Offshore Patrol Vessels

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 22nd October 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, our plans to withdraw the Batch 1 River-class offshore patrol vessels from service have yet to be finalised. Our decision will be informed by the outcome of cross-government discussions to determine our requirement for fisheries protection and compliance of patrols in UK waters following our exit from the EU. HMS “Severn” left service in December 2017 and is held alongside pending these deliberations.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his reply. Yesterday was of course the 213th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar—

[Lord West of Spithead]

A great hurrah! The Secretary of State wrote in a Sunday paper that Nelson would look at the modern Navy with great pride and amazement. I think the amazement would be because he said that the Navy was growing, but it is not. Nelson had 280 frigates and we have 13, so I find that difficult to imagine.

The Minister touched on one area where there is real concern: our exclusive economic zone and territorial seas. We do not have enough assets there. Here is a wonderful opportunity to increase the number of ships available to look after those waters at a very low cost. They could be manned by the RNR and we would achieve something rather than just talking about it. Does he agree?

[Earl Howe]

I am sure that the noble Lord will acknowledge the extent of the investment devoted to the Royal Navy over the past few years. His point is a good one. The watchword in this context is “flexibility”. The programme to replace the Royal Navy’s offshore patrol vessels is continuing; the Batch 1 vessels will be replaced by the Batch 2 ships as they enter service. It is important that we keep open the possibility of extending the service of and/or keeping in reserve HMS “Clyde” or HMS “Mersey”, for example, to meet any requirements emerging from not only Brexit but other contingencies. That is what we intend to do.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

If the patrol vessels are to work in the EEZ, which would be highly desirable, there are of course multifarious parties and agencies that also work there—the Navy, the Border Force, customs, Defra, HMRC and so forth. Which government department has the overall lead on such matters as command and control, training and funding for the activities that will be done in the EEZ?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there are two key requirements to ensure the security of our waters. One is that operations need to be intelligence-led, and the other is that they should be well co-ordinated—the noble and gallant Lord makes an excellent point. In the protection of our borders, the capability to detect and deter vessels and aircraft approaching the UK is just one part of a multilayered approach that the Government take in protecting our country. The Ministry of Defence is just one organisation with a role in this. It is important though to recognise the importance of co-ordination. That is why the permanent Joint Maritime Operations Coordination Centre exists—to deliver a national and international focal point for home waters maritime security and planning. The key is for all agencies to work together in a concerted fashion.

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

Is my noble friend aware that I have a special interest in this matter? I think I was the Minister who ordered the original 11 River-class minesweepers, of which now apparently four remain. What has happened to the other seven?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, they have been decommissioned. In congratulating my noble friend on the foresight that he showed in commissioning those vessels, I hope he will be reassured by my initial Answer—that we are maintaining flexibility to cope with unforeseen contingencies.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

Is this issue part of the defence modernisation programme, which is of course a defence review by another name? The results of that review were promised in June this year. So far, no results have been published. What is the reason for the delay, and when will the results be announced?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Defence Secretary published a Written Ministerial Statement on 19 July, as the noble Lord will be aware. It set out the headline conclusions of the modernising defence programme. I know that noble Lords were slightly disappointed with that Statement. We had hoped that it would be informative and reassuring—we had certainly intended it to be so. It confirmed the direction of travel; it described the work done to date; it set out some headline conclusions. Strictly speaking, the matter of the offshore patrol vessels is not part of that but, as I have explained, it is important to prepare now for the contingencies that may ensue from Brexit.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, how many of these ships will protect our fishing fleet after Brexit at any one time? After all, we are taking back all these waters and presumably clawing back the allocation of catches from the Spanish and everybody else.

[Earl Howe]

As we speak, the Marine Management Organisation within Defra is making a full assessment of the scale and volume of both sea-based and non-seaboard patrol and surveillance capability required after we leave the EU. This is the key point for us to focus on. The Ministry of Defence and other agencies are tracking this work, but it is important to remember that fisheries protection is multilayered. It is not just the Royal Navy that enforces protection. The Marine Management Organisation relies on a lot of other systems to do that very thing.

[Lord Sterling of Plaistow (Con)]

My Lords, I have just flown in from New York, having attended Trafalgar Night on board the “Queen Elizabeth”. It was a most splendid occasion. We entertained the seniors of both the United States Navy and their Marine Corps. They could not have emphasised more their pride in having us as an ally, and everybody in this House can be very proud of the professionalism of all our sailors on board that ship. But when I asked the head of their navy, “Could you remind me how many people you have?”, he said, “363,000”. What was very clear was that they would like us to have greater capability. Do the Government recognise that, to keep this valuable friendship with the Americans, greater capability must be provided by the Government?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend will know that the national shipbuilding strategy recognises the need for greater volume in the destroyer and frigate force. The Type 31e will enable us to grow the size of the frigate force.

Armed Forces (Specified Aviation and Marine Functions) Regulations 2018

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 24 July be approved.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the background to this statutory instrument is as follows. At the moment, a commanding officer can require a person to take an alcohol or drug test if the commanding officer has reasonable cause to believe that they are committing a service offence by performing a safety-critical duty while over a set alcohol limit, or impaired by drugs or alcohol. A commanding officer has similar powers if they believe that a civilian subject to service discipline has committed similar offences under legislation relating to safety in shipping and civil aviation. This power and the linked offences help deter or detect the misuse of alcohol or drugs by those performing safety-critical duties, and so help prevent accidents. However, these powers are aimed at gathering evidence for a possible prosecution, hence the need for a commanding officer to have “reasonable cause to believe” that an offence has been committed.

When an accident happens, it may be important to determine whether anyone involved had been misusing alcohol or drugs, even if the commanding officer does not have any immediate cause to believe that an offence has been committed. Section 2 of the Armed Forces Act 2016 amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to allow a commanding officer to also require a member of the Armed Forces, or a civilian subject to service discipline, to co-operate with a preliminary test for drugs or alcohol after an accident. Importantly, in these circumstances a person may be tested without the need for suspicion that an offence has been committed. This gives commanding officers the power to test those who performed aviation or marine functions relating to an aircraft or ship involved in an accident. They also apply to anyone who performed a safety-critical function connected to any serious accident. “Serious” in this context means an accident which resulted in or created a risk of death or serious injury to any person, serious damage to any property or serious environmental harm. This will improve our investigations of such accidents.

It is important that accidents in the military environment are investigated thoroughly with a view to contributory factors being identified and appropriate punitive or remedial action being taken. The test will be carried out by the service police, and the results of a preliminary test can be used in support of criminal and non-criminal investigations. The tests will mainly support service inquiries, but they may be used in any type of investigation arising from an aviation or marine accident or any other serious accident. The relevant aviation and marine functions must be specified by regulations made under the amendments in the 2006 Act. The safety-critical functions are already set out in the existing offences and powers that I mentioned.

The draft regulations we are considering today specify these aviation and marine functions and are based largely on existing safety-critical duties relating to aviation or shipping. The duties specified in the regulations reflect the wide range of duties undertaken in a military environment that are linked to aircraft or ships: for instance, maintenance; acting as crew on an aircraft or ship; loading and unloading fuel, cargo and weapons; and conducting hazardous operations such as parachuting or diving. The duties specified in regulations include similar functions carried out by civilians subject to service discipline. This would include, for example, any civilian working on an aircraft or ship overseas.

In the event of an accident, a commanding officer may require a person to co-operate with preliminary testing if he or she was carrying out, or had carried out, a specified function at the time of—or in some situations before—the accident. As I said, the testing will be carried out by the service police. It will be an offence for an individual without reasonable excuse to fail to provide a sample when required to do so. Reasonable excuse could include, for example, a medical condition that prevented a person from providing a breath sample.

We hope, of course, that serious accidents will not happen and that there will be no need to apply these regulations. But the very nature of military activity is, by necessity, dangerous, and our people are exposed frequently to risk. It is important that, in the event of a serious accident, we uncover whether alcohol or drugs may have contributed to the cause of an accident to enable appropriate corrective action to be taken. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I was nominated to speak from the Front Bench this evening and have very little to say on this matter. The regulations seem to be admirably sensible and not overly draconian. In civilian life, if there were an accident in a similar situation, one would expect to be breathalysed. Therefore, we on these Benches have nothing to add.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the Armed Forces have come a long way on this issue of alcohol and drugs. The railway industry faced this challenge some 20 years ago and the position that the Armed Forces have reached is very similar. I sense that there is an ongoing significant challenge in the military. I do not have statistical data but if one wanders through Google and looks at the events there was certainly the tragic event of the submarine that highlighted these cultural problems.

The Minister’s speech tonight was a great deal better than the EM, because I think that I understand the regulations now. It seems to me that this statutory instrument is virtually identical to another one that covered the suspected offence side of it, and this is really just a matter of writing it across—I do not know whether there are any detailed differences.

The regulations essentially state that if one is doing any of these activities one must have alcohol levels below the specified limits. That leaves me with one question, which we wrestled with in the railway industry but is a good deal more acute in the military. That is a situation where an individual is not performing one of these activities—the most obvious example is the captain of a ship—because he is not the officer on watch. He is actually in his bunk asleep after an interesting night out. His subordinate drives the thing into another ship. There is instantly an incident, at which point, presumably, the captain would take command. There must be parallel situations in the Army, and perhaps, although less likely, in the Air Force. Are we clear about our expectations of these individuals who are on duty but not actively performing a task? Do we expect them at all times to maintain their lifestyles so that they are below the appropriate limits?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their comments and I am glad that they are supportive of these regulations, which I hope they will agree are fairly uncontroversial in their content.

The particular question that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, posed, is an interesting one. It is one that I have discussed with my officials. The short answer is that it would very much depend on the circumstances of the situation as to whether the captain of a ship would be tested for drugs or alcohol after a particular accident took place and he or she were away from the bridge when the accident occurred. The key point, however, is that the powers commit a commanding officer to order a test if he or she has reasonable cause to believe that a person was carrying out a safety-critical function or duty at the time of the accident or had carried out a safety-critical function or duty before the accident.

In the example that the noble Lord suggested, the captain will still have command of the ship and he or she may have given orders for the control or navigation of the ship before repairing to their cabin—let us imagine that situation. It would largely depend on the circumstances of that order and whether the person to whom the order was given was a fit and responsible person and in a fit condition to accept the responsibility. However, I can imagine a situation where a captain was away from the bridge following an accident and was not, so to speak, in the line of fire when it came to taking a drug or alcohol test, but where a commanding officer might feel that it was prudent for the captain to take such a test. It would be very much back to the test that I have just articulated if a commanding officer has reasonable cause to believe that any given individual was involved in a safety-critical function.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I will explain my point just a little more. I am concerned not so much about the test as about what the Navy’s expectation is of a commanding officer. It seems to me that there is an implication that he should, in all circumstances, maintain a lifestyle whereby he is under the limit. Certainly in my organisation—fortunately, we did not have the same commanding officer situation—we did have a level of management where we ran a roster to make sure that we always had a sober general manager to handle any situation. The noble Lord probably cannot answer now, but I would have thought that there was an implied moral obligation that the senior person at sea, the captain, should maintain a situation below these limits.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. He will see that in the regulations officers may be tested—they are one of the groups of people who can test. The alcohol limits for prescribed safety-critical duties have been set at two levels, higher and lower. The limits will not be amended by these changes. The majority of safety-critical duties correspond to the higher alcohol level for testing of breath, blood or urine; the lower levels apply to safety-critical duties that require a heightened speed of reaction in an emergency situation, such as aviation or carrying a loaded weapon.

