(5 days, 16 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations and setting out their purpose. These regulations increase the immigration skills charge, or ISC, for the first time since its introduction eight years ago in 2017, and they align it with inflation. This is a sensible measure, and we are pleased to support it.
As has been noted, the ISC raises revenue to support skills funding, and, in the words of the Migration Advisory Committee, it also encourages employers to invest in the development of domestic workers rather than relying on migrant labour. We welcome the Government’s recognition that the charge should reflect the rising cost of living and their continued focus on linking skills, migration and wider labour market policies. By increasing the charge by 32%, it is estimated that the ISC could raise an additional £180 million. This could contribute to funding skills development in priority sectors and, over the medium term, reduce reliance on migration.
We also observe that, while this measure is straightforward and proportionate, it is important to consider its impact on businesses. We recognise that the charge is lower for certain sponsors, such as charities and small businesses, which helps to mitigate any disproportionate effect. None the less, we encourage the Government to continue monitoring the balance between supporting skills investment and avoiding undue burdens on employers.
We also take the opportunity to underline that the original purpose of the ISC is to support skills development in the United Kingdom. While the income raised is not hypothecated, it does contribute to maintaining the Department for Education’s skills budgets, which, in turn, supports apprenticeships and workforce development. We hope that the Government will continue to ensure that this connection between the charge and skills investment remains robust and effective.
In conclusion, we welcome the increase in the immigration skills charge. We recognise its potential to help upskill the domestic workforce and encourage employers to invest in British talent, while also contributing to the broader objective of aligning skills and migration policy.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for his broad support for the measure before the Committee. I am also grateful for his questions, which I hope to answer in line with the questions from the noble Lord, Lord German.
As noble Lords will be aware, the immigration skills charge has not been increased since it was introduced in 2017. The noble Lord, Lord German, asked me why that was the case. Had I been the Minister then, it would have been increased on an annual basis, but that was not the case. Now that I am the Minister, it is being increased. I hope that that is helpful.
The charge has risen by 32% because that is the rise in the consumer prices index between 2017 and March 2025. That is a fair increase to make in these times, in order to achieve the Government’s objectives, which remain to invest in training and to ensure that we reduce net migration.
Both noble Lords asked whether this will be kept under regular review. The answer is yes. I am responsible overall for examining budget matters with the Home Secretary in the Home Office. I will make sure that, as part of our annual reviews, this charge is looked at—along with a range of other charges for a range of other services. It is important that we undertake that.
Noble Lords asked whether there was consultation on this matter. The skills package, which was welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the measures on raising the charge price were trailed in the immigration White Paper, which was subject to widespread consultation; it has also had much debate and discussion in both Houses, as well as among the public at large. I accept that there has been no specific consultation on the immigration charge itself, but the trail was put in the immigration White Paper. As noble Lords know, the Explanatory Memorandum says that, when the immigration White Paper was published, the devolved Governments were invited to discuss and contribute to it. It is a tax, and therefore a full regulatory impact assessment is not required.
The noble Lord, Lord German, asked about the National Health Service. First—this also goes to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst—the Home Office is the point of collection for money, but that money is given to the Treasury, which disburses it elsewhere. As ever, the Treasury remains all-seeing and all-powerful in all matters; we are simply the conduit for such funds to be passed on in due course.
Following another question from by the noble Lord, Lord German, it is difficult to give a figure on the costs to the National Health Service because of a range of factors. They include: which organisations sponsor a worker; whether they are large or small organisations, in the health service context; whether the people being recruited are exempt, such as those with PhD roles and students; and how many people are ultimately recruited. Again, I have overview of this, so I will look at that and at the impact on the health service as a whole.
We keep all immigration routes under regular review, including charges. We also keep under review—in answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst—the impact on businesses.
As I hope both noble Lords have recognised, the broad purpose of this instrument is to encourage businesses, first and foremost, to look at training a UK-based workforce, recruiting a UK-based workforce, and recruiting workers from overseas only if they have a shortfall or feel that such workers bring specific skills. If they bring a set of specific skills or are on the exempt list, there will be no charge. If they are not on the exempt list and do not bring specific skills, there will be a cost to the employer, but, again, the employer must decide whether that is a cost worth bearing because they are recruiting individuals who help make them productive and efficient.
I hope that, with those remarks, I have answered both noble Lords’ concerns; I welcome their views. I commend these regulations to the Grand Committee.
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we welcome government Amendment 262, which recognises that cases of cuckooing often involve a complex web of coercive control. The person who seems to be in charge may actually be being manipulated or exploited by somebody else, and this addresses that complexity. However, while I understand the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and recognise all too well the potential life-changing harm caused by cuckooing, we are not minded to support restricting the trial venue in that way.
Magistrates’ courts provide quicker access to justice for victims and less delay than Crown Courts, particularly given the current backlogs. This is particularly important as cuckooing is linked to ongoing exploitation, with offenders often moving on to repeat the offence elsewhere, so fast action to stop the creation of more victims may in some cases be the more sensible option. Magistrates’ courts can also be less intimidating for vulnerable victims, supporting them to testify. Many other exploitation and safeguarding offences can be tried either way, allowing the specific facts of each case to determine the appropriate court. Imposing a blanket restriction on trial venue risks delaying justice, undermines established practice, and limits judicial discretion.
The pattern of coercion and control is at the heart of all these issues, whether we are talking about the exploitation of vulnerable children or adults. The evidence shows that women—as well as children—who are coerced into offending, often by traffickers or abusive partners, are in practice more often punished than protected. Too many victims of coercive control are still unfairly prosecuted for offences linked to their own abuse. Many female victims do not report to the police for fear of being criminalised, and that concern is well-founded. If, for example, drugs are being stored or grown in their flat, it is all too often the woman who is prosecuted. The statistics bear this out: around 70% of women in prison are victims of coercion or domestic violence.
Turning to the issue of coerced internal concealment, Amendment 259 links the new offences of causing internal concealment and cuckooing, making it clearer and easier to prosecute these serious and often related behaviours. Coerced internal concealment, whereby a person hides items such as drugs inside their bodies, is a particularly stark illustration of the abuse of power. Anyone who puts another person’s life at risk in this way should be subject to the harshest of penalties, so we support the introduction of this new offence.
I take this opportunity to raise an issue which, regrettably and surprisingly, remains absent from the Bill. In the past five years in England and Wales, a child has been subjected to an intimate police search every 14 hours on average. Black children are four times more likely to be strip-searched compared to their proportion of the population. Half these searches lead to no further action.
In opposition, the Government promised stronger regulation, including a statutory duty to notify parents, which should be the bare minimum. Although a consultation began in April 2024, there have been no firm proposals since, which is disappointing given an earlier commitment from the former Home Secretary to new mandatory rules and safeguards being
“put in place as a matter of urgency”.
That pledge followed a series of recommendations from the IOPC, including a call to amend the law so that police forces are required to make a safeguarding referral for any child subjected to a search involving the exposure of intimate parts. It also called for clearer guidance, enhanced training, greater consistency across police forces and, again, for these reforms to be implemented “quickly”.
Some 18 months later, some forces have improved practice and made more safeguarding referrals, but there is still no legal requirement. The Children’s Commissioner confirms that poor strip search practice is widespread and is not limited to any one force or region; failures include not having an appropriate adult present. Can the Minister confirm that a timescale is in place for the implementation of these recommendations? If not, will the Government consider amending the Bill to reflect the need for urgent action?
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for introducing his amendment. This is an opportunity to consider cuckooing more broadly.
We on these Benches recognise the need for a cuckooing offence, and we did so last year before the general election. I am glad to see that the Government are now following our lead. Data suggests that cuckooing offences have quadrupled in recent years; given that it is a crime largely associated with child exploitation, it is all the more pertinent that we tackle it head on now.
Children are used to conceal and traffic illegal drugs in order to fund the activities of criminal drug gangs. Some 22% of people involved in county lines drug trades are children—that is almost 3,000 vulnerable people under the age of 18 being made to do the dirty work for criminals. These county lines trades are often run out of the dilapidated homes of vulnerable people. Criminals appropriate and transform them to use them for their own ends. Children are ferried in and out; they are sent to similar locations all over the country. It is a very specific crime that requires a very specific law. We see force in my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s amendment, but we would not wish to tie the prosecutor’s hands.
Amendment 259, which addresses the offence of causing internal concealment, would prohibit cuckooed houses being used to house people who hide and then transport drugs. These people, as I have pointed out, are often children. Amendments 260 and 261 address that more broadly. Cuckooing—using children for criminal purposes—is a heinous and exploitative crime and it is right that it be given its own offence. However, while we welcome the Government agreeing to come with us on cuckooing, it is a shame that they have failed to address another root cause of the issue. As we have said, cuckooing is a crime primarily committed by gangs who co-opt homes to run their criminal operations. If you could break up those gangs, you would reduce cuckooing; the two feed off each other.
On the previous day of Committee, His Majesty’s Opposition had two amendments that would have done this. The first amendment would have created a statutory aggravating factor for gang-related offences. The second would have created an offence for specific gang-related graffiti. We appreciate the Government following our lead to create the offence of cuckooing, but if they are serious about this, they should do the same with gangs. Our measures would not, as some noble Lords suggested, criminalise fence-painting or church symbols. Neither is a gang sign. They would, however, deter gangs from their activities and lock up members who partake. This would be just as effective as this new offence.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed to this short debate. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that I was not agitated—if he thinks that that is me being agitated, he has not yet seen me agitated. I hope that noble Lords never will. I was just reflecting the conventions and guidelines to respect each other and the courtesies of the House. We will move on. I welcome the brief and succinct way in which he introduced his amendment, but if he will allow me, I will first deal with the government amendments in this group.
Amendment 262 would make it clear that controlling another person’s dwelling for the purposes of the new cuckooing offence may be carried out via another person. I welcome the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the principle behind them. While the existing drafting would already allow for the prosecution of a perpetrator who uses a third party to exercise control over another’s dwelling, the amendment would put this point beyond doubt, which we felt was important.
In cuckooing cases, particularly within the county lines context, gang leaders may exploit children or vulnerable adults to control another person’s home, as noted in the debate. The amendment would make it clear that the new cuckooing offence can, and should, be used to pursue the perpetrators who are responsible for directing the cuckooing rather than the individuals who may well be victims of exploitation. We will issue statutory guidance to the police to support the implementation of the offence.
