Crime and Policing Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Requiring CCTV on the rail network to meet police access and retention standards could bring important benefits for public safety and criminal justice. Ensuring footage is readily accessible to the police would help to deter crime, enable faster investigations and support prosecutions with reliable evidence.

Victims and witnesses benefit when their accounts can quickly be corroborated, and cases are more likely to be resolved effectively. Standardising CCTV systems across train operators would also reduce inefficiencies, removing delays that can occur due to incompatible formats or outdated technology. In high-risk areas or busy urban transport hubs, this kind of clarity and consistency could make a real difference to public confidence and police capability.

No doubt some will argue that increased surveillance on public transport raises questions about privacy and civil liberties, particularly if passengers feel that they are being constantly monitored. Also, rail operators may face high financial and logistical burdens if they are required to overhaul existing CCTV infrastructure to meet new standards. For smaller operators in particular, the cost of compliance could be significant, potentially impacting service provision or ticket prices.

I would be grateful if the Liberal Democrats told us whether this requirement would apply to all train operating companies, including heritage railways and smaller, regional operators. What specific technical or operational standards would CCTV systems be expected to meet, and how would those be determined or updated over time? Have they reviewed how many operators already meet or fall short of the proposed standards, and what level of upgrade would typically be required? Have they assessed the financial implications for train operators, and would they expect any Government funding or support to assist implementation?

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

New clause 9 would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway be made immediately accessible to the British Transport police and the relevant local Home Office police force. I am sympathetic to the cases that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, shared with the Committee. I particularly sympathise with his plight and predicament when his saddle was stolen; having to cycle home without a saddle must have been incredibly painful, so I fully welcome the aims of this new clause. We know that lack of immediate access to railway CCTV camera images has been a significant issue for the British Transport police, as it may reduce their ability to investigate crime as quickly as possible. However, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address the issue. Let me explain why.

My colleagues at the Department for Transport are looking to implement a system that will provide remote, immediate access for the BTP, Home Office forces and the railway industry where relevant. As I said, that does not need legislation. What is needed is a technological solution and the resources to provide for that. I am sure that the hon. Member will continue to press the case with the Department for Transport, and for updates on the progress of the work, but for now, I invite him to withdraw his new clause.

[Luke Taylor]

In response to the specific comments from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West, this measure relates entirely to existing footage and would allow access to existing footage. I thank the Minister for addressing the points made. At this point, are happy to withdraw the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 12

Domestic abuse aggravated offences

“(1) Any criminal offence committed within England and Wales is domestic abuse aggravated, if—

(a) the offender and the victim are personally connected to each other, and

(b) the offence involves behaviour which constitutes domestic abuse.

(2) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and

(b) ‘personally connected’ has the meaning given by section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”—(Luke Taylor.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Rural communities deserve the same protection, visibility and voice as those in urban areas, yet too often rural crime goes under-reported, under-resourced and underestimated. From equipment theft and fly-tipping to wildlife crime and antisocial behaviour, the challenges facing rural areas are distinct and growing. Having rural crime recognised in police structures and developing a specific taskforce could send a strong signal that rural communities matter, that their concerns are heard and that they will not be left behind when it comes to public safety.

However, although the new clause is clearly well-intentioned I would like to put some operational questions to those who tabled it, to ensure greater clarity. What assessment has been made of the additional resources that police forces might need to implement such a strategy effectively, particularly in already stretched rural areas? The new clause refers to the creation of new roles. The National Police Chiefs’ Council already has a rural crime lead and many police forces across the country already appoint rural crime co-ordinators. How would the suggested additional roles be different?

How does the new clause balance the need for a national strategy with the operational independence and local decision making of police and crime commissioners? Is there a clear definition of what constitutes a rural area for the purposes of this strategy? How will this be applied consistently across the country? I am interested to hear the answers, but would be minded to support the new clause if it was pressed to a Division.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset set out, new clause 14 would require the Government to establish a rural crime prevention taskforce. Let me first say that the Government take the issue of rural crime extremely seriously, and that rural communities matter. I want to outline some of the work going on in this area.

I take the opportunity to acknowledge the vital role that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit play in tackling crimes affecting our rural areas, as well as helping police across the UK to tackle organised theft and disrupt serious and organised crime. Those units have delivered a range of incredible successes. The national rural crime unit co-ordinated the operational response of several forces to the theft of GPS units across the UK, which resulted in multiple arrests and the disruption of two organised crime groups. The unit has recovered over £10 million in stolen property, including agricultural machinery and vehicles, in the past 18 months alone.

The national wildlife crime unit helped disrupt nine organised crime groups, with a further nine archived as no longer active, as well as assisting in the recovery of £4.2 million in financial penalties. It also oversees the police national response to hare coursing, which has resulted in a 40% reduction in offences.

I am delighted to say that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit will, combined, receive over £800,000 in Home Office funding this financial year to continue their work tackling rural and wildlife crime, which can pose a unique challenge for policing given the scale and isolation of rural areas. The funding for the national rural crime unit will enable it to continue to increase collaboration across police forces and harness the latest technology and data to target the serious organised crime groups involved in crimes such as equipment theft from farms. The national wildlife crime unit will strengthen its ability to disrupt criminal networks exploiting endangered species both in the UK and internationally with enhanced data analysis and financial investigation, helping the unit to track illegal wildlife profits and to ensure that offenders face justice.

The funding comes as we work together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to deliver the new NPCC-led rural and wildlife crime strategy to ensure that the entire weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crime. That new strategy is expected to be launched by the summer. We want to ensure that the Government’s safer streets mission benefits everyone, no matter where they live, including those in rural communities. This joined-up approach between the Home Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and policing, as well as the confirmed funding for the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit, will help to ensure that the weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crimes such as the theft of high-value farm equipment, fly-tipping and livestock theft.

Given the work already ongoing in this area, I believe that the Liberal Democrat new clause is unnecessary, and I urge the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset to withdraw it.

[Anna Sabine]

I want to come back on some of the questions asked by the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West. He asked about the resources that would be required to implement the strategy. Having spoken to the rural police force in my area, my understanding is that the issue is not necessarily one of rural officers being under-resourced, although more resource clearly would be helpful; it is actually to do with how those officers are allocated. For example, in Frome we have a rural crime team, but because of a lack of neighbourhood policing, if there is an incident in Frome on an evening—a fight outside a pub, for example—rural officers are deployed to go and deal with that rather than fighting rural crime. One of the challenges for those officers is that they are not actually allowed to do the job they are trained for, because they are covering for other areas.

The hon. Gentleman asked why the strategy was necessary when we already have various regional rural crime leads. The reason is that we need to ensure that rural crime is seen to be significant nationally—we need to have a national push and develop some strategies to tackle it. I welcome what the Minister said about that.

The shadow Minister’s third question was about defining rural areas. We are quite good at defining them now, so I am not sure why we could not continue to define rural crime areas in the way that constabularies do currently, but we could look at that.

I welcome the Minister’s comments on what is clearly a growing Government drive to take rural crime seriously. I do not doubt any of her figures about the reduction of crimes such as hare coursing. All I would say is that farmers in my constituency are really not reporting crimes, and I worry that crime figures are dropping simply because crime is not being reported, not because it is not occurring. The longer rural crime is not taken seriously, the more those numbers will drop.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Dame Diana Johnson]

I will respond directly to the points that have just been made about the Metropolitan police. It is worth reminding ourselves that the Metropolitan police are the best-funded part of policing in England and Wales. They constitute around 25% of policing, and this year they are receiving up to £3.8 billion to provide policing in London—it is worth reflecting on that. They have also received, as has every other police force, additional money to fund neighbourhood policing. I have had reassurance from the Met that the money will actually go into neighbourhood policing, which I think is worth saying.

While I fully appreciate what the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam is concerned about for his constituents, it has to be made clear that we have just come out of 14 years, many of which were years of austerity. I do not wish to labour the point, but the hon. Gentleman’s party was involved in the first five years of austerity, when cuts to the public services were most acute and severe. We are now at the end of that period and this Labour Government are trying to put money back into policing. I have been very clear that more money is going into the Metropolitan police and into every other police force, to build up neighbourhood policing in particular. A little bit of humility on the part of the Liberal Democrats might be helpful.

[Luke Taylor]

Again, I invite the Minister to respond to the specific point about the 1,700 fewer officers in London. Whatever the circumstances, people today are concerned about crime, including tool theft and sexual offences. We can argue back and forth about the note from the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), which said that there was no money left, about austerity or about how long memories go back. If there are to be cuts to the number officers next year in my constituency of Sutton and Cheam, and across London, let us address the issues at hand about how we mitigate the impact on our residents tomorrow.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I hear the hon. Gentleman’s point loud and clear. All members of this Committee are concerned about crime and want to ensure that crime goes down, that victims are supported and that the police are properly funded. We can probably all agree on that in this Committee. On the particular point about the Metropolitan police, I dispute the numbers that he has given. He is right that there will be a loss of PCSOs and police officers in ’24-25, but my understanding is that it is around 1,000, not 1,700. Subject to what happens in the spending review, we will have to look at what happens in future years.

The Metropolitan police have not had the necessary funding for years, which is why they are having to make some really tough decisions. Nobody wants to see a reduction in police officer numbers—I certainly do not, as the Policing Minister. The Home Secretary and I are working to do everything that we can to support police forces and not see reductions in PCSOs and police officers.

New clauses 15 and 16 seek to legislate for minimum levels of neighbourhood policing. I certainly agree with what the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset said about the need to address the lamentable decline in neighbourhood policing since 2010, which we can all see, but legislating in the way that she proposes is unnecessarily prescriptive and risks imposing a straitjacket on the Home Office, police and crime commissioners and chief officers.

The Government are already delivering on our commitment to restore neighbourhood policing. We have already announced that police forces will be supported to deliver a 13,000 increase in neighbourhood policing by the end of this Parliament. By April ’26, there will be 3,000 more officers and PCSOs working in neighbourhood policing than there are today. This is backed up by an additional £200 million in the current financial year, as part of the total funding for police forces of £17.6 billion, which is an increase of £1.2 billion compared with the ’24-25 police funding settlement.

Additionally, the neighbourhood policing guarantee announced by the Prime Minister on 10 April sets out our wider commitment to the public. As part of that guarantee, every neighbourhood in England and Wales will have dedicated teams spending their time on the beat, with guaranteed police patrols in town centres and other hotspot areas at peak times, such as a Friday and Saturday night. Communities will also have a named, contactable officer to tackle the issues facing their communities. There will be a dedicated antisocial behaviour lead in every force, working with residents and businesses to develop tailored action plans to tackle antisocial behaviour, which we all know has blighted communities.

Those measures will be in place from July this year, in addition to the new neighbourhood officers, whom I have already mentioned, who will all be in their roles by next April. Finally, through the Government’s new police standards and performance improvement unit, we will ensure that police performance is consistently and accurately measured. The work of the unit will reinforce our commitment to transparency through the regular reporting of workforce data and the annual police grant report.

I wholeheartedly support the sentiment behind the new clauses. We absolutely need to bolster neighbourhood policing, reverse the cuts and set clear minimum standards of policing in local communities. Working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the policing inspectorate, the College of Policing and others, we have the levers to do that. Although the new clauses are well intentioned, I do not believe that they are necessary, so I invite the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.

[Anna Sabine]

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, made a couple of points. The first related to who would set the levels of neighbourhood policing under the new clause. Our proposal is that it would be the Home Office, in discussion with local police forces and local councils—the people who know their area best. I can easily see that there would be a way of doing community engagement through councils as part of that discussion, which is another point that he made.

Of course it is important for local police and crime commissioners to have flexibility, but there is a problem with the lack of structure around the numbers for neighbourhood policing. In my constituency, if a big issue, event or activity happens in Bristol, a lot of the local police get taken off there, and we lose our neighbourhood policing. It is similar point to the one that was made earlier.

I welcome the Minister’s response, which was thoughtful as always, and I appreciate the commitment that the Government are making to neighbourhood policing. I hear all of that, but we will still press both new clauses in the group to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset for explaining the intention behind new clauses 17 and 18. The Government have been clear that water companies must accelerate action to reduce pollution to the environment. Ofwat, as the independent economic regulator of the water industry, sets water companies’ performance commitments, including those on pollution incidents, in the five-yearly price review process.

Where those performance commitments are not met, companies can incur financial penalties, which are returned to customers through lower bills in the next financial year. As a result of underperformance in the 2023-24 financial year, Ofwat is requiring companies to return £165.2 million to customers. Ofwat has just expanded those performance commitments further for the 2025-2030 period to include storm overflow spills and serious pollution incidents. That means that the regulator is already punishing water companies for failing to meet their pollution commitments.

Furthermore, the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, which received Royal Assent earlier this year, significantly strengthens the power of the regulators and delivers on the Government’s commitment to put failing water companies in special measures. The Act introduced automatic penalties on polluters, and will ban bonuses for water company executives if they fail to meet adequate standards. Before introducing secondary legislation to implement automatic penalties, the Government will consult on the specific offences that will be in scope, and on the value of the penalties.

On the subject of senior management liability, the Water (Special Measures) Act creates a statutory requirement for all water companies to publish annual pollution incident reduction plans. The plans will require companies to set out clear actions and timelines to meaningfully reduce the frequency and seriousness of pollution incidents. Both the company and the chief executive will be personally liable for ensuring a compliant plan and report is published each year. In addition, measures from the Act, which came into force on 25 April, introduce stricter penalties, including imprisonment, where senior executives in water companies obstruct investigations by the Environment Agency and the Drinking Water Inspectorate.

The new clauses would cut across the recently strengthened regulatory regime, with enhanced penalties for the water companies that fail to live up to their obligations and increased powers for the regulator. Given that, the new clauses are unnecessary; indeed, they would add complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.

[Anna Sabine]

I enjoyed the new clauses being called headline grabbing. They are certainly headline grabbing; the whole issue of sewage in our waters has been massively headline grabbing, because the public feel incredibly strongly that our waterways, and the rivers that we use and want to swim in, should not be full of sewage pumped out by private water companies. I think many members of the public would welcome a slightly more punitive approach than we saw under the last Government.

In terms of being unworkable, I think the new clauses are very practical and measurable—I am not sure in what way they are unworkable. Turning to the Minister’s comments, the Lib Dems have said that we welcome many of the directions taken in the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, but we do not feel it goes far enough. Banning bosses’ bonuses is not the same as making them criminally responsible for some of the actions they are taking in terms of environmental negligence. Again, we will press both new clauses in the group to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Matt Vickers]

When deployed responsibly and with appropriate safeguards, facial recognition technology is an incredibly valuable tool in modern policing and public protection. It is already being used to identify serious offenders wanted for violent crime, terrorism and child exploitation; to locate vulnerable individuals, including missing children at risk; and to enhance safety in high-risk environments such as transport hubs, major events and public demonstrations. It enables rapid real-time identification without the need for physical contact—something that traditional methods, such as fingerprinting and ID checks, cannot provide in fast-moving situations. It can accelerate investigations, reduce resource demand and ultimately make public spaces safer.

The technology is improving in accuracy, especially when governed by transparent oversight, independent auditing and clear operational boundaries. I would be grateful for further comments on whether the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and the Government feel that this proposed regulation of this crucial technology could limit the ability of law enforcement to respond swiftly to emerging threats or intelligence-led operations.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam for setting out the case for introducing new safeguards for the use of live facial recognition. I agree there need to be appropriate safeguards, but the issue requires careful consideration and I do not think that it can be shoehorned into this Bill.

I say strongly to the hon. Member that live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps keep communities safe. If I may say so, I think that some of his information is a little out of date. Despite what he implied, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including, among others, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 2008.

I fully accept, however, that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework governing the use of live facial recognition technology for law enforcement purposes is needed. We need to get this right and balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder while safeguarding individual rights. To that end, I have been listening to stakeholders and have already held a series of meetings about facial recognition, including with policing, regulators, research institutions, civil society groups and industry, to fully understand the concerns and what more can be done to improve the use of the technology.

I will outline our plans for facial recognition in the coming months. In the meantime, I hope that the hon. Member, having had this opportunity to air this important issue, will be content to withdraw his new clause.

[Luke Taylor]

Based on the comments and reassurances, I will be happy to withdraw the new clause. I would be interested in being involved in any discussions and updates as they come forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan

“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.

Brought up, and read the First time.

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Police and crime plans are regularly reviewed and updated in consultation with local communities and partners. The new clause would ensure that, once priorities are agreed, they are not sidelined, but instead become the backbone of local policing strategy. The new clause would strengthen the link between the democratic mandate of the police and crime commissioner, and the operational activity of police forces. It would ensure that the police and crime plan is not a token document, but a guiding framework for strategic decision making. By reinforcing the duty to follow agreed priorities, the new clause would enhance accountability, improve public trust and support the delivery of better, more responsive policing.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the new clause. As hon. Members will be aware, those vested with responsibility for providing democratic oversight of police forces—whether PCCs or mayors with PCC functions—have an important role in policing across England and Wales. They are responsible for holding their chief constable to account for the performance of their force and for setting, through their police and crime plan, their strategic objectives for the area. In setting police and crime plans, PCCs must consult their chief constable, the public and victims of crime in their area, as well as their local police and crime panel. As the directly elected representatives for policing in their area, PCCs have a choice as to how they implement their plan and the weight they give to each priority.

The new clause would have the effect of placing an inflexible duty on PCCs to follow their own priorities, with no ability to adapt to and reflect changing circumstances. The new clause would also encroach on the operational independence of chief constables. It risks constraining chief constables and the officers under their command, limiting their ability to balance local priorities as set out in the police and crime plan with their own assessment of threat, risk and harm.

In setting their police and crime plan, PCCs and chief constables must also have regard to the strategic policing requirement. If the amendments to the 2011 Act set out in the new clause were made, they would also have the effect of creating an inconsistency, making local police and crime plans the most important instrument for PCCs and others to follow, potentially at the expense of national priorities. The Home Secretary and I have been clear that the Government will work with PCCs and chief constables to set clear expectations for policing on performance and standards, and to ensure that our communities have an effective and efficient police force within their force area.

Through our forthcoming police reform White Paper, we are working closely with policing to explore and develop specific proposals to deliver effective and efficient police forces and to address the challenges faced by policing. That includes ensuring that policing is responsive to national and regional priorities, as well as to local needs. The Home Secretary will set out a road map for police reform in a White Paper to be published later this year, which will consider proposals to strengthen the relationship between PCCs and chief constables in a revised policing protocol. For those reasons, I invite the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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Used transparently and proportionately, stop and search can be a legitimate and effective tool in reducing violence. Clear communication about the rationale for its use, including public notifications when section 60 is authorised, helps to build trust in its deployment. Lowering the threshold would not undermine public confidence if the powers are exercised responsibly. Proposed new clause 35 is a measured and operationally meaningful change. It preserves the structure and safeguards of section 60, while allowing earlier, more effective intervention in response to anticipated violence. In so doing, it would strengthen the ability of the police to keep the public safe, particularly in urban areas, where violence may escalate quickly, and ensure that the law better matches the practical needs of modern policing, without compromising accountability or fairness.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the hon. Member for his suggestions about the police response to violence and other serious offending. However, I believe that the changes contained in the proposed new clauses are unnecessary.

Regarding proposed new clause 29, I agree that transparency is important. That is why the Home Office already annually publishes extensive data on police recorded crime and the use of police powers. That data includes the number of stop and searches conducted, broken down by individual community safety partnership and police force areas. In addition, members of the public have access to detailed crime and stop and search maps on police.uk, which use monthly data directly provided by police forces. Police forces also publish detailed information on deployments of live facial recognition.

Turning to proposed new clause 35, I note that stop and search is a vital tool for tackling crime, particularly knife crime, but it must be used in a fair and effective way. That is particularly true of section 60 powers, which are the focus of the proposed new clause. Such powers may be authorised under certain conditions in response to, or anticipation of, serious violence, and allow officers to search individuals without the normal requirement for reasonable suspicion. The powers are rightly subject to strict constraints.

In practical terms, changing the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” would not represent a meaningful change. Section 60 provides powers to search for offensive weapons or dangerous implements, and any use of such items is, by definition, serious violence. In the year to March 2024, the latest for which data is available, 5,145 stop and searches were undertaken in England and Wales under section 60 powers. They resulted in 71 people being found carrying offensive weapons and 212 arrests made on suspicion of a range of offences. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw his proposed new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would mandate that the Secretary of State, through regulations, grant police access to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ tobacco track and trace system. Such access would enable law enforcement to determine the provenance of tobacco products sold by retailers, specifically to identify whether those products were stolen. According to HMRC, the illicit market in tobacco duty and related VAT was £2.8 billion in 2021-22, preying on the most disadvantaged of communities. In 2023, about 6.7 billion counterfeit and contraband cigarettes were consumed, representing one in four cigarettes, thus undermining progress towards a smoke-free England by 2030.

With the negative impact that the illicit tobacco market has on communities and with UK revenue in mind, it is paramount that our police forces be provided with the resources required to counter the organised crime groups that dominate the illicit tobacco market. The sale of illicit tobacco on the black market also poses significant risks to public health, with illegal tobacco often containing five times the standard level of cadmium, six times as much lead, 1.6 times more tar and 1.3 times more carbon monoxide than regulated cigarettes and rolling tobacco.

The illicit tobacco market poses significant challenges, including revenue loss for the Government and health risks for consumers. Professor Emmeline Taylor’s report, “Lighting Up”, emphasises the potential of TT&T in identifying and prosecuting offenders involved in the illegal tobacco trade. Granting police access to TT&T would strengthen efforts to dismantle organised crime networks profiting from counterfeit tobacco sales.

Giving the police access to TT&T technology has the potential to disrupt the illicit tobacco trade and has been highlighted by the National Business Crime Centre, which argues that police utilisation of TT&T would allow them to routinely check tobacco sold by local retailers to ensure legitimacy, thus shrinking the pool of buyers for criminal gangs and lowering demand for stolen tobacco, helping police to tackle organised crime and safeguard legitimate business.