I would not dissent from the noble Lord’s statement. He is absolutely right that the captain of a ship, to take that example, bears responsibility for the safety of the ship and its crew in all circumstances, which is why we have seen captains—on rare occasions—court-martialled for an accident that has occurred, even though the captain has sometimes not personally been on board the ship. I come back again to the point I made at the beginning: it would depend on the judgment of the person investigating the accident immediately after the event as to who was tested or not.

I hope that is helpful. If I can amplify those comments in a letter in any way, I shall certainly do so. In the meantime, I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Armed Forces (Terms of Service) (Amendments Relating to Flexible Working) Regulations 2018

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 18 July be approved.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the instrument that we are considering today will make consequential changes to the terms of service regulations for regular personnel in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Army and Royal Air Force. The changes are necessary to enable defence to operate and manage part-time service and restricted separation service, described collectively as “flexible service”, from 1 April 2019.

As noble Lords will recall, in February this year, the Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Act 2018 became law. In the informative and productive debates that we held in the lead-up to Royal Assent, it became clear that there was a genuine desire to understand how flexible service will operate legally, fairly and efficiently for our people and their families, who will benefit from these new opportunities, and for the chain of command, who will manage them while continuing to deliver operational capability. Indeed, I recall that when we were debating the flexible working Bill some noble Lords used the phrase “the devil will be in the detail”. The Government have acknowledged the desire to scrutinise the fine detail that will enable flexible service to operate. Accordingly, today we are introducing an important piece of secondary legislation that provides that detail.

We have worked with the Armed Forces to ensure that while the changes introduced by the instrument will usher in new, modern opportunities for our people, they are at the same time balanced with the need to protect the Armed Forces’ ability to deliver operational capability. This, we are clear, must be our red line. I hope this and the debate that follows will assure noble Lords that the MoD has appropriately balanced the overriding need to maintain the operational capability of our Armed Forces with the need to support those who deliver it, and their families, with opportunities to take flexible service.

I draw the House’s attention to some of the main content of the instrument. It enables regular service personnel to serve on a part-time basis. It also enables them to restrict the number of days for which they can be required to serve away from their home base—up to 35 days in any 12-month period. The instrument sets out the overall time limits for periods of flexible service and the flexible service application process, which has been designed to be fair and efficient. It enables service personnel to apply voluntarily for flexible service and empowers the service to consider applications. However, it does not guarantee that an application will always be successful. In addition, the instrument outlines the actions required by each party during the application process. Importantly, the process is designed to ensure that service personnel cannot have flexible service terms imposed on them.

There may be occasions when, a flexible service arrangement having been agreed, circumstances require changes to be made to the arrangement, either permanently or for a specific period. We have therefore set out the conditions under which a flexible service arrangement may be varied, suspended or terminated. In the interests of national security, we conclude that in extremis it is essential for the services to be able to recall personnel back to their full-time duties immediately, either as a permanent termination of the flexible service arrangement or a temporary suspension of it. However, this will only be used sparingly, and only where a 90 days’ notice period would have an unacceptable impact. Individuals will also be able to terminate their arrangement with 90 days’ notice, or to apply to suspend or vary it.

We want to give service personnel as much certainty as possible over any flexible service arrangement that they enter into. Otherwise they will not apply, if they feel an arrangement is likely to be cancelled without warning or explanation. However, we are very clear that this must be balanced with service need above all else. We recognise that service personnel may not always get the outcome they had hoped for when applying for flexible service; therefore, we judge it right and fair that we make provision for an appeals process in the instrument. However, the scope of any appeal will be limited to requesting that the appeals authority reconsider the decision that the serviceperson is unhappy with. Service personnel will be limited to one appeal against a decision. Outside of this process they will retain their normal access to the Service Complaints system.

As noble Lords will note, the working detail beneath the main headlines that I have outlined ensures that we achieve our main policy aim effectively and fairly—that is, to give our people access to new, modern, flexible service opportunities, but at the same time recognising that maintaining operational effectiveness is paramount.

My Lords, the House’s approval of this legislation will be a key step in the journey towards the introduction of flexible service on 1 April 2019. As well as the primary purpose of making changes to the Armed Forces terms of service regulations, it will also enable the finalisation of some other important related activities. These include, first, the amendment of subordinate Armed Forces regulations; secondly, the publication of a suite of policy guidance material for those who may consider applying for flexible service and those who will administer it; and thirdly, our ongoing comprehensive communications campaign, which will promote and explain flexible service but also manage expectations and not over-sell it.

All this activity, together with other consequential changes to Armed Forces pension scheme and compensation scheme legislation, and the changes we need to make to our IT systems to enable flexible service to operate, are firmly on track for delivery in time for launch on 1 April 2019.

To conclude, noble Lords have already demonstrated their overwhelming support for the concept of flexible service. Today we can crystallise that support by approving the detail that will make flexible service a welcome reality for our Armed Forces, who continue to serve us with distinction around the world, often in challenging circumstances. I beg to move.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, with his usual skill and clarity my noble friend the Minister has made more or less the same points that were made when we debated this matter during consideration of the primary legislation. I am entirely happy with his Motion. What I do not understand is why noble Lords opposite, and your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, sought the affirmative procedure for this very minor matter. Noble Lords should be aware that Ministers have the power to make much more significant changes to the terms and conditions of service than these very minor flexibilities. I hope the Opposition Front Bench have some substantive points or questions that are relevant to the regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we will, of course, support these regulations. I fear the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has in many ways the wrong challenge. The requirement that these be subject to an affirmative order has an effect that one comes across again and again in complex organisations: the knowledge that something will be scrutinised at the highest level produces very high-quality work. One of the key factors noticeable in these regulations—I take them together with the notes for the service personnel who will use them—is that virtually every question left unanswered in the primary legislation has been answered in them. Therefore, I welcome and support them. I have only one question related directly to the regulations, which is about the reporting procedure: will the frequency of their use be reported in the public domain, and if so, where?

The problem of being a Minister in your Lordships’ House is that nobody is here to enforce the rules. Accordingly, I looked at the Explanatory Memorandum to see if I could find something to say. I noted that one reason for these rules was to improve recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces. Essentially, it was an important piece of morale-boosting, which this Government certainly need. Total outflow from the Armed Forces has exceeded intake every year since 2011. I looked into this a little bit further; the way to find out what morale is like in the Armed Forces is to go to the regular Armed Forces continuous attitude survey. It is a brilliant document in terms of information—and a deeply depressing one for anybody who reads it. I will quote one or two statistics from it: satisfaction with pay has gone from 52% in 2010 to 31% now; satisfaction with service life in general has decreased—among both officers and other ranks—from its peak of 61% in 2009 to 41% now.

Dissatisfaction has been particularly acute in the Royal Marines. Members of this House have fought a little battle to keep ships retained for the use of the Royal Marines, yet we find that service morale among officers—that is, ratings for high morale—has gone from 64% two years ago to 23%; for other ranks, it has gone from 32% two years ago to a staggeringly low 9% now. I would defend the right of the Minister not to respond to this, but I hope he will rise to the occasion and give us some indication of how this crisis is being addressed. I put it to him that one of the reasons is leadership—I am not talking about people in uniform; I am talking about the politicians. SDSR 2015, which was published on 23 November 2015, promised annual reviews. That was a good thing, as I think it has emerged that the SDSR was underfunded.

The Government met their commitment and, roughly a year after that publication, they produced an annual review—the first annual report. The second annual report should have been published on 23 November 2017 but it was overtaken by, of all things, a review by the Cabinet Office. There must have been some squabbling because that metamorphosed into something called the Modernising Defence Programme. We were told that its main points would be published by the time of the NATO summit of 2018, and indeed we got a letter from the noble Earl. As ever, it read brilliantly the first time—these letters are always well drafted—but the second time you read it through you realised that it said absolutely nothing. There was not a single concrete piece of action in it.

If the noble Earl wants to rise to the occasion, I hope he will say when we will see real progress on the review and when the Armed Forces will recognise that they have a serious morale problem, with a programme to address it directly. Although I have served in the VR, I am not a military man in the sense that I have not served full time or been presented with any hostile forces, but I have talked to a lot of people who have. My summary of what they have said to me is: if you want effective forces, you have to have leadership, equipment, training and morale. These are not additives; they are multiplicities, and if any of them is at a low level, that affects all of them and you have wasted your money. We are not at all happy with the equipment area or the training area, and now we are not at all happy with the morale area, and I hope that the Minister will be generous enough to provide some answers.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in response to the introduction that I gave. Beginning with my noble friend Lord Attlee, whom I thank for his supportive comments, I think it is fair to say that Ministers felt duty-bound to respond to the recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee to make these regulations affirmative. One reason that the committee felt as it did was that there would be a great deal of significant detail and that would really matter in the way that the arrangements were rolled out. I hope that, in common with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, noble Lords will feel that, having read the statutory instrument, the devil is absent from the detail. Indeed, I hope that the Archangel Gabriel has exercised an influence on it, not least in the way it is expressed, which, as the noble Baroness helpfully said, is designed to be as clear as possible.

Perhaps I may turn to the questions put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. First, on whether and to what extent we will publish the statistics relating to take-up after the scheme is launched, initially and going forward we will capture this type of data on our internal systems for analysis purposes and make adjustments where necessary. We do not plan to report publicly on the numbers who take up flexible service in the early years following the launch of these new opportunities. As we have said previously, a more valuable measure of the effectiveness of flexible service will be the long-term effect on recruitment and retention. That is the principal aim of these new policies.

The numbers who initially take up these opportunities will be modest. I have no doubt that they will grow over time but I think they will grow slowly. We envisage that it is unlikely that they will account for more than 1% of individuals—approximately 1,400—so we want to avoid undue focus on numbers for numbers’ sake. We feel that regular collating of external reporting information on such a small cohort would not be particularly beneficial. Having said that, we have pledged to report on the introduction of flexible service in the Armed Forces covenant annual report. If in future we have meaningful data on take-up, we will include it. We will of course provide information in the normal way in response to external ad hoc requests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Craig of Radley]

Will the pensions and pay abatement regulations be put before Parliament or will they just be handled internally? In order to avoid any delay, perhaps the noble Earl would like to write to me?

[Earl Howe]

My understanding is that they will not be put before Parliament, and that they will be administrative arrangements and not the subject of regulations. If I am wrong about that, I will certainly correct myself in a letter.

Motion agreed.

Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigate

Earl Howe Excerpts

Thursday 6th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they still plan to have the first Type 31e frigate in Royal Naval service by 2023.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, there has been no change in the Government’s plans to procure a first batch of five new Type 31e frigates. We still want the first ship to enter service by the end of 2023, with all five ships delivered by the end of 2028.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I thank the noble Earl for his Answer—in “Yes, Minister” terms, he is very brave to make that statement. Our great maritime nation has 13 ageing frigates, which is a national disgrace. Replacing them is crucially important. The first design contract for the Type 26 frigate, the key replacement, was placed in 2005, and the first one will be delivered in 2024 or 2025, some 14 or 15 years later—a very long time. The Type 31e does not as yet have any contractors, designers or orders, yet we are saying that it will take four years. I hope that the Minister is right—that would be wonderful—but I am concerned. Is it not time to push the Type 26 programme to get these ships delivered more quickly, and to order the remaining five of them, in order to get a steady drum beat of orders that will drive the cost of the Type 26 ships down? A number of people in the Treasury would like to see that happen.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Type 26 programme is proceeding at pace, on time and on budget so far. The point that the noble Lord makes, about ordering all Type 26 ships in one go, might not be the right way to get value for money. If we had done that in the first instance, it is arguable that we would have overpriced the contract, because Australia has since come in with a firm order for Type 26 frigates. We are sure that this will play very favourably into the price of our next order for the Type 26.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Earl’s reply to the noble Lord a few moments ago was, to say the least, concise. He failed, however, to point out that the contract for the Type 31 has been restarted. Part of the problem, as the Government have indicated in their reason for restarting, is that the bids that were received were “not compliant”. I understand that to mean that the capability that the Government seek is not deliverable at the price of £250 million per ship. On that basis, the Government have a choice to make: either to reduce the capability or to increase the price. Unless they do one of those things, the exports on which the Government have set great store will not be achieved.

[Earl Howe]

I hope to reassure the noble Lord on those points. The contracts that were being competed for, and which have now been recommenced, were to pay for a series of design deliverables to support the main procurement contract; they were not the main assessment of industry’s ability to deliver the manufacture programme. We still believe that industry will be able to meet that challenge, and the procurement process, despite having been recommenced, is now proceeding at pace.

[Lord Clark of Windermere (Lab)]

My Lords, is the Minister really confident that the 31e will be in service by 2023—in just over four years’ time? Can he give us any example of the Royal Navy ordering a ship that has not yet been designed and picking it up in four years?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this is the first warship design and build programme for which the UK has competed in a generation, but based on our understanding of the market, which has developed considerably since this time last year during all the engagement with industry that we have enjoyed, we believe that industry can rise to that challenge. We are committed to starting the new procurement, as I say, at pace.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the general thrust of the Question from the noble Lord, Lord West. Clearly, the Royal Navy and the fleet at its disposal is far smaller than it has ever been in peacetime before. This is a national embarrassment, which our allies are picking up on. Is it, however, not a reflection on the size of our overall defence budget? We have never spent as little as 2% of GDP on our defence. Is there not surely a rising case to increase the size of the defence budget not only for the benefit of the Royal Navy but for the other two services as well?

[Earl Howe]

I greatly respect the noble Lord’s point of view, but I humbly suggest that we should not get too distracted by percentages. We need to look at the threats and make sure that we have the right capabilities to deal with them. That work is ongoing through the modernising defence programme. We continue to have one of the largest defence budgets in the world, and it is growing by £1 billion a year.

[Lord Sterling of Plaistow (Con)]

My Lords, I have just come back from the conference in Portsmouth with the First Sea Lord yesterday. I have been to many of these and I found it inspiring because, for the first time, with all the younger officers there, the climate of interest in changing the culture and delivering that is dramatically different from what it has been during the last two or three years. It really was something you could capture. The Second Sea Lord, who has the responsibility of delivering the Type 31 ships, has no illusions as to what needs to be done. He made the point, which I totally agree with, that you have to make the best use of the money you have actually got and not just pile more money on top of it. We need more money in practice and perhaps the Minister would be kind enough to ask again because, over and above what is being done—I think they will deliver that on time—the key, as has just been said, is that we need it to enlarge the whole capability of our armed response.

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend speaks with considerable authority on this matter. The modernising defence programme is about making our Armed Forces more capable, against the harder threats that we now face, and it is looking at how best we can use our growing budget to that effect.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this Question prompted me to look at the National Shipbuilding Strategy, whose first birthday is today. When it was published a year ago, it was meant to be a solid basis for industry to develop. It is interesting to see how it is starting to erode. Paragraph 56 said of the Type 31e ships:

“The first will be in service by 2023”,


but “by 2023” means during 2022. The Minister has just answered a similar question by saying that it will be by the end of 2023. This is the first incremental crumble in the strategy. In paragraph 61, the strategy said:

“We have set a maximum £250 million per ship price for the Type 31e”.


Are either of those statements still sound, or is this one year-old strategy going to crumble incrementally, like all the strategies before it?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, our target dates have not changed, as I have already said, and we still believe that industry can deliver all five Type 31e frigates at a price of £1.25 billion. The national shipbuilding strategy is an overarching strategy for the future of naval ship-building in the UK over the next 30 years, and is much wider than the procurement of a particular class of ship. Type 31e is a pathfinder project for a new way of procuring warships, and we are learning beneficially from those challenges.

Afghanistan Update

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 11th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made earlier today in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence announcing an uplift to UK troop numbers in Afghanistan. The Statement is as follows:

“The UK will never forget the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the thousands of innocent women, men and children killed in this atrocity. This barbaric violence prompted the UK, alongside our NATO allies, to enter Afghanistan to ensure that terrorists could never again use it as a base from which to attack our citizens at home or abroad.

Before I continue, I want to pay tribute to the efforts of tens of thousands of brave British men and women who have served in Afghanistan stretching back 16 years. We will never forget what they did there—particularly those 456 brave men and women who paid the ultimate price, as well as those who suffered life-changing injuries in the line of duty. Their service and sacrifice was not in vain.

As I saw for myself when I visited back in March, not only do millions of ordinary Afghans now have access to clean water, vital medicine and education, which would not have seemed possible less than 20 years ago; not only have they enabled the Afghan people to take charge of their own security; and not only is the capability of the Afghan national defence and security forces growing, but elections are giving a voice to the people of Afghanistan, who are increasingly calling for peace—something that would have seemed unthinkable a short time ago.

Our commitment to Afghanistan remains an enduring one. Although UK combat operations ended in 2014, our troops are playing a key role in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission by leading the Kabul Security Force. They are performing a vital role training, advising and assisting the Afghan army and air force, developing the nationwide security structures that will strengthen Afghanistan’s democracy. They have a Quick Reaction Force, which works alongside the Afghan national army to provide urgent help in Kabul when required.

They continue to work alongside their Afghan, Australian, New Zealand and Danish partners at the Army Officer Academy to mentor staff. Since opening in 2013, it has held its 11th graduation. More than 3,000 high-quality officers have passed out of this great institution, modelled on the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. They are making a genuine difference in helping the Afghan national defence and security forces maintain security and keep their citizens safe.

The momentum is with the Afghan forces, and the Taliban cannot militarily win. Ultimately, in the long-term, Afghanistan’s only chance for a better future is through a peaceful negotiation that is Afghan-led. Significant progress is already being made. The UK welcomes the Government of Afghanistan’s offer to start a discussion on a political process with the Taliban, supported by the recent ceasefire. It is encouraging to see bilateral relations with Pakistan improving, which helps build wider stability in the region. Critically, over the coming 12 months, parliamentary and presidential elections are planned, giving ordinary people the chance to shape their nation’s destiny for the better.

But despite the growing confidence of Afghan forces, atrocities such as the appalling attack against the Intercontinental Hotel at the start of the year, which killed 42 people, demonstrate that the insurgency has proven resilient. It still controls parts of Afghanistan and it continues to conduct brutal suicide attacks, killing innocent civilians. Of equal concern is the fact that terrorist groups such as Daesh are seeking a foothold in the region in order to conduct operations against Britain and other nations.

Given the upcoming elections and efforts by the Afghan Government to reach a political settlement, NATO has recognised that now is a critical time to give extra support. So today, in response to a NATO request, and in recognition of the professionalism and competence of our forces, I can announce that we will be increasing the number of troops to support our existing mission, sending an additional 440 personnel in non-combat roles to take the total UK contribution to around 1,100 personnel. This will make the UK the third largest troop contributor to the NATO operation. Around half of the 440 additional personnel will deploy in August; the remainder will follow no later than February 2019. The additional troops will initially deploy from the Welsh Guards, who already currently provide the UK’s contribution to the Kabul Security Force.

Today’s decision underlines our commitment to the people of Afghanistan. It will help strengthen the institutions that preserve Kabul’s security and enable the Afghan-led peace process to develop. It will send a signal to the Taliban that we will not abandon this proud nation; nor can they simply outwait our departure. It shows our commitment to NATO, which in a darker, more unpredictable world must remain the corner- stone of our defence. Above all, it reiterates Britain’s commitment to strengthen the security of our nation. History teaches us that the prize for a more secure Afghanistan is peace and security for all.

I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, and I echo the words of the Secretary of State and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, on the commitments that this country has made to Afghanistan and the tributes paid to the service men and women who have given their lives in Afghanistan.

This is clearly a serious decision that is being announced today. As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, pointed out, 440 service personnel is a significant number. It increases the personnel that we currently have in Afghanistan by two-thirds. It is noticeable that the decision has been made, we are told, in response to a NATO request, at the time of a NATO summit and on the eve of a visit by the President of the United States. What is not clear is when the request was made. When was the United Kingdom asked to make this additional commitment and when was the decision actually taken? Is the confluence of timings just ahead of the NATO summit intentional? Is it intended in any way to send a signal to the President of the United States that the United Kingdom at least is keeping up to its NATO targets?

There is a whole set of other issues associated with the nature of the contribution and some of the key decisions that need to be considered, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has pointed out, have not necessarily been answered in the Statement. How long is this additional deployment intended to be? We have been told that about half the troops are due to be deployed in August 2018 and the rest by February 2019, but we are not told how long this is intended to last. The more deployments that we have, the more questions there are about the sustainability of deployments and the pressures put on Her Majesty’s services. While we pay tribute to the service men and women who are deployed to Afghanistan and everywhere else around the world, there is a question of the impact that this will have on forces morale. Is the Minister content that the resources are there to ensure that this additional deployment can be managed? Can he tell us a little bit more about what the Government’s exit strategy might be?

Finally, the Secretary of State commented that this shows our commitment to NATO, which,

“must remain the cornerstone of our defence”.

