Shared Parental Leave

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Thursday 29th June 2023 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

The Government have today published our response to the consultation on parental leave and pay. This confirms that the Government will make changes to paternity leave, delivering our manifesto commitment to make it easier to take.

In July 2019, the Government consulted on whether the current arrangements for parental leave and pay met our policy objectives, and if more could be done to better balance the gender division of parental leave and pay between parents. We sought views on the costs and benefits of reforming parental entitlements, and any trade-offs that might need to accompany such reform.

The Government response, published today and placed in the House Library, sets out the changes now planned for paternity leave, fulfilling our commitment to make it easier to take. The Government will legislate when parliamentary time allows to:

Give employed fathers and partners more choice and flexibility around how and when they take their paternity leave, allowing them to take two separate blocks of one week of leave if they wish;

Give employed fathers and partners the ability to take their leave at any time in the first year, rather than just in the first eight weeks after birth or placement for adoption; and

Change the notice requirements for paternity leave to make these more proportionate to the amount of time the father/parent plans to take off work. We will cut the amount of notice of dates from 15 weeks before the expected week of childbirth to 28 days before the leave will be taken. This will give parents more flexibility in planning to take the leave that they need.

The territorial extent of the proposals included in the Government consultation response extends to Great Britain—employment law is devolved to Northern Ireland. These changes are anticipated to take effect in April 2024, subject to parliamentary scheduling.

More details of the Government’s plans can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/good-work-plan-proposals-to-support-families.

Shared Parental Leave and Pay Evaluation

The Government are also publishing today the shared parental leave and pay (SPL) evaluation, which has assessed the extent to which the implementation and take-up of SPL achieved its original objectives: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shared-parental-leave-spl-evaluation.

The evaluation showed positive results for both parents and business, boasting greater work-life balance for parents, and improving retention and recruitment for employers. The uptake of SPL was also in line with projections made at its roll-out and has doubled between 2015-16 and 2021-22.

The Government are committed to supporting labour market participation, including participation by parents. Parental leave and pay policies give employed parents a right to time off work in the first year of their child’s life and supports them in their return to work. This represents an important part of our drive to deliver growth by helping people to access and stay in work.

[HCWS893]

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 166 to 168 stand part.

Clauses 170 and 171 stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Maria. The clauses restate and update the Enterprise Act 2002. Clause 165 sets out which courts in the UK have jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for consumer protection orders. The globalised nature of modern business means that a trader with UK consumers may well not have a place of business or carry on business in any part of the UK. The clause provides that in those circumstances the relevant consumer’s place of domicile will determine which UK court has jurisdiction.

Clause 166 will extend the effect of consumer protection orders made by a court with jurisdiction in one part of the UK to other parts of the UK, as if the order were made in those other parts. That eliminates any jurisdictional gap within the UK and restates and consolidates relevant sections of the Enterprise Act 2002.

Clause 167 will allow evidence from previous court proceedings to be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving that infringing conduct has occurred under this part. Convictions in the criminal courts and any relevant findings in the civil courts are admissible to prove that a person has engaged in an infringing practice or has been an accessory to such a practice.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

I wonder whether the Minister could pinpoint where in the Bill’s impact assessment documents the estimates are for the number of cases that the Government expect under this legislation, the average time for a case to be heard and the amount that the Government will be resourcing courts?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Hollinrake]

What a helpful question. I do not have those figures to hand, but I am happy to write to the hon. Member if we cannot find the information for him today. I am grateful for his intervention.

Clause 168 will give the court a discretionary power to make some or all of the requirements of a consumer protection order, including monetary penalties, binding on other members of the interconnected corporate group of the infringer. This power will prevent complex corporate structures from frustrating the ability of enforcement interventions to protect consumers and law-abiding traders. The exercise of the power is subject to two important conditions: first, that the infringing company meets the definition of a member of an interconnected corporate group at the time the order is made or at any time when the order is in force, and secondly that the court may make an order binding on other members of the same corporate group only if it considers it just, reasonable and proportionate. That will require an objective assessment on the facts of each case.

Clause 170 will apply where the court is considering an application for a consumer protection order made in relation to a suspected breach of unfair trading prohibitions. It will empower the court to compel traders to substantiate any factual claim made as part of their commercial practices. The burden of proving the accuracy of claims is on the trader. The clause is crucial to stopping unscrupulous traders making wild promises or getting the enforcer bogged down in disproving claims that should be backed up by evidence.

Clause 171 makes an exception to exempt the Crown from the monetary penalties that the court may impose under chapter 3 when it is engaging as a trader in commercial transactions with consumers.

I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship today, Dame Maria. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks.

The Opposition recognise that clauses 165 to 167 are technical clauses. Clause 165 will provide the criteria to determine which courts within the UK have jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for consumer protection orders. It provides that where the respondent does not have a place of business in the UK, the appropriate court is where a relevant consumer is domiciled. This is a common-sense clause, and we support its inclusion in the Bill.

Clause 166 will have the effect of enabling a consumer protection order made in a court in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland to have effect in each of the constituent nations of the UK. This is a technical clause that the Opposition support.

Clause 167 will allow convictions in criminal courts and findings in civil courts to be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving that infringing conduct has occurred. The explanatory notes confirm that it will still be necessary to prove that the conduct harmed the collective interests of consumers.

We recognise that these technical clauses are important for the implementation and operation of the new consumer protection regime enacted by this part of the Bill. We therefore support their inclusion.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark made a point about case numbers and court resourcing. We expect demand on the courts to increase. The last thing that the Minister will want to see is the effective implementation of the regime, or confidence in it, being undermined because the courts cannot take on cases at speed when they might need to do so. I would welcome the Minister’s response on the issue of court capacity, support and resources.

Clause 168 will introduce provisions such that when a court makes a consumer protection order against a corporate body that is or becomes a member of a group of interconnected bodies corporate, the court has a discretionary power to direct that the order is binding upon one or more other members of the same corporate group. Subsection (6) defines two or more bodies corporate as interconnected bodies corporate

“if one of them is a subsidiary of the other, or…if both of them are subsidiaries of the same body corporate.”

Under the clause, a court would be able to make part or all of the order binding on other members of the group where the court considers it just, reasonable and proportionate to do so. The explanatory notes state that when considering whether to extend an order to another group member, the court might take into consideration whether the other member was the brains behind or benefited from the infringement, and whether the extension would help to ensure that financial penalties are paid.

Clause 168 will provide a more robust consumer enforcement regime, helping to prevent companies from restructuring to avoid liabilities and ensuring that significant deterrents are in place to prevent companies from infringing regulations of the new regime. We support the clause.

Clause 169, “Enhanced consumer measures: private designated enforcers”, sets out two conditions that must be met before enhanced consumer measures can be included in an undertaking either given to a private designated enforcer or given through the court via an application from a private enforcer.

The first condition

“is that the private designated enforcer is specified…in regulations made by the Secretary of State”

to act as a private enforcer. In our debates on clauses 143 and 144, I raised questions with the Minister’s colleague the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the process of becoming a private designated enforcer. However, I would welcome further clarification from the Minister of how he envisages the process of a private enforcer working in practice. I am not very clear on whether that is through an application or via the discretion of the Secretary of State; it would be helpful and important to clarify that point to ensure that clause 169 is effective in enabling private designated enforcers, so we can be sure we know who they may be in future, and to include enhanced consumer measures in an undertaking.

The second condition, rightly,

“is that the enhanced consumer measures do not directly benefit the private designated enforcer or an associated undertaking.”

Will the Minister clarify some matters in relation to subsections (7) and (8)? Private designated enforcers must have regard to any relevant advice or guidance given by a primary authority. Could he perhaps illustrate that with an example of a primary authority within the meaning of subsection (7)(a) and a situation in which that may occur, so we are clear about the intentions for how the clause will be used?

