell us about them.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for tabling the new clause, which seeks to require proposals for a national disruptive passenger database to be published within six months of Royal Assent. I must say, it brings me absolutely no pleasure to rain on the hon. Member’s parade in the way that I have done for the previous few new clauses that we have debated. However, there may be some rays of light in relation to this one, when it comes to action that the Government are taking in this space.
Disruptive passenger behaviour is completely unacceptable, and airline staff and passengers must be protected from those who engage in such conduct. That is precisely why the Government have announced work with airlines and trade unions to develop a new system for sharing information on persistently disruptive passengers that does not require primary legislation. That work is under way, and we are considering practical arrangements to improve information sharing while properly addressing data protection, fairness and operational effectiveness. Requiring the publication of statutory proposals within six months and prescribing specific features that they must contain risks pre-empting the ongoing work and limiting our ability to develop the most effective solution in partnership with industry.
I cannot express enough my agreement about how much of a significant problem this is. I recently met representatives from Unite the Union and GMB from Glasgow airport and Edinburgh airport. They described the appalling abuse that they get as members of staff from disruptive passengers, including being hit and spat at and having people screaming in their face. Because information sharing does not take place in the existing system, a disruptive person can just walk out of the airport, book a new ticket, walk back in and board a different carrier’s flight.
I am pleased to say that airlines and airports have been constructive and helpful in engaging with us on the work to develop this system and create a shared list of passengers, so that airlines can determine whether to allow them to board. We are making meaningful progress in this space. For those reasons, although we share the objective of the new clause, the Government’s existing work provides the right route to develop a proportionate and workable approach. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage to withdraw the new clause.
Alison Griffiths
I am delighted to hear the Minister’s comments. This is such an important topic. It is quite extraordinary; anyone who flies regularly will know how disruptive such behaviour is, and this has become an increasingly concerning issue in recent years. It is a serious matter for passengers, cabin crew and airlines, and I am delighted to hear from the Minister that the Government are now giving this proper attention. I look forward to a timeline from him on when he will bring forward this system. The Liberal Democrats have suggested a timeline in their new clause, which has been rejected, so I look forward to hearing an alternative proposal from the Minister.
Keir Mather
I completely understand the hon. Lady’s encouragement for us to set out a timeline. This is being developed in consultation with private sector operators who are working through the data requirements and legal strictures that relate to information sharing of this kind. It is obviously a complicated process. That being said, I am happy to take this away and write to both her and the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage and share whatever detail I can on how the scheme is likely to unfold.
Alison Griffiths
I thank the Minister for his response. To conclude, although we welcome the debate that the new clause has prompted, and we recognise the importance of the issue that it raises, we will be abstaining, pending more information from the Minister.
Olly Glover
We have heard enough. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Passenger Luggage Minimum Sizing: Duty to produce regulations
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, lay before Parliament regulations providing for ‘British Standard’ luggage for Air Travel.
(2) The regulations specified in subsection (1) must set out the following definitions—
(a) ‘British Standard Hand Luggage’, namely a hand bag or personal item form of carry-on luggage; and
(b) ‘British Standard Suitcase’, namely a form of large carry-on bag.
(3) Regulations made under this section must provide for a minimum size, both in terms of dimensions and weight, for both the British Standard Hand Luggage and the British Standard Suitcase, and require airlines to allow luggage which meets the definition of a British Standard Hand Luggage to be taken on board by passengers without charge.
(4) The regulations made under subsection (1) may permit airlines to charge passengers who wish to carry a British Standard Suitcase aboard, however airlines may not impose a restriction on ‘carry-on luggage’ which would be smaller than the definitions of a ‘British Standard Suitcase’.
(5) Regulations made under this section must establish a cap on any fines or penalties that airlines may charge for luggage that does not meet the definitions of either ‘British Standard Hand Luggage’ or ‘British Standard Suitcase’.”—(Luke Taylor.)
