Alleged Spying Case: Home Office Involvement

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Home Secretary to make a statement about Home Office involvement in the alleged China spying case.

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I thank the shadow Home Secretary for the question, and I thank you, Mr Speaker, for the opportunity to respond to it today.

As I have repeatedly set out to the House, the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the wider Government are extremely disappointed that this case will not be heard in court. I have heard the strength of feeling right across the House and I share Members’ concern about the threats we face from espionage. The witness statements released last Wednesday vindicate what the Prime Minister and other members of the Government have stated repeatedly: the deputy National Security Adviser faithfully, and with full integrity, set out the various threats posed by the Chinese state to the UK, and he did so in order to try to support a successful prosecution.

This urgent question asks about the involvement of the Home Office. Following the charging decision made in early 2024, under the previous Government, the Crown Prosecution Service advised the witness that he could not share the evidence with others in government. The Home Office’s involvement following the charging decision that was taken under the previous Government was therefore heavily restricted to avoid breaching the CPS’s requirements.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mike Tapp)]

Listen to that.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I do not need any help from the Government Front Bench. This is a very important statement that really does affect Members of this House.

[Dan Jarvis]

As I have repeatedly made clear in this House, Ministers and special advisers were not involved in any aspect of the production of the evidence, and I stand by that statement today. The Prime Minister has also made clear that he was informed of the CPS’s decision only a matter of days before the case collapsed. There is nothing that the Prime Minister or any other Minister could have done at that point that would have changed the law and the policy under the previous Government between 2021 and 2023. Those who have read the DNSA’s statements will know that they clearly articulated the threats posed by China based on the previous Government’s policy at the time, detailing the damage caused by the alleged offences. Ultimately, it was an entirely independent decision by the CPS to discontinue the case, and the CPS has confirmed that it came under no outside pressure to do so.

Like Members from all parts of the House, I remain very frustrated that this case will not be heard in court. We wanted to see the trial go ahead. I have made it clear on many occasions that the decision not to proceed was an independent decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has given assurances that there was no Government interference in that decision.

I note that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy will be undertaking an inquiry on the case and intends to hold public evidence sessions. The Intelligence and Security Committee has also indicated that it will investigate. We welcome the launch of the inquiry and the investigations, with which the Government will, of course, fully co-operate. I have already set out the range of activity that this Government are taking to combat the Chinese espionage threat, and I hope that that is well understood. Let me also provide the House with the reassurance that the Government will take all necessary action to keep the UK safe and secure.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Home Secretary.

[Chris Philp]

Last Wednesday, the Prime Minister told this House that no Minister or special adviser was involved in the handling of the China spy case, yet The Sunday Times has since reported that the Home Secretary had

“heard that the case might collapse and had made representations to ensure the evidence put forward was as ‘strong as possible’.”

So I ask the Minister: when did the Home Secretary become aware that the case might collapse, and what representations did she or her proxies make about the evidence and to whom? Why has the House been told—including just now—that Ministers and advisers were not involved in any way when The Sunday Times reports that they were?

The Sunday Times also reported on a key meeting that took place on 1 September—a meeting that the Government originally denied took place. Is it true that Jonathan Powell chaired that meeting? Did that meeting discuss the CPS view that the evidence provided to that point was inadequate, and the possibility of providing further evidence in the case? Will the Minister agree to publish the minutes of all meetings in which this case was discussed and the correspondence relating to it?

The Sunday Times reported that following the meeting, the Attorney General’s Office was asked to speak to the CPS. Did anyone from the AGO speak directly or indirectly to the CPS after that meeting? Can the Minister confirm that Dan Chugg from the Foreign Office was at the 1 September meeting, and that it was the same Dan Chugg who approached the Lord Speaker with a proposed deal in which the Chinese ambassador would be allowed back into Parliament? The Sunday Times also reported that the DNSA is understood to have acknowledged privately that the decision not to say that China is an ongoing threat was political in nature. Is that true?

Finally, the current Government’s position has been that all the evidence provided related to the previous Government’s policy, but we now know that that is categorically not true. In paragraph 8 of Matt Collins’s third statement, from August this year, which he copied and pasted from the Labour manifesto, he stressed the importance the current Government attach to a “positive relationship” with China, weakening the evidence compared with 2023 and bringing in current Government policy, contrary to what we have been told in recent weeks. Why have the Government been providing this House with inaccurate information, and why did Ministers know what the CPS wanted but refuse to give it to the CPS?

[Dan Jarvis]

With great respect, a lot of what has just been said does not actually relate to the urgent question that was initially asked by the shadow Home Secretary. I have to say, the Opposition’s position is confusing. They initially criticised the Government for intervening. Then—[Interruption.] I will answer the question. I am answering it. I think it is important that on these matters of national security, we try to debate things in a reasonable and sensible way. That is the approach that this Government will seek to take. If Members opposite—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I think we have had enough.

[Dan Jarvis]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

The Opposition’s position is confusing. They initially criticised the Government for intervening. Then, when it became absolutely clear that we had not done that, they criticised us for not intervening. They asked for greater transparency, then when we provided it they accused the Government—wrongly—of hanging people out to dry. Given that this urgent question relates to the activities of the Home Office, I am not at all clear why the shadow Home Secretary thinks it is appropriate—given accusations that have been made previously about hanging officials out to dry—to name an official in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. How does that relate to the urgent question that was asked? [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I think I need to help a little bit. It is in order to mention another Department. You cannot ringfence this and not refer to other people. It might not be comfortable, but the fact is that a question has been asked that is within order, and that is what matters.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful for your guidance, Mr Speaker. I am simply pointing out to the shadow Home Secretary that Conservative Members have previously criticised Ministers and the Government for, to use their words, hanging officials out to dry, and now the shadow Home Secretary has just named twice an official from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I have said to the Government Front Bench that I do not need any chipping in. I certainly do not need it from all along the Opposition Front Bench.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I do wonder whether at any point the shadow Home Secretary and certain Conservative Members—not all, but certain Members—have considered the need to have some humility and acknowledge their part in this. These activities took place on their watch, when they were in government, and under the legislation of the time.

[Chris Philp]

Don’t just read that out. Answer the question.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Mr Philp, you have had the benefit of an urgent question. I have had the benefit—some might say—of listening to you, so I want you to have the benefit of listening to the Minister.

[Dan Jarvis]

The shadow Home Secretary would be well advised to listen to the points being made. I am seeking to respond to the questions that he and other right hon. and hon. Members have raised. I am trying to do that in good faith, and I would be grateful for the opportunity to do so.

I remind the shadow Home Secretary that we are here today only because the previous Conservative Government did not move quickly enough to fix the glaring holes that existed in our national security laws. The charges in this case, as I hope is well known, were brought under the Official Secrets Act 1911. This antiquated legislation was drawn up before the first world war, and the Conservatives began reviewing it in 2015 because it was widely known that it was not fit for purpose. But it took eight years for them to introduce the National Security Act 2023. Fortunately, the law has now been updated, with cross-party support, but not in time to protect our Parliament from Chinese espionage. If the Conservatives had acted more quickly and the National Security Act had been in place when these alleged offences happened, the prosecution would likely have proceeded. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Look, I am trying really hard. People who hold positions should know better.

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me make this point crystal clear: no member of this Government, nor any special adviser, was in any way involved in the evidence submitted to the CPS or the decision by the DPP not to proceed with the case.

There was an important omission from the shadow Home Secretary’s remarks. As hon. Members will know, the first substantive witness statement was provided under the previous Government, when the right hon. Member was a Home Office Minister, yet neither he nor the Leader of the Opposition have taken the opportunity to say what involvement Conservative Ministers and Conservative special advisers had in the main tranche of the evidence.

The Prime Minister has confirmed that no Labour Ministers or special advisers were involved with the provision of evidence for the case. Last Wednesday during Prime Minister’s questions, the Prime Minister asked the Leader of the Opposition to confirm whether that was also the case under the previous Government. I was in the House last Wednesday, and I think that I heard the Leader of the Opposition confirming from a sedentary position that she did know the answer to that question, but the Conservative party has refused to confirm if any Conservative Ministers or special advisers were involved in the provision of evidence under the previous Government. I wonder if any of the former Ministers in the Chamber can provide the answer.

As Ministers have repeatedly said from the Dispatch Box, the Government are extremely disappointed that the case did not proceed to trial. I gently say to Opposition Front-Bench Members that they need to stop throwing mud and start coming to terms with what happened on their watch.

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)]

The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), and other relevant Select Committee Chairs, including me, have met the Director of Public Prosecutions and sent him a detailed series of follow-up questions. The Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), has convened an inquiry and is likely to call a number of relevant witnesses, including Government Ministers. The Minister mentioned that the ISC will be looking at this matter. Can he assure the House that the Government will co-operate fully with those inquiries and responses, and that that is the best way to take these matters forward in a thorough and timely fashion?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question and for the role he has played in these proceedings. Yes, I give him the absolute assurance he seeks. There is an important role for the House to play in looking carefully at precisely what has gone on. That is why, on behalf of the Government, I very much welcome the work that will now be done by the JCNSS and the ISC. Both those important Committees have an important role, and I am sure that hon. Members across the House will want to make other contributions as part of that process.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am genuinely grateful to the hon. Member for the points he has raised. Let me take them in turn. I lead on behalf of the Government on vetting, and a lot of work has taken place in government since we came into office to ensure that the systems and processes that underpin our vetting are fit for purpose. The hon. Gentleman is right to ask about it. Although it might seem like a reasonably niche point, it is an important one because our national security is underpinned by our ability to vet those who have access to privileged information. He, for reasons that I completely understand, made reference to a link between the work that we are doing in government and the importance of ensuring that the appropriate vetting procedures are in place for this House. I know he will understand that, fundamentally, that will be a matter for the Speaker and for this House, but I can give him an absolute assurance that we will work closely with Mr Speaker, the Deputy Speakers and all those in this place to ensure that we look carefully at what happened and satisfy ourselves that the vetting arrangements are absolutely fit for purpose.

The hon. Gentleman’s second point related specifically to two Members of this House. I do not believe that either of those two Members are in their place today. I am keen to meet them and work closely with them, and to ensure that the Government are providing the support that they may want or require. I am happy to speak to the hon. Gentleman and to those Members about the point that he has made.

With regard to the hon. Gentleman’s final point, which was specifically about China, I hope he will acknowledge that the Government have been crystal clear about our position with regard to China—[Interruption.] Right hon. and hon. Members may chuckle, but we have had this debate previously. If there are Members who think that the nature of our relationship with China can be defined by a single word, then I do not believe that they are serious about the nature of the relationship. All Members in this House have an absolute responsibility to decide for themselves what meetings they take. With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, I do not believe that it is for Ministers to opine from the Dispatch Box about whether individual Members should take meetings or not.

[Fred Thomas (Plymouth Moor View) (Lab)]

Personally, I am very clear that China remains an active, persistent and everyday threat to our country and has done so for many years. In the light of this, what steps is the Minister taking on behalf of the Government to ensure that parliamentarians across this House are much better protected in the years to come from the kind of foreign interference that we saw—regularly, unfortunately—on the last Government’s watch?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, not only for his question but for his previous service and for the work of his constituents with regard to underpinning our national security. He makes an important point. He will know—as will you, Madam Deputy Speaker—that the National Protective Security Authority recently published guidance designed specifically to provide hon. Members with advice and guidance to ensure that they are best able to deal with the risks and threats that all of us in this House face.

On the second part of my hon. Friend’s question, that is something that the Government take incredibly seriously. We inherited the defending democracy taskforce from the previous Government. That was a good institution, and I have on many occasions paid tribute to all those Conservatives Members who were involved in setting it up. The Prime Minister has renewed the mandate of the defending democracy taskforce. It is the fulcrum point across Government that brings the different Departments and law enforcement together, alongside Members of this House, to ensure that we are doing everything that we can to address and tackle the threats that we face. I have always believed and maintained that that should be a shared endeavour right across this House, and my door will always be open to Members of the House who would like to discuss it.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I rather thought that, in a civilised country, whether or not someone was prosecuted depended on the evidence. Was it therefore wise for the witness statement to replicate—word for word—the words of the Labour party manifesto, and has it ever happened before?

[Dan Jarvis]

I always appreciate the Leader of the House’s questions—[Hon. Members: “Father of the House!”] Forgive me. I always appreciate the Father of the House’s questions because he brings a long-standing wisdom and perspective to these matters. I hope he will understand that, in line with the point that he made about civility, it is not for Ministers to critique the decision that was made by the CPS. The Government have made it clear to the House on many occasions that this was an independent decision that was taken by the CPS, and the DPP has been clear about the fact that no special adviser and no Minister interfered in that process.

[Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)]

Mr Speaker, I share your frustration at the collapse of the case. Two questions remain top of mind for Members of the House and for people in my constituency. First, what is the Minister’s assessment of the risk of spying on MPs in this House? Secondly, what is his assessment of the ongoing transnational repression of British national overseas passport holders in Milton Keynes and elsewhere across the country? Does it not show a pattern of Chinese Government activity right across the UK, which is a risk to us?

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise her concerns in the way that she does. I hope that she understands, as the House does, that this Government have been absolutely clear that no interference in our democratic process is remotely acceptable and that there are no circumstances under which we will tolerate countries, wherever they may be, seeking to cause harm to anybody who is resident in the United Kingdom. She specifically mentioned transnational repression. That is something that the Government take incredibly seriously, and we have done a lot of work on it through the defending democracy taskforce. Let me say again to her and to the House that it is completely unacceptable that China or any other country should seek to harm anybody who lives here in the United Kingdom.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I first of all thank the Minister for what he said about co-operation with the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee on this matter. I agree with him, as I often do, that the Government are entitled to clarity about what the question they are being asked is. The question for me is not whether the Government sought to intervene to persuade the DPP to take a different view. I do not think the Government did that. Neither do I think the Government went back and sought to change evidence it had already submitted. The question is, when the CPS asked for additional evidence, as it undoubtedly did, whether the Government chose to supply that evidence or not. That is not about interference; it is about responding to a request made to Government by the CPS. Given that we now know that the request was to make it clear in terms that, during the relevant period, China was a current national security threat to the UK, who in the Home Office or elsewhere decided that that could not be submitted in a further statement of evidence in very clear terms?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman; the remarks I made earlier about the ISC, which he sits on, are genuinely meant. I think that the ISC has an important role to play in looking at precisely what has happened here, and I give him an absolute commitment that we want to work very closely with his Committee on this specific issue and on others.

Let me try to give the right hon. and learned Gentleman a bit of detail, because he asked his question in an entirely reasonable way. I reiterate the point, which I hope is understood by him and his Committee, that the final evidence went in August this year, and there was nothing that any Minister could have done post that. I hope he is crystal clear, as I am, that there was no political interference.

Let me just say something about the DNSA: he is an outstanding public servant who does a very important job and does it very well, and I think it is a terrible shame that there has been commentary about him as an individual. He has acted with integrity throughout this process, and we as a Parliament owe him a debt of gratitude for the service that he has offered. Let me say something about the evidence that he gave: in each of the three statements, the DNSA makes it crystal clear that China poses wide-ranging threats to the UK. In his third statement, he says:

“the Chinese intelligence services are highly capable and conduct large scale espionage operations against the UK to advance the Chinese state’s interests and harm the interests and security of the UK.”

