Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, beginning with the amendments that regulate the name changes of sex offenders, I am glad that Members across your Lordships’ House agree on the necessity of regulations. Clause 87 is a sensible measure from the Government, and the amendments that build on its principle are similarly prudent. An individual who commits a crime as intrusive and offensive as a sexual offence demonstrates that they are a threat to public order and safety. After all, that is the reason why we have a sex offender register. Criminals who have proven that they pose a risk should be monitored by the authorities, and the authorities should have the necessary details to monitor and manage them.

Amendment 317 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would ensure that those who change their name by deed poll are legally required to alert the police of this change. The amendments in the name of the Minister extend the provision restricting the granting of driving licences in a new name to Northern Ireland. All these amendments seek to consolidate the existing legislation to ensure that there are no gaps there or in the Government’s new law, and we support the principle behind them.

The most consequential of the amendments in this group is that tabled by my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch. It would serve to bar those who commit sexual offences from obtaining a gender recognition certificate. This is a very necessary measure. I am glad that the Government have not yet granted an exemption for sex-offending transgender criminals, which would allow them to attend a prison different from their biological sex. Hailing from north of the border—where, as others have commented, there have been several incidents of that happening—I believe that it is a very worrying scenario indeed.

The Government have still not implemented the Supreme Court’s judgment in the For Women Scotland case, neither in statute nor in guidance. There is still the chance that those who commit sexual offences can end up in the wrong prison through obtaining a gender recognition certificate. I am not remotely suggesting that the Government would wilfully do this, but I hope that, given their record on prisoner administration, the Minister can understand our concerns.

No safeguards currently exist outside of ministerial discretion. A way to guarantee that this does not happen would be to bar sex offenders from obtaining a certificate in the first place; it is a bare minimum. In sending such people to prison, we are admitting that they are not trustworthy among the public; why, then, should we risk the safety of prisoners of the opposite sex? For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendment, and I hope the Minister can too.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments in this group from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. There are also a number of amendments in my name, which I will formally move and explain what they mean in a moment.

Clause 94, which we will come to in more detail later, provides for the police to restrict changes of name on registered sex offenders’ identity documents. Where the police consider it necessary to prevent sexual harm, they will be able to issue a notice to a registered sex offender, which may require them to apply for the police’s authorisation to change their name on specified documents. This will ensure that registered sex offenders who are deemed to be at risk of using a name change to commit sexual harm are unable to continue offending under a new name and pass under the radar of law enforcement. I am grateful for noble Lords’ broad support for the Government’s general direction of travel on these points.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Does that mean that if somebody changes a name and does not inform the police, the new name can be put on the sex offenders register?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is my understanding of the position. I hope that helps the noble and learned Baroness. That is the principle behind what we are proposing here today. Again, I say to the whole Committee that this is, ultimately, management based on risk, not on gender.

[Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)]

May I press the Minister on one specific point? I understand what he is saying about management of risk, but would it be possible for a convicted sex offender—a serious sex offender or rapist—to be prevented, on the basis of risk, from obtaining a gender recognition certificate, should they wish to do so? Would it be possible for that to be barred in a specific case, should that individual be assessed as posing a risk to public safety?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 ensures that convicted sex offenders are already subject to post-conviction controls. They are managed according to their risk, and the sex offenders register is about looking at the position with regard to the individual having the risk on the basis of their actions. It would not be possible to stop someone applying for a gender recognition certificate. Ultimately, they would be placed on the sex offenders register based on their risk, not on their gender. With that, I hope that the noble Lords will not press the amendments.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, may I also ask a question for clarification? It is not really about GRC but about the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made about name change. I know that the Minister covered that in his comments, but I am still left a little confused. Can a person who is a convicted sex offender and on the sex offenders register change their name by deed poll and have their new name omitted, therefore, from the sex offenders register? Surely, as soon as a sex offender changes their name, if they are changing their name from a male name to a female name, that needs to be updated on the sex offenders register.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My understanding of the position is that the individual is on the sex offenders register, regardless of the name that they are currently providing. The risk is around the individual. If a registered sex offender seeks to change their name, the provisions in the Bill will apply, as proposed in the Bill here today.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

On a final clarification—possibly the Minister will write to us, because there is some confusion—I have always said that it is about managing risk and that it has nothing to do with gender. When I have raised this issue in the past, my concern has been that once gender is added into the mix, risk somehow gets forgotten slightly.

First, the point of the sex offenders register is not just for the authorities to know that they are there but for all sorts of institutions to know. I have been told in the past that an enhanced privacy privilege is given to those who change gender. Is that not true? Therefore, even probing that means that we will leave it well alone.