As a signatory to the World Health Organisation’s framework convention on tobacco control, the UK is obligated to implement measures that curb illicit tobacco trade. Providing police with TT&T access aligns with those commitments by enhancing the traceability and accountability of tobacco products throughout the supply chain. Illicit tobacco sales undermine legitimate retailers who comply with regulations and pay due taxes. Empowering police to identify and act against illegal tobacco products helps to level the playing field, ensuring that law-abiding businesses are not disadvantaged by competitors engaging in unlawful practices.

With that in mind, the Opposition believe that new clause 38, which would grant police access to the UK TT&T system to help determine whether a retailer has obtained stolen or counterfeit tobacco illegally, is necessary to facilitate the police in carrying out their duty in delivering the current plans for smoke-free England 2030. It will help to claim back revenue currently lost to the black market trade of tobacco and protect public health by disrupting the trade in these bogus products.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clause 38 seeks to grant the police access to the tobacco track and trace system, as we have just heard. The scourge of the illicit tobacco trade threatens the health of UK citizens, robs the public purse of billions of pounds and funds the wider activities of organised crime. All businesses in the tobacco supply chain are required to register within the track and trace system, and individual tobacco products are tracked from the point of manufacture up to the point of retail. The track and trace system includes a reporting platform that enables nominated authorities to access registry data, traceability data for individual products and UK-wide tobacco market data.

I understand the intention behind the shadow Minister’s new clause, and I know that we both share the same goal of working with our law enforcement agencies to tackle illicit tobacco. The principle of maximising the use of traceability data in these efforts to tackle illicit tobacco is sound. Existing legislation strictly limits who can access traceability and the purposes for which it may be used. At the moment, only HMRC and trading standards may access this data.

I reassure the Opposition that engagement is already under way between the police and HMRC to investigate opportunities for extending access for the police to traceability data. When that engagement is complete, the Government will consider whether it is appropriate to bring forward any necessary legislative changes. However, I do not wish, at this stage, to pre-empt the outcome of that engagement through legislation. In the light of those reassurances, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the motion.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee—I am sure Members are aware of these. Please switch electronic devices to vibrate or silent. No food or drink is permitted during Committee sittings, except for water, unless you have a particular health need—obviously, speak to me, and I am sure that will be fine. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members email their speaking notes to [e-mail], or alternatively pass their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. Very importantly, Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate. We will have a two-minute silence at 12 noon.

New Clause 21

Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims

“(1) Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 29 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2000)—

(a) before the entry for section 54 insert—

‘section 11 (membership of a proscribed organisation)

section 12 (support of a proscribed organisation)

section 15 (fund-raising for terrorism)

section 16 (use and possession of property for terrorism)

section 17 (funding arrangements)

section 17A (insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands)

section 18 (money laundering)

section 19 (disclosure of information: duty)

section 21A (failure to disclose: regulated sector)

section 38B (information about acts of terrorism)

section 39 (disclosure of information prejudicial to investigation)’;

(b) after the entry for section 57 insert—

‘section 58 (collection of information)

section 58A (eliciting, publishing or communicating information about members of armed forces etc)

section 58B (entering or remaining in a designated area)’.

(3) In paragraph 31 (offences under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001), after the entry for section 50 insert—

‘section 67 (security of pathogens and toxins)

section 79 (disclosures relating to nuclear security)’.

(4) In paragraph 35 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2006)—

(a) before the entry for section 5 insert—

‘section 1 (encouragement of terrorism)

section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications)’;

(b) after the entry for section 6 insert—

‘section 8 (attendance at a place used for terrorist training)’.

(5) After paragraph 35 insert—

‘Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c.28)

35ZA An offence under section 54 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (offences relating to notification).

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (c. 23)

35ZB An offence under section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (contravention of terrorism prevention and investigation measures notice).

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)

35ZC An offence under section 10 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (breach of temporary exclusion order or notice).’

(6) The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to an offence committed before this section comes into force.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause excepts the listed terrorism offences from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 61

Notification requirements

“(1) This section applies where a youth diversion order requires the respondent to comply with this section.

(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a youth diversion order requiring the respondent to comply with this section is first served, the respondent must notify to the police—

(a) the respondent’s name and, where the respondent uses one or more other names, each of those names,

(b) the respondent’s home address, and

(c) the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends.

(3) If, while the respondent is required to comply with this section, the respondent—

(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order,

(b) changes home address, or

(c) begins to attend an educational establishment the name and address of which have not been notified under the order,

the respondent must notify, to the police, the new name, the new home address or the name and address of the new educational establishment.

(4) A notification under subsection (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the respondent uses the name, changes home address or first attends the educational establishment.

(5) A notification under this section is given by—

(a) attending at a police station in the police area in which the home address, or the court which made the order, is situated, and

(b) giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.

(6) A notification under this section must be acknowledged in writing.

(7) In this section ‘home address’ means—

(a) the address of the respondent’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or

(b) where the respondent has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the respondent can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the respondent may select.

(8) In determining the period of three days mentioned in subsection (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the respondent is—

(a) in police detention within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 118(2) of that Act);

(b) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court or kept in service custody,

(c) serving a sentence of imprisonment or a term of service detention,

(d) detained in a hospital, or

(e) outside the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to notify to the police their name and address and the name and address of any educational establishment they normally attend.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 62

Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales

“(1) A youth diversion order made by a court in England and Wales may impose on the respondent a requirement (an ‘electronic monitoring requirement’) to submit to electronic monitoring of the respondent’s compliance with prohibitions or requirements imposed by the order. This is subject to section (Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales).

(2) A youth diversion order that includes an electronic monitoring requirement must specify the person who is to be responsible for the monitoring.

(3) The person specified under subsection (2) (‘the responsible person’) must be of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument.

(4) Where a youth diversion order imposes an electronic monitoring requirement, the respondent must (among other things)—

(a) submit, as required from time to time by the responsible person, to—

(i) being fitted with, or the installation of, any necessary apparatus, and

(ii) the inspection or repair of any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;

(b) not interfere with, or with the working of, any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;

(c) take any steps required by the responsible person for the purpose of keeping in working order any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring.

These obligations have effect as requirements of the order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to submit to electronic monitoring of their compliance with the prohibitions or requirements of the order (if the conditions set out in NC63) are met.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 63

Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales

“(1) This section applies for the purpose of determining whether a court in England and Wales may impose an electronic monitoring requirement under section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales).

(2) An electronic monitoring requirement may not be imposed in the respondent’s absence.

(3) If there is a person (other than the respondent) without whose co-operation it would be impracticable to secure the monitoring in question, the requirement may not be imposed without that person’s consent.

(4) A court may impose the requirement in relation to a relevant police area only if—

(a) the Secretary of State has given notification that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the area, and

(b) it is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available.

(5) For this purpose ‘relevant police area’ means—

(a) in any case, the police area in England and Wales in which it appears to the court that the respondent resides or will reside, or

(b) in a case where it is proposed to include in the order—

(i) a requirement that the respondent remains, for specified periods, at a specified place in England and Wales, or

(ii) provision prohibiting the respondent from entering a specified place or area in England and Wales,

the police area in which the place or area proposed to be specified is situated.

(6) In subsection (5) ‘specified’ means specified in the youth diversion order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause sets out the conditions for imposing an electronic monitoring requirement under NC62.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 64

Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice

“The Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of electronic monitoring of persons under electronic monitoring requirements (within the meaning of section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales)) imposed by youth diversion orders in England and Wales.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements imposed under NC62.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 65

Reviews of operation of this Chapter

“In the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in section 44(2) (provisions the operation of which the person appointed under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006 is also responsible for reviewing), after paragraph (e) insert—

‘(f) Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment provides for the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to report on the operation of Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Bill (youth diversion orders).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 66

Remote sales of knives etc

“(1) Section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (remote sales of knives) is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (4) substitute—

‘(4) Condition A is that, before the sale—

(a) the seller obtained from the buyer—

(i) a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer, and

(ii) a photograph of the buyer, and

(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that the buyer was aged 18 or over.

(4A) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.’

(3) In subsection (5)(b), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.

(4) In subsection (6), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.

(5) In subsection (8), omit ‘or a person acting on behalf of the buyer’ in both places it occurs.

(6) After subsection (9) insert—

‘(10) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.

(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells knives etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).

Brought up, and read the First time.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 67—Delivery of knives etc.

Government new clause 68—Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales.

Government new clause 69—Remote sale and letting of crossbows.

Government new clause 70—Delivery of crossbows.

Government new clause 71—Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision.

Government new clause 72—“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”.

Government new clause 73—Coordinating officer.

Government new clause 74—Notice requiring appointment of content manager.

Government new clause 75—Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances.

Government new clause 76—Replacement of content manager.

Government new clause 77—Duty to notify changes in required information.

Government new clause 78—Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty.

Government new clause 79—Unlawful weapons content.

Government new clause 80—Content removal notices.

Government new clause 81—Content removal notices: review.

Government new clause 82—Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content.

Government new clause 83—Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties.

Government new clause 84—Guidance.

Government new clause 85—Notices.

Government new clause 86—Interpretation of Chapter.

Government new schedule 1—Civil penalties for service providers and content managers.

Government amendments 80 and 81.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

It is nice to see you back in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. This group of new clauses makes extensive and timely changes to the law around the sale and marketing of offensive weapons, particularly knives and crossbows. These measures form part of the steps that we are taking to tackle knife crime. They will implement recommendations from the police’s independent end-to-end review of online knife sales, undertaken by Commander Stephen Clayman at the request of the Home Secretary, and will deliver on our manifesto commitment to hold to account senior managers who flout the rules on online sales.

New clauses 66 and 67 introduce new, stricter age verification at the point of sale and on delivery for knives bought online. New clauses 69 and 70 make the same changes in respect of crossbows. Commander Clayman’s review highlighted that existing age-verification methods for online sales are insufficient. Buyers can provide false birth dates and parcels can be left with neighbours so that there is no age check of the buyer. Existing legislation, as contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, already requires age checks for the sale and delivery of knives. We are introducing two key changes to the existing requirements.

First, the checks at the point of sale will have to include photographic identity documents, plus a current photograph to demonstrate that the identity documents belong to the buyer. Secondly, on delivery, couriers will be required to check photographic identification provided by the person receiving the package. There will also be a new offence of handing the knife to someone other than the buyer. That will mean that knives cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours with no checks of the intended recipient.

[David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)]

The Minister will remember me mentioning Julie Taylor, who has campaigned locally on this issue after the death of her grandson Liam. She welcomes these new clauses. She said to me that she welcomes anything that helps get rid of this awful crime, and that she thanks the Government for introducing them. Does the Minister agree that these measures give an even greater level of protection and prevention so that we can start to drive down the awful offence of knife crime?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that contribution. It is heartening to know that Julie supports these new clauses and recognises the important role that they can play in tackling knife crime. Again, I extend my condolences to Julie and her family on the death of Liam.

These clauses also have the support of the coalition to tackle knife crime, which involves many families, campaigners and victims of knife crime helping the Government to develop policy. They will make sure that we are held to account for our promise to halve knife crime over the next decade, including through the strengthened requirements in the new clauses, which aim to ensure that under-18s cannot easily evade checks when buying knives online, as they have sadly in the past.

Like knives, crossbows are an age-restricted item and cannot be sold or hired to anyone under the age of 18. Legislation for crossbows was brought in through the Crossbows Act 1987, but in contrast to knives, there has been little change to that legislation since. These new clauses seek to introduce the same age-verification requirements for the online sale, hire and delivery of crossbows as are being brought in, or are already in place, for knives.

New clause 69 amends the 1987 Act to introduce equivalent age-verification methods for crossbows to those in section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which provides limitations on the defence to the offence of selling a knife. For crossbows, where the seller or seller’s agent is not in the presence of the buyer, the seller will not be regarded as having taken

“all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence”

unless all the conditions are met.

Condition 1 is that the seller obtained a copy of an identity document and a photograph of the buyer. Condition 2 is that the package containing the article was clearly marked by the seller to say that it contained a crossbow or crossbow part and that it should be delivered only into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. Condition 3 is that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that it would be delivered into the hands of the buyer. Condition 4 is that the seller did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.

As with bladed articles, before the dispatch of the crossbow or part of a crossbow, the seller must receive from the buyer a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer and a photograph of the buyer, and confirm that they are aged 18 or over. New clause 70 amends the Crossbows Act 1987 to create a new offence on the part of the seller if they deliver or arrange for delivery to residential premises in respect of the sale or letting of a crossbow or part of a crossbow, similar to equivalent defences to those in section 39A of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 for knives.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for setting out in detail the provisions for where crossbows are sold and the seller is not in the presence of the buyer. On providing identity documents and photographic evidence, is she concerned that the wording that she used is vague and that there is scope for providing false documents? Perhaps she could reassure me that, in some cases, copies would certified by a solicitor or someone of sufficient standing in the community—whatever the wording might be. I am concerned that false documents could be provided, but perhaps there is provision to stop that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, and it is of concern to me as the Minister. We are introducing this new procedure because we think that the current legislation around buying and delivering is not strong enough. I take his point and I will reflect on it. It may be—I do need to think about it—that it would be onerous to have certified copies. We want to get this right, however, and ensure that accurate legal documents are used, so I will come back to that point.

I will return to the new clauses, so that the Committee is clear about what they will do. New clause 70 also provides for a new offence on the part of the courier or the person delivering on their behalf, equivalent to the new offence that I have described for the delivery of a knife. The courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier must provide the crossbow or parts of crossbows only into the hands of the actual buyer, and only at the address that the buyer provided at the outset. If the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier fails to do that, they will commit a summary offence attracting a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine.

It will be a defence, however, for the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier to show that they have checked an official identity document, and that the ID has the name of the person indicated by the seller, that it shows that the holder is over 18, and that as far as they can tell, the picture in the identity document is of the person at the doorstep. Where businesses hire out or let crossbows for corporate events or entertainment—something that I did not know happened, but apparently does—and do so online, the age-verification measures will apply to the hire and delivery of the crossbows where the hirer is an individual. New clause 71 also provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the new offence under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Turning to the reportable sale of knives, new clause 68 introduces a requirement to report all sales of knives where they are made remotely, including online sales. That will help the police to tackle what is called the grey market—the resale of knives on social media. The police tell us that grey market sellers act irresponsibly. For example, they promote knives as weapons, which is unlawful, and they do not conduct age-verification checks. The new clause will give the police information that will enable them to act. Sellers who do not comply will be liable to a fine.

Sales are reportable where six knives or more, or two or more qualifying sets of knives such as a block of knives, or one or more qualifying set together with five or more knives, are sold remotely in one sale and are to be delivered to the same residential address in England or Wales. The reporting requirement is also triggered when multiple sales meeting those limits are made to the same person or the same residential address in England or Wales within a 30-day period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)]

I welcome the new clauses—thinking back to my policing days, they are extremely welcome. Is there a risk that if we do not add these clauses to restrict such sales, knife crime and crossbow crime could become more prevalent over the coming years?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

These new clauses on bulk and suspicious sales come directly from the police—from Commander Clayman’s report and his concern about the grey market. The police clearly believe that these new measures are necessary for them to use this intelligence to tackle our problems with knife crime. Obviously, that fits with the Government’s manifesto commitment to halve knife crime over the next 10 years.

That information and intelligence will be sent to a central unit in the first instance. We will provide guidance to the police on the use of that information. We expect that the information that is not connected to other relevant intelligence linking it to criminality will be deleted and not subject to further investigation.

I turn now to the sanctions on online executives. Government new clauses 72 to 86 and new schedule 1 introduce civil penalties for online companies and their senior managers should they fail to take down illegal knife and offensive weapons content when notified of it by the police. Knives and weapons that are illegally marketed to encourage violence or to promote their suitability for use in violent attacks are commonly sold online and then used in senseless attacks. We know that the boys who murdered Ronan Kanda did so using weapons that had been illegally sold online. Many of those types of knives are marketed on social media and other platforms, meaning that those companies indirectly profit from their sale.

Commander Clayman’s review set out the extent of the problem related to the online sale of knives and offensive weapons, particularly where it relates to knives illegally being made available to young people. That report recommended that social media platforms be required to remove such prohibited material within 48 hours of police notification. These new clauses deliver on that recommendation.

The Home Office consulted widely on these measures. We engaged directly with tech companies and also held a public consultation. Tech companies and associations, charities, councils and members of the public responded to the consultation, and our response to that was published recently.

Collectively, the new clauses will grant the police the power to issue content removal notices to online marketplaces, social media platforms and search engines. The notices will require them to take down specified illegal content relating to knives or offensive weapons. If the specified content is not taken down within 48 hours, the company and an executive designated as their content manager would be liable to civil penalty notices of up to £60,000 and £10,000 respectively. Additionally, should a company fail to designate an appropriate UK-based executive when required to do so by the police, it would be liable for a civil penalty notice of up to £60,000.

These measures provide important safeguards. Both online companies and their designated executives will have the opportunity to request that the content removal notice be reviewed. The police must comply with such requests. Should online companies not have an executive who meets the criteria to be designated as their content manager, they will have the opportunity to inform the police as such. Prior to the issuing of a civil penalty notice, the company and the content manager will have the opportunity to make representations to the police. Finally, penalty notices may of course be challenged in the courts.

I fully expect online companies to act responsibly and take down harmful illegal content when made aware of it. The measures will be used in the rare cases where reckless companies choose to continue hosting such content. Taken together, this is a comprehensive package of measures that will further help to restrict the supply of weapons, particularly to children, and to keep our communities safe. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. The Opposition welcome the measures that aim to restrict the sale of knives in a wider bid to tackle knife crime. The unregulated purchase of dangerous items such as knives or crossbows presents a serious and growing threat to public safety. Without proper controls the weapons can be easily acquired by individuals with harmful intent, including gang members, violent offenders and young people at risk of exploitation. The availability of such items online without age verification, purchase limits or traceability undermines efforts to reduce knife crime and protect communities. It also places law enforcement in a reactive position, forced to respond to violence that could have been prevented through stronger regulation and control. Ensuring proper safeguards around the sale and distribution of knives is not about restricting legitimate use: it is about closing loopholes that are currently exploited to devastating effect.

Government new clause 66 strengthens the legal framework around the remote sale of knives by tightening the requirement for verifying the age of the buyer. Under the proposed changes to section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, sellers must obtain both a copy of a valid identity document and a photograph of the buyer before the sale is made. A reasonable person would need to be satisfied that the buyer is 18 or over, based on the evidence. By increasing the burden of proof on the seller and clarifying acceptable forms of ID, the measure aims to reduce the availability of knives to young people and close key loopholes in online transactions, contributing to broader efforts to curb knife crime.

Government new clause 68 introduces a legal duty for sellers in England and Wales to report bulk remote sales of knives and other bladed articles, marking a significant step forward in tackling the online flow of potentially dangerous weapons. The measure is aimed at identifying suspicious buying patterns that might indicate stockpiling for criminal use or illicit resale, helping enforcement bodies to monitor and disrupt supply chains. Notably, the duty applies to individuals and businesses unless the buyer can prove they are a VAT-registered business or incorporated company. Failure to report such sales will rightly be a criminal offence, although sellers will have a due-diligence defence if they can demonstrate they took reasonable steps to comply. The clause bolsters the UK’s strategy to reduce knife crime by increasing accountability in the remote sales sector and closing gaps that criminals may exploit.

Government new clauses 69 to 71 amend the Crossbows Act 1987 to tighten the rules on remote sale and delivery of crossbows, preventing sales to under-18s. Government new clause 69 requires sellers to verify the buyer’s age with identity documents and photographs, ensuring marked packages are delivered only to the buyer, and not to lockers. Government new clause 70 creates offences for delivering crossbows to residential premises or lockers. Government new clause 71 defines terms, allows regulations for additional offences and extends guidance to cover crossbow offences. This aligns with the Bill’s aims to enhance public safety. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee how the Government will support businesses in complying with the new verification requirements. What resources will ensure effective enforcement of delivery restrictions?

Government new clauses 72 to 83 establish a framework for regulating online service providers by requiring the appointment of content managers to oversee compliance with a new chapter of the Bill. Government new clause 73 mandates the Secretary of State to designate a co-ordinating officer from a police force or the National Crime Agency to manage functions, with authority to delegate tasks. Government new clause 74 empowers the co-ordinating officer to issue an appointment notice requiring service providers to appoint a UK resident content manager within seven days or confirm that no suitable candidate exists, and provide contact details.

Government new clause 75 requires providers to appoint a content manager within seven days if a suitable candidate emerges within two years after they reported them non-existing. Government new clause 76 allows providers to replace content managers and mandates notification within seven days if a manager no longer meets eligibility criteria, requiring a new appointment or confirmation that there is no candidate. Government new clause 77 obliges providers to notify the co-ordinating officer of any changes in required information within seven days, and Government new clause 78 authorises penalties of up to £60,000 for non-compliance, including failure to appoint a manager, provide accurate information or correct any false statements. Government new clause 80 empowers authorised officers to issue content removal notices to providers and content managers, requiring removal of unlawful weapons content within 48 hours.

Government new clause 81 allows recipients to request a review of removal notices within 48 hours, with a senior officer reviewing and confirming, modifying or withdrawing the notice. Government new clause 82 requires decision notices post-review to enforce content removal within 24 hours or the remaining 48-hour period. Will the Government do anything to support service providers—especially smaller platforms—in meeting content manager appointment requirements and ensuring that there is appropriate guidance or training available? How will the co-ordinating officer ensure consistent enforcement of these obligations across diverse online services?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister for the general tone of his response on this group of Government new clauses, which come directly from the review that Commander Clayman set out, as well the manifesto commitment we made, particularly around tech executives and holding them to account.