Amendment 259 would add the offence of coerced internal concealment created by the Bill to the list of offences in Schedule 6, which are relevant offences in England and Wales, for the purpose of the cuckooing offence. Similarly, Amendments 260 and 261 would add the offence of child criminal exploitation, also created by the Bill and which we discussed earlier today, to the list of relevant offences in Scotland and Northern Ireland for the purpose of the cuckooing offence.
As noted, cuckooed properties may be used as a base for criminal exploitation. These amendments would therefore ensure that, where cuckooing is carried out for the purpose of enabling the commission of the coerced internal concealment offence in England and Wales, or the commission of the child criminal exploitation offence anywhere in the UK, the cuckooing offence will apply.
I turn to Amendment 258A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. As he explained, the amendment seeks to remove the ability for cuckooing offences to be tried as a summary offence in a magistrates’ court, thereby limiting the offence to being tried in the Crown Court on indictment. While I am sympathetic to the noble Lord’s intention of ensuring that the perpetrators of this harmful practice receive appropriate sentencing, we, like the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, consider that the provision for the cuckooing offence to be triable either way is fair and proportionate.
Sentencing in individual cases is a matter for the courts, and we do not want to see that approach restricted. When deciding what sentence to impose, courts must consider the circumstances of each individual case. The courts may also have a statutory duty to follow any relevant sentencing guidelines developed by the independent Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The cuckooing offence is designed to capture a range of actions that may be involved in controlling another person’s dwelling, from occupying the property through to directing delivery of items, such as drugs, to and from the property. It may therefore be more proportionate for some cuckooing cases to be tried in a magistrates’ court.
More broadly, allowing offences to be tried in magistrates’ courts helps reduce the burden on the Crown Court and can enable quicker access to justice for victims. It is a sad fact that the lack of investment in the court system over recent years has meant that there is huge strain on the court system. As we always say, rightly, justice delayed is justice denied, so restricting the trial of a cuckooing offence to the Crown Courts would not necessarily deliver the justice that victims deserve and that society would seek to be meted out on the perpetrators.
My Lords, as was clear from our debate, this is a very important group of amendments, which seek to clarify and improve a necessary measure in the Bill. When we discussed the fourth group today, we heard about the horrific crimes committed against some children in this country: the industrial-scale abuse of young, white, working-class girls over the past four decades, as well as abuse of other groups. This happened —and is still happening—because the people who commit these crimes are among the most depraved in our society. However, it has also happened because people familiar with the abuse, or even those who had mere suspicions, turned a blind eye or simply did not look at what was in front of them.
The victims were failed by everyone, from the police to the authorities, their teachers and community leaders. Too often, they were treated with a blind negligence that bordered on positively enabling the crimes that were occurring. We have heard many powerful speeches today; I cannot list them all, but I remind the Minister of the introduction by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the powerful speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone.
I think we all now agree that safeguarding needs to be supported by sanctions. How else can we put a stop to bureaucratic failure to report? The difficult and important question is around striking the balance when doing that, to make certain that it is effective but that it does not have unintended, unhappy consequences. It is important also to make non-reporting a criminal offence, but, again, exactly how that is phrased will need considerable care. Many ideas have been canvassed today, and it would be dangerous for me to try to draft on the hoof at the Dispatch Box.
There was force in the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, as to why there should be an exception for what is learned in confession, and that was also important. I am not urging that there should be an exception, but it should be looked at. We have had arguments on both sides. What is the evidence? What are likely to be the benefits of opening that up? Personally, I think it should be opened up, but it should be looked at with care.
We heard earlier today from the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, all about the grooming gangs, so I will not go back to that, but they are an incredibly striking example of why we need a duty to report suspected child sex offences in general and why it is important that the clause is properly drafted.
One important oversight, which was spotted by noble Baronesses, Lady Cash and Lady Grey-Thompson, concerns the reference to Wales. As has been established, it is necessary to correct an oversight in the drafting. As things stand, local authorities and police forces in Wales will have to be informed of crimes, but only if they are considered crimes in England. That must be redrafted, and I hope the Minister will agree to that come Report stage.
Amendment 283A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash—which was not moved, but it is sensible to make the point—would implement another recommendation of the Casey review, adding child criminal exploitation to the crimes for which there is a duty to report. It is important to look at all these points when drafting the obligations.
We on this side are largely supportive of the principles behind the several amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Leaving out subsections (5) and (6) raises an interesting point. It is obviously better to be safe than sorry. We will have to look very carefully at what removing those subsections would actually do.
We on this side worry about removing defences in cases where an individual genuinely fears for the safety of the victim or believes that someone else has definitely submitted a report. That must be looked at, too. Perhaps the Minister can guide us on how to ensure that genuine defences with merit will remain available without providing a route to or excuse for shirking responsibility.
The noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, raised an interesting point about the bureaucratic burden on faith schools. Government obviously must look at that. It should not be a let-out; equally, we on this side would not support any extra unnecessary burden being imposed. However, it must be done properly.
My noble friend Lord Polak’s Amendment 286A raises important considerations. It is worth noting that he is supported by Barnardo’s, the NSPCC and other organisations with great specialist expertise and knowledge—and not just anecdotal knowledge; they really know what is going on. He is looking to prevent the intentional concealment of child sex offences. That must be the absolute minimum. My noble friend Lord Bethell was supportive of that amendment, and he was right to caution us about going too far, so that it has the unintended consequence of not achieving what we all want to achieve. His words of caution should be heeded.
As to Amendment 274 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, we are rather hesitant in our support. Ensuring that a report goes straight to the local authority, which then has a duty to inform the police, might risk slowing down a response that is often needed quickly. Indeed, it might never reach the police. If a child is in imminent danger of being abused, it is not the local authority which should know first; it must be the police, who have to respond. There should be a simultaneous notification, because it can be, in effect, simultaneous.
With this amendment, it seems that someone who reported child abuse to the police would be criminalised for not going to the local authority. That cannot be right. Leaving it to the discretion of the individual which authority to report to, while requiring that there be a duty to do so, seems to us to be the right thing. People will know generally where to go but they must go to one or the other, and not automatically to the local authority first.
I think I have addressed the amendments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Featherstone and Lady Walmsley. These are all interesting points. The Government and those behind the Minister must look at this very carefully. It is really important to get the drafting right.
Amendments 283 and 286A seek to create and expand the specific crime of preventing or concealing reports of abuse. These are largely in line with the amendments addressed in the group in which we debated grooming gangs, so we support the intentions behind them.
As I have said, this is a group of amendments that have been tabled with the best of intentions. The issue in question should be entirely non-partisan; it is simply a question of how best to manage it and get it right, making certain that children and young people in this country are not allowed to suffer in the way in which they have for the last 30 years. I hope that the Minister will take away the points which are being made and, not least, add Wales to the list of jurisdictions. That is all I need to say at this stage tonight.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for moving the amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and to colleagues who have spoken this evening. This has been a valuable debate on Chapter 2, Part 5. As noble Lords will know, introducing a statutory duty delivers the intention of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I am confident that the measures we have brought forward strike the balance that we need.
A number of amendments have been tabled, and I am sorry that Amendment 271F, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, was not moved. However, it is important to put on record that the reason the duty relates to the Welsh Government is that they have declined to legislate for a mandatory reporting duty in their own response to the independent inquiry. Therefore, we are respecting the devolution settlement by not including that legislation in the Bill. It is a devolved matter which requires the consent of the Senedd.
There are a number of other amendments which I will try to speak to. We know that child sexual abuse continues to go unreported. The reasons for this are complex, including fear, stigma and lack of awareness. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester covered some of those points in relation to the performance of the Church of England.
The unique nature of child sexual abuse as a type of harm requires the introduction of this new duty. I want to be clear that the introduction of the new duty establishes a floor, not a ceiling, and does not change or interfere with in any way the existing expectations set by government that all children at risk of harm should be referred to the appropriate authority for guidance and advice.
I want to first touch on Amendments 274 and 276, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, which seek to require that reports under the duty are made to local authorities only, removing, with minor exceptions, the option to notify the police. Allowing reports to be made to either the local authority or the police, as recommended by the independent inquiry, ensures that reporters can act swiftly, so I cannot accept that amendment.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and others, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady Featherstone, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sought to introduce a criminal offence for those who conceal or fail to report abuse. The Government do not consider this type of sanction, which risks creating fear and apprehension among those with reporting responsibilities, to be proportionate or effectively targeted. That is why we are empowering reporters by focusing the criminal sanctions in this Bill on anyone who seeks to interfere with them carrying out their duty, rather than on the reporters themselves. This issue has been carefully considered by a number of agencies and has the support of, among others, the NSPCC, the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Children’s Commissioner, so I cannot support the amendments.
The noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson—via the noble Lord, Lord Meston—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen seek to extend the duty to a number of additional contexts. The purpose of the duty is to report and place a clear requirement on those most likely to encounter information relating to sexual abuse. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and the right reverend Prelate that this does include members of the clergy. Proposals to extend the ambit of a reporting duty to those who do not personally come into contact with children would introduce another layer of procedural complexity.
(4 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not intend to rehearse the arguments already put so effectively by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. Suffice to say that we on these Benches fully support Amendment 23, as £500 is an extortionate amount of money for the type of behaviour that fines are designed to address and will simply result in private companies making even greater profits than they do at the moment while pushing those already struggling further into debt. For these reasons, we have serious reservations about the implications of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
The orders create a postcode lottery for victims. Charities warn that, in some parts of the country, orders are handed out like confetti. This undermines public trust by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location.
Overall, the use of these powers needs to be subject to much stricter safeguards. The Government must ensure that there is proper oversight of their use and that the law is applied equally, openly and proportionately.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this thoughtful debate on Clause 4 and associated amendments. The discussion has reflected the balance that must be struck between proportionate enforcement and ensuring that penalties remain effective and fair. As anti-social behaviour seems to be increasingly present on our streets, it is right that the clause is given careful consideration.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised concerns in Amendment 23 about the overuse or inappropriate issuance of fixed penalty notices. Those are indeed legitimate points for consideration, and I am sure that all noble Lords agree that such powers should be exercised carefully and with a proper sense of proportion. Fixed penalty notices are designed and intended to deal swiftly with low-level offending without recourse to the courts, but they must always be used responsibly and in accordance with proper guidance. However, it seems that Clause 4(3) and (4) will help to act as a proper deterrent to anti-social behaviour, as they will play an important part in ensuring that the penalty levels remain meaningful. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on this matter.