Nobody in your Lordships’ House would disagree with that, but does the Minister think that the President of the United States feels similarly? What discussions might the Prime Minister have with the President to try to ensure that, by the end of this week, the United States’s commitment to NATO is strong as that of the United Kingdom?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for their support for this announcement and, indeed, for their well-directed questions. Some of the questions from both noble Lords coincided, and I shall attempt to address them all in turn.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me about the process that led to this decision. He is absolutely right to remind the House of the lessons from Chilcot, and that there needs to be a formal deliberative process across government for a decision as momentous as this—and that is indeed what happened. The UK was initially asked to consider this additional deployment in March of this year—that request came from NATO itself. We subsequently did so; that is to say, the Ministry of Defence considered the feasibility and a decision, following a discussion, was taken formally by the National Security Council on 26 June. It was then endorsed formally by the Treasury and by No. 10.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was again correct to make the point that the decision to do this was based not only on the fact that we thought it was the right thing for Afghanistan, for the UK and for NATO, but that it was intended—as I hope it will—to underline our commitment to NATO and the fact that Britain has particular skills that it can offer in a context such as this. I am sure that that message will not have been lost on any of our NATO partners.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, made the perfectly fair point that we will be sending troops into harm’s way. I would, however, just qualify that by making clear, as the Statement does, that the roles that are being and will be performed by our personnel in Afghanistan are non-combat roles. They are therefore quite distinct from the kind of role that we saw being performed under the ISAF banner before 2015, when our troops were very definitely on the front line against the Taliban. Chiefly, our troops will be charged with supplementing the Kabul defence force within Kabul itself. We have to remind ourselves that the NATO mission operates under the banner of “Train, Advise, Assist”. The UK contribution will therefore be to support that NATO mission but—to come back again to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—the safety and security of our troops remains, as it always will, our key priority. We keep the protection measures for our personnel under constant review and will not hesitate to adapt those measures to the changing threats. They are benefiting from bespoke equipment, such as the Foxhound armoured vehicle, which is suited to the streets of Kabul. Essentially, as far as force protection is concerned, our personnel are equipped and mandated to protect themselves, as well as to protect coalition and diplomatic personnel. It is the Afghan national defence and security forces which are responsible for maintaining security in Kabul.

Both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness asked about the timescale. I hope that they will understand that it is not possible to put a timescale on the deployment of our troops within the NATO mission in Afghanistan. All NATO allies are agreed that we will continue to support the Afghan national defence and security forces until the conditions are right for our collective withdrawal, which includes the ability of the Afghan forces to protect the people of Afghanistan without support from international forces, and when progress has been made on a peace process.

The noble Baroness—and, I think, the noble Lord—asked what kind of training we are delivering in Afghanistan. As I have already said, the mission goes under the strapline “Train, Advise, Assist”. The UK is mentoring and advising Afghan personnel, helping to develop capable and independent Afghan government and security structures, and working in the mission headquarters and the Afghan security ministries. An example of this is at the Afghan national army officer academy, where we are working alongside our NATO allies and Afghan partners to produce the next generation of Afghan military leaders.

Finally, the noble Baroness asked about the messages that we wish to deliver this week at the NATO summit. We have a number of objectives for that summit. Essentially, they can be summarised as making NATO more modern and adaptable. NATO continues to adapt to ensure that it is less bureaucratic, better at prioritising its activity and more capable of taking and implementing decisions quickly. The principles for all those things were largely agreed at the NATO summit in Cardiff and endorsed at the subsequent summit in Warsaw. We are confident that allies will agree ways to deliver those objectives, with the aim in view of strengthening deterrence and defence against Russia, increasing our efforts on tackling terrorism and addressing the threats presented by cyber and hybrid warfare. That very much relates to how we can improve readiness so that we can make sure that we have the right forces in the right place so that they can act when needed to protect our people. I believe that the UK already has an important part in that process, supporting the design of a new NATO command structure, and I think that we can be very proud that we will be committing an extra 100 posts to that structure, taking our commitment to over 1,000 UK service personnel.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, recent research begins to suggest that certain kinds of assistance can have the effect of stabilising communities, even within the context of war and conflict. I am talking about investments in infrastructure such as roads, sewerage and water. Can the Minister tell us something about whether the Army will be involved in working with the Afghan army in trying to further infrastructural projects in the interests of creating some kind of stability in local communities?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness makes an excellent point. I can tell her that the UK is supporting the Afghan people by helping to provide them with greater access to healthcare, education, safe drinking water and many things that a few years ago they were unable to enjoy. But it is also about building a better basis for the Afghan economy to function: helping to create jobs, boosting economic development, and, importantly, tackling corruption, which I am afraid has been endemic in many parts of the country. To that end, the UK has pledged to spend up to £750 million in aid to Afghanistan between 2016 and 2020, depending on security conditions and Afghan government performance.

As I understand it, our Armed Forces are not directly involved in that civilian type of work, although they could be called on if needed, as indeed could personnel from any of the NATO allies—but on the whole our focus is on enabling the Afghan agencies themselves to undertake that work with financial support.

[Lord Robathan (Con)]

My Lords, I think that I visited Afghanistan five times while at the Ministry of Defence, and every time I went there I was sure that things were getting better. The House should remember that we first assisted in getting rid of the Taliban Government in Kabul in 2001, nearly 17 years ago, yet it does not appear that the Taliban is defeated in any way. There is a vexed history between Britain and Afghanistan which, as people will know, dates back to the first Afghan war and the appalling slaughter and retreat from Kabul of 1842. Will the Minister take back to his Secretary of State and indeed to the Government as a whole that we must work towards getting an Afghan Government taking control? I fear that this is just another step along the road that has not achieved very much in the last 17 years.

[Earl Howe]

I very much respect my noble friend’s views on this, but I do not share his pessimism. The NATO-led ISAF combat mission was completed at the end of 2014, as noble Lords are aware. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces are now taking the lead in the security of Afghanistan, and I believe that they have repeatedly proved that they are capable of carrying out their responsibilities. President Ghani himself has said that he believes that we have now turned an important corner. The momentum is definitely with the ANDSF and, as the Statement said, the Taliban cannot now win militarily. However, I acknowledge my noble friend’s point to the extent that significant challenges still exist in Afghanistan; we cannot get away from that. That is why the international community remains committed to the future of Afghanistan, and why NATO is clear that it is vital to continue to train, advise and assist Afghanistan’s forces through the means that I have referred to.

[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Lab)]

My Lords, as the person who invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, from which the Afghanistan mission derives, I commend the Government for this further reinforcement of our troops in Afghanistan. We cannot too often pay tribute to those who died or were injured and to the tens of thousands of British troops who have served in Afghanistan over these long years. However, I do not think that we do nearly enough to explain to the public in this country why we went there in the first place, how much we achieved when we were there and why it is of continuing importance that we maintain our commitment there. It is important that we get that message over and do much more about it.

I will just say to the Minister that Gordon Brown as Prime Minister made one speech in the House of Commons about Afghanistan. David Cameron made one speech in the House of Commons about Afghanistan. Mrs May has yet to make a speech about Afghanistan, yet our forces have been committed over that long period and have substantial successes behind them. Therefore, will more efforts be made in the information war to get out to the British public why their security and the security of the alliance, which is being questioned today in Brussels, depend on the resolution and unity of the North Atlantic Alliance?

[Earl Howe]

I pay tribute to the noble Lord’s distinguished role in the early stages of our involvement in Afghanistan and to the support that he has given since leaving ministerial office through his various other commitments and responsibilities. He makes an extremely good point. I think that many of us at ministerial level appreciate that we do not say enough to the public. We do not tell the story sufficiently often and sufficiently clearly of why this mission is so important. We certainly should look for every opportunity to step up that effort. I shall take that advice back to my colleagues in the Ministry of Defence and see that it is relayed further up the chain.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister explain the legal status of our forces in Afghanistan? Is there an MoU with the Afghan Government? Do they work entirely under a NATO umbrella? What is their position? If they were to get involved in hostilities, what further legal protection would be required?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as I have said, the Resolute Support Mission is NATO-led. The legal framework for Resolute Support is provided by a status of forces agreement signed in Kabul in September 2014 and ratified by the Afghan Parliament later that year. The status of forces agreement defines the terms and conditions under which NATO forces are deployed as well as the activities that they are authorised to carry out. The mission is also supported by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189, which was unanimously adopted in December 2014. The Resolute Support Mission provides training, advice and assistance in eight key areas: multiyear budgeting; transparency, accountability and oversight; civilian oversight of the Afghan security institutions; force generation; force sustainment; strategy and policy planning, resourcing and execution; intelligence; and strategic communications.

[Baroness Hodgson of Abinger (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for repeating the Statement and welcome the UK’s enduring commitment to Afghanistan. I have been to Kabul twice this year and welcome the progress that has been made there. Although I, too, acknowledge that there are many challenges, I especially welcome the progress that has been made there for women. Today I had the pleasure of welcoming the woman cadet from NMAA who won the Sword of Honour, Somaiya Haidari. She is outstanding and is spending this year at Sandhurst. Two weeks ago, I had the pleasure of welcoming and hosting the Afghan First Lady in this House, who has done so much to speak out about the importance of supporting women. She has held five symposiums, gathering women from all over the country. As my noble friend says, ultimately we need an Afghan-led peace process. Is the UK encouraging the Afghan Government to ensure that women are taking part in preliminary talks and that they will be at the peace table? If not, there is a threat that this peace process will leave half the population in danger, because we all know about the Taliban’s attitude to women.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this important issue and I thank her for her part in flying the flag for female representation in the Armed Forces. This issue is very much on the agenda in Afghanistan. I remember that my former colleague in the MoD, Penny Mordaunt, when she was Minister for the Armed Forces, visited the training academy, which we are mentoring in Afghanistan, came back with the news that there were an encouraging number of female officers going through the academy at that time. There is no doubt that President Ghani takes this issue as seriously as we would like him to. The equality agenda is being promoted in Afghanistan, which is, as my noble friend said, a vital piece of the jigsaw in countering the philosophy and ideology of the Taliban. If we can get that pattern well established in Afghan society, it will be difficult to reverse.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Earl will know that I am firmly on public record as supporting our invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Indeed, as commander-in-chief on the ground there, I was able to see how huge the training camps were that sent terrorists around the world. They had various laboratories where they were trying to develop anthrax and things like that.

I am also firmly on public record as saying that after six months, when we had totally thrashed al-Qaeda and pushed it into the FATA, we should have cobbled together some agreement in Afghanistan and got out. We stayed there and lost sight of what we were really there for. In the interim, we invaded Iraq and there is no doubt whatever in my mind that we became part of the problem on the ground because we lost sight of what we wanted to do. Did we want women’s rights and clean water? Did we want to help the poppy fields not to be there? All those things were thrown up as options, but that was not the reason we went in.

I am very concerned about this announcement that again our numbers are creeping up in Afghanistan. The Statement mentioned that the Taliban “outwaits our departure”. The Taliban has been outwaiting our departure for 17 years, as the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, said. I am very concerned that it can outwait our departure because this is an open-ended commitment. We have to be very careful that we do not end up sending more troops and more people there. Yes, it would be lovely to have a nice, calm, polite Afghanistan. All my experience of Afghanistan over many years is that it is not that sort country. It is not like Belgium, I am afraid. It is different. I am very worried that we are putting our people in harm’s way—because that is where they are. This could grow yet again. I am not sure exactly what we will achieve.