This new clause makes provision for a minimum standard for hand luggage and carry-on bags and establishes a cap on any fines or penalties that airlines may charge for luggage that does not meet those standards.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Luke Taylor
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause returns to my overarching theme, and that of all of us, which is how to make flying slightly less horrible for all involved—for families, the disabled, those who need to drive to the airport. The new clause would take a huge step towards making flying marginally less stressful and, importantly, less expensive for anyone who brings hand luggage aboard a flight.
To explain the new clause as clearly as possible, I will start by defining the difference between the British standard hand luggage in subsection (2)(a) and the British standard suitcase in subsection (2)(b). Those admittedly somewhat overly theatrical terms simply act as minimum standards and not, sadly for any aspiring baggage entrepreneurs among us, as required suitcase models or dimensions.
Regulation EU261 has recently been agreed for passengers departing from inside the EU. That regulation will entitle passengers to carry a personal item that fits under the seat in front of them, which corresponds roughly to my British standard hand luggage item. Under EU261, that has a maximum dimension defined as 40 cm by 30 cm by 15 cm, adding up to 85 cm combined. EU261 also defines one piece of hand luggage, which corresponds roughly in concept to my British standard suitcase, as weighing up to 7 kg and requiring a maximum of 100 cm in combined dimensions.
We are all very aware that the UK is no longer part of the EU. Opinions on the wisdom of that may vary, but it means that British passengers may be entitled to a free cabin bag only when returning home on a carrier covered by the new EU regulation. For example, easyJet has confirmed that the changes will apply to flights returning from EU countries and not to departures from the UK. Passengers flying out of the UK will therefore not benefit from a free item of hand luggage, despite the new rules in Europe. The airline easyJet said that the rules will apply to UK passengers only on return flights.
That demonstrates the need for the new clause. It would avoid streams and streams of passengers potentially being fined by airlines on their way home to Europe, because of different rules on one leg of the trip from another. If we do not address the issue, we risk tourists being put off visiting our country due to the lack of parity, costing our fragile economy and hospitality industry huge amounts of revenue.
Today, we have already heard about how passengers run a gauntlet of fees, charges, fines and mistakes: as they travel from home, through the drop-off curve where they are forced to pay a charge or are fined; at check-in, where they may be forced to pay a fee to guarantee that they can sit near their children or to check a bag; and then at security, where they might have their perfume or purchased drink taken away if slightly over the limit. Having navigated our way to the gate, we can see the fragile aluminium or carbon-fibre tube, mere millimetres thick, which, together with the wings full of extremely flammable jet fuel, will convey us at 600 mph at 40,000 feet through storms and turbulence, lightning and rain, to a far-off land while we stew in 200 strangers’ halitosis and flatulence, surrounded by other people’s screaming children—while ours sit at the far corner of the plane, because we did not pay the fee to guarantee we would all sit together.
Before boarding, however, we must face the most terrifying hurdle of all: the gate agent and the handbag sizing frame. We look down and suddenly realise that we have packed our hand luggage in our easyJet bag, instead of the Ryanair bag—easyJet, alongside British Airways and Jet2, allow the most generously sized bag for large airlines, at 56 cm by 45 cm by 25 cm, which compares with 55 cm by 40 cm by 20 cm for Ryanair. The 1 cm-height, 5 cm-width and 5 cm-depth exceedance of that bag clearly means that it cannot fit on the 40-metre long aircraft I longingly gaze at through the terminal window. I shuffle forward with my bag. I am now past the point of no return, because I could have dealt with my error at check-in by paying £45-ish to check the bag into the hold.
Edward Argar
I hesitate to interrupt the hon. Gentleman’s flow of rhetoric highlighting the golden age of air travel, as he may or may not characterise it. I do not disagree with the challenges that can be faced and the fact that people make ordinary mistakes, but is there not a simple way of doing this? Before going to the airport and getting on a plane, people should check the requirements on the website and make sure that the bag fits them.
