(1 week, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I extend my personal sorrow to the family of Lance Corporal George Hooley. His tragic death is a humbling reminder of the risk that we ask all those who serve with such honour to confront on a daily basis.
In relation to the Urgent Question, we have here a story of starkly, indeed darkly, contrasting facts. In the summer, troops were taken ill after using Ajax vehicles. In late November, 31 soldiers fell ill after using the vehicles, forcing a two-week suspension of Ajax’s use while a safety investigation was carried out. Personnel have been limited to spending only one and a half hours inside the vehicles due to health concerns. Their speed has been restricted because of instability, and they cannot fire while moving. Meanwhile, in early November Mr Luke Pollard, the Minister, visited General Dynamics in Wales to mark the initial operating capability of Ajax. The November edition of Desider, an internal MoD publication, lavished praise on Ajax as a “world-class armoured fighting vehicle” and a “transformational capability”.
Given what we now know, I ask the Minister how on earth the MoD could accept initial operating capability. Who signed that off? If this nightmare cannot be fixed, as looks increasingly likely, can the contract be terminated?
I thank the noble Baroness for her remarks about our British serviceman who was so tragically lost. The whole House will join in her remarks.
With respect to the position regarding Ajax, the previous Minister will be well aware of the various reports and representations that have been made to various Ministers over a number of years. All Ministers, past and present, will want answers to the very questions that the noble Baroness has quite rightly put to us. Like all of us, she will be waiting for the results of the various investigations that have been set up. I assure her that—as she will have heard from my colleague in the other place—when we get the results of those investigations, we will consider all available options on how we move forward.
My Lords, we on these Benches also recognise the responsibilities we have with troops now helping to train the Ukrainian army and we send our condolences; we know that we are committed to Ukraine. Now that we are waiting for further comments on what is really happening with the Ajax vehicle, can I ask three quick wider questions?
First, the Minister in the Commons admitted:
“The Army has a number of vehicles that … have been in service for a long period”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/12/25; col. 58.]
I think that is saying that both the fighting fleet and the logistics fleet are pretty outdated. Does that mean that in this much more dangerous period we should be investing much more into the Army fleet than we currently plan to?
Secondly, the SDR says that we are now in a very different situation but the Treasury, at the Budget, has said that we will do a little bit of extra investment in the next two years and then maybe a bit more in three or four years. Should we not now be talking about a much more serious threat that requires much more defence investment than we are currently planning?
My third question is about strategic partnerships. The Defence Industrial Strategy says:
“It is no longer affordable for NATO Allies, especially within Europe, to develop their own exquisite capabilities at low production volumes”.
That means much closer co-operation and collaboration with others. Given what President Trump is saying about the NATO alliance, that means hard negotiations with our European partners, difficult though it is. Does the Minister agree?
There was quite a bit in that. I thank the noble Lord for his comments about the bravery and sacrifice of our Armed Forces. He will know that we have paused all use of the Ajax vehicles pending the outcome of the investigations as the safety of our Armed Forces comes first.
On logistics, I think he refers to the fact that large numbers of trucks are having to be repaired. They are being repaired, and we expect that to be completed in the new year. On the SDR and the money, he will see the budgets that have been made available and the increase over a period of time. He referred to the aspiration to move even further with that, particularly by 2035.
On the point he made about strategic partnerships, of course they are crucial. We spend a large amount of time negotiating with European friends and partners. He will have seen the recent Norway deal with respect to the frigates, and the arrangements we have made with France, Germany and Poland. They are just some examples, and I hope it demonstrates to the noble Lord that we take seriously the need to negotiate, work and co-operate with our European friends, most of which are members of NATO as well.
My Lords, this scandal reminds me of a scandal I worked on when I was a very young man: the airborne early warning system of the 1980s. It started under Labour and was cancelled by my noble friend Lord Trefgarne; it cost millions of pounds. Working within that company, Ministers were deliberately deceived so that they could get payment for costs plus. Can the noble Lord, who is a highly respected Minister in this place, assure the House that Ministers have not been deceived over this contract? Is it possible that we could decide to go for an off-the-shelf product from a manufacturer within this country or one of our allies? My noble friend made the difficult decision, and in the 1980s we took an off-the-shelf product to replace the failed airborne early warning contract. We took AWACS, which still works to this day.
I thank the noble Lord for the question. Clearly, Ministers from all Governments make decisions on the basis of the advice they receive. Let us see what the investigation tells us about that advice. He will know that there are four different aspects to the investigations. There are the defence, Army and ministerial aspects, then alongside that, which I think the noble Lord will appreciate, we are looking to people outside the MoD—some independent consultants—to look at what is happening so that we get independent advice. I think that was something the former Minister in the other place, James Cartlidge MP, asked for. When we get the result of those investigations we will take the decisions that are necessary at that point, but we need to wait for the results.
My Lords, has any foreign interest been expressed in purchasing Ajax at any stage? If it is not going to be purchased, will it be a UK-only piece of equipment?
I am not aware of any foreign interest in it, but I will check my facts and come back to the noble and gallant Lord if I am incorrect.
My Lords, I have enormous sympathy for the Minister, given the situation in which he finds himself. More than £6 billion has been spent on a fighting vehicle that is more dangerous to our own troops than to the enemy. What steps are being taken to pursue redress for malefaction on the part of the company concerned, General Dynamics? Permanent Secretaries at the Ministry of Defence have been the accounting officers responsible to Parliament for this expenditure. If we find that at the very highest level, Permanent Secretaries and directors-general in the Ministry of Defence have made mistakes that have endangered the lives of our fighting men and wasted millions, will we in this House have the opportunity to ensure that appropriate action is taken to ensure that they cannot play a future role in public life?
I do not know the absolute answer to the noble Lord’s last point, but at some point there will be a significant number of debates and questions that will explore in much more detail the whole Ajax programme since 2014 up to the present day. As I say, we are in a slightly difficult situation because we are waiting for the outcome of those investigations to inform the way forward. The budget of £6.3 billion was set in 2014 and is the same budget now, but I take the noble Lord’s point. Let us come back to it at a future debate when we have the results of the investigations.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a chief engineer working for AtkinsRéalis. We have a difficult history of armoured fighting vehicle procurements in this country. The TRACER programme was a failed procurement, as was the multi-role armoured vehicle, MRAV, and now we have issues with the Ajax programme. What lessons learned from Ajax are being brought forward into future procurements, such as Boxer and Challenger 3?
Without being flippant, I am fed up with lessons learned from various reports over a period of time. The bigger question is why the lessons learned so often do not translate into something that makes a fundamental difference. The noble Baroness worked in the MoD, and the noble Lord works in the way that he suggested. I do not think that the vast majority of people set out to do a bad job; they work with dynamism, principle and determination to do their best. But somewhere along the line, we do not seem to be able to procure the equipment that we should, at the pace we should and for the price we should.
I hope that the defence reform that the Secretary of State has implemented—the establishment of a new National Armaments Director Group, with a new National Armaments Director at the top who is directly accountable for what happens with respect to procurement —is a reform that, in a year, two years or whenever, the noble Lord will be able to describe as a reform that worked. He will be able to say that lessons were learned and actions taken that made a fundamental difference.
We have to get our defence industry working, whether across Europe or fundamentally within our own country, because the defence and security of our nation depend on the sovereign ability of our own industry to produce and develop the goods, ammunition and war equipment that we need to support our soldiers.
(1 week, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what are the priorities for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
My Lords, before I answer the noble Baroness’s Question, I follow the Prime Minister in expressing our deepest condolences to the family and loved ones of Lance Corporal George Hooley, who died yesterday in Ukraine. He served his country with honour in the cause of freedom, and all of us in your Lordships’ House will want to affirm that his service will never be forgotten.
The NPT is the cornerstone of international peace and security, and has been for over half a century. The UK is working hard to strengthen the NPT to ensure its continued success. At this review conference we will work across all three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. This will include supporting efforts to create the conditions for disarmament, upholding the IAEA and its safeguards, championing nuclear weapon-free zones, countering attempts to weaken the non-proliferation architecture, and enabling access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses worldwide.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer and associate these Benches with his tribute. As he is all too aware, the NPT is in a very fragile state, with nuclear arms states modernising and expanding their range of nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons increase the risk of escalation, miscalculation and accidents. As was stated in your Lordships’ House a couple of weeks ago during Questions, a nuclear war must never be fought and there will be no winners. As the UK is currently chair of the P5, will the Minister use that position to prepare the ground for the NPT conference next April? Meanwhile, will the Government reconsider their refusal to join the UN panel on the physical and societal effects of a nuclear war?
