English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (First sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[David Simmonds]

Q One of the issues that we aired in the debate when this subject first emerged on the Floor of the House was that at the Government’s chosen footprint of 500,000 minimum population, the Bill implies the abolition of 90% of the local elected representatives in each of those areas. I know the cross-party concerns about the risk of losing that community voice. With your experience at community, district and borough level, it would be helpful for you to spell out what you think is the impact of that potential democratic deficit, especially on contested issues such as planning.

Sam Chapman-Allen: You will appreciate how busy your inboxes and mailsacks are, with the casework that you receive daily from your residents. When you begin to remove councillors, that casework does not disappear; it just becomes a bigger challenge for a single councillor. The risk is as we begin to get bigger those mega-councils, and we begin to think about how to ensure that those councillors can represent their communities. Does it become a full-time job? Does it then preclude other people from being able to stand to become community champions?

The reason why local government and district councils work successfully, in the same way as London boroughs and Manchester metropolitan councils, is because they are hyper-local. There are circa 200,000 to 350,000 residents per council, and they have local councillors representing a couple of thousand people. As we move forward with mega-councils, the risk is that a single councillor will be representing some tens of thousands. The independent think-tank Localis has done some analysis of the current proposal for a 500,000 threshold. We could see 90% of councillors across shire areas removed overnight. That would be a democratic deficit and an absolute catastrophe.

If we look back through the pandemic, as Justin has alluded to, community councillors were out every single day, just as you were as MPs, supporting the most vulnerable, making sure that communities could bounce back and, more importantly, giving support to local businesses to make sure that they could bounce back as well and grow from strength to strength. My concern is that if we begin to move ourselves to a distant model, there will be a democratic deficit and unaccountability, and the ability of a councillor to know that every resident, street, business and community leader will be lost.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

Q My first question is for Councillor Chapman-Allen. First, I should put on the record that the 500,000 number that has been cited is not fixed. The Government will prioritise making sure that there are clear links and that we have that democratic basis, so that communities feel connected to their local institutions. That is a priority for us and we will proceed on that basis.

Strategic authorities are made up of constituent local authorities, and at their best, where they work, it is based on partnership. Can Councillor Chapman-Allen give the Committee examples from among his membership, where strategic authorities already operate, of that collaboration among the constituent authorities, which will always have a key role, working in tandem with the mayor to deliver for communities?

I also have a question for Mr Griggs. The role of neighbourhoods and the connection between communities and the places where elected representatives serve is fundamental to what we are trying to do with the Bill. The part of the legislation on neighbourhood governance is looking to bolster and strengthen that. What are your views on how that will create new opportunities not only for community partnership working but, critically, for community voice and power?

Sam Chapman-Allen: Thank you for your question. To start, I think the 500,000 figure as the initial threshold has caused confusion. I think that many of the submissions that will be received in the devolution priority areas next week and then in the rest of the country in November will show that many councils are submitting models of 500,000-plus. Let us put that into context: they will be some of the biggest councils in the western developed world. I think that will ensure there is a democratic deficit.

In relation to strategic authorities and constituent members, the only model where all district councils, or all principal councils, are members are in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough. If you look at what is taking place there, you will see it is a really successful model. Yes, there is a little bit of grit every now and then, but that is why scrutiny, governance and accountability are so important. We will not always agree on everything.

If we look at a model in which all principal councils are members—I cite Greater Manchester, with Andy Burnham and his 10 councils within that area—they all share responsibility together. All of them within that locality are the responsible authorities for housing and for planning, and they are working together to drive the agenda forward around the real challenges that localities face. They have had some real successes, and I do not think anybody should take that away from them. I know that you have Lord Houchen giving evidence later; he will give exactly the same example of where you have those principal councils able to pull the levers to get stuff done.

Justin Griggs: First of all—

[The Chair]

Sorry to interrupt, Mr Griggs, but you are quite quietly spoken. Could you please speak up?

Justin Griggs: Yes, Dame Siobhain, I will definitely speak up a bit.

First, congratulations Minister on your appointment; we look forward to working closely with you. I will try to channel my remarks, and also pick up on what Mr Simmonds said about the democratic deficit and the distance that there will now be because of the reorganisation in respect of new unitary strategic authorities and in neighbourhoods.

It is undoubtedly the case that if we did not have a structure called parish and town councils across 92% of England, bringing together 100,000 people to improve their areas—parish councillors put 14.5 million hours into serving their communities—we would have to set one up. It is right in the White Paper and in parts of the Bill to seek to lean into that, because decisions will be taken much further away from places. That is why it is our view, and it has certainly been the case in previous rounds of reorganisation, that it is right for the role of parish and town councils to be strengthened and empowered and to be recognised and respected partners to our colleagues in the principal authorities and in the strategic authorities.

On Sam’s point, we wholeheartedly agree with the importance of collaboration. Where the Bill could go further—we would be keen to work closely with the Government on this—is around mechanisms for more partnership at the mayoral level, linking in much more closely with communities and neighbourhoods through their parish and town councils to provide a democratic voice. They work very closely around agendas for infrastructure, housing and skills in their areas, because they will be the places that are most affected. They are local leaders with skin in the game and they know their places best, so they will be well placed to work with them.

This is where a number of mechanisms can come in that are well tried and tested across other parts of the country that have reorganised, such as the development of charters and protocols to set out how to better work closely together, and parish liaison officers working closely with council associations and local councils across a sensible authority footprint. They are the people who know parish councils best and can work as a trusted partner with the principal authorities to build their capacity and capability.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

Q I have a quick follow-up question, particularly to Councillor Hicks: would it be fair to say that the policy on the local government reorganisation is a soft target, certainly, but it was portrayed as a hard target to local authority leaders at the time?

Matthew Hicks: We certainly felt in the beginning that Suffolk, with a population of 750,000, was right in the middle of the range and would be an ideal candidate for one unitary.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have a question for Councillors Bentley and Hicks first on unitarisation, and then, if I may, a question to Councillor Craig on strategic authorities. Obviously you are going through the process of working hard with colleagues to put together a proposal for unitarisation. I am really interested in your perspectives and insights about how you—because we are putting it in the hands of local areas to do the heavy lifting—and we get that right. Critically, we are not doing this for fun; we are doing it because we fundamentally believe it will drive better services and better outcomes. I am interested in your perspectives, from your individual areas, about the sorts of impact that you think we can deliver if we get this right.

Kevin Bentley: Thank you, and welcome to your new role; I am sure we will be seeing a lot of each other the coming months, Minister.

In Essex, there are 15 councils. If you want to look at councils of any shape or size, come to Essex; we pretty much have them all, and a lot of them, as well. And while there are four different business cases coming from Essex—and you would expect that, as it is a huge county in terms of population and people have differing views—each has been done thoughtfully and carefully. The overriding message is that the 15 councils are made up of all political parties and none, and there is common cause. No one has fallen out. There is no argument. There is no row going on at all. We meet regularly in something we call the Essex leaders and chief execs meeting—I am talking about Essex here; I will talk about the LGA in just a second—and certainly our experience is of collaboration.

We may have different views from the Government for them to consider, but the understanding that we need to do things differently is really there. That goes for all political parties. We understand that the current system cannot carry on, because it will just run out of money if we are not careful. We are already seeing that.

The one thing to say is that everyone across the sector should be allowed to have their view and decide what is right for their area. When I started as a leader, the one question that I continually asked myself, and still do today, is, “What does this mean for the public and does it improve their lives?” Unless you can answer that question affirmatively, you should stop. So far, for me the answer has been yes—yes, we can do it better than we currently do it—and I think colleagues are in the same position.

It is also important that our colleagues in local government across the country consult not only with each other but with the public to ask whether we can do this better. If they believe we cannot, okay, but I think they will find that we can. The most important thing is to not lose sight of why we are doing it. It is for the public and the people of this country, not for politicians and councils.

Matthew Hicks: I would echo that. For us, it is about building on the experience of others who have been through this. We have been out to places such as Cumbria to ask for advice on what they learned and what works well. We have learned how others delivered on business cases or struggled to deliver on some of the items they included.

Ultimately, for us, this is about a new and more positive relationship between local government and our residents and businesses; it is about doing things differently. With the two cases in Suffolk, ultimately, everyone has the interests of our residents at heart. The big issue is how you analyse the data that people are using, and the forecasting. That is where we are seeing the major variants, but the delivery and what we want to deliver are not too different.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q Councillor Craig, obviously Greater Manchester has been at the forefront of devolution and the development of mayoral strategic authorities; I had the pleasure of being there at the outset a decade and a half ago. I am interested in your take on the impact the difference and it has made on your communities and, critically, on the collaboration between constituent authorities and the mayor and the strategic authority. During the last panel, the concern was about the power, onus and importance of constituent authorities. I am interested in how it has worked in practice and what we can learn from that.

Bev Craig: That is an important question. The difference for Greater Manchester was that we asked for devolution. That started the journey across the north of England initially, but it went out across the whole country. It has come off the back of a generation of co-operation in Greater Manchester, so it was built into a system. When the Greater Manchester authority was disestablished in the 1980s, my predecessors carried on with the meetings and kept that model alive.

I will come on to accountability, but what helps is that people do not identify with local authority boundaries. We represent people who, in their normal lives, say that they are from a place. A colleague might say that they are from Middleton and they are proud to be from Middleton, but when they are on holiday and people ask where they are from, they say “Near Manchester.” There is something about creating a place that people can identify with; that has been really strong. When you look at models where mayors have been successful, it is because they have tapped into a place identity. That links to my point that rural areas can still have place identity.

On accountability, in the Greater Manchester model of combined authorities, which moved to strategic authorities, we all have a role to play. Think about the role of the city. It is a major economic driver for not just Greater Manchester but the north of England as a whole. The whole region needs Manchester city centre to do well, in the same way that Manchester city centre needs the rest of Greater Manchester to do well if it is to have people with skills, good education, homes to live in and places to celebrate that they enjoy spending time in. That is why, through our model, we all hold portfolios. I am just as interested in getting Atom Valley in the north of the conurbation to be a success as I am in growing my life sciences sector in the city centre. There is something about getting people to take responsibility.

When we look at the competencies, that is why the LGA argues for clarity in the Bill that local authorities will still have a stake in some of the areas that we might think mayoral strategic authorities lead on. I say this with kindness, and I often say it to my Mayor’s face: he can give the parameters of the homes that we build and he can help fund them, and I will put on his logo and picture if we need to, but fundamentally it is Manchester city council that is out there building council homes. That is why we built more council and social homes last year than at any point over the last decade and a half. It works when we work together.

To clarify the role of commissioners in the context of the Bill, where they have been useful in Greater Manchester has been in an advisory capacity. We have been able to draw in people like Dame Sarah Storey as an active travel commissioner. She does not need to be a deputy mayor or take away my authority as a leader of a place, but she brings something that is additional. We must not lose sight of the fact that devolution models work with systems and Bills in place to deliver them, but actually it is about collaboration. There will need to be investment in the time that leaders of a place spend together if you are to get that relationship with the mayor to work.

Kevin Bentley: The identity question was raised before and it is important that we say political boundaries might change but communities do not. Identity of communities will always remain strong, whether you are in a district or county council. I represent 1.5 million people. That could be a disparate place. If you want to say, “Which is the most important to your leader?” they are all important, because they all have their own identities.

[Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)]

Q A quick question to Councillor Hicks. In your role as chair of the County Council Network, have you had any discussions with or representations from Konsel Kernow, Cornwall Council? If you have, what is the nature of those discussions in relation to mayoral combined authorities?

Matthew Hicks: I have only been in post a week, so I cannot give you an answer as to whether those discussions have taken place in the past. Certainly I know we have looked at the Cornwall business case and Cornwall has always been well represented and a strong voice at the CCN, putting its case very strongly, and I am sure that will continue in the future. However, I cannot answer that question today.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

Q This question is to both witnesses. There are a number of different elements in the Bill on which you have relevant expertise, but can you give the Committee your view on the impact of the envisaged reorganisation on the planning system? What impact will the measures in the Bill about upward-only rent reviews have?

Ion Fletcher: Good morning, everyone. My name is Ion Fletcher. I am the director of finance policy at the British Property Federation. Our members own, develop and invest in both commercial and residential property across the UK.

In high-level terms, our members have had a good experience with devolution so far. Having combined authorities with responsibility for planning, transport and place making, and strong convening powers, means that our members are able to invest with confidence, knowing the strategic aims for that area. We hope to see that replicated with strategic authorities. We can get into more detail—Cat is better placed to comment on the reorganisation and the impact on planning.

We feel that the way that upward-only rent reviews were introduced into legislation without any meaningful consultation is not good policymaking. We feel that it will not do much to help the high street and it could have a negative impact on new investment and development.

Catriona Riddell: Hello, I am Catriona Riddell, a strategic planning specialist. There are two components to this. First, it is about the fact that fewer than 30% of local plans are up to date. That is partly because all the decisions and all the financial, technical and political risk sit with individual local planning authorities. It is right that there is a separation of decision making in the way that we had before 2010 for 40 years.

If that decision making is now through the new strategic authorities, that is probably the right place for it in terms of the new spatial development strategy, which I know sits with the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. However, there is no point in strategic authorities having the responsibility to prepare those strategies if they do not also have some responsibility to deliver them. The range of delivery mechanisms set out in the Bill will help that.

For example, in the last few weeks, the Mayor of the North East combined authority announced a massive housing development in Newcastle on a site that has been derelict and unviable for many years. She has used her convening and financial powers to bring together Homes England, local authorities and others to bring forward development on that site. On the delivery side, the powers and funding that the mayors will have to make sure that spatial development strategies and local plans are implemented will be really important

In terms of local government restructuring, it is fair to say, as everybody has already this morning, that resources are thin on the ground. They are getting thinner the longer this goes on. People want a resolution. They want to move to the new local government structure as soon as possible to make sure that the resources within the local government family remain.

But, again, before 2010, for 40 years planning resources were done in two ways. The strategic level is where all the specialist skills sat, and then the planners and others were within the local authorities. They worked as two parts of the same team. We do not have the specialist skills in local authorities anymore; they have to pay to bring that back. A lot of specialist skills are rare anyway, so they are difficult to get. Having some teams and general support at the strategic scale will be invaluable to local authorities going forward.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have a question for Mr Fletcher and then a question for both witnesses. You have expressed some reservations and concerns about the upward rent review. Is it fair to say that the position among your members is not unanimous? Mark Allan of Landsec, who I think was the previous president of the organisation, has said that he thinks the changes are favourable, and that the status quo is complex and suboptimal. It would be good to clarify that there is not a single position that thinks this is averse.

Northern Ireland went through a very similar reform about a decade and a half ago. I am interested in your assessment, because most people would look at that property market and think it works well. There was a transition, and it has ended up in a position that, most people would argue, is not just benign and effective but consistent with what we see in other countries. I am interested in your views, and then I will have a question for both of you.

Ion Fletcher: I think that Mark would also say that the way it was announced was not great; it should have been done with prior consultation. One of our main concerns is about how one of our members was recently in Malaysia and Singapore, and his investors were asking him questions about it: “Where did it come from? Why was there no consultation?” It has been noticed overseas, and by people who are deploying capital into our towns and cities. It was not something that was trailed, either in the Labour manifesto or in any of the discussions about devolution. In fact, it is a bit odd to find commercial leasing provisions in a Bill that is mainly about local government reorganisation and strategic authority powers.

There is also the focus on the high street. Upward-only rent reviews are not what is keeping shops empty at the moment. That is more to do with business rates and a lack of demand for space. Most high street shops are on leases of five years or less, so upward-only rent reviews are not going to be an issue; they do not have those clauses in them.

The real value of upward-only rent reviews to investors and developers is that they provide predictability of income. If you are thinking about undertaking a new development project or refurbishing an existing commercial building, having the confidence about the level of income that you are going to get gives you much more security, and it de-risks the project. It makes it more likely to happen. At the moment, there is a shortage of development going on—there is a bit of a development viability crisis across both residential and commercial property—so adding more uncertainty in the form of unexpected policy changes does not help.

In relation to your point about international comparators, yes, Ireland went through this, as did Australia about 20 years ago. There is a transition period. The industry can and would find ways to adapt, but the point is: what problem is it really trying to solve? Is the disruption that it is going to cause in the meantime—the transitional costs, for example—worth the candle?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q But if I may, Mr Fletcher, do you recognise that the UK is an outlier? What we are doing is moving to a system that is consistent with other major economies and works well. Commercial investors operate in those systems with no issues.

Ion Fletcher: England and Wales is an international outlier in that; it is also an international outlier in the strength of the rights that it gives to occupiers to renew their leases. Generally speaking, where countries offer occupiers the automatic and statutory right to renew their commercial leases, it tends to be restricted to particular sectors. That is not the case in England and Wales. You have to look at it in the round.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q We think that strategic planning and the role of strategic authorities within that are quite important—in the context of how we want to “build, baby, build”, to quote my boss, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. I am interested in your take on how, if we get this right, it will have an impact on the Bill, and critically, where you think we might need to go further to make sure that we are delivering the buildings and the growth that we need?

Catriona Riddell: What is set out in the Bill is going to help to develop things more quickly. We have just talked about viability; that is such a massive factor in everything that we do at the moment. In relation to strategic planning and spatial development strategy, I think the Minister for Housing and Planning, Matthew Pennycook, has referred to it as a spatial investment framework. If you look at it as that, and not as a big local plan, and if it does that role, that is going to set the precedent. It is going to say: “This is where we want to invest.”

They are also long-term plans; they are 10, 20 or 30-year frameworks. Again, that is to start building investor confidence in these areas. What is needed, in terms of building investor confidence, is leadership and that is where the strategic authorities can help. Some of the planning mechanisms in the Bill are really important, but actually, it is more about the wider powers, such as the convening powers and the duty to talk to your neighbouring mayor—the sum of the parts has to add up to a national picture. We do not have a national spatial framework in this country, so the sum of the SDSs has to add up to that national picture. I think the softer powers in the Bill that mayors and strategic authorities will have to bring together stakeholders will be really important.

I would say the measure needs to go further. My understanding of the convening powers is that they are largely about bringing local authorities and the public sector together, but one of the biggest challenges we have is around the infrastructure side of things—with utility companies, such as water companies and electricity companies, that engage at the very end of the process. We need to use these mechanisms—the convening powers—to bring them into the plan-making bit about the spatial development strategy from the start, so that there are no surprises at the end and nobody says, “We don’t have enough water or electricity to plug into these new homes that we have already permitted,” because that is what is happening all over the place. This is about getting the system working up front, much further upstream, so that the decisions on planning applications are much easier further down. The strategic authorities have a huge role to play in that.

The only other, minor change I would mention is on national parks. I think that once we have gone through local government restructuring, all local planning authorities will effectively be a constituent member of a strategic authority. National parks will continue to be local planning authorities. They have plan-making powers and development management powers. At the end of this, they will be the only planning authorities that will not actually be part of the strategic authority, so I guess we need a shout-out to national parks and some thinking about what their role should be in this.

[Mike Reader (Northampton South) (Lab)]

Q Can I pick up on upward-only rent reviews? I recognise the points you made about consultation. The intention is primarily to focus on high streets. Do you think, with the way the legislation is written currently, it is focused on that narrow area, or is it broader? Could we see unintended consequences in things like—this is important to my constituency—logistics and advanced manufacturing?

Ion Fletcher: That is a really good question. Yes, as currently drafted, the Bill applies to all commercial tenancies, regardless of whether they are on the high street or in an industrial park, a data centre or a laboratory.

Upward-only rent reviews have definitely been highlighted as an issue among high street small businesses and in the hospitality sector, and I have a lot of sympathy for businesses that have been on high streets and going through a lot of change and turbulence over the last decade or so. At the same time, they have not really been raised as an issue by occupiers in logistics parks or in office buildings. I guess the main reason is that property costs are a far smaller proportion of their total cost base than for retailers and hospitality businesses.

Larger businesses also tend to be well advised and are aware of the trade-offs that come with upward-only rent reviews. They can allow property owners to give a longer rent-free period, for example, or a bigger contribution to fit-out costs. There is definitely merit in thinking about how the Bill might be more closely targeted at those areas where there is perceived to be more of an issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Vikki Slade]

Q Welcome to the Committee. Communities will be able to nominate assets of community value that are of economic value. Nick, that is particularly relevant for the community businesses that you support. Can you say a little about how communities could use the new power, and whether there are resources that need to come with that power?

Nick Plumb: At Power to Change, we think that the Bill’s provisions on community right to buy are a positive step forward. Power to Change has been calling for this for several years. To illustrate why the right is so needed, the key piece of data on the current regime on assets of community value and the community right to bid is that of every 1,000 assets that are listed as assets of community value, only 15 end up in community hands. The expansion of the definition of assets of community value to include economic as well as social benefit is a positive step, as is the introduction of a community right to buy as opposed to a community right to bid.

Some of the questions lie in the implementation. We think that there are potential challenges with this new right if you are asking councils to maintain a broader list of assets of community value and trying to get the new right to live up to the expectations that communities are rightly bringing forward. One thing that Power to Change has been calling for since the end of the community ownership fund is continued community ownership funding to support groups, particularly at the early stage at which groups might have a great idea for an asset but are not quite sure how to take it forward. A combination of revenue and capital funding is really important.

One of the lessons of the community ownership fund is that communities have a real ability to raise funds themselves. One of the great stories of the fund was that Government money leveraged lots of other investment, whether that was through private loans or by community share raising, where groups go out to the community to raise money from local members. Any future funding model for community ownership to sit alongside the community right to buy could be quite mixed. It could involve grant, loan and, importantly, revenue funding support and training. I know that there is mention of that in the Bill, and I am pleased to see that.

There is one final point to add, on the economic contribution of community-owned assets. Power to Change recently did some work with the 11,000 community businesses across England and found that they contribute roughly £1.5 billion in direct gross value added to the economy, which is equivalent to the solar sector, so they are important economic actors. Importantly, the economic contribution of community-owned assets sticks locally: we found that roughly 56p in every £1 circulates in the local economy, due to local supply chains, compared with roughly 40p for large private businesses. With the agenda around local growth, I see a successfully implemented community right to buy as a key driver of local growth outcomes.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q Thank you for setting out how we are building on the community right to bid and the additional powers that are baked in to the legislation that will generally give communities the power to take over assets. One of the things that we have done a huge amount of work on over the past decade and a bit is building the capacity of our community organisations to be in the position to do this. I am interested in your take on the relationship with the neighbourhood governance powers in the Bill and the extent to which you think that this is an opportunity to build the capacity of some of our community organisations both to take over ownership but, critically, to have voice and power to change their places.

Nick Plumb: I want to make a couple of points. It was a really interesting conversation this morning on neighbourhood governance from colleagues from parish councils and local government. Power to Change is a member of the We’re Right Here campaign, which has been campaigning for community power legislation such as some of the measures in this Bill. We are keen that the neighbourhood governance measures that are introduced through the Bill allow for local variation and for a whole range of different organisations that exist at a neighbourhood level to be a part of that neighbourhood governance arrangement. We think that one of the risks with the area committee model is that it is a prescriptive top-down model that says, “This is the way to do things,” rather than saying, “What exists already in a neighbourhood, and how do we build on that?”

One of the ideas that Power to Change has been working on and testing in place is a community covenant. We have been testing that so far in Market Drayton in Shropshire through a partnership of 20 local organisations—everyone from the local authority to community organisations to representatives from town and parish councils—on the idea of a family and neighbourhood hub. So far, the results from that work are really positive. There was some initial scepticism about a new way of working, but one of the council officers has fed back that the new approach is a real gift that has helped them to move much further and faster with their communities than they would have done if they were just doing things from the council down.

One of the calls from us through this legislation is to try not to be too prescriptive with neighbourhood governance but lean into a model that puts people on an equal footing and gives people an equal seat at the table. I will not spend too long on this, but my other point is that it is great that we have a piece of legislation with “community empowerment” in its title, and I think that community right to buy and neighbourhood governance, if done right, go some way. Power to Change and the We’re Right Here campaign would like to see community right to buy as one of several community rights. We have been calling for a community right to shape public services, which would entail involving the people who receive services from the state in the design, delivery and development of public services. That would build on provisions in the Localism Act, such as the right to challenge, and it would make that a much more expansive right.

We would also like to see a community right to control investment, which would involve certain bits of investment from central Government sitting at that neighbourhood level. Both of those rights really lean into some of the Government’s existing agenda. The plan for neighbourhoods is a real example of that. There are some questions still to be answered on what that looks like, but it could involve trusting neighbourhoods to take hold of money and think, “How do we improve our lot together?”

The right to shape public services is very in line with some of the test, learn and grow work that is happening in the Cabinet Office. We would see the community empowerment element of the Bill really living up to its name if it was the beginning of a set of community rights rather than the community right to buy tick and done.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q Mr Whittaker, I want to pick up on the sporting asset of community value measures within the Bill. Obviously, sporting community assets are of huge value to our local communities, and I am interested in your view on whether the measures create a pathway to far greater community control and ownership of these assets.

Robbie Whittaker: Thank you, Minister. We are certainly very encouraged by the proposal to create a new designation of a sporting asset of community value. It builds on what we have traditionally had before. It is something that we have lobbied for because we think—as we would—that sporting institutions have a valuable role to play in local communities, particularly in promoting empowerment of the kind that Nick was talking about.

One of the interesting benefits of this proposal is that in the last year, as you will all know, we have created an independent regulator for football, which is going to bring profound change for a relatively small number of clubs—only 116 clubs at the very top of the English pyramid. The proposal in the Bill potentially attracts a far larger cohort of clubs further down the pyramid, which are not necessarily as commercially attractive to buyers from outside the country. Therefore, the right to buy is actually a realistic aspiration that some of those communities can have.

We are increasingly seeing valuations of football clubs at the top end of the pyramid that take them beyond the reach of local community or fan groups. But that is not the case lower down. The extent to which you can create an opportunity here for local communities and people who follow relatively small clubs to feel that it is a pathway that they can go down and sustain is very welcome.

I echo what Nick said about community ownership funding, or some equivalent thereof; the existence of that fund played a large part in the creation of the phoenix club at Bury. You may remember that Bury AFC failed spectacularly in 2019, and has caused a lot of angst within the football community ever since. The existence of that fund was quite crucial to enabling a new club to emerge in Bury that was able to play at the ground that had been used for around about a century.

[The Chair]

Your answer, Mr Whittaker, made me consider whether I should declare that I am an AFC Wimbledon season ticket holder and a member of the Dons Trust.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Second sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Pithy answers, please.

Tracy Brabin: The mayoral precept is democratically held by the mayor for the public. It would be for transport projects; it would be allocated to something specific. For example, the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, uses it for young people’s travel. The Bill widens the opportunity to use the precept, but none of the public would be happy if you were paying off debts. It is fundamentally for betterment of and investment in communities, in the way that the police and crime commissioner precept is held to deliver better outcomes, whether that is more police community support officers on the street or initiatives around violence against women and girls. It is democratically held by the mayor. We have not introduced it as yet in West Yorkshire, but others have.

Donna Jones: I will be very brief because I am conscious that there are lots of Members on the Committee. The referendum limit is the prohibitor. Essentially, a mayor, like a police and crime commissioner and a council, can precept to the level that they want, but you have to have a referendum if you are going over that limit. Although the Government are right to want some checks and balances, so that you do not get areas that are really out of kilter with others, a referendum is prohibitive: it becomes very political, and it is very costly to do. Therefore, I think there should be a simpler mechanism if a mayor wants to precept above the Secretary of State’s agreed level. Perhaps that could be with written consent from the Secretary of State, as opposed to a referendum.

Ben Houchen: I am not a fan of mayoral precepts generally. I have not raised one, and have promised ever since I was elected not to raise one. Some transparency could be brought to the legislation. You have mayoral precepts, you have transport levies, and there is lobbying from a number of mayors around tourism taxes and so on. From a constituent point of view, forgetting the rights and wrongs of it, all that could be consolidated into a single precept, rather than having a separate transport levy, which can be quite opaque, particularly where you have new combined authorities. Some of those taxations are merged into combined authorities, and who has actually raised the levy can be quite lost. It ultimately all comes into the combined authority once it is established, but the Committee could take away the question of how that could be consolidated to streamline the precept. From the public’s point of view, the mayor has the ability to raise a mayoral precept; there is no reason to have a transport levy as well. For transparency’s sake, that should be clarified as a single levy, if you are going to have one.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

Q Let me start by thanking you for the support, encouragement and enthusiasm for what we are trying to do through the Bill. You are completely right that this is our baseline—our floor—and our ambition as a Government is to build on it. In that spirit, I want to pick up on the right to request that we are introducing through the Bill. I am interested in your views on how we can ensure that the right is as effective as possible in taking us on the journey of empowering our mayors to deliver for their communities.

Tracy Brabin: I will be pithy—and congratulations on your role, by the way; I know that we have a champion by our side. What is important is the way that we can collectively come to a consensus on the Mayoral Council and say, “The mayors are agreed that this is the next step,” and then the Government have to explain why we cannot have it. There is also an opportunity for individual mayors to have something of value that relates to them and their region specifically. The key to that, Minister, is surely for it to be as straightforward and efficient as possible, rather than hoops and processes.

As mayors, one of the things that we are discussing at the moment is taxi licensing. Just to give you the numbers, 49% of private hires operating in Greater Manchester are licensed by authorities outside of the 10 local authorities. We know, from Baroness Casey’s work about violence against women and girls, how that is a weakness in the system when it comes to the safety of young women. As mayors, we are looking to the council to help us to understand how we can do that more efficiently, but that may be something that affects only some urban metro mayors and not others. It is about how we can collectively ask, which is a really fast-track process, but then there will be individual conversations.

Donna Jones: I really welcome the right to request. Following on from what Tracy just said about mayors and their unique geographical areas, in my patch, I—or whoever is successful next year—will have the largest island, aside from Ireland itself, of course, that we represent in part of England: the Isle of Wight. That piece of water creates a lot of problems for the Isle of Wight in terms of the supply chain and the skills market; things are a lot more expensive on the Isle of Wight.

One of the things that I am really pleased about is that the Government are looking, through the Bill to establish Great British Railways, which is coming forward, to give mayors greater powers around the planning, performance, improvement and project management of rail networks in their areas. I argue that that should be extended to ferries, particularly for my area. The Isle of Wight has three main transporters: Wightlink and Red Funnel are the two car and foot passenger ferries, and Hovertravel is a hovercraft that runs until 6.30 pm every day. For a lot of people who live on the island, it is cost prohibitive to travel off it and back. If it is not included in Committee or picked up by you, Minister, I will be requesting the right to have a regulator power over the ferry companies that operate across the Solent, because of course they need Crown permission to operate across that piece of water.

Following on from Tracy’s point about the uniqueness of certain geographical areas, I think that there are other good things, such as lane rental approval. I love the idea of that. Utility companies are given permission by the highway authority to dig up the road, and it goes on and on. That has an effect on transport, pollution and people’s travel to work time, and it has a knock-on effect on economic growth in the area, putting people off travelling to or from work or taking up jobs. We have to look at that. Giving mayors the ability to effectively tax or fine companies every day they go over the set period of two weeks, or however long it would be, is absolutely key. I could go on—there are some brilliant things in here—but I welcome what you are trying to achieve.

Ben Houchen: The right to request is an interesting one. There is a bit of an academic argument about the Government wanting to standardise mayoral powers so they are same across the board, but then the right to request, if done correctly, would allow for differentiation. There is an issue about whether we are looking for a standard model or whether we want more of a patchwork. That is for members of the Committee to think about, but it is important: at the nth degree, if you have differentiation through the right to request, you could have areas with hugely different powers. That is going to create political problems, with people feeling like one area has more control than another.

Administration from a central Government point of view is also difficult. Irrespective of devolution, there is always a clawback into central Government. That is probably right, rather than giving us carte blanche over everything, but it goes back to the strategic question about what you want to happen. The ultimate right to request—this is where you are going to have proper devolution that allows for earned autonomy over time—is the relationship between combined authorities, the Department and the Treasury. The key question that needs to be answered is how you get the combined authority to have an accountable officer within the organisation. Where I think combined authorities should get to is being treated as geographical Departments. We should be treated in the same way as a Department, bidding into Budgets and spending reviews, with our full, eclectic mix—from housing to transport and everything in between—and we should be accountabledirectly to the Treasury.

The only thing holding that up is the internal civil service mechanism of having an accountable officer outside Whitehall. That sounds flippant, but it is a difficult thing for the civil service to deal with; once you deal with that, it negates the need for a right to request or anything else, because over the years organisations will mature with that direct relationship with the Treasury.

It also gets into some key niggles that I know other mayors care about: “Why do you therefore need organisations like Homes England?”. If you get into the right to request, you do not need them. At the minute we are already doing half of what Homes England does. The Government have again gone into this halfway house of strategic partnerships, instead of taking the bold leap they should have taken: where you have mayors, you do not need Homes England, so make them the financially accountable body and ensure there are ties back in to central Government for oversight and value for money. Something more strategic could be done, but for me it goes back to the point that the Government did not want to address the strategic question of where devolution is going over the next five or 10 years.

[Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)]

Q I have a question for the whole panel, but first I would like to come on to something Mayor Brabin just said. I was really pleased you raised the issue of taxi licensing. We have a border problem around my area of Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, where taxis register in certain councils because they have laxer standards. Do you think there is a case for adding something to this Bill to give mayoral authorities a role in that licensing process, or at least for making it one of the first things brought forward under the right to request?

Tracy Brabin: Thank you for that question; I know your mayor has raised that with me. The strategic overview is really helpful, because some councils might have different processes. Uniformity across mayoral strategic authorities can only be helpful. I would say that the majority of mayors feel that that is a solution to some of the problem, where we have seen cowboys from way outside people’s patches, not necessarily with the same expectations on their vehicles or safety and so on, and we do not know who they are. It is important to have that clarity for the safety of the public.

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[The Chair]

Can I just ask you to keep your answers fairly short? We have two very important questioners coming up. I call the Minister.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q Thank you, Ms Vaz. You have both campaigned to remove upward-only rent review clauses. Could you give us a sense of the negative impact that those clauses have had on your members, and, if we remove them, the impact that will have on both your members and the wider economy?

[The Chair]

Before you answer, can I ask you to direct your answers to the speaker or the Chair, rather than to each other?

Andrew Goodacre: Running a high street business, whether it be retail or whatever else, is expensive, and the costs are going up all the time. When you talk to those business owners, they will tell you that the three biggest chunks are labour, business rates and rent. If your rent is only ever going to go up because the lease stipulates it and there is no negotiation around that, irrespective of what the economic climate might be or what has happened in the local area to perhaps take footfall away to a different part of town, your business is left with ever-increasing costs and no power to change it. That just does not seem right.

If there is pain because of a change in the area, the landlord, the property owner, has to feel some of that as well. At the moment it is only ever faced by the commercial tenant who has a difficult decision to make: either they go with the higher rent in the hope that they can compensate for it or they leave the business. They should not be faced with that choice, in fairness. These are hardworking businesses. People have probably been running those businesses for many years. There needs to be a more sensible, mature conversation taking place between landlords and commercial tenants. I think it does happen; I think there are good examples of it. But if we leave it to best practice, if we leave it to the industry and good actors dominating, we will be waiting another 20 years and sat here moaning about upward-only rents, so we do need to remove it.

Allen Simpson: Two quick points on rent reviews. The first thing is that upward-only rent reviews also drive up business rates because of the link between rateable values and rents. So the Government’s intention to reduce business rates expenses for businesses relies on addressing upward-only rent reviews. They do bake in inflation in the way that you say. There is an A/B test here, which is that the pubs code, of course, banned them some years ago. That has increased the amount of time that the average pub tenant stays on site. It has not led, that I can see, to any other negative outcomes, so there is evidence that it does actually increase tenancy rates.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q To follow up on the point that you made around local growth, which is a big driver of everything that we are doing, what things should we think about in the context of local government and powers and resources in order to deal with the huge challenge that we have around reviving our high streets?

Andrew Goodacre: We touched on good examples, and we should look to learn from them. On local engagement, you need local leadership, but they need help sometimes. That help could be internally from the next level of authority up, or it could be from an external body. One body that I thought was beneficial to high street regeneration at a local authority level was the high streets taskforce that was set up as part of the Institute of Place Management for Manchester Metropolitan University. It has now ended as a body, although in name it carries on because stakeholders—we were one of those stakeholders—would meet on a quarterly basis to discuss opportunities, challenges, good news and bad news on high streets and high street regeneration. We would share those ideas and share them back with the high streets taskforce, and they would help that local decision making.

Quite often what you find is that people know what they want to do. They just do not quite always know how to do it. A think-tank independently managed and run could help them with that “how” and the implementation of their ideas. If you do not bring it back as it was, something similar would really help that local decision making, because sometimes the pride is there, the passion is there; they just do not always have the nous to make it work in the way they hoped for.

With regard to high streets, I see it from a retail point of view, but I recognise the fact that high streets are increasingly dominated by experiential elements—cultural, leisure, more hospitality driven—and I have no issue with that. It does mean that we need better change of use of some of the retail sites that become empty. I know planning is part of this whole issue, so speeding up the planning process is important.

Ideally, I would like to bring homes back into high streets where the possibility exists. There are some large, empty buildings. I live quite near Stratford-upon-Avon and I still go past a VHS store that closed in 2016. It is still empty. I find it remarkable that a landlord can let a big place like that stay empty for so long. We have not looked at the opportunity of what more we could do with that, or what we could do differently with that. If we can bring homes and people back into high streets as places where people want to live, preferably with affordable properties for younger people, I think you would start to create local economies that would drive some of those high streets as well.

Allen Simpson: The question is what level you devolve at. Clearly, we are all nimbys. Nimby is an irregular verb—you are a nimby; I am concerned about my local environment. There are circumstances in which we need to find ways of treating high streets like strategic infrastructure. There will be asymmetric benefits and costs if you live close to a high street or, as people used to, above shops—that is less common than it was—versus being in the surrounding community. Sometimes local politicians do need help. We have seen an approach to that in London that the Committee will have views on.

I am very much in favour of hospitality zones, which have specific licensing approaches, where there is some form of recognition that you get to a “yes” more quickly. There is a specific question around Andrew’s point about bringing people back into former high street or commercial areas, in the City of London or elsewhere, around agents of change. I am very in favour of placing a burden on developers to fit the development around hospitality, rather than buying a flat next door to a pub and then being annoyed that there is a beer garden, for which I have zero sympathy.

[David Simmonds]

Q At what level, or by what mechanism, do you think the views of local businesses, particularly smaller businesses, should be captured and used to influence the decision making of the new authorities that will come into being? I was very conscious listening to your descriptions that you very ably depicted some issues that those businesses might face. How do you make sure that the mayors, and the decision makers feeding into those mayors understand what the impact of those decisions will be, and take those views into account?

Andrew Goodacre: That is a good question. What works well at the moment is the business improvement district model. Where it falls down slightly again depends on the people involved. A good BID represents the voice of local businesses, which are paying through business rates, because the levy is on the business rate, as we know. What I saw in Enniskillen at that time was a BID that really listened to its stakeholders, shared ideas with them and took back the feedback. One of the things introduced there was an Enniskillen gift card that could be used in any shop in that area—ideal for the tourist market that it is trying to appeal to.

We should establish BIDs; the problem with them is that they can be very indifferent, in terms of their make-up and the quality of them. Again, the funding often becomes a point of contention because you are adding to business rates, which is already a massive point of contention for most business owners. In a way, I would like to see BIDs funded in different ways, through the devolution White Paper. Their performance would therefore be a bit more targeted. Part of their performance metrics should be the ability for them to show that they have engaged, understood and taken forward what local business people want, in my case, within their high street.

Allen Simpson: An observation: if you are looking to drive growth, by definition you are looking to bring in businesses that are not there or do not exist, so to some extent your problem is how you consult businesses that do not currently exist. To some degree, it is less about having consultation with specific businesses and more about having an approach that is pro the foundation of businesses in a given area. Clearly, there will be examples where licensing rules could be better consulted on so that existing businesses can expand, but I wonder whether it is less about consultation and more about taking a proactive approach to growth.

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[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Gareth Davies, Comptroller and Auditor General at the National Audit Office, and Bill Butler, chair of Public Sector Audit Appointments. For this panel, we have until 3.40 pm.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I am interested in you giving us an assessment of the current system and the current state of the local audit regime. What your views are on the key benefits of us getting that system working right?

Gareth Davies: I will start, and then Bill can come in with some facts and figures on the current state of play with the firm’s contracts. First, it is important to say that, before I did this job at the National Audit Office, I was an auditor in local government, so in the past I have had a foot in both camps. Audit in the public sector is a fundamental part of our democracy; in local government, it is a fundamental part of local democracy.

Ensuring effective local accountability through independently audited council accounts, governance and value for money arrangements is a fundamental part of a healthy, functioning, tax-paying society. There is no doubt that we have run into some very serious problems with that in recent years, such as big backlogs of unaudited accounts. When those backlogs start to be cleared, at first we are seeing disclaimed audit opinions, which are essentially the auditors giving no assurance on those accounts. That is an unprecedented and unacceptable position to find ourselves in for a significant amount of public money. People have a right to expect audited accounts as a bare minimum when they pay their council tax and business rates, so this is a big system failure that needs fixing as quickly and robustly as possible. That is my starting point.

The obvious question is: why has this happened? Unusually, we have a natural experiment in the UK on this. No other devolved country has the same problem as England, with a failure of local government accountability and audited accounts. Everybody has had a pandemic and changes in auditing standards and so on, but only one country has dismantled its audit machinery and expected it to function nonetheless. Those changes were not implemented in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, so we do not have to look far for the explanation. That is why I welcome the creation of the Local Audit Office in the Bill. It is the right measure to correct that problem. It is necessary, but it is not sufficient. We will want to explore what else will be necessary.

The reason it is necessary is that it brings back together the essential functions that make for a robust audit regime. That includes letting the contracts with the firms to do the work, specifying that work; holding the firms to account for delivery on time and to the right quality standard; supporting the firms with technical advice and help with tricky issues, many of which we are seeing across local government; and robustly speaking with local government about where problems need to be fixed.

It also includes working as a partner with local government to improve the quality of accounts, and make them less burdensome to local authorities and more useful to taxpayers and businesses. There is a big agenda beyond just the creation of the Local Audit Office—it is a necessary but not sufficient requirement.

Bill Butler: I should also declare an interest, although mine is slightly more historic than Gareth’s. I spent 35 years in local government audit before I escaped. As you can see, Chair, I have been dragged back. I hope I am not going to sound too much like an echo, but I agree with everything that Gareth said. The effective audit of public bodies, which are funded by compulsory taxation and not by voluntary shareholders, is fundamental to proper democracy, governance and the financial credibility of English local government.

The world looks down on the large number of disclaimed audit opinions. We should not underestimate what bankers in New York and the large accountancy firms are thinking. When they look at that, they cannot comprehend how we have ended up in this position. We therefore strongly welcome the commitment to reform, the changes in the Bill and the creation of the Local Audit Office.

We particularly like the fact that it will reestablish a co-ordinated local audit system, and bring together responsibility for audit appointments, the code of practice, audit quality and the performance of auditors, because local government audit is in a very bad position. The only option available that anybody could think of to tackle the increasing backlog of delayed accounts was to disclaim opinions. It is really important that we do not replace a backlog with disclaimed opinions. Currently, there are 273 bodies that have received disclaimed opinions—51% of the bodies in England and Wales that we are responsible for appointing to. That is up to ’23-’24. Of those, 236 are for two or more years, and 53—that is 11%—are for four or more years. In total, that means there are 716 sets of accounts in English local government for which there is no assurance from the auditors. Gareth did not mention this, but it also affects his opinion on the whole of Government accounts, which he has had to disclaim owing to the disclaimers in local government, which affect and knock on to the credibility of Government across the country.

We also think that there is a risk to the broader proposed local government reform because of the bad apple in the barrel. If you are constituting a new authority and you are incorporating an authority with a number of years of disclaimed opinions, sorting that out will get in the way of the effectiveness of those bodies at exactly the time when you want them to be focusing on their new responsibilities and opportunities. I will say the same thing as Gareth, but in a slightly different way: we cannot envisage a solution without the Local Audit Office, but it is not the solution. Bold action is required to cut through the Gordian knot that exists at present. The sector seems unlikely to resolve the underlying issues without, as Gareth has made clear, support both to those bodies preparing accounts and to those auditing the accounts.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q Thank you, Mr Davies and Mr Butler, for setting out the gravity of the situation, the urgency and need to reform, and how the Local Audit Office is an important step. You both candidly made the point that it is necessary, but not sufficient. I am interested in what key building blocks are needed in addition. Obviously, we need to deal with the backlog—that is a given—but, alongside creating this institution, what are the top three things that the Committee should have in mind in order to deal with the problem we have today?

Gareth Davies: The first would be skills and capacity. This sector has suffered from a loss of skilled expertise. Public audit is not interchangeable with company audit; it is a specialist field—you are auditing political institutions and reporting in the public interest. It is a different skillset, with some common areas with the rest of the auditing profession, and it attracts people who are interested in how public bodies become successful and how they achieve value for money, and so on. The pool of experts in that area has reduced sharply, so the system faces the challenge of building up that body of expertise and skills.

It is not just the auditors. In the past, the auditors did a lot of the training, and people then went on to careers in local government, the rest of the public sector and other sectors. It was a breeding ground for the finance function of local authorities. Individual local authorities cannot typically sustain large training programmes of accountants on their own, so having a regime that supports the development of that skillset is vital.

The other essential is getting hold of local government financial reporting and radically simplifying it, streamlining it in a way that can still be incorporated into the whole of Government accounts. That is always the caveat, and the reason for some of the complexity, but I do not believe that it is an impossible task. At the moment, the accounts are too easily dismissed as only of interest to the auditor because they are long, complex and quite difficult to follow in many places. There is no reason why we should put up with that. I know the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy and the wider profession have started work on what professionals think would represent a high-quality, meaningful financial statement that would clearly explain to taxpayers how we have used their resources.

There is a danger that everyone focuses only on the council budget and ignores the accounts. That is dangerous, because the balance sheet matters as well as annual expenditure.

Bill Butler: I can save quite a lot of time by saying that I agree with all of that. This may happen on a number of occasions, and we have not shared briefs. If you start with those who prepare the accounts, that needs to be revitalised. It is moribund, and people are looking at the scale of this task and finding it difficult. Some of this can be the support that Members and Ministers can bring to bear in terms of its importance, because—again, echoing Gareth—it is not considered to be interesting and it is too easily put aside, but that is not going to get any better. There is a real risk that it will get worse unless preparers are properly supported, and unless it is clear what revisions are possible to make the accounts simpler and deliverable.

There are issues around how we encourage colleagues who work in the audit firms. That is a broader issue, because they are bound by the technical standards imposed across the firms by their relationship with the Financial Reporting Council. However, at the moment, that seems occasionally to act as a block to overcoming that risk. We need to be honest about the fact that that risk assessment is there and about what we can do around it.

As Gareth said, we have been looking, with CIPFA, at reforming local government accounts for some considerable time. The clock has now ticked down, I think. One of the things I hope for is that the commitment shown to reform so far carries on across these broader areas, not of all of which are susceptible to legislation, but all of which would be, I hope, susceptible to encouragement.

Gareth Davies: I would like to add one other thing, because an important bit of the full picture is governance arrangements in local authorities. I know that the Bill includes provisions on audit committees, but it is important that local authorities have robust audit committee-type arrangements. I am not prescriptive about exactly what form they should take, but meaningful engagement with internal and external audit and a connection to the governance of the authority as a whole through its political leadership are essential to good governance. That means having somewhere where difficult questions can be asked and answers gained.

In quite a few of the disasters we have seen in local government finance in recent years, it is the governance arrangements that are primarily at fault in not picking up on excessive risk-taking and lack of understanding of the nature of the risk being taken on, and so on. It is another example of where a more robust audit system will not, on its own, solve everything—although it will definitely help, because it will bring those questions to the audit committee table—but the audit committee itself needs to be a functioning, robust and effective part of the governance of the authority.

Bill Butler: If I may say so, these are not things that can wait for the Local Audit Office, which has a massive task to perform anyway. If we wait, these problems become intractable, and the organisation’s chances of succeeding, if it has any at all, are very low,. They are issues that need to be addressed now, while we have the opportunity and—I hope everybody agrees—a pressing need.

[David Simmonds]

Q I would like to ask you some questions about the risks you outlined in broad terms, and how they play out in the context of the devolution and reorganisation envisaged in the Bill. For the record, I was involved in launching public sector audit appointments some years ago.

In a local authority, there is the collection fund, which essentially covers all the income that it is due to collect, then there are pension schemes, the dedicated schools grant, the housing revenue account and the parking revenue account, where there are slightly variable legal ringfences. All of those pose risks and many of them are impacted by elements of the devolution proposals affecting who will be responsible for decision making and what that revenue might underpin in terms of borrowing or day-to-day expenditure. Will you give us a sense, from your experience, of what the risks are, what the potential opportunities are and where changes are needed to, for example, the ringfences, and your views on the inclusion of the dedicated schools grant in the annual, legal council tax-fixing process, which might help or hinder the proper management of some of those financial risks.

Gareth Davies: Do you want to go first, Bill?

Bill Butler: Yes, then you can agree with me.

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[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Mark Stocks, head of public sector assurance at Grant Thornton UK. For this panel we have until 4 pm, unless we are interrupted by a vote—I am sorry about that, Mr Stocks.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q In the last panel, we got a sense of some of the challenges in the local government audit system. Clearly, multiple organisations currently oversee and regulate the audit sector. I am interested in your views on the impact that has had on the system more broadly. Aligned to that, the Government are introducing a set of local government audit reforms through the Bill. How do you see that impacting the private sector audit landscape?

Mark Stocks: I have done this for a rather long time. I was an auditor with District Audit back in the day, then with the Audit Commission, and I am now with Grant Thornton. I have seen quite a lot of changes. The division of the Audit Commission duties has probably been the most impactful change, because it has created quite a confused landscape in terms of what the priorities are. The National Audit Office maintains responsibility for the code, which sets out the basis of our work, but our primary regulator has been the Financial Reporting Council, whose focus tends to be on the accounts. Public Sector Audit Appointments sets out the fees, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales decides whether we can act as a key account partner. That is quite difficult to cope with.

Throughout my whole history as an local auditor, the accounts have been important, but it has been equally important that I spend my time on value for money. I have to look at the financial sustainability of authorities, as well as their governance and performance. That has changed, to be candid, over the last 10 years. The code changed, so we spent less time on value for money. Then it changed again, so we spent more time on value for money. However, our primary focus in the last five years has been on the accounts, which has led to a confused environment in terms of how local auditors have acted.

In terms of what the Bill does, bringing in the Local Audit Office is crucial. Somebody needs to speak to the Government about the issues that auditors are seeing and what is actually happening out there, because some of the pressures on local government are quite immense. To be candid, I need somewhere to go and someone to speak to when I am concerned about what I am finding—someone who can say, “Let’s do this, or we’ll speak to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.” The changes in the Bill are crucial for a functioning local audit in the future.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q And in terms of the interaction with the private sector?

Mark Stocks: You only have the private sector. It provides all of local audit now. We are used to working with the PSAA, so I do not see any issue in working with the Local Audit Office. It will make it easier; we will have a single code and a single arbiter of what quality is for a local auditor. I think that will be easier for us, as the private sector auditors, than it is now. I would not want the Committee to go away thinking that there is no commitment to this from the private sector. It was a difficult procurement the last time round, but the PSAA did manage to appoint sufficient auditors and we remain committed—I certainly remain committed—to a successful local audit system.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have a final question, if I may, Chair. We heard very clearly from the last panel that the reforms that were put in place are necessary but not sufficient, and that we need to think about how we build on things such as skills and capacity. From the perspective of someone at the coalface, what are the things that we need to get right? What should we reflect on as we take through these reforms in the Bill?

Mark Stocks: It is still fragile. I thought Gareth and Bill were accurate in what they said. We need to have more capacity so that we are not reliant on just a few suppliers. For that, there has to be consistency in terms of message. We need to get to grips with local authority accounts. If I went and did a set of NHS accounts, they are perhaps 100 pages long. The average local government accounts are 200 to 250 pages long, so the work involved is immense. That is why it takes longer, so we have to get that right.

We need to start to deal with some of the risks in local government, to be candid. It is quite difficult to deal with the breadth of what local government does. If you add on top of that the financial issues that they face and the issues that are asked of them in terms of policy, that layers on quite a scope for auditors, which means that we have to bring in specialists to do some of the work. I do not think that will get any easier under the current landscape.

[David Simmonds]

Q The previous panel addressed some of the complexities of the local government finance landscape, with the different accounts and so on. I am interested in your perspective as someone from the audit sector that receives many of these contracts, first on the challenges involved in skilling up the sector with the necessary knowledge and training. I am also interested in your perspective on the standardisation question. I think we all understand that audit is sometimes more of an art than a science—sometimes the other way round. How do you end up with something where everybody understands what is expected of them, in the context of a high degree of transparency that often is not really there in the commercial sector? How do decisions to deviate from that standard impact on the wider perception of the state of that organisation?

Mark Stocks: Local government accounts are complex. These are highly complex sorts of businesses, if I can use that phrase, that deal with any number of services. What we see now are local finance teams who are stretched, to be candid. There has been a lack of investment in them over the years. Gareth talked about trainees going from the Audit Commission into local government, but that does not happen now. There is a bunch of people who are around 50, who may be disappearing in the short term, so we have to sort out the strength of local government finance teams. As I said, we also need to sort out the complexity of the accounts.

In terms of the standards, all local government accounts are under international financial reporting standards, and that will not change. That is a Treasury requirement. How that is interpreted and what is important in those accounts is open to judgment. The emphasis from the LAO on whether it is more important for us to audit income or to audit property will make a difference to what local auditors do. I would always argue that it is more important to audit income.

It is very difficult to standardise anything that we do, because local government is not standardised. I can take you from a district authority that spends £60 million, most of which is housing benefit, to an authority that spends £4 billion and has significant regeneration schemes and companies. The skillsets that you need and the ability to standardise is very difficult. You have to have the right skills to do the work.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Zoë Billingham, director of IPPR North, and we welcome back Professor John Denham, professorial research fellow in the department of politics and international relations—that is a long title—at the University of Southampton and director of the Centre for English Identity and Politics. We will have until 4.40 pm for this panel.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I want to talk a bit about the Bill, and I know you have publicly shown support for the direction of travel. I want to get your views on how important it is for us to be putting strategic authorities and our devolution framework on a statutory footing, in the way that we are for the first time, and what the impacts and implications are for the longevity and momentum that we are trying to create around devolution.

Professor Denham: Thank you very much, Minister. It is absolutely crucial that the Bill underpins a really robust legal framework for devolution if it is to last—it cannot be for one Parliament. I will talk today about work that I have developed with Sir David Lidington—so that was a Labour Minister and a Conservative Minister coming together to say, “You need to have a consensus that lasts; otherwise, the Government changes.”

This is where I would say we are at the moment: there are many good things in the Bill, but there are some real areas of weakness that could lead to it being undermined quite quickly. It depends on financial commitments to integrated settlements and long-term funding, which are not even mentioned in the Bill. The Bill creates no forum in which finance can be discussed between strategic authorities and central Government. One of the ways in which that could be mitigated, at least to some extent, is to put the mayoral council on a statutory basis. Mayor Brabin said earlier today, “Well, the mayoral council is where we talk about new powers for mayors.” The mayoral council is not in the Bill. If Ministers decided tomorrow that it was not going to meet any more, it would not. It has no terms of reference and no secretariat. The mayors have no legal right to put items on its agenda.

I would give that as one example of where things could be embedded much more deeply. Parliament would have to come back and say, “We are going to abolish it”, in order to stop that meeting happening. If that sounds very radical in our system, every other European nation with a devolved system of government has a layer between the devolved level and central Government. I would suggest that it will be of benefit to Ministers, too. It is probably possible to manage relationships with a relatively small number of powerful mayors, but when there is one for every part of the country, there will be a cacophony of people demanding special treatment for their areas. The ability to corral that into a proper process would be an advantage.

This has to be embedded. Prior to this, regional arrangements lasted for about 10 years before Government lost interest in them. If you want this to be here in 30 years’ time, doing the Bill, but adding to it, is crucial.

Zoë Billingham: I absolutely agree that it is essential that devolution through this Bill should be put on a statutory footing. I would highlight a few things that I think achieve that entrenchment, in addition to the legal aspect of that. First, the broadening and deepening is absolutely essential, with the right to request in combination with that, so that strategic authorities can decide what further powers they wish to request from Government. I agree with John that the integrated settlement is a really important entrenchment to give places the flexibility they need to demonstrate how different places make different choices about how they spend public money. That will be essential to showing how devolution can deliver differently according to the needs of different places.

The moves towards votes at 16 and returning to a supplementary vote system for our mayors is absolutely essential to broaden the number of people who can take part in in local democracy. I would urge the Committee to consider going further in a few areas in the Bill, to build on that entrenchment from a statutory footing. Fiscal devolution has so far been completely omitted from the Bill. We at IPPR North have been looking at options, including a visitor levy to start with, to start the process of fiscal devolution that we think will really help to mature the model that we have today. Accountability is another key area. I know that you have talked in previous sessions today about LPACs, and we absolutely agree that we need to beef up the accountability of mayoral combined authorities—that is a two-way street, but I am sure we can get on to it later.

Finally, in terms of public support, the flip side, if you will, of further empowering and rolling out devolution to the country is demonstrating to the public what devolution can deliver for them. The evidence shows that in places that have more powers and freedoms, voting turnout and engagement with local democracy go up, so we think it is important not just for the economy, but for democratic reform.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q If I can pick up on the point about scrutiny and accountability, there are two parts to my question. Some evidence has been raised in these sessions about the connection between people and communities and the mayors who serve them. We have had a decade and a half of this experiment, so I am interested in your views on whether the claim of a democratic deficit—which I do not buy—is about something genuine in the experience we have seen.

Secondly, we need to ensure strong scrutiny and accountability for any institution. We heard in the last session about some of the challenges with local government accountability and scrutiny. I am interested in your views on what we need to do to strengthen that and the provisions in the Bill to build on that.

Zoë Billingham: First, to your point on the democratic engagement of mayors, I do think, and I stand by the evidence that suggests this, that the more powers that mayors get, the more they are able to demonstrate to the public how they can tailor and do things differently in their places, according to what the public want. That is essential for the responsiveness of democracy; therefore, I also think that votes at 16 and the return to a supplementary vote are helpful additional aspects to this Bill, in terms of demonstrating that the Government are serious about broadening engagement with mayoral combined authorities.

I would also pick up the proposal in the Bill for neighbour area committees. Something along those lines is essential. We know that, as currently drafted, the Bill is proposing full unitarisation of local authorities to a 500,000 population level, which is far larger than we see in local government in our European counterparts, for example. There is a question about how those unitaries engage with those communities, not on an ad hoc basis, but as an ongoing community conversation. I wonder whether, for instance, the neighbourhood area committees could be predominantly made up of community representatives and young people, so that they do not replicate the district level that the Bill proposes to abolish, but instead create an ongoing, democratic renewal at that local level.

Secondly, to pick up your point on scrutiny, this is essential. If you speak to local leaders, mayors included, they are absolutely game for it. It is not something that central Government are imposing; it is an essential part of both enabling the further devolution of power and resources, and ensuring that the current model is not undermined because there is not enough scrutiny in place for what is already there. I totally support the proposal for a local public accounts committee—we have built on that idea ourselves at IPPR North, looking at mayoral accounts committees, which bring together overview and scrutiny, and local public accounts committees.

We think that those committees need to represent place leadership; this is no longer narrow lines of inquiry about certain budgetary lines or solely about audit. It must be much broader. This is about place-based leadership, not only by the mayor and the mayoral cabinet, but by other public leaders locally who could be brought in front of such committees. We think that is a really important thing to go hand in hand with the future of devolution.

Professor Denham: May I pick up and develop a couple of those points? There is no doubt that the Bill has a danger of an upwards movement of power: things are being moved from local authorities to strategic authorities and mayors have more autonomy. I understand why that is being done, but the Bill needs to build in a healthy counterpoint to that. I, too, would go beyond the neighbourhood governance proposal, which sounds a bit narrow and a bit prescriptive, as though the same model will work everywhere.

Sir David and I proposed what we called community empowerment plans, and we proposed them even when we did not know there was going to be local government reorganisation. The strategic authorities should have a legal duty to set out how they will engage with local people across the whole range of activity—I should have declared an interest, in that I am the honorary president of the Hampshire Association of Local Councils—

[Paul Holmes]

Hear, hear!

Professor Denham: So I am familiar with town and parish councils, and there are some very good ones, including in Mr Holmes’s constituency. But they are not uniform everywhere within the area, so a single prescriptive approach is unlikely to work.

There has also been, in the last 10 or 15 years, a transformation in our understanding of deliberative, participative engagement with local communities by many local authorities. We need both the strategic authorities and the unitary authorities to set out, in a document that should be challengeable, how they propose to do that. I think that would be useful.

Secondly—I will embarrass her—Zoë has written the best policy paper on local public accounts committees, so I will not say any more about that, except that I agree with Gareth Davies in an earlier panel: the challenge here is not local council audit, but the whole of public spending across a mayoral area. I was delighted to see the new Secretary of State backing the concept of total place, which is something I was involved in as a Minister 15 years ago; but, if that is going to work, you cannot combine that with upwards accountability to departmental accounting officers.

Local authority scrutiny has very good people, but it is not up to the job. You have to create a new local institution, the local public accounts committee and, picking up on what Mayor Houchen said earlier, make the chief executive within the area the local accounting officer. So you have a complete audit model at local level that is not then channelled upwards through departmental accounting officers. I think that is what we need to work towards. Those two things would not only empower local people, but ensure that you have local scrutiny of what is being spent and what is being done with their money.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

Q Others might. I want to move to duties. We see duties for health and health inequalities in the Bill already. Are there any other duties that you would like to see added, potentially in Committee or at the next stage?

Richard Hebditch: As I mentioned, these are potentially very powerful bodies, as the Bill collects powers and duties from other legislation, rather than being a stand-alone piece of legislation. The health duty is potentially important. We would like to see duties around climate and nature. Those are long-term issues; they are not the kinds of things where, as a mayor or an authority, you are under short-term pressure—or, necessarily, pressure from central Government—to deliver, but they are really important. In the collection of duties from elsewhere—on local transport plans, for example—there are duties to have regard to national policy, but not in terms of the exercise of your functions, so these strategic authorities will be powerful delivery bodies in their own right, not simply as plan-making and strategy bodies, which makes it important to have those climate and nature duties as well.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: The Labour Government in Wales introduced a different format in the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015—a public authority duty. It has a series of goals, and each public authority has to carry out those duties in relation to their functions. I should declare that I am a member of the Eryri national park authority, so I have a very close view of how this is actually carried out. It comes to the point about where the public interest is in the proposals in front of us. There is growth and a bit about health, but where is the public interest? It does not seem to me to be properly explained or described in the Bill that this is all about delivering on the public interest—what is the Government’s role in doing that?

There is a bit of confusion between the two Bills. Look at the health duty in this Bill and then look at the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, which is obviously in the Lords at the moment. There is no consultation for health groups in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, but there is a health duty on the combined county authority. It is just not connected. On the spatial development strategies, it is not particularly mentioned as a group, but there is a duty on the CCA, so it is really important to examine the connection between the two a bit more closely.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have two questions, one at the strategic level and one at the community level. Obviously we are pushing through strategic planning powers for mayors. I am interested in your assessment, given your huge expertise, of whether that is the right function, and what we need to do to ensure that it delivers sustainable development, which is obviously our objective.

At the community level, we obviously want to build in a way that is sustainable, but we need to make sure that there is public consent. I am interested in how we ensure that strategic planning powers sit alongside community engagement and community consent to make sure that there is a whole place sense of the direction of travel and the development that needs to happen, in a way that builds public support.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: On public participation, the UK is a signatory of the Aarhus convention. Article 393 of the trade and co-operation agreement is really clear that when you are doing something that has an impact on the environment you must have a proper process of public participation. It must happen at an early enough time to influence the outcomes; otherwise, what is the point of having people involved? You are literally just asking them, “What colour do you want the gates to be?” You are not asking them to be involved in the full decision.

The issue that you have here—I will talk about the products that are produced—is that, if you look at the spatial development strategies, it specifically says in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in proposed new section 12I of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004:

“No person is to have a right to be heard at an examination.”

That is completely the opposite of what you have on local plans: any person who makes representations must be given the opportunity to be heard in front of the examiner. That is not going to send out a strong signal that you actually want people to participate in the making of these spatial development strategies.

It is not a sell-out event to go to a plan examination, so I do not think that you need to be worried about that. I do, however, think that you need a right to be involved at that stage, and it cannot be at the discretion of someone else. I think that is one of the issues: if you have to wait for somebody else to give you consent or permission to enter that space, you do not have a right to enter it, because it is at somebody else’s discretion. That is why the formulation of such a right of access—a right to participate—is really important.

Your other point was about the duties, and how that is carried out. I would be really interested to see how the local growth plan is supposed to comply with, for example, the environmental principles policy statement. How does it combine with that? How does it combine with the spatial development strategy? What is the interaction there? It is quite complex, if you look at the organogram of the different plans that, if you are a member of the public, might affect and shape the place in which you live, and therefore what the purpose of all these plans are—whether they are there to achieve sustainable development in the public interest—and how you are supposed to get involved in influencing the outcome of the decisions that are made through these plans.

Richard Hebditch: It is probably also worth talking about the resourcing of all this. As people have discussed, we have the local government reorganisation at the same time. The new format for local plans, which are out of date, has new housing targets as well. Then we have the SDSs—spatial development strategies—on top of that. How do we make sure that we have the resourcing to develop all those things, which are happening at the same time? We then have wider planning reform, and we might have another planning Bill in the new year. There is a lot of potential chaos at the same time. I am sure the Government want to address that, and the resourcing for planners to develop the SDSs is very helpful, but there is a risk of not necessarily having a clear road map for how you get to that place. As I was saying, we are very supportive of the idea of spatial development strategies and the strategic layer, but the journey there is going to be quite chaotic. I think it would be good to look at issues around workforce skills and the timing of all the different things that are going on.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q The Government will do our very best to make sure that chaos is not the thing that comes out of this set of reforms. I think most people would concede that the status quo is not optimal and therefore reform is required. The piece that I want to push back and follow up on is the need for public participation. That is the whole basis on which our planning system works, but there is something about accountability and the mandate that sits with the mayor. Ultimately, if people do not like the set of decisions that the mayor drives through a development plan, they can boot them out in an election, so there is a specific piece around the function of the mayor that means that they can hold that development plan and the public are able to hold the mayor to account.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: I think we need to reflect on what became of the regional spatial strategies, and on whether that was an issue around social licence and public consent. Obviously, an examination was attached to them in their development, and there was accountability in different formats. If it is not clear to people that they are going to be involved, you will just get disempowerment and disenfranchisement, and then people are just going to say, “Well, it’s nothing to do with me. I haven’t been able to be involved, and I haven’t been able to have an influence.” Those routes to influence and to participate properly, which means having an impact on the outcome, need to be very clearly laid out so that people can participate. I agree with you that it is a whole discussion. Planning is the way we organise ourselves in space, in society and in places. That is what it is supposed to be, so we need to make it like that.

Your point about democratic accountability is really important. One of the things that the Better Planning Coalition has been looking at is the national scheme of delegation, which will have a huge impact on whether there is democratic accountability for planning decisions at local level. If people realise what is happening only when the bulldozer turns up at the end of the road, that is obviously a failure of the system. If they feel that a decision has not been made in a way that is accountable, if there is no one for them to go and talk to, and if they do not have public speaking rights at planning committees any more and cannot have their say on that decision, I think that will lead to a democratic deficit.

[David Simmonds]

Q To pick up on the point about a democratic deficit, one of the things that has been much debated is that the Government have embarked on two major pieces of legislation: the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, and the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill. Both will have a huge impact on the policy area, particularly around housing. We know that housing delivery has collapsed, and part of the solution to that in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill is to strip out a lot of the environmental protections, which you have referred to. Then the devo Bill comes along and removes much of the community voice as well—for example, by reducing the number of planning applications that may be considered by a local planning committee. Can you tell us a little bit about how, perhaps in an ideal world or a more optimal world, that community voice could be secured behind the delivery of the types and number of homes that communities want, but in a way that best reflects the needs of those local communities and those areas?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Sacha Bedding MBE, chief executive of Wharton Trust and a member of Locality. For this panel, we have until 5.20 pm.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q My first question is about your views on how the community right to buy provision in the Bill will help communities to better make use of and take ownership of community assets.

Sacha Bedding: We welcome the community right to buy. It is a good step, a big step, and it is important. Communities often do not feel that they have those rights, because they do not, and when they see a treasured building or space go up for sale, and they have no opportunity to purchase or reclaim it—lots of these things are already ours—they feel disillusioned and hopeless. To have an avenue and pathway to change that will be important and helpful. It will need to be properly resourced; I think we should look again at a community ownership fund or a successor to it. Places that do not have capacity but have a willingness and desire should be supported in creating that. But it is a great opportunity for the people of this country.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q To build on that, vibrant, strong communities and community organisations are critical to our vision and to taking advantage of the powers that we are providing through the Bill. I am interested in your views on the new duty on local authorities to make effective arrangements at the neighbourhood level. Also, with your vast experience in the sector, what is your sense of what we need to get right to ensure that we genuinely empower community organisations, when we know that they have the capacity to have a voice, representation and power for the communities they represent?

Sacha Bedding: I watched some of the proceedings, and I understand why there is a desire for an expansion of parish councils. It is what we look like, and it is a reflection of this at a local level, but it is not right for everywhere. There are places up and down England where organisations like mine—Locality has hundreds of them as members—have the opportunity to create an active role in making sure that decisions reflect the will, the want and the need of the people who are going to be affected by those decisions.

That will happen only if we do not prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution to what neighbourhood governance looks like. Neighbourhood governance should mean that when the people in that community are asked, “Do you feel you have a stake in this place and the opportunity to shape where you live?” the answer is yes. At the moment, our opinion is no: roughly 80% of people say they do not feel they have that stake in their community. We see that in election turnout: the by-elections in Hartlepool, which I know well, had turnout of under 20% or 15%. That is an issue, and I am afraid that it is not going to be solved by creating another layer of councillor. I live in a parish area, by the way. Where parish councils do tremendous work, perfect—build on it—but where it is not right, let’s not mandate it. Let’s be creative and braver than we have been so far.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q You make the point about creating organisations and capacity that reflects the will and want of the people. A big part of that is diversity and representation. One of the challenges that we have had in the community sector is that it tends to be those parts of the community who have the social capital, the time and so on who are at the forefront of that. I am interested in your views on what we should be thinking about to ensure that whatever neighbourhood governance structures we create are genuinely representative and have that diversity of views and opinions to genuinely drive the will and want of the community.

Sacha Bedding: The first thing is that we have to make it accessible. I will always advocate for a community organising approach, because I think that releasing people’s agency, so that they feel that they can take action on the things they care about, is a route to that. However, whether it is asset-based community development, old traditional community development or community organising, that is where we start. We start where people are, not where we would like them to be.

If we can do that and resource that, there are thousands of people willing to roll up their sleeves and get involved where they live. I see it every day; you see it in your constituencies every day. This is not some great big secret—it is just, “Go out and ask them.” On the flipside of that, our sector, like every other sector, has been hammered for a long time, but releasing the skills and talents of local people to take action on the things they care about will answer that question.

[Vikki Slade]

Q I absolutely support your comment about the reopening of the community improvement fund or similar, but last week we had the Museum of Broken Dreams downstairs, which showcased some incredible projects that had failed due to various issues. This Bill is a good start, but does it go far enough? For example, it is great to see supporting assets included, but are they the right ones? What about environmental assets—places within communities for nature and open space? Would they be something you would be interested in expanding to?

Sacha Bedding: I do not work in an area of environmental concern. If there are environmental opportunities in places, the broader the scope of what we consider an asset of community value to be, the better, in my opinion. I do not think we should prescribe that it must be bricks and mortar. For us in Hartlepool, things such as long-term plans for neighbourhoods should include the sea. That is our greatest asset, after the people who live there, and every community plan could involve the sea, for example. The environmental opportunities are there; whether we can distinguish whether they are social or environmental does not matter—let us expand the scope.

However, we should also look at the right to shape public services, because too often the people who are receiving services do not have a stake in the design of those services and the right to control investment. That is a big one. I do not mean, for example, Hartlepool getting 10 nuclear modular power stations, although that is great news; I mean at the neighbourhood level, where houses can be built, or not built, as we have just heard. People should have a stake in that decision. If you want more housing built, work alongside people who live in that community now. Do not just internally exile them, flatten the houses and say, “Hard luck, son.” That is not an answer.

The more expansive the assets of community value are, the better. The opportunity to expand the community rights is there, and it makes more sense for everybody. On homelessness strategies, where people are still on the streets and we are spending hundreds of thousands of pounds, or a literacy strategy, where one in three people is illiterate and that works with cohesion, if people can bring those together, they will coalesce around a place, and they can do that far better if those rights are enhanced.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider new clause 35—Standardisation of definitions—

“(1) Within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations standardise the definition in legislation of—

(a) ‘national’,

(b) ‘strategic’,

(c) ‘local’ and

(d) ‘community’

for the purposes of ensuring each refers consistently to the appropriate level of local government across all legislation.

(2) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

(3) In exercising this power, the Secretary of State must have due regard to the need to ensure consistent use of the words listed in subsection (1), to facilitate public understanding of devolution.

(4) Within six months of a statutory instrument under subsection (2) being made, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report setting out how the power under this section has been used this power, including any reasons for failure to exercise it where there is inconsistent usage of the words listed in subsection (1).”

This new clause would ensure that words like “strategic” and “local”, where they relate to a level of government, have consistent meaning across statute.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir John. Before I speak to the first group of amendments, I put on the record my thanks to the witnesses who gave up their time in September to give evidence to the Committee. Their comments were insightful and will inform our scrutiny over the remainder of Committee stage.

The English devolution White Paper committed to introduce in law the concept of strategic authorities, which sits at the heart of our new devolution architecture for England. The clause makes good on that commitment and establishes a more consistent and simple model of devolution. The clause sets out the three levels of strategic authority: the single foundational strategic authority, the combined foundational strategic authority and the mayoral strategic authority. Each category will have access to a consistent set of devolved powers and functions.

Mayoral strategic authorities that meet specified eligibility criteria may be designated by secondary legislation as established mayoral strategic authorities, unlocking further devolution. We believe that that will deliver a permanent shift in power from Whitehall to all parts of the country, with consistent powers at the right level across all of England, so that empowered mayors can drive growth, unlock house building and infrastructure, and deliver the change that our communities want.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

I echo the Minister’s welcome, Sir John. It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair.

We will refer to a good deal of evidence on all parts of the Bill, but it is important to set out briefly—in terms equivalent to those used by the Minister—the concerns that the Opposition continue to have about the significant democratic deficit that arises from the measures in the Bill; the risk of losing the efficiency and local insight that come from many of our local government structures; and, in the context of a country that already has fewer elected representatives per voter than any other developed democracy in the world, the impact of stripping out, by some estimates, up to 90% of elected representation. I therefore echo your comments, Sir John, on the importance of scrutiny of the Bill. Local authorities are the means by which our voters, our residents, exercise control over what happens in their neighbourhoods and communities. It is critical that the legislation gets that right.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We absolutely recognise the hon. Member’s point about democracy. Directly elected mayors can play a powerful strategic role. They are a key new part of the devolution architecture that we have seen work well across the country. I point to Greater Manchester, which has delivered the fastest growth of any local economy. They sit alongside strong democratic structures that we will have in local government. The Bill is complementary to that and does not cut across or undermine those structures.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. This is not my first Public Bill Committee, but I have had the whole summer to forget how these things work, so I look forward to being firmly guided by you if I stray from good practice.

I will speak to new clause 35. In that context, I emphasise how friendly, constructive and helpful the new clause is intended to be as a way of getting the Committee started on a good note. I ask Ministers to take the need for it on board, although I will not press it to a vote. I tabled the new clause to ensure that, more broadly, words such as “strategic” and “local”, where they relate to a level of government or a level of area of policy, have a consistent meaning for strategic authorities, constituent authorities and community-level groups.

I will give some examples of possible confusion growing in the areas cited in new clause 35. We have a strategic road network, which is in fact a national network managed by National Highways. We have new strategic authorities, which will have to manage a key route network, analogous to the Transport for London route network. We also have local roads managed by local authorities. In the Bill, however, we have strategic authorities being asked to make a local transport plan. That could be more helpfully named a strategic transport plan.

Another area of policy I am very familiar with is the community infrastructure levy. In later clauses, we will discuss new applications of the mayoral community infrastructure levies. I have experience of how, more locally, spending on what most local councils call strategic community infrastructure levies is done by local authorities. Decisions on local CIL spending, which is what councils normally call is, are made closer to the community, often by ward councillors or neighbourhood forums.