[Earl Howe]

Again, I very much pay tribute to the noble Lord’s experience and first-hand knowledge of the situation in Afghanistan. I am not as pessimistic as he has just sounded; recent events have shown some encouraging signs that a peace process is possible. As the Statement made clear, only a political settlement will finally secure the safety and peace of that country. President Ghani’s offer of peace talks without preconditions and the recent ceasefire were steps in the right direction, as I hope the noble Lord will agree, and a definite sign of progress. We now want and have to build on those historic steps taken by the Government of Afghanistan. I believe that the uplift in NATO representation will provide the right climate for those peace initiatives to continue.

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, touched on an important point about the contribution of infrastructure. I am reminded about the region at large, not least Tajikistan, which has water and therefore energy that could be supplied to the north of Afghanistan and would make a big contribution. Also, the Uzbeks should be commended for the railway down to Mazar, which has also played a role.

The noble Lord, Lord West, touched on poppies. To what extent is it believed that the opium industry continues to be a root cause of the conflict in Afghanistan? Will the Minister urge those who are minded to look for a long-term solution to take account of this, not least the need for access into markets? Farmers can have a market for agricultural products, rather than the need to supply or cultivate poppies.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his pertinent insights. As he will know, the whole issue of the poppy harvest has been near intractable since we became involved in Afghanistan. I am not in a position to offer ready solutions, but I can tell him, from a political point of view, that the need to resolve the endemic problems arising from the poppy harvest and the opium trade in Afghanistan is high on the list of political imperatives. It is undoubtedly the source of great corruption in Afghanistan and a source from which the Taliban derives funding. We therefore need to hit the supply side, not least by means of a peace settlement. If we can achieve that, there will be far less incentive for the proceeds of the poppy harvest to be used for nefarious ends.

[The Earl of Sandwich (CB)]

My Lords, I am bound to say that my nephew was one of those junior officers who set up the new academy. I am delighted to hear that so many officers have now been trained.

We are used to hearing tributes being paid, quite rightly, to the soldiers who fought and lost their lives. Can the Minister mention also the many hundreds of aid workers who have been in Afghanistan, among them many who have lost their lives as well? They do not receive sufficient tribute. Are aid workers among those who have been offered close protection from our soldiers?

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, for that point, which is well made. My noble friend Lord Bates, who sits beside me here, will be all too aware of the role played by aid workers, many of them from this country, in Afghanistan and of the risks and dangers that they face there. The noble Earl is right that some have paid the ultimate price for their selflessness.

Protecting those aid workers is of course an important part of the work done by the Afghan national defence force when required. It is its responsibility, as I have explained, to maintain the security of the country, but I am not aware that it has been lacking in either commitment or effectiveness in that way. If I can find out more about the topic, I will be happy to write to the noble Earl.

Single Source Contract (Amendment) Regulations 2018

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 4 June be approved.

Relevant documents: Special attention drawn to the instrument by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, 28th Report

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, a substantial proportion of the MoD’s annual procurement spend, amounting to some £8 billion a year, goes on single-source contracts. Given this level of expenditure, it is critical that the department obtains value for money. It is also critical that we protect the long-term future of the defence industry by ensuring that suppliers get a fair return on single-source work.

When the noble Lord, Lord Currie, produced his independent report on non-competitive defence procurement in 2011, he concluded that the arrangements then in place were simply unfit for purpose. The result was a weak negotiating position for the department and poor value for money for the taxpayer.

Following the noble Lord’s report, in 2014 we introduced a new framework as part of the Defence Reform Act. Our intent was clear: the new framework sets out firm rules on pricing single-source defence contracts and puts the onus on suppliers to demonstrate that their costs are “appropriate, attributable and reasonable”. Where there is a dispute, either party can refer the matter to an impartial adjudicator, the Single Source Regulations Office, for a decision.

Since coming into force in December 2014, the new framework has made considerable progress: more than £19 billion-worth of single-source contracts have been brought under the framework, and the benefits to the MoD have been significant.

However, any new regime of this complexity needs to be refined in the light of experience. The Act therefore requires the Defence Secretary to carry out a thorough review of single-source legislation within three years of the framework coming into force. This review was completed in December 2017 and several proposals were identified as potential improvements to the framework. We have incorporated the first of these into the SI under consideration, but we plan to introduce further amendments later in the year.

The main amendments under consideration here relate to those types of single-source contract, known as “exclusions”, which cannot become qualifying defence contracts. Experience in implementing the framework has shown that there is some confusion about how such exclusions are applied and that some contracts, relating to intelligence and international co-operative programmes, are being unnecessarily excluded. We therefore propose a clearer and more precise definition of these two categories.

We are also adding a further category of exclusion to deal with situations where contracts are transferred from one legal entity to another, such as where an internal restructuring of industry has taken place. In such cases, although the legal identity of the supplier may have changed, the contract itself has not otherwise changed in a material sense.

We have engaged extensively in drafting these amendments and believe that the proposals will be generally welcomed by suppliers. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument and apologise for arriving momentarily after he started. He mentioned that the changes introduced in 2014 were intended to improve value for money and MoD procurement arrangements in general and that, since then, £19 billion had been spent using the single-source procurement mechanism. Will he explain a little more how the changes proposed in the SI will benefit the MoD and the taxpayer? I heard him say that the changes will be of benefit to the supplier. While we do not want to do down the suppliers, it would be helpful to understand how the changes will benefit the taxpayer as well.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for presenting the regulations. Part 2 of the 2014 Act and the subsequent Single Source Contract Regulations 2014 are supported by these Benches. Unfortunately, I have lived through every bit of their creation and evolution. The key thing is: are they effective? The way to judge their effectiveness is, first, to understand the mechanisms, which the Minister has been invited to expand on, and, secondly, to look at how extensive they are. Does the Minister have at hand how much is being spent on equipment and infrastructure in a typical year, say, 2017-18? How much of that is single sourced? I believe the answer is nearly half. What proportion—and this is the key issue—are qualifying defence contracts? I wonder if he has similar figures for contracts with BAE.

The Explanatory Memorandum says that three of the five categories are “working well”, meaning that they describe the exclusions clearly. Two relate to land, I believe, and the third to government-procured equipment. Three are new or modified. The first, Regulation 7(b), is where there is international co-operation. The modification is that there should not be an exclusion if all parties agree. I have great trouble working out why parties would want to agree, because the mechanism is designed to give the Government, the SSRO, the MoD or whoever a better understanding of what is happening in the contract, giving them rights to challenge the suppliers. Why would anybody want to agree to this? Have any firms actually agreed to this?

The second modification relates to “intelligence activities”. This is clearly a case of unintended consequences because all intelligence activities are currently excluded. This turns it on its head to require only those contracts that are a risk to national security to be automatically excluded. Paragraph 7.9, I think, of the Explanatory Memorandum effectively defines “risk to national security”; that is, reports that would normally be required by the SSRO would contain information above a certain security level. Am I right in that understanding? Am I right that the key test will be the security level of the information that the SSRO would naturally demand if they became qualifying contracts? Otherwise, how is national security defined and who defines it?

The final modification relates to what one might loosely describe as novation. That does not give me any pain at all.

The key question about the modifications is: how many more, or what greater proportion of, single-source contracts will be brought into the ambit of the Single Source Regulations Office by these changes? Will the number be trivial or substantial? My final question relating to the order is: when will the MoD respond to the other SSRO recommendations?

Lastly, I have a question that is completely out of order. I point out to the Minister that the NATO summit is, I think, on Wednesday and Thursday. Will he give some indication of when he will give an overview of the defence modernisation programme promised before the NATO summit?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their general support for these regulations, and for their questions. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—if I may address his questions first—asked about the level of MoD procurement spend for the last full financial year and the level of single-source procurement within that. In the last full financial year, 2017-18, the MoD spend on procurement was just over £24 billion, of which just over £8 billion went on single-source contracts. We do not track the value of defence qualifying contracts on a year-by-year basis, but I can confirm that since the framework came into force in December 2014, up until the end of May 2018, a little over £19 billion-worth of single-source contracts have been brought under the framework. For the same financial year, the MoD placed contracts worth more than £3.6 billion with BAE systems—about which the noble Lord asked me specifically—of which around £3 billion were on single-source contracts. I am afraid I cannot disclose the proportion of the single-source spend covered by the SSCR framework because it is commercial in confidence.

The noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked how much the department expects this situation to change as a result of these regulations. We have identified approximately 8% to 10% of single-source spend which we would seek to bring under the regulations as a result of this amendment, subject to the consent of the suppliers in question. Obviously, before the contracts are signed, it is a bit difficult to quantify the amount of money that we expect to save, but I hope that that gives a rough order of magnitude to both noble Lords.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Is that an 8% to 10% increase in the contacts which become qualifying, or is it a 50% increase in those that qualify? If the noble Earl does not know, I am perfectly happy to wait for a letter.

[Earl Howe]

I will vouchsafe to the noble Lord that my note is ambiguous on that point and I think, therefore, that I should write to him. We have identified 8% to 10% of single-source spend, which makes it more or less clear that we are talking about single-source spend as a whole rather than that proportion of the spend that comes within the framework. But I will confirm that.

The noble Lord asked me about the exclusion relating to international co-operative programmes which would require the consent of the suppliers involved. He made a very good point about obtaining consent, which was a matter on which we deliberated long and hard. We came to the conclusion that to remove supplier consent altogether would mean that we would have to seek agreement with partner nations, which in practice might sometimes be difficult to achieve. We believe that this proposal represents a pragmatic approach. In fact, we are reassured to note that such agreement on several large contracts has already been achieved with the supplier. Since the framework came into force in December 2014, 11 contracts have been made into qualifying defence contacts on amendment—that is, with the consent of the supplier in question—with a total value of more than £10 billion. The background to that is that many suppliers recognise that the Government are fully committed to implementing the framework and accept that it is in their long-term interests to co-operate with it.

The noble Lord asked me about how the intelligence exclusion would work in practice. Under current legislation, single-source contracts relating to “intelligence procurement” would be excluded from the framework. The problem with that is that experience has shown that there is confusion over exactly how this definition is applied. That is why we have proposed the amendment. Under this change, single-source contracts would be excluded where complying with the single-source legislation would involve having to release information to the SSRO that it is not authorised to see. That significantly raises the bar required for exclusion.

It might be easiest if I gave a hypothetical example. It may be that we sign a single-source contract allowing us access to a specific port overseas in support of a sensitive operation. If this becomes a qualifying defence contract, the reporting requirements under the framework would mean disclosing to the SSRO who the contractor in question was. That would very quickly reveal the location and the likely purpose behind the contract. It is that aspect that we wish to keep classified because of the risk of a negative impact on national security.