My Lords, we will always consider any suggestions, but let me be clear: we chair the P5 as part of the NPT. We are very proud to do that. We established the process. This country has as its goal a nuclear-free world, but we also recognise today’s strategic realities, and to meet these challenges, we have to take the action that we do. We are very proud to be part of the P5 and the NPT, but we also recognise in the strategic context that we are in that the nuclear deterrent and its modernisation are essential to our security and that of the global world.
The Minister takes this extremely seriously, and so he should. Does he agree that the NPT review now faces the worst challenge in the 50 years since its inception in 1968? Will he assure us that our team, when we go into the review, will press on all three of the pillars he described extremely hard and bring home to people the extreme danger of smaller countries wanting to get in on the act, already applying to see whether they can break the existing five’s monopoly, which, of course, is broken a bit anyway, and bring to the public a much stronger understanding of the intense danger of the proliferation everywhere of nuclear bombs?
I strongly agree with the noble Lord’s analysis. The NPT is an essential cornerstone of global security. I suggest that in many ways it has been particularly successful. I was looking at the figures earlier on. In 1986, there were an estimated 70,300 nuclear warheads, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the most recent figure I could find was 12,241. Although there are challenges, as the noble Lord points out, we have managed in many ways to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure that, as far as possible, the architecture of the post-war world remains the same. However, the noble Lord is right to point out the challenges, and this country, along with our allies and friends, will do all we can to ensure that the NPT remains successful and that all three pillars are pursued.
I endorse the Minister’s comments about the tragic loss of Lance Corporal Hooley and express sympathy to the lance corporal’s family and friends. What analysis have the Government made of the likely impact on non-proliferation efforts of the wholly inadequate response of the international community to Russia’s violation of the Budapest memorandum through its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent war of aggression in Ukraine?
I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his comments, and I should have thanked the noble Baroness for associating herself with the remarks that I made about the tragic death of our serviceman. The lesson I think we should learn as a country is that it is important for us to reassert and re-establish the principle of deterrence. Part of preventing war is actually preparing for war. The whole success of the deterrent is the fact that the nuclear deterrent is there—the theory of deterrence. I think what happened following the Budapest arrangements, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons there, is perhaps a lesson for us that sometimes a position of strength allows you to negotiate and pursue peace more effectively than in the alternative way.
First, on behalf of these Benches I echo and endorse the Minister’s sentiments on the tragic death of Lance Corporal George Hooley of the Parachute Regiment in Ukraine while observing Ukrainian forces testing a new defensive capability, and we of course extend our condolences to his family on this tragic loss. On the subject of proliferation, what is the Government’s current assessment of Iran’s progress towards nuclear capability? What work is ongoing to discourage Iran from further progress, and what steps is the UK taking in concert with our allies to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons?
I first thank the noble Lord for the comments that he made and his association with my remarks about the tragic death. It is appreciated by everyone in this House and beyond. The noble Lord will know that there is no difference between us all. We support the work of the IAEA in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear technology is not used for the making or establishment of a nuclear weapons facility; we take action with respect to that. The noble Lord will have seen the action that others have chosen to take. The UK takes this very seriously, and we continue to press Iran to ensure that it abides by the provisions of the NPT.
My Lords, the challenge of the review next year is to prevent the escalation, never mind the reduction, of nuclear weapons, and to ensure that there is no worrying escalation by America, China or Russia of their threats to test nuclear weapons, for example. How can we be sure that we put the process into reverse rather than see it escalate?
The establishment and existence of the NPT, which involves 191 countries, including all the countries—Russia, China and the United States—that the noble Lord has mentioned, provides a conference and a venue in which much of this can be discussed. All I am saying is that the NPT has been a successful vehicle. We need to continue to support it to try to take this forward.
The noble Lord mentions the comprehensive test-ban treaty; that has been another success. I know the point that he is making about the apparent re-establishment—according to President Trump—of that. That is a matter for America. This country has not tested a nuclear weapon since the early 1990s. We adhere to the provisions of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, and to the provisions of the NPT. We ask and call on other countries to do exactly the same.
At the risk of repeating myself—the only thing that I am testing is my memory—can the Minister give us any reassurance that the international community is taking seriously the increase in the production of nuclear weapons, and in weapons capability, by the DPRK? What action is being taken with some of the DPRK’s influential neighbours to contain a potentially lethal situation?
The noble Lord will be pleased to know that I never repeat myself. On the serious point about the DPRK, we take that challenge seriously. The DPRK announced that it had departed from the NPT in 2003. That is something that the UK and the international community dispute and do not accept. We call on the neighbours to which the noble Lord refers to put pressure on the DPRK to adhere to its responsibilities that it accepted when it joined the NPT in the first place.
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Curran
To ask His Majesty’s Government what support is offered to victims of sexual violence in the armed services.
My Lords, people who choose to serve their country deserve to do so free from fear of abuse. The Defence Serious Crime Command has driven improvements to victim care and investigations since its establishment in December 2022. The Victim Witness Care Unit has delivered independent, exemplary care to victims of crime since launching in 2023. We have partnerships with several charities providing independent support, and we are further strengthening this with an independent legal advocacy pilot and improving access to medical support following an incident, so action continues.
Baroness Curran (Lab)
I thank my noble friend the Minister for that very helpful reply. Are all complaints of sexual harassment and assault recorded? How are they monitored, and is the Minister aware of what percentage leads to disciplinary action or prosecution?
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her Question, which I think is of importance and interest to us all. As I said, various units have been set up to deal with this problem. The MoD publishes annual statistics for sexual offending within the service justice system, and the Service Complaints Ombudsman for the Armed Forces reports on complaints of sexual harassment. In 2024, there were 294 criminal investigations into sexual offences, including rape and sexual assault, compared to 251 in 2023. Additionally, 37 cases were transferred to the Home Office police. A further 10 cases were recategorised as non-sexual offences but remained within the service justice system and were handled by commanding officers. The Service Prosecuting Authority brought 61 charges for sexual offences in 2024 based on cases received that year. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.
My Lords, the Army website for the Victim Support Pathway for sexual offences is, helpfully, very clear and, most of all, encouraging, making it plain that it is not the victim’s fault and setting out a route for her—it usually is a her—to get help. I apologise for asking for more data, but is there data yet by rank to show what percentage of the military workforce has undertaken training recommended on the Victim Support Pathway? The key advice about not being a bystander will work only if there is extensive training throughout the military.
I agree with the noble Baroness about the importance of training all ranks. Certainly, I know that the military take that extremely seriously. The establishment of the victim care unit is part of ensuring that victims are supported through the process. On whether the training has been identified according to rank, I will go back and see whether that has been done.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that part of supporting victims is showing clear and sustained condemnation for this type of behaviour, and ensuring that the military pursues these cases vigorously and rapidly and that we do not find delay in the process?
I know that there have been a number of documented cases of utterly unacceptable behaviour, some of which is criminal and deserves to be prosecuted. I know from speaking to senior officers, past and present, that they are determined to do something about the small number of people who undermine the culture of our Armed Forces. They are adamant in the pursuit of those who break those rules and act inappropriately. The Government support them in that, as did the previous Government. We support our senior officers and officers at all ranks in rooting out this totally unacceptable behaviour.
My Lords, this Question is specifically about sexual violence, but a lot of distress is caused by sexual harassment. Can the Minister assure the House that sexual harassment, which can cause great anxiety and difficulty to the victim involved, is taken very seriously too in the Armed Forces?
I can assure my noble friend of that. The Armed Forces go out of their way to encourage service personnel to report all examples of sexual harassment. They make it clear that sexual harassment or sexual intimidation below what we might consider to be the criminal threshold is unacceptable as well. They encourage self-reporting and keep statistics in respect of that. At all levels and at all ranks within the Armed Forces, they are seeking to root out unacceptable behaviour, whether it is so-called minor sexually inappropriate behaviour or more serious criminal activities.
My Lords, in response to my amendment to the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill, which would have enabled an independent direct route to the commissioner for whistleblowing complainers, the Government announced that they would undertake a whistleblowing in defence review. Can the Minister update the House on the progress of that review?