Secondly, in relation to DBS checks and so on, a change of gender, a change of identity—forget the politics of it—can mean that nobody knows that you are the person on the sex offenders register. If the DBS check is in one name, there is no way of knowing that you are the same person who is the rapist. That was why I used the Clive Bundy-Claire Fox example—Clive Bundy, as Claire Fox, would not show up on DBS checks or be on the sex offenders register if they went to work with children. That cannot be right or what the Government intend.

Maybe I have got it all wrong, but nobody from the Government has reassured me. By the way, my questions and amendments in the past were to the previous Government, so this is not having a go at this Government. This has been an unholy mess over two Governments.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It may help the Committee if I say that both the original name and the new name would be recorded. For clarity, where a DBS check applicant has changed their names, they are required to state all names that they have been previously known by on the application form. In submitting that form, applicants sign a legal declaration declaring that they have not knowingly provided false information. Failure to disclose previous names and deliberately avoiding detection of previous convictions would lead to an individual being liable for prosecution. I hope that helps to clarify the position with regard to the amendments. I invite the noble Lords not to press them at this stage.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am on the “how to change your name” government website, which says that if you are a sex offender, violent offender or terrorist offender, you must go to your local prescribed police station where you are known within three days of changing your name. It is a criminal offence if you do not tell the police straightaway. There will be probation and other things going on in the background as well.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is worth clarifying that this group of people are not necessarily the kind of people I trust. This idea that a local sex offender—or terrorist, since we have been talking about Bondi Beach—thinks, “God, it would be against the law if I didn’t declare that I’ve changed my name”, and would be frightened by the possibility that they would be breaking the law, seems a tad naive.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I remind the Committee that the position of any of these individuals—as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned in her initial contribution—will be subject to consistently heavy management. These are serious offenders. There is a Probation Service. There is a MAPPA process. There is the registration. I have given the assurance that both names will be included in that registration.

Every piece of legislation that any House of Commons and House of Lords passes is subject to people breaking it. That happens, but there will be significant consequences in the event of that occurring. I am simply saying to the noble Baroness who has proposed this amendment, and to the proposals in the Bill that are genuinely welcome across the Committee, that there is significant supervision of sex offenders, and the requirements are as I have outlined to the Committee already. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I am glad he focused on risk mitigation, and I think we got there in the final few paragraphs of his response. We need to take very seriously what he said, and I hope that if anything he said needs qualification, he will write to us subsequently, because this is a really important area.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

318: Clause 89, page 104, line 17, after “46,” insert “46A,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland) inserted after clause 63.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

320: Clause 94, page 120, line 20, leave out “driving licence” and insert “licence to drive a motor vehicle under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 16, makes it possible for the regulations made by the Secretary of State to prevent a relevant offender getting a British driving licence in a new name as a replacement for a previous driving licence issued in Northern Ireland.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

326: Schedule 10, page 285, line 39, at end insert—
“15A In section 136 (Part 2: Northern Ireland), in subsection (11), after “sections” insert “86B, 87A, 93A, 93H,”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the term “Secretary of State” is not read, in relation to Northern Ireland, as meaning the Department of Justice in provisions inserted into Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where there is different provision about Northern Ireland.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, it seems an awful long time since my cycling proficiency test. We can debate whether standards have slipped in the 50-plus years since I took my test, but I think it is a common experience of all noble Lords who have spoken that a small minority of cyclists’ reckless actions potentially put people at risk. As a temporary resident of London during the week, I regularly see cyclists on pavements and going through red lights. I can report that, on crossing a zebra crossing one evening, I myself was almost hit by a cyclist, who was then pulled over by a police car not 100 metres later, much to my satisfaction. So it is possible for enforcement to happen.

I want to start with enforcement, because it is a thread that has run through a number of noble Lords’ contributions. It is right that strict legislation is already in place for cyclists, and the police do have the power to prosecute if these laws are broken. Cyclists have a duty to behave in a safe and responsible way that is reflected in the highway code. The Road Traffic Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, mentioned, imposes a fine of £2,500 for dangerous cycling and of £1,000 for careless cycling. The Road Traffic Act 1988 also makes it an offence to ride a bike if a person is unfit to do so due to drink or drugs. A considerable amount of activity is undertaken by the police to enforce these potential breaches of legislation. In fact, the Government themselves have pledged £2.7 million for each of the next three years to support police enforcement action on road traffic offences in the form of Operation Topaz, which is a strategic partnership between the Department for Transport, the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council.

I was pleased also to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about the City of London Police, who I know have taken this matter extremely seriously. They have cycling police officers who can catch offenders who have gone off-road into areas where vehicles or police officers on foot could not catch them, so it is important we recognise that. We have had contributions today from the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Hogan-Howe, and Lord Blencathra, who introduced amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. We have also heard from the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell of Beeston, Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lady Pidgeon and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. All have touched on the issues of enforcement and whether the legislation is significant enough.