He was very clear about that. He adds:

“China’s espionage operations threaten the UK’s economic prosperity and resilience, and the integrity of our democratic institutions.”

He has been very clear in the evidence statements that he provided. I do not think that there is much more that I can add to that, other than to reiterate that it was then ultimately a decision for the DPP.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

Malign foreign actors will always try to find the next weakest link, and my concern is local authorities, which have the spending power of £127.1 billion. What action is the Home Office taking to ensure that our councillors and other democratically elected people at the lower levels of government are also given the protection they need?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend because he raises an important point. We have a defending democracy taskforce precisely to ensure that our response is rooted across government—not only here but in the regions and nations. We work very closely with local government and are acutely conscious of the fact that important elections will be taking place around the country next May. We are working at pace to ensure that those elections can take place in an environment that we would all want to see. I can absolutely give him an assurance that we work closely with our partners not only in local government but in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.

[Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)]

Notwithstanding the Home Secretary’s reassurances about spads or Ministers not being involved in the advice, does the Minister accept that this matter has reinforced the growing concern in this country about a lack of clarity on our position towards China, the fear of a threat to our energy security from the involvement of Chinese companies, and the super-embassy in London? My constituents are becoming increasingly concerned about the activities of the consulate in my constituency. Can the Minister reassure us that this Government will make their position towards China absolutely clear in the near future?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the hon. Member because she asks an entirely reasonable and constructive question. She acknowledges, I am sure, that the previous Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House about the China audit, and I hope she will acknowledge that the nature of the relationship is complex. I am not aware that anyone in this place thinks that we should not have some form of economic co-operation with China. It is in our country’s national interest to be clear-eyed about the nature of the relationship. Where we are able to co-operate economically where it is in our national interest to do so, we should proceed, but we should proceed, as I say, with a clear set of principles that underpin that. Fundamentally, our national security comes first. This Government will of course look for opportunities to co-operate economically with China, but fundamentally, we will always do what we can to keep our country safe.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am sorry that the Minister finds himself in a position which was not of his own making. I am also sorry that only four members of his parliamentary party out of over 400 are standing up to contribute to the debate. Does he accept that one reason for the cloud of suspicion of political interference around this matter is the decision to appoint a highly political special adviser as National Security Adviser for the first time? That has put the deputy National Security Adviser in the firing line. Can the Minister at least confirm that if and when, as I am sure it will, the Intelligence and Security Committee asks the National Security Adviser to come and give evidence in its inquiry that he will do so?

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman refers to what he described as a “highly political” appointment. With great respect to him, and he knows that I hold him in the highest regard, I disagree with his characterisation of that appointment. The National Security Adviser is someone who has huge experience of government, is extremely well connected—[Interruption.] Hon. Members may think it is not a good thing that we have somebody occupying a very important role in government who is known around the world; the Government contend that it is a good thing. We only need to look at the comments made by President Trump’s foreign affairs adviser just the other day, commending the important work that the National Security Adviser has done. He works incredibly hard to secure the security of our nation. Rather than talking him down, we should get behind him and ensure that he is supported to do the important job that he has been given.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

As has been mentioned, the spokesman for the Prime Minister, when asked whether China was a threat, referred to the DNSA’s statement, which said that China conducts “large scale espionage operations” that

“threaten the UK’s economic prosperity and resilience, and the integrity of our democratic institutions”.

By anyone’s definition, that would mean that China is a threat. I am a sanctioned Member of this Parliament. That is what this is all about: I have been spied upon, and I have had a wolf warrior from China follow me around the world and impersonate me very threateningly. Does the Minister think that I ought to refer to China as a threat?

[Dan Jarvis]

It is for the right hon. Gentleman to choose his own words. He is a very experienced Member of this House. The activities that he describes are completely unacceptable. That is why this Government have been clear on numerous occasions that we want to work across the House to ensure that all right hon. and hon. Members have the protections they need to speak their views in this place without fear or favour. If he wants to discuss those matters further, I would be very happy to do so. I hope that we can find a way of discussing these incredibly serious issues in a more grown-up way, as has been the case previously.

[Graham Leadbitter (Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey) (SNP)]

After the Cabinet Office meeting of 1 September, did the Prime Minister receive a note on this case in his ministerial red box, and, if so, did he approve it? Additionally, did the UK Government give Chinese officials private assurances at any point and in any form that the application for the Chinese embassy in London would be approved?

[Dan Jarvis]

Hon. Members will know that there is a very long-standing custom whereby Ministers do not comment on the contents of the Prime Minister’s box, but under these particular circumstances I am very happy to confirm that there was no note to the Prime Minister.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

May I first invite the Minister to clarify what he said in response to my question last week? I pointed out that, in his letter to the Select Committee Chairs, the Director of Public Prosecutions was clear that he had asked for a statement that China was a national security threat, and it was not forthcoming. The Minister shook his head and appeared to dispute that. Will he now acknowledge that that statement was not forthcoming?

Furthermore, when the DPP informally approached the Government after the third statement of evidence had been supplied to him to complain that the words “national security threat” were still not contained in that document, the Government consciously chose not to give any further response. Is that correct? Why, at that point, given all the things that the DNSA had already said, did nobody in the Government think that they could use the three words “national security threat”?

[Dan Jarvis]

This is the third time that I have appeared at the Dispatch Box to answer questions from Members, including from the hon. Gentleman, so I hope that he will forgive me if I cannot remember the specific detail of the question that he put to me when we were last here. I have sought to provide clarity. In response to the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) a moment ago, I gave a detailed account of the three statements from the deputy National Security Adviser.

We have been clear—as was the deputy National Security Adviser in the statements that we provided. The fact that China poses a range of threats to the UK is not in doubt. As the Government have said before, the question in this case was whether the overall legal threshold for a realistic prospect of conviction had been met in the totality of the evidence available to the CPS. Although I understand why Members will focus on the three individual statements from the deputy National Security Adviser, there was clearly other evidence available for the CPS to consider as part of this process. I could not have said more times or been more clear that the decision lies with the DPP.

[Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)]

Last Thursday, the Minister at the Dispatch Box agreed with me that China is indeed a national security threat, and the Government have consistently said that they are “disappointed”. As the Minister knows, I like to be helpful and constructive at all times, so I asked a KC to advise as to whether a private criminal prosecution could be brought under the Official Secrets Act. The advice I have is that the answer is yes, as long as it has the consent of the Attorney General, and as long as the Government are helpful and constructive by providing evidence and witness statements. Will the Minister confirm whether the Attorney General will give such consent and provide appropriate evidence?

[Dan Jarvis]

For the sake of clarity, “extremely disappointed” is the phraseology that we have used. We seem to have moved on from the original question about the Home Office, and the hon. Member will understand that I am not responsible for the actions of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General. Colleagues in the other place and in government will have heard the hon. Gentleman’s question, and I would be happy to discuss it with him further.

[Graham Stuart (Beverley and Holderness) (Con)]

I think the reason we are gathered here today—although I cannot see into your mind, Mr Speaker—is because of the story in The Sunday Times. That is why the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), asked this: when did the Home Secretary hear that the case might collapse? That was question No.1. Are we not owed an answer to that question? Did the Home Secretary, as The Sunday Times said, then make representations as to the evidence being as “strong as possible”? Did she or didn’t she?

We are here because of that piece, Mr Speaker; I assume, although I cannot know your mind, that that is why you agreed to this urgent question. This Minister refuses, disgracefully, at that Dispatch Box to answer the question about the role of the Home Office in this spy scandal. Will the Minister now answer, not with his obfuscation and not with his flannel? Will he answer the question directly?

[Dan Jarvis]

We are here because of activities that happened under the previous Government. That is why we are here—I repeat the point I made earlier about Conservative Members showing a bit of humility—and I gave a response to the shadow Home Secretary.

[John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)]

A senior Chinese Government official invited Britain to

“fulfil its obligations and honour its commitments”

over the so-called super-embassy, but can the Minister shed light on what those obligations and commitments were? If he is going to say that no such commitments or obligations were offered, can we file that under another threat to this country by the Chinese?

[Dan Jarvis]

We do not recognise those claims. Of course, given the quasi-judicial nature of the process, it would have been entirely improper for anybody to have made any comment that basically cut across the legal process that is being led by the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

I appreciate the Minister’s clarity, which he keeps talking about. On that basis, let me say this. The case collapsed. This is about leadership. He has seen all the evidence in public, and all the evidence in private. Was China spying on two Members of Parliament in this case—yes or no?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am happy to debate issues of leadership with anyone in this House, not least because I have spent all my professional life trying to keep the country safe. I will continue to serve in government to make sure that we do everything we can to stand against the threats we face. I had hoped, entering into government, that that process would be consensual, and that we could work across the House to keep the country safe. That has been the approach of this Government, and I am sad that Conservative Members do not want to proceed on that basis.

[Stuart Anderson (South Shropshire) (Con)]

Does the Minister believe that the collapse of this case has weakened the UK’s position on the international stage, and that we will see more foreign state actors trying to carry out operations of espionage against Members of Parliament?

[Dan Jarvis]

That is precisely why we work closely with our Five Eyes allies, and why the United Kingdom hosted the five country ministerial in London just a couple of weeks ago. This needs to be a shared endeavour with our allies, our partners and our neighbours. We have a huge amount in common with our international allies, particularly the Five Eyes alliance, and this Government will continue to work closely with them. We will ensure that if any country—whether China or whoever it might be—seeks to interfere in our democratic processes or to harm those who live in our countries, we work collectively across those alliances to stand against those threats.

[Llinos Medi (Ynys Môn) (PC)]

I rise to raise another case of foreign interference in our politics. Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales and a constituent of mine, pleaded guilty to accepting bribes from Russia. He was stopped by the police in September 2021, but only charged in February this year. Reports now suggest that the Kremlin operation targeted not only him but at least two other Members of the European Parliament and a Member of the House of Lords. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that Russian networks cannot continue to influence UK politics?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Lady raises an important case that will be a matter of concern to Members from right across the House. I can assure her that we take these matters incredibly seriously, specifically with regard to her point about Russia. I can also give her the assurances that she seeks that we work incredibly hard, alongside our allies, to make sure we are doing everything we can to combat the threat that we all know we face from Russia.

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

I think most people would consider things that are threatening indeed to be threats, so we can only assume that the Minister has been instructed that he cannot make such a statement from the Dispatch Box. Will he help us to understand better the Government’s position on their relationship with China. Is China an ally? Is it a friend? Will he explain that?

[Dan Jarvis]

I would be very happy to do so. I repeat the point that I made a moment ago: no one who wants to be considered as serious thinks that the nature of our relationship with China can be defined by a single word—I hope that the hon. Gentleman acknowledges that. As I said a week ago, this Government assess that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber-attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hongkongers. However, we are also alive to the fact that China presents the UK with opportunities as the world’s second largest economy and the UK’s third largest trading partner. We have to be clear-eyed about both the challenges and the opportunities.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I have now asked the Government why China is not included in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme three times. On 9 June, I was told

“that particular report is coming forward in due course.”—[Official Report, 9 June 2025; Vol. 768, c. 613.]

On 15 September, I was told

“no doubt we will have more to say about it in due course.”—[Official Report, 15 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1194.]

And on 13 October, I was told

“any decisions about the enhanced tier will be brought forward in the normal way.”—[Official Report, 13 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 85.]

The Government are now panicked about the Chinese embassy decision, they are desperately trying to deflect from attention on the Chagos deal that the National Security Adviser negotiated on, and they appear to be decriminalising spying for China. What is the Government’s rationale for not including China within the enhanced tier? Given the threat, when will it be added?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am old enough to remember when Conservative Members said that we would not introduce the foreign influence registration scheme by 1 July. We worked at pace to introduce the scheme on 1 July. The hon. Gentleman knows the answer: we are looking carefully at whether other countries should be added to the enhanced tier, but we will take that decision in due course and bring it forward in the normal way.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The Minister is striving incredibly hard to answer these questions; some would say—well, with respect, we will leave it at that.

The news of suspecting spying in Parliament is worrying —there is no that this poses a huge threat to this country and to us as MPs. Mr Speaker, we owe you a debt of gratitude for the stand that you are taking on behalf of MPs to ensure that we are protected. We thank you for that. It is equally worrying that cases such as this are under no scrutiny by the CPS and no accountability is taken. What assurances can the Minister give our constituents that the Government will put pressure on the CPS to prosecute this case? Will he please understand the level of disappointment and betrayal felt by MPs because of the lack of action on the case?

[Dan Jarvis]

It is always good to hear from the hon. Member, and I agree with the sentiment that he has expressed. I hope there is a unity of view across this House that collectively we can be incredibly concerned about what has happened. I pay tribute to the work that you have done, Mr Speaker, through the Speaker’s Commission; the Government will want to work very closely with you and look carefully at the findings of your commission.

We need to work across this House to ensure that all the protections are in place so that, as I have said previously, Members can have their say in this place without fear or favour. That is precisely why additional guidance was published just a week or so ago and why, just before the House went into recess back in July, I wrote to every single Member of this House spelling out what support and protections are in place. We take very seriously our responsibilities to safeguarding our democracy, and we want to work very closely with Mr Speaker on that process.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

The Minister has been asked why further steps were not taken to provide the evidence requested in this case, knowing that the case was on the verge of collapse. He may feel that he has provided clarity, but I am afraid that he absolutely has not. Will he ask the Attorney General to come to this House and make a statement about what the CPS wanted and why that was not provided by the Government?

[Dan Jarvis]

With great respect, it was the decision of the Opposition to table the urgent question in the way that they did; they could have chosen to table it in the way that the hon. Member describes. The Attorney General and colleagues right across Government looked very carefully at the circumstances of this particular case. I have spelled out in some detail the information that the Government are able to put into the public domain about the three witness statements published by the Prime Minister last week. The final piece of evidence was sent by the deputy National Security Adviser in August; there is nothing that any Minister or special adviser could have done thereafter.

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

It seems to me that the key question, which has not been answered despite three sessions on this subject, is the following. We know that in April 2024 the evidential test for prosecution under the Official Secrets Act 1911 was met. We also know that come September ’25, the CPS was saying that it was not met. The key question is: what changed? Part of the answer seemed to come from the CPS, when it said that it asked for Government information, which it did not get to a satisfactory level. Does that not suggest that there was a failure on the part of Government that contributed to the collapse of this prosecution? If the Government simply said, “On the one hand, China is a threat; on the other hand, it is an opportunity,” how could we ever put beyond all reasonable doubt in a criminal case the fact that it was a threat? Was that equivocation not the source of the problem?

[Dan Jarvis]

As I have said previously, in each of the three statements the DNSA makes it crystal clear that China poses wide-ranging threats to the UK. In his third statement, in August ’24, he says that the Chinese intelligence services are “highly capable” and conduct

“large-scale espionage operations against the UK to advance the Chinese state’s interests and harm the interests and security of the UK”.