I thank again the noble Baroness for the whistleblower review amendment that she brought to the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill in liaison with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. That is being taken forward. The whistleblowing review is under way. We expect an interim report to be available in the very near future, with a full report available sometime in the spring next year. I assure the noble Baroness that it has not been forgotten; it has not been put on the shelf; it is something that we are actively pursuing.
My Lords, given that chaplains routinely provide partial support for victims of crime, including sexual offences, can the Minister outline what steps His Majesty’s Government are taking to ensure that Armed Forces chaplains receive specialist trauma-informed training so that they can support survivors of sexual violence? Is such training consistent across the services?
I can assure the noble—I do not know what the correct title is.
The right reverend Prelate, who I know very well is the Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham. I can reassure the noble—
I can reassure the right reverend Prelate that of course the chaplaincy service within the Armed Forces is involved in support and dealing with these matters when they arise. That sort of support is essential, because victims should have the confidence and support to come forward. If they do not feel that anyone is there to support them, they will not do so. The chaplaincy service is fully involved in these discussions and obviously at the forefront of giving support to those who find themselves in that situation. As for consistency across all services, I would hope that that is consistent across all three services, because it affects them all, but, again, I will go back and make sure that is the case.
My Lords, I conducted the study 30 years ago into whether women should serve at sea and came to the conclusion that they should, and it has been a huge success. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that, overall, women have added hugely to our Armed Forces and that, with all these debates, there is a real risk it might put women off joining for what is still a fantastic career with huge opportunities for them? It is only a tiny minority, and we need to be very clear to get that message across.
I congratulate my noble friend again on the work that he did with respect to encouraging women into the service and in particular into the Navy and indeed the submarine service. A number of noble and gallant Lords are in the Chamber listening to this debate, and I know that they too have been right at the forefront of encouraging that. Let us be clear, of course there are unacceptable behaviours; of course there are examples where standards are not met, but across the whole of the services, the contribution that women make is phenomenal. They add to our services; they are an important part of our Armed Forces, and it is a brilliant career for women. I hope many more women join the services in the future.
My Lords, the noble Lord missed out that it was a ministerial decision to send women to sea, and it was taken because we were turning away very good women and accepting substandard men. That decision was taken by a Conservative Government.
I will just say to the noble Lord that I try very hard not to be partisan on defence matters. I do not really care whether it was a Conservative Government or a Labour Government. The important principle is that women have made a huge contribution to our Armed Forces. That decision was the right one and, frankly, that is what we should be celebrating.
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what response they are making to the proposals for a ‘whole society’ approach to threats to national security, as set out in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review.
My Lords, the Government are committed to reviewing the recommendations outlined in the strategic defence review, which recognises the importance of a whole-of-society approach to strengthening our resilience and readiness against the threats we face. Defence is playing a key role within the Cabinet Office-led home defence programme, which is co-ordinating civil and military preparations against the most serious risks. Our approach includes strengthening our civilian and military links to deliver legislation, enhance critical national infrastructure protection, and develop our reserve and cadet forces.
Does the Minister agree that this is a very radical proposal? The SDR envisages the mobilisation of substantial numbers of volunteers at local level, under local leadership, in civilian rescue teams, with reserve firemen, special constables and a new home defence force. It also calls for a national conversation on security. Do the Government intend to begin a national conversation, and how will they start to mobilise the sort of people who are needed?
The noble Lord is absolutely right: it is an important matter and a radical proposal, and it is to do with the new threats we face as a country. We cannot any longer simply carry on as we always have done, so the proposals in this strategic defence review are radical and serious, and we intend to deliver them. One way that we intend to do that is to start to talk to the population of this country about the need for us all to wake up to the threat we face. That will require many of the actions that the noble Lord pointed out, and we intend to come forward with proposals in due course.
My Lords, recent surveys suggest that there is weak to no openness among Generation Z to engage with defence or security issues. Going further on what the Minister has just said about talking to people, does he agree that any whole-of-society approach to defence must, as a precursor, require the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces more widely to reconnect with societal attitudes in this country, particularly among young people? If he does agree, can he say in more detail how the Government intend to go about this?
I agree very much with the noble and gallant Lord’s points. As he said, the reconnection between the military and the civilian population is crucial. The one positive thing I would say is that, just a few weeks ago, like many noble Lords, I was at the remembrance events, where up and down the country tens of thousands of young people were remembering the sacrifice made in the past. They were Scouts, Guides, cadets and Reserve Forces—all of those. That is not a solution to the problem, but it points the way forward. It is one thing we should celebrate, as well as looking at the challenges we still face. The noble and gallant Lord will also know that we look to extend and expand the reserve and cadet forces. That will take some doing, but we are determined to do it.
An important feature of the strategic defence review will be the defence investment plan. Can the Minister update the House about whether that will be published, as it was intended to be, before the Christmas Recess, and how the national conversation is going on between the Ministry of Defence and His Majesty’s Treasury?
The Secretary of State is working hard to finalise the defence investment plan by the end of the year. The discussions that we are having with the Treasury have been successful up to now and we will continue those. Importantly, as well as the point that he made about the Treasury, the noble Lord referred to the national conversation. It is crucial that, across government, whatever Government it is, we start that national conversation with the people of our country so that they recognise the threats that they face, not necessarily from traditional warfare but from “greyfare”, the threats to underwater cables, cyber attacks and all those sorts of things. We face a very real threat from that now, and the question is how we take that national conversation forward quickly and urgently.
My Lords, I first declare an interest as a senior counsellor with the Cohen Group. Does my noble friend agree that the importance of the strategic defence review, which needs to get through to the wider public, is that Britain is under attack, both at home and from abroad, and that the transformation of defence, which is what the strategic defence review is all about, is essential for the nation’s safety? In the light of the stunningly depressing national security review published by the Americans last Friday, even more needs to be done to warn our public about the risks that we now face, and which we might now have to face without the United States of America?
I totally agree with the comments that my noble friend has made. I read the strategic defence review again over the weekend in preparing for the Question, so I know that it is chapter 6. The important part was the challenge that it makes—not only to the public but to us as politicians and to Parliament—to reflect on how we engage. Too often, when we talk about national conversations, we talk about having a village hall meeting here or a village hall meeting there. That is not sufficient. This requires a whole-government approach, involving all government departments, the devolved Governments, local authorities, civil society, financial society and industry. All those together need to wake up to the very real threat. As my noble friend says, we are facing a threat now, not in a year’s time or five years’ time. That threat is upon us, and we need to wake up to it.
My Lords, I echo what the Minister has been saying: the threat that we are facing is immediate. Other countries, recognising that urgency, have taken steps to engage their public through a range of measures, from conscription at one end to seeking volunteers aged 18 and over for military training—as in France and Germany—at the other end. I think what this Chamber wants to know is what imminent steps will the Government take to educate the British public now about the gravity of the situation and to put the UK on to a comparable readiness footing to these other countries.
In saying that we need to do more and to act more urgently, there are already steps that have started to be taken across government. We are already looking at how we extend and develop the reserve and cadet forces, which are important. We are already looking at how we celebrate the involvement of young people at remembrance events, as I just said. We are also having seminars and conferences with industry and with finance—I am going to an event on Thursday night with veterans and the City of London. All sorts of different events are taking place that seek to address the very real and important issues that the noble Baroness has raised. The real challenge for the Government is how we do that more quickly and more urgently, but it is certainly one that they have addressed and have taken on board. It is a whole-government response; it is not just the government response now—although the Government have to lead it, of course—but how we all come together to address that very real challenge that we face.
More fundamentally, does the Minister agree that the real resilience of a nation does not rest on the state of its physical infrastructure, or military numbers, or the number of boy scouts or reserves that we have, but, rather, it rests on its moral fibre and its societal integrity? The Minister does not explain or tell the House what the delivery pathways are that will enhance the human dimension of national resilience, for they are sorely needed.
It is an important challenge and an important question put by the noble and gallant Lord. The starting point is to speak up and speak out, in a way that sometimes does not happen. For example, there is very real resilience among the population in many respects, but we need to explain to people, through government, devolved Governments and local government, the very real threats and challenges that they face now. The point that members of the public, more generally, need to understand is that it is not the traditional warfare, necessarily, that is the threat we are currently facing but the cyber attacks that we have already seen many examples of in our country, the threats to underwater cables and the threat to data. Indeed, it is why the carrier strike group was in the Indo-Pacific recently, protecting the trade routes on which this country’s economy and prosperity also depend. We need to do more on that, because, as the noble and gallant Lord says, building resilience among the population is something that needs to be done. I have confidence in the British people that if that is explained to them, they will stand up for it.