There has been a great deal of consultation, particularly around the tech executives, how it would work and engagement with tech companies. I take the shadow Minister’s point about smaller platforms, but there has been that engagement. On the issue around training and enforcement in terms of the new clauses relating to sale and delivery, it is clear that all courier and delivery companies will have to ensure that their staff are trained on these new legal requirements. To be clear, if the person who is delivering the package has taken all steps to make sure that they have checked the information that is being provided and the identification document, and they are acting reasonably, that is a defence, but there will be a need for training and for people to know what their legal obligations are, particularly when they are delivering, because we know that has been a particular issue. The engagement, particularly with tech executives, that I talked about has also happened with courier firms and delivery businesses, and will continue.

I want to go back to the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised about identity checks, just so everybody is clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call the Minister.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Thank you, Mr Pritchard. I wanted to make it clear that the documents that are being talked about in relation to proving identity are passports and driving licences. I take the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised with me in his intervention, but those are the two documents that will be looked at and provided. We will want to make sure that this works, and in the future, other documents may well need to be added to that list. However, just to be clear, it is those two documents.

As I have also said, we would expect that a person who is delivering would look at those documents. I do not really want to get into how those documents can be forged, because that is obviously an issue that is on the hon. Gentleman’s mind, but at the moment those are the two documents, and we would expect them to be examined by a delivery driver or courier when the items are delivered.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister; that is helpful. Those documents are obviously very hard to forge, so I was not suggesting that they might be forged. My question was about was the possibility—I may simply be wrong here—of someone else presenting those documents. They are not forgeries; they are simply not the passport or driving licence of the buyer. Clearly, if the buyer has to be present when they present those documents to the person making the delivery, there is plainly not an issue, so I welcome that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is clear. As we have said, photographic identity has to be provided at the beginning of the process—at the point of sale—as well as the identity document, to ensure it matches up.

With that, I commend these measures to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 66 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 67

Delivery of knives etc

“(1) The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 39 insert—

‘39A Defences to offence under section 38: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of delivering a bladed product to residential premises to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person (“the seller”) charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of arranging for the delivery of a bladed product to residential premises to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the bladed product unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the product would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid commission of the offence.

(4) The delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the bladed product was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the buyer was an individual, that P was the buyer.

(5) In subsection (4) “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38.’

(3) After section 40 insert—

‘40A Delivery of bladed products sold by UK seller to residential premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed product to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed products for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed products, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed product to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed product.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 39(2) to (5) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) and (e) as it applies for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) and (e).

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.’

(4) After section 42 insert—

‘42A Delivery of bladed articles sold by non-UK seller to premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed article to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed articles for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed articles, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed article to premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed article on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed article.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 42(2) and (3) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) as it applies for the purposes of section 42(1)(b).

(9) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales);

“delivery conditions” has the meaning given by section 39A(4), but reading the reference in that section to a bladed product as a reference to a bladed article.’

(5) In section 38(10) (offences) for “section” substitute “sections 39A and”.

(6) In section 39 (delivery of bladed products to persons under 18)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e) after “premises” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (7) omit paragraph (a).

(7) In section 40 (defences to delivery offences under sections 38 and 39)—

(a) in the heading, after “39” insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (2) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(d) in subsection (3) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(e) in subsection (4) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(f) in subsection (5) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(g) in subsection (6) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(h) in subsection (7), omit “England and Wales or”;

(i) in subsection (14), in the definition of “appropriate national authority” omit paragraph (a).

(8) In section 41 (meaning of “bladed product” in sections 38 to 40)—

(a) in the heading, for “40” substitute “40A”;

(b) in subsection (1) for “40” substitute “40A”;

(c) in subsection (2) for “40” substitute “40A”.

(9) In section 42 (delivery of knives etc pursuant to arrangement with seller outside UK)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e), after “article” insert “to premises in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (5) omit “England and Wales or”;

(d) omit subsection (10)(a);

(e) omit subsection (11)(a).

(10) In section 66(1)(j) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) for “42” substitute “42A”.

(11) In section 68 (regulations and orders)—

(a) in subsection (2) after “State” insert, “, except for regulations under section 39A(5)(d),”;

(b) after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 39A(5)(d) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the offences and defences relating to delivery of knives to premises in England and Wales following a remote sale.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 68

Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

“(1) In the Criminal Justice Act 1988, after section 141C insert—

‘141D Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument, report to the person specified in the regulations any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.

(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in subsection (4), sells—

(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;

(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles;

(c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.

(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.

(4) The ways are—

(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in England and Wales, or

(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—

(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in England and Wales, or

(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in England and Wales.

(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller and the person to whom the bladed article is sold are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) a person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(7) A sale is not reportable if the person to whom the articles are sold (“the buyer”)—

(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and

(b) is—

(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or

(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.

(8) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence.

(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.

(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(12) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales), other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;

“residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).

(13) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) may in particular include requirements about—

(a) how reports are to be made,

(b) when reports to be made, and

(c) the information reports must include.

(14) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(15) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend—

(a) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(a);

(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(b);

(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(c);

(d) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(c);

(e) the period specified in subsection (4)(b).

(16) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (15) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’

(2) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(1) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) after paragraph (g) insert—

‘(ga) section 141D of that Act (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales),’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause imposes a requirement on sellers of bladed articles to report bulk sales to a person specified in regulations.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 69

Remote sale and letting of crossbows

“(1) The Crossbows Act 1987 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 1 omit ‘unless he believes him to be eighteen years or older and has reasonable grounds for the belief’.

(3) After section 1A insert—

‘1B Defences to offence under section 1: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) is charged with an offence under section 1, and

(b) A was not in the presence of the person (“B”) to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire at the time of the sale or letting on hire.

(3) A is not to be regarded as having shown that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence unless, as a minimum, A shows that the following conditions are met.

(4) Condition 1 is that, before the sale or letting on hire—

(a) A obtained from B—

(i) a copy of an identity document issued to B, and

(ii) a photograph of B, and

(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that B was aged 18 or over.

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) Condition 2 is that when the package containing the crossbow or part of the crossbow was dispatched by A, it was clearly marked to indicate—

(a) that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow, and

(b) that, when finally delivered, it should only be delivered into the hands of B.

(7) Condition 3 is that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that, when finally delivered, the package would be delivered into the hands of B.

(8) Condition 4 is that A did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.

(9) Where the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A to a place from which it was to be collected by B, references in subsections (6) and (7) to its final delivery are to be read as its supply to B from that place.

(10) In subsection (8) “locker” means a lockable container to which the package is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells crossbows etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 1 of the Crossbows Act 1987, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 70

Delivery of crossbows

“In the Crossbows Act 1987, after section 1B (inserted by section (Remote sale and letting of crossbows)) insert—

‘1C Offence of seller delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England or Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and

(b) A and B are not in each other's presence at the time of the sale.

(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to residential premises in England or Wales.

(3) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a locker in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to a locker in England or Wales.

(4) In subsection (3) “locker” means a lockable container to which the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(6) The “maximum term for summary offences”, in relation to an offence, means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.

1D Defences to offences under section 1C

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(a) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(b) to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the crossbow or part of a crossbow would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(4) For the purposes of this section the delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the crossbow or part of a crossbow was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.

(5) “Identity document” has the same meaning as in section 1B(5).

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under section 1C.

1E Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is within the United Kingdom at any time if the person carries on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) A person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.

(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

1F Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to premises in England and Wales on behalf of non-UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England and Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is outside the United Kingdom at any time if the person does not carry on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) Any person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause creates offences relating to delivery of crossbows to premises following a remote sale equivalent to the offences relating to knives in sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 71

Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision

“(1) After section 1F of the Crossbows Act 1987 (inserted by section (Delivery of crossbows)) insert—

‘1G Interpretation of sections 1B to 1F

(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 1B to 1F.

(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(3) “Residential premises” means premises used solely for residential purposes.

(4) The circumstances where premises are not residential premises include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.

(5) A person charged with an offence is taken to have shown a matter if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.’

(2) After section 6 of the Crossbows Act 1987 insert—

‘6A Regulations

(1) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act are to be made by statutory instrument.

(2) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (alone or with other provision) regulations under section 1D(6) or 1E(7) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(3) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(3) In section 66(1) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc), after paragraph (ga) (inserted by section (Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales) insert—

“(gb) any of sections 1 to 3 of the Crossbows Act 1987 (sale etc of crossbows) as they have effect in relation to England and Wales,”.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new sections added to the Crossbows Act 1987 by NC69 and NC70 and extends the guidance-making power in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 to cover offences under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 72

“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter—

(a) a ‘relevant search service’ is a search service other than an exempt service;

(b) a ‘relevant user-to-user service’ is a user-to-user service other than an exempt service.

(2) In subsection (1), ‘search service’ and ‘user-to-user service’ have the same meanings as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (the ‘2023 Act’) (see, in particular, section 3 of that Act).

(3) The following are exempt services for the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) a service of a kind that is described in any of the following paragraphs of Schedule 1 to the 2023 Act (certain services exempt from regulation under that Act)—

(i) paragraph 1 or 2 (email, SMS and MMS services);

(ii) paragraph 3 (services offering one-to-one live aural communications);

(iii) paragraph 4 (limited functionality services);

(iv) paragraph 5 (services which enable combinations of user-generated content);

(v) paragraph 7 or 8 (internal business services);

(vi) paragraph 9 (services provided by public bodies);

(vii) paragraph 10 (services provided by persons providing education or childcare), or

(b) a service of a kind that is described in Schedule 2 to the 2023 Act (services that include regulated provider pornographic content).

(4) This Chapter does not apply in relation to a part of a relevant search service, or a part of a relevant user-to-user service, if the 2023 Act does not apply to that part of the service by virtue of section 5(1) or (2) of that Act.

(5) In this Chapter, ‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant user-to-user service or a provider of a relevant search service.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause, which together with NC73, NC74, NC75, NC76, NC77, NC78, NC79, NC80, NC81, NC82, NC83, NC84, NC85, NC86 and NS1 are expected to form a new Chapter of Part 2 of the Bill, defines key terms used in the new Chapter.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 73

Coordinating officer

“(1) The Secretary of State must designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the coordinating officer for the purposes of this Chapter.

(2) The coordinating officer may delegate any of the officer’s functions under this Chapter (to such extent as the officer may determine) to another member of a relevant police force or National Crime Agency officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to designate a “coordinating officer” to perform the functions conferred on that officer under the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 74

Notice requiring appointment of content manager

“(1) The coordinating officer may give a service provider a notice (an ‘appointment notice’) requiring the provider—

(a) either to—

(i) appoint an individual who meets the conditions in subsection (2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(ii) if there is no such individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer, and

(b) to provide the coordinating officer with the required information.

(2) The conditions are that the individual—

(a) plays a significant role in—

(i) the making of decisions about how a whole or substantial part of the service provider’s activities are to be managed or organised, or

(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities, and

(b) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom.

(3) ‘Required information’ means—

(a) the contact details of any content manager appointed;

(b) an email address, or details of another means of contacting the service provider rapidly which is readily available, that may be used for the purpose of giving the provider a notice under this Chapter;

(c) information identifying the relevant user-to-user services, or (as the case may be) the relevant search services, provided by the provider.

(4) An appointment notice must—

(a) specify the period before the end of which the service provider must comply with the notice, and

(b) explain the potential consequences of the service provider failing to do so (see section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty)).

(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(a) must be at least seven days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to require a service provider to appoint a senior executive as their “content manager” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72 or to confirm that there is no-one who meets the appointment conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 75

Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice,

(b) the provider has confirmed to the officer (in accordance with the appointment notice or under section (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b)), that there is no individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), and

(c) at any time within the period of two years beginning with the day on which that confirmation was given, there is an individual who meets those conditions.

(2) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the first day on which there is an individual who meets those conditions—

(a) appoint such an individual as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(b) provide the coordinating officer with the content manager’s contact details.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that at any time could not appoint a senior executive as its content manager when required to do so (because there was no-one who met the appointment conditions) to make an appointment if, following a change in circumstances within 2 years, there is someone who meets the conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 76

Replacement of content manager

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has appointed an individual as the provider’s content manager (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or this section).

(2) The service provider may replace the provider’s content manager by appointing another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s new content manager for the purposes of this Chapter.

(3) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment is made under subsection (2), provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details.

(4) If the individual appointed as a service provider’s content manager ceases to meet any of the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), the appointment ceases to have effect.

(5) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment ceases to have effect under subsection (4)—

(a) either—

(i) appoint another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(ii) provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details, or

(b) if there is no longer such an individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the appointment by a service provider of a replacement content manager, including in a case where the original content manager ceases to meet the appointment conditions (and so that appointment ceases to have effect).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 77

Duty to notify changes in required information

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has, in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(a)(ii)provided the coordinating officer with required information.

(2) The service provider must give notice to the coordinating officer of any change in the required information.

(3) The notice must specify the date on which the change occurred.

(4) The notice must be given before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the change occurred.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that has given the coordinating officer required information (as defined in NC74) to inform the officer of any changes in that information.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 78

Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty

“(1) This section applies if the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice and—

(a) the period specified in the notice as mentioned in (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(4)(a) has expired without the provider having complied with the notice,

(b) the provider has failed to comply with a requirement under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information),

(c) the provider, in purported compliance with a requirement to provide, or give notice of a change in, required information (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information)(2)) makes a statement that is false in a material particular, or

(d) the provider makes a statement that is false in giving the confirmation mentioned in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1)(a)(ii) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b).

(2) The coordinating officer may give the service provider a notice (a ‘penalty notice’) requiring the provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £60,000.

(3) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in subsection (2).

(4) Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this Chapter.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider that fails to comply with various requirements imposed by an appointment notice or under NC75, NC76 and NC77.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 79

Unlawful weapons content

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in England and Wales if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc a dangerous weapon),

(b) an offence under section 1 or 2 of the Knives Act 1997 (marketing of knives as suitable for combat etc and related publications), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of England and Wales (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc an offensive weapon).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Scotland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence within subsection (1)(a) or (b), or

(b) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Scotland.

(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Northern Ireland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under Article 53 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160) (N.I. 24) (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc certain knives),

(b) an offence within subsection (1)(b), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Northern Ireland.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause defines “unlawful weapons content” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 80

Content removal notices

“(1) This section applies where an authorised officer is satisfied that content—

(a) present on a relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service;

is unlawful weapons content in a relevant part of the United Kingdom.

(2) The authorised officer may give a content removal notice to—

(a) the provider of the relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) the provider of the relevant search service.

(3) If the authorised officer gives a content removal notice to a service provider in a case where the coordinating officer has the contact details of the provider’s content manager, the authorised officer may also give the notice to that manager.

(4) A content removal notice is a notice requiring the service provider and (if applicable) the provider’s content manager (each a ‘recipient’) to secure that—

(a) the content to which it relates is removed (see section (Interpretation of Chapter)(2)), and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(5) A content removal notice must—

(a) identify the content to which it relates;

(b) explain the authorised officer’s reasons for considering that the content is unlawful weapons content in the relevant part (or parts) of the United Kingdom;

(c) explain that the notice must be complied with before the end of the period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notice is given;

(d) explain that each recipient has the right to request a review of the decision to give the notice and how a request is to be made (see section (Content removal notices: review));

(e) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notice;

(f) contain the authorised officer’s contact details;

(g) be in such form, and contain such further information, as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.

(6) The authorised officer may withdraw a content removal notice from a recipient by notifying the recipient to that effect (but withdrawal of a notice does not prevent a further content removal notice from being given under this section, whether or not in relation to the same content as the withdrawn notice).

(7) In this section—

‘authorised officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the chief officer of the force, or

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant part of the United Kingdom’ means—

(a) where the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force in England and Wales, England and Wales;

(b) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Scotland, Scotland;

(c) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland;

(d) where the authorised officer is a member of the Ministry of Defence Police or a National Crime Agency officer, any part of the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the police or an officer of the National Crime Agency to give a service provider and (if there is one) the provider’s content manager a notice requiring them to remove unlawful weapons content from the services they provide.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 81

Content removal notices: review

“(1) A person who is given a content removal notice (a ‘recipient’) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notice.

(2) A request under subsection (1) is to be made by the recipient giving—

(a) a notice (a ‘review notice’) to the authorised officer, and

(b) a copy of the review notice to the other recipient (if applicable).

(3) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—

(a) content to which the notice relates is not unlawful weapons content;

(b) content to which the notice relates is insufficiently identified for the recipient to be able to take the action required by the notice;

(c) the provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant user-to-user service or relevant search service to which the notice relates;

(d) the individual who received the notice as the service provider’s content manager is not, in fact, that provider’s content manager;

(e) the notice was otherwise not given in accordance with this Chapter.

(4) On receipt of a review notice, a review of the decision to give the content removal notice must be carried out—

(a) if the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force, by another member of that force who is of a higher rank;

(b) if the authorised officer is a National Crime Agency officer, by another officer who holds a more senior position in the Agency.

The individual carrying out the review is referred to in this section as ‘the reviewing officer’.

(6) On completing the review or (in a case where two review notices are given) both reviews the reviewing officer must, in respect of each recipient, either—

(a) confirm in full the decision to give the content removal notice,

(b) confirm the decision to give the notice, but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, or

(c) withdraw the notice.

(7) The reviewing officer must give each recipient a notice (a ‘decision notice’)—

(a) setting out the outcome of the review or reviews, and

(b) giving reasons.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the police or the NCA to review the decision to give a service provider or their content manager a content removal notice under NC80 where the recipient of the notice requests a review.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 82

Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content

“(1) This section applies where the reviewing officer—

(a) has carried out a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(b) confirms the decision to give the content removal notice to the service provider, the provider’s content manager or both of them (in each case whether as mentioned in subsection (6)(a) or (b) of that section).

(2) If the reviewing officer confirms in full the decision to give the content removal notice, the decision notice must require its recipient to secure that—

(a) the content to which the content removal notice relates is removed, and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(3) If the officer confirms the decision to give the content removal notice but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, the decision notice must—

(a) identify the content to which the confirmation relates (the ‘confirmed content’), and

(b) require its recipient to secure that—

(i) the confirmed content is removed, and

(ii) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(4) A decision notice within subsection (2) or (3) must specify the period before the end of which the notice must be complied with, and that period must be whichever of the following is the longest—

(a) the period of 24 hours beginning with the time the decision notice is given;

(b) the period—

(i) beginning with the time the review notice or, if there was more than one, the first review notice, was given under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(ii) ending with the end of the initial 48-hour period.

(5) In this section, ‘reviewing officer’ has the same meaning as in section (Content removal notices: review).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause provides for the police or NCA, following a review under NC81 which confirms (in full or in part) the decision to give a content removal notice, to give the service provider or content manager a decision notice requiring the removal of the unlawful weapons content concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 83

Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties

“(1) Subsection (2) applies where—

(a) a content removal notice has been given to a service provider, or to both a service provider and the provider’s content manager, in accordance with section (Content removal notices), and

(b) the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notice having been complied with or a review notice having been given.

(2) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the content removal notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(3) Subsection (4) applies where, following a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review)—

(a) a decision notice has been given to the service provider or to both the provider and the provider’s content manager in accordance with section (Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content)(2) or (3) confirming the decision to give the content removal notice, and

(b) the period specified in the decision notice under subsection (4) of that section has expired without that notice having been complied with.

(4) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the decision notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(5) In this section a ‘penalty notice’ means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty—

(a) where the recipient is a service provider, of an amount not exceeding £60,000;

(b) where the recipient is a service provider’s content manager, of an amount not exceeding £10,000.

(6) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for a sum for the time being specified in subsection (5).

(7) See Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) for further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the police or NCA to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider or up to £10,000 on a content manager if they have failed to comply with a content removal notice or a decision notice.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 84

Guidance

“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the persons mentioned in subsection (2) about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the chief officer, and any other member, of a relevant police force;

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency and any other officer of the Agency.

(3) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.

(5) A person mentioned in subsection (2) must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function under this Chapter.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police and the National Crime Agency about the exercise of their functions under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 85

Notices

“(1) This section applies in relation to any notice that must or may be given to a person under this Chapter.

(2) A notice may be given to a person by—

(a) delivering it by hand to the person,

(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,

(c) sending it by post to the person at that address, or

(d) sending it by email to the person’s email address.

(3) A notice to a body corporate may be given to any officer of that body.

(4) A notice to a partnership may be given to any partner or to a person who has the control or management of the partnership business.

(5) A notice sent by first class post to an address in the United Kingdom, is treated as given at noon on the second working day after the day of posting, unless the contrary is proved.

(6) A notice sent by email is treated as given at the time it is sent unless the contrary is proved.

(7) In this section—

‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever name called;

‘email address’, in relation to a person, means—

(a) an email address provided by that person for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(b) any email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person;

‘officer’, in relation to an entity, includes a director, a manager, a partner, the secretary or, where the affairs of the entity are managed by its members, a member;

‘proper address’ means—

(a) in the case of an entity, the address of the entity’s registered office or principal office;

(b) in any other case, the person’s last known address;

‘working day’ means any day other than—

(a) a Saturday or Sunday, or

(b) a day that is a bank holiday in any part of the United Kingdom under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.