I do not think that there could have been any greater clarity.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

The Minister has repeatedly said that he is extremely disappointed that this case did not proceed to trial. That is thin gruel if all the steps necessary to ensure that it got to trial were not taken. With that in mind, can he set out whether the report in The Sunday Times over the weekend that the Prime Minister and other Ministers were aware of the imminent collapse on 12 September is correct? If that is correct, can he set out what steps the Home Secretary took to ensure that the CPS had the evidence it needed?

[Dan Jarvis]

I hope the hon. Gentleman understands that the point about the Government being extremely disappointed is absolutely genuine. I could not have been clearer, from day one, that the Government are extremely disappointed that we will not be proceeding with this trial. However, it is not for Ministers to opine on a decision taken independently of Government. Final evidence went in in August, and I can give the hon. Gentleman an assurance that there is nothing the Prime Minister or any Minister could have done thereafter.

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

The Minister has been asked by numerous people, not least by the shadow Home Secretary and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart), when the Home Secretary knew that this case was going to collapse. We have not been given an answer. The Minister has also been asked by numerous people if the Home Secretary made representations; again, we have not been given an answer. These should be relatively straightforward questions with straightforward answers. Will the Minister answer those questions or give a reason as to why he cannot do so?

[Dan Jarvis]

I have done my very best to provide the clarity that hon. Members are asking for. There is, of course, still an unanswered question about the position of the previous Government. The Prime Minister put that point to the Leader of the Opposition last week, and there are a number of former Government Ministers in the Chamber—perhaps they could tell us the answer.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I am going to give the Minister a fifth chance to answer. Did the Home Secretary make representations when she discovered that the case was about to collapse—yes or no?

[Dan Jarvis]

I have given the House the response—[Interruption.]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. Could we calm down? Marvellous. I call Robin Swann.

[Robin Swann (South Antrim) (UUP)]

Chinese officials recently briefed Stormont’s Finance Minister on the status of a local company in his constituency owned by the Chinese state. Information on that briefing, released under the Freedom of Information Act by the Department of Finance, withheld details, citing freedom of information laws that protect confidential information obtained from a foreign state. In the current climate and in the interests of openness and transparency, does the Minister agree that it would be best to release all the details of that meeting, rather than hide behind FOI laws?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Gentleman has asked quite a technical question. I am not entirely clear which meeting he is referring to, but I am very happy to write to him with the details.

[Graham Stuart]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I want to update the House on the facts surrounding the collapse of the trial of Christopher Berry and Christopher Cash. However, following the Home Secretary’s statement, I also want to take the opportunity to express my deepest sympathies for the victims and families of those affected by the abhorrent terror attack that occurred at Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur. Tragically, two members of the UK’s Jewish community lost their lives. They remain in the thoughts of the whole House at this very difficult time.

I also express my gratitude for the rapid reactions of emergency responders, the security services and members of that local community. Two days later, a mosque in Peacehaven, East Sussex, was targeted in an arson attack. Fortunately, no one was injured. My thoughts, and I am sure the thoughts of the whole House, will be with members of that local community as well. We remain united in standing against hate in all its forms.

As I told the House in September, the Government remain extremely disappointed by the outcome of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry case. I understand the strength of feeling across the House and share the deep frustration at the fact that these individuals will not face trial. While the decision not to proceed was an independent one made by the Crown Prosecution Service, the Government remain gravely concerned about the security of our democratic institutions and are crystal clear that our Parliament must and will be protected from espionage. That is why I am today announcing that MI5’s National Protective Security Authority will be taking further steps to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I will set out more details on that in a moment.

Since I addressed the House on 15 September, there has been correspondence between hon. Members, the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service. There has also been widespread—and, at times, wholly inaccurate—reporting in the media. I will address the details set out by the Crown Prosecution Service and the basis on which the Government provided evidence to support the case, but first let me underline a fundamental point that has too often been overlooked in recent days, including by the Conservative party. The CPS brought these charges under the previous Government, and under the legislation that was in place at the time: the Official Secrets Act 1911—an antiquated law that is clearly no longer fit for purpose in addressing the complex and sophisticated nature of the state threats that we face today.

It has been clear for many years that the legislation has not kept pace with the modern state threats that we face today. It was evident that the Official Secrets Act was no longer fit for purpose as early as 2015, when Conservative Ministers tasked the Law Commission with reviewing this antiquated legislation—10 years ago. In 2020, the Law Commission and the Intelligence and Security Committee of this House were both clear that the legislation, drafted before the first world war, needed to be updated as a matter of urgency. It referred to espionage as

“any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information…which…might be…useful to an enemy”.

Those terms are archaic in the modern threat landscape that we now face. That is why the Labour party supported the passing of the National Security Act 2023 on a cross-party basis, closing the loopholes that have been exposed by this case.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), and the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), about this case, and it is welcome that these facts have been set out. The DPP has made it clear that charges were brought in April 2024 based on the law as it stood at the time of the offences. The deputy National Security Adviser—a senior official with very extensive experience in matters relating to national security—provided a witness statement in December 2023, under the previous Government. Further witness statements were requested and provided in February and July of this year.

All the evidence provided by the deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offence and the policy position of the Conservative Government at the time of the offence. Every effort was made to provide evidence to support this case within those constraints. The decision on whether to proceed with the prosecution was ultimately taken by the Crown Prosecution Service, which was hamstrung by antiquated legislation that had not been updated by the previous Conservative Government—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I say to both Front-Bench teams: please, this is a very important and serious matter. We could do without the side chatter.

[Dan Jarvis]

Despite the evolving nature of the state threats that we face, the DPP has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government, or any senior civil servant or special adviser working within it. I want to be clear again today, as the Government have been before, that suggestions that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or restricted the ability of witnesses to draw on particular bits of evidence are all untrue. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so.

What has changed is the CPS’s assessment of the case law. The DPP has explained that in a separate case—the Crown v. Roussev—the High Court ruled on the threshold for evidence needed to prosecute under the antiquated 1911 legislation. In the light of this new judgment, the CPS independently decided to seek further evidence. But the fact remains that it was not the policy of the Conservative Government to classify China as a threat to national security. As the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) said as Foreign Secretary, summing up China in one word as a threat was

“impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise.”

I have listened with interest in recent days to advice from former Conservative Ministers on how the UK should now define our approach to China, but I must remind them and the House that what matters is what their policy was in government. The previous Government set out their position on China in the 2021 integrated review, in which they described China as a “systemic challenge” to UK security. In the integrated review refresh of 2023, they described China as an “epoch-defining challenge”. As the Prime Minister has explained, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to the assessment made by the CPS. Ministers cannot retrospectively change policy that existed under the Conservative Government and, as stated before, the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official.

At this moment of profound global change and insecurity, these matters have led to discussion about this Government’s approach to China, so let me set that out for the House. We must tackle the threats that China poses, which range from cyber-security attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hongkongers in the UK. This Government are unequivocal that the first duty of Government is to keep people safe. We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, yet we must also be alive to the fact that China presents us with opportunities. It is the world’s second largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, the UK’s third largest trading partner. The only way to act in the UK’s best interest is to take a long-term and strategic approach. That means working in close co-ordination with Five Eyes and wider allies to build collective resilience to the threats that China poses, investing in our intelligence services and being unequivocal about our position on human rights. It also means developing a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising on our national security. Let me set out the recent actions that the Government have taken to strengthen UK security against state threats, including those posed by China.

MI5’s national protective security authority has today launched new guidance to protect the UK’s democratic institutions from foreign interference. The guidance will help Members in this House and the other place, Members of the devolved legislatures, local councillors, mayors and elected representatives’ staff to better understand the nature of the threat. It also provides simple, effective steps for at-risk individuals to take to protect themselves, their teams and the integrity of our democratic processes. The guidance will kick-start a wider cross-Government action plan that is being driven through the defending democracy taskforce to reduce foreign interference and espionage threats to UK democratic institutions. It will be delivered in close co-ordination with the parliamentary security authorities. I urge all Members of this House to be alert and follow the guidance, and to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses.

The Government also remain steadfast in our commitment to holding Chinese state-linked actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage. In September, the NCSC co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I can reassure the House that we continue to keep all tools under review, and will act as necessary to reduce their threat.

The Government are also committed to legislating to further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference. That specifically includes a new elections Bill to strengthen safeguards against covert foreign political funding, and involves taking forward the recommendations from the independent reviewer for legislation on state threats.

Let me finish by reiterating this Government’s unwavering commitment to national security and to keeping our country safe. We will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm, and to ensure that the UK is best placed to tackle state threats, including those emanating from China. I commend the statement to the House.

[Mrs Kemi Badenoch (North West Essex) (Con)]

May I associate myself with the Minister’s remarks about Heaton Park synagogue? I thank Mr Speaker for all his work on Members’ security. No one has worked harder to protect the integrity of our Parliament.

The Security Minister is very well regarded, so I am sorry to see that he has been sent here again to make these arguments, which will not wash. This is about the ineptitude of the Government, and I cannot accept much of what he says. He has brought some updates to the House, which we acknowledge, but in essence, China spied on this Parliament and the Government are issuing us with leaflets. That is not good enough. There are Members here who have been spied on and sanctioned by China. Even Madam Deputy Speaker has been sanctioned. All MPs speaking today should be acting in the national interest—nothing else.

Let us remind ourselves of what has happened. Two men have been accused of spying on MPs in this very building. The CPS has what it felt was a clear and compelling case to prosecute, but the trial has collapsed because, for months and months, the Government have refused to give the CPS vital information. That was not a mistake; it was not a misunderstanding; it looks like a deliberate decision to collapse the case and curry favour with the regime in China. Instead of admitting that, the Security Minister has come here blaming the Official Secrets Act, when we know that the Act was enough to prosecute the case. Its deficiencies had nothing to do with the Government’s failures.

May I remind the House how serious this is? If the Government do not prosecute those who spy on us, it sends a message to the public that the Government do not care about their safety; it sends a message to our allies, who share intelligence with us, that Britain cannot be trusted; and it sends a message to those who spy on us that they can get away with it.

Let us look at the facts. First, the Government blamed the CPS. The Minister came to the House on 15 September and claimed that he had become aware of the situation only that day, and that the CPS decision had been an entirely independent one—an assertion that he has repeated today. He said:

“I am not able to talk about why the CPS has decided to make this decision.”—[Official Report, 15 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1186.]

He said that it was not for him to “speculate on the reason”. He told my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) to “seek a meeting” if she wanted to find out the reasons. However, we now know, despite all he has just said, that the trial collapsed because the Government refused to give the CPS what it needed, and the Minister knew full well why it had collapsed. The Director of Public Prosecutions has said that he spent months trying to get the Government to provide the evidence that the CPS needed.

Secondly, the Government tried blaming the previous Government. Just like the Prime Minister, the Minister claims that the CPS could not prosecute because the previous Government did not describe China as a threat. I cannot believe that he would actually say that. He knows what we said, but let me remind him. For starters, the 2021 integrated review described China as—listen carefully—the “biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security.” The 2023 integrated review refresh said several times that China posed—listen carefully—a threat. In 2024, the then Minister for Security said from the Dispatch Box that China poses a serious threat. But even if the previous Government had not said China was a threat, which they did, this Government needed only to convince a jury that it was a threat, and the Minister knows that. I am astonished that he has repeated that nonsense today.

The Minister’s and Prime Minister’s argument has been refuted by no less than a former DPP, two former Cabinet Secretaries—one a former National Security Adviser—two former heads of MI6, and a professor of public law at the University of Cambridge, who said today that Ministers’ statements so far are “misleading” about the legal position. They are all clear that those people could have been prosecuted under the old legislation. Is the Government’s position that they are all wrong and the Government are right? The Minister referred to R v. Roussev. That case last year made it easier to prosecute, not harder. As the former Director of Public Prosecutions said of recruiting people to spy on MPs,

“That of itself clearly constitutes a threat to national security.”

Only this Government could mess that up.

We know that the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, has a very close relationship with China. Are we supposed to believe that he was not involved in the “substance of the case and discussions around it”, as they say? What does that even mean? He was in those meetings, acting in the name of the Prime Minister. Do the Government really expect us to believe that he never mentioned any of this to the Prime Minister at any point?

We know from the CPS that it spent months and months asking the Government for the evidence that it needed. The Government say that the NSA did not take the decision not to give it the evidence, so who did? Who made that decision—can the Minister answer that question today? Is the Government’s argument seriously that no Minister knew anything about this until the trial collapsed? If that is the case, it is astonishing. My suspicion is that that is not the case, and that Ministers did know. They had the Chinese super-embassy in their in-tray, and they are allegedly being asked to pay £1 billion in compensation for the nationalisation of British Steel. I suspect that they have decided that closer economic ties with China were more important than due process and our national security. If that is the case, and that was the Government’s decision, they should tell us and have the backbone to admit it. They should explain it to the public, the CPS and our international allies, and let them all be the judge.

This issue is not going away—there is nowhere to hide. I wrote to the Prime Minister today and would like to know when I will get a response to my questions. We have also written to the Crown Prosecution Service to ask whether the trial can be reopened if the Government finally provide the evidence that they have been holding back. We know that the evidence that the CPS needs exists. If the Government decide not to provide it, then we will know that that is because this weak Prime Minister does not have the backbone to stand up to Beijing.

[Dan Jarvis]

I find it genuinely astonishing that at no point did the Leader of the Opposition acknowledge that all the acts that we have been talking about this afternoon happened when she was in government, on her watch.

I believe that it is important to discuss these matters in a fair and reasonable way, so I particularly made sure that the right hon. Lady had early sight of the statement, to give her ample opportunity. She has clearly not read the statement—she either did not read the statement or did not listen to what I have said, because she has asked me a number—[Interruption.]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. This statement is very important, both to me and my constituents. Please let us hear the Minister.

[Dan Jarvis]

I took every opportunity to give the right hon. Lady as long as I possibly could so that she could look at the points that we were seeking to raise today. But she has asked me questions that I answered in my earlier responses. I say that to her because it is important that we seek to discuss these things in a reasonable way. Matters relating—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston (Neil O'Brien) guffaws from a sedentary position, but I think it is important that we should seek to discuss matters relating to national security in a reasonable and consensual way. That is the approach of this Government.

I am genuinely really sorry that the right hon. Lady has taken the opportunity to make a whole series of baseless smears this afternoon. Perhaps we should not be too surprised: the statement that we have heard from the Leader of the Opposition is sadly typical of what we have heard from some of her colleagues in recent days. For days, the Conservative party has been making baseless claims that the Government deliberately collapsed an independent legal process through political interference. There is not a shred of evidence to back up any of the accusations that she has made. I do not think that is a responsible way to discuss matters of national security.

I remind the Leader of the Opposition that, whatever Members might say this afternoon, we are here today because of legislation and policy that existed under the previous Government. The Leader of the Opposition referenced the letter that she had written to the Prime Minister. We want to respond to her in a timely fashion, so I will now respond to the points that she made to the Prime Minister. In case she has forgotten, it was she herself who said in September last year:

“I have shied away from calling China a threat”.

