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Written Question
Legal Aid Agency: Cybercrime
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Marie Rimmer (Labour - St Helens South and Whiston)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what types of personal and sensitive data were compromised in the April 2025 cyber attack on the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) including whether the breach included information on vulnerable individuals such as victims of domestic abuse and asylum seekers.

Answered by Sarah Sackman - Minister of State (Ministry of Justice)

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.


Written Question
Legal Aid Agency: Cybercrime
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Marie Rimmer (Labour - St Helens South and Whiston)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, regarding the cyber attack in April 2025 on the Legal Aid Agency (LAA), other than the information on the LAA’s website, what steps have been taken to notify legal aid applicants that their confidential data has been accessed.

Answered by Sarah Sackman - Minister of State (Ministry of Justice)

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.


Written Question
Legal Aid Agency: Cybercrime
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Marie Rimmer (Labour - St Helens South and Whiston)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what is the determined method by which unauthorised access was gained to the Legal Aid Agency's online digital systems during the April 2025 data breach.

Answered by Sarah Sackman - Minister of State (Ministry of Justice)

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.


Written Question
Immigration: Convictions and Sentencing
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: James McMurdock (Independent - South Basildon and East Thurrock)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what plans he has to publish data on convictions and sentencing outcomes for immigration offences.

Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip

The Ministry of Justice routinely publishes data on prosecutions, convictions and sentencing at criminal courts in England and Wales in the Outcomes by Offences data tool. This tool includes convictions and sentencing for immigration offences and can be downloaded from the Criminal Justice Statistics landing page here: Criminal Justice Statistics.


Written Question
Prisoners: Surrey
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Al Pinkerton (Liberal Democrat - Surrey Heath)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what steps his Department is taking to improve prisoner rehabilitation in (a) Surrey and (b) Surrey Heath constituency.

Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip

HM Prison and Probation Service rehabilitation services take many forms, ranging from accredited programmes and interventions that are aimed at giving people skills to change their attitudes, thinking and behaviour, to enabling a person to access education, healthcare, substance misuse support, suitable accommodation, and the means to earn a living pro-socially.

Some rehabilitative activity is delivered in-house, and some via our partner organisations. We keep our work under constant review to ensure we are acting in line with the available evidence whilst also meeting the rehabilitative needs of the people we work with.


Written Question
Reoffenders: West Midlands
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Andrew Mitchell (Conservative - Sutton Coldfield)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what recent steps his Department has taken to help reduce levels of reoffending in the West Midlands.

Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip

HMPPS Area Executive Directors (AEDs) are responsible for leading a joined-up approach to prisons and probation in their region, alongside working with criminal justice partners such as the police and local authorities to address the causes of offending and to make sure that those released from prison do not reoffend.

For those who persistently break the law, we are building 14,000 new prison places to make sure they are removed from the streets. Whilst in prison they will be expected to take part in education or learn new skills to make them more useful contributors to society after release.

Anyone released from prison is subject to strict licence conditions, including exclusion zones where appropriate. If found to have breached these conditions they can be returned to prison.

The Probation Service puts in place services aimed at reducing re-offending by supporting the needs of people on probation in the West Midlands. These include providing support in obtaining and maintaining suitable accommodation, help with drug and alcohol dependency issues, assistance with personal wellbeing needs and a holistic service addressing all needs for women.

In the Midlands, we have introduced an area Reducing Reoffending lead who will lead on projects working with Prison and Probations across the Midlands to help in reducing reoffending.


Written Question
Prisons: Hampshire and Surrey
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Al Pinkerton (Liberal Democrat - Surrey Heath)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what steps his Department is taking to improve safety in prisons in (a) Hampshire and (b) Surrey.

Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip

Safety in prisons is a key priority, and we are working hard to make prisons as safe as possible for those who live and work in them. We are providing targeted support to a number of prisons to improve safety, security and substance misuse processes, and the join-up between them, to strengthen safety outcomes.

There are a number of local initiatives taking place to improve safety in prisons in Surrey and Hampshire. These include but are not limited to; using peer mentoring and restorative justice to promote conflict resolution and personal growth, encouraging positive relationships between staff and prisoners to bolster prisoner wellbeing and specific projects designed to support young adults and neurodiverse individuals in custody. Sites are also upskilling staff in safety related tasks, implementing improvements in the physical environment, and utilising Substance Free Living Units.


Written Question
Courts: Cheshire
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Tim Roca (Labour - Macclesfield)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what steps he is taking to tackle the backlog of court cases in Cheshire.

Answered by Sarah Sackman - Minister of State (Ministry of Justice)

Chester Crown Court has been allocated an additional 232 sitting days in-region to increase hearing capacity and improve throughput of cases. Additional Legal Advisor recruitment is underway to facilitate an increase in court hearing capacity in Cheshire Magistrates’ Courts.

The Government inherited a justice system in crisis, with a record and rising open caseload of nearly 80,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard and too many victims waiting years for justice. Investment alone is not enough - that is why this Government asked Sir Brian Leveson to undertake his Independent Review of the Criminal Courts. On 2 December, the Deputy Prime Minister responded to the first part of that review and set out why reform is necessary, alongside investment and modernisation.


Written Question
Parole: Surrey Heath
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Al Pinkerton (Liberal Democrat - Surrey Heath)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of parole board hearings on victims and their families in Surrey Heath constituency.

Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip

We recognise that parole hearings can be distressing for victims and their families, which is why dedicated Victim Liaison Officers provide support throughout the process. Victims can explain the effect of the offence, and the ongoing impact it has on them, through a Victim Personal Statement, which may be read aloud during the hearing. They can also request specific licence conditions are put forward for the Parole Board to consider applying if an offender is released.

Since April, we have made it possible for victims to apply to observe hearings if they wish, to help them understand how the Parole Board considers evidence and assesses risk. We understand how challenging this process can be and we want to ensure that victims and their families are given the support, information and opportunities they need to help them through it.


Written Question
Prisoners: Repatriation
Tuesday 23rd December 2025

Asked by: Pam Cox (Labour - Colchester)

Question to the Ministry of Justice:

To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, how many Prison Transfer Agreements are currently in place.

Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip

The UK has Prisoner Transfer Agreements (PTAs) with over 110 countries. They allow for the transfer of Foreign National Offenders (FNOs) to their country of nationality to serve the remainder of their sentence, and the repatriation of British Citizens imprisoned overseas.

There are two types of PTA, compulsory meaning the FNO does not need to consent to transfer, and voluntary which means they do. In either case both countries must agree each transfer.