The noble Lord asked me when we will respond to the review of single-source legislation. I can tell him that when my right honourable friend the Secretary of State completed his review of single-source legislation last December, several proposals were identified which could improve the operation of the framework, but he asked officials to carry out further work on how these might be implemented, so as to avoid any unintended consequences. Part of that included an extensive process of cross-Whitehall engagement to ensure a fully joined-up position, as well as additional engagement with key stakeholders to take forward the proposals. That work is nearing completion, and we expect to publish our full response shortly.

Finally, on the noble Lord’s last question about the NATO summit and when we expect to announce headline figures from the modernising defence programme, unfortunately, I cannot promise anything this week—contrary to the hopes that I and others have expressed at similar previous occasions. We are endeavouring to make the delay in the announcement as short as possible, and I shall be sure to give the noble Lord as much warning as possible before that event.

Motion agreed.

Royal Navy: Deployment

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 2nd July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the strategic rationale for the deployment of Royal Navy ships east of the Malacca Straits.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, these ships are present in the region to provide a clear and substantive demonstration of the UK’s commitment to the peace, security and prosperity of the region as a whole, as well as to demonstrate support for the rules-based international system.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, is that demonstration short term, or do the Government intend to maintain those three ships on station east of the Malacca Straits? The Minister will recall that when a Labour Government decided 51 years ago to withdraw from the east of Suez, part of the argument was that keeping a ship on station east of Singapore required another four naval ships in place to prepare for moving out and so on. We require virtually half of the British Navy to commit to keeping three ships in the South China Sea. If we follow the Foreign Secretary’s promise—as we always do—and send an aircraft carrier with a full complement of support ships east of the Malacca Straits, with aircraft on board the carrier, that would be half of the British Navy already. Probably most of the British Navy would be committed to the South China Sea. Is that really a strategic priority over the defence of our waters and the seas around Europe?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, Royal Navy deployments are thought about and planned very carefully. They are also kept under regular review. The judgment of Ministers, and, indeed, of the Royal Navy, was that these deployments would fulfil multiple important objectives for UK plc. That remains the case.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Earl is well aware of the fact that £4 trillion-worth of trade goes through the South China Sea. We run global shipping from the UK. We are the largest European investor in that region and stability is crucial. The point the noble Lord makes about a lack of ships is absolutely right. Australia—a country much smaller than us and with not as much money as us—has ordered nine Type 26s and we have ordered three. Why do we not go ahead and order eight and get the steady drumbeat that the noble Earl has himself admitted will allow innovation, reduce prices and provide greater productivity? We need to get on with ordering the ships; then they can take their proper place in the world.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it is still the Government’s intention to order eight Type 26 frigates, but also, as the noble Lord knows, to order several of the new Type 31e frigates, which we believe will fulfil a multipurpose role. Indeed, they could fit this country for export orders well into the 2040s. While I take the noble Lord’s point about wanting a larger Navy—I am sure we would all like to see that—I believe the Government are on track to see that happen over the medium to long term.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that if the Government are to continue to have global aspirations and global influence, the Royal Navy must train where, in the final analysis, it might have to fight? The oceanographic and climatic conditions in the Atlantic are not the same as in the South China Sea and the Pacific.

[Earl Howe]

The noble and gallant Lord is quite right. I am sure that that point will not be lost on the high command of the Royal Navy.

[Lord Sterling of Plaistow (Con)]

My Lords, it has been made clear and is public knowledge that General Mattis has written to our Secretary of State, stating that as much as he is proud of the association with this country over hundreds of years, he has to say quite seriously that at least 2% is good enough for a regional ally, but certainly not as an ongoing partner in the rest the world. The shortages are so great. Do the Government feel that a lack of an ongoing association after the NATO meeting in a week’s time is in the best interests of this country?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I hope my noble friend will appreciate that I cannot comment on a leaked letter. What I can say, I hope by way of reassurance, is that the United States has been, is and will remain this country’s closest ally. It is a vital partner in the NATO alliance. I am quite sure that the United States feels exactly the same way about the integral nature of the NATO partnership.

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon (CB)]

My Lords, our Prime Minister famously declared in Washington not much more than a year ago that Britain will have to stop acting as the world’s policeman. Bearing that in mind, what is the point of our having a naval presence right around the globe? Russia, China and the USA all wish to have the same. Does that further the cause of peace? Would the Minister agree that we are living in the 21st century and not the 19th?

[Earl Howe]

I certainly agree with that.

I say in all seriousness to the noble Lord that this is not simply about policing. These deployments arise principally from a convergence of tasks and opportunities. A main focus for the Navy in the case of each Royal Navy ship is joint training and exercises with our Far East partners, but there are other important tasks as well, such as international efforts to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions and sanctions on North Korea—which HMS “Sutherland” has been assisting with, for example.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

Will we deploy ships east of Suez, or are they too vulnerable for that sort of work?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, in due course we certainly hope to do so, but it is too early for me to comment on their precise deployments at this stage.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the most significant deployment for a generation. Did SDSR 2015 envisage such deployments and what deployments have been abandoned to provide resources for them?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, no deployments have been abandoned, but one of the expressed aims of SDSR 2015 was for defence policy to be international by design, which includes working closely with our partners and allies. Ultimately, both our allies and the nations in the region will judge the UK by our actions. The deployment of Royal Navy ships shows that we have both the will and the capability to deploy naval power to the region in support of our friends.

UK Territorial Seas: Incidents

Earl Howe Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, it depends on the nature of the incident. Operational responsibilities fall to a number of different government departments and agencies. For example, environmental incidents would be led by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and search and rescue operations would be led by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. The Joint Maritime Operations Coordination Centre, or JMOCC, retains an overview of where appropriate assets are and seeks to co-ordinate their support.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his Answer, and indeed I thank him for the very good briefing that we had yesterday. However, as he knows, I remain concerned that no single figure in the JMOCC is in operational command. If there is a clash of options as to where these units should be used, I am afraid that with nine departments all talking about it, it will be like ferrets in a sack. However, my question relates to the funding of the joint maritime centre beyond April next year, as it does not seem at all secure. Can we have an urgent study into the number of craft and ships available for the various government departments tasked with looking after our inshore waters, our borders and the exclusive economic zone? Clearly, there are not enough of them, and there will be a crisis post Brexit unless something is done urgently. In that context, can we make more use of the Maritime Volunteer Service?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I take the noble Lord’s points and suggestions fully on board. I have come equipped with a list of the assets and vessels that are available for deployment today, and I can inform noble Lords about them if they are of further interest. The noble Lord makes a very important point about the funding of the JMOCC. In a purely technical sense, it is fully funded, but only for the current financial year. However, he should be in no doubt that all contributing departments are committed to it and to the work that it does. Even in its short life since October last year, it has very much proved its worth in terms of co-ordination.

[Lord Robathan (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank my noble friend the Minister for the briefing that he gave yesterday, which I found very helpful. Although I agree with a great deal that the noble Lord, Lord West, said—I think that we need to be very clear about this—it seems that this is work in progress. This is a relatively new organisation which is developing as we go forward, so will my noble friend keep the House updated on what is happening? I think that many of us share the noble Lord’s concerns.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to my noble friend and I can readily give him that assurance. In addition to the platforms and assets required for maritime security, which is of course an important priority, the key to effective maritime security operations is that they should be, first, intelligence led, secondly, risk assessed on the basis of that intelligence and, thirdly, well co-ordinated. There is no doubt in my mind that, since the creation of the National Maritime Information Centre—which the noble Lord, Lord West, was instrumental in setting up—and the JMOCC, we have seen a step change in efficiency in the delivery of these operations.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, can the noble Earl say a word or two about fishery protection and the continuing funded role of the JMOCC? Three-hundred thousand square miles of sea will need to be patrolled after we leave the European Union.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that question, which is very much centre stage in the Government’s thinking. We need to prepare for two things in this context after we leave the European Union. One is amended legislation relating to our territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, so that we ensure that our security and prosperity interests are fully protected. The other is to make sure that we have sufficient platforms and assets to monitor that area of sea. I would be delighted to talk to the noble Lord outside this Chamber on the work that is intended in that area.

[Baroness Scott of Needham Market (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as deputy chair of the Harwich Haven Authority, which includes the ports of Felixstowe and Ipswich. Will the Minister tell the House what national oversight there is of the workings of the local resilience forums, which are very important in managing emergency planning? There are growing inconsistencies in their approach and a lack of clarity about who would actually be in charge. Can he tell me when they were last operationally exercised and what national oversight exists and whether he would be prepared to meet interested parties to discuss their concerns?

[Earl Howe]

I would be more than happy to meet interested parties to discuss those concerns. This is an important element in the tapestry of activity on which we depend for maritime security. It is important to emphasise, as the noble Baroness is aware, that we rely not just on aerial surveillance, space-based systems, radar and so on, important as those things are; human intelligence is often important as well. There is now a network of field intelligence officers working for Border Force around the country. I would be happy to take this matter forward with the noble Baroness.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I too am grateful to the noble Earl for the briefing that was provided yesterday. The improvements that have come with the co-ordination activity are welcome, but it is co-ordinating limited resources, as the noble Earl has admitted. He talked about it being intelligence led. Perhaps he cannot share it with us, because it would be difficult, but can he ensure and guarantee the House that he, as the relevant Minister, will have an intelligence assessment of what is actually required to prevent illicit materials, guns, people and so on entering the country, and whether that is sufficient given the resource that is available?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, Ministers collectively will have that picture presented to them because, as I have explained, it is not just the Ministry of Defence that is involved in this sector. The Royal Navy is deployed, as noble Lords will be aware, very much in a supportive role to many of the other agencies. But I entirely take the noble Lord’s point. He may be interested to know that UK Border Force has introduced into service six new coastal patrol vessels in addition to the five cutters already in service, while continuing to call on a maritime patrol aircraft contract for aerial surveillance. But that is not the end of the story: we are looking at future needs across the piece.

Defence: Helicopters

Earl Howe Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in his name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, we continue to assess the military effectiveness of rotary unmanned aerial systems and carry out ongoing capability studies that will help inform our future manned and unmanned equipment choices.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville]

I thank the Minister for his response, but the Government’s failure to provide a clear strategy for the preservation of our onshore sovereign capability to design and manufacture helicopters is now endangering investment, jobs and prosperity, both in the south-west and nationally. Is the Minister aware that, if this is not remedied either in the modernising defence paper this summer or in the Budget, long-term real damage will be done to the crucial national defence and aerospace capability, as well as to local jobs in the Yeovil area and to the UK economy?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness raises some very important points and I understand the emphasis that she attaches to this aspect of UK industry. Our approach to rotary capability will be considered as part of the modernising defence programme, as she mentioned. It is worth remembering that we already have a long-term close relationship with Leonardo helicopters, which represents the design and manufacturing capability in the south-west, through our strategic partnership arrangement—a 10-year arrangement from 2016. That arrangement is unique and it enables us to maintain a continuing dialogue with the company to ensure that we are speaking the same language on capabilities, needs and requirements.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, another NATO summit is imminent. This brings to mind the frustrations of 15 years of shortfalls in NATO’s helicopter capability, which was much-needed in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that most of our European allies had helicopters available—at one stage I counted over 1,000—we could not get 17 into Afghanistan. Our stand-alone capability reminds me of the relevance of this Question. We have an opportunity with the MDP for the noble Earl and the MoD to sit down with Leonardo, Boeing, Airbus and other providers of our helicopter capability. Will the noble Earl refresh his memory of the 2005 defence industrial strategy, which is still the last strategy any UK Government have had and is still relevant? He may want to look at page 90 in particular.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I shall do exactly that. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his suggestion. We are on track to share headline conclusions from the modernising defence programme by the NATO summit in July. At that stage we expect to describe what the changed strategic context means for defence policy and planning, including the area in which the noble Lord is interested; how our overall approach needs to evolve, as surely it must; and how we intend to pursue improved capability in the new domains of warfare.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, does the noble Earl not agree that, given both the size of our defence budget and the multiple challenges of affordability it faces, the idea that we can for all time sustain a whole range of sovereign defence capability is simply untenable?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I do not think that this Government or any preceding recent Government have pretended that we can maintain sovereign capability in every area of our defence requirements. We certainly consider maintaining sovereign capability where that is in the national interest but, in general, competition ensures best value for money, best capability and innovation.