(8) In the case of an entity registered or carrying on business outside the United Kingdom, or with offices outside the United Kingdom, the reference in subsection (7), in the definition of ‘proper address’, to the entity’s principal office includes—

(a) its principal office in the United Kingdom, or

(b) if the entity has no office in the United Kingdom, any place in the United Kingdom at which the person giving the notice believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of any director or other officer of that entity.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the ways in which a notice can be given, and the time at which a notice is to be treated as given, under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 86

Interpretation of Chapter

“(1) In this Chapter—

‘appointment notice’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1);

‘authorised officer’ in relation to a content removal notice, means the member of a relevant police force, or officer of the National Crime Agency, who gave the notice;

‘chief officer’—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, means the chief officer of police of the force;

(b) in relation to any other relevant police force, means the chief constable of that force;

‘contact details’, in relation to an individual, means the individual’s—

(a) full name;

(b) telephone number;

(c) email address;

(d) residential address, or other service address, in the United Kingdom;

‘content’ has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘content manager’, in relation to a service provider, means the individual for the time being appointed as the content manager of the provider (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or (Replacement of content manager));

‘content removal notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices)(4);

‘coordinating officer’ means the individual designated as such under section (Coordinating officer)(1);

‘decision notice’ means a notice given under section (Content removal notices: review)(7);

‘encounter’, in relation to content, has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘entity’ has the same meaning as in that Act (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘initial 48-hour period’, in relation to a content removal notice, means the 48-hour period specified in the notice as mentioned in section (Content removal notices)(5)(c);

‘issuing force’—

(a) in relation to a content removal notice given by a member of a relevant police force, means that force;

(b) in relation to a content removal notice given by a National Crime Agency officer, means the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant police force’—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, means—

(i) a police force in England and Wales, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(b) in relation to Scotland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Scotland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

‘relevant search service’ and

‘relevant user-to-user service’ have the meanings given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’);

‘required information’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(3);

‘review notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices: review)(2)(a);

‘search content’ and ‘search results’ have the meanings given by section 57 of the Online Safety Act 2023;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to a relevant police force, means—

(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force, or

(b) a member of the relevant police force of at least the rank of inspector authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the chief officer;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to the National Crime Agency, means—

(a) the Director General of the National Crime Agency, or

(b) an officer of the Agency who—

(i) holds a position in the Agency the seniority of which is at least equivalent to that of the rank of inspector in a relevant police force, and

(ii) is authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the Director General;

‘service address’ has the same meaning as in the Companies Acts (see section 1141 of the Companies Act 2006);

‘service provider’ has the meaning given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, a reference to ‘removing’ content—

(a) in relation to content present on a relevant user-to-user service, is a reference to any action that results in the content being removed from the service, or being permanently hidden, so users of the service in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content cannot encounter it;

(b) in relation to content which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service, is a reference to taking measures designed to secure, so far as possible, that the content is no longer included in the search content of the service that is available in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content;

and related expressions are to be read accordingly.

(3) The following provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 apply for the purposes of this Chapter as they apply for the purposes of that Act—

(a) section 226 (determining who is the provider of a particular user-to-user service or search service);

(b) section 236(5) and (6) (references to content being present).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause contains definitions of terms used in the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 87

Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (6).

(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—

‘27A Causing death by dangerous cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section “serious injury” means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(3) In section 28—

(a) in subsection (1) for ‘on a road dangerously’ substitute ‘dangerously on a road or other public place’;

(b) omit subsections (2) and (3).

(4) After section 28 insert—

‘28A Meaning of “dangerous cycling”

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 27A, 27B and 28.

(2) A person is to be regarded as riding dangerously if (and only if) the condition in subsection (3) or (4) is met.

(3) The condition in this subsection is met if—

(a) the way that the person rides falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist, and

(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding in that way would be dangerous.

(4) The condition in this subsection is met if it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding the cycle in its current state would be dangerous.

(5) In determining the state of a cycle for the purposes of subsection (4), regard may be had (among other things) to—

(a) whether the cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations under section 81 (regulation of brakes, bells etc, on pedal cycles);

(b) anything attached to or carried on the cycle and the manner in which it is attached or carried.

(6) In determining what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(7) References in this section to something being “dangerous” are references to it resulting in danger of—

(a) injury to any person, or

(b) serious damage to property.

28B Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

28C Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section ‘serious injury’ means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(5) In section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)—

(a) after ‘a road’ insert ‘or other public place’;

(b) after ‘the road’ insert ‘or place’.

(6) After section 29 insert—

‘29A Meaning of careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 28B, 28C and 29.

(2) A person is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention if (and only if) the way the person cycles falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist.

(3) In determining what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(4) A person (A) is to be regarded as cycling without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by A’s cycling.’

(7) The table in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences) is amended as follows.

(8) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 27’ insert in columns 1 to 4—

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

The devastating consequences of road traffic collisions caused by reckless or dangerous behaviour are not limited to motor vehicles. In recent years, a small but significant number of cases have emerged where pedestrians and other vulnerable road users have been seriously injured or even killed as a result of dangerous or careless cycling. This new clause rightly recognises that, while the majority of cyclists are law-abiding and responsible, the law must be equipped to deal appropriately with the minority who behave recklessly and put others at grave risk.

Currently, there is a glaring gap in the legal framework: while motorists who cause death or serious injury through dangerous or careless driving face severe legal consequences, no equivalent provision exists for cyclists. This clause introduces parity in accountability, ensuring that victims and their families are not left feeling that justice is denied simply because the vehicle involved was a bicycle rather than a car.

New clause 87, alongside Government amendment 82, ensures that the legal definitions of dangerous and careless cycling reflect the realities of modern shared road and path usage, including in public places beyond traditional roadways. With the increase in cycling on footpaths, shared spaces and pedestrianised zones, it is vital that the law keeps pace and applies wherever the public might be put at risk.

Importantly, the introduction of these offences does not criminalise cycling itself; it targets only those rare but serious cases where a cyclist’s conduct falls far below that which would be expected of competent and considerate road users. It draws on the well-established legal test from dangerous and careless driving legislation, helping to ensure that the proposed offences are proportionate, fair and clearly understood.

As Members will be aware, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green has long campaigned for a change to the law regarding responsible cycling, and I pay tribute to his work to deliver this improvement to public safety. The last Government confirmed that they would adopt an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would have resulted in a change comparable to the one we see today.

Much of this would not have been possible without the sustained efforts of people such as Matthew Briggs, who, in 2016, tragically lost his wife Kim Briggs, aged just 44, after she was hit by a cyclist riding a fixed-gear bike with no front brakes. She sustained catastrophic head injuries and sadly died a week later. Unfortunately, Kim is just one of many victims, and Matthew’s is just one of many families harmed by these situations, but he has campaigned for this change in the law after tragically losing a loved one. I pay tribute to Matt and his campaign for justice, and hope that this change effectively bridges the gap in the law that so many have highlighted.

Finally, this measure sends a strong message that all road users, regardless of their mode of transport, are responsible for the safety of others. It underlines the seriousness with which Parliament treats the loss of life or serious injuries, promotes responsible cycling, and contributes to safer public spaces for everyone.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 87 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 88

Places of worship: restriction on protests

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 12(1) (imposing conditions on public processions)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, the procession is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship,’.

(3) In section 14(1) (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, the assembly is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’

(4) In section 14ZA(1) (imposing conditions on one-person protests)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (a) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) the protest is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause gives the police power to impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests that may intimidate people and deter those people from accessing a place of worship for carrying out religious activities or from carrying out religious activities there. It does not provide power to impose conditions where those who may be intimidated are using a place of worship for other purposes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 89—Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests.

Government new clause 90—Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clauses 88 to 90 further update our public order legislation to reflect operational experience. It is important that the legislation keeps pace with the operational realities faced by police on the ground.

In the wake of the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023, we have seen a wave of large-scale protests across the United Kingdom. Although the right to protest is of course a cornerstone of our democracy and the majority of demonstrations have been peaceful, we cannot ignore the very real impact that some of the gatherings have had on religious communities. We have heard troubling reports of people of all faiths feeling too intimidated to attend places of worship, and of services being cancelled due to the proximity and nature of the protests.

New clause 88 therefore seeks to provide religious communities with better protection from intimidation caused by protests within the vicinity of their place of worship. The police have powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to manage protests where there is serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, the powers often do not capture the types of harm currently being experienced by religious communities, especially where the intimidation is not deliberate, but is none the less very real for those affected.

The intention of the new clause is to strengthen the police’s powers to manage intimidatory public processions, public assemblies or one-person protests near places of worship, specifically by allowing police to impose conditions where they reasonably believe that the procession, assembly or protest may result in the intimidation of and deter those seeking to access places of worship.

New clause 88 achieves that by creating a new threshold in sections 12, 14 and 14ZA of the 1986 Act, under which the police can impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests. To be clear, it does not ban protests outright, but it enables the police to use this threshold to consider the appropriate time, location or routing that a protest should have in order to avoid intimidating those wishing to practise their faith at their place of worship.

The new clause will allow the police to assess whether a protest may create an intimidating atmosphere that could deter people from accessing places of worship to carry out religious activities or from conducting religious activities there, regardless of whether the organisers of the protest themselves intended for the protest to have that effect.

I turn to new clause 89. In managing recent protests, the police have relied on their powers under sections 12 and 14 of the 1986 Act to impose those conditions, for example where there is a risk of serious public disorder or serious disruption to the life of the community. However, under the current law, only the most senior officers physically at the scene can impose these conditions on live protests or where people are assembling with a view to take part. That can cause delays, particularly when strategic or tactical commanders, known as the gold and silver commanders, who are often based in off-site control rooms, have better access to intelligence but are unable to impose conditions directly. That can also lead to inconsistencies in how similar protests are managed across different locations, especially when multiple events occur at once.

Policing stakeholders have made it clear that allowing gold and silver commanders to impose conditions remotely, where the statutory thresholds are met, would improve the timeliness, consistency and effectiveness of public order policing. Those commanders typically have the best oversight of unfolding events and are well placed to make informed decisions. New clause 89 therefore amends the 1986 Act to enable gold and silver commanders to exercise powers to impose conditions under sections 12(1) and 14(1) in relation to public processions and assemblies.

Finally, new clause 90 addresses two operational issues raised by the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence to ensure that public order powers can be used effectively by the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police. First, it amends the definitions in the Public Order Act 1986 to allow the BTP to impose conditions on public assemblies taking place at railway stations. Currently, the law restricts the use of these powers to open-air locations, which limits the BTP’s ability to manage protests in enclosed but high-risk public spaces such as major stations. This change will ensure that the BTP can act appropriately within its jurisdiction across England, Wales and Scotland.

Secondly, the new clause corrects a legislative error made in 2004 that unintentionally prevented the BTP from using section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the existing power to require individuals to remove face coverings. This amendment restores that power. It also empowers the MDP to issue authorisations under section 60AA and section 60 of the 1994 Act to enable MDP officers to exercise powers under these provisions within its jurisdiction, in the same way as territorial police forces.

These are technical but important amendments. They do not expand thresholds or the scope of the powers themselves, but simply ensure that the BTP and MDP can apply them, where appropriate, to keep people safe, particularly in transport hubs and around defence infrastructure. The proposals reflect direct feedback from operational policing and will bring clarity and consistency to the use of public order legislation. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 88 rightly seeks to strengthen protections for the freedom of religion and belief by ensuring that individuals are not deterred or intimidated from attending or participating in religious worship due to protests taking place in the vicinity of places of worship. It balances the right to peaceful protest with the fundamental right of individuals to practise their faith without fear or obstruction. Places of worship are not just buildings; they are sanctuaries for reflection, community and faith. When people are intimidated from entering these spaces or carrying out religious observance because of aggressive or targeted protests, it undermines not only their personal freedoms, but the broader principle of religious tolerance.

This new clause helps to ensure that those attending religious services can do so without being subject to harassment or psychological pressure. The provision is not a ban on protests: it enables the police to impose conditions, not prohibitions, on processions, assemblies and even one-person protests that occur in the vicinity of a place of worship, where such demonstrations risk intimidating individuals of reasonable firmness and deterring from participating in religious activities. The threshold is carefully defined to target behaviour that causes harm, while still protecting legitimate expression of opinion.

While some may easily dismiss this new clause, it is important to recognise that there are real-world examples where people believe that protests are being used to undermine the ability to worship. For example, recently in Westcliff-on-Sea, a protest organised by Action for Palestine, which the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign described as “not constructive”, took place on Shabbat during the final week of Pesach, in a Jewish neighbourhood where many residents would be travelling to and from the synagogue. The local rabbi said:

“There were quite a few people in the community who were so intimidated that they decided to go to their parents’ in London for the weekend, to get away completely.”

Others decided to attend one of the other orthodox synagogues in the area, such as the Westcliff Charedi synagogue, and ending up having to walk a mile to make Saturday’s two services. While I would not expect the Minister to comment on the specifics of whether that protest would constitute a breach of the new clause in question, it highlights how people practising their religion have felt targeted by particular protests.

Given the rise in targeted demonstrations, whether based on religion, race or identity, this new clause ensures that the law is responsive to the realities of contemporary protest dynamics. It draws on the existing powers under the Public Order Act 1986, applying them specifically in a context where dignity, privacy and religious freedom deserve particular safeguarding. Ultimately, this new clause is a proportionate and necessary step to preserve the peaceful co-existence of rights: the right to worship freely and the right to protest responsibly. It affirms that places of worship must remain accessible and free from intimidation for all communities.

I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. How will she ensure that new clause 88 strikes the right balance between protecting freedom of religion and upholding the right to protest under articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights? What guidance will be provided to the police to assess whether a protest

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”?

How will subjectivity be mitigated to avoid arbitrary enforcement? Has the Home Office identified particular recent incidents that demonstrate a pressing need for the power? How frequently does the Minister expect it to be used?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Burton-Sampson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. Like my right hon. Friend the Minister, I will always defend the right to protest, but it must be appropriate. Having one’s voice heard must not come at the expense of intimidating those who are peacefully worshipping.

As the hon. Member for Stockton West mentioned, only recently in Southend my constituents were affected by a march that was purposely routed past a place of worship at the time when people were due to be leaving that place of worship. We have heard similar evidence of that happening across the country. Let us be clear: it is not acceptable that people should be intimidated while they go to or from, or are in, their place of worship, whatever their religion. I welcome the new clauses.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the short speech that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh just made. He has spoken to me about the events in Westcliff-on-Sea and their impact on that community. I was also grateful to the shadow Minister for referencing that incident, because it sets out clearly why the provision in new clause 88 is necessary. I welcome that.

The shadow Minister asked whether we will stop legitimate protests, and somehow put the right to religious worship above the right to protest. I want to make it clear that the new clause does not place the freedom of religion above the right to protest. I think we all agree that the right to protest is an important part of our democracy. The new clause seeks to balance those rights by ensuring that protesters do not unduly intimidate or prevent individuals from accessing places of worship.

Although the right to protest remains key and fundamental, the provisions in the new clause clarify police powers to manage those protests near places of worship, ensuring that the freedom of religion is protected without imposing a blanket restriction on demonstrations. The intent is not to curtail protest rights, but to prevent situations where protests create a hostile environment that discourages religious observance. It is important to note that it applies equally to all faiths and all places of worship, not just, as we started off talking about, a specific religious group.

The shadow Minister raised the resource implications for BTP and MDP. The request to bring forward the provisions was because of the operational needs of those police forces. I am expect that they will be able to deal with any costs arising from new clause 90 from their existing budget. The shadow Minister also mentioned training and making sure that police officers understood the introduction of these provisions. I am sure he agrees that there is extensive training of police officers. With public order in particular, we know that there is a very well-worn path of how officers are trained at the right level, depending on the situation.

I recently had the pleasure of meeting Metropolitan police officers, who do a lot of public order work, down at Gravesend to see that training first hand, and I saw the amount of resource that goes in to ensuring that those officers are equipped and know their rights and how most effectively to use them. The new provisions will be part of the continuation of that training for police officers, alongside the work of the College of Policing. On that basis, I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 88 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 89

Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most’ to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’.

(3) In section 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most” to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’;

(c) in subsection (2ZB), for ‘reference in subsection (2)(b) to a chief officer of police includes’, substitute ‘references in subsection (2) to a chief officer of police include’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause allows the powers in sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions on public processions and public assemblies to be exercised by a police officer authorised to do so by a chief officer of police.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 90

Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) In section 14A(9) (prohibiting trespassory assemblies), in the definition of ‘land’, after ‘“land”’ insert ‘, except in subsections (4A) to (4C) of this section,’.

(3) In section 16 (interpretation), in the definition of ‘public assembly’, for the words from ‘wholly’ to the end substitute ‘—

(a) wholly or partly open to the air, or

(b) within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 31(1) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003;’.

(4) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).

(5) In section 60 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of or after violence), after subsection (9A) insert—

‘(9B) So far as they relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police—

(a) subsections (1) and (9) have effect as if the references to a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, and

(b) subsection (1)(aa)(i) has effect as if the reference to a police area were a reference to the places in England and Wales specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’

(6) In section 60AA (powers to require removal of disguises)—

(a) for subsection (8) substitute—

‘(8) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the British Transport Police Force, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 31(1)(a) to (f) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.

(8A) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’;

(b) in subsection (9) omit ‘and “policed premises” each’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause extends certain powers under Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 to land which is not open to the air; allows Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and allows British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60AA of that Act.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 91

Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences

“(1) This section applies where in criminal proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or in proceedings (anywhere) before a service court, a person (‘D’) is charged with a qualifying offence.

(2) An offence is a ‘qualifying offence’ if—

(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,

(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and

(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.

(3) The court must—

(a) cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so—

(i) D’s name;

(ii) D’s address;

(iii) D’s date of birth;

(b) give a reporting direction (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions)) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.

(4) The court may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so, make an anonymity order (see section (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)) in respect of D.

(5) If D is convicted of the offence—

(a) subsections (3) and (4) cease to apply in respect of D, and

(b) any restriction put in place under subsection (3)(a) and any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under this section in respect of D cease to have effect at the time D is sentenced for the offence.

(6) In subsection (1), ‘authorised firearms officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable,

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,

(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—

(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and

(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or

(d) a member of the armed forces who—

(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and

(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.

(7) In this section—

‘conventional round’ means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;

‘lethal barrelled weapon’ has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;

‘member of the armed forces’ means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);

‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;

(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;

(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;

(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;

‘relevant chief officer’ means—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;

(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;

(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;

(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘relevant police force’ means—

(a) a police force in England and Wales,

(b) the British Transport Police Force,

(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or

(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘service court’ means—

(a) the Court Martial, or

(b) the Court Martial Appeal Court.

(8) This section does not apply in relation to proceedings begun before the coming into force of this section.”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause provides for a presumption of anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with (but not convicted of) an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Crime and Policing Bill (Ways and Means)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Wednesday 30th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her support, but on the financial settlement to police forces this year, it is worth saying that there is up to £19.6 billion going into policing. She will be well aware of the additional funding going in to support neighbourhood policing, which we want to restore after the decimation that happened under the previous Conservative Government.

The shadow Minister can make her points, but it is this Government who are committed to funding policing and supporting police officers. We are getting more police officers on our high streets, and in our communities and local areas. I know that she has only recently joined the House, but 14 years of history explain why we have found ourselves in the position where police forces are in challenging circumstances with their finances. This Government are committed to supporting policing, and the financial settlement this year does exactly that.

Question put and agreed to.

Licences and Licensing

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Wednesday 30th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I beg to move,

That the draft Licensing Act 2003 (Victory in Europe Day Licensing Hours) Order 2025, which was laid before this House on 23 April, be approved.

Next week marks the 80th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, which was of course a hugely significant and consequential moment in our country’s history. After more than five long years, during the first of which we stood alone, on 8 May 1945 Prime Minister Churchill proclaimed to cheering crowds in Whitehall, just a few hundred yards from this Chamber:

“This is your victory. It is the victory of the cause of freedom in every land.”

As the 75th anniversary commemorations involving public gatherings were, sadly, cancelled in 2020 due to the covid outbreak, the upcoming milestone is a precious chance to pay tribute to that greatest generation and hear the stories of those who lived through the war. At this point, I want to refer to my father, Eric Johnson, who served in the Royal Navy in the second world war, and my mother, Ruth Johnson, who worked in munitions factories.

Many people will want to come together with friends and family to mark the occasion, and to raise a glass to those who fought for our freedoms—the soldiers, sailors and airmen from the United Kingdom and across the Commonwealth, as well as our allies in Europe, and also those who contributed to the war effort at home, including civilians working in the emergency services, transport, the home guard, the wardens and those working in factories and on the land. Twenty three Members of this House and 20 Members of the other place gave their lives in world war two, and I know that Mr Speaker is working to mark that. We should celebrate the role of this place and our wartime coalition in saving democracy beyond our shores from what Winston Churchill called

“the abyss of a new dark age”.—[Official Report, 18 June 1940; Vol. 362, c. 60.]

Commemorative events will be held in many locations during the anniversary week, including: a military procession from Whitehall to Buckingham Palace; street parties across the country on the bank holiday; evensong at Manchester cathedral, followed by a celebratory ringing of bells; a celebratory picnic at Cardiff castle; a living history event at Sterling castle in Scotland; a series of commemoration events at Belfast city hall; and a service at Westminster Abbey, which will serve as both an act of shared remembrance and a celebration of the end of the war.

VE Day falls within the annual Commonwealth War Graves Commission’s War Graves Week, and the commission is marking the 80th anniversary of VE Day with the “For Evermore” tour, a mobile exhibition travelling the UK sharing stories of those who died in world war two. The commission is also holding a special VE Day concert on 2 May at the historic Coventry cathedral, which was rebuilt after being destroyed by bombing in 1940. A concert will also take place at Horse Guards Parade to mark the end of commemorations on 8 May.

As a Member of Parliament who represents Kingston upon Hull, a city that was routinely referred to anonymously in the second world war as a “north-east coastal town” despite bombing comparable to the east end of London, Hull’s celebrations for VE Day will be accompanied by a desire to see greater national recognition of the effects of the blitz on my city than we have had over the course of the past 80 years. Hull will have a memorial service at Hull cenotaph; the Hull History Centre will show free screenings of archive footage from VE Day in 1945 of the celebrations that took place in Hull; and in Cottingham there will be a 1940s music singalong at Cottingham civic hall.