We are slightly better off in planning, where there is a national basis for decisions on nationally significant infrastructure, and where strategic planning applications may be called in by regional strategic level mayors under current or new structures. However I do think that we lack rigour, sometimes logic, and often clarity in all these terms now. More thought about making things more standardised and easier to understand would be very welcome. I am not proposing a vote on this new clause, but what I would like to hear from the Minister today is that she will take this away, ask for at least a report on the current range of terminology we have ended up with in different areas of policy, and consider potential further amendments and the fuller review the new clause calls for.

[The Chair]

As a point of advice, if people want to contribute after I have called the Minister to sum up then just let me know in advance and I will call the Minister at the end, so she can respond to a variety of points that have been made. I do not want the Minister to have to keep getting up and responding to every speech. I know people are new to Committee, but it helps the Minister be able to sum up her consideration of all the points that have been made.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the new clause, and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion makes a good point regarding the tapestry of terms that we have in a very complicated local government structure; however, the Bill already includes defined terms relevant to interpreting local government structures. For example, clause 1 defines exactly what strategic authorities are. My concern is that taking a one-size-fits-all approach might have unintended consequences by altering existing definitions that have been deliberately tailored to work in specific legislative contexts. My view is that as we go through this process of standardising the new structure, with strategic authorities now established in legislation working alongside local government and community structures, the roles and the definitions of different structures of government will become much clearer. I hope the hon. Member will not press the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Functions of Strategic Authorities and Mayors

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 261, in clause 2, page 2, line 21, after “economic development”, insert “, poverty and socio-economic inequality,”

This amendment would make poverty and socio-economic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas.

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[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the amendment, but we spent time reflecting on its implications and appropriateness for the Bill. I suspect that, to a degree, the Minister and I agree on this point. If we reflect on the legislative framework around our local authorities from their earliest origins, the relief of poverty and addressing inequalities—the duties that the amendment refers to—have been enshrined. It goes back as far as the Poor Laws, but in more recent years the National Assistance Act 1948 compelled all local authorities to support those destitute in their areas, and the Localism Act 2011 gives scope for local authorities to use their economic powers through activities such as procurement in ways that specifically benefit the local area.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which was much debated and broadly had cross-party support, is reflected in a lot of this Bill. It was specifically about local authorities using their powers to support the economy of their local area. Just a short time ago, some of the members of the Committee were in this room debating the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in which the Government set out a vision—contested to some extent—about how those measures affecting local authorities will address persistent issues of inequality. We recognise that sometimes that is about legislation, but sometimes it is about Government action.

Mention has been made of food banks, which were rolled out under the last Labour Government as a means of addressing persistent issues of poverty. I remember them being opened during my time as a local authority councillor, and Gordon Brown visiting and saying, “This is an example of how we expect local authorities to address some of these persistent issues.” Local authorities already have these duties at both the strategic and the micro level. I question whether it is necessary to add an amendment that, in essence, reflects existing duties throughout all the different tiers of local government in England.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I shall start by setting out the purpose of clause 2, then turn to amendment 261. The clause provides some broad thematic policy areas under which functions and powers of strategic authorities are arranged in the Bill. Defining those areas on the face of the Bill will bring clarity and purpose to the role of strategic authorities, which all parties agree we need to do. We want to empower mayors, who know who their areas best, to respond to local needs, so they can be the ones driving change and improvements in economic prospects and living standards and poverty. These thematic policy areas are deliberately broad, to allow for a wide range of activities.

I have a lot of sympathy with the intention behind amendment 261. Alleviation of poverty and tackling socioeconomic inequality should be a core part of what we do and a core metric of economic success. However, as the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner set out, those duties are already baked into the very function and purpose of local authorities and, critically, they cut across all the thematic areas that we have set out.

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[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. Amendments 4, 28 and 29 would make English devolution genuinely local by ensuring that local consent and public consultation come first. Amendment 4 would change clause 3 so that local authorities must apply to the Secretary of State themselves to become a single foundation strategic authority, rather than Whitehall imposing devolution on local councils. Amendments 28 and 29 would remove the parts of schedule 1 that would allow the Secretary of State to prepare a proposal for there to be a mayor in an existing combined authority area, and for the establishment of a combined county authority, without public consultation.

One of the greatest criticisms of the Bill is that it proposes a top-down, Whitehall-led devolution, which is not really devolution at all. In my county of Warwickshire, the choice of which strategic authority we create, form or join must come from local elected representatives who are closer to their communities and understand better the needs of our constituents. Such an important shaping of future governance must have grassroots support and should not end up being imposed by central Government, especially if we want to decentralise powers to tackle socioeconomic inequalities, address regional disparities and promote real autonomy.

Without the amendment, local people will lose the right to decide their own governance arrangements. Whitehall will be able to impose devolved powers, force mayoral models on to areas that have not asked for them, and redraw local governance boundaries behind closed doors. Community involvement and local consent are essential to ensure transparency and accountability in devolution decision making.

Amendment 4 reaches the heart of the issue at hand. It would ensure that devolution is locally led, not imposed. It would ensure that a council that wishes to become a single foundation strategic authority must initiate the process itself, rather than wait for the Secretary of State to decree it. If devolution is to have legitimacy, it must be built on local consent, local ambition and local accountability. Without that, we risk the Bill becoming an exercise in central control and a top-down approach dressed up as devolution. We would like to push amendment 4 to a vote.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Both the policy intent and the practice with places going through the devolution process are locally led. The impetus is coming from local leaders and local authorities that are working with their communities to drive the process.

On amendment 4, the Government have been clear that we will consider non-mayoral devolution arrangements for single local authorities on an exceptional basis where certain criteria are met. Designation is not intended as the end point; it is a stepping stone towards deeper devolution, which is what we hope will be the journey for all parts of the country. It is therefore most appropriate for the process to be initiated by the Secretary of State rather than the local authority. However, to be clear, the Secretary of State will not be able to designate a council as a foundation strategic authority unless the council itself consents to that designation. That is a robust safeguard that will protect the interests of the single local authority concerned. I agree with the sentiment behind the amendment to ensure that the Secretary of State has regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government. I am pleased that those criteria are already embedded in the Bill when conferring functions on a single foundation strategic authority.

Amendment 28 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s proposed power to direct for there to be a mayor for an existing combined authority without local consent. The Government have been clear about the benefits of mayoral devolution; we are seeing it across the country. For example, South Yorkshire mayoral combined authority brought the Supertram network back into public control after 27 years, and there are already drops in fare evasion, increases in usage, ticketing apps and improved clearing. Greater Manchester authority has taken control of its bus service, resulting in increased punctuality and ridership and cheaper fares. The North East combined authority has secured a £450 million development for one of the largest film studios in Europe, with the potential to create over 8,000 jobs.

We know the impact of this devolution model. We are seeing it across the country and we want to see it in more areas. We are clear that mayors with skin in the game are best placed to drive forward growth, reform public services and deliver the change that their communities want. Every resident in England should be able to benefit from deeper mayoral devolution in their area.

[David Simmonds]

There is, perhaps, a risk of the Committee being inadvertently misled, in that all these points are being described as locally led. The Committee needs to be clear: local authorities were told that they needed to submit the proposals or the Government would take powers to direct them to do it. It was a gun to their heads. It was not the case that local authorities came forward proactively. During the 14-year era under the previous Government, it was clear that proposals that did come forward for reorganisation would be entertained by Government, and a number of those were taken forward, but compulsion was not the case. It is only since the Government told local authorities that they either had to come forward or would be directed to do so that we have seen the proposals, so it is not the case that they are locally led. The Committee needs to be clear on that.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I completely disagree. I have been having conversations, for example, with our strategic combined authorities that are going through the process. The difference between this Government and the last is that we have created a clear sense of the powers and the economic opportunities that areas can take forward. Take, for example, our current devolution priority area. I am the new Minister, and I am having the first set of conversations with them. Every single one is excited and enthusiastic about the prospect. At the moment, the demand for devolution deals is outstripping our ability to respond, because we have attached to them clear powers, access to funding and the ability to drive the change that we want to see in those areas. So I completely reject the premise that places are being driven to do this.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

There is a risk here that we are conflating what is actually happening on the ground. The Minister is absolutely right, and no one can argue that this Government have not been clear about the structures that they want to put forward. However, to say that there is a demand from local authorities requesting devolution is stretching it a bit, because it is quite clear out there—particularly in my area, in Hampshire and the Solent—that this Government have said to them, “You have to do this; otherwise we are going to force it on you.” That is not locally led, is it?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I spoke to the leaders of Hampshire and the Solent just last week, and they were unanimously enthusiastic about what was being proposed, because they could see the opportunity. I am pleased that it is being voted on, and ultimately it is for places to come forward. What we have said to them is, “If you go through this journey, there are powers that you can draw down that will allow you to drive change in your areas.” The strategic authorities, combined authorities and constituent authorities can see the economic prospect. They see what is happening in Greater Manchester, the Liverpool city region and the west midlands, and they want that for their residents. That is absolutely right, and what we are doing is enabling and supporting that.

Let me talk about the backstop power provided here. We do not expect to use it, which is why it does not come into force at Royal Assent; it is there if we need to draw on it. The only reason it is there—because we think the demand and the momentum created by devolution will do the job for us—is in the instance where there are blockages. That means when constituent authorities that want to move forward are being resisted by a particular authority, we give ourselves the ability to intervene. The reason we are doing that is because we do not want any residents to be left out. We do not want areas to be devolution deserts, not being able to benefit from the economic opportunities and prospects provided.

[Vikki Slade]

The reality is that the only reason they are queuing at the Minister’s door to access devolution is that they are being denied access to funding if they do not. Let me give the example of Wessex: Somerset, Dorset and Wiltshire have all been unitarised over the past 10 years. They should have been in the ideal position, but they were overlooked for the first wave of devolution. They were apparently not ready, and I accept that fact, but they have missed out this financial year on more than £300 million—£159.29 for every single household in that area—compared with other areas. They have no real choice but to devolve to a single authority, because why would their residents think it is acceptable for them to miss out on £300 million? So it is not fair, or it is disingenuous, to suggest that this is not compulsion. The other point I want to make—

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[The Chair]

Order. Interventions should be short.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It is absolutely right that we say that, in order to drive economic success in particular areas, there are powers that relate to economic drivers and levers that we want, and there is an investment fund that can be deployed at that functional level. I will not resile from that; it is absolutely the right thing to do. We are clear with places that we think a strategic authority operating at a functional geography is the way to unlock their economic potential, and we are building powers alongside that. Places that want to take it up absolutely can. At the moment they are queuing up to do so, and I am incredibly happy about that.

I am very disappointed in the hon. Member for Hamble Valley for not getting on in support of his area, which is enthusiastic for this and moving forward. Ultimately, there is momentum around devolution because the benefits of it are being seen already. It is not theoretical; it is not on paper. We are seeing it in our areas, and I want it for every part of the country, not just the ones that have gone through the journey.

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister should be very careful about attributing motives to myself that are not there. I am very supportive of the fact that Hampshire and the Solent and will have a mayor. Hopefully, it will be a Conservative mayor, as that will drive the economy going forward. I want to press the point that we can see how divisive this is in the fact that three different versions of local government reform are being proposed. Hampshire and the Isle of Wight were told, in this Government policy, that if they did not go ahead and embrace devolution, it would be forced on them in a way they may not like. That is not locally led; it is compulsion, is it not?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will not press this point. All I can say is that I sat down with the leaders last week as a new Minister—the newbie—and I asked them how it was going. They told me, “we are enthusiastic and there is momentum around this because we can see the value that it will provide for our communities, so we are driving forward. What we need is for Government to get out of the way and for the Government to support and enable us.” I take that as a ringing endorsement of what we are trying to do. I can only go by the conversations I have had with local leaders. At the moment, I am seeing momentum and support for this, and rightly so because we are seeing the impacts of this on the ground and the Bill will extend that across the country.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[David Simmonds]

The short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. I have spent a good deal of my time in local government. One of the key issues that we learned from the process, and one of the reasons why former Secretary of State Eric Pickles said that he had a pearl-handled revolver in his desk—for anyone who came to him to suggest forcing local government reorganisation on England—was the need to get things right with local consent.

There are times, which I think we can all see in the local government landscape at the moment, when, because of geography or failure of leadership, we know it is necessary for Government to intervene, and Governments of all parties have done so. Northamptonshire was an example of such a place. Individual local authorities within it had not failed, but there had been a collective failure of the public service in that area. The Government therefore felt compelled to intervene to remedy that, as opposed to imposing an alternative vision for how they thought the local area should be governed.

New clause 23 stands in my name. It seeks to enshrine in the legislation the principle of consent. We have the very opposite of what we have been told as a Committee, that this is all locally led. Clearly, the Government are already using the levers in their power to compel local authorities down a certain route. Under the force of such compulsion, local authorities feel that that is what they have to do, because it is the only way to address some of their reasonable and justifiable concerns. The timetable, the process and all those things come at the same time as a wholesale reorganisation of planning and infrastructure, which is stripping away the local powers and voices that are so critical to ensuring that the infrastructure and new housing that we all want are delivered.

The view of the Opposition, therefore, is that we need to enshrine in this legislation not powers for Whitehall but powers for people—powers for people to shape through their local leaders the community structures of service that deliver for them and the taxes that they pay. People are represented to exercise such powers. Enshrining the consent of local authorities is a small step in that direction.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to amendments 30, 31 and 33 first, and then amendments to 266 to 280. I appreciate the intention of the Liberal Democrat amendments, and I reiterate that I think we are completely aligned in this Committee in our desire not just to push power down, but do so in a locally driven way. On the specifics of the lead amendment, the principal body affected by the designation that we are seeking will be the unitary council or the county council. The Bill already provides that no designation can be made without the consent of the relevant councils.

On amendment 31, the Secretary of State must already notify the proposed constituent councils, and any other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate, about a proposal to direct the establishment of a combined authority. The Secretary of State must consider the representations of that body. As my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cheshire said, there is no shortage of representation and voice from individual town and parish councils. We think that the process of engagement is already there and that to impose additional requirements to consult every town and parish council in the proposed areas would be disproportionate and also risks conflating the distinct roles of town and parish councils, which, as I said at the evidence stage, we absolutely see having a role to play in the new architecture of strategic authorities.

Strategic authorities have been created to tackle regional issues and to capitalise on the opportunities that exist over a significant economic geography, such as pursuing, for example, integrated transport. Town and parish councils, meanwhile, will continue to represent their local communities, managing neighbourhood services and supporting initiatives that improve the day-to-day lives of their residents. Each tier of local government will be accountable to their local communities and should continue to represent their interests and to work in alignment.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

When areas go through this process—and they are being made to go through it—will the Minister consider making it easier for areas that are unparished to create town and parish councils? Otherwise she will create large unitary authorities and some areas will have town and parish councils and others will not. Will she make it easier to set up town and parish councils where there are not any?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We will discuss neighbourhood governance and neighbourhood boards later in the Bill. When it comes to areas that do not have town and parish councils, we recognise there is an opportunity for us to create structures so that there is stronger community representation and a stronger community voice. There is an opportunity for us to design something that works in areas where town and parish councils do not exist or may not be appropriate. We want to create flexibility so that local areas can find the right structures for them, so that neighbourhoods and communities have the voice and representation that we want to see across the country.

I turn to amendments 266 to 280. As I have said before, we have been accused of compulsion, and all I can do as a new Minister is point to the feedback that I get from the local areas that we speak to. Our engagement to date suggests there is genuine enthusiasm and momentum, because areas can see the economic opportunity and what a strong Mayor can do for their area. The Government have been clear in our aims: we want to get universal coverage of strategic authorities across England, because we can see the benefits that places like Greater Manchester and Liverpool are experiencing. We want that for every single resident across the area.

[David Simmonds]

During the evidence sessions, we heard senior local government leaders describe “inconsistent and…unhelpful messaging” on the building blocks of the new authorities—I quote what I wrote down. When we heard from those who are intended to be part of the investment agenda, they described no “meaningful consultation” from the Government on the proposals. How does the Minister square that with the idea that this is strategic and locally led?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

That is not the feedback that I heard in that evidence session. At the moment the places in our devolution priority areas are going through a process of consultation. They are talking to their constituent councils, voting it through the council chamber and taking it to their residents to make the case.

What we are seeing is positivity and momentum. Our job as a Government is to build on that and support and enable that. I come back to the point that there is a backstop power that we do not expect to use. But in the instances where we have got a blockage, we want to be able to help create a strategic authority so that we do not have devolution deserts and parts of the country left behind. We are very clear that the powers will commence only at the point that they are needed, rather than on Royal Assent.

Finally, new clause 23 would impose disproportionate consent requirements for these processes, requiring strategic authorities to seek the consent of all district, parish and town councils in their area. As I have said, there are already provisions in place to ensure a level of consultation. A primary aim for us in this Bill is to make the process simpler, more streamlined, more effective and less expensive. That is the feedback that we have had from places that have gone through the process and the feedback that we are getting from places going through the process.

My worry is that the proposed amendments would undermine the principle of having a process of devolution that is far more streamlined and far easier for places. Again, the feedback we are getting from conversations is that there is enthusiasm, appetite and commitment to do this. We want to make it as easy as possible for places, which is why I hope that hon. Members will not press the amendments.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Manuela Perteghella]

It is pointless to establish a strategic authority without appropriate financial support. Without support to build structurally, hire staff, co-ordinate partners and begin delivering on their devolved powers, new combined and strategic authorities risk becoming bodies with responsibilities but no real capacity to act. As the Minister will know, local authorities have been starved of funding by consecutive Governments. We need to ensure that these new unitaries—these new beginnings—have the best start in life, and that begins with fair funding so that devolution can be effective.

Amendment 39 is complemented by amendment 361, which would require the Government’s annual devolution report to include details of funding given to support new strategic authorities. Each year, when the Government report to Parliament on devolution, they would be required to explain how and why money has been spent to help to establish new devolved authorities.

As it stands, the Bill risks becoming a Trojan horse for centralisation, concentrating power in Whitehall rather than genuinely devolving it to local communities as promised. Amendment 361 would support true, locally led devolution by ensuring financial transparency and holding Ministers accountable for supporting local government reform. That is why we intend to divide the Committee on amendment 39, which is essential to ensure that new combined authorities and new strategic unitaries can operate effectively from the outset and deliver the powers and services they are intended to provide. Without adequate funding, the whole exercise of devolving powers and establishing new authorities will be meaningless.

For too long, my constituents, like so many across the country, have faced the consequences of under-resourced local authorities, with promises to their families and communities left unfulfilled. Our amendments would provide the vital financial support that this new era of local government requires, enabling us to deliver on the ambitions of devolution and achieve real, tangible results.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner for highlighting the deep cuts that were imposed on local authorities during a decade and a half of Conservative government, which fundamentally weakened our civic infrastructure. We should never forget that. We absolutely appreciate that, as a result, local government is operating in a difficult context. I welcome the intent behind the amendments: it will be important for strategic authorities to ensure that they have the capacity funding so that they are established.

Amendment 38 concerns single foundation authorities. We do not anticipate that there will be transition costs for such authorities. When a unitary or county council is designated as a single foundation strategic authority, it will retain its existing voting and governance arrangements. The designation will sit alongside its status as a local authority. In other words, there will be no transition involved, so transitional funding is unnecessary.

We recognise that the mayoral strategic authorities that we are creating will need funding to support the transition and build capacity. All Members across the House want to see strong, capable authorities in their area, with the tools and capacity to deliver for their local communities. That is why in the English devolution White Paper we committed to provide new strategic authorities with capacity funding to kick-start their organisation. I am pleased to confirm that all areas on our devolution priority programme will receive £1 million in mayoral capacity funding this year to help establish new institutions, once the legislation has been laid before Parliament. They will also receive capacity funding in future years, so that they are ready and prepared to deliver the benefits that we believe devolution will unlock. As the Government are committed to providing funding for establishment expenses through the mechanism of mayoral capacity funding, we do not believe that amendment 39 is necessary, but we recognise the intent behind it, which is why are we are taking action.

Amendment 361 would require the Government to report on funding allocated to support the establishment of new strategic authorities. I am pleased to say that that is already established practice. Clause 19 amends the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 to ensure that all funding devolved to strategic authorities is reported. That will include any funds to support their establishment. Again, therefore, we agree with the intent behind the amendment but we do not believe that it is required.

[Vikki Slade]

Will funding be made available for areas that are not yet in a programme on the same footing as the areas that are already in one? It would be completely inappropriate if that funding was not committed to. I want to get that on record.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We have established a principle that there should be mayoral capacity funding. We have established a principle that for places that are going through the transition, to ensure that any mayor that is created is able to hit the ground running, capacity building needs to be a core part of that. That applies to the places that are going through the devolution priority programme at the moment, but the same principle invariably will apply across the piece.

[The Chair]

Vikki Slade, do you wish to divide the Committee on amendments 38 and 39?

[Vikki Slade]

We were seeking to divide only on amendment 39, but given that we have had that assurance, I am happy not to do so. I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Combined authorities and CCAs: establishment, expansion and functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 4 introduces schedule 1, which will streamline and simplify existing processes for establishing new combined authorities and combined county authorities, and for changing the arrangements of existing authorities. The Government have been clear that their goal is to achieve universal coverage of strategic authorities. We are therefore confident that clear and tangible benefits of devolution will be experienced across the country. We have also been clear that we want to create mechanisms that will ensure that the process is streamlined—that it is fast, and effective and efficient locally—and allows representation, but fundamentally allow us to move through the process that we see appetite and demand for across the country.

The powers introduced by the clause will be used as a backstop. They will be deployed only where we have devolution deserts and we want to work with areas to remove blockages, to the benefit of residents.

[David Simmonds]

We return to the theme that areas can have devolution provided it is in the form that Whitehall dictates. It remains a significant concern to the Opposition that we are proceeding in this manner, but that point is made and I suggest that we move on.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Establishment, expansion and functions of combined authorities and CCAs

Amendment proposed: 266, in schedule 1, page 79, line 15, leave out subparagraph (b).—(David Simmonds.)

This amendment, and Amendments 267 to 273, remove the ability of the Secretary of State to create, or make certain changes to the governance or composition of, combined authorities without consent of the councils involved.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Division 5

Ayes: 6

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Conservative: 3
Liberal Democrat: 2
Green Party: 1

Noes: 11

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Labour: 11

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 62, in schedule 1, page 80, line 19, at end insert—

“5A After section 105B insert—

‘105C Non-mayoral combined authority: consent to budget

(1) A non-mayoral combined authority may only exercise the following functions with the consent of each constituent council—

(a) adopt or amend the authority’s budget;

(b) where it is not part of the budget, approve the total sum of the transport levy.

(2) In this section a reference to the “transport levy” is a reference to any levy issued by the combined authority relating to the exercise of its functions relating to transport in accordance with any regulations made from time to time under section 74(2) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988.”’

This requires that a non-mayoral combined authority must have consent from its constituent councils to the approval and amendment of the budget and to the approval of the transport levy (if separate).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 63 to 67.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will begin by talking to Government amendments 63 and 65. The Government recognise that the creation of a combined authority or combined county authority can cause some concern in prospective constituent councils. One of the main worries is that the new institution could create new financial burdens on existing councils.

Many existing combined authorities and combined county authorities already include provisions in their constitutions that enable constituent councils to veto decisions that could create a financial liability on them. We recognise that those provisions have helped to soothe concerns about establishing new combined authorities and combined county authorities. That is why the amendments will create a standardised requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to obtain the consent of affected constituent councils before exercising their functions in a way that could create a financial liability on these councils. That will ensure that any future non-mayoral combined authorities or non-mayoral combined county authorities will need to comply with this requirement without the constituent councils needing to secure agreement to its inclusion in the individual authority’s constitution.

I turn to Government amendments 62 and 64. In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out that in combined authorities and combined county authorities without a mayor, most decisions would require a simple majority vote. That is provided for in clause 6. However, in the White Paper, we also said that key strategic decisions would require unanimity in non-mayoral authorities. The budget for the authority is one of those decisions.

Similarly to amendments 63 and 65, amendments 62 and 64 introduce a standardised requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to obtain the consent of all their constituent councils when adopting or amending their budget. That includes the direct contribution of those councils to transport expenditure.

Government amendments 66 and 67 are minor, technical amendments. They amend the terminology used in schedule 1 so that references to secondary legislation within the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 use the term “regulations” rather than “orders”.

[David Simmonds]

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. It feels as though these amendments are intended to bring some welcome consistency and clarity.

The Committee will know that local government finance is largely regulated by the Local Government Finance Act 1992, but that older legislation on council tax fixing and budget setting all essentially states that a local authority’s budget must balance in-year. A local authority is not the same as central Government—it cannot borrow to fund its day-to-day expenditure.

However, one implication of the Secretary of State’s allocation of all these new powers to mayors or combined authorities is that they may choose to incur expenditure that imposes a liability on an individual local authority without seeking that authority’s consent. For example, there would be a legislative conflict if the mayoral combined authority decided to increase spending, or to increase rights to services for social care, which a local authority has to pay for, without giving the local authority the opportunity to include that in its budget.

Will the Minister give us clarity, first, on accounting standards? The legislation mentions that local authorities should refer to guidance from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. CIPFA is not the only accepted accounting standard in the public sector, although it is generally a reliable one. Given our previous discussions and the evidence we have heard about access to local audit and financial advice, can the Minister confirm that accounting standards other than CIPFA will be accepted, if a local authority relies on them? Or will they have to be reframed within CIPFA? That will let the Committee and member authorities know exactly where they stand.

Secondly, while this is a fairly catch-all provision, there will be areas—we have seen this in Greater Manchester most recently—where central Government fund the investment and set-up of a new transport network but the ongoing running costs must be met by trading that service to local residents, and a large deficit emerges; essentially, the service runs at a significant loss. Especially if the underlying authority is a transport authority that issues freedom passes, that can have a significant financial impact. Essentially, council tax payers of one authority subsidise the costs of service delivery by a mayor.

We see significant elements of that in London under Mayor Khan. I think that was one reason why the Labour leader of Manchester city council spoke about how Manchester works and London does not. It would be helpful to have clarity—if necessary, in writing to the Committee—about how those trade-offs will be managed effectively, so that the capital costs of mayoral projects are not subsidised by the revenue or capital budgets of individual local authorities. Particularly with larger projects, mayoral authorities do not always have to meet the same tight financial requirements, especially in respect of things like education. It would be useful to know how that will be managed so that local authorities do not suddenly go bust because something emerges from the financial accounting arrangements between the new structures.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for his detailed, complicated questions. We will write in response, particularly on the public accounting standards.

We have set what we think is a good baseline. There will obviously be some flexibility for constituent authorities. The hon. Member will remember from the evidence session that the accountability and financial framework across local government is a current challenge, so we are looking to drive improved standards across the piece. That will apply to strategic authorities as much as to local authorities, but we will write fully in response.

On the wider question about the balance and the trade-off, our judgment is that for non-mayoral combined authorities, where constituent authorities operate together, we should put in those safeguards. In essence, constituent authorities act in concert, collectively, to make decisions. Whether it is a question of financial liabilities or transport budgets, it is right that all the constituent authorities provide consent. In the case of the mayor, however, our view is that because the mayor has his or her own democratic mandate and the ability to direct, that is separate from what we see in non-mayoral combined authorities.

Inevitably, there will be safeguards. In the evidence session, we heard really powerful evidence that the mayoral model works well when the mayor works in lockstep with constituent authorities and the two are aligned, with a strategy that they work around. We have seen examples of where the model does not work well, and we have had to go in and support and remediate the process when the mayor works without their individual local authorities. The model drives that. However, we think that there is something specific in the mayor’s democratic mandate; we have a model where there is a majority vote, with the mayor on the side of the majority, in order to drive through big strategic decisions.

[David Simmonds]

I am grateful to the Minister for undertaking to provide that clarity in writing. She said that there are differences between a mayoral authority and a combined authority without a mayor. We have seen a good case study in the Mayor of London’s decision that he wished to be seen to fund free school meals in primary schools, but the budget that is provided is less than the cost. School budgets, which are determined by the Department for Education, are subsidising the shortfall in the money provided by the mayor. We see posters on the tube saying that the mayor is funding this, but in fact the amount he provides is less than the cost. Probably all London MPs have had representations from schools that have said, “We are having to make staff redundant because of this shortfall. It’s a significant burden. It is causing a real cost.”

That is an example of where accounting and legal decision making sit across several different authorities. Although it is not the only ringfenced local authority grant, it would be helpful to have clarity about how the dedicated schools grant will be managed in a mayoral combined authority, so that we do not see a repeat of what happened in London with school budgets being raided to cover up a shortfall in a mayoral policy proposal.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am happy to provide that clarity in writing.

[The Chair]

The Minister has courteously and helpfully said that she will write regarding those specific questions. May I ask that that is done within the period in which we are considering the Bill, and made available to all Committee members?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Yes.

Amendment 62 agreed to.

Amendment made: 63, in schedule 1, page 80, line 19, at end insert—

“5A After section 105B insert—

‘105C Non-mayoral combined authority: functions imposing financial liability

(1) This section applies where a non-mayoral combined authority considers that the exercise of a function by the authority may result in a financial liability being incurred by one or more constituent council (each such council being a “relevant constituent council”).

(2) The function may only be exercised with the consent of each relevant constituent council.

(3) When deciding whether subsection (1) applies, the authority must have regard to the “Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the United Kingdom” published by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, as amended or reissued from time to time.’”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This restricts a non-mayoral combined authority from exercising a function that might impose a financial liability on any of its constituent councils unless those councils have given their consent.

Amendment proposed: 269, in schedule 1, page 80, line 20, leave out paragraph 6.—(David Simmonds.)

See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.

--- Later in debate ---

[Perran Moon]

I have had no commitments; I have had discussions with Ministers. We have had discussions about the difficulties with the proposals made here, with the potential for the Bill to become a hybrid Bill and the complications that that would bring. I am happy to keep talking to the Government in a spirit of openness, reflecting the views of every political party in Cornwall bar one. On that basis, I am content to keep talking. I cannot support the amendments because of the negative change that I think they would make to the nature of the Bill, so I will be voting against them.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I put on record my thanks to hon. Members who are championing specific areas that have a unique identity, which the Government completely recognise. On amendments 43 and 44, I pay tribute to the hon. Members who have been championing the Isle of Wight and its proud history. The Government understand and support the intent behind the amendments, but we will not be taking them forward. Let me explain why.

Earlier this year, Isle of Wight council, Hampshire county council, Portsmouth city council and Southampton city council submitted a joint expression of interest in the Government’s devolution priority programme. They went through a consultation process, based on the proposed name of Hampshire and the Solent. This was not imposed by the Government; it came as a proposal from the local area, and on that basis a public consultation was conducted.

It is worth saying that of the 6,000 responses we received, only a small minority commented specifically on the name of the proposed combined authority area. The Government’s response to that consultation is online, if hon. Members want to look at it. It is important to say that once it is established, it is completely open to any combined authority or combined county authority to change its name by resolution, with the consent of its members and using existing powers. That is already in the Bill. The Liverpool city region combined authority and the South Yorkshire mayoral combined authority have both changed their names in the same way. There was no constraint from Government; the powers are there. It is within the gift of local areas to go ahead and do that.

[Lewis Cocking]

The Minister mentions that 6,000 people replied to the consultation on Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, but that only a small number of respondents actually mentioned the name. How many people from the Isle of Wight responded to that consultation, and how many of them mentioned the name?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I do not have those figures, but we can write to the hon. Member with them. However, the principle remains that the power is there. It is within the gift of constituent authorities; it is not being imposed by Government. If there is a name change that the combined authority wants to take forward, it can take it forward. We have seen that in Liverpool and South Yorkshire. There is no constraint from us. It is a determination for, and with the consent of, the constituent authorities. It is within the gift of Hampshire and the Solent to make that change.

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister says that it is not the Government who are making sure that it happens. I accept that. However, having been in her position for only a short time—that is not her fault, as the fickle finger of fate has rested it on her shoulders—she may not know that the negotiation process that has taken place among the local authorities in Hampshire has not been smooth. There has been an overarching view that the county council, which has rushed towards accepting this devolution notwithstanding the impacts of the Government’s decision to push it forward, has not worked collaboratively. There is a wish for devolution, but in the minutiae it has been a very county council-dominated process.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne says, the reason that there has not been a huge uptake in response to the consultation is the flawed nature of the decision-making process. I ask the Minister not to rest on the consultation responses, because as my hon. Friend says, a number of people on the Isle of Wight simply did not bother to respond. It is not about the make-up of a geographical devolution settlement; it is about a name. I ask her to listen to the elected representatives on the Isle of Wight who serve in this House, who have asked for it, and to consider it again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Reader]

I declare that I am Hampshire born and bred, being from Romsey. I just ask: why are we so disrespectful of a place like Brownsea island? If it is called “Hampshire and the Isle of Wight”, what about the great Brownsea island, the home of our native red squirrels? Surely “Solent” is more inclusive for all the other islanders who live in the area beyond the Isle of Wight.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I say gently to hon. Members that we absolutely recognise the desire. I have had multiple conversations with the leader of Isle of Wight council, who was enthusiastic about this devolution deal. It is within the gift of constituent authorities to change their name; it is not for Government to impose. I hope that there is now a constructive conversation and relationship among the leaders of all the different parties. The leader is an independent politician, and I hope that in that spirit they will move forward.

I recognise the uniqueness of the name, but what really matters is what devolution will deliver for residents and constituent authorities. I hope that as much energy and time will be put into the nuts and bolts, the bread and butter, and the impact of what we are trying to do through devolution as will be put into the name. However, I recognise the particular sensitivities in relation to the Isle of Wight.

My hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth spoke about the issue of Cornwall. He has been a long-standing champion of Cornwall and its distinct identity. He has prosecuted the case incredibly effectively, not just in the context of this debate but across the piece. He is a proud Cornishman and I know that he wants the best for his constituents. I have put it on record in Committee, and I do so again, that we recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall. We are keen to continue engaging not just with my hon. Friend, but with other Cornish MPs, to ensure that we recognise that uniqueness and status and, critically, that we are doing a set of things that can enable local leaders to respond to the challenges—

[The Chair]

Order.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 305, in schedule 1, page 83, line 32, at end insert—

“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make an order under this section that has the effect of placing Cornwall in a combined authority with any other authority.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from making an order establishing a combined authority which would include Cornwall and any other area east of the Tamar in the same combined authority.

Amendment 43, in schedule 1, page 84, line 13, at end insert—

“(9A) If the order establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”

Amendment 306, in schedule 1, page 86, line 18, at end insert—

“(5A) Neither the added local government area nor the existing area of a combined authority in the order includes Cornwall.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from adding a local government area to an existing area of a combined authority if either area includes Cornwall.

Amendment 44, in schedule 1, page 86, line 32, at end insert—

“(7A) If the proposal establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement when directing the establishment of a new combined authority, setting out how the proposed combined authority would affect the physical geography, community identity and boundaries of other public services in the local area. I have no doubt that the intention of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon is absolutely right and that such matters are important; as I have said, the examples of the Isle of Wight and Cornwall highlight that. In practice, however, such matters will already have been considered through the process set out in the Bill.

In deciding whether to establish a new combined authority, the Secretary of State will already be required to have regard to the likely effect on the exercise of functions in neighbouring local government areas. In addition, the Secretary of State is already subject to the statutory tests requiring them to have regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to areas of competence. The proposal itself can be expected to cover those issues. There is therefore no need for a separate statement, and so I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

In our consideration of the issue, the Minister is asking the Committee to give a great deal of weight to the meetings she has described having had with various local leaders and Members with particular concerns about the impact on their local areas in terms of national identity, heritage and geography. Will she share with the Committee a little more detail on the substance of those discussions, so that before we vote we can understand what exact assurances may have been given to local leaders and what their understanding of them is, so that we are all completely clear?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

On Hampshire and Solent, for example, our conversation was very candid. The leaders were clear about some of the debates that they had had within the council; as the Minister, I said what opportunities would be open to them, and I expressed the fact that in the context of the Isle of Wight, the name was completely down to the constituent authorities. We support constituent authorities working together collaboratively to ensure that all the constituent parts are happy with the deal and the proposal.

On Cornwall, I believe that the Secretary of State, my boss, had those conversations, but I have also had some with MPs. We absolutely recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall and its identity. There are clear things that we know Cornish MPs and the council want, such as protection for the Cornish language, which we are in discussion about. There are clearly opportunities to build on the existing devolution deal. The previous Government provided a devolution deal for Cornwall in recognition of that exception. Another issue might be housing, which is big in Cornwall, for example, and the area is especially exercised about that, in particular in the context of the impact of tourism. We are happy to have a conversation about continuing to support the local authority to make inroads on some of those issues.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Once the Bill comes into force, there will be various ways in which functions can be conferred on a combined authority or combined county authority that will be operating as strategic authorities. The clause makes the necessary amendment to existing legislation to clarify these wider options. It is a small but important clause that will ensure our new devolution framework can operate effectively.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for that introduction. It is the implementation of this that is the subject of political contention, but a great deal has been said, and a vote has been taken. There is nothing further we can do on those issues at this stage, but I expect they will be the subject of great debate in the remaining stages of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Combined authorities and CCAs: decision-making and validity of proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Moving from devolution by deal to devolution by default is at the heart of the Bill. Clause 6 and schedule 2 are essential to achieving that. The Bill ensures that strategic authorities have a consistent set of functions, and these provisions standardise how they exercise those functions. Many existing strategic authorities have complex and varied arrangements for agreeing fundamentals such as budgets and transport plans. That makes it hard for the public to understand how decisions are made and, therefore, to hold the strategic authority to account.

The provisions in clause 6 and schedule 2 would create a transparent and consistent default voting arrangement—a simple majority. It would unblock decision making to ensure that the right decision, even if it is difficult, can be made. In mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. Mayors are directly accountable to all voters in their area, so it is right that decisions cannot be made if they disagree. The Government expect mayors and other strategic authority members to continue to work together to build consensus. We heard time and time again in the evidence sessions that the model works well when the mayor works in partnership with its constituent authorities, but it is important that one member cannot get in the way of the right decisions being made for the entire area. It is therefore imperative that clause 6 and schedule 2 remain within the Bill to ensure that mayoral strategic authorities can operate effectively, and to provide the public with clarity on how decisions are made, so they can hold these institutions to account.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I rise to speak to new clause 48, tabled in my name. I also want to raise another issue for consideration by the Minister at a future stage.

In clause 6, the new rules for mayoral combined authorities give simple majority voting for relevant decisions by bodies to adopt budgets or policies, such as spatial development strategies, local transport plans and other strategies set out elsewhere in the Bill. For example, schedule 2 outlines that

“a resolution to adopt the strategy is to be made by a simple majority of the constituent members present and voting”.

There are other rules to do with a tied vote.

I think that the Bill should also amend the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to give simple majority voting for decisions by the London Assembly on the budget and mayoral strategies of the Mayor of London. That is for consistency of decision making across the different authorities and bodies, and for fairness to London’s democracy. Along with many Opposition Members, this is something that I have wanted for some time now, as I was a member of the London Assembly in my previous job. In these Committee debates I will frequently bring up examples from my long experience of being part of an effective scrutiny body in a devolved authority at the strategic level—I feel that I have a good handle on how it works.

Using “a simple majority” is the right way to go about this. The Minister has talked about building consensus and working in partnership. I really value it when cross-party working can result in genuine dialogue, with mayors that will listen and make changes, and bodies scrutinising or working with them to put forward their own ideas and have them taken up. Those are all really healthy things for our democracy. New clause 48 would simply amend the parts of the 1999 Act that outline how the Assembly votes. Currently, the Act requires at least a two-thirds majority for any changes to be made, and the new clause would instead insert the words “a simple majority”. It is a very simple change, which the Minister should consider.

The second issue I want to raise relates to forward plans, which are incredibly useful for the general public, or anyone who wants to influence mayoral decisions and the decisions of combined authorities or local authorities. At the moment, only local authorities have this particular requirement written into law, under the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, which clearly set out how key decisions are to be included in forward plans. I am not talking about planning decisions but key decisions, as set out in the schemes of delegation. Those forward plans are required to be published in advance, so that people who want to influence or scrutinise those decisions can bid to change them, or for things to be taken into account at the appropriate time.

Again, this certainly comes out of my experience in the London Assembly. It unanimously passed a motion in 2022 that was put forward by one of the Liberal Democrat members and me, which said that the Mayor of London should publish a forward plan. However, he did not agree to do that, as he said that he was complying with everything in legislation; so the answer seems to be for legislation to require both the Mayor of London and these new combined authority mayors to publish a forward plan along the same lines. Looking at the 2012 regulations, it would be very simple to change the current wording, “local authorities”, to “strategic and local authorities”, if the Minister wanted.

I also point the Committee to the excellent report published last month by the GLA oversight committee, a cross-party committee currently chaired by a Labour member of the London Assembly. It makes exactly the same request: for a forward plan of key mayoral decisions to be put into the 1999 Act. Because of the complexities of the different regulations, I have not tabled an amendment for such a change, but I hope the Minister would consider the question of effective scrutiny of these new bodies and the ability to influence them. I hope she could potentially come forward with a new clause at a later stage for us.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition support the amendment; the principle of having a simple majority is sound. In oral evidence, we heard about why Manchester works and London does not, and there is a logic to implementing those measures consistently across the country. We support introducing that consistency.

There is a broader question, however. I understand what the Minister and the Government are trying to achieve; it would clearly be frustrating if one authority was effectively acting as a blocker. However, I asked the Minister earlier to give us some assurances about the treatment applied when financial impacts occur that affect one or more of the constituent authorities in a combined authority area. There will be cases—we have seen them in planning, for example—where an authority argues that to deliver its housing target, a site in another local authority’s area must be developed, because it does not have sufficient developable land to hit the target that it has been given; legally, it is not that authority’s decision. There will be other examples.

I am mindful of some of the Government’s amendments that introduce a lot more scope into this Bill for mayors and combined authorities to undertake their housing responsibilities. One of the main routes for funding is through borrowing against the housing revenue account, which is ringfenced. Each individual local authority has a legal duty to balance that account and the power to borrow against it; it also holds all of the legal housing duties and responsibilities. The purpose of the measures is to make mayors the vehicle for the delivery of asylum accommodation, as opposed to asylum hotels, as is the case now to some degree. Yesterday, on the Floor of the House, another Minister in the Department alluded to this in his response to a question about asylum accommodation.

Those decisions will have a significant impact on the legal obligations of the authorities that sit beneath the mayoral authority. There is a risk that being outvoted in a decision made at combined authority level would put an individual constituent authority in breach of its legal obligations to balance its dedicated schools grant, its housing revenue account or some other element of its council tax account. Will the Minister, either now or in writing, set out what arrangements will apply in the likely situation of a conflict between the legal obligations on a constituent authority to balance the budget and the strategic decisions put forward by the combined authority? How will the conflict be resolved without undue detriment to the constituent authority in particular, which is the one that will find itself in court?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to the amendment to clause 48, and then I will pick up the specific questions from the hon. Member. The GLA has a different and long-established governance model. In London, the mayor is elected by the people of London to make decisions; the Assembly’s role is to scrutinise those decisions. As a London MP, I think that model has worked well for London for well over 25 years. It is tested and it strikes the right balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the Assembly.

[Siân Berry]

It is notable that recently the London Assembly has, on a number of occasions, made constructive changes to the mayor’s budget at stage one of budget setting, which have simply been overturned at the second stage. This tendency, I think, is part of the growing need for a change in the threshold.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We think that the model works well. We have heard representations from constituents, local authorities, Assembly members, and the mayor himself. Any model needs to evolve; as we think about how we expand the powers of the mayor, which we want to, we will also be thinking about reforming the GLA to make it fit for purpose in the 21st century. We will take into consideration some of the points that have been made in this Committee.

On the specific question about decisions at the strategic authority level putting an individual local authority in breach of its legal obligations or jeopardising its financial viability, all our experience of combined authorities is that they always operate within the legal duties of constituent authorities. I struggle to think of an example where constituent authorities have been put in such a position by their mayor and the decisions of the collective. There are sufficient safeguards in place to mitigate that risk.

I hope that majority working will benefit the collective area. This Government will make sure that clear legal obligations on constituent authorities are not breached. I am happy to write to the hon. Member to provide further reassurance on that point. I think we agree that we want clear and effective decision making with a democratic mandate, that will not jeopardise individual authorities by forcing them to breach their legal requirements and/or putting them in financial distress.

[David Simmonds]

Let me give a concrete example: the long-standing proposal for Heathrow expansion airport. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out her absolute determination to ensure that happens, because it is part of her Government’s growth agenda. It is likely to be directed under these powers and in the purview of the Mayor of London, who will ultimately have some planning role in the decision making. However, as well as being the planning authority, the London borough of Hillingdon, within which Heathrow sits entirely, has legal duties in respect of air quality. It is already breaching those duties, which it has no means of fulfilling, simply because of that external factor.

If the Treasury and the Mayor of London were say to the combined authority, “In pursuit of the growth agenda with which we have been tasked, we are determined to see this expansion take place,” immediately that local authority would be put in significant legal jeopardy. To give an indication of the scale, when the Localism Act 2011 was debated and there was also interaction with European Union standards, it equated to an annual fine of £150 million to be paid by the legally responsible local authority. That is a significant jeopardy, and it is by no means the only one—in the case of special educational needs and disabilities obligations, for example, there are significant duties to pay compensation in the event of failure.

We can all envisage situations where a mayor decides that, for the good of everybody, they want an individual place to take a hit, but through the judicial review process that places that individual local authority at significant moral and financial risk. If the Minister sets out how those very significant and real risks will be addressed, I will be grateful.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for that very detailed and specific example. The concerns he raised have been heard and noted. Both in practice and principle, ensuring that no constituent authority is put in either financial or legal jeopardy underwrites all of this. I will take the hon. Member’s points away and write to provide the relevant reassurances.

[The Chair]

As I said this morning, Minister, if you are going to write to the Member, I would be grateful if you did so in a timely fashion and made that correspondence available to all members of the Committee for consideration.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 7

Combined authorities and CCAs: powers not limited by other provision or

powers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 7 is a small but important clause that supports the wiring of our new devolution framework. As hon. Members will know, the Bill introduces a systemic approach, ending one-off deals and creating a standardised devolution framework in which strategic authorities and mayors are given a clear and coherent set of functions. However, the Government recognise that it may, on very rare occasions, be necessary to tailor the exercise of specific functions to reflect local circumstances and to preserve the smooth running of public services. Clause 7 provides that existing powers that allow Ministers to modify how a function is exercised by an individual combined authority or county combined authority can continue. Exceptions will be rare, but this flexibility, where appropriate and necessary and where it reflects local circumstances, will be essential to ensure the smooth running of public services.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Combined authorities and CCAs: designation as established mayoral strategic authorities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The devolution White Paper set out our commitment to introduce a new category of established mayoral strategic authority, representing the highest level of devolution in England. The clause delivers on that commitment. It enables a mayoral strategic authority that meets the eligibility criteria set out in the English devolution White Paper to submit a written proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as an established mayoral strategic authority. Designation will provide a strategic authority with access to the highest level of powers and functions in the devolution framework, as well as the right to request additional devolved functions and eligibility to receive an integrated funding settlement.

In the event that a Secretary of State decided not to designate an authority as an established mayoral strategic authority, they would be required to notify the authority in writing of the reasons for their decision. It would remain open to the authority to submit a fresh request at some future point. Importantly, once an authority has been designated as an established mayoral strategic authority, it will not be possible for Ministers to remove its status through secondary legislation. In that way, we will hardwire the powers and functions of established mayoral strategic authorities into our system of government, future-proofing arrangements against unnecessary change and ensuring permanent and enduring devolution.

[David Simmonds]

I draw the Committee’s attention to a topic to which we will return throughout our proceedings: the extent to which the devolution legislation is about the powers of the Secretary of State to designate this or direct that. Ironically, we are embarked on a course of action that started with us hearing about how it was going to be locally led, despite all evidence to the contrary, yet as we proceed, we have clause after clause and paragraph after paragraph referring to new powers for the Government to make local authorities do this or to direct them to do that. It is clearly not in the spirit of devolution.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause does two things. The proposal to become an established mayoral strategic authority will come up from the locality. The power is about the ability of the Secretary of State to designate it as such at its request; it is not about the Secretary of State imposing the status on any area. Critically, it will lock in the established mayoral authority for good, and will, in fact, contain and curtail the power of future Secretaries of State to decide that they will change the status of an established mayoral authority, therefore locking in devolution for the long term.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Appointment of commissioners by mayors

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 9, page 11, line 19, leave out from “function” to “, or” in line 20.

This would omit this wording is because of its replacement by the new section 30A(2) of LURA 2023 (see Amendment 220).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 69.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Government amendments 68 and 69 are consequential to Government amendment 220, which we will discuss later. Government amendment 220 will ensure that responsibility for fire and rescue functions sits directly with the elected mayor, who can delegate them only to a public safety commissioner and not to deputies or officers, thereby strengthening accountability. Government amendments 68 and 69 simply remove wording that will be superseded should Government amendment 220 be accepted.

Amendment 68 agreed to.

Amendment made: 69, in clause 9, page 12, line 7, leave out from “function” to “, or” in line 8.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would omit this wording is because of its replacement by the new section 107DZA(2) of LDEDCA 2009 (see Amendment 220).

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Policy delivery in areas of competence—

“(1) Any function of a mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority which—

(a) relates to an area of competence, and

(b) is not a mayoral function exercisable solely by the mayor

must be exercised by or under the direct authority of the constituent members of that authority.

(2) No person may be appointed to exercise any function that relates to making or delivering policy relating to an area of competence unless that person is an elected member of—

(a) the relevant strategic authority, or

(b) a constituent council within the relevant strategic authority.

(3) Nothing in this section is to be taking as preventing the appointment of staff by the strategic authority or its elected members for the purposes of administrative, advisory or technical support for the exercise of its functions.

(4) For the purposes of this section, ‘constituent members’ means any elected representative who is—

(a) appointed by a constituent council to be a member of the mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority;

(b) any person acting in the place of a person appointed under paragraph (a).”

This new clause provides that any policy delivery or development relating to an area of competence in a strategic authority is carried out by an elected representative.

New clause 21—Power to provide for an elected mayor to appoint a deputy mayor—

“(1) The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (section 107C) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), leave out ‘one of the members of the authority to be the mayor’s deputy’ and substitute ‘a deputy mayor’.

(3) In subsection (3)(c), leave out ‘the person ceases to be a member of the combined authority’ and insert ‘the person ceases to be a councillor of a constituent council of the authority’

(4) In subsection (4), leave out ‘another member of the combined authority’ and substitute ‘another councillor of a constituent council’.”

This new clause would amend section 107C of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 so that a mayor is no longer restricted to appointing a deputy mayor from among the leaders of the constituent local authority members of the Combined Authority.

New clause 22—Mayoral special advisers—

“(1) The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (section 15) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 15 (Definition of ‘special adviser’ insert—

‘15A Mayoral special advisers

(1) A mayor may appoint one mayoral special adviser.

(2) A mayoral special adviser is a person who holds a position within a mayoral strategic authority and whose appointment to that position meets the requirements in subsection (3).

(3) The requirements are—

(a) the mayoral special adviser is appointed to assist the Mayor after being selected by the Mayor personally;

(b) the appointment will end not later than—

(i) the day on which the Mayor ceases to hold office, or

(ii) if earlier, the end of the day after the day of the poll at the election following the appointment.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish a code of conduct for mayoral special advisers (“the code”).

(5) Before publishing the code (or any revision of it) the Secretary of State must consult the Council of Nations and Regions.

(6) The code must provide that a mayoral special adviser may not—

(a) authorise the expenditure of public funds; or

(b) exercise any power in relation to the management of any part of the mayoral or strategic authority.

(7) The code must provide that a mayoral special adviser may—

(a) engage in political activity; and

(b) provide party-political advice to the Mayor.

(8) The code must form part of the terms and conditions of service of any mayoral special adviser.

(9) A person appointed under this section is not to be regarded, for the purposes of Part I of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (political restriction of officers and staff), as holding a politically restricted post under a local authority.’”

This new clause would insert a new section into the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 to establish a statutory framework for the appointment of “mayoral special advisers”. It makes provision about appointment, function, code of conduct, and exemption from political restrictions.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The public rightly expect that mayoral strategic authorities will have access to the expertise they need, that they will work with businesses and other stakeholders, and that mayors will work full time to deliver for their communities. Mayoral strategic authorities will undertake critical new functions, including a stronger set of planning, transport and skills powers and, increasingly, police, fire and public health duties. The authorities will also represent their region in engagement with national bodies, and undertake joint working with partners. It is simply not realistic to expect a single mayor to do all that on their own.

The appointment of commissioners will be a local decision and no additional funding will be provided. I will gladly take Members’ questions now, but when we discuss schedule 3 in four groups’ time, I will expand on some of the checks and balances we are introducing to ensure that commissioners add real value to local decision making. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

The name of the Bill promises devolution and community empowerment, yet a number of its clauses cause the Liberal Democrats some concern, and this is one. A key principle of democracy, local or national, is to have elected people—Ministers, Members of Parliament or councillors—delivering for the people who elect them. It makes little sense that a mayor of a combined county authority or combined authority, with dozens or scores of skilled constituent councillors and council leaders beneath them, might instead choose to appoint a commissioner to such an important role.

We heard in oral evidence from Councillor Bev Craig about the model used in Manchester, where the leaders of the constituent councils perform one of the portfolios. That strikes me as much more appropriate in a large strategic authority, where each of those individuals has skin in the game. There is no reason why a mayoral authority should not operate in the same way as large unitary authorities do. Mine represents more than 400,000 people and does not require a commissioner to look at planning, although it does have a head of planning—a paid member of staff. Policy decisions have in the English system traditionally been made by politicians, so I struggle to see why creating a new layer of authorities, further away from people, should take away the principle that such decisions should be made by elected people.

Some have suggested that there are not enough constituent council leaders in some areas—perhaps areas that have only three or four council leaders. There are some incredible deputy leaders and portfolio holders. There may be a case for drawing from a broader pool, but suggesting that those people are not sufficiently qualified in understanding their area or area of expertise could damage the respect that council leaders have in their area, as well as the connection between a constituent council and the strategic authority that sits above it. If we want constituent councils to drive better strategic decisions and better strategic outcomes for all residents, it would be much more sensible to give those individuals a real role in the authority. Given the way that additional responsibility allowances are scheduled, that can be a lot cheaper, because the Bill does not provide for people to have the double allowances that we already have in other parts of the system.

If we bring in external individuals as commissioners, there will be few checks and balances; they are not democratically accountable. The mayor may well be able to remove them, as is detailed in the Bill, but the public cannot remove them. Fundamentally, the people who are making policy decisions should be able to be removed by the public. They should also be held to the standards regime, as well as the other elements of conflicts of interest and financial declarations that councillors must follow.

I think that is all I want to say, but I feel really strongly that a model is there, such as the one in Manchester. We have heard about London evolving over time, but we have some great models running in the country. To me, it seems a sensible way forward to look at what they are doing in Greater Manchester, which is already incredibly successful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I am attempting in my speech not to be too biased towards what I am used to, because that is a failing as well. We should discuss this in a very open way. Other new clauses I have tabled contain proposals for things such as a citizens assembly. We should look at international examples as well. When there are proposals to spend a significant amount of money on the commissioners, there is value in spending an appropriate amount on decent scrutiny and elected representatives. Again, I am biased—I am an elected representative. I think we are good value, but that is a case to be made.

Finally, I cannot find any mention in schedule 3 about guidance that the Secretary of State may issue to commissioners about conduct, standards and transparency. I would like some reassurance from the Minister about guidance on those aspects of the job. Even if they are not elected, they are accountable to the public and must be given a process and regime of standards, and potentially be brought into existing standards systems. Without scrutiny, standards and regulations to govern their behaviour, I worry about this in the same way as several other Members today have.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Commissioners can and will support mayors in getting the job done for their communities. They are not compulsory. There is no obligation on a mayor to appoint commissioners, but it gives the mayor the option of increasing capacity and expertise to do that. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about the example of Greater Manchester, where they have council leaders who are portfolio leads. It is worth pointing out that Manchester also uses commissioners—for example, on active travel—so it can be complementary or can supplement. It is just giving them an additional set of levers in order to respond.

It is also worth pointing out that there will be some roles that the mayor has accountability for that they simply cannot delegate to councillors—for example, strategic planning powers, where direct delegation to a commissioner might expand the mayor’s capacity to dispense with that responsibility. However, to the point about checks and balances, which has been made time and again, it is important to be clear that we completely agree on the need for accountability for commissioners. They will be accountable to the mayor for their performance, who has the power to terminate their appointment, and the combined authority or combined county authority must also agree before any non-mayoral functions are delegated to the commissioner. Critically, the combined authority or combined county authority overview and scrutiny committee will also have the power to recommend the termination of commissioners if they think the commissioner is not performing or delivering. A two-thirds majority of members of the authority is required to accept that recommendation.

[Siân Berry]

Does the Minister believe that the people who are able to recommend that the commissioner be terminated have sufficient ways to discover whether or not they should be?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Member made the point about the scrutiny of commissioners, which is a fair and valid point, and my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire made the point about flexibility in different contexts, particularly for smaller strategic authorities. We have come at this in such a way as to allow local areas as much flexibility as possible, but these are valid points about making sure that the model is flexible enough to respond to specific contexts. We will provide further detail in statutory guidance on the selection and appointment of commissioners, as well as other operational matters that the combined authority or combined county authority will need to consider, and we will take some of the points that have been raised as we do that in due course.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

The Minister talks about our scrutiny committees being able to recommend the termination of commissioners. Has she given any thought to their involvement in the appointment of commissioners? For example, currently, those appointed as deputy police and crime commissioners have to appear before the police and crime panel, which makes a recommendation to the police and crime commissioner about their suitability for the role. Has the Minister given any thought to how scrutiny committees can get involved before someone takes on the commissioner role, rather than waiting to see if they are good or not and then making a recommendation to the mayor?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We have done this through the constituent members of the combined authority, so that before an appointment can be made, the full combined authority will need to agree to that appointment. We think that provides sufficient safeguards and the ability to scrutinise; however, the point about how we ensure ongoing scrutiny of the work being done and the performance by more than the mayor and the combined authority is a fair point, and we will take it away.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

The commissioners are not accountable to the public; they are accountable to the mayor, who will of course be elected. The Minister talks about scrutiny, but what about holding them to account on public standards? What kind of framework is there to ensure trust in these commissioners?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

All holders of public office have to adhere to public standards; that is as true for national Government as it is for regional and local government. We expect those standards to apply, and the safeguards we are putting in place by enabling the mayor to terminate based on performance or poor conduct will ensure that they are upheld.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Commissioners

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 70, in schedule 3, page 111, line 33, at end insert—

“(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.”

This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 71).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 71, 73 and 74.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The amendments will prevent a commissioner from exercising certain fire and rescue functions that should be reserved as functions of the mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority in the area. The effective delegation of fire and rescue functions to a commissioner can ease capacity constraints on the mayor, by ensuring that there is a dedicated individual with the time and expertise to focus on executing those functions. Fire and rescue functions are already delegated successfully to deputy mayors for policing and crime in Greater Manchester and in York and North Yorkshire. The ability to delegate to a commissioner, without the need for secondary legislation, simplifies that process. If they wish, mayors will be able to make an existing deputy mayor for policing and crime the public safety commissioner, meaning that individual could lead on both policing and fire.

However, certain functions should be the sole responsibility of an elected mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority. The retained functions are those with the most significant bearing on the strategic direction of the fire service, such as its budget, its risk plan, and the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer. It is important that these decisions are taken right at the top, and that the person taking them is accountable at the ballot box.

These amendments provide for the effective delegation of fire and rescue functions. They ensure that decisions are taken at the right level and support the Government’s commitment to ensure that our communities are safe.

Amendment 70 agreed to.

Amendment made: 71, in schedule 3, page 112, line 3, at end insert—

“(6) In this paragraph “excepted fire and rescue functions” means—

(a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004—

(i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes);

(ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters);

(iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others);

(b) the functions of—

(i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;

(ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer;

(iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service;

(c) approving—

(i) the community risk management plan;

(ii) the fire and rescue declaration;

(d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—

(i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and

(ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;

(e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of—

(i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise);

(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.

(7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph—

“Category 1 responder” and “Category 2 responder” have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental);

“chief fire officer” means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service;

“community risk management plan” means a plan which—

(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and

(b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework—

(i) the combined authority’s priorities and objectives, and

(ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the combined authority’s fire and rescue functions;

“emergency” has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of “emergency”);

“fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004;

“fire and rescue declaration” means a document which—

(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and

(b) contains a statement of the way in which the combined authority has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the combined authority for that period;

“fire and rescue functions” means—

(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the combined authority has by virtue of an order under section 105A, or

(b) functions which the combined authority has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004;

“Fire and Rescue National Framework” means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004;

“fire and rescue service” means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under—

(a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety);

(b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting);

(c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents);

(d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies);

(e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act;

(f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority;

“FRSA 2004” means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 70.

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move amendment 293, in schedule 3, page 112, line 16, at end insert—

“(2A) The relevant remuneration panel may not recommend allowances which exceed the amount paid in salary to a person employed at director level within the relevant authority.”.

This amendment ensures that Commissioners cannot be paid more than Directors working for the authority.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I understand the issue that the hon. Member is highlighting. One thing that emerged from the debate about councillor pensions was that they were essentially taken away by a decision of Parliament, without the process of legislation. One of the risks here is that statutory guidance, robust as it can be and coming with a duty to “have regard”, can be changed quite quickly. Therefore, if this is not clearly set out on the face of the Bill, the ability of this Parliament and of local communities, as we are observing, to exercise the degree of accountability and scrutiny that they might wish is undermined. That is why we have proposed these amendments.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for his thoughtful contribution on this critical question of how to ensure value for money in the remuneration of commissioners. It is important that allowances paid to commissioners accurately reflect the work they do but also represent value for money. We completely agree with that principle. That is why the Bill, as drafted, has a clear process for setting the allowances of commissioners. The relevant authority must consider a report by a relevant remuneration panel, and payments cannot exceed the amount specified in that report.

Ultimately, what commissioners are paid is a local decision, and we have crafted the measures for that, but it is a decision that needs to be made in alignment with recommendations, as is the practice across local government. Adding a further requirement that commissioners cannot be paid more than directors would reduce local autonomy in decision making and would pre-emptively undermine the relevant remuneration panel. The Bill is about empowering places, but what we can and will consider is how we set up statutory guidance to provide clarity about what is possible and to deal with some of the potential pitfalls that the hon. Member has raised.

Amendment 292 seeks to place a duty on remuneration panels to consider and make recommendations about the local government pension scheme. Again, I understand the intent behind the amendment and the importance of ensuring that public officials in local government are properly remunerated and incentivised. However, I do not believe the amendment necessarily advances that.

We value the work that remuneration panels do to make considered recommendations about allowances that should be paid locally. However, overall access and eligibility to the local government pension scheme is dealt with at national level. It is therefore not clear what value the amendment would add, which is why I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw it.

[David Simmonds]

I have listened intently to what the Minister has said. I think the risk is that, if things are delegated to statutory guidance, what emerges later on will not meet the expectations set out in the debate. I will therefore push for a vote on these amendments.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 72, in schedule 3, page 112, line 23, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 and insert—

“Ending of appointment

8A The appointment of a person as a commissioner ends if—

(a) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 2(2), 4(3) or 5,

(b) the appointment ends—

(i) in accordance with the terms and conditions included by virtue of paragraph 6(1), or

(ii) in accordance with paragraph 6(2),

(c) the appointment is terminated in accordance with its terms and conditions—

(i) by the mayor for the area of the CCA (whether that is the person who made the appointment or a successor), or

(ii) by the commissioner,

(d) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 10(4), or

(e) the commissioner dies.”

This would state the ways in which the appointment of a commissioner can end.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 75.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Simply, these amendments set out the ways in which a commissioner’s appointment can end. Specifically, it can end if the appointment is invalid, if the person becomes ineligible, if the term of the appointment ends, if the appointment is terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions, if a recommendation to terminate the commissioner’s appointment is accepted, or if the commissioner passes away.

We have talked about the accountability mechanisms that we are putting in place to ensure that commissioners play the role they should play, but they are accountable to the mayor. We have also talked about the role of the scrutiny committee in providing oversight and recommendations about termination.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Amendments made: 73, in schedule 3, page 116, line 40, at end insert—

“(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.”

This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 74).

Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 117, line 10, at end insert—

“(6) In this paragraph ‘excepted fire and rescue functions’ means—

(a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004—

(i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes);

(ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters);

(iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others);

(b) the functions of—

(i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;

(ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer;

(iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service;

(c) approving—

(i) the community risk management plan;

(ii) the fire and rescue declaration;

(d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—

(i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and

(ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;

(e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of—

(i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise);

(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.

(7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph—

‘Category 1 responder’ and ‘Category 2 responder’ have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental);

‘chief fire officer’ means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service;

‘community risk management plan’ means a plan which—

(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and

(b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework—

(i) the CCA’s priorities and objectives, and

(ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the CCA’s fire and rescue functions;

‘emergency’ has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of ‘emergency’);

‘fire and rescue authority’ means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004;

‘fire and rescue declaration’ means a document which—

(a) is prepared and published by the CCA in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and

(b) contains a statement of the way in which the CCA has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the CCA for that period;

‘fire and rescue functions’ means—

(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the CCA has by virtue of regulations under section 19, or

(b) functions which the CCA has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004;

‘Fire and Rescue National Framework’ means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004;

‘fire and rescue service’ means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under—

(a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety);

(b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting);

(c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents);

(d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies);

(e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act;

(f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority;

‘FRSA 2004’ means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”

This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 73.

Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 117, line 31, leave out from beginning to end of line 36 and insert—

“Ending of appointment

8A The appointment of a person as a commissioner ends if—

(a) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 2(2), 4(3) or 5,

(b) the appointment ends—

(i) in accordance with the terms and conditions included by virtue of paragraph 6(1), or

(ii) in accordance with paragraph 6(2),

(c) the appointment is terminated in accordance with its terms and conditions—

(i) by the mayor for the area of the combined authority (whether that is the person who made the appointment or a successor), or

(ii) by the commissioner,

(d) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 10(4), or

(e) the commissioner dies.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would state the ways in which the appointment of a commissioner can end.

Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 10

Combined authorities and CCAs: allowances for members with special responsibilities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause will ensure that all combined authorities and combined county authorities can pay their members an allowance where they take on special responsibility for the combined authority or the combined county authority. Constituent council members regularly take on important additional responsibilities, particularly leading on policy portfolios such as housing or transport. We heard from the leader of Manchester city council about the important role she plays for that combined authority. They are crucial in driving forward local policy, ensuring that it meets the needs and aspirations of our communities. Indeed, their role will grow in importance as we increase the powers and functions available to combined authorities and combined county authorities.

However, currently, constituent council members can be paid for such special responsibilities only by their council, not the combined authority or combined county authority. This simply is not right; members should not be expected to do important work for free, and constituent councils should not foot the bill for work done in service of another body. Ensuring that the combined authority or combined county authority can pay its members creates a fairer system, allowing areas to recognise and reward hard work that delivers for communities. To ensure transparency and accountability, pay will be determined following a report by an independent remuneration panel.

[David Simmonds]

I draw the Minister’s attention to the existing arrangements for independent remuneration panels. She has referenced the proposals for how this kind of situation will be handled. However, we can envisage circumstances such as those that we heard about in Greater Manchester, where the mayoral commissioners are effectively drawn from the leadership of those local authorities.

There is a degree of ambiguity in proposed new sections 52A(6) and 113E(6), which refer to allowances paid

“in respect of the same special responsibilities”.

For example, I think of a situation where someone is a cabinet member with responsibility for transport in a constituent authority and also undertakes a strategic transport role as part of the combined authority. We as politicians would recognise that those are two different things, in the same way that a Minister undertaking duties in the Government is paid separately from their role as a Member of Parliament because those two things are distinct.

Transparency and clarity are important to retaining public confidence. Clearly, we do not want to create a situation where there is a degree of dispute, such as where a mayoral combined authority expects the constituent council to pay, or vice versa, and where an individual who wishes to take up those duties is inhibited from doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out how the statutory guidance will address that issue so the Committee can be confident that we will not see this act as a barrier to participation in the governance of these new authorities.

[Sam Carling]

I have some more thrilling financial commentary, so I hope the Committee will forgive me. First, I welcome what the Minister has just said. Exactly this situation happened in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, where our mayor went on medical leave for some time. His deputy, Councillor Anna Smith, who is a good friend of mine, ended up taking on the deputy mayoral role, so she had to drop hours at work and faced a significant loss of income. Our council took the decision to pay her as essentially a cabinet member, but it was not ideal. Clause 10 will resolve so many issues.

I want to highlight a discrepancy in that, at present, there is usually no allowance for members who sit on the combined authority board. A lot of the time, it is the leader of the council who does so, and it is often considered to be part of their portfolio, but it is not always leaders who sit on the board. That can lead to people taking on a very significant commitment without any financial support, despite potentially having to reduce hours at work and the like, if the councillor in question has a job, as many do. That is not conducive to having a diverse range of elected representatives to do these jobs.

Following local government reorganisation, if we have fewer leaders on boards and more holders of other portfolios and councillors, we may see this problem increase. I encourage the Minister to consider either altering the clause or making other provisions as the Bill progresses to allow combined authorities, if they wish, to pay an allowance to their board members for that role.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner and the context in which that could arise. Our judgment is that if the independent remuneration committee does its job, we can mitigate around that. There is always a balance. We are trying to live the spirit of the Bill and to create as much autonomy, space and power for the mayor and constituent authorities to make such decisions, rather than us specifying nationally. As we get representations from strategic authorities going through the process, we will reflect that in statutory guidance, but we think we have the right balance. The important role that the remuneration committee will play will help to mitigate some of the risks the hon. Member mentioned.

On the specific example raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire, we are not prohibiting elected members from sitting on the combined authority. It is within the gift of the combined authority. Again, we are giving as much flexibility as possible for an authority to come up with measures that work for a particular local area.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: precepts

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 82, in clause 11, page 14, leave out from line 35 to line 13 on page 15 and insert—

“(a) omit subsection (11)(a);

(b) in subsection (11)(b), for ‘that section’ substitute ‘section 107G of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009’;

(c) omit subsection (12)(a);

(d) in subection 12(b), for ‘that section’ substitute ‘section 41 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023’.”

This removes the restriction on mayoral combined authorities and mayoral CCAs only being able to issue a precept in connection with mayoral functions.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 76 and 79.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The amendment updates the clause to ensure that mayors have the power to precept across all their functions. It replaces the provisions added to the Local Government Finance Act 1992 by the Bill, which needed clarification. The amendment will mean that, by virtue of being major precepting authorities, combined authorities and combined county authorities will have the power to precept across all their functions. It repeals provisions that previously restricted that precepting power to specific functions. The amendment more effectively meets the policy intention to allow mayors to precept for everything that they are required to do. That will give mayors more flexibility in how to fund mayoral priorities to create growth and improve local services.

Government amendments 76 and 79 provide that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act is a function exercisable only by the mayor, and that that is the case for mayoral and non-mayoral functions. By removing restrictions from the existing legislation, the amendments will establish that precepting is a function of the mayor for expenditure relating to mayoral and non-mayoral functions, meeting the original policy intention. It has always been the intention of the Government that issuing a mayoral council tax precept should be a function of the mayor alone. The amendments will ensure that that will be the case and will ensure that mayors can precept across all their functions.

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Further, let us consider our recent debates following last year’s Budget and local government finance settlement, and the consultations that are going on for local authorities around the country at the moment. Ministers have now admitted that baked into that settlement is an assumption of the maximum possible rises in council tax, before Government provide any additional resource. Clearly, this provision opens the door to using the mayoral precept to extract further local taxes to fund central Government priorities, rather than central Government shouldering that responsibility. That should concern every citizen and resident in this country, especially given the risk of a lack of accountability that comes with it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I would just point out to the hon. Gentleman that the mayoral precept was introduced in 2017 by a Conservative Government, and that mayors are directly elected. Like Members of Parliament, mayors are not immune to political pressures around tax rises, and examples across the country show that mayors are as thoughtful about the right balance between investing in their services and managing tax increases as national politicians—in fact, when we think about the record of the last Government, perhaps more so.

[David Simmonds]

That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it.

Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.

[Vikki Slade]

I have no principled objection to the mayor setting a precept. I found it confusing when I heard Mayor Houchen explain how he had a zero precept. How does anything get done? Where does the money come from? [Interruption.] I am sure he has a salary, and I am sure he has an extensive office that is paid for by someone. I accept that the principle of a precept is, in some respects, self-limiting, but what bothers me is that the combined authority mayors have no referendum cap, unlike upper-tier, lower-tier, police and crime or fire authorities.

It is fire authorities I particularly want to speak to, because although some Government amendments have been tabled on the role of the mayor in terms of fire and rescue, there is almost silence in the Bill about the role of the fire and rescue service, while embracing it completely and almost making the whole service disappear. I am really concerned that fire authorities are already desperately under-resourced. Dorset and Wiltshire Fire and Rescue Service gets £1.76 a week per household. It has desperately been trying to get a 20p per week increase, but has been told, “No, you can’t have that.” There is nothing in the Bill that protects and ringfences any money for fire services, whereas there is more talk about police services. I am looking for some reassurance and commitment about how fire services funding will be properly resourced and ringfenced to make sure that no area suffers as when we had those horrendous wildfires, where fire services had to beg, borrow and steal equipment.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are all hugely sympathetic to the funding of fire and rescue—as we see climate change, the imperative of fire and rescue services is key—but it is outside the scope of the Bill. We believe that we have the balance right between allowing precepting powers for mayors and allowing democratic accountability by which the electorate can hold any mayor and politician to account.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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This provides that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 in respect of expenditure relating to the functions of a mayoral combined authority is a function exercisable by the mayor acting on behalf of the authority.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from “consists” to the end of that paragraph substitute “includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,”.”

This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral combined authority has PCC functions as to how the components of the authority’s council tax calculation which relate to the authority’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 78, 80 and 81.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The amendment relates to where a mayor has police and crime commissioner functions: secondary legislation about the arrangements for setting the precept must provide that the police and crime commissioner component is ringfenced. Where a mayor has police and crime functions for more than one police and crime commissioner area, secondary legislation must provide that there is a separate police and crime component for each area. The legislation currently provides that there must be separate components for police and crime administrative functions and for mayoral general functions.

The amendments mean that Ministers have the flexibility to provide for either one component for non-police and crime functions, or multiple separate components for different types of non-police and crime functions. I hope Members are following. This gives Ministers the option to direct how precept spending on non-police and crime functions is accounted for, by setting this out clearly in secondary legislation. In doing so, they will be able to ensure that the precept is accounted for in ways that best reflect how the precept should be spent—whether that means allowing for full flexibility across the non-police and crime component, or ringfencing money to be used for certain functions.

Amendments 78 and 81 will give the Secretary of State the ability to make an order about the preparation of budgets for all an authority’s functions. The provision in the Bill currently only provides that power in relation to the mayor’s general functions. This needs to be updated to align with the expanded mayoral precepting powers introduced by the Bill. This allows Ministers to set out the procedures that should be followed in the preparation and calculation of a budget.

By enabling Ministers to set clear direction on the preparation of budgets and the calculation of precepts, these amendments allow for consistent processes to be set across the sector, to give full effect to the expanded precepting powers.

[David Simmonds]

I have two questions for the Minister. First, given that these budgets, and the precepts that the amendments relate to, will sit within that bit of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, will the requirement for budgets to be balanced in-year apply to all the accounts that the Secretary of State will be giving direction to?

The second question—the Minister may wish to write to the Committee on this—is, will the consistency that she referred to be introduced by giving the Secretary of State individual, and in effect case-by-case, power to issue these directions for different authorities? Clearly, our concern is that if the door has been opened to, in effect, unlimited precept rises, and these were to be used by the Secretary of State to bail out a significant amount of debt in one of these reorganised local authorities—which I know is a significant concern of many of the local authorities that are proposing reorganisation—that would not apply everywhere.

There are certain parts of the country where there are very high levels of debt, and others where those levels of debt do not exist at all. It would be, in effect, a condition of those constituent authorities’ doing the devolution at all that they were not asked to bear that cost. Yet this Bill introduces a back-door power for the Secretary of State to direct that they would go down that route. How do the Government propose to ensure that that is forestalled, so that they can have the assurances that they would need as a necessary minimum?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

There are two processes that I, as the Minister for devolution, as opposed to the Minister for local government reorganisation, am constantly keen to emphasise. There is a devolution process and there is a local government reorganisation process, which my colleague the Minister for Local Government and Homelessness, my hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Alison McGovern), is taking forward. We know that some authorities are in a difficult financial position as part of that, and we are having a conversation with those authorities in the context of the proposals they are putting forward. That is still very distinct from what we are trying to do through the devolution process, and it is important that colleagues do not conflate the two.