She articulated the previous Government’s policy as Business Secretary, saying in September 2023:

“We certainly should not be describing China as a foe”.

Those are the right hon. Lady’s own words.

Opposition Front Benchers have raised a number of questions, including in the letter published by the right hon. Lady earlier today. I am very happy to set out the Government’s response to her questions. First, on the question of what Ministers knew about the Government’s interactions with the CPS, Ministers were aware that evidence was being provided by the deputy National Security Adviser to the CPS as it built a case for prosecution, as was first agreed under the previous Government. Ministers and special advisers did not take decisions about that evidence and they were not cited in the contents. The deputy National Security Adviser was given full freedom to provide evidence without interference, as was the case before the general election.

Secondly, the right hon. Lady asked in her letter whether the Prime Minister was briefed by Ministers or the National Security Adviser about the case. The Prime Minister has already confirmed that he was briefed on the case by officials, not least because the case began under the previous Conservative Government.

Thirdly, there have been various reports alleging that in a meeting in September, the National Security Adviser ruled that China could not be defined as a threat and took decisions relating to witnesses or evidence. That is simply untrue. Of course, the NSA takes part in discussions about national security and diplomatic relations—that is literally his job. But any discussions were on the basis that the case would be going ahead and about how to handle the implications. The National Security Adviser was not involved in any decisions about the substance of the evidence. That means, to answer the fourth question raised by the Leader of the Opposition, that he made no decisions about the content of any evidence—[Interruption.] Hon. Members have asked for a thorough explanation and I am giving it to them; they might pay the House the courtesy of listening to the responses.

The National Security Adviser made no decisions about the content of any evidence relating to the case itself. This was a matter for the deputy National Security Adviser—a hugely experienced, highly capable senior official who provided evidence under the previous Administration.

On questions about when I and other Ministers were aware that the case would not be proceeding, I should say that Ministers were informed after the DPP had made his decision and shortly before reporting restrictions were lifted. Hon. Members will note that I came to the House straight away to make a statement.

Finally, on whether it might still have been possible to argue successfully in court that China was a threat regardless of the previous Government’s position not to do so, that was a judgment for the Crown Prosecution Service. However, the deputy National Security Adviser provided evidence reflecting the threats posed by China as the CPS built its case. On the comments, referenced by the right hon. Lady, made by two former Cabinet Secretaries, I note that they have both remarked that the Official Secrets Act was not fit for purpose. Of course, if the Conservatives had been swift in replacing it, we would not be here today.

Safeguarding our national security is the most fundamental responsibility of this Government. In 14 years of rule, the Conservative party was slow both to update our national security laws and to adapt to the national security realities that we face today. If we followed the Conservatives’ approach—to ignore and refuse to engage with China—that would undermine our national security. On this side of the House, we will always defend our national interest.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

It seems that there is now case law saying that an enemy is a threat to national security. Frankly, that seems to be a lower test not a higher test. But if, in 2024, there was evidence that China was an enemy and the Crown Prosecution Service had made a decision to prosecute on that basis, I cannot understand why there has been a change now. The only other answer is that the Crown Prosecution Service did not properly assess the evidence before making those charges. Moving away from all the light, heat and fury, it seems to me that those are the central points.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. She talked about muddle and confusion: she is right that there has been a lot of ill-informed commentary in previous days. That is precisely why the Government have proactively brought a statement to the House to set out the facts of the trial, and I am very happy to be able to do that.

Let me do that again for my right hon. Friend. The DPP has set out the reasons at the heart of his decision not to take this case to trial. He believed that the evidential test was not met. The DPP took an independent decision on the evidence, as was set out in his letter of 7 October. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so. As the Prime Minister, her constituency neighbour, has explained very clearly, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to this assessment. It is only the Government’s policy at the time that the alleged offences were committed that is relevant.

My right hon. Friend will understand that the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official. I have been crystal clear about that today. The Director of Public Prosecutions has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party. As the Government have already stated, the suggestions that the Government concealed evidence or withdrew or leant on witnesses are all untrue.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. Over the weekend, Sir John Sawers became the latest former intelligence chief to express disbelief at the collapse of this espionage case, and our intelligence allies are now also questioning whether the UK can be trusted to counter China’s growing threat. It is vital that we have a clear answer about who in Government is responsible for the failure to bring this case to trial. Sadly, instead of clear answers, over the weekend we have heard Ministers delivering vague and cryptic lines to take.

The nation has a right to understand which figures within Government were involved in the process not to proceed with a prosecution. Given the Minister’s statement that the Government have not concealed the evidence or suppressed anything, will the Minister commit to publishing a timeline showing who knew what and when, and who said what and when? Will he publish correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS? If he will do that, we can gain the clarity that we and the British public need.

Will the Minister confirm again, with full confidence, that the Prime Minister, or any individuals who act on his behalf, played no role in any decision to prevent the supply of relevant evidence to the CPS, which might or might not include words of gentle encouragement either way? We must learn the lessons from this appalling episode so that we can have confidence in the ability of our national security laws to protect our interests and protect our democracy. That is our job in this House. This is the only way to provide the British public with the answers that they deserve and demand, and to rebuild the UK’s credibility with Five Eyes allies.

Will the Government commit today to holding a statutory independent inquiry into the China spying case? We know that China poses a clear threat to this country’s interests and values, a view that is shared by Liberal Democrat Members, as well as by our intelligence chiefs. Yet the Government’s approach to this case is only the latest example of their unwillingness to challenge Beijing’s efforts to expand its espionage capabilities in the UK and export transnational repression to our shores.

It is time for the Government to take the steps necessary to protect our interests and those of our citizens. Working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to prosecute the two individuals involved? Those options are still available. Will the Government block the application for the Chinese mega-embassy? And will the Minister add China to the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

[Dan Jarvis]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman to his new role. As he may know, I am a regular visitor to his constituency and I pay tribute to the important national security work that takes place there. He asked me a number of questions and, with great respect to him, I hope that he will concede that I have responded to a number of them already.

On his point about releasing information, which is an entirely reasonable question, it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in any further ongoing legal processes, so I hope he understands the reason that I am unable to commit to doing that at the moment.

I take issue with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis of the Government’s relationship with China, particularly on transnational repression. I hope that he will accept that the Government take that very seriously. We have done a lot of work through the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that we have the right resources in the right place to protect all those who live here in the UK from the impact of transnational repression, but I am happy to discuss that with him further.

The hon. Gentleman specifically raised the importance of our Five Eyes alliance, about which I agree with him. That is precisely why the UK recently hosted the ministerial gathering of the five countries in London, where we cemented our excellent relationship with our Five Eyes partners. As he will know, we share intelligence with them on a very regular basis. That relationship is in good health and has in no way been undermined by recent events.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Justice Committee.

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith and Chiswick) (Lab)]

The Government have made it clear that they regret the fact that this case is not going ahead. The Minister rightly says that the CPS acts independently when making charging decisions, but will he go further than regret and say that, as a matter of law and evidence, this prosecution should have gone ahead and that the issue of innocence or guilt should have been determined by a judge and jury?

[Dan Jarvis]

I have a huge amount of time for my hon. Friend. The expression that I used both on 15 September and again today, on behalf of the Government, was that we are “extremely disappointed”. I hope that he will understand, not least given the Select Committee that he chairs, that it is not appropriate for Ministers to give advice to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the CPS on matters of law. The CPS and the DPP are rightly independent of Government. Frankly, we go down quite a dangerous road if we get into a situation of politicians and Ministers seeking to advise them and to influence their decisions. That is not the approach that this Government will take.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I can give the right hon. Lady that absolute assurance. The Government and both the Departments in which I serve take the importance of parliamentary scrutiny very seriously. As Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Lady conducts herself with great gravitas and, of course, I give her an assurance, on behalf of Government, that we will work closely with her and her colleagues to provide any information that they seek.

[Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)]

Following on from the point made by the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, it is vital that Parliament is able to examine what has happened here. The Government have made a commitment to transparency. We have a wrinkle, in that the National Security Adviser has been appointed as a special adviser rather than as an official, which means that he has to appear in front of a Committee of the House in camera. That is far from adequate. Will the Minister commit to engaging fully with the Committee corridor to ensure that the relevant Committees get access to information, as is normal, in a reading room, in camera or in a Cobra situation, in order to ensure that Parliament can satisfy itself of the comments that he has made so clearly at the Dispatch Box today?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am genuinely grateful to my hon. Friend for her suggestion. I hope that she, the House and Opposition Front Benchers know that my approach will always be to make as much information as possible available to colleagues, whether through the Privy Council process or through other means.

I welcome the fact that the National Security Adviser will shortly be giving evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, but I am happy to look more closely at my hon. Friend’s suggestion and to give her an assurance that we will want to work very carefully with this House and its Committees to make sure they are able to do their important job of holding this Government to account.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, the 2021 and 2023 integrated reviews were very clear. All the officials and security services said that China was a significant threat. That was sufficient not only for Ministers but for officials to give to the CPS. The question is why they did not.

The question I really want to ask is about the absurdity of the role, or lack of role, of the National Security Adviser. The Government say that he was not involved in any matters of substance, but is it not the role of the National Security Adviser to be involved in all matters of substance when it comes to national security? What is the point of a National Security Adviser who does not involve themselves in matters of national security, as in this case? Instead, are we meant to believe that the deputy National Security Adviser was allowed to involve themselves in substantial matters of national security in this case, but apparently not to discuss these substantial matters of national security with the National Security Adviser? This seems to me to be a matter of substantial absurdity.

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman has been consistent in expressing those concerns over many years. I would gently point out to him that the situation he describes as absurd is the same situation that we inherited from the previous Government.

The right hon. Gentleman is a very experienced Member of this House, so let me say something to him about the National Security Adviser. Over the past year, this Government have rebuilt our international relationships, led on the global stage and signed new agreements with multiple countries to safeguard our security and to grow our economy. The National Security Adviser is doing an excellent job and, if the right hon. Gentleman does not believe me, perhaps he should speak to Steve Witkoff.

[Mr Toby Perkins (Chesterfield) (Lab)]

I share Mr Speaker’s fury about the collapse of this trial, as I am sure all Members do. It is a huge disappointment that this former Conservative party researcher has escaped justice.

I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Minister has been able to be so unequivocal about the facts of this case. It is extraordinary that, having listened to him, the Leader of the Opposition should carry on almost as though his statement had not happened, because he had answered many of the questions that she posed.

On the changes that have happened since, can my hon. Friend be sure that we would be more able to pursue a criminal conviction if this offence had taken place under the current legislation? If not, can he tell us what he is doing to make sure it does not happen again?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who asks such a very useful question that parliamentarians should be asking themselves. Yes, I can give him that assurance, and I have made clear from this Dispatch Box on many occasions the importance that this Government attach, as I am sure the previous Government did, to the National Security Act 2023. It was a groundbreaking piece of legislation, and as my predecessor, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), would acknowledge, I have paid tribute on numerous occasions to those who were involved.

My hon. Friend asks the right question. The NSA closed the loopholes that we are essentially debating today, so I can assure him that our legislative framework is in a much better place than it was a couple of years ago. That said, because this Government take these matters incredibly seriously, we constantly look at the legislative framework to assure ourselves that it is appropriate. We work very closely with Jonathan Hall KC, who has made recommendations, at the Government’s request, on our legislative framework, and we have made a commitment that wherever there is a requirement for more legislation, we will bring it forward.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

The integrated review refresh, which stated that the Chinese Communist party posed a threat to our people and our security, was in fact published the very day that these two men were arrested. But that in itself is a red herring, because the Bulgaria case proved that it is for a jury to decide whether a country is or could be a threat, and it is not for the Government alone to prove that. The Minister told the House in response to our urgent question that the Government demanded that the Chinese chargé d’affaires come in for the démarche. Did a Minister do that, or did an official do it?

Secondly, given that the House has been told how disappointed the Government are with this outcome and that they seem to be quite clear about the evidence of guilt, what repercussions are they choosing to put on the Chinese Communist party? Will they be cancelling the joint economic and trade commission? Will they be putting in place sanctions? Will they be banning the embassy? If they will not act, why not?

[Dan Jarvis]

Of course, the hon. Lady has a very close personal interest in this case, and it will be well understood by Members across the House why she has expressed concerns today and previously. I am sorry that she does not feel that the Government’s response is adequate, but I assure her that I will endeavour to ensure that this Government do as much as we possibly can to work with her and the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on this issue, so that she can have confidence that these matters are not able to happen again.

The hon. Lady specifically asked about the démarche I referenced in my statement—it was not an urgent question—on 15 September. As she will know, that was done through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, but I will come back to her with more details should she wish.

[Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement and for introducing some facts to the debate—I can see that some alternative realities have come crashing down.

I want to focus on the future and the Minister’s commitment to protecting democratic life in the UK, particularly through the cyber-security measures. He knows that this will rely, at least in part, on the Computer Misuse Act 1990—if my memory serves me right, the 386 Amstrad was then the best computer we could get. As he knows, many people think that that Act fails to distinguish between malicious actors, state or otherwise, and cyber-security professionals working in the public interest, and perhaps the democratic interest. Will he commit to looking at that anomaly?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, not least for saying that facts matter—they really do. That is why I have come to the House today, to set out facts so that Members can make a judgment on how they wish to proceed.

My hon. Friend also makes an important point about cyber-security and the ongoing review of the Computer Misuse Act. I can assure him that we take these matters incredibly seriously. In fact, I will have more to say about it shortly.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge) (Con)]

The Minister and I have been friends for many years, so it gives me no pleasure to say this. The statement that he read out today, no doubt under instruction, has thrown out more chaff and set up more straw men than a Russian disinformation campaign. It is pure fabrication to claim that those are the relevant points and, sadly, he knows it.

The Minister knows it, because we discussed many of these issues when he was in opposition and I was in his place. He knows it, because the various security and defence reviews that have been updated in the past four years have set out the clear position of the threat. He knows it, because I stood at the Dispatch Box, as he now does, on 15 April 2024 and made clear the position of China being a threat.

And the Minister knows it, I am afraid, because the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, set out how the DPP has asked a very clear question: why have we not had the information in time for these cases to proceed? That is exactly the right question. The DPP did not say that the evidential threshold was not met. If it had not been met, the arrests should never have happened and the Minister should rightly be hauling the head of MI5, the head of counter-terror policing and the Treasury solicitor before him for abuse of power. He is not doing that because he knows the threshold was met.

Instead, the Minister should read the words of the DPP—the threshold is “no longer met”. That means there has been a change, and there has been a change because something has changed. That change could either be a commission or an omission, and from what we have heard today—from the way in which the Government have very carefully used language—it sounds much more likely that something has not been done than that it has.

As my friend the Minister knows, simply ignoring an order is not the same thing as not receiving one. I am afraid that what this has done, and what this statement does, is advertise that the UK is not willing to defend itself against threats from hostile states. I know that that is not a position he wishes to advocate.