Luke Taylor
The right hon. Gentleman is correct that checking the website could protect the passenger, but the problem is that these are arbitrary sizing decisions so they can be changed at any moment. Should Ryanair need to prop up its bottom line this season by taking another 5 cm off its baggage sizing, there is nothing to restrict it from doing so. The Bill offers the opportunity to set minimum standards for passenger service and to give passengers power and protection from predatory practices. I think we should grasp that opportunity, and that is why the new clause is so necessary.
To begin to conclude, the race to the bottom that Lord Hendy described is not the worst-case scenario; it is what is actually happening today. We live today under the tyranny of the gate agent’s sizing frame. The new clause would throw off that yoke and release us into a free market of airlines competing on passenger experience, service and price, rather than on their fear at sea level before they even board that terrible, fragile, flammable metal fart tube of misery. Please support new clause 8 today—not just because it is right, but maybe so I do not have to subject Members to this rant all over again during the Bill’s remaining stages.
Keir Mather
When I recently visited the Bayeux tapestry, I learned that the British Museum was the first institution to ever have “British” applied to its name, and I am now reflecting on the fact that we have an entire classification of luggage named after our beautiful country. It is hard not to be filled with a flood of patriotism at the prospect, and it is hard not to be moved by the reflections of the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam.
In my youth—some say it has not yet ended—I also experienced just the thing that the hon. Gentleman described. When I was on the way back from a rowdy holiday in Portugal, I flew on a carrier that will remain nameless, and I also felt the trepidation of looking down the line and thinking, “Oh no, I’m not sure my bag is going to fit.” Having to put on two hoodies and two pairs of jeans is not something that anyone should be subjected to, and in that respect, I feel his pain.
However, although the Government support clear information for passengers, and we expect airlines to communicate baggage allowances transparently, I feel that the new clause would impose what is a highly prescriptive statutory regime governing baggage sizes, weight limits and charging practices across the sector as a whole. Such matters are closely linked to airlines’ operating models and their commercial offerings, and any intervention of this scale would require careful consideration of its impacts on competition, consumer choice, operational efficiency and fares.
Luke Taylor
I sympathise with the Minister’s experience on holiday—and the experience of his rapidly decreasing youth. This point was potentially buried at the beginning of my speech, but the introduction of asymmetric EU regulations could present a challenge. Our passengers departing from the UK might not be protected by—I do see this as being “protected”—the same mandatory minimum standards that would support our European brethren on their journeys here. It really is a challenge to remove that disparity and ensure that there are not different rules at either end, which could then be exploited by carriers imposing charges and different conditions in each direction of a trip.
Keir Mather
The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. Regulatory alignment does not have to catch consumers out, and it can also provide regulatory certainty for business. Of course, the Government keep developments in the European Union under close watch and advisement, and I saw the ones made in relation to both baggage sizes and family seating. The beauty of this legislation is that it allows us, where appropriate, to align with European rules when it is in the best interests of both British business and consumers. He pre-empts a point that I was just about to make on clause 1, which, as the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage rightly reflected, has done a great deal of the heavy lifting: it allows us to make these changes once we have had time to consider matters carefully.
I have absolutely no doubt that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam will continue to make a full contribution to those discussions. I do have sympathy with what he says, but I do not believe that now is the right moment to put what is quite a prescriptive regime on the face of this legislation. I thank him for what has been a very thought-provoking debate.
Olly Glover
How do I follow my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam?
Olly Glover
One will endeavour to be brief; I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman’s ventures always succeed in that aim either. My hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam generally shows himself to be a champion of the aviation industry, yet his description of the experience perhaps undermines that brand.
I want to speak to new clause 11, which would introduce a passenger charter for air travel. My hon. Friend has talked about a micro example of some of the challenges of customer service in the industry; new clause 11 is more about the macro—the wider picture. Airline customer service is too often not up to scratch, as we have discussed already, especially when problems arise. Which? research in 2024 found that airlines were the third-worst sector for overall customer service. Another Which? customer satisfaction survey earlier this year found that four in 10 customers experienced problems when contacting an airline with an issue or query. The survey also found that Ryanair was the worst short-haul airline for customer satisfaction, although it is interesting to note how many people continue to use it. That is one for the business and marketing students to ponder.