What I would say on the wider questions that the hon. Gentleman raised is that there is nothing that we are proposing to do through the Bill that denudes or undermines the standards for financial prudence and financial accountability that sit across the local government landscape.

[David Simmonds]

Turning to the question of how a mayoral precept will be used under this group of amendments that the Government have tabled, if we think of the reorganisation in Thurrock or Surrey, both those local authority areas contain a single authority that has a very high level of capital borrowing, or a high level of debt. Those authorities have been assured that there will be three years’ worth of revenue support; in effect, there will be a Government grant to cover the revenue cost of the borrowing for three years. However, the borrowing cost is extended over 40 or 50 years, so there will be a very long period of time where, as things currently stand, that local authority will be expected to meet that cost, when it comes into being.

Clearly, one way of doing that is for the Secretary to State to say, “You will raise your precept, and that is how we will deal with the debt,” but that runs contrary to the proposals for devolution where those authorities have said, “We will do this, but it is simply not fair or ethical for us to accept those debts on to our books.” I am just seeking an assurance from the Minister that either the existing provisions that require the in-year balancing will apply, in which case the Government will deal with this prior to the devolution arrangement coming into existence, or the provisions will not apply, in which case those authorities need to be mindful that the likely consequence of devolution will be a massive increase in the precept levy purely for the purpose of paying off someone else’s debt.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

To answer the specific question, yes, in-year balancing will apply. The purpose of the precepting function is to allow the mayor to invest in key things that will drive the economic prosperity of the area and the core functions that we have set out in the Bill. It would be a very brave mayor who chose to raise the precept not to deliver on that. In the end, they are democratically elected, and it will be for their residents and constituents to show them the consequences of that at the ballot box.

Amendment 77 agreed to.

Amendments made: 78, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the authority (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”

This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a combined authority to prepare an annual budget in relation to the authority’s functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.

Amendment 79, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (2), omit ‘in respect of mayoral functions’.”

This provides that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 in respect of expenditure relating to the functions of a mayoral CCA is a function exercisable by the mayor acting on behalf of the CCA.

Amendment 80, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from ‘consists’ to the end of that paragraph substitute ‘includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,’.”

This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral CCA has PCC functions as to how the components of the CCA’s council tax calculation which relate to the CCA’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.

Amendment 81, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the CCA (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a CCA to prepare an annual budget in relation to the CCA functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Power to borrow

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 12, page 16, line 24, at end insert—

“(9AA) A combined authority or CCA must provide a report to the Secretary of State to lay before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing the reasons for which they are seeking consent to exercise the power conferred by section 1.”

This amendment would require the combined authority or CCA to lay a report before Parliament detailing the reasons for which they are seeking the Secretary of State’s consent for exercise of the powers conferred by section 1 on mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA.

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[Manuela Perteghella]

No, the amendment is not kicking anything into the long grass. We have to get the Bill—this devolution—right. It is all about accountability, as I said when we were discussing the commissioners. This is a big change. Some of the Committee will already have unitary authorities and I will talk later about devolved Administrations, but for my constituency, that will be new. We need to get it right. Going back to the cost, that will be smaller compared with the cost of what could go wrong.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will speak to clause stand part and amendment 83 before responding directly to amendment 20. On the clause, all existing mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities have powers to borrow for all their functions. That allows them to invest in economically productive infrastructure. Unlike for local authorities, the existing process for confirming the power to borrow money on mayoral combined and mayoral combined county authorities is by making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. To confirm such powers by bespoke statutory instrument is highly inefficient and slow. The clause streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and county authorities for purposes relevant to all their functions. It preserves existing safeguards by requiring them to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Government amendment 83 is minor and technical. It simply clarifies that the reference to section 12 coming into force relates to clause 12 of the Bill. Amendment 20 would require a combined authority or combined county authority to produce a report, to be laid before the House by the Secretary of State, detailing the reasons for which they are seeking consent to exercise borrowing powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury and Opposition Members have pointed out, this would be an onerous, costly and time-consuming process. The amendment is well-intentioned, but we do not think it necessary.

Like the rest of local government, combined authorities and combined county authorities must operate within the prudential framework, which comprises statutory duties and codes that are intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. The framework already provides robust mechanisms of oversight and accountability. In addition, the exercise of borrowing powers by mayoral combined authorities and county authorities to date has not raised issues. Amendment 20 also contradicts the Bill’s aim of furthering devolution and increasing financial autonomy for these authorities. For this reason, I hope that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon will withdraw it.

[David Simmonds]

I want to make sure that I can reconcile the Minister’s observations and the import of the amendments with her reply to me earlier, when she said that the requirement to balance in-year will apply. Clearly, the provisions essentially state that the Secretary of State can give consent for a substantial degree of borrowing, but it is not at all clear in the clause or the amendments what the purpose of the borrowing would be.

Manchester’s improvements to its transport system are fantastic, but they were funded by central Government as part of the devolution deal, and they are now creating a significant ongoing deficit in the mayoral budget, which has to be covered, essentially, through precepting—by levying those in the local area to cover the cost. There is clearly a concern with that. If the borrowing is for capital purposes there is a clear strategy for its repayment, and it must be for the purposes of capital investment. However, if borrowing is undertaken to cover shortfalls between revenue and the mayor’s expenditure on day-to-day costs, this House would have significant concerns about it in relation to our national accounts. Can the Minister tell the Committee how that decision making will sufficiently constrain a mayor or combined authority from undertaking borrowing that is for the purposes of day-to-day revenue expenditure, so that we do not find a large debt bubble growing underneath these new bodies?

[The Chair]

Minister, do you want to comment on that particular point?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Yes, I will answer that question. There is a contradiction in the hon. Member’s position. He has spent much of today talking about the need for us to take a more local approach and to give local leaders and communities control, yet he is talking about restricting that very power. Everything that the strategic authority and mayoral combined authority will do will have to operate within the prudential framework. There are robust mechanisms to ensure that all their financial mechanisms adhere to the standards that we expect across local government and national Government.

The shadow Minister gave the example of Greater Manchester. That was a combination of a grant—a lot of devolved areas have an investment fund—borrowing and precepting. That is what we would expect for big capital projects. My experience suggests that mayors across the country have the aptitude and ability to make the right economic decisions on how they balance investment in things that will unlock the economic potential of their areas. We should trust them to do so, as the hon. Member has been saying all day.

[Lewis Cocking]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Chair]

Have you finished, Minister?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I have.

[Manuela Perteghella]

As I said, the amendment would give Parliament the opportunity to assess whether devolution requests are handled with consistency and fairness across the regions, because at the moment they are not. I therefore wish to press it to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[The Chair]

We have a number of clauses on which I feel we can make some progress. My proposal is that we get to either the end of clause 19 or 5 pm, whichever comes first. I will not sit here in the cold for much longer than that.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

As the local transport authority, combined authorities and combined county authorities deliver a range of local transport functions across their area. Each combined authority or combined county authority agrees its own transport budget for the year and, in many cases, constituent councils contribute to this through a transport levy. This is because constituent councils receive funding for some transport functions directly from Government.

The clause standardises the power for combined authorities and combined county authorities to levy such funding from their constituent councils to cover the cost of their transport functions, where they are not otherwise met. This power has proved effective in supporting transport delivery in local areas. For example, each of the seven councils of the West Midlands combined authority pays a levy based on its population figures, which goes on to fund a range of functions from subsidised bus services to the English national concessionary travel scheme, which provides free bus travel for eligible older and disabled people.

This power complements clause 39, which provides combined authorities and combined county authorities with the power to pay grants to constituent councils. Together, these powers support partnership working between combined authorities and combined county authorities and their constituent members.

[David Simmonds]

Again, I seek a point of clarification from the Minister. I understand the purpose of the clause, but clearly there is a distinction between a levy, where it is the constituent authority that is required to pay, and a precept, where it is the taxpayer who is paying for it through their council tax bill. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify, if necessary in writing, how it will work where there is a dispute about the payment.

If we take London as an example, we have a London-wide concessionary travel scheme, but it is has very different application in different boroughs. It is easy to foresee a situation where, particularly if the purpose of the overall transport levy does not benefit the whole of the mayoral combined authority area, there will be a dispute about whether that is an appropriate way forward. Particularly if the levy is large, it would have a significant impact on the budget of the constituent local authority. Can the Minister set out how that type of process will be addressed in practice?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I have agreed that I will write on the specifics; I think this question comes back to the same theme of how we mitigate collective decision making and agreement across constituent authorities that put at risk their financial viability, or cut across the legal obligation of a particular constituent authority, and I will capture that in writing. However, I would say that we cannot legislate for every eventuality. Indeed, I do not think that is the purpose of legislation. What we can draw on is the practice that we see across the country. Broadly, it is not in the interests of a mayor, who has been democratically elected by the residents and constituents of any of their constituent authorities, to make decisions that will be fundamentally detrimental to those constituents.

[The Chair]

I am grateful to the Minister for saying that she will include that in her correspondence, which we look forward to with enthusiasm.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Combined authorities and CCAs: minor amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Committee members will recall that clause 1 introduced the established mayoral strategic authority as a specific type of strategic authority. It drew a distinction between combined authorities and combined county authorities led by a mayor, and those operating without one. Clause 14 inserts the formal definitions of an established mayoral strategic authority, a non-mayoral combined authority and a non-mayoral combined county authority into the relevant existing legislation. These are minor but necessary provisions intended to give clear meaning to the existing legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Additional functions of the GLA

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It is vital that the devolution framework works for the unique circumstances of London’s governance, which we have talked about in this Committee. That is why the Bill will enable Government to confer functions on the Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority and its functional bodies. Previously, the Government could change the powers of the Greater London Authority only via primary legislation. This clause brings London into line with other strategic authorities by enabling the Government to change its powers via secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Greater London Authority benefits from the devolution framework and can deepen its powers over time.

[David Simmonds]

Again, I have a question of clarification; can the Minister tell the Committee whether these powers apply to a transfer of functions, as opposed to the conferral of functions? We know there have been situations, and we can certainly envisage some within the overall package of the Bill, where the statutory duties of the constituent authorities could be transferred over to the mayor, either en bloc or in part. Indeed, there might be times when it might be a sensible approach; if there is an example of a significant failure in one authority, that could be looked after by the mayoral office while the situation is turned around—that goes to the point raised about South Northamptonshire. However, can the Minister clarify whether this refers solely to new powers that are conferred, or opens up the door to the transfer of functions that are currently statutory duties of constituent authorities?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This clause relates to functions and powers that sit underneath the devolution framework that we have talked about and are putting on the face of the Bill, and the seven areas of competencies that this measure applies to.

We currently have a situation where, for example, certain powers will go to Greater Manchester that currently would not necessarily go to the Mayor of London and the GLA, and that does not feel right. Clause 15 allows a mechanism and a process to make sure that there is consistency across the piece, and that we can achieve that without having to go through primary legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 16 will prevent individuals from being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and a mayor of a strategic authority at the same time.

The Government are clear that mayors are central to delivering the growth, economic prosperity and change that local communities want. Already, the impact of our mayors, from West Yorkshire to the North East, from Greater London to the West Midlands, is being felt clearly. However, their responsibilities will only increase once this Bill is in law.

It is right that the role of mayor receives the officeholder’s full time and attention. Both MPs and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents that elected them. Fulfilling two different democratic roles could lead to conflicts of interest, given the differences in public expectations for each role and the differing responsibilities of a mayor and an MP. Clause 16 prevents that conflict and will ensure that regions benefit from their mayor’s full time and attention.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the principle of not having too many people able to do double-hatting, but it is a fact that there have been overlapping periods when mayors of different combined authorities and London have also been MPs, either at the beginning or end of their term. That has been dealt with in a pragmatic way, with nobody overextending those kinds of double-hatted jobs.

As I understand it, and I would like the Minister to clarify this, writing this rule into statute would mean that, while nobody would be prevented from campaigning to be a mayor or an MP while in either of these jobs, at the moment they are elected, the situation then becomes illegal. An instant resignation takes place on that day. There would be immense disruption across a wide area—perhaps not so much for one constituency, as we have got used to having by-elections for various reasons, but in holding a mayoral by-election.

I wanted to check whether the Government’s intentions here, in making that resignation statutory and instant, are not a bit too much, when these issues have been previously worked out. Does there need to be more detail in the clause to allow for a transition period?

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[Paul Holmes]

I am not sure that I can beat the excellent oratory of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, but I want to add some context in my own style on why this clause is a bit of a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion has adequately and expertly addressed why there may be need for overlap in different local situations. She is absolutely correct to say that there have been instances where that overlap has been dealt with in an orderly manner and has been sorted within the usual confines of the democratic mechanisms we currently have.

All the way through the Bill, which I think has admirable aims, the Minister and the Government have said, “Let local people decide.” Now, local people presumably have elected those mayors or those MPs who now might want to be a mayor; I declare an interest here, as this clause will stop me running for the Hampshire and the Solent mayoralty. I will not cry in front of the Minister, but it will mean that my hon. Friends here would have to listen to some of my more mundane speeches for the next three or four years.

Local people have elected their MPs and they should have the right to determine whether those MPs are the people they want to be the mayors. The hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), served as a mayor from 2018 to 2022. At no point did anybody on the Labour side of the House say that he was not good enough to do both jobs at the same time. Ken Livingstone was a mayor and a Member of Parliament from 2000 to 2001. I do not think anybody who was on the Labour side of the House at the time—I grant that many of the Members on that side of the Committee Room were not in the House at the time—was saying that he could not do two jobs at the same time.

This clause just seems very restrictive. If an election is going ahead and a city or region says, “Actually, we do not want you to be our mayor—we want you to remain an MP”, that person will not win the election. The Minister has said many times today that, on elections and democracy, local people should have their say. I find it strange that we seem to be taking quite a restrictive measure on who can and cannot stand in a democratic event, decided democratically by local people, for candidates who, presumably, are local too. I have some concern that this is overreach.

I also think that MPs are generally sensible—I do not want to create breaking news here, but they are generally sensible and, as the Minister said in the context of mayors setting council tax precepts, they are also not immune to the moods and feelings of the local people that they serve. If a local MP wants to stand for election as mayor, they have the right to say that to their constituents. If they get a massive kickback from their constituents, they either will not win the mayoralty or they will not stand.

Local MPs should have the right to make that decision. Local people in that constituency or that region should have the right to say that they do not want that person; or that they might want that person, and allow that person to stand down from Parliament at a time of their choosing, if they are allowed to stand for the mayoralty, and resist the cost of a sudden burst of by-elections to this House. Let local people decide. Let local politicians be local. If they are not wanted, they will not be voted in.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank hon. Members for their comments, and I have some sympathy with the arguments made. However, in a world where we are giving greater powers to mayors, which is the process we are going through with this devolution Bill, the idea that someone can exercise those functions to the best of their ability alongside the very important role we all do as MPs is a stretch. It is right for residents and constituents that we say, “If you are elected as a mayor, you ought to be doing that job full time.”

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

If I may finish, I will give way to hon. Members. The point about transition is a fair one. To clarify, we are setting out in legislation that, at the point someone is elected as a mayor, they resign as an MP, and vice versa. It is at the point of gaining office that this comes into effect. In response to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s example of the transition period when campaigning, there are flexibilities within that.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate that, but these are two things in different directions. A sitting mayor who becomes an MP would need to resign as mayor that day, given what the Minister has just outlined for us. A mayoral by-election across a large area is a much bigger thing than a parliamentary by-election, and I am not sure that making it instantly statutorily illegal has been properly thought through.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will take the other interventions.

[David Simmonds]

I ask the Minister to reflect that it used to be the practice of this House that any MP appointed as a Minister had to resign and fight a by-election, because they were undertaking a function different from that for which their constituents had originally elected them. That practice was abandoned because of the extent of the disruption it caused to the work of government and of the House, as well as the cost of those by-elections, so I ask the Government to reflect. We have learned from experience, cross-party, that having these types of requirements is not conducive to good democracy. Perhaps the Minister will undertake to reflect on that.

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[The Chair]

Now the Minister can deal with all of you.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are trying to create empowered mayors with huge responsibility over transport, housing, infrastructure and skills. That is a full-time job—bigger even, candidly, than that of an individual Minister. It is absolutely right that they should, if elected to do that job, be doing that job. Hon. Members have made important points about how we get the transition right in order not to have disruption. I thank the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner for his encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of local and national government and the precedent that Ministers used to resign their seats. We will reflect on that and think about how we get the transition right.

[Paul Holmes]

My intervention will be very brief. I am slightly burnt by my experience on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill Committee, where the Minister constantly said that they would reflect, and we never heard back from them until after the Committee had finished. May I seek assurance from the Minister—she does not need to give an answer today—that, on the point of the immediacy of the vacation of the office, she will come back to us in writing to give us the steer of her reflections and what actions she will take in regard to these concerns, if any? Will she commit to doing that before the Committee rises?

[The Chair]

I can see the Minister is nodding already.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am happy to make that commitment.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 18 stand part.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clauses 17 and 18 make technical but necessary changes to existing legislation. As hon. Members will know, some functions conferred on combined authorities or combined county authorities are exercisable only by a mayor acting on behalf of the authority.

Clause 17 clarifies that, where a function is conferred on a mayor, it should be taken to be a function of the underlying authority that is exercisable only by the mayor acting on behalf of the combined authority or combined county authority. This is because mayors of strategic authorities are not corporate entities in themselves; therefore, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority.

Clause 18 clarifies the meaning and extent of the “general functions” of mayors in combined authorities and combined county authorities. The term “general functions” here refers to non-police and crime functions. It is appropriate for the mayor alone to be able to exercise their judgment in certain cases, and to be held fully accountable for those decisions and ultimately to the public. I commend these clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Report under section 1 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016

[The Chair]

We now come to amendment 361 in the name of Manuela Perteghella. Do you wish to press this to a vote?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have sympathy with the points the hon. Member made. We can rarely have too much transparency, but we are conscious that these new bodies and devolution arrangements will be subject to a degree of political oversight. There will be manifestos, on which the public will have a vote. There will be the element of scrutiny, which we have not heard enough about yet but which we would like to think will be built into the new arrangements for these authorities. There will also be a regular process of elections, which will determine who provides the necessary level of leadership. Layered over that, there will be both the political priorities of the devolved authority and those things that are more part of the administrative function. Local authorities have historically had council plans and forward plans that set out decision making, all of which are part of this arrangement. Although the points have been well made, the Opposition are therefore not convinced that what the amendment would add is sufficient to justify its inclusion in the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to amendment 363 and new clause 46 before discussing clause 19.

In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out clearly our ambition to have universal coverage of strategic authorities in England. That direction of travel is clear. It is also important that the process is led locally, and that areas can submit proposals for devolution that reflect their unique circumstances at a time that makes sense for them. A centrally mandated strategy would cut across that principle, requiring areas to work to a timeline set by Government. That would not only be challenging, but go against the grain of what we are trying to do. The new clause is therefore not necessary. We have set the ambition, and we will work with areas to enable them to come forward with proposals at the appropriate time.

Clause 19 amends existing requirements for the annual report on devolution to ensure that it reflects the introduction of strategic authorities as a category in law. To indicate how the report will look should the Bill receive Royal Assent in its current form, this year’s report was laid before this House and the other place earlier today, so Members can spend their evening reading the report with a glass of wine if they wish. It covers strategic authorities that were established and details of the new devolution framework as set out in the English devolution White Paper.

I commend the clause to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw the amendment and not to press the new clause.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fifth sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 4.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

Since its introduction via the Localism Act 2011, the general power of competence has given local authorities the legal capacity to do anything that an individual can do that is not specifically prohibited in law. It has allowed local authorities to undertake a wider range of activities and reduced the need for the Government to issue legal clarifications or new legislative instruments.

Extending the power to all mayoral and established mayoral strategic authorities will bring consistency to the current landscape and ensure parity with local authorities, providing them with the same broad enabling power to do creative and innovative things in delivering for their communities. Foundation strategic authorities will also be permitted to exercise this general power of competence for the purpose of economic development and regeneration. This will ensure that areas can benefit from devolution.

The Greater London Authority and the Mayor of London will not receive the general power of competence. Instead, they will continue to rely on the Greater London Authority Act 1999, which provides a similarly broad general power that has served successive mayors well. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart, and to resume consideration of the Bill.

The Opposition are proud that the general power of competence was introduced when we were in government during the coalition years. It was something that I, as a serving local authority councillor at the time, lobbied hard for. The then Secretary of State, now Lord Pickles, was very receptive to the view that local authorities should have a greater remit, rather than being constrained to do those things that they were specifically permitted to do by law.

I have a question of clarification for the Minister. She said that the general power of competence could be exercised for economic purposes. Will the authorities have the full general power of competence, or will the power be constrained to a specific set of mayoral functions? Constraining it would not be entirely consistent with what was said in previous proceedings about the use of precepts.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

For mayoral strategic authorities, it will be the full general power of competence, but for foundation strategic authorities, at the single tier level, it will be exercised in the context of economic development and regeneration; the constituent local authority that makes that foundation strategic authority already has the wider general power of competence.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clause 21

Power of mayors to convene meetings with local partners

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 21, page 23, line 28, leave out subsection (b) and insert—

“(b) one or more of the following—

(i) health and social care;

(ii) planning;

(iii) environmental concerns;

(iv) funding;

(v) sustainability measures;

(vi) education;

(vii) transport provision and

(viii) green and community spaces.”.

This amendment ensures that mayors must consider specific community matters when consulting with local partners.

In previous contributions, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon and I have made clear the importance of decision making at the lowest possible level. I welcome the explicit provision on convening meetings with partners.

On clause 20, the Minister talked about the breadth of issues that come under the general power of competence and the scope and interest of combined authorities and mayors. We are concerned that the wording in clause 21 on the topics about which meetings can be convened is too narrow, as it is restricted to the items in clause 2.

There should be an ability to convene meetings at a strategic level about matters that are not covered there, such as education. Where skills are within the remit of the strategic authority, and education remains the remit of the constituent parts, the impact and the opportunities available would be across the strategic area.

There is also a concern that while the Bill provides the opportunity to convene meetings and consult, share and partner, it does not provide any sense of obligation for a mayor to do so where others are involved. We would like to see more of an obligation on mayors, rather than a sense of, “Let’s hope they do; if they don’t, never mind.”

The amendment seeks to broaden the scope of clause 21 beyond the items listed in clause 2. I am looking for some assurance that the Minister will be interested in broadening the clause so that we get a meaningful sense of two-way discussion, where the mayor is part of that area conversation.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition are not entirely persuaded of the argument for this amendment, although the point is well made. We will be listening attentively to what the Minister has to say.

We are always very conscious that there is a risk with this legislation of creating conflicts. I know you have done a lot of work in the past in the field of education, Mr Stuart; we have seen that the well-intentioned education policy of school autonomy can come into conflict with the statutory duties placed on a local authority. We need to ensure that is resolved. As we heard from the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole, education is a good example of where conflict can crop up—for example, a university technical college is part of the skills economy, but is also, for the purposes of the Bill, a school. There is a need to ensure that all those statutory duties are squared off.

Although we are not persuaded of the need for the amendment, we would like to hear what the Minister has to say so that we can be confident that those points have been fully taken into account.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole for her amendment. I am not sure that, as drafted, it achieves the intended effect. The Bill already defines the meaning of a relevant local matter as one that occurs within the geographical boundary of a strategic authority and relates to one or more of the areas of competence set out in clause 2. The areas of competence are deliberately broad to allow for a wide range of activities to fall within scope. However, the amendment would remove the existing references to skills and employment support, economic development and regeneration, climate change, public service reform and public safety. That risks inadvertently constraining the matters on which a mayor may convene meetings with local partners.

On the specific point about the dialogue needing to be two-way, I refer the hon. Member to the evidence we heard in the context of the Greater Manchester combined authority. Ultimately, for the mayor to have impact and traction, and to deliver, they must work with key partners, because ultimately those partners are the delivery arm of any strategic intent of the mayor. That requires two-way engagement and a two-way conversation. While we have not locked that in explicitly in the way that the hon. Member suggests in her amendment, that is fundamentally the principle that sits behind the way a mayor ought to work.

[Vikki Slade]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 84, in clause 21, page 23, line 30, at end insert—

“(1A) In section 252 of LURA 2023 (regulations)—

(a) in subsection (5)(a), after “subsection” insert “(8)(aa) or;

(b) in subsection (8), before paragraph (a) insert—

“(aa) under section 17B(5);”.”.

This provides that regulations made under new section 17B of the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 (mayoral power to convene meetings with local partners), as inserted by clause 21 of the Bill, are subject to the negative resolution procedure.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to debate Government amendments 85 and 86.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This Government have committed to empowering mayors to make the right decisions for their local communities—a thing that runs through every aspect of the Bill. The new power to convene meetings with local partners and the corresponding duty on those partners to respond to any meeting requests will strengthen the ability of the mayor to drive local action. The use of the negative procedure provides an appropriate and proportionate level of scrutiny for the regulations. The amendments will enable us to efficiently deliver the legislative framework needed to support our mayors to effectively use their powers to engage local partners and deliver for their local communities.

[David Simmonds]

We have concerns about these measures; I will briefly explain why. As we have seen in the passage of the Bill so far, much of what is proposed for mayors will cut across different Government Departments. It could have financial and legal implications for constituent authorities, and there is plenty of scope for disputes to arise, not least where there might be different political control across different authorities. Our concern is that if we go down the route of using the negative procedure, there is a risk that the awareness of the issues in government will not be triggered and that what we will, in fact, be doing is setting up the authorities to fail by not having the appropriate procedures for getting the issues resolved at the first point where they arise, rather than waiting until they are the subject of disputes in the courts. So we are not content that this is the best way to address the issue.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I understand the hon. Member’s concern. The process is an iterative one. Strategic authorities do not operate in a vacuum. They are in constant conversation with the Government. We have set up the mayoral council as a way for us to have that conversation and dialogue. The fundamental role of national Government is to ensure that our mayors succeed. If issues arise in the way that we are seeing with existing mayoral authorities, there is a space for conversations and mechanisms for those issues to be resolved. I do not think we need an onerous legislative and regulatory procedure to resolve that. The amendment looks at the duty to convene the relevant partners. That matters where the mayor has a mandate to do something, but it requires them to bring lots of different partners around the table to deliver that. We are seeing mayors using their soft power. We have created an additional power to enable them to perform that vital function.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: 85, in clause 21, page 24, line 18, at end insert—

“(2A) In section 117 of LDEDCA 2009 (orders and regulations), in subsection (3)(a), after “order” insert “or regulations”.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This provides that any regulations made under the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 that are not subject to the affirmative resolution procedure will be subject to the negative resolution procedure. This will include regulations under new section 103B (mayoral power to convene meetings with local partners), as inserted by Clause 21 of the Bill, and section 107N (public authorities: duty to have regard to shared local growth priorities), as inserted by Schedule 19 to the Bill

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move amendment 295, in clause 21, page 24, line 27, leave out subsection 3.

This amendment would remove the requirement on local partners to respond to a meeting request from the Mayor.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to my hon. Friend’s question, and then I will address the amendments. It absolutely does apply to anchor organisations—the key people we would expect to have around the table for particular issues. We expect it to be private sector, although I think the power of direction might be a bit weaker for the mayor in that context. In order to advance an issue, it will be for the mayor to be clear about the partners that they need around the table, both private and public, and to bring them around the table. The experience of mayors has been that most of this is done voluntarily, because most partners in a place want to work together to deliver the outcome for their people. This provides an additional tool that the mayor can draw on in instances where, for whatever reason, partners are not automatically willing to come around the table.

Turning to the amendments, first, I want to flag that as drafted, they are focused on the Mayor of London. We believe they introduce an inconsistency between the powers of the Mayor of London and his counterparts elsewhere in England. They also run contrary to a central aim of the Bill, which is to standardise and simplify the legislative framework for devolution across England, including London. Clause 21 includes a power for the mayor to convene meetings with local partners on relevant local matters, and amendment 295 seeks to remove the corresponding requirement on local partners to respond. The power is designed to enable a mayor to bring the right people around the table; it is not an enforceable call-in power. That is not what we are proposing here; rather, it is aimed at empowering a mayor to work with local partners to drive delivery and better outcomes for their communities. Members will see that the requirement on local partners is proportionate and not overly burdensome. It does not obligate partners to engage or collaborate, but it requires them to respond to requests from a mayor. We hope that that triggers a process where most parties will be willing to engage or move forward.

Amendment 294 would allow the Mayor of London to specify local partners where other mayors should not, which would lead to a piecemeal and unclear definition of local partners, risking confusion at all level. Defining local partners in regulation allows for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny and will provide a single, coherent definition across England that can be understood by both mayors and local partners.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

I apologise for interrupting the Minister. I understand what she is saying, but we have seen a contradiction from the Government on Second Reading as well as in Committee. Is the meaning that they want to go a full devolution power and have mayors in power to make decisions for their local people? I think it is accepted that, across different geographical areas, there will be different local partners, so why are the Government being so prescriptive and removing the role of the mayor to govern their own corresponding responsibilities?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am sympathetic to the hon. Gentleman’s point. The regulation, when drafted, will be permissive, because we recognise that it will be different in different places. Through the regulation, we are trying to ensure that it is proportionate. We are also trying to make sure that the scope is drawn as broadly as possible in a way that makes sense for the mayor. I come back to the point that this is not a compulsion to be around the table; it is to trigger a process that means that if a public utility is required around the table, they have to engage. Even if the engagement is to say no which we would hope it would not be, it forces a process of engagement. We think that gives the mayor an additional tool to get the right people around the table to drive the change they want to see.

[David Simmonds]

My major concern is that it sounds like a mess. We can easily imagine situations, given the diverse job of the mayors and some of the ambitions envisaged for them as part of the legislation, where there will be a high degree of confusion about what is expected of whom and who has what obligations.

To simply say that it will be the subject of a permissive regulation when drafted seriously risks setting this up to fail, particularly when it comes to the envisaged economic partnerships. The Committee has not seen that regulation, and has no idea how it will work in practice at a local level.

We will push these amendments to a vote, which is all we can do at this stage. I am sure we will return to this issue during the later passage of the Bill.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

New clause 19—Duty on mayors to establish a citizens’ assembly—

“(1) After section 17B of LURA 2023 (inserted by section 21 of this Act) insert—

‘17C Duty to establish a citizens’ assembly

(1) The mayor for an area of a CCA must establish a deliberative citizen’s assembly (“the assembly”) within six months beginning on the day of their election.

(2) The purpose of the assembly is to inform strategic decision making on relevant local matters.

(3) The assembly must comprise at least 40 persons from the area of the CCA, who are—

(a) selected by sortition or lottery, and

(b) representative of the population of the local authority area.

(4) “Relevant local matters” are such matters as the mayor may specify with the agreement of the assembly.

(5) The mayor must make arrangements for—

(a) the assembly to convene within one year beginning on the day on which the mayor is first elected, and at least once per year thereafter; and

(b) the establishment of a regular consultation process with the assembly in addition to its convening under paragraph (2)(a);

(6) The mayor must—

(a) take into account any recommendation made by the assembly either at a convened meeting, or in regular consultation; and

(b) publish a response to any such recommendation within two months beginning on the day on which the mayor first receives the recommendation.’

(2) After section 103A of LDEDCA 2009 (inserted by section 21 of this Act) insert—

‘103C Duty to establish a citizens’ assembly

(1) The mayor for the area of a combined authority must establish a deliberative citizen’s assembly (“the assembly”) within six months beginning on the day of their election.

(2) The purpose of the assembly is to inform strategic decision making on relevant local matters.

(3) The assembly must comprise at least 40 persons from the area of the combined authority, who are—

(a) selected by sortition of lottery, and

(b) representative of the population of the local authority area.

(4) “Relevant local matters” are such matters as the mayor may specify with the agreement of the assembly.

(5) The mayor must make arrangements for—

(a) the assembly to convene within one year beginning on the day on which the mayor is first elected, and at least once per year thereafter; and

(b) the establishment of a regular consultation process with the assembly in addition to its convening under paragraph (2)(a).

(6) The mayor must—

(a) take into account any recommendation made by the assembly either at a convened meeting, or in regular consultation; and

(b) publish a response to any such recommendation within two months beginning on the day on which the mayor first receives the recommendation.’

(3) After section 40A of GLAA 1999 (inserted by section 15 of this Act) insert—

‘103C Duty to establish a citizens’ assembly

(1) The mayor must establish a deliberative citizen’s assembly (“the assembly”).

(2) The purpose of the assembly is to inform strategic decision making on relevant local matters.

(3) The assembly must comprise at least 64 persons, who are—

(a) selected by sortition or lottery, and

(b) one of whom must live in each London borough.

(4) “Relevant local matters” are such matters as the mayor may specify with the agreement of the assembly.

(5) The mayor must make arrangements for—

(a) the assembly to convene within one year beginning on the day on which the mayor is first elected, and at least once per year thereafter; and

(b) the establishment of a regular consultation process with the assembly in addition to its convening under paragraph (2)(a).

(6) The mayor must—

(a) take into account any recommendation made by the assembly either at a convened meeting, or in regular consultation; and

(b) publish a response to any such recommendation within two months beginning on the day on which the mayor first receives the recommendation.’

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify—

(a) the period by which the Mayor of London must appoint a deliberative citizen’s assembly, and

(b) any necessary further provision relating to deliberative citizens’ assemblies.

(5) Regulations under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.” —(Siân Berry.)

This new clause creates a duty on mayors to convene a citizens' assembly consisting of local people within the first year of their election and at least once annually after this, with an additional, non-legally binding duty to take account of the recommendations from the citizens' assembly, as well as defining the term “citizens' assembly”.

New clause 42—Power of mayors to convene meetings with local public service providers and government—

“(1) After section 17B of LURA 2023 (inserted by section 21 of this Act) insert—

‘17C Mayoral duty to convene meetings with local public service providers and government

(1) The mayor for the area of a CCA must convene regular meetings with—

(a) principal local authorities within their area,

(b) public service providers in their area, and

(c) town and parish councils within their area.

(2) Meeting under subsection (1) must occur at least every 12 months.’

(2) After section 103B of LDEDCA 2009 (inserted by section 21 of this Act) insert—

‘103C Mayoral duty to convene meetings with local public service providers and government

(1) The mayor for the area of a combined authority must convene regular meetings with—

(a) principal local authorities within their area,

(b) public service providers in their area, and

(c) town and parish councils within their area.

(2) Meeting under subsection (1) must occur at least every 12 months.’

(3) After section 40B of GLAA 1999 (inserted by section 21 of this Act) insert—

‘40C Mayoral duty to convene meetings with local public service providers and government

(1) The Mayor must convene regular meetings with—

(a) principal local authorities within their area,

(b) public service providers in their area, and

(c) town and parish councils within their area.

(2) Meeting under subsection (1) must occur at least every 12 months.’”—(Manuela Perteghella.)

This amendment would require mayors of combined authorities, mayors of CCAs, and the Mayor of London to regularly convene meetings with local government actors within their area.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 21 will ensure that mayors have the means to drive effective engagement across the communities to generate economic prosperity. We have already talked about local partners playing a vital role in this process, and in helping mayors to address shared challenges and seize opportunities, but to be very clear—I stress this again—the clause does not oblige local partners to support matters they oppose. Rather, it creates a duty to respond to a mayor’s request to meet or engage on an issue, facilitating constructive dialogue even where there may be disagreement.

Mayors have a powerful local voice—we know that; we see it across the country where there are mayors—but that soft power does not always allow them to drive forward change. The clause strengthens a mayor’s existing soft power and encourages collaboration with local partners, so they can drive growth in and deliver improvement to their communities.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. New clause 42 would make it a legal duty for mayors to hold regular meetings with local councils in their area; with service providers such as the NHS, police or transport bodies; and with town and parish councils. The power to convene would become a mandatory duty to convene. In particular, parish and town councils are included on the list of bodies that local mayors are required to convene meetings with.

I used to be a parish councillor, so I know the important role that these rural councils play and the many services that they deliver. They also stepped up socially during the covid pandemic, including setting up food-share schemes and referring people to food banks if they lost their job. Town councils are also important. For example, a town council in my constituency has been fostering important community projects. One of the initiatives is working with local businesses to make Alcester a neurodivergent-friendly town—a town for all.

These councils are invaluable partners for combined authorities and mayors in the shires. Engaging with such bodies means that the combined authority and the mayor have direct insight into local issues. Put simply, the new clause would ensure that mayors regularly bring together local authorities and public services to co-ordinate on shared priorities and improve co-operation across the region.

In rural areas such as my constituency of Stratford-on-Avon, parish and town councils, as we have already discussed, are the first tier of local government. Mayors should include these important councils as partners and consult them on a range of issues. We must create a regular, structured forum for dialogue between all the key players in local government and public services.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I entirely disagree with my hon. Friend—he has not been nearly vocal enough in expressing the level of his concern.

The faults in new clause 19 are multiple. It would compel mayors, in a Bill that is supposed to be about devolution. Having spent a part of my life engaged with deliberative democracy and citizens assemblies, I agree with my hon. Friend. While I am sure they were an uplifting experience for all concerned, they achieved absolutely nothing. They wasted a huge amount of taxpayers’ money. If we reflect on the previous Labour Government’s Local Agenda 21, all the money was spent on meetings to discuss what to do about climate change, and there was nothing available to implement any of it. On Building Schools for the Future, years were spent on consultations and project planning, with not one brick laid and not one school roof repaired as a consequence. We have seen lots of examples where these kinds of processes have led citizens up the garden path.

The point about trust and consent is an important one. I reflect on my own party’s experience in government during the pandemic of low-traffic neighbourhoods. A vocal minority argued for them, but did not remotely gain the trust and consent of the affected residents. That sparked a backlash, which has led to their removal, at great expense to the taxpayer, in order to enable people to go about their daily lives. Our experience with these processes is quite negative. If a mayor wishes to implement such a process, in particular on a specific policy area, they should be free to do so, but they should not be compelled. I suspect we and the Government will find common cause on that.

The hon. Member for Banbury made reference to talking shops. We do not like talking shops in the Conservative party. I am sure he will find one quite easily if he wishes to continue his proposed debate about capital punishment and the death penalty—I am sure there are many people who would like to discuss that. It is really important that mayors are focused on the things that they can do on behalf of their constituents. We should not set up authorities that are there to talk; they should be there to do things on behalf of their constituents.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling new clause 19. I have a lot of sympathy and support for the concept of citizens assemblies, so I have sympathy for the intention behind the new clause, but it is really important that mayors, as locally elected leaders in their region, should have the ability to decide how best to engage with their local communities.

Mayors can already convene citizens assemblies using functional and general powers of competence as a way of hearing from local people and ensuring that local voices play a role in decision making. I give the hon. Lady the example of the Mayor of the West Midlands, and the Mayor of South Yorkshire, who held a citizens assembly on climate—they are already happening across the country.

Once the Bill becomes law, all mayors will have the general power of competence that we have talked about, which will enable them to convene citizens assemblies should they wish to do so. However, as other hon. Members have said, placing a duty on all mayors to convene a citizens assembly, irrespective of whether it is appropriate or how costly it is, would take away the local choice of mayors to decide how best to engage with their residents. I therefore ask the hon. Lady not to press the new clause.

On new clause 42, I again completely recognise the spirit in which it has been tabled. It will be important for all mayors to engage with the wider public and with local authorities when delivering their functions. On that we are completely agreed. However, the Government cannot accept the new clause, because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury said, it would impose a disproportionate and unworkable administrative burden on mayors of strategic authorities. By way of illustration, North Yorkshire alone comprises 729 individual parishes, which are organised into 412 town and parish councils. Expecting a mayor personally to discharge the proposed duty in respect of each body would, I fear, be impracticable and inevitably crowd out the time needed for the office’s other core strategic responsibilities: driving change and economic outcomes across the area.

Furthermore, many public service providers will be commissioned and contract-managed by local authorities. Superimposing a parallel mayoral duty would blur lines of accountability, cut across established commissioning arrangements, and risk duplication, confusion and delay. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon will not press the new clause, however well-intentioned it may be.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Duty of mayors to collaborate

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move amendment 296, in clause 22, page 25, line 29, at end insert—

“(7A) The guidance issued by the Secretary of State under section 7 may not include a role for trade unions.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from creating a role of trade unions in the execution of mayors’ duty to collaborate.

I shall speak briefly about the motivation for tabling the amendment. A concern that has run through the Opposition’s responses to a number of the Government’s measures, especially in the space of economic development, is that the Government have chosen not to enshrine the roles of businesses, entrepreneurs or local employers, but always to give a statutory privilege to trade unions to be part of discussions. Although it is wise for any local leader to include the broadest possible range of stakeholders, singling out one, which serves the interests of only one group—sometimes at the expense of others—is simply not a process that any democracy should envisage. We tabled the amendment to ensure that that is not the case in the Bill, and we will press it to a vote. We are clear that, following a change of Government, this is one provision that we would seek to repeal very rapidly.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

There are two issues with the amendment. First, we believe that it could create an inconsistency between the powers of mayoral combined authorities and their equivalents elsewhere in England, because it would change only the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023.

More fundamentally, we have already talked about the duty to bring local partners around the table. Underneath that is a presumption and expectation that all relevant parties, including parties in the private sector, that are fundamental to the mayor driving outcomes on behalf of his voters and residents come together to deliver things. There is a vital role for trade unions both in being a clear voice for workers in an area and in being a fundamental part of that economic partnership to drive outcomes.

[David Simmonds]

May I ask the Minister to clarify something? Some 70% of workers in this country are in an enterprise with fewer than five employees in total. Where is their voice at the table? Why is it only the unions representing large-scale organised labour that are compelled in legislation to be at the table when the mayor makes decisions?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Business organisations, whether small businesses, the Confederation of British Industry or chambers of commerce, will inevitably be around the table when a mayor worth their salt is making economic decisions and driving forward strategic partnerships.

The Government believe that as part of that partnership between workers, businesses and civic leaders, it is right that trade unions are firmly around the table. They give voice and expression not only to their individual members but to key concerns for workers across the piece. We do not resile from that; we think it is critical.

[Paul Holmes]

Correct me if I am wrong—it may be very rare, but sometimes I am—but earlier, the hon. Member for North West Cambridgeshire asked the Minister for assurance regarding the ability of a mayor to engage with businesses to further economic regeneration across the country. Why has the Minister decided to legislate for mayors to consult with trade unions, but not—to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner—with private business, which represents vastly more economic output and employers than the trade unions do? Why is she doing that?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are clear that the duty to collaborate will include a wide range of partners. We are going through a process of engaging with and consulting mayors to make sure that in secondary legislation we fully reflect the sorts of partner they want around the table. We believe that trade unions should have a place at the table. We are taking a set of actions to empower trade unions, because we think it is the right thing to do for our economy, so it is important that we include them within the duty to collaborate.

[Lewis Cocking]

The Minister has said previously, “We want to empower local communities,” “We want mayors to have freedom,” and, “We want mayors to have choice,” but in this case she is prescribing which organisations should be around the table. How do those two opinions meet? In some cases, she is saying she wants mayors to have the freedom and the choice to drive local communities, but in this case, she is prescribing organisations that should be at the table.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We will specify in secondary legislation the range of local partners, based on feedback from mayors. Again, this is not compulsion; we think it is really important that civic organisations, local leaders and the mayoral strategic authority engage with organised labour. That is part of the economic model that we think is right, because it means we have the voice of organised labour around the table, driving outcomes on behalf of workers. I know the Conservative party struggles with that, because the idea of empowering workers is a bit of a strain for them, but Labour is very clear. We are building a model that ensures we have the voice and representation of labour alongside businesses and our civic leaders, driving change in the economy for working people.

[David Simmonds]

I spent many years chairing employers’ organisations, negotiating with trade unions about all kinds of matters. I have a very high degree of respect for them in the space in which they have expertise, but I do not really understand the Government’s rationale for arguing for a model in which one specific group—perhaps coincidentally, a very large-scale Labour funding group—is given a privileged place at the table when decisions are made about political matters for which the mayor is elected. That place at the table is not protected in statute for anybody else affected by it. That seems to me to border on abuse of the political process. It is very serious to be putting trade unions in a position to make decisions on matters that are not remotely within their area of competence and for which they have no mandate whatever. It is simply unacceptable.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Will the shadow Minister give way?

[David Simmonds]

I have finished my remarks.

[Paul Holmes]

I want to make some brief remarks agreeing with my hon. Friend. I have negotiated with trade unions and I have a huge amount of respect for them. When I was cabinet member for children’s services and learning at Southampton city council, a hugely unionised organisation, I was responsible for negotiating some of the pay contracts for our really important staff. I had a very productive relationship with my trade union representatives and held them in great respect, as my hon. Friend did his when he was deputy leader at a local authority.

We are not anti-trade union, but we do not believe that there should be political favouritism for organised labour, where private business is essentially left out. Why does the Minister believe that organised labour, who, I must say, have intrinsic links with the Labour party movement, should have that prestigious and privileged seat at the table with the elected mayor? The Minister has resisted legislating for a mayor to have a duty to ensure that private business is included around that table; she is leaving that to the direction and the whim of the mayor elected at the time. Why can she not take that same attitude towards organised labour and the union movement?

Finally, I would say that this is very closely bordering on abuse of the political system. We on this side of the House firmly believe that. [Interruption.] Government Members can chunter as much as they want, but I ask them again: when they go around their constituencies and speak to private businesses that have been drastically affected by the decisions of this Government, will they say to those businesses, “It is absolutely fine that, when you get a mayor, you will not be legislatively consulted, but the unionised, organised labour workforce will be guaranteed a prestigious seat at that table”? That is a clear blurring of the lines on what a mayor should be doing. That is why we in the Opposition are opposed to that legislative proposition. As I have said clearly, Conservatives—including any Conservative Government and my hon. Friends and I here today—are not anti-trade union, but the measure gives legislative access on a dangerous scale, and that is why we will be opposing it. [Interruption.] The hon. Lady is welcome to intervene if she wants to.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I do not want to drag out this debate any further, but I think the hon. Gentleman is over-egging this. This is a duty to collaborate; it is not about decision making. Any mayor worth their salt will collaborate with key businesses in their local area if they want to drive economic outcomes. We have also been clear that we will put in place regulations outlining the set of partners, including local partners.

I hope the Opposition understand that it is not always second nature for mayors to decide that they want to collaborate with trade unions. [Interruption.] Well, our view is that they should, because we think it is important that workers are part of that collaboration and work as part of that partnership.

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister is absolutely correct when she says that a mayor should, if they are worth their salt, discuss and collaborate with business. I entirely agree with her on that, but she has not ensured that that is enshrined in legislation. What she has enshrined in legislation is that organised labour and the trade unions should be around that table. If she really believed in equal access for everybody who contributes to economic output in our regions, she would include private business on the face of the Bill.

As I say, this is a dangerous precedent to set; it is favouritism. It is privileged access to the mayor for organised labour, and I think that is a bad thing. If the Minister wanted to give organised labour parity with private business, which delivers economic growth across this country, she would have our support, but she certainly does not have our support for the privileged position that she is putting our trade union movement in.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are clear that if a mayor is serious about driving economic outcomes in a way that works for their community, they must collaborate with a set of partners. That 100% includes private business, and will include anchor organisations, but it should also include trade unions. The duty to collaborate will be broadly set. We will lay out the set of partners in regulation, but that will be dictated by the feedback that we get from mayors. I therefore ask that amendment 296 be withdrawn.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I am speaking to clause stand part. Broadly, I very much support the duty. I do not agree with the amendment moved by the Conservatives. I cannot see how that would be logical or work when a mayor or council might well change. Similarly, in the sense that I would like it clarified today, I raise the issue of why the clause only seems to allow for collaboration between pairs of mayors. The various proposed new sections for the different Acts in this clause—often in the proposed new subsection (4)—seem to mandate that the two areas must be adjoining. A mayor may therefore only make a request to a neighbour, and I do not think that they may request to collaborate with a number of neighbours. However, a key transport connection in the strategic rail or road networks could lie in the next mayoral area beyond. A mayor might want to approach the other mayor about the possibility of collaborating on approaching Great British Railways about some financing ideas, for example. Likewise, a key hospital or employer might be in a nearby mayoral area that is not adjoining—a collaborative project at a strategic mayoral level might still be appropriate.

For a mayor in the middle, potentially a chain of collaborations could be set up, but were it a transport link, if the mayor in the middle was not that bothered or was focused on other things, such as digital tech rather than transport links, they might be able to stand in the way. I want to check whether the clause needs some amendment to allow for more flexibility in how mayors collaborate, and with which other mayors.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I note that amendments 297 and 298 relate only to the mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities, not to the Mayor of London. That inconsistency runs contrary to the Bill’s goal of standardising and simplifying arrangements across England. More broadly, the clause already gives mayors discretion to decline a request to collaborate. The provision is intentionally flexible—it would not be appropriate or practical to prescribe those interactions in statute in advance. Any issues around repeated or unreasonable requests can be addressed through statutory guidance, to which mayors must have regard. That guidance will set clear expectations for constructive engagement without imposing unnecessary legal rigidity. Mayors should retain the freedom to initiate or decline collaboration requests as they see fit, provided they act reasonably and in accordance with any guidance.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

Following discussion with colleagues, we remain concerned about this, but we made the point in earlier debates and there has already been a vote on a similar issue. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Regulation of provision of micromobility vehicles

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause gives the Secretary of State the ability to empower local authorities to license on-street micromobility services, such as dockless cycle schemes, operating in their areas. The market for those services is currently unregulated. Operators do not have to get permission for services, and local leaders are limited in their ability to address antisocial behaviour and poor parking. We have all seen the issues created by rental e-bikes obstructing pavements. It is apparent in my constituency, and I know that other hon. Members will have it in theirs. The Government remain committed to keeping streets safe, and the clause will tackle this directly.

Local leaders have been vocal about their need for more powers to ensure that schemes work for their communities. We want more shared cycle schemes across the country, and ensuring that local leaders have the powers to manage them properly will be key to delivering sustainable, long-term growth of these services. The industry is also keen to see regulation, but the patchwork system is creating burdens on business and holding back growth and investment in the sector.

[Lewis Cocking]

This is one of the good clauses in the Bill, but I would like the Minister to clarify this. A number of authorities want this power now to combat the issues she just spoke about, so where strategic authorities do not exist, is there any way for even county authorities to get those powers, if the Bill receives Royal Assent?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause gives the ability to empower local authorities.

[Lewis Cocking]

In that sense, if an authority wants one now but is not on the devolution priority programme and does not have a strategic authority coming, will it be able to get those powers upon Royal Assent?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Yes. Where a local transport authority exists, the power will essentially be conferred on it.

We will discuss the detail of the regulatory framework when we come to schedule 5. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5

Providers of micromobility vehicles

[Vikki Slade]

I beg to move amendment 372, in schedule 5, page 124, leave out lines 1 to 14.

This amendment would remove the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations which create exemptions from the prohibition on the provision of micromobility vehicles without a licence.

We welcome the clarification that micromobility vehicles will be licensed, but I am slightly concerned—I hope the Minister will provide some clarity—that the broad nature of the provision may inadvertently catch hundreds of leisure-hire businesses in tourist areas such as the Camel trail in Cornwall, the New Forest and parts of the Purbeck, where visitors can hire bikes from a public place. Those businesses do not need to be licensed, and licensing them would create a huge burden on the council and on those small businesses. They may be covered under the exceptions in proposed new section 22G, but if that is the case, it does not feel defined precisely enough—it talks about a person having made

“arrangements between the licensing authority and that person”.

I would like some clarity that the new section will not inadvertently capture businesses that are not share schemes whereby people pay by the minute or by the hour, which I think is the intention of the legislation.

We have Beryl bikes in Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole, and in parts of Dorset. Such schemes are excellent and licensing them is a great idea. We want more measures to be put in place to protect pedestrians and road users, particularly from scooters. We have seen so many cases of unregulated and unlicensed scooters travelling at as much as 30 or 40 mph on pavements. Any additional measures to prevent that will be useful.

We also see a lot of e-scooters and e-bikes being used in crime. In Dorset, innovative work is happening, with smart water being used to spray offenders as they go, thereby allowing them to come back later and not risk either the offender or the police in a dangerous chase. Whatever we can do to make the legislation tighter for organisations would be a good thing.

I am sure I am not alone in regretting the fact that we still do not have clarification of the law on the private use of e-scooters and other micromobility vehicles. I am concerned that if local and strategic authorities are going to get more powers to license vehicles that are used through hire organisations, it will be a real missed opportunity if the Department for Transport were not encouraged to bring forward a decision on private use at the same time. So many local authorities get calls from the public about problems only part of which local authorities can deal with. Councillors’ and MPs’ inboxes are filled with people asking, “Why can’t you act on x?” We reply, “Well, we cannot act on that bit, but we can on that bit.” Alignment in respect of the use of micromobility for public or private use would be really helpful.

My particular concern, and the reason for the amendment, is that schedule 5 caveats important powers granted to strategic and local authorities by allowing the Secretary of State to override them with new regulations at any point of their choosing. That would appear to have a direct effect on the number and types of locations, as well as the purpose for their use. A situation last year demonstrates the point. Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole council wanted to extend its successful partnership. We had no e-bikes in Christchurch, where the population was oldest and most in need of e-bikes, and we wanted to increase the physical number of scooters from 500 to 1,000, because the scheme was so successful. But the council was forced to come to the Secretary of State to get permission for changes that everybody locally wanted and that the provider could deliver, and we missed a window in the season when we would have got really strong use.

The amendment would delete lines 1 to 14 on page 124 of the Bill, so that the power truly remains at the local authority level, rather the powers just granted being undevolved by allowing the Secretary of State to override them. I will be grateful to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for tabling the amendment. I have a lot of sympathy for the principle behind it. The framework that we have set out is necessarily broad in scope to capture all types of micromobility schemes, including those that may emerge in the future. We have made it clear, however, that the exception power ensures proportionality in licensing to avoid unnecessary burdens on, and the criminalisation of, businesses such as those to which she referred that operate small, low-impact schemes. We have specified the type of exemptions that we expect we might make in order to keep the scope of the power contained—for example, community schemes with a handful of cycles, or cycle hire on privately owned but publicly accessible land. While I accept the sentiment behind her proposals, I do not believe that the amendment is needed. I therefore ask that it be withdrawn.

[Vikki Slade]

That deals with my first concern, but the second one was about subsections (2) and (3) in proposed new section 22G on the first 14 lines of page 124. However, I apologise and withdraw my comments—the clause applies specifically to the exemptions and not to the ruling. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Sixth sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

I am delighted to serve under your chairship, Ms Vaz. It is great that there is broad support across the House for this schedule. We have introduced this framework to tackle obstructive parking, so although I appreciate the sentiment behind the shadow Minister’s amendment, I do not believe it is needed.

In common with other traffic management measures, traffic authorities know their roads best and are best placed to consider what level of provision is appropriate and in what locations. The schedule already gives the Secretary of State the power to set what conditions must be in every licence issued and what additional conditions licensing authorities can set, as well as powers to fine operators or suspend or revoke licences where the licence holder does not comply with those conditions. We will publish guidance on best practice for deciding on parking provision and enforcement, but since we think that there are enough safeguards in our proposals, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I wanted to make a speculative point about schedule 5, although I have not tabled an amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Schedule 5 sets out the details on giving the Secretary of State the ability to empower local authorities to license on-street micromobility services, such as dockless cycle schemes, operating in their areas. We have had a good, broad debate on this, and I think there is support across the Committee for the view that this area must be tackled.

All licensing regimes will contain mandatory conditions and additional local conditions, which will bring the consistency that all parties seek, while ensuring flexibility to meet the needs and priorities of different areas. The framework allows for new micromobility modes, such as pavement robots and e-scooters, to be incorporated in future, to ensure that our local leaders will always be able to manage their streets effectively.

The schedule sets out clear, consistent processes and powers for local authorities to feel confident that these services are operating safely and effectively in their areas, and are well integrated into the transport networks of the future. I commend schedule 5 to the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

As I indicated, I would like to make a rather speculative suggestion in relation to schedule 5, which is to ask whether Ministers have considered, or might consider, extending these kinds of provisions on the licensing of micromobility to also cover managed delivery services, many of which currently use micromobility-type vehicles, or vans. Those tend to cause similar problems, which could be solved in similar ways, and that would add up to helping to achieve the same goals as this schedule.

Essentially, Ministers could add delivery vehicles and managed delivery services to be licensed in the same way as micromobility vehicles. As with this schedule, the details of how that was done would come in guidance afterwards, so Ministers could choose between something relatively light-touch or something a bit more useful.

Reasons to consider this suggestion include traffic generation and the ability to speak regularly to, or regulate, the companies involved to allow for more consolidation, so that journeys are carried out more efficiently. Powers to regulate and license food delivery by bike might be very useful in relation to issues of safety and workers’ rights. We know that freelance delivery riders report huge time pressures and poor working conditions, and people who have problems with how some of the micromobility hire services are used by users also often report the same kinds of issues with delivery riders. Although I do not want to create a huge amount of bureaucracy, I think the issues are similar, and Ministers might look either now or in the future at widening the scope of these kinds of powers for the authorities that we are considering today.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz. It seems to the Opposition that this schedule is weaker than it would have been had the amendments been accepted. I know that when we have debated other areas of local government legislation, the issue that comes up time and again is the frustration that our constituents feel when they are unable to get what sounds like a perfectly robust regulation enforced in practice—whether that is fly-tipping, antisocial parking or the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion around delivery drivers, scooters and so on, which I know exercises many of my constituents.

We remain concerned that this is a missed opportunity to give local authorities the most robust tools that would put beyond doubt what the test that had to be met was, and create the appropriate legal path for effective and rigorous enforcement locally. None the less, the schedule broadly represents a step forward. Therefore we will not oppose it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions and the support for the schedule. In response to the questions raised about additional types of vehicles on the road that are of a similar nature, obviously the scope of the schedule is on micromobility, but the points have been made well—they are also being made by local authorities and our communities. We are considering how we can respond so that mobility vehicles—of sorts—on our streets are not blighting our communities, and we will take that away.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 5 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 24

Arrangements to carry out works on highways

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 6.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Strategic authorities are uniquely placed to provide oversight of the construction and maintenance of the highways in their area. That is particularly likely to be the case when required works cross local authority boundaries. As such, the clause provides that all existing and future strategic authorities can, when asked to do so by the Secretary of State, carry out work on trunk roads on behalf of National Highways. The second measure in the clause allows strategic authorities to enter agreements with local authorities and National Highways regarding highway planning and maintenance.

The strategic authority is uniquely placed in that it has a transport planning role encompassing the whole authority area. This provision capitalises on that and would, for example, enable strategic authorities to enter agreements on the maintenance of cross-boundary roads. Both those powers would only be allowed with the consent of the relevant constituent authority. Together, those two measures will enable strategic authorities to oversee a co-ordinated approach to improvements to local roads, leading to less disruption and better outcomes for motorists.

[David Simmonds]

We understand the logic of this. Could the Minister set out for the Committee where the liability will sit for issues arising from the maintenance, standards or provision of those roads under the clause?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

In the end, this will only come into place where the constituent authorities support it. When it is the Secretary of State making the request, it would be with the Secretary of State; when it is constituent authorities coming together to do maintenance or works that they would do anyway, it would be shared among them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clause 25

Civil enforcement of traffic contraventions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 246, in schedule 7, page 138, line 22, insert—

“3 (1) After Paragraph 10 of Schedule 8 to the Traffic Management Act 2004, insert—

‘Exercise of functions relating to civil enforcement

11 Any functions related to civil enforcement described by this schedule must be exercised directly by—

(a) the elected mayor for the area of an authority, or

(b) a member of an authority who is an elected member of a constituent council.’”

This amendment ensures civil enforcement powers, when exercised by CAs and CCAs, must be under the direction of elected officials.

Amendment 348, in schedule 7, page 138, line 22, at end insert—

“3 (1) Part 1 of Schedule 7 of the Traffic Management Act 2004 is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph (4) insert—

4A ‘(1) There is a parking contravention in England if a person causes an obstruction which, without lawful authority or excuse, causes or permits a motor vehicle to stand on a pavement in such a manner as to wilfully obstruct free passage along the pavement.

(2) A parking contravention under subparagraph (1) is a civil offence which may be enforced by the local authority in which the contravention has occurred.

(3) The relevant local authority under subparagraph (2) may issue penalty charges for a civil offence under subsection (2).

(4) The amount for a penalty charge under subparagraph (3) shall be determined by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(5) Regulations under subparagraph (4) may specify different penalty charge amounts based on—

(a) the obstructing vehicle class,

(b) the area of the local authority in which the obstruction has occurred, or

(c) any other relevant circumstantial consideration.

(6) In this paragraph—

(a) “motor vehicle” has the meaning given in section 136 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and

(b) “pavement” has the meaning given in section 72 of the Highway Act 1835.

4B (1) Penalty charge amounts for parking contraventions under this Part may be set by the relevant local authority.

(2) Amounts under subparagraph (1) must align with provisions under section 77 of this Act.

(3) Amounts under subparagraph (1) must have regard to any regulations made under section 87 of this Act.

(4) Amounts under subparagraph (1) must be published by the local authority and may be revised from time to time.’”

This amendment would allow local authorities to enforce obstructive pavement parking within their areas as a civil offence and devolves the power to set parking penalty charge amounts for all parking penalty charge offences to local authorities.

Amendment 291, in schedule 7, page 138, line 23, at end insert—

“3 (1) Section 45 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) After subsection (1A) insert—

‘(1B) A qualifying CCA or combined authority may not make an order under subsection (1).’

(3) After subsection (8) insert—

‘(9) In this section “qualifying CCA or combined authority” has the meaning given in paragraph 9 of schedule 8 to the Traffic Management Act 2004 (civil enforcement areas and enforcement authorities outside Greater London: bus lane contraventions).’

4 (1) Section 55 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1994 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) After subsection (9) insert—

‘(9A) A qualifying CCA or combined authority shall not undertake any activity provided for under this section.’

(3) In subsection (10), after ‘Greater London Authority Act 1999’ insert—

‘“qualifying CCA or combined authority” has the meaning given in paragraph 9 of schedule 8 to the Traffic Management Act 2004 (civil enforcement areas and enforcement authorities outside Greater London: bus lane contraventions)’”.

This amendment would prevent mayors of CCA from increasing charges for vehicle parking, and from using proceeds of those charges.

Schedule 7 stand part.

Amendment 368, in schedule 9, page 152, line 17, at end insert—

“16 In section 178 (Preliminary)—

(a) In subsection (1) leave out ‘workplace’;

(b) In subsection (4) leave out ‘workplace’;

(c) In subsection (5)(c), at end insert ‘by a combined authority or combined county authority’.

17 In section 182 (Workplace parking places)—

(a) In the heading, leave out ‘workplace’;

(b) In subsection (1) leave out ‘workplace’;

(c) In subsection (5) leave out ‘workplace’.

18 In section 190 (Rights of entry—

(a) in sub-section (1) leave out ‘workplace’;

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) leave out ‘workplace’.

19 In section 198(1) (Interpretation of Part III) after ‘“local transport policies” has the meaning given in section 108(5),’ insert “and include the policies of an applicable local transport plan as defined in section 113.”

This amendment would extend the power to create parking levies to all strategic authorities. Where a strategic authority had become local transport authority and responsible for the local transport plan, it would deem that plan as forming the policies of any constituent authorities.

New clause 47—Road traffic contraventions: requests by Mayors—

“(1) The Mayor of a strategic authority may submit a request to the Secretary of State to make regulations providing that a specified traffic contravention relating to high occupancy vehicle lanes is subject to civil enforcement under Schedule 7 to the Traffic Management Act 2004.

(2) On receipt of such a request, the Secretary of State may by regulations amend the tables in paragraph 8A(5) of Schedule 7 to that Act to give effect to the request.

(3) Regulations under this section are subject to negative resolution procedure.”

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause allows combined authorities and combined county authorities to take on the responsibility for civil enforcement of contraventions of bus lanes and other moving traffic restrictions including banned turns, no entry and box junctions. Currently, English local authorities may apply to the Department for Transport for an order designating powers to take civil enforcement action against such traffic contraventions. The clause does not change the current arrangements, whereby constituent local authorities wanting civil enforcement powers must apply for a designation order. Instead, it enables joined-up enforcement across a combined authority or combined county authority area, conditional on each constituent authority giving its prior written consent. That means that motorists crossing over boundaries, including within large cities, who are otherwise likely to encounter different types of enforcement, will benefit from a joined-up and consistent approach across the region.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I want to speak in support of my amendment 368, to schedule 9. It belongs in this debate because it would broaden the issues in schedule 9 beyond simply workplaces. I have been working on the amendment and on these proposals with Transport Action Network—I should declare that I used to work for a predecessor to that excellent campaign. There is a technical part to the amendment and a more forward-looking part, so I will talk about it in three parts.

First, we need to ensure clarity in the Bill about what counts as a local transport plan, in terms of the power to levy what are currently called workplace parking levies, but actually parking levies more generally. Section 179 of the Transport Act 2000 says that a local licensing scheme, which is what a workplace parking levy scheme is,

“may only be made if it appears desirable for the purpose of directly or indirectly facilitating the achievement of local transport policies of the licensing authority.”

I believe that the Bill, however, moves the responsibility for setting such policies through a local transport plan from the local traffic authority to the combined strategic authority, and that other provisions requiring due regard to a strategic authority’s local transport plan do not fix this, as the condition in section 179 of the Transport Act 2000 relates to the authority’s own policies, not other policies it needs to pay regard to. Without an amendment, the Bill could inadvertently scupper proposals that are under development for new workplace parking levies or at least create new legal risks for them.

Many people will know that Nottingham has had a workplace parking levy since 2012, which has helped it to invest £1 billion in transport—not all of it came from the levy, but a lot did—which has made public transport relatively more attractive than driving to work. There has been a virtuous circle of improvements and investment as a result of that initiative. We know that Oxfordshire is considering introducing a workplace parking levy, and Leeds is considering introducing one too, again to invest in new tram infrastructure. Nottingham. Edinburgh and Leicester are also considering that in some detail, and there are definitely discussions in London between boroughs and the Mayor. Several mayors of the new combined authorities could make good use of these powers. It is up to local authorities to do this, and they should definitely be able to do it, which is what I am concerned about.

Secondly, the omission in the Bill of an extension of the power to create parking levy schemes to strategic authorities is odd. Indeed, it is an exception to the other powers that the Bill extends to them. It makes sense to combine this power with the body that in some cases also sets the local transport plan. That does not mean that a workplace parking levy would need to cover the whole of a combined authority area. Parking spaces, by definition, cannot move, so an intricate map of things that were being levied and not levied could definitely be put together. Strategic authorities have the scale to adopt the visionary approach of some of the larger areas making plans that I have already mentioned.

Thirdly, the amendment would do a big thing in extending the current law beyond workplace parking. There are many reasons why I want to argue for that. Since the pandemic, there has been a notable shift from the dominance of travelling to work to other purposes, particularly leisure. We see that on the roads, but we also see it on the railways. It is a general travel trend. It therefore makes sense to consider broadening the scope of levies such as this beyond simply commuting to workplaces, and include other trip generators, particularly when leisure travel makes up the majority of mileage. I want to say clearly that parking spaces on the public highway would be out of scope, no matter what. This would be for parking on private land, and I think the existing rules for workplace parking levies are very clear on that.

I will give a few examples of ways in which this could form part of a truly integrated set of transport policies, be beneficial in generating investment, change travel behaviours and make good applications to things such as safety and congestion. One fairly obvious example is out-of-town retail parking. This would help councils with struggling high streets to level the playing field between those high streets and sprawling out-of-town retail. We see councils around the country subsidising town centre parking, forgoing revenue to revitalise high streets. With this measure, they could instead charge a small fee for parking at out-of-town developments, and make that an incentive as an alternative to forgoing revenue that can be spent on sustainable travel. With new investment, those kinds of parking levies could unlock more reliable, cheaper bus services, improving access to town centres and, potentially, essential things in the periphery of the city for people who do not own a car. Car dependency is a genuine equalities issue.

There is also the question of big car parks. This is a land use question, really. Big car parks use up land. They are very profitable for the private landowners, but this measure could genuinely create a new incentive to convert unproductive land into much-needed homes. Big car parks are often near to city centres, and the higher-density social housing that could replace those car parks would be very desirable to many towns and cities. On a slightly smaller scale, it could nudge owners of under-used garages to redevelop those sites for housing as well, doing infill and increasing the density. I could go on for a long time about the potential benefits to land use planning of enabling local authorities and strategic authorities to make plans for parking that is an unproductive use of land into something better.

Then we have leisure. Leisure uses concentrate in cities and town centres, but in some rural areas, transport and traffic problems are caused by big attractors and tourist destinations. Having a way of raising revenue to improve sustainable travel to those places and disincentivise the promotion of car travel would be excellent. It would increase access to exciting, educational tourist destinations to people who live in urban areas and do not own a car. If attractions outside London or other cities cannot be reached by public transport, people are stuck if they do not own a car. It would potentially be a way of increasing visitors and helping to get investment for more access for visitors to some of these places if we can stop looking at them as places only to drive to.

That is essentially my case. The existing rules around workplace parking levies are extremely rigorous. There is a process for gaining consent, and there have to be public enquiries. There is a good process there that, if extended to other ideas—and the limits on that extension could be set out in regulations—could have a really beneficial impact on transport planning, traffic reduction, car dependency and could potentially increase the viability of towns, cities and rural areas right across the country.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

There are a few amendments to work through, so let me take them in turn. On amendment 246, although I share the desire of the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole to ensure that the general public can hold their authorities to account, particularly on something as important as parking, the amendment would limit the ability of combined authorities and combined county authorities to effectively discharge their functions. It would prevent the mayor and elected members from delegating functions to officers or commissioners—that is the intent of the amendment—but delegating those functions to individuals with the specialist knowledge and capacity to carry out those functions effectively is an important and long-standing feature of how those authorities operate.

I can absolutely reassure the hon. Member that officers are already accountable to the authority, and to its overview and scrutiny committee. The Committee yesterday debated commissioners, and their accountability to the mayor and the oversight committee. Likewise, where a combined authority or combined county authority exercises civil enforcement powers they may do so only with the written consent of relevant constituent authorities. We believe that sufficient safeguards have been put in place to address the important point that the hon. Member raises.

I share the concerns that amendment 348 seeks to address. I agree that vehicles parked on pavements can cause serious problems for all pedestrians, especially people with mobility issues or sight impairment, as well as for prams and pushchairs. All mums in the House, and indeed dads, could attest to that. The Government are already considering measures to address pavement parking. We know and have heard that it is an issue. As the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole stated, the Department for Transport put out a consultation in 2020. We will publish a formal response to that consultation in due course. In the meantime it is worth saying that highways authorities may continue to introduce specific local pavement parking restrictions using their existing powers. We know that pavement parking is an issue. It is an issue that the Government and the Department will come to more fully.

On the specific matter of varying parking charges across different areas, local authorities already have the ability to vary charges within the levels set in national guidance. Obviously, they have to take the decision to vary carefully, and do it alongside public consultation.

Amendment 291 essentially seeks to prevent mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities from increasing charges for vehicle parking, and from using the proceeds of those charges. The Bill does not provide mayors with powers in respect of parking provision. Parking restrictions inherently apply with localised variations—we acknowledge that. Consistent enforcement across a combined authority and combined county authority area is therefore not appropriate. That is why the Government have determined that powers relating to parking provision should continue to be exercised by local authorities. Combined authorities and combined county authorities will not have powers to provide paid-for parking places. The Bill does provide combined authorities and combined county authorities with the ability to take on powers on civil enforcement of contraventions of bus lanes and moving traffic restrictions. Critically, any proceeds in any case are ring-fenced, in the way that they are with local authorities, for environmental measures and public transport schemes. The scenario would not arise in which parking charges could be used to fund something other than those narrowly defined areas.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause will make it easier for Transport for London to free up land for new housing and development in the capital. The Bill gives the Mayor of London the power to agree to Transport for London selling or leasing unneeded operational land. In most cases, this will remove the need for Government consent, which currently adds complexity and delay to the process.

To guard against the risk of Transport for London inadvertently disposing of operational land that is relied upon by the wider rail network in London, the Bill requires Transport for London to consult Network Rail before selling or leasing land involved in wider rail services. To reflect the Mayor of London’s geographical remit, and to mitigate against a democratic deficit, the Mayor’s powers to consent will apply only to Transport for London land within the Greater London Authority area. These changes will better enable the Mayor of London to unlock land for much-needed housing, supporting growth in the capital.

[David Simmonds]

The current Mayor of London clearly has a mountain to climb, given the distance by which he has fallen behind his housing targets. We remain concerned that some issues are sometimes seen as easy pickings, such as the disposal of TfL surface car parks, where we have seen a series of unwelcome planning applications that have risked creating congestion in town centres across Greater London. However, we recognise that the purpose of the clause is more about the technicality of the consultation process, and therefore we will not oppose this provision.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Key route network roads

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause introduces schedule 8, which relates to key route networks in England. As we will discuss later, in the debate on schedule 8, combined authorities and combined county authorities take important roles in co-ordinating local transport networks. As I have just noted, schedule 8 sets out some of the roles for combined authorities and combined county authorities on local road networks. This will include agreeing a local key route network and power of direction, and the power to transfer a duty to make reports on traffic levels.

[David Simmonds]

Briefly, the Bill states, “including road traffic reduction”, and the Opposition’s concern is that when we consider our UK transport infrastructure, the one area in which we conspicuously lag a long way behind our peers is our provision of roads, particularly our motorways. We have about 20% less road capacity than peer countries, but we are in line with them on things like high-speed rail, trams and bus networks, where we have seen enormous progress in recent years. However, I recognise that these are plans that will be implemented subject only to that local democratic process, so we will not oppose this provision.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 8

Key Route Network Roads

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 87, in schedule 8, page 142, line 20, leave out from beginning to “that” in line 25 and insert

“under section 33 or 33A of the Traffic Management Act 2004 or under a permit scheme prepared under section 33 of”.

This amends the definition of “permit authority power” in relation to combined county authorities so that it conforms with the definition used in relation to combined authorities in section 89A of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (as inserted by this Bill).

Under schedule 8, the mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities will have a power to direct local highways authorities in the use of their powers on these roads, including over traffic, highway, street and permit authorities. The power of direction will help mayors to deliver their local transport plans and assist places in developing more integrated transport networks.

The role of a permit authority is to provide permits for roads and street works. The amendment will make a minor adjustment to ensure that the definition of a permit authority is coherent throughout schedule 8. This is an important amendment to ensure that schedule 8 delivers on our aims of a consistent framework of powers across all combined authorities and combined county authorities.

Amendment 87 agreed to.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 328, in schedule 8, page 147, line 7, leave out “key route network”.

This amendment, alongside Amendments 329 to 333 would apply the traffic reporting duty to all local roads within the area of a Local Transport Authority.

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[Siân Berry]

These amendments all do the same thing. Amendments 328 and all the amendments up to 335 would simply remove the words, “key route network” from the part of the Bill that specifies traffic reporting duties. Essentially, they would apply the traffic reporting duties to all local roads within the area of a local transport authority, not simply the key route network.

When it comes to strategic transport planning and its informed scrutiny, I believe that requiring data collection and reporting only for the key route network makes no sense. We, the public, those doing the transport planning and those scrutinising it at all levels of government need to have better data about traffic on local roads, too. The strategic level is the right level at which to require that data to be organised and published, so as not to place new burdens on local authorities, but giving those authorities new tools to work with as well. Obviously, resources must be put in place to enable that, but the benefits—achieving good-value investments, effective policy that serves the public good, and benefits to public engagement and scrutiny—will be huge.

Strategic authorities do the strategic planning, setting the direction for where major developments go. Major developments affect not only key route networks, but local roads as well. Those authorities are also the ones more likely to be moving forward with things like demand management policies and congestion charges—I have already talked about workplace parking levies being able to be run at that level. All of those policies are needed to tackle traffic and congestion, but to be able to plan them, it is really important that good information about local roads is out there and collected. Local authorities have far fewer powers to tackle traffic, but they would also benefit from this kind of information when implementing policies such as safer speed limits and bus lanes. Bringing this duty all under the strategic authority would be a gift to local authorities, and would make transparency much easier as well.

I have tabled further amendments that ask for similar data collection and publication at the strategic authority level, which I will speak to later. In concept, this mirrors the new planning data-related transparency requirements that have come from the same Department that has introduced this Bill. More generally, the system of outcomes frameworks proposed by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government currently has big gaps in it—this is just one of them. That system needs to be looked at again. In its consultation on outcomes frameworks, MHCLG recently admitted that transport was a unique area and that the Department had work to do with DFT on reporting. This particular example seems like one where the Department would benefit from thinking things through again and potentially doing exactly what this amendment suggests—if not now, then at a later stage of the Bill’s passage.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will speak to amendment 328 in particular. As the hon. Member has set out, the amendment would expand the duty of combined and combined county authorities to make reports on traffic levels to all roads within their area, rather than just key route network roads.