[Dan Jarvis]

As the House knows well, the right hon. Gentleman is personally invested in this issue. Members will understand the history and the reasons for the concerns he has expressed, and I understand why he has taken the opportunity to express them today and on other occasions. The Government fundamentally agree with some of his concerns, though clearly not with his subsequent analysis. He will have noted the point I have made today about the issuing of guidance from the NPSA. We have published that guidance today, and I hope he will acknowledge the determination that exists—from myself as the Minister and from colleagues right across Government—to provide assurances and satisfy his concerns.

One of the ways in which we will do that is through the defending democracy taskforce, of which the right hon. Gentleman was a founding member. I can say to him and to the House that that taskforce provides the fulcrum point for dealing with many of these matters right across Government. It has had its mandate refreshed by the Prime Minister, and we invest a lot in that mechanism. It will seek to provide us with some of the answers we need in order to give the right hon. Gentleman the assurance he seeks. I hope he will understand that I stand ready to meet him and the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) to further discuss any concerns they might have. The right hon. Gentleman may not be satisfied today, but I will do what I can to provide that satisfaction and assurance as we go forward.

[Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)]

My constituents will welcome the Minister’s clarity that China is indeed a threat. [Interruption.] Let me finish. Those threats to our national security take place not just here, but overseas, and I am increasingly troubled by the actions of the Chinese Government in former British colonies across the world, not least in Africa. They are looting minerals, destroying nature and damaging democracy. That impacts us in this country too, and for far too long, Britain has been missing in action. We have let China run riot, and enough is enough. What engagement has the Minister had with the Soft Power Council to ensure it keeps national security in mind as it carries out its work, and can I urge him to work with colleagues across Government, particularly in the Foreign Office? We need to get serious with China and fast, which requires a cross-Government approach.

[Dan Jarvis]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that these matters require a cross-Government approach, and that is precisely the way in which this Government seek to proceed with them. I think it is fair to say that the Government have referenced concerns about the issues he has raised on a number of occasions, but I would be very happy to discuss them further with him, should he wish to do so.

[David Davis (Goole and Pocklington) (Con)]

The Minister used the Roussev case in his own defence. In that case, the Court of Appeal set the clear precedent that the appropriate definition of an enemy state is not based on what the Government say—it is a state that behaves like an enemy. The judge stated plainly that

“There is no reason in our view why the term ‘an enemy’ should not include a country which represents a current threat to the national security of the UK.”

Throughout the duration of this case, there has been ample evidence—including from the Intelligence and Security Committee and the current director of MI5—that China represents a threat to our national security, including at the time when Mr Berry and Mr Cash were acting as spies. The Prime Minister’s comments on this case were frankly nonsense, and it is time that we stop kowtowing and take a stand against China. If the Minister means what he said about future dealings, will he start by doing what a number of people have called for and refusing to approve the espionage centre masquerading as an embassy at the Royal Mint? Will he reject it and tell the Chinese, effectively, that enough is enough?

[Dan Jarvis]

I always listen to what the right hon. Gentleman has to say, but that does not mean that I always agree with it. I do not agree with it today, and I am not sure it is especially helpful to refer to China’s application for an embassy in the way he has done. I can give him the assurance that I have given the House previously about the importance we attach to national security in the context of that issue. I hope the right hon. Gentleman understands that the issue of the embassy is not a matter for me—there is a quasi-judicial process in place, and it is a matter for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government—but the previous Home Secretary and the previous Foreign Secretary have been crystal clear about the national security implications that underpin that decision.

[Dr Jeevun Sandher (Loughborough) (Lab)]

All of us across this House have an interest in protecting and preserving our democracy. Clearly, we have threats to our democracy, internally as well as externally. The Minister said a little bit about the elections Bill, but can he set out in more detail what the safeguards and protections will be for our democratic institutions and, indeed, for this place?

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend asks a really important question. In July, the Government published a policy paper outlining their proposals for an elections and democracy Bill, which we will introduce as the “Elections Bill” as soon as parliamentary time allows. Our intent is to modernise our democracy so that it is fit for the 21st century, including reinforcing safeguards against foreign influence in our elections.

In relation to political finance—hon. Members may want to listen very carefully to this—tough new rules will require parties to assess companies from which they are receiving donations against a series of tests, proving their connections to the UK and Ireland. This will end the status quo whereby a new company registered today, owned by anyone, funded from anywhere and without even a single day of trade, can donate and have influence in UK politics. The introduction of “know your donor” checks will increase scrutiny of donations, requiring recipients to conduct enhanced checks to decrease the risk of illegitimate donations entering our system. This will guard against foreign interference. It will be very interesting to see whether or not Opposition Members vote for that Bill.

[Sir Jeremy Hunt (Godalming and Ash) (Con)]

The Minister said categorically and very carefully that the National Security Adviser took no decisions as to the contents of the evidence provided to the CPS. Will he clarify for the House whether the NSA had any influence at all—direct or indirect, and whether about provision or omission—over the contents of that evidence, provided by his own deputy, which led to the collapse of the trial?

[Dan Jarvis]

I can give the right hon. Gentleman that assurance.

[Melanie Ward (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his absolute clarity today. Will he provide further details of the measures he has announced today and how they will protect parliamentarians, councillors and those in public life across the UK from foreign interference?

[Dan Jarvis]

The proposals contained in the elections Bill will hopefully go a long way towards providing that kind of reassurance, but again, I reference the importance of the work being done by the defending democracy taskforce. It is a mechanism that we inherited from the previous Government, which brings together Ministers, law enforcement and senior officials to look very carefully at these issues and make sure that we have the right resources in the right places. I hope very much that this will be a shared endeavour across this House, to ensure that wherever there are attempts to interfere with our democracy and harass or intimidate elected representatives, we can stand together as a House against those threats.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The Minister says that it is for another Department to decide whether the Chinese Government should have a new embassy. That is certainly true, but the proposed new embassy is so large that it would be the biggest embassy in any country anywhere in Europe. That has national security implications, and if the Minister wants to encourage people to believe that the Government are not cosying up to communist China, he should make recommendations accordingly.

May I just ask the Minister about the extract he read from the 1911 Act? I will read a slightly fuller one, though still one with ellipses:

“If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State…obtains or communicates to any other person any…document or information which…might be…directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; he shall be guilty of felony”.

My reading of that extract from the Act is that the felony lies in the disclosure to anyone at all—it does not have to be directly to an enemy. Whether or not China was regarded as an enemy at the time, the nature of the sensitive material disclosed meant it was a felony, even if it was disclosed to a China that was not regarded as an enemy. Surely the trial should have gone ahead.

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that I always value his sage advice and listen carefully to what he has to say. [Interruption.] It is true. He asked about the embassy. So that we can dispel some of the nonsense that has been spouted about the embassy, we need to provide a Privy Council briefing for him and for other Privy Counsellors, and I am happy to take that away. On his second point, he knows that these are points of law and matters for the CPS and the DPP; they are not matters for Ministers.

[Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)]

I welcome the Minister’s clarity on tackling the threats that China poses, including the transnational repression of Hongkongers in the UK. That will be a real reassurance to the many British nationals overseas who live in Milton Keynes. I would like him to go into further detail, particularly in the context of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia’s interference in Brexit and the Nathan Gill case that has just completed, with eight counts of bribery coming from Russia. At the time of taking those bribes, he was a close colleague of some MPs on the other side of the House. How will the new elections Bill stop interference through political funding, which we are seeing gaining more and more ground here in the UK, creating a real threat to our democracy?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I ask the Minister to be brief and on point regarding what this statement is actually about.

[Dan Jarvis]

The safety and security of Hongkongers in the UK is of the utmost importance, and any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the UK will not be tolerated. On my hon. Friend’s second point, and not wanting to get in trouble with Madam Deputy Speaker, I just say that using a position of public office to effectively further Russia’s malign interests while benefiting financially will not stand. It is a betrayal of our democratic values and of our electorate.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

The Minister has told us that his Government’s assessment of China is a mixture of national security threats and opportunities for engagement, including economically, but does he accept that that is exactly the assessment made by the last Government? That combination, with reference to the Act and the offence we are concerned with, does not require a country only to present a national security threat, simply that it does so, perhaps in combination with other things. That is the key point, and the Minister has been clear about that, so can we be clear about what happened with the Government’s evidence? Was it the case that the Government could find no evidence of China presenting a national security threat? Was it the case that the Government internally decided that the evidence it could find would not meet the CPS’s requirements? If so, who made that determination? Was it the case that the Government did supply evidence to the CPS on that specific point, and the CPS decided it was not significant enough? If it is the latter, will the Minister publish the evidence to the House? If he does not think that is appropriate—it may not be—will he give authority to the deputy National Security Adviser to share that evidence in full with the Intelligence and Security Committee?

[Dan Jarvis]

I have a lot of time for the right hon. and learned Gentleman, not least because he brings an almost unique perspective from his understanding of the law and of matters relating to intelligence. He correctly made the observation that ultimately, any Government strategy on China has to take consideration of national security issues. At the same time, any fair-minded, reasonable Government have to understand the economic opportunities that exist. As a former Attorney General, he would not recommend that I get into the business of second-guessing judgments and decisions taken by the DPP. On his point about publishing the evidence, he hopefully will have heard the response I gave a moment ago. [Interruption.] I am responding to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s serious question about publishing the evidence. I hope that he will have heard the response I gave a moment ago.

[Chris Law (Dundee Central) (SNP)]

The Minister states:

“we will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm,”

and that includes threats “emanating from China”. Despite ongoing transnational repression of Tibetans, Uyghurs and Hongkongers, continued cyber-security attacks on this country, and Members of this Parliament being sanctioned and spied upon, there appear to be no consequences for China. Instead, the UK Government give in to its coercive, bullying behaviour. I have a straightforward question: if the Minister is serious about deterring this behaviour and these threats, will he take the necessary action and include China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme—yes or no?

[Dan Jarvis]

Any decision about the enhanced tier of FIRS will be brought forward to Parliament in the normal way. I can say to the hon. Member that any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities here in the UK will not be tolerated.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

We know the very basic facts, which is that the Director of Public Prosecutions asked for a statement from the Government to clarify that, at the time of the offence, China was a threat to national security. He says in his letter that such an assurance, or evidence, or a statement from the Government were not forthcoming. We know that the Government withheld that vital element of the case. The Minister is shaking his head, but who decided that, in the words of the DPP, it would “not be forthcoming”. Somebody decided that. He seems to be saying that it was the deputy National Security Adviser who is somehow accountable for making those decisions, but I question that point. To whom are they accountable, if not the National Security Adviser?

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me seek to clarify. The deputy National Security Adviser, who is a senior and highly regarded official with extensive experience in matters relating to national security, provided a witness statement in December 2023. That was under the previous Government, and I made that point earlier. Further witness statements were requested and provided, as I said earlier, in February and July this year. All the evidence provided by the deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offence and the policy position of the Government at the time. I can give the hon. Member an assurance that every effort was made to provide evidence to support this case within the constraints that I have just outlined. The decision about whether to proceed with the prosecution was ultimately taken by the DPP and the CPS, which were hamstrung by antiquated legislation.

[Bobby Dean (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

I admire the Government’s attempts to pin this on the previous Conservative Government. It is an endeavour in which I would usually join them, but on this occasion I cannot, because the argument simply does not stack up. The argument seems to hinge on the Conservative Government’s classification of China as a threat to national security. That is not a formal classification, but one that needs to be substantiated. The Government seem to be arguing that it was not because, for instance, in the integrated review refresh of 2023, China was merely described as an “epoch-defining…challenge”. However, the same paragraph in that report talks about the Chinese Communist party as presenting

“state threats to the UK’s democracy, economy and society”.

Reports by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the same year talk about how China’s

“ambition at a global level…poses a national security threat to the UK.”

We have heard other testimonies today from MI5 and others. My question to the Government is: was this the sort of evidence that was provided to the CPS? If not, why not? Whose decision was it not to present that kind of evidence?

[Dan Jarvis]

There is, I am afraid, a fundamental flaw in the hon. Gentleman’s question. These activities took place under the previous Government and under the legislation that was in place at the time. This is not about seeking to blame the previous Government, but it is a statement of fact to say that those activities, about which there is concern across the House, took place in the previous Parliament and under the previous legislative framework. That is just a statement of truth.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I have to say to the right hon. Gentleman, whom I respect very much indeed, that his answer to the question put by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), the former Attorney General, raised more questions than he gave answers. Is he seriously suggesting that the National Security Adviser, with all his links to the 48 Group and to the Grandview Institution, had no involvement whatsoever in the advice that went to the Crown Prosecution Service? While he is about it, will he clarify that apparent conflation of this country’s economic ties with China, which he appeared to give in mitigation for the mess that the Government appear to have got themselves into?

[Dan Jarvis]

I respect the right hon. Gentleman too, and I hope that he will understand that any Government will seek to balance issues relating to national security as well as issues relating to economic prosperity. That, I think, is not an unreasonable way in which to proceed. I do, however, want to pick him up on one point: the National Security Adviser does not have any links to the 48 Group.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Foreign interference in our democracies is, of course, deeply concerning, and transparency from Governments and, indeed, all legislators is essential. That includes transparency in relation to past elected representatives, such as Reform UK’s former leader in Wales, who has pleaded guilty to accepting bribes from Russia. To uphold public accountability, will the Minister commit to working with the Attorney General to publish the names of all individuals interviewed by counter-terrorism police in connection with the Nathan Gill bribery cases? The people of Wales are rightly concerned.

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Lady is right; transparency is important. If she will forgive me, I will look carefully at the point that she has made and take it away, but I hope this also means that she will be seeking to support our elections Bill.

[Harriet Cross (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)]

I am going to keep this quite basic, because I think this is where a lot of the public will come from. The Government should always want to do everything they can, and more, to keep the British public and our institutions safe, so I do not understand why they will not do everything they possibly can at least to try to bring this to trial—at least to try to give a jury an opportunity to take matters into its hands and consider this case. I do not understand why they are willing to accept advice, and not actually put this matter to trial when they have the opportunity to do so. Will the Minister please commit to publishing all minutes from any meetings at which matters discussed with the CPS, or what the CPS had requested, were asked for?

[Dan Jarvis]

I will keep it basic as well. This Government will do everything that we can to keep the public safe, and the hon. Lady will have heard the response that I gave earlier with regard to publishing issues.

[Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)]

The stench emanating from the collapse of this Chinese spy case makes a manure heap seem positively floral. The bottom line is that everyone is disappointed, everyone thinks there is enough evidence and everyone seems to agree that China is a security threat, yet the case has collapsed and China has been given, essentially, carte blanche to carry on spying in the United Kingdom. I have it on good authority that senior figures in Washington now fear that Five Eyes has become Six Eyes.

The one thing that has changed since charges were made in April 2024 is the National Security Adviser. Will the Minister give a commitment that the National Security Adviser will appear, and answer questions in person, before any parliamentary Committee that wishes to have those questions answered?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Member talks about a stench. He has some brass neck, given what has gone on in his party recently. The National Security Adviser is a special adviser, and, given the reference to the United States, I would point the hon. Member in the direction of President Trump’s policy adviser, who just this morning praised the contribution made by the NSA.

[Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)]

The problem that the Government have is that the story keeps changing, either each day or within a day. The right hon. Gentleman, who is obviously stating the Government’s position now, is giving us a view that completely contradicts the messages given by Ministers over the weekend. He has clearly referred to a huge number of meetings at which—I say this with the greatest respect—he was not present. Can he agree now that the content of all those meetings, and the minutes of those meetings, will be published, so that everyone in the House can understand what has happened? If that has to be done under certain rules so that the public do not have access to the information, fair enough; but the reality is that until such time as the Government come clean, the stench of this will continue.

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me assure the hon. Member that I take very seriously the points that he has made. Clearly there will be a legal dimension to all this, but I am happy to go away, look at his point and then come back to him.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

In 2023 the Intelligence and Security Committee published a report on China in which it wrote that China was a “whole-of-state threat”. In their 2023 public response to the ISC report, the Government wrote that they recognised

“the committee’s concerns about the long-term strategic challenge”.

The ISC had used the word “threat” rather than “challenge”. Does the Minister regret that in 2023 the Government’s response did not use the word “threat”?

[Dan Jarvis]

With respect to the hon. Member, I am not going to become involved in a critique about whether the Government should have responded in a different way, because that is a matter for them. However, he mentioned the important work of the ISC. The Government consider that the ISC has a very important role to play in Parliament. It is obviously independent of Government, and it will clearly be for the Chair, the deputy Chair and the wider Committee to take a view on how they wish to proceed. As for the specific report to which the hon. Member referred, all that material would have been available to be considered by the CPS.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

The right hon. Gentleman is the Minister for Security. I have been here for almost an hour and a half, and I have not heard him answer this question: was China spying on Parliament, or is it even a consideration that it is spying on Parliament?

[Dan Jarvis]

I have been crystal clear—[Interruption.] If hon. Members will allow me, let me say that China poses a series of threats to the United Kingdom, and I was very clear about what they were. I referred specifically to a number of particular issues. I could not have been clearer about that.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the Minister for coming forward. As he knows, this topical issue lies heavy in the hearts of many people in constituencies throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as we consider whether national security has been at threat owing to the semantics of language, and the general public are asking for openness and transparency. I have been contacted on a number of occasions by concerned constituents of Chinese descent who believe that they are being shadowed by the Chinese secret service, and the decision not to prosecute means that they are feeling even more insecure and even more fearful. That must be addressed. Will the Minister tell us exactly when the decision was made to classify China as non-threatening, and how will I tell that to my constituents who are living in fear right now as a result of this so-called non-threat?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always. I think he is referring to activity that took place under the previous Government, but let me agree with his basic point: the public do want to know what has happened. That is why the Government have put forward a statement today, to provide that transparency. What I think the public do not want, however, is Ministers, or politicians, interfering in the legal process, and seeking to influence, persuade or cajole senior figures in the CPS, including the Director of Public Prosecutions. I do not think that is the right way to proceed, and I think that hopefully, if Opposition Members, and indeed Members throughout the House, step back for a moment, we can reach a consensus that it is not right for Ministers to second-guess legal decisions made by the Crown Prosecution Service.

[Nick Timothy (West Suffolk) (Con)]

The Minister has comprehensively taken on several strawman arguments, answered questions that have not been asked, and stuck to his carefully constructed sentences. One example was: “Ministers and special advisers did not take decisions about that evidence, and they were not sighted on the contents.” But was any Minister, the National Security Adviser, any other special adviser or any senior official other than the deputy National Security Adviser, such as the Cabinet Secretary, sighted on the decision regarding the evidence sent to the CPS?

[Dan Jarvis]

Fundamentally, the decision was one for the DPP and the CPS. I could not have been clearer about the fact that this Government have not sought to interfere with the process.

[Calum Miller (Bicester and Woodstock) (LD)]

I listened carefully to the Minister’s statement, but questions remain. The Minister says that China poses threats. Will the Government now publish in full the China audit, so that we can know the scale of those threats? The Minister says that the Government will act against transnational repression of Hongkongers here in the UK, so will the Government now implement targeted sanctions against the officials in Hong Kong and Beijing who are responsible for the bounties? The Minister says that the Government will legislate against foreign influence. Will he ensure that the new elections Bill tackles not only covert foreign political funding, but all foreign political funding, by shutting down the opportunity for foreign actors to influence our politics through corporate donations?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Member referenced the China audit; I am sure that he will acknowledge that the then Foreign Secretary came to the House to give a statement specifically on the China audit. The reason why the China audit has not been published is that it is at a higher classification than documents that would normally be published.

I hope that the hon. Member’s second point was at least a tacit welcome of the Government’s elections Bill. There will be a number of measures in there, which I hope that he and his colleagues will be able to support. It is important that we seek to work together to transform the political landscape to make it much, much harder for those who seek to interfere in our democracy to do so.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

The Minister has made great play of the need to work cross-party on this issue. May I gently suggest to him that the time to do that was before the case collapsed, not afterwards?

The Minister has leant heavily on what officials are willing to say about the threat or otherwise that China poses, but officials do not make Government policy and do not state the position of the UK Government; Ministers do. If the Government were struggling to find an official who would say in a witness statement that China was a threat, is there any good reason why they could not have asked the former Security Minister to do so, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), who was happy to give a statement at the Dispatch Box? I am sure that many other former Government Ministers would have happily given evidence that China was a threat, enabling the case to proceed. What possible reason was there for not doing that?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Member talks about my making great play of the need to work cross-party, but that is because I genuinely believe that on important matters of national security, we should proceed in a certain way, and where possible, we seek to work across the political divide to establish consensus. I thought there was a slight irony in the point that he went on to make. I agree with him that Ministers are accountable, and if Opposition Members want to hold Ministers to account, that is absolutely a matter for them. What I think is most unfortunate—I am not saying that he was responsible for doing this, but others have done it—is when Members seek to blame officials or imply criticism of them. I do not think that is the right way to proceed.

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

It seems to me that the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, put her finger on the nub of this matter. We know that in April 2024, the CPS decided that the evidential test was met. The evidential test was that there was a reasonable prospect of conviction for the offence of passing useful information to an enemy. We know that in September ’25, the DPP maintained that the evidential test was not met, so what changed? Who changed it? How did we move from the evidential test being met to the evidential test not being met? Was the evidence before the DPP withdrawn? Was it found to be unreliable, or did the Government fail to substantiate the evidence that enabled the evidential test to be met back in April 2024?

[Dan Jarvis]

With great respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, that is what I was at great pains to explain in my opening remarks.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that the Government have now set a perverse incentive for British officials, in that admitting to espionage problems with China is seen as rocking the boat?

[Dan Jarvis]

No, I do not agree.

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

The Government have not had a great record in the courts recently. Kneecap’s case was thrown out because the paperwork was not correct, and now we have the spy case not proceeding because evidence was not provided. The fact of the matter is that China now controls many of our supply chains, holds a lot of our national debt, and is an important part of the economic framework in the United Kingdom because of its investment in strategic industries. The general public may not understand the intricacies of how a case is built up and who is involved in it, but can the Minister understand that despite his excuse-ridden statement today, many members of the public might be coming to the conclusion that national security is being sacrificed because the Government are not prepared to deal with our increasing economic dependency on China?

[Dan Jarvis]

No, I do not agree. There will be those, including in this House, who will seek to simplify the nature of the relationship to a single word. More sensible and fair-minded colleagues, and certainly the public, will understand that difficult choices have to be made. Fundamentally, this Government’s approach will always be to put our national security first. I have been crystal clear about that today and previously, but that does not mean that we should not look for opportunities to trade with a country where there will be some economic advantage to doing so. That seems to me entirely reasonable and completely pragmatic, but we will proceed on the basis that our national security absolutely comes first.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last month, the Security Minister came before the House and stated that he was not happy with the decision not to prosecute. I asked him why the Government were dithering over formally challenging China, having excluded it from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and he suggested that they were not doing so. Subsequent revelations have suggested that the Government have yielded to Chinese threats to withhold investment, and to offers to waive the outstanding debt owed to Jingye. Would the Minister like to correct the record and explain why China is not in the enhanced tier, given that we are discussing spying for China? Can he clarify what role the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, has played in deciding that China should not be classified in the enhanced tier alongside Russia and Iran?

[Dan Jarvis]

“Extremely disappointed” was the way that I described our reaction, both on 15 September and again today. I gently say to the hon. Member that he should not believe everything that he reads in the papers. He asked me about FIRS. I hope he heard the response that I gave some moments ago; I said that we look very carefully at any question of whether to place a particular country on the enhanced tier of FIRS. FIRS is an important part of the National Security Act 2023. There were those, including on the hon. Gentleman’s side of the House, who said that we were not going to roll it out, but we rolled it out on 1 July. I said that we were going to roll it out on 1 July, and we did. We looked very carefully at how we can most effectively use that tool, and we will continue to look closely at that, but any decisions about the enhanced tier will be brought forward in the normal way.

[Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

The Government say that they want to take a long-term and strategic approach to China, but that is exactly what China does, whether we are talking about it increasing control over supply chains to gain leverage over the west, the belt and road programme, or the debt-trap diplomacy with which it is associated abroad. This is nothing less than a concession to an authoritarian regime, and it plays into China’s hands, as it wants to continue gaining economic and military leverage over the west. The head of the CPS said that he requested evidence from the Government to allow the case to proceed, but the Government did not provide that evidence. Why not, and is it still the Government’s view that it is impossible to argue in court that China is a threat?

[Dan Jarvis]

On the hon. Gentleman’s final question, I have taken every opportunity to try to provide the Government’s response. I was not entirely clear about his critique of taking a long-term strategic approach and whether he thinks that is a good thing to do or not. I think it is a good thing that Governments think carefully and strategically about their role in the world and the nature of their relationships with countries like China. Yes, we have to be clear-eyed, and have to always defend our national security, but we also have to look for opportunities for economic growth as well.

[Neil O’Brien (Harborough, Oadby and Wigston) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Official Secrets Act

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Monday 15th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

This morning, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to proceed with the prosecution of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who had been charged with espionage for China under the Official Secrets Act 1911. Members right across the House will be aware that the charges related to allegations of Chinese espionage within Parliament and will want reassurance, as will you, Mr Speaker. Many Members will be as extremely disappointed as I am that there will now not be a trial.

The decision not to proceed with this prosecution is an independent one for the CPS to make in its role as the UK’s independent prosecuting authority. However, I want to be clear that the Government remain gravely concerned about the threat of Chinese espionage. Parliament and our democracy are sacrosanct, and any attempt by any foreign power to infiltrate or interfere with parliamentary proceedings is completely unacceptable. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will therefore set out the measures the Government are taking to tackle any residual risks arising from this case and outline the wider approach the Government are taking to protecting our democracy and countering state threats, including those from China.

The decision of the CPS related to charges under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which was the relevant legislation in force at the time. It is well known that state threats legislation had not kept pace with the changing threats we face. The Official Secrets Act was passed to counter the threat from German spies before the first world war. It referred to espionage as obtaining

“any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information”

that

“might be…useful to an enemy”.

Clearly, that language—drafted well over 100 years ago —does not reflect the types of espionage or state threats we face in the modern day, nor the breadth of states that engage directly in that activity.

For that reason, the UK passed and has now commenced the National Security Act 2023 with cross-party support. That legislation, which replaced the Official Secrets Act 1911, brings new criminal offences and powers to bear against the full range of modern-day state threats. Moreover, the National Security Act is state agnostic, removing the unhelpful “enemy” language from the Official Secrets Act and focusing on the malign activity we are all concerned about.

The Act also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government brought into force on 1 July. FIRS encourages transparency, strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions against covert influence, and gives our intelligence agencies and law enforcement additional tools to detect, deter, disrupt and prosecute state threat actors. It requires that any foreign influence in our democracy, including from China, be declared. We can now be confident that should cases of espionage or state threats be uncovered in the future, we will be in a much better position to prosecute them under the new National Security Act.

This case hits at the heart of our democracy, so let me be clear: the Government will not tolerate any state threats to the UK and its democratic institutions. We will robustly challenge China when necessary, as we would challenge any country for unacceptable behaviour on our soil. I can confirm that the Foreign Office has démarched the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in London to make clear that we will not tolerate any activity that interferes in our democracy. MI5 is considering the provision of additional advice to those most at risk of being targeted by state-led espionage, and the Government are taking robust action to counter state threats and continue to build up the UK’s resilience.

In April, we established a new cross-Government state threats unit to better co-ordinate our response to state threats. As I set out following the recently completed review of transnational repression, new training modules on identifying and countering state threats are being offered to all 45 territorial police forces through the College of Policing and are mandatory for counter-terrorism policing officers. We have committed to legislate as soon as parliamentary time allows to take forward the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. That includes creating a new proscription-style tool for state threats.

As the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) set out in his statement to the House following the conclusion of the China audit, we are investing £600 million in our intelligence services to support them in detecting and disrupting state threats to the UK. In September, the National Cyber Security Centre co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I know there will be calls to go further, and I reassure the House and the country that we will keep all tools under review and act as necessary.

As you are aware, Mr Speaker, the safety and security of our Parliament is of the utmost importance. That is why the National Protective Security Authority will issue new protective security guidance to parliamentarians and political staff on protection against foreign interference and espionage. That guidance outlines the potential risks we all may face in our day-to-day work, and how we can all better protect ourselves. I urge colleagues to read and follow the advice once issued. I also urge Members to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses. It allows the NCSC to alert individuals if it identifies evidence of malicious activity on their personal devices or accounts, and swiftly advise them on steps to take to protect their information.

The strategic defence review was clear that China presents a sophisticated and persistent challenge. As the national security strategy reinforced, instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years. As I have set out, we are addressing those threats, but there are also opportunities we need to grasp as we navigate our complex relationship with China. The last Government did not describe China as an enemy, and this Government do not think our relationship can be simplified down to a single word. Instead, we are taking a consistent, long-term approach to China, firmly rooted in the UK’s global interests.

I finish by paying tribute to our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. They operate often in secret, often in the shadows and often at great personal danger, but they have our enduring gratitude. While we are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, the legislation it relied on has already been changed. Should we need to go further, we will not hesitate to do what is necessary to keep our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Home Secretary.

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

Let me start by thanking the Security Minister for the briefing and information he provided ahead of his statement. Let me also join him in paying tribute to the officers in our police force and in the security service. They work so hard and take personal risks to keep us safe.

Let us start with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee’s assessment of China, published a year or two ago. It found that China had penetrated every sector of our economy. When the Security Minister a moment ago said that China merely posed a “challenge”, he was wrong I think to use that word. China poses a threat. It poses a threat because it participates and organises systemic espionage into our public institutions, including Parliament. It purloins intellectual property from universities and from companies, particularly in the technology sectors, and it routinely spies on the UK as a state. They also engage in transnational repression of Chinese citizens here, for instance running secret, undeclared police stations and putting bounties on the heads of individuals. The word “challenge” is not strong enough; the state of China poses a threat.