In that survey, customers were asked to rate airlines on numerous factors, including whether the flight was on time, last-minute cancellations, how big the seat pitch was, seat comfort, how easy the booking process and boarding were, customer service, food and drink, cabin environment and value for money. Ryanair’s response was that the survey was “fake”—who does that remind us of?—and that nobody pays attention to these “manufactured surveys”.
For those reasons, we have tabled this passenger charter for air travel. It would provide targets on punctuality, reliability and improved onboard amenities, including in-flight wi-fi. It would also take steps to ensure that delay compensation is automatic and digital. The charter is ultimately designed to promote a customer-first approach in the aviation sector, just as we have sought to do for the railways. Poorly performing airlines such as Ryanair, which dismiss negative customer feedback as fake, could clearly use some statutory direction on how to treat their customers.
We support the principle of redesigning the skies and recognise that they need updating, but we must ensure that, in doing so, we do not leave communities on the ground suffering a bad service. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 11. Mrs McVey, with your generosity, we would like to press new clauses 8 and 11 to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 11—Passengers’ charter for air travel—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a Passengers’ Charter for Air Travel.
(2) A Passengers’ Charter for Air Travel must include—
(a) a guarantee about value for money, quality of service, and provision of adequate seating for any flight operated to, from or within the United Kingdom;
(b) targets for punctuality and reliability of air services;
(c) timetable for implementing improvements to passenger accommodation on aircraft, including in relation to—
(i) seat design and minimum seat pitch,
(ii) availability of high-speed WiFi and reliable in-flight connectivity,
(iii) provision of power outlets and USB charging points,
(iv) storage for carry-on luggage, pushchairs and prams,
(v) provision of lavatories, including standards of cleanliness and accessibility, and
(vi) provision of in-flight catering on any service with a total scheduled duration of at least two hours;
(d) a guarantee relating to improving the accessibility of aircraft, airports, areas immediately surrounding airports and interfaces with connecting transport modes, and alternative transport arrangements, for passengers with disabilities requiring relevant equipment such as wheelchairs;
(e) extension of the principles behind existing flight delay compensation to include a framework of compensation for failures to comply with the Passengers’ Charter for lack of specified on-board amenities; and
(f) a commitment that air carriers will take all reasonable steps to ensure that systems for compensating passengers for delays or disruption—
(i) are digital by default;
(ii) minimise any administrative burden on passengers when applying for compensation; and
(iii) allow, where practicable, for compensation to be issued automatically based on information attainable by the carrier from a customer's booking or ticketing account.”
This new clause creates provision for a Passengers’ Charter.
Olly Glover
First, I apologise: there was an error in my notes as to the groupings and I had new clause 11 in the previous one. That is entirely my error, and I apologise to the Committee for the confusion. The good news is that the speech on new clause 11 has already been done, and the one for new clause 10 is significantly more concise—good news all round, I would suggest. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] Yes, marvellous.
New clause 10 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report two years after the passage of the Act reviewing its impact on passenger protections and standards. Given the somewhat concise nature of the Bill, for which we might be grateful in the Committee but may regret in future, we feel that Parliament needs a formal mechanism by which to judge whether the Government’s promises of strengthened rights, for instance at the baggage carousel, havematerialised. The new clause would help to ensure that passenger protections and standards are not weakened as a result of the Bill. If the Minister is not minded to agree, perhaps he will say how else this legislation can be reviewed and he and his Department held to account, so that the many high expectations of clause 1 are fulfilled and delivered in.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for tabling new clause 10, which would require a report on this legislation’s impact on passenger protections and standards two years after Royal Assent. I agree that it is important to ensure that legislation and regulation have the intended impact, but it is not necessary to include in primary legislation a requirement for a post-implementation review.