I believe that any duty to make reports on traffic should be accompanied by meaningful powers to give effect to such reports directly. That is why, elsewhere in the schedule, mayors of combined and combined county authorities are given a power to direct the highways authority in the use of its powers on such roads. These amendments would give combined and combined county authorities duties to make reports on traffic on such roads, but without any direct control of the traffic itself.

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[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Schedule 8 will provide mayors with a power of direction on key route network roads and transfer duties to make reports on these roads to them. Combined authorities and combined county authorities have an important role in co-ordinating local transport networks, including local roads.

Although local highways authorities will rightly continue to manage local highways, mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities will be required to propose a key route network. This will allow places to work together at the appropriate level to manage traffic and ensure that there is effective traffic planning. To this end, mayors will gain a power to direct highway authorities on these roads, helping them to deliver their local transport plan. The powers balance the important role of local highway authorities in maintaining the road network while helping mayors to co-ordinate and lead transport planning at a strategic level. I commend the schedule to the Committee.

[David Simmonds]

I will speak to amendment 287. We understand the point that the Minister is making about a need to ensure that there is strategic oversight of what is going on. Our concern is that, as we have seen in London, where a version of this already exists, there is sometimes a conflict between what a mayor seeks to do and the views of a local authority—in particular, the elected mandate of that local authority.

We have heard a lot of evidence and had a lot of lobbying as constituency Members of Parliament about issues such as the impact of floating bus stops on people who are partially sighted, and the conflict that the use of bus lanes can sometimes introduce with cyclists. Rather than a duty to implement whatever the mayor decides, there clearly needs to be a duty to “have regard to” it, so that those two things can operate constructively together. That is the thinking behind the amendment, which we intend to push to a vote in due course.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to the questions that were asked. The key question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire concerned the designation of key route networks and its potential inappropriate use by mayors. The mayor will not be able to do that unilaterally; they will be able to do so only alongside their constituent authorities and with their support. We think that that will fundamentally mitigate that risk, but he is right to raise it, and we will keep it under review to ensure that the Bill does not operate differently from the intent behind it.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion suggested that we should move beyond having an Office of Rail and Road to having an office of integrated transport. I endeavour to write to her to inform her of the Department for Transport’s considerations.

On the wider question of key route networks versus local road networks, we are trying to strike a balance between conferring strategic power on the mayor, and the ability not just to request reports from the highways authority, but to direct it to respond to them. The principal authority has the ability to put those requests, but also the ability to respond to them. We think we have the balance between those things right, because, in the end, they interact in a place. Although we do not want to confer too much power on the strategic authority, neither do we want to denude the local highways authority of the power that sits with it.

Question put, That the schedule, as amended, be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.

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There will be tensions if we say that the constituent council has to do whatever is in the mayor’s transport plan, if we want to call it that. For me, local councils will know their areas best, so I think that it is appropriate to make the change to “have regard to”. As we have said before in Committee, to have a successful council and a successful mayor, it is of course the case that, regardless of political affiliation, everyone needs to work together for the benefit of residents. But I think that the terminology in the Bill, which is that councils “must” do what is in the transport plan, goes a step too far and will cause a number of issues. As I said, I suspect that different people will be elected on different mandates—with different things in their manifesto—trying to serve the needs of their residents, and local councils will know them best. I think that we should change the terminology to “have regard to”.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I have some sympathy for the point that has been raised. What I would say in response to amendments 287 and 288 is this. Strategic authorities are the local transport authority for their area. We are very clear as a Government that in performing that role, strategic authorities must work closely with their constituent councils, which are responsible for managing local highways. Indeed, that is the way things are operating at the moment in places where the mayoral strategic authority is the local transport authority.

Clause 28 supports this by placing a duty on all types of constituent council to implement the strategic authority’s local transport plan when carrying out their functions. That does not undermine our expectation that strategic authorities work in co-operation with constituent councils. Instead, I hope, it will ensure that local transport planning is consistent across strategic authority areas. This duty already applies to metropolitan district councils. The purpose behind clause 28 is to create consistency between different types of constituent council.

Amendments 287 and 288 would undermine clause 28 by weakening the duty placed on constituent councils. That would reduce the proposed alignment between constituent councils and their strategic authorities. I reassure the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner that constituent councils, as members of the strategic authority, have in themselves a key role to play in the development of the authority’s local transport plan. As set out in other aspects of the Bill, that includes a vote on whether to approve the local transport plan. Therefore, I think that there are enough checks and balances, and I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Local Transport Authorities and Other Transport Functions

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 88, in schedule 9, page 149, leave out lines 25 and 26 and insert—

“(a) the council is a constituent council of a combined authority or a combined county authority (and here ‘constituent council’ has the meaning given by section 104(11) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 in relation to a combined authority and section 10(11) of the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 in relation to a combined county authority),”.

This clarifies when a county council or a council of non-metropolitan district will not be a local transport authority for the purposes of the Transport Act 2000.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 89 to 97, 99 and 100.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Government amendment 88 ensures that the combined authority or combined county authority is the only local transport authority for the area with the associated powers and duties once it has completed its first full financial year. That includes having responsibility for local transport planning, bus partnerships and bus franchising, and is in line with its role as the strategic decision-making authority for the area, with other responsibilities such as producing the local growth plan. Constituent councils sometimes need to retain certain local transport powers to continue the operation of, for example, a local authority-owned bus company. That will still be possible through bespoke arrangements provided for in secondary legislation.

Turning to Government amendments 89 to 97, 99 and 100. Paragraph 4 of schedule 9 currently sets out the voting arrangements for adopting local transport plans for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities. These amendments extend the provision to cover all types of combined authorities and combined county authorities. This will provide standardisation and clarity for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities about the requirements for adopting their local transport plans.

Regarding Government amendment 92, there are currently no provisions in schedule 9 for the type of vote needed to adopt a local transport plan in non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities. The amendment provides a clear voting arrangement: a simple majority vote of constituent members. That is in line with the approach taken for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities in the schedule. It ensures that a majority of the constituent members agree with the decision on top of the consent requirement provided for in Government amendment 96.

Government amendment 94 provides detail on how votes to adopt the local transport plan occur in non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities. In line with the existing provisions in schedule 9 for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities, the amendment ensures that each constituent member has one vote. Unlike mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities though, no member of a non-mayoral combined authority and non-mayoral combined county authorities will have a casting vote. In the event of a tie, the resolution would not pass. A clear majority would be needed. This amendment is important to bring clarity to how votes to adopt local transport plans are taken in all types of combined authorities and combined county authorities.

Finally, on Government amendment 96, the standard voting arrangement for making decisions in non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities will be a simple majority vote, as is provided for in clause 6. However, in the English devolution White Paper, the Government committed to ensuring that key strategic decisions would have the support of all constituent councils. Adopting a local transport plan is one of those key decisions. Existing non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities already have provisions in their constitutions that require local transport plans to be agreed by all constituent councils.

We know that these provisions provide reassurance to prospective constituent councils, which is why the amendment introduces a requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to get the consent of all their constituent councils before adopting a local transport plan. I commend all the amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 88 agreed to.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 265, in schedule 9, page 149, line 37, at end insert—

“(4D) In preparing or revising a local transport plan, a local transport authority must have regard to the air quality guidelines established by the World Health Organization.”

This amendment requires all local transport authorities, including mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities, to have regard to the World Health Organization’s air quality guidelines when preparing or revising their local transport plans.

This is a simple amendment that I worked out with the Healthy Air Coalition and my good friends who campaign on air pollution, such as Rosamund Adoo-Kissi-Debrah who works in memory of her daughter. The health burden of air pollution falls hardest on those with the least choice—children, old people and low-income communities living near congested roads and industrial corridors—yet the current legal limits for nitrogen dioxide and fine particulate matter are four times higher than the World Health Organisation recommends.

The latest figures from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs may show improvements in some cities. Areas such as London and Nottingham are now technically compliant with the legal limits, but compliance with outdated legal limits does not mean the air is safe to breathe. The Bill gives combined authorities a crucial opportunity to align transport planning with public health outcomes and the correct goals.

Combined authorities have shown some real willingness to act, but their ambition can be constrained by national standards that lag far behind the World Health Organisation’s evidence and guidelines. The Bill is a chance to change that by ensuring that local transport plans are designed not just to meet the legal minimum but to deliver genuinely clean and healthy air for communities.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 98, in schedule 9, page 152, leave out lines 10 to 13 and insert—

“14 In section 146 (mandatory concessions: supplementary)—

(a) the existing text becomes subsection (1);

(b) in that subsection, in the definition of ‘travel concession authority’, after paragraph (c) insert—

‘(cza) a combined authority,

(czb) a combined county authority,’;

(c) after that subsection insert—

‘(2) A county council or a council of a non-metropolitan district is not a travel concession authority for the purposes of this Part where—

(a) the council is a constituent council of a combined authority or a combined county authority (and here “constituent council” has the meaning given by section 104(11) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 in relation to a combined authority and section 10(11) of the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 in relation to a combined county authority), and

(b) the combined authority or combined county authority has completed its first full financial year.’”

This removes joint functions as a travel concession authority from constituent councils of a combined authority or CCA once the authority has completed its first full financial year.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 101 to 104.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Under schedule 9, all combined authorities and combined county authorities will hold powers and duties over travel concessions. This includes the duty to provide concessionary fares for older and disabled people, as well as a power to provide concessionary fares beyond those that are mandatory.

Government amendments 98, 103 and 104 provide for a transition period for all recently established authorities, during which time they will hold these powers and duties concurrently with constituent authorities. That transition period will extend until the end of the first full financial year following the establishment of the authority, at which point the combined authority or combined county authority will become the sole travel concession authority for the area.

These are important amendments that mean that schedule 9 delivers on our aim to have a consistent framework of powers across all combined authorities and combined county authorities. That will streamline the management of travel concessions, making better use of local government resources. Having only one travel concession authority in an area means a uniform approach for passengers, who can rely on their concession passes working across their local area.

I now move to Government amendments 101 and 102. It is essential that newly established strategic authorities can staff themselves and establish robust decision-making procedures—for example, before exercising certain vital transport functions. That is why amendment 101 introduces a transition period, so that newly established combined authorities and county authorities do not have to secure the provision of passenger transport services on day one.

Until the end of the combined authority or combined county authority’s first full financial year, their constituent councils can continue to exercise that duty to ensure that bus services, for example, are provided for local residents. The transition period allows the combined authority or combined county authority to build up capacity and capability, and to agree a suitable approach to taking on the exercise of these functions. That will support a smooth transfer that minimises disruption for passengers and supports the continued delivery of services.

Finally, Government amendment 102 introduces a transition period for powers to make agreement with Transport for London specifically regarding paying for public transport services, in line with similar transition periods for other local transport powers and functions already provided for in the Bill. Proportionate transition arrangements are essential to support the smooth transition of transport powers from constituent councils to newly established combined authorities and combined county authorities. That will be particularly relevant for councils that border London if they form new strategic authorities. Any agreements that they have made with Transport for London to pay for public transport services can remain in place for the transition period, which gives the combined authority or combined county authority time to negotiate agreements during that period, rather than having to do so on day one.

[David Simmonds]

We have some concerns about the real-world impact of the measures outlined in these amendments. We all recognise that there is a logic in bringing consistency to concessionary travel, but public transport is commonly not uniformly available across all parts of single existing and combined authority areas. If we think of the footprint of Greater London, there are places such as Harefield in my constituency and Orpington on the opposite side of London that are essentially rural villages that do not have access to trains and are not on the tube network. They are entirely reliant on buses and their transport connections are frequently outside the boundary of Greater London. The value to people who live in those places of the transport network for which they are paying is therefore significantly less than it is to people who live in the centre of the city.

It certainly feels like this set of measures will benefit people in urban areas at the heart of some of these new combined authority areas, but leave people in areas on the fringes paying but not seeing much benefit in terms of access to transport. We know that in many rural parts of the country, access to bus services, for example, is infrequent. Such services are certainly not fit for purpose in terms of providing school transport and transport for medical appointments or similar purposes.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. One is around how existing settlements—whereby local authorities that will become constituent authorities are already, in effect, levied through the local government finance settlement to pay into a centrally co-ordinated concessionary travel scheme, which is what operates in London—will be managed.

The London boroughs effectively forgo a part of their budget in return for free public transport being paid for children of school age. The Freedom Pass also operates for older people, alongside a variety of other concessions—for example, for people with disabilities. How will that be managed so that we do not see a situation where the mayor takes control of it but has no responsibility for that element of the financial impact, or indeed chooses to redeploy resources away from the things for which that resourcing was originally provided?

Secondly, how will that issue be addressed in areas where this factor is newly established? When the end of that first financial year comes into effect, the constituent authorities, which may have a variety of schemes—for example, because one has a particular priority around access to apprenticeships and may have set up a concessionary travel arrangement to enable people to access that—might find themselves at risk of losing them because the combined authority does not have the same priority? It would be helpful to hear from the Minister how those arrangements, many of which are designed to take account of specific local circumstances, will be accounted for in the provisions.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will write to the hon. Member on the specifics of that. I will say that the mandatory concession scheme is determined by the Department for Transport and would operate in that way, and then there is the ability for greater flexibility for additions on top of that. The way that is applying at the moment is that it varies between different strategic authorities in the approach that they are taking, both in terms of who is eligible and the way that they implement it. On the details of how the provisions in the Bill are mitigating against the scenario that he sets out, where the strategic authority wants an additional concession and it has a financial impact on constituent authorities—

[David Simmonds]

If the Minister can give us an assurance that she will provide that in writing before the conclusion of the Committee, I am happy not to press these amendments to a vote.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am very happy to give that assurance. I think the hon. Gentleman can accept my word: in a previous sitting, I assured hon. Members that I would come back in writing, and I think we did that within a day.

Amendment 98 agreed to.

Amendments made: 99, in schedule 9, page 152, line 15, leave out “place insert” and insert—

“places insert the following definitions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 90.

Amendment 100, in schedule 9, page 152, line 17, at end insert—

“‘non-mayoral CCA’ means a combined county authority that is not a mayoral CCA,

‘non-mayoral combined authority’ means a combined authority that is not a mayoral combined authority,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 90.

Amendment 101, in schedule 9, page 152, line 30, leave out from “are” to the end of line 31 and insert “—

(a) where the combined authority or combined county authority has completed its first full financial year, references to the combined authority or combined county authority (instead of to the council), and

(b) until that time, references to the combined authority or combined county authority as well as to the council.”

This provides for combined authorities and CCAs to have joint transport functions with county councils within their area until they have completed their first financial year, and thereafter to hold those functions alone.

Amendment 102, in schedule 9, page 153, leave out lines 6 and 7 and insert “—

(a) where the combined authority or combined county authority has completed its first full financial year, references to the combined authority or combined county authority (instead of to the council), and

(b) until that time, references to the combined authority or combined county authority as well as to the council.”

This provides for combined authorities and CCAs to have joint transport functions with county councils within their area until they have completed their first financial year, and thereafter to hold those functions alone.

Amendment 103, in schedule 9, page 153, line 13, at end insert—

“19A In section 93 (travel concession schemes), after subsection (8) insert—

‘(8A) A county council or a council of a non-metropolitan district is not a local authority for the purposes of this section where—

(a) the council is a constituent council of a combined authority or a combined county authority (and here “constituent council” has the meaning given by section 104(11) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 in relation to a combined authority and section 10(11) of the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 in relation to a combined county authority), and

(b) the combined authority or combined county authority has completed its first full financial year.’”

This removes certain jointly held travel functions relating to travel concessions from constituent councils of a combined authority or CCA once the combined authority or CCA has completed its first full financial year.

Amendment 104, in schedule 9, page 153, line 18, at end insert—

“(d) after subsection (3) insert—

‘(4) The power under subsection (1) does not apply to a county or district council where—

(a) the council is a constituent council of a combined authority or a combined county authority (and here “constituent council” has the meaning given by section 104(11) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 in relation to a combined authority and section 10(11) of the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 in relation to a combined county authority), and

(b) the combined authority or combined county authority has completed its first full financial year.’”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This removes the power in the Transport Act 1985 of constituent councils of a combined authority or CCA to provide travel concessions once the combined authority or CCA has completed its first full financial year.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Ninth schedule to the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 11—Transport Authority functions: funding and support—

“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that relevant authorities have sufficient financial resources and adequate administrative support to discharge effectively any functions relating to transport conferred on them by this Act.

(2) In discharging the duty under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must regularly review the financial and administrative needs of those authorities in relation to their transport functions, taking into account the scale and complexity of those functions.

(3) For the purposes of this section, ‘functions relating to transport conferred on them by this Act’ means—

(a) functions of a local transport authority as described in Schedule 9, and (b) any other functions reasonably connected with the transport.”

This new clause creates a requirement for regular reviews of the financial and administrative needs of authorities to carry out their transport functions.

New clause 17—Total transport authority powers for strategic authorities—

“(1) Every strategic authority is a total transport authority for its area.

(2) In any case where an area is covered by more than one strategic authority, the total transport authority for that area is the strategic authority that covers the largest overall area.

(3) ‘Total transport authority’ means a local transport authority (as defined in section 108 of the Transport Act 2000) with the additional responsibilities, powers, and functions provided by this section

(4) The additional strategic responsibilities of total transport authorities are—

(a) the integration of public, private, and community transport within its area;

(b) modal integration of all public transport within its area, including integrated ticketing across all modes of public transport;

(c) integrating the procurement and delivery of transport services with those provided by other public services in its area, including NHS trusts, local authority social care providers, and school transport;

(d) integration of local transport plans with local strategic priorities, including landuse planning and local growth plans; and

(e) entering into cross-border transport agreements with neighbouring transport authorities where the total transport authority or a neighbouring authority consider it appropriate for the purpose of discharging their duties under section 108 of the Transport Act 2000.

(5) A strategic authority may discharge its functions and duties as a total transport authority through either—

(a) the strategic authority itself, or

(b) delegation to a functional body of the strategic authority.

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision about the powers and duties of total transport authorities.

(7) Schedule 23 (Powers to make regulations in relation to functions of strategic authorities and mayors) applies to regulations made under this section.”

This new clause would create total transport authorities from existing local transport authorities and provide them with new powers and responsibilities relating to integration of transport.

New clause 18—Report on strategic authority financing of transport projects and schemes—

“(1) Within one year beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must prepare and publish a report on the potential merits of—

(a) providing to strategic authorities additional borrowing powers for transport projects or schemes; and

(b) the establishment and operation of tax increment financing schemes for transport projects.

(2) A report under this section must consider—

(a) options for a standardised model for tax increment financing to enable strategic authorities to fund infrastructure;

(b) which revenue streams could be provided to strategic authorities for use in tax increment financing arrangements; and

(c) the potential for revenue generation resulting from infrastructure investment under any such scheme.

(3) A copy of a report published under this section must be laid before each House of Parliament.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on the potential merits of enabling strategic authorities to levy a tax increment for the purposes of transport development.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Local transport is a key responsibility of strategic authorities, which will continue to be the local transport authority for the area. These authorities will be responsible for local transport planning, the duty to secure the provision of local passenger transport services such as buses or trams, and other relevant powers for bus partnerships, bus franchising and travel concessions. This will allow them to make strategic decisions to support growth and placemaking across their areas through improved transport outcomes.

Currently, combined authorities and county authorities hold varying local transport powers under diverse governance arrangements. The Bill gives authorities certainty and clarity about these powers by standardising them. I commend schedule 9 to the Committee.

[Vikki Slade]

I rise to speak to new clause 11 on funding for transport authorities. There is a lot of merit in harmonising and simplifying the way that transport authorities work. Having borders between different systems can cause huge complications for people crossing them. Obviously, such borders will still exist, but hopefully they will be fewer and farther between.

The purpose of our new clause is to address the elephant in the room. The legislation adds a healthy set of new transport functions for combined authorities, set out across the various measures we have already heard about, and many of them are very positive, but the reality is that those transport authorities that are currently local authorities receive a lot of central Government funding, while the strategic and combined authorities sitting at the higher level do not. Their money is not coming from the magic money tree; it is coming from levies and precepts.

Additional responsibilities are great, but given the additional work involved in all this transport reporting that we have heard about, and the additional functions at a higher level, I am greatly concerned that we may be setting some of these organisations up to fail from the start. Through new clause 11, I am seeking assurance that the Secretary of State will continue to assess and review whether authorities have sufficient support and capacity to carry out these functions, and ensure that they are not too onerous given the source of their funding—levies on the authorities beneath them and precepts directly on the taxpayer.

This Bill is a move away from how we have been funding local authorities; yes, some local authorities are on zero revenue support grants, but many are still quite heavily reliant on central Government funding, and this is the first opportunity for me to say, out loud: are we sure this is a good idea? We are creating a whole framework of legislation and a whole set of local authorities, that have no real central funding. New clause 11 provides the first chance to ask that question and get assurance from the Minister about precisely where the money is coming from. If the money is coming directly from our residents through precepting, we should say that out loud, so that they understand what they have let themselves in for.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I support the arguments made by the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole. We seem to have a lot of new responsibilities, and in transport we lack clarity about where the money is coming from. I agree with the idea of integrated settlements, but will transport continue to receive what it currently does? Will the new authorities be well funded? With austerity so entrenched in local authorities and all this reorganisation happening, will any of that start to be reversed?

With that in mind, I have put forward two new clauses with ideas to solve some of those issues. I will briefly outline why Members might consider supporting new clauses 17 and 18, which are closely related.

New clause 17 is an attempt to put together so-called total transport authority powers for the strategic authorities, to help them to be more of an integrated transport authority than would be achieved by simply transposing local transport plan powers over from the Transport Act 2000. It would add strategic responsibilities around planning and integrating different modes and transport providers in a total transport authority’s area. To be clear, it is not necessarily about providing all those things; many are provided by different parts of the public sector. It is about having responsibility for integrating them.

New clause 17 is also about bringing in integrated ticketing. That is crucial, not just for the convenience and benefit of passengers on public transport, but as a way—particularly at the scale of a strategic authority, which is where these kind of total transport authority responsibilities sit—of achieving the ability to cross-subsidise different modes of travel. This is a good way of making efficiency work in terms of funding, raising money and making the most of the ability to use revenue to create borrowing for investment.

The Department for Transport conducted a viability trial of total transport solutions in 2019 . It was focused on rural areas, and found that local authorities made savings—relatively modest, but they were at the local authority level—and services could be improved without additional costs. This saves money at the wider Exchequer level. If we are talking about the providers of public services listed in the new clause—NHS trusts, local authority social care providers and school transport provision in the area—strategic authorities are asked to look at better integrating those obviously integratable types of transport, and make them more efficient.

The new clause would also enable cross-subsidisation between profitable and non-profitable streams of transport provision. We see that in the London budget, with which I was intimately familiar for many years. The tube network is able to make a profit, which helps to subsidise bus journeys, and that is to everyone’s benefit. That is worth Ministers’ consideration in more detail, and I hope the new clause will prompt them to do that.

It was not my intention to go over the top with this, so I tabled a second new clause—new clause 18—which asks Ministers to look again at tax increment financing, instead of attempting to amend powers already in the Bill. There are clear benefits from tax increment financing. The ability to add a levy to, for example, business rates, as has been done in the past, or potentially on VAT in an area, and to use that to borrow for significant investment, is potentially really powerful. It was used in part for the Northern line extension to Battersea, for example—a glimmer of new tube line that suddenly happened because of that kind of initiative. New clause 18 asks Ministers to look at this issue again and to consider the power for strategic authorities.

We are all wondering where the money might come from. We can see the potential benefits of this level of organisation, but the new clause would put some more powers in place and prompt further reviews of what might be done to help these bodies stand on their own two feet. As we discussed earlier in relation to precepts, powers to raise money will not necessarily lead to a lot of new taxes and levies; they are self-regulating via the process of democracy and are therefore not to be feared.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire and then turn to new clauses 11, 17 and 18.

I assure my hon. Friend that grandfathering arrangements apply. Existing local transport plan voting arrangements for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough that have already been brought into their constitution will apply, and the amendments in the Bill will not override them.

I welcome the intent behind new clause 11 and completely agree with the principle that we need to ensure that the local transport authorities we are creating, which have an vital role to play in our areas, have the resources and funding to do that well. The hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole asked whether we have thought this through. We actively have, but more important is that places have thought it through; there is a clamour to move in this direction and to put in place strategic transport functions, because the huge opportunities are recognised.

We already have a mechanism through the spending review by which we can judge and calibrate whether individual local transport authorities have the resources to do the job required. All local transport authorities will make a judgment about the demands versus their funding as part of the spending review decision.

It is worth noting for the Committee that funding for local transport increased in the spending review settlement, with £15.6 billion put in place for transport for city regions, £2.3 billion for areas outside of city regions and £1 billion for buses. That was in addition to local transport funding provided through the local government settlement. That is both proof and an example of how conversations about what is needed are being matched by resources provided.

Alongside that, we are creating as much flexibility as we can through the local government finance settlement, where we are moving to more consolidated multi-year funding, but also through the Department for Transport giving local leaders greater funding certainty and flexibility, again with multi-year funding settlements, which allows them to plan better.

Finally, as we discussed on Tuesday, there is the question of capacity. We must include capacity to ensure that combined authorities and combined county authorities are doing the job that is being asked of them by their respective constituent authorities, voters and us. That is why we are committing to include funding for capacity building.

On new clause 17, I share the desire of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for transport integration. Strategic authorities have been created to seize the opportunities to come together across a larger geography on transport, economic development and regeneration. However, the new clause would duplicate many of the existing powers and actions of strategic authorities, as well as the new powers already being introduced by the Bill.

In addition to the new powers over planning, clause 21, in part 2 creates a new power for mayors to convene other public bodies to assist with their aims. This power could be used to bring these bodies together without creating a new class of authority. Strategic authorities already undertake significant work to bring together transport modes and functions in their areas, and already have wide-ranging public transport powers. We encourage authorities working on these plans to engage with providers, including those of community transport.

I recognise that new clause 18 is well intentioned and well reasoned, but I do not believe that it is necessary. Existing mayoral strategic authorities possess borrowing powers for all their functions, including transport, which enables them to invest in projects and infrastructure. Through the Bill, we are also enhancing the opportunities for mayors to raise revenue so that they can invest more in local transport. This includes enabling the existing mayoral council tax precept to be spent on the full range of growth levers, including transport, and giving mayors the power to charge a mayoral community infrastructure levy. If mayors of established mayoral strategic authorities wish for changes to existing powers, they will be able to express this through the statutory right to request process. For all those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to push their new clauses to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.

[The Chair]

We have to do a little bit of procedure. I am sure you all noticed that we missed the decision on clause 29 stand part. We can remedy this with an amendment to the programme motion that changes the order of consideration, meaning that clause 29 can be taken after schedule 9, which is now.

Ordered,

That the Order of the Committee of 16 September be varied as follows—

In paragraph 3, leave out “Clauses 28 and 29; Schedule 9; Clause 30;” and insert “Clause 28; Schedule 9; Clauses 29 and 30;”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Adult education

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 30, page 38, line 3, leave out “adult”.

This would be consequential on Amendment 108.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 106 to 108.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Strategic authorities are uniquely placed to understand the sustained demand for education and training places in their areas. In line with the rest of the Bill, the clause places duties on strategic authorities to work with their constituent councils to plan provision locally and ensure that enough education and training is provided in their areas. This will ensure that the needs of those aged 16 to 18, and those aged 19 or over with an education, health and care plan, are met. Some strategic authorities already have these duties. This provision creates uniformity across all areas and provides the legal basis for the allocation of funding to meet such duties. All areas should benefit from strategic authorities working with their constituent councils to deliver essential education and training for young people.

Government amendment 107 will ensure that at least one full academic year has passed between the establishment or designation of a new strategic authority and its ability to exercise the six adult education functions. It also ensures that the strategic authority delivers those functions from the beginning of an academic year, thereby mitigating disruption for learners and providers. The full academic year gives strategic authorities time to build their adult skills teams, develop their skills strategies and plan how they will fund and procure adult skills provision in their areas, thereby maximising the chances of effective delivery. This approach is in line with that taken for strategic authorities that already exercise such functions. Strategic authorities that already exercise adult education functions will continue to do so uninterrupted.

Amendment 105 agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 10.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Devolving adult education functions, such as the duty to secure the provision of education and training for persons aged 19 or over, will provide strategic authorities with an essential tool to drive regional economic prosperity. As I have said, adult education functions are already devolved to 21 strategic authorities and delegated to the Greater London Authority, but the arrangements are currently ad hoc and patchwork. Clause 30 will allow the automatic conferring of adult education functions on new and existing strategic authorities, to create a more consistent and coherent model of devolution. It establishes a standardised framework—a key objective of the Bill—so that devolved powers, duties and functions are taken up by all strategic authorities.

Schedule 10 amends the Apprenticeships, Schools, Children and Learning Act 2009 to confer education-related duties to strategic authorities. The manner in which those duties are conferred is in line with the approach for the 13 authorities that already have adult education functions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendments made: 106, in schedule 10, page 153, line 22, after “this” insert “Part of this”.

This would be consequential on Amendment 108.

Amendment 107, in schedule 10, page 157, line 37, at end insert—

“10A After section 120A insert—

‘120B When functions become exercisable by strategic authorities

The Mayor of London

(1) The functions conferred on the Mayor of London by this Part are exercisable by the Mayor in relation to—

(a) the academic year beginning with 1 August 2025, and

(b) each subsequent academic year.

Combined authority or CCA already exercising the functions

(2) Subsection (3) applies to a combined authority or CCA if functions conferred on it by this Part are also pre-commencement functions.

(3) The functions continue to be exercisable by the combined authority or CCA on and after the commencement day (but as functions conferred by this Part).

Other combined authority or CCA

(4) Subsection (5) applies to a combined authority or CCA—

(a) if functions conferred on it by this Part are not pre-commencement functions;

(b) whether the combined authority or CCA was established before, or is established on or after, the commencement day.

(5) The functions conferred on the combined authority or CCA by this Part are exercisable by it in relation to—

(a) the second academic year to begin after the academic year during which it was, or is, established, and

(b) each subsequent academic year.

District or county council already exercising the functions

(6) Subsection (7) applies to a district council or county council that is a strategic authority if functions conferred on it by this Part are also pre-designation functions.

(7) The functions continue to be exercisable by the district council or county council on and after its designation (but as functions conferred by this Part).

Other district or county council

(8) Subsection (9) applies to a district council or county council that is a strategic authority if functions conferred on it by this Part are not pre-designation functions.

(9) The functions conferred on the district council or county council by this Part are exercisable by it in relation to—

(a) the second academic year to begin after the academic year during which its designation takes effect, and

(b) each subsequent academic year.

Interpretation

(10) In this section—

“academic year” means each period—

(a) beginning with 1 August, and

(b) ending with the next 31 July;

“commencement day” means the day on which the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 is passed;

“designation”, in relation to a district council or county council that is a strategic authority, means its designation as a single foundation strategic authority;

“pre-commencement functions” means functions which were exercisable by a combined authority or CCA immediately before the commencement day by virtue of—

(a) an order under Part 6 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or

(b) regulations under Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023;

“pre-designation functions” means functions which are exercisable by a district council or county council immediately before its designation, by virtue of regulations under section 16 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016.’”.

This would specify when the education functions dealt with by Schedule 10 become exercisable by a strategic authority. If a strategic authority does not already have the functions, or is established or designated after commencement, the functions are exercisable in relation to the second academic year after establishment or designation.

Amendment 108 in schedule 10, page 158, line 36, at end insert—

“Part 2

Education for 16-19 year olds etc

13 The Education Act 1996 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.

14 (1) Section 15ZA (duty in respect of education and training for persons over compulsory

school age: England) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In subsection (1), for ‘local authority in England’ substitute ‘relevant authority’.

(3) In the following provisions, for ‘local authority’ substitute ‘relevant authority’—

(a) subsection (2);

(b) subsection (3), in the words before paragraph (a);

(c) in subsection (4), in the words before paragraph (a);

(d) in subsection (5), in the words before paragraph (a);

(e) in subsection (9).

15 In section 15ZB (co-operation in performance of section 15ZA duty), for ‘Local authorities in England’ substitute ‘Relevant authorities’.

16 In section 15ZC (encouragement of education and training for persons over compulsory school age: England), in subsection (1), in the words before paragraph (a), for ‘local authority in England’ substitute ‘relevant authority’.

17 In section 579 (general interpretation), in subsection (1), after the definition of ‘regulations’ insert—

‘“relevant authority” means—

(a) a local authority in England,

(b) a combined authority established under Part 6 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, or

(c) a combined county authority established under Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023.’”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would confer on strategic authorities additional functions relating to education and training for persons over compulsory school age.

Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 31

Planning applications of potential strategic importance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 11.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Mayors will be given new powers in relation to planning applications of strategic importance, in order to help them to shape the strategic development in their area. The Secretary of State and the Mayor of London have long had the power to intervene and call in planning decisions; we want to ensure that mayors across the country have the opportunity to do the same. This will help to decentralise decisions away from Whitehall—something that I know all Committee Members are keen on.

Clause 31 introduces schedule 11, which works alongside schedule 12, which is inserted by clause 32. The schedules expand existing Mayor of London powers in sections 2A and 74(1B) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to give mayors outside London the ability to call in or directly refuse applications. Schedule 11 also amends section 2A of that Act to allow call-ins when the local planning authority is a mayoral development corporation.

The powers will apply only to the most significant developments that have the potential to raise genuine strategic planning issues—for example, large-scale housing and commercial developments, or significant development on protected areas such as the green belt, which could have a bearing on the implementation of the area’s adopted spatial development strategy. Mayors will be able to intervene only where applications meet thresholds set out in secondary legislation.

The Government have made clear the importance of getting a spatial development strategy in place, so we will legislate so that a spatial development strategy must be in place before the powers can be used. We will consult on legislation before bringing the powers into force. I strongly emphasise that local planning authorities will continue to make decisions on the vast majority of applications without recourse to the mayor.

Finally, the new powers will not affect the well-established arrangements that have been in place in London for more than 15 years. We are, however, engaging with the Mayor to improve the process in order to support greater housing delivery in London, which I know the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner is very keen on.

[David Simmonds]

I rise to ask some brief questions of the Minister, perhaps starting with the last point, about where there is a conflict. London is a good example. The Mayor’s total failure to achieve the housing targets set by central Government is creating a knock-on pressure at local authority level. We know that, in trying to unlock developments, the Government are currently engaged in discussion about significantly reducing the target for affordable housing. There is the potential for call-in powers to create a conflict with the housing duties of the local authority against its overarching objectives. I can think of places in or close to my constituency—a good example is Hendon circus, where 27 years ago I chaired a planning committee that granted consent. That is still a derelict site, despite multiple interventions with the Mayor of London, because it has basically been ping-ponging between developers. We need to make sure that this legislation has rigour and will actually deliver.

Will the Minister provide some assurance that an effective mechanism will be in place? It is all very well talking about mayoral powers to direct planning authorities, but we often see a mayoral failure to progress developments, to the frustration of a planning authority. How will we ensure that there is that rigour, so the homes for which planning consents are granted actually get built?

[Siân Berry]

I, too, have much experience of the London system of planning—of putting together the London plan and its implementation through strategic planning applications. I have a couple of things to say.

First, as alluded to by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, we have heard alarming reports today that the well-worked-through, evidence-based requirements that were put into the London plan may be undermined by an unclear process. We would like assurance that once the processes are carried out—once local people have engaged and many local authorities have given evidence in respect of a plan and some policies—the policies are kept in place and used by the mayors who have gone to so much trouble. We hear rumours of CIL holidays and other really worrying things. I will not ask for answers on that now, but we will discuss the community infrastructure levy later.

The issue I want to raise is the transparency and clarity of the online information that accompanied the Mayor of London carrying out his strategic planning responsibility in respect of individual planning applications. As an expert user of that online information in the past, I know it is vastly worse than what is commonplace and very good from most local authorities. One does not get easy access to the accompanying documents or other people’s comments as they come in; they can be incredibly useful in local authority planning applications. By contrast to the national infrastructure planning process, the documents associated with the planning application are not published and the timetable is not necessarily available. I had endless trouble while trying to scrutinise and take part in the process.

I beg the Minister to look at putting in place a more standardised way of making the planning applications that are intervened on by mayors, and the process that happens, more transparent. It should match either of the other two planning levels we have. At the GLA end of things, it has not been very good.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We all share the desire to see housing built. I will not make the political point that the last Government, of which the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner was part, categorically failed to do that. The challenges faced by the Mayor of London are the function of systematic failure over 14 years and a housing market that is in a very difficult position.

We absolutely want to see house building at pace. First, we are putting in place a requirement that there has to be a spatial development strategy that sets out how the mayor will deliver housing needs—a core document that will ensure that it bites. Mayoral call-in powers can be used only once that spatial development strategy is in place. Once house building has been granted permission, we want to see it built out effectively. Obviously, we will keep this under review to ensure that the duty to direct comes alongside the call-in and that the spatial development strategy works effectively to deliver the outcome we want to see.

On the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s point about the transparency of the process, residents across the piece often find the planning process, whether at the strategic or local authority level, pretty opaque and hard to navigate. We will continue to look at that, because it is important that when strategic or local planning decisions are made, residents understand why, how, and how they can fully engage in the process.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clause 32

Development orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 32 expands existing Mayor of London powers in relation to mayoral development orders and directions to all mayors of strategic authorities. It will allow the mayor to be consulted on and to direct the refusal of certain planning applications, and it makes consequential changes to other legislation. We will discuss the effects of the schedules that the clause introduces in greater detail later. For now, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12

Development orders

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to move amendment 58, in schedule 12, page 162, leave out sub-paragraph (5).

This amendment would remove provision for the Secretary of State to have the power to approve a Mayoral Development Order where a Local Planning Authority has not approved it by the end of the period.

--- Later in debate ---

We must trust local authorities to make their own planning decisions. The delaying of consent to a mayoral development order is often done because there are issues that need to be resolved. The amendment would restore the balance and ensure that mayoral development orders can proceed only when local approval and consent is given, and not by ministerial decree. What assurances can the Minister give the Committee that planning decisions will remain local?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I recognise the intent behind the amendment, but we cannot accept it. In any planning process, constituent authorities will be fully consulted and engaged. Ultimately, the implementation of a local transport plan or of transport decisions that are made through a mayoral development order will require engagement and work with the constituent authority, so the process will be one of consensus. In the broad majority of cases, we expect to see that consensus. Indeed, where we currently see collaboration across boundaries, consensus is what is driving decisions across those boundaries.

However, we recognise that there will be occasions when consensus cannot be reached. It is absolutely right that mayors can then refer the case to the Secretary of State and the Planning Inspectorate, to be assessed on its planning merits. The ability to make a referral to the state and the Planning Inspectorate is a standard feature of the planning process, even for local authorities, and we think it is right that it operates. I come back to the point that, ultimately, to implement big schemes, constituent authorities need to be brought in and to be part of the implementation. Finding consensus is not only what happens in practice but the spirit in which we expect mayors to work. This provision is but a backstop.

[David Simmonds]

I listened carefully to the Minister. We have great sympathy with the amendment. One of the concerns that has run throughout this debate and that on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, with which this legislation interacts, is that it complicates the planning system still further. My earlier example illustrates that well: a developer applies to the local authority and gets consent for something; it comes back for something larger, but is refused; it goes to the planning inspector, gets consent for something else; it puts in another application, going to the mayor and getting the chance of going to a Secretary of State call-in; and then the developer sells the site, and the whole process starts again. No homes are built and no infrastructure is delivered, but value is added from the developer’s perspective, because it has traded the site on.

There is clearly a risk to introducing that extent of mayoral call-ins as well. They will provide massive incentives for a developer at every stage to second-guess the decision maker, whether that is the planning committee at the local authority, the mayor, the planning inspector or the Secretary of State, continuing the merry-go-round of the 1.5 million planning permissions in England at the moment where development has not commenced. In many cases, that is because of that trading process.

We are minded to support the amendment. I appreciate that the Government have the numbers and we will be defeated, but the point is well made: we need to streamline the system, not add to its complexity and bureaucracy in this way.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The Government agree that we need to streamline and simplify the planning process, making it much quicker and smoother. I will again put on the record that the previous Government had 14 years to do that, but they absolutely, categorically, failed to do so. We are now getting on with it, and my colleagues in the Department have taken the Planning and Infrastructure Bill through the House. Hon. Members on the Conservative Benches should not want to be talking about their record, because they should be ashamed of it.

On the key point about adding another level of complexity, I point hon. Members to the fact that the measure applies only to strategic sites. The planning system will operate as usual, with local planning authorities having the key remit to drive things forward. This provision is for strategically significant sites, partly because of their scale or because they are critical to the strategic development plan.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I endorse the amendment. It is extremely sensible to have this kind of priority in place. It is extremely reminiscent of planning policy guidance note 13, which was abolished by the coalition Government in 2011 and was originally put in place under the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2001, if I recall correctly. It was part of an integrated transport policy, making sure that homes and transport were planned in concert and that there was a sequential test for focusing first on areas that were already developed—areas close to urban centres—and then allowing for sequential use of greener areas.

That is something that we lack in planning policy at the moment. Having a policy that is entirely either/or, or where we free up things completely or not at all, without a sequential test, has led to a lot of conflict in planning policy lately. Something that sets a sequence of priorities is much more sensible, and I think the Minister should look at it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon for her constructive and helpful amendment 252. In principle, the ability to integrate a land use framework and energy plan at the strategic level obviously makes sense. Regarding the amendment as drafted, the Government have consulted on a land use framework but have not yet provided a response, so the land use framework is not a tangible thing that strategic authorities can hinge their plans on.

Similarly, strategic spatial energy plans, which I have a lot of support for, and which I hope to see across the country, are at an embryonic stage. We do not know how high level they will be. The principle—that as strategic authorities are thinking about their strategic plans they should think about a whole host of things—holds, but we do not think that the amendment is appropriate because of the frameworks that it hinges on.

[Vikki Slade]

I wish to clarify the purpose of raising the issue of strategic spatial energy plans. There is a real risk that people confuse local area energy plans with net zero and climate change, but there is a possibility for us all to agree that it is far easier to put the role of the strategic authorities to think about the future of energy, from grid capacity to how we get things done, in those terms than to risk it becoming a net zero football. I would love to see, as the Bill goes through Parliament, a way for this measure to be inserted, because there are some real risks coming down the line, with potential leaderships that may try to drive things in a different direction.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I agree with the hon. Lady’s broader point. There is absolutely a piece for us to think about regarding energy infrastructure. Having served as Minister for energy consumers, thinking about how we drive warm homes and the interaction with the grid, there is clearly a big piece of work that needs to be done there, and a role for strategic authorities to play in thinking about that planning in an integrated way.

The frameworks that amendment 252 refers to are nascent and likely to be quite high level, but the principle is that as strategic planning authorities think about their spatial energy plan they should think about both how they effectively use the land and the energy and transport infrastructure that is in place.

I agree with the intent behind amendment 304. I refer hon. Members to the national planning policy framework, which rightly places greater emphasis on the use of previously developed land, and we want to see mayoral development orders used to support urban regeneration. On those points, we are completely aligned. However, we should not over-constrain mayors. We want legislative flexibility to allow a mayor to use a range of land types across their area. Where an urban extension or a new town is the appropriate thing, we do not want to bind the hands of mayoral strategic authorities and stop them being able to use the right land for the right development.

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister is right to say that the NPPF outlines previously developed land, but it does not include density, so it is not necessarily relevant to this amendment. We seek an incentivisation of densification: does she agree with that policy basis?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I refer the hon. Gentleman to the national planning policy framework, which tries to encourage and incentivise the use of previously developed land, and to make sure that within our urban centres we are building out as much as we can. That is an issue for the NPPF and the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. It would not be right, in the context of mayors specifically, to constrain them and say, “You can only use one land type.” We must allow the flexibility but use national planning policy to encourage urban regeneration and urban densification.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I will not press the amendment, but I would like a reassurance from the Minister on the frameworks. Although they are nascent and in their embryonic state, they are really important. By the time the Bill becomes law, we will be consulting on these frameworks and applying them. Will the Minister write to tell us how this issue will be resolved? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment proposed: 304, in schedule 12, page 164, line 33, at end insert—

“61DCB Density requirement

(1) A strategic authority issuing a mayoral development order must prioritise applications which—

(a) will deliver greater density in urban areas,

(b) are located in areas with greater public transportation accessibility according to the indices established by subsection (2), or

(c) if located within the Greater London Authority, are located in areas with a Transport for London Public Transport Accessibility level equal or greater than Level 4.

(2) A strategic authority must create ‘public transport accessibility index’ to categorise areas within the authority based on their proximity to public transportation

(3) A strategic authority must issue a mayoral development order for any land which has been previously developed.”—(David Simmonds.)

This new clause would require mayoral development orders (MDOs) to prioritise planning applications in areas of high urban density and public transport accessibility, and would require MDOs to be issued for previously developed land.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Seventh sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 13.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

Schedule 12 expands on existing powers in relation to the mayoral development orders in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to all mayors of strategic authorities. MDOs grant planning permission for development as an alternative to granting permission through a planning application. They are similar to local development orders, which Members will be familiar with and are used across the country.

Development orders are designed to enable up-front planning certainty for developers and communities. For example, the Gravity LDO in Somerset granted permission for advanced manufacturing facilities and a giga-battery factory is now under construction. We want to give mayors and strategic authorities the same opportunities so that they can support development, which will make a difference to growth and economic opportunities in their areas.

At the moment, only the Mayor of London can make an MDO; schedule 12 would expand that to all mayors. It also streamlines the MDO process. Currently, an MDO needs to be requested by each relevant local planning authority, and their consent is needed before the mayor can consult on the draft order. Schedule 12 removes those limitations. That does not mean that local planning authorities are cut out of the process; they will still be consulted and their approval will be sought for making the order.

In practice, we expect to see local planning authorities and mayors working closely in partnership. However, we recognise that there may be instances where a mayor and a local planning authority cannot agree. Proposed new section 61DCA of the Town and Country Planning Act allows a mayor to request that the Secretary of State consider an order where local planning authority approval is not given. These provisions set the framework; the detailed process for making an order will be set out in secondary legislation, which we will consult on.

Schedule 13 contains consequential amendments to other legislation, which are necessary for the provisions under clauses 31 and 32. I hope that Members will agree that this measure will be an important tool for mayors in delivering the housing and the economic growth and development that we want to see across the country. I commend schedules 12 and 13 to the Committee.

[The Chair]

In the absence of Mr Simmonds, I call Mr Holmes.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

I will do my best not to disappoint you, Sir John, or the Minister or Government Back Benchers. I welcome the Minister to her place and hope that she feels refreshed after last night’s late sitting; we will try to make this as easy as possible.

In relation to schedules 12 and 13, this is a standard procedure used by the Mayor of London. We see this as a perfectly sensible proposal that unifies the regulations with those existing in London. I will just say this to the Minister, if I can without disappointing her. On proposed new section 61DCA, the Minister outlined that the Secretary of State could direct or issue an order, should local authorities not agree to a mayoral development order. I understand that details will come out in secondary legislation, which is perfectly acceptable, but could she outline to the Committee the balance of power? As I think the Minister respectfully acknowledges, we have been consistently worried that, if this is supposed to be a true devolution Bill, giving power to the Secretary of State to order or issue kind of breaks the spirit of that devolution.

Could the Minister give the Committee some reassurance that the views and objections of local authorities would be taken into proper consideration? What would that balance of power be, should the Secretary of State have to use that order? We do, however, see this as a perfectly reasonable schedule, and will not seek to divide the Committee on it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for supporting the measure. In the event that there is not consensus between a constituent authority and the mayoral strategic authority, it would go up to the Secretary of State in the way that planning applications do currently. The Planning Inspectorate will review it based on its planning merits, in the light of issues and objections that have been raised locally, and the full suite of evidence. It is consistent with the current process for planning applications that are called in. We think this will essentially standardise what we do for individual local authorities currently.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 12 accordingly agreed to.

Schedule 13 agreed to.

Clause 33

Power to charge community infrastructure levy

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 289, in schedule 14, page 170, line 15, at end insert—

“, and

(b) must, as far as it relates to the exercise of the mayor’s functions as a charging authority, publish details of—

(i) each instance in which CIL has been charged,

(ii) how much has been raised by the charging of CIL, and

(iii) the impact on delivery of housing infrastructure development.”

This amendment would ensure that mayors charging CIL reported on the effect that this has on housing development.

Schedule 14.

New clause 1—Community infrastructure levy charges: guidance—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, prepare and publish guidance for charging authorities on—

(a) the implementation and administration of community infrastructure levy charges;

(b) appropriate procedures for handling technical errors in the calculation, notification, or collection of community infrastructure levy charges; and

(c) best practice for resolving disputes relating to community infrastructure levy charges where technical errors have occurred.

(2) The guidance under subsection (1) must include—

(a) guidance on what constitutes a technical error in the context of community infrastructure levy charges;

(b) recommended procedures for reviewing and, where appropriate, waiving or reducing community infrastructure levy charges where a technical error has occurred;

(c) principles to guide the proportionate collection of community infrastructure levy payments when technical errors have been identified; and

(d) time limits for the rectification of technical errors.

(3) In this section—

“charging authority” has the meaning given in section 106 of the Planning Act 2008, as amended by Schedule 14 of this Act;

“technical error” means an error in the calculation, notification, or administration of a Community Infrastructure Levy charge that is not related to a material change in the development to which the charge applies.”

New clause 28—Application of CIL to householders—

“(1) The Planning Act 2008 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 205 (The Levy) after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) In making the regulations, the Secretary of State may not charge CIL on householders’ property extensions that are for their own use.

(2B) The Secretary of State must amend the Community Infrastructure Regulations 2010 so that they are in accordance with the requirements of subsection (2A).””

This new clause disapplies CIL from householders extending property for their own use.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 33 and schedule 14 will give mayors of strategic authorities the ability to raise a mayoral community infrastructure levy, or MCIL. I am sure Members will be aware that the Mayor of London’s ability to charge MCIL in London was critical to funding delivery of the fantastic Elizabeth Line. We want to extend the same power to other regional mayors so that they too can fund vital infrastructure that will drive growth and create opportunities in their areas.

The power will not be unconstrained. Mayors will need to have a spatial development strategy in place, meaning that they will have to have a clear plan for meeting overall housing and development targets in their area. Mayors will also need to develop and introduce a CIL charging schedule, which will undergo public consultation, examination and approval. That means that the levy rates that apply to MCIL will strike an appropriate balance between supporting development through infrastructure provision and the potential effect on viability of development. We will provide further detail on what MCIL can be spent on through regulations.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair today, Sir John. I support the clause and schedule 14. It is really important that we have devolved fundraising powers, and this is one of the ways in which that can be done.

I have a question for the Minister about the rules for what mayoral CIL in different areas can be levied to fund. In London, the current regulations restrict spending by the mayor to funding roads or other transport facilities. Is the Minister making changes in the Bill, or will she do so through regulations?

[Paul Holmes]

I will speak to amendment 289, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, on behalf of the official Opposition. I will also briefly speak to new clause 1. The hon. Lady has just very expertly outlined why the Government should accept it, and the official Opposition agree with her. She is absolutely correct that CIL, although a very good thing, is—not always intentionally, but sometimes negligently—being used in inappropriate ways. Just last week, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) mentioned a case in his constituency with his local authority, where somebody was being charged £70,000. That is clearly unacceptable.

Any measure that could improve the regulation and guidance to local authorities, not necessarily to restrict them but to give them clarity—it would also slightly pull on the tail of their coat, so they do not act irresponsibly to people who are responsibly improving their homes—is a good thing. We will therefore be supporting new clause 1 if the hon. Lady chooses to press that to a vote. It clearly does not place an undue burden on the Secretary of State, and it would mean that the system would become more streamlined and transparent. It would give protection to people who are doing the right thing and ensuring that they are following the rules, but the rules are clearly being interpreted in different ways.

Amendment 289, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, would ensure that the mayors charging CIL report on the effect that this has on housing development. Similarly to new clause 1, we do not think that that would place an undue burden on the legislation or on the necessary parties because, where the community infrastructure levy is being used at the moment, there clearly is a lack of transparency on what it is delivering for local people. The amendment will improve the transparency that mayors and local authorities would be bringing to the table.

CIL is meant to improve infrastructure and make sure that housing is delivered. We have seen across the country places where existing mayors are not necessarily delivering on their housing commitment, particularly in London. We argue that this amendment would bring transparency because a mayor has to account for how they are using CIL and the effect that that would have on housing development in a city region that they control. We think that is a perfectly reasonable amendment.

For that reason, we will press amendment 289 to a vote, and if the hon. Lady the Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole chooses to press new clause 1 to a vote, we will certainly support that today.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will start by addressing some of the questions that were raised, and then move to amendment 289 and new clause 1. There is a key question of how to ensure that the mayoral strategic CIL does not undercut local CILs. The mayor will have to have regard to local CILs that are already being issued, to ensure that there is a balance. The CIL proposal will need to be done in the context of viability assessments, so the mayor will need to think about what is happening at the parish, town and local authority levels in terms of CIL before a strategic CIL is put in place. It is also worth noting that the charging schedule will be subject to statutory consultation. Again, that is another provision to ensure that the right balance is being struck.

The hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole asked what the CIL will be used for. That will be set out in regulations, but we are clear, up front, that it will be for vital infrastructure that can unlock growth and economic development. Therefore, there will be broader permissiveness within that, but we will set that out in further regulations.

On amendment 289, while I fully support the need for transparency in the use of developer contributions to ensure accountability, the amendment is unnecessary because it duplicates existing regulatory requirements. All contribution-receiving authorities are already required to publish an infrastructure funding statement each year. This annual statement must include details on the amount of CIL collected and spent, and information on infrastructure projects funded, or intended to be funded, by CIL.

The CIL regulations are already very prescriptive about what must be included within an infrastructure funding statement. Introducing further reporting obligations is not necessary and potentially risks confusing things and increasing the administrative burdens on strategic authorities.

Finally, we have an additional safeguarding provision: the Planning Act 2008 provides a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations to amend existing reporting requirements, or create new requirements, if it is determined that existing arrangements are not necessary. We think that we already have sufficient provisions within existing legislation, which means that amendment 289 is not required.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

We are talking about a mayoral CIL reset, but some local authorities will not introduce a CIL because they get far more out of section 106 negotiations. Will mayors be able to take part in 106 negotiations if they do not bring in their own CIL? If not, why not?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Ultimately section 106 will remain with local authorities. I hope that the process of developing a strategic spatial plan means that the mayor and constituent authorities have already had the conversation about housing development and critical infrastructure that needs to sit alongside it, and how that will be well funded. The CIL is a complementary tool that will sit alongside section 106 and other tools that sit with the local authority but, critically, all should be working toward a collective plan for the area that they have all fed into and engaged with. If that plan is done well, there will be consensus across the piece.

Although I completely appreciate the intentions behind new clause 1—to promote consistency and best practice in how the CIL is administered—they are already achieved under existing legislation and statutory guidance. Regulation already includes provisions for correcting errors in CIL charges, including by issuing revised liability notices and demand notices. There are also clear routes of review and appeal, initially to the local authority itself, but also to the Valuation Office Agency in certain cases, and to the Planning Inspectorate. Those are well established, effective safeguards that are used where developers believe that an error has been made. In addition, the Planning Act 2008 allows a Secretary of State to give guidance to charging authorities or other public authorities about any matter connected with CIL, and the authority must have regard to that guidance. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I cannot comment on the motivations of the Minister, who I believe is an hon. Lady of utmost integrity, but I suspect that the Government want to amend the Bill on their own terms. The hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole and I both speak for Opposition parties, but we would not make hay if the Minister chose to accept these new clauses. The Government have a position, stated on the Floor of the House of Commons, that CIL is not working for people who tried to follow the rules but are being persecuted and in many cases prosecuted by local authorities, through the wrong charging mechanisms being applied. The Minister outlined the mitigation and the appeal infrastructure that people can currently use, but they are not working either. New clause 1—an admirable new clause—and new clause 28 would make it very clear that people in that situation cannot be charged the CIL.

The Minister is in charge. She has the power to accept the new clauses and improve the legislation to change the lives of people who face injustice every day in the current system. I absolutely accept that the last Government did not do it, but she has a simple choice today: accept these new clauses, change the situation, and make sure that people do not have to go through what these people have been going through. I encourage her to accept these new clauses in the spirit of co-operation and tripartisanship—[Interruption.] Quadripartisanship! We would genuinely support her in doing that.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

First, I thank hon. Members for tabling these amendments and for raising the issue. I assure the Committee that we know there is a problem here. We are alive to the cases that have arisen, which demonstrate that the CIL, as it should apply, is not working in practice. Although exemptions exist, they are not being applied in the way that they ought to be.

We are giving careful consideration to this matter as part of our commitment to develop a far clearer and more effective contribution system. As I said, I completely appreciate that the intention behind the amendments is to protect a segment of the market that we want to protect; it ought to exempted. I can clearly confirm that we are looking seriously at this matter and we will revert to it at a later stage, so I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments to allow the Government time to consider it properly.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 34 introduces schedule 15, which contains provisions to enable strategic authorities outside London to undertake their housing and strategic planning competences. These standardise the extension of powers relating to the acquisition and use of land currently held by Homes England and local authorities to strategic authorities outside London.

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister has outlined the clause and set out the responsibilities and changes she wants to make in a very reasonable manner. This seems a perfectly sensible solution; it encourages more transparency and accountability in some of the actions that Homes England undertakes. People in my constituency feel that some of the money allocated to development through the current channels of scrutiny and planning is not necessarily in lockstep with what they want for their local areas. As I have said throughout, a devolution Bill should mean true devolution, so I think these responsibilities coming under the remit of the new authorities is a good thing. I welcome this addition to the legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 15

Acquisition and development of land

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 109, in schedule 15, page 173, line 7, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) in subsection (1), after ‘HCA’ insert ‘or a strategic authority outside London’;

(aa) in subsection (2), after ‘HCA’ insert ‘or a strategic authority outside London’;”

This would alter the amendment of section 9(2) so that the function there would not be conferred on the GLA (only on strategic authorities outside London).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 110, 111, 127 and 128.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The Bill gives the Greater London Authority, as well as other strategic authorities, the powers of Homes England to acquire land both by agreement and by compulsory purchase. Government amendments 109 to 111 change that, ensuring that the power is conferred only on strategic authorities outside London. This is because the Greater London Authority already has similar powers under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, and so does not need the additional powers, and duplicating powers could create legal uncertainty and confusion. We are providing greater certainty by clarifying these provisions.

Similarly, the Bill provides that part 1 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 applies to all strategic authorities, as well as Homes England. Government amendment 127 clarifies that this should be applied only to strategic authorities outside London, as functions of Homes England are to be conferred only on those authorities. Again, The Greater London Authority already has similar powers to acquire land by agreement through the Greater London Authority Act.

Government amendment 128 would place conditions on how strategic authorities outside London use land that is not consecrated or a burial ground and that at the time it was acquired had a building being used or previously used for religious worship. The use of this type of land is subject to prescribed requirements about the disposal of monuments. This is in addition to the requirement extended in relation to land that contains burial grounds or consecrated land, which is already extended by schedule 15(10).

At present, this provision applies only to land acquired by Homes England, and the amendment would extend it to strategic authorities. This change ensures consistency in how land powers are applied across different public bodies. This is a small change, but it is necessary to ensure that the legislation works properly and longstanding protections are not lost.

Amendment 109 agreed to.

Amendments made: 110, in schedule 15, page 173, lineusb 11, leave out from “on” to end of line 12 and insert “strategic authorities outside London.”

This would be consequential on Amendment 109.

Amendment 111, in schedule 15, page 173, leave out lines 19 to 21.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would be consequential on Amendment 109.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 112, in schedule 15, page 173, line 30, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 114, 115, 117, 119, 120, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139, 159, 161, 162, 164, 166 and 167.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

These amendments make a series of technical corrections to ensure that the Bill uses the correct terminology. They replace the word “authority” or “authorities” with “council” or “councils” in several places in schedules 15 and 16. The change is important because the term “constituent council” or “councils” is the defined and accurate term used elsewhere in the legislation for the local authorities that form part of the combined authority or the combined county authority.

Using consistent language helps to ensure that the Bill is clear, legally precise and easy to interpret, and avoids confusion about which bodies are being referred to. The amendments do not change the substance of, or intent behind, any of the provisions; they simply improve their clarity and consistency, and hopefully result in a lack of confusion—although I am not clear that they do—in the drafting. I encourage the Committee to support the amendments, to help to maintain the accuracy and integrity of the Bill.

Amendment 112 agreed to.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 113, in schedule 15, page 173, line 31, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority.”

This would make the Broads Authority a consultee if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 116, 118, 121, 123, 125, 132, 135, 137, 140, 160, 163, 165, 168 and 169.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

These amendments add the Broads Authority to the list of bodies that must be consulted by mayoral strategic authorities or provide their consent to non-mayoral strategic authorities before land in its area is compulsorily acquired using powers devolved by the Bill. The broads are a nationally important landscape with equivalent status to a national park, and the Broads Authority is best placed to advise on the potential impact of land acquisition in its area. This is about ensuring proper engagement with the right bodies when decisions affecting sensitive and protected areas are made. That reflects the approach already used by existing authorities and ensures that all constituent councils have a clear and accountable role in the decision-making process.

Amendment 113 agreed to.

[The Chair]

We are moving ahead with alacrity, are we not?

Amendments made: 114, in schedule 15, page 173, line 36, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 115, in schedule 15, page 173, line 38, leave out “authority” and insert “council”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 116, in schedule 15, page 173, line 39, at end insert—

“(d) the Broads Authority.”

This would make the Broads Authority a consultee if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 117, in schedule 15, page 174, line 5, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 118, in schedule 15, page 174, line 6, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority;

and consent of a constituent council must be given at a meeting of the combined authority.”

This would (i) require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area; and (ii) require consent of a constituent council to be given at a meeting of the combined authority.

Amendment 119, in schedule 15, page 174, line 11, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 120, in schedule 15, page 174, line 13, leave out “authority” and insert “council”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 121, in schedule 15, page 174, line 14, at end insert—

“(d) the Broads Authority;

and consent of a constituent council must be given at a meeting of the CCA.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would (i) require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area; and (ii) require consent of a constituent council to be given at a meeting of the CCA.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 122, in schedule 15, page 174, line 15, after “council” insert

“that is a strategic authority”.

This would clarify that subsection (8) applies to a county council only if it is a strategic authority (in line with the application provision in subsection (1) of the new section 9A).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 124.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

These amendments are, again, about making the legislation clearer and more consistent. They confirm that only councils that are strategic authorities are subject to the additional consent requirements when using the compulsory purchase powers in the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. This matches what was already set out in subsection (1) of proposed new section 9A of that Act.

Without those changes, there would be confusion about whether all county and district councils are included. That is not the intention: these provisions are meant to apply only where councils are designated as strategic authorities. The amendment is helpful to avoid misinterpretation and ensure that the Bill is applied as intended.

Amendment 122 agreed to.

Amendments made: 123, in schedule 15, page 174, line 20, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority.”

This would require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 124, in schedule 15, page 174, line 21, after “council” insert

“that is a strategic authority”.

This would clarify that subsection (9) applies to a district council only if it is a strategic authority (in line with the application provision in subsection (1) of the new section 9A).

Amendment 125, in schedule 15, page 174, line 22, leave out from “any” to end of line 24 and insert

“of the following bodies whose area contains any part of the land subject to the proposed compulsory acquisition—

(a) any National Park authority;

(b) the Broads Authority.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would make the Broads Authority a consultee if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 126, in schedule 15, page 174, line 29, at end insert—

“Main powers in relation to acquired land

6A In section 11, omit ‘by the HCA’.”

This would reflect the effect of the Bill on Schedule 3 to the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.

This technical amendment again ensures consistency in how the Bill amends existing legislation. It removes the words “by the HCA” from a reference in section 11 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 to schedule 3 to that Act. In paragraph 10 of schedule 15 to the Bill, “by the HCA” is already being removed from the heading of schedule 3 to the 2008 Act. This change aligns with that. The original wording refers specifically to Homes England, and no longer reflects the full range of bodies that may exercise those powers under the Bill.

This amendment ensures the legislation is clear and accurate, and I encourage the Committee to support it to ensure that we have clarity and consistency across our legislation.

Amendment 126 agreed to.

Amendments made: 127, in schedule 15, page 177, line 2, after “authority” insert “outside London”.

This would alter the amendment of paragraph 17(1) so that the function there would not be conferred on the GLA (only on strategic authorities outside London).

Amendment 128, in schedule 15, page 177, line 22, at end insert—

“(8) In paragraph 21 (other land connected to religious worship), in sub-paragraph (1), after ‘HCA’ insert ‘or a strategic authority outside London’.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would provide for paragraph 21 of Schedule 3 to the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 to apply in relation to land acquired by a strategic authority outside London. It allows for restrictions on the use of land that was connected to religious worship but was neither consecrated nor a burial ground.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 129, in schedule 15, page 179, line 34, leave out from “(6)” to end of line 4 on page 180 and insert—

“(a) in paragraph (bb), omit ‘and’;

(b) after paragraph (c) insert—

‘(d) if the land is in the area of a strategic authority to whom this section applies, consult with that strategic authority (in addition to any other consultation required by this subsection).’”

This would require the Secretary of State to consult a strategic authority (as well as the local authority) before authorising a compulsory acquisition

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 130, 143 and 152 to 154.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Amendment 129 revises the consultation process when the Secretary of State is authorising the compulsory acquisition of land. It removes a provision that would have required consultation with a strategic authority instead of the relevant local councils, and adds instead a requirement to consult the strategic authority as well as the councils where the land is located. This ensures that both local and strategic authorities are involved in decisions affecting land in their area. It is a practical and balanced amendment.

Amendment 130 removes the provision that makes the mayor the person responsible for exercising the compulsory acquisition of land function in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Instead, the powers will be exercised by the mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority. This is consistent with how the function is currently exercised in most existing mayoral strategic authorities, where decisions about how to use the function are taken collectively. The amendment does not affect the ability of authorities to make timely and effective decisions on land acquisition; it simply ensures that there is collective buy-in behind the decision.

Amendments 143, 153 and 154 ensure that all local authorities, non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities have access to the same powers and restrictions in relation to acquiring and using land under the Town and Country Planning Act. At present, only mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities are covered by these provisions, because they are included in the Act’s definition of local authorities. This creates an unnecessary gap in the legislation, which the amendments seek to close. These are technical but important changes that support fairness, consistency and effective delivery across all areas with devolved powers.

Finally, amendment 152 is again technical, but is an important clarification to ensure that the Bill works as intended. It updates the wording to confirm that the proposed new subsection (4) contained in paragraph 21 of schedule 15 applies to both section 238 and section 239 of the Town and Country Planning Act. These sections deal with the use and development of consecrated land and burial grounds. This is a technical amendment that ensures consistency and accuracy across all our legislation.

Amendment 129 agreed to.

Amendments made: 130, in schedule 15, page 180, leave out lines 10 to 13.

This would remove the provision under which the compulsory acquisition function of a mayoral combined authority or CCA is exercisable by the mayor (so that it would be exercisable by the combined authority or CCA itself).

Amendment 131, in schedule 15, page 180, line 18, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 132, in schedule 15, page 180, line 19, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority.”

This would make the Broads Authority a consultee if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 133, in schedule 15, page 180, line 24, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 134, in schedule 15, page 180, line 26, leave out “authority” and insert “council”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 135, in schedule 15, page 180, line 27, at end insert—

“(d) the Broads Authority.”

This would make the Broads Authority a consultee if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 136, in schedule 15, page 180, line 32, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 137, in schedule 15, page 180, line 33, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority;

and consent of a constituent council must be given at a meeting of the combined authority.”

This would (i) require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area; and (ii) require consent of a constituent council to be given at a meeting of the combined authority.

Amendment 138, in schedule 15, page 180, line 38, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 139, in schedule 15, page 180, line 40, leave out “authority” and insert “council”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 140, in schedule 15, page 181, line 1, at end insert—

“(d) the Broads Authority;

and consent of a constituent council must be given at a meeting of the CCA.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would (i) require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area; and (ii) require consent of a constituent council to be given at a meeting of the CCA.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 141, in schedule 15, page 181, line 10, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 142 and 144 to 151.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

These amendments make a small but important clarification to part 2 of schedule 15. They ensure that the provisions explicitly insert only references to non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities. This is because mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities already have these powers conferred upon them by the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Specifically, they fall within the definition of “local authorities”, so including them is unnecessary. These amendments do not remove any powers from mayoral combined authorities or mayoral combined county authorities; instead, they are small, technical amendments that simplify and clarify, and they are important for the consistency and coherence of the Bill.

Amendment 141 agreed to.

Amendments made: 142, in schedule 15, page 181, line 13, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 143, in schedule 15, page 181, line 20, at end insert—

‘Power of Secretary of State to require acquisition or development of land

17A (1) Section 231 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) after “borough” insert “, or a combined authority or CCA,”;

(b) after the second “council” insert “or combined authority or CCA”.

(3) In subsection (2), after “local authority” insert “or a non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA”.’

This would extend the application of section 231 so that all combined authorities and CCAs are within its scope. (Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs are already within subsection (2) as “local authorities” as defined in section 336 of the TCPA 1990.)

Amendment 144, in schedule 15, page 181, line 23, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 145, in schedule 15, page 181, line 27, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 146, in schedule 15, page 182, line 3, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 147, in schedule 15, page 182, line 5, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 148, in schedule 15, page 182, line 11, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 149, in schedule 15, page 182, line 13, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 150, in schedule 15, page 182, line 16, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 151, in schedule 15, page 182, line 18, leave out “combined authority or” and insert

“non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral”.

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs do not need to be added to this section as they are already within the definition of “local authority” in section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as precepting authorities).

Amendment 152, in schedule 15, page 182, line 24, leave out from “In” to “compulsorily” in line 27 and insert

“sections 238 and 239 ‘relevant acquisition or appropriation’ also includes an acquisition made by a combined authority or CCA under this Part or”.

This would provide for the new subsection (4) to apply to section 238 (as well as section 239); and would remove the reference to the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 as this does not apply to combined authorities or CCAs.

Amendment 153, in schedule 15, page 182, line 35, at end insert—

‘Overriding of rights of possession

22A In section 242, in paragraph (a), after “authority” insert “or a non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA”.

Constitution of joint body to hold land for planning purposes

22B In section 243, in subsection (1)—

(a) for “local authorities concerned” substitute “authorities concerned”;

(b) for “local authority for planning purposes” substitute “local authority, or non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA, for planning purposes;

(c) for “any other local authority” substitute “any other local authority, non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA”.’

This would extend the application of sections 242 and 243 so that all combined authorities and CCAs are within their scope. (Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs are already within their scope as “local authorities” as defined in section 336 of the TCPA 1990.)

Amendment 154, in schedule 15, page 183, line 3, at end insert—

‘Extinguishment of rights of statutory undertakers: preliminary notices

23A (1) Section 271 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In the following provisions, for “local authority” substitute “relevant authority”—

(a) subsection (1) (in both places);

(b) subsection (5) (in the words before paragraph (a)).

(3) After subsection (8) insert—

“(9) In this section ‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) a local authority, or

(b) a non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA.”

Extinguishment of rights of electronic communications code network operators: preliminary notices

23B (1) Section 272 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In the following provisions, for “local authority” substitute “relevant authority”—

(a) subsection (1) (in both places);

(b) subsection (5) (in the words before paragraph (a)).

(3) After subsection (8) insert—

“(9) In this section ‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) a local authority, or

(b) a non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA.”

Orders under sections 271 and 272

23C In section 274, in subsection (3), for “local authority” substitute “relevant authority”.

Extension or modification of functions of statutory undertakers

23D (1) Section 275 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In the following provisions, for “local authority” substitute “relevant authority”—

(a) subsection (1)(a);

(b) subsection (3) (in all three places);

(c) subsection (5)(c).

(3) After subsection (5) insert—

“(6) In this section ‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) a local authority, or

(b) a non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA.”

Procedure in relation to orders under section 275

23E In section 276, in subsection (1), in the words before paragraph (a), for “local authority” substitute “relevant authority”.

Objections to orders under sections 275 and 277

23F In section 278, in subsection (7), for “local authority” substitute “relevant authority”.

Contributions by local authorities and statutory undertakers

23G (1) Section 306 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In the following provisions, for “local authority” substitute “relevant authority”—

(a) the heading;

(b) subsection (1) (in the words before paragraph (a) and in paragraph (c));

(c) subsection (2) (in the words before paragraph (a));

(d) subsection (3) (in both places);

(e) subsection (4).

(3) After subsection (6) insert—

“(7) In this section ‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) a local authority, or

(b) a non-mayoral combined authority or non-mayoral CCA.”’—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would extend the application of these sections so that all combined authorities and CCAs are within their scope. (Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs are already within their scope as “local authorities” as defined in section 336 of the TCPA 1990.)

Schedule 15, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 35

Housing accommodation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 155 to 158 and 170.

Schedule 16.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Housing is a national priority for this Government, and these provisions play an important role in enabling strategic authorities to contribute meaningfully to this core mission. This is particularly true where regional leadership is needed to unlock delivery. These provisions enable strategic authorities to assess housing demand, provide amenities and acquire land. Land may be acquired compulsorily, subject to consultation in the case of mayoral strategic authorities, and via consent, in the case of non-mayoral strategic authorities. I believe this drives cohesive regional solutions.

Some may argue that local councils have sufficient powers, but the clause grants strategic authorities the scope for the transformational, region-wide impact that I know Members across the House want to see. Clause 35 and schedule 16 harness proven powers to meet regional housing goals, and I commend them to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for promoting me to Minister; I cannot wait for that to happen one day. I suspect that I will have more grey hair, and less hair. He is correct, and I am on the record as having spoken about this: the Building Safety Regulator is a barrier to building. I know that this is slightly out of scope, but I have offered to work with Ministers on a genuine cross-party basis to try to remove some of the burdens on the Building Safety Regulator, which I think has purview over too much that is not material to the delivery of housing.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, but in terms of the current powers, the mayor is not delivering, and the Government are not delivering on their promise of 1.5 million homes. The Secretary of State yesterday said that his job would be on the line if he did not deliver the 1.5 million homes. I suspect that we will see a sacking in the not-too-distant future, because everybody in this country who is an expert in housing—there was a documentary on it just this week—says that the Government will not achieve their stated aim of building that number of homes.

The clause in itself is not a panacea that will unlock huge housing growth in our cities. The Minister should be careful not to overpromise and underdeliver, as her mayors consistently do across the country. However, we know that this is a unification and simplification of the system. We will not divide the Committee on the clause. This is a perfectly sensible solution, but let us not pretend that it is a sledgehammer that will crack a nut, and cause the Government to achieve their aims across the country.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It would be remiss of me not to address some of the issues in London. We recognise that we have a housing challenge in London and across the country. I suggest that the hon. Member show a little more humility, because the consequences are the legacy of the Conservative party. He did not mention that the Conservatives in government slashed housing targets across the country, which throttled development; or that they crashed the economy and caused mortgages to rise, which had an impact on demand. He did not mention their record on inflation, which increased construction costs.

Anyone who knows housing knows that there is a lag, so the impacts of the Conservative party’s failure—[Interruption.] The hon. Member solicited this by attacking our brilliant mayor. The Conservatives’ failures are feeding through, and we are now trying to accelerate progress. That is why record investment of £39 billion is going into social housing, and it is why we are seeing housing targets across the country. We are doing our part to get the country building again. Ultimately, we will be the ones to solve the housing crisis.

[Paul Holmes]

We really should not accept this party political broadcast. One million homes were built over the lifetime of the previous Parliament. Can the Minister explain to the Committee why housing delivery is at an all-time low? Why is it that experts in the housing sector, including the Home Builders Federation, say that the 1.5 million homes that the Government have promised simply cannot be delivered, and the Chancellor’s own figures show that only 1.1 million homes will be delivered? That is a failure on the promise that she made, is it not?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

If we look at a graph, we see that housing starts plummeted in 2023. I do not know whether the hon. Member wants to remind the Committee who was in power at that time—it was the Conservative party. We are trying to accelerate housing development, and we have a 1.5 million target that we are committed to delivering. That is not to underestimate the incredible difficulty, but we believe that homes are a requirement and a necessity. We have a homelessness crisis and a temporary accommodation crisis, so we have to get to grips with this. That is why we are doing the job of accelerating housing development. The amendments, and giving strategic authorities the powers that will enable them to play a role, are critical to that endeavour.

[The Chair]

I have been generous in allowing that debate to range rather more widely than might generally be thought acceptable. After all those technical amendments, we needed a bit of debate, did we not?

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 16

Housing accommodation

Amendments made: 155, in schedule 16, page 184, line 17, at end insert—

“(1B) But if a local housing authority has complied with the duty imposed by subsection (1) in relation to a part of the area of a combined authority, CCA or two-tier county council, that strategic authority—

(a) does not need to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1A) in relation to that part of its area; and

(b) may rely on the local housing authority’s consideration of the matters referred to in subsection (1) as if it were the strategic authority’s own consideration of those matters.”