I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We are grateful to my noble friend for his focus on practical enforcement. His Amendments 24 and 25 seek to strengthen the collection of fines by introducing automatic confiscation provisions and modest administrative charges for non-payment. It is right that those who incur penalties should expect to pay them, and that local authorities are not left to have to chase persistent defaulters at the public’s expense. We therefore view my noble friend’s proposals as a constructive contribution to the debate in order to ensure that enforcement is both efficient and fair.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has given notice of her intention to oppose the Question that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill. We respect this view, but we cannot agree to the removal of the clause. Clause 4 contains a number of sensible and proportionate measures that are designed to improve compliance and to strengthen the effectiveness of penalties. Many of these reforms build on the Criminal Justice Bill brought forward by the previous Conservative Government.
This debate has underlined the importance of maintaining confidence in the fixed penalty system, ensuring that it is used appropriately and enforced consistently. The system exists to fulfil the wider aim of upholding law and order in our communities. In these endeavours, we on our Benches will always be supportive.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, with the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for discussing and tabling Amendment 23, and to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his Amendments 24 and 25. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for his broad support for the Government’s approach to the main thrust of the issues, although he, like us, slightly diverges from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which I will come back to in a moment.
I cannot agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I am afraid that is the nature of political life. These offences are used for things such as dog fouling, littering, vandalism and drunken, aggressive behaviour. They are not trivial or low level; they are things that impact on people’s lives, and the abandonment of the clause would mean the abandonment of the people who are victims of those particular instances. The debate for me is around whether £100 or the £500 that we have put in the Bill is a reasonable figure. I argue to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that it is practitioners who have said to us that the current £100 limit does not always carry enough weight to stop offenders committing further anti-social behaviour.
I also say to him that, under existing legislation, relevant agencies may already issue fixed penalty notices of up to £500 for environmental offences such as littering, graffiti or fly-posting. We expect that the prospect of a higher fine will act as a stronger deterrent, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has said. These measures were consulted on by the Home Office in 2023, before this Government came to office, and received majority support as an effective deterrent to anti-social behaviour. I do not know offhand whether the Manifesto Club contributed to that consultation, but the point is that a majority in the consultation accepted that the increase was necessary. Increasing the upper limit does not mean that every person breaching an order will receive a fine of £500. The figure could be lower, proportionate to the individual circumstances and the severity of the case.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will make just a brief intervention from us on this matter, which was raised in Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for telling me what reasons he had for not taking out Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act. It raises some further questions, which I guess the Minister might have been expecting. Essentially, the noble Baroness’s amendments aim collectively to inject greater protection of civil liberties and to ensure proportionality in the use of detention powers, and they demand clarity regarding the mental element required for the new immigration offences in the Bill.
In his letter to me, the Minister said of Section 12 that
“policies to differentiate in line with the provision can be resumed if required”.
He said that they
“are not currently in use”,
and they have not been in use since this Government took office. He said:
“This Government is prioritising steps to restore order to the asylum system”,
et cetera, as one might expect. But, he continued:
“While the Government reviews the approach, it would not be appropriate to remove these provisions from the statute book”.
Can the Minister tell me what review of what approach will determine whether this provision should be removed, and whether, in the immediate future, there is any intention to recommence Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act?
In conclusion, having some clarity on this matter would be useful. The Law Society, as noble Lords might expect, says that the retention of Section 12, by removing the
“court’s ability to decide for itself whether the detention of a person for the purposes of removal is for a reasonable period”,
risks increasing unlawful and prolonged detention. There is currently a legal aspect to retention; I know that it is not being used, but we need to ensure that the fallback described by the Law Society is in place. I look forward to the Minister’s response to those questions.
My Lords, I begin by making plain our opposition to the amendments in this group. In Committee, we spent much time rehashing the arguments over the Illegal Migration Act 2023. We have made our position abundantly plain. It is obvious that there exists a gulf in opinion regarding that Act between many of us in this House. This is Report, so now is not the time for me to repeat those arguments. As noble Lords know, we strongly oppose the repeal of the bulk of the Illegal Migration Act, but I should say that it is at least some solace to us that the Government have deemed it right to retain Section 12. Since we support the Government’s intent to keep that section on the statute book, we oppose Amendments 28, 30 and 32, notwithstanding the elegant arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her amendments and how she presented them. She said that she was trying to be helpful and supportive on these matters, and I am grateful for that.
Amendment 28 seeks to add Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act to the list of sections of that Act being repealed under this Bill. Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act establishes that it is for the Home Secretary, rather than the courts, to determine what is a reasonable period to detain an individual for a specific statutory purpose, such as for removal. The noble Lord, Lord Harper, raised a point that I would wish to set out: the Home Secretary is a Member of the House of Commons, and I answer for the Home Secretary in this House on matters to do with the Home Office. Therefore, we are accountable to Parliament for the decisions that are taken.
The important point that I want to put to the noble Baroness is that, even with Section 12 in force, the courts will continue to have significant oversight over detention. That goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord German, made today and my noble friend Lady Lister made in Committee. Individuals detained under immigration powers may apply at any time to the First-tier Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber for immigration bail, where a judge will assess whether their continued detention is justified. If they consider that it is not, they will grant immigration bail. Therefore, the Home Secretary will have more discretion, but there will still be judicial oversight of immigration bail.
Additionally, as I said in Committee, individuals can challenge the legality of their detention through a judicial review in the High Court, where the court will consider whether the Secretary of State made a reasonable decision in detaining a person or in continuing their detention. If the court considers that the Secretary of State did not act reasonably, it will ensure that that person has access to an appropriate remedy, including ordering a release if appropriate. Again, there will be greater discretion for the Home Secretary, but there will also be strong judicial oversight and parliamentary oversight of this matter.
Section 12 simply makes it clear that the Secretary of State’s judgment of what is a “reasonable” period of detention should have more weight. That is logical, since the Home Office is in full possession of all the relevant facts and best placed to decide whether continued detention is reasonable in all the circumstances. That could include safeguarding the public, safeguarding an individual or the issues of cost that have been mentioned. Ultimately, the Home Secretary will determine what is reasonable based on the information before her. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, from the Opposition Front Bench, added his voice to those general concerns.
Section 12 also provides for detention to continue for a reasonable period while arrangements are made for a person’s release. That is particularly important when, for example, we need foreign national offenders to be accommodated in a specific location in accordance with their licence conditions, or to make safeguarding referrals for vulnerable people. Previous case law established the principle of a grace period to enable a person’s release, and Section 12 now provides legal clarity by placing that on a legislative footing.
Section 12 applies to all immigration detention powers. The noble Baroness’s Amendment 30, which is consequential to Amendment 28, seeks to ensure that the provisions that apply to Section 12 are repealed. Although I know that the noble Baroness is trying to be helpful on this matter, for the reasons I have just set out, it is right that Section 12 is retained for all immigration detention powers, to give the Secretary of State an additional discretion. None the less, that will be subject to parliamentary oversight and judicial oversight.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 32 seeks to remove the retrospective effect of Clause 41. As Members have discussed, Clause 41 clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention where the Home Office is considering whether deportation is conducive to the public good and consequential amendments to existing powers to take biometrics and searches upon being detained for this purpose.
My Lords, I support my noble friend and the three amendments that she has in her name, Amendments 29, 69 and 79B.
Amendment 29 seeks to repeal Section 29 of Illegal Migration Act and to remove individuals who have sought to use modern slavery protections in “bad faith”. We have heard clear warnings that Section 29 represents a dangerous expansion of the public order disqualifications originally introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Crucially, Section 29 transforms the disqualification of potential and confirmed victims of trafficking and modern slavery from a discretionary power to a mandatory duty—unless compelling circumstances exist. This mandatory disqualification extends to non-British nationals sentenced to imprisonment of any length for a crime of any seriousness. This blanket approach fails to consider that victims of modern slavery are frequently coerced by their traffickers into committing criminal offences. By lowering the threshold so severely and making disqualification mandatory, there is an increased risk that vulnerable survivors will be denied protection, denied a recovery period and ultimately be removed from the United Kingdom, potentially exposing them to re-trafficking or retribution. The International Organization for Migration has explicitly called for the repeal of this section.
The Government argued in Committee that Section 29 needs to be retained for its potential “operational benefit” and to allow flexibility in reforming the national referral mechanism. While reviewing the national referral mechanism is vital, retaining a measure that institutionalises the potential criminalisation of victims is fundamentally unjust and unnecessary. Section 29 seriously undermines our commitment to tackling modern slavery. We must uphold our duty to protect the exploited.
Amendment 69 would introduce a new clause to strengthen protection for victims of slavery or human trafficking by placing a duty on the Secretary of State to amend the Modern Slavery Act 2015. This amendment seeks to establish crucial firewall arrangements. Its intention is to safeguard vulnerable individuals by preventing public authorities, when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking, sharing information with immigration authorities that might result in deportation or prosecution for an immigration offence. That firewall is critical for many people to report on what is happening to them.
We must ensure that these victims feel safe seeking help and engaging with the national referral mechanism process. Without a robust firewall, a victim coerced into illegal entry might fear that disclosing their history of exploitation to obtain assistance will simultaneously expose them to immediate prosecution and removal. It is chicken and egg, egg and chicken. This is an unacceptable dilemma for them to face.
Amendment 69 seeks to weaken the grip of traffickers and enable victims to come forward and seek justice. By implementing this firewall, we align safeguarding duties with our enforcement aims, preventing information provided for protection purposes being weaponised against the victim by the state.
Amendment 79B seeks to address a fundamental vulnerability in our system: the inherent conflict faced by a victim of labour abuse who is simultaneously subject to immigration controls. This secure reporting clause is designed to prevent information disclosed by a victim or a witness of labour abuse being used for a purpose within Section 40(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007, which of course is the gateway for immigration and nationality purposes.