In practice, the inclusion of such review requirements must already be considered when developing secondary legislation and included where appropriate. Given that the much talked about clause 1 will give the Secretary of State the power to amend air passenger rights legislation through regulations, that would be the most suitable point at which to decide whether such a review was needed for a specific regulation and to determine its scope. In addition, a Government amendment made in the other place—clause 5(2)—requires the CAA to report annually on its use of the direct enforcement powers introduced by the Bill. Parliament will therefore receive regular, ongoing information on how the new enforcement regime is operating. As such, I hope that the hon. Gentleman feels able to withdraw new clause 10.
I also thank him for tabling new clause 11, which would require the Government to introduce a statutory passengers’ charter for air travel. I recognise the ambition behind this new clause, but as was made clear when this proposal was considered in the other place, a statutory charter is not the right or most effective mechanism for delivering on that objective. The fundamental difficulty is how such a charter would operate in practice: if drafted broadly, it would create expectations that could not meaningfully be enforced; if drafted prescriptively, it would quickly become inflexible. Where reform is justified, targeted and evidence-based, regulation under clause 1 will offer a clearer and more effective route, allowing requirements to be introduced where there is evidence of consumer detriment, without prescribing broad service standards in primary legislation.
The new clause brings together matters that are already addressed through existing legislation and regulatory frameworks, while others are commercial decisions properly left to airlines. Established requirements cover safety, accessibility and passenger rights, and those protections can be strengthened through statutory instruments where the evidence demonstrates that change is needed. In contrast, catering, wi-fi, seat configuration, charging points and baggage allowances are ultimately commercial matters that properly sit with airlines.
Different operating models give passengers a choice between price and service. Low-cost carriers, for instance, can offer lower fares because they use higher-density seating and unbundle optional services. Imposing uniform statutory standards in these areas could reduce choice, increase costs and make affordable air travel less widely available. Nor are all the proposed commitments suitable for statutory targets. Concepts such as “value for money” and “adequate seating” are subjective, while punctuality and reliability can be affected by weather, air traffic restrictions and other factors outside an airline’s control.
The hon. Gentleman will also be aware that the Department is already developing a non-statutory accessible travel charter. That work will set clear, shared expectations for transport operators and local authorities to improve accessibility for disabled people across all modes. It is a more focused and practical response than the wide-ranging statutory charter proposed here.
In short, the new clause would duplicate existing frameworks, constrain legitimate commercial flexibility and create a risk of unintended consequences. For those reasons, I cannot support it and ask the hon. Gentleman not to press new clause 11.
Alison Griffiths
New clause 10 is a very sensible amendment and one that is clearly in the interests of passengers. Given the significant changes being introduced through the Bill, it seems entirely reasonable to review their impacts after two years, particularly on passenger protections and accessibility. It is a fair point; providing greater clarity and accountability over whether the measures are working can only be a good thing. We are therefore happy to support the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Olly Glover
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I know that you, Ms McVeigh, and the Committee will be delighted to know that this will be my final speech in this Bill Committee, because the last new clause will be moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam. The end is in sight.
New clause 12 would prohibit any powers in the Bill from being used for the purposes of airport expansion. Airport expansion is an entirely valid debate to be had and, indeed, the Transport Committee is spending innumerable hours at the moment scrutinising the Heathrow expansion national policy statement. I know everyone here who is also on the Transport Committee is very much enjoying that task. The new clause would ensure that the efforts to advance airport expansion are handled appropriately, transparently and not through the back door. We have received reassurances from Ministers in the Lords that the Bill is not intended to be a vehicle for airport expansion and we take those assurances in good faith, but the time when British politics and our constitution, if that term can be used, can be relied upon in good faith has long gone and there is no substitute for legal guarantees.