This would remove the duty imposed by the new subsection (1A) where a local housing authority has already carried out the required consideration of housing conditions and enable the strategic authority to rely on the local housing authority’s consideration of housing matters.

Amendment 156, in schedule 16, page 184, line 24, at end insert—

‘Provision of housing accommodation

2A (1) Section 9 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In subsection (1), in the words before paragraph (a), after “local housing authority” insert “, combined authority or CCA, or two-tier county council that is a strategic authority”.

(3) In subsection (4), for “A local housing authority” substitute “An authority”.

(4) In subsection (5), for “a local housing authority” substitute “an authority”.’

This would expand the application of section 9 so that combined authorities, CCAs and two-tier county councils that are strategic authorities are within its scope.

Amendment 157, in schedule 16, page 184, line 27, leave out from beginning to end of line 5 on page 185 and insert—

‘(1A) In subsection (1), for the words before paragraph (a) substitute—

“(1) A local housing authority, combined authority or CCA, or two-tier county council that is a strategic authority may provide in connection with the provision of housing accommodation under this Part (whether it is provided by that authority or another authority)—”

(1B) In subsection (4), for “A local housing authority” substitute “An authority”.’

This would enable a local housing authority, combined authority or CCA, or two-tier county council that is a strategic authority to provide board and laundry facilities in connection with accommodation, whether the accommodation is provided by that or another authority.

Amendment 158, in schedule 16, page 185, leave out lines 8 to 22 and insert—

‘(1A) In subsection (1), for the words before paragraph (a) substitute—

“(1) A local housing authority, combined authority or CCA, or two-tier county council that is a strategic authority may, with the consent of the Secretary of State, provide and maintain in connection with housing accommodation provided under this Part (whether it is provided by that authority or another authority)—”.

(1B) In subsection (3), for “the local housing authority” substitute “the authority”.’

This would enable a local housing authority, combined authority or CCA, or two-tier county council that is a strategic authority to provide shops etc in connection with accommodation, whether the accommodation is provided by that or another authority.

Amendment 159, in schedule 16, page 186, line 16, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 160, in schedule 16, page 186, line 17, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority.”

This would make the Broads Authority a consultee if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 161, in schedule 16, page 186, line 22, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 162, in schedule 16, page 186, line 24, leave out “authority” and insert “council”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 163, in schedule 16, page 186, line 25, at end insert—

“(d) the Broads Authority.”

This would make the Broads Authority a consultee if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 164, in schedule 16, page 186, line 30, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 165, in schedule 16, page 186, line 31, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority;

and consent of a constituent council must be given at a meeting of the combined authority.”

This would (i) require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area; and (ii) require consent of a constituent council to be given at a meeting of the combined authority.

Amendment 166, in schedule 16, page 186, line 36, leave out “authorities” and insert “councils”.

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 167, in schedule 16, page 186, line 38, leave out “authority” and insert “council”

This would change the provision to use the correct term “constituent council”.

Amendment 168, in schedule 16, page 186, line 39, at end insert—

“(d) the Broads Authority;

and consent of a constituent council must be given at a meeting of the CCA.”

This would require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 169, in schedule 16, page 187, line 4, at end insert—

“(c) the Broads Authority.”

This would require the consent of the Broads Authority if any of the land proposed for compulsory acquisition is in its area.

Amendment 170, in schedule 16, page 187, line 12, leave out “(1)” and insert “(2)”. —(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This corrects the reference to the Housing Act 1985.

Schedule 16, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 36

Mayoral development corporations

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause grants mayors of strategic authorities outside London the power to create mayoral development corporations. They are another tool for mayors to enable regional regeneration and economic development. Stripping away these provisions would limit regional ambition. The clause gives effect to schedule 17, allowing mayoral development corporations to spearhead land acquisition, planning and infrastructure projects. This will help to foster jobs, unlock growth, drive infrastructure development and attract investment into our regions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 17

Mayoral development corporations

[Paul Holmes]

I beg to move amendment 290, in schedule 17, page 193, line 2, at end insert—

“7A After section 202, insert—

‘202A: restrictions on designation of greenfield land

Where an MDC exercises any functions in relation to the designation of land for development, the MDC must not designate any development on greenfield land unless there is no available land that has not previously been developed.’”

I rise to speak to the amendment, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. Although we welcome mayoral development corporations, since this Government came to office an environment has been created, if Members will forgive the pun, where it is easier to build in rural areas but harder to develop our urban centres. As we mentioned in a debate last week, the Government’s planning and building conditions are making it harder to densify urban centres. We have discussed the housing targets in rural and urban areas, and now mayoral development corporations are being created. That is perfectly acceptable, but we do not think it protects the green belt across this great green and pleasant land, and it will essentially allow mayors to build on greenfield land without the necessary checks and balances.

The amendment is simple. We tabled it because we want to make it much easier to build in areas of existing development where there is scope for densification, and we want to protect green belt and greenfield land by restricting building on it where many people to whom the mayor is accountable simply do not want that to happen. The amendment would not rule out such development completely, but it would make the MDC more streamlined and disciplined about unlocking areas where infrastructure exists and it is easier to build, rather than using green fields, where we believe development is more difficult and takes longer.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I understand the intent behind the amendment. Mayoral development corporations are already subject to the national planning policy framework, which reflects the brownfield-first approach that the hon. Member has talked about, encourages densification where it makes sense and includes strong protections for greenfield land. We think the provisions already exist, because any mayoral development corporation must have regard to the national planning policy framework.

We believe it is important to give mayoral development corporations flexibility, however, because there will be instances, in the case of urban extensions or new towns, when the decision needs to be made to build on greenfield land. We think that the amendment would disproportionately restrict mayoral development corporations and place on them additional restrictions that do not apply to other bodies. Ultimately, it would reduce mayoral development corporations’ flexibility, slow down delivery and add unnecessary constraints on decision making. For that reason, we do not support it, and I ask the hon. Member to withdraw it.

[Paul Holmes]

I understand where the Minister is coming from, and I am inclined not to press the amendment to a Division but to treat it as probing. She is aware that I have long advocated for, and pushed her and the Government on, the incentivisation of densification. In our debate on amendment 304 last week, I think she reasonably accepted that a densification strategy was needed. She has come back to the NPPF today, but that is simply not working. We tabled amendment 304 and this amendment to solidify the position. We think that that is a perfectly reasonable approach to the guidance and regulations.

I hope for some reassurance from the Minister that she and the Government will look at further action regarding that incentivisation. If I get that reassurance, I will withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am happy to provide reassurance in writing.

[Paul Holmes]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Vikki Slade]

I beg to move amendment 60, in schedule 17, page 195, line 23, leave out from “that” to end of line 24 and insert

“the majority of members of an MDC are elected members of relevant councils”.

This amendment would require that the make-up of Mayoral Development Corporation boards must have a majority of members from constituent councils.

We welcome the introduction of the mayoral development corporations across the country. Some good successes have been achieved in London; not many miles from here, the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park continues to grow and expand, and it has some incredible facilities, including a new arts hub.

The one small thing that we would like the Minister to consider is the make-up of the corporations. It is important that people trust the organisations that are doing such large-scale development, which can potentially make enormous changes to the landscapes around them, whether on credible brownfield sites or, as others have said, through new towns or greenfield development, about which people are far more sensitive.

The Bill states that a mayoral development corporation must have at least one member from each constituent authority and that there must be no fewer than six members, but it does not give a maximum number. There is a real risk that if there is simply one member from each authority—some of these authorities are fairly large to start with—the majority of a corporation may be made up of people who are not connected to the community. It is absolutely right that there should be expertise, strategic people, and perhaps people from other sectors with skills, talents and experience from other places or sectors, but the organisation needs to be locally led. That is why my amendment 60 simply states that a majority of members of an MDC should be

“elected members of relevant councils”.

We think that that is a minor amendment that would benefit and broaden trust, and lock it in to local decision making.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I recognise the hon. Member’s intention to strengthen the voice of local councillors in the decision making of mayoral development corporations in their areas, and I support that intent. The Bill will introduce a requirement on mayors outside London to appoint at least one elected member from each council in which the development corporation operates. That mirrors the existing requirement on the Mayor of London, which has been in place since 2011, and how this function has been conferred on mayors outside London so far. That is working; the evidence from on the ground and from practice is that this approach is the right one and strikes the right balance.

I agree with the hon. Member that membership of a mayoral development corporation should absolutely include local expertise from the relevant councils, but it is important that it should be led by people with experience and capacity in the matters that the corporation is taking forward and delivering. When they work well, the corporations bring together local and technical expertise from both the public and private sectors to address complex, long-term projects that in most cases will take longer than an election cycle to deliver.

I worry that the amendment would weaken the mayor’s ability to choose the right mix of expertise that he or she and the strategic authority need in the mayoral development corporation, and limit the corporation’s capacity to drive delivery. Although we agree that there must be council representation, we think that the amendment as drafted provides that, without binding the hands of the mayor, in a way that allows them to bring in any key technical experience that they might need from outside their area in order to deliver impact on the ground.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Seventeenth schedule to the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Schedule 17 equips mayors with the tools they need to drive the critical function that we are asking them to. Mandatory consultation with councils where development corporations are proposed ensures transparency and collaboration. Preserving these provisions strengthens our devolution framework, enabling regions to take targeted, strategic action to boost growth, drive development and create jobs. They add no new duties, but only extend proven mechanisms.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 17 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 37

Assessment of economic conditions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 18.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Strategic authorities, as we have said consistently in discussing the Bill, are a key driving force for local growth. To lead growth for its area, the authority must understand its local economy. That is why this clause will provide combined or combined county authorities with a duty to assess the economic conditions of their areas.

Local councils will continue to play a critical role in formulating the strategic authority’s understanding of the local economy. Combined and combined county authorities will be required to consult and work with the councils in their area when building their assessment of economic conditions. This requirement will ensure that the economic strategy for an area combines a strategic, regional assessment of opportunities with a ground-up understanding of local economies. The duty has been long held by strategic authorities without issue and empowers them to develop a holistic understanding of their local economies.

[Paul Holmes]

Briefly, could the Minister elaborate on some of the consultation mechanisms that the strategic authority would use with the authorities that currently have the power? We completely understand why she has introduced this, but throughout proceedings in Committee, we and the other Opposition parties have expressed concern about the erosion of existing authorities’ responsibilities with the centralisation that is going on. Will the Minister elaborate on how much weight the new authority will give local authorities’ considerations?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are very clear that although we want a strategic assessment of the economic opportunities and risk in an area, and a local growth plan that crosses that area, it must be informed by constituent authorities. The way it is working in practice—we hope the legislation enables this—is that constituent authorities bring into the conversation their understanding, insights, analysis and key priorities for the area, and a collective decision is made. Ultimately, I come back to the point I have made consistently: the mayor’s capacity to be effective and deliver is only as strong as their relations and collaboration with constituent authorities.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 18 agreed to.

Clause 38

Local growth plans

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 29—Inclusive economy plans—

“Schedule [inclusive economy plans] confers on mayoral strategic authorities functions in relation to inclusive economy plans”.

This clause renames Local Growth Plans as Inclusive Economy Plans and introduces NS1.

New schedule 1—Inclusive Economy Plans—

“1 (1) After section 107K of LDEDCA 2009 insert—

“Mayoral combined authorities: inclusive economy plans

107L Inclusive economy plans

(1) A mayoral combined authority must prepare and publish an inclusive economy plan for its area.

(2) An inclusive economy plan must—

(a) include an overview of the economic conditions of the area (including the main economic characteristics which are likely to influence current and future economic inclusivity),

(b) identify priorities for the economic inclusivity of the area that are agreed with the Secretary of State (‘shared inclusive economy priorities’), and

(c) identify key projects for achieving economic inclusivity in the area through private or public investment.

(3) A mayoral combined authority must, in preparing an inclusive economy plan, develop a set of local indicators to measure inclusive economic outcomes in its area.

(4) The indicators should—

(a) be developed in collaboration with residents of the area, including by means of public participatory process convened by the mayor of the combined authority, and

(b) include the proposed effect of the plan on—

(i) inequalities between persons with and without protected characteristics as defined by the Equalities Act 2010;

(ii) health, including inequalities in health, nutrition and housing in the strategic authority area;

(iii) happiness and social connection;

(iv) access to nature and opportunities to play;

(v) increased power and control of the economy to people living in the strategic authority area.

(5) A mayoral combined authority may revise or replace an inclusive economy plan published under this section.

(6) The authority must arrange for any inclusive economy plan that is revised or replaced to be published.

(7) The requirement under subsection (1) may be met by the publication of an inclusive economy plan before this section comes into force.

107M Secretary of State guidance on inclusive economy plans

(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to mayoral combined authorities in relation to inclusive economy plans under section 107L.

(2) A mayoral combined authority must have regard to any such guidance in exercising their functions.

(3) The guidance may include (but is not limited to) guidance about—

(a) who the authority might consult when preparing or revising the plan;

(b) information to be included in the plan under section 107L(2) or the plan as revised;

(c) the process for agreeing priorities for the economic inclusivity of the area with the Secretary of State for the purposes of section 107L(2)(b);

(d) the circumstances in which the authority may revise or replace the plan;

(e) the ways in which the authority may have regard to the plan when exercising its other functions.”

(2) After section 107M of the LDEDCA 2009 (as inserted by sub-paragraph (1)) insert—

“107N Public bodies: duty to have regard to shared inclusive economy priorities

(1) A relevant non-departmental public body must have regard to a shared inclusive economy priority of a mayoral combined authority when—

(a) exercising, at the request of the authority, a function which could reasonably be expected to have an effect on that priority;

(b) preparing a bid for public funding for an activity the objectives of which align with that priority;

(c) preparing a statutory plan or strategy which relates to that priority.

(2) A ‘relevant non-departmental public body’ means a non-departmental public body specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(3) In this section—

‘enactment’ includes an enactment comprised in subordinate legislation within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978;

‘Minister of the Crown’ has the same meaning as in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975;

‘non-departmental public body’ means any public authority other than—

(a) a Minister of the Crown or government department;

(b) the Welsh Ministers;

(c) a devolved Welsh authority within the meaning of 30 section 157A of the Government of Wales Act 2006;

‘public funding’ means funding from a Minister of the Crown or government department;

‘shared inclusive economy priorities’ has the meaning given by section 107L(2)(b);

‘statutory plan or strategy’ means a plan or strategy that a non-departmental public body is required by an enactment to issue or publish.

(4) References in this section to an enactment or to provision made under an enactment are to an enactment whenever passed or (as the case may be) to provision whenever the instrument containing it is made.”

(3) After section 32 of the LURA 2023 insert—

“Mayoral CCAs: local inclusive economy plans

32A Local inclusive economy plans

(1) A mayoral CCA must prepare and publish an inclusive economy plan for its area.

(2) An inclusive economy plan must—

(a) include an overview of the economic conditions of the area (including the main economic characteristics which are likely to influence current and future economic inclusivity),

(b) identify priorities for the economic inclusivity of the area that are agreed with the Secretary of State (‘shared inclusive economy priorities’), and

(c) identify key projects for achieving economic inclusivity in the area through private or public investment.

(3) A mayoral CCA must, in preparing an inclusive economy plan, develop a set of local indicators to measure inclusive economic outcomes in its area.

(4) The indicators should—

(a) be developed in collaboration with residents of the area, including by means of public participatory process convened by the mayor of the CCA, and

(b) include the proposed effect of the plan on—

(i) inequalities between persons with and without protected characteristics as defined by the Equalities Act 2010;

(ii) health, including inequalities in health, nutrition and housing in the strategic authority area;

(iii) happiness and social connection;

(iv) access to nature and opportunities to play;

(v) increased power and control of the economy to people living in the strategic authority area.

(5) A mayoral CCA may revise or replace an inclusive economy plan published under this section.

(6) The CCA must arrange for any inclusive economy plan that is revised or replaced to be published.

(7) The requirement under subsection (1) may be met by the publication of an inclusive economy plan before this section comes into force.

32B Secretary of State guidance on inclusive economy plans

(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to mayoral CCAs in relation to inclusive economy plans under section 32A.

(2) A mayoral CCA must have regard to any such guidance in exercising their functions.

(3) The guidance may include (but is not limited to) guidance about—

(a) who the CCA might consult when preparing or revising the plan;

(b) information to be included in the plan under section 32A(2) or the plan as revised;

(c) the process for agreeing priorities for the economic inclusivity of the area with the Secretary of State for the purposes of section 107L(2)(b);

(d) the circumstances in which the CCA may revise or replace the plan;

(e) the ways in which the CCA may have regard to the plan when exercising its other functions.”

(4) After section 32B of LURA 2023 (as inserted by sub-paragraph (3)), insert—

“32C Public bodies: duty to have regard to shared inclusive economy priorities

(1) A relevant non-departmental public body must have regard to a shared inclusive economy priority of a mayoral CCA when—

(a) exercising, at the request of the CCA, a function which could reasonably be expected to have an effect on that priority;

(b) preparing a bid for public funding for an activity the objectives of which align with that priority;

(c) preparing a statutory plan or strategy which relates to that priority.

(2) A ‘relevant non-departmental public body’ means a non-departmental public body specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(3) In this section—

‘enactment’ includes an enactment comprised in subordinate legislation within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978;

‘Minister of the Crown’ has the same meaning as in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975;

‘non-departmental public body’ means any public authority other than—

(a) a Minister of the Crown or government department;

(b) the Welsh Ministers;

(c) a devolved Welsh authority within the meaning of 30 section 157A of the Government of Wales Act 2006;

‘public funding’ means funding from a Minister of the Crown or government department;

‘shared inclusive economy priorities’ has the meaning given by section 107L(2)(b);

‘statutory plan or strategy’ means a plan or strategy that a non-departmental public body is required by an enactment to issue or publish.

(4) References in this section to an enactment or to provision made under an enactment are to an enactment whenever passed or (as the case may be) to provision whenever the instrument containing it is made.”

(5) After section 333F of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 insert—

“333G Public bodies: duty to have regard to shared economic inclusivity priorities for London

(1) A relevant non-departmental public body must have regard to a shared economic inclusivity priority for Greater London when—

(a) exercising, at the request of the Mayor, a function which could reasonably be expected to have an effect on that priority;

(b) preparing a bid for public funding for an activity the objectives of which align with that priority;

(c) preparing a statutory plan or strategy which relates to the priority.

(2) A ‘shared local economic inclusivity priority for Greater London’ is an economic priority for Greater London that—

(a) is developed in collaboration with residents of Greater London, including by means of public participatory process convened by the Mayor of the London;

(b) has regard to—

(i) inequalities between persons with and without protected characteristics as defined by the Equalities Act 2010;

(ii) improving health and narrowing inequalities in health, nutrition and housing in the strategic authority area;

(iii) improving happiness and social connection;

(iv) improving access to nature and opportunities to play;

(v) promoting increased power and control of the economy to people living in Greater London;

(c) is agreed between the Mayor of London and the Secretary of State;

(d) is published by the Mayor of London.

(3) A ‘relevant non-departmental public body’ means a non-departmental public body specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(4) In this section—

‘enactment’ includes an enactment comprised in subordinate legislation within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978;

‘Minister of the Crown’ has the same meaning as in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975;

‘non-departmental public body’ means any public authority 20 other than—

(a) a Minister of the Crown or government department;

(b) the Welsh Ministers;

(c) a devolved Welsh authority within the meaning of section 157A of the Government of Wales Act 2006;

‘public funding’ means funding from a Minister of the Crown or government department;

‘statutory plan or strategy’ means a plan or strategy that a person is required by an enactment to issue or publish.

(5) References in this section to an enactment or to provision made 30 under an enactment are to an enactment whenever passed or (as the case may be) to provision whenever the instrument containing it is made.

(6) In section 420 (regulations and orders), in subsection (7), in the appropriate place, insert ‘section 333G;’.””

This new schedule renames Local Growth Plans as Inclusive Economy Plans and introduces NS1.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause introduces schedule 19, which requires mayoral combined authorities and county authorities to produce and publish a local growth plan—a critical tool and document for driving the developments, jobs and prosperity that we want to see in areas. We will discuss schedule 19 in more detail later in the debate.

[Siân Berry]

I rise to speak to my new clause 29 and new schedule 1, which seek to replace clause 38 and schedule 19. They would replace local growth plans with inclusive economy plans, which, following an enhanced process of consultation and approval, would have the same prominence in terms of policy priorities as the proposed growth plans. While we have adopted much of the same drafting and general process, wherever the goal of growth appears, my new version says instead that our goal would be an inclusive economy or economic inclusivity.

It is important to confront the harmful concept of growth for the sake of growth. Prioritising economic growth, wherever it may come from, above everything else is wrong. Growth may be the Government’s No. 1 mission, but what is the point if it does not serve the people? Growth alone is insufficient to address inequality and the environmental crisis. For example, gross domestic product has roughly doubled since 1980, yet the richest five households in the UK own more wealth than 13.2 million people. When it comes to jobs, growth has not delivered, with low pay and stagnant real wages the reality for most.

A test of the Bill, and indeed the Government, will be whether it succeeds in moving beyond growth alone to creating an economy where everyone can thrive. That has to begin with clear intentions for the type of economy we want to build, not growth at any cost. In the case of local government and the new strategic authorities, how this is codified in the prescribed strategies for each area is important. That is the core reason why, working with the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, I have proposed this change to the core goals in the central economic strategy that each local authority will produce.

Those comparing our new schedule with the original will see that, in paragraph (3), proposed new sections 107L of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 and 32A of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 add further steps to the process of developing a plan so that it can be tailored to each local area through appropriate local indicators of progress. Paragraph (4) of the new schedule would require mayors to bring the public into both setting local indicators and setting out how the plan will help to achieve the inclusive economic outcomes that cover the necessary ingredients for a good life in that area. That is because, if they are going to shape a local economy, they need to listen and deliver for the people who live and work in it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

The way that people want their economy to go is to have growth, and for them to be able to pay their bills, feed their families and have good jobs. I say to the hon. Lady that any mayor who does not put those things in their manifesto is not worth electing. An election is the point at which the mayor should be held accountable. Any mayor who says that they would not want to make their local economic situation better and improve the lives of their citizens should not be elected. The current legislation that we have enables people perfectly reasonable input into the journey that a mayor might take over their mayoral term.

I believe that over the course of the last few Governments, the House of Commons has made great strides in protecting the environment and in making sure that mayors and public authorities, as well as private businesses, are responsible in how they treat their people, but also grow with the environmental and other protections that are necessary. While I understand the hon. Lady’s argument and I genuinely have a great deal of respect for her, the unintended consequences of the new clause and the new schedule will be to restrict growth, and to restrict the power of the mayor to have a responsible attitude to enabling growth on an even basis within the system that we currently have.

The hon. Lady’s proposals would be restrictive, but they would also take us back. A mayor should be unrestricted in their ability to deliver the growth and prosperity for the people they serve. I do not believe that the new clause and new schedule would do that. I know that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is not pushing those to a vote, but if she did, we would not be able to support it, and we would vote against it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling the new clause and new schedule. Let me put on record that I completely agree with the goals of an inclusive economy; they are right, and we have a lot of sympathy for that. This Government are clear that we have to get the economy to work better for people, and I am obliged to remind everyone that over the last 14 years that was not the case.

Ultimately, mayors must have a democratic mandate, and the mark of success will be not just economic growth, but the economy impacting on people’s living standards, jobs and wages—bread and butter, tangible things. We think that the aims that the hon. Lady is trying to achieve are already locked into the Bill. If we achieve growth only on a graph and people do not feel it, our residents, voters and electorate will ensure that we pay the price. Therefore, that democratic lock is already baked into the Bill.

It is also worth saying that local growth plans, as set out in the Bill and as conceived, are a manifesto commitment for this Government, and the existing, established regional mayors have already developed their plans, with many starting to publish them already. By focusing on challenges around housing, transport, skills, employment and innovation, those plans will set the framework for unlocking the growth potential of those areas. As I said, growth only matters if it has a tangible impact on people. The strategic authorities that we are working with absolutely understand that and are trying to drive through measures that will deliver it.

We have already agreed growth priorities with 12 mayors. Those priorities are underpinned by a robust evidence base and a shared understanding of the biggest cross-cutting challenges and opportunities for economic development in those areas. Inclusivity, people and the impact on communities are absolutely central to that. The Government want to see more jobs, more money in people’s pockets, higher wages and investment that touches each and every one of our communities. One of the things we think mayors can do, when we devolve, is to ensure that they rewire their local economics in a way that gives people a greater stake.

Through co-operative ways of organising things, as in Liverpool city region and Greater Manchester, we are seeing new models that put people and communities front and centre to ensure that the growth and development that happens fundamentally benefits people. I believe that we have already baked in the intent behind the hon. Lady’s new clause and new schedule within the very design of this policy, but, more importantly, the power of democracy will drive and unlock it: if mayors and this Government do not deliver for people in our communities, we have the ballot box by which people can show their discontent. I think the hon. Lady has already said that she is not pressing the new clause and new schedule to a vote.

[The Chair]

If Ms Berry wanted to test on the Committee’s view on the new clause and new schedule it would come at a later stage anyway. Members will remember that we are debating clause 38.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 19

Local growth plans

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I feared we might stray into other considerations on planning, so I am grateful to the hon. Lady for speaking specifically about land use and nature recovery, which is the subject of the amendment. I call the Minister.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for the amendment. I will say three things. First, local growth plans are locally-led documents with the flexibility to consider the challenges and opportunities that matter to particular areas. Places are already taking into account whether there are green growth opportunities in their area. In rural areas they will take into account the rural economy, the farming economy, and how that has a bearing on economic development opportunities. We need a framework that allows the flexibility for plans to be locally specific. In areas where it makes sense, places are already doing that in practice and we expect them to do that going forward.

[Vikki Slade]

Local nature recovery strategies matter not only in rural areas. If someone lives in the most urban part of the country, the local nature strategy is critical to those tiny pockets, so I would argue that it is as relevant in cities as it is in rural areas.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. She pre-empted the second point that I was about to make, which is that local nature recovery strategies are critical for every part of the country. Decisions that impact on land use and nature recovery will still need to consider the relevant policy framework, including the local nature recovery strategies that exist across the country. Any strategic planning decision will have to have regard to those local strategies. Thirdly and finally, we recognise that economic development sits alongside nature recovery. The two should not be and do not need to be in conflict.

[Siân Berry]

On a point of clarification, I recognise that the Minister has set out that the local nature recovery strategies will have to be regarded, and also that local growth plans will be very important. Which does the Minister see as having greater weight in local planning and strategic planning decisions?

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

They are doing different things. The local plan is a strategic document. It is not the spatial development plan that will be the key driver for planning decisions. As is the case now, it is absolutely right that the relevant authority making the decision on planning has regard to local nature recovery strategies.

[Lewis Cocking]

What happens if one plan says one thing and another plan says another? The Minister just said that the strategic spatial framework would take precedence, but what happens if the local plan from the local planning authority has policies that contradict or do not align with the strategic plan?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

That is why we have the planning process. We will come on to talk about the strategic spatial plan. That is a document that will have to be done in consultation with constituent authorities. It will focus on strategic infrastructure and development that is needed in the area. Ultimately, we hope that that process will be done through consensus. When it is not, and when there is a dispute between the constituent local authority and the strategic authority in the round, we have said that that will go to the Secretary of State to make a determination through the independent Planning Inspectorate. The planning process already has provisions for us to mitigate that instance.

We have discussed the land use framework in Committee before. We have consulted on it and will publish the response to the consultation in due course. Although the principle of ensuring alignment across the piece is the right one, we think that before we have a tangible framework that is live and has been tested, it is premature to put a requirement in legislation that we would need to have regard to the land use framework.

[Vikki Slade]

I recall a similar argument being made last week to my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon, and a reference to “nascent” organisations. My hon. Friend pointed out that by the time the Bill comes into play some of the land use frameworks will be up and running, so they predate the legislation that will form the local growth plans. It feels completely pointless and a waste of money for local authorities to spend all that time putting in place the land use frameworks only for this legislation to come along and say, “Well, they haven’t really been tested.”

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are developing the process of providing a land use framework, and we are taking onboard the responses that have come through the consultation. Whether that framework ends up being high level and strategic or quite granular will come out through that process, so it feels incredibly prescriptive and constraining to put that requirement on local plans at this stage.

Whether it is the local plan that is thinking about how we drive economic opportunities in the area, or it is the spatial development plan that mayors will be required to have in place, it will obviously have to take into account land use, the composition of the area, nature and all the key considerations in order to be an effective plan that works and that is supported by all the constituent members and parts that need to get onboard. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I absolutely agree, because local parish councillors are experts in the areas that they represent—sometimes more so than district councillors or county councillors, because it is a smaller area. I think that the amendments from the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon are perfectly acceptable—I hope that the Minister agrees—and that she is trying to rectify an unintended consequence of the legislation. In many areas, it tries to streamline some of those aspirations, but in this area it is cutting its nose off to spite its face. We will support the amendments, and I hope the Minister will also support them and come back to us on how she imagines that she will strengthen her ability to consult town and parish councils.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

First, let me thank the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon, who has been a consistent champion and advocate of town and parish councils throughout the Bill Committee. Let me put it on record again that town and parish councils play an important role in their communities. That is a role that we understand, that we appreciate and that we want to support. We have been clear that the—

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Eighth sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 353, in schedule 19, page 200, line 17, at end insert—

“(2A) A mayoral combined authority must engage town and parish councils within its area in creating a local growth plan.

(2B) Engagement under subsection (2A) must include—

(a) sharing draft proposals,

(b) sharing evidence gathered to prepare the proposal, and

(c) opportunities to provide feedback on draft proposals.”

This amendment would require mayoral combined authorities to engage with town and parish councils in creating local growth plans.

Amendment 354, in schedule 19, page 201, line 4, at end insert—

“(f) minimum engagement requirements under section 107L(2B).”

This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to create guidance about the minimum levels of engagement with town and parish councils that is required in the development of mayoral combined authorities’ local growth plans.

Amendment 355, in schedule 19, page 202, line 14, at end insert—

“(d) include an overview of the views of town and parish councils about the plan.”

This amendment would require information about the views of town and parish councils about a mayoral CCA’s local growth plan to be included in the plan.

Amendment 356, in schedule 19, page 202, line 14, at end insert—

“(2A) A mayoral CCA must engage town and parish councils within its area in creating a local growth plan.

(2B) Engagement under subsection (2A) must include—

(a) sharing draft proposals,

(b) sharing information gathered to prepare the proposal, and

(c) opportunities to provide feedback on draft proposals.”

This amendment would require mayoral CCAs to engage with town and parish councils in creating local growth plans.

Amendment 357, in schedule 19, page 202, line 37, at end insert—

“(f) minimum engagement requirements under section 32A(2B).”

This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to create guidance about the minimum levels of engagement with town and parish councils that is required in the development of mayoral CCAs’ local growth plans.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

I was in the middle of thanking the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon for being a consistent champion of town and parish councils throughout our proceedings. We also recognise the important role they play in their communities, which is understood and should not be understated.

We have been clear that local growth plans should reflect the diverse needs and views of a range of local and regional stakeholders. Not only is this already possible, but it is actively encouraged. We have set out in the Bill that, when drafting their local growth plans, mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities must have regard to guidance published by the Secretary of State. That guidance can already set out who the authority might consult, as well as the information to be included in the plan.

We think that specifying a minimum level of engagement for town and parish councils is disproportionate and over-prescriptive. For too long, central Government have dictated what local areas should do, who they should talk to and how they should do it, and we are calling time on that. This is about empowering mayoral strategic authorities to reach out to the key stakeholders that they know and understand best to drive the changes they want in their place. For that reason, I do not believe this cluster of amendments is necessary.

I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw her amendment.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Siobhain. I would not usually speak at this stage, but as the Minister did not outline why she does not believe that the Government should prescribe who mayors and mayoral development corporations should be talking to, will she say why, in earlier clauses, she prescribed that organisations such as trade unions should sit around the table? Town and parish councils that are delivering services on the ground are now being asked to deliver more services because of some of the provisions she has included in the Bill. Why does she not think it is necessary to issue guidance forcing mayors or MDCs to talk to them when they are delivering?

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I know I am, Dame Siobhain. I cut my teeth against you in Mitcham and Morden in 2015, and I was required to be of strong stuff to try to beat you.

I do not believe that the hon. Member for North West Cambridgeshire is correct. What I am saying is that the Minister and the Government cannot have their cake and eat it. On various things, they are prescribing who mayors should talk to, who should be included in a strategy and who should sit around the table. But when it comes to organisations that are delivering services on the ground, and district councils that are to be abolished are transferring assets down to town and parish councils, the Minister says there is no need to prescribe that mayors need to talk to them. In many cases—including in my constituency and that of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon, who so eloquently spoke to this amendment—these town and parish councils are increasing the number of services they provide, and they are taking on sections of land and businesses that are integral to the development of local growth plans. I say very gently, if the Minister wanted to completely devolve power to mayors, that would be absolutely fine with us, but let us not have a patchwork quilt approach by which she is absolutely prescribing who and to which stakeholders mayors should talk in other areas of the legislation, but she does not feel it necessary to include town and parish councils in this part. That is a shame.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

To clarify, the Bill does not specify any particular organisation that should be consulted. It says that we will set that out in guidance. That guidance will be driven by a whole host of consultation with strategic authorities and their partners around the range of organisations and bodies we think is necessary. The Conservative amendment specifically picked on trade unions and specifically said we should exclude them. That is what we were pushing back against, so we are completely consistent in this.

In this case, again, there will be guidance that will talk about a range of local stakeholders, but we think it is wrong to prescribe on the face of the Bill that there should be a minimum requirement in order to engage with town and parish councils. That is too onerous and is disproportionate. We should allow the mayor and the strategic authority to know their stakeholders and the people with whom they need to have a conversation, to make sure that they have consensus and the support to drive forward their local growth plan.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I share the hon. Lady’s concern and her view of the importance of environmental and climate change targets. The economic plans of any strategic authority must be compatible with our legal targets for those core considerations.

National Government and local government at all levels, along with business and individuals, must continue to make a contribution to tackling climate change and improving the quality of the environment around us. I refer the hon. Lady to the local growth plans that are already in place and the actions of mayors who are already in place, which show that a regard for climate change and air quality obligations is a driving force.

[Vikki Slade]

There is a big difference between what has been done by mayors who have gone before and creating mayors across the whole country. The new mayors will have very different backgrounds and landscapes, both geographical and political, to deal with. The word “hope” has done a lot of heavy lifting today, and although I also hope that all these mayors are as great as some of the mayors who have gone before, the Minister has more confidence in them than I do. Legislation is there to ensure that we are not reliant on the good will of hard-working people in political posts, and to protect us from people who may achieve political office and then seek to create something that we will have to undo, at great cost to our economy and health.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I have a lot of sympathy with the hon. Lady’s point. Mayoral strategic authorities are already subject to the recently strengthened biodiversity duty, which supports the delivery of legally binding biodiversity targets. We have seen that mayors have complied with the duties on local authorities around air quality and producing air quality action plans. Those have shown to be effective in London. The principle and the intention are that we are baking our climate and environmental obligations into the way that we are thinking about how we drive the economy. We will reflect on the guidance that comes alongside local growth plans to ensure that, across the piece, those national obligations are reflected in every tier of Government. The hon. Member has my assurance that we will reflect on it, and I ask her to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

Forgive me, I apologise to the Committee if I misspoke. I meant that the hon. Member for Banbury spoke against an amendment that would have guaranteed that mayors would have to speak to town and parish councils.

To return to amendment 359, the way that mayoral authorities are formulated means that mayors will represent diverse areas. As I said to the Minister, we want them to be able to succeed and we want to make sure that their growth plans actually work. In an earlier debate, I tried to adequately back up the Minister’s aim for mayors to deliver that and to make people in their area more prosperous. Businesses being created and economic growth should absolutely be the top priorities of the Government and the mayors that they are creating, and we fully endorse that message. I would argue, however, that mayors cannot do that if there is not guidance—or at least something in the legislation—that requires them to look at our coastal and rural communities and some of the unique challenges that the mayors will be able to face.

I will use the example of Hampshire and the Solent again. I have a friend who will probably end up being the Labour candidate for Hampshire and the Solent. She would make a very good mayor, but she has a history of representing and leading a council in an urban centre in an industrial city like Southampton—that is her expertise. She did it very well; she took over from the Conservative administration that I was part of. What she cannot do, and what she does not have strong experience in, is represent the coastal communities that go down the Solent and the farming communities outside.

The amendment would require rural and coastal communities and areas to be enshrined in the legislation. I do not think that Government Back Benchers, or the Minister, should be scared of that, because it would codify a solid strategic view for the local mayor to follow. I welcome the amendment, and we will support it if the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon presses it to a vote.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I know that Opposition Members—indeed, Members on both sides of the Committee—are all too aware of the unique needs and challenges that rural, remote and coastal communities face. I want to reassure them that local growth plans provide a framework for growth for all parts of their regions. That is exactly why we are requiring local growth plans to set out an economic overview of their whole area. Whether it is urban centres, or rural or farming parts of the entire strategic authority area, a proper assessment needs to be conducted. Yes, there is no requirement to specifically reference rural, remote or coastal areas, but there is equally no requirement to specify urban or suburban areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I hear the passion and commitment of the hon. Lady clearly. Certainly my experience of strategic authorities and mayors who cover a combination of areas—including rural areas—is that they are mindful and clear about it; they want to have a conversation about transport connectivity and digital connectivity, and about how we drive economic growth and prosperity within our farming communities.

There is no evidence to suggest that local growth plans as defined in the Bill do not enable places to drive that. That is certainly not the experience that we are seeing at the moment. I understand the concern that a lot of our mayors have been in more urban areas, but in the north-east and increasingly with the mayors who are coming through our priority programme, they are clear about the importance of their rural communities and the fact that they will need certain powers and functions to drive that.

Although I completely understand the intent and legitimate concern behind the amendments spoken to by the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon, I think they are too prescriptive, and it is right that we create the flexibility for mayors to understand their patch across the piece and then respond effectively in their local growth plan. I hope that with that reassurance the hon. Lady will withdraw amendment 359—although I think she said she will press it to a vote.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I would like to press amendment 359 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Vikki Slade]

Amendments 52 and 53 are about funding strategic authorities for the local growth plans. I apologise to Committee members—they are going to get bored of hearing me say the same thing—but the point I am trying to make with these amendments is that we are pushing huge amounts of responsibility, cost and activity into a space that does not yet have clarity about how that will be paid for.

As we all know, our local authorities are at breaking point, with many of them expecting to make section 114 declarations within the next 12 months. I am deeply concerned that additional responsibilities to help to fund a strategic authority above them—they will have to pay in through a levy but they will have only minimal involvement in the decision making coming back down—will put them under more pressure.

These amendments are designed to make that point, to probe the Minister and to ask for further consideration about how the Secretary of State can assure local communities, who will be paying for these authorities, that there will be sufficient financial resources and adequate administrative support to discharge the functions involved in the preparation, publication and delivery of the local growth plans. There is no point in having a fantastic plan if it cannot be delivered, or if the organisations beneath the strategic authority have just gone bust.

I have said it before: the money is coming either from levies, from precepts, or potentially from grant funding through central Government. These amendments are really about probing to ask whether these growth plans will be coming with the money attached to them so that local areas, wherever they are in the country, have a fighting chance of producing a really good growth plan that benefits every resident within their area. That is why I have tabled these amendments: to try to draw a bit more out of the Minister.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for these probing amendments. Again, we had a debate about this earlier in Committee. Let me put on record that we are clear that, if we are asking strategic and mayoral strategic authorities to drive this critical function, they must have the capacity to do that job well. It does not serve them, the Government or their constituents if they do not have the capacity and capability to do that well. That is why we are, for example, providing capacity-building funding for mayoral strategic authorities, so that they can not only set up but do some of the core enabling functions, such as producing plans, well and effectively.

As I said, the principle holds that capacity-building support must be there to ensure that strategic authorities can do their functions incredibly well, but I do not think it is necessary to specify that on the face of the Bill, not least because we already have the spending review process where strategic authorities set out their demands, ambitions and resources, and have a conversation with Government about ensuring that they are adequately resourced.

The principle of capacity building is therefore absolutely clear and firm, and is designed into the way we are trying to drive the legislation forward. Putting it on the face of the Bill would be too prescriptive when there are already processes in place to enable it to happen.

[Vikki Slade]

For clarity, at the point of the spending review when Departments are given their spending powers, are we to expect the strategic authorities to be separately and directly given a settlement each year, or will that be over a three-year period in the way that local authorities are given that settlement? I just want clarity that it is a separate pot of money from local authority funding, because I would not want to see them have to fight like rats in a sack with the mayoral authorities above them.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The process in practice is distinct from the local government funding settlement. Established mayoral combined authorities are all going through the integrated settlement process, which is a negotiated process where the demands and ambitions of the mayor are weighted against the funding in Government Departments that we have provided with an integrated settlement. That is being rolled out among established combined authorities.

For other mayoral combined authorities that are not established, the process in practice has been, “This is what we have tried to do in our area. These are the resources, and this is where we can use, for example, the mayoral precepting power,” and then there is a conversation with Government to enable them to do what they want. We are moving towards multi-year settlements, because we think that is a better way to run the public finances. The principle of multi-year settlements applies to local government and across Departments, and will apply in the context of mayoral combined authorities.

[Vikki Slade]

On the basis of that assurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move Government amendment 171.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 172, 173, 175 to 177, 179 to 181, 183 to 185, 187, 189, 190, 192 to 194, and 196.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

There are quite a few amendments in this grouping, and all are broadly technical, clarifying and consequential amendments. Government amendments 172, 181 and 190 are consequential amendments that expand the definition of relevant bodies that can be named in secondary legislation that must have regard to the shared local growth priorities agreed with mayoral strategic authorities. The change reflects the original intention set out in the White Paper to apply the duty to arms-length bodies.

Government amendments 174, 182, and 191 simply clarify that public authorities that operate GB-wide or UK-wide may be specified in regulations as subject to the duty to have regard, and that the duty will apply only to their activities in England.

Amendment 171 agreed to.

Amendments made: 172, in schedule 19, page 201, line 8, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This expands the power to require a non-departmental public body to have regard to shared local growth priorities to any relevant public authority.

Amendment 173, in schedule 19, page 201, line 11, after “of the” insert “mayoral combined”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 172.

Amendment 174, in schedule 19, page 201, line 17, at end insert—

“(1A) Where a relevant public authority carries out activities in England and anywhere else in the United Kingdom, the duty under subsection (1) only applies in relation to activities that the authority carries out in England.”

This ensures that where a relevant public authority carries out activities in England and anywhere else in the UK, the new duties relating to the local growth priorities of mayoral combined authorities will only apply to activities that the authority carries out in England.

Amendment 175, in schedule 19, page 201, line 18, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 172.

Amendment 176, in schedule 19, page 201, line 19, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 172.

Amendment 177, in schedule 19, page 201, line 26, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 172.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 178, in schedule 19, page 201, leave out line 28.

This means that a Minister of the Crown or government department can be specified in regulations as bound by the duty to have regard to shared local growth priorities.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 186 and 195.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The Government amendments we just discussed enable the Government to specify a broader range of public bodies in secondary legislation, to reflect the original intention of clause 38 and schedule 19. To avoid inadvertently curtailing the effect of those amendments, it is necessary to remove the restrictions on specifying a Minister of the Crown or a Government Department in regulations. Government amendments 178, 186 and 195 will have the effect of allowing the Government to specify in regulations Executive agencies and non-ministerial Departments. This reflects the duty as proposed in the White Paper.

Amendment 178 agreed to.

Amendments made: 179, in schedule 19, page 201, line 37, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 172.

Amendment 180, in schedule 19, page 203, line 2, leave out “bodies” and insert “authorities”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

Amendment 181, in schedule 19, page 203, line 3, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This expands the power to require a non-departmental public body to have regard to shared local growth priorities to any relevant public authority.

Amendment 182, in schedule 19, page 203, line 10, at end insert—

“(1A) Where a relevant public authority carries out activities in England and anywhere else in the United Kingdom, the duty under subsection (1) only applies in relation to activities that the authority carries out in England.”

This ensures that where a public authority carries out activities in England and anywhere else in the UK, the new duties relating to the shared local growth priorities of mayoral combined county authorities will only apply to activities that the authority carries out in England.

Amendment 183, in schedule 19, page 203, line 11, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

Amendment 184, in schedule 19, page 203, line 12, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

Amendment 185, in schedule 19, page 203, line 19, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

Amendment 186, in schedule 19, page 203, leave out line 21.

This means that a Minister of the Crown or government department can be specified in regulations as bound by the duty to have regard to shared local growth priorities.

Amendment 187, in schedule 19, page 203, line 30, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 188, in schedule 19, page 203, line 35, at end insert—

“(4A) In section 252 of LURA 2023 (regulations)—

(a) in subsection (5)(a), after ‘subsection’ insert ‘(8)(ab) or’;

(b) in subsection (8), before paragraph (a) insert—

‘(ab) under section 32C(2);’.”

This provides that regulations made under new section 32C of the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 (public authorities: duty to have regard to shared local growth priorities), as inserted by Schedule 19 to the Bill, are subject to the negative resolution procedure.

The amendment provides that regulations that specify the relevant public authorities that must have regard to shared local growth priorities agreed between the Government and mayoral combined county authorities are subject to the negative procedure. Use of the negative procedure provides an appropriate and proportionate level of scrutiny for these regulations. The amendment will enable us to introduce the duty on relevant public authorities in the most efficient way.

Amendment 188 agreed to.

Amendments made: 189, in schedule 19, page 203, line 37, leave out “bodies” and insert “authorities”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 190.

Amendment 190, in schedule 19, page 203, line 39, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This expands the power to require a non-departmental public body to have regard to shared local growth priorities to any relevant public authority.

Amendment 191, in schedule 19, page 204, line 7, at end insert—

“(1A) Where a relevant public authority carries out activities in England and anywhere else in the United Kingdom, the duty under subsection (1) only applies in relation to activities that the authority carries out in England.”

This ensures that where a public authority carries out activities in England and anywhere else in the UK, the new duties relating to the shared local growth priorities for Greater London will only apply to activities that the authority carries out in England.

Amendment 192, in schedule 19, page 204, line 12, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 190.

Amendment 193, in schedule 19, page 204, line 13, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 190.

Amendment 194, in schedule 19, page 204, line 20, leave out “non-departmental public body” and insert “public authority”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 190.

Amendment 195, in schedule 19, page 204, leave out line 22.

This means that a Minister of the Crown or government department can be specified in regulations as bound by the duty to have regard to shared local growth priorities.

Amendment 196, in schedule 19, page 204, line 29, leave out “person” and insert “public authority”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 190.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Nineteenth schedule to the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I know that the Committee agrees on the need to boost economic prosperity—there is broad consensus on that—and to do it in a way that reflects national and, critically, local priorities. Although many places have a plan for growth, there is no consistent requirement for places with a mayor to do so. Currently, only London is required to set out a strategy for its economic development, and we can see how London’s economy has benefited over the decades. Where places have taken the initiative, their plans do not have consistent central Government backing.

Schedule 19 will change that by creating a process for all mayors to agree local growth priorities with the Government. It will provide a common approach for mayors outside London to set out their priorities and investment opportunities in their local growth plan. Mayors up and down the country have given their backing to local growth plans, and we are already seeing this in practice. We have already agreed shared local growth priorities with the 12 longest established mayoral authorities, but agreeing and publishing shared local growth priorities is not enough. Mayors need to know that these priorities will be acted upon, which is why we will require public bodies to have regard to them at key points.

The approach will ensure that everywhere with a mayor has a clear plan for growth and economic prosperity in their area, whether that is a local growth plan or the economic development strategy for London. Crucially, it will ensure that the priorities we agree with mayors have Government backing, with relevant public bodies alert to them, so that all levels of government can pull in the same direction.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 19, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

Clause 39

Local Government Act 2003: expenditure grant

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Often, funding held by combined and combined county authorities is best used by local councils to deliver their responsibilities. Consistently throughout our proceedings, I have said that the mayor is only as strong as its partnership and relationship with the constituent authorities that have to drive the delivery. That is why the clause will standardise the power already held by most existing combined and combined county authorities to pay grants to their constituent councils.

The ability of combined and combined county authorities to pay their constituent councils is vital to the smooth running of transport, for example. Constituent councils are the highways authority in their area, with the duty to manage their road network and deliver highways maintenance; the authority therefore needs a power to fund them for delivering those key functions. We understand highways authorities’ need for sufficient funding to deliver against their duties, which is why clause 39 requires combined or combined county authorities to have in mind the necessity of ensuring a council has enough to deliver its highways functions when paying grants.

[Vikki Slade]

I welcome this provision. It is hugely important that money can flow in both directions, but there is one glaring omission, and the Committee will know what it is. The clause gives the strategic authority the power to pay a grant to a constituent council, but not to a town or parish council.

It may be that a town or parish council is fulfilling one of the areas of competence for the strategic authority. For example, under clause 2(g), public safety, a town council might be running CCTV or paying for community safety accreditation team officers. Under clause 2(e), environment and climate change, that parish or town council might be delivering solar insulation or be rewilding. I did not table an amendment on this, but might there be a drafting error in not allowing the strategic authority to pay a grant to an organisation associated with a constituent council? There is an opportunity there to use our town and parish councils in this way.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I commend the Liberal Democrat Members for their consistent championing of town and parish councils. This power is focused on the constituent authorities, in part because the use case we have in mind is transport, where we can see the importance of highways authorities in particular.

The hon. Lady will know that town and parish councils in the round tend not to draw down Government grant or funding. In conferring on strategic authorities this power, which currently goes from the Secretary of State to constituent authorities, we are thinking in particular about grant funding. That is why we have constrained it in the way we have set out. I will take her point away and consider it to make sure we have not missed a trick, but our focus is particularly on transport and highways authorities and the ability to pass through grant funding.

[Vikki Slade]

I thank the Minister for that assurance. I simply want the opportunity not to be denied. Town and parish councils often say, “Well, we are not allowed to access that,” but there may be an opportunity here, and to exclude them would be a shame. Perhaps use of “may” would give that opportunity for grant funding. I would welcome a tiny amendment at some point in the future. It is something to reflect on.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40

Encouragement of visitors and promotion of visitors

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I am sure the hon. Member uses surveys when he communicates with his constituents. When he sends them out, I am sure he is not worried about overburdening his constituents in their lives, whether they want to respond or not. The same principle applies. There are many perfectly good programmes that could be used now to send out a consultation to people who are already programmed into a mailing list. If they want to respond, they can, and if they do not, good on them—that means that they are perfectly happy with what is going on.

I do not understand the constant fear about consulting town and parish councils. That is particularly the case—I say this with all due respect and with realism about the situation out there in the country—given the stated aims of the Government and the situation in local government, where, without a manifesto promise, districts and county councils are being abolished and there is a rush to transfer assets to town and parish councils. They are taking on mainstream responsibilities because of what the Bill will do. Whether we are talking about local growth plans or attracting visitors, many will miss out on having a visitor strategy that is worth the paper it is written on.

We are now discussing several authorities that already have the responsibilities. This legislation was drafted at a point from which we have moved on, and it puts unintended consequences before local authorities. I ask the Minister, in the spirit of constructive debate, to go away and properly look at how town and parish councils can be consulted. They are doing a lot more than the Minister or the Government Back Benchers who have spoken this afternoon realise.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank hon. Members for that lengthy and robust debate. I will start with clause 40, and then I will pick up on the amendments. I remind the Committee that the purpose of clause 40 is to promote tourism and cultural activities, which we think are critical to boosting regional economies. These provisions enable authorities to encourage visitors and provide facilities such as conference centres, driving job creation and investment. Authorities can add value by forging a regional brand, and by attracting business and visitors, they can make the most of their multifaceted areas and the strengths of each local authority area. That is key to creating thriving hubs for visitors and residents.

Amendment 358 and new clause 41 touch on something that has been a constant theme throughout the debate. I understand the aims behind the provisions, and I understand opposition parties’ desire to have regard to town and parish councils. I come back to the fact that we have agreed that town and parish councils have an important role. They are important local partners, and we expect authorities to work with them where appropriate.

However, we do not believe that it is proportionate or right to put that in the Bill as a legal requirement. We trust authorities to decide how best to engage with their local partners, including town and parish councils, based on what is right and appropriate for their areas. Requiring formal consultation and reporting could, as my hon. Friends the Members for Banbury and for Camborne and Redruth have so eloquently said, create unnecessary administrative pressure, burden and resources at a time when we want these strategic authorities to be focused on delivery. Of course we want to encourage collaboration, but not to prescribe it. Engagement should be flexible. It should not be dictated by central Government or indeed this Committee; it should be left to mayors and strategic authorities who know their patch and their partners best.

I recognise the type of levy that new clause 41 would introduce, and I recognise that it is supported by local authorities and mayors. The Government keep all tax policy under review, and any changes to tax policy will be announced at a fiscal event in the normal way. I do not believe that the Chancellor would be very pleased with me if I were to make tax policy now in this great Committee.

[The Chair]

That would also be outside the scope of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It would. One thing that the Bill does create is a statutory duty for Government to respond to formal requests from mayors for new powers—the right to request. Calls for any new fiscal powers should be made through that process. The Government propose to take account of the impact of visitors on local authority areas through the fair funding review. That point has been made by local authorities and by Committee members, and we are doing so to account for the fact that visitors—

[Vikki Slade]

I fear I am about to be told off by the Chair, but—[Interruption.] The shadow Minister has just taken an interest. I welcome the Minister’s comment that the impact of visitors will be taken into account in the fair funding review. It is really important to add that that affects the fair funding review for our police authorities, as well as our local authorities.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

There are already mechanisms to enable places to introduce overnight stay levies through the accommodation business improvement district model, as the hon. Lady mentioned. With that, and allowing that this good Committee is not the Chancellor, I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw the amendment.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I will not press new clause 41 to a vote, but I would like to do so with amendment 358, which concerns consultation with parish and town councils on tourism strategy.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I am sure the Committee would like to thank you for being so candid.

Clause 41

Co-operation with local government pension scheme managers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 41 requires that strategic authorities work with the local government pension scheme to identify and develop suitable investment opportunities. The local government pension scheme already plays a vital role in supporting local growth, with a portion of its £400 billion in assets invested in local projects. Such investments must of course provide a suitable return to pay pensions while also contributing to local prosperity, including through affordable housing, clean energy and local regeneration.

Although some combined authorities already maintain productive relationships with their local government pension scheme funds, clause 41 ensures that that collaborative approach becomes standard practice, embedding local government pension scheme engagement into local investment planning. That will not be a one-way responsibility. The Pension Schemes Bill introduces a corresponding duty on local government pension scheme funds to work collaboratively with their strategic authorities. Those reciprocal requirements are designed to foster key partnerships between the two parties to unlock investment in local growth and deliver benefits to communities across the country.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Miscellaneous local authority functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 20.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

These functions are essential to the effective operation of strategic authorities. We are now standardising these functions across all existing and future authorities. These powers are core functions that any local government body needs. Standardising them across strategic authorities will create consistent foundations for them to build on and thrive from. Without these functions, we risk significantly debilitating new institutions before they have a chance.

[Paul Holmes]

To bring some agreement to the Committee, the Opposition absolutely understand, as we did earlier about standardisation, such recommendations to give powers to CAs and CCAs. We are perfectly in agreement with that and we thank the Minister for bringing the issue to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 20

Miscellaneous local authority functions

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 197, in schedule 20, page 205, line 6, leave out—

“, a combined authority and a combined county authority”.

This removes the reference to combined authorities and combined county authorities inserted into section 113(5) of the Local Government Act 1972 as these bodies are already included in the definition of “local authority” under section 146A(1) of that Act.

This is a minor and technical amendment to prevent duplication in legislation.

Amendment 197 agreed to.

Schedule 20, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 43

Health improvement and health inequalities duty

--- Later in debate ---

[Vikki Slade]

Amendments 247 and 248 are similar to those that we tabled on other issues. They seek the assurance that combined authorities will have “sufficient financial resources” and “adequate administrative support” to fulfil their duties on health and health inequalities. I will not repeat myself, because we have a lot to get through this afternoon, but I will add that there is a real risk that more and more responsibility is going to the strategic authorities from other Departments. The Department of Health and Social Care is under huge financial pressure, but it would be remiss if this responsibility were moved across to a strategic authority without sufficient funding. I am assured by the Minister of sufficient capacity-building funding and an integrated settlement for these organisations in future. I trust—I need some assurance—that that will include sufficient funds to take account of the health inequalities in our regions. If that happens, I will be happy not to press the amendments.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I reiterate the assurances that I have given. We have a vested interest in ensuring that, where strategic authorities take on new functions and duties, they have the resource and capacity to do so. That could mean: providing capacity funding to the strategic authorities; ensuring that the budgets necessary to deliver the outcomes that they are committed to are in place through the process of devolution, or, ultimately, when they become established combined authorities, through the integrated settlements. I again put that reassurance on the record.

[Vikki Slade]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I will be as quick as I can—it is a very short speech.

Although the health improvement and health inequalities duty is very good, the determinants of health outlined in clause 43 are limited and lacking in consideration for the impacts on health from a wide range of activities that these new authorities will be able to influence. My amendments aim to fix that. It is positive that the Opposition parties all immediately spotted the need for improvement to this clause, and that both Liberal Democrat colleagues and I have aimed to fix it, albeit in different ways.

Amendments 262 and 263 would replace references to “prosperity” with “poverty and socio-economic inequality” in the clause. They would make clearer what causes and exacerbates ill health. I do not believe that “prosperity” on its own is sufficient. I will not repeat all my earlier arguments, but there is much supporting evidence for this from a range of organisations, including the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, the Reclaiming our Regional Economies programme, and the all-party parliamentary group on poverty and inequality, which I co-chair. This is just one of the ways that the Bill can make improvements, by focusing on reducing inequality and not simply creating growth within these new strategic authorities. I hope that the Government will accept my changes.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for the intention behind the amendments. I completely understand her key points. I think there is consensus that tackling health inequalities and their determinants is a key priority, which is why we included this clause in the Bill. We have deliberately drawn from the well-established approach in the Greater London Authority, which names “prosperity” among the general health determinants. It is deliberately broad so as to encompass a wide range of things. Our intention is not to establish an exhaustive list here, but to ensure that we cast the definition broadly enough to cover the issues of poverty and inequality that the hon. Lady raises.

There is a gradient across society for the determinants of health inequality, and my concern is that if we were to replace “prosperity” with poverty and inequality, we would cast the definition too narrowly. The broader “prosperity” definition captures poverty and social inequality, but it also captures other critical factors. Although we absolutely agree with the intent, we have tried to craft the legislation in a way that is broad and permissive, but that critically draws on the experience and track record of the Greater London Authority. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Lady will consider withdrawing her amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I will withdraw the amendment for now, but I hope we see some measures coming through from the Minister, particularly in regulations. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Manuela Perteghella]

I would like to speak to amendments 253 and 254. These are simple amendments, but they can make a meaningful impact and save lives. We want to add nitrogen dioxide levels and general air quality as a factor that combined authorities and combined county authorities must consider in their work to reduce health inequalities. That would ensure that environmental health risks were treated as core determinants of health, not as an afterthought.

We have heard a moving speech by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. We know that nitrogen dioxide pollution and poor general air quality are major contributors to respiratory and cardiovascular disease, and they disproportionately affect vulnerable communities. Including air quality as a health determinant would protect the most vulnerable. As we have heard, poor air quality causes thousands of premature deaths every year and leaves many others with chronic illnesses, but these are preventable. We also know that pollution hits deprived communities and those near busy roads or industrial estates the hardest, yet without action, their voices will be ignored. By explicitly including air quality, we can create healthier communities, which will translate into fewer hospital visits and a better quality of life for everyone.

By explicitly including air quality in the duty of combined county authorities and combined authorities to reduce health inequalities, amendments 253 and 254 would ensure that environmental factors are considered alongside social and economic ones. They also would encourage authorities to make evidence-based decisions across transport and planning, and also about the siting of heavy industry in an area, so we would like to hear the Minister’s views and assurances on these important issues.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank both hon. Members for their heartfelt contributions to the debate. Let me put it on record that we absolutely recognise that air quality is one of the greatest environmental threats to our health and that its impacts are not felt equally in our society. Action by local authorities is absolutely pivotal in improving air quality locally. The Environment Act 1995 already requires combined authorities and combined county authorities to work directly with local authorities on air quality action plans for their areas. Local air quality management statutory policy guidance also sets out ways of joint working with public health professionals to ensure that plans reduce health risks and disparities in affected communities to which local authorities must have regard.

Equally, we recognise the importance of environmental factors beyond air quality to people’s health. The scope of the general health determinants in the Bill has intentionally been crafted broadly. Some examples are given, but it is not our intention to set out a definitive list, as we think that would be too constraining. Combined authorities and combined county authorities remain the experts in their local areas. They will understand how air quality or environmental issues are impacting on their local communities, and they are best placed to decide how to consider general health determinants to deliver for their communities.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister clarify how the list in clause 43 as it stands was put together? It is bizarre that the use of tobacco and those kind of lifestyle choices are somehow explicitly listed, when environmental factors as a whole are left out.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Those are examples that we are giving based on existing precedents and drivers that we know local authorities are grappling with, but the list is not exhaustive. The intention is for it not to be exhaustive or definitive. We want to keep it broad, so that combined authorities and county authorities can decide the core determinants in their areas.

We as a Government are committed to the enhancement and protection of our environment. It is the Government’s intention to publish a revised environment improvement plan to protect and restore our natural environment with delivery information to help to meet the ambitious Environment Act 2021 targets. This will help us to restore our natural environment, improve environmental quality, create a circular economy, protect environmental security and improve people’s access to nature. That is something we want to hardwire into what the Government are doing and what we are seeing at all levels of government.

However, I come back to the point that it is important to cast this as broadly as we can, to allow constituent strategic authorities and mayors to establish the determinants that are most pertinent in their areas. While I have sympathy with and support the intent behind the amendments, there is enough provision in the Bill as drafted to ensure that what strategic authorities are doing is aligned with a host of national and local requirements already in place to drive health equality and improvements in the environment.

[Siân Berry]

I thank the Minister for her comments. I cannot accept that a detail such as tobacco use was put in, and standards of housing as a result of Awaab’s law and the things have gone on there, and yet environmental factors have not yet been included. I am determined that they should be, and I still intend to push this to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

Amendments 255 and 256 would add a health and wellbeing in all policies strategy to the requirements of the Bill. Life expectancy in England has stalled since 2010, something that has not happened for well over a century. According to Professor Sir Michael Marmot, that is a sign that society has “stopped improving”.

The Government have committed to halving the gap in healthy life expectancy between the richest and poorest regions of England, but that cannot be achieved without concerted action from the strategic authorities. Good population health is the foundation of a thriving economy. The Government have committed to halving the gap, and amendments 255 and 256 would go further than the Bill does currently to achieve that, simply by requiring mayors and strategic authorities to have regard to health through adoption of a health and wellbeing in all policies strategy document. The amendments would also require consultation with relevant entities and create accountability through targets and metrics. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I go back to the core principle underlying the duty. We believe that a driving purpose of the strategic authority should be to improve health outcomes and reduce health inequalities, so we are absolutely aligned with the intent behind the amendment, and nothing in the Bill prevents local partners from agreeing to align on an area-wide approach or strategy. We are very clear that we must allow combined authorities and county authorities local discretion to decide the best way to fulfil the duty and deliver for their communities. We do not want to overprescribe or constrain local thinking and innovation—indeed, many local areas throughout the country are well ahead of the national Government in some of their thinking in this area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Vikki Slade]

Amendments 21 to 23 relate to the integration of police and crime commissioners into the strategic mayoral system. They are quite straightforward, requiring the Secretary of State to make regulations and thereby ensure more parliamentary oversight of the inclusion of the police and crime commissioners, given that this is such a fundamental change in so many areas.

I am upset that established authorities in several areas have already taken on those roles, but many of the strategic mayoral authorities are brand-new organisations that will potentially be taking on functions way beyond their scope. They will also potentially be taking on police and crime functions that run across completely different policing and crime areas with different strategies and ways of working in terms of police and crime panels and their scrutiny. We believe that to do that through the proposed process will produce a rushed system. I commend the Minister for her decisiveness, but sometimes it is better to pause and take a slower approach to bringing together those organisations, rather than rush the process.

We are already seeing huge changes to our integrated care boards, with many being abolished. Rather than alignment, we see some coming together for financial reasons or for convenience. There is a real risk that trying to do all of that in harmony ends up not with the right outcomes but ones that suit the creation of a very simplistic jigsaw. Most of the mayors will be taking on roles that they have never performed before. We feel that it is time to pause, slow the pace and ensure that this has more parliamentary oversight.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The purpose of the provision in the Bill is to give the Secretary of State the power to make that transfer in a way and at a time that makes sense. Whether with regard to the electoral timetable or to issues of deliverability and the viability of the transfer, the Secretary of State’s ability to take a view and set a future date is why we have provided that power to mitigate the issues the hon. Lady is concerned about. The default should be that the police and crime commissioner function sits with the mayor where the geographies align. That is an important principle as we build up the mayoral strategic authorities across the country.

[Vikki Slade]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Before we resume, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 198, in clause 44, page 46, line 29, leave out “fire and rescue” and insert “police”.

This would correct the reference in the second sentence of new section 107FA(4).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 199, 202, 200, 201, 203 and 204.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This basket of amendments seeks to correct drafting errors, including inconsistencies and inaccurate references, to ensure that the Bill functions as intended. Amendments 202 and 203 are consequential to Government amendments 77 and 80, which the Committee passed when it voted on clause 11 on the mayoral precept. They ensure that mayors’ police and crime commissioner functions are ringfenced as a separate component from other functions.

[Paul Holmes]

We cannot expect the Government to get it right all the time with minor things, and these seem like sensible changes to smooth the legislation. We therefore have no problem with this group of amendments.

Amendment 198 agreed to.

Amendments made: 199, in clause 44, page 46, line 36, leave out—

“mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA”

and insert “combined authority”.

This would correct an inconsistency.

Amendment 202, in clause 44, page 47, line 8, leave out from “there” to the end of line 11 and insert—

“is a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

Amendment 200, in clause 44, page 47, line 34, leave out “mayoral”.

This would correct an inconsistency.

Amendment 201, in clause 44, page 48, line 8, leave out “mayoral”.

This would correct an inconsistency.

Amendment 203, in clause 44, page 48, line 19, leave out from “there” to the end of line 22 and insert—

“is a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 80.

Amendment 204, in clause 44, page 48, line 36, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—

“(a) paragraph 21(a) of Schedule 5 to the West Yorkshire Combined Authority (Election of Mayor and Functions) Order 2021 (S.I. 2021/112),

(b) paragraph 21(a) of Schedule 5 to the York and North Yorkshire Combined Authority Order 2023 (S.I. 2023/1432), and

(c) paragraph 21(a) of Schedule 1 to the South Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority (Election of Mayor and Transfer of Police and Crime Commissioner Functions) Order 2024 (S.I. 2024/414),”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would remove the unnecessary word “after” from paragraphs (a) to (c), insert references to the relevant Schedules to the Orders, and correct the citation of the South Yorkshire Order.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause sets out the criteria for transfer by default of police and crime commissioner functions to the mayor of a strategic authority, where the mayoralty matches the geography of the police force area and a transfer date has been set. Making mayors responsible for policing governance offers a more joined-up approach to preventing crime and driving local economic improvements. It will enhance mayors’ broader ability to bring about local change by bringing together responsibility for policing and crime with mayors’ wider remit for economic development, skills and infrastructure. This delivers the ambition set out in the English devolution White Paper.

Mayors who have police and crime commissioner functions will be required to appoint a deputy mayor for policing and crime. That will ensure that the mayor has sufficient capacity to discharge their functions, while ensuring there is dedicated oversight of policing on a day-to-day basis. The clause provides for a mayor to exercise police and crime commissioner functions for either a single police force, or more than one force when the boundaries of those forces align with the mayoral area when taken together.

[Paul Holmes]

We welcome this section of the legislation. I congratulate the Minister, the Government and officials on ensuring in legislation a smooth process for transfer of responsibilities, and on including a target date. The people served by the mayors—that is, our constituents—will want to understand very simply what new powers and responsibilities are being handed to the mayor. This is a sensible solution.

We also welcome the creation of the deputy mayor for police and crime. Given the responsibilities outlined in other sections of the Bill, the mayor will quite rightly have many and multifaceted responsibilities. It is therefore perfectly reasonable to provide in statute for a deputy mayor specifically to cover the police and crime powers of the mayoralty. That will ensure that policing and crime is looked at as a top priority for the residents they serve. We welcome this sensible section of the legislation, and will not seek to oppose it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause sets out the functions of a police and crime commissioner that a mayor will exercise where they have been transferred under the Bill. The clause also amends the Secretary of State’s existing power to alter police force boundaries by order, so that orders can be made at the same time as the transfer of the police and crime commissioner functions to a mayor. These would be used where a local case had been made to change the boundaries to facilitate a transfer of the PCC function.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Cooper]

I agree entirely with the principle of mayors holding responsibility for police and crime commissioners where the boundaries of the roles are coterminous, and the idea of appointing a deputy mayor to that role makes absolute sense, as does the power to align boundaries where it makes sense administratively. That all works in principle. My concern is about how this will be applied in Cheshire. Halton local authority is part of the Liverpool city region. That was a decision made when the Liverpool city region was first proposed—at the time the Minister may well have been in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government as a civil servant—and for Halton, then, it was the only game in town.

The proposed Cheshire and Warrington combined authority will cover the remainder of Cheshire—Cheshire West and Chester, Cheshire East and Warrington—and is not coterminous with Cheshire police, which covers all of Cheshire and includes Halton, as does Cheshire fire and rescue. This measure will therefore allow the Home Secretary to change the police boundaries, and there are significant concerns within Cheshire police that, were this to go ahead, their viability would be at risk, as well as practical concerns about the location of the custody suite.

This power already exists regarding fire and rescue services, but, under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, the Secretary of State is required to consider whether the order is in the interests of public safety before it is made. That test is not included in this Bill. In her summing up, could the Minister provide some reassurance that this power will not be exercised in Cheshire’s case without due consideration of that public safety factor, as well as significant consultation with local stakeholders to make sure that any future alignment is right for Cheshire?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will speak to the specific amendments, then come to my hon. Friend’s important intervention about Cheshire and some of the specific challenges that we face there.

It is worth noting on amendment 26 that the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the deputy mayors for policing and crime are supportive of this measure. Deputy mayors for policing and crime are already making a difference in areas such as West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester. They are driving through improvements in their local police forces, fostering collaboration and doing the role that we absolutely need them to do.

On my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cheshire’s important point, because we are not working from a blank piece of paper, and because there are complexities around the boundaries, we are trying to be sympathetic, sensitive and mindful. Obviously, the strategic intent of Government is to ensure that, when there is a transfer of police and crime commissioner functions, that is not to the detriment of the functions on the ground, because we absolutely need those to hold out. We are therefore having specific conversations with Cheshire and Warrington, and the local leaders in that area have raised the specifics of the PCC function. We will work with them to come to the best solution and resolution—one that has no detriment to the constituent authorities involved.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 21

Functions of police and crime commissioners

Amendments made: 205, in schedule 21, page 206, line 9, after second “the” insert “police”.

This clarifies that “the Area” means a police area. This amendment is connected with amendment 206, which deals with the case where a mayor exercises PCC functions in relation to two or more police areas.

Amendment 206, in schedule 21, page 206, line 11, after “commissioner” insert—

“; and, in a case where a combined authority or combined county authority meets the eligibility condition in relation to two or more police areas (see section 107FA(4) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 or section 33A(4) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023), this Schedule applies separately in relation to each of those police areas and ‘the Area’ is to be read accordingly”.

This clarifies that where a mayor exercises PCC functions in relation to two or more police areas that together make up the area of the combined authority or CCA, “the Area” here means each of the police areas (rather than the area of the combined authority or CCA).

Amendment 207, in schedule 21, page 209, line 41, at end insert—

“(j) a person who is the deputy mayor for policing and crime for a different police area.”

This would prevent a deputy mayor for policing and crime for one police area from being appointed as the deputy mayor for policing and crime for a different police area.

Amendment 208, in schedule 21, page 213, line 4, after “if” insert “—

‘(a) after subsection (1) there were inserted—

“(1ZA) If a combined authority or combined county authority meets the eligibility condition in relation to two or more police areas (see section 107FA(4) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 or section 33A(4) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023)—

(a) subsection (1)(b) does not apply; but

(b) a person is disqualified from being elected to the office of police and crime commissioner for any of those police areas at any election unless, on each relevant day, the person is a local government elector in at least one of those police areas;

and for that purpose a person is ‘a local government elector in’ a police area if the person is registered in the register of local government electors for an electoral area in respect of an address in that police area.”;

(b)’”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This provides that, where a mayor is to exercise PCC functions in relation to two or more police areas that together make up the area of the combined authority or CCA, a candidate is disqualified only if the person is not on the electoral register in any of those areas.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Twenty First schedule to the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The schedule sets out the content of the new schedule 10A that will be inserted into the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. It provides that once the functions of a police and crime commissioner have been transferred so that they are exercised by a mayor, there will no longer be a PCC for that police force area, which I know the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole will be delighted about. It also explains how mayors are to exercise PCC functions where functions have been transferred.

I beg to move that this schedule stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 21, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

Clause 46

Functions of fire and rescue authorities

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 209, in clause 46, page 51, line 10, leave out from “for” to end of line 14 and insert—

“the whole of its area if the Secretary of State designates it as the fire and rescue authority for that area in accordance with section 1A(1);

(g) a mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA is the fire and rescue authority for a part of its area if the Secretary of State—

(i) specifies that part of its area, and

(ii) designates it as the fire and rescue authority for that part of its area,

in accordance with section 1A(2) and (3).”

This would enable the Secretary of State to provide for a mayoral combined authority or CCA to be the fire and rescue authority for its area or part of its area. Amendment 212 makes further provision about these powers.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 210 to 219.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This cluster of amendments to clause 46 allow a mayoral combined authority or a mayoral county combined authority to take on the role of a fire and rescue authority, where appropriate.

These amendments strengthen the fire and rescue provision in clause 46. They give the Secretary of State the power to designate strategic authorities as fire and rescue authorities. They also ensure that where strategic authorities cover more than one fire and rescue area, they take on responsibility for all fire and rescue authorities in their area.

Collectively, these amendments provide consistency and prevent fragmentation of governance, by requiring mayors to cover all fire and rescue authority areas within their boundaries, creating stronger accountability across local areas.

Amendment 209 agreed to.

Amendments made: 210, in clause 46, page 51, line 17, leave out from “for” to second “a” and insert—

“an area by virtue of subsection (2)(f) or (g),”.

This is consequential on Amendment 209.

Amendment 211, in clause 46, page 51, line 23, after “the” insert “combined authority or”.

This corrects an omission.

Amendment 212, in clause 46, page 51, line 25, leave out from beginning to end of line 37 on page 52 and insert—

““1A Designation of mayoral combined authorities and mayoral CCAs

(1) The Secretary of State may by order designate a mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA as the fire and rescue authority for the whole of its area.

(2) The Secretary of State may—

(a) by order specify a part of the area of a mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA, and

(b) by order designate the mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA as the fire and rescue authority for the specified part of its area.

(3) But, if the Secretary of State exercises the powers conferred by subsection (2) in relation to a particular mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA (the “relevant mayoral authority”), the Secretary of State must ensure that those powers are exercised so as to secure that—

(a) two or more parts are specified under subsection (2)(a) which, when taken together, consist of the whole of the area of the relevant mayoral authority;

(b) the relevant mayoral authority is designated as the fire and rescue authority for each specified part;

(c) all of those designations come into effect at the same time.

(4) Accordingly, where the powers conferred by subsection (2) are exercised in relation to the relevant mayoral authority—

(a) there are separate fire and rescue authorities for each area specified under subsection (2)(a);

(b) the fire and rescue authority for each of those areas is the relevant mayoral authority.

(5) The Secretary of State may by order provide for the name by which an area specified under subsection (2)(a) is to be known.

(6) An order under subsection (1) or (2)(a) or (b) may make consequential alterations to any other—

(a) section 1A(2) area,

(b) section 2 combined area, or

(c) section 4 combined area.

(7) The alterations that may be made by virtue of subsection (6) include alterations that result in a reduction or an increase in the number of such areas.

(8) An order under subsection (1) or (2)(a) or (b) may make provision for the abolition of—

(a) a metropolitan county fire and rescue authority,

(b) a combined fire and rescue authority constituted by a scheme under section 2, or

(c) a combined fire and rescue authority constituted by a scheme to which section 4 applies.