This firewall is desperately needed because exploitative employers rely on the fear of their workers that authorities will prioritise issues around their immigration status over the abuse that they have faced. Unscrupulous employers use threats about illegality, detention and removal as a method of control and coercion. This turns the state’s immigration framework into a tool of the exploiter—Amendment 79B would combat this.
These Benches also oppose Amendments 29A and 31A, which are a reversal of the modern slavery safeguards that appeared in the Illegal Migration Act. Sections 22 to 28 of the Illegal Migration Act removed protections for victims of modern slavery who had arrived in the country without a valid visa. The current Bill includes the repeal of those sections, a step that is widely welcomed, because these positions could have been catastrophic for survivors. Therefore, we support the Government in proceeding with these amendments and in removing those sections from the Illegal Migration Act. Section 29, as proposed here, is dangerous because it expands the scope of public order disqualifications and makes them mandatory. This measure mandates disqualification for potential victims of modern slavery unless there are compelling circumstances, even if they have been convicted of an offence of any length.
In conclusion, we support the Government in their intention of removing those sections in the Illegal Migration Act and press them on a way in which the firewall of which we have spoken earlier can be protected.
My Lords, efforts to tackle modern slavery are indeed a noble and important cause—we all agree on that—but, as my noble friend Lord Harper said in Committee, there is a balance to be struck.
My noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch has made many of the points I would have made, and I will not repeat those arguments, particularly on Report. Suffice to say, however, that protections which were initially intended to protect victims of modern slavery have now become loopholes that are being exploited by those with no right to be here, and whose claims are too often totally spurious. It does our country no good. It does not build public faith in the immigration and asylum systems when illegal migrants abuse modern slavery protections to circumvent their own legitimate deportation.
To that end, my noble friend Lady Maclean is right to highlight that the Government have a number of legislative tools at their disposal. It is unfortunate that they are seeking to repeal those powers, and even more unfortunate that the Liberal Democrats wish to remove those others that the Government intend to retain.
We take particular issue with Amendment 69. When it comes to tackling the border crisis, surely there cannot ever be enough information sharing. The noble Baroness’s amendment would prohibit public authorities mentioned in it sharing information regarding a suspected victim of modern slavery. We fear this may only encourage more people to make spurious claims in a last-ditch attempt to halt removal from the United Kingdom.
I am grateful for this series of amendments. Having served as the lead shadow spokesperson for the Labour Party in the other place on the Modern Slavery Bill in 2015, I can say that we continue to be steadfast in government in our commitment to tackling modern slavery in all its forms and to supporting survivors.
Amendment 29, from the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered on a case-by-case basis for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. I argue that Section 29 needs to be retained in its current form so that it can be considered for future commencement alongside potentially wider reforms as part of the Government’s commitment to work with partners on the long-term reform of the national referral mechanism. I will come back to that point when I discuss Amendment 69.
Amendments 29A and 31A, from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, seek to retain further modern slavery sections from the Illegal Migration Act and for those sections to be commenced on the day this Act is passed. For the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord German, has mentioned, the Government have been clear that we are repealing those sections because we have committed to ending the migration and economic partnership with Rwanda, which we did not feel served a useful purpose. The Government are going to retain only the measures in the Illegal Migration Act that are assessed to provide operational benefit in delivering long-term, credible policies to restore order to the immigration and asylum system. I am afraid that Amendments 29A and 31A, for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord German, has mentioned, are not ones that we can accept today. However, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for her contribution and for raising those issues.
Amendment 69, from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German, seeks to prevent a public authority, when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking, sharing information with immigration authorities and other public authorities that might result in deportation or prosecution for an immigration offence. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, from His Majesty’s Opposition’s Front Bench, made valid points on the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German.
On restricting information shared in respect of modern slavery identification, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides certain public bodies in England and Wales with the statutory duty to notify the Secretary of State when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be a victim of slavery or human trafficking. This information provides that notification enables the UK to fulfil its obligations to identify and support victims. The duty to notify is discharged for adults by making a referral into the national referral mechanism for consenting adults, or by completing an anonymous entry on digital systems where the adult does not consent. The information provided is used to build a better picture of modern slavery in England and Wales and to help improve law enforcement responses. It does not include—this is the key point—information that identifies the person, unless the person consents to the inclusion of that information. It should be noted that child victims do not need to consent to enter the national referral mechanism. As such, the national referral mechanism referral discharges the duty to notify.
This is another key point. If a person is identified as a potential victim of modern slavery or trafficking, they are currently eligible for a recovery period during which they are protected from removal from the UK if they are a foreign national and are eligible for support, unless disqualified on grounds of public order or bad faith. Imposing restrictions on the information provided to identify and support victims of modern slavery would be to the detriment of our obligations to those vulnerable people and, I suggest, to our duty to protect UK borders and protect the public.
My Lords, at the beginning of his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said that this was Pro Bono Week. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he has fulfilled his job for this House. I am sure that the Minister will be very grateful for the advice that he has given pro bono and I hope that, if he asks for more, the noble Lord will be willing to give it.
I have learned two things from what has been said so far in this debate. First, we have a crisis of legal aid. No one who has spoken has said that it is all fine and dandy. Secondly, what is available is not working well.
On the first of those, a survey by Bail for Immigration Detainees found that only 42% of people held in IRCs had a lawyer in their immigration case in 2025. That is a steep decline, down from 75% in 2012—some years ago. For those detained in prison, 71% of respondents had not received legal advice under the scheme. The second concern raised is of course about what is provided; that is the 30 minutes, often considered to be of doubtful quality and insufficient. As professionals have argued, immigration law is highly complex: those of us who are working on the Bill will understand that this is a very highly complex area of work. It is unrealistic to believe that a detained person, who may be traumatised, speak little English or have just arrived, can navigate this complex labyrinth of law on their own and without professional assistance.
The amendment is necessary not merely on humanitarian grounds but to protect the integrity of the rule of law itself—first, access to justice, and secondly, practical effectiveness. I do not want to repeat the points about cost, which are obviously going to come up in the response, but it would save taxpayers’ money: invest to save early. That is quite clear from everything that has been said so far. We must be clear also that a failure to provide legal aid can amount to a breach of fundamental rights, particularly under Article 6 of the European convention, so this amendment offers a practical and necessary solution to a systemic failure. It mirrors existing successful arrangements, such as the immigration police station advice scheme, which is used when detained persons are found to have no criminal element in their case. It would simply ensure that an immigration lawyer is allocated to an individual upon entering detention, providing a necessary check against unlawful incarceration and ensuring fair process.
I end with a quote that was given by one of the organisations working in this field:
“Ensuring prompt legal counsel for detained persons is not merely a gesture of goodwill; it is the necessary foundation for a fair judicial process. A system that incarcerates first and allows access to justice later is like starting a race 48 hours behind the starting gun—the individual is severely disadvantaged before they even begin to fight for their rights”.
My Lords, in Committee we had a very detailed and well-informed discussion of this amendment in the existing framework of legal aid in the asylum and immigration system—with a House full of eminent lawyers, this was always bound to be the case. On our side, of course we welcome efficiency, and we have looked hard at this amendment, but we are not persuaded by the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and other noble Lords that the proposals they advance will have the beneficial effect that they seek.
Amendment 33 would ensure that any person detained under a relevant detention power would have access to a raft of legal aid within 48 hours, but to move from the current situation, where a person is given a 30-minute window for free legal advice, to one where there is a 48-hour window in which legal aid can be given, would come with entirely unknown costs. The current system already diverts scarce resources away from those in genuine need: every pound spent on repeat litigation, in particular, is a pound not spent on border security, faster processing or refugee support. We are unable to support Amendment 33.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Bach for his amendment. I am grateful for the opportunity I have had, limited though it is, to speak to him outside the Chamber about the motivation for the amendment, which remains unchanged since Committee and would seek to impose a duty to make civil legal aid available to detained persons within 48 hours of them being detained. I note the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Prashar, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and my noble friend Lady Lister for my noble friend Lord Bach. I cannot go as far, dare I say it, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in his denunciation of my noble friend’s amendment, because I feel it is a point well made, but I assure him and other noble Lords who have spoken that access for justice for those in immigration detention is a priority shared by the Government.
I agree with those who spoke in previous debates on this subject, and indeed today, that provision of legal aid for those seeking protection is important in maintaining an effective asylum system, reducing costs and reducing the asylum backlog. Indeed, it will help to end hotel use and increase returns, because speeding up the asylum process depends on good legal aid, but also depends on the measures that the Government are taking separately, putting extra investment into that area to speed up asylum claims. That is why, as I noted in the previous debate, we have legal aid available for asylum cases and immigration advice for victims of domestic abuse, modern slavery, separated migrant children and those challenging immigration decisions.
As I noted in the previous debate, to additionally support detained individuals, all those in immigration removal centres can access the 30 minutes of free legal advice that has been described today, through the detained duty advice scheme, DDAS. This triage appointment supports people to meet a legal provider who may provide further legal advice, subject to the matter being within the scope of legal aid and the detained person’s eligibility for that legal aid.
Concerns were raised in the previous debate about the take-up of this advice. I can assure noble Lords that all detained individuals arriving at an immigration removal centre are advised of their right to legal representation and how they can obtain such representation. That is done within 24 hours of their arrival as part of their induction. All individuals arriving at an immigration removal centre in England are booked an appointment with a legal representative under the scheme that I have just described, unless they decline to have that appointment. Their appointment will take place as soon as possible after they attend the immigration removal centre, which could be as early as the next working day, but obviously, as noble Lords have mentioned, it may on occasion be longer. We have produced leaflets in 26 languages on the operation of the scheme, and I therefore suggest gently to my noble friend that Amendment 33 would have no material effect on access to justice, as those in the system are entitled to an initial appointment under that long-standing scheme.
In Committee, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and I questioned the potential cost of this. I have had the opportunity to look into the costings, and I just clarify that the Government’s position on this is not now related to cost. This has been assessed, and we have looked at it in detail. Were the proposed amendment to be passed, the overall spend on legal aid would be unaffected, so the cost element is not one of the things that we need to look at now, because there is a high likelihood that detained individuals will seek legal aid-funded support regardless of a time limit, and their eligibility for legal aid would be unchanged were a time limit to be introduced. The concern and discussion around the amendment is based on the consideration that existing arrangements already enable detained individuals to seek an initial appointment, and therefore the amendment is unnecessary.