While we are glad that the Secretary of State and, indeed, the Aviation Minister are still with us and hope to continue the stewardship of their Department for a long time, none of us knows the future and we do not know who will be in charge going forward. Without clear instructions written into the Bill, the public and local communities do not have reassurance that powers included here will not be used for airport expansion via the back door. For the communities who live daily with the noise and emissions of a flight path, verbal comfort is an insufficient shield against vast, unscrutinised delegated powers that are potentially contained in this legislation.
While the Government maintain that slot co-ordination itself cannot increase capacity, it is undeniable that slots are the strategic levers that manage how expanded capacity is utilised. If the Government proceed with their publicly stated ambition of a third runway at Heathrow by 2035, the regulatory framework we build today will be the one that governs those new movements. We cannot allow the rules of the game for slot allocation to be rewritten by secondary legislation without a statutory requirement for community consultation and mandatory environmental and noise impact assessments. The Minister in the Lords, the noble Lord Hendy, pointed to the forthcoming review of the airports national policy statement as the proper avenue for such scrutiny, but scrutiny of a statement is a far cry from a legal duty in a Bill.
While we recognise that this new clause is something of a blunt tool, if the Government truly have no intention of using the powers in this Bill to facilitate airport expansion we see no reason why such a clear safeguard cannot be written into it. It is a necessary boundary, because the Bill’s reach is so broad—we come back to the marvellous clause 1. The Bill touches everything from airspace redesign to the CAA’s new rule-making function. Local residents deserve the certainty that can only come from primary statute. We must ensure that the redesign of our skies and the reform of our airports are anchored in democratic consent and environmental transparency, not left to the administrative discretion of a regulator or the temporary reassurances of a Minister.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his new clause, which seeks to prevent the powers in the Bill from being used “in connection with” airport expansion. The reasons I cannot support this new clause are clear and the central point is straightforward: this Bill is about aviation consumer protection and the aviation regulatory framework; it is not a Bill about airport expansion. Its measures are needed irrespective of whether an expansion proposal comes forward and irrespective of the outcome of any such proposal.
The Government have been clear that they support airport expansion where it can deliver economic and connectivity benefits and meet the relevant environmental and planning requirements, but such proposals must be considered through the established planning system. They are not authorised, facilitated or decided through this Bill.
That distinction is reflected in the scrutiny of the draft Heathrow expansion national policy statement, including my appearance tomorrow before the Transport Select Committee, which I very much look forward to. Airport expansion is considered through dedicated processes, with their own consultation, scrutiny and Parliamentary oversight. Nothing in this Bill displaces those processes or prejudges their outcomes. The new clause would therefore not provide a meaningful safeguard against airport expansion. Instead, its broad reference to powers used “in connection with” facilitating expansion could create uncertainty well beyond any individual proposal. It could cast doubt on routine regulatory activity that neither approves nor promotes expansion, potentially constraining the effective operation of the aviation framework to no clear benefit. Put simply, in my view this new clause seeks to guard against something the Bill does not do, while risking unintended consequences for what the Bill must do. It is therefore unnecessary and could inhibit legitimate regulatory functions. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Alison Griffiths
I find new clause 12 quite extraordinary. We have been clear throughout these proceedings that we want to see economic growth, greater investment and a thriving, internationally competitive aviation sector. Airport expansion has an important role to play in achieving these ambitions, subject to sensible, local, proportionate mitigations. I simply cannot understand why we would want to insert a provision into the Bill that deliberately seeks to restrict our ability to deliver that growth.
We want Britain to succeed and we will not be signing up to measures that deliberately seek to curtail the economic growth our country so desperately needs.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Luke Taylor
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is intended to ensure that the economic regulation of NATS contains effective incentives to prevent avoidable disruption and strengthen operational resilience, as we recognise the impact that major system failures have on airlines, passengers and the wider economy. It would establish the principle that NATS’s regulatory framework should incentivise the prevention of major disruption events, particularly those arising from operational and technology failures. It should not simply focus on the recovery of costs. Recent NATS outages have demonstrated that the consequence of operational failures are borne overwhelmingly by airlines and passengers through cancellations, delays and the loss of economic activity, but the existing regulatory incentives are primarily focused on delay metrics and do not adequately address resilience, software assurance and major cancellation events.