Clause 170, “Substantiation of claims”, will enable the court to require evidence from traders to substantiate the factual claims used in their commercial practices with consumers when an application for a consumer protection order has been made against those traders. Under subsection (3), it is for the court to decide whether any evidence provided is adequate. If the court decides that it is not, or if no evidence is produced, the court can determine that the claim is inaccurate. This provision will ensure that the burden of proof regarding the accuracy of claims rests with the trader. In effect, claims must be based on evidence that can be verified by the court.

The explanatory notes specifically mention environmental claims—sometimes referred to as greenwashing—and claims about the health benefits of goods as examples where substantiation of claims may be required. Greenwashing generally refers to claims made about the positive impact of a product or service on the environment that could be seen as misleading or untrue. This is a growing area of concern under competition law. We have not tabled amendments at this point, but it is an important area in this and other legislation.

The Government and the EU have announced proposals to introduce new legal instruments to address alleged greenwashing. Ultimately, legislation to regulate claims that businesses in Europe can make in their consumer communications would come into force, as is already the case in France. A European Commission study in 2020 highlighted that 53.3% of examined environmental claims in the EU were found to be vague, misleading or unfounded, and 40% were unsubstantiated. This policy issue has highlighted the absence of common rules for companies making voluntary green claims, which, in a sense, leads to greenwashing. The uneven playing field in the market is to the disadvantage of genuinely sustainable companies. It also has an impact on how effectively consumers can make their purchase decisions.

EU proposals for the green claims directive outline that before companies communicate any of the covered types of green claims to consumers, any such claims would need to be independently verified and proven with scientific evidence. As part of scientific analysis, companies would identify the environmental impacts that are actually relevant to their products, as well as any possible trade-offs, in order to give a full and accurate picture.

There have been calls to review how comparisons between products and organisations should be made, based on equivalent information and data. There have also been calls to look at regulating environmental labels, outlining the fact that there are over 230 different labels, which, according to evidence, leads to consumer confusion and distrust. The Competition and Markets Authority published the green claims code in September 2021. It has also been investigating the sustainability claims of major household brands, and how products and services claiming to be eco-friendly are marketed.

This is a newer area, and as we move towards achieving our net zero targets it is going to become increasingly important to how the marketplace is defined. It is important to know and be ahead of where consumers might be being misled. Some of the work in the run-up to COP26 and since has been welcome, but we cannot take our foot off the accelerator.

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[Neil Coyle]

I did not intend to speak, but I want to press the Minister on the approach that the Government are choosing to adopt in this group of clauses. What the Bill intends is welcome, as we have heard from witnesses and from elsewhere. Fundamentally, customers want quick redress, and businesses want justice and the removal of counterfeit or fake products that undermine their licences and appropriate trading. The Government’s approach—specifically in these clauses, heading for the courts—ignores the backlog that my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston has spoken about.

On Tuesday, we heard from the Minister for London that the Government did not have an agreement with Citizens Advice, or funding set aside for Citizens Advice, to support people to take a case through the courts. I was promised some further information that has not arrived yet; I do not know whether it is in the snail mail or the Minister’s crayons ran out or something, but I hope it is coming.

As has been raised this morning, there is no information yet from the Government about their expectations for how many cases will be taken to court, how that will have an impact on the backlog, or what the cost will be to Government or individuals. The reason people will end up at Citizens Advice is that they are seeking legal information; Citizens Advice needs to be resourced to support people and to take cases. In connection with this group of clauses, we are not hearing what the Government intend to do to support cases that need to be taken.

And, of course, it takes time. In the time that someone is going through the process—potentially for months and months—products that are dangerous to individuals might still be online. I am keen to hear from the Minister what will happen in the interim. What is to stop sellers and online marketplaces continuing to retail products that are dangerous to individuals or are counterfeit goods?

We will come to this next week, I think, but there is an alternative: the take-down power suggested by trading standards. With what is out there currently and what the Bill intends, we hear lots of analogies about the wild west, but it all feels a bit as if, instead of getting a Clint Eastwood figure to address the problems, we are getting a Deputy Dawg. Will the Minister say why the Government chose a costly court process—costly to Government and to individuals, as well as more time-consuming—rather than a specific measure that allows for a body already set out in a schedule to require the removal of information on products that are known to be faulty or counterfeit?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

On resourcing, the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston and for Bermondsey and Old Southwark were both right to mention the courts backlog. If my ministerial colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, committed to write to the hon. Gentleman, I am sure that he will do that. It has not come across my desk yet, but there will be no delay when it does, short of ensuring that it answers the hon. Gentleman’s questions.

One thing to say about that, of course, is that the fact that we are putting in place a direct enforcement regime may well ease the pressures on the courts, because the CMA can take action without recourse to them. That should help by ensuring that not all such cases need to go to court.

On private enforcement, and how it would work, it could happen on the basis of an enforcer’s application, or on the Secretary of State’s initiative after consultation with a proposed enforcer. I think that the only private designated enforcer currently is Which?. I hope that that answers the question of the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston.

On the hon. Lady’s points about a primary authority, a primary authority can be a local authority, it could provide information about the business to enforcing authorities and help direct their efforts to improve regulatory efficiencies.

On greenwashing, she is right that the CMA is conducting an investigation into ASOS, Boohoo and Asda. We have the green claims code to try to ensure that there are standards in this area. The Government policy in this area, of course, is that misleading information is already a breach of existing consumer laws. The CMA has issued guidance to help businesses to comply with existing obligations in that green claims code.

The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark asked about product safety. Rather than Deputy Dawg, I would use the analogy of Clint Eastwood in “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”. We are working very hard on this, in terms of product safety. The Office for Product Safety and Standards, which I work very closely with, comes under my remit. It has put a huge amount of time and effort into market surveillance and ensuring that products online are safe.

We have real concerns over whether that is the case, of course, and we recently met with Amazon to discuss that issue. We have also met with eBay, Wish and other platforms to point out their responsibilities. As far as we are concerned, as distributors they have responsibilities to proactively remove unsafe content. As the hon. Gentleman knows—I have said this to him before—we intend to look at that again through the product safety review, which we are about to announce, and that should clarify those responsibilities and ensure that unsafe products do not hit the marketplace in the first place.

I take the points on takedown powers very seriously, and I heard the same evidence from trading standards that the hon. Gentleman heard. We are keen to look at that matter and, again, it might involve another layer of enforcement so that we can then try to prevent those unsafe products from hitting marketplaces across the UK. Trading standards has the capacity to do that for individual websites, but I understand that there are wider concerns regarding other areas of online activity that we are keen to address.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments relating to the calls from trading standards to strengthen the legislation, which I also support. Could the Minister perhaps clarify a couple of points?

On greenwashing, my point was about how robust our regime will be in making sure that the green claims code, and how that is implemented, will be sufficient to ensure more compliance—either with the code or with any other ways in which we are going to be taking forward legislation on this—so that we do not have to do a lot more by way of enforcement. That would clearly not be the best outcome in the long term for consumers. Having the information up front and ensuring that labelling and other matters are much more robust is better than having challenges later on, with the associated costs of taking things through the courts. My question was more about how this all sits together, and whether the Government have an overall strategy, which I think is quite important.

Finally, on the product safety review, it has been “about to be published shortly” for quite a long time. Is it coming shortly?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Yes, it is coming shortly.