I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Clause 106, which is where these amendments are coming from. Clause 106 underlines the Government’s determination that cyclists who cause death or serious injury should face the full force of the law, as if that were done by a motor vehicle. The criminal justice system should not fail fully to hold to account the small minority of cyclists whose reckless actions lead to tragic consequences. A number of contributors to the debate have mentioned their personal experiences and have also witnessed incidents. There is a whole cohort of cyclists who obey the law and who perform well, and as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would anticipate me saying, there is a health benefit to cycling that should be recognised and encouraged. However, there is certainly a holding to account of death and serious injury, and that is where the Government are coming from as a starting point to the debate today.

A wide group of amendments has been put forward, and I will try to touch on each amendment in turn. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, spoke on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I spoke to him before he went on his short, I hope, leave of absence from the House and discussed these amendments with him briefly. I wish him well for his speedy recovery and thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing the amendments on his behalf.

Amendments 330, 338, 339, 340 and 342 would allow persons to be disqualified from cycling upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Again, let us not forget that Clause 106 contains the penalty of significant jail time, and potentially a life sentence with significant jail time added to it. I agree that dangerous or careless cyclists are a serious risk to others, but disqualification would pose significant challenges. This may touch on other, later amendments, but self-evidently, cyclists are not currently required to have licences, and the only obvious way to address this would be to introduce a licensing system. However, such a system would be complicated, costly and, I would argue, potentially disproportionate, in that it would be created solely to enforce offences perpetrated by a small minority of people. Again, I do not think the noble Lord intended his amendment to serve as a barrier to cycling, but my concern is that it would risk implementation of this and would not really be workable.

In his own right, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, introduced Amendments 337B and 337F. Again, these would introduce greater criminal penalties for cyclists riding heavier, faster e-bikes. I do understand that, as has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords, it is e-bikes that have been illegally modified for greater speed that represent an inherently greater risk to other road users. There is no longer any weight limit, following enactment of the Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycle Regulations 1983, but they do specify that the electrically assisted speed for e-bikes is limited to 15.5 miles per hour. E-bikes that can achieve greater speeds would not be compliant with these regulations and therefore would be classed as motor vehicles. Because they are motor vehicles, a person using such could already be prosecuted under the existing offences in the Road Traffic Act 1988 of causing death or serious injury, which carry the same penalties as proposed in the new cycling offences: a life sentence with a 14-year potential sentence.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Just for clarification, the Minister said that they will be classed as motor vehicles. Does that mean they are still motor vehicles, even though they might not be registered or insured?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

They are classed as motor vehicles for the purposes of the legislation if they can travel above 15.5 miles per hour; but they are not, self-evidently, for the reasons I have already outlined, subject to the licensing arrangements that we have to date.

Mandatory uplifts based on specific vehicle type would be a novel but also an inconsistent approach to sentencing. Sentencing should always reflect the facts of the case and the level of culpability. Introducing rigid statutory additions could undermine the principle of proportionality, create inconsistency and risk setting an undesirable precedent. On the noble Lord’s amendments on changing the “careless and inconsiderate” cycling definition, I understand his desire to put beyond doubt that cycling on a pavement or in an area intended only for pedestrians should be considered as cycling without due care and attention. However, cycling on pavements is already an offence in its own right, as set out in Section 72 of the Highways Act 1835, which is an awfully long time ago and has stood the test of time. It is also an offence under Section 129 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Given that these offences are still in place, I would suggest that, along with those in the Bill for serious offences, that provides a sufficient deterrent.

Amendment 337F would insert the definition of a cycle. Again, I come back to Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which already defines cycles, and this definition includes compliant electrically assisted pedal cycles. As I said earlier, an e-bike that does not comply with the relevant legislation is a motor vehicle for the purposes of the legislation, not a cycle.

I turn to a series of amendments—341A to 341D, 342A to 342F, 346A, 346B and 498A—in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which propose that a person could receive up to 12 points on their driving licence upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Reaching 12 points on their driving licence would, of course, disqualify them from driving a motor vehicle.

As I have mentioned already, cyclists do not require any form of licence to cycle, therefore the noble Lord proposes points on a driving licence as an alternative penalty. In the Sentencing Bill, which is currently before your Lordships’ House, there is already a new driving prohibition requirement that the court can impose when giving a community or suspended sentence order. This prohibition will allow a court to take a more flexible and tailored approach to punishment than a driving disqualification, and it will be available irrespective of the offence that has been committed. I hope that the noble Lord agrees that the provision in the Sentencing Bill goes some way towards meeting his objective.