My Lords, I refer to my interests as chair of the National Preparedness Commission. The Minister is saying all the right things; he is talking about how urgent it is, how it must be the whole of society and the whole of government, but he did not answer the question put at the beginning by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, on when this national conversation is going to start. Could he give us a clearer indication of the Government’s timescale on that, and an indication, for example, of when the defence readiness bill—proposed in the security review—is going to come forward, and whether it will include a wider definition so that it looks at all the hazards we face, including climate change, criminal cyber gangs as well as hazards from overseas states?
I am sure that when it comes forward, a defence readiness bill will include many of the things that my noble friend has pointed to. Defence in that sense, as he says, is more than just military equipment and troops; it is about climate change and many of the other things that he mentioned. The conversation has already started. We have started having conferences and conversations with different parts of industry. What I am saying to the Chamber, to my noble friend and to all those who spend so much time working on this, as I know he does, is that we need to accelerate and expand that, and to do that more than we are doing at present. A conference here and a conference there, while worth while and important, are not at the level of the sort of national conversation that needs to take place regarding our country. That is the point that I am trying to make. We have an Armed Forces Bill next year, but we are exploring defence readiness legislation—we look forward to seeing whether we can deliver that in this Parliament.
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what measures they have implemented to resolve problems confronting the Royal Navy’s submarine force.
My Lords, the Royal Navy has successfully maintained Operation Relentless, the continuous at-sea deterrent, without interruption for over 56 years. We continue to adapt to new challenges to meet our submarine commitments, deploying globally on operations, protecting national interests and keeping us and our allies safe. Today, the First Sea Lord has announced further measures to protect the undersea environment to counter the new threats we face in that domain.
My Lords, our submarine force is in a parlous state—the worst in my 60 years of service. Successive delays in ordering, a lack of dry dock investment, the failure to recruit and train the requisite nuclear personnel, training delays for those for those we have got, lack of spares and lack of maintenance have all taken their toll. Does our nation realise that, for the last year, this great maritime nation has had one attack submarine operational for most of the time? Some of the time, it has not had one at all. That is pretty horrifying for a maritime nation of our stature. These submarines are war winners. They frighten Putin and are what we use to give the Soviets a hard time with. That is where we have got to on that.
In terms of a continuous at-sea deterrent, at the moment, the boats are having to do 200-day patrols, with no fallback should something go wrong. We have maintained it—it is an amazing effort to do it—but, my God, we should not be in that position.
I think that the MoD does understand this and is beginning to pull things together and 1SL has a 100-day programme to sort it out. I ask my noble friend the Minister, because the nation needs to know how bad this is, can we go back to the Treasury and ask for extra money in-year, which can start an impetus to the 100-day programme of the First Sea Lord?
I thank my noble friend for his Question. He will know that we have been to the Treasury and have secured more money for the defence programme and industry. Just to pick up on a point that my noble friend made, I think it is incumbent on us all to praise our submariners for the work they do and the time they spend at sea. We are seeking to address some of the challenges that my noble friend pointed out. He will know that there are now programmes of investment in the infrastructure of both Devonport and Faslane. He will know that the Dreadnought programme has a commitment of £31 billion, with a £10 billion contingency. He will know that we are seeking to invest in AUKUS, and we also have the Astute programme.
Alongside that, with respect to the problems that my noble friend pointed out with respect to the engineers and technicians who keep our submarines at sea, he will know that we have started to ensure that we recruit more of those. I am also pleased to announce to the House that the recruitment and retention submariners have improved as well. I accept the challenges that my noble friend lays out but, with the First Sea Lord and others, we seek to address that quickly and urgently, as the 100-day plan pointed out.
My Lords, could the Minister explain the maintenance problem, which clearly goes back a number of years? On the dry docks that are not ready, are private contractors are failing in their obligations or is there a shortage of money? What is now being done to rectify this enormous backlog of maintenance, which is a very large part of the problem?
It is a challenge. Part of it is investment into the infrastructure. That can take a long time. One of the things that the Navy has looked to deal with that is the floating dry dock concept, which others could explain better than I can. It is certainly something that can be made available much more quickly than the investment into that, but there is significant investment going in Devonport and Faslane. That was something that I indicated in answer to my noble friend. We are also seeking, through the defence technical colleges that were announced as part of the growth deals and other ways, to ensure that we get engineers and technicians into these areas to work. That has been part of the problem.
If I might just digress slightly, I will say that getting technicians, engineers and the important skills that we need is a problem that has bedevilled our country for decades. We have always had a shortage of them, and successive Governments have tried hard to tackle that. Indeed, the noble Lord mentioned defence technical colleges, or whatever they are called, and they were one of the ways in which we tried to deal with that. Certainly, we need to do more to raise the esteem of vocational education to ensure that we get all the technicians and engineers that we need.
My Lords, could the Minister advise the House as to the progress of the floating dock construction to which he alluded just now? The programme was announced two years ago but has not yet shown any sign of going into production. Secondly, could he indicate whether there is any linkage between this and the Chancellor’s recent announcement of money to restore the Inchgreen dry dock in Port Glasgow?
I do not know the answer to the second part of the question, so I shall have to write to the noble Earl about it. To answer the first part of his question, I know that the Ministry of Defence is looking carefully at the concept of floating dry docks. It is a much quicker way of ensuring that we have the capability that would otherwise be provided by the more traditional dry dock. It is certainly an important question that we need to look at it urgently.
Senior representatives from BAE Systems and Babcock recently warned the Defence Select Committee in the other place of the risk to the AUKUS programme of delays in decision-making and alignment. What steps have the Government taken in the light of that evidence to avert these risks?
With respect to the AUKUS programme, we have made sure that nobody is under any doubt about its importance and our determination to take it forward. There has always been a question about the commitment of the United States to it. Recently—I think it was in October—the President announced its commitment to the programme. The noble Baroness should wait until later in the week, when other things may be said. Let us be clear. The AUKUS programme is a phenomenal alliance between Australia, ourselves and the US, and one of the ways to ensure that it goes forward is for us to have the confidence that we can deliver it and to talk about how it will be delivered as well as some of the challenges it faces.
My Lords, do we have any concerns about the commitment of the US Administration to the AUKUS concept?
The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is now not in his place. I keep saying that the US and the UK are fundamental allies in the protection of global security in every part of the world. To answer my noble friend’s important question, I have no doubt that the US, the UK and Australia will stand together in the AUKUS programme. One way in which we will achieve that is by looking forward to the important steps that the US is taking to work with us. I think it was the Colby review there that looked into the AUKUS programme and found it was something that the US could take forward. As I have said, let us wait until later in the week, but the US-UK alliance is as strong as it ever has been and will continue to be so.
My Lords, the Minister referred to and acknowledged the shortage of technicians. He also said that we need to raise the status of vocational education. I really do not think that is the problem. We have at least five people chasing every apprenticeship opening in this country. We have excess demand for engineering courses at universities, because they are not funded at a level which means that the number of places can be expanded. Could the Minister say whether his ministry is talking directly to the relevant other departments about how to increase capacity for technician training?
It would be interesting to have a conversation outside the Chamber with the noble Baroness about her challenge to me. Certainly, we are talking to other departments about what more we can do to encourage technical education and I would like to discuss this with the noble Baroness. When I go to MoD establishment after MoD establishment, there are vacancies and they cannot recruit people into those bases to do some of the work they need to do. There is a particular problem and I would be very keen to talk to the noble Baroness about what we might do about it.
My Lords, is not the most immediate and serious threat to our national prosperity and security the safety of our entire subsea cable system, on which the nation depends daily and hourly? I do not think the Minister has mentioned subsea cables and how to cope with them, or the role of submarines in dealing with this. Can he assure us that, even if we do not have the submarines now, we are planning to build the vehicles—submarines and new technologies—to deal with this rather promptly, because the threat is coming soon?