Turning to greenwashing, we take the matter very seriously, and there are two ways to deal with it. We can do ex ante regulation, which involves building a huge bureaucracy around a certain system and people checking everything, or we can put in an ex post regulation deterrent regime, which involves a code or set of standards that companies should adhere to, and then an enforcement regime that takes breaches of the code very seriously and applies penalties to organisations that do not meet the standards. The latter is a more efficient and effective way to regulate, and that is the approach we are taking. That should prove a deterrent and prevent people from doing the wrong thing in the first place.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 165 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 166 to 171 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 172

Power of CMA to investigate suspected infringements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss that clauses 173 to 176 stand part.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Clauses 172 to 176 set out a range of new enforcement powers for the CMA to determine whether certain consumer laws have been breached and, if so, to direct compliance and impose remedies and penalties. These powers correspond to powers available to the civil courts under chapter 3 of this part of the Bill to make consumer protection orders, but are available in relation to certain consumer protection laws only.

Clause 172 gives power to the CMA to conduct an investigation into suspected infringements under its direct enforcement regime. This acts as a trigger for the use of the CMA’s direct enforcement powers under chapter 4 of part 3. To use its direct enforcement powers, the CMA must have reasonable grounds for suspecting an infringing practice has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur.

Clause 173 allows the CMA to issue provisional infringement notices to enforcement subjects. It provides that enforcement subjects have a right to know the claims against them and be given an opportunity to make representations in a meaningful manner before a final decision is taken by the CMA. That ensures that the direct enforcement process is fair, with appropriate safeguards to protect the legitimate rights of the enforcement subject.

Clause 174 is fundamental to the direct enforcement regime and gives the CMA a discretionary power to issue a final infringement notice. To do so, the CMA must be satisfied that the infringing conduct has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur. As well as giving directions to prevent or stop infringing practices or require enhanced consumer measures, a final infringement order may impose monetary penalties. That may be up to £300,000 or, if it is higher, 10% of the subject’s total turnover, in relation to past or ongoing infringing conduct.

Clause 175 empowers the CMA to include enhanced consumer measures as part of a final infringement notice if it considers them to be just, reasonable and proportionate.

Clause 176 empowers the CMA to issue an online interface notice to avoid the risk of serious harm to the collective interest of consumers. To exercise that power, the CMA needs to be satisfied that no other tools under the direct enforcement regime, nor the court’s power to make interim online interface orders, would be wholly effective.

An online interface notice may be given to the infringer or to any relevant third party. For example, an online interface notice may require a third party to remove, modify or restrict access to content that can be found on an online interface, such as a website. An online interface notice may be given to an overseas third party if the third party satisfies the UK connection test at subsection (3)(c). This clause therefore takes into account the global nature of online commerce, but does not give the CMA unfettered extraterritorial jurisdiction. I hope hon. Members will agree that it is appropriate that this provision has cross-border reach to websites, platforms and applications that direct their business activities to consumers in the United Kingdom.

[Seema Malhotra]

Clause 172 introduces provisions empowering the CMA to begin an investigation where it has reasonable grounds for expecting that a person has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in a commercial practice that would be considered a relevant infringement. That power acts as a trigger for the use of the CMA’s direct enforcement powers. Under subsection (3), the CMA would be able to publish a notice of investigations setting out what and whom it is investigating and indicating the investigation timetable. If, after giving such a notice, the CMA decides to close the investigation, it would be required to publish a notice of termination.

The clause is welcome. It is a vital part of the new consumer protection regime, and we need to ensure is properly enforced. While I am glad the provisions are being introduced, I note again that it will be a long time before they are in operation. It is not until 2025 that some of the provisions come into force.

It does not appear that publishing of the notice of investigation would be mandatory in all cases. Are there any times or examples of when a notice should not be published? If so, could the Minister share those with the Committee?

Under clause 173, the CMA would be empowered to give an enforcement subject a provisional infringement notice where the CMA has started an investigation under clause 172, which continues. The provisional infringement notice would need to contain certain information, including the grounds on which it is given and the enforcement subject’s acts or omissions that give rise to the CMA belief that there has been an infringement. It must also include the CMA’s proposed directions specifying the conduct required to ensure compliance. If the proposed directions include enhanced consumer measures considered by the CMA to be just, reasonable and proportionate, the notice will also need to state that and include details of those measures.

The notice must also include the process for the enforcement subject to make representations to the CMA about the notice, including the means by which and the time by which representations must be made by the enforcement subject. That must also include a hearing if the enforcement subject decides to make an oral representation and, if the CMA is considering monetary penalties, the detail of that penalty.

This is an important clause in enabling co-operation through the enforcement regime, but I would welcome clarification in a few areas. Subsection (3) sets out how the CMA may give the respondent a notice. Are there any scenarios in which the CMA will not need to give the respondent an infringement notice? If not, is this intended to be a power rather than a duty?

Subsection (4) states that the infringement notice must specify the time by which representations must be made. Does the Minister have in mind an expected time range for those representations to be made? I am sure that there is an intention that this all happens as quickly as possible, but there is no specification or guidance as to what some of the timelines might be. It would be helpful to understand the Minister’s intentions on that further.

Clause 174 grants the CMA a discretionary power to issue a final infringement notice to the enforcement subject. In deciding whether to issue a final infringement notice, the CMA will be required, under the clause, to consider whether an undertaking has been given and, if so, whether the enforcement subject has complied with its terms. A final infringement notice may impose on the enforcement subject a requirement to comply with such directions as the CMA considers appropriate to rectify an infringement and achieve compliance, and/or a requirement to pay a monetary penalty. Subsection (6) sets out that the monetary penalty must be a fixed amount not exceeding £300,000—I think that was described in earlier discussions as the middle of the pack—or, if higher, 10% of the total value of the enforcement subject’s turnover.

Under subsection (8), a final infringement notice could require the enforcement subject to publish the notice and a corrective statement. I ask the Minister—again, in the interests of transparency—why this subsection says “may require” rather than “will require”. I ask in the interests of consistency and transparency for consumers, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s response.

Clause 175 empowers the CMA to include in a final infringement notice enhanced consumer measures that it considers to be just, reasonable and proportionate. This clause is welcomed by the Opposition as an important part of the consumer protection regime.

Under clause 176, the CMA will be able to issue an online interface notice to any person whom the CMA believes has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in a relevant infringement. This includes third parties with a connection to the UK—for example, UK nationals and residents, UK-established businesses, and businesses carrying on business in the UK or targeting UK consumers. The purpose of this notice would be to prevent serious harm to consumers where there has been or is likely to be an infringing practice. In effect, the notice would force the infringer or any third party to take down content that is harmful to consumers. Subsection (4) sets out what the directions could include: removing content from, or modifying content on, an online interface; disabling or restricting access to an online interface; displaying a warning to consumers accessing an online interface; and deleting a fully qualified domain name.

Use of those powers has been described as a last resort. Will the Minister clarify whether this would therefore be after a period of notices and whether there is a timeline in which it might be undertaken? If a business was not responsive, would the Minister expect relatively quick use of the powers in order to protect consumers and to deter any further consumer detriment? Also, is it the Minister’s intention that the powers are just for the CMA? Considering some of the discussion that we have been having in relation to trading standards, I wonder whether use of the powers may be open in the future to other enforcers.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

In terms of publication of a notice, I think that that is a judgment for the CMA. There may be public interest in making a notice public—for example, to inform traders or consumers about practices of concern. Why would it not publish a notice? Well, it might be, for example, that that might prejudice the CMA’s investigation, which is clearly not something that we would want to happen.

The hon. Lady asked about the timescale for response. That will be something that the CMA consults on, in terms of how the process will happen, and stakeholders will be able to input into that consultation. However, we expect clear timelines to be set for responses.

Why would the CMA not give an infringement notice? Well, it might be that it decides, for example, that another enforcer might be better placed to take forward enforcement in that area. Circumstances will vary widely from case to case, and the CMA will be the best judge of whether publication is desirable in any given situation.