The noble Lord’s Amendments 346A and 498A seek to create a registration scheme for the purposes of enforcing the new offences in Clause 106—

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, on the point about the prohibition that might come from the Sentencing Bill, is the danger that unless the sentencing guidelines shift to reflect that new piece of legislation, you will end up with a very inconsistent approach in at least 43 police force areas as applied by the magistrates in those areas? If it is just a random event, they might lose their driving licence because of anti-social behaviour, some of which might be on a cycle. I understand the principal point that the Minister makes but I am not convinced that it will lead to a radical change in the way that cyclists are called to account through their driving licence.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is ultimately for the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the Sentencing Bill, to look at sentencing guideline issues later. I cannot give assurances on those points today. However, the Sentencing Bill is currently before this House and it is trying to look at those issues as a whole. When it is law, my noble friend Lady Levitt and others will look at guidelines and those potential enforcement issues as a matter of some urgency. The Sentencing Bill proposes, in some way, one of the issues that the noble Lord seeks to achieve.

Again, self-evidently, a registration scheme for cycles would make enforcement of offences easier. The absence of a registration scheme does not make enforcement impossible. As the noble Lord will know, the police would be expected to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry that are open to them by examining other evidence before them at the time of any potential incident.

As with the example of licensing for cyclists that I referred to earlier, the House must accept that the likely significant cost and complexity of introducing a registration scheme for cyclists would mean, for example—this was mentioned in one of the contributions today—that all cycle owners, including children and those making new purchases, would have to submit their information to a central database. That central database would be required to keep the information and the ownership up to date, and some form of registration plate would need to be affixed to a cycle. To give the noble Lord one statistic, the Bicycle Association has estimated that nearly 1.5 million new cycles were sold in 2024. That is a big undertaking. I know that the noble Lord understands that, but the enforceability of the existing legislation is the key, and the work that we are doing, which I have opened my remarks with, would be key to that and would counterbalance the potential cost to the public purse of establishing the registration scheme.

Amendment 346B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seeks for e-bikes, which are currently faster and more powerful, to be treated as motorbikes or mopeds for policing purposes. The Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycles Regulations 1983 mean that e-bikes which do not comply with existing regulations will be treated as motor vehicles for policing purposes. The Department for Transport, which has overall responsibility for these areas, has published fact sheets explaining that e-bikes which do not comply with regulations will be treated as motor vehicles.

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has tabled Amendments 341, 343 and 344, which seek to reduce the penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from life imprisonment to 14 years’ imprisonment. We have taken the view—I am pleased with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this—that the offences in the Bill bring into line this behaviour so that it is subject to maximum penalties equivalent to those already in place for dangerous driving offences, which is life imprisonment.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

The Minister referred in a debate last week to a Bill currently before the House with micromobility provisions. It would be interesting to know whether the consultation has already taken place before that aspect of the Bill. I am sure that it is in his notes, but I cannot for the life of me remember what Bill it was. Also, the amount of funding from the Home Office that the department has announced is an operational matter. It is very welcome, but how will he ensure that each individual force such as the Met will use that money and implement enforcement?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are operational issues. We put the money into Operation Topaz for all police forces to examine them, and ultimately it is for the forces to determine. The City of London Police has determined who is a problem in the City of London. There is a strong argument for parts of the country to face further enforcement measures because self-evidently there are problems. There will be public consultation before any new regulations come into force. It is a Department for Transport matter, so I hope that the noble Baroness will allow me to reflect on that with regard to when the consultation is. I will get back to her as a matter of course.

The noble Baroness’s Amendment 344 seeks to require reporting annually on cycling offences. We already publish annual statistics on those killed and seriously injured—in fact, a number of noble Lords and Ladies have quoted those in the debate today. Therefore, I suggest that this is already covered.

Amendment 346, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to make it an offence to tamper with an e-bike. I accept that some people may well tamper with or modify their e-bikes to increase their speed, but as I already mentioned, this is already an offence under Section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Should the police issue a fixed penalty notice, this would result in a £300 fine and six penalty points, and should the case go to court, it could result in an unlimited fine and driving disqualification.

I have tried to cover a number of points; I apologise for not referring individually to every point made by every noble Lord. The broad thrust is that there is a problem—we recognise that. There should be enforcement—we are trying to address that. There is a new measure in the Bill, Clause 106, to increase the level of penalty for causing death and serious injury by dangerous cycling. We recognise that and I welcome the support of the House. A range of discussion points and measures have been brought forward today around lifting, increasing or changing the penalties accordingly. We may well revisit those on Report, but the Government are right in recognising the problem, putting some money into enforcement and making dangerous cycling and causing death by cycling further offences with serious consequences.