[Lord Razzall (LD)]

My Lords, following up on my noble friend’s Question, I am sure the Minister will agree that this not only is a question for the south-west but also affects the position of Airbus, which, after all, provides at the moment one-third of all UK defence helicopters. Bearing in mind the likely pressures on Airbus to shift production to France or Germany if Brexit happens, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that Airbus’s helicopter capability remains in the UK?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is right: Airbus provides the majority of police and emergency services helicopters and has the largest share of the UK’s civil and military market. Its main base is in Oxford, where it modifies and customises helicopters, although the design and manufacture is completed in France, as the noble Lord is aware. We are in regular contact and have regular discussions with the company. The aerospace growth partnership, in particular, enables the industry and Government to engage on a formal basis to tackle the barriers and unlock market opportunities across these sectors of the economy.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

I know it is not my noble friend’s responsibility but does he have any idea when the Metropolitan Police will start using unmanned aircraft for surveillance over London rather than flying helicopters, which is the most expensive form of aviation?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am afraid I shall have to write to my noble friend on that issue as it is not in my brief.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, in researching this Question I discovered the defence industrial policy December 2017, which I believe is the latest statement of the Government’s intentions. I word-searched it for the word “helicopter”, which appeared under two pretty pictures and nowhere in the main text. Are we really going to get by the middle of July in the modernising defence programme a definitive answer to the original Question?

[Earl Howe]

I might suggest that the noble Lord should turn his attention to the Government’s industrial strategy White Paper as well. We are very alive to the issue he raised concerning helicopters. We are committed to keeping the UK as a leading aerospace nation. The industrial strategy White Paper identifies a range of cross-government measures to boost productivity, employment, innovation and skills. Indeed, my honourable friend Philip Dunne has recently completed a review of prosperity arising from our defence industries which will help to inform our future thinking in this area.

National Security Situation

Earl Howe Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, it comes as no surprise to me that a debate devoted to our national security should have elicited so many contributions of real depth and insight from your Lordships, and I therefore begin by thanking all those who have taken the trouble to speak this afternoon. To my mind, a number of big themes have emerged and many noble Lords have recognised that our national security situation today is more serious than at any point since the end of the Cold War. As my noble friend Lord Ahmad made clear, it is the depth and breadth of the threats we face that is different now, and even greater than when we last assessed them fully, in the 2015 SDSR.

What is also clear is that we face a range of threats from state powers, not just the terrorists and insurgents who have often been the focus of recent debates. Particular events are fresh in all our minds. In recent weeks Salisbury and Syria have shown that chemical warfare, a scourge of the early twentieth century, is still something that we need to counter. As a Government, we have endeavoured to show leadership against these two brutal attacks; first, by attributing and exposing them, which improves understanding of the nature of the threat; secondly, by proposing and implementing tough responses, which raise the cost for those adversaries who would otherwise act with impunity; and thirdly, by building international support that ensures that our responses are even more effective and maximise the combined effect, whether through diplomatic expulsions after Salisbury or the precision of the missile strikes in Syria last weekend. A heavy price has been paid by our adversaries and we have sent a crystal-clear message.

On Syria, we know that our response to the CW attack degrades Assad’s capabilities and we hope it deters further chemical weapon use. As noble Lords know from earlier statements, our response was not designed to change the fundamental course of that conflict. However, we remain clear that the only appropriate outcome in Syria is a negotiated settlement that takes account of legitimate grievances. I will say more about that later. While on occasion we are obliged to be reactive, this Government are determined not to be buffeted by security crises, but to shape them by internationalising our agenda. NATO is at the heart of our defence approach. The alliance has taken important and lasting steps in recent years to build a robust response to the challenge posed by Russia.

The Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 made clear in stark terms that the rules-based order is under threat and the free choices of European states must not be taken for granted. NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the Baltic states and Poland, along with air and naval patrols north and south, have shown a clear commitment to collective defence, while being measured and non-escalatory. The UK is one of the most active contributors. An ever-stronger deterrent is being built with a NATO badge. This coming October the alliance will hold its biggest exercise of the year in and around Norway. It will involve some 35,000 forces from 30 countries, with as many as 70 ships and 130 aircraft. The UK will play a full part, contributing Royal Navy and Royal Air Force platforms and an Army HQ. This training will show that NATO is credible and able to operate at an impressive scale with integrated multinational forces. This year’s NATO summit will also reform command structures and refocus on the north Atlantic as a contested environment on which the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff has placed great emphasis.

Russia uses what some have termed “reflexive control” to deceive us and manipulate domestic and international audiences, as well as intimidate the West. We must not fall victim to this or succumb to the Kremlin’s agenda. Its narrative is filled with disinformation and conspiracy theories that aim to weaken our unity and responses. We must also resist exaggerating the threat in the way that Moscow wants or following its feints when it seeks to distract us. Instead, we must and will expose the genuine attacks that it seeks to hide. The Government issued a démarche to Russia earlier this year over its NotPetya cyberattack in Ukraine and drew attention to the evidence for Russia’s role in the Montenegro coup attempt back in 2016. Deception is one facet of what our American colleagues call “grey zone conflict”—the space between peace and war where Russia acts with far less ethical or legal constraint and, importantly, strives to stay below our threshold of response. The range of hostile acts we face in this grey zone, including cyber, subversion and information warfare, can be serious. To counter threats of this kind, we must prepare to do so with allies and partners. All the time, we strive with them to appreciate the full scope of the threats and ensure our ability to respond. The modernising defence programme and the NATO summit in the summer are important parts of our developing approaches.

On geography and reach, our well-justified refocus on the euro-Atlantic region does not mean acting at the expense of our expeditionary ability or our long-standing commitment to security in the Arabian Gulf. This year will see the UK deploy some 4,500 members of the Armed Forces to the Gulf for Exercise Saif Sareea 3. That demonstration of our ability to project power at distance and intervene if required shows the flexibility, reach and capability of our Armed Forces and sends a strong message to our adversaries in the Middle East and globally that they should not assume a free hand.

Understandably, the role of Parliament has been a subject of discussion this week and in this debate. The noble Baroness the Leader of the Opposition asked me to clarify the Government’s position. The Government take their responsibilities when using force most seriously. Combat operations receive the closest scrutiny and attention. I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, that we share the principle that Parliament should be able to debate the deployment of UK military forces in combat. However, we must be clear that, for the success of some such deployments, we must not shackle all decisions on the use of force to pre-authorisation by Parliament. Had we done that in relation to the recent military action, it would have weakened our operational security by divulging military choices openly, including to our enemies. It would also have undermined our imperative for speed of decision and action. An adversary with more time to prepare for our response will naturally be better able to evade the action against him. I was grateful for the comments of my noble friend Lady Finn in that regard. Our ability to exploit uncertainty and maximise the element of surprise played a critical part in the success of the operation. Those two very reasonable concerns are supported by those in government and the Armed Forces who are seasoned in planning military action.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, asked me what would happen if Mr Assad staged a repetition of the chemical attacks of 7 April. Our actions were designed to disrupt the Syrian regime’s ability to conduct such attacks and to prevent further unacceptable human suffering. We know that we have not destroyed every part of Assad’s chemical warfare capability—that was not the intention—but we hope and believe that UK and allied action will deter such attacks in future in Syria, and deter others from believing that they can use chemical weapons with impunity. It is in our national interest to prevent the further use of chemical weapons in Syria and to defend the global consensus that those weapons should not be used. Syria and others should be in no doubt of our resolve to uphold international norms and values.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, expressed concern that the strikes should worry the wider Arab community. They should not. This was a limited, targeted and effective strike with clear boundaries that expressly sought to avoid escalation and did everything possible to prevent civilian casualties. It was not about intervening in a civil war. My noble friend Lord Dobbs was spot on about that. To the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, I emphasise that the legal basis for our participation in the strikes is humanitarian intervention. We have published that legal position. The UK is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Singh, to whom I listened with great respect, that the evidence of the Syrian regime’s culpability for the chemical weapons attack is very strong indeed.

The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, asked whether the decision-making process leading up to the strikes was fully Chilcot-compliant. He, along with my noble friends Lord Attlee and Lady Pidding, will wish to know that throughout the planning stages, officials and Ministers have been acutely aware of learning lessons from the past and we have sought to apply the recommendations in the Chilcot report rigorously. From the start, we deliberately used structured and independent internal oversight and sought challenge from France and the US, and other agencies. A key component of that was the JIC process.

Decision-makers were informed directly by subject matter experts and an audit trail has been constructed throughout. We based our decision-making on an assessment from all sources available to us. We agreed a clear and realistic objective, developed a robust plan and allocated the appropriate resources. We considered a range of scenarios and developed contingency planning and preventative action. We gave space for debate and challenge, including through officials’ meetings in COBRA and ministerial meetings in the National Security Council and the Cabinet. Key to the operation were the consequence management assessments. We ran through a number of scenarios and then worked on plans for de-escalating the situation. The whole focus of the operation was a humanitarian one, so the focus on not causing casualties was inherent in the targeting from the start.

My noble friend Lady Helic, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Campbell and Lord Hylton, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Coventry asked about the future strategy for Syria and the game plan for ending the conflict. Mr Assad’s regime bears overwhelming responsibility for the suffering of the Syrian people. His oppression has caused untold human suffering, fuelled extremism and terrorism and created the space for Daesh. It has been suggested that we should recognise the reality of the Assad regime and rebase our diplomatic policy in the light of that. I listened carefully and respectfully to the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Campbell, and others on that issue. However, I am afraid that I cannot offer any comfort to them.

The image of an ambassador of Her Majesty shaking hands with Mr Assad following a restoration of diplomatic relations with Syria is anathema to me and my ministerial colleagues. We believe that the Assad regime has lost all legitimacy, due to its atrocities against the Syrian people. In our view, a sustainable political settlement in Syria requires a political transition. For that reason, we remain committed to achieving our long-standing goals in Syria: defeating the scourge of Daesh and achieving a political settlement that ends the war and suffering, one which provides stability for all Syrians and the wider region. What should that look like?