What about other consumer enforcers? We believe that the CMA has a leading and co-ordinating role in both the public enforcement of consumer law and in tackling market-wide practices that hinder consumer choice. The new direct enforcement model will enable the CMA to act faster and take on more cases on behalf of the public, resulting in an estimated further tens of millions—or potentially hundreds of millions—of pounds of direct benefit to consumers. Improving the speed and responsiveness of the CMA’s interventions has the greatest potential to safeguard the wider interests of consumers right across the economy.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 172 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 173 to 176 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 177

Undertakings

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 177, page 118, line 12, at end insert—

“(2A) Subsections (1) to (6) of section 156 (inclusion of enhanced consumer measures in undertakings) apply to an undertaking under this section as they apply to an undertaking under section 155(2).”

This amendment ensures that requirements imposed by undertakings given under clause 177 may include the taking of enhanced consumer measures (as defined by clause 213).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 177 to 180 stand part.

Government amendment 61.

Clauses 181 and 182 stand part.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Government amendments 60 and 61, and clauses 177 to 182, govern the acceptance and enforcement of undertakings by the CMA under its direct enforcement regime. Clause 177 provides a framework for the CMA to accept an undertaking as an alternative to giving a final infringement notice or online interface notice. The CMA may not accept undertakings unless they include provisions that effectively stop the conduct of concern. The more co-operative nature of the undertakings procedure can lead to faster resolution of consumer protection concerns and shorten the enforcement process.

Government amendment 60 adds a provision to clause 177 empowering the CMA to include enhanced consumer measures—or ECMs—in undertakings that it accepts under its direct enforcement powers. The power to add ECMs to undertakings is available to the CMA, and other enforcers in the court-based regime, under clauses 155(3) and 156 of the Bill. The inclusion of ECMs in undertakings has been a valuable part of the toolkit available under the court-based regime. The amendment makes it expressly clear that the power already available in the court-based regime is also available to the CMA under its direct enforcement powers under chapter 4 of part 3.

Clause 178 prevents the CMA, once it accepts an undertaking under clause 177, from giving a final infringement notice or an online interface notice to the same enforcement subject in relation to the same matter. The CMA can still give those notices if they relate to matters or persons not addressed in the undertaking, if circumstances have materially changed since the undertaking was accepted, or if the CMA suspects the undertaking has been breached or was based on false or misleading information.

Clause 179 sets out the process that the CMA must follow to make a material variation or to release a person from an undertaking once it has been accepted. The clause is important for procedural fairness, and ensures that the CMA cannot significantly modify or release persons from undertakings without giving notice to the other party and considering their views. Clause 180 allows the CMA to start a process to enforce compliance if it has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has breached at least one term of an undertaking. As with the majority of the CMA’s direct enforcement powers under this part, any assertion or sanctions for wrongdoing must be preceded by a provisional notice. That includes, for example, proposed directions and proposed penalties, and an invitation to make representations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

Within clause 181 there is the option for someone who is potentially identified as selling rogue or dangerous products to use a reasonable excuse. Can the Minister better define what a reasonable excuse might be? Companies and individuals could choose to prolong the timeframe involved in order to sell more goods that are hooky while the process is followed.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

As I said earlier, there are measures to ensure that any representations are given earnestly. A reasonable excuse might be that the trader was not aware of some of the difficulties surrounding the product. There may be various circumstances. When implementing and enforcing legislation, we always try to ensure that the CMA can apply discretion in different circumstances where an honest mistake has occurred.

[Neil Coyle]

To be clear, I am not looking for a list of what companies or individuals might use as an excuse for selling dangerous goods; I wondered whether the Minister would set out the timeframe, as the clause, and associated clauses, are not clear about how long companies and individuals get to provide information or remove dangerous products. What is there to prevent someone from saying, for example, “We have this product on our online marketplace, but it is manufactured in another country. We have been trying to contact the manufacturer, and it has taken some time to identify the specific individual.”? In that time, of course, the individual could have sold more counterfeit and dangerous goods, or have changed their email and other addresses in order to avoid the removal of their products online.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

We are now getting into the weeds of this. We have similar views about online marketplaces and their responsibilities. In our view, their responsibility as a distributor requires them to ensure that products are safe before they are placed on the marketplace in the first place. There should be no excuse for a distributor not checking the validity of a standards marking, for example. That is a responsibility that I have discussed with various platforms. We want to get to the position where products are verified before they enter the marketplace, through checks and balances. Rather than working reactively, platforms should work proactively in such instances, but part of that crosses over into work that we are doing in the product safety review, which we have discussed previously and will, I am sure, discuss again.

If the CMA is satisfied that a breach occurred without a reasonable excuse it can impose a penalty. That ensures that there are meaningful consequences to breaching an undertaking, to deter unscrupulous traders. Clause 182 states the types of penalties and the maximum penalty amounts that can be imposed by the CMA through a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice. The penalty imposed can be the higher of a fixed amount up to £150,000 or 5% of total turnover. A daily rate penalty can be up to £15,000 or 5% of the total value of the daily turnover, whichever is higher, accruing over the days in which non-compliance continues. Both a fixed amount and a daily rate penalty may be imposed, but they must not exceed the fixed amounts that I have just referenced. I hope that hon. Members will support Government amendment 60, and clauses 177 to 182 standing part of the Bill.

[Seema Malhotra]

The Opposition support the inclusion of clause 177. We welcome any measures that enable co-operation between enforcement bodies and subjects. I will, however, ask the Minister about timescales. The legislation as it stands contains little in the way of specifying timescales. The Minister might tell me again that this might be relevant for the consultation that the CMA undertakes on the process, but I think this will end up being relevant also for the resources that are in place, the expectations of how quickly all the procedures will be able to operate, and certainly how long it could take during the course of an initial infringement notice and a final infringement notice to reach an undertaking.

Although the inclusion of these provisions is necessary to make the regime a co-operative one, it is important that their inclusion in the Bill does not lead to unnecessary delay by enforcement subjects who might have no genuine intention to reach a commitment with the CMA. I would welcome the Minister explaining how he believes that will operate effectively.

Government amendment 60 ensures that the requirements imposed by undertakings given under clause 177 may include the taking of enhanced consumer measures, as defined by clause 213. We welcome this amendment, which should bring further consistency in the enforcement regime.

Clause 178 is consequential on clause 177. It prevents the CMA, once it has accepted an undertaking under clause 177, from giving a final infringement notice or an online interface notice to the same enforcement subject in relation to the same matter. The explanatory notes explain that the underlying policy intent is that undertakings are an alternative to final infringement or online interface notices and therefore the effect is that a person cannot be subjected to multiple enforcement resolutions of the same matter. Subsection (3) provides the necessary flexibility for the CMA. The CMA can still give a final infringement notice or an online interface notice to the extent that it deals with different matters from the undertaking. We welcome the clause.

Clause 179 sets out the process to be followed when the CMA needs to change or end an undertaking. Where the CMA proposes to accept a material variation of an undertaking or to discharge an undertaking, under this clause the CMA would be required to first give notice to the enforcement subject. If, after considering any representations made in accordance with the notice the CMA decides to take the proposed action, it would have to give further notice to the enforcement subject of that decision. We think this is an important clause.

Under clause 180, the CMA would be able to give a provisional breach of the undertakings enforcement notice where it has reasonable grounds to believe that the enforcement subject has failed to comply with one or more of the terms of the undertaking. It also sets out what the provisional breach of an enforcement notice must include. We welcome this clause as an important provision. It is important for the CMA to be clear on its intentions, for the enforcement subject to have no means of saying it was a misunderstanding, and for transparency for consumers.