That is a really important question; I apologise if I have not mentioned undersea cables, because there is an important need and requirement for us as a country to protect them and the critical national infrastructure that flows under the sea. If the noble Lord has not had a chance yet, I suggest that he reads the First Sea Lord’s speech this morning at the International Sea Power Conference, where he talked about Atlantic Bastion, which seeks to deal with many of the points that the noble Lord has quite rightly just raised. These are new undersea technology vessels, for want of a better word, that can operate through the use of artificial intelligence and, as a result of that artificial intelligence, military personnel can make decisions about what they should do. They can stay under water for a considerable period of time and they liaise not only with ships but with aircraft and indeed submarines. That is the sort of thing that I was talking about in the earlier Question about the new warfare and new threats that we face, and the new equipment that we will need to deal with those threats. So, having these uncrewed vessels, alongside our submarines, our ships and our aircraft, as outlined in Atlantic Bastion earlier today, is certainly the way forward, and I hope that that reassures the noble Lord with respect to that threat that we face.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberIt is a very good point. I think there is a divergence, exactly as in this country, between the permanent apparat and the rest of the country, which would explain why my noble friend Lord Kempsell and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, are speaking to very different sets of people. As the German ambassador to London in 1914 said to his French counterpart, “You have your information, we have ours”. It seems that there is at least a debate in the United States about this, and you can see why. As my noble friend Lord Bellingham said, there is a real prospect down the line that a future Mauritian Government may take a very different attitude towards the presence in the outer atolls of powers that are unfriendly to us. We have no assurance that we will always be on friendly terms with that republic.
The world is imperfect, I understand that. The world is sublunary. We are dealing with lesser evils, as is usually the case in politics. But when the Minister has justified this treaty and the treatment of the Chagossians, she has always done so by saying, “Our priority was the security of the base”. I just ask noble Lords on all sides to consider how this makes us more secure in an imperfect world than we are at present. We have obvious sovereignty over the entire region at the moment. We have the great advantage of its isolation. There is no prospect of anybody taking a leased island and putting any kind of listening infrastructure or anything else nearby. How does moving from where we are now to what is proposed in this treaty make us more secure, even if we set aside all the wrongs being done to the Brits of Chagossian origin?
I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was on to something when he asked, “What if the Americans were to change sides?” But I am not sure that quite makes the point he intended. I just invite noble Lords to consider the wholly pecuniary terms in which Mauritius has considered this territory: not as part of its own demos, not as part of its own nation, but as an investment and a way of raising money—of paving its streets with gold, as my noble friend said earlier. Would it not be the ultimate humiliation if Mauritius were to trouser the sum of money that we are now paying it and then to turn around and sell the base to the United States? Where would that leave this Government? I would love to hear the Minister’s reply.
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to an important set of amendments, and I thank them too for the way in which they have put those amendments. There is clearly some disagreement between us, but there is no disagreement over the fact that every single person in the Chamber is seeking to ensure that we protect the security of the nation and the security of Diego Garcia, and on the importance of that base to us. I start from that point. There were a couple of times when noble Lords almost seemed to question that. I do not question it at all. I do not agree with everything that has been said, but I do agree with the right to challenge how we take this forward, because out of that come better legislation and more clarity. While I do not agree with the need for some of the amendments, some of the comments that those amendments require to be made from the Dispatch Box are important. I wanted to set that context out for noble Lords.
I also just want to say this, because I think it is important. I do not want to have a Second Reading debate again but the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Beamish, and others have made this point: the Government, whatever the rights and wrongs, are trying to bring stability. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, disagrees with the treaty, and it is fair for him to make that point, but the Government’s point of view is that we are trying to bring stability and certainty to an uncertain situation. The noble Lord disagrees with that, as do a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. But that is the Government’s view. The Government’s view, in answer to the challenge the noble Lord raised, is that we are changing it because we are trying to bring certainty to an uncertain situation. We believe we have done that, and we have made certain that we have secured one of the most important military bases—if not the most important military base—for ourselves and the United States. The noble Lord does not accept that or agree with that, but that is the alternative proposition the Government are making.
It is really important, therefore, to say, in answer to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, and others, that we would not have gone forward with this were it not for the fact that the Americans support it. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is right. We can say, “Well, the Americans said this” or “The Americans said that”. I am going to quote this, because I think it is really important. The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that
“the United States welcomed the historic agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius on the future of … the Chagos Archipelago … this agreement secures the long-term, stable and effective operation of the joint US-UK military facility at Diego Garcia. This is a critical asset for regional and global security … We value both parties’ dedication. The US looks forward to our continued joint work to ensure the success of our shared operations”.
That does not mean, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Ahmad, and many others, said, there are not challenges to that and what it actually means in practice. But it is a pretty fundamental starting point for the UK Government to be able to directly quote US Secretary of State Rubio saying that the US supports what this Government are doing and taking forward. I lay that on the table as the context for trying to answer some of the points and considerations that have been made.
Some of the points and comments—I say to the noble Lords, Lord Morrow, Lord Weir and others, and even to an extent to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey —are perhaps better dealt with in some of the other groups, particularly on the rights of the Chagossians. My noble friend Lady Chapman has answered on this at great length and will continue to do so as we move forward. That context is really important for the debate and the discussion we are having.
I will try to deal with some of the amendments. It will take a little while and I hope that noble Lords will bear with me. Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seeks to prevent the presence of non-UK and non-US civilian personnel in the Chagos Archipelago. The treaty gives the UK control over these matters. The security provisions were, as I have said, designed and tested at the highest level of the US security establishment, which supported us in proceeding with the deal.
On Amendment 34 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, let me be clear: the entire treaty is designed to preserve the UK’s ability to take the necessary steps to preserve the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base. Article 3(2)(c) states clearly that the UK has
“the full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia”.
Mauritius and other states should have no doubt—this is the importance of comments made here—about our willingness to exercise our responsibilities in a manner that ensures the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base.
If I am wrong on this, I will write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library so that all Members can access it. My understanding is that the crucial bit of Annex 1(11)(c) is
“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification”.
The phrase,
“the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties”,
refers to things contained within the treaty. I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that. I am grateful to her for pointing it out.
The fundamental point I am trying to make—which I think the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made—is that we have an obligation under the treaty to notify Mauritius of activities emanating from the base but we do not have to seek its permission. “Expeditiously” notifying does not mean notifying before we take any agreed action. Those were the points that I thought the noble Baroness was making, but I will certainly seek to clarify exactly where that takes us with Annex 1(11)(c). I will write to the noble Baroness and provide a copy to others. I thank her for raising that.
The treaty specifically confers on the UK the unrestricted ability to
“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”
in respect of Diego Garcia. Given that there is no question over operational freedom on Diego Garcia, it is unclear what necessary derogations the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, is seeking. The annex gives the UK the extensive rights that we would need in such a situation.
The noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, raised reporting restrictions. His Majesty’s Armed Forces and the intelligence services routinely produce reports for the Prime Minister on all types of security matters. I reassure the noble Lord, and other noble Lords, that this will include operational issues arising on the Diego Garcia base. There is no requirement for this to be made a statutory obligation, as Amendment 81E seeks to do. Additionally, Amendment 81F would represent an unusual interference with the prerogative to conduct international affairs and to make or unmake treaties. Noble Lords will understand that there is often a need for confidentiality in international discussions.
The clock is flashing away and the Whip is getting jumpy next to me. I shall have a look at Hansard and I shall write to noble Lords in the debate with anything that I have not covered and any questions that have not been answered and make sure that the amendments that I have not responded to are responded to. I shall send the letter to noble Lords in the debate. Let me be clear: I shall write to noble Lords about two or three of the amendments that I have not covered, copy the letter to noble Lords and put a copy in the Library. I hope that that is acceptable to everyone.
I thank noble Lords for a really interesting and important debate on the security provisions of the treaty and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my Amendment 88 in this group is very much in a similar vein to my earlier amendments, although I see I do not have the presence of my newly acquired fan—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—to encourage me. I seek reassurance that the
“unrestricted access, basing and overflight”
provisions in Annex 1(1)(a) of the agreement includes the right of the UK to allow nuclear-propelled vessels and nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft to enter the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia.
Although not in the amendment, the annexe of the treaty referred to also specifically covers the United States of America, and, for the avoidance of doubt, I include it in the confirmation I seek from the Secretary of State in this amendment. Again, I am asking that this be confirmed by the Secretary of State before the Bill can come into force. In this respect, I am perhaps baring my teeth more than my noble friend Lord Lilley, which is a rather unusual situation.