I reiterate to all Members the vital role that legal aid plays, both in mainstreaming and maintaining an effective immigration and asylum system, and ensuring that the most vulnerable, such as victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, can navigate the complex legal system. As my noble friend mentioned and knows, we have taken important action to support the provision of immigration and asylum legal aid. The Government have confirmed uplifts to immigration and asylum legal aid fees, which is a significant investment and the first since 1996. The Government are also funding the costs of accreditation for immigration and asylum caseworkers, providing £1.4 million in 2024 and a further £1.7 million this year.
I want to continue to work with my noble friend Lord Bach and with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, to look at how we can improve the efficiency of this system still further. I am happy to meet them to look at the suggestions that were made today. Those made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, are hot off the press this evening and worthy of examination. I am happy to reflect on those and to work with my noble friend Lord Bach. I suggest to him that the amendment does not add to what we currently offer and therefore I ask him to withdraw it, with the assurance that we will look at the issues that both he and other noble Lords have raised in this debate.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there are necessary provisions in the Bill but there is also window dressing. While we all deplore assaults on shop workers, we do not need this new measure. There are good laws of theft, robbery and assault. What we lack are the resources to arrest and prosecute. Last night, the Metropolitan Police announced that London will be left with just two police stations with front counters operating 24 hours a day—10 more are set to close under cost-cutting measures. That is not good enough.
Today’s Times reports that family drug and alcohol courts face closure, yet each such court case saves local authorities £58,000 in care costs and £15,000 in legal costs. Instead of chasing headlines, the Government should be funding the police, the CPS, those on legal aid and the courts properly. The Ministry of Justice has been starved of money by the previous Government—I accept that—and it is not being helped by the current one.
Clause 39 is well intentioned. It will show shoplifters who regularly steal low-value goods that this may be treated as a serious offence, triable in the Crown Court. But it is really important that only the prosecutor and not the defendant can go on to elect a Crown Court trial. If not, our Crown Courts will be overwhelmed. Backlogs are already years long.
I welcome the measures in Part 8, which are directed at electronic devices to steal cars. These are necessary and overdue. The measures to address so-called SIM farms are also to be welcomed.
I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about the changes proposed under Clause 82 to the law of limitation. These are unnecessary and will be unhelpful.
Finally, I turn to Clause 191—the decriminalisation of abortion. I make it plain that I am not in principle opposed to abortion, but there was no prior scrutiny of, or public consultation on, this. The intention, which I accept is benign, of not criminalising a woman who aborts her own child risks new evils. Without the safeguards of the current law, women may be harassed into abortion, and a woman will be permitted, without medical advice, to abort a baby right up to due birth date. Just think about that; on any measure, it is a human being at that stage. What if the baby survives but is damaged? Will they sue the mother?
I agree with what my noble friend Lord Elliott of Mickle Fell has had to say about this provision. We must look at it very carefully. Such an important change to the law regarding human life should be based on proper inquiry and evidence, and then, if necessary and appropriate, made through measured change in measured circumstances to the Abortion Act 1967.
To wind up, 240 seconds to debate 400 pages is not very much. We must be allocated proper time in Committee. It is likely that more baubles will be added to the Christmas tree.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I am sorry not to get in before the noble Lord, and I am grateful for the tolerance of the House. I will be as brief as I can. I support Amendment 203I in the name of my noble friend Lord Murray. He has explained the reasons for his amendment, which seeks to restore the initial intention behind the refugee convention, on which Section 31 of the 1999 Act is based. This is an important amendment because as we have seen, even today, there is a lack of clarity on and a great deal of debate about the refugee convention, its status and its very meaning. I will touch on two of the problems I see, which my noble friend’s amendment would overcome.
The first is the problem of the convention itself. It does not oblige the refugees themselves to seek refuge in the first country; it is an agreement between states, and therefore it is for the states, not the individuals. That has given rise to a lot of the discussion we have heard about whether they have to make a claim in the first safe country. The second problem is the guidance, updated by the Home Office on 27 June this year, which explains the inadmissibility rules in respect of safe third countries and where asylum should be claimed if asylum has been claimed, should be claimed or could reasonably have been expected to be claimed,
“(or, for claims made before 28 June 2022, where exceptional circumstances didn’t prevent such a claim), provided there is a reasonable prospect of removing”
the claimant—which I understand is to reflect the case law. Therefore, we have all kinds of obstacles and not very much agreement on the problem.
I recognise how far the Government have gone to tackle the problems of historically high levels of not only immigration but asylum claims, and the small boat arrivals pose a particular problem, with people crossing the channel from the French coast, having travelled through France and probably a number of other safe countries in the EU, as has been stated. We paid France £476 million to deal with this problem and try to control their coastal departures but, sadly, it has not worked. This year we added the one-in, one-out agreement, but so far that has not paid many dividends: as of last Thursday, we have seen 26 people sent to France and nine people come in from France, which is a drop in the ocean of the 32,000 recorded in September.
We have a problem, and so do the French. Their immigration figures are higher than ours: last year, 1.6 million people came in from outside Europe—that is, non-EU citizens—and they had 157,000 asylum claims compared to our 110,000. They have a much less stable regime at the moment, with President Macron unable to command a majority in Parliament and losing Prime Ministers regularly. So, I cannot blame the French, either. Migration is top: the party with the majority is Madame Le Pen’s.
Good though the Government’s intentions are—and they are good intentions—returns agreements will not work as well as a proper legal amendment, such as that proposed by my noble friend Lord Murray, which would control the problem at source, in the law, of whether or not we admit claims from people who have passed through a safe country. That is why I support it.
My Lords, this group is certainly a tale of two halves. We on these Benches are unable to support the first two amendments. The United Kingdom’s problems with the current migration crisis stem not necessarily from the refugee convention itself. Rather, the problems lie with the metaphorical scaffolding which has been built around the convention. First, the Government are unable to carry out the will of the British people and turn away those who arrive here unlawfully. To all intents and purposes, the convention already has primacy in United Kingdom law. Those who qualify as asylum seekers have their subsistence paid for by the British state. They have an army of lawyers to hand.
Secondly, the problem lies with processing. Because this Government have continued to expand the incentives for people to come here, asylum processing remains severely backlogged. Removing legal safeguards against illegal migration will only make this problem worse. We already know the impact the Human Rights Act is having on our ability to control our borders and end this crisis. We will debate that Act further in a later group, so I will not go further now. Suffice to say that further incorporating treaties and conventions into domestic law is not the right way to reduce crossings by small boat.
Amendment 185 is another attempt to promote a world view divorced from reality. It is a measure that would allow people claiming to be asylum seekers to face no penalty for illegally entering this country regardless of the country they directly came from. It would open the door to even wider and more egregious exploitation of our already generous system. Let us consider what the effects of this amendment would mean. Asylum seekers, having arrived in France or a similarly safe third country, would have no disincentive to make the dangerous crossing over the channel. Not only would they be enticed by free board and lodging which we provide, alongside many other amenities on offer, but they would face no recourse to justice should they be forging their identity or embellishing their story.
What is the result? More money on the taxpayers’ bottom line, more stigmatisation and scepticism of actual and true asylum seekers, and more casualties among those crossing the channel. Our legal system, so long as we are part of this convention, should be practical and prudent. We cannot decriminalise all illegal migration so that we may feel virtuous when discussing refugees. We should reject this amendment.
Amendment 203I tabled by my noble friends Lord Murray of Blidworth, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lady Lawlor is very pertinent. It seeks both to clarify and vindicate the rights of the United Kingdom under Article 31 of the refugee convention. It does so at a time when, as we have heard, its provisions are under increased scrutiny. While other Members of this House—those on the Benches opposite—attempt to dilute our sovereign right to control our borders, I am grateful to those on this side who have the resolve to prioritise Britain’s interests while keeping us in line with our international obligations.
This is a moderate and necessary amendment. As it makes clear, only asylum seekers fleeing genuinely dangerous and war-torn countries will be able to enter the United Kingdom without fear of persecution. Those who pass through or stop in another country where their freedoms were not so threatened will not be able to claim in a court of law that they were fleeing persecution, for the evident reason that they will have chosen not to stop in a prior safe country. This should be our starting point.
The refugee convention exists to provide respite for those fleeing persecution and violence; it is a measure that was born not out of necessity but from pragmatism and benevolence. However, unending benevolence, which gives every person who enters our country the benefit of the doubt and allows everyone the same defences in court regardless of their last country of departure, will undermine confidence in the asylum system. It damages the national interest and endangers national security.
This amendment is in the national interest. We have seen for too long the effects of an over-lenient legal system that has not adequately dealt with those who arrive here illegally, those who seek not true refuge but our generosity. By articulating and vindicating the United Kingdom’s rights under Article 31 of the convention, we do a service not only to people of this country but to those who are genuine refugees who flee persecution.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an extensive and wide-ranging debate—certainly for the last day in Committee. None the less, I shall try to address the major points raised in the debate while being brief, given the hour.
Amendment 184, tabled by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, seeks to require that legislation, Immigration Rules and guidance are to be interpreted in compliance with the 1951 refugee convention. Where any such provision may be found by a court to be incompatible with the convention, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.
I wish to thank my noble friend for her amendment, also noting the reflections that she made during Second Reading, including on how the refugee convention was a direct result of some of the worst atrocities seen in the last century. I might note that possibly Second Reading was a better place to have a long discussion of the rights and wrongs of the refugee convention and its fitness in this day and age than is Committee. I make it clear on the record, in addressing the comments of many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, that the Government remain committed to ensuring that all asylum claims in the UK are considered in accordance with our international obligations under the 1951 refugee convention.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that I have not had the pleasure of reading the Times as extensively as maybe I should have done at the weekend, but even so I shall not be drawn into commenting on leaked memos. However, I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for mentioning, although it was not entirely germane to the debate but an important thing to register on this day, the international developments, particularly the release of hostages. I take this opportunity to join her, as I am sure that all noble Lords would wish to, in welcoming that development.
To go back to the Bill, all claims that are admitted to the UK asylum system will continue to be considered on their individual merits by assessing all the evidence provided by the claimant against a background of published country information. We assess that Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 as already drafted on the statute book, which sets out the primacy of the refugee convention in relation to Immigration Rules, is already a sufficient safeguard for ensuring that we remain compatible with our international obligations. As such, we do not consider this amendment necessary.