Clause 181 introduces provisions enabling the CMA to issue a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice in circumstances where the deadline for the enforcement subject to make representations to the CMA in accordance with the first notice has expired, and if, after considering representations, the CMA is satisfied that the enforcement subject has committed an infringement. The clause also lists what must be included in the enforcement notice.

Subsection (4) lays out the threshold for a monetary penalty. It states that the penalty

“may be imposed only if the CMA is satisfied that the failure in question is without reasonable excuse.”

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, I want the Minister to expand on the word “reasonable”. Will further definition be required? Does he think there will be some case law or further guidance? This is an important matter, because it can lead to questions about whether the CMA’s interpretation of “reasonable” is reasonable. We do not want to go down that route; we want a clear regime that provides less wriggle room for enforcement subjects that have no intention of complying and will use any excuse not to do so. I hope the Minister will look at that further and will give the House confidence that the apparent vagueness of the term will not enable companies that are in breach of their undertaking to escape the monetary penalties that, under the regime, they ought to pay.

Government amendment 61 requires that the information contained in a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice includes information about rights of appeal. We welcome it as a common-sense addition to what must be included in the final breach notice.

Clause 182 sets out the maximum monetary penalty that can be imposed for a breach of undertakings notice under clause 181. It amounts to a fixed amount of £150,000 or, if higher, 5% of the total value of the enforcement subject’s turnover. In the case of a daily rate, it is £15,000 or, if higher, 5% of the total value of the daily turnover of the enforcement subject. We have debated that previously. I assume that that amount relates to this being an enforcement penalty. Will the CMA continue to be the only body that has such fining powers? Will other enforcers, such as trading standards, be able to pursue penalties only through other routes? I would appreciate clarification from the Minister on that.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

The Opposition make a reasonable point about the reasonable excuse. We have left the threshold pretty broad to reflect the range of situations that could prevent compliance. We feel that a closed list on the face of the Bill would bind the CMA’s hands and make the measure less effective. As hon. Members know, the Bill requires the CMA, in the guidance on exercising its direct enforcement functions that it produces under clause 205, to provide information about the factors it takes into account in determining whether a reasonable excuse exists, and that will include examples.

The hon. Lady asked how soon after a provisional notice the CMA will issue a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice. She pre-empted my response to that: it will, again, be subject to consultation. Of course, it is at the discretion of the CMA. The CMA will set out its approach to determining the period within which representations have to be made in forthcoming guidance, preceded by the public consultation.

[Seema Malhotra]

I will take what the Minister said on reasonableness, and we will have a look at it. We may return to this matter, in order to ensure that there is not a gap between what an enforcement subject could argue and what the CMA intends, but I thank him for his response.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

It is perfectly reasonable that we have that debate, but we will do so we when we discuss clause 205. It is right that the Opposition challenge us and the CMA to ensure that the guidance is clear, and covers all bases.

Amendment 60 agreed to.

Clause 177, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 178 to 180 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 181

Final breach of undertakings enforcement notice

Amendment made: 61, in clause 181, page 121, line 28, at end insert—

“(e) state that the respondent has a right to appeal against the notice and the main details of that right (so far as not stated in accordance with paragraph (d)).”—(Kevin Hollinrake.)

This amendment requires that the information contained in a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice includes information about rights of appeal.

Clause 181, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 182 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 183

Provisional breach of directions enforcement notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss that clauses 184 to 188 stand part.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Clauses 183 to 188 principally deal with the enforcement of directions imposed by the CMA in its final infringement notices, online interface notices, and final breach of undertakings enforcement notices. Clause 183 empowers the CMA to enforce compliance with enforcement directions by giving a provisional breach of directions enforcement notice. That allows the enforcement subject to know the case against them and to make representations.

Clause 184 allows the CMA to give a final breach of directions enforcement notice, if it is satisfied that a direction has been fully or partially breached without a reasonable excuse. The notice must follow a provisional breach of directions enforcement notice and can be given only after the period to make representations has expired and the CMA has considered any representations received. Given the seriousness of the situation and the late stage in the process of enforcing compliance with consumer protection law, the Bill sets out that the CMA will impose a monetary penalty each time it gives a final notice under the clause.

Clause 185 provides for the types of penalties and the maximum penalty amounts that can be imposed by the CMA through a final breach of directions enforcement notice. The total penalty amount can be a fixed amount up to £150,000 or 5% of total turnover, whichever is higher. It can also be a daily rate penalty up to £15,000 or 5% of the total value of the daily turnover, whichever is higher, and accruing over the days while non-compliance continues. It can also be a combination of both, but that must not exceed the maximum penalty amounts in both separate cases.

Clause 186 gives the CMA an alternative means of enforcing compliance with directions given in final infringement notices, online interface notices and final breach of undertakings enforcement notices by enabling applications to court for an order to require compliance. It also provides a backstop power for the CMA to apply for a court order where it considers a person has failed to comply with a direction given in a final breach of directions enforcement notice.

Clause 187 gives the CMA the power to require evidence from the enforcement subject to substantiate factual claims made as part of its commercial practices under investigation. This applies where the CMA gives a provisional notice concerning a suspected breach of the unfair trading prohibitions in chapter 1 of part 4 of the Bill. By placing the burden of proving the accuracy of claims on the trader, the clause is crucial in stopping unscrupulous traders from spreading wild promises or getting the CMA bogged down in disproving claims that should be backed up by evidence.

Clause 188 sets out the process that the CMA must follow for proposing to materially vary or revoke any directions. The clause gives flexibility to the CMA to direct compliance while requiring it to provide a sufficient notice period and clear information to guarantee fairness to the person involved.

[Seema Malhotra]

Clause 183, in conjunction with clause 184, sets out the CMA’s powers to enforce compliance with enforcement directions. It introduces provisions enabling the CMA to issue a provisional breach of directions enforcement notice where it has reasonable grounds to believe that the enforcement subject has without reasonable excuse failed to comply with the direction. We support the clause.

Under clause 184, the CMA would be able issue a final breach of directions enforcement notice requiring the payment of a monetary penalty upon completion of the process laid out in the clause. We support this clause. Clause 185 is consequential on clause 184 and sets out the maximum monetary penalty that the CMA may impose for a breach under clause 184. Again, we support the clause.

Clause 186 provides the CMA with the power to apply to an appropriate court when a person or company has failed to comply with a direction given under clause 184. Under the clause, the CMA would be able to apply to the court for an enforcement order, an interim enforcement order, an online interface order or an interim online interface order. That would enable the court to act in respect of any practice or conduct that would amount to a “relevant infringement” by making a consumer protection order in addition to or instead of making an order in respect of the breach of directions. We welcome this clause, as it provides a necessary backstop for the CMA to enforce its judgments and penalties.

Clause 187 would enable the CMA to require evidence from traders substantiating the factual claims used in their commercial practices with consumers, which are at issue in a provisional notice involving alleged contravention of the new consumer protection regime. Where the CMA has issued a provisional notice to an enforcement subject and the enforcement subject makes representations to the CMA in response to that notice, the CMA may require the enforcement subject to provide evidence as to the accuracy of any claim made. For the reasons that we debated earlier, we welcome this clause and this power as they will enable the CMA to carry out its functions more effectively on behalf of consumers.

Clause 188 introduces provisions enabling the CMA to make a material variation of, or to revoke, directions that it has given under other clauses as specified. We support the inclusion of clause 188 in the Bill. I hope that what the clause provides for will be able to be done at speed and that we do not see any delays in the use of these powers where needed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 183 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 184 to 188 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 189

Provisional false information enforcement notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 190 stand part.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I notice that England just bowled Australia out, which is very good news.

[The Chair]

Let us stick to the important information.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Of course—sorry, Dame Maria.