As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, Mauritius is a party to the Pelindaba treaty, which establishes the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear weapons in any signatory state. Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty states that both Mauritius and the United Kingdom confirm that no
“existing international obligations or arrangements … conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.
Annex 1 of the treaty states that the United Kingdom retains
“unrestricted ability to … control the … deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”.
Nuclear weapons are lethal capabilities. So Britain and the United States must, as per the terms of the treaty, have an unrestricted ability, surely, to house nuclear weapons or to dock nuclear submarines at the base on Diego Garcia should we choose to do so. Yet that would appear to require an express provision in this treaty, and I cannot find it.
Article 7(3) appears to seek to allay those concerns, but I would welcome an absolute clarification from the Minister. Will Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty prevent us basing Vanguard-class submarines or, in the future, nuclear-armed aircraft, or the United States stationing any nuclear weapons at the base on Diego Garcia? That is a question that I require answered. This cannot be left in doubt—hence my requirement that the Secretary of State publish a statement to confirm the matters I have raised before this Bill comes into force, so that everyone is clear about what the UK and the US can or, perhaps more alarmingly, cannot do. As my noble friend Lord Lilley commented, although they are not directly covered by the Pelindaba treaty, my amendment also makes reference to nuclear-propelled vessels and, for the avoidance of doubt, I seek reassurance that Mauritius would not take exception to that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for their amendments. I appreciate that they have questions about how the treaty protects the full operation of the base, and I want to reassure them that the treaty enables the continued operation of the base to its full capability. The treaty and the Bill we are debating today will have zero impact on the day-to-day business on Diego Garcia. Importantly, it will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to Diego Garcia. I am putting some of this on the record, and the noble Baroness, as a former Defence Minister, will know the careful calibration of the language that I am using: I am putting it on the record so that we are all clear.
As I say, noble Lords will understand that I pick my words with care in this particular context. I cannot and will not discuss operational matters on the Floor of this place, but I am confident that the Chamber would not necessarily want me to. The long-standing UK position of neither confirming nor denying the location or presence of nuclear weapons must stand. But let us talk about the hypothetical. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the application of the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness said, to the treaty. The UK is not a signatory to the treaty but is a signatory to Protocols 1 and 2. I can confirm to the Chamber that the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with these existing obligations.
I also remind colleagues, because this is important—again, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, if I remember rightly from his remarks, and, indeed, the noble Baroness raised this—that we are not alone in the matter. The Government of the United States have also tested all aspects of the Diego Garcia treaty in depth and at the highest levels of the security establishment. They, too, are satisfied that it protects the full operation of the base. Indeed, when I was talking about the earlier amendments in answer to that, I quoted the remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his comments about being satisfied with the treaty in every aspect.
Amendments 63 and 88 therefore are not necessary. We do not need a review of the impacts of nuclear treaties on the future operation of the base, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has proposed, because the future operation of the base has been protected. I say to the noble Baroness that we do not need to reopen paragraph 1.a of Annex 1 to the treaty, as has been suggested, because this already provides for unrestricted —that is the key word—access for UK and US vessels to enter the sea of Diego Garcia. Paragraph 1.b.i provides for unrestricted ability to control the conduct and deployment of lethal capabilities.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do of course understand the sensitivity of not discussing operational activity in a public domain. However, if I revert to the Minister’s understandable reliance on what I described at Second Reading as that “huge protection” in Article 1, that is explicitly in contradiction with Article 7(1). Article 7(1) says expressly with reference to international obligations or arrangements that, if they are not to be obtempered or agreed to, that must be provided for in this agreement. That is the dilemma that is perplexing my noble friend Lord Lilley and myself. We seem to have on the face of this treaty a self-evident contradiction.
I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. What I am saying to her is that the Government of Mauritius, the Government of the UK and the Government of the US see no contradiction in what the treaty says, and explicitly lays out, in respect of the ability of Diego Garcia to operate in the way that it has always done, with the lethal capabilities as outlined elsewhere in the Bill.
I hope that is helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness as reassurance that the situation will stay the same as it is now. As I have said, all those three parties to that treaty are confident that that remains the case.
I will say, however, that, although resisting the amendments, I am grateful that they were tabled. They are really important amendments to have made in order for the Government to have put on the record important elements of the treaty and the Bill. We have been able to clarify for the Chamber, and for those who read our proceedings, that the position that we would all want to see will continue with respect to Diego Garcia and that the full capabilities will be maintained.
Let me be absolutely clear: the full operational use of the base is protected to ensure that the base is able to continue in every way that it always has done. I hope that is helpful. On the basis of the reassurances that I have made and the comments that I have put on the record, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
That is very helpful and I entirely respect what the Minister says. He is a man of obvious integrity and commitment to the defence of this country. I am comforted that he is speaking for the Government, and therefore that the Government will maintain the freedom to use the Diego Garcia base to its full capabilities. I am not persuaded that that is necessarily in line with the Pelindaba treaty. That does not worry me so much. It may worry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, or any future Lord Hermer in Mauritius, but let us hope that they will be ignored. So I will, of course, withdraw my amendment.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the “Yantar” spy ship has form when it comes to pushing boundaries, but directing laser beams at a UK Poseidon surveillance plane is an unwelcome development. It is provocative and irresponsible. In the air domain during the Cold War, there was a regular pattern of incursion into United Kingdom airspace by Russian planes, and the stratagem of reaction and close-flying escort by UK planes was developed, which was effective. How do we replicate that in the marine domain? For example, can a frigate close-shadow the “Yantar” so that the Russian crew feels under constant observation and any attempt to interfere with subsea infrastructure is immediately visible—and, importantly, whatever protective action is then necessary can be taken?
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for such an important question. The Royal Navy constantly monitors activity in and around UK waters. This includes the “Yantar”, which is continuously and closely monitored by Royal Navy frigate HMS “Somerset” and the RAF’s P-8s. As the Secretary of State for Defence described last week, Russia has been developing military capability to use against critical underwater infrastructure for decades. For that reason, we have directed a change in the Royal Navy’s posture so we can more closely track and robustly respond to the threats from that vessel and many others. Such actions have previously included surfacing a Royal Navy submarine, strictly as a deterrent measure, close to the “Yantar”, to make it clear that we have been covertly monitoring its every move. We will not shy away from the robust action needed to protect the UK.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said, the “Yantar” has form. Do His Majesty’s Government feel that sufficient action is being taken? I note that one question asked in the other place was whether the Russian ambassador had been called into the Foreign Office, and the answer appeared to be in the negative. Do the Government need to be doing more? Are they doing everything to ensure that Russia realises that we will not tolerate its actions and incursions into our waters?
That is another very important question. The whole House will recognise the significance of what the noble Baronesses have said. The UK Government are constantly talking to the Russian ambassador, constantly making the Russians aware of what we are doing, and we are constantly monitoring those ships that seek to monitor our underwater cables, potentially for purposes in future. We have Royal Navy ships monitoring that and P-8 Poseidons from Lossiemouth —we have a fleet of nine now—looking at that. But I say to the noble Baroness and to all noble Lords—and I am sorry to repeat it, but it is just to make it clear, because the implications of what I am saying are obvious—that to surface a Royal Navy submarine close to the “Yantar”, as was done towards the end of last year, is an unprecedented way of demonstrating to Russia and the “Yantar” how seriously we take what they are doing. I know that that is supported by all Members of your Lordships’ House, but that signifies the importance of the deterrence and the importance and significance of the activity that we are undertaking to try to deter such activity.
My Lords, with the greatest respect to the Minister, is this not much more than a simple defence matter? If the laser used was a weapons system, not just laser torching by a member of the “Yantar” crew, is this not a serious disregard of the 1980 UN protocol and its convention on certain conventional weapons? What steps have the Government taken with the Russians? Has the Russian ambassador been called to a meeting in the FCDO, to be informed of the UK’s disapproval?
Nobody can be in any doubt about the seriousness with which we take the incident that has happened. As the noble and gallant Lord has pointed out, it was not a weapons system, but that does not alter the fact that a handheld laser was pointed into the cockpit of one of our planes. That is of huge significance and importance, and the Russians are in no doubt about how seriously we take that incident. We have made sure that they are aware of that and we will continue to make sure that they are aware of it. Indeed, the noble and gallant Lord’s question—with those from the noble Baronesses from the other Benches —has helped to signify to the Russians, again, quite how seriously we take the incident which occurred.