It promises to be a special atmosphere in many communities and the order will allow people to celebrate for longer, should they so wish. Section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003 allows the Secretary of State to make a licensing hours order to allow licensed premises to open for specified, extended hours on occasions of exceptional international, national or local significance. By way of background, past occasions where the then Home Secretary has exercised this power to extend licensing hours have included: the King’s coronation; Her late Majesty the Queen’s platinum and diamond jubilee celebrations; the royal weddings in 2011 and 2018; and, most recently, the semi-final and final of the men’s UEFA European championship last year. The Government consider the 80th anniversary of VE Day to be an occasion of national significance and, as such, worthy of the proposed extension before the House today.

Turning to the practical details, the order makes provision to relax licensing arrangements in England and Wales, and allow licensed premises to extend their opening hours on Thursday the 8 May for a further two hours, from 11pm until 1am the following morning. A truncated consultation was conducted with key stakeholders who were supportive of the extension, and we take the view that the order will not bring about any significant crime and disorder due to the nature of the events. However, we recognise that there may be implications for police resourcing, and we will continue to work with stakeholders to mitigate any concerns around the impact.

As well as enabling celebrations, the extension has the added potential benefit of providing a welcome boost to the hospitality sector. I hope that Members across the House will agree that this order represents an appropriate use of the powers conferred on the Home Secretary by the Licensing Act 2003.

To conclude, this extension reflects our commitment to remembering what was a truly momentous event—our finest hour—and to celebrating those who defended our country, liberated Europe and secured peace. With that, I commend this order to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the shadow Minister.

Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 79 stand part.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

Good morning, Ms Lewell. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair on this glorious day.

Clause 78 introduces two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle-related theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices, and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply such devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle, theft of anything in a vehicle, or taking a vehicle without authority.

A significant proportion of vehicle theft is driven by serious and organised crime groups, and it costs millions of pounds in social and economic harm each year. Given the high demand for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts, this is an attractive and lucrative area for criminals to profit from. Criminals find ways to overcome security measures, even in the latest vehicle models, by using electronic devices to exploit vulnerabilities in vehicles and new technologies. The Metropolitan Police Service estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle thefts in London.

The clause does not define specific electronic devices, but uses a broad definition to cover any electronic device that could be used in vehicle theft. That ensures that the legislation is future-proof for any new devices that may be developed and used by criminals. The offence will be triable either way and, on conviction on indictment, will carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both.

We have also provided a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. The clause also outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it is on any premises at the same time as the defendant, or on premises at which the defendant was the occupier or an habitual user otherwise than as a member of the public. The defendant will have a defence where they can show that they did not know of an article’s presence on the premises or had no control over the article. During proceedings, a court can also assume that the articles in question are intended to be used in vehicle theft. That reflects the fact that the specified articles have few legitimate uses.

Clause 79 supports clause 78 by clarifying the evidential burdens for the new offence, while also inserting it into the list of lifestyle offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That means that, if convicted of this offence, a person’s assets will be considered to have potentially derived from crime and may be subject to confiscation. To have a defence, a defendant will be required to establish the facts that are within their knowledge—such as demonstrating that they run a company that supplies legitimate electronic devices.

Signal repeaters, which have been approved for use by Ofcom, are legal to own and use to boost an otherwise weak mobile phone signal, for example. If a defendant can demonstrate that they did not intend, nor reasonably suspect, that the articles were to be used in vehicle theft, the evidential burden falls back on the prosecution. The prosecution will need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had reasonable grounds to suspect that the article they were importing, making, modifying, supplying, offering to supply or possessing would be used in vehicle theft.

That reverse evidential burden is appropriate given the few legitimate uses associated with the specified articles. It will ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to target those individuals who keep just enough distance from the serious offences being carried out to avoid consequences under existing legislation.

Serious and organised crime has a devastating effect— I am sure we can all agree on that. Clauses 78 and 79 send a clear message about our commitment to tackling vehicle crime and associated serious and organised criminality, and to making it easier for the police to take action. That means more prosecutions and more criminals off our streets, which will help to restore public confidence.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority.

The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it.

Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.

Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs.

We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Taylor (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I rise to speak in favour of clause 78, which tackles the growing scourge of criminals using high-tech devices to steal from hard-working people, because I know how important this is in my community. For 14 years, between 2010 and 2024, crime in my patch doubled. These thieves no longer need a crowbar; they use laptops, signal boosters and hacking tools to rob families of their vehicles, their livelihoods and their sense of safety. Enough is enough. Clause 78 strikes directly at those parasites by making it an offence not just to steal but to possess, import, manufacture or supply the very devices that make these thefts possible—it cuts off the tools of their horrific trade.

I recently heard from a Hemel resident who, back in December 2023, had his truck broken into and all his work tools stolen. Then, in November 2024, his family’s disability car was also stolen. Later, two of their neighbours’ cars were stolen along with hundreds of pounds-worth of equipment, having been parked side by side in a lay-by by their homes.

This clause sends a message: “If you are gearing up to commit a crime, this country will come down on you like a ton of bricks.” Let us be clear that this is not about targeting legitimate businesses or technology users; it is about targeting criminals, gangs and the shadow economy that thrives on stealing from working people and laughing as they do it. Subsection (3) rightly offers a defence for those acting innocently, but it removes the cloak of plausible deniability that too many criminals have hidden behind for too long.

The people of Hemel Hempstead are fed up. They are tired of waking up to find their cars stolen, they are tired of seeing criminals treated as an inevitable part of life, and they are tired of seeing their vans broken into and their tools stolen. They expect and demand that we act, and act we must. We have to stand up for the delivery driver who loses their van, for the care worker who needs her car to get to her patients, and for every family who fear that they will become a victim of crime. It is not enough simply to chase stolen vehicles after they are gone. We must prevent these thefts from happening in the first place, and we must choke off the supply of tools that fuel this criminality. We must make it clear that there are no easy pickings for those who prey on working people.

I am proud that the Bill does not stop with vehicle crime. It invests in neighbourhood policing, strengthens the fight against organised crime and clamps down on new forms of digital exploitation. It rebuilds the idea that security—real, everyday security—is a right, not a privilege. The Bill is a line in the sand; it says to criminals, “Your time is up,” and it says to our communities, “We hear you and we are on your side.” For Hemel Hempstead, for our towns and cities and for the millions of honest people who deserve better, I urge hon. Members to back clause 78 and the Crime and Policing Bill without hesitation.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I welcome the support for the two clauses. We all know the devastation that the theft of a motor vehicle and its contents can cause to our constituents. I want specifically to address the questions posed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West. As he may recall, vehicle crime was raised in the previous Government’s serious organised crime consultation. After that, conversations with law enforcement, vehicle manufacturers and Ofcom have confirmed that this is a key issue. I know from speaking to car manufacturers that they welcome the legislation.

We are also working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for vehicle crime to reduce vehicle crime through the national vehicle crime working group and the recently established, industry-funded national vehicle crime reduction partnership. The vehicle crime action plan was formed through the national vehicle crime working group and in conjunction with the Home Office, and it includes commitments to work with motor industry representatives to consider crime prevention measures that can be taken to prevent thefts.

The hon. Member for Stockton West also asked about the effect of the clauses on offending. As I indicated, designating the new offence as a lifestyle offence under POCA will support the increased confiscation of the proceeds of vehicle crime, which chimes well with sending a clear message to criminals that enough is enough and that we will come after them.

With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80

Possession of a SIM farm

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Clauses 81 and 82 stand part.

Schedule 10.

Clauses 83 to 85 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

This group relates to SIM farms. We know that criminals abuse telecommunications networks, including texts and calls, to target people and defraud victims at a significant scale. We most likely all know of a friend, family member or constituent who has received such a text, or we have even received one ourselves—I certainly have. Such scams prey on the public, particularly those who are vulnerable. They can have a devastating emotional impact and can inflict serious financial harm on victims.

Scam texts are frequently traced back to SIM farms—electronic devices that can hold sometimes hundreds of physical SIM cards, which can be used to send out thousands of scam texts and calls in seconds. They are currently legal for anyone to buy, and it is easy to find suppliers online, making it easy to commit telecoms fraud on a very large scale. Clauses 80 and 81 therefore provide for new offences that criminalise the possession of SIM farms without good reason, and their supply without undertaking adequate due diligence.

Clauses 83 to 85 will also allow the potential extension of the ban to further technologies that may be exploited by criminals to scam the UK public, with any such extension subject to a high level of scrutiny and checks. The new offences will make it difficult for criminals to access and use these devices for the purpose of fraud. They will give the police the necessary tools to disrupt fraudsters, even before they start using SIM farms to commit fraud.

Clause 80 bans the possession of a SIM farm without good reason. A person can possess a SIM farm if they can prove that they have a good reason or lawful authority to do so. The Government have identified several legitimate uses of SIM farms, such as multi-SIM devices used in broadcast and programme-making to facilitate the production and delivery of live and pre-recorded broadcasts.

SIM farms are also used by transport providers to offer wi-fi—I am sure most hon. Members who have to travel frequently will welcome the availability of wi-fi—not only on trains, but on trams, buses, coaches and ferries, as the devices switch between mobile network operators, depending on which has the best reception where the device is located at any particular moment. We have worked closely with stakeholders to develop a defence that will allow such legitimate use to continue uninterrupted, while stopping criminals using SIM farms for criminal activities.

Clause 80 provides examples of what may be a good reason to possess a SIM farm, including the provision of broadcast services, the operation or maintenance of a public transport service and the operation or maintenance of an electronic communications network. The list of good reasons in subsection (3) is not exhaustive and it would be open to a person under investigation for, or charged with, the offence to argue that they have another good reason for possessing a SIM farm.

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[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.

It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government.

Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms.

The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement.

On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 81 and 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clauses 83 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86

Offence of concealing identity at protests

--- Later in debate ---

The new clause would provide better protection of public interests by ensuring that essential services and the normal functioning of society are not unduly disrupted by public gatherings; it would also offer a clearer, more predictable legal framework, reducing ambiguity for both law enforcement and protest organisers, so that everyone knows the boundaries of acceptable behaviour during public events.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 86 introduces a new criminal offence for a person

“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity or another person’s identity”

in a public place that has been designated by the police. It is a defence for a person to prove that they wore or used the item for a purpose related to either the health of the person or others, religious observance or the person’s work. Clause 87 provides that

“A constable whose rank is at least that of inspector may designate a locality in England or Wales that is in their police area for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours if they reasonably believe that—

(a) a public assembly, or public procession, which constitutes a protest may take place or is taking place in the locality,

(b) the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and

(c) it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.

Earlier we heard evidence—the hon. Members for Windsor and for Sutton and Cheam raised this example—about people, perhaps from the Hong Kong community, protesting against the Chinese authorities, and how this provision could affect those who legitimately want to cover their faces because of the reprisals and repercussions that might be threatened against their families back in Hong Kong. I want to be clear: this measure does not create an offence of concealing identity at every protest. The offence applies only to a protest in a locality designated by the police, and they can designate a locality only where they reasonably believe that

“the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences,”

and that

“it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.

The majority of protests are peaceful and would not be captured by these clauses. The use of these powers and the management of protests is also an operational decision for the police, and we would expect them to consider the nature of the protest, including those who are likely to be present, before deciding to designate an area using this power. I hope that deals with the point raised about protestors from the Hong Kong community, and of course others.

As I have set out, the constable at the rank of inspector who designates a locality must ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to notify the public that the designation has been made, the offences created under clause 86, the locality and the period for which the designation will be enforced. Clause 88 sets out the procedure for designation, including what must be specified. Clause 91 is the interpretation section for part 9 of the Bill.

In recent years, as a number of Members have said, the police have faced significant challenges in policing large-scale protests. While the majority of those attending these protests are exercising their rights peacefully and within the confines of the law, unfortunately we have seen a minority of individuals behave in a criminal manner while hiding their identity. It is vital that the police are able to identify those who commit criminal offences during the course of these protests, because those who commit criminal offences should face justice for their crimes and because preventing criminality at protests ensures that peaceful protestors and the wider community are protected from harm.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)]

The shadow Minister spoke about an incident that happened in my constituency. I want to assure everybody that the people who committed those criminal offences, which were not part of any protest, were held accountable and sent to prison.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

It is always good to hear when people are held accountable for their criminal actions and punished accordingly, so I am very pleased to hear that.

I want to explain fully how clause 86 will work. At the moment, the police have existing powers to require individuals to remove disguises in designated localities where criminality is likely, but those powers have not always worked in the way that we all want them to, with individuals complying with directions to remove disguises, but then later putting them back on. In a large protest, it is difficult to prevent that from occurring, which is why the new offence makes it a criminal offence to conceal an identity as soon as the locality has been designated.

I want to make it clear that the police have to take all reasonable steps to notify the public that a designation has been made, including the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period during which the designation will be enforced. A designation must be in writing, except for where that is not reasonably practicable, such as in a live and rapidly moving public order situation, in which case the police can make an oral designation instead and record that in writing as soon as reasonably practicable. The maximum penalty for this offence is one month’s imprisonment or a level 3 fine not exceeding £1,000.

Let me turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 51 seeks to limit the defences in clause 86 to those who have given written notice to the police or, if not reasonably practicable, oral notice. While I understand the motivation behind the amendment, we believe that clause 86 already provides a sufficient and specific statutory defence for individuals who wear or use identity-concealing items for purposes related to health, religious observance or work. Crucially, this defence is subject to a reverse burden of proof, which means that the individual must prove on the balance of probabilities that their use of such an item was for one of these legitimate purposes. This mechanism already ensures that only those with genuine reasons can rely on the defence without placing an undue burden on the prosecution.

Introducing a requirement to notify the police in writing or orally would add an unnecessary and impractical layer of and risk excluding individuals with legitimate defences simply because they did not, or could not, provide prior notice, and could result in the criminalisation of innocent people on procedural grounds. The current legal framework strikes an appropriate balance between public safety and individual rights. Amendment 51 would undermine that balance without offering meaningful enforcement benefits.

New clause 34 seeks to import directly into the Public Order Act 1986 the provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023. The shadow Minister has indicated that the rationale for the new clause is to seek to mitigate the effects of the Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgment in June 2021.

The 2023 regulations amended and clarified the meaning of

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

for the purposes of the police’s powers to imposes conditions on protests under the 1986 Act. They did so by amending the examples of cases that may constitute serious disruption, specifying that the cumulative impact of protests in the same area, and all relevant disruption, may be considered by police, even when it is not protest-related, when they assess the impact of a particular protest for the purpose of imposing conditions. The serious disruption regulations also defined the term “community”. The example of cases that may constitute serious disruption aligned the use of the term with the definition provided in section 34 of the Public Order Act 2023.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case established that the protection afforded to protesters by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights extends to circumstances in which the disruption caused by protesters is the intentional obstruction of others. However, the extent of the disruption, and whether it was intentional, are relevant factors in the assessment of proportionality.

Let me take the subjects in turn. First, the shadow Minister will be aware that Liberty successfully challenged the serious disruption regulations in May 2024. This Government disagreed with the High Court’s ruling in that case, particularly in relation to the Court’s finding on consultation. Accordingly, we have appealed the Court’s decision, and await the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which is expected shortly.

Secondly, the provisions in the serious disruption regulations are not discernibly impacted by the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case. That judgment relates to the reasonable excuse defence, and more recent case law, such as R v. Hallam and Others, has since made clear the limitations of such a defence.

I recognise the positive intention of new clause 34 to ensure that the changes made by the serious disruption regulations remain available to police forces in their policing of protests, but we consider that we cannot seek to address the issue—should there be one—until the Court of Appeal’s judgment is received. In short, it would be inappropriate to pre-empt the Court of Appeal’s judgment. In the meantime, the regulations remain in force until the judgment is handed down. It remains open to the Court of Appeal to overturn the High Court’s quashing order, should the judges find in favour of the Government. We will consider our response to the Court of Appeal’s judgment once it is available.

New clause 53 seeks to insert a statutory right to peaceful protest into the Public Order Act 1986, by requiring public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. The rights that it outlines are already firmly established in UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998, and public authorities must act in a way that is compatible with a convention right. Introducing a parallel provision risks legal duplication, confusion and inconsistent interpretation, potentially complicating the enforcement of public order. Rather than adding legal clarity, the new clause might create uncertainty without offering any new protections.

I hope that I have been able to persuade Opposition Members that their amendments are not necessary or are premature. I ask that the hon. Member for Windsor withdraws amendment 51.

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[Dame Diana Johnson]

During recent protests, the police have observed that protesters are increasingly using flares and fireworks. Although there is existing legislation that prohibits the use of fireworks in public places and the possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose, it does not consistently cover the mere possession of flares and fireworks during protests. The clause therefore creates a new criminal offence of possession of a pyrotechnic article for those taking part in a protest.

The misuse of pyrotechnic articles has implications regarding public safety. This new measure will enable the police to take the necessary preventive action against such behaviour during protests. It is a defence for a person to show they had a reasonable excuse for having the pyrotechnic article, such as a flare or firework, in their possession at the material time, or, in particular, to show they had it in their possession for use in connection with work.

The offence applies only to those taking part in a protest. It does not capture a person who is taking part in, for example, a cultural or religious event where pyrotechnic articles are customarily used. The maximum penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of £1,000. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

I am content.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s support and hope the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90

War memorials

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 11.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

We all understand and accept that war memorials play a vital role in commemorating those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including those who have no known grave. They offer a place of reflection and should be protected.

In some recent protests, protesters have climbed on war memorials, causing anger and outrage among the public. The new offence will provide greater clarity for policing. In particular, the measure makes it clear that the act of climbing on specified war memorials is unacceptable. It gives police the powers they need to ensure that justice is delivered to those who engage in such disrespectful conduct.

A war memorial is an object that preserves the memory of a war or conflict and those involved in it. It can take any form and be created by anyone at any time. It can be permanent or temporary; it can be a living thing such as a tree; it can a building or a more traditional plaque, monument or sculpture. The offence is intended to ensure that our most significant war memorials are used for their intended purpose of providing remembrance for those who have died and have no grave to be visited, and are not to be disrespected.

Schedule 11 specifies 25 war memorials, including the Royal Artillery memorial and the Cenotaph in London, the Portsmouth naval war memorial, and the Liverpool Cenotaph. The clause includes a power to amend the list of specified war memorials in schedule 11 by regulations.

The penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. It is a defence for a person charged with the offence to provide that they had good reason for climbing on the specified war memorial, or had the owner or occupier’s consent to climb on it. That will ensure that activities such as maintenance approved by the owner will not be criminalised. If a war memorial has a base or steps that are designed for individuals to climb, individuals will not be criminalised. On that basis, I commend the clause and schedule 11 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause introduces a new offence targeted at individuals who climb on designated war memorials without lawful justification. It is designed to protect sites of national remembrance and ensure that they are treated with appropriate respect and dignity. The act of climbing on such memorials, often during protests or large gatherings, can be seen as disrespectful, provocative or even intentionally inflammatory, particularly when shared on social media.

For example, at a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London in 2023, a group of protesters climbed on to the Royal Artillery memorial at Hyde Park Corner, which honours the tens of thousands of Royal Artillery soldiers who died in the first world war. The Metropolitan police described the actions as inflammatory, but noted that at the time no specific law prohibited climbing on war memorials, so no arrests were made.

The introduction of the offence reflects growing public unease about the perceived disrespect towards war memorials during certain protests in recent years. It is right that this measure should be put in place to protect the memory and legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am pleased with the cross-party support for the measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92

Suspension of internet protocol addresses and internet domain names

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 12.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The clause introduces schedule 12, which provides for a new power for law enforcement and certain investigative agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to apply to the court for an order to suspend internet protocol addresses and domain names when they are used to facilitate serious crime.

All too often, criminals use IP addresses and domain names to facilitate crimes such as fraud, the distribution of child sexual abuse material, malware and phishing. Currently, law enforcement agencies do not have the legal power to mandate the suspension of IP addresses and domain names, so in some scenarios the UK public continue to be at risk of falling victim to crime.

Law enforcement agencies currently utilise voluntary arrangements with industry to request the suspension of IP addresses and domains. In the majority of domestic cases, voluntary arrangements are successful, and the Government are clear that they should continue to be the first port of call in the United Kingdom. However, most of the organisations responsible for providing the IP address or domain name are situated in foreign jurisdictions and often require a formal request, such as a court order, before they will take action. The measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Domestically, the provision will empower law enforcement agencies to compel the small number of organisations that do not co-operate with voluntary arrangements.

The measure will protect the public by giving law enforcement and certain investigative agencies the tools they need to tackle crimes facilitated by IP addresses and domain names, and to prevent individuals from becoming potential victims. It will ensure that the UK cyber-landscape continues to be one of the safest in the world. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause rightly provides a legal framework for suspending IP addresses and domain names linked to serious crime. This is a valuable measure in the fight against cyber-enabled criminal activity, including fraud, child exploitation and unlicensed online gambling.

By allowing appropriate officers to apply to a judge for a suspension order, the clause ensures that access to digital infrastructure used for criminal purposes can be swiftly and lawfully disrupted. It will be particularly effective in cases where traditional enforcement is difficult because of the borderless nature of online platforms. Crucially, safeguards are built in to ensure that the powers are used only when necessary, and proportionately. The involvement of a judge, strict criteria for suspension, and provisions for variation or appeal ensure a fair balance between enforcement and civil liberties.

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[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the Opposition’s support.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clause 93

Electronically tracked stolen goods: search without warrant

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 94 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 93 amends the Theft Act 1968 to create a new power for the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that have been electronically tracked to the premises, without requiring a warrant from a court if it is not reasonably practicable to obtain one. Clause 94 makes the same change in respect of the service police.

Under the safer streets mission, the Government are determined to crack down on acquisitive and street crimes, antisocial behaviour, and other crimes that make people feel unsafe on our streets. Crimes such as phone theft and snatch theft are deeply invasive and can have a profound impact on those whose possessions are stolen.

Tackling mobile phone theft is a priority for the Government. According to the crime survey for England and Wales, in the year ending March 2024 an estimated 235,000 people had their mobile phone stolen. Around half of stolen phones are taken through snatch thefts or pickpocketing, known as theft from the person offences.