(9) The provision that may be made by regulations under section 52 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025 (incidental etc provision) for the purposes of, or in consequence of, an order under subsection (1) or (2)(a) or (b) relating to a particular mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA and particular area includes—

(a) provision for functions of a fire rescue authority to be exercisable in relation to the area by the mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA during a shadow period (and not by any fire and rescue authority by which those functions would otherwise be exercisable),

(b) provision for those functions to be exercisable only by the mayor on behalf of the mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA;

(c) provision about who is to scrutinise the exercise of those functions;

(d) any other incidental, consequential, transitional, transitory or supplementary provision.

(10) In this section—

“section 1A(2) area” means an area specified in an order under subsection (2)(a) (including such an area as varied from time to time);

“section 2 combined area” means an area for which a combined fire and rescue authority is, or used to be, constituted by a scheme under section 2 (including such an area as varied from time to time);

“section 4 combined area” means the area for which a combined fire and rescue authority is, used to be, constituted by a scheme to which section 4 applies (including such an area as varied from time to time);

“shadow period” , in relation to provision made in accordance with subsection (9)(a) in relation to a particular area, means a period which—

(a) ends when the designation of the mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA as the fire and rescue authority for the area takes effect, and

(b) is no longer than one year.””

This would make further provision about the Secretary of State’s power to provide for a mayoral combined authority or CCA to be the fire and rescue authority (see Amendment 209). In particular, subsection (3) would ensure that, where the area of a mayoral combined authority or CCA is to consist of several fire and rescue areas, it must be the fire and rescue authority for all of those areas.

Amendment 213, in clause 46, page 52, line 40, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 on page 53.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would be consequential on Amendment 209.

[Vikki Slade]

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 46, page 53, line 15, at end insert—

“(7) Regulations made under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.”

This amendment would ensure that regulations made by the Secretary of State regarding the functions of fire and rescue authorities receive parliamentary scrutiny.

[Vikki Slade]

I should probably declare a personal interest—my father spent his life as a London firefighter throughout his career; I was a member of the local fire authority, and I have spent a lot of time talking to and engaging with the fire and rescue services. That was not because I managed to set my bedroom on fire as a child—although I did—but because fire safety has always been a lifelong passion of mine.

I am troubled that the Bill rolls fire and rescue services into the role of a mayor. That may be a great idea; in some cases, I know that fire and rescue services have come together with police and crime. However, the amount of attention that this Bill gives to fire and rescue, and indeed the comment made last week when I asked questions about the precepting and the funding of fire, which suggested that it was outwith the scope of this Bill, makes it feel as though fire and rescue are an afterthought. It feels as though the work of the fire and rescue services is not being given enough attention and that there has not been real thought about how they can best be delivered.

Fire and rescue authorities around the country are doing a really good job in supporting our services, often on tiny precepts, and in dealing with big, and changing issues. Wildfires around my Mid Dorset and North Poole constituency have been horrific this year, and we have just put in for Bellwin funding. The proportion of energy that is used in dealing with fires that are usually human-caused and flooding, which is also related to climate resilience, has gone through the roof.

To add fire and rescue services in as a couple of pages in a large Bill feels inadequate, which is why we are looking to ensure that regulations made under clause 46 are subject to the affirmative procedure, and why we are seeking more parliamentary scrutiny and energy around bringing in the fire and rescue services, particularly where they do not align.

My area is likely to be Wessex, if we get into the next round, and it will probably cover three different fire authorities. As well as having to get two or three different police authorities together, we will now have to get two or three different fire authorities from the police authorities. Adding the clause in at this stage is complicated, and sticking it in as two and a half pages of a Bill feels inadequate. Therefore, we ask that regulations made under the clause are subject to the affirmative procedure and receive suitable parliamentary scrutiny.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I want to put on record that the Government absolutely recognise the vital role the fire and rescue authorities are playing across the piece; there is a huge amount of work going on in my Department to ensure that they are fit for purpose, that they are resourced and that they can continue to evolve. The Government believe that the negative procedure is the right and proportionate route for these regulations. The powers here in the Bill are simply technical powers, enabling powers that are already conferred in legislation for the fire and rescue authority functions to be transferred. That is why they take up such a small proportion of the Bill—it is a technical change rather than a substantive one, which exists already in legislation.

It is important that there is a timely transfer of these functions so that mayors can deliver joined-up services without lengthy procedural hurdles. Subject to clause 46 standing part of the Bill, Parliament would have already approved the principle of mayors exercising fire and rescue functions. This part of the Bill makes that transfer live and real. I hope the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole appreciates the care that we certainly have around the fire and rescue service and that there is much wider work going on outside the scope of the Bill about how we ensure those services are fit for purpose, and will therefore withdraw her amendment.

[Vikki Slade]

I would have loved to do that, but I feel that this transfer needs to be a deliberate and active thing. I spoke to my chief fire officer, who seemed completely oblivious to what is going on. If our chief fire officers are not really aware of what is going on, then more needs to be done, and therefore I would like to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

This would be consequential on Amendment 209.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 220, in schedule 22, page 234, line 12, at end insert—

“LDEDCA 2009

1 (1) LDEDCA 2009 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In section 107D (delegation of functions by the mayor), after subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) Subsection (3) is subject to section 107DZA.’

(3) After section 107D insert—

‘107DZA Limitation on delegation of mayoral functions

(1) The mayor may not make an arrangement under section 107D(3)(a) or (b) for the exercise of any fire and rescue functions of the combined authority.

(2) The power to make an arrangement under section 107D(3)(ba) is subject to paragraph 7 of Schedule 5BA.

(3) In this section “fire and rescue functions of the combined authority” means—

(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the combined authority has by virtue of an order under section 105A (and here “fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004), or

(b) functions which the combined authority has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.’

LURA 2023

2 (1) LURA 2023 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.

(2) In section 30 (functions of mayors: general), after subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) Subsection (3) is subject to section 30A.’

(3) After section 30 insert—

‘30A Limitation on delegation of mayoral functions

(1) The mayor may not make an arrangement under section 30(3)(a) or (b) for the exercise of any fire and rescue functions of the CCA.

(2) The power to make an arrangement under section 30(3)(ba) is subject to paragraph 7 of Schedule 2A.

(3) In this section “fire and rescue functions of the CCA” means—

(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the CCA has by virtue of regulations under section 19 (and here “fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004), or

(b) functions which the CCA has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.’”

In new sections 107DZA and 30A, subsection (1) would prevent the mayor from delegating fire and rescue functions to a deputy mayor or another member or officer of mayoral authority; and subsection (2) would replace wording in clause 9(2) and (5) (see Amendment 68 and Amendment 69).

As the Committee has previously discussed in the context of consequential amendments 68 and 69 to clause 9 of the Bill, Government amendment 220 ensures that responsibility for fire and rescue functions sits directly with the elected mayor. The mayor can delegate those powers only to the public safety commissioner and not to deputies or officers, which strengthens accountability. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

Amendment 220 agreed to.

Schedule 22, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 47

Mayor with PCC and fire and rescue functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause introduces alternative ways by which a mayor or strategic authority may exercise fire and rescue and police and crime commissioner functions introduced by the Bill. The Government aim to establish mayoralties with the full range of powers and responsibilities wherever possible. The clause enables the Secretary of State to authorise a mayor of a strategic authority to delegate fire and rescue authority functions to a chief constable and to authorise that chief constable to further delegate fire and rescue authority functions to police and fire rescue personnel. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Sharing of information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Strategic authorities have a number of responsibilities in relation to public safety, something that I know Members across the House care very much about. The Bill deepens those responsibilities. The clause brings combined and combined county authorities into a group of public sector organisations that can receive information in relation to crime and disorder. It also places a duty on the combined or combined county authority to share information about crime and disorder with other public sector organisations as required, and vice versa. That will empower the combined and combined county authorities and partner organisations to develop intelligence, make informed decisions and implement appropriate responses to crime and disorder issues such as crime prevention. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I have a broad interest in this group of measures. First, I will raise some issues with the clause as a whole; then I will speak to new clause 53, and then new clauses 32 and 33 on a separate topic. I hope hon. Members will bear with me as I work through those three parts.

I support clause 49, which provides a way for mayors of strategic authorities to usefully request more powers, but the gap in the Bill highlights that we need the Government to make bolder policies in the areas of competence so that strategic authorities can request that they should be devolved to the lower levels. I will turn to the example of housing in a moment but, in general, it would be great to see strategic authorities working together to develop models of rent controls. As I understand it, however, because those powers do not currently exist centrally, strategic authorities cannot make requests for them under the clause. We need to be bolder at the centre to maximise the effectiveness of devolution on such issues.

If a Bill is not the right place to create a new power that is usable only in a local area, what is? Can the Minister explain why the Government have not taken the opportunity of the Bill to allow councils or new authorities to request those kinds of powers in areas where the Government do not currently act? It is on that principle that my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol Central (Carla Denyer) tabled new clause 53, which I will speak to now. It does not do what I just suggested, but it does allow for clear reporting of the conversations between mayors and the Government on the use of clause 49 powers. That includes where authorities have made requests for powers to be created and devolved to them, even when there is no existing national power to devolve.

If the Secretary of State’s goal is to make sure people take back control of their own destinies, it is only right that this power should be considered. Ministers need to pay serious attention to the full range of powers that mayors are already saying they need in order to make a material difference to people’s lives. As the Secretary of State for Housing said in his speech at the Labour party conference, communities have been held back because they do not have the power to make the changes they want. The new clause would at least help to keep track of the powers mayors are asking for under clause 49, as well as the additional powers they are telling Ministers to legislate for to enable them to do the best for their communities and, ultimately, to fulfil their areas of competence.

The new clause is not prescriptive as to which policies and areas need to be considered, but as I implied earlier the area of competence that inspired it is housing. That is because we are in an acute affordability and evictions crisis, and mayors have been calling for rent control powers from Ministers for some time. For example, in 2023, the Mayors of Manchester, Liverpool and London wrote to the then Secretary of State calling for a rent freeze, in order to immediately relieve the pressure on millions of people in the private rented sector in their areas. Recently, the Mayor of London said that the power to control rents was now at the top of his list in terms of devolution. His position follows many years of pressure and dialogue with politicians such as the Greens on the London Assembly—of which I used to be one—and with independent grassroots renters groups.

That is just one example of the kind of power that would be involved. Rent controls are something close to my heart, and we heard new figures today showing that 172,000 children are now in temporary accommodation in the UK. On average, people spend 36% of their income on rent—in my constituency, it is 42%. This is a classic policy for that issue.

The annual report the new clause requires would recognise the need for transparency over the discussions taking place about powers in the Bill—in the absence of the changes I have asked for in it—and also let us see what is going on in the conversations happening outside of the powers in the Bill.

New clauses 32 and 33 do what I just talked about and what clause 49 does, but at the level of the strategic authority. This is about the strategic authority having a duty to have a plan for devolving more of its powers and duties to smaller local authorities in its area. I recognise that the aims of devolution can often be in tension, particularly in terms of the balance between scale and geography. It is correct to have some powers at the level of combined authorities, so that they cover sufficiently large populations and enable authorities to exercise strategic policy making. But large authorities will not necessarily empower local people to address issues that are unique to their area; they might not represent the diversity of things going on around that area, and issues that people really care about in local communities might be better addressed using deeper local knowledge.

The new clauses do not prescribe a single model for this further local devolution. There is such diversity. We have discussed today the differences between coastal areas, rural areas, towns and larger urban areas. We have talked about areas with countryside and nature to protect, areas that need new investment, and areas with unique industries that could be developed locally.

I do not think that we should be prescriptive in our new clauses; we should just put in place a legal duty that makes some kind of move towards subsidiarity across the whole of English local government. Under the new clauses, the strategic authority would have a duty to set out how it would devolve its own responsibilities to the lowest possible level for effectiveness—including, where they exist, district, town and parish councils. I think that would be a really positive thing that would please most Opposition Members on the Committee. I hope that the Minister will take that onboard and come up with some way of codifying the need for the new strategic authorities to avoid becoming too centralised and to make a plan for listening and devolving powers down to the right level.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank hon. Members for their amendments and new clauses. Let me say a word about clause 49, and then I will speak to those.

We are clear that devolution is a continuous process. Our intention in the Bill is therefore to create a framework to establish mayoral strategic authorities and empower them to deepen devolution. That is what the right to request, which we have been debating, does. Critically, the right to request will hardwire the process of continual extraction of power from the centre—from Whitehall and Westminster—to our local areas, which is why the clause is so important.

In my view, amendments 9 and 3 are too constraining, as not all mayoral requests will require a legal process in order to be implemented. For example, requests to change funding, or pilot schemes or partnerships, do not have any legal requirements and do not require legal clearance. My concern is that the amendments would make the process too onerous and bureaucratic and, critically, slow it down. Anyone involved in the devolution process knows that extracting power from Whitehall is slow and painful as it is. I would not want to add further hurdles to that process.

I appreciate the intent behind new clause 32, but similar mechanisms to those proposed in it already exist. Any combined authority or combined county authority can enter into a joint committee with another local authority and collaborate across boundaries to jointly discharge their powers. Also, the additional requirement proposed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for strategic authorities to publish a community empowerment plan may end up being too burdensome and, critically, risks conflating the roles of the strategic and the local authorities.

We are clear that we want to see double devolution, and that we want to extract power from Whitehall and make sure that it is pushed down to the strategic authority level, the local authority level and, critically, the community level for community empowerment. We will go on to talk about neighbourhood governance—we have talked about it before in debates. There is a vital role for local authorities to enable and enshrine that community empowerment and engagement, and there is a risk that we conflate the strategic economic role of the mayor and the combined authority with the critical enabling role of the local authority.

Earlier, Members across the Committee talked eloquently about the need for us to ensure that local authorities continue to have a vital role and are empowered. I would not want to take something that I think is a core competency of local authorities, which are well placed to drive that community engagement, and lift it from the local authority level to the strategic level.

Finally, on new clause 33, the Bill already provides adequate powers for strategic authorities to request and receive functions and duties from non-departmental public bodies. On clause 53 and the notion that the right to request should be made transparent, while the process is transparent, I think it is important that we create the space for mayors to have detailed policy conversations with the Secretary of State and with Secretaries of State across Departments, and that those conversations can be open, frank and sensitive. We do not want to create a process whereby we constrain mayors’ ability by publishing all the detail. The outcomes will be put in the public domain, but it is important that we create the space for mayors to undergo a policy process and that we allow an internal and private space for frank, robust policy conversations to happen in this context.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I must tell the hon. Lady that I can barely hold them back. Our mayors are pretty independent-minded and robust, and they are very clear when they want a particular power. They run effective campaigns and they are very good at advocacy, so I do not think the Government need to—or indeed can—tell them what to do. They are very clear about the powers they want; they build consensus among all their partners to ensure that they apply maximum pressure on Government to respond effectively to the right to request, and rightly so. That is the case now and I suspect that, once we give them legal powers in this Bill, it will continue to be so.

[Vikki Slade]

I am content that the scope of the amendment may have been broader than intended in terms of some of the minor things that a local authority may wish to do, but I ask the Minister to keep in mind the larger-scale changes that may be required, which really should come with some form of Government statutory intervention. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Powers to make regulations in relation to functions of strategic authorities and mayors

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank you, Dame Siobhain, and all hon. Members for the swift and substantial progress we have made on the Bill today. I am grateful for everyone’s patience and the constructive way they have engaged in debate.

The devolution framework delivered by this Bill is the floor, not the ceiling, of our ambition for devolving real powers to local communities. That is why we are taking the power to add new functions to the framework, which will ensure that strategic authority mayors have the powers they need to deliver for local people. The Government will not be taking those decisions in isolation; any new functions added to the framework will be subject to votes in both Houses of Parliament and to consultations with the mayor, the constituent councils and the body currently holding those functions.

It is important that the governance arrangements within strategic authorities enable local leaders to make effective decisions to deliver for their people, so the Government are taking the power to modify governance arrangements where necessary. In some cases, the best way to bring about real, substantive devolution across the country will be to test it in one or two places first. The Bill therefore allows the Government to confer or modify functions on a pilot basis, which will enable local leaders to innovate in order to deliver the best outcomes for their citizens.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Deirdre Costigan.)

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Ninth sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Holmes]

Good morning, Dame Siobhain. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, and to see everybody on the Committee on this very sunny Thursday morning. I know everybody is delighted to be here, and I welcome the Minister too.

The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations that would allow certain functions of single foundation strategic authorities to be exercised only by the mayor of that authority. Amendment 309 would create additional boundaries for regulations that may provide for a function of a strategic authority to be transferred to the authority’s mayor. In essence, we believe that amendments 307 to 309—we will come to amendment 308 in the next grouping—would address the issue that single foundation strategic authorities such as Cornwall currently cannot access the highest level of devolution, because the Bill only allows for combined or county combined authorities with a mayor to exercise the functions that the Government are putting forward.

Amendment 307 promotes fairness and flexibility by allowing foundation strategic authorities such as Cornwall to benefit from the same level of democratic leadership as combined authorities. That would empower local areas to choose a directly elected mayor if they wish, strengthening accountability and enabling them to access greater devolved powers, which the Minister has outlined as a key priority for the Bill.

Amendment 309 would enable the Secretary of State to transfer functions to a strategic authority’s mayor, and would ensure that devolved powers can be effectively localised and exercised by accountable leadership. The amendment would complement amendments 307 and 308, by giving mayors the tools they need to deliver on local priorities, ensuring that devolution works in practice, not just in principle.

I will move amendment 308 at a later stage, but together, our amendments would effectively let foundation strategic authorities have mayors and the associated powers of delegation and function transfer, putting them on par with mayoral CAs and CCAs, and I encourage the Government to support them.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Siobhain. Let me take amendment 307 first. To be clear, the single foundation strategic authority will not have a mayor. That is not the intent of the provision or of the Bill and it is not in the Government’s plans. Invariably, however, we want to be sure that at every level we are devolving power. Certain powers will be devolved to single foundation strategic authorities, such as Cornwall, in order to enable it to respond to some of its issues. We are also clear that certain powers will be reserved to mayors, because a level of democratic accountability is critical to the exercise of such powers. That is the distinction that we have made throughout the design of the policy and it is built into the Bill.

Amendment 309 is out of the step with the Bill’s objective of streamlining the process for conferring and modifying the functions of strategic authorities and mayors. The Bill already puts in place sufficient guardrails when functions are transferred to mayors. When making functions exercisable by the mayor, it is already the case that constituent authorities will be consulted before such a change. Requiring the consent of those authorities will create an unnecessary barrier to enabling mayors to take on functions and to get on with the job delivery, which is what we need of them.

Finally, many mayors can already appoint political advisers—another piece of amendment 309—as agreed through the establishment of statutory instruments. The Bill will also allow mayors to appoint commissioners to support them in the exercise of their functions. That is the right balance to be struck to ensure that the mayor has what he or she needs to do the job that their constituents or voters require of them. With that, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Paul Holmes]

I hope that the Minister understands our motivation for tabling the amendment. We are not trying to score a political point, but to strengthen the Bill. I am reassured that the Minister has given us some reassurance that she sees that every kind of authority should be devolved and that the powers should be aligned with those. We may come back to this on Report, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Paul Holmes]

I beg to move amendment 308, in schedule 23, page 237, line 30, at end insert—

“Functions moving from mayors to deputy mayors and strategic authority members

5A (1) Regulations may provide for the mayor of a strategic authority to allow any function of the mayor to be exercised by—

(a) the deputy mayor,

(b) a member of the relevant strategic authority,

(c) a committee members of the strategic authority appointed by the mayor.

(2) Regulations may create requirements for the committee in sub-paragraph (1)(c) including—

(a) requirements about the membership of the committee,

(b) requirements about the appointment of a chair of the committee,

(c) requirements about the process by which the mayor may appoint members to the committee,

(d) requirement about the committee’s voting procedures,

(e) requirements about information which must be disclosed by the strategic authority to the committee.”

This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations to allow a mayor to delegate exercise of a function to a deputy mayor, a member of the relevant strategic authority, or a committee of a members of the relevant strategic authority.

This amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, is an extension to my earlier amendments 307 and 309, as I said. In essence, it would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations to allow a mayor to delegate the exercise of a function to a deputy mayor, a member of the relevant strategic authority or a committee of members of the relevant strategic authority. Allowing mayors of strategic authorities to delegate functions would ensure consistency with existing mayoral models, making government more effective and responsive. The amendment would provide practical flexibility so that mayors can share responsibilities appropriately and ensure that local decisions are made at the right level.

I expect the Minister to resist the amendment, but I look for some reassurance on whether we can ensure that the Bill brings some standardisation, an efficient transfer of functions and efficient exercise of the functions proposed. I am interested to hear her thoughts, but at this stage we do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, depending on what the Minister comes back with.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Again, I understand the intent behind the amendment. I would say that mayors are already able to delegate the majority of their functions to deputy mayors and to members of constituent authorities. In the evidence session, for example, Councillor Bev Craig from Manchester was responsible for the economic development portfolio in Greater Manchester. Such functions are already in place. In part in recognition of the fact that local councillors, in particular leaders and cabinet members, have busy paid jobs, we want to increase the mayor’s pool of support, which is why we are creating the ability for the mayor to appoint and to delegate functions to the commissioners. That will give the mayors options. We are not specifying how the mayor should do it, and ultimately each mayor will figure out what works for their area and the mix between deputy mayors, commissioners and lead members, but this provision will increase the pool and the options available to them.

[Paul Holmes]

We are content with that answer, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Twenty Third schedule to the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The schedule is introduced by clause 50. I have already spoken about why the clause should stand part of the Bill. As I explained previously, the schedule is essential to providing Government with the powers to add new functions to the framework. That will ensure that strategic authorities and mayors have the powers they need to deliver for their local people, which is what all this is about. I commend the schedule to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 23 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 51

Health service functions: application of existing limitations on devolution

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This Government want to ensure we have a national health service that is fit for the future, and we are doing huge amounts to repair the damage to the national health service done by the Conservative Government. That is a core function of what we are doing. It is therefore right that certain core functions, such as the NHS constitution or university clinical training, remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care. This clause retains the existing limits on the devolution of health functions in England. Protections against devolving health functions are not new—they have been in place since the Government began the process of devolving functions to combined authorities—and the Bill maintains them. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Paul Holmes]

I was going to stay quiet, but unfortunately for the Minister I was inspired by her speech, so I hate to disappoint the Government Whip by speaking very briefly. The Minister, quite rightly—it is her job—outlined that she wants to rectify some of the supposed damage done to the national health service over 14 years, but I gently remind her that waiting lists are increasing and that the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care is looking at possible strike action while putting forward a reorganisation that he cannot afford.

I look to the Minister for some reassurance regarding whether wider health policy, such as that reorganisation and some of the local functions of integrated care boards, which we know are changing, may affect the provisions in the clause. Could there be some effect on the ground that may create delay or necessitate some changes to the clause in the longer term?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Obviously, the NHS is going through huge reform. We are working closely with the team in the Department of Health and Social Care to ensure that reforms sit alongside our plans for devolution. A big part of what we are trying to do through our health reforms is to provide community-based healthcare, and there is a big opportunity for local and regional government to work alongside the NHS to deliver integrated services that work for our communities and are user-led. We are making sure that every stage of the reforms, including the changes to the ICBs, is done in lockstep with what we are trying to do across the country.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Incidental etc provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This is a simple provision. When functions are conferred on, or modified for, strategic authorities in the future, the Government will sometimes need to make technical changes to other pieces of legislation to ensure that the functions conferred on strategic authorities work as intended. That is why the Bill includes this technical clause—it is just a technical clause—to allow the Government to have the power to make technical changes to existing legislation when necessary. The clause will ensure that strategic authorities and mayors are able to effectively exercise the functions, as intended by policy. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53

Transfer of property, rights and liabilities

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

We understand the overarching aims of this clause, and the debate does not necessarily have to revolve around whether or not it should happen, but we tabled this probing amendment because we understand that the legislation is essentially applying TUPE regulations regardless of whether they legally apply. We want to challenge that and probe why, if TUPE regulations need not legally apply in cases of transfer, the Government have insisted that TUPE regulations have to go into this regardless. Can the Minister answer that key question?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

TUPE regulations are there to ensure that staff are not dismissed for the sole reason that functions are being transferred from one public body to another. We believe that they are fundamental to protecting staff, which we want to make sure happens throughout this process.

In line with the Cabinet Office guidance, this clause tries to ensure that the regulations apply when we have public bodies moving to strategic authorities. The amendment, as drafted, risks creating uncertainty for staff and disrupting the smooth transfer of functions.

TUPE regulations are there for a reason—to protect the workers that are fundamental and critical to delivering any public institution. When we are going through the process of creating these strategic authorities, it is important that we embed those TUPE regulations. That is why I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister for her full and direct answer, and I understand it. I take it she accepts that TUPE is being put into this clause regardless of whether there is a legal necessity for it to apply. Has she had any correspondence or lobbying from the trade union movement to make sure that it is included?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

To answer that question directly: no, although it helps that I am a new Minister. The clause is in step with long-standing Government practice. It mirrors provisions that have been made in previous legislation by the previous Conservative Government, including in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. It is standard practice and it is done by all parties. It is there because we need to protect staff.

[Paul Holmes]

I feel very reassured that the Government are following the excellent judgment of the last Conservative Government. On that note, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 221, in clause 53, page 58, line 16, at end insert—

“(8A) Regulations under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would make regulations under clause 53 subject to affirmative resolution procedure.

Clause 53, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54

Prohibition of secondary legislation removing functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Strategic authorities will not be able to deliver for their residents if they fear that a future Government could easily remove functions that have been devolved. Parliament is sovereign, and the Government will always be able to table primary legislation to redesign how functions are delivered. However, the Bill makes sure that Governments will have to make that argument in Committee and on Report, as we are doing now. It must not be easy to take devolved powers away from strategic authorities. We want this to be locked in because we fundamentally believe that this is how to deliver for communities across the country. That is why this Bill limits the ability of this or any future Government to remove functions from strategic authorities using secondary legislation, so that they can be exercised again by central Government.

I commend clause 54 to the Committee.

[Paul Holmes]

This is a difficult one for us. I am not saying that the Minister is trying to bind the hands of future Governments, but it does feel like the Government are trying to make this increasingly difficult. We would argue that any elected Government have a mandate to make legislative changes as they see fit. I wonder whether this is using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

Of course, we accept the need for parliamentary scrutiny, but an elected Government should be able to use any mechanism they want to use. I ask the Minister once again to consider whether she thinks this is really necessary. A Government who might want to remove some of the functions would have a democratic mandate to do so, and arguably very good reasons for doing so when future structures need to change. I would like to challenge her on whether she thinks this is absolutely necessary, which may depend on our forcing a vote on this issue.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for his question. My view is that devolution is a fundamental shift in power and a rewiring of how we govern the country. At the heart of the devolution process are a lot of democratic processes, where people vote for a mayor on the basis of what they say they will deliver for their community. To make a fundamental change, it is absolutely right that a future Government must get the consent of Parliament to rewrite it. That is the premise on which we think about the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and devolution, and it is what we have done in the context of Scotland and Wales. These are fundamental shifts in power, and it is right that there has to be a full democratic process within Parliament to reverse them.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Reorganisation is a crucial part of the Government’s mission to fix the foundations of local government. I come back to the fundamental point that this is not about reorganisation for reorganisation’s sake; it is about creating better-functioning unitary councils that are more sustainable and better able to deliver the high-quality services that their residents want and fundamentally deserve.

Schedule 24 enables the Secretary of State to direct areas to submit proposals to reorganise. We are committed to working in partnership with local areas. Therefore, this will be used only where areas have failed to make progress following an invitation. It also includes new merging provisions to enable existing unitary councils that believe structural change would be beneficial to submit proposals for reorganisation. That aligns the process for reorganising single-tier areas with the current process for reorganising two-tier areas.

With devolution and local government reorganisation progressing concurrently across the country, mechanisms are needed in the Bill to ensure these reforms work in harmony. The first mechanism is the ability to convert a combined county authority into a combined authority. This is a straightforward and common-sense provision. When local government reorganisation takes place in an area covered by a combined county authority, we need a streamlined way to convert the authority into a combined authority.

The second mechanism is the ability to abolish a combined authority or combined county authority if local government reorganisation renders that authority obsolete. This mechanism would be used only in very limited circumstances: if a new unitary authority covers or includes the whole area of an existing combined authority or combined county authority. Any local government reorganisation proposal requiring the use of this abolition mechanism will need to consider how it would impact future devolution in the area, as per the Government’s reorganisation criteria. That ensures these areas will not be left without a viable pathway to devolution.

I commend clause 55 to the Committee.

[Paul Holmes]

Clause 55 essentially goes to the heart of the Bill. As we argued when we voted in the House against local government reorganisation, the thing in this Bill that most people out there—our voters—will notice, aside from the devolution aspects and the creation of mayors, is the bread-and-butter transactional services that people see on the ground. That will be the biggest impact the change will have on their daily lives.

We oppose clause 55 because we believe the Government have no democratic mandate to deliver local government reform. It was not in their manifesto, they did not ask the British people to vote for them on the basis of local government reform, and we fundamentally have—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth looks shocked at my proposition, but if he can refer me to where this was in the Labour party’s manifesto, I will happily withdraw that point. I suspect he cannot, because it was not there. That is a key aspect of why we oppose the clause.

The other reason why we oppose the clause is because there is no overwhelming evidence showing that services or local government would be more efficient with larger organisational structures and a larger population being encapsulated into unitary authorities. I am a big fan of unitary authorities—I declare an interest in that I am a former lead member of one, and I was very happy to be so—but we have to accept that the nature of devolution means that a standardised model is not adequate for everywhere in the country. In some areas, it may not be what is best or wanted by local people. That comes back to the democratic deficit we believe the Government have in announcing these LGR proposals.

I know the Minister is relatively new in post, so she will not have had as much communication with local authority leaders as her predecessor did—that does not reflect on her or her ability; it is just the nature of her period in post. But, in previous sittings, she outlined and indicated to this Committee that there is overwhelming excitement from many local authority leaders who welcome LGR and the new mayors proposed by the Government. She will also be aware that this has caused a huge amount of disruption to local people and the working of local authorities, at a difficult time for their operational capacity and capability, with reduced budgets. This is not needed.

For example, there are now three proposals to Government in my area. One is from the 12 district councils, which absolutely do not want to be abolished. There is unified agreement on that, except from Gosport borough council, which has opposed everything completely. There is a county council recommendation, lauded previously by the Minister, which is not supported by MPs who represent the area. And there is another proposal that is contested. One of my Hampshire colleagues has just entered the room, and he takes the same view as me.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

The hon. Gentleman hits the nail on the head. There were unique circumstances where everything was going bankrupt, so strict action had to be taken. This Government are proposing, unilaterally and without any consultation with those who do not want it to go ahead, to change local government structures across the whole of the United Kingdom without democratic legitimacy.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Does the hon. Member recognise the state of local government—the absolute mess and the financial vulnerability of local authorities—that his party left us with? Unique circumstances, absolutely. We are having to fix the mess we inherited. We absolutely want local government to be successful and to thrive, but it is on its knees after 15 years of austerity. That is why we are having to take the action we are taking.

[Paul Holmes]

If the Minister is seriously suggesting that a complete and wholesale reorganisation across the whole United Kingdom is the one answer to making sure that local government can operate on a sustainable footing, I do not buy that at all. There are many things that this Government could do to make local government much more efficient and to deliver for people. First is an uplift in funding.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are doing that.

[Paul Holmes]

Well, the Minister should speak to the many council leaders across the country who do not agree that it is enough.

If the Minister is seriously saying that abolishing 90% of elected councillors in rural areas across this country will somehow be the miracle cure for local government, and that is what is driving these measures, then I am sorry but this Government need to go back to the drawing board.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Cocking]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. It is interesting that the Government have moved away from that, particularly because I have not met one person who thinks that reorganisation into large unitary councils is a good idea.

If it is good for parts of the country, I hope that the Minister can explain why London and lots of the metropolitan boroughs in the north are not being compelled to reorganise. If this 500,000 figure is the sweet spot and the Government have loads of evidence to back that the claim that this will make services more efficient and put councils on a better financial footing, why is it good for only certain parts of the country, and not the whole country?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank hon. Members for their robust contributions. I will say a few things. First, we acknowledge that any process of change or reform is difficult. The Government do not underestimate the challenge of the process, but I come to why we are doing this. I made an intervention earlier to point out the state of local government that we inherited. Any one of us will know the huge pressures that local government are under. Fifteen years of austerity and rising demand has made local government increasingly unstable. The status quo is not tenable or sustainable. We have to do something systemic, because we have a systemic issue in local government.

Reforming and reorganising local government will deliver better services, because we can locate services at a level that works for residents. This is not reorganisation for reorganisation’s sake. It will be tough for our areas, but we are doing it because we are trying to ensure that local government services can work for their residents. It is about sustainability. We need to ensure that we have a model of local government that is fit for purpose and can be sustained in the future, because they provide absolutely vital services for residents. It would be completely reckless of this Government to see the state of play that we inherited and say, “We’re going to sit on our hands and not do anything.” That may be the Conservative way, but it is not the Labour way. We are clear that we have to help drive through a process of reform, and we are doing that because we want to ensure that local governments are fit for purpose to deliver those services for their residents.

There is a fundamental point about accountability and accessibility to residents. If we talk to any of our residents, they will say that they barely understand how local government works—who is responsible for what. Creating structures and systems that work, and that our communities can interact with and cohere with, is absolutely right.

We are very clear: this is not a one bullet solution. It absolutely is not. We know that local government reform needs to sit alongside other things that we are doing. We recognise the funding pressure that local government are under. That is why we boosted local government funding last year, and why we are delivering a real-terms increase to local government funding, despite the tough fiscal inheritance from the last Government. We are moving to multi-year budgets because we think that the system of year-by-year funding for local government is madness. We are making that reform. We are also moving towards consolidated budgets. Having lots of silos and funding streams has made it hard for local government to be strategic and to drive integrated services; we are reforming all of that. We are clear that this measure sits alongside all of that.

The final bit is our funding review. We understand that there are huge pockets of deprivation across the country—I come back to the Conservative party, which had a Prime Minister who boasted about the fact that he took money away from deprived areas to give it to affluent Tunbridge Wells. We will not do that. We are trying to recalibrate funding so that we can reduce deprivation and drive improvements across the country.

On the process—just to be clear and put it on record—we have not put a gun to any heads in councils; the Secretary of State has invited councils to put forward their proposals. Areas are now going through a process. The hon. Member for Hamble Valley talked about three proposals in his area; that is because we are making it bottom-up and saying, “Have a conversation about what model works best. We have a set of criteria to ensure that it is fit for purpose. Consult your residents and your stakeholders, and put that proposal to Government.” That is the process that we are undergoing at the moment.

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister says that there is no gun being held to local authority leaders’ heads. Can she therefore outline, in a clear way, what would happen to a county or district authority that said that it did not want local government reorganisation and refused to engage? They would be forced to reorganise, would they not?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

They have been invited. There is a backstop power, but we do not think we will need to use it because the conversation now playing out across local government is that, yes, this is hard, but everyone recognises that the status quo—standing still—is not feasible or sustainable.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister for giving way one more time. She is being very generous, especially as I know that I have spoken for a while. [Interruption.] I am delighted to hear that Government Back Benchers are so delighted with my speaking.

I ask the Minister again, because she has not committed to this in clear language: if a county council leader or a number of district councils refused to engage with the Government’s process on local government reorganisation, they would be forced to reorganise, would they not?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

That is not where we want to be. That is not where we think we will end up. We have invited places and, to the credit of local government, everyone recognises that change is required. What is now happening is that places are making decisions about the best proposal to deliver the outcomes that they want for their constituents. This process has been hard—of course it has—but, throughout it, every single local authority has understood that the status quo will not deliver for their residents. That is the thing that is driving the impetus for change.

I will say a few words on the 500,000 population figure because Opposition Members have mentioned it. That is not a hard and fast number. We have said that it is a benchmark. If we think about other authorities that have gone through the process of local government reorganisation over the past 20 years—the likes of Somerset or Cornwall—500,000 is the sort of number that they have gone for, and we have seen that their reorganisations have delivered improvements in services and in the way that they operate. Places can go below or above that number. Ultimately, it is for places to figure out the best configuration of their locality to deliver for their residents. We have been clear and consistent about that point.

I want to address the specifics on London. We are open to a conversation with any part of the country that wants to talk about reorganisation. London, with its boroughs, obviously has a different configuration locked in legislation. It is distinct from our two-tier areas, which is why we are not focusing on it. But we are very open to a conversation about London, where we tend to have big authorities that are delivering some of these integrated services anyway.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Lady in that we need responsibility, bearing in mind that amendment 51 would give the Secretary of State the power in this case to enforce that flexibility. A problem in the proposed local government reorganisation is that it focuses overly on the role and consent of county authorities, but the voice of district councils has not been listened to in this approach, as I outlined earlier when quoting Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen, who was leader of the District Councils’ Network.

I know what the Minister will say to our amendments, and I respect her position in doing so, but the Conservative party believes that devolution can mean so much to so many if done with the bottom-up approach that the Minister insists is hers. We want some words of encouragement that she may look—although I know she will not—to reduce the restrictions on a single tier for larger geographical areas. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, as it is a probing one. However, I have it on the good authority of my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley and Ilkley that he will table similar amendments on Report. We will listen to the Minister’s response with great enthusiasm.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Let me say three things in response. First, there is already flexibility in the creation of boundaries and geographies for unitaries to ensure that they are fit for purpose and that they work for the communities they need to serve.

We are clear that, on the other side of local government reorganisation, councils must be the right size to deliver the high-quality services that residents deserve and need. Judgment on proposals will be driven by that fundamental question. Splitting up existing unitaries, further fragmenting and disaggregating services, does not feel like it would be in the interests of the residents concerned in delivering better and more efficient services, or value for money for taxpayers and those residents.

Clearly, we must have a reform process that fundamentally delivers those outcomes. There is now a process to do that. We will look at the various proposals and, ultimately, the test is: will the proposal deliver local government that is fit for purpose and deliver for our communities? Voters across the country want that and respect it.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister for what she said. I absolutely knew what she was going to say—that comes as no surprise to us in the Opposition—but this is about what we discussed before. She said that it would not necessarily be to the advantage of local people were we to allow the splitting of unitary authorities, but she is missing the fact that some people want that. I think that the non-uniform approach to local government works. I still believe that this is a community empowerment and devolution Bill. One size fits all across the UK is not the way that the Government should be going. I will withdraw the amendment, but I have no doubt of further amendments of this nature on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Deirdre Costigan.)

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Tenth sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

I rise in support of amendment 5, spoken to by the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon. This is where the Government should have started. The amendment seeks to put place at the very heart of local government reorganisation, which the Government have missed. In coming up with the arbitrary target of half a million people or thereabouts, they have not thought about place and how communities connect with shared identities.

I have spoken in Committee before about Hertfordshire. Hertfordshire has a number of significant towns, all of relatively the same size and population, but there is very little interconnectivity between the towns, particularly on rail and road. Not many people move between those towns, and I fear the consequences of an arbitrary target of around half a million. I appreciate what the Minister has said about the flexibility of that target, but even setting a target of 300,000 people is not looking at what best serves communities; it is sitting in Whitehall, coming up with a figure, and saying, “This is what we want to push top-down throughout the country. This is what we need to do,” rather than saying to places, “We want to reorganise you. Please come up with appropriate examples of how you might best do that within your communities.” That is what the amendment speaks to.

We really need to think about place. If we want these new councils to be successful, they must have buy-in from local communities. Local communities must have a shared sense of identity and a shared sense of vision. We cannot lump places together that have hardly any connectivity—places that people do not travel between—because we would be setting up those councils to fail, and to have competing priorities for the towns they want and do not want to invest in. The amendment is logical, and it is disappointing that the Government did not start off in this place and give more flexibility to the top-down reorganisation they are forcing on large parts of England. If the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon wishes to push the amendment to a vote, the official Opposition shall support it.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairpersonship, Ms Vaz. I have a lot of sympathy for the sentiment behind the amendment, but we are already building in provisions to reflect the issues that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon has raised.

The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 already provides that a direction for local government reorganisation can be issued only if the Secretary of State deems the proposal to be in the interests of effective and convenient local government. Having regard, therefore, to size, geography, public services and local identity is fundamentally embedded in the decision-making process. That is demonstrated by the statutory guidance and criteria shared with areas currently preparing for reorganisation. The hon. Lady is right to highlight those factors that matter for the sense of place, and therefore the boundaries of councils, and we think that the statutory guidance and safeguards fundamentally lock them into the process that we are going into.

On whether this process is top down or bottom up, let us look at it: we have invited places to go through a process of reform, and those places are now having conversations among themselves to come up with proposals. Those are not Government proposals; they are proposals from local areas. We are already allowing conversations to be had about what makes sense for those areas and how we take into account the specifics of identity and other issues in those proposals. Whatever proposal is chosen must be consulted on before it is implemented, which, again, is an opportunity for local people to have a conversation, and to have some say and voice in the process.

Although I appreciate the intent behind the amendment, we have legal provisions and, critically, have set out a process that fundamentally addresses the issues that the hon. Lady has raised. I therefore ask her to withdraw the amendment.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I would like to press the amendment to a vote, because it is important to mandate that the Secretary of State consider these criteria. They will have many proposals from the same area, so these criteria would give guidance on how we can keep the cohesion of communities that hon. Members have discussed before.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Local government reorganisation is already possible through existing legislation and does not require a referendum. In the last 20 years, we have precedents of local government reorganisation, and a referendum has never been part of that. Adding a referendum on to the process is disproportionate and will slow it down. We need to go through this process for all the reasons that we have talked about in the debate.

To be clear, however, before any local government reorganisation proposal is implemented, all affected authorities must be consulted. Residents can submit their views during those consultations, and authorities will engage with their residents through the proposal development process that is going on at the moment.

Furthermore, all implementation orders for new unitary authorities must pass through Parliament’s affirmative resolution procedure. That allows elected Members to have their say on proposals based on the feedback that they are getting from their constituents. All these provisions are proportionate, right and consistent with what we have done in the past. Therefore, this additional measure is disproportionate and unnecessary, and I hope that the hon. Member for Hamble Valley will withdraw the amendment.

[Paul Holmes]

I will respond briefly. The Minister is entitled to say that she does not want to accept the amendment, but I ask her to look not at the logistical and legal arguments of the legislation, but at what is right and what is wrong in the practice of implementing local government reorganisation. As I say, we are all democrats—we are all elected to serve here—so she should not fear asking the people whether they endorse the local government reform that she is currently implementing without the consent of the public or many local authority leaders. We will not press these amendments to a vote, but notwithstanding what I have said before about other amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley and Ilkley, we will table amendments of this nature on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Twenty Fourth schedule to the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider:

Clause 56 stand part.

New clause 24—Impact of local government reorganisation—

“(1) Whenever the Secretary of State has made any order or regulations in pursuance of provision inserted or amended by Schedule 1 of this Act, the Secretary of State must, at the end of a period of two years beginning on the day of the making of the order or regulations, issue a report.

(2) Each report required by subsection (1) must include, but shall not be limited to, details of the following, as far as they arise from any reorganisation resulting from the order or regulations—

(a) the cost of the reorganisation;

(b) the impact on service delivery, including the quality of social care provision and quality of SEND provision;

(c) the impact on development, including the number of homes delivered against local targets;

(d) the performance of individual commissioners;

(e) the sustainability of the finances of the newly created authority;

(f) the extent to which Council Tax has increased and the extent to which any mayoral precept has increased; and

(g) satisfaction of local residents with the standard of services provided by the authority established or changed by the reorganisation.”—(David Simmonds.)

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 55 introduces schedule 24 and I have already spoken in detail about it.

On clause 56, we must avoid a situation in which a predecessor council—one soon to be replaced by a new unitary council—could delay devolution by withholding consent to the establishment of a new strategic authority. Where a new unitary council is keen to progress devolution during the transitional period, the requirement for the predecessor councils to give consent will be disapplied.

The Bill will ensure that consent is given by the new unitaries, which will form the constituent councils of the new strategic authority. Consent should come only from those with a stake in the future strategic authority. This clause ensures access to devolved powers as quickly as possible, where the elected representatives of all shadow unitary authorities are in agreement. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Paul Holmes]

Well, there we have it: the mask has slipped—

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It hasn’t!

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister says it has not, but I will convince her that it has. All morning we on the Opposition side have been talking about the fact that the Government are forcing this to happen without consent. The mask has slipped because this clause disapplies the ability of a currently existing council to refuse consent for the creation of new authorities.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

On a point of clarification, it is consent to the creation of a new strategic authority, so this is the tier above.

[Paul Holmes]

Fine. I thank the Minister for her intervention, but the point I am about to make still applies: the people who currently serve have a stake. The people who send those people to serve have a stake. The way in which this clause is being put forward shows again that the Government are forcing change on a number of organisations and predecessor authorities that currently exist and serve their local people—so the mask has slipped. We have been saying all day that this is a proposal and local government reform that is not in the manifesto and is being forced on local authority leaders who do not want it.

The Minister said last week that she had had lots of enthusiastic conversations about people who want to go forward with devolution. I put it to her again that many local authority members do not, and the only reason they are going forward with it is because she is going to force them to do it anyway. Now that those local authorities might want to refuse to give consent to the creation of strategic authorities—something that should be within their gift anyway—she is disapplying their right to say that they do not want them. The Government are invoking a top-down reorganisation and not listening to the views of local leaders or of the people they are elected to serve.

I say to the Minister once again on this clause: throughout the Bill, she has advocated for it being a bottom-up reorganisation, but this is the sledgehammer of central Government refusing local people the voice that they should have. The mask has slipped and the Minister has just admitted that it is a centrally imposed thing, which many people do not want. The clause should be removed from the legislation, and we will oppose it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It is important to disaggregate two processes, although I appreciate the challenge because we are doing them concurrently: there is a local government reorganisation process and a devolution process. To clarify, I am the Minister for Devolution, so when I refer to the enthusiasm in my conversations with local government leaders, that was on devolution, where it absolutely is felt. It is right for devolution that the authorities that will form the constituent authorities and ultimately have a stake in the future direction of the strategic authority are the driving force behind it.

It would be wrong if one single authority that was about to be shifted in the context of local government reorganisation were able to scupper, delay or veto the creation of that strategic authority when there is consent and support for it. This is completely rational if we allow that there are two processes. This part of the Bill is about the creation of strategic authorities and about who ultimately has the ability to drive them and consent to them. It should be those constituent authorities that will form part of the strategic authority to come.

[Paul Holmes]

Forgive me, Ms Vaz; as the Committee can see, I got rather carried away and I forgot to speak to new clause 24 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. Briefly, the new clause should be included in the legislation, because all in the House believe in transparency. In the process, subsection (1) of the new clause would require an impact assessment of the local government reorganisation to be published. Each report would be required to include things such as the cost of a reorganisation, something that the Minister has advocated will deliver more efficient services and will not be onerous.

A report will allow us to see not only whether that is true post the creation of the authority, but the impact on service delivery and development, as well as the number of homes delivered—we have seen mayors who are not able to deliver the number of homes required of them—and an assessment of the performance of individual commissioners. It would provide a clear link for the people who live in those areas where the reorganisation is to go ahead. We believe that would not be onerous on the new authorities and that new clause 24 would bring the right balance between transparency and accountability, so we ask the Minister to accept it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am sympathetic to new clause 24, but there is no need for the Secretary of State to publish a report after the implementation of every single reorganisation proposal. Ultimately, local authorities are responsible for their own financial performance and the delivery of their local services, and they are accountable to their local electorate. As many currently do, local authorities may report on their performance each year to their electorate. That is the appropriate place for the responsibility to lie.

The Government already have mechanisms to monitor the performance of local authorities and to ensure that our councils are fit, legal and decent. As part of the process of reforming local government, we recently launched our local government outcomes framework, providing outcome-based accountability for councils. I think that there are enough mechanisms, including those that are baked into what councils need to do for their local electorate and our overall performance review and assessment process. In essence, those will deliver the intent of new clause 24.

[Paul Holmes]

I genuinely hate to detain the Committee—I do not just say that out of politeness—but I believe that we should press new clause 24 to a Division, when we come to that point.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 57 and schedule 25 will simplify and bring consistency to local authority governance arrangements. By abolishing the committee system, we will ensure that all councils operate an executive form of governance, providing clearer, more easily understood governance structures at a local level and more efficient decision making.

We will accept the continuation of the 13 legacy directly elected council mayors, while introducing measures to prevent the creation of any new ones. This will ensure a more consistent approach to governance and avoid the potential confusion caused by the establishment of new regional mayors for strategic authorities and mayors for councils. It is at this strategic level that we think the single focal point of leadership for the area and direct electoral accountability and mandate works best, and we believe this provision delivers the right powers in the right places.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Vaz.

I rise to speak against clause 57; I believe it is extreme control freakery and overreach from the Government and in no way essential to this Bill. Why impose a leader and cabinet model on all councils, even against their will, along with all these other changes? The Government can see only the benefits and, like a poorly run council, they ignore the critical risks.

Good governance benefits in many places from a deeply involved voice for principled opposition councillors to vote on policy, check the numbers, put forward good ideas and raise mission-critical questions about issues such as fire safety, service quality or big projects and contracts, even when that is uncomfortable for the administration. Places need the right to choose, democratically, a new model of governance when appropriate—especially when councils face problems and need a fresh start.

Changes of this sort are sometimes made after a crisis or a period of problems; I will talk in the next debate about changes made by referendums. I hear the claims of stagnation and indecision often levelled at committee systems, but I point out that under the current system people who see that happening have the right to change the model and try something else. A new administration can vote to switch to a leader and cabinet for a period, or to a mayor, if it wishes, or the people can make the change themselves by calling a referendum. The Government want to take away all that choice. That is very wrong and this clause is overreaching in the extreme.

Given the exceptions being made for mayors in the mandate for leader and cabinet, it seems that the committee system is the one most under attack from the Government in this Bill, so I want to provide some words and examples from cross-party local councillors about its benefits for their areas. In July 2025, Sheffield city council voted unanimously for a motion defending its democratically chosen model, stating that

“the benefits of the Committee System demonstrated in Sheffield include: greater collaboration across political groups in policy formulation and in decision making; overcoming party political tribalism and focussing on areas of agreement, not antagonism; improving the culture of the Council, with officers and Councillors focusing on what is best for the city; all Councillors being involved in the decision-making of the Council, and greater accountability to the electorate; and improved outcomes for the residents of Sheffield”.

That is a cross-party view.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I understand hon. Members’ sentiments, but 80% of councils currently operate a leader and cabinet model. My view is that that executive model allows for greater accountability and better decision making, and that is why we are proposing these changes.

My hon. Friends the Members for North West Cambridgeshire and for Banbury eloquently set out the experience of that model and said that it leads to quicker, better decision making and efficiency. It is about spending less time in committees and meetings and more time delivering. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about things that make that consensual, collaborative way of governing work, but critically they are more to do with the culture in the council and the quality of the councillors, as my hon. Friends the Members for North West Cambridgeshire and for Banbury pointed out.

We think the model used by the majority of councils is working. Delivering for residents is at the heart of the entire Bill, and we think that that model can lead to much stronger governance and decision making, which will deliver for residents. That is why we are keen for this provision to remain in the Bill.

On the point about consistency, there is always a place for referendums. As the hon. Member for Hamble Valley said, the last Labour Government were a great fan of them and introduced provisions to lock them in, but there was always a balance around proportionality. My issue is not about the logic of having a referendum or not; there is a judgment to be made about what is proportionate, given what we are trying to do and the urgency of the reform agenda. Local government is under pressure, and there is a need to deliver services when resources are really tight. Our constituents rightly demand good-performing public services, and that is what is driving us. We think we have the balance right in the provisions and safeguards in the Bill, which is why I ask the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion to support the clause.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Manuela Perteghella]

I want to support the hon. Lady. The national Government should not force structures of local governance on local councils. We saw written evidence from Councillor Martin Smith, the leader of the Liberal Democrats in Sheffield city council, showing how the committee system has made the governance of the city council more transparent. Abolishing the committee system in Sheffield and Bristol, and in other areas where local people wanted a change from the leader and cabinet system, would go against the will of the people in those areas. For that reason, if the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion were to press amendments 326 and 327 to a vote, I would support them.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for talking us through some of the specifics, particularly in the context of Sheffield. My hon. Friends the Members for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed) and for Sheffield Hallam (Olivia Blake) have been very effective in explaining the specifics of Sheffield to the Government, including the history of how the council got there and how the democratic process has played out. We are very mindful of that, and we will reflect on that and on the question of legacy.

[Kevin McKenna (Sittingbourne and Sheppey) (Lab)]

I would just like to give a counter. We have heard some very interesting evidence, but my own local authority has the misfortune to operate under the committee system, which was largely brought about in a deal that created a rainbow coalition with the Greens and some other local parties. Honestly, it is a dismal failure. Contrary to the evidence that has been presented, it has made the council more siloed, and fewer councillors feel that they can engage well with the council. Frankly, it is the whim of every individual committee chair as to how they operate, often constraining meetings to an extremely short duration. That has reduced the amount of scrutiny and gummed up the business of the council. I would like to present that as evidence from someone who actually lives within a council that has a committee system.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We made this proposal because we fundamentally believe that the cabinet and leader system provides more effective governance. There is a question about legacy and what the transition will look like, and we have heard representations on that from my hon. Friends the Members for Sheffield Central and for Sheffield Hallam. We will reflect on how to get the balance right, because in the end we want stronger, better governance for residents and constituents across the country, and obviously we have to ensure that the transition is done in a way that minimises disruption and has local support. We will reflect carefully on how to get that balance right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 336, in schedule 25, page 253, line 25, at end insert—

“Duty to introduce code of conduct, inductions and ongoing training (England)

4A (1) Every local authority must adopt and enforce a code of conduct for elected members that—

(a) includes provisions addressing harassment, discrimination and online abuse; and

(b) provides for independent investigation of alleged breaches, overseen by the monitoring officer.

(2) Every local authority must provide a structured induction programme for all newly elected members, which must include—

(a) professional standards and responsibilities;

(b) equality and diversity duties; and

(c) family-friendly and inclusive working practices.

(3) It is a duty for local authorities to provide further such training every two years following the election of new members to the authority.

(4) Local authorities must also make provision for continuing professional development for elected members.

4B (1) A monitoring officer’s functions shall include responsibility for—

(a) investigating breaches of the code of conduct in accordance with paragraph 4A of this schedule;

(b) promoting councillor welfare and wellbeing;

(c) ensuring compliance with equalities duties; and

(d) maintaining transparent procedures for the handling of complaints.

(2) Every local authority must publish an annual report on complaints received by the monitoring officer, including—

(a) the number of complaints received, and

(b) outcomes of those complaints.”

This amendment ensures that all local authorities are required to maintain clear and enforceable codes of conduct for councillors, tackling harassment, discrimination and online abuse and mandates induction and continuous training on equalities and conduct. It embeds and extends independent oversight by monitoring officers.

The amendment deals with a separate matter of inclusive practices. It is aimed at improving more diverse access to elected office and arises from work I have been doing with the organisation Elect Her, which aims to motivate, support and equip women in all their diversity to stand for political office in Britain, and to nurture an ecosystem of organisations reshaping the political system so that all women can thrive once elected. Its research found that weak codes of conduct, poor induction for new councillors and lack of financial recognition all deter women from entering and continuing in office. The amendment would help deal with that.

Elect Her’s report on Scotland by demonstrates how inclusion can improve when councils adopt stronger codes of conduct, structured induction and clear reporting mechanisms. The amendment would introduce a duty to have a code of conduct for elected members, which would include provisions against harassment, discrimination and online abuse. It would provide for independent investigation of alleged breaches overseen by the monitoring officer, and a structured induction programme for newly elected members.

Setting the stage for behaviour is crucial, particularly when new councillors are elected, before things start to go wrong. The programme would include important information and training on professional standards, equality and diversity duties, and family-friendly and inclusive working practices. It would also mandate that the training should be refreshed, particularly following the election of new members. Continued professional development is also covered by the amendment. It asks monitoring officers to investigate breaches of the code of conduct and gives them duties to promote councillor welfare and wellbeing, equalities duties and transparent procedures for complaints. It also asks for an annual report on complaints.

The provisions are sensible suggestions that I hope the Government will take up. Although I will not press the amendment to a vote, it speaks to the fact that while we have discussed potential problems with workload that councillors in these new authorities may have, which are also inclusion issues in some cases, the Bill could more directly address some of the issues that we know affect people’s ability to carry on in the job. We have received disturbing evidence from Elect Her on the extent to which councillors report abuse. We know that women and minorities are disproportionately likely to experience abuse, and we have a duty to do what we can in the Bill to make being a local councillor a more inclusive job. My amendment addresses some of the systemic barriers that might stand in the way of local democracy truly representing all of our communities. I hope the Government will look again at the options.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The Government fully understand that greater devolution relies on local authority members embodying the highest standards of conduct, so we absolutely agree with the spirit of the amendment. We have consulted on proposals for comprehensive reform of the standards and conduct framework for local authorities in England. Our response to the consultation will be published shortly and will set out in detail the scale of our ambition for a whole-system reform of the standards and conduct framework.

Our ambitions go significantly further than the amendment in terms of introducing a clearer and consistently applied framework for standards and conduct, and ensuring misconduct is dealt with swiftly and fairly in every type and tier of local government. We will bring forward legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows, so I ask the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion to withdraw the amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

As you would expect, Ms Vaz, I entirely endorse my hon. Friend’s words. I suspect that if we took the motivation of this part of the Bill and told Labour Members that they could not put out any of their “Labour in touch” communications, or whatever they call them, they would be shouting from the barriers that they could not communicate with residents who are digitally challenged or not engaged in digital communications.

It is important that there are varied and diverse ways for our punters, if I can call them that, and our voters to find information and to engage in the process. I do not understand why the Minister is proposing to actively harm our local independent newspaper sector in a Bill that has admirable intentions and will radically change the face of local government, in some cases for the better, but in the majority of cases for the worse when it comes to accountability. We all see that press is becoming much more large scale and a lot less local through TV and media restructuring. I do not understand why the Government would put in such a retrograde step for independent local newspapers.

We support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon. When the Committee comes to new clause 55, we will push it to a vote. I am not sure whether we are voting on the consequential amendments to new clause 55 today, but if we are, we will push those to a vote too.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I agree completely that we need varied forms of communication to engage with our residents and that local media play a vital role. We will continue to do everything we can to protect that part of our ecosystem, because it is fundamental to our democracy.

Let me be clear about what we are doing in the clause: we are shifting the focus from prescribing how information is published to ensuring that the public are effectively informed. The Bill will give councils the flexibility to publish notices of any governance change in whatever manner they consider is most appropriate for the local circumstances, because they know their residents better than we do.

In some respects, it is bizarre that we were ever prescribing exactly what councils should do, so now we are saying it is up to councils. Ultimately, it is in their interest to reach the very residents we care about, because they are their voters and residents too. To be clear: nothing in this provision stops a council from including local print newspapers, which will continue to play an important role. We are simply enabling councillors in the 21st century to think about the range of media that makes sense for the constituents, voters and residents they need to reach.

It is important to put this debate into perspective. As we have said, 80% of councils already have the leader and cabinet model. We are talking about the 20% of councils that do not that would go through some sort of process. This provision is talking just about that small proportion of councils. It is right that we give maximum flexibility to councils to make the right choice about how they communicate.

In the context of a pretty small, practical measure relating to the specifics of the decision to shift away from the committee system, the official Opposition’s proposal on consultation is completely disproportionate and overblown. We absolutely recognise the importance of local media. We recognised the need for an overall review, which is why the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is currently undertaking a review of local media and putting in place a local media strategy—to address the very issues that the hon. Members have raised. We agree that we need to do the job of making sure local media can survive and thrive in the 21st century. I hope that the amendment is not pressed.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call the Minister to open the debate.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

As we have debated amendments to the schedule, we can deal with it formally.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 25 accordingly agreed to.

[The Chair]

I realise that Ms Perteghella wished to speak to new clause 4, which was grouped with schedule 25, which we have agreed to. I will suspend the Committee briefly to determine the correct way to proceed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Manuela Perteghella]

I will address these amendments as two separate groups. Amendments 14 and 15 are simple and, in combination, would ensure that the definition of a “neighbourhood area”, which is important in this clause, is decided by the effective local authority and not by the Secretary of State. In these amendments we are again trying to devolve powers to grassroots governance. For the sake of clarity, we drafted amendments 14 and 15 to grant that neighbourhood areas are defined in accordance with local perspectives, rather than with the view from Westminster.

Amendment 13 complements those changes. Within the locally agreed and defined neighbourhood area, the authority would be required to make appropriate arrangements to secure effective governance. This amendment specifies that those arrangements must not alter any function performed by a town or parish council, or result in the abolition of a town or parish council. As I have explained previously, it is really important to keep town and parish councils. The amendment would give important protections for our smallest and first tier of local governance. The Committee has already debated how town and parish councils perform a crucial role in effective governance and in providing services. They are to adopt many more services as well. We talked about them being consulted, and this amendment is about making sure that they do not get abolished in the definition of a “neighbourhood area” and “neighbourhood governance”.

The Liberal Democrats continue to be surprised by the lack of protection for, or even reference to, town and parish councils in the Bill. This is an excellent opportunity for the Minister to protect those tiers of governance, and put on record her support for hyper-local government, as we consider devolution more broadly.

Amendment 61 has a different purpose. Throughout the Committee debate, hon. Members have spoken about the need for authorities to be able to access support of all kinds, including financial and advisory support, while delivering local planning functions. The amendment is relevant in the light of the Government’s decision earlier this year to remove funding for localism and neighbourhood planning, which was an excellent initiative that put planning and growth plans in the hands of local people. That initiative saw more than 1,000 neighbourhood plans approved at referendum, and was a key way of securing other local involvement in planning proposals and decisions, giving the local community the power to shape their own future in development. Neighbourhood plans were also very much linked to local housing needs, such as locally how much social housing is needed in a village or town, so they were really important.

Removing funding from neighbourhood planning seems to run contrary to this Government’s aims of devolution and community-engaged house building. I urge the Minister to reinstate some form of funding. I would like to hear reassurances from her, especially in relation to the protection of town and parish council governance, which I set out in amendment 13.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The key thing to say in response to this group of amendment is that provisions in the Bill are not about central Government imposing a model of neighbourhood governance without the flexibility or consideration of local places and their requirements; they are about setting a standard for smarter, more responsive decision making for our communities and, critically, ensuring that there are no black spots or gaps across the country, so that every community has the ability to shape, and have a voice, say and power in the decisions that impact their neighbourhoods.

We are not designing the regulations in isolation; we are working closely with local government and the community sector—including the Local Government Association, the National Association of Local Councils and the We’re Right Here campaign—to make sure that the provisions in this part of the Bill reflect how we get effective good community governance.

On amendment 13, throughout the debates in this Committee I have said consistently that we absolutely recognise the important role that town and parish councils play in our democracy and our community life. There is no intention to abolish parish and town councils in the Bill. It is not about duplicating them—in fact, I have consistently said that where we are building neighbourhood governance, we should rightly build on the civic institutions that are there anyway, to ensure that we have both depth and proper coverage across the country. The regulation-making powers in the clause therefore cannot be used to make regulations that amend primary legislation, which protects town and parish councils already, and there is no intent to do that.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I thank the Minister for her reassurance, but would she put what she has said about the protection of town and parish councils in writing to us?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am happy to put that in writing, but I will state again that there is already primary legislation in place that protects town and parish councils and means they cannot be abolished. There is nothing in the clause that undermines that. I will absolutely put that in writing. Again, the intention of the clause is to recognise that town and parish councils exist in some parts of the country, but not others. We want every community across the country to have effective neighbourhood governance structures, so that people can have power, agency and a voice to shape their locality and their direct neighbourhood.

Finally, on amendment 61, again, I agree that we should protect the important functions of neighbourhood planning. That is why my Department has already committed to ensuring that local planning authorities continue to be appropriately funded for their neighbourhood planning functions, including for plan examinations and referendums. Funding for those costs is provided through a claims-based system. We will make an announcement on the claims for this financial year in due course. As I said, there is nothing in the clause that undermines effective neighbourhood planning; it is quite the contrary. We think there is an opportunity, as we strengthen neighbourhood governance structures across the country, for that to enhance and build on the work that has been done through neighbourhood planning. I ask that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon withdraw the amendments.

[Manuela Perteghella]

In the light of the Minister’s assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 264, in clause 58, page 60, line 25, at end insert—

“(e) requiring that local engagement activities under paragraph (d) meet minimum standards to ensure meaningful community participation, including—

(i) the use of deliberative processes such as citizens’ panels, assemblies, or community conversations;

(ii) the active inclusion of communities most likely to be impacted by the policy measures, and communities underrepresented in policy making; and

(iii) reporting, and publication of resulting reports, on how community input has influenced local plans and decisions;

(f) providing existing local democratic bodies, including parish and town councils, with appropriate powers, funding and infrastructure to support and facilitate such participation.”

This amendment requires regulations on neighbourhood governance to set minimum standards for involvement, including deliberative processes, inclusion of underrepresented groups and transparency.

This is a really important amendment. It proposes a minimum standard for meaningful community involvement be added to this part of Bill on neighbourhood governance. It aims to put people at the heart of the new local decision-making structures by setting minimum standards so that community involvement is inclusive, uses deliberative methods and clearly shows how people’s views have shaped decisions. It would also give local councils the powers and funding that they need to make that happen effectively. The problem with the Bill as it stands is that “appropriate arrangements” is left undefined. That risks weak or inconsistent community participation. The amendment would ensure that the arrangements meet minimum standards and would make engagement consistent, inclusive and transparent.

The Bill’s success depends on whether it achieves what the Minister has been assuring us of throughout these proceedings: a shifting of democratic power. It needs to ensure that decisions are made with people rather than consulting them or imposing on them. I am sure we are all aware of the ladder of engagement, where final decisions are simply waved in front of people for consultation. That is the bare minimum and, in many ways, the worst form of engagement with the public. People will often look at a big proposal and respond in great detail, only to then see that nothing has changed. That really undermines trust. We need to make sure that people can see how their voices are shaping outcomes at a local level. This amendment would enable us to rebuild public trust through the Bill.

We need to ensure that we actively facilitate and enable community participation, and it is important that it is properly funded. Doing a consultation is a very separate thing to participation. We do know that people want participation. Demos polling from 2024 found that 63% of the public would very likely accept an invitation to take part in participation exercises of this kind, but 41% said that they would be less likely to take part if they believed that the Government would not listen to what they had to say. I recognise that the Bill presents the opportunity for secondary legislation to fill these gaps, but if the Government cannot support the amendment, it would be helpful for the Minister to put clearly on the record that those regulations would include deliberative processes, real involvement and reporting back on the ways in which decisions are changed, as the amendment would require.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am pleased to see the focus on community engagement in this amendment. However, we already have powers to set standards for local engagement through regulations, and that is what we will do. We are currently working with local government and the community sector to understand what best practice looks like and what is already happening on the ground. My view is that it is right and appropriate that different principal authorities work out the best way to engage their communities, which can be very diverse and will need different approaches.

We are clear that principal authorities can and should already be working to support their communities through meaningful and robust community engagement and coproduction. The very best councils already do that, and we have examples of that across the country. It does not always happen in the way that it does with the very best, so we will work with and support councils to have meaningful community engagement. At the heart of this is giving communities and residents—people in our localities—proper voice, agency and ability to drive decision. We will ensure that we design this in a way that enables and supports that.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate the detail of the answer that the Minister is giving me, but I would like some further reassurance that poorly performing councils will face some sort of redress under the system that she is talking about.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

As I said, for this to work, we need councils to enable it. We will introduce a set of measures including peer-to-peer support—so, where we have great practice, sharing it with other councils—as well as capacity building and training, in order to make sure there is meaningful community engagement, because we believe it is fundamental. If we get this right, it is fundamentally about empowering our communities and residents. Every tier of government, from national Government through to strategic authorities and local authorities, will all have to play their part to ensure we do that well.

[Siân Berry]

I am content with the Minister’s response, so I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 222, in clause 58, page 60, leave out lines 31 and 32 and insert—

“‘local authority’ means—

(a) a county council,

(b) a district council,

(c) a London borough council;”.

This narrows the types of local authority in England that are bound by the requirement to make arrangements to secure effective neighbourhood governance.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The Bill sets out our clear ambition to embed communities at the heart of local decision making. This is about ensuring that decisions are shaped by those who know their communities best. Our ambition is that this will result in visible improvements in every neighbourhood across the country. Neighbourhood governance moves decision making closer to residents. It empowers communities to hold leaders accountable for their decisions and ensures that local priorities are understood and considered in the decision-making process. This will improve public trust in our councils, enhance our local democracy and ensure that our governance arrangements are rooted and working in the interest of our communities.

Turning to amendment 222, the policy intention is that only county councils, district councils and London borough councils will be subject to the duty to make arrangements for effective neighbourhood governance. As currently drafted, the Bill also includes parish and town councils, the Isles of Scilly and the City of London within scope of the provision. That is not the policy intention, and our amendment seeks to rectify it. We do not consider that town and parish councils should be subject to the duty, as it would be disproportionately burdensome.

[Lewis Cocking]

Does the Minister include metropolitans and unitary councils in what she has just said?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Yes. This is purely putting in exemption for parish and town councils, the Isles of Scilly and the City of London corporation. That is because, in the instance of town and parish and councils and the Isles of Scilly, it would be disproportionate and extremely burdensome. Town and parish councils are already doing effective community engagement, and we will continue to support them to do that. At the heart of this is empowering our communities and creating structures that enable effective neighbourhood governance.

Amendment 222 agreed to.

Clause 58, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners: supplementary vote system

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 312, in schedule 26, page 259, line 35, at the beginning insert “For any elections on or after 1 May 2026,”

This amendment would formally guarantee the introduction of the supplementary vote system for any elections taking place in May 2026 for mayors in local authorities.

Amendment 313, in schedule 26, page 261, line 27, at the beginning insert “For any elections on or after 1 May 2026”

This amendment would formally guarantee the introduction of the supplementary vote system for any elections taking place in May 2026 for mayors in combined authorities.

Amendment 314, in schedule 26, page 263, line 6, at the beginning insert “For any elections on or after 1 May 2026,”

This amendment would formally guarantee the introduction of the supplementary vote system for any elections taking place in May 2026 for mayors in combined county authorities.

Schedule 26.

New clause 7—Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners: alternative vote system—

“(1) Within three months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the use of the alternative vote system in elections of mayors and police and crime commissioners.

(2) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This amendment would require the introduction of the Alternative Vote system for elections of mayoral and Police and Crime Commissioner elections within three months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will speak to clause 59 and schedule 26 now, and I will then respond to hon. Members on their amendments.

The Government recognise that the voting system used to elect our representatives sits at the heart of our democracy and is of fundamental importance. Given the large population that each regional mayor and police and crime commissioner represents, far exceeding that of Members of Parliament, the Government believe they should have a broad base of support among the electorate. We believe that a supplementary voting system, a preferential voting system, will achieve that and is appropriate for selecting single-person executive positions such as mayors and police and crime commissioners. The supplementary voting system will help to increase the local electorate’s voice, as voters may choose their first-choice and second-choice candidates, and it will require the winning candidate to receive the majority of votes counted.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister for begrudgingly giving way. She has just outlined that she believes a winning candidate should win a majority of the vote. We entirely agree with her, which is why we support first past the post. Why does she not seem to think that the supplementary vote should also be used to elect MPs, who are single executive politicians but do not necessarily always receive a majority of the vote?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

MPs going to Parliament to work as part of a collective is very different from a single individual who needs democratic accountability to drive decisions. Those are two very different models, which is why we think the single transferable vote makes sense in the context of mayors and police and crime commissioners but the first-past-the-post system that we currently have for MPs is right for collective decision making.

Finally, mayors and police and crime commissioners are currently elected via first past the post, which we think is the wrong approach. We think that shifting to this new system will provide greater consensus for the electorate.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I will speak to new clause 7. I commend the Government for their decision to do away with the first-past-the-post system for mayoral and police and crime commissioner elections. As has been said, the decision to move mayoral elections to first past the post was a complete disaster, and this improvement will ensure better local voter representation. The Mayor of the West of England, for example, was elected with only 25% of the vote. Supplementary voting is a significant improvement, but the Liberal Democrats believe we should introduce the alternative vote system as a further advance on that.

We all want to see genuinely representative local elections to ensure that local people know that every vote counts, and so that the councils they elect are truly representative. Where the supplementary vote system allows people to vote for their first and second choices, the alternative vote system allows for a more comprehensive ranking by each voter. For example, under first past the post, a candidate with no majority backing can still win because of vote splitting. We believe that an alternative vote system will increase engagement and deliver fairer outcomes. Our new clause has the support of the Electoral Reform Society, which strongly recommends that it is incorporated into the legislation. I await the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I would argue that it is up to us as politicians and candidates in the election to advertise the position and generate excitement among the electorate, so that people vote for them. It was still 41%, I think, in the election that the hon. Lady cited; it was below half the total electorate, so this is not a panacea for improving electoral participation.

Also, I know that the hon. Lady was advocating for SV, but the Liberal Democrats have always been vehement in their approach to AV, despite the fact that they lost the national referendum that they managed to get on the AV voting system. [Hon. Members: “You gave it to them.”] We gave it to them because that is coalition, but they lost and we won, so I am quite happy with the outcome. They lost a test on the national system.

AV was used in mayoral elections and PCC elections when these positions were created, and turnouts were demonstrably low and very low in some cases—12% to 18%. They are now massively higher. Okay, they are not high enough, but they are higher now because they have become a constant and well-established institution in our voting system. That is not because of the voting system. It is because the system has been allowed to bed in and people have the choice of whether to elect a PCC or mayor or not. That is one of the bedrocks of our political systems today.

I thought I was triggered on the amendment where I saw the words “citizens’ panels”, but now I am even more triggered; we have a long history of speaking about citizens’ panels and citizens’ assemblies. As I said at the beginning, there is a clear need for local people to have a straightforward system that does what it says on the tin. The Conservative party will always believe that first past the post is the system that does that. Other parties want to gerrymander a system to try to suit their own preferred political outcomes.

The Minister said that directly elected people need to have the widest possible mandate and number of people voting for them. Her Prime Minister secured 32% of the vote in a national election and won a majority of the size that he did. [Interruption.] It is not a reason to support another system at all. I do not think that the Minister can advocate for a different voting system in one case, but then—the Government’s position is confused on voting systems—accept that a 32% vote share got well over 60% of the seats on a turnout, I think, in the high 60s. That is not exactly representative, either. The Government need to have a solid position on all kinds of elections, not just ones that suit their potential candidates.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Let me address amendments 312 to 314 first. I am happy and pleased that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is keen on the supplementary vote system that we want to implement. The challenge to her amendment was summed up by the hon. Member herself in the final part of her speech. We are moving at pace because we want to drive through these reforms. We want to drive through the rewiring of the state and the devolution of power. However, we do not expect the Bill to come into force in time to restore the supplementary vote system for the elections in May 2026, as much as I would love us to.

Once the Bill is enacted, we will need to bring forward secondary legislation to implement the measures updating the conduct rules for these polls. Also, returning officers will need to prepare for polls under the new voting system and we need to ensure that there is sufficient time. Therefore, with all the will in the world, with the full gusto of the Government on what we are trying to do, we do not think we will be able to hit that timetable. But for subsequent elections, the new system should be in place.

On new clause 7 and the alternative vote system, I say two things. First, I again gently remind Liberal Democrat Members that there was a referendum on AV and 67.9% of voters rejected it at the time, so it is not clear that there is a groundswell of desire for that voting system. And critically, from our perspective, it is slower, more expensive to run and more burdensome. Therefore, we think that the system that we are proposing—supplementary votes—is the right and appropriate system and I ask hon. Members to withdraw or not press their amendments.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Many Members will have pubs or community centres in their constituencies that are at risk of loss or closure, despite being the heart of their community and playing a crucial role in local lives. Too many valued community spaces are being lost because communities do not have the powers they need to protect them. That has a massive impact on the vibrancy and identity of local areas. Clause 60 and the associated schedule 27 will put control back into the hands of communities, giving them real power to take ownership of cherished local assets and protect them for future community use.

The clause will strengthen the existing assets of community value scheme in England, which since its introduction in 2012 has seen only 15 in every 1,000 listed assets come into community ownership, and create a new, far more effective and far more powerful, community right to buy. This will give communities a right of first refusal on the purchase of valued community assets. It will give an extended 12-month period to raise funding to purchase the asset, as we recognise that the current six months is not long enough. It will also introduce an independent valuation process to ensure a fair price for everyone.

We know that village shops and bank branches are a lifeline to our communities. The clause will therefore extend the definition of an asset of community value to include those with an economic value and assets of historical importance, so that communities can protect and make use of them.