[Lord West of Spithead]

Does the Minister believe that there is any possibility whatever of getting a diplomatic solution if we try to ignore Assad, who is a fact of life on the ground? Looking back over the years, Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of this country have had to shake hands with some pretty loathsome people because that is realpolitik—what the world is like—much as we do not like them. But if you do not do it, things can become worse.

[Earl Howe]

We certainly believe that Mr Assad needs to be a part of the negotiations leading to a long-term solution, as I shall explain. There needs to be a transition to a new, inclusive and non-sectarian Government who can protect the rights of all Syrians and unite the country, but we are pragmatic about how to achieve that.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

In my time in the Foreign Office, recognition was not a seal of approval; the recognition was that somebody was in control. We have a mission in Pyongyang and in all sorts of places where shaking hands might not be what the noble Earl would wish to do, but that is what we are paid to do. We diplomats are paid to find out what the other lot are up to, and it is most important in relation to one’s foes.

[Earl Howe]

I take the point, but I repeat that our view is that there needs to be a transition to a different regime, despite everything the noble Lord has just said. Syria’s future must be for Syrians to decide.

[Lord Marlesford]

With great respect, there really is confusion in what my noble friend says. One moment he is saying that Assad has to be involved; the next moment he is saying that there has to be regime change; then he contradicts the idea that you have to talk to people of whom you disapprove and negotiate with them. It seems to me that, far from learning from the mistakes of the past, we are digging our heels into them.

[Earl Howe]

If my noble friend will be patient for just a minute, I think I can elucidate the point of confusion that he has just enunciated.

The UN-led Geneva process between the Syrian parties, mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 2254, remains the forum for reaching a lasting political settlement to end the conflict in Syria. The latest round was held in Vienna on 25 and 26 January. All international efforts need to be in support of the UN-led process. The Syrian negotiation commission engages constructively and without preconditions, but clearly to achieve progress the Assad regime must also engage credibly in Geneva and Russia must use all its influence to ensure that it does. I hope that that clarifies our approach.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked what other international action might be put in train. Shortly ahead of us are the G7 Foreign Ministers meeting and the NATO summit where we will discuss Syria further with our international partners. At the Foreign Affairs Council on 16 April, the EU 28 agreed further sanctions. I can assure the noble Baroness in particular that we will use all feasible existing avenues to achieve the settlement that I am sure we all desire to see.

The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, asked me for an update on the OPCW inspection in Douma. We are deeply concerned by the news that UN security officials in Douma, in advance of the OPCW inspectors’ planned visit, came under fire. It is imperative that all parties offer the OPCW fact-finding mission team their full co-operation and assistance to carry out their difficult task. On 18 April, UN security personnel advising and supporting the OPCW fact-finding mission were engaged in further discussions and co-ordination with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Russian military police on how to enhance and reinforce the security arrangements. Clearly, this is a fast-moving situation.

The noble Baroness also asked what support the UK is giving to refugees in the light of the Dubs amendment. As she knows, we are committed to resettling 20,000 vulnerable refugees by 2020. As of December 2017, a total of 570 had been resettled through the vulnerable children’s resettlement scheme since it began in 2016. That is in addition to those we resettle under our gateway and mandate schemes and the thousands who receive protection in the UK under normal asylum procedures. In 2017, 6,212 people were provided with protection and support under a resettlement scheme in the UK.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked what our assessment is of Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria, a topic also raised by the noble Lords, Lord Owen and Lord Glasman, among others. We are closely following developments in Afrin and wider north-western Syria. We are concerned about recent reports of civilian casualties and tens of thousands of people fleeing the violence. The UK Government have called for de-escalation and the protection of civilians while recognising Turkey’s legitimate interest in the security of its borders. Ministers have urged their Turkish counterparts to do everything they can to minimise humanitarian suffering. We support the ongoing discussions between Turkey and the US and believe that a negotiated agreement, taking into account the security concerns of both parties, is necessary to prevent further conflict. The Prime Minister has raised the need for protection for civilians and proper humanitarian access with President Erdoğan, as has my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary with his Turkish counterpart.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked whether we were sending our envoy to Kobane. I have to say to both him and the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, that the UK has had only occasional diplomatic contact with the PYD but we will certainly use that channel to discuss the situation in Syria and the region. The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, also asked whether we had asked Saudi and Gulf states to cut off money and weapons to al-Nusra. We have close dialogue with Saudi and Gulf states on Syria, including on how to counter extremism and extremist groups.

To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and to answer my noble friend Lady Helic, we have a long-standing commitment to accountability for human rights abuses in Syria. The UK is at the forefront of global efforts to bring Daesh to justice for its crimes, about which the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, spoke so movingly. In September 2017, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted the UK-drafted Daesh accountability Resolution 2379, co-sponsored by 46 member states including Iraq. The resolution calls for the UN Secretary-General to establish an investigative team to collect, preserve and store evidence of Daesh crimes, beginning in Iraq. The team will be led by a special adviser with a mandate to promote the need to bring Daesh to justice across the globe. The UK has committed an initial £1 million to support the resolution and help to set up the UN investigate team. The resolution is focused exclusively on Daesh. The question of accountability for other actors in Syria, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere will continue to be pursued through other efforts.

My noble friend Lady Helic suggested that the UK funding of Syrian hospitals was only around £200,000. That is not correct. To date, DfID has provided £37 million to the World Health Organization, which operates in Syria. UK aid contributes to supporting vital health facilities in hospitals, offering first aid, trauma care, primary health services and reproductive health services. Since 2012, UK support in Syria has helped to provide 8 million medical consultations and over 3 million vaccines. The UK has committed £2.46 billion since the start of the conflict, our biggest ever response to a humanitarian crisis.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, asked whether we had a dialogue with Iran. We are committed to tackling Iran’s destabilising activity in the region, particularly its ballistic missile programme and proliferation, through the JCPOA. The Minister for the Middle East was clear about this when he met his Iranian counterpart in February. We believe these matters need to be dealt with outside the JCPOA and, importantly, the deal allows us to do that.

The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, spoke about the National Security Capability Review. The NSCR report explains how the Government are taking a transformative whole-of-government approach to national security in response to the worsening security situation. The approach is referred to in the report as the “fusion doctrine”, and it is designed to ensure that the UK makes better use of all our capabilities through economic levers and cutting-edge military resources to our wider diplomatic and cultural influence on the world stage. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, spoke of the need for culture change across Whitehall if the fusion doctrine set out in the NSCR is to become a reality. I agree with them and am confident that it can be done. There are several good examples of such cross-government working—

[Baroness Helic]

If I may correct the Minister, I made no reference whatever to hospitals. I would be grateful if he could actually answer the question I asked about the investigating mechanism that has been put in place. I believe the records say that the UK Government have committed £200,000 but that for the overall start-up programme to start will cost $14 million. I would just like to correct that.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to my noble friend. That was my misunderstanding and I will write to her with clarification on that point.

As I was saying, there are several good examples of good cross-government working. The UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security has seen the MoD, the FCO and DfID coming together very effectively. Another example is international peacekeeping, where we have seen successful co-ordination between those three departments. It can be done, and it will be.

In that context, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about resources for community policing with a counterterrorism focus, as did the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria. The Government understand that police demand is changing, becoming increasingly complex. That is why, after speaking to all forces in England and Wales, we have provided a comprehensive funding settlement which is increasing total investment in the police system by more than £460 million in 2018-19. That includes £50 million for counterterrorism. The 2015 spending review and the SDSR protected funding for counterterrorism until 2020-21.

My noble friend Lord Suri, the noble Lords, Lord Wallace, Lord Owen and Lord Campbell, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and others spoke about the effect of Brexit on our contribution to European security. As the Government have said many times, we are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe.

At the December European Council, the Prime Minister and other Heads of State welcomed the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, as a useful tool to support the development of capabilities that Europe needs for its security, provided that it remains complementary to NATO and encourages EU-NATO co-operation. The UK’s approach reflects our continuing commitment to European defence and security and to protecting the interests of UK industry. The UK has not joined PESCO—after leaving the EU, we cannot be a member of PESCO—but that does not diminish our wish to collaborate on the development of capabilities that we need for our shared security, which may include PESCO projects.

The way in which the UK may continue to take part in CSDP missions and operations is an issue that we are actively discussing with the EU Commission. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, mentioned the European Defence Agency in particular. That is likely to be a key route by which we can continue to participate in European collaborative capability development and protect UK defence industry interests. The Prime Minister has made clear that we want to explore terms on which the UK could remain part of EU agencies, including the EDA.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, that our defence relationship with France is deepening, not reducing. France is our most important defence partner after the USA. It is the only other European state that can deploy significant military forces globally on operations. We work closely with France on international security issues and military operations and have regular contact at all levels. We want to continue to deepen and broaden our defence and security relationship with France under the Lancaster House treaties, while also working towards a deep and special UK-EU partnership for the future that contributes to the prosperity, security and global power of Europe. The 2018 UK-France summit held at Sandhurst in January reaffirmed the strength of our defence and security relationship with France. France is one of several European countries with which we are strengthening our defence ties.

More broadly, in March 2018, the Foreign Secretary announced the creation of at least 250 new diplomatic roles and 10 new sovereign missions over the next two years, and today he has announced another nine new missions in Commonwealth countries.

Inevitably, the subject of UK defence spending was raised by several noble Lords, notably the noble Lord, Lord Owen, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones. The first duty of government is the safety and security of the British people at home and abroad. That is why we have committed to meeting the NATO guideline of spending at least 2% of our GDP on defence and to increasing our defence budget by at least 0.5% above inflation every year of this Parliament. The UK is one of the few allies to meet both NATO spending guidelines—that is not only the 2% of GDP but committing 20% of annual defence expenditure to major equipment and associated research and development.

I in no way wish to sound complacent. It is of course outputs rather than inputs that really matter. Indeed, the whole purpose of the modernising defence programme is to throw a clearer light on our defence needs and priorities and the resources required to deliver them. The whole purpose of the MDP is to ensure that defence is configured to address the evolving threats that we face while being sustainable and affordable. As the Defence Secretary and the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff have said, we aim to achieve better military capability and better value for money. The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, will appreciate that, because this process is ongoing, I cannot yet answer his questions about specific capabilities. We intend to be able to share MDP headline conclusions by the summer.

I fear I would be testing the patience of the House if I continued much further. Let me therefore assure noble Lords that, on those issues and questions that I have not had time to address or answer in my response today, I will write as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Government will not be narrowly focused on the threats manifested most recently in Salisbury and Syria. Our long-term strategic challenges are critical, even where these attacks reveal facets of those greater challenges. With the recent national security capability review as a basis, and with the modernising defence programme to come this summer, the Government will show how we will strengthen our standing as a respected leader on international security.

Motion agreed.