I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw and not to press his amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

I am sorry that I could not be here at the beginning of this group. My noble friend has given a very encouraging response to the many amendments—

[Lord in waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister has gone over time, but in any case the noble Lord needed to be here at the start of the group to be able to intervene during the debate.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful. This Minister would not have gone over time had he not given way, but he now has gone over time and so will sit down. I commend the course of action that I suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his decency in replying as fully as he possibly could. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that there are many more groups to go on cycling, and I think he will have a chance of input there.

The general thrust that the Minister detected is one thing, but, if I may say so, my forecast was right. I said at the beginning that the general thrust I would detect was that Peers from all sides would be highly critical that not enough is being done. Clause 106 is okay as far as it goes, but there is a much wider problem out there, as articulated by nine other Peers from all sides, in addition to me. My noble friends LadyMcIntosh of Pickering and Lady Stowell asked why this never-ending consultation is taking place. Someone said that, as this is a Home Office Bill, why does it not just get on with it? It may be a Home Office Bill, but it is the Department for Transport’s policy, and that is where the rot lies.

Those who criticised the last Government were absolutely right to do so. I condemn in no uncertain terms the Department for Transport under the leadership from 2019 to 2022 of Mr Grant Shapps, who was obsessed with getting more and more e-bikes and e-scooters on the road. The reason the consultations were extended was, in my view, and in what was tipped off to me, that he wanted to get so many more e-bikes out there that it would be impossible to pull back on them. It is like the police saying that everybody is shoplifting and so there is nothing they can do about it. Mr Shapps wanted to say, “Everyone has got e-bikes now, so we cannot put in a registration system and we cannot control them”.

If noble Lords want further evidence of the Department for Transport’s attitude, in February 2024 it went out to consultation again. The consultation was to double the size of the electric motor from 250 watts to 500 watts and to introduce an additional speeding system. There were 2,100 responses; the vast majority of professionals—police forces and others—totally condemned it, and the Department for Transport had to pull that back, and rightly so. But mark my words, it will try it on again and again.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a very good point: why should cyclists have a right to a healthy life but not the pedestrians who are getting mowed down? He tabled some good amendments that would be excellent. He made the point that although everyone has called for more enforcement, you cannot have more enforcement if you do not know the bike and the identity of the person riding it.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe made the point that the amendments just do not go far enough. She used the term Wild West. I assume she was quoting the press release—I have it here—from the Mayor of London, Mr Sadiq Khan, who said that very thing last month: London is now a Wild West for e-bikes.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, made an absolutely excellent speech, and I commend him for it. He is right to say that we have boosted cycling, which is a good thing, but have not boosted the safety protocols. He is right about cyclists jumping red lights. You do not have to go far to see that; go to our prison gates at the Peers’ entrance and stand there and look at the pedestrian crossing and the lights. Last week, when the lights changed to red for the cars, I was halfway across when a cyclist tried to come through. I stopped and said: “Get back! Get back!” He did actually stop and move back a bit. That happens all the time. They use the red lights as an excuse; when cars stop, the cyclists belt through.

My noble friend Lord Goschen made the point that there is no enforcement at all. He wondered why anyone would bother to buy a moped or a small motorbike, when you have to have an MOT and insurance and pass a test, when they can buy an e-bike which goes 70 miles an hour and does everything you want, and you do not have to do anything to register or insure it, and no one will stop you when you break the law.

My noble friend Lord Shinkwin made the comment, rightly so, that there is a threat to disabled people. I am glad the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, welcomed my definition of cycles. It is possible that that was the only thing she agreed with me on, but I will take any little crumbs of comfort. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel supported most of my amendments, as I fully support his. I did ask for tougher penalties, but I am now content that the penalties are okay.

The Minister, in his speech, which was as courteous as usual, said that only a small minority break the law. He is right, I think, when that applies to the conventional cyclists and not e-bikes. In the past, it was my experience that it was a tiny minority of Lycra louts—the ones with their heads down between the handlebars and their backsides up in the air, belting through lights. I submit that I am certain that the majority of e-bike riders are breaking the law one way or another, either by excessive speed or by riding through lights or on the pavement. I can say with absolute certainty that 100% of the food delivery drivers are breaking the law, but more of that in another group. I disagree with the Minister that we cannot have a simple presumption that if people are riding a bike on the pavement then it is automatically, per se, and without any other judgment needed, seen as driving without due care and attention.

I simply say this again. I always come in with slightly more trenchant views than many other colleagues in the House, but we have had support today from colleagues with much more moderate amendments than mine. I am fairly certain we will see that when we come to the other groups. The Minister has to go back to the Department for Transport and tell it to get off its high horse and on to its bike. We must have proper amendments to toughen up the law and deal with all the other abuses of e-bikes, particularly in London. In those circumstances, on the assumption that we will be doing more work on this, I beg leave to withdraw my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 330.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, stalking is an offence which constitutes severe harassment and can instil grave fear into victims, as we have just heard. It is absolutely right that the law bears down on perpetrators of stalking. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 gave magistrates’ courts the power to impose stalking protection orders on application by the chief officer of police. Clause 97 extends this power so that a Crown Court can impose such an order where a person has been acquitted of any other offence.