Finally, the clause will address the historically low uptake of sporting assets under the current regime by establishing a new sporting asset of community value designation. Sports grounds across England will be automatically and indefinitely designated as sporting assets of community value, ensuring that these cherished facilities, vital to our communities, are protected for generations to come.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 60 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 27

Assets of community value

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to move amendment 349, in schedule 27, page 265, leave out lines 1 to 8.

This amendment would remove the provision for assets of community value to be removed from the list of assets of community value after five years.

[Manuela Perteghella]

Amendments 349 to 351 concern the rules around assets of community value. The designation of a building such as a pub, community shop or village hall, or even a piece of land like a community orchard, as an asset of community value allows local people to protect the places that play an important role in their community. They are often linked to wellbeing and social cohesion. The intent behind the original legislation was to give communities a real say on places that matter deeply to them, particularly when they are at risk of being sold or redeveloped.

There is, however, a flaw in the current system. Under existing law, once an asset is listed on the register by a local authority, it automatically drops off the register after five years. This creates a huge burden not only on the local community, including local community groups and parish and town councils—as they have to jump through bureaucratic hoops to resubmit the application to the local authority—but on the local authority itself, as the application has to go through its legal department and be scrutinised once again. In the time it takes for that to happen, a cherished community asset might be sold off.

Like sporting assets of community value, these important buildings and sites must remain on the list of community assets. Amendment 349 would remove the automatic five-year expiry for assets of community value for all buildings and places on that list. It would mean that, once an asset is listed as being of community value, it will stay on the register indefinitely, unless there is a clear reason for it to be removed.

The amendment would shift the burden from communities to maintain protection for something that is still vital to local life. I had an experience in my constituency where one of the village pubs, which had been put on the register of assets of community value, dropped off the list during covid. Obviously, we were all preoccupied with the pandemic, and we only realised later that it was not protected any more.

Amendments 350 and 351 are consequential to amendment 349. In a way, these amendments would also take away the burden on local authorities that have to assess the application once again. This change matters because reapplying is not a simple process; it takes time, organisation and paperwork, and it is handled by volunteers who may have limited capacity and resources. Removing the time limit for all assets of community value would mean that we provide continuity of protection and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy for both communities and local councils. It would also recognise that community value does not just disappear after a few years. A local pub or post office that was vital to a community in 2019 is still vital in 2025.

In our view, these amendments sit entirely within the spirit of the Bill by giving communities more tools to strengthen local decision making, and not limiting them with arbitrary timeframes. I urge the Minister and the Committee to cut the red tape and strengthen local power, and I ask her to consider reviewing the time limit.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for tabling these amendments. We absolutely want to ensure strong protections for assets of community value, and the five-year listing period recognises the need of the community in that period of time. We also recognise that the need and desire of the community may change over time. Something that is an asset of community value in year one might not be an asset of community value in year six or seven. This allows a review process to happen.

We are also trying to balance the protections that we absolutely want to give to communities with those of the asset owners, and to ensure it is proportionate. We think that five years is a fair balance between both parties. I am also mindful of the risk that if we designate assets of community value permanently, local authorities may be incentivised to take tougher judgments on requests from communities to list assets of community value. On balance, when we think about the incentives to create more assets of community value, protections that we need to give to communities and protections for the asset owners, five years feels like the right amount of time to allow the system to operate in a way that is fair for all parties. For that reason, I urge the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw her amendment.

[Manuela Perteghella]

Would the Minister consider looking at extending that five years to give a bit more time to the community to—

--- Later in debate ---

[Manuela Perteghella]

These amendments are interlinked. First, I would like to speak in support of the Bill’s provisions to protect assets of community value under the new sporting category. Those are important, and we are all delighted to see them in the Bill. These are key community hubs, including for our grassroots sports clubs and particularly for our young people. They play a fundamental role in building local pride, building engagement and developing young people’s skills. I thank the Government for these welcome provisions.

In that context, the Bill’s exclusion of environmental assets of community value seems stark. Social, economic and environmental impacts are often grouped together in legislation, and yet although sporting assets have been added to the group of possible categories for an asset of community value, environmental assets have not. The environmental impact is absent. We can only assume that exclusion is a protection against environmental considerations being used as a mechanism to prevent development. Perhaps the Minister can explain that in her response. This seems needlessly reductive, because the positives outweigh the negatives, and the negatives can be mitigated if there is a concern.

There is widespread support for these amendments. We worked on them with Locality and the Community Land Trust Network, in conversation with them I heard about sites all across the country that could be protected. I am sure that Members can think of many examples in their constituencies. Given the value of environmental conservation—the value of nature for its own sake, as well as its benefits for public health and mental health—we ask the Minister to consider including provision for considering environmental impact in assets of community value. It would be of huge value to my constituents to be able to ensure that measures are in place to protect the environmental value of, for example, Meon Vale woods, which they fought to save and which has become a local nature reserve. Depending on the Minister’s response, I will press amendment 34 and consequential amendments 35 to 37 to a vote.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The Government absolutely want to ensure that the community right to buy can be used to protect a wide range of assets. That already includes a wide range of environmental assets where communities can demonstrate an existing historical, social or economic purpose, including allotments, woodlands, parks and other green spaces. We know that many of those can already be found on local lists of assets of community value.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I will speak briefly on new clause 51. It is really encouraging that there is a cross-party effort to reinvigorate community ownership funding, which has lapsed. Although I am excited about the pride in place funding, which is quite extensive and goes into local areas in quite an intensive way, I think the community ownership angle of that is limited to the geographic area covered. Things such as sporting assets or community assets that serve a whole town may not be within that area. I would like to hear from the Minister that, if she will not accept new clause 51, something will be done for other parts of the country to ensure a fund to support community ownership.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will try to work through all the amendments. Let me start with amendment 373. I appreciate the commitment of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to protecting historical assets. The Government are proud to support communities to celebrate heritage buildings and assets, and there are already protections in place for them to do that. Historical buildings that are valued by local communities, but do not meet the criteria to be nationally listed, can be listed by local authorities as non-designated heritage assets. That protects them through the national planning policy framework, so the protection is already there.

On amendment 40, I reassure the Committee that we already have established processes in place to ensure that local authorities are adequately funded to deliver new policies, and this is no exception. The new burdens doctrine requires that all new responsibilities placed on local authorities are properly assessed and fully funded by the relevant Department. We are assessing the cost of the process for local authorities and will provide new burdens funding accordingly.

On amendment 41, I can confirm that we are assessing the costs of independent valuation to local authorities. Where the owner and community buyer cannot agree a purchase price for an asset through negotiation, the local authority must appoint an independent valuer. We will provide new burdens funding to meet those costs accordingly, once assessments have been finalised and tested with local government. I hope that that provides some assurance.

On amendment 374, we know that some community groups may not come forward as they do not have the capability or capacity to put together a bid for an asset. The intention of the 12-month sale period is to give communities time to organise and to raise the funding required. We will continue to work with community organisations to ensure that they have the support to do so. Requiring local authorities to step in to purchase assets where there is no community buyer would put too much of a burden on local authorities, and we could end up with local authorities taking over and having to run theatres and pubs. Although those assets might have value for the community, that does not feel appropriate for a local authority.

We think we have the balance right and that this measure is proportionate. As my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury said eloquently, however much we might want a particular asset to stay in its original form, sometimes that may not be viable. We do not want buildings becoming dilapidated when they could be retained in a different way.

On amendment 42, we are already putting requirements on local authorities to enable and facilitate this process. For example, they must arrange that joint meeting between the asset owner and the community buyer at the start of the process and enable that process of negotiation and, as I have said, local authorities again need to step in to provide the independent valuer if negotiations fail. We think that is the right role for the local authority, not least because it has to be an arbiter in the process.

However, we want there to be enough capability across all our communities, irrespective of the level of social capital, to be able to take on these powers. There is a range of community organisations with the expertise and experience to provide this kind of support to communities, such as Plunkett, Power to Change and Locality, and we are working with those organisations on the additional support that they can provide to communities across the country.

Amendment 249 would restrict what an asset owner can do with their property once listed. We think that it is ultimately up to local planning authorities to consider planning applications in accordance with their development plans and other material considerations. That could include the listing of an asset of community value. The weight afforded to material considerations in making the decision will be decided on a case-by-case basis, and we think it is right that that is left to the local planning authority.

Critically, the national planning policy framework already includes important safeguards to protect against the unnecessary loss of social, recreational and cultural facilities that serve an important value for the community. We think that the balance between what already exists in the planning system and the protections that we are providing through the community right to buy is right and appropriate.

Finally, on new clause 51, let me be clear: this Government are absolutely committed to empowering our communities. We are giving communities everywhere the power to take ownership. Our pride in place programme, which the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about, is providing £5 billion over 10 years to support 244 places, to enable and support them to take on such community assets of value.

We will continue to review this area, because we are committed to communities having a stake in and ownership of their assets, and we are committed to doing our part as a Government to enable them to do that. With that, I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw her many amendments.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I will not press the amendments to a vote, although my hon. Friends might table them again on Report, but I will press new clause 51 to a vote later on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 236, in schedule 27, page 275, leave out lines 23 to 25 and insert—

“(b) the relevant local authority has determined that the preferred community buyer does not meet the progress requirements after any of the review periods (see section 86U), or”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 234, 223 to 233 and 235.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This group of amendments introduces and defines the new 16-week review period for communities seeking to purchase a sporting asset of community value accommodating more than 10,000 spectators. This will permit landowners to request evidence from the preferred community buyer no less than two weeks before the end of the new 16-week review period. The period begins on the date when a notice of intent to enter into a relevant disposal is given. At the end of the 16-week review period, the local authority will decide whether the community has met the progress requirements and will give written notice of its decision to both the owner and the buyer.

While I remain committed to empowering communities to take ownership of larger sports grounds, I also recognise the importance of ensuring that they have the capability and readiness to manage them effectively. That means putting in place processes to safeguard the long-term sustainability of those assets, ensuring that community buyers are well-prepared to take on the responsibilities of permanent ownership for an asset that will be critical to their community.

Amendment 236 agreed to.

Amendments made: 234, in schedule 27, page 281, line 39, leave out “that” and insert “the notice”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 223, in schedule 27, page 281, line 10, at end insert—

“(1A) Where the land that the notice relates to is a sporting asset of community value which can accommodate over 10,000 people, and the owner makes a request in writing, the relevant local authority must—

(a) determine whether at the end of the 16 week review period the preferred community buyer has met the progress requirements, and

(b) as soon as reasonably practicable give written notice of the determination to the owner and the buyer.”

This provides that where requested by the owner a preferred community buyer of a sporting asset of community value which is a large venue must show additional evidence of progress of their proposed purchase at an earlier stage in the process.

Amendment 224, in schedule 27, page 281, line 13, leave out “first” and insert “6 month”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 225, in schedule 27, page 281, line 18, after “subsection” insert “(1A) or”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 226, in schedule 27, page 281, line 19, leave out “first review period” and insert

“review period that it relates to”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 227, in schedule 27, page 281, line 21, leave out “second” and insert “12 month”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 228, in schedule 27, page 281, line 28, leave out

“the first and second review periods”

and insert “each review period”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 229, in schedule 27, page 281, line 34, at end insert—

“‘the 16 week review period’ is the period of 16 weeks beginning with the date on which the notice of a wish to enter into a relevant disposal was given under section 86M(1) (‘the notice date’);”.

Amendment 230, in schedule 27, page 281, line 35, leave out “first” and insert “the 6 month”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 231, in schedule 27, page 281, line 35, leave out “six” and insert “6”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 232, in schedule 27, page 281, line 36, leave out from “with the” to the end of line 37 and insert “notice date”.

Amendment 233, in schedule 27, page 281, line 38, leave out “second” and insert “the 12 month”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Amendment 235, in schedule 27, page 281, at end of line 39 insert—

“‘review period’ means the 16 week review period, the 6 month review period or the 12 month review period.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 223.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Deirdre Costigan.)

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 12—Local authority oversight over management of land of community value—

“(1) A local authority is responsible for overseeing the management of land of community value in their area.

(2) If the relevant local authority identifies deliberate neglect or mismanagement of land of community value by its owner, the authority may—

(a) exercise compulsory purchase powers, or

(b) refuse planning changes in relation to the land.”

This New Clause would require local authorities to oversee the management of land of community value in their area and enable them to exercise compulsory purchase powers in instances of mismanagement.

New clause 20—Right to apply to purchase derelict, mismanaged or inaccessible sporting assets of community value—

“(1) A community interest group or a parish council may apply to a local authority to purchase land to which this section applies.

(2) This section applies to land that is a sporting asset of community value (as defined by section 86C of the Localism Act 2011, as inserted by Schedule 27 to this Act) and meets one or more of the conditions specified in subsection (3).

(3) The conditions are that the land—

(a) has been left derelict for a continuous period of at least 2 years;

(b) is being, or has been, mismanaged in a way that significantly impairs its sporting value or public benefit; or

(c) has been unreasonably made inaccessible to the community, where it was formerly accessible for sporting purposes.

(4) For the purposes of this section land is—

(a) derelict if it is not actively used for its primary sporting purpose, or is in a state of disrepair that renders it unfit for such use, having regard to its previous use and condition;

(b) mismanaged if its condition or use is such that it fails to realise its potential as a sporting asset, due to neglect, poor maintenance, or inappropriate development, contrary to the interests of the local community;

(c) unreasonably made inaccessible if measures have been taken to restrict public access or use for sporting purposes without a compelling public or safety justification, where such access or use was previously permitted or established.

(5) An application under subsection (1) must—

(a) be in writing,

(b) identify the land to be purchased,

(c) include evidence demonstrating that the land meets one or more of the conditions specified in subsection (3),

(d) outline the community interest group’s or parish council’s plans for the future use of the land for sporting purposes, and

(e) be accompanied by such fee (if any) as the local authority may reasonably require.

(6) On receiving an application under subsection (1), the local authority must—

(a) notify the owner of the land of the application within 14 days, and

(b) consider the application.

(7) The local authority may not reject an application under subsection (1) if it is reasonably satisfied that—

(a) the land is a sporting asset of community value and meets one or more of the conditions specified in subsection (3),

(b) the applicant is a community interest group (as defined by section 86D(2)(b)(ii) of the Localism Act 2011, as inserted by Schedule 27 to this Act) or a parish council, and

(c) the applicant’s plans for the future use of the land are viable and will in the opinion of the local authority further the social or economic well-being or social or economic interests of the local community.

(8) If the local authority decides to approve an application, it must—

(a) notify the applicant and the owner of the land of its decision, and

(b) facilitate negotiations for the sale of the land to the applicant at a price to be agreed or, failing agreement, at market value determined by an independent valuation.

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision for, or in connection with, applications under this section, including (in particular) provision about—

(a) the form and content of applications,

(b) the evidence required to demonstrate the conditions specified in subsection (3),

(c) the procedure for considering applications,

(d) appeals against decisions of local authorities, and

(e) the process for determining the purchase price and facilitating the sale.

(10) In this section, ‘local authority’ has the meaning given by section 86Z4(1) of the Localism Act 2011, as inserted by Schedule 27 to this Act.”

This new clause creates a right for local residents and organisations to apply to a local authority to purchase sporting assets of community value that are derelict, mismanaged, or unreasonably made inaccessible.

New clause 52—Assets of negative community value—

“In the Localism Act 2011, after section 92 insert—

“92A Assets of negative community value

(1) A building or other land in a local authority’s area is of negative community value if, in the opinion of the authority, the asset—

(a) has been the subject of a measurable and sustained increase in anti-social behaviour in the locality,

(b) has caused material disruption or harm to the amenity, cohesion, or wellbeing of the local community, or

(c) has been vacant or derelict for a continuous period of not less than three years, and during that period no meaningful attempt has been made by the owner of the asset to restore it to use.

(2) A local authority may maintain and publish a list of assets of negative community value in its area.

(3) Where a local authority has listed an asset of negative community value, the authority may—

(a) take such steps as may be prescribed by regulations to secure temporary management or community stewardship of the asset;

(b) invite community groups, charities, or other qualifying organisations to bring forward proposals for its use or stewardship;

(c) exercise such enforcement or compulsory acquisition powers as may be made available by regulations made pursuant to subsection (5).

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations—

(a) make provision as to the procedure for listing an asset of negative community value;

(b) confer rights of appeal on owners or occupiers of listed assets;

(c) provide for safeguards to ensure proportionality and fairness in the designation and management of such assets;

(d) make further provision for the disposal, management, or transfer of listed assets to qualifying community groups.

(5) For the purposes of this paragraph ‘community group’ has the same meaning as in section 86D of this Act (as inserted by schedule 19 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025).”

This new clause would create a parallel category to “assets of community value” by enabling local authorities to designate “assets of negative community value” (ANCVs). Designation would trigger a framework for temporary community stewardship or pathways to transfer into community use. Further provision would be made via secondary legislation.

New clause 59—Local authority acquisition of dormant assets—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument enable a local authority to carry out functions relating to compulsory acquisition of land under section 226A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (inserted by Schedule 15 of this Act) where the local authority is satisfied that any land of community value to be purchased within the authority area is dormant.

(2) Land of community value is considered dormant if—

(a) the land has been included in the authority’s list of assets of community value under section 86A for five years continuously,

(b) a notice of relevant disposal under section 86M was issued at least once during the five year period under sub-paragraph (a),

(c) there has been a preferred community buyer whose offer was rejected despite the buyer offering the value price determined under section 86T or an agreed price with the owner by the end of the negotiation period (see section86S(4)), and

(d) the owner has not entered into a relevant disposal of the land with anyone other buyer during the permitted sale period under section 86M(6).

(3) Regulations made under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.”

This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to authorise a local authority to engage the compulsory acquisition function under Schedule 15 of this Act if the land is considered dormant.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

When I spoke last week on why clause 60 should stand part of the Bill, I covered the provisions in the schedule, but I will restate my position. The schedule strengthens the existing assets of community value scheme in England and will give communities real power to take ownership of cherished local assets. Together with clause 60, the schedule is vital to delivering the Bill’s community empowerment goals and protecting assets at the heart of our local communities.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir John. My hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley set out the view of the official Opposition during the debate last week, so I will not relitigate that in its entirety, although I am sure he will be keen for me to emphasise the sheer cross-party commitment on assets of community value.

We know about the risk to assets that are at the heart of a community, from a village pub or cricket field through to community centres and business premises. We need a means laid out in the law whereby the value they add to the local community can be retained where necessary. That was enshrined in legislation by our party when we were in government, and in general we support the direction of the current Government in taking up those principles. We will listen carefully to the debate.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I will speak to new clauses 12, 20, 52 and 59. New clause 12 stands in my name, new clause 20 in that of my hon. Friend the Member for Frome and East Somerset (Anna Sabine), new clause 52 in that of my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney) and new clause 59 in that of my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson).

New clause 12 would give local councils a legal duty to oversee how land listed as a community asset is managed. That means that if the owner neglects or mismanages land of community value, the council can take powers to purchase compulsorily, take ownership and restore the land to community use, or to block planning changes that would further damage or undermine the land’s community value. Such powers are essential to protect local assets from being run down deliberately to justify redevelopment. By granting councils those powers, we enable them to hold absentee or speculative owners accountable and ensure that designated community assets are properly maintained and used for community benefit. We all have in our constituencies examples of land that has been mismanaged or assets left derelict. With the new clause, councils would become a genuine safeguard for assets of community value far beyond simply listing the assets. They would have real power to hold landowners and speculative developers to account.

New clause 20 would give community groups and parish or town councils a legal right to apply to buy sports facilities such as playing fields, leisure centres, gyms or pitches that have been derelict for two or more years, managed in a way that harms their sporting value, or unreasonably made inaccessible to the public. If the council agrees that those criteria have been fulfilled, it will be able to facilitate negotiations for a sale. As we spoke about in a previous debate, the abolition of district councils means that town and parish councils will be asked to take on more assets. It is therefore important that the safeguards are in place and that the unitary councils support them.

New clause 20 would save local sports facilities that have been locked up or left to decay by private owners by empowering local communities to bring them back into use. I had an example of that in my constituency a few years ago. A sports pavilion was built as part of the conditions for a new settlement, but it was locked—it was not used. When I became the councillor for the area, I asked why it was not open, and was told that the condition was to build a sports pavilion, not to manage it. The community managed to get the sports pavilion opened, and it is now a fantastic community hub and café, but it took a lot of campaigning from the community and parish councils, lots of grant applications and so on. It is important that we give councils all the tools they need. It is not fair that local sporting heritage and public access to sports facilities are lost due to neglect, speculation or profit-driven redevelopment. The new clause would put power back into the hands of communities to reclaim their pitches, courts, clubs and sports pavilions, and to keep sport where it belongs—in public hands and for the public good.

New clause 52 would create a new category complementary to assets of community value: assets of negative community value. Those would be properties or land that encourage, for example, antisocial behaviour, cause harm or disruption to community wellbeing, or have been vacant and derelict for at least three years with no attempt at restoration. I am sure we all have such assets in our constituencies. I can think of a couple in mine. Once the assets are listed, local authorities could take steps to secure temporary management or community stewardship. That would also contribute to wider community wellbeing. The councils could invite community groups to propose new uses or use compulsory purchase orders to bring the assets back into productive community use. New clause 52 would also allow local authorities to tackle eyesore or nuisance buildings that attract crime or vandalism. It is a way to contribute to the sense of place. We could speed up regeneration by giving councils and communities tools to deal with long-term neglect.

New clause 59 would give local councils greater power to protect and manage land that has been officially recognised as being of community value, such as local parks, playing fields, pubs or community halls. If a council found that such land was being mismanaged, it would have the power to compulsorily purchase it or, again, to refuse planning changes. The new clause would strengthen community protections against speculative neglect and misuse of valued local assets. For example, it would stop landowners from deliberately running down community buildings, green spaces or sports facilities so that they can later argue for redevelopment. The new clause would make councils stewards of community assets, rather than just record keepers of a list. It would give real teeth to the community right to buy, which obviously is welcome, and to the assets of community value system, which is set out in the Bill.

Overall, our new clauses would expand community rights and local authority powers from just protecting community assets by listing them to actively reclaiming and repurposing land that has been neglected or misused. We feel that the new clauses are drafted in the spirit of the community empowerment aspect of the Bill. They aim to strengthen local control and community ownership, especially where private ownership fails the public interest.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I completely agree with the importance of protecting community assets from unscrupulous owners, but it is not clear that new clause 12 is wholly necessary or appropriate, and I am worried that it would place an unreasonable burden on local authorities by requiring them to monitor the management of all assets of community value in their area.

The substantive provision of the new clause gives local authorities the power to intervene and take on assets of community value, but those intervention powers already exist where land has been neglected or mismanaged. For example, under section 215 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, local authorities can take steps to clear up land and buildings whose condition adversely affects the amenity of the area, and we are refreshing the guidance to ensure that local authorities can make full use of those existing powers. For that reason, I do not think that new clause 12 is necessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon not to press it to a vote.

Regarding new clause 20, it is really important to make it clear that the purpose of this policy is not to compel landowners to sell their property without first disclosing an intent to sell under proposed new section 86M of the Localism Act 2011. There are already well-established legal mechanisms for the acquisition of land without the consent of the landowner—I refer again to the existing compulsory purchase order powers. Local authorities can use those powers on behalf of community groups or parish councils to acquire sporting assets of community value that are derelict, mismanaged or inaccessible.

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

The Minister talks about existing compulsory purchase rights for local authorities, but that is very different from communities wishing to list assets of community value and then coming together to go through the process of purchasing them. If the Minister wants to say, “Well, this isn’t needed because we already have that,” why is the Bill even bothering with assets of community value or giving communities the right to buy? This provision is designed to put the power in the hands of the community. We know that most of the district councils will not exist anymore, and the strategic authorities will not be interested in a little block of garages or piece of land. That is why the new clause is about the assets being in the hands of the community.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I completely agree that the community right to buy is about putting power into communities, but the new clauses would require local authorities to enable and facilitate. My point is that, in the instances where we need a local authority to step in, support and enable, there are existing powers to do that. We want communities to have the right of first refusal, and that is why we are including this provision. We want them to be able to designate vital local assets as being of community value, and combined with existing CPO powers, our view is that this provides the right set of provisions to ensure that the system works, and that it works in the interests of communities.

[David Simmonds]

I sympathise with the Minister’s argument, but does she agree that there is a general weakness in the Bill in that the opportunity has not been taken to tidy up the legislation, particularly the role of parish councils and parish meetings in this context? The point has been well made that it is often through those vehicles that we see districts and others going through reorganisation already looking to enshrine the community value of these assets. It is a missed opportunity if we leave it hanging so that the convoluted but robust powers that the Minister outlined, which can take years to put into effect, remain the only available route, when there is an opportunity for an alternative structure to deal with that now.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I take the hon. Member’s point. I also take the point that a process of asset transfer between authorities and town and parish councils is happening. Our judgment is that the provisions we are putting in place sit well alongside that and will enable the processes to happen, but we will keep that under review, because the end goal is to ensure that communities are able to say, “This asset really matters to us, and we want it for the use of the community,” and that we enable them to do that. As we do with any legislation, we will keep this under review ,and if it is not biting in the way that we intend, we will consider how to build and strengthen the provisions. None the less, the intent is very clear.

On new clause 52, I commend and share the ambition of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to combat antisocial behaviour and eliminate vacant and derelict properties. We all have them in our constituencies; we know how much they are hated and the blight they cast on our communities. We are absolutely committed to creating thriving places and to reversing the decline seen in many of our communities. That is why, through our £5 billion pride in place programme, we are enabling communities to play a role in driving forward. Alongside that funding, we have ensured that local authorities have access to a suite of tools to meet the challenge, which we understand and we know is real. That includes powers to auction the lease of persistently vacant high street properties via our high street rental auctions and compulsory purchase powers, which we have discussed. Section 215 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 sets out powers to clean up land and buildings that may be affecting the amenity of the area and encouraging poor behaviour. The community right to buy will play an important role in ensuring that assets are used in a way that is appropriate and adds value to the community.

Finally, through the Crime and Policing Bill, the Government are strengthening the powers available to the police and other agencies to tackle antisocial behaviour. Every police force now has a dedicated antisocial behaviour officer to work with communities to develop an action plan and give residents a say. We recognise the problem that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon has highlighted through new clause 52, and we have put in place a suite of things that will fundamentally get to the heart of that problem, which we know all our communities despair of and hate. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

[Manuela Perteghella]

We will not press new clauses 12, 52 and 59 to a vote, although we may reintroduce them on Report, but we will push new clause 20 to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

As you know, new clauses are debated now but decided later, so you will have the chance to test the opinion of the Committee at a later stage in our consideration.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 27, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

Clause 61

Establishment of Local Audit Office

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 237, in clause 61, page 62, line 20, at end insert—

“(8) Subsection (9) applies to any sum received by the Office by way of penalty under—

(a) paragraph 2A of Schedule 1B (penalties against external registration body), or

(b) arrangements made for the purposes of paragraph 10 of Schedule 1C (penalties against registered local audit provider),

including any interest.

(9) The Office—

(a) must pay the sum to the Secretary of State, but

(b) may deduct any costs incurred by it in connection with the imposition or enforcement of the penalty, so far as those costs are not otherwise recoverable.”

This amendment makes provision about the destination of penalties enabled by Amendments 238 and 240.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 238 to 240 and 242.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

These amendments contain provisions relating to criminal offences and enforcement among audit providers, lead partners and external registration bodies. It is vital that the local audit system has the right levers to deter and sanction improper behaviour and to establish beyond dispute the Local Audit Office as the regulatory authority for this system. This is about maintaining stability rather than effecting change. The amendments maintain the existing criminal offences relating to misleading statements and wrongful holding out, and set out oversight powers over professional accountancy bodies similar to existing powers. We will also retain the principle that a professional accountancy body, where recognised as an external registration body, will be responsible by default for enforcement. An external registration body will be required to investigate and impose a sanction for serious breaches committed by audit providers and lead partners.

The LAO will supervise any enforcement activity conducted by an external registration body. This could include setting guidelines on indicative sanctions, depending on the type of breaches, and monitoring live cases. The LAO will have the power to reclaim responsibility for any particular enforcement decision if it is considered to be in the public interest. This will ensure that the LAO is the final authority on all quality matters. An improvement-led approach will be central to the LAO’s regulatory work, and we expect that any enforcement action will be considered only as a last resort. However, it is vital that these levers exist to ensure that the local audit system is accountable and responsive, rather than broken, as was expressed very powerfully in our oral evidence session.

[David Simmonds]

Again, the Opposition are broadly sympathetic to the Government’s direction of travel, but I will put a couple of questions to the Minister. I previously raised the issue that, in respect of local audit, there are a number of accredited accounting bodies to which professionals may belong. I have not seen a response, but I know that at the time there was some discussion about the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy being the identifying body. I seek an assurance that the Government have given due consideration to what will happen where that qualified individual of an appropriate status belongs to another professional body that sets accounting standards, rather than CIPFA, not least because accounting is often as much an art as a science, and there are differences of opinion as to how different accounting provisions might be made.

Secondly, I would be grateful if the Minister can give some clarity to the Committee. Government amendment 237 requires that, when a penalty is imposed, the Local Audit Office must pay the sum of that penalty to the Secretary of State. Clearly, where there has been a failing in local audit, it is the specific local authority, or the general group of local authorities, that is the victim; they are the ones who have suffered a demerit or deficit as a consequence. It seems a little illogical that the penalty would be paid to the Secretary of State rather than those who have been directly affected by that failing. It would be helpful if the Minister set out how the Government will ensure that, where those failings have had an impact, and where penalties have been gathered to make some degree of remedy, it is the victims that see the benefit, rather than it essentially sitting in a Government office.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for his questions. He raised the question of CIPFA, and I committed to clarifying that in writing. I believe we have done so, but I will make sure that we come back to confirm that. On his very good point about ensuring that the penalties are not gobbled up by the central state, we are moving towards a more centralised system, whereby the LAO reports to the Secretary of State, who is then accountable to Parliament. That is the mechanism through which this will happen. However, the principle is right: if fines are imposed, they will be used to bolster the system, which we know needs huge repairs. We know that over time, as we reform the system, we will need to ensure that we are investing in it. Whatever the collection processes for these fines, it is right and fair that they ultimately go towards bolstering the system and ensuring that it is improving.

[The Chair]

The Minister has been very courteous in saying that she will make the letter available to all members of the Committee. Will it include the guidelines she mentions? Shall we discuss that offline, rather than testing her on it now?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

indicated assent.

[The Chair]

I know that the Minister mentioned guidelines that will be published, and I just wondered whether they will be available during the course of our consideration, but let us think about that at the end of today’s sitting.

Question put and agreed to.

Amendment 237 agreed to.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 28.

Government new clause 9—Review of audit and reporting arrangements at Secretary of State’s request.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The local audit system is broken. There is consensus about that across the House and within this Committee. It is fragmented and has significant capacity and capability challenges. The problems in local government reporting and the backlog of unaudited accounts have led to the disclaimed opinion on the whole of Government accounts for the past two years. This provides no assurance to Parliament, and puts public accountability and trust in the system at risk.

The Government are leading the most transformative programme of audit reform in over a decade. Clause 61 will enable the Local Audit Office, a new statutory and independent body, to be established by autumn 2026. The LAO will have an oversight, regulatory and appointing role in the local audit sector. It will cover a wide range of public sector bodies responsible for delivering essential services and managing public funds, as well as oversight of aspects of the NHS audit system.

The LAO will be instrumental in overhauling the local audit system and will play a crucial role in ensuring that reforms are effectively implemented to provide better value for taxpayers and support economic growth. The LAO will be vital to rebuilding transparency, accountability and public trust in local government, and will restore a crucial part of the early warning system for local authorities.

Schedule 28 sets out the core elements of the LAO’s constitution and governance to enable this new organisation to be established. Part 1 establishes the requirements for the board, as proper constitution of the LAO is critical to establishing its authority, ensuring operational readiness and enabling it to deliver its objectives. Part 1 also covers other provisions that are integral to the successful set-up and operating function of the LAO.

Part 2 of the schedule allows the Secretary of State to put schemes in place to legally and properly transfer employees who are currently performing functions that the LAO will be responsible for after it is established.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

Good morning, Sir John. I am asking for a genuine point of clarification from the Minister. The Library briefing says:

“If an MP were appointed”

to one of these boards,

“they would be disqualified from membership of the House of Commons”.

Why have the Government chosen to do that? There is no motivation behind my question; this is just for clarification.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

That is a very niche question. I will have to write back to the hon. Member to clarify.

[Paul Holmes]

I do not expect the Minister to know the answer this morning, but if she could write to me before the end of our sittings this week, I would be grateful. The reason I ask the question is that these are local audit offices for local authorities. The Secretary of State is appointing these boards, and there is obviously political oversight of those appointments, but it would seem sensible to have the expertise of someone representing the area. If this is a devolution Bill, appointing MPs would seem to be perfectly fine, so I am not sure why the Government are disqualifying them. If she could come back to me on that point, I would be most grateful.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am happy to write to clarify that key point.

Everything that we are doing through these new clauses and this reform package is in order to ensure that we have a system that is fit for purpose, fair and operates so that we can build trust and accountability within public bodies at the local level. Committee members will appreciate the importance of providing certainty to the people who have worked to maintain the local audit over the years, which is why we are putting in place these two provisions.

New clause 9 will provide the Secretary of State with a new power to require the LAO to conduct a review of local bodies’ financial reporting and audit arrangements. The LAO will have the power, through contract management and quality oversight, to monitor timeliness in the sector, and will have levers to hold firm account where audits are late. Those statutory reviews will address the accountability gap by providing a way to understand whether individual local bodies have adequately supported the audit process. We believe that those reviews are vital to restoring public accountability, providing assurance at each stage of the audit process and rebuilding our early warning system. They are an integral part of a much bigger reform that we think is both necessary and long overdue. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[David Simmonds]

Will the Minister set out the role of the section 151 officer in relation to the Local Audit Office? Primary accountability around local government finance is in the council tax fixing process. By law, it has to be balanced in-year. The audit process sits behind that, verifying that the information presented, on which that decision has been lawfully made, is true and accurate. The section 151 officer holds that legal duty in each local authority. Can she set out how the accountability that she has described, which revolves around the role of that individual, will be dealt with by the law, particularly given the role that the Secretary of State is taking on in the appointments process?

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are trying to ensure that there is a coherent system operating across all of local government. That is the core role that the LAO will play. The system is fragmented at the moment. There are multiple bodies, whether that is the NAO or other bodies, that are in some respects duplicating functions. The consistency and clarity that we need across our local public bodies is therefore not there.

The local government accounting system will remain as it is. Through guidance, but also through practice and working with the new LAO, we will try to ensure far better alignment between the functions held by local authorities, whether that is the accounting officer role or the audit committees, and the infrastructure that we are trying to provide at a national level. We do not think that the new clause will duplicate or undermine that system; it remains a core pillar.

However, we hope that the new clause will ensure that we have a national framework that works across the piece, that we are contracting auditors of the highest standards and that local authorities can use the insights from those audits to make sure that they are managing their public accounts effectively. We think it is complementary and supports our existing institutions. At the moment, it feels like the national infrastructure is undermining the efforts at the local authority level.

[The Chair]

With the courtesy that she has shown throughout the Committee, the Minister has agreed to write a further note to clarify some of those points. I am grateful for that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 61, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 28 agreed to.

Clause 62

Local audit providers: registration and public provision

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Let me first clarify that no decision has yet been made on who will deliver public provision. It is important to state that. The Bill is drafted deliberately to allow flexibility, whether through the Local Audit Office itself, through a company that it establishes or in collaboration with the private sector. That said, I fully agree that if the Local Audit Office does act as the audit provider, it must be subject to robust and independent scrutiny to maintain trust and confidence across the sector. That principle is wholly right, and I think everyone would agree with it.

Clause 66 already requires the Local Audit Office to appoint an independent entity to scrutinise its audit work. We do not consider that amending the language from “independently” to “wholly independent” would change that position, although I recognise that it is a small change and I understand the intent behind it.

The expectation that the appointed body must possess appropriate expertise is inherent in the function itself and a statutory requirement for expertise would be unnecessarily prescriptive—it is in the practice, the guidance and the strength of the infrastructure and the institution that we are creating.

The LAO will remain accountable with the Department, and there will be robust mechanisms to ensure transparency and competence. That is a big priority for us as a Department, given the state of the system that we inherited. The Secretary of State will continue to use all the available levers to ensure we have a system and an LAO that is independent when it needs to be and of the highest standard and competence. I hope the hon. Member agrees that there are sufficient safeguards in place and will withdraw the amendment.

[Vikki Slade]

I believe the public would expect it to be very clear that someone was not “acting independently”, but were in fact independent, so I will push the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 29.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 62 will establish a new framework for the regulation of local auditors, which will be overseen by the Local Audit Office. Independent reviews have been consistently clear that local audit regulation is too fragmented and lacks central co-ordination. The system is failing and, at the same time, audit quality requirements designed for corporate audits have driven up work on areas of accounts of little relevance to users. That contributes to delays and increases costs.

The clause enables the LAO to hold a register and regulate the sector directly, or to designate and supervise an external registration body to oversee the registration, quality monitoring and conduct of audit providers. Designation of an external registration body would reduce potential conflicts of interest for inspectors and monitoring. The LAO would retain overall authority for the audit quality and act as the final arbiter where enforcement action is required. We expect the LAO to continue the current model under which a professional accountancy body is recognised to register and oversee audit firms, although it will not be bound to do so. The framework will facilitate high-quality, timely audits and restore the confidence of local bodies and users.

Schedule 29 sets out the detail of the new framework for the registration, oversight and quality of local audits. It replaces the existing statutory framework, which aligned local audit regulation with corporate audit regulation, and had rigid statutory safeguards and regulatory functions delivered by a range of bodies. That reflected a move to the private market provision of the local audit, with the expectation that local bodies would individually appoint their own auditors. By contrast, the LAO will restore central oversight and public accountability to the local audit system, with mandatory and independent auditor appointments to all local authorities, as well as some other local bodies. The schedule streamlines and simplifies the regulatory framework. I commend the clause and the schedule to the Committee.

[David Simmonds]

I will briefly return to the question of accounting standards and how they will operate. As the Minister set out, the aim is to streamline and, broadly, to restore the Audit Commission district auditor-type system we have seen in the past, which itself had a number of issues. Clearly, when local authority councillors make their decision on fixing council tax—when local authority finance officers put that information together—they will always be mindful of the accounting standards that apply.

One of the issues is that there are a lot of different ways of approaching that. Some may use cash accounting and some will use accruals; some will use Sage and some will use Oracle. All of those have different characteristics in managing the system, and different auditors may have different views about which they prefer. Many of us will have experience of where a difference of opinion between auditors on the treatment of a transaction can have a significant impact, including by directly impacting the level of council tax that needs to be set.

I have not been able to locate a response from the Minister on the different types of accounting. Can she set out how the system will ensure sufficient flexibility to recognise legitimate professional differences between different types of accountants, authorities, businesses and systems? None of them is inherently wrong or incorrect; they just reflect different approaches to managing the finances of that local authority. Flexibility for local decision making should remain at the heart of what is supposed to be a devolution Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I apologise to the hon. Member for the lack of response—I will make sure we get one to him swiftly. Inevitably, different accounting standards will be used. We will set out guidance, and we will of course look to retain flexibility within that, so that local authorities can ensure that they are using the appropriate standards. We do, however, need a far more centralised and streamlined process, whereby the appointment of auditors is done through a central function—the LAO. Across the piece, there will be uniform and consistent standards that apply both to local authorities and public bodies. That is currently sorely missing, but within the system, there will be different accounting standards and professional body accreditation that individual auditors will apply to. For us, the key is consistency and clarity across the piece on the standards and norms that all professional accountancy bodies are using.

[David Simmonds]

The key challenge is that, unlike any other public body, local authorities are democratically elected. They are subject to an annual process of budget fixing, where they are legally obliged to balance that budget in year. That rule does not apply to any Government Department, or NHS bodies and so on, all of which have a conversation with central Government about how overspends, capital expenditure, borrowing and so on are dealt with, in a completely different way from local authorities. Could the Minister address that, and ensure that the Committee is fully aware of how those provisions will be considered?

Local authority finance is not the most exciting subject—[Interruption.] I hear murmurs of agreement—but ensuring investment for housing, children’s social care, adult social care, education and local transport depends on us getting this right. Rather than create a system that sets local authorities up to fail, we need to have that debate and put that right straightaway. Taking into account fully the specific, unique legal and financial impositions on local authorities in this audit arrangement is critical, so that decisions can be made locally in good faith and with the relevant level of local democratic accountability.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman’s original question. The accountability of the finance director, the sets of standards already locked in and the legislation they have to consider to ensure good use of public funds completely apply to this. It is their responsibility to ensure that the council’s decisions are right, that it is financially viable and that it is delivering the services required. The changes we are putting in place do not cut across that or undermine it. It remains a fundamental plank of this.

We are, however, changing the oversight. First, we are enabling an independent auditor to come in and do the function of auditing, as that is currently not happening. Secondly, it will be done with auditors who adhere to a standard code of norms consistent across the public sector. That ensures that we are raising standards across the piece. If a council gets an audit, it will know it is an audit of good quality that will drive and deliver the change that we want.

Thirdly, we already have the best value regime, where central Government can intervene when local authorities are not performing, or there are financial considerations at play. That will still apply. This takes the best of the current system but deals with the existing gap, which is that we do not have a uniform, consistent auditing regime that ensures an independent review of what individual councils are doing. The new system will also ensure that when problems are found, there is a mechanism for escalating, so that councils will be financially viable and delivering effective services. We all want to achieve that but, sadly, the audit regime is not delivering it at the moment. It beggars belief, but it is where we are now. These additional provisions will strengthen the entire infrastructure, add to the responsibilities of our finance directors as accounting officers, and deliver local authorities that are more financially secure and able to deliver the services their users require.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 29

Local audit: registration bodies, registered providers and qualifications

Amendments made: 238, in schedule 29, page 297, line 17, at end insert—

“Financial penalties

2A (1) If the Local Audit Office considers that an external registration body has failed to comply with a requirement under—

(a) this Act, or

(b) an agreement under section 6B(5),

the Office may impose a financial penalty on the body.

(2) A financial penalty is imposed by giving the body a written notice requiring the body to pay the Office a financial penalty of a sum specified in the notice.

(3) Such a notice must—

(a) explain the Office’s reasons for imposing the penalty, and

(b) specify the time by which, and manner in which, the penalty must be paid.

(4) An external registration body must, as soon as practicable after the end of a financial year, notify the Office of its total income in that year from fees charged under section 6A(5).

(5) The amount of a penalty imposed on a body under this paragraph may not exceed 30% of the sum last notified by the body under sub-paragraph (4).

Directions and penalties: procedure etc

2B (1) Before giving a direction under paragraph 2 or imposing a penalty under paragraph 2A, the Local Audit Office must—

(a) give the body a notice of intent, and

(b) consider any representations made by the body in response to (and in accordance with) that notice.

(2) A notice of intent is a notice that—

(a) states the Office’s intention to give the direction or impose the penalty,

(b) sets out the intended terms of the direction or of the notice imposing the penalty,

(c) explains the Office’s reasons for intending to give the direction or impose the penalty, and

(d) specifies the time by which, and manner in which, representations may be made.

(3) Where the Office has given a direction under paragraph 2 or imposed a penalty under paragraph 2A, the Office may by written notice given to that body—

(a) cancel the direction or penalty, or

(b) vary the direction, or the notice imposing the penalty, it in any way that does not make it more onerous.

(4) The Office must publish—

(a) a direction under paragraph 2,

(b) a notice imposing a penalty under paragraph 2A, and

(c) any notice cancelling or varying such a direction or notice.

(5) But it must do so only after the direction or penalty can no longer be cancelled or varied on appeal (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time).

(6) If a penalty imposed under paragraph 2A is not paid in time—

(a) the penalty (or the unpaid part of it) carries interest at the rate for the time being specified in section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838;

(b) the Office may recover the penalty (or the unpaid part of it), with the interest, as a debt.

Directions and penalties: appeals

2C (1) An external registration body may appeal to the High Court against a direction given to it under paragraph 2 or a penalty imposed on it under paragraph 2A.

(2) The grounds on which an appeal may be brought are—

(a) that the failure of compliance on the grounds of which the direction was given or the penalty was imposed did not occur, or

(b) that any of the following is unreasonable—

(i) the decision to give the direction or impose the penalty;

(ii) any of the terms of the direction;

(iii) the amount of the penalty, or the time or manner of its payment.

(3) If satisfied that any of those grounds is made out, the court must allow the appeal and do whichever of the following it considers appropriate—

(a) cancel the direction or penalty, or

(b) vary the direction or the notice imposing the penalty.

(4) Otherwise, the court must dismiss the appeal.

(5) The court may—

(a) make an interim order suspending the effect of a direction or penalty appealed against under this paragraph;

(b) if it allows an appeal under this paragraph against a penalty, make any order as to interest that it considers appropriate (including an order varying the effect of paragraph 4(6)(a)).

Compliance orders by the court

2D (1) This paragraph applies if the High Court is satisfied, on an application by the Local Audit Office, that an external registration body has failed to comply with a requirement under—

(a) this Act, or

(b) an agreement under section 6B(5).

(2) The court may order the body to take steps that the court considers will secure that the requirement in question is complied with.

(3) Such a step—

(a) must be one that the body has the power to take;

(b) may consist of not doing something.

(4) This court may not make an order under this paragraph in respect of the requirement to comply with a direction under paragraph 2 unless it is satisfied that the failure of compliance on the ground of which the direction was given did in fact occur.”

This amendment empowers the Local Audit Office to take enforcement action against an external registration body if it fails to comply with its duties.

Amendment 239, in schedule 29, page 301, line 28, at end insert—

“(c) arrangements for the imposition of sanctions in respect of breaches that are established, and

(d) registration rules and lead partner rules designed to secure that providers and lead partners are bound by any sanctions.”

This amendment and Amendment 240 require the body maintaining the register of local audit providers to put in place a system of sanctions, including financial penalties, against registered providers and their lead partners.

Amendment 240, in schedule 29, page 301, line 30, at end insert—

“(3) The available sanctions must include financial penalties.

(4) The arrangements and rules must allow for appeals to be made to a person who will determine the appeal independently of the maker of the decision appealed against.

(5) The arrangements and rules must allow for the Local Audit Office to be able—

(a) to determine that a particular case raises or appears to raise important issues affecting the public interest, and

(b) to assume enforcement responsibility in a case in which it has made such a determination.

(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (5), the Office assumes enforcement responsibility if it assumes responsibility for the final decision (subject to any appeal) as to—

(a) whether the requirement or rule in question has been breached, and

(b) if so, the sanction to be imposed.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 239.

Schedule 29, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 63

New appointment arrangements for non-NHS audits

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 63 is central to our reform agenda. It will give the new Local Audit Office responsibility for appointing auditors for all local authorities, as well as some other local bodies, such as police and fire bodies. Currently, such bodies can choose to opt into an appointment scheme overseen by Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd or appoint their own auditor. In practice, more than 99% of bodies are opted into PSAA’s scheme, demonstrating the sector-wide support for a centralised appointment regime.

Centralised appointments significantly reduce burdens on individual authorities. The LAO’s position at the heart of the audit system will make it uniquely qualified to ensure that audits provide value for money, support market sustainability and effectively manage audit contracts. The clause will also establish a proportionate framework in which the LAO will make appointments, including requirements regarding when and how appointments are made. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[David Simmonds]

A number of these other local bodies are subject, in the Treasury’s eyes and legally, to different accounting rules. In particular, Government Departments have revenue and capital departmental expenditure limits, and the Treasury is happy to shift money between those annually: capital may be allocated to cover revenue shortfalls and so on. That is something that a local authority cannot do. Will the Minister set out how the appointment process will ensure a high degree of transparency, particularly at the local level, so that people can see the difference between bodies that are subject to the local authority regime of in-year balancing and the other local bodies that are subject to a separate regime, and why the levels of assurance and the nature of decision making may be different? I would be grateful for clarity and assurance on those points from the Minister.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I confess that I am not 100% clear about what the hon. Gentleman is getting at. I might partly answer his question by saying that the majority of public bodies—99%—are going through the Public Sector Audit Appointments regime anyway, because they see value in it. What we are now doing is taking that function, aligning it with the oversight of the entire regime and putting it in the Local Audit Office. That will make it streamlined and more effective. We are not fundamentally changing the decisions that individual local bodies are making.

If there was a big clamour for diversity in the market, that would be a different thing, but at the moment we hear from local public bodies that they want a centralised system. That makes their life much easier; it means there is a standard procurement process, which reduces the burden on them. It means that they get an auditor that is accredited and approved to be of a certain standard, and therefore they can be confident in that auditor. The system should make it easier for all our public bodies. At the moment, all our conversations suggest that they hugely support the direction of travel and have no concerns about it. Perhaps I have not understood the hon. Gentleman’s question. We are taking something that is happening by default anyway and making it better and standard, in a way that will work for all those public bodies.

[David Simmonds]

I am reassured to a degree by what the Minister says. I was personally involved in the setting up of the PSAA, although I do not have any direct interests in it. The market has clearly moved in that direction. My concern with bringing all these things into a central accountability stream that sits with the Secretary of State is that the legal and financial environments in which these bodies operate are quite different. If an NHS trust or a police organisation has overspent, it can ask the Secretary of State to reallocate capital for building, for example, a new police station to cover the revenue shortfall, but the local authority cannot do that.

The risk is that, if there appears to be a consistent standard, the judgments produced in respect of authorities that are operating within one legal and financial framework will be very different from those produced in respect of bodies operating within another. Given the Bill’s envisaged reorganisation of local government and the centralisation that the Minister has referred to, we need to retain a level of local clarity about what differences arise as a result of local decision making, so that council tax payers can see them, versus things that result from interactions with central Government via the Secretary of State.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Decision making at the local authority level will remain. Accountability to the constituents in the local authority will remain. We are not fundamentally changing that regime, and hopefully we are making it better by, for example, moving to multi-year budgets for local authorities and consolidating budgets, so that there is far more flexibility for them to manage the challenges that we know they have to manage.

That is complementary to what we are trying to do by creating a national audit system that is coherent, of a high standard and works, which is not what we have now. These arrangements will not undermine the decision-making ability of local authorities. They will mean that a proper accountability system is in place, so that we are better able to validate when authorities are either failing or in financial distress and put in place the measures that I have talked about, such as the best value regime, to get them out of distress.

Once again, the clause is not an attempt to run counter to the accountability system that local authorities must have for their people. It is an attempt to strengthen that accountability system, so that local people have an independent basis to verify what the local authority is doing. I think that Members across the piece will support that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Audit providers to nominate lead partner

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause will change the current requirement whereby local audits may be signed off only by a key audit partner—a senior auditor who meets specific eligibility criteria determined through statutory guidance. The current requirement for local audit sign-off is both rigid and unique to local audits. No other audit category places such a specific condition on the eligibility of senior auditors. That has restricted the pipeline of senior auditors to the sector and places a significant barrier to market entry. It can be difficult for a firm wishing to enter the market to recruit or develop individuals who can satisfy the specific criteria.

Under the clause, the requirement for key audit partners to sign off local audits will end. Instead, local audit officers will work with an external registration body to establish suitable competence requirements. The measure will empower the sector to draw on the best possible range of talent, while continuing to ensure that senior auditors are competent and understand the distinctive element of the local audit. I commend the

[David Simmonds]

The section 151 officer is the person in the local authority who has whistleblower protection; they have a legal obligation to ensure that the local authority has the information that it needs when setting its budgets, and that the information is true and correct. However, disputes about the treatment of financial decision making are also common, where a section 151 officer may have a lesser degree of comfort about a risk arising from a decision.

We talked earlier about assets of community value, and there are many MPs in this room who will have campaigned for their local authority and undertaken responsibility or an intervention to preserve an asset or local amenity. That leads to a debate about whether that is a good use of taxpayers’ money. The elected folk may be of the view that it is, but a section 151 officer may say that it does not stack up in financial terms. There needs to be a process for resolving that dispute, and that will revolve around the professional standards that the Minister has just set out. It would be helpful if she could set out what process of assurance there will be following a decision, so that we can all be clear that there is an adequate pipeline of people, as she has described, to undertake those roles, and that we do not suck out all of the expertise of section 151 officers, who are the only people who can undertake them. What consultation has the Minister undertaken with accounting bodies, such as the Association of Consulting Actuaries, CIPFA and all the others, so that they can ensure that the necessary degree of influence has been exerted to ensure that the training standards and process that will emerge from this will be sufficiently robust?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We recognise that we have a challenge in bringing in sufficient audit capacity of the standard we need. That is the status quo. We are working closely with the sector to ensure that we are generating a pipeline and that there is training provision. We are working with the Local Government Association to ensure that that happens.

To be completely candid, we are in a mess. I will not play party politics by mentioning where that mess came from, but the status quo is dire. The regime is failing, and we do not have sufficient audit capacity of the quality that we want. That is why we are putting these reforms in place. I reassure the Committee that we completely understand the challenge we face. We want to keep high-quality finance directors in local authorities. We understand the risk that there might be bleed into the much bigger audit infrastructure and regime that we are creating, but the job now is to reach into the private and public sectors to train up a cadre of auditors so that the system is fit for purpose. At the moment, the system is under strain and collapsing. There is urgency, certainly on the part of the Government—that is why we are bringing forward these reforms—to address the problem.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 64 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Code of audit practice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This clause will transfer responsibility for the code of audit practice from the Comptroller and Auditor General at the National Audit Office to the Local Audit Office. The clause also unequivocally sets out that, as the standard-setter for local audit, the LAO will be able to modify auditing standards to reflect the needs of local public bodies—a point that the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner was making.

The LAO will review the interpretation and/or application of international standards on auditing, including where the requirements of specific standards should be interpreted for the local audit context. Currently, auditing standards are interpreted for corporate and local audit by the Financial Reporting Council. In the current system, it has not been possible to vary the interpretation of standards to better reflect the risk profile of local bodies.

It is vital that the LAO has the powers to interpret some standards differently for local audit. Otherwise, extensive work will continue to be required on areas of accounts that have little relevance to account users, contributing to timeliness and capacity issues as well as undermining value for money. Through its ownership of the code of audit practice, the LAO will be empowered to define appropriate audit requirements for different categories of body in the principal audit regime. This is central to delivering our commitment to a risk-based and proportionate approach to local audit that is focused on the needs of local bodies and account users. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[David Simmonds]

Will the Minister briefly set out some examples of things that are being undertaken but she feels are not adding value? We are all sympathetic, but it would be helpful to the Committee’s decision making if we understood what we are going to stop doing as a result of the decision we are being asked to take.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It is not wild or out there to say that the new auditing body we are creating should have full flexibility to ensure that the standards being applied are appropriate. The feedback we are getting from local government and public bodies is that the status quo is not fit for purpose, that it is onerous, and that its requirements do not align with their needs or, critically, the needs of the user. Is the hon. Member suggesting that the current system is fit for purpose? Is he suggesting that we retain it or that it does not require reform? If he is, he should stand up and say so.

[David Simmonds]

The Minister is perhaps being a little mischievous in responding politically to what was essentially a technical question. We all recognise that there are challenges. Broadly, the audit system suffers not from a lack of regulation but from a lack of capacity. Measures such as Public Sector Audit Appointments were designed to address that, but they have not been sufficient, despite being implemented in consultation with the sector. We therefore agree that an alternative approach is required.

The Minister has been clear to the Committee that she feels that many of the requirements imposed by the current system are unnecessary. She has returned a number of times to the point about there being things that do not add value and are onerous. It would be helpful if she set out what those things are so that our colleagues in local authorities can understand what will be removed from the requirements upon them and the Committee can understand what risks, if any, that poses to the public.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I dare not do the job of the Local Audit Office, or indeed trained auditors, and go into detail. This provision creates powers for the LAO to design a system that works for local bodies. As I said, the feedback that we have had from local authorities and public bodies is that the current system is onerous. It will depend on whether we are looking at a fire and rescue service or a local authority service, but it is absolutely right that we confer the powers on the LAO to look at the system and say, “We will change and adapt the standard so that it is fit for purpose.” I do not think that is controversial; I do not think it requires me to talk about it in great detail. We will issue guidance for the LAO and it will set the standards and what is appropriate. It is right that we give it the powers to do that in the Bill.

[David Simmonds]

The treatment of the dedicated schools grant, which has a huge impact on local authority budgets, is an example of an issue that comes up regularly on the Floor of the House. It is CIPFA’s view that, because it sits within a legal ringfence that has to be balanced each year, it is a budget killer for local authorities. However, ownership of that sits with a different Government Department that takes a different view about how it should be addressed. To me, that is a good example of something that is onerous and requires a lot of work, but in practice, the Government have collectively decided that they are going to deal with it in a different way and effectively ignore the rules that they imposed on local authorities to make it go away.

The Minister keeps returning to the point that she feels that there are elements of the system that are onerous and burdens that should be alleviated. It would be helpful if she briefly set out a couple of examples for the Committee so that we can understand what she thinks we should no longer look at so that we and our council taxpayers can at least understand the risk and reward associated with it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

If the hon. Member wants examples, one example—I am sure that we can give others based on the conversations that we have had with local government—is that pensions do not drive local government decision making and financial resilience, so the audit reviews focus on operational assets that may not be necessary, depending on the local body that we are talking about. There are clearly examples within the system.

I come back to the fact that we are not prescribing this; we are saying it is right that a new body that will have oversight of a regime that we all agree needs to be reformed should be able to make sure that those standards are commensurate with what is required by the local authority and public bodies as well as the user. That is not controversial; that is common sense. It is right that we create the provisions for that new body to do that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66

Audit committees

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 66, page 70, after line 28 insert—

“(4A) A Local Audit Office may make arrangements about—

(a) the membership of an audit committee;

(b) the appointment of the members; and

(c) the conduct and practices of the committee.”

This amendment removes the role of the Secretary of State in appointing audit committees and provides LAOs with the ability to oversee the membership and work of audit committees.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I am sympathetic to the issue behind these amendments, although I am not convinced that this is the mechanism to address it. I will briefly explain why, and where this sits in the context of the previous debate. The Minister gave the example of the pensions audit as something that we could alleviate, but my personal experience would suggest that is a very poor example, and amendments 18 and 17 connect to it.

If we think back to the last big financial crash when the last Labour Government were in office, the local government pension scheme, which is currently overfunded, saw a huge fall in the value of its assets to the extent that it was then 30% underfunded. Local authorities across the country, which have a legal obligation to make up any such shortfall, were then faced with this question: to what extent will we have to make financial cuts to public services to bridge that gap at short notice so that, if the pension fund is falling short, council tax will bail it out? That is not something about which we could say, “You don’t really need to know about it, and you can safely ignore it.” It is something that, if it goes wrong, could be critical to the finances of that local authority.

When these amendments talk about local arrangements, I think they are seeking to enable flexibility in a local authority, for example, whose pension fund profile may be slightly different from its neighbours or outwith the norm, because it has a younger or older workforce than is typical, or because it has entered outsourcing arrangements. That flexibility would allow the local authority to have people on its audit committee who have the relevant experience to ensure that the audits and information reflect that, and that the decision making properly reflects those risks and does not unduly impact on council tax payers. Does the Minister have a good view or a strong reason as to why that element of local expertise should be disregarded, given the extremely significant financial risks associated with the example that she gave the Committee of something that she envisages the Government will stop requiring councils to do?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Let me deal directly with amendments 18 and 17. I reiterate to the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon what I have consistently said: the governance regime of local government finance is not changed by the measures in the Bill. It will still stand, including the decisions that accounting officers and the finance director need to take, and the accountability to the local community still holds. We are shoring up the system of assurance so that it is fit for purpose, and to ensure that there is independent scrutiny that then feeds back into what the local authority does. That is how the system should be operating, but it is not currently, which is why we are driving through these reforms.

On the amendments, I recognise the important role that the Local Audit Office will play in overseeing the local audit system. Amendments 18 and 17, however, would delegate important policy and legislative functions from Ministers—who are directly accountable to the House, which is the way we believe it ought to be—to an independent body.

Given the central role that audit committees play in local financial governance, it is essential that responsibility for their statutory framework remains with the Secretary of State, who is responsible for the overall integrity and effectiveness of the local government system. My Department will continue to work closely with the Local Audit Office and key stakeholders in the sector to ensure that audit committee requirements are effective, proportionate and well-functioning. We think, however, that parliamentarians would want the Secretary of State to be ultimately accountable, so that Parliament can hold them to account. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.

On amendment 362, I fully support the hon. Member’s view that audit committee members must demonstrate the necessary skill, understanding and competence that we are asking of them. The committees are integral to robust local governance, playing a critical role in ensuring that public resources are used efficiently, transparently and in the public interest. Clause 66, however, already provides for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance in relation to audit committees. It is our intention that the guidance will include a requirement for members to undertake appropriate training.

Alongside that, we will continue to work with the LGA and CIPFA to ensure that training programmes support existing and new audit committee members. There is a job to be done to make sure that we have a pipeline of members, that they are fit for purpose and that we have the right training and capacity building in place. I hope that that assures the hon. Member that we are doing everything we can to ensure that training is fit for purpose, as we need audit committee members of a high quality and standard, and that we will continue to work with the relevant bodies to ensure that that is a reality.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 362, in clause 66, page 70, line 31, at end insert—

“(c) the training of members newly appointed to an audit committee.”—(Manuela Perteghella.)

This amendment would require the provision of training for all new members of an audit committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 66 introduces a statutory requirement for all local authorities, excluding NHS bodies, to establish an audit committee with at least one independent member. Members will be aware that audit committees are the cornerstone of good governance and financial management in local government. They provide independent oversight of financial controls, risk management and internal audits, reinforcing transparency and accountability in the use of public funds.

Although many councils have already adopted audit committees as best practice, and combined authorities are required by statute to do so, it is time to standardise this requirement across the board. Consistency in governance structures is essential to ensuring that all local bodies are held to the same high standards of scrutiny and accountability.

In addition, the clause mandates that at least one member of the audit committee must be independent. Independent members bring impartiality, technical expertise and continuity, ensuring that scrutiny is robust and well informed. Where elected members may lack specialist knowledge in audit or finance, independent members can provide the professional insight needed to effectively challenge financial reports.

Mandating audit committees is a key pillar of our local audit reform programme. It is about getting the basics right. Good governance and financial management start at the heart of local authorities. The clause is a practical, proportionate and necessary measure to strengthen local accountability and ensure that every authority is equipped to manage public money responsibly, and I commend it to the Committee.

[David Simmonds]

I have a brief question for the Minister. One challenge is that most local authorities will have an arrangement, although it is not always called the audit committee; sometimes it is the finance scrutiny committee or the overview committee—there are lots of different arrangements. Could the Minister set out briefly what specific requirements, if any, she intends to impose on local authorities about who can be a member of an audit committee and what its composition is? Will it sit within the overall political balance structure that exists in all local authorities? I ask that just so that we understand where it will fit within the new arrangements.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We will issue guidance when the Bill gains Royal Assent. The broad principle, which is applied across the piece with all our reforms, is that where there is good practice, we look to build on that. However, we will set out principles that we want to see standardised across the piece, to ensure that we have mechanisms that are fit for purpose and effective. To take the example of the independent member, we think that having that expertise massively helps, whatever function it is. However, where there are existing arrangements in place, our intent is to transition those to something that adheres to a set of principles that we will set out in guidance.

[The Chair]

I call Vikki Slade to speak to new clause 45.

[David Simmonds]

The only element where I have any disagreement with the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole is over whether the legislation needs to be implemented for local public accounts committees to happen. There have been a number of measures in this regard, and I think of the Localism Act 2011, where there was a great deal of debate about the role of the local armchair auditor and the requirement for local authorities to publish all expenditure over £500—itemised—so that people can see what is being spent day to day, as a means of bringing about transparency.

In this debate about audit committees, we have already covered the fact that there are different local arrangements. Some have everything dealt with by a single, financially focused scrutiny and overview committee, while others do it as part of a wider context or in the context of individual service areas. So there are different approaches, and it is important that that local discretion continues to exist.

I am not convinced that it is necessary to have further legislation, but it is right that we bring the matter to public attention. One weakness of the Westminster-focused Public Accounts Committee is that it does not always grasp local nuance. Home-to-school transport in rural Lincolnshire or North Yorkshire is a completely different challenge from that in Greater London, where all local authorities are, effectively, levied so that public transport in the capital is free for children going to school. Such things are difficult to capture. When we hear that North Yorkshire spends £51 million over a couple of years taking kids to school, that sounds like an extraordinarily high level of expenditure, but it is driven entirely by local circumstances; it is not the result of inefficiency or negligence on the part of decision makers. The point is well made that we have to have that really clear grasp in decision making that comes from people understanding and knowing their local place.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole for tabling new clause 45, and I have a lot of sympathy with what it tries to do. She rightly quoted the English devolution White Paper, in which we committed to explore local public accounts committee models. We consulted on the initial proposal for such a model in December last year, as part of our local audit reform strategy. The Government’s response on 9 April confirmed that they would explore how any model could draw on audit findings and interact with the Local Audit Office, once established. It is important to consider how that would fit with the reformed local audit landscape.

Mayoral strategic authorities are already expected to follow the principles and processes described in the English devolution accountability framework and scrutiny protocol. That includes the requirement to have overview and scrutiny committees and an audit committee. We absolutely recognise that there is scope for further strengthening the system of accountability and scrutiny for mayoral strategic authorities, and we are carrying out engagement with the sector on what that looks like. Although I accept the principle of new clause 45, the Government intend to do further work to ensure that whatever new regime or additional arrangements to strengthen the status quo we put in place, they work well alongside not only the huge reforms we are driving through in the audit system but what already exists on the ground, to ensure that we are not duplicating or creating confusion.

We need a little time to work that through and to think about the right set of reforms to put in place. However, the principle that we absolutely need to strengthen the status quo is one we completely accept and recognise the need for. I ask the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole to allow us the time to do the work properly, so that we can come up with a system that works alongside the reforms we are driving through. I therefore ask her not to press the new clause.

[Vikki Slade]

My resistance is because I wonder how long it is likely to be before the different stages of the Bill go through. What assurance do we have that the new clause does not disappear, in the same way as other things have disappeared on the journey so far? That puts me in a difficult position, because this issue is hugely important. Allowing the Government time and then seeing the new clause disappear would not give us the chance to have anything on the record. It is because enough organisations feel that they want to have it on the record that we have pushed it. I know that the Minister wants me not to push the new clause, but I need to for the benefit of all those organisations that have worked so hard on it and that want to see it go as far as it possibly can.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 67 paves the way for greater flexibility in how audit regimes are determined, moving away from a one-size-fits-all approach that relies solely on the size of a local authority. We recognise that local authorities vary not just in scale, but in complexity, risk profile and the services they deliver for local people. This proactive measure will enable the Local Audit Office, working closely with my Department and the sector, to design and implement audit frameworks that are proportionate, targeted and fit for purpose. Although any changes to the classification of local bodies within the category 2 regime would require secondary legislation, the clause removes any ambiguity about the future basis for audit regimes. It makes it clear that size alone should not determine audit requirements; risk and complexity should also be considered. That flexibility will lay the foundations to reduce unnecessary burdens on smaller or lower-risk councils, while maintaining robust oversight where it is most needed.

On clause 68, fixing the broken local audit system for authorities is the intention behind all the measures we are debating in this part of the Bill. However, the Bill also provides an important opportunity to address specific challenges within the smaller authorities audit system. In recent years, Salisbury city council and Lindsey Marsh drainage board have surpassed the outdated financial threshold for smaller authorities—a limit that remained unchanged for more than a decade, despite significant growth in local budgets and financial activity. Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd has been unable to secure auditors for those bodies under the principal regime, leaving them without external assurance, and contributing to the wider audit backlog.

The principal regime demands significantly more complex financial reporting, which smaller authorities may not be well equipped to deliver. There is currently no transitional support for those moving into the regime, despite limited internal capacity and capability. Overall, those circumstances mean that auditors from the principal regime are reluctant to be appointed to those bodies, particularly given the wider capacity problems.

Clause 68 lays the groundwork for regulations that will allow those two bodies to be retrospectively treated as smaller authorities, enabling them to receive a limited assurance review. That is a more proportionate and practical solution than leaving them unaudited in the principal regime. It will help ensure that public resources are used more efficiently, both within local authorities and across the audit system, while maintaining robust yet appropriate external scrutiny.

[David Simmonds]

Broadly, the Opposition agree with the Government’s direction of travel, and this seems a logical thing to do. This kind of update is periodically required. However, it would be helpful if the Minister could set out, for the benefit of transparency in Committee, what the assurance process will be around risk. To reflect on where things have gone wrong, West Somerset district council—then the smallest local authority in England—was essentially not financially viable, but it was also the planning authority for the Hinkley Point nuclear power station, so it was absolutely critical that it could do its job for the needs of national infrastructure. Its budget was essentially broken by the loss of a business rates appeal in respect of Hinkley Point, which cost its £6.5 million out of its already very small budget.

Sometimes there are risks that sit beneath what will be classified as smaller authorities, especially given our earlier debate about how reorganisation is seeing asset transfers between districts and parish and town councils as a result of the need to manage opportunities and challenges. Could the Minister therefore set out who will be accountable? Will Ministers sign this off? What is the role of the delegated legislation Committee in making these decisions? What will be the role of the Local Audit Office in deciding how risks are managed? We need to be confident that what may appear to be a low-risk environment does not produce a very nasty surprise.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It will be the Local Audit Office, working closely with my Department, but we will obviously engage with the sector while doing that. As the hon. Member will understand, there is always a judgment call in this, and it is about balancing a set of factors. Our job is to ensure that the Local Audit Office has the capabilities and skills to be able to make that judgment, working with our respective authorities. Ultimately, if we get it wrong, it is for Parliament to haul up the Secretary of State and hold them to account.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Amendment paving way for separation of LGPS accounts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner was dissatisfied by my pensions example. In part, I hope the clause speaks to some of the challenges that we are trying to get at.

Clause 69 is the first step in separating pension fund accounts from the accounts of the administering authorities. It removes the implied requirement in the current legislation for the accounts to be published together. We can then make regulations to introduce the change in practice. Decoupling the accounts is widely supported by auditors and local authorities and was recommended by the Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee in the last Parliament. The clause implements that recommendation. It is a relatively straightforward change that will deliver real practical benefits. Pension fund audits will no longer be held up by audit delays on administering authority accounts, allowing timely assurance to be provided to scheme members and admitted bodies.

Many other organisations rely on pension fund audits to confirm pension figures in their own accounts, and their audits have been disrupted and delayed by problems around administering authorities that rarely relate to the pension fund. As well causing problems for local bodies, the issue has caused problems in completing the audits of the whole of Government accounts and at least two Government Departments. Decoupling will shorten and simplify administering authorities’ accounts. It is more logical to publish pension fund accounts separately, as those funds are ringfenced for the benefit of scheme members and not available to the administering authority for other purposes.

[David Simmonds]

In many ways, the clause reinforces the concerns that I set out earlier. The Minister said that this was an area where no value was being added and that it was the Government’s intention to reduce expectations. In fact, the clause increases expectations: it requires the publication of a separate opinion on the pension fund’s accounts. As I set out earlier, the concern we all recognise is that, where there is a shortfall, the local authority is required to make up that shortfall and, where there is potentially a surplus, it may choose to reduce the pension contributions that it makes on a regular basis, as is already the case. We have seen examples across the private sector in the past when that has been significant in both negative and sometimes positive ways.

The assumptions made about the pension fund are critical to the setting of the council tax, which is a statutory process. This is not the only set of relevant accounts that must meet that same test. Local authorities have limited but varying degrees of control over the parking revenue account, housing revenue account and dedicated schools grant, but all are ringfenced for specific purposes and all can create significant financial liabilities that fall on the council tax payer in the event that something emerges within them that had not previously been considered.

Although I understand that the Minister thinks that separating out the requirement makes life easier for some parts of the Government, it can none the less create significant issues in the council tax fixing process. Will she set out the Government’s thinking about how those risks will be managed? In particular, how will the legal requirement to set an in-year balanced budget be met, and how does imposing a requirement for an additional and separate opinion, with a separate timetable, represent a reduction of the burden on the local authority?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We are having the same debate over and over again. Ultimately—I have said this before and I will say it again—it will be for the accounting officer and the finance director to make the judgment about their accounts in year and over a multi-year period. We are not changing that. Given that pensions are administered by a single body, it is bizarre that the system at the moment involves individual local authorities having to audit their pension funds.

[David Simmonds]

I invite the Minister to reflect that she may have inadvertently misled the Committee. Each local authority has a statutory duty in respect of its own pension fund. There are some pooling arrangements and common standards, but if a local authority in one place has chosen to invest in something that has gone down, it will have a shortfall that will not be replicated in the neighbouring authority that has invested in something else. It is not the case that there is one single scheme. Each of the individual schemes will have an impact on the local authority that employs those members; they are not part of some amorphous national scheme.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

No, they are not, but the auditing requirement at the moment is burdensome, as local authorities and, under the previous Government, the Select Committee have said. I think the hon. Gentleman is just asking a probing question, which is fine, but no one is telling us that this measure is a bad idea. No one is telling us that decoupling is not helpful. It will mean that local government auditing does not hold back pension fund auditing and vice versa. Everyone agrees that this is a simple provision.

[David Simmonds]

rose—

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will not give way; I am going to have to close down this debate. Critically, none of this detracts from the core function of the finance director, nor does it detract from the core function of local authority governance or local authority financial accountability. Everyone agrees that it will make the system stronger, so I struggle to understand the hon. Gentleman’s issue with it. No one says that the status quo is fit for purpose, and he himself has conceded that it is not. We are taking the existing system and providing stronger assurance and stronger audit to fix a system that is fundamentally broken, and I come back to the fact that it was broken under the Conservatives’ watch.

[The Chair]

The Minister has been very generous in taking interventions, and I have allowed them to be quite lengthy, if I can put it that way. She has made her position clear.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 241.

Schedule 30.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 70 introduces schedule 30, which makes minor and consequential amendments to Acts of Parliament—primarily, the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. Despite the amendments being minor and consequential, this schedule is an integral part of the wider reforms that we are driving through, by ensuring consistency across legislation.

As we have said, the Bill establishes the LAO as the body responsible for appointing auditors for all local authorities, as well as certain other local public bodies. However, health service bodies will continue with their existing arrangements to appoint their own auditors. Government amendment 241 corrects a minor drafting error and omission from the Bill as introduced, by ensuring that all previous references to relevant authorities in the provision now apply only to health service bodies.

I ask that these minor and consequential amendments stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 70 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 30

Local audit: minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: 241, in schedule 30, page 311, line 10, at end insert—

“(b) for “body by a relevant authority” substitute “Office or body by a health service body”.”

This amendment makes a consequential amendment that was missing from the Bill as introduced.

Amendment 242, in schedule 30, page 316, line 28, at end insert—

“Offences of deception etc

32I False or misleading information

(1) It is an offence for a person knowingly or recklessly to provide information that is false, misleading or deceptive in a material way—

(a) for the purposes of, or in connection with, an application under the local audit provisions, or

(b) in purported compliance with any requirement having effect under those provisions.

(2) In subsection (1), “the local audit provisions” means—

(a) Parts 2A to 5A of this Act (including any regulations under any of those Parts),

(b) an agreement under section 6B(5), and

(c) registration rules within the meaning of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1C.

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both).

32J Wrongful holding out

(1) It is an offence for a person who is not a registered local audit provider to—

(a) describe themselves as a registered local audit provider, or

(b) hold themselves out so as to indicate, or be reasonably understood to indicate, that they are a registered local audit provider.

(2) It is an offence for a person who is not an external registration body to—

(a) describe themselves as an external registration body, or

(b) hold themselves out so as to indicate, or be reasonably understood to indicate, that they are an external registration body.

(3) It is an offence for a person who is not a recognised qualifying body to—

(a) describe themselves as a recognised qualifying body, or

(b) hold themselves out so as to indicate, or be reasonably understood to indicate, that they are a recognised qualifying body.

(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(5) In subsection (4), “the maximum term for summary offences” means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This amendment creates offences, similar to those currently provided in the Companies Act, about misleading conduct in the context of the new local audit regime.

Schedule 30, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 71

Rent reviews and “put options”: prohibited terms

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 375, in clause 71, page 72, leave out lines 22 to 25 and insert—

“54A Rent reviews and arrangements for new tenancies

(1) Schedule 7A makes provision about rent reviews.

(2) Schedule 7B makes provision about terms relating to rent in arrangements which require a new tenancy to be granted or taken.”

This is consequential on the amendments of Schedule 31 in my name.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 376 to 381.

Government amendments 384 to 386.

Government amendment 391.

Amendment 303, in clause 78, page 78, line 7, at end insert—

“(5A) Section 71 will not come into force until the Secretary of State has—

(a) completed a consultation about the impact of section 71 on businesses, and

(b) laid a report summarising the consultation before both Houses of Parliament.”