The Security Minister said that the Government would “robustly challenge China”, but let me gently point to some of the decisions that the Government have taken in practice. We saw a signal back at the G7 last year, when the Prime Minister was, I am afraid to say, obsequious in dealing with President Xi, appearing to prioritise economic links above security considerations. We have not seen any decision to place China in the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme, although that regime has been in place for several months, and the Government seem to be viewing with favour the application for a new super-embassy in London, to which our allies, including America, are urging us not to consent and which many of our intelligence services say will be used as a base for espionage activities. So the Government’s record on China causes deep concern, but of equal concern is this specific case—and, Mr Speaker, you explained why that is of particular concern to Parliament, given that the alleged espionage activities touch directly on Parliament and the way in which Members of Parliament do their duty.

I have in front of me a briefing provided to the press by the Crown Prosecution Service, dated 26 April 2024, when these charges were first laid. That briefing states that one of the subjects was commissioned over a period exceeding a year, between December 2021 and February 2023, by a Chinese intelligence asset. There are 34 reports on what this note describes as “very specific topics”, some of which relate directly and personally to Members of Parliament. One of the deputy national security advisers told the Crown Prosecution Service that he assessed this information to be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state, and said that it was

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

Given the gravity of that assessment, it is astonishing that these charges have now been withdrawn. The Crown Prosecution Service clearly assessed these allegations, and the evidence, against the law—against the 1911 Act —in 2024, and found the test to have been met; so why today, more than a year later, have we suddenly been told that the test is no longer met? My question to the Security Minister is a simple one: given the gravity of the charges that I have just read out, what has changed between last year and this year? Why has a case that met the threshold and met the test in April 2024 all of a sudden been determined not to do so?

May I ask specifically whether anyone in the Government put any pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this case? Did the Government co-operate fully with the police, the security services and the CPS in providing the information required, including information relating to the definition of “an enemy”? Can the Security Minister give the House those express assurances? I certainly share your concern, Mr Speaker, and, I am sure, the concern of many others, that what appears to be extremely serious espionage, assessed as such in the written disclosure that I read out—assessed by the deputy national security adviser as being prejudicial to our national interests—has all of a sudden, and with no explanation, been dropped, even though previously, just a year and a bit ago, it was assessed that this case did meet the threshold. The House and the country need to know what exactly has changed.

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me seek to address the shadow Home Secretary’s points. He raised the question of whether China constitutes a threat or not. I think I was very clear in the language that I used. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, and as the Government set out in the strategic defence review, China presents a “sophisticated and persistent challenge”. The reality is that, in government, there is an absolute requirement to co-operate with nations all around the world. When there are areas in which we need to challenge China, of course we will do so. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members will completely understand that when there are areas, in terms of economic co-operation, in which we need to work closely with China, of course we will do so, because it is absolutely in our national interest.

I referenced the comments of the previous Foreign Secretary, and the shadow Home Secretary might want to look back at what was said following the China audit. The previous Foreign Secretary was absolutely crystal clear: we will take a long-term, strategic approach to China that is rooted in the UK’s national interest. I understand why the shadow Home Secretary wants to boil down such a complex bilateral relationship into a single word, but the reality is that it is neither helpful nor sensible to do so.

The shadow Home Secretary will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with his characterisations of what he described as the “signals” that this Government have sent to China. In truth, I will not take any lessons from him on that, not least because—I have said this to him previously—it was not so long ago that a Conservative Prime Minister took the leader of China to the pub. When it comes to signals, I am not sure that the shadow Home Secretary speaks with a huge amount of authority.

The shadow Home Secretary spoke about FIRS. He knows that the Government’s position is that no decision has been taken with regard to the enhanced tier and China, and any decision taken by the Government will be announced in the normal way. FIRS is a crucial tool, and I am proud that this Government have got on and implemented it as of 1 July.

The shadow Home Secretary specifically raised the issue of the embassy in London, as I am sure other hon. Members will. He will know that China’s application to build a new embassy in London is going through an independent planning process. A final decision on planning permission will be made in due course by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, but I can be absolutely clear, in relation to FIRS, the nature of the threat and the embassy, that national security has been, and will continue to be, a core priority for this Government throughout the process.

The shadow Home Secretary asked about the CPS decision. I know that he understands that he is asking me about decisions made by the CPS that are entirely independent of Government. This was an independent decision made by the CPS, and it is not for any Government Minister to speculate on the reasons behind it. As I have said—I have been crystal clear—the Government are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, and we remain extremely concerned about the espionage threat posed to the United Kingdom.

[Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)]

I hope that the Intelligence and Security Committee will get a good chance to dig into what has happened in this place, because we are hampered in the Chamber by not being able to look at sensitive issues. I also hope that the Minister will lend his weight to the approval of many senior Members of this House, prior to the last election—it got as far as the last Prime Minister—to create a Committee to look at sensitive spending, but also sensitive issues. In the summer, this Government chose to reintroduce extradition arrangements with Hong Kong, despite the application of the Chinese security Act. Given what the Minister has said today, how can we square both of those positions?

[Dan Jarvis]

I hope that my hon. Friend knows that this Government hugely appreciate and respect the relationship we have with Hongkongers. Through the processes in place, we will absolutely ensure that nobody, be they a Hongkonger or any other nationality, is extradited for reasons of political expediency. I can also point her to the important work, which we take incredibly seriously, on transnational repression. I previously made a statement to this House, and I hope that she and others understand the seriousness with which we take these activities. We are working closely with our international allies, and we are doing everything we can to ensure that the UK is a hard target for these threats, wherever they might originate.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)]

As always, I am very grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement.

For years, the Chinese Communist party has worked to undermine the democratic institutions and values that underpin our society. This House is all too aware of the warnings, not least from the Intelligence and Security Committee’s excoriating report on China. That report made it clear that the previous Government lacked a coherent strategy for dealing with the threat posed by the Chinese state and that insufficient resources had been committed to meet that challenge. We expect to see better from this Government.

We are faced with a case in which two men, one of them a parliamentary researcher with close links to senior MPs, were accused of serious offences under the Official Secrets Act, only for the Crown Prosecution Service to drop those charges due to insufficient evidence. In this context, the decision is deeply worrying. It raises serious questions about the UK’s capacity to detect and prosecute espionage linked to hostile states, particularly China. So what specific issues with the evidence led the CPS to conclude that the threshold for prosecution was no longer met?

More broadly, what does this outcome say about our preparedness to respond to threats from foreign intelligence services operating on our soil, and even within the corridors of this Parliament? The Government must make protecting our democracy a national security priority. That means implementing the recommendations of the ISC’s China report in full, and ensuring that we are not left exposed to foreign interference simply because our systems are not equipped to respond.

Finally, the Minister again today committed to introduce legislation for a proscription mechanism for state and state-linked bodies as soon as parliamentary time allows. Could he update us on the timeline for bringing this forward and what its scope will be?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as I aways am, for the very sensible and reasonable way in which she has made her comments. She raises a number of important observations, many of which I agree with. I do have to say to her what I said to the shadow Home Secretary, which is that it would be completely inappropriate for me to speculate about the reasons why the CPS sought to make this decision. I completely understand why right hon. and hon. Members would ask me about it, but I hope they also understand that I am not able to talk about why the CPS has decided to make this decision. That is very much a matter for it, not for the Government.

On the other points the hon. Member raised, let me give her an assurance that the Government do everything we possibly can to ensure that the UK is a hard target to guard against those malign forces, wherever they may come from, that seek to infiltrate or interfere with our democratic processes. We will ensure that our security and intelligence services and agencies and law enforcement have the necessary tools and resources they need to do the difficult job of guarding against the threats we face. Obviously, as she understands very well, there is also a legislative framework for that, and that is why, I understand, she asked the question about Jonathan Hall KC and the recommendations that she has made recently. As she knows, we have made an absolute commitment that we will legislate as soon as we can, and I give her an assurance that that work continues at pace.

[Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement. I think we have a duty—all democracies have a duty—to protect democracy from its enemies. I do not doubt that our allies face exactly the same challenges, so I would be interested to know what discussions we have had with our allies about this very challenge. The Minister mentioned that MPs and their offices would get new guidance. Can he commit to a date for that being issued?

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend raises an important point about our allies. Many of the threats and challenges we face are shared ones, which is precisely why the UK Government convened the five countries ministerial conference last week. We were proud to host our allies from the Five Eyes nations, with which we work very closely, along with other important international co-operation arrangements. We do work very closely with our allies to ensure that, collaboratively and collectively, we are best able to guard against the threat we face.

I can give my hon. Friend an assurance that we will seek to ensure that the new guidance is in place as soon possible. I also point to the fact that I wrote to all Members of this House just before the recess with advice on protective security and other matters. However, should any Member feel that they need additional support, we will work very closely with you, Mr Speaker, and the Parliamentary Security Department to ensure that they get it.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.

[Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)]

The Minister made the point that the charges brought were under the old legislation, the Official Secrets Act, which has now been superseded. Has he made an assessment of whether the charges would have proceeded had the new offences been in place at the time the charges were brought? Will he be working with ministerial colleagues, law enforcement and others to look at whether new offences are needed in this case and in others?

[Dan Jarvis]

If I may say so, that is a very clever question from the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee. I hope that the right hon. Lady will understand that, given that the decision was communicated this morning, the Department and the Government will be looking at it very closely. I am confident that the new National Security Act gives the Government—I genuinely pay tribute to the previous Government for their work in introducing that groundbreaking legislation—the tools we need, but I know she will understand that we will look very closely at the decision communicated this morning and satisfy ourselves that we have all the necessary powers and tools to guard against the nature of the threat we face.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Minister for his statement. The first duty of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, and I know that he has a track record of doing just that. He also rightly recognises that politics is not just about MPs or Members of the other place; it is also about political staff, the Clerks, everybody who works in this place, and everybody in local government. What reassurances can he give my constituents and the greater population that he will ensure that we stop foreign influence over our democratic processes for everybody?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who raises an important point. I can give him and his constituents the assurances he seeks. The Government take these threats incredibly seriously and we will do everything we need to do to keep the public safe. On behalf of the Prime Minister, I chair the Defending Democracy taskforce. The Prime Minister recently renewed the mandate of that cross-departmental mechanism, which ensures that we are able to provide a whole-of-Government approach to the threats we face. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. These are not party political issues. I have always believed that these are matters that should be a shared endeavour. I will want to work with him and Members right across the House to ensure that, collectively, we keep ourselves safe.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Member who has been heavily involved in this, Alicia Kearns.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I will be responding in a personal capacity, but may I start by thanking you, Mr Speaker, for the support you have given to us over the past two years? I also place on record my gratitude to our intelligence community and counter-terrorism police, who are exceptional.

From a securities perspective, today’s events are disastrous. They will embolden our enemies and make us look unwilling to defend our own nation, even when attacked in this place, the mother of all Parliaments. I am relieved that the National Security Act will make it safer and easier in future to prosecute foreign spies, but I urge the Minister to reform the Treason Act so that traitors are prosecuted and face justice, put China in the enhanced tier, and support private prosecution.

It remains unclear to me why Chris Cash and Christopher Berry cannot be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. The evidence shows a clear line between those two, the United Front Work Department and the politburo—the very top of the Chinese Communist party. The information shared was prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK, and I believe it put Members at personal risk. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) was told by agency heads that the evidence was overwhelming and the case beyond doubt. Counter-terrorism police this morning agreed and said the same to me—that the evidential standard had been met at the time of charges.

My question for the Minister is simple: if officials, the security services and the police agree that the case was a slam dunk, why has the Crown Prosecution Service not been able to get it over the line? If the CPS was not confident, why, given the compelling evidence, did it not put it to a jury and test it? Whoever is responsible for this decision—whether the Director of Public Prosecutions, an official in his own Department or the Attorney General—they have weakened the defence of our country today and I am desperately sorry to see it.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for her remarks, and I completely understand why she has phrased them in the way that she has. Let me also join her in thanking you, Mr Speaker, for the work you have done to keep parliamentarians safe. Over the next few days, weeks, months and years, it is vital that we work together. I look forward to meeting you later on today to discuss how we can ensure that we work together to safeguard all our parliamentary colleagues.

Turning to the substance of the remarks made by the hon. Lady, I agree with her characterisation of the National Security Act. I will look very carefully at the points she made specifically with regard to treason. On her assessment of the decision that has been made, I completely understand why she has arrived at that conclusion, as will Members right across the House. In my opening remarks, I expressed my extreme disappointment at the decision that has been made. These remarks, and the judgments people are forming in the House this afternoon, will be heard by the CPS. I know that she will take every opportunity—as will the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), whom she referenced in her introductory remarks—to seek a meeting with the CPS at the earliest available opportunity to hear and better understand the decision-making process it has been through.

As I have said previously, I am not able to speculate on the reason why the CPS has taken this decision. I am extremely disappointed that it has done so, but I will do everything I can to ensure that Government are organised so that we can ensure we have the resources in the right place to stand against the threats that we face.

[Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)]

I have raised with the Security Minister on several occasions the fears of the Hong Kong community in Bracknell and across the country, and today is just another reminder of the long arm of the Chinese state that so worries my constituents. Given that, and given the real and genuine fears of the Hong Kong community, does the Minister agree that it is important that as we seek, rightly, to reform the immigration system—it is good to see the Migration Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal (Mike Tapp), in his place next to the Security Minister—we nevertheless safeguard and protect the bespoke route of the British national overseas visa, recognising the historic commitment we have to the Hong Kong community?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the work he has done to support his constituents and champion Hongkongers. Hopefully he heard my earlier remarks about the respect and admiration that we have for Hongkongers and the importance that we attach to our relationship. I completely understand the fears that have been represented by my hon. Friend and a number of his constituents; I have had a number of meetings with members of that community and will have further such meetings. I look forward to working with him and with colleagues in the Department to ensure that those from the community feel that the Government will protect them, because that is what we will always want to do.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I make the following comments as somebody who has been sanctioned and hounded by the Chinese Government all the way through the past few years. I was briefed by the security services at the beginning that this was a slam-dunk prosecution—they were clear that they had met every single requirement within the Official Secrets Act. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) said earlier, the deputy national security adviser was very clear in his assessment of the information communicated by the two characters who were being prosecuted that at least 10 of the 34 charges that were laid were absolutely about passing secure information to the Chinese intelligence agency that would be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state. That is very clear. It cannot, therefore, be for a lack of evidence that this has been dropped by the CPS.

The key here was the whole idea of the Official Secrets Act defining that work as against an enemy—that is the key. So why in heaven’s name did the Government not take the opportunity, when it arose after the China audit, to raise China into the upper tier, as they did with Russia, North Korea and Iran? The Minister speaks of threats, but he does not say that China is a threat; he says it is a “challenge”, which is a ludicrous position to take.

I honestly feel today that this Government have let you down, Mr Speaker—the Speaker of this Parliament—after you bravely stood for people like me to protect us against the overtures of the Chinese. They have let down Parliament. Nobody knows now whether they are safe, because these charges have been dropped. It is absolutely key, furthermore, that until we define China as what it is—a persistent threat that targets individuals, like me and others, and states—this will be a shame and a blot on our reputation as a strong state against terrorism.