The new clause would not alter NATS’s role as the UK’s air navigation service provider or undermine resilience. Instead, it would ensure that the regulator considers the economic consequence of major failures and whether the existing incentives are sufficient to drive operational performance. It would place those principles on a firm statutory footing and enhance the role of the CAA regarding the role of NATS in mitigating the impact of major cancellation events.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause, which seeks to ensure that the economic regulatory framework incentivises resilient and reliable air traffic services and efficient and cost-effective operations. Although we fully agree that resilient air navigation services are critical, particularly in the light of recent disruptions, I cannot support the new clause for reasons that I will outline.
In the first instance, safety must remain the overriding priority for air traffic controllers. Air traffic control decisions must be taken solely on safety grounds; they should not be based on other considerations, such as financial penalties. The CAA already regulates NATS with an existing regime that provides accountability, with delay-related targets and a penalty mechanism that reduces airline charges.
In addition, the new clause risks prejudging the results of ongoing work. The Secretary of State for Transport has commissioned the Civil Aviation Authority to lead an independent investigation into the air traffic control disruptive events in September. It will examine the cause of the incidents and broader questions relating to NATS’s resilience, capital investment and modernisation plans, and will help to identify any lessons needed to strengthen the resilience of the UK air traffic management system. It will also review the findings, recommendations and actions arising from previous significant UK disruption, such as in August 2023. It will assess the extent to which they have been effectively implemented and whether they remain adequate for addressing system resilience, and the consequences of major disruption for airlines and passengers in the wider aviation sector.
The new clause assumes that the appropriate response to recent disruptions is to alter the statutory framework for economic regulation. However, it is not yet clear that the underlying issues relate to deficiencies in the CAA’s economic regulatory duties. The CAA’s investigation is intended to establish precisely what caused the incidents and what lessons should be learned. It would be premature to conclude that legislative changes to economic regulation are required before that evidence is available. If the CAA’s investigation identifies a case for changes to the economic regulatory framework, those proposals should be considered through the normal policymaking process so that any reforms are carefully developed, properly tested and coherent, rather than pre-empting the outcome of that work now. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam that work is ongoing on this important issue and gives him leave to withdraw the new clause.
Alison Griffiths
I am delighted to hear from the Minister that work is ongoing on this important subject. New clause 15 makes a valuable contribution and we are happy to support it. Given the multiple serious failures at NATS in recent years, including two in September alone, it is absolutely right that the regulatory framework places greater emphasis on operational resilience and reliability, and preventing major disruption. We have seen the enormous consequences of these failures for airlines, passengers and the wider aviation industry, with thousands of flights disrupted through absolutely no fault of their own. What message does that send to potential investors—those wishing to expand and grow?
Frankly, I question whether the Government have taken their eye off the ball when it comes to ensuring that our air traffic control system is fit for purpose. They could not even be bothered to come to the House to make a statement, and had to be dragged to the Chamber to answer the urgent question asked by the shadow Transport Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith). We must do everything possible to safeguard passengers and airlines from further disruption and ensure that the regulatory framework properly incentivises NATS to prevent these failures in the first place. I therefore welcome the new clause, and the Opposition will support it.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Keir Mather
May I thank the shadow Minister? It has been a pleasure to work with her in the Committee room for the first time, and I look forward to many such interactions in the future. I also thank the Lib Dem spokesperson, and all right hon. and hon. Members who made such fantastic contributions from their lived experience and from their constituency experiences—some more vivid than others, it must be said. Nevertheless, it has been a pleasure; the Bill Committee has been filled with constructive debate and good humour. I also thank the Whips, my fantastic Bill team, all the Clerks and staff who have made today’s proceedings possible, and you, Chair.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.