The latest crime survey estimates show that street crime, which includes theft from the person offences and personal robbery, increased by 43%, driven by a significant rise in snatch theft. Data published by the Metropolitan police shows that theft from the person offences involving a mobile phone increased by 30% in London during the year to January 2025. Those figures are extremely concerning.

In recent years, the ability to track valuable items such as phones, bicycles and vehicles has become vastly more sophisticated. If items fitted with GPS or other trackers are stolen, it is now far easier for victims to know where their stolen property is located. However, victims have raised concerns that when they share that information with the police, they are not always able to act. This is extremely frustrating for victims of crime and for the police.

Those who commit the offences are not just petty criminals and opportunists. There is clear evidence of organised criminality and profitability, with stolen devices often being trafficked internationally, particularly to China and Algeria. That is why, at our mobile phone summit on 6 February, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary brought together law enforcement agencies and the mobile phone industry, and secured their commitments to working jointly to tackle mobile phone theft and to breaking the business model of the organised criminal networks that drive it.

Collaborative efforts include significantly boosting data and intelligence sharing to better understand this complex problem, increased police-intensification activities, and ensuring that all parties work together to drive joint solutions. To complement these actions, the legislative reforms in the Bill will enable the police to investigate more swiftly those who conduct mobile phone and other forms of theft. Currently, the police have no general power to enter and search premises solely for the purpose of searching for and seizing stolen property without a warrant. We know that when items can be tracked to specific locations, they are quickly moved on or sold, limiting the window in which the police can act.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Burton-Sampson]

As I look around the room, we all have our mobiles glued to our hands. They do everything for us now: payments, emails, leisure and, occasionally, phone calls. These devices are massively important to us. We all know the feeling of leaving home without a mobile device—many of us would have to turn round because we cannot live without it.

There has been a significant rise in snatch-and-grab crimes throughout the country, and I know many constituents, friends and colleagues in this place who have been impacted. Given that these devices can be tracked, it is madness that the police are not currently able to go in and recover them. I take the point raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of tracking. I do not think it is as big an issue as he makes out, but perhaps it is something for the Minister to consider.

The biggest thing is that knowing the police can enter to recover these items will act as a deterrent. We need to drive down this crime. The prevalence of snatch-and-grabs in this country is simply unacceptable, so I welcome clause 93.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I will deal with the questions that have been raised in this short debate. First, the new measure differs from the previous Government’s proposed reform as it provides the police with specific targeted powers to retrieve electronically tagged stolen items that have been tracked to premises using the geolocation data and intelligence, and it will equip the police with tailored powers to act quickly to retrieve items, bringing offenders to justice and providing a swifter resolution for victims. We are also introducing robust safeguards, including the requirement for an officer of at least inspector rank to authorise the use of the powers, so that they are used proportionately and lawfully.

I take very seriously the issue raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of data. With these new powers, as I tried to set out in my opening remarks, the police will need to be satisfied that at least one item of property in question has been electronically tracked to the premises, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is stolen and on the premises before entry is authorised. We would expect the police to undertake due diligence and, as far as possible, to use additional information or intelligence to ensure that the location is accurate. As I said, any use of the power has to be authorised by at least an inspector.

[Luke Taylor]

I thank the Minister for giving way, because I think this is a helpful query: will there be any differentiation between last known locations and live tracking? Obviously, tracking devices can be removed and batteries can run out. Will a last known location be considered sufficient evidence of an item’s current location, or will a live location be needed to prove that the item is currently in that position?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman raises legitimate questions about how this will work operationally. As I said in my opening remarks, there will be guidance on how this will function.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the possible redress for householders when things perhaps go wrong. There are existing provisions under which individuals may be able to claim compensation where the police have caused damage to property by, for example, forcing entry. Any compensation will obviously depend on the circumstances of each case and will be for the police force to determine, and it is unlikely to be paid if the damage was caused by the police acting lawfully on the evidence and information available to them.

On that basis, I commend these clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 93 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 95

Access to driver licensing information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 95 deals with access to driver licensing information. It will facilitate automatic access by the police and other law enforcement officers to Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency driver information, at the point of need, for all policing and law enforcement purposes.

The police and other law enforcement officers are frequently required to deal with unpredictable circumstances, often operating under significant time pressure, as they strive to protect the public, maintain order and investigate complex criminality. The police have provided compelling operational examples of where they could better deal with the threats and harms faced by individuals if direct access to DVLA driving licence data were provided.

Protecting our communities from the threat of sexual violence, stopping drug gangs preying on the vulnerable, safeguarding people from harassment and stalking, and informing relatives of the death or serious injury of a loved one are duties that our police officers frequently undertake. Unfortunately, those are some of the activities for which police officers cannot make effective use of DVLA driving licence information within the current data access regime.

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[Matt Vickers]

Clause 95 updates and expands police and law enforcement access to driver licence data held by the DVLA. It replaces the existing section 71 of the 2000 Act with a revised framework, adding proposed new sections 71A and 71B. The modernised provision allows authorised individuals including the police, service police and other specified law enforcement bodies to access driver licensing information not just for road traffic offences but for a wider range of policing and law enforcement purposes. The Secretary of State is given power to regulate access, impose conditions and consult relevant bodies before issuing new rules or codes of practice. The clause also introduces oversight measures, such as a statutory code of practice and an annual report to Parliament, ensuring transparency and responsible data use. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the role of facial recognition technology and on the safeguards put in place to ensure the power is not used disproportionately or inappropriately.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 96

Testing of persons in police detention for presence of controlled drugs

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedule 13.

Clauses 97 to 100 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

These clauses relate to drug testing. There are a number of provisions we wish to introduce. Clauses 96 to 100 and schedule 13 amend existing legislation to expand the powers of the police to drug test people aged 18 or over on arrest, or aged 14 or over on charge, where the offence they have been arrested for or charged with is a “trigger offence” or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector reasonably suspects that their drug use caused or contributed to their offending.

These clauses expand the police’s powers to drug test in three clear ways: first, by expanding the range of drugs that can be tested for, from specified class A drugs only to any specified controlled drug; secondly, by expanding the list of trigger offences which may automatically trigger a drug test; and thirdly, by expanding the power to take an additional sample for drug testing when the first is unsuitable or insufficient, and up to a maximum of two samples. The clauses also expand the regime for subsequent assessments for misuse of controlled drugs following a positive test result.

As we all appreciate, drugs can have wide-ranging and devastating impacts on individuals and society. Addressing the drug use that is linked to crime is key to the Government’s safer streets mission. The purpose of drug testing on arrest is to reduce reoffending by referring those whose offending is believed to be at least in part caused by drug use into assessment for treatment and support services. The intention is not to further criminalise drug users, although refusing to provide a sample or to attend or stay for an assessment is an offence. Nor does it mean that they will receive treatment instead of a sentence. Drug testing on arrest is a discretionary power, subject to the safeguards included in the existing legislation, the PACE codes of practice and other relevant guidance. How it is implemented and funded is a local decision made by the police and crime commissioner and service providers.

Clause 96 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to expand the existing police power to drug test in police detention to include any “specified controlled drug” as opposed to just specified class A drugs. The list of controlled drugs will be specified in secondary legislation, subject to the negative procedure. To be specified, drugs must be controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

Clause 96 also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE, which provides an updated list of trigger offences for drug testing on arrest. A number of the additions to the list of trigger offences are key to the Government’s safer streets mission, including offences linked to violence against women and girls, knife crime and antisocial behaviour. Some existing trigger offences are removed, such as fraud and vagrancy offences where there is no longer a clear link to drug misuse or those offences are being repealed. The clause also moves the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of trigger offences in secondary legislation, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, into PACE. Clause 97 amends the Drugs Act 2005 and the Bail Act 1976 to reflect the expansion from class A drugs to “specified controlled drugs” to align with the changes in clause 96.

Clause 98 amends PACE to expand the police’s power to take an additional sample from a person in police detention for the purpose of testing, where the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient, up to a maximum of two samples. It allows the police to take an additional sample where required—for example, where one sample alone is not suitable or sufficient for testing across more than one machine or kit to test for additional, different drugs. Only one additional sample may be taken, and only when the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient. The legislative safeguards that apply to the first sample will continue to apply, such as being reminded that refusal to provide a sample is a criminal offence, having a maximum of two samples taken during the period of detention, and not being tested before having seen a custody officer.

Clause 99 repeals subsections (8A) and (8B) in section 37 of PACE and amends section 38, which currently enable the police to continue to detain an individual for the purpose of taking a sample for drug testing, before or after charge. We have determined that, due to changes in operational procedure and drug testing technology, the power is no longer necessary and so we are removing it.

Finally, clause 100 removes the notification conditions in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act 2005. In 2011, Home Office guidance advised all forces in England and Wales that they did not need to seek additional, individual authorisation from the Secretary of State to conduct drug testing on arrest. These amendments reflect that guidance by removing the notification condition from both PACE and the Drugs Act 2005. They remove an administrative burden on the police, improving efficiency. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 96 and schedule 13 significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in detention. Currently, the police can test only for class A drugs under certain conditions. The clause amends sections 63B and 63C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enable testing for any specified controlled drug, broadening the scope beyond class A to include class B and C substances. The change allows for testing following arrest for those aged 18 and over, or charge for those aged 14 and over, where the arrest relates to a trigger offence or where a police inspector reasonably suspects that drug misuse contributed to the offence.

The clause also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE to define the list of trigger offences, replacing the outdated schedule 6 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The updated schedule retains many existing offences, particularly theft and drug offences, but removes fraud and vagrancy offences. It adds a range of new offences such as common assault, certain violent crime and public order offences. The Secretary of State is given the power to amend the list of drugs and offences through regulations subject to either the draft affirmative or negative resolution procedures, depending on the nature of the change.

Clause 97 makes related changes to the Drugs Act 2005 to align the drug assessment framework with the new expanded testing regime. Sections 9 and 10 of the 2005 Act, which govern the process for initial and follow-up assessments following a positive drugs test, are amended to refer to specific controlled drugs rather than just class A substances.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Taylor]

I rise to support clause 96, a necessary update to the law that reflects the reality facing many of our communities. Drug misuse comes in many forms and continues to drive crime, harm and deep personal suffering. Hemel Hempstead has a long-standing drug issue going back several decades. Indeed, drugs were a significant cause of the deaths of two members of my own family, my aunt and my cousin, so I am particularly motivated to see the clause enacted to help tackle the causes of drug crime. Currently, police can test detainees only for class A drugs. Clause 96 rightly extends that power to all controlled drugs, including class B and C substances such as cannabis or illegally traded prescription drugs. Those are not harmless. They contribute to the cycles of reoffending, antisocial behaviour and exploitation, and too often go unnoticed in the system.

The clause is not about punishment; it is about awareness and intervention. Testing can be the first step forward towards treatment. It allows the police to respond more effectively and open the door to support for those struggling with addiction issues. With proper safeguards and parliamentary oversight, these changes give our officers the tools they need while protecting people’s rights. Communities, from major cities to towns like mine, will benefit from a smarter and fairer approach. This is about being honest about the harms that drugs cause, about how we help users and how we prevent the crime that drugs cause. I urge Members to support the clause.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead for his speech. He talked about his experience within his family, and how devastating drugs can be to families, individuals and communities. That is why extending the testing regime with these clauses is so important to try to assist those people who have got themselves into problems with drugs and are involved in criminality. They are not excusing that at all, but finding a way of testing and offering that support and help if people are ready to access treatment. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 13 agreed to.

Clauses 97 to 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Cautions given to persons having limited leave to enter or remain in UK

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 101 expands the current criteria for foreign national conditional cautions to encompass foreign nationals with limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. A foreign national conditional caution requires a foreign national to be removed from the UK as an alternative to prosecution. It will also specify that they may not return within a specified period of time.

Presently, foreign nationals may be given a foreign national conditional caution to secure their removal from the UK if they do not have existing leave to enter or remain here. The clause extends that to apply to foreign nationals with limited leave to be here. The clause will extend the pool of persons to whom a foreign national conditional caution may be given with a view to securing the removal from the United Kingdom of more foreign nationals who commit crime. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause expands the definition of a “relevant foreign offender” in both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to include individuals who have limited leave to enter or remain in the UK as defined by the Immigration Act 1971. By doing so, it ensures that people with limited immigration status are treated as relevant foreign offenders for the purposes of issuing conditional or diversionary cautions, enabling those cautions to carry immigration-related consequences, such as potential removal from the UK.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 101 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102

Confiscation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedules 14 and 15.

Clause 103 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 102 introduces schedules 14 and 15 to the Bill, which make the most significant reforms to the confiscation regime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 since that Act was passed over 20 years ago. The confiscation regime allows courts to place confiscation orders on defendants to repay the benefit gained from criminality and to make it clear to offenders that crime does not pay.

The Government have been aware that confiscation has been in need of reform for some time. In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations for reform. The Law Commission’s final report was published in November 2022 and contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in the Bill. Reform is necessary to improve enforcement of confiscation orders and streamline processes by law enforcement and court services, so that the regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Reform will be achieved by rationalising court processes, creating streamlined confiscation orders, expediting the enforcement of unpaid orders and returning more funds to victims. In particular, the Bill contains a new measure to return funds to victims following an uplift of the amount that is to be paid towards a confiscation order. If a confiscation order is uplifted, money can be redirected towards existing victims to compensate for their outstanding losses. The Home Office has consulted extensively.

Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Schedules 14 and 15.

Clause 103 stand part.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime.

The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful.

Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation.

Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be

“just and reasonable to make such an order”

against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings.

One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is

“to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.”

That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court.

Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate.

Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime.

A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited.

In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle?

Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings.

Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister; he went into some detail about how schedule 14 operates. I want to refer to the issue of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 to POCA, which is about what the court utilises to determine whether a defendant has a criminal lifestyle. This is about the changes that we are adding. I refer in particular to the two environmental offences:

“depositing…certain waste, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit”

and

“operating a regulated facility, or causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit.”

The third offence that we are adding is the keeping of a brothel for prostitution. I want to make clear that those offences are being added.

The shadow Minister asked how this would be kept under review and whether unreasonable measures will be introduced. The legislation will set that out, but it is my understanding that the court will still have a role to play in any measures that are deemed to be unreasonable and forming a view about that. This part of the schedule is very technical, so I am happy to put in writing to the shadow Minister any further information that I have not been able to provide, but I think the general view is that it is implementing the recommendations from the Law Commission. As I understand it, it is very similar to what the previous Government were going to support. On that basis, I commend the provisions to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 14 and 15 agreed to.

Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104

Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 107 to 109 stand part.

New clause 23—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—

“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or

(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”

This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.

New clause 31—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—

“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—

(a) the officer fails vetting, and

(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe.

(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—

(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and

(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”

This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Part 13 of the Bill pertains to matters relating to the police. Before I talk in detail about clauses 106 to 108, it may assist the Committee if I first provide some context for these provisions. Following the shooting of Chris Kaba, and the subsequent trial and acquittal of Sergeant Martyn Blake in October 2024, the Home Secretary made a series of commitments in response to the issues raised under the previous Government’s accountability review. The measures announced by the Home Secretary will rebuild confidence in police accountability systems for both the public and the police.

As the Home Secretary said when making her announcement, the case happened against a backdrop of wider and long-standing concerns about accountability, standards and confidence in policing. The British model of policing relies on mutual bonds of trust between the public and the police. For our model of policing to work, it is essential that the police have the confidence of the communities they serve, and that officers have the confidence they need to do the vital and often extremely difficult job of keeping us all safe. Too often in recent times, both elements of that confidence have become frayed.

Clauses 106 to 108 give effect to certain findings of the accountability review. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the system by allowing the Independent Office for Police Conduct to make referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to completing its final report. Clause 107 will amend the threshold for the IOPC to make referrals to the CPS, and clause 108 places the IOPC’s victims’ right to review scheme on a statutory footing, further improving the robustness of the IOPC’s investigative process.

Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the misconduct system. At present, a number of factors cause delay in the misconduct system, one of which relates to the fact that in order for the IOPC to make a referral to the CPS, it is legally required to complete its final report, concluding its investigation, which causes delays in making referrals. The final report has to include misconduct findings and lessons learned for the IOPC. Such elements are not required for referrals to be made to the CPS, so the change that we are making will enable the IOPC to make a referral prior to completing its final report, allowing for an improvement in pace in the accountability system.

Currently, the law states that the IOPC may refer a police officer to the CPS where there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed. This is a relatively low bar for making referrals to the CPS. Clause 107 changes this to bring the system in line with the threshold that the police apply when making referrals of members of the public to the CPS, which requires there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. It is right and fair that, as a result of this change, officers and members of the public will be referred to the CPS at the same threshold. The CPS will continue to make charging decisions at the same threshold, which is the full code test. This change will improve overall fairness in the system.

Finally, the IOPC’s victims’ right to review currently allows for victims and their families to challenge the IOPC when it decides not to refer matters to the CPS. This right is currently available to victims and their families through guidance. Clause 108 places this right on the statute book to protect victims and demonstrate our clear commitment to victims’ rights. Taken together, these clauses are a balanced package of measures that will help to speed up IOPC investigations while strengthening the rights of those who may be aggrieved by the outcome of an investigation.

Clause 109 amends the powers of the Secretary of State to make provisions on appeals to the police appeals tribunals. It will enable chief constables to appeal the findings or outcome of police misconduct proceedings, with a similar right for police and crime commissioners to appeal where the officer subject to proceedings is a chief constable. It will also enable a right of appeal to be conferred on the director general of the IOPC where the IOPC has presented the case at the misconduct proceedings.

This Government are committed to restoring public trust and confidence in policing, which is something fundamental to our model of policing by consent. While the majority of our police officers act with bravery and integrity, where things go wrong the public rightly expect that there is a system to robustly hold the police to account.

In the context of recent high-profile cases that have damaged that vital trust and confidence, chief constables must be empowered to drive up standards. While chief constables are themselves rightly held to account for standards in their forces, they are not afforded the same ability to challenge disciplinary decisions as the officers in their force. The only route for chief constables to challenge decisions that they consider to be unreasonable is through judicial review. That is a lengthier and more complex process than the existing specialist police appeals tribunals.

Clause 109 will allow the Secretary of State to make amendments to existing rules. First, it will provide for a right of appeal for chief constables to challenge the findings or outcomes of misconduct proceedings in relation to officers within their force, and an equivalent right of appeal for police and crime commissioners where the officer concerned is a chief constable. This is designed to ensure parity within the system, supporting the wider responsibilities of police and crime commissioners in respect of chief constables.

Furthermore, the clause will provide an equivalent right of appeal for the director general of the IOPC, limited to circumstances in which the IOPC has presented at the misconduct proceedings. This again supports public trust and confidence by ensuring vital independence in the system in the most serious and sensitive cases. Amendments to secondary legislation will be developed in consultation with the sector, including the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.

I will speak to new clauses 23 and 31, which are also in this group, once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers]

On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy.

Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed.

In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made?

Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.

--- Later in debate ---

Importantly, the new clause includes a safeguard to prevent unfair or disproportionate outcomes. If a chief officer believes that, despite the vetting failure, the officer is still capable of performing a substantial majority of duties appropriate for their rank, and that dismissal would undermine the operational effectiveness of the force, they can decide not to proceed with a dismissal. This ensures that the decision remains proportionate, and sensitive to operational realities. The new clause builds on recommendations made in the Government’s 2023 review of police officer dismissals, which advocated for a clarified and consistent route for removing officers who fail vetting. By embedding this power in legislation, the new clause would give chief officers clearer authority to act in the interest of police professionalism and public trust.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I welcome what the shadow Minister has said. There have been no changes to the clauses that were introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill and that are now in the Crime and Policing Bill, so I think we are on the same page in terms of these being the appropriate measures to take forward. I am grateful that he set out in detail the case for introducing the new clauses, which seek to ensure that the provisions work in policing and are fit for purpose, and that everyone who is in policing is fit to be a police officer. I reassure the Committee that the Government take police integrity very seriously. It is essential, as I said in my earlier remarks, that we have public confidence in policing and that the highest standards are upheld and maintained. I think we all agree that individuals who fall below the standards the public expect should not be police officers.

New clause 23 seeks to ensure that previous complaints or convictions are considered a factor in determining when a complaint against an officer should be handled formally under schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. I recognise the shadow Minister’s desire to strengthen the legislation to that effect but, in reality, these elements are already established practice. Under existing statutory guidance issued by the IOPC, previous complaints against an officer should be taken into account when considering whether to handle a complaint under schedule 3. All those working in policing must have regard to that statutory guidance. Compelling forces to record complaints under schedule 3, where a historical complaint exists on an officer’s record, would limit their ability to handle those complaints in the most proportionate manner and in the interests of the complainant.

Similarly, information on historical convictions is available to forces on the police national computer and is relevant in determining the most appropriate way to handle a complaint. The Government have committed to ensuring that vetting rules are strengthened with regard to historical convictions. We intend to put mandatory vetting standards into law this year, so that those who have committed certain offences cannot hold vetting clearance and serve as police officers.

New clause 31 would amend the Police Act 1996 to ensure that a code of practice may provide that a police officer who fails their vetting will be dismissed without notice. It may help the Committee to understand that the Government have acted rapidly to develop new regulations in this area, which will enable forces to dismiss officers who cannot maintain vetting clearance. The regulations have taken into account the relevant legal proceedings, such as the Di Maria judicial review, which considered the adequacy of the Metropolitan Police Service’s processes to remove those officers without vetting clearance. The Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025, which were laid just last week on 23 April, introduced a duty on police officers to hold and maintain vetting clearance, and provide a bespoke regulatory mechanism by which they can be dismissed should they fail to do so.