Clauses 189 and 190 empower the CMA to give a provisional false information enforcement notice, followed by a final notice imposing a monetary penalty of up to £30,000 or, if higher, 1% of total turnover. They allow the CMA to enforce against, and penalise, the provision of materially false or misleading information to the CMA without reasonable excuse.

[Seema Malhotra]

Clause 189 introduces provisions granting the CMA a discretionary power to issue a provisional false information enforcement notice if it has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has provided to the CMA materially false or misleading information. It also lists what would be included in this enforcement notice. It would obviously be a really serious matter if false or misleading information was provided to the CMA. We therefore support this clause.

Clause 190 enables the CMA to issue a final false information enforcement notice. This clause is consequent on clause 189 and we therefore welcome its inclusion in the Bill. Clause 190(4) sets out the maximum monetary penalty for a false information infringement. It is important that there is a sufficient deterrent and also the ability for significant enforcement where it is found that false information has been provided to the CMA and that has been proven.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 189 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 190 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 191

Statement of policy in relation to monetary penalties

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 192 to 199 stand part.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Clauses 191 to 194 cover appeal rights and other requirements for the CMA that will ensure that it exercises its direct enforcement powers proportionately and transparently. I will also discuss clauses 195 to 199, which make supplementary provision for the monetary penalties imposable by the CMA and the civil courts under part 3 of the Bill.

Clause 191 requires the CMA to produce and publish a statement of policy relating to its exercise of powers to impose monetary penalties. The statement of policy must cover the considerations relevant to whether to impose a penalty and the nature and amount of the penalty. When preparing or revising that statement, the CMA must consult the Secretary of State and other relevant stakeholders. The statement, or its revised form, cannot be published without the Secretary of State’s approval. Finally, the CMA will be required to have regard to the most recent published statement approved by the Secretary of State when deciding whether to impose penalties under this chapter, as well as deciding the penalty’s nature and amount.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I fear that I may have missed one or two of the hon. Lady’s points, but I think I got most of them. Guidance under clause 191 will be publicly consulted on, giving those potentially affected by it an opportunity to comment directly. That consultation will happen post Royal Assent, and when finalised it will be published on the CMA’s website. On the Secretary of State requesting reports, clearly we do not know what we do not know. The Secretary of State has flexibility on when they might consider that a report is required under clause 193. The CMA already publishes regular impact assessments and other public reports, including its annual report to Parliament, and scrutiny will continue by traditional means, such as through Select Committees.

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister will know that so much has gone to the Business and Trade Committee that there will be great concern about how frequently, and in what level of detail, it will be able to scrutinise all the work done under the regime. It will be a pretty tall order to do that job. I have a question for the Minister that I think is important. We have heard in previous debates about the frequency of reporting and what would be in the CMA’s report for all the new regimes and units that it will undertake. We obviously do not want to overload the CMA with unnecessary reporting, but there should be an expectation about what might be in the annual report, and there should be clarity on what the Secretary of State might expect in a report on the new regime.

Surely Ministers will want to have confidence in what is happening under the regime, and to have some data reported to them if the CMA is collecting it. Will the Secretary of State expect a, perhaps annual, report on the new regime, perhaps for a few years, to know whether it is operating effectively? Secondly, will clause 193(2) give the Secretary of State the ability to request additional or more detailed reports if there are concerns about aspects of the regime’s implementation? I understand the power to ask for more reports, but not having any report requested through the course of the implementation of the operations strikes me as a serious gap, particularly—

[The Chair]

Order. Shall we get the Minister to reply?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I thought that perhaps I had to intervene on the hon. Lady.

[Seema Malhotra]

Particularly in relation to the early implementation of the regime—I was on my last sentence.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

That was a very comprehensive intervention. I think that we are saying the same thing. Of course the CMA will continue to report annually, and of course we would expect it to report on the new powers that it has been granted through the Bill. In addition to that, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to request additional reports as he or she sees fit. We think that that achieves an appropriate balance. We do not think that it is right to get in the way of the CMA doing its job by obliging it to report on a more frequent basis. Of course, as part of my role, or my successor’s role if I move from this position back to the Back Benches or wherever, we regularly have meetings with the CMA to discuss its activities and where it is using its powers. Indeed, we write an annual letter to the CMA, which sets out where we expect its focus to lie.

The hon. Lady asked a fair question about the appeals timelines. They will not be consulted on, but they will be subject to the civil procedure rules, and relevant rules in other UK jurisdictions. The civil procedure rules will be amended as part of the implementation of the provisions through the Civil Procedure Rule Committee in the usual way. Of course, we will want appeals to take place as expeditiously as possible, provided that they are fair.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 191 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 192 to 199 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 200

Investigatory powers of enforcers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss that schedule 15 be the Fifteenth schedule to the Bill.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Clause 200 introduces schedule 15 to the Bill, which contains amendments to schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015, relating to the investigatory powers of consumer protection enforcers. Schedule 15 amends provisions in schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act to ensure the enforceability of statutory information notices given to a person under paragraph 14 of schedule 5.

The amendments made through schedule 15 come in two parts. First, we are providing the courts with a new power to impose a civil monetary penalty where the court finds there has been non-compliance, without reasonable excuse, with an information notice given by any consumer enforcer. Secondly, we are providing a new direct enforcement power for the CMA to decide whether an enforcement notice it has issued has been complied with and, if not, to impose a civil monetary penalty for any non-compliance without reasonable excuse.

The schedule also sets out the extraterritorial reach of enforcers’ power to request information by notice. We are legislating to ensure that enforcers can obtain all the necessary information from parties in and outside the UK to inform their analysis and ascertain breaches of the law, subject to certain conditions. The schedule also ensures that a warrant may be granted in relation to material that may be remotely stored in the cloud but still be accessible from the premises. I hope hon. Members agree that the schedule completes the largely successful modernisation of the investigatory powers of consumer law enforcers made by the Consumer Rights Act in 2015.

[Seema Malhotra]

Clause 200 introduces schedule 15 to the Bill, which amends schedule 5 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which in turn details the information-gathering powers available to consumer enforcers for the purposes of civil enforcement of consumer protection law. We support the clause, but I will make a few more remarks on schedule 15.

Schedule 15 makes limited amendments to schedule 5 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 so that an enforcement notice would have to specify the circumstances in which non-compliance with the enforcement notice could result in a financial penalty. The amendments would apply where an enforcer has given an information notice to a person and the enforcer considers that the respondent has, without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with the notice. In such circumstances, the enforcer would be able to make an application to the court.

The Opposition welcome the schedule, but there are questions related to those we have asked in relation to other clauses, specifically around the absence in the Bill of the updating of trading standards authorities’ powers for the digital economy and the 21st century. That is important. We have raised before the ability for trading standards to obtain information online and so on. Can the Minister have a look at that in more detail? In the course of further clauses next week, we may come on to some other amendments as well, but I would be grateful for the Minister’s response.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

It is our contention that trading standards do have the powers that they need to access information. There are concerns; I have concerns—I want to ensure that trading standards have sufficient powers in terms of take-down powers. That is something that we are looking at and, as the hon. Lady says, is probably something that we will discuss as the Bill proceeds.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 200 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 15 agreed to.

Clause 201 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 202

Notices under this Part

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 203 to 207 stand part.

Government amendments 62 to 64.

That schedule 16 be the Sixteenth schedule to the Bill.

Clause 208 stand part.

Government amendment 65.

That schedule 17 be the Seventeenth schedule to the Bill.

Clauses 209 to 215 stand part.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Clause 202 provides for the practicalities of giving notices. It sets out the permissible means for the CMA and other enforcers to give a notice: by delivering it to the person; by leaving it at the person’s address; by post; or by email.