My Lords, it is clear that that message is conveyed, but it seems to do nothing to deter the Russians from continuing with their activity. Can the Minister say whether our military leaders have come to any conclusions about what an appropriate response will be to what, in the end, could be an act of war?
This is a really important question, but I say to everyone that we have to be really careful about the language that we use when we ask, “If this happened, what would we do? If that happened, what would we do? Would we see such and such as an act of war?” That is not to underplay the seriousness of what is happening, but it is about trying—as any Government would—to be reasonable and sensible in the language that is used.
Let nobody be in any doubt that the seriousness of this is significant. We know what the “Yantar” is doing as part of Operation GUGI, we know that it is surveying the underwater cables in a peacetime way for potential use in other scenarios in the future and we are making sure the Russians are aware of that.
The Minister said he was going to visit the NMIC and the joint cell that was with it down in the south. I do not know whether he has done that yet, but I am glad it is up and operating fully, because we have been bad at tracking the “Yantar” and the other ships of that type. Now, we are doing it properly and we need to have ships that can counter it. I hope that there will be enough money in the Budget for us to get in more ships; we will see.
I have been at sea with the Russians in the Cold War when they tried to ram us, opened weapon systems against us and interrupted flying operations—all highly dangerous things, and similar to what happened in the Iceland cod war. I believe there is more that we can do to make it very uncomfortable for a ship such as the “Yantar”. There are things one can do that make life horrible at sea. They are not all seen and we should start thinking about doing some of those.
I thank my noble friend for the question. We are trying to do a whole range of different things. He will know that, as well as the measures that I have talked about against the “Yantar”, we have Operation Baltic Sentry—in the Baltic Sea, obviously—which is NATO monitoring, run from Northwood, to track what is going on there. We have Nordic Warden, which is a JEF operation as well, with maritime capabilities, alongside P-8s. There is a whole range of different things that are taking place. The defence investment plan will be published this year; let us see what is in that in terms of the increase in capability to deal with this threat.
My Lords, I understand the difficulty of the Minister; I am not trying to stir things up, I assure him. But supposing a laser had brought down the aircraft by disabling the pilot, what would we consider that? Would we consider it an act of war?
To be clear, I am not in any difficulty answering the question from the noble Lord, but I will not speculate at the Dispatch Box about what we would do if this or that happened. The noble Lord has much more experience in military matters than I do, so he will recognise how serious it would be if I misspoke in answer to his question. So I am not evading the question but, in the interest of the country, it is sometimes best to have these discussions in private.
My Lords, given what we know the “Yantar” has been engaged in, would the Minister be able to tell the House whether the Government are now actively considering some of the suggestions made in the recent report by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in relation to the possibility of a purpose-built vessel that would help fix undersea cables, were any activity to take place that resulted in them being severed?
Certainly, those sorts of considerations are being looked at in the context of the defence investment plan. As we have committed to, that will be published this year. Let us see what is in that in terms of the capability my noble friend mentions.
Lord Banner (Con)
My Lords, do the Government consider that these acts of aggression and subversion will come to an end if a deal is reached in relation to Ukraine?
One can only say: let us hope the discussions around Ukraine bring about arrangements that are satisfactory to the Ukrainians, which is the important part of any agreement that is or is not breached. I think we are in different times now, and the different times we are in mean that Russia will continue to look at underwater cables and some of the other things that go under water, such as energy and data. Certainly, what we see from the “Yantar”, along with other ships that are part of the GUGI operation, is the mapping of the underwater capabilities that we and other nations have for peacetime purposes, but of course that could be used in other scenarios.
(4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of President Trump’s statement on 30 October regarding the testing of nuclear weapons.
My Lords, the United Kingdom has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and continues to press for its entry into force. We remain committed to our voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions, having ceased nuclear testing in 1991. The nuclear testing policy of the United States is a matter for the US Government, and it would therefore be inappropriate to comment further.
My Lords, it is easy to look on this as some sort of playground bravado by President Trump, who clearly did not understand the implications of, or what was meant by, the trials of delivery systems that Putin was conducting. With him having made his statement, President Putin wanted to show how tough he was and made his statement about doing tests again. This would be probably quite amusing if it was not so incredibly dangerous. The comprehensive test-ban treaty is one of the few treaties regarding nuclear weapons that are still in existence; many have fallen by the wayside. We are less safe than we used to be because of that. If the comprehensive test-ban treaty is broken, it opens a Pandora’s box. All of us will be far less safe. That is extremely worrying.
I know the Minister cannot say very much in response to my Question—in effect, it was nothing, but those are wonderful. However, even though something may not happen because the Department of Energy in America is unable to do a test straight away—it will take a couple of years and cost billions of dollars, so this thing may go away— and even though, as he says, it is their business, does he believe that the Government should make it very clear to the Americans how much we support keeping the test ban treaty in place and that we will be very disappointed if there is any break to that?
The UK has a long-standing and important relationship with the United States—it is important to start out and say that on a number of occasions. The comprehensive test-ban treaty, as my noble friend has said, is a really successful treaty, and we continue to push and to do all we can to ensure that it is as effective as it is with as many states as possible. We look forward to everyone who signed it ratifying it in due course.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, we saw the PrepCom for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty—or NPT—conference, which is due to meet again next year. We have five signatories. In light of what we have heard from the rhetoric of Russia, and the actions that others have taken, what assessment is being made of the potential success of the NPT meeting next May? Further, linked to the recent conflict we saw between India and Pakistan, what extra efforts have been made to ensure that those countries also sign the NPT?
The noble Lord has a lot of experience in these matters, and he knows that numerous conversations go on and numerous efforts are made by numerous countries, in ways we cannot often speak about in this Chamber. Whether it is India and Pakistan, or other countries, numerous debates and discussions take place to ensure that we are as safe as we possibly can be. As he knows, the parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty will meet in New York next year—I think is an important statement that it is taking place in New York. It is a really important treaty. We have the comprehensive test-ban treaty, and we have the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I think sometimes that what countries such as us should do, as well as recognising the difficulties and problems, is to continue to push the importance of those treaties and to do all we can to ensure their continued success.
My Lords, does the Minister not agree that this is the latest instance of the potential use of nuclear weapons being referred to loosely by leaders of the recognised weapon states, on which President Putin gave the lead on several occasions when he spoke about it in the context of the Ukraine conflict? That is surely a lamentable change from the taboo on talking about these matters since the end of the Cold War. Does he think that we would do better to work at the non-proliferation treaty review conference next year for a reaffirmation of the view that a nuclear war must not be fought and cannot be won?
The noble Lord makes a good point. With all the questions and my comments so far, it is extremely important that we do not let rhetoric cause a problem. The question that the noble Lord has posed is important. As I have said in my answers so far, it is important that we talk about the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. We have not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1991. The United States and others have conformed to that as well. People must be really careful in the use of rhetoric in whatever circumstance. Our debates and discussions on these matters are looked at and pored over. I take the noble Lord’s point very seriously. We need to be very careful in how we discuss these matters while having the right to discuss them.
In a conflict-beset world, a credible nuclear deterrent is unarguable, but macho posturing by the leaders of the United States and Russia is an alarming development that undermines the non-proliferation treaty. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, will the Government take a lead to encourage or persuade India, Pakistan and Israel to sign that treaty, reaffirm it, strengthen it and make it clear exactly what has been said? A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.
We encourage all states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It has been a huge vehicle by which we have worked together to keep the world safe. This Government accept, as previous Governments have done and as do many Governments across the world, that the nuclear deterrent is part of the security architecture of the world. Part of having a nuclear deterrent is to deter from war, deter from aggression. The restatement of the deterrent policy is consistent with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, under which the noble Lord will know that the UK is allowed to have weapons.
My Lords, following on from what the Minister has just very helpfully said, in relation to our own United Kingdom nuclear defence capability, we have seen just this week that between 400 and 500 jobs will be put at risk at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The Government claim that the workforce needs to be reshaped so that it is fit for the future. However, in a time of growing international insecurity, can the Minister confirm that there will be no reduction in staffing for our nuclear weapons capability?