This amendment would prevent section 71 from coming into force until a consultation on its impact on businesses has been completed and a report summarising the consultation has been laid before both Houses of Parliament.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 71 and schedule 31 will ban the use of upward-only rent review clauses in commercial leases in England and Wales. Those clauses put commercial tenants at a disadvantage by keeping rents artificially high even when the market declines. In no other credible market would one party be contractually bound to accept only upward price changes, with no recourse to changing conditions. We saw in covid how damaging that can be. We have also heard at first hand from stakeholders and business representatives—including UKHospitality, the Federation of Small Businesses and the British Independent Retailers Association—about the adverse effects that upward-only rent reviews have.

An efficient and dynamic market for leasing commercial property is vital for growth and for the vitality of our high streets. Upward-only rent reviews create an imbalance of supply and demand, contributing to the blight of empty properties that we have seen, ranging from high street shops to empty office floors. The UK is an outlier in continuing to permit those clauses. This ban follows the lead of countries such as Ireland and Australia. We absolutely recognise that the ban creates some initial uncertainty for investors. However, landlords will still have access to a range of lease models, such as stepped rents and inflation-linked leases, that offer predictability and flexibility; and we have committed to consulting on whether to permit the use of rent “collars” via secondary legislation.

It is important to remember that our high streets are more than retail spaces; they are the social and economic heart of our communities. The Government have set out ambitious steps to support high streets through our Pride in Place strategy. This measure is part of that. If we want new businesses to take a chance on a tenancy and if we want resilient high streets, it is essential that the leasehold market works efficiently. I urge that this clause stand part of the Bill.

Government amendment 375 is a technical amendment updating clause 71 in line with the amendments in schedule 31 tabled in my name. The amendment ensures that readers can continue to navigate the scope and effect of those provisions as intended when drafted.

I now turn to Government amendments 376 to 381, 384 to 386 and 391. These amendments work together to clarify the scope of the ban on upward-only rent reviews, ensuring that tenants are provided with protection when it is right that they receive it. Government amendment 376 brings forward a large proportion of these changes. In particular, the new part 1 sets out a new definition of “business tenancy”. It expands the scope of the ban so that a tenant who is still bound by the lease does not lose the protection of the ban simply because they have vacated the premises, have not yet taken occupation, do not intend to take occupation, or have sub-let the whole premises. It is right that tenants receive the protection of the ban in these circumstances. Without the amendment, it is likely that they would be deterred from sub-letting, which might in turn damage their ability to trade successfully.

Part 2 expands the tenant’s ability to trigger the rent review, so that it applies regardless of whether the lease contains prohibited terms. It also applies if the lease was granted in a compliant manner but was later varied to include non-compliant terms. Finally, paragraph 5A of part 3 provides for the ban to apply in circumstances where a lease is granted in a compliant manner but later varied to include non-compliant terms.

Finally, I turn to Government amendment 391 and to amendment 303. To further ensure that tenants are provided with protection when it is right they receive it, amendment 391 replicates new paragraph 1 of new schedule 7A, contained in amendment 376, in schedule 7B. Cumulatively, the amendments will ensure that the enacted ban is robust, clear and applies in the right circumstances.

Amendment 303 would require the Government to undertake a consultation on the impact of the ban on upward-only rent reviews before the provision comes into force. But that amendment is not mine, so I will speak to it later.

[Mike Reader (Northampton South) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak about this issue. I thank the Minister, who has been gracious in giving me a lot of time to discuss upward-only rent reviews. I hope to use a couple of minutes to clarify a couple of points in the Minister’s statement that I do not think completely reflect the evidence that we have heard and, perhaps, the current position of the Bill. I say that in a constructive way, recognising that there is further opportunity to improve the Bill and make sure it delivers what we promised in the White Paper. As the Minister herself says, we have to protect high streets and small businesses, which can often be caught in really challenging upward-only rent reviews. She is completely right that the impact was seen particularly during the covid era.

I will talk about international evidence first and then come back to how we can improve; I recognise that the amendments start to go that way. The Minister mentioned Ireland in particular, which is often cited as one of the great examples of action on upward-only rent reviews; industry there was concerned that sectors would collapse, but actually there was a relatively minimal impact. I am sure that the Minister’s civil servants will argue that that is a great example of why the worries of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the British Property Federation, the UK Warehousing Association and agents such as Colliers, which have all written to me in the past week or two to share their concerns, are perhaps unfounded.

The scheme in Ireland was specifically brought in with collars and a floor, which meant that there was protection—that was at the point of introduction rather than through secondary legislation, which I think is important. It was introduced in a very different market with very different interest rates, corporation tax and other factors that drive corporate rents. The challenge with the way the legislation is written at the moment is that it has unintended—

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Miatta Fahnbulleh Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

We have some concerns, which are reflected in the amendments I have tabled. As we just heard, countries approach this issue in different ways. Broadly speaking, it sounds like one of the reasons why Ireland did not see an impact on the market was that what was implemented was the end of upward-only rent reviews almost in name only; there were still many other mechanisms that achieved the same outcome, even if that specific one ceased to exist.

Our concern is that we risk creating a number of complex structures for rental agreements that in practice have the same consequence, but without the benefit of upward-only rent reviews, which is that landlords’ certainty about their position in turn encourages investment in our high streets, the availability of the units we want to see, and those units not being turned into residences or repurposed for things other than business. The loss of upward-only rent reviews as part of the toolkit of available options undermines the confidence to invest in our high streets, and in turn undermines the objective, which we all share, of ensuring that they remain vibrant and successful. That is the purpose of the amendments, which I am sure we will come on to in due course. The Minister may have something to say about that, but that is the Opposition’s clear position.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton South for his thoughtful contribution. He is well versed, and has both reached out to business in his constituency and advocated his case persuasively.

We are very mindful of unintended consequences. We are also very mindful of designing this system in a way that strikes the balance between the investment that we absolutely want to unlock on our high streets and in our local communities, and the protections that we want to provide for tenants and to ensure that our high streets continue to thrive. I will take away my hon. Friend’s thoughts and challenges, and reflect on them as we go into the details of how we design this system in the best possible way.

I know that we will go into Opposition amendments in greater detail. However, the key point I want to emphasise at the start of this debate is that this is not a new debate and this issue is not a new one. We have known that we need to do something about this issue for well over a decade now. Huge amounts of work have gone into considering how we reform the system and there have been huge amounts of consultation over the years. So, we are very clear that something must be done, because the status quo is not fair and is not working for tenants, particularly the small and medium-sized enterprises on our high streets.

We need to respond and to reform, but we will make sure that we do so in a way that strikes the right balance between the protections that we must provide for tenants and the investment that we obviously want to see in our commercial premises.

Amendment 375 agreed to.

Clause 71, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 31

BUSINESS TENANCIES: PROHIBITED TERMS RELATING TO RENT

Amendments made: 376, in schedule 31, page 322, line 24, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 on page 323 and insert—

“Part 1

Key terms

“Business tenancy”

1 (1) A tenancy is a “business tenancy” at a particular time if, at that time, Part 2 of this Act—

(a) applies to the tenancy, or

(b) has the potential to apply to the tenancy.

(2) For that purpose, Part 2 has the potential to apply to the tenancy at a particular time if, at that time—

(a) Part 2 cannot apply to the tenancy because—

(i) none of the property comprised in the tenancy is or includes premises which are occupied by the tenant, or

(ii) property comprised in the tenancy is or includes premises which are occupied by the tenant, but none of those premises are so occupied for the purposes of a business carried on by the tenant or for those and other purposes,

(b) the terms of the tenancy include terms (the “permitted business use terms”) which would permit the tenant to occupy the premises for the purposes of a business carried on by the tenant (whether the terms permit occupation for the purposes of business generally, a specific business or a specific kind of business) or for those and other purposes, and

(c) if the tenant were to occupy the premises in accordance with the permitted business use terms (and taking into account all other circumstances), Part 2 of this Act would apply to the tenancy.

(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b), terms of the tenancy which—

(a) would prohibit the tenant from occupying the premises for some purposes, but

(b) would not prohibit the tenant from occupying the premises for other purposes,

are to be regarded as terms which would permit the tenant to occupy the premises for the purposes which are not prohibited.

(4) Sub-paragraph (2) must be construed as one with section 23(1).

“Business tenancy with a rent review”

2 (1) A tenancy is a “business tenancy with a rent review” at a particular time if, at that time—

(a) it is a business tenancy, and

(b) it is subject to rent review terms (whether contained in the instrument creating the tenancy or not).

(2) In this Schedule “rent review terms” means terms under which an amount of rent payable under the tenancy will or may change during the terms of the tenancy (“rent under review”).

Part 2

Triggering and operation of rent reviews

Application of this Part

3 (1) This Part of this Schedule applies to a tenancy at a particular time if, at that time, it is a business tenancy with a rent review.

(2) But this Part applies to such a tenancy only if—

(a) the tenancy is—

(i) granted, or

(ii) varied so that it includes rent review terms,

after this Schedule comes into force, and

(b) the grant or variation is not made under a contract entered into before this Schedule comes into force.

Tenant to have power to trigger a rent review

4 (1) This paragraph applies if—

(a) an action is necessary for a particular rent review to be initiated (a “trigger action”), and

(b) the rent review terms, or any other terms (whether contained in the instrument creating the tenancy or not), do not allow the tenant to take the trigger action.

(2) The tenant may initiate the particular rent review by giving the landlord notice in writing.

(3) Notice under sub-paragraph (2) may not be given after the time when trigger action may be taken.

Tenant to have power to take action to enable rent review to operate effectively

5 (1) This paragraph applies if—

(a) an action is necessary for a particular rent review to operate effectively (an “operational action”), and

(b) the rent review terms, or any other terms (whether contained in the instrument creating the tenancy or not), do not allow the tenant to take the operational action.

(2) The tenant may take the operational action.

(3) If the tenant takes the operational action, the tenant must give the landlord notice in writing of the action within the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the action was taken.

Part 3

Rent review terms that are of no effect

Application of this Part

5A (1) This Part of this Schedule applies to a tenancy at a particular time if, at that time—

(a) it is a business tenancy with a rent review, and

(b) the rent review terms—

(i) do not specify new passing rent, and

(ii) include elements 1 and 2.

(2) But this Part applies to such a tenancy only if—

(a) the tenancy is—

(i) granted, or

(ii) varied so that it includes rent review terms that do not specify new passing rent and include elements 1 and 2,

after this Schedule comes into force, and

(b) the grant or variation is not made under a contract entered into before this Schedule comes into force.

Rent review terms that “do not specify new passing rent”

5B Rent review terms “do not specify new passing rent” if they are such that an amount of rent under review that will be payable at a time during the term of the tenancy (the “new passing rent”)—

(a) is not known, and

(b) cannot be determined,

at the time when the tenancy is granted or varied so that it includes the terms.

Elements 1 and 2

5C (1) This paragraph sets out elements 1 and 2.”

This would provide for various definitions; for application of provisions to tenancies that are varied; and for the provision about the triggering and operation of rent reviews to apply to any business tenancy with a rent review (regardless of the particular terms of the rent review).

Amendment 377, in schedule 31, page 323, line 38, leave out “relevant”.

This is consequential on Amendment 376.

Amendment 378, in schedule 31, page 324, line 3, leave out “relevant”.

Amendment 379, in schedule 31, page 324, line 13, leave out “relevant”.

This is consequential on Amendment 376.

Amendment 380, in schedule 31, page 324, line 19, leave out “relevant”.

This is consequential on Amendment 376.

Amendment 381, in schedule 31, page 324, line 35, leave out from beginning to end of line 19 on page 325.

This is consequential on Amendment 376, by which the new paragraphs 4 and 5 would replace the existing paragraphs 8 and 9.

Amendment 382, in schedule 31, page 325, line 19, at end insert—

“Part 4

Sub-tenancy required to include rent review terms that would be of no effect

Application of this Part

7A (1) This Part of this Schedule applies to a tenancy (the “superior tenancy”) at a particular time if, at that time—

(a) the superior tenancy is a business tenancy,

(b) the superior tenancy requires or permits the grant of a sub-tenancy (the “authorised sub-tenancy”),

(c) the authorised sub-tenancy would, at the time of its grant, be a business tenancy with a rent review, and

(d) either—

(i) the superior tenancy requires the authorised sub-tenancy to include rent review terms, and that requirement can only be complied with by the inclusion of rent review terms which (on one or more particular rent reviews) would produce, or would be capable of producing, the result that is prohibited by paragraph 6(3), or

(ii) the superior tenancy permits the authorised sub-tenancy to include rent review terms, but rent review terms can only be within that permission if (on one or more particular rent reviews) they would produce, or would be capable of producing, the result that is prohibited by paragraph 6(3).

(2) But this Part applies to the superior tenancy only—

(a) if the superior tenancy was—

(i) granted, or

(ii) varied so that it includes rent review terms that do not specify new passing rent and include elements 1 and 2,

before this Schedule comes into force, or

(b) if the superior tenancy is—

(i) granted, or

(ii) varied so that it includes rent review terms that do not specify new passing rent and include elements 1 and 2,

after this Schedule comes into force and the grant or variation is made under a contract entered into before then.

Modification of terms of superior tenancy

7B (1) The superior tenancy has effect after this Schedule comes into force as if it requires, or as the case may be permits, the authorised sub-tenancy to include rent review terms of any kind which (on each particular rent review) would not produce, and would not be capable of producing, the result that is prohibited by paragraph 6(3).

(2) The actual rent review terms that are to be included in a particular authorised sub-tenancy are to be—

(a) agreed by the persons who are to be the landlord and tenant under that sub-tenancy, or

(b) determined in such other manner as they may agree.

(3) Accordingly, the landlord under the superior tenancy may not require the inclusion of particular rent review terms in the authorised sub-tenancy (unless that is what is agreed by the persons who are to be the landlord and tenant under the sub-tenancy).

(4) This paragraph does not prevent a superior tenancy from being varied or modified by the parties to it (and accordingly sub-paragraphs (1) to (3) are subject to any such variation or modification).

Interpretation

7C (1) The following provision applies for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule.

(2) The superior tenancy permits the grant of a sub-tenancy, or the inclusion of particular rent review terms in a sub-tenancy, if granting the sub-tenancy, or including those terms, would not breach the terms of the superior tenancy.

(3) References to the superior tenancy, and references to the terms of the superior tenancy, include references to—

(a) the terms of any agreement relating to the superior tenancy, and

(b) any document or communication from a party to the superior tenancy which gives or refuses consent for the grant of a category or description of sub-tenancy.

(4) “Superior tenancy” has the meaning given in paragraph 7A(1).

(5) “Sub-tenancy” means a tenancy that is inferior to the superior tenancy (whether or not it is immediately inferior to that tenancy).

(6) The “result that is prohibited by paragraph 6(3)” means the result that the new passing rent is larger than the reference amount.

Part 5

General provision”

This would apply to pre-commencement tenancies that require any sub-tenancy to include terms that would be of no effect by virtue of paragraph 6(3) (as they could result in the new passing rent being larger than the reference amount). It would enable a sub-tenancy to be granted without including such terms.

Amendment 383, in schedule 31, page 325, line 24, leave out “new passing”.

This is consequential on Amendment 382.

Amendment 384, in schedule 31, page 325, line 27, leave out “, in relation to a tenancy” and insert—

““business tenancy” has the meaning given in paragraph 1;

“business tenancy with a rent review” has the meaning given in paragraph 2.

(2) In this Schedule, in relation to a business tenancy with a rent review—

“elements 1 and 2” means element 1 and element 2 set out in paragraph 5C;”.

This is consequential on Amendment 376.

Amendment 385, in schedule 31, page 325, line 33, leave out “4(2)(b)” and insert “5B”.

This is consequential on Amendment 376.

Amendment 386, in schedule 31, page 325, line 37, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 326 and insert—

““rent review terms” has the meaning given in paragraph 2(2);

“rent under review” has the meaning given in paragraph 2(2).

(3) A reference in this Schedule to rent review terms that do not specify new passing rent has the meaning given in paragraph 5B.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This is consequential on Amendment 376.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 387, in schedule 31, page 326, line 4, leave out “Put options:” and insert—

“Arrangements for renewal of tenancies:”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 388, 390, 389, and 392 to 404.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This group of amendments expands the scope of schedule 7B so that arrangements such as options and rights of first refusal are also within the scope of the ban. Arrangements of this type may allow the tenant to enter into a new lease on pre-specified terms, which could include upwards-only rent review provisions. Permitting such arrangements could therefore be used to avoid the ban’s effect. As a result, we cannot permit new leases such as those to be excluded from scope, as this would likely encourage gaming of the system and prevent businesses from being protected in the way that the Bill intends.

Government amendment 389 makes a minor change to clarify that the application of schedule 7B to an arrangement can vary over time depending on the circumstances, therefore allowing for arrangements to move in and out of scope. By doing so, this amendment ensures that different types of arrangements, such as options and rights of first refusal, are caught by the ban if they meet the stated criteria at the relevant point. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[David Simmonds]

I want to make the same point again, but I will not go back and repeat it. We remain very concerned about the loss of freedom of contract that this represents. Clearly, this is consistent with the Government’s direction of travel. The Minister refers to protecting businesses, some businesses will benefit from this and others will lose out, including property investors who are critical to the success of our high streets and commercial sectors. They are facing rapidly rising business rates and increases in national insurance, all of which are hammering our commercial sector and resulting in a very large number of job losses. We see this as part of that picture. We encourage the Minister to think again, reflect and perhaps change direction on this matter.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

My summing up will be very short. There is clearly a problem. That problem has been around for decades. Upwards-only rent reviews are an outlier internationally, and it is putting huge pressure on our high street. I absolutely recognise that we have to strike a balance between the investment that we want to see in our local economies and commercial property sector, but we also need to protect tenants. It cannot make sense to have a system whereby rents can only go up, irrespective of what is happening in the market, and cannot go down if the market goes down. That is an illogical system and one that is putting huge pressures on businesses, particularly small and medium-sized ones. There is a reason why all other advanced countries do not apply this system. Those countries all function well and have vibrant property markets. Critically, there are specifics around individual places and the reforms that they have been through, but the lesson across the piece—whether in Ireland or Australia—is that reforms are possible, and in the end we can still have both a vibrant sector and a property market that is far more rational from the perspective of tenants. I commend these amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 387 agreed to.

Amendments made: 388, in schedule 31, page 326, leave out line 5 and insert “Application of this Schedule”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 390, in schedule 31, page 326, line 6, leave out “to an arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 389, in schedule 31, page 326, line 6, leave out “if” and insert—

“at a particular time if, at that time,”.

This would make clear that the application of Schedule 7B to an arrangement can vary over time depending on the circumstances.

Amendment 391, in schedule 31, page 326, line 9, leave out paragraph 2 and insert—

“2 (1) Condition A is met if Part 2 of this Act—

(a) applies to the tenancy, or

(b) has the potential to apply to the tenancy.

(2) In the following paragraphs of this Schedule—

(a) the tenancy to which Part 2 applies, or has the potential to apply, is referred to as the ‘existing tenancy’;

(b) the premises let under the existing tenancy are referred to as the ‘relevant premises’.

(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, Part 2 has the potential to apply to the existing tenancy if—

(a) Part 2 cannot apply to the existing tenancy because—

(i) none of the relevant premises are occupied by the tenant, or

(ii) the relevant premises are or include premises which are occupied by the tenant, but none of those premises are so occupied for the purposes of a business carried on by the tenant or for those and other purposes,

(b) the terms of the tenancy include terms (the ‘permitted use terms’) which would permit the tenant to occupy relevant premises for the purposes of a business carried on by the tenant (whether the terms permit occupation for the purposes of business generally, a specific business or a specific kind of business) or for those and other purposes, and

(c) if the tenant were to occupy relevant premises in accordance with the permitted use terms (and taking into account all other circumstances), Part 2 of this Act would apply to the tenancy.

(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(b), terms of the existing tenancy which—

(a) would prohibit the tenant from occupying relevant premises for some purposes, but

(b) would not prohibit the tenant from occupying relevant premises for other purposes,

are to be regarded as terms which would permit the tenant to occupy relevant premises for the purposes which are not prohibited.

(5) Sub-paragraph (3) must be construed as one with section 23(1).”

This would replicate the new paragraph 1 of new Schedule 7A that is contained in Amendment 376.

Amendment 392, in schedule 31, page 326, line 17, leave out “put option” and insert “tenancy renewal arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 393, in schedule 31, page 326, line 19, leave out from “to” to end of line 25 and insert—

“a tenancy renewal arrangement.

(2) In this Schedule—

‘new tenancy’ means a new tenancy of the whole or a part of the relevant premises;

‘tenancy renewal arrangement’ means an arrangement under which the tenant under the existing tenancy—

(a) can require the landlord or another person to grant a new tenancy, or

(b) can be required by the landlord or another person to take a new tenancy.”

This expands the scope of new Schedule 7B to cover any arrangement under which the grant of a new tenancy can be required, whether it is the landlord or tenant that can impose the requirement.

Amendment 394, in schedule 31, page 326, line 26, leave out “put option” and insert “tenancy renewal arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 395, in schedule 31, page 326, line 27, leave out “put option” and insert “tenancy renewal arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 396, in schedule 31, page 326, line 31, leave out “lease” and insert “tenancy”.

This would ensure the defined term “new tenancy” is used.

Amendment 397, in schedule 31, page 327, line 1, leave out “put option” and insert “tenancy renewal arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 398, in schedule 31, page 327, line 3, leave out “put option” and insert “tenancy renewal arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 399, in schedule 31, page 327, line 6, leave out “put option” and insert “tenancy renewal arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 400, in schedule 31, page 327, line 14, leave out “lease” and insert “tenancy”.

This would ensure the defined term “existing tenancy” is used.

Amendment 401, in schedule 31, page 328, line 22, leave out “put option” and insert “tenancy renewal arrangement”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 402, in schedule 31, page 328, line 35, leave out “(2)” and insert “(2)”.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 403, in schedule 31, page 328, leave out line 36.

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Amendment 404, in schedule 31, page 329, line 2, at end insert—

“‘tenancy renewal arrangement’ has the meaning given in paragraph 3(2);”.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This is consequential on Amendment 393.

Schedule 31, as amended, agreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

A real safety net should be put into the Bill. I do not think that we can pass the Bill without adding scrutiny and accountability provisions. The new clause is a very friendly way of ensuring that Ministers look again at scrutiny. I would hate the Bill to leave Committee without an assurance from the Minister that that will be looked at again and that something will be put into the Bill to match the increase in powers with an increase in scrutiny in the future.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I acknowledge the intent behind new clauses 3 and 15. We all agree that transparency, accountability and greater scrutiny are needed, and that there is room for improvement in our system.

On the specifics of new clause 3, all local authorities must publish annual accounts along with an annual governance statement. The local government transparency code 2015 requires local authorities and combined authorities to publish regularly on their websites information about spending and assets, including, as a minimum, all spending over £500, which must be published quarterly, and all land and building assets held.

All mayoral strategic authorities are expected to follow the principles and processes described in the English devolution accountability framework. That sets out how mayors will be held to account by central Government, at local level, and by the public. As part of the local assurance framework, mayoral strategic authorities must describe their arrangements for enabling effective and meaningful engagement with local partners and the public. My argument is that we have the legislative framework, and that this is now a question of practice.

Everyone wants information about public spending and Government accounts to be as accessible as possible. It is as much a problem for central Government as it is for local government and lots of bodies and institutions. I would argue it is a question of practice and of improving the way we do things. Through digital technology and the ability to use different methods, we can make this information far more accessible. I do not think we need further legislation. We need to improve our practice and innovate and modernise so the public can better hold all of us to account. That is an endeavour across all levels of government and all public institutions, so the new clauses duplicate existing arrangements and do not really get to the heart of the issue that we all recognise we need to resolve.

I absolutely agree with the intent behind new clause 15. We have stated on the record that we understand the need to strengthen the accountability and the scrutiny mechanism for strategic authorities. We said this in the English devolution White Paper, my colleague said it in the House, and we are committed to that. I assure the Cttee we will consider how to strengthen the scrutiny of strategic authorities, because I completely agree that as they acquire more powers, it is right we have accountability and scrutiny frameworks that are robust and fit for purpose, to ensure they are held to account for how they use the powers we confer on them.

The challenge I have with the new clause from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is that the independent panel she is recommending would mean we have to wait over a year after Royal Assent to respond to this critical issue, because we would not want to pre-empt the recommendations of the panel. In some respects, the very thing that the hon. Lady is trying to force us to do may well end up slowing our ability to do.

[Siân Berry]

Is the Minister honestly saying that if there was a call from Parliament to review scrutiny within one year of Royal Assent, she would not be telling us that was too soon? The reason one year is written into the new clause is that is a very reasonable deadline.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We acknowledge this is an area we want to strengthen. As I said in the last debate, we are working to make sure that we are taking in view the scrutiny models that we apply, including local public accounts committees and the models proposed by think-tanks and other organisations, in the context of the big reforms to the local audit and assurance framework we are driving through. I ask the Committee to give us time to do the work properly, so that we design something that is fit for purpose and aligned with the big reforms we are driving through. There is no resiling from the belief that we need to strengthen the arrangements. I put that on record and am happy to give those reassurances. Let us get on with the work of figuring out how we do that in the best possible way, by engaging with strategic authorities and critical stakeholders, rather than put in the Bill a requirement that may, in fact, slow the pace at which we are able to develop proposals. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw her new clause.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 4

Funding for Local Authority governance reorganisation

“The Secretary of State has a duty to ensure that local authorities are adequately funded for any purposes relating to the reorganisation of cabinet governance structures that are required or enabled by this Act.”—(Vikki Slade.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to ensure funding is available for any rearranging of councils’ governance models.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We absolutely recognise the funding pressures that local government is under, and we have been clear and transparent about them. They are a function, obviously, of the legacy that we inherited and that we are working incredibly hard to rectify. The long-established new burdens doctrine sets out that all new burdens on local authorities must be properly assessed by the relevant Department. That includes the overall cost to local government, including any one-off implementation or transition costs.

Suffice to say, but to reassure the hon. Member, my Department is working in the usual way to assess the cost to local government of any mandated changes to local governance models. We will go through the standard process to take a judgment on that. The principle that local authorities should be adequately compensated if there are new requirements or burdens on them runs through what we will do. I hope that, with those reassurances, the hon. Member will withdraw her new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I will try to deal with the two main issues raised by the new clauses, in reverse order.

We all recognise that last year’s Budget was a disaster for local government. The rise in national insurance alone was a £1.5 billion net cut, but the loss of funding to support neighbourhood plans, although small in the grand scheme of things, was one of the most challenging elements. As we heard from the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole, it is at that neighbourhood level—in the locality—that the buy-in of our constituents for new homes is often first secured.

The inability to support that work any longer is particularly challenging for very small local authorities. Although they do not employ many people, so they were not as hit by the national insurance rise as the big local authorities that do social care, the town and parish councils that support those neighbourhood plans—and the district councils that support such work in the local areas—have been particularly hit by the loss of funding. Ensuring that funding is there to deliver the vision that we set out when we were in government for neighbourhood planning is really important.

New clause 5 is about the ability to deliver local elections. The Government are in a bit of a mess on this issue: the messaging on devolution is that there is no point in having elections to councils that are about to be abolished, which I think we would all agree with, but the legislation simply defers the elections for one year. That is what the laws that we have passed actually do, so as far as the law stands, all the councils set to be abolished are due to have elections on their current footprint next year unless the Government return with further legislation to cancel elections under different provisions or to defer them again. The risk highlighted by the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole remains a live one.

Multiple Ministers and two different Secretaries of State have assured us at the Dispatch Box that there will be elections, but without giving any specific commitments. In many places, in the normal cycle of events, there will be district elections. If the new mayoral authorities come into being, there may be mayoral elections. If there are not, under the current legislation, those existing counties will go to the polls next year. It would be helpful if the Minister could provide a clear assurance that the existing provisions that guarantee an additional separate grant to fund elections to take place will continue to apply, as has been established practice for a long time.

Will the Minister also tell us—or at least give us a steer—whether the Government intend to introduce further legislation to defer elections again, so they will not take place as scheduled next May in councils that are set to be abolished, or do the Government have a different intention? That may well affect how we vote on these new clauses; we oppose the deferral, delay or cancellation of elections, but we need to know the Government’s intentions so that we understand what we are voting for or against.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Let me address the question directly, and then I will turn to new clause 5, on the cost of local elections, and new clause 43, on support for neighbourhood planning.

We like elections, and we think it is absolutely right that voters have the opportunity to exercise their democratic mandate. We have therefore proceeded with elections. It is important to clarify that we opted to delay them where there were specific requests from the local authorities involved, because they were going through the process not only of local government reorganisation but of creating mayoral strategic authorities. The concern was that the capacity, resource and transitional arrangements would be jeopardised by early elections. All reasonable Members will understand that it is right that the Government listen to constituent authorities that are going through what we all acknowledge is a difficult reform and transition process, and that we get that balance right.

Our principle will always remain that we want elections to go ahead, because it is critical that voters have the chance to exercise their democratic rights. We are balancing that with being fair minded, rational and reasonable. When constituent authorities, including authorities of both parties, tell us that there is a genuine transitional and delivery risk that we need to take into account, we are sensible and reasonable, and take that into account. That is the balance that we will continue to hold to.

[David Simmonds]

On a point of clarification, when the process of reorganisation was embarked on, local authorities were told quite clearly, in accordance with long-established practice, “If you are due to have elections but we are going to abolish your council as a result of this process, we will not hold elections to that council again, because it is not going to exist.” However, the legislation introduced to Parliament simply delayed the elections for 12 months. All those authorities, including Surrey, which was today announced as the pathfinder, are, as a matter of law, expecting to have elections next May, but on the undertaking of Government they are not expecting to have any further elections to the existing authority again. Are the elections to the county councils that are about to be abolished going to proceed next year, or are the Government going to introduce legislation to delay them again?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I think I have been very clear. The legislation is very clear, and Members of the House were all involved in agreeing it. We are proceeding with elections. The principle that has guided what we have done is that the preference is always to have elections, but if there is a reasonable, justified case that there is a risk to delivering our reforms, or that the risk to the transitional arrangements is a genuine, material consideration for those authorities, it is right, rational and sensible for the Government to listen to them.

The legislation is that legislation that we have. We are proceeding with elections, and certainly the Labour party is gearing up to speak to its voters and ensure they come out—no doubt parties across the piece are doing that. That is the mode in which most of local government is operating, and certainly we on the Government Benches are.

The cost of local elections is met locally. Again, I refer Members to the new burdens doctrine, which requires that any new responsibilities are assessed. That is how we will approach elections, which are locally funded. Broadly, we are not hearing about issues with constituent authorities that are undergoing this process at the moment, but we will continue to review the new burdens doctrine to ensure that critical elections are held with no detriment to the voters in those particular areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

What does the Minister say to parishes such as my own, Hertford Heath, that do not have any more funding to support the delivery of their neighbourhood plan? They are all run by volunteers, they do not have very many houses to collect a precept from and they do not have very many staff. What does she say about that environment? They are trying to be proactive with a plan and choose where they want development, so that they are not at the mercy of developers who want to build all over the green fields. What does she say to parishes that are working really hard to do the right thing by the Government and by their local community, without any funding to go with that?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Both the last Government and this Government have invested huge amounts in building the infrastructure. In the end, Governments have to make a judgment about where we put our funding and finances. We know that is difficult for particular communities, but we think there is sufficient infrastructure and sufficient people with expertise in neighbourhood planning. We will continue to work with them on how they innovate to provide a service for particular parishes.

The hon. Member for Hamble Valley is forcing me to labour the point that, because of the absolute mess that the Conservatives left us with after years of austerity, we are having to make tough judgments about what we can fund and invest in. It is not where we want to be, but that is the reality we have to confront. We had to make choices in the spending review; we are investing more in affordable housing, and in supporting our communities with homelessness. We think that those choices were right, and ultimately we had to make a judgment about prioritisation. We are committed to working with the sector to ensure that it can innovate and continue supporting neighbourhoods.

[Paul Holmes]

Will the Minister give way on that point, as she referred to me?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I have finished, and I have sat down.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

No, I do not; we should keep the current system in place. I believe that, even though we are essentially going from three to two tiers, we are not actually going to one tier in this country, because mayors are being created as well. There is a direct link between the mayor and the local people, and there is a direct link between these new councils and local people. Again, I do not think the answer to simplifying the electoral system and making representation easier is to create more councillors from different parties in a ward. That is expensive and lacks democratic legitimacy, and I think the current system is perfectly acceptable. We are always going to be on the losing side on this one. Smaller parties often want to change the system to ensure that their parties have more victories and more legitimacy in democratic chambers. The Conservative party has a long and proud history of opposing proportional representation.

I remind the Liberal Democrats that they have tried and tested a change in the electoral system, and when they went to the country seeking it, they lost. Therefore, people have been asked whether they want to change the voting system in a national election. I think that the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole would find that if there were referendums—we know that the Government are against referendums in the Bill—many people across this country would choose not to change the voting system in local government too. The current local government electoral system works, and it suits its purpose. People know who their councillors are; they are linked to them and know that they often represent an area that they deeply care for and are passionate about—even Liberal Democrat ones in Eastleigh. We oppose the new clause, and will vote against it if it is pressed to a vote.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank hon. Members for the lengthy and robust debate on this issue. We all recognise that there is a need to continue evolving, improving and strengthening our democracy, but we do not believe that the new clause and the electoral reform proposal are the right answer. The Government have no plans to change the electoral system for local councils in England. We believe that first past the post is a clear way of electing representatives. It is well understood by voters, and, as pointed out by the hon. Member for Hamble Valley, provides a direct link and relationship between the member of the legislature or council and the local constituency. That model works well where we have collective decision making and collective systems of governance—that is quite distinct.

We had a debate on the changes that we are proposing for mayors and police and crime commissioners—the supplementary vote system—where there is a single executive position. We think that strengthening the democratic link in that way is appropriate and right in that context. We think that through the Bill we will have the right mechanism for the right type of representation, as presented through the mayor and the police and crime commissioner on the one hand, and councillors and MPs, which operate within a collective governance model through Parliament or councils. I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw the new clause—I am not sure that she will, but I will put the request.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I will not withdraw the new clause. I wish to press it to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Vikki Slade]

I welcome that intervention. During covid, a lovely, very elderly Conservative lady on Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole council decided to take her laptop into the toilet with her. I think we all have such stories to tell. There are huge merits in online training and training in person.

We talked previously about audit training. There is compulsory training for our quasi-legal systems, including licensing and planning, but what about scrutiny, audit and even, “How on earth does a council work? How do I behave? What is the code of conduct?” Training on all those things is not currently required. It is not unreasonable to ask that when somebody takes on a responsibility—particularly when they receive an allowance so to do—they understand what is required of them. There should be a minimum training standard, across the board, but that is currently absent. Training is very variable from place to place.

My simple request is for the Government to agree to the new clause and produce guidance that allows local authorities to look at the relevant content.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will be brief because the Committee has discussed this question before. We absolutely recognise the importance of training, which is why the Government currently fund the sector support programme, which is delivered by the Local Government Association and open to strategic authorities and local authorities. That will continue and we will build on it.

It should be for strategic authorities and local authorities, as independent bodies that we are trying to empower, to decide the form of training for elected members. The Government will do our part to work alongside them and to give the LGA what is required, but we do not think that a one-size-fits-all requirement on strategic authorities to provide training is proportionate. The best way to do that is to build the infrastructure to enable and support training in an effective and sustainable way. For that reason, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

[Vikki Slade]

It is not a requirement of all local authorities to be a member of the Local Government Association. I speak as a vice-president and former board member of the Local Government Association. The new clause does not dictate what the training should be; it dictates that there should be a requirement for training. On that basis, I would like to push it to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

It is tempting to make reference to all sorts of detailed points of local government finance that we could bring up in a debate about allotments. However, I purely want to make a point about where this issue sits, which I think other Members have touched upon. The Opposition are big fans of allotments, just as everybody else is, but the local plan is the mechanism by which that should be delivered. We all know—particularly those of us, like myself, who have lots of allotments in our constituencies—that there are often waiting lists for some of the more desirable sites and also huge numbers of vacancies on others.

When allotments on their current scale were introduced in the 1950s, food was one of the biggest costs that households faced. Today, the UK has some of the cheapest food in the world, relative to household budgets. The UK and the US spend the lowest proportion of household expenditure on food in the developed world. Indeed, the proportions have reversed since the 1950s, and housing costs are now the highest factor.

One of the Opposition’s concerns about the purposes of this Bill, and about where the Planning and Infrastructure Bill was going, is that the focus on units and achieving targets will mean losing green spaces, particularly gardens and spaces outside people’s homes. When we pass this legislation, it is through the local plan that we will be able to ensure that we are not using allotments to plug a massive gap that has arisen because of those housing targets, but are instead building the types of homes that people want to live in, particularly those that include outside space. That is why, although we agree with the sentiment behind the new clause, we are not minded to support it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We understand the intention behind this provision on allotments, and we are big fans of allotments and nature-rich spaces. However, I would point out that a duty to provide allotments already exists and sits with local authorities, which is the appropriate level. In addition, the provision of nature-rich spaces is already being tackled through multiple Government initiatives, whether that is the access to nature programme or the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, which places a duty on all public authorities operating in England to consider, from time to time, what action they can take to further the conservation and enhancement of biodiversity.

We recognise the need for green spaces and allotments for communities. We think that there is already sufficient provision in legislation, so the new clause is unnecessary. Actually, putting the duty at the strategic authority level is not appropriate; it should be at the local authority level. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion to withdraw the motion.

[Siân Berry]

I take those points constructively, as they were intended. I hope that this issue can be looked at during future stages in a cross-party manner, so that we can put something together. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 16

Duty to contribute to delivery of nature, clean air and climate targets

“(1) When exercising their functions, a strategic authority, mayor, or local authority must contribute to—

(a) meeting the targets and carbon budgets set under Part 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008;

(b) meeting the targets and interim targets set under Part 1 of the Environment Act 2021;

(c) meeting the limit values set under Schedule 2 of the Air Quality Standards Regulations 2010; and

(d) the delivery of the programme for adaptation to climate change under section 58 of the Climate Change Act 2008.

(2) A strategic authority, mayor or local authority must not make any decision that is incompatible with the duty described in subsection (1).

(3) Within one year beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish guidance describing the contribution that each strategic authority should make toward meeting the targets listed in subsection (1).

(4) Guidance under subsection (3) must include clear metrics and measurable terms for strategic authorities, mayors and local authorities to meet.”—(Siân Berry.)

This new clause requires strategic authorities, mayors, and local authorities to act in accordance with the statutory Climate Change Act and Environmental Act targets, carbon budgets, Air Quality Standards Regulations, and climate adaptation programme across their functions. The Secretary of State must publish guidance for defining authorities’ contributions towards these objectives.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is my pleasure to make the case for new clause 16, which would introduce a climate and nature duty into the Bill. I have been working with a tremendous group of campaigners who, like me, cannot see why the duties are not currently in the Bill. Those campaigners include the Climate Emergency Group, the Wildlife and Countryside Link, the Healthy Air Coalition and Friends of the Earth. As I have previously argued, the Bill lacks strong safeguards to ensure that the new authorities embed climate action and nature recovery, and action on deadly air pollution in their work. There is a growth duty, but not yet any equivalent duty for climate mitigation, adaptation or nature recovery.

Subsection (1) of the new clause sets out the different targets that ought to be passed down from national Government to strategic authorities. Subsection (2) would compel local authorities and strategic authorities not to make decisions incompatible with the duties—in other words, not to make things worse. Subsection (3) is a really important part of the new clause and would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance describing the fair contribution that each area must make toward meeting the national targets. That is what we currently lack. There is nothing in the Bill that helps to achieve the national targets through the actions of the strategic authorities that we are creating, and that is an important gap. I am not idly making this point; reaching our national targets requires a contribution from the authorities with these important powers, areas of competence and actions. Leaving out how we will share out the contribution to the national target—leaving it out altogether—just does not wash.

The evidence from the allies I have been working with, and from monitoring of what goes on at council level, shows that every council scoring 20% or below in the climate action scorecards that get produced is in England or Northern Ireland. That is because we have had the duties passed down by the Governments in Wales and Scotland. It is our duty to ensure that this Bill fills the gap.

Precedents exist not only in Scotland and Wales, as I have mentioned, but in London, because this is done effectively under sections 42 to 44 of the Greater London Authority Act 2007. Each of them systematically passes on a duty for the GLA—the Mayor and Assembly combined—to act to address climate change. This has led to more action in London. It has meant that the Mayor has produced results. The legislation mandates the creation of a climate change mitigation and energy strategy. The strategy, the law says, will contain proposals for the contribution to be made in Greater London towards the mitigation of climate change. These are not hard clauses to write. These are not hard things to pass down, and yet these things are missing from the Bill. That is why we have put together new clause 16, which should be adopted. It could be adopted today, and I intend to divide the Committee on this issue.

We have had discussions about these issues before. We talked about clause 2 and the different ways in which air pollution might be included in the legislation governing the new strategic authorities, and the Minister responded in a similar way each time. For example, this was a typical response:

“The principle and the intention are that we are baking our climate and environmental obligations into the way that we are thinking about how we drive the economy.” ––[Official Report, English Devolution and Community Empowerment Public Bill Committee, 21 October 2025; c. 327.]

It is no good giving these assurances—setting up a baker in a back room behind a curtain—for climate, pollution and nature action, when for so much else, the targets, accountability and duties, is clearly stated in the Bill. As I mentioned before, there is an issue of fairness. Talking to each local area about what contribution each of them will make cannot be done behind closed doors. It requires a transparent process, which the new clause provides for.

The measure has massive and wide support not only from the kinds of campaigners that I associate with on a daily basis, but from more than 100 hundred businesses, which have twice signed open letters in support of such a duty. For them, it would provide the certainty needed to unlock support and drive green investment. The Local Government Association has made it clear that councils require further statutory duties, powers and resources to lead on climate action, while 150 councils responded to a climate consultation, with the vast majority in favour of these duties in England. The District Councils’ Network in its general election prospectus, London Councils, the Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport, and 88% of UK100 members all called for a climate statutory duty.

The Minister also said this in Committee:

“National Government and local government at all levels, along with business and individuals, must continue to make a contribution to tackling climate change and improving the quality of the environment around us.” ––[Official Report, English Devolution and Community Empowerment Public Bill Committee, 21 October 2025; c. 327.]

Those words need to be reflected in the Bill, and the new clause would do that very effectively. We have the opportunity right now to embed climate, clean air and nature duties for all local authorities and strategic authorities, and to make sure that they hit the ground running for our national environment targets. That would mean no delay for them to take action on clean power, warm homes, clean air and making space for nature. We know very well that there is willingness on the part of local authorities to act, so why would the Labour Government not use the Bill to codify that, and help, inspire and support them in further action?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member, who has consistently talked about the challenge of tackling climate change and the important role that local government has to play in that. We absolutely recognise the imperative of climate change and nature recovery, and the vital role that all levels of government, including our strategic and local authorities, can and must play in that endeavour.

Local authorities already have a statutory duty to improve air quality in their areas. Thanks to the combined efforts of local authorities—for example, the Mayor of London—we have seen huge improvements. That is testimony to the fact that, when all tiers of government work together, we can tackle these big structural issues. My key point is that the existing tools and duties already support the things that the hon. Member is trying to achieve through her new clause. For example, we have talked before in the Committee about the local nature recovery strategies, the biodiversity duty under the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, and the Environment Act 2021. All of that requires public authorities to consider, take account and take action to conserve and enhance nature and biodiversity.

On the point about climate adaptation, I recognise that there is both an urgency and an imperative for us to take action, and Local authorities are at the vanguard of wanting to push this already. The Government are working with a number of local authorities that have come forward with climate risk assessments, and that is something we hope and expect to see at authorities across the country. In October we launched a local authority climate service, which provides tailored data on climate change impacts to enable local authorities to do their assessments and think about adaptation strategies. We also ran the first adaptation reporting power trial for local authorities last year, providing guidance and support on how to assess climate risks to their functions and services.

That is all to say that this Government recognise the importance of this issue, and we are taking action. Acting and working in collaboration with all tiers of government to respond to the climate change and the nature recovery challenges is the way we do that. Further duties at this stage would not add to that; what we need is action and collaboration, and that is what this Government are cracking on with.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The need for this new clause has become greater as the Committee’s consideration of the Bill has continued. The original legislation and amendments from the Government have set out that new mayors will have precepting powers that will apply to non-mayoral functions. That gives rise to a suspicion, particularly in the context of the Government’s frankly dire financial situation, that such powers will be used as a means of levying, through a mayoral precept, additional resources that will be funnelled not into the priorities of local government but—the Government having set out that they see these new authorities as the local delivery agents of central Government—into the priorities of Government.

It is a long-established principle—it has been implemented for a good, long time now—that there should be some degree of constraint, and that consent should be required before a local authority seeks to proceed with a council tax rise above a certain level: 5% is the current figure. It seems to us a reasonable principle that the new mayoral authorities should be subject to the same constraint to ensure that the tax rises, which would of course be inflationary, notwithstanding the impact they would have on household budgets, would be subject to a similar process of democratic consent, rather than being something that a mayor can simply proceed with without needing to go down that route. That is the objective of the new clause, and it will be interesting to hear what the Government have to say about it.

Our key concern is that these new authorities do not become a means of addressing shortfalls in other areas of Government spending or simply backfilling some of those costs. The Minister likes to talk about a financial mess, and it is noteworthy that the Government have borrowed over £80 billion in this financial year alone already. We heard the Chancellor talking about a £22 billion black hole, which she alleged existed after 14 years of Conservative Government. I use the term “alleged” advisedly, because the Office for Budget Responsibility, which did the calculations, swiftly came back and said that it did not stand by the figure used by the Chancellor. That is £22 billion after 14 years versus £80 billion since the start of this financial year alone.

It is clear that the country’s finances are facing an exceptionally challenging time and have deteriorated exceptionally fast. Local government, in particular, has a £1.5 billion black hole that has been created purely by last year’s Budget, as a result of the national insurance rise, notwithstanding any previous challenges that may have existed. There will naturally be a temptation to see an unlimited, uncapped and unrestricted mayoral levy as a means of tapping taxpayers’ pockets further. We need to make sure that that is constrained in a proper democratic manner.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Let me respond directly to the inference by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner that, through the Bill and the devolution of power, we are essentially imposing the Government’s own agenda and requirements on strategic authorities, mayors or local authorities. Let me be very clear: that is not the intent. The intent is to enable mayors and local and strategic authorities to define and drive their own priorities. If the hon. Member spends any time with any of our brilliant mayors or our emerging strategic authorities, it will be incredibly clear that they have their own agenda, which is driven by the priorities of their local people. The idea that we can impose on them a set of things and use them essentially as a new revenue-raising mechanism is for the birds.

We do not think that the desire expressed in the new clause to impose restrictions on the ability of the mayor to raise a precept is right or proportionate. We are clear that the precept must be both proportionate and fair. Ultimately—I said this before, and I will say it again—mayors are democratically elected. They are no less immune to the requirements and the political pressure from their voters than I am or the hon. Member is. The process of democracy—of people having to account for both revenue-raising and, critically, for what they are investing in—is absolutely right. I trust our mayors to do that. Ultimately, if they do not raise revenue and, critically, invest it in things that improve the lives of their constituents, they will pay the price at the ballot box. They do not need the hon. Member to impose his requirements on them.

[David Simmonds]

Given the significance of this issue, we will push the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We have spent a good deal of time debating the importance of housing and the delivery of housing targets. If we reflect on the construction industry news that came out yesterday, it is clear that there has been an absolute collapse in confidence in house building. Here in London, around 4% of the mayor’s housing target is being delivered, despite his having been allocated billions of pounds for that purpose.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Can the hon. Member remind the Committee when housing stocks plummeted? Was it not in 2023, on his watch?

[David Simmonds]

I think the Minister will probably be aware that the net additional new homes target that we set ourselves in the last Parliament was 1 million new homes. While we were, frustratingly, slightly below that target, we none the less delivered, in round terms, 1 million net additional new homes in this country. The collapse, as the Minister well knows, has taken place since the change of Government. That is an unfortunate reality. We know that the Budget in prospect later in the year is a significant issue of a conspicuous lack of confidence and a desperate need to get construction activity going again.

[David Simmonds]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: it is desperation in action, and we can see that happening, as can the whole world. We would like to see the Government succeed—we would like to see the country succeed in developing the new homes that it needs. However, it has been a continuous theme in our contributions to debates on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill that we must ensure that the 1.5 million homes that already have planning permission in England get built, rather than focusing on tearing up the green belt and on more permissions that also do not get built.

We know that in our capital city there are more than 300,000 new homes that already have planning permission, but on which work has not started. The purpose of the new clause is to ensure, just as we have sought to in the past in respect of private sector developers where there is a failure, that where a local authority or a mayor is in charge of a development, they are required to build it out in good time. That is so that we do not see a repeat of the situation where well-intentioned changes to the planning system simply result in more unbuilt permissions, while people who need homes do not have access to them, because that is not what is being delivered.

The focus of the new clause is to ensure that the system does what it is intended to and actually builds the homes, as opposed to churning out more planning permissions. Given the Government’s desperate need to move somewhere in the direction of achieving their 1.5 million target, I am sure the Minister will welcome the new clause and ensure that the Government support it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I understand the intent behind the new clause, and the Government are absolutely committed to building the homes that people across the country need. But I cannot let it pass without setting the record straight: housing delivery plummeted because of action taken by the previous Government, including the scrapping of housing targets across the country, the under-investment in social and affordable housing and, dare I mention, Liz Truss—remember her?—who saw mortgage rates skyrocket. Those are the factors that have driven down housing stock, and we, again, are having to fix the mess left by the previous Government. I will take no lectures from them on house building, given their record.

We are determined to deliver the 1.5 million homes that we know the country needs, and we will work with strategic authorities and local authorities to do that. There are already provisions that will enable mayors to accelerate housing development and drive economic growth, and we are providing further tools through the Bill, whether that is the strategic planning powers, the ability to raise the community infrastructure levy, the extension of the ability to form mayoral development corporations to all mayors outside London or, importantly, the land assembly powers given to strategic authorities to unlock development. We are very clear-sighted about what needs to be done, and we are already equipping and empowering mayors to do that.

We already have examples of where this is working, such as the Olympic legacy in Stratford and the huge progress delivered in London through that. There are provisions in the Bill. Our challenge is that we have to fix the mess that we inherited, but we are absolutely determined to do that, and we will do it in partnership with mayors.

[David Simmonds]

Many interpretations can be placed on the facts, but it is very clear if we look at the numbers that Government borrowing costs are now significantly higher even than under Liz Truss. It has been a pretty disastrous period for Government finances. If we are to see the measures to which the Minister has just referred succeed, there must be some imperative around building. We cannot simply see a tranche of mayors granting permissions, assembling sites and failing to deliver in the way that Mayor Khan has in London.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The intent of the new clause is very much in line with the recommendations that Mr Speaker has recently made in respect of Members of Parliament. There has been a degree of concern about the intimidation and victimisation of politicians and the impact that has had on wider public debate. It has been a long-standing principle that a person needs to declare their eligibility to stand in a particular place, and in a local authority there are specific requirements connected to the local area that person is seeking to serve.

However, it has been a widespread view for some time that there needs to be a degree of confidentiality so that members who are concerned that they will be victimised are able not to have that data, that information, placed in the public domain. Once they have satisfied the local authority’s returning officer that they meet the requirements—with evidence, as is currently the case—their home address does not need to be placed in the public domain, creating risk.

We think the precedent that Mr Speaker set out in respect to Members of Parliament is absolutely right. The intent of the new clause is to achieve the same for our locally elected brethren. I am sure that to achieve that objective, the Government will be pleased to support the new clause.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for this new clause. We wholeheartedly agree with its intent. In the English devolution White Paper, the Government committed to removing altogether the requirements for local government members’ home addresses to be published. The new clause would not achieve that aim because it relies on a member requesting non-publication. We believe that the default position should be non-publication, and we intend to legislate with more robust provisions when parliamentary time allows.

In light of the reassurance that we will be legislating on this important issue, which we agree on, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

This is a poorly worded new clause that lays an additional burden on the Secretary of State—I am a fan on a personal level—as well as on the local authorities that are already going to have to establish something at a very early stage. I do not think it is going to deliver the increased engagement, I do not think it is measurable, and ultimately I do not think the new clause will lead to a better outcome, which is a better level of trust between a constituent and the mayoral combined authorities. That is why I do not support it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We all agree that we need stronger community engagement, and a big strand of what we are trying to do through the Bill is to ensure that our communities across the country have greater powers and voice. A new commission is not the answer. The answer is in the doing—us doing the job of enabling all levels of Government, including our national Government, to engage the public and our communities better.

There is a role for the LGA, supported with funding, in building local authorities’ capability to do community engagement effectively. We have discussed the neighbourhood governance structure that we are trying to build, and creating an effective locus for communities to exercise their voice and power, and to be interlocutors with local government. We are building the network for neighbourhoods, which will bring together communities and partners to share best practice, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is suggesting, and strengthen the capability of communities to exercise their voice and power.

Critically, we are already putting this into practice through pride in place. We are putting investment into communities, organising community leaders on to neighbourhood boards to make decisions about the things that matter. While I appreciate the need for greater community engagement, I think that rather than set up a long-winded commission, we should crack on with the doing. That is what the Government are committed to.

[Siân Berry]

A standing commission that offers regular advice to all the groups that are trying to innovate would be a boon to them, not a burden as the hon. Member for Hamble Valley said. I believe that reporting back from “time to time” is completely normal language in Bills that set up an independent agency or organisation and we want to receive reports back; it definitely does not mean anything in particular.

I remind the Minister that there are risks if we do not do something to ensure that we stand by the important rights that people expect to be upheld. It is not just full of opportunity and excitement, as my previous speech implied; there is genuinely a risk that the new bodies—these unfamiliar, geographically drawn strategic authorities—will rejected by the public if the Government do not get this right. Trust is a crucial metric that we cannot measure ourselves—it just happens or not in other people. We need people to genuinely trust the new bodies. We cannot tell someone to trust them—they do or they do not. The Government must ensure that they are doing that right.

I do not want the reforms to fall flat any more than Ministers do. I think this provision is an important thing that could be done to ensure that they succeed better than they otherwise would. However, I am not going to press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I have been working on the new clause with the Centre for Local Economic Strategies. The new clause would require strategic authorities to prepare community wealth-building action plans and makes provision for partnerships with anchor organisations such as hospitals, colleges and employers, to support them. That would create the opportunity for organisations to come together to build collective action on things such as procurement, employment and the better use of owned assets in the local area. It would also grant mayors a right to request levies on private equity in local public services to limit extraction. The new clause is tailor-made for Labour Members, whose party outside government has long championed community wealth building.

In brief, community wealth building is the practice of creating an inclusive and democratically owned economy. It puts people before private equity profits, and champions the kind of economic development activity that is overlooked by industrial strategies, focusing instead on the everyday economy, where most people—our carers, our cleaners, our builders—work. Community wealth building is the missing piece of the puzzle to unlock growth for the benefit of everyone, everywhere. Scotland has a Community Wealth Building (Scotland) Bill passing through its Parliament. England must not be left behind.

We have all heard about Preston’s remarkable success in this field. Analysis of Preston’s programme in The Lancet Public Health found fewer mental health problems than expected during the community wealth building programme compared with similar areas, as life satisfaction and economic measures improved. The analysis found that the approach can provide an effective model for economic regeneration, potentially leading to substantial health benefits. Community wealth building is also part of the economic strategy of my city of Brighton and Hove, with a consensus to work on it over successive administrations.

To further the case, I will quote comments on the London borough of Islington’s programme made in November 2024 by its director of inclusive economy. She said:

“As I say very clearly to our team, this is not about levelling the playing field. This is about tilting the table. In an economy like Islington, we have to focus our limited resources on those who are least served by this economy…It’s about sustainability, it’s about justice, and that idea of creating prosperity for everyone. The core focus is on being locally rooted—trying to make sure that the money we spend and the efforts we make are all rooted within Islington and our wider regional economy”,

and that such programmes

“make sure that the big businesses who are in our local economies are able to engage with a local supply chain and local employment practices so that we can create that virtuous circle at a local level.”

The Islington programme director also commented on how equality is helped, saying in the interview,

“Similarly, lots of investment money typically goes to male-owned businesses. We’ve set up a series of programmes aimed at supporting underrepresented entrepreneurs.”

They reduce rents in their affordable workplaces if the operators support local people’s employment and local businesses and work on the supply chain. She also gives the example of dedicated incubation programmes

“to make sure that we ‘tilt the table’ in the favour of people who are least served by this economy.”

She says that, in short,

“It is about trying to make prosperity local”.

Who in this room could disagree with that?

I hope that the new clause is taken in the constructive spirit in which it is intended and receives a positive response from the Minister.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for tabling this amendment. As a proud Co-operative MP and as part of a Government who are driving through changes to the economy that put people at the heart, I support the intent behind this amendment. I know of the good work CLES does to drive this agenda across local and regional government. As I have said before, for us, the purpose of devolution is to equip and enable our mayors, local authorities and communities to rewire the economy so that it works for local people and fundamentally builds the wealth of communities. That is clear.

However, a duty to create a separate community wealth building plan will not achieve the intent of the new clause. These approaches should be embedded in the local growth plans that mayors are developing. We see that in practice if we look across the country at what our Labour mayors are doing, whether that is in Greater Manchester, the Liverpool city region or the West of England combined authority. Their approach builds in the principles of building community wealth, of co-operatives and mutuals and of community power, with a strong emphasis on the everyday economy.

We can legislate as much as we like, but what is important is the doing and the practice. We are clear that our job is to empower and equip our local leaders to do this. Many of them are already at the vanguard and well ahead of national Government because of the legacy of the previous Government. We will work with our mayors and strategic authorities to embed this in their local plans.

Critically, we are making sure that there are clear levers at the community level to drive this approach, for example, through the community right to buy. We agree with the intent, but a separate plan is not the way to deliver it. It needs to be fundamentally baked into the way that mayors drive local economic growth—a way that will put their communities at the heart and not just improve living standards, but build the wealth of those communities.

[Siân Berry]

I thank the Minister for her response. I am not entirely convinced that these measures are as baked in as she said. All these issues are vulnerable to election cycles. Something more specific along these lines, potentially within the requirements of the local economic plans, would help to ensure that people consistently see this approach taken across the country. The Minister talked about Labour mayors, but is she convinced? I am not sure that other mayors will take this on board, despite the proven benefits. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 34

Local government data

“(1) LURA 2023 is amended in as follows.

(2) In Section 84, in subsection (2)(b), after “planning and development” insert “including in relation to economic conditions, transport, tourism and nature”.

(3) In Section 91 (Interpretation)—

(a) after “(g) Part 8 of GLAA 1999,” insert “(ga) Parts 2 and 3 of the Transport Act 2000”;

(b) after “(k) this Part or Part 4 or 6 of this Act” insert “ the Environment Act 2021, Part 3 of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, Part 3 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026”.”—(Siân Berry.)

This new clause extends data standardisation powers contained in the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 to encompass Local Growth Plans, Local Nature Recovery Strategies and Local Transport Plans. Currently, proposals in these other plans may not constitute “development”, so would be outside the scope of existing powers.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 34 is about something that I do not think Ministers have yet considered, but it would be of real benefit to the efficiency and transparency of these new authorities. The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 created a number of new powers to standardise planning data, including local plans, planning software and the ways in which we can get information about planning applications and policies. The new clause would make sure that other activities of the strategic authorities were, from the start, set up to provide a similar level of data. We are talking about spatial data, spending data, data for inward investments, and data for the jobs created in association with different parts of economic plans. It would be marvellous to put that level of digitalisation of public data into the Bill, for the same Department mandated the planning data reforms that are being taken up extremely well.

We must do something about this either now or at the next stage of the Bill. We have seen provisions in the Bill—I have tabled other amendments on this—say things like, “Mayors must publish in such a manner as the mayor thinks appropriate.” That kind of wording is a recipe for PDFs inaccessible to organisations such as Natural England seeking to scrutinise or interact with these different strategic authorities around the country. Ministers themselves may want to know some data about what is going on in these local authorities, as well as the public at large—civil society. If we do not make things standardised, we will end up having to go through multiple inaccessible PDFs. Sometimes, those are Excel documents that have been turned into PDFs, and yet the Excel documents are not released. It would be tremendous for standardised, accessible data in API formats—searchable, integratable and comparable—to be produced as a matter of course through the Bill.

The measure would also help to support the goals of the Aarhus convention, which is all about transparency and being able to find out information. It would also be a gift to people who want to create things like accessible apps, websites and maps for pamphlets about the services in a local area. Those are the kinds of benefits that the Government talked about at the time of introducing the requirements on planning. They need to look again at whether they want things published in multiple different ways that become hard to integrate later, or whether they want things to be organised a little better from the start. The new clause is tabled in a constructive way. I hope that Ministers will ask their teams to explore the idea and talk to the people working on planning. It would be of huge benefit not to have to unpick a mess of data for these new authorities later on.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Lady has set out the Government’s ambition to move away from a document-led planning system to a data-driven one, where planning data is openly available and more easily accessible. I recognise the intention to expand the data standards provision to ensure that it covers other types of plans produced by strategic authorities, such as the local growth plan or the local transport plan.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 grants the Secretary of State the power to specify in regulations which planning information must meet set data standards. Given that data standards can evolve, the Secretary of State also has the power to define those standards. The definition of planning and development is already broad enough to capture the types of data that would be used for the plans sought to be covered by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion.

The Government are confident that existing powers in the 2023 Act are broad enough to make the new clause unnecessary. I come back to the consistent theme of many of my responses to the hon. Lady: it is now in the doing and the acting. We have the powers in statute to respond; it is about how we put those into practice. I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.

[Siân Berry]

I implore the Minister to go away and look at this again. The courts have confirmed that transport schemes, such as the cycleway running along the Embankment, do not count as development. Therefore, the wider applicability that I think the Minister was asserting may not be in place without some kind of amendment to make sure that things such as the local economic plans, local growth plans, nature recovery strategies and local transport plans are fully covered by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. It may need some changes that I think the Minister is unaware of at the moment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Perran Moon]

I think that there is scope within the Bill to find a path forward that would be acceptable to the people of Cornwall and would adhere to the Government’s devolution plan, particularly around a single strategic authority. I implore the Minister to keep working with Cornish MPs to find a solution that allows the Cornish people access to the highest level of devolution, but without a requirement to join a mayoral combined authority. On that basis, I will not support the new clause.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The new clause conflates two issues, and I will try to unpack them. On the one hand, there is the question of recognition of national minority status, which is particularly pertinent in the case of Cornwall. My hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth has been a steadfast, impassioned and persistent champion and advocate for it.

My departmental colleagues and I have put it on the record that we absolutely recognise the unique status of Cornwall. We are looking for ways both to enhance the protections that are already there and, critically, to support the Cornish local authority in responding to the challenges that it faces and unlock the potential of the area. That is all on the record. We will continue to work, not just with members of the Committee but with MPs across Cornwall and the local authority, to take that forward. However, that is distinct from the ambition to create a regional tier of government. I remind colleagues that that was roundly rejected in a referendum. I know it was a couple of decades ago, but the question was tested.

There is a fundamental question here: if we are trying to drive the economic prosperity of places, where is it best to locate that? One model proposes that the best place is large regional blocs, while another model says that functional geographies around city and county regions are better placed to drive that. The large regional blocs model was tested with the regional development agencies, and we found that the connection to the local economy was weaker. Critically, the democratic link to people in those places was weaker. That is why the model did not endure, and why, unfortunately, the Conservatives undid all the good work that we did when we were last in power. Our strong view is that strategic, functional geography—city and county regions—is the best place to make decisions around transport, housing and planning, skills and travel-to-work areas. That is why we are conferring powers at that level.

If we seek to create another regional tier that is not about the collaboration that we are seeing, for example, with Northern Powerhouse Rail or our authorities in the midlands to deal with issues, predominantly to do with rail, that cut across functional areas, I worry that we will denude the very institutions that we are trying to strengthen, confuse the system, create more complexity and bureaucracy, and undermine the one thing we all want to achieve: stronger, functional economic geographies that can drive prosperity in places.

There are two issues here. I understand what the hon. Lady’s new clause is trying to do, but it is fundamentally wrong. We have tested that model, and we believe that functional geographies at the strategic authority level are where we can make progress. I point her to the evidence of the past decade, in which we have had mayors in Greater Manchester and the Liverpool city region driving growth and prosperity. That is the right geography. We need to build the power there. We should not confuse the matter. I ask the her to withdraw the new clause.

[Vikki Slade]

No, I am not going to withdraw the new clause. If the Minister reads it, she will see that I am not conflating the issues at all. I simply gave Cornwall as an example of where it might work. The new clause does not mention the word “Cornwall”. It allows for

“a regional governance body in any part of England, where in the opinion of the Secretary of State there is demonstrable local support for such a body”,

so it does not undermine the role of the strategic authority.

Let me give the Minister another example. Whether Cornwall is or is not included is up to the people of Cornwall, but Wessex, we presume, will come forward in the next wave of devolution deals. Wessex may be a functional geography in terms of our connectivity, but the south-west of England is the place that most of us identify with far more.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Lady talks about regional assemblies in the context of Cornwall. Can she explain the purpose of the local authority and the elected council in the model that she is proposing?

[Vikki Slade]

I refer the Minister to the fact that I gave Cornwall as an example of a place where people may want to set up a regional governance body. The new clause was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough (Tom Gordon), initially in reference to Yorkshire, which has a number of mayoral authorities that want to work together. The people of Yorkshire feel that they have an identity as Yorkshire, and they want a regional assembly.

If the Minister would like me to withdraw my comment about the fact that that may work for Cornwall, she should feel free to ask, but I know for a fact that my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Ben Maguire) believes that the new clause would benefit him in Cornwall, so I will not withdraw it. It is important to give people the opportunity to have something that they feel works for them.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I am sorry to tempt the Committee with the prospect of a nice pint in the Strangers Bar, but I will not speak to this new clause for very long. It was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson). We have spent the afternoon talking about unique circumstances elsewhere in the country, but there are unique circumstances on the Isle of Wight, because of the nature of its geography.

Before I say any more on that, Dame Siobhain, may I, as one of the shadow Ministers, thank you and the other Chairs for your chairing, because this is probably the last time that I will speak in this Bill Committee? I also thank the Minister and the Government Whip, who has been so courteous during our negotiations through the usual channels; hopefully, she will do us some more favours going forward.

Even though we are not in government, I also thank the officials, because I have seen the churn of officials coming in and going out of the Committee Room in the last couple of weeks. Without them, politics would not be able to function, so I thank them for their work on the Bill. We mostly disagree with the Bill, but they are doing a great job for all of us.

The Isle of Wight is geographically unique, because it is only really accessible by boat, including ferries. Over the last 20 years or so, the two main ferry companies for the Isle of Wight, Red Funnel and Wightlink, have been passed between and traded by private equity groups. Just last week, Red Funnel changed hands in what was believed to be a distressed sale, with banks being owed tens of millions of pounds.

The people of the Isle of Wight absolutely rely on access to the mainland, and the island relies on mainland access to it, in order to supply it and to ensure that the people of that great place are well and are looked after. Under the pricing model of the last 20 years, however, peak car return fares have skyrocketed to as much as £400 a car, just for crossing a five-mile stretch of water. Timetables have diminished, so what was once a 30-minute service is now hourly or worse, and under-investment by Red Funnel’s owners means that its car ferry fleet is so old that it entered service before the maritime Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Selby (Keir Mather), was born. Breakdowns are increasingly frequent, with some parts now so obsolete that boats are having to be withdrawn from service.

The Isle of Wight ferry service is a lifeline. There is no other way for the island’s 140,000 residents to cross the five-mile stretch of water to get on and off the island, including for key activities such as work, health appointments, education, visiting sick relatives, or being visited by relatives on whom they rely.

In the last debate on new clause 44, the Minister said that she believed that transport management structures should be run on a county basis. We agree with her; the efficiencies of scale mean that the mayor of Hampshire and the Solent should be able to run transport locally. The Government have a record of policies whereby we are seeing greater Government and regional involvement in the commissioning and running of our transport services, particularly through the bus Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East and I would argue that ferries should not be treated differently, especially when they are the sole mode of transport that people must rely on.

When my hon. Friend met the previous maritime Minister, the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Mike Kane), however, the Government showed a distinct lack of action in this regard. My hon. Friend was promised that there would be a number of meetings—there have been meetings with the previous Minister—and that a body would be convened to discuss the matter, but that simply has not happened.

My hon. Friend therefore tabled new clause 49, which would give mayors the authority to regulate ferry services. It would apply not only to the Isle of Wight but to any regional structure that has ferries acting within its geographical boundaries. The functions exercisable by the mayor would include

“making regulations concerning the provision, operation, safety, accessibility, affordability, and reliability of ferry services”.

Labour Members should look at me with encouragement—perhaps I have had a conversion to the centre-left of British politics—because the new clause would also provide for the regulation of fares and a fare cap. I think that is acceptable in a situation where a single provider is flagrantly breaching the good faith of the people of the Isle of Wight.

I know that the Minister will resist this new clause—that does not surprise me; she has a job to do, as do I—but there is clearly a problem. I live just up the road from the Isle of Wight and the prices are crazy. The people living on the island rely on those ferries—they are used to supply medical services, to supply businesses and shops, and for family situations on the Isle of Wight—so the Government must step up.

The new clause makes a reasonable suggestion to the Government to give a mayor the power to control transport services within their region. I am delighted that the Conservative candidate for mayor of Hampshire and the Solent, Donna Jones, has said that she is actively pushing the Government for those regulatory powers. We support her in that so that she can come down very hard on the ferry services that are taking advantage of people who live on the Isle of Wight.

If the Government genuinely believe in devolution and in the control of transport—we have seen over the last 14 months that they believe in mayors being able to commission and manage transport services—that should include all transport services. I commend the new clause to the Committee, and hope that the Minister will give some encouraging words to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East and to me. I have not spoken to my hon. Friend about this, and I am sure he will want to move the new clause on Report, but I wish to press it to a Division in Committee.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Let me start by saying that we absolutely recognise the issue that the hon. Member for Hamble Valley and hon. Members representing the Isle of Wight have raised. That is why the Department for Transport has engaged with MPs and stakeholders on the Isle of Wight to identify their local solutions to the concerns that we understand and appreciate need to be addressed.

That engagement has included a ministerial roundtable on this issue and a commitment to create a cross-Solent group. An independent chair has been appointed to take that group forward. We will continue to engage with partners locally to address the genuine issues that have been raised about the ferry service in the area. The power of a democratically elected mayor is that they can make this a core issue and use the levers that they have and the seat that they will have at the table with Government to keep making the case and delivering for their community.

[Paul Holmes]

I thank the Minister for those encouraging words. She is absolutely correct, and I hope she does not see this intervention as unfair, but can she use her good offices to speed that group along? When the then maritime Minister visited the Isle of Wight in April, he said that a DFT working group would be created, but that has not happened—there has been no meeting. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East and the hon. Member for Isle of Wight West (Mr Quigley) have been involved in that working group on a cross-party basis but it has not met yet. Could the Minister use her good offices to push for that meeting?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will write to my counterparts in the DFT. The commitment to create the group came in recognition of a problem. We are committed to working with local stakeholders and Members representing the area to respond to that, so I am happy to write to my DFT colleagues to chivvy that along.

[Paul Holmes]

The Minister has gone further than I was expecting her to. I think it is now up to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East to table the new clause again on Report, alongside, if necessary, the hon. Member for Isle of Wight West. Pending conversations with my hon. Friend, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 51

Community ownership fund

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations which establish a community ownership fund within six months of the passage of this Act.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) are subject to the negative procedure.

(3) Regulations under subsection (1) must make provision for any strategic authority to apply for funding of up to £2 million to support any—

(a) voluntary and community organisation, or

(b) parish or town council,

to purchase of an assets of community value they determine is at risk in their area.”—(Vikki Slade.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a Community Ownership Fund to which strategic authorities may apply for funding.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that the Minister can either support all three new clauses, or reassure us on how we can ensure that strategic authorities and all the other partners work together to ensure that our skills strategy succeeds.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The English devolution White Paper set out clearly our proposals to strengthen the role of strategic authorities in local skills improvement plans and highlights the intention to use legislation and statutory guidance as appropriate to achieve that. As a Government, we remain completely committed to that position, and we intend to bring forward legislation to do precisely that.

We are not, however, just waiting for legislation; ahead of that, updated statutory guidance will set out how we expect strategic authorities and employer representative bodies to work together on the next round of local skills improvement plans. That will include a requirement for both parties to confirm whether they are content with the plan before it is submitted to the Secretary of State for approval. Where they do not agree, Skills England, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, will help to resolve any issues. In that context, and given the direction of travel, I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw new clause 56, because it is not necessary.

On new clause 57, I point the hon. Member to schedule 10 of the Bill, in which strategic authorities will be under a duty to secure appropriate adult education provision in their area. That will include considering existing provision and provision of different types in the area; but, crucially, it also allows them to consider a broader range of factors than the new clause allows for. We know that in practice strategic authorities are already considering a wide range of local factors—including where the labour market is, and where current and future demand is—as they design, develop and drive forward their adult skills strategy.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I know they are already doing it, but making it statutory ensures that it actually happens and can be scrutinised—that is why we want to do that.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The current devolution framework creates the basis by which effective execution of the powers that authorities have on adult skills will be driven forward. The legislative provisions exist; it is now in the doing. As a Department, we will both enable that working between strategic authorities and employers on the ground that I have talked about and, critically, make sure that we provide the tools that they need to strengthen their capability to do that well. It matters to us because effective skills, and developing the pipeline and the workforce to drive the economic change we want, are critical to delivering on housing and our warm homes plan. We are vested in ensuring that our strategic authorities have the tools that they require to do that and to do it incredibly well.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 72

Interpretation

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 243, in clause 72, page 73, line 15, at end insert—

“‘FRSA 2004’ means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004;”.

This would define the abbreviation “FRSA 2004” which is used in the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 244.

Clauses 73 to 77 stand part.

Government amendment 245.

Clauses 78 and 79 stand part.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

As this is, I hope, the last time that I will be standing, I thank you, Dame Siobhain, and our other Chairs for your fantastic chairing of this Committee. The pace, tone and quality of the debate are testimony to how effectively it is been chaired. I put on record my thanks to the Clerks, who have done a fantastic job facilitating the proceedings of this Committee and ensuring that we all know what we are doing.

I offer huge thanks to my hon. Friends, who have been fantastic colleagues in driving through this line-by-line process. It is the first time that I have ever taken a Bill through Committee, and I thank them for all their support. I also thank Opposition Members. The way we have conducted the Committee is a testament to the very best of Parliament. It has been done with much gusto, with spirit and with great insights, but in a very collegiate manner, and I thank all hon. Members for that.

Finally, I put on record my thanks to my fantastic officials. This is a mammoth Bill, with a huge amount of work done before my time and up to this point. We would not be here with this genuinely transformative piece of legislation, which begins to rewire the state to put power in the hands of our communities, without the fantastic work of my officials in the Department who drove it forward.

With huge thanks, great relief and slight exhaustion, I turn to part 6 of the Bill. The clauses in part 6 are standard Bill clauses, which ensure that the provisions in other parts of the Bill work as intended when it comes into force. The amendments are consequential clarifying amendments. They mean that the Bill as a whole is coherent and operates the way that we intend it to in policy. I draw the Committee’s attention to clause 79, in particular, which provides that the short title of this Bill, once enacted, will be the “English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act”. I think we will all be proud of our role in bringing it into force.

Amendment 243 agreed to.

Clause 72, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 73

Saving of orders and regulations relating to combined authorities and CCAs

Amendment made: 244, in clause 73, page 74, line 27, leave out from “which” to end of line 29 and insert

“is to continue to apply instead of the primary legislation by virtue of subsection (2), or

(b) makes modifications or other contrary provision to which the primary legislation is to continue to be subject by virtue of subsection (2).”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would clarify the relationship between subsection (4) and subsection (2); and clarify that paragraphs (a) and (b) are alternatives.

Clause 73, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 74 to 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Commencement

Amendment made: 245, in clause 78, page 76, leave out lines 11 and 12 and insert—

“(c) any other provision of this Act comes into force (including provision modifying other legislation) so far as it confers power to make secondary legislation or is otherwise necessary for enabling the exercise of such a power on or after the day on which this Act is passed.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This ensures that the powers to make secondary legislation inserted by the Bill, and any provisions necessary for enabling the exercise of such powers, come into force on the day on which the Act is passed.

Amendment proposed: 303, in clause 78, page 78, line 7, at end insert—

“(5A) Section 71 will not come into force until the Secretary of State has—

(a) completed a consultation about the impact of section 71 on businesses, and

(b) laid a report summarising the consultation before both Houses of Parliament.”—(David Simmonds.)

This amendment would prevent section 71 from coming into force until a consultation on its impact on businesses has been completed and a report summarising the consultation has been laid before both Houses of Parliament.

Question put, That the amendment be made.