Clause 203 empowers the CMA to make rules about procedural and other matters in connection with its direct enforcement functions. This clause expressly permits the CMA to delegate decision making for its direct enforcement functions to its board, panel and/or staff. The clause provides the CMA with a vital tool with which it can establish the technical details of a robust and predictable direct enforcement process that will achieve the stronger enforcement that we need without compromising fair process or certainty for traders.

Clause 204 requires that the CMA’s rules must be publicly consulted on, and given the approval of the Secretary of State through regulations, before coming into force. Public consultation will ensure that the views of all stakeholders, including consumer groups and traders, are adequately considered as rules are prepared. The Secretary of State also has the ongoing power to vary or revoke rules, which will ensure that the wider needs of the economy continue to be reflected in the operation of the direct enforcement regime. This clause ensures that the CMA’s discretion to make technical rules governing its direct enforcement functions is exercised in a balanced way that serves the needs of the economy.

Clause 205 requires the CMA to prepare and publish guidance about its general approach to the carrying out of its direct enforcement functions, and to keep under review the guidance, which it may update from time to time. The CMA is required to publicly consult, and obtain the Secretary of State’s approval, before issuing its first guidance.

Clause 206 provides that, for the purposes of the law of defamation, absolute privilege applies to anything done by the CMA in the exercise of its direct enforcement functions. There are strong precedents for that approach: judicial or tribunal proceedings are protected from defamation. There is also protection from defamation for the CMA’s direct enforcement regime for competition law and its merger and market investigation powers. Those suspected of infringing are not unfairly prejudiced by this clause, which merely reflects the long-standing principle that the exercise of regulatory and judicial functions should not give rise to defamation claims.

Clause 207 formally introduces schedule 16 and its contents within the body of the Bill. Schedule 16 makes numerous minor and consequential amendments to other legislation. This schedule is important to provide for the smooth functioning of the enforcement regimes and to ensure legislative consistency.

Government amendments 62 and 63 add a reference to chapters 3 and 4 of part 3 of the Bill to schedule 14 to the Enterprise Act 2002. These amendments will ensure legislative consistency.

Government amendment 64 is a consequential amendment. It includes part 4 of the Bill in the list of enactments in respect of which investigatory powers under schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 are conferred.

Clause 208 introduces schedule 17, which makes transitional and saving provision in relation to the court-based and CMA direct enforcement regimes. Schedule 17 provides for the general rule that the new law will apply to conduct that takes place on or after the commencement date of chapters 3 and 4 of part 3 of the Bill. Conversely, as a general rule, the “old law”—that is, part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and related provisions—will continue to apply to conduct that takes place before the commencement date of chapters 3 and 4 in part 3 of the Bill.

Schedule 17 also makes specific rules for continuing conduct that is essentially an act or omission that starts before the new law has commenced but is repeated or continues after the new law’s commencement. In such a scenario, as well as applying to the post-commencement conduct, the new law will apply to the pre-commencement conduct for the purpose of enabling enforcement action under part 3 of the Bill.

However, no requirements or penalties can be imposed on a person for the pre-commencement parts of the continuing conduct, unless such a requirement is already imposable under part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002. Similarly, the court and the CMA will not be able to use their new powers to impose penalties for breaches of any undertakings given under part 8 of the 2002 Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Clause 202 sets out the process for giving notices under part 3 to persons within and outside of the UK, including business entities registered or operating outside the UK. It defines acceptable means of service and the meaning of a recipient’s proper address. We welcome the clause.

Clause 203 allows the CMA to make rules, subject to approval by the Secretary of State through secondary legislation, to set out the procedural administrative details of the CMA’s enforcement regime. The rules supplement the framework provided in chapter 4 of part 3. We welcome the clause and the clarification, and also the important points made in the explanatory notes, including the point that the rules will cover “arrangements for complaints’ handling”. The clause is a common-sense provision.

Clause 204 sets out the process for the exercise of the rule-making power under clause 203. We welcome the fact that the CMA will be required to consult with stakeholders during the preparation of the rules, and we discussed that in relation to earlier clauses. The CMA will also be required to obtain the Secretary of State’s approval before bringing any rule into operation or varying a rule. We welcome that measure too.

Under 204(5), the Secretary of State will be empowered to vary or revoke rules or to direct the CMA to vary or revoke rules, and regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative parliamentary procedure. Although we welcome the clause, will the Minister clarify why that has been left to the negative procedure? The inclusion of affirmative and negative procedures in the Bill seems to be slightly random, so I would be grateful for that clarification.

Under clause 205, the CMA will be required to prepare and publish guidance about its general approach to carrying out its direct enforcement functions. The guidance will provide more detailed information to traders and other stakeholders about how the direct enforcement regime would work in practice. The Opposition welcome the clause because it introduces more transparency and clarity into the regime, but will the Minister tell the Committee what timeframe is considered appropriate for the publication of the guidance? He said that he saw publication happening after Royal Assent, but does he expect it to happen within a certain period of time? I am sure that he wants the legislation to be implemented as soon as possible, as do I.

Clause 206 would protect the CMA against actions for defamation as a result of the exercise of functions under part 3. We welcome the clause. It is important that the CMA is protected in carrying out its job as the co-ordinating enforcement authority.

Clause 207 introduces schedule 16, which contains minor and consequential amendment in relation to part 3. We support schedule 16 and do not consider the consequential amendments contentious. We also support Government amendments 62 and 63.

Clause 208 introduces schedule 17, which provides transitional and saving provisions in connection with part 3. Those provisions concern the operation of the new law introduced by chapter 3 and CMA direct enforcement powers under chapter 4 of part 3. They also relate to the operation of the old law, which constitutes part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002. It lays out how the new law would apply to conduct that takes place on or after the commencement date of the Bill, and to conduct of concern that a person is likely to engage in, where such conduct is likely to take place on or after the commencement date. The old law would continue to apply to conduct that takes place before the commencement date, as well as to various other forms of conduct. We welcome this technical schedule and clarification, and we support amendment 65.

Clause 209 introduces definitions for references to supply of goods or digital content as used across part 3 and we support the clause. Clause 210 defines how references to the supply of services should be construed across part 3 and we support the clause. Clause 211 defines what is meant by an accessory to the commercial practice of a body corporate. Will the Minister clarify whether he is confident the clause adequately captures anyone who may act as an accessory and how the definition was brought together? Was it through consultation? That will provide full clarity on what constitutes an accessory.

Clause 212 defines what constitutes having a special relationship with a body corporate, covering two scenarios outlined by the Minister. As such, we support its inclusion in the Bill. Clause 213 defines three types of enhanced consumer measures, referred to as redress, compliance and choice measures. I am grateful to the Minister for outlining some detail on that and the definitions, so that those set out in subsections (2) to (4) are straightforward and clear, and that that also applies to their interpretation by consumers. We thus welcome the clause’s inclusion in the Bill.

Clause 214 defines other terms for the purposes of this part, including the definitions of “businesses”, “goods”, “enforcement orders”, “subsidiary” and “supply”, which are important, and we support their inclusion. Further, clause 215 sets out an index of defined expressions and we welcome and support it.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I will make a couple of points, the first of which is on the negative procedure. On regulations, there is a combination in clause 204 of public consultation followed by review by the Secretary of State, which will allow for a significant level of scrutiny. On that basis, we feel the negative procedure is justified and appropriate.

On the guidance, the CMA must undertake several actions, including a public consultation on the practices. This may take some time, and we expect that the guidance may be ready by autumn 2024, but that will depend upon a number of factors. We clearly want it in place as quickly as possible, but we must ensure that it is fit for purpose.

The definition of “accessory” in clause 211 is consistent with, and restates with minor clarifications, the current definition in part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 202 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 203 to 207 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 16

Part 3: minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: 62, in schedule 16, page 329, line 17, leave out sub-paragraph (b).

See explanatory statement for Amendment 63.