[Dan Jarvis]

I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman has, for entirely understandable reasons, a very long-standing interest in these matters, but I am afraid I do not agree with the assessment he has just offered. This Government take the threats that we face, regardless of where they come from, incredibly seriously. We will do everything that we need to do to safeguard our Parliament and our parliamentarians and to ensure that our democracy is not undermined or infiltrated by malign forces, wherever they might come from. I give the right hon. Gentleman and the House a categorical assurance that we understand that national security is the first duty of Government, and nothing—nothing—will get in the way of that.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

As someone who chaired the Intelligence and Security Committee throughout its China inquiry and who criticised the previous Government’s position on China, I am sad to see that this Government do not seem to understand the importance of signals. It sends a signal to describe “Chinese challenges” but not “Chinese communist threats”. It sends a signal to allow China to build a super-embassy against the advice of the security services. It sends a signal not to put China in the top tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and it sends a signal above all to allow it to buy up increasingly important parts of our economy and national infrastructure. Can we stop sending the wrong signals?

[Dan Jarvis]

The only signal that this Government will send is that threats to our country, wherever they come from, will not be tolerated.

[Bobby Dean (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

China has broken international agreements with the UK. It has placed bounties on the heads of Hongkongers seeking refuge in this country. Today’s announcement that charges have been dropped will only embolden China in its efforts to interfere with our democracy. The Minister has mentioned the effectiveness of the foreign influence registration scheme, so will he now assure us that all relevant officials, including those in the Administration of Hong Kong, will be placed in the enhanced tier of the scheme?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his remarks, but I hope that he would acknowledge that the incidents he described, about which he rightly has concerns, were condemned by the UK Government at the time. The UK Government have been clear about the fact that we will not tolerate transnational repression on those living in the UK. FIRS falls out of the National Security Act, and he knows that we have already announced that two nations will be included on the enhanced tier. Any further decision about other nations being included will be made in due course.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Minister euphemistically described our relationship with China as “complex”. It is not complex. It is characterised by espionage, malign behaviour and a massive trade imbalance. How is that complex, and why do this Government persist in opposing the views of their advisers and permitting—even facilitating—this massive centre for espionage close to the centre of our financial quarter?

[Dan Jarvis]

I have a lot of time for the right hon. Gentleman, but I do not agree with what he has just said, I am afraid, nor do I agree with the characterisation he makes around the embassy. I have said to him and the House previously that national security will be the overriding priority with regard to any decision that is made independently in a quasi-judicial process led by the Secretary of State. I can again give him an assurance that when it comes to any decision about the embassy, as has been detailed in letters that the previous Foreign Secretary and I have sent, national security will absolutely be at the forefront of any consideration.

[Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)]

There is a very nasty smell about the collapse of this Chinese spying affair case. Just over a year ago, the Crown Prosecution Service counter-terrorism unit said after complex investigations that these were very serious allegations and that charges were brought, but now we are supposed to believe that it cannot provide any evidence whatsoever. It feels to me as if one of two things has happened here: either the Crown Prosecution Service was wrong—potentially incompetent—or someone very high up in the Government has interfered with this situation. Which is it, Minister?

[Dan Jarvis]

When the hon. Member takes a moment to think carefully about these things, he will understand that Government Ministers should not speculate on the reasons provided for a particular decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, which is independent of Government. It would be entirely improper for any Minister to do that. I am happy to give him and any other Member who needs it an absolute assurance of how seriously we take the threats we face from a range of different malign forces around the country. This Government will ensure that we are best able, best prepared and best resourced to guard against the nature of the threat, and nothing will stop us doing that.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

The Security Minister mentioned the Official Secrets Act 1911, but he will know that it was updated in 1920 and, indeed, in 1989. As one of the co-authors of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s China report, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), I say to the Minister, following the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), that that report highlighted China as a threat, not a challenge.

There has been reference to the ISC looking at the case as it is currently looking at the data leak around the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, but the reality is that the legislation that set up the Committee—one part over 30 years ago and one part over a decade ago —is not fit for purpose. A lot of trust is invested in that Committee. Is it not time that with more power and funding going to the Intelligence and Security Committee —with even more responsibility being put on it, to be fair—it should be given more powers so that this Parliament and the people we represent know there is proper democratic parliamentary oversight of the intelligence community in this country? They are wonderful and they do a fantastic job, but they are sometimes fallible.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for his remarks, as well as the work he has done in this area and his service on the Committee. As a former Committee member, he will understand that the Committee is fiercely independent of Government, and rightly so, but I happen to think it does an outstanding job. It is a great asset for Parliament.

As Security Minister, I will want to work incredibly closely with the Committee and co-operate with it whenever we can. It is clearly not for me to suggest particular matters that it may wish to investigate, but knowing the Chair and the deputy Chair as I do, I think it entirely likely that it may decide to look closely at this particular matter.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

The Minister is clearly not happy with the CPS’s decision, and therefore the Government are not, and the House is obviously not either. Because the two suspects did not face a trial, double jeopardy does not come into play. Will the Minister undertake to explore with the Attorney General the scope for him to bring a case against those two, if not under the Official Secrets Act to test the case with a jury, then under the new legislation, which clearly would present no problem in court terms?

[Dan Jarvis]

I certainly agree with the hon. Member in his assessment of my being not happy. The decision was communicated this morning. The points he raised were reasonable, constructive and helpful, so let me take them away and consider them with colleagues across Government.

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

The threat to our national security from China is real, and I share the disappointment and concern expressed. However, the Minister will also be aware that China has used entirely bogus national security charges to imprison a British citizen, Jimmy Lai, who has now been in solitary confinement for five years and whose health is deteriorating rapidly. This morning, his son Sebastien Lai asked to see the Prime Minister to press him to do more. Will the Minister reinforce that case and take every action possible to get the Chinese to release Jimmy Lai?

[Dan Jarvis]

Jimmy Lai should be released immediately.

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, published an inquiry report into transnational repression earlier this year. It welcomed the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme but expressed concern about the absence of China on the enhanced tier. Its absence risks undermining the credibility and coherence of the scheme. Will the Minister listen to colleagues from across the House, pick up the recommendations of the report and include China on the enhanced tier?

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for the work he does on the Committee. I hope that when I gave evidence to the Committee, I conveyed the seriousness and importance that we attach to matters relating to transnational repression. I am genuinely grateful to the Committee for the work it has done and the report it published. I will respond to it as soon as I am able to do so.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

The Minister has repeatedly said that it is not his job to speculate on the CPS. He is right, but it is his job to defend the security of this country and therefore to ask the CPS why it has not brought charges. Has he done that? Has he rung the CPS before he came to the House to speak to it and to understand why it has not gone ahead? If not, why not?

[Dan Jarvis]

I accept the charge the hon. Gentleman makes against me that it is my responsibility to defend our national security, and I hope he understands that that is something I take incredibly seriously. The decision was communicated this morning. This was an independent decision, but I give him and others an assurance that we will, of course, look incredibly closely at it.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

In early June, the Government told me that the report regarding the inclusion of China in the enhanced tier would come forward in due course. As the Minister said in his statement, the chargé d’affaires at the Chinese embassy has now been démarched. Can the Minister outline why China has not been included in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, because if national security is the first duty of Government and nothing will get in the way of that, why are the Government dithering when it comes to formally challenging China?

[Dan Jarvis]

We are not doing what the hon. Gentleman suggests we are. What we are seeking to do is ensure that we have all the right tools to guard against the nature of the threats that we face. We take that incredibly seriously. He knows our policy with regard to FIRS, which this Government introduced on 1 July, but no doubt we will have more to say about it in due course.

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

Is the alarming takeaway from this, both for this House and for any potential spy, that we are being asked to believe that the espionage in which Messrs Cash and Berry engaged is not a criminal offence? Is that where our defence of national security has got to?

[Dan Jarvis]

The takeaway is that the CPS made an independent decision this morning, and that this Government will do everything we can to keep the country safe. That is the takeaway.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The Minister is an honourable man, but our disquiet and our constituents’ concerns run very deep. While I welcome the improved legislation in place to deal with the issue, the fact of the matter is that once again—I say this with great respect—the Government are being seen nationally as weak on criminal activity, and particularly on the action of the three defendants. When will the Government remind the world that this great nation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is a strong nation that meets our enemies face to face and on any footing? Will the Government send the message that any foreign operatives on our soil will be rooted out and will pay a price for working against this sovereign nation?

[Dan Jarvis]

I hold the hon. Gentleman in the highest regard, so I hope that he will not mind me gently pointing out to him that I could not have been clearer in my earlier remarks about how seriously we take these issues. We will work very closely with allies and partners right around the world to ensure that we do everything we can to guard against the threats that we face.

[Mr Speaker]

I call Alicia Kearns on a point of order. May I just say what a pleasure it is to see you back?

Draft Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and the Terrorism Act 2000 (Port Examination Codes of Practice) Regulations 2025

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2025 General Committees

[The Chair]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The usual rules apply: no tea, no coffee and, if anyone wishes to remove their jackets, they may do so.

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and the Terrorism Act 2000 (Port Examination Codes of Practice) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. This statutory instrument, which was laid before the House on 9 July, brings forward revised codes of practice for the exercise of powers under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Those powers are vital tools in our national security framework. They allow a counter-terrorism police officer to stop, question, search and detain a person at a port or the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity, respectively.

The changes we are debating today follow a public consultation held earlier this year that ran from 17 March to 27 April. The consultation invited views from a wide range of stakeholders, including legal experts, civil liberties organisations, operational partners and members of the public. It focused on proposed updates to the codes of practice to ensure that they remain clear, proportionate and fit for purpose. The Government’s response was published on 23 June. Let me take the opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone who engaged with the consultation. The feedback received has helped to shape the final versions of the codes, which now provide greater clarity on how these powers are to be exercised and therefore strengthen safeguards for individuals subject to examination.

I will briefly summarise the key changes that will be made by this instrument. First, a minor element of how examining officers can use the powers in the border area of Northern Ireland will be clarified. The updated guidance makes clear that officers can ask someone why they are in the border area to help them decide whether the person falls within scope of the powers before any formal examination begins.

Secondly, the distinction between counter-terrorism and public order policing will be reinforced. Schedule 7 powers are designed to help police to identify individuals who may be involved in terrorism. They are not meant to be used for managing protests or public order. However, in rare cases, someone’s protest activity might cross a line, for example if it involves serious violence to promote a political cause and could meet the legal definition of terrorism. In such situations, officers may use schedule 7 powers to assess whether the person is involved in terrorism.

Thirdly, consular access guidance will be improved. Individuals detained under these powers have the right to contact their embassy, high commission or consulate. The codes now clarify that questioning may proceed once a request for consular notification has been acted on, even if the consulate is not yet available. That ensures that detained individuals understand their rights and that officers act promptly.

Fourthly, notification safeguards will be enhanced. Officers must inform individuals when an examination begins. That is a key safeguard to ensure that people understand their rights and responsibilities. The updated codes confirm that this notice can be given verbally or in writing, which is especially helpful where language or communication barriers exist. That will make the process clearer and more accessible.

These changes are designed to strengthen public confidence, support operational effectiveness and ensure compliance with human rights obligations. With that, I commend the regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I thank the hon. Members for Reigate and for Sutton and Cheam for the constructive and reasonable comments that they have made. Let me seek to respond to them as best I can. First, let me take the opportunity to reiterate the importance of these powers. Both schedule 7 and schedule 3 are essential tools in our counter-terrorism and counter-state threat networks. They allow officers to act swiftly and decisively at the border to detect and disrupt those who pose a threat to our national security.

I thank the hon. Member for Reigate for her kind words. It is indeed a privilege and a pleasure to continue to serve, not only in the Home Office but also now in the Cabinet Office. I have been in touch with the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), to seek to talk to him about the nature of the changes that we have made across Government. I think there will be very significant benefits in terms of our ability to co-ordinate national security activity across Government, and I very much hope that will have the support of Members right across the House.

The hon. Lady will know, I hope, that we have always approached matters relating to national security not on a party political basis. These are matters of the most profound importance. My approach as Security Minister will always be to work closely with Members across the House, and certainly with Opposition Members, but I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her comments.

The hon. Lady asked an entirely reasonable question, seeking assurances about conversations that we have had with the police. I can give her the reassurance that she seeks. We have worked incredibly carefully with the police. Of course, I am always required to make the point that the police are operationally independent of Government, as she knows, but we work to ensure that any changes, whether to codes of practice or, obviously, to more weighty matters relating to legislation, are worked through very closely with police forces, both nationally and locally. We value the work that our police officers do, we recognise the challenges that they face, and this Government—as I am sure the last Government did as well—will always work as closely as we can with them.

The hon. Lady made an entirely reasonable point about the observations of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall. Let me say something about him as an individual, because his name often gets raised in these kinds of forums. He is someone who speaks with great credibility and authority on these matters, and I think has widespread respect throughout the House. Having worked closely with him in opposition and in government, I know that there is a diligence and an authority as well as an independence to the work he does, and the Government always listen very carefully to his recommendations.

The hon. Lady specifically asked about Northern Ireland. I am conscious that with us is a distinguished former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon, so I shall choose my words carefully, not least because he may take the opportunity to intervene on me. Specifically regarding the use of powers in the Northern Ireland border area, I can tell the hon. Lady that the Government do recognise the sensitivities. The codes now provide greater clarity on the preparatory powers available to officers, and explicitly address concerns raised by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in his report, which I think dates back to 2022. The changes that we have made ensure that the powers will be used only for national security purposes.

It is also worth making the point that, on public order policing, the Government have accepted the independent reviewer’s recommendation that schedule 7 should not be used to manage protest activity. I can reassure the hon. Lady that we work very closely with the independent reviewer and we look very closely that the recommendations that he has made.

I now turn to the points that were very reasonably made by the Liberal Democrat spokesman. I understand the concerns that he and his colleagues, including the leader of his party, have raised on matters of proscription. His Front Bench spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, has had a number of briefs on Privy Council terms on these matters, but should the hon. Gentleman or the hon. Lady require further information from this Government, we stand ready to provide it.

The hon. Gentleman knows the Government’s position with regard to the proscription of Palestine Action. The Government believe that the decision to proscribe was necessary and proportionate, and we have sought to explain that as well as we are able to, given some of the limitations that are imposed upon us—not least ongoing police investigations and ongoing court proceedings. However, I do recognise the concerns that the hon. Member and others have raised about the process of proscription, and I can say to him, as I have said to the House previously, that these are matters that the previous Home Secretary, the current Home Secretary and I take incredibly seriously. We were satisfied, based on the advice that we received, that the decision that was taken was both proportionate and necessary. I understand that he will not agree with that, but I hope that he understands the reasons why we took the decision.

Let me say a word before seeking to conclude, because I am grateful for the attention of Committee members but I do not intend to detain them further. I again offer thanks to Opposition Members for their contributions, and I finish by emphasising that public safety and national security are priorities of the utmost importance for this Government. In discharging those critical responsibilities we are fiercely committed to transparency, accountability and the rule of law, and it is in that spirit that we brought forward these draft regulations, which I commend to the Committee once more.

Question put and agreed to.