My noble friend’s other amendment, Amendment 185, seeks to amend Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 by applying Article 31 of the refugee convention directly. In effect, this would require the courts, when considering whether a refugee is entitled to a defence provided by Article 31 and should not be convicted of an immigration offence, to make their good faith interpretation rather than interpreting the will of Parliament, as set out in Section 31. That picks up on some of the comments made by noble Lords opposite, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Harper.
Section 31 provides a defence for refugees charged with certain document-related offences if they entered the UK directly from a place where their life or freedom was threatened, presenting themselves to the authorities without delay and claiming asylum as soon as reasonably practical. This defence is conditional on the refugee not having reasonably been able to seek protection in another country en route. While the defence under Section 31 of the 1999 Act provides important protection for refugees, it applies only in the circumstances outlined above—namely, to those who come directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened or who could not reasonably be expected to seek protection en route. In practice, we know that very few migrants will meet these criteria. Most will have transited through multiple safe countries where they could have sought protection, and therefore do not qualify under Section 31.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I have a short intervention. If the First-tier Tribunal is open, as I understand from my noble friend Lord Murray it is, I see no reason for not allowing publication in the interests of confidence in our tribunal system.
My Lords, the amendments in this group raise a serious and important issue. As we have heard, tens of thousands of decisions of real importance to both the individuals and the wider public go unreported every year. We on this side are most grateful to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for bringing these amendments and to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Alton, who unfortunately is not well at the moment, for their support for them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
Members of the public or any interested parties can apply to have decisions of the First-tier Tribunal published, and it is the case that that can be decided by members of the judiciary. We see no reason—to sidestep the binary choice the noble Lord presents—to enforce that position on the judiciary.
How does a member of the public ask about a decision and say, “Can you publish a decision in this case?”, if they do not know the name of it and do not know that it has been decided? The whole point of this exercise and these amendments is so that they are all there and you do not have to know about a case; you can look at a case and you say, “That is an excellent decision” or “That is an interesting decision” or “That is a very strange decision”. But if you do not know that the decision has been made, because you are sitting there like we all are here, how are you going to know to ask for it, other than to ask for every single decision to be published?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I remind noble Lords that, in April 2022, the National Archives and the Ministry of Justice launched Find Case Law, which is an online service allowing everybody to access freely accessible court judgments and tribunal decisions.
It remains the case—I suppose it ill behoves me to point this out, but this is something that the Opposition Front Bench is a sudden convert to—that, in various passages of immigration law that the previous Government put through your Lordships’ House, Members opposite could have made this proposal. It is convenient that they have now decided that this is a worthy thing to do.
I do not think it is unfair to suggest that people with an interest in accessing judgments can make the application. Those persons are most likely to be interested journalists or other legal practitioners. I am sure that it is the case that, despite some of the other tribunals that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, enumerated for us, such as the land tribunal, just because it is openly accessible that does not mean that everybody is regularly searching through it.
We see no reason to change the status quo; it is for the judiciary for decide whether to publish decisions. This suited the previous Government, and this suits us as well. That is why I ask the noble Lord, Lord Murray, to withdraw his amendment.
Perhaps I may add one brief point in support of my noble friend’s amendment. The statistics clearly show that the abuse of student visas by people who come here, have a period as a student or as a purported student, and then choose to try to extend their time here by claiming asylum is a significant problem. The amendment would force a genuine asylum seeker to lodge their claim once they reached the safe country of Britain, and two days is plenty of time to do that. On their arrival, they can make that claim for asylum. Having this rule in place would provide a significant deterrent for those who seek to abuse our asylum system in an attempt to extend their stay in the United Kingdom. For that reason, I certainly support this amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak broadly in favour of Amendment 203L, tabled by my noble friend Lady Lawlor. At its core, this amendment seeks to prevent the abuse of the student visa route by using it as a back door to asylum. This recognises an important principle. Those who enter the United Kingdom in one set of circumstances should not then be permitted to rewrite those circumstances once they have got here.
A student visa is granted on trust. It is granted to those who come here to study, not to those who claim asylum. When someone applies for such a visa, they do so on the clear understanding that they are entering this country for educational purposes. If, once here, they make an asylum claim that was not mentioned at the point of entry and, indeed, do so days, weeks or months later, they are by definition acting under false pretences unless there is a good reason for it—and I will come to that in a moment. The asylum system exists to protect those who are genuinely fleeing persecution, not to reward those who seek to manipulate our visa system for other ends. Where individuals apply dishonestly, where they misrepresent their reasons for coming to the United Kingdom, we cannot simply turn a blind eye and reward that deception with the right to remain.
On this side, we on the Front Bench have a qualification: we cannot be blind to the fact that circumstances in someone’s home country may change after arrival. A student in the United Kingdom on a student visa may find that, in their absence, their home country becomes unsafe for them personally to return. They may therefore become eligible for asylum during the time they are in the United Kingdom on a student visa.
The amendment as drafted prevents any asylum claim being made if someone has entered on a student visa. That is a strong prohibition. If this were clarified in some way, with a carve-out for those who can establish that the situation has genuinely changed in their home country while they are here, we would commend consideration of an amendment to address that situation. So I ask my noble friend Lady Lawlor to consider whether the amendment should be redrafted.
For their part, the Government must stop the abuse of student visas under the current system. They should equally ensure that, in the appropriate but, I hope, reasonably exceptional circumstances where there has been a genuine change, such people are protected.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, for Amendment 203L. I am also grateful for the latter point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, because it is very possible that someone arrives as a student and finds that the situation in their home country has changed since their arrival. I remember that, when I was at university, which is an awfully long time ago now, there were students who arrived when there was one regime in Iran and left when there was another regime. The flexibility to which the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, referred is very important, and this is one of the particular holes—dare I say it?—in the proposal brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. However, I have to say that there are several more holes in the argument that she put forward. If I point those out to her as part of this debate, I hope she will accept them in good faith.
The amendment seeks to widen the scope of existing inadmissibility powers, so that any claim made by a holder of a student visa that was lodged more than two days after they arrived in the UK must be declared inadmissible. We had a large debate on inadmissibility on day 4 of the Committee, and we considered five amendments then. This is a very late amendment to this discussion, so we have had limited time to consider it. However, it is not an approach the Government consider appropriate.
The likely consequence of the amendment, as well as that pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would be to refuse to admit claims to the UK’s asylum system, but without any obvious way in which to return individuals who make those claims. It would leave affected individuals in a state of limbo, with no certainty as to whether they qualify for refugee status or whether they should be returned to their home country. On the basis of that contention, it could prove both costly and ineffective.
Furthermore, in affording a more favourable position to those students who claim asylum within two days of first arriving in the UK, the amendment also risks benefiting those students who are more likely to have deliberately used the visa system as a way to access the UK’s asylum system.
The Government cannot support the amendment. I respectfully suggest that it does not achieve the objective that the noble Baroness proposed, and it is certainly open to the wide hole which the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, pointed out to the Committee today. So I ask the noble Baroness to reflect on what the noble Lord said and, in general terms, to withdraw the amendment.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I believe in choice and personal autonomy, but, if this Bill is passed, it will change how we treat each other as humans, and not for the better. Hard cases make bad law and the Bill is defective in too many respects. I say that despite the imperfect state of the current law.
The reports of the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee cannot be brushed aside. The Bill is at once long but incomplete. There is insufficient detail or principle evident for proper scrutiny of the important powers to be delegated. We should, for example, have had draft regulations regarding the co-ordinating doctors, who are to have a central role and will make the most important assessments—namely, whether the person seeking assistance has sufficient mental capacity, a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life and seeks assistance voluntarily, without coercion or pressure from another.
How will this be done and from what knowledge base? My noble friend Lord Murray has explained that. How will the panel then test the process? How long will the panel devote? How will it be resourced, so that it is not, as it must not be, a tick-box exercise? We all know that subtle family pressures are real.
Until now, doctors have been obliged to protect against suicide. The Bill goes against that. Death by poison is not treatment. It brings huge ethical challenges and changes for doctors.
What sort of people will be the independent advocates? What skills will they have? How will the vulnerable be identified? Qualifying vulnerable persons are those with a learning disability, mental disorder, or autism, which is often not diagnosed—people who may experience substantial difficulty in understanding the processes or information relevant to those processes, or in communicating their views, wishes or feelings. But there is no requirement to involve the independent advocate before a doctor decides to initiate a conversation on assisted dying with people in that precious cohort. The independent advocate will only be appointed once someone is on the path.
Who will consider family coercion—subtle family coercion or just the old person who thinks, “I’m probably a bit of a burden”—and with what resources? I am aware of the head of safeguarding in a London hospital who has recently said that there are already issues with families who want to clear the decks. The noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, explained all that.
The overloaded NHS is not always safe. Remember the Bristol Children’s Hospital and Stafford Hospital scandals. My chambers were involved in dealing with the aftermath of those and many other medical disasters. Mistakes happen and practitioners are, I am afraid, known to change the notes after the event. I have personal experience of that in matters in which I have been involved. How will we know whether the system is working properly? Cover-ups will happen. Yet, we are not to have coronial inquest. Why on earth not?
Giving responsibility to the NHS will create a stark financial conflict. It will likely damage the delivery of palliative care: the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, addressed that in detail. Palliative care should be our focus. This Bill cannot be put into acceptable shape. We shall be left with a national death service—and a poor one at that. We should have had a royal commission and proper legislation.
(7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful and instructive introduction and wish well the aims of this order. Saturday’s great London parade ending at the palace was a magnificent event, helping towards national unity, pride and patriotism. I recall my father’s return from Burma with his star in November 1945—there were difficulties in getting a great army back home from far away as speedily as possible.
Our service men and women displayed and paraded on Saturday brilliantly alongside the flag-flying Ukrainian guests. Surely, after the parade, many of the huge crowds and millions watching on television sought to sink a pint or two. As an Army veteran and president of our RBL branch, I am certain that many pints will be sunk on 8 and 9 May. We can generate quite a thirst in Wales when the occasion arises. This surely shall be one. I have marched in many remembrance parades— at least some 45. In several, I marched with a then constituent who wore his medals of two world wars. He was a lovely man and he invited me into his home.