What I can confirm is that there will be no reduction in our capability of ensuring that the nuclear deterrent is effective and that it remains so seven days a week, 365 days a year and 24 hours a day. That is the commitment that the Government make. I hear what the noble Baroness says about the AWE. That is about looking at reshaping how that important body works. The Government have committed £31 billion to the Dreadnought programme, with a £10 billion contingency. We have committed £15 billion in this Parliament to the development of a new warhead. That is a Government who are committed, as the last Government were, to spending billions of pounds on maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, which, as I said in answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, is essential to the global security of the world.
My Lords, I draw the attention of your Lordships’ House to my entry in the register of interests, particularly as vice-chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which I am a consultant to as well. Every European NATO member has ratified the 1996 nuclear test-ban treaty. In addition to a commitment to Article VI, the commitment by the five nuclear weapon states to the CTBT was essential to the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1995. My noble friend the Minister will be aware that former US officials who have had responsibility for their nuclear arsenal have stated publicly that new US nuclear tests are unnecessary, unwise and unwelcome. As those officials have done, have our Government assessed the impact on the NPT’s future if there are renewed explosive nuclear tests by any of the five—including the US and the UK?
As I have said, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is an essential part of the Government’s policy. We remain committed under that treaty to the aspiration to a nuclear-free world, which may seem a long way off but is our aspiration. All I can say with respect to this is to reiterate the complete commitment that the Government have to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to the meeting next year in New York. We want that conference to be a success.
The UK remains an active participant in all the nuclear non-proliferation treaty forums, alongside the commitment to maintain for as long as is necessary our nuclear deterrent. The commitment that we have to that nuclear non-proliferation treaty is important as well. That is good UK government policy.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what steps the Ministry of Defence is taking to maximise UK- manufactured products in its procurement decisions.
My Lords, the defence industrial strategy set a vision to make the UK defence sector more competitive, innovative and resilient, including measures backing UK businesses, lowering barriers to entry and increasing competitiveness by supporting SMEs through the defence office for small business growth, reforms to social value and exploring an offset policy, regional defence growth deals supported by £250 million and establishing the office of defence exports, helping businesses compete globally.
I thank my noble friend for that Answer. Under the national shipbuilding policy, the Ministry of Defence is committed to placing UK shipbuilding orders in UK yards to ensure a continual drum beat of work. Therefore, why, under the defence maritime services next generation contract, which has just been awarded to Serco, will 24 tugs and pilot boats be built by Damen in the Netherlands? Why are we exporting UK defence jobs to Holland and to a company that has recently been bailed out by the Dutch Government? I ask my noble friend to follow the German Government’s recent announcement that they will cancel their frigate order with Damen and to place those much-needed orders in UK yards.
I will look at the specific example that my noble friend has raised about the awarding of that contract. As well as that example, I could give others of where we have been successful in ensuring that shipbuilding is seeing something of a renaissance in our country, not least the recent winning of the contract from Norway for Type 26 frigates on the Clyde. That was an enormous boost to British shipbuilding and to that part of Scotland. That is the sort of example that we want to build on, but I will look at the example that my noble friend raised.
My Lords, those who know about defence procurement—as the Minister does; I am encouraged by much of what he says—know that it is incredibly bureaucratic. That slows down any decisions —I do not know whether it has affected this decision—for UK-made kit rather than buying stuff off the shelf. Can the Minister please look carefully at how we can get rid of some of the bureaucracy surrounding defence procurement?
We have recently recruited a new National Armaments Director and reforms are taking place in the Ministry of Defence. I ask this of the noble Lord and the House: why is it that in wartime we have an urgent operational requirement that cuts through bureaucracy and red tape, allowing us to deliver the weapons and equipment that our Armed Forces need? We need to ensure that that sort of attitude and culture operate in peacetime. It should not take a crisis or war to deliver the things we want and the equipment our troops need.
My Lords, the real barrier for UK SME manufacturers is the time it takes to secure contracts, which is typically years, even for kit upgrades. By contrast, as the Minister knows, I recently hosted an event exploring ways to link UK manufacturers with Ukrainian software developers, who are innovating and making daily updated wearable drone detection kit. That is saving soldiers’ lives in Ukraine every day, but our troops do not have it. Can the Minister tell the House how the defence industrial strategy will engage with SMEs, for example in supplier networks such as the neutral vendor framework for innovation? Could this include cross-border joint ventures with innovative front-line experience elsewhere, of the sort I have just referred to?
We have established and are looking to grow a defence office for small business, which will be important. The noble Lord’s point is an extremely good one. The idea that the solution is always massive business has been shown by Ukraine not to be the case. The development of small business and small industry—the noble Lord gave the example of drone manufacture on a small-time basis—has been essential to the Ukrainian effort against the illegal Russian threat. His point about how we can develop that sort of capability and capacity is important for us all and something we need to learn from. As I said, the office for small business growth will take that forward.
I declare an interest in that one of my sons works in defence procurement. In light of concerns raised about the reliance on overseas supply chains, can the Minister set out what steps the Government are taking to ensure that procurement decisions actively support UK-based manufacturers so that our defence capability is not dependent on foreign production?
We are doing everything we can to support UK manufacturing. Let me set out one of the reasons why we are doing that. As I have said many times, Ukraine has been a wake-up call for us. The manufacturing industry in this country has been allowed to decline over decades, in a way that puts our homeland defence at risk. It is in our own national interest to grow our defence industries, which is why it will be at the heart of what we do. It is not only about what we do here. The noble Baroness will have seen that the carrier strike group was out in the Indo-Pacific and is now back in the Mediterranean. There have been numerous round tables, conferences and industry events on the carrier, and on the ships with it, to promote growth. One of the ways to do that is by expanding our growth to the rest of the world.
My Lords, I revert to the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. When it comes to MoD procurement within the United Kingdom, there are two certainties: there is a £2.6 billion black hole in the defence budget and domestic procurement has virtually dried up. In addition to that, the defence investment plan appears to have evaporated. Can the Minister tell this House what is happening to put this country on to the Government’s much-vaunted phrase, “war readiness”?
On the specific question of the defence investment plan, that will be published this year, so the noble Baroness and the House will not have to wait too long. It will lay out the investment decisions we are going to make. On the basis of a growing defence budget, that defence investment plan will lay out the sorts of capabilities we need and the decisions that will need to be made to ensure that we have war readiness. We need to learn from what has happened in Ukraine and look at the wars of the future. The defence investment plan will look to fight that war to ensure that we are war ready.
My Lords, in the two or three years after the end of the Cold War, around 150,000 jobs were lost in defence manufacturing. Everyone is right in hindsight, but now, looking back, that looks extremely short-sighted. Is there not now a need to reverse that process and expand our manufacturing base, at least as far as weapons manufacture is concerned, in this insecure world?
My noble friend makes a really good point, and of course he is right to say that. The total number of direct and indirect jobs supported through MoD expenditure with UK industry a couple of years ago was 272,000, which was up from 244,000 the year before—so defence is growing. Is it growing fast enough? We would all like to see it growing more quickly. But there is no doubt that the development of a UK defence industry is crucial to our defence and the defence of our allies.
Noble Lords will recall the Prime Minister’s announcement earlier this year of £1.6 billion in contracts for Thales in Belfast to supply air defence missiles for Ukraine, creating 200 jobs in Northern Ireland. The deal also included the prospect of a further £500 million of additional work to be added in collaboration with the Ukrainian industry partner. Can the Minister provide the House with an update on progress, including how many new jobs have been delivered and whether the extra £200 million of work for Thales in Northern Ireland has been secured?
One of the key points that the Government have pursued is to ensure that the increase in defence expenditure is felt across the nations and regions. Northern Ireland has secured significant sums of money: Thales, as the noble Lord mentioned, as well as other manufacturers, including small and medium-sized businesses. It is a massive success story for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland plays a huge role in the defence and security of our nation. There are huge numbers of jobs being created there, and there is a huge amount of investment taking place as well.
My Lords, as Defence Procurement Minister back in the 1990s, I recall receiving almost daily communications from No. 10 Downing Street. Does the present Prime Minister play any part?
Let me answer a couple of questions, and I hope it addresses the noble Lord’s point. The Prime Minister is very supportive of the defence industry and the development of this country and has supported that a great deal. He allows the defence industry and the MoD to carry on with their work. The important point is that he is very supportive of that, as noble Lords can see by the increase in the defence budget and the interest he takes in both defence and foreign affairs.