The Government also strongly believe that there should be no circumstances in which an officer who is unable to hold vetting clearance should remain in policing, so I cannot support the qualification in new clause 31, which suggests that an officer may be capable of deployment to other duties despite failing to maintain their vetting clearance. I hope that, having had the opportunity to consider the existing framework for complaints, the new regulations that I just referred to and the ongoing work to strengthen the vetting rules, the shadow Minister will be content not to move his new clauses later in our proceedings.

I want to mention how the IOPC will keep an eye on the changes that are being introduced. It is clear that there will be scrutiny of what happens following the changes. If there are emerging patterns of cases where, for instance, the CPS declines to charge an officer, despite the IOPC referral, I would expect the IOPC to consider whether there are lessons to be learned and a further review to be undertaken.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 106 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 107 to 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 110

Power to make youth diversion orders

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 110, page 128, line 31, leave out “an” and insert “a relevant”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 54 and 55.

Clause stand part.

Clause 111 stand part.

Government new clause 61—Notification requirements.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Part 14 of the Bill is about counter-terrorism and national security. Protecting the public is the first duty of any Government, which is why national security is a key pillar of the Government’s plan for change. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world, but we cannot stand by while threats evolve.

As the Home Secretary has set out in her statements to the House, the Security Service, Counter Terrorism Policing and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have all consistently raised concerns related to the increasing number of young people being investigated for terrorism offences. While there must always be the potential to pursue prosecutions in the most serious cases, it is important to ensure that there are alternative risk management measures that do not automatically result in a young person receiving a terrorism conviction, which can have a hugely destructive impact on their life prospects. We have listened to operational partners about the need for alternative and earlier interventions, and we are taking the opportunity to build on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. Chapter 1 of part 14 therefore introduces new youth diversion orders or YDOs.

YDOs will be a new civil order designed to better manage terrorist risk from young people, while reducing the need for their further involvement in the criminal justice system. They demonstrate this Government’s commitment to ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to reduce terrorism risk and support rehabilitation.

Clause 110 introduces a new power for the police to apply to a youth or magistrates court for a YDO. To impose a YDO, the court will need to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has either committed a terrorism offence, committed a non-terrorism offence with a terrorism connection, or engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court will also need to consider that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm, as defined in clause 111. This ensures that the new orders will be imposed only where there is a serious risk to the public.

The technical Government amendments 53 to 55 adjust the definition of “offence with a terrorist connection” to avoid the need to refer to legislation relating to sentencing. Sentencing will not take place in YDO applications, but the judge considering a YDO application will be able to consider whether the individual has committed an offence with a terrorist connection, in the same way as a judge would consider this on sentencing.

Finally, new clause 61 requires individuals to provide their personal details to the police where a YDO includes notification requirements. The relevant details are the respondent’s name, including any aliases, and their home address. This requirement will not be automatic or mandatory for every YDO, but will need to be agreed by the court on a case-by-case basis.

The notification requirement will also include a requirement to provide information about the individual’s school or other educational establishment if relevant. This information would be helpful, for example, in a scenario where someone moved school and there was no other trigger for the local authority to inform the police of the move.

The new clause is supported by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and operational partners have confirmed that it is necessary to support the effective day-to-day management of YDOs. I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage.

Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21.

The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs.

New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance.

This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s comments. On his point about information on schools and stigmatising children, am I right in thinking he believes that information will be made available to the public? I was not clear.

[Matt Vickers]

In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO.

Amendment 53 agreed to.

Amendments made: 54, in clause 110, page 129, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert—

“‘relevant offence’ means an offence which—

(a) was committed on or after 29 June 2021,

(b) is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and

(c) is not specified in—

(i) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, or

(ii) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code;”.

This amendment, Amendment 53 and Amendment 55 replace the concept of an “offence with a terrorist connection” with the concept of a “relevant offence with a terrorist connection” so as to enable the court dealing with an application for a youth diversion order to makes its own determination as to whether an offence has a terrorist connection.

Amendment 55, in clause 110, page 129, line 14, at end insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(ii), a relevant offence has a terrorist connection if the offence—

(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or

(b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 112

Content of youth diversion orders

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 112, page 130, line 11, leave out “subsection (2) or (3)” and insert “subsections (2) to (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 59.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 57 to 59.

Amendment 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.

(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.

(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.

(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.

(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.

(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”

This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.

Government amendment 60.

Clause stand part.

Government new clause 62—Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales.

Government new clause 63—Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales.

Government amendment 79.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies.

Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism.

The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO.

Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments.

New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs.

Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people.

This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel.

Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered.

I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention.

Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation.

Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety.

Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism.

Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?

[The Chair]

My sincere apologies to the Committee: before I called the shadow Minister, I should have proposed Government amendment 56. I call the Minister.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

To answer the question that the shadow Minister just posed, I said in my earlier remarks that there would not be restrictions that interfered with educational and work commitments, or with religious observances. I think that deals with his question. On that basis, commend the Government amendment to the Committee.

Amendment 56 agreed to.

Amendments made: 57, in clause 112, page 130, line 18, at end insert—

“(d) the respondent’s presence in, or access to, a specified area or place or an area or place of a specified description;

(e) the respondent's travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom and other places or otherwise).”

This amendment provides that the prohibitions or requirements a youth diversion order may contain include ones relating to the respondent’s presence in or access to particular areas or places, or to the respondent’s travel.

Amendment 58, in clause 112, page 130, line 22, leave out “provide information” and insert

“answer questions, provide information or produce documents”.

This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to answer questions, provide information or produce documents.

Amendment 59, in clause 112, page 130, line 23, at end insert—

“(d) require the respondent to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).

(3A) An order may contain any prohibition that is of a kind that could be imposed by the Secretary of State in relation to an individual by virtue of paragraph 6A of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (weapons and explosives measures).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to comply with notification requirements under NC61 and may contain prohibitions relating to weapons and explosives.

Amendment proposed: 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.

(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.

(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.

(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.

(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.

(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Duty to consult

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 113, page 131, line 4, leave out from “order” to “consult” in line 5 and insert

“, a chief officer of police must, if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made,”.

This is a drafting change that ensures consistency between the drafting of subsection (1) of clause 113 and subsection (2) of that clause as amended by Amendment 62.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 62, 64 and 63.

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 65 and 66.

Clause 114 stand part.

Government amendment 67.

Clause 115 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clauses 113 to 115 set out duties on the police to consult with relevant authorities, provide for applications to be made without notice in urgent circumstances, and provide for interim YDOs to be made.

The Committee will recognise the importance of ensuring that the police take wider factors into consideration—for example, a person’s age, mental health, safeguarding and educational needs—before applying for a YDO. Clause 113 therefore introduces a duty to consult before applying for an order or applying for variation or discharge of an order. In England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, the police will be required to consult with youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Agency respectively for applications involving individuals under the age of 18. In Scotland, the police will be required to consult with the Lord Advocate for all applications. This is necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where consultation with the Lord Advocate is appropriate for all YDOs, including for 18 to 21-year-olds, and for without-notice YDO applications. That reflects the Lord Advocate’s specific functions in relation to their role as the head of the system for the investigation and prosecution of crime, which includes a specific working relationship with Police Scotland.

Government amendments 62 and 65 make the additional requirement in respect of Scotland that the police consult with the local authority before making an application for a YDO, irrespective of the age of the respondent, and remove the requirement for consultation with the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration for YDOs for under-18s. Again, the amendments are necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where there is no equivalent to youth offending teams. Government amendments 63, 64 and 66 are consequential on those amendments, while Government amendment 61 ensures consistency of drafting between the subsections of clauses 113, as amended.

Consultation will be an important part of the YDO application process, ensuring that the police have thoroughly considered the necessity and proportionality of a YDO and taken into account the expertise of those who work closely with young people in the community. This statutory duty does not prevent the police from engaging with other authorities, such as the CPS or the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, wider social services, or the respondent’s school or college, where appropriate.

While it is likely to be rare in practice, there may be circumstances in which an urgent YDO application is required and providing notice to the respondent may increase risk. Therefore, clause 114 provides a route for police to apply for a YDO without notice to the respondent. The requirement to consult does not apply in such cases, although the police will still be required to consult relevant authorities before the full court hearing for a YDO.

Where an application is made without notice, the court will be able to consider whether to impose an interim order, in line with the approach taken with other preventive orders, such as knife crime prevention orders. Due to the temporary nature of an interim order, clause 115 ensures that the only positive requirements that can be included in such an order are to provide information and to comply with notification requirements. For example, the Bill does not allow the police to impose a requirement to attend intervention sessions similar to Prevent in an interim order, but they will be able to impose risk-management measures where necessary and proportionate, subject to the court’s permission. Amendment 67 clarifies the measures that can and cannot be imposed in an interim YDO.

I commend the amendments and the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made?

Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision?

Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The shadow Minister raised the issue of consultation with youth offending teams and their equivalent in the devolved nations. My understanding is that we are not talking about a large number of individuals being subject to these provisions. The reason we say that youth offending teams have to be consulted is that they have the expertise and the knowledge of working with young people, and it is likely that the individuals they will be consulted on will already be known to them. It is a good, positive measure to undertake that consultation with youth offending teams and recognise the skills and safeguards that they will bring. Their knowledge of the individual will perhaps include, as I spoke about earlier, issues in their background or safeguarding issues that need to be considered. That is really important.

An interim YDO may be required if there is an immediate risk that has to be managed. That is why provision needs to be made for interim YDOs, but of course they are interim, and a full hearing will take place. Interim YDOs will be used only in urgent circumstances, and of course the court will have to agree; while an application can be made, if the court does not recognise the urgency, it will not be granted. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has agreed that the power to make interim measures is necessary in order for YDOs to be effective.

I hope that, on the basis of those answers, the shadow Minister is satisfied that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 61 agreed to.

Amendments made: 62, in clause 113, page 131, line 10, leave out from “Scotland” to end of line 15 and insert

“must consult—

(a) the Lord Advocate,

(b) the relevant local authority, and

(c) if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made, the Principal Reporter.”

This amendment changes who the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland must consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or for the variation or discharge of such an order.

Amendment 64, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, at end insert—

“‘relevant local authority’ means—

(a) the Scottish local authority in whose area it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives, or

(b) if it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives in more than one such area, whichever one or more of the relevant Scottish local authorities that the chief constable considers it appropriate to consult;”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.

Amendment 63, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, after “section” insert “—

‘Scottish local authority’ means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994;”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.

Clause 113, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 114

Applications without notice

Amendments made: 65, in clause 114, page 131, line 27, leave out “Section 113(1) does” and insert

“Subsections (1) and (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 do”.

This amendment disapplies the requirement to consult the relevant local authority and (where the respondent is under 18) the Principal Reporter where an application for a youth diversion order is made without notice in Scotland.

Amendment 66, in clause 114, page 131, line 35, leave out “section 113(1)” and insert

“subsection (1) or (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 (as the case may be)”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.

Clause 114, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 115

Interim youth diversion orders

Amendment made: 67, in clause 115, page 132, line 8, leave out subsection (3) and substitute—

“(3) The only requirements that may be imposed by an interim youth diversion order on the respondent are—

(a) a requirement of the kind mentioned in section 112(3)(b) (requirements to provide information etc);

(b) a requirement to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables an interim youth diversion order to require the respondent answer questions, provide information or produce documents, or to comply with notification requirements under NC61.

Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 116

Variation and discharge of youth diversion orders

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 116, page 132, line 33, at end insert—

“(4A) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm.

(4B) Subsections (5) and (7) of section 112 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.”

This amendment provides that a court may only vary a youth diversion order to include an additional prohibition or requirement or to extend its duration if it considers it necessary; and that certain provision in clause 112 about the content of orders applies equally to such additional prohibitions or requirements.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 69 to 71.

Clause 117 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 116 ensures that the police or the subject of a YDO can apply to the relevant court to vary the order once it is in place to, for example, add or remove measures or to change the duration of existing measures. The clause also allows the police or the subject of a YDO to apply to end the order before it is due to expire, allowing the police to withdraw the order if it is no longer considered necessary.

Clause 117 sets out the route for the police or a respondent to appeal against a court decision to impose a YDO, an interim YDO or any change made under clause 116. Appeals will be made to the Crown court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland. The court may then make changes on the basis of that appeal, as required. Government amendments 68 and 71 make changes to clarify and streamline the appeals process for YDOs, as do Government amendments 69 and 70, which provide that a second appeal in relation to a YDO may be made to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.

The Committee will recognise the importance of the clauses in ensuring that there is a process for varying or revoking the order as well as for both the police and YDO subjects to have a prescribed and proportionate route for appeals.

Amendment 68 agreed to.

Clause 116, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 117

Appeal against youth diversion order etc

--- Later in debate ---

Offence of breaching youth diversion order

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 118, page 133, line 22, at end insert—

“(1A) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to provide information or produce a document, it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that requirement, to provide any information or produce any document which the person knows to be false.

(1B) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to comply with section (Notification requirements), it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that section, to notify to the police any information which the person knows to be false.”

This amendment makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a youth diversion order.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 73 to 75.

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 76.

Clauses 119 and 120 stand part.

Government amendments 77 and 78.

Clause 121 stand part.

Government new clause 64—Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice.

Government new clause 65—Reviews of operation of this Chapter.

New clause 42—Report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders.

(2) That report must include—

(a) the organisations which will be responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders;

(b) what level of counterterrorism and de-radicalisation training and expertise they have; and

(c) what additional resources they will require to effectively administer the provisions, prohibitions and requirements of youth diversion orders.

(3) Within one month of the publication of this report, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan assessing the—

(a) training,

(b) financing, and

(c) guidance,

available to the organisations identified in the report under subsection (1) to bring their training, expertise and funding to the requisite level identified in that report.

(4) The Secretary of State must commission a report from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to assess whether the levels of funding, training and expertise proposed in the plan under subsection (3) are sufficient. This report will be laid before Parliament with the plan under subsection (3).”

This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders and a plan and independent report on the funding, training and expertise they need.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I wonder whether it might be helpful for the Committee if I respond after the shadow Minister has spoken to his new clause 42.

[Matt Vickers]

Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders.

Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18?

Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs.

New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan.

The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism.

What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clauses 118 to 121 will support the implementation of YDOs. Although the aim of a YDO is to divert a young person away from terrorist offending, it is critical that there is an effective deterrent against breaching the order, and that where a young person breaches the order, the police can take action.

Clause 118 ensures that a separate criminal offence is available for breaching a YDO without a reasonable excuse. In practice, we propose that statutory guidance will set out that the police will be expected to consult youth offending teams where there is a suspected breach, and for less serious breaches the police may consider alternatives to prosecution, such as varying the measures in the order or issuing a formal warning to the individual. Prosecution for this offence will therefore be a last resort.

Government amendment 72 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a YDO. Government amendments 73 and 74 make the offences under clause 18 triable either way irrespective of the defendant’s age, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The amendments ensure that there is a consistent maximum penalty for any breach of a YDO, regardless of the young person’s age, and that the legislation more accurately reflects the potential severity of breaching a YDO. For example, a serious breach may involve a breach of a weapons measure, such as by making plans to purchase knives or encouraging or assisting others to do so. We would expect a prosecution for that offence to be the last resort. Detail on other options to be considered beforehand will be included in the statutory guidance. The change is supported by operational partners and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Government amendment 75 enables a copy of a YDO to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.

Clause 119 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police in relation to YDOs. In issuing such guidance, we recognise the importance of proper consultation with relevant authorities, including the police, the prosecution service in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is why clause 119 requires mandatory consultation with certain parties and permits the Secretary of State to consult with other stakeholders, where appropriate. Government amendment 76 expands the list of consultees to include youth justice agencies.

Clause 120 ensures that rules of court can provide for anonymity for individuals going through civil proceedings for a YDO. That is important to ensure that reporting restrictions apply, and it is in line with the general policy aim of ensuring that young people do not feel stigmatised through engagement with the justice system—something that the shadow Minister has spoken about.

Finally, clause 121 makes procedural provision in respect of applications for a YDO. Government amendment 77 disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a YDO from being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78 enables proceedings in Scotland for, or in relation to, a YDO to be heard by a summary sheriff.

I turn to the Government new clauses in this group. To safeguard effectively the data that is gathered under electronic monitoring requirements, new clause 64 will require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for the processing of such data. The processing of such data will be subject to the requirements in the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. New clause 65 will enable the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review and report on the use and operationalisation of the youth diversion order. The independent reviewer already has a number of statutory functions, and this new clause aligns his statutory functions, enabling him to report on the YDO. The independent reviewer has been consulted on the clause, and his view is that the power to review the operation of the youth diversion order is important.

New clause 42, tabled by the shadow Minister, would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations that are responsible for implementing and enforcing YDOs, and a plan for delivering the relevant funding, training and guidance available for these organisations. It would also require the Government to commission a report from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.

As Matt Jukes, the head of counter-terrorism policing, set out in his written evidence to this Committee, counter-terrorism policing is a collaboration of UK police forces with a network of exceptional investigators. It is the lead law enforcement agency for managing terrorist risk, so it is appropriate that it will lead the implementation and enforcement of YDOs. It will be supported in this role by youth justice partners who have substantial experience of working with young people who are subject to court-imposed orders.

As I have already set out, Government new clause 65 already ensures that YDOs are added to the statutory remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As part of this role, the independent reviewer is required to review the operation of YDOs in practice and report to Parliament. I hope that the shadow Minister agrees that new clause 42 is therefore unnecessary.

On the other issue that the shadow Minister referred to, regarding the consistent use of YDOs across the UK, one of the key objectives of the statutory guidance under clause 119, which chief officers must have regard to, is to ensure that there is consistency. To go back to the point about the youth offending teams, given the small size of the cohort of children who are likely to be given a YDO, we do not anticipate that the changes will add significant pressures to those youth offending teams. On that basis, I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Amendments made: 73, in clause 118, page 133, line 23, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 74.

Amendment 74, in clause 118, page 133, line 33, leave out “aged 18 or over”.

This amendment makes offences under clause 118 (breach of youth diversion order) triable either way whatever the age of the respondent.

Amendment 75, in clause 118, page 134, line 8, at end insert—

“(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section, a copy of the original youth diversion order, certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables a copy of a youth diversion order to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.

Clause 118, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119

Guidance

Amendment made: 76, in clause 119, page 134, line 16, at end insert—

“(za) the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales;

(zb) the Scottish Ministers;

(zc) the Youth Justice Agency in Northern Ireland;”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment adds to the list of persons the Secretary of State must consult before issuing or revising guidance to chief officers of police about youth diversion orders.

Clause 119, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 121

Applications

Amendments made: 77, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—

“(2) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc) does not apply to a complaint under this Chapter.”

This amendment disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a youth diversion order being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application.

Amendment 78, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—

“(3) In Schedule 1 to the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp 17) (civil proceedings etc in which summary sheriff has competence), after paragraph 12 insert—

‘Youth diversion orders

13 Proceedings for or in relation to a youth diversion order under section 110 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables proceedings in Scotland for or in relation to a youth diversion order to be heard by a summary sheriff.

Clause 121, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 122

Prevention of terrorism and state threats: weapons etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 122 amends the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and the National Security Act 2023 to broaden the definition of weapons that are prohibited for individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures or state threat prevention and investigation measures. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to prohibit individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or to state threat prevention and investigation measures, from possessing any items that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury. The change builds on a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, in his annual report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 43—Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation—

“(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation.

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes—

(a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation;

(b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation;

(c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation;

(d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation;

(e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or

(f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption.

(3) This section does not apply to—

(a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations;

(b) accredited media outlets and journalists;

(c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or

(d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).”

This new clause would make travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation an offence.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place.

Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups.

The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence.

Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence:

“A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”

What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed?

New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction.

The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations.

New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed.

As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity.

There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism.

The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances.

As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel.

Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 123 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 124

Management of terrorist offenders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 16.

Government new clause 21—Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims.

Government amendment 23.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 124 introduces schedule 16, which amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It gives powers to effectively manage a certain cohort of historical terrorism offenders. That cohort includes individuals who committed non-terrorism offences, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered to have a terrorism connection had they not been committed before the relevant legislation came into effect. This is the same cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders as captured by clause 104, relating to the polygraph testing of those offenders, which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice spoke to earlier.

The 2008 Act introduced a requirement for courts to consider whether there is a connection to terrorism when sentencing certain specified offences. In circumstances where a court determines that an offence has a terrorism connection, it must aggravate the sentence. Where a terrorist connection is determined, the sentence imposed will reflect the risk profile of the offender. In addition, the offender can be more appropriately managed on their release because certain counter-terrorism risk management tools become available to the police in respect of that offender.

Since the passage of the 2008 Act, several further risk management tools have been introduced via various Acts of Parliament to manage terrorism and terrorist-connected offenders. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 also expanded the scope of the terrorist connection provisions to require a court to aggravate certain non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years.

The clause and the associated schedule will extend the application of existing risk management measures. Those measures include powers of urgent arrest and personal search for those on licence, where it is suspected that they have breached a licence condition, as well as imposing terrorist notification requirements under the 2008 Act for this cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders.

The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation noted that the schedule will allow the police to apply important counter-terrorism measures to serious offenders involved in terrorist plots backed by proscribed organisations, but who were convicted of non-terrorism offences. The amendments made in schedule 16 will also permit the police or the Secretary of State to apply to the courts for an order imposing the terrorist notification requirements on offenders whose historical offences have a terrorist connection. If such an order is made, the urgent arrest power and the power of personal search will also apply in respect of the offender. That measure is supported by the police and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who described it as a “sensible measure”.

Government new clause 21 will add certain existing terrorism-related offences to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Government amendment 23 is consequential on new clause 21. As we have debated, schedule 4 to the 2015 Act contains a list of serious offences to which the section 45 defence of that Act does not apply. The list currently includes some terrorism offences, as well as serious violence and sexual offences. Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution for victims of modern slavery, and is designed to give victims the confidence to come forward without fear of prosecution.