Strangely, some 60 years ago, Wales organised a referendum for or against Sunday opening—for Sundays were supposedly to be dry in Wales, presumably to encourage attendance at church, chapel and other places of worship. The referendum delivered a resounding “No” to opening, so tired, red-faced, ageing men with large stomachs took the Sunday bus that ran across the Wales-England border to quench their thirst in the then attractively wet England. Our local bus ran to Chester. We in Wales still have a lingering gift for whitewash and hypocrisy—but only skin deep, of course.
I recollect the Minister’s superb tenure and many years as Member of Parliament for Delyn. He was much admired as a vigorous and successful constituency man and a friendly and approachable Member of Parliament, just as he now is as a Minister in your Lordships’ House. We have shared a pint or two together over the years.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction. Like others, I rise with humility and respect as we mark the 80th anniversary of victory in Europe and, to come, victory over Japan. These are two defining moments in both our national story and the wider history of the free world. This anniversary offers a rare and precious opportunity, perhaps one of the last, for living veterans to share their memories first hand. It is a moment for us as a nation to come together across generations and communities to honour the service and sacrifice of all those who fought, served and contributed to the war effort.
In this, I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for including my late father, who joined the Royal Air Force on 4 September 1939, his 19th birthday. He was very fortunate to survive: he served on 43 operations in Bomber Command over enemy territory, the last of them in November 1944. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. He was, he thought, a very lucky survivor. He told me that he could not believe he was still alive at the end of the war. He always marched proudly with his medals in thanksgiving parades, and he never forgot those with whom he served.
Whether in mourning, reflection or celebration, coming together is a time-honoured tradition in Britain. It has long helped us to connect with one another and with our shared history. I therefore welcome the Government’s recognition of the central role that public houses and hospitality venues play in marking national moments such as these. The extension of licensing hours is a small but real gesture that will allow communities across the country to gather, reflect and raise a glass in tribute. Indeed, many of these same establishments were open on the very day that peace was declared. The London Museum hosts a wonderful collection of photographs from the 1945 celebrations. I encourage all noble Lords to visit its dedicated website and take a moment to reflect on those scenes of spontaneous joy and national unity.
We are especially pleased to see the Government place strong emphasis on remembering the contributions of the Commonwealth. Millions from India, Africa, the Caribbean, Australasia, Canada and others further away stood shoulder to shoulder with Britain. They volunteered and they fought. Many made the ultimate sacrifice. Their bravery and commitment are and were integral to the victory we commemorate today and tomorrow, and they must always hold a central place in our national memory.
This statutory instrument enables a broad, inclusive and ambitious programme of commemorative events, from military processions and national services to cultural initiatives, educational programmes and grass-roots street parties. This is a comprehensive and thoughtful approach. We welcome the Government’s vision: a commemoration that is both solemn and celebratory, which reflects our veterans while ensuring that their stories and values are passed on to a new generation.
We are particularly encouraged by the Government’s commitment to inclusivity, ensuring that these commemorations recognise not only the European and Middle Eastern theatre but the Far East and the global scale of that conflict. The previous Conservative Government’s allocation of £1 million to establish a memorial to the Muslim soldiers who died in both world wars is a testament to our ongoing commitment to recognising the diverse faiths and communities who served this nation in its hour of need.
The recognition of the so-called Forgotten Army in Burma and the efforts to honour the many backgrounds, beliefs and nationalities represented in our forces mark a vital and long overdue step toward a fuller and more accurate reflection of Britain’s wartime experience.
As we commemorate these historic anniversaries, let us do so with pride, gratitude and in unity, remembering not only the victory but the values and sacrifices that made it possible.
I am grateful for the contributions of the three noble Lords who have spoken today. In particular, I thank my noble friend Lord Jones for reminding us both of the joy he would have had when his own father returned home from the war and the contribution this week of the Ukrainian forces, who are still fighting in Europe for the values that noble Lords have mentioned today.
As my noble friend Lord Jones knows, I am Lord Hanson of Flint and for many years he was the Member of Parliament for the constituency covering Flint; he mentioned the British Legion club, where we will, I am sure, see many beers sunk on Thursday as a result of this order. I am grateful for his very kind words about my service over 28 years in that town.
I am also very pleased to have the strong support of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for the order. It is good to see this cross-party support for the recognition. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, ably summed up the mood of this Committee: we have pride and gratitude for the service of people such as his father who served our country with bravery and humility. I am always aware of the fact that when my uncle was killed, he did not know that the war would one day be over and won; he did now know that there would be three more years of the conflict; he did not know that the people such as the fathers of my noble friend Lord Jones and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would come back.
Only now can we reflect on that dark period and on the service of those on the home front, in the Navy, the Air Force and the Army and in the Commonwealth—a point from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, which I very strongly agree with—who all came together to defeat an evil. On 8 May 1945, that evil was defeated, and celebrations began. We can do no better on this 8 May than to allow this order to go through, allowing colleagues throughout the country to enjoy an extra couple of hours and have an extra couple of beers, glasses of wine or, dare I say, even soft drinks if they wish to do so. In doing so, we are giving the opportunity to toast the people who made this country what it is today by defeating fascism and all its evil in 1945.
I am sure that we will return to the end of the Second World War later this year. For the moment, however, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and ask that the order be approved.
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to act as junior counsel to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened carefully to some comments that the Minister made on Monday, which alluded to this clause, and I thought about them carefully, but they were brief and I, too, wish to test what is really intended by the Government. My feeling is that the Government have made an inadvertent mistake in Clause 31 which they can easily rectify.
This Bill is designed to protect citizens by imposing clear statutory duties. When clear statutory duties are imposed and there is a breach of those duties, it is very common for a citizen who is a victim of that breach to be able to bring a civil action. The purpose of the civil action is often to recover damages, though it may involve other declaratory judgments too.
I want to give a few examples, because I think we are going to have one substantive debate on this clause and then a decision will be reached. I am going to mention a number of instances in which breach of statutory duty gives rise to a civil action to obtain judgments of the kind I mentioned. First, driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition gives rise to a statutory duty which can result in a judgment for damages. In this Bill we are talking about something much bigger in scale than driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition, but it may have exactly the same consequences.
There are other examples. If there are unsafe systems or means of work in any workspace, there can be an action for breach of statutory duty without it being necessary to prove negligence, nuisance or any other tort —civil wrong—that requires specific proof of certain aspects. Allowing a vehicle to be driven by an uninsured person allows a claim for breach of statutory duty. The failure to arrange compulsory insurance for employees allows such a claim. If a landlord fails to provide habitable standards, equally, there can be such a claim. If a company fails to disclose required financial information to investors, there can be such a claim for breach of statutory duty.
If a shop sells faulty electrical equipment whereby a fire is caused in the home for which it has been bought, for example, one does not have to prove negligence. One may have an action under the Sale of Goods Acts or their equivalent, but there is an opportunity to obtain damages for breach of statutory duty. At a construction site, the failure to provide safety barriers gives rise to such an action. If we go to a restaurant and suffer food poisoning because it has failed to reach the statutory hygiene standards, we can make a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty. If one fails as an employer to provide proper training to employees on handling hazardous chemicals, that too gives rise to a potential claim for breach of statutory duty. I have chosen just a few examples—and there are others—where one does not have to prove negligence and the components of negligence.
Such provisions are all designed to secure protection for individuals without the need to prove those other elements of common-law civil wrongs. I do not understand why those rights are removed by Clause 31(1). I invite the Government to reflect on what is, as I have suggested, probably an inadvertent failure.
My Lords, I beg to differ with the noble Lord, but not because I do not want deserving people to recover compensation. My reading of the Bill as it stands is to the effect that, as drafted, Clause 31 achieves two things. First, it puts beyond doubt any question whether the breaches of requirements under the Bill can of themselves be a ground for a civil claim. It says plainly that such breaches will not in themselves be a ground. However, it is important to be aware that the fact that a breach of duty under the Bill or regulations has occurred will still be evidence that will be admissible in a civil claim which alleges negligence or other breach of common-law duty. The important point is that there may have been a breach that was without negligence.
If there has been a breach then it will be strong evidence that something has gone wrong that should be compensated for, but it may be capable of explanation and justification in the civil courts, which does not excuse criminal liability. Put simply, the Bill as drafted makes plain that a breach of statutory duty will not of itself alone give rise to an actionable breach of duty sounding in damages.
Secondly, as it stands, the Bill makes it clear that what is said in Clause 31(1) does not affect—that is, detract from—any right of action that exists in common law. In other words, a claim of negligence, in particular, or any other common-law right will remain; so this provision takes nothing away. Where, in a civil action, the claim establishes that as a matter of fact there has been a breach of such statutory duty, that will be evidence in the case and it is likely to be strong evidence. It will be a matter for the court to determine whether it is evidence of negligence or other evidence that might give rise to a justifiable claim for damages, and what weight to give it. I hope that is clear.
The amendment proffered to us would delete the whole of the existing clause, and would simply say:
“Nothing … affects any right of action”.
With respect, I suggest that that would be less clear and less helpful to the courts, because it will leave open a possible argument that breaches of statutory duty are themselves grounds for action, even where no want of care has been established. That would be getting closer, in effect, to strict liability for civil damages, however blameless the body or person concerned. That is why it is a step too far. It is unnecessary and potentially damaging, when we look at the vast range of bodies and people who will be affected.
There have always been instances in which some Acts have given rise to immediate civil liability. In others, you had to plead that the breaches of regulations and so on were evidence of negligence. That was so under the old Factories Act and, I think, under the health and safety Act—I cannot remember, but it was a common pleading which I used to do 30 years ago.
It is for the Government to make it absolutely plain whether they want this to be a strict liability—in the sense that the moment that a breach occurs, however blameless, but nonetheless in breach, the party is, damages should follow. My understanding is that the Bill as drafted had that in mind, although it may be difficult. Think of a terrorist act: there may have been a relatively minor breach of regulations. Is that to give rise to millions of pounds-worth of damages, where it has no or very little causal connection, but just enough?
I understand where those moving the amendment are coming from, but this is a matter of policy for those behind it as to the parties likely to be affected and whether the change is necessary. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister what the philosophy is behind the drafting.