The Government will no doubt argue that they are taking the necessary action to further prevent cases of stalking through this part of the Bill, but let us not forget another Bill they are currently taking through your Lordships’ House. The Sentencing Bill will suspend sentences for anyone charged with the offence of stalking. Section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 states that a person found guilty of stalking is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—less than the 12-month time limit for the presumption of a suspended sentence order.

Furthermore, the offence of breaking a stalking protection order is also likely to lead to a suspended sentence under the Sentencing Bill. Although a custodial sentence of up to five years can theoretically be imposed on conviction on indictment, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines state that in most cases of culpability and severity the starting point will be one year’s custody, and the ranges can go down to 12 weeks in custody and even a community order. This may very well be proportionate for low-level stalking offences, but the fact is that a person with a high degree of culpability and a medium to high level of harm will fall into the range that will mean their sentence is highly likely to be suspended.

If the Government are serious about bearing down on stalking, I suggest that letting anyone convicted of that offence walk free is not a good move for the safety of the victim. The Minister might try to rebut this argument by talking about the stalking protection orders, but I gently say to him that there is no good in letting a stalker roam the streets just because they have an order slapped on them. Given the falling police numbers, what is the likelihood of a person who violates their order actually being arrested? I also suggest that victims of stalking will not feel safer simply because their stalker has been given a court order.

What makes this even worse is that there is a very real possibility that a person who breaks the terms of their suspended sentence order will still not receive a custodial sentence. Although the automatic presumption will not apply in that case, the Government have opposed Conservative amendments to explicitly exempt people with a history of non-compliance from suspended sentences. They have also resisted our amendments to exempt repeat offenders from being handed suspended sentences.

Under this Government’s legislation, there is a very real possibility that a stalker could continually stalk their victim, break their stalking protection order and their suspended sentence order and never face jail time. That is not protecting victims. Against this backdrop, I suggest that it does not matter what we do in this place regarding stalking; we can table all the amendments we like to toughen up the protection orders, but they will not protect victims or prevent stalkers if the Government let than walk free. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, did not have much to say about what is in this Bill. He has opportunities to talk about another Bill; let him do that at another time. I am talking about this Bill. He never mentioned what was going on in this Bill, the measures within it or, indeed, the amendments before us in his opening contribution—not a single word. Maybe he should reflect on that, because he has not endeared himself to me in these discussions.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Do I ever?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord asks, “Do I ever?”—he does occasionally, and I will give him the benefit of the doubt, but I was not really impressed that he did not say one single word about what is currently before the Committee. Let us have a discussion about the Sentencing Bill with my noble friends Lady Levitt and Lord Timpson another time. That is being completed. Anyway, let us leave that to one side.

I hope to be helpful in part to the noble Baronesses and others who have spoken. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing their experience, their views and their passion for this subject to this debate. A number of amendments are before the Committee. As I said, I hope to be helpful in part on some of them.

Amendments 330A, 330AZA, 330AA, 330AB, 330B and 330C all relate to stalking protection orders, which, as Members know, are civil orders introduced in 2020 to protect victims of stalking. Amendment 330A in the name of my noble friend Lady Royall seeks to reference explicitly the required civil burden of proof—that is, on the balance of probabilities—for determining whether the behaviour of a person to be made subject to a stalking protection order amounts to acts associated with stalking. Currently, statutory guidance for the police published by the Home Office references that it is likely the courts will apply the civil burden of proof when considering stalking protection orders, but I agree with my noble friend that there could be a case for making this clearer. I therefore undertake to consider her proposals in Amendment 330A ahead of the next stage on the Bill. I hope that helps the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who also spoke on this matter and my noble friend.

I am grateful for Amendment 330AA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am particularly grateful to her for drawing her personal experience to the attention of the Committee. I had not realised the traumas that she had had in the run up to the 2010 election, but I had a quick chance to google those matters while she was speaking. It looks like it was an appalling experience. I am grateful to her for bringing it to the attention of the Committee.