Schedule 4 to the 2015 Act ensures that those who commit the most serious offences specified in the schedule do not have the option to rely on that defence. New clause 21 adds existing terrorism offences to schedule 4, building on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Currently, only a limited number of terrorism offences are listed in schedule 4, including those in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006—preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism, respectively. Others, such as the offence in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000—collection of information useful to terrorists—are in scope of the section 45 defence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 127 relates to the implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, clause 128 sets out the meaning of “appropriate national authority” and clause 129 relates to the consultation with devolved authorities about regulations under clause 127.

International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provides law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. Clause 127 will provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement any new legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail needed to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement. Clause 127 also stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation.

Clause 128 defines the appropriate national authority as the Secretary of State or, where a provision falls within devolved competence, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. Clause 129 requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations, to consult devolved Governments about any provisions in the regulations that would be within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature.

These measures will enable the swift implementation of new international agreements that are designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, and help to protect vulnerable people. I commend them to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly.

The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications.

The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127.

Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 128 and 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 130

Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine.

In the 1970s, the Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass case determined that a corporation can be held liable for a crime if it is committed by its “directing mind and will”, but there is a lack of clarity on what that constitutes. As companies have grown in size and complexity, there are often multiple controlling minds within different business functions who can exert control and cause harm through different functions of the business.

Through clause 130 the Government are placing the case law test for attributing crimes to corporate bodies on a statutory footing, and clarifying and extending the circumstances under which a body corporate or partnership is liable for any criminal offence, if that offence has been committed by its senior management.

The previous Government undertook the first stage of this reform in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, placing the identification doctrine in legislation for economic crime offences. However, the identification doctrine was never intended as an economic crime-only regime. It has historically applied to any criminal offence in case law, and it is important that statute reflects that.

Clause 130 therefore repeals the relevant sections of the 2023 Act and replaces them with an identification doctrine that applies to all relevant crime, not just economic crime. As a result of the clause, a body corporate or partnership in the UK can be held liable for any criminal offence and fined accordingly where a senior manager who has control over the whole or a substantial part of the business commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority.

The broadening of the principle to senior managers with control over any substantial part of the body corporate reflects the wide decision-making responsibilities of organisations and mitigates prior concerns that individuals committing crime could escape liability by changing or removing their title. That will ensure that businesses cannot continue to avoid liability where senior management have clearly used the business to facilitate or conduct crime.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered,

That the Order of the Committee of Thursday 27 March be varied by leaving out paragraph 1(g).—(Keir Mather.)

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)

Draft Forensic Science Regulator Draft Code of Practice 2025 (VERSION 2)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2025 General Committees

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Forensic Science Regulator draft Code of Practice 2025 (Version 2).

It is a pleasure to see you in your place, Sir Desmond. Upholding quality standards in forensic science is vital to securing and maintaining confidence in criminal justice outcomes. Our missions to halve violent crime, halve violence against women and girls and increase confidence in the police and criminal justice system depend on the timely delivery of high-quality and cost-effective forensic science. We also intend to consult on a new national centre of policing to bring together crucial support services, including forensics, that local police forces can draw on, in order to raise standards and improve efficiency.

When in opposition, the Labour party fully supported the then Government in passing the Forensic Science Regulator Act 2021, which established the regulator as a statutory office holder and allows them to take action when they have reason to believe that forensic science activities are being conducted in such a way as to create a substantial risk to the course of justice. The Act also requires the regulator to produce a statutory code of practice that formally defines which forensic science activities will be regulated and sets out the standards that providers will be expected to meet. The code sets out the required standards of conduct and practice for forensic science providers, including the requirements for quality-management systems. It also provides definitions of forensic science activities and states which activities the code applies to.

The first version of the code came into force in October 2023, and was the first such statutory code anywhere in the world. Due to the novelty of the new statutory requirements, the regulator considered it prudent to anticipate a second version a year on from the first coming into force. As a result, a consultation on version 2 of the code was launched in early 2024. During the initial consultation approximately 1,230 comments were received from 96 respondents from a range of organisations and sectors, including law enforcement, academia and commercial providers. Law enforcement made up 64 of the 96 respondents. The regulator also held extensive discussions with specialist groups and others across the forensics community.

Version 2 of the code represents another significant milestone in the ongoing journey to enhance the integrity, reliability and effectiveness of forensic science in England and Wales. Most of the changes in version 2 are minor and technical, and clarify existing provisions. The changes address practical issues that arose when the first version of the code was implemented.

The most significant change in version 2 relates to the regulation of incident-scene examination. Many forensic stakeholders, including chief police officers and others in law enforcement, raised concerns with the regulator regarding the effectiveness of the requirements set out in version 1. As a result, version 2 streamlines the compliance process for crime-scene examination by requiring a corporate approach by each police organisation, and therefore avoids what was seen as unnecessary replication across the 149 sites where individual sites are currently assessed.

The new requirements for crime-scene examination in the code will ensure that a risk-based and proportionate approach is taken to regulation. The regulator believes this will save significant police staffing hours. The new requirements set out in version 2 of the code have widespread support among forensic practitioners, forensic leaders and chief police officers, and should lead to significant cost savings for policing. The new iteration of the code will continue to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system and help to guard against miscarriages of justice.

Finally, I put on the record my thanks to the UK’s hard-working police and forensic scientists, who do an excellent job of delivering vital services every day. I commend the draft code of practice to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I very much welcome the shadow Minister’s comments, and recognise the cross-party support for this work.

It is important that stakeholders have been listened to. Having the consultation over a considerable period of time was helpful in allowing everyone to put forward their views. I take the hon. Lady’s point about keeping the regulatory burden under review, and also her point about the transitional period. I am of the view that it is a good transitional period, but if issues are raised that cannot be dealt with by October, I am sure we can look at it again. Given the hon. Lady’s comments, there seems to be cross-party support for the measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Headingley Incident

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Alex Sobel (Leeds Central and Headingley) (Lab/Co-op)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on the incident that occurred in Headingley on 26 April.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

First, I thank my hon. Friend for securing this urgent question. I begin by saying that my thoughts and prayers are with the victims of this horrific violent incident in Headingley, Leeds, on Saturday. I understand the shock that this incident has caused among the local community in Headingley, and I understand that my hon. Friend will want to get rapid answers for the constituents he represents. At the same time—as you have pointed out, Mr Speaker—this is a live police investigation, and we all have a responsibility not to say anything that would interfere with that investigation or any legal proceedings that may follow from it.

For the benefit of the House, though, I will recap what the police have themselves said about the incident and the ongoing investigation. On the afternoon of Saturday 26 April, West Yorkshire police were called to reports of a male on Otley Road, Headingley, Leeds, in possession of a crossbow and a firearm. Armed police arrived at the scene at 1453 hours, where the suspect was found with a self-inflicted injury. He was taken to hospital and remains in a life-threatening condition. On arrival, officers also found two members of the public who were injured and were admitted to hospital. One victim has now been discharged from hospital; the other has undergone surgery after suffering life-threatening injuries. Our thoughts remain with the victims and their families. Counter Terrorism Policing North East has taken the lead for the investigation into this attack, and is now working with West Yorkshire police.

As I have said, this is an ongoing investigation and I cannot comment on details of the case, other than to note that we must allow the police time and space to conduct their investigation. Having said that, we are very aware of concerns about the use of crossbows in violent attacks. We share that concern, and last week, the Government tabled amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill to strengthen age verification controls on both the online sale and delivery of crossbows. Last year, the previous Government held a call for evidence on licensing systems that could apply to crossbows, to which they did not respond. As part of our wider work to get dangerous and lethal weapons off Britain’s streets, we will shortly publish our response to that consultation, setting out how we plan to go further to limit the availability and accessibility of crossbows in this country.

[Alex Sobel]

Mr Speaker, I am very grateful to you for granting this urgent question after the harrowing attack in Headingley on Saturday. My community is still reeling in shock and disbelief at the horrific act of violence that occurred in our midst on Saturday afternoon.

I begin by expressing my concern and sending my best wishes for the recovery of the two women who were harmed in the egregious attack this weekend. I also express my gratitude for the heroic efforts of the members of the public and of our local community who intervened. The details of how they helped are still emerging, but I already know that without them, we may have had a far worse tragedy. I also thank all the emergency services and Leeds city council for their swift response, and for ensuring that the situation was brought under control and isolated. The fact that this most heinous crime was committed against two women is not lost on anyone, and I thank West Yorkshire police for committing to increase its presence in the area and working to ensure the safety of women and girls. The response to this horrific attack is a testament to the Headingley community, Leeds, and the people of West Yorkshire. Our community is strong and we will show that we remain united. We will not allow this to divide us.

The key suspect was carrying a range of lethal weapons when the attack was carried out, and the two victims were both shot by crossbows, a weapon that has been used in murders before. I know that the Home Office issued a call for evidence on strengthening controls on crossbows on public safety grounds, which ran from 14 February to 9 April last year. Will the Minister now publish a response on providing further controls on the use, ownership and supply of crossbows after Saturday’s horrifying attack? We need to see action taken on those lethal weapons.

Police inquiries are ongoing, but we know that this is a critical incident and that the lead force is Counter Terrorism Policing. The fact that an individual was able to plan and carry out such a vile, hideous attack on two women requires us to ask questions about how our intelligence gathering operated prior to the attack. Can the Minister reassure me, my community and the House that there will be a thorough investigation into what intelligence gathering had been undertaken on the suspect, and whether lessons can be learned for the safety and security of the public?

I pay tribute once more to the local community in the area that I am proud to call home, and thank them for their bravery and kindness, as I do to our excellent emergency services in West Yorkshire.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank my hon. Friend for those comments. He is absolutely right to pay tribute to the community, the members of the public who came forward when the attack was happening and the emergency services, who, as ever, run towards danger when many others run in the opposite direction. It is absolutely right that we pay tribute in the way that he has done. I hope that my response to his urgent question offered him some reassurance about the Government’s approach towards crossbows and what more we want to do. As I said, we will shortly publish our response to the consultation that took place last year. The investigation is under way; I know that it will be thorough and comprehensive, and that all the issues he raised will be looked at.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Everybody will have found the reports about this incident, which was of great severity, deeply concerning. I would like to express my deepest sympathies to those who were injured during this horrendous attack. Our thoughts are with them at this time. I also thank the public, the police and the emergency services more broadly for their response to the incident.

There are two aspects that I would like to touch on with the Minister. West Yorkshire police has said that counter-terrorism police are involved in responding to the incident. We have heard from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation about the importance of not allowing an information vacuum to form. Will the Minister ensure that there is as much transparency as possible in the release of information about this case?

Secondly, I am aware that in the aftermath of the incident, although the police are not seeking anyone else in connection with it, there will be an increased police presence across Headingley and the broader city of Leeds in the coming days and weeks. Given that this horrific attack was on two young women, I would be grateful if the Minister could outline whether there have been any discussions about what that presence will entail and what measures are being taken, in particular to ensure that young women and girls feel safe in Leeds following this incident.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his comments; he is absolutely right to praise the public of Headingley and the emergency services. The policing presence in Headingley and across Leeds is an operational matter for the chief constable, and I know that he will be mindful of the needs of the community in making clear what police presence is needed.

I am mindful of the issue around transparency and the flow of information, but again, this is a live police investigation. The police make decisions about what information is disclosed at the appropriate time. As I have said—and as you have set out to the House, Mr Speaker—it is important that there is not speculation at this stage, and that we allow the police to do their job and to investigate, look at the evidence and take the appropriate action as and when.

[Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)]

I echo my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) in expressing my deepest sympathies to the families of the victims of this horrendous crime. West Yorkshire police is investigating two recent murders in my constituency of Shipley. Will my right hon. Friend assure me that West Yorkshire police has the necessary resources to investigate not only this most recent incident in Headingley, but serious crime taking place in the area more broadly?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s comments. Let me reassure her that all police forces have additional resources in this new financial year—up to £19.6 billion is going into policing. We know that there are challenges in policing, but I have every confidence that West Yorkshire police has the resources it needs. West Yorkshire has a very effective mayor and deputy mayor, who leads on policing, and they make the case for their police force very well indeed.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)]

No one should have to live in fear of such horrific violence. The appalling events in Headingley on Saturday have left a community shocked and two women with really serious injuries. My thoughts and those of all the Liberal Democrats are, of course, with the victims, their families and all those affected by a crime of such awful brutality. This is yet another devastating example of the violence faced by women and girls across the country, which we must all work to end. It is also yet another example of a violent attack in which a crossbow has been used—one of too many in recent years. My hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), among others, has urged the Government to review and strengthen crossbow regulations. I note the Government’s amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill, including new clause 70, and the Minister’s response to the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel). Can the Minister confirm when the Government’s formal response to the call for evidence will be published?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the comments from the hon. Member who leads on this subject for the Liberal Democrats. We all are committed to ensuring that violence against women and girls is halved over the next decade. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), who is sitting with me, is leading on that. It is an important strand of the safer streets mission.

I am pleased to hear of the support from the Liberal Democrats for our ongoing work on crossbows, particularly through the Crime and Policing Bill. We will bring forward details of the Government’s approach, and the response to the consultation, very shortly. I have taken a particular interest in this issue, and I have met families who have been affected by violent crossbow attacks. I recently met Laura Sugden up in Driffield, who lost her partner, Shane Gilmer. Just this morning, I met Joan Whelan, whose partner, Dave Peck, was killed in 2022 by someone using a crossbow. I am aware of the need for action on this issue.

[Mr Bayo Alaba (Southend East and Rochford) (Lab)]

I wish the victims of the Headingley attack a full recovery. My thoughts are with their friends and family and the community. Just this morning, I welcomed Joan Whelan to Westminster to meet the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire—I thank the Minister for her time, and her sage advice and counsel—following the tragic loss of Joan’s beloved partner, Dave Peck. Dave was fatally struck by bolts fired from a crossbow into an open busy pub in Westcliff in my constituency of Southend East and Rochford in 2022. Dave was affectionately known as West Ham Dave, and was a larger-than-life character. Dave and Joan together had 22 grandchildren, who no longer have their grandad in their life. The crossbow was purchased by a resident with paranoid schizophrenia who had a history of mental health struggles. It was purchased freely, unchecked and unlicensed, on the internet. Does the Minister agree that more needs to be done to stop crossbows falling into the wrong hands? Will she join me in thanking Joan for her bravery in sharing her story?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank my hon. Friend for bringing Joan to see me today. She is an incredibly brave and impressive person, and we heard directly from her what the loss of Dave meant to her, her family and her 22 grandchildren. In the few words that my hon. Friend used, he made the case effectively for further changes to the law around crossbows.

[Charlie Dewhirst (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)]

The Minister mentioned her meeting with Laura Sugden, and I pay tribute to Laura for her campaigning on the issue. It is more than seven years since Anthony Lawrence brutally murdered Laura’s partner Shane Gilmer. Laura was attacked with a crossbow, and was pregnant at the time. I know that a response to the consultation is coming, but can the Minister give us more detail about the timetable for that response? What next steps will we likely see?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I also pay tribute to Laura, an incredibly brave woman who faced a horrific attack when her neighbour got into the house through the roof space and attacked her and her partner. In answer to the hon. Gentleman, I cannot give a specific date. I used to really dislike it when I was sitting on the Opposition Benches and a Government Minister would say “shortly” or “imminently”, but I can guarantee that I am doing my best to ensure that we respond to the consultation from last year as soon as possible.

[Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)]

I express my sympathies and those of the people of Central Ayrshire to the victims of this horrific attack, and those affected by it. I note the presence of the Mayor of West Yorkshire in the Gallery. Does the Minister support the excellent work that the mayor is leading to keep women and girls safe in West Yorkshire? Will the Minister commit to working with mayors, and police and crime commissioners, across the country to tackle the rise of misogyny?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I do not want to get into trouble with you, Mr Speaker, but I am very conscious of the excellent work done by the Mayor of West Yorkshire and her deputy, Alison Lowe, on violence against women and girls, and of their real commitment to making policies that will have a dramatic effect on the women and girls of West Yorkshire.

[Lee Anderson (Ashfield) (Reform)]

Unhinged individuals are roaming the streets of our towns and cities with crossbows, knives, saws and other dangerous weapons, and no tinkering around with legislation or licensing will stop this madness. Is it not about time we had mandatory jail sentences for people who carry such weapons?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

We are working as quickly as possible to understand and identify the nature and scale of the growing cohort of predominantly young men and boys who are fixated with violence. We want to ensure that we have a proper approach and multi-agency interventions to manage the risk that they pose. The Prime Minister has already said that if the law needs to change in recognition of this new and dangerous threat, we will change it, quickly.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Minister for coming forward to respond to the urgent question. Let me put on record my deepest sympathies for the victims of this terrible incident and their families. Members on both sides of the House have talked about the victims of crossbow attacks, and I find the whole issue very shocking, especially as someone who regularly visits Westcliff-on-Sea. Is there any more that we can do as a Government to support victims of these terrible attacks and their families?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

My hon. Friend has raised the important issue of how victims of such attacks are supported. As I said, this morning I talked to Joan about the support that she received after the horrific attack on Dave Peck, and I have heard about the support and help that Laura Sugden has received since she was attacked with a crossbow; but I am well aware that there is more to do, and I will talk to my counterpart in the Ministry of Justice about that.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Does the Minister share my surprise at just how easy it is to get hold of one of these weapons? A few clicks will buy someone a Guillotine X+ compound crossbow for £324.91 plus £6.99 for delivery, or a Jaguar Deluxe for £129.95, with free delivery. These things are as deadly as shotguns, yet we do not license them as such. Will the Minister, in the plans that she has heralded, consider seriously going down the same route as other European countries and ensuring that these deadly weapons are properly controlled?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

In just a few sentences, the right hon. Gentleman has made a compelling case for why change is needed in this regard. I cannot go any further today, but I hear what he says, and I share his concern about the fact that people can go online and, with a few clicks, buy one of these items.

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

A number of people have mentioned to me that they have been to university in Leeds, or have kids who live in “Below Clarey” in Harrogate and go to university in Leeds. There is quite a high-density student population in the area. What conversations have the Government had with local authorities and other partners to ensure that university students and parents feel supported and reassured? May I also echo the sentiments of Members on both sides of the House who have thanked the emergency services?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman has made an important point about reassurance for the public, so that they can feel confident about going out in local communities. I know that West Yorkshire police is ensuring that through the extra police presence, and my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) will be working with community groups and the university. Also, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and the Minister for Security were properly briefed about the incident over the weekend. There is engagement across the board, and all the key stakeholders are part of those conversations.

[Robin Swann (South Antrim) (UUP)]

I join all the other Members in wishing the victims of this horrific crime a speedy recovery. I note that Counter Terrorism Policing has been involved in intelligence-gathering, and that there is concern about online incitement to violence. Will the Minister join me in condemning the recent statement by the so-called Irish rap band Kneecap, who are reported to have told their audience that they should kill their local MP, and that the only good Tory is a dead Tory?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Yes, of course I would condemn any such comments. Clearly, I cannot comment on anything that was posted online in relation to the case we are talking about today, but the hon. Gentleman will know that we work in partnership with technology companies to ensure that they understand their responsibility to tackle illegal content on their platforms, and we have been clear that they need to act quickly to identify and remove such content from their platforms once it has been posted. More generally, the Online Safety Act 2023 places duties on platforms to swiftly identify and remove illegal content, which we expect them to abide by. Furthermore, these platforms have a moral responsibility to keep their users and the general public safe, and we expect them to take all reasonable steps to do so.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. It is very important that this matter is raised, but I am not sure that it fits in here. It might have been better if the hon. Gentleman had raised the issue in the House by making a point of order at the end.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the Minister for her answers. Our thoughts are with the victims and, indeed, with the police officers and the emergency services workers, who responded in such a positive way. Like others, I believe that such incidents highlight the fact that police officers, and particularly police community support officers, need to be on the ground so that they can deal with the use of crossbows, put in place measures to ensure public safety, and send the message that the police are close by. That needs to be the case not just in Headingley, but across all of this great United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman makes the case for what this Government are doing on neighbourhood policing. We are putting 13,000 police officers and PCSOs back into local areas and communities to provide not only a police presence, but public reassurance, which is so important to the people we all represent.

Personal Liability Consultation

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Thursday 24th April 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

The Government are today publishing their response to the public consultation on establishing personal liability measures on senior executives of online platforms and marketplaces who fail to remove illegal content relating to knives and offensive weapons from online platforms, search engines and market- places. The consultation ran between 13 November and 11 December 2024. This was open to the public and targeted at the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, online platforms and marketplaces, businesses, voluntary sector and community groups, and other organisations with a direct interest in the proposals.

The consultation received a total of 74 completed responses. We are grateful to all those who took the time to respond. The Government response sets out our consideration of these responses.

The Government will introduce legislation to provide the police with the power to issue content removal notices for illegal knife and other offensive weapons related content. If a company ultimately does not comply, the police are able to decide whether to issue a civil penalty notice against the company and a senior executive of that company.

A copy of the consultation response will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and published on gov.uk.

[HCWS600]

VE Day 80th Anniversary: Licensing Hours Extension

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd April 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

The Government will move forward with the proposal to issue a licensing hours order under section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003, following growing and overwhelming support from the public to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day. To confirm, this order will extend licensing hours in England and Wales for the 80th anniversary of VE Day.

The order will apply to premises already licensed for the sale of alcohol and late-night refreshments for consumption on the premises until 11 pm. The order will extend the licensing hours for these premises from 11 pm on 8 May to 1 am on 9 May. The territorial extent of the order will be England and Wales.

The Government view VE Day as an event of exceptional national significance, and an extension to licensing hours will enable communities to come together at their local licensed premises to celebrate 80 years of peace since the end of world war two, which millions paid the ultimate sacrifice to achieve. This will also provide support to the hospitality sector by enabling businesses to extend their trading hours should they wish to do so.

The order will be laid in Parliament in due course and an economic note will be published alongside it on legislation.gov.uk.

[HCWS593]