I will speak to Amendment 37A to Clause 31, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. This amendment proposes to remove Clause 31 and replace it with a new provision, stating that:
“Nothing in this Act or regulations made under it affects any right of action in civil proceedings”.
The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill represents a critical step in strengthening the security framework for public venues and premises across the country. The increasing sophistication and unpredictability of terrorist threats demand that we establish robust and effective measures to protect the public. By setting out clear responsibilities for operators of certain premises, the Bill aims to ensure that the tragic events that we have seen in the past are less likely to be repeated in the future.
As we consider Amendment 37A, it is essential to examine whether the proposed changes will support or potentially undermine the Bill’s objectives. At its core, this amendment seeks to clarify that the Bill will not interfere with the right to pursue civil claims. Such a provision could be seen as a safeguard, ensuring that individuals and organisations maintain access to legal redress if they believe that negligence or a breach of duty has contributed to harm caused by a terrorist incident.
This is a significant consideration. Civil liability serves as an important mechanism for accountability and justice in our legal system. It encourages responsible behaviour, provides a pathway for compensation and often plays a complementary role in reinforcing public safety. Ensuring that individuals retain this right can provide reassurance that public security measures do not come at the expense of fundamental legal principles. However, there are important questions that we must address.
First, is this amendment necessary? It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that civil liability is not displaced unless explicitly stated in the legislation. Therefore, some may argue that this amendment is redundant and risks introducing ambiguity into the Bill’s interpretation. If the existing legal framework already protects the right to bring civil claims, we must carefully consider whether including an explicit provision could inadvertently complicate matters rather than clarify them.
Another practical consideration is the potential impact on compliance with the Bill’s requirements. Premises operators, many of whom are already facing financial and operational pressures, may view the introduction of this provision as increasing their exposure to litigation. This could have the unintended consequence of discouraging proactive security measures if operators become overly concerned about the risk of legal action. It is essential that the Bill strikes a balance between imposing reasonable obligations and supporting those who are making good-faith efforts to comply.
Furthermore, we must assess whether this amendment could lead to increased litigation that detracts from the primary purpose of the Bill. Legal disputes can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, diverting attention from the urgent task of implementing effective security measures. We should be mindful of the potential for unintended consequences that may hinder the Bill’s objectives. It is also worth considering the impact on the insurance market. If the inclusion of this provision is perceived as creating greater uncertainty or exposure to liability, it could lead to increased insurance premiums for premises operators. This may place an additional financial burden on businesses and organisations that are already navigating a challenging economic environment.
That said, the Government must also be mindful of the importance of maintaining public trust and confidence in counterterrorism measures. Ensuring that individuals have access to justice when they have been wronged is fundamental to our legal system and to public confidence in the rule of law. If stakeholders, legal experts or civil society organisations believe that this amendment is necessary to provide clarity and reassurance, their concerns should be carefully considered. Ultimately, the key question is whether the amendment strengthens the Bill by providing clarity or whether it introduces unnecessary complexity that could hinder its implementation. I look forward to hearing the Government’s view on this matter and the perspectives of other noble Lords.
As we deliberate on this amendment, let us remember the importance of striking the right balance: ensuring robust security measures that protect the public, while safeguarding access to justice and upholding the legal rights that are fundamental to our democracy. We must strive to create a framework that achieves both security and fairness in the face of evolving security threats.
I speak to Amendments 46 to 49. I adopt everything that my noble friend Lord Davies has already said, so I can be short.
Amendment 46, which is a probing amendment, is very simple. We all know we cannot let the terrorist indulge in preventable acts of terror. I emphasise “preventable”. Equally, we cannot allow the threat of terror to close down society and normal life as we now understand it to be. Also, it must be plain that once the Act has been enforced for 18 months, people will have a better idea of what may and may not work, so a review at that stage will be helpful to everyone. It is a shakedown period and it will cut both ways.
As to Amendment 47 and the six-month delay of commencement, that is simply to impose a minimum period—it can be longer if appropriate—before regulations and other actions can be taken by requiring draft guidance to have been issued and consulted on first. This will simply ensure that businesses and other bodies are properly consulted before guidance is finalised. It will ensure that the consultation on the guidance has preceded the laying of regulations. We are moving into new territory. A wide range of powers is being exercised over disparate bodies and a wide range of organisations in respect of matters which have not previously been subject to such detailed supervision. It is obviously right that those affected should be consulted. That will apply to the potential enforcers—the SIA and local authorities—as well as to those on the receiving end who are running the establishments and organisations where these regulations will apply.
Finally, Amendments 48 and 49 are simply probing amendments on the timescale. We have heard that it may take two years to come into force. We tabled these amendments, as my noble friend has said, to test how that period will work.
I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling the amendments today. I hope I can respond to them in a positive and reassuring manner.
First, I will look at Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst. All through this debate, at Second Reading, in Committee, and in discussions that we have had outside of this Chamber, we have been keen to reassure noble Lords that we are trying to strike the right balance between public protection and burdens on premises and events. In fact, I prefer the word “standards” to “burdens”; a burden is something that is difficult. What we are trying to put in place is a number of basic standards which it is important for businesses and organisations to meet.
I have said throughout consideration of the Bill in Committee and at Second Reading that, following Royal Assent, we expect that there will be a period of at least 24 months to give us the time to ensure that those responsible for premises and the events in scope understand the new obligations, that they have time to plan and prepare, and—to go back to previous discussions —any training required of volunteers or staff is undertaken.
The proposed timetable in Amendment 46 of 18 months would, with respect, be before any detailed action has been taken under the provisions of the Act. It would assess the preparations generally, as opposed to the actual impact and implementation downstream. Ministers, including myself and my right honourable friend Dan Jarvis will keep legislation under review, including its effectiveness, impact and implementation. Should unintended consequences be identified, the Bill provides powers, which have been subject to debate, to adjust the regime as appropriate. I hope the noble Lord will reflect on Amendment 46 and, when the time comes, withdraw the amendment.
On Amendment 47 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, there will be a 24-month implementation period before the Act is commenced. The Government intend to issue guidance under Clause 27, published before commencement. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord seeks to put some timeframes on that. I think it is best to leave that to judgment, both in the guidance and in the consultation on that guidance with key partners.
Again, the 24-month period covers Amendments 48 and 49, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst. The implementation period will allow those in scope to prepare for and comply with the new obligations. It is important that the SIA, particularly, is operating as soon as is practical. The Government must be certain that it is ready for its new role. We anticipate that this will take at least 24 months—it might take slightly longer—in the light of previous timeframes for other regulators introduced under previous legislation.
I do not anticipate any delays in commencement, but I want to keep the flexibility and appropriate ability for the Government to pick an appropriate commencement date when the Government assess that the SIA has fulfilled its duties, as we anticipate them under the Act, and that the organisations impacted by the Act at that stage are fully prepared and cognisant and are able to implement. Again, I gently suggest to the noble Lord that it would not be sensible for the Secretary of State to be driven by a tied provision in the Act, as opposed to the judgment that, as I have said to the Committee, will look in due course at whether or not we put those provisions in place.
Generally, in relation to Amendments 48 and 49, the 24-month period is what I would hope to be a realistic time to establish the set-up of the regulator and for those in scope of the Bill to prepare. If the Bill achieves Royal Assent, which I hope it will, the noble Lord, this House, the House of Commons and the court of public opinion—that is, the people in businesses and pubs and others who will be impacted by this legislation—have the opportunity to feed into both the Government for their guidance and the SIA for its guidance, as well as into the debate generally about implementation, about how they think the Act is going and what measures are being put in place. A formal consultation or review, as outlined and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would inhibit that process and set formal timescales that would not be helpful. This House remains the first port of call for any concern or points that noble Lords may want to raise about the implementation downstream. I hope that reassurance means that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
(9 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI understand the concern that those in charge of organising events must act responsibly, and I hope the Committee will accept that all decent people—the sort of people who organise a voluntary event—will want to do so. If things go wrong and there is a disaster in the form of a terrorist event, in particular one that could and should have been prevented, the person responsible—the chairman of the committee or whatever—will not want to be found responsible in the court of public opinion for an outrage occurring at something that they have organised. Quite simply, no decent person who has thought about it for a moment would want that on their conscience. That is the starting point. I cannot deal with rogues and vagabonds, because they are to one side; I am talking about the vast majority of people who get involved in smaller events, not commercial organisations.
Small organisations, if properly advised, will insure against financial penalties. That may be the cost of putting on an event. At a local jubilee event a few years ago in south-west London, in Putney, on a little green we have in our street, we were going to have a bouncy castle. I said that we must get substantial personal injury liability insurance in case a child falls off and breaks their neck and suffers brain damage. It was vast damages then—not as much as it is now but certainly into millions of pounds. We were able to get it fairly cheaply.
However, that was for personal injury damages. What you cannot do is ensure against going to prison. You could certainly get insurance against criminal penalties up to a certain level. If it is known that the fine is not going to be more than £2,000 or something, it will not be terrible, but the insurers will not insure you next year if you are fined this year.
I shall make three quick points. First, I hope the noble Lord can in summing up this debate reassure the Committee about proportionality and that it is not the intention of this Bill to attack or penalise volunteers—it is to encourage volunteers to play their role fully in the understanding of what this Bill is about and the need to prepare for the eventuality of a terrorist attack.
Secondly, I have listened very carefully and I have a lot of sympathy on the issue of volunteers. I am a volunteer trustee on several boards and I know about the liability that you have as a trustee on a board. You do have personal liability—but that does not put me off, and I hope that it will not put lots of other people off. I cannot support these amendments, because I think they water down the core element of individual responsibility in the Bill.
For what criminal liability is the noble Baroness as a trustee going to be liable, other than the criminal offence of fraud?
That is a fair point—but you are financially liable as a trustee.
You can insure against that, and I am sure the noble Baroness is insured as a trustee.
For me, the amendments water down a core element of the Bill, which is about individual responsibility—people taking responsibility for ensuring that an organisation or an event at a venue has thought about what it will do in the eventuality of an attack. That is the key purpose of this Bill.
Thirdly, it would be useful if the Minister could write a letter or bring forward proposals to illustrate how volunteers will be treated with due respect and that it will be understood that this legislation must not put them off, which is why an information campaign is so important. A public information campaign should reassure people.