The noble Baroness’s proposal in Amendment 330AA would remove the requirement for the restrictions in SPOs to avoid, where possible, conflict with the defendant’s religious beliefs and interference with their attendance at work or at an educational establishment. On this occasion, I understand the noble Baroness’s view that this could be brought out in statutory guidance, but it is our view in the Home Office that it is important to retain this within primary legislation, particularly regarding an individual’s rights through the European Convention on Human Rights, especially Article 9 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, so I am afraid I cannot help her on that one.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that intervention, and I will certainly discuss those suggestions and points with colleagues from the police. The current statutory guidance for police on SPOs includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions, many of which could align with Amendment 330AZA. For example, the guidance could include prohibitions on contacting the victim or referring to the victim on social media, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, the statutory guidance for the police on DAPOs also includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions. It may well be that the points the noble Lord has mentioned are covered in that, but I will happily reflect on what he said.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

I am sure my noble friend is correct that it is, or should be, covered in guidance, but patently the judge looking at the case that I mentioned was not aware of this and said the fact that the victim had been contacted via LinkedIn was not something he could take a view on. He did not know that this was something he could take a view on. I am grateful to my noble friend for ensuring that the guidance is properly looked at.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful again to my noble friend for referring to the LinkedIn experience. My assessment, having discussed this with officials and with my colleague Ministers, is that the statutory guidance for police includes prohibitions on contacting the victim by any means, including social media. If my noble friend will let me, I will reflect on what she has said today, and I will discuss again with officials whether the guidance in its current format is sufficient to cover that point. That is my understanding, and I think it is a reasonable understanding to put before the Committee today.

Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would replace the power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on stalking with a duty to do so. This would align the provision on guidance with the Stalking Protection Act 2019 and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, supported the general direction of travel that the noble Baroness brought forward in her amendment. I agree that it is important, where appropriate, to ensure that legislative provisions tackling violence against women and girls are consistent. Accordingly, this is an amendment that I am happy to take away for further consideration and to discuss with officials.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I think the key question is why it is acceptable that there are different rules for “may” and “must” between this and domestic abuse protection orders.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If the noble Baroness will allow me, we have agreed that we will take Amendment 330C away and have a look at it. That is not a guarantee that we will do something with it, but it is an opportunity to reflect on it. She can examine what, if anything, the Government do, and she can determine whether to table it again on Report.

Amendment 330B, again tabled by my noble friend Lady Royall, would introduce a stalking protection notice that could be imposed by a police superintendent. I think my noble friend’s motivation is to ensure that swift action can be taken. However, on reflection we view that introducing such a notice would potentially put further complexity into the legislative framework without significantly improving protection for victims. We also need to consider the proportionality of a police-issued notice backed by a criminal offence of breach that denies the respondent the opportunity to argue their case before an independent judicial tribunal. Failure to comply with a police-issued domestic abuse protection notice is not a criminal offence for this reason.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, tabled Amendment 331, which would provide a statutory review of the effectiveness of two stalking offences, and Amendment 332, which seeks to provide a statutory review of stalking awareness guidance. I hope the noble Baroness can accept—this goes to points that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend have also mentioned—that work is currently being undertaken on both these issues. In December 2024 we announced six new measures to tackle stalking, including a commitment to review the criminal law on stalking contained in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. As a number of speakers have referenced, we have already appointed Richard Wright KC to lead the review. It is intended to be completed by the end of March 2026. We have given a timetable. I do not think it is right and proper that we change that timetable now, as a number of noble Lords suggested. The review will consider measures to achieve clarity in the legislation. On completion of the review, the Home Secretary will consider the findings and recommendations before determining next steps, potentially including further legislation. I hope that helps the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

There are a number of government amendments to the provisions in Clause 99. We have done this with guidance from stakeholders in the criminal justice system. Government Amendments 330AZB to 330AZE and 330AE clarify the process for appealing the making of a stalking order. Our Amendments 330AC and 330AD provide for applications to vary, renew or discharge a stalking protection order and avoid applications having to be heard by a higher court. Amendments 330BA, 330D, 522A and 547A extend the provisions in Clauses 97, 98 and 100 to Northern Ireland to allow the courts in Northern Ireland to make stalking protection orders. They have been introduced in conjunction with the Department of Justice and allow it to issue guidance to the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The changes have been brought forward in amendment form at the request of the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland.

I hope I have been able to assist in part my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Russell—and Lady Doocey. I undertake to examine Amendments 330A and 330C further ahead of the next stage. On that basis, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

330AZB: Clause 97, page 124, line 14, at end insert—
“(za) in subsection (1)(a) after “order” insert “by a magistrates’ court, a youth court or the Crown Court””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the cases in which an appeal against the making of a stalking protection order can be brought under section 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

330AC: Clause 98, page 127, line 20, leave out from “by” to “a” in line 23
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment to inserted section 364D of the Sentencing Code, together with my amendment to clause 98, page 127, line 35, provides for applications to vary, renew or discharge a stalking protection order made by any court other than a magistrates’ or youth court to be made to the Crown Court.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

330BA: After Clause 98, insert the following new Clause—
“Stalking protection orders: Northern Ireland(1) The Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)) is amended as follows.(2) In section 6 (meaning of act associated with stalking and risk associated with stalking), in subsection (1) for “7” substitute “6A”.(3) After section 6 insert—“Meaning of “stalking protection order”(1) In this Act “stalking protection order” means an order under this Act which, for the purpose of preventing a person from carrying out acts associated with stalking—(a) prohibits the person from doing anything described in the order, or(b) requires the person to do anything described in the order.(2) This Act provides for the making of a stalking protection order—(a) on an application under section 7, or(b) where a person is acquitted of an offence, successfully appeals against a conviction for an offence, is dealt with in respect of certain findings or is convicted of an offence (see section 8(1)).”(4) In section 7 (applications for orders) omit subsection (1).(5) In section 8 (power to make orders)—(a) for subsection (1) substitute—“(1) This section applies in respect of a person (“D”) where—(a) the Chief Constable has applied under section 7 to a court of summary jurisdiction for a stalking protection order against D,(b) D is acquitted of an offence by or before a court,(c) a court allows D’s appeal against a conviction for an offence,(d) a court deals with D in respect of a finding that—(i) D is not guilty of an offence by reason of insanity, or(ii) D is under a disability and has done the act charged against D in respect of an offence, or(e) D has been convicted of an offence and a court deals with D for the offence.”;(b) in subsection (2), in the words before paragraph (a), for “the order” substitute “a stalking protection order”. (6) In section 10 (variations, renewals and discharges)—(a) in subsection (1), for “a court of summary jurisdiction” substitute “an appropriate court”;(b) after subsection (3) insert—“(4) In subsection (1) “appropriate court” means—(a) where the stalking protection order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction other than a youth court, a court of summary jurisdiction which is not a youth court;(b) where the stalking protection order was made by a youth court—(i) if the defendant is under the age of 18 when the application for variation, renewal or discharge is made, a youth court;(ii) if the defendant is aged 18 or over at the time the application for variation, renewal or discharge is made, a court of summary jurisdiction which is not a youth court;(c) where the stalking protection order was made by any other court, the Crown Court.(5) For the purposes of subsection (4)—(a) a stalking protection order made by a court on an appeal is to be treated as made by the court whose decision was appealed against;(b) a stalking protection order that is confirmed, varied or renewed on an appeal remains an order of the court that first made it (or, if it was made on an appeal, the court that is treated as having made it under paragraph (a)).”(7) In section 11 (interim stalking protection orders), in subsection (2), after “application” in the first place it occurs insert “under section 7”.(8) In section 12 (procedure)—(a) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) An application to the Crown Court under section 10 is to be made in accordance with Crown Court rules.”;(b) in subsection (5) omit “10 or”.(9) After section 12 insert—“Appeals(1) Where a stalking protection order is made in the circumstances mentioned in section 8(1)(b), (c) or (d), D may appeal against the making of the order as if—(a) D had been convicted of the offence and,(b) the order were a sentence passed on D for the offence by the court which made the order,(if an appeal would lie against such a sentence).(2) Where a stalking protection order is made in the circumstances mentioned in section 8(1)(e), D may appeal against the making of the order as if the order were a sentence passed on D for the offence by the court which made the order (if an appeal would lie against such a sentence).(3) The following may appeal against a decision under section 10 made by the Crown Court—(a) the person against whom the stalking protection order in question was made;(b) the Chief Constable.(4) An appeal under subsection (3) is to be made to the Court of Appeal, and may be made only with the permission of that court.(5) On an appeal under this section, the court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and (b) such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.(6) For appeals against decisions of a court of summary jurisdiction on an application under section 7, 10 or 11, see Article 143 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26) (appeal to county court against proceedings on complaint).”(10) In section 21 (interpretation)—(a) in the definition of “stalking protection order”, for “section 7(1)” substitute “section 6A(1)”;(b) at the end insert—““youth court” has the meaning given by section 12.”(11) In section 20(3) (report on the operation of Act)—(a) in paragraph (b) omit “and the number of orders made under section 8”;(b) after paragraph (b) insert—“(ba) the number of stalking protection orders made under each paragraph of section 8(1);”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision extending the power of courts in Northern Ireland to make stalking protection orders at the end of criminal proceedings, similar to the provision made for England and Wales by clauses 97 and 98.

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Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

330D: After Clause 100, insert the following new Clause—
“Guidance about disclosure of information by police: Northern IrelandIn the Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)), in section 17—(a) in subsection (2) for “this section” substitute “subsection (1)”;(b) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable about the disclosure of police information for the purpose of protecting persons from risks associated with stalking.(2B) The Chief Constable must have regard to guidance issued under subsection (2A).”;(c) in subsection (3) for “subsection (1)” substitute “this section”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This clause requires the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to issue guidance to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland about disclosure of police information about stalking.