Amendment 63, in schedule 16, page 329, line 23, at end insert—

“5A In Schedule 14 (provisions about disclosure of information) at the appropriate place insert—

‘Chapters 3 and 4 of Part 3 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2023.’”.

This amendment, which is made for drafting consistency, inserts a reference to Chapters 3 and 4 of Part 3 of the Bill into Schedule 14 to the Enterprise Act 2002 instead of achieving the same effect by adding that reference into section 238(1) of that Act.

Amendment 64, in schedule 16, page 337, line 2, at end insert—

“Part 4 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2023.”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)

This amendment adds Part 4 of the Bill to the list of enactments in the new paragraph 20A of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (inserted by paragraph 8(10) of Schedule 16), with the effect that authorised enforcers will be able to exercise the investigatory powers conferred by Part 4 of Schedule 5 to CRA 2015 in connection with infringements of Part 4 of the Bill.

Schedule 16, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 208 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 17

Part 3: transitional and saving provisions in relation to Part 3

Amendment made: 65, in schedule 17, page 338, line 1, leave out from “means” to end of line 11 and insert “—

(a) Part 8 of EA 2002, as that Part had effect immediately before the commencement date, and

(b) any provisions of law (including in particular Schedule 5 to CRA 2015) relating to Part 8 of EA 2002, as those provisions had effect immediately before the commencement date.”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)

This amendment clarifies that the definition of “the old law” for the purposes of the transitional provisions in Schedule 17 to the Bill includes Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (which confers investigatory powers on enforcers).

Schedule 17, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 209 to 215 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered,

That the Order of the Committee of 13 June be varied by the omission from paragraph 1(f) of “and 2.00 pm”.—(Mike Wood.)

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mike Wood.)

Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Wednesday 21st June 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 2B.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Lords amendment 4B, and Government motion to disagree.

Lords amendments 5B, 5C and 5D, and Government motion to disagree.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

There are three motions before the House. I am grateful for the fact that both Houses have reached agreement on the appropriate territorial application of the Bill, but I regret that we have not yet reached agreement on some remaining issues. I must once again urge the House to disagree with the Lords amendments before us. Again, the Bill has been amended in ways that would delay implementation or seriously limit the operation of minimum service levels. That would mean that we could not provide the all-important balance between the ability of unions and their members to strike and the ability of the wider public to access, during periods of strike action, the key services that our country needs. I will briefly summarise for the House the reasons why the amendments remain unacceptable to the House.

First, through Lords amendment 2B, the noble Lords seek to introduce additional consultation requirements and new parliamentary scrutiny processes. We recognise the importance of ensuring that the public, employers, employees, trade unions and their members are all able to participate in setting minimum service levels. That is why we ran consultations on applying MSLs to ambulance, fire, and passenger rail services on that basis. The Government maintain that the Bill enables the appropriate consultation to take place, and we are confident that the affirmative procedure will allow Parliament to conduct proper scrutiny of secondary legislation.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

Proposed new section 234F of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, inserted by the schedule, says,

“the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Does that not mean that there is no obligation to consult at all? The Secretary of State can decide that no one needs to be consulted. Does that not show the importance of the Lords amendment?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

If there is anybody whom the hon. Gentleman thinks was not able to contribute to the consultation, I ask him to please let me know, but it was open to anybody to make a submission to the consultation, and all those submissions will be properly assessed by Ministers and officials.

I turn now to the Lords amendments that would restrict the ways in which we can ensure that minimum service levels are achieved, Lords amendment 4B still leaves employers powerless to manage instances of non-compliance when workers strike contrary to being named on a work notice.

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

Could the Minister set out the timescale for the consultation and how he intends to carry it out?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

As the hon. Lady may know, our initial consultations closed around the middle of May—9 May to 11 May. Those submissions will now be considered, and we will report back to the House accordingly.

[Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)]

To be absolutely clear, Lords amendment 2B addresses the concerns that many of us in this place have about the right to strike and how it will be protected. How are the Government going to ensure that these minimum service levels are fair and balanced and do not affect that right to strike?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

We are very clear that we want to maintain the right to strike. Previous derogations, which we very much appreciate, have not interfered with people making their views known through industrial action. We do not expect that situation to change. As I say, the consultation ran for a good period of time, and the submissions are now being considered. Of course, we want to make sure that people have been properly consulted and that the regulations are fit for purpose.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I will make a little progress, but I will make sure that both the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) and the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens) get a chance to make their points.

The Bill takes the same approach as to any other strike action that is not protected under existing legislation. Lords amendment 5B may suggest that the other place accepts that trade unions should have a role to play in ensuring that minimum service levels are met, but in reality under, that amendment, whether and how the unions encouraged their members to comply with work notices would be at their discretion. Unions would be able to induce people to strike as normal and take steps to undermine the achievement of minimum service levels. That is clearly directly counter to the objectives of the policy.

[Alan Brown]

The Minister has said that the consultation has already closed, but the whole point of the Lords amendment is to oblige the Government to consult on draft regulations when they bring them forward and to publish impact assessments. If the consultation has already closed, that proves that there will be no transparency going forward, does it not?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Not at all. There will be further scrutiny of the minimum service levels when they are brought forward, in the usual way that legislation passes through this House. Those regulations will be considered by both Houses.

[Chris Stephens (Glasgow South West) (SNP)]

In response to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine), the Minister indicated that the Government agree with the right to strike and want to protect it. However, rejecting Lords amendment 4B does not do that, because the consequence would be that employers would have the right to dismiss a worker taking part in industrial action, with no recourse to a tribunal. How does that protect the right to strike action?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Because it requires people who are named in a work notice to turn up for work, which is common in other jurisdictions that use minimum service levels in order to ensure that the public can go about their daily lives and businesses continue to operate. It does not interfere with that ability.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I will give way for the final time.

[Jim Shannon]

The Minister is an honourable person, and I know that he understands the issues and where we are coming from. Decent, ordinary people vote to strike only when they feel voiceless and invisible to management. Government and big business can prevent strikes by listening and acting before that stage is reached, but the right to strike must always be a last-ditch possibility, and those people must reserve that right. Does the Minister understand that and agree with it?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

As always, I entirely agree with all the points that the hon. Gentleman has made. Of course strikes should be a last resort, and workers should be able to take industrial action when they feel their voices are not being heard. I do not think there is anything in the Bill that cuts across that. Hon. Members may disagree, but that is our position, and it is a position we have maintained throughout the passage of the Bill.

[Alan Brown]

Will the Minister give way?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

No, I have given way twice to the hon. Gentleman.

The Government maintain that there must be a responsibility for unions to ensure that their members comply. Without that, and without any incentives for employees to attend work on a strike day when identified in a work notice, the effectiveness of the legislation will be severely undermined. Unfortunately, I do not consider that these amendments are a meaningful attempt to reach agreement. I fear that we are having a somewhat repetitive debate that is delaying us getting on with the important business of minimising disruption to the public during periods of strike action, and I encourage this elected House to disagree with the amendments.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that the Lords hold firm if the amendments are rejected. Amendment 4B is a fundamental principle of natural justice, and I hope the Minister will explain why he is against that principle for workers in this country.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I thank Members for their contributions. It is fair to say that we will have to agree to disagree. We believe that this legislation is a proportionate response that gives the Government the power to ensure a safe level of service in areas such as health, transport and border security, so that people’s lives are not put at risk and they can work, access healthcare and safely go about their daily lives.

I will touch on one or two points raised by right hon. and hon. Members. I have a great deal of time for the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Justin Madders), though perhaps we do not agree so much in this debate. He asked who we govern on behalf of, and he listed very important people in our society—our nurses, train drivers and border security officers. But is he properly representing the many other stakeholders in this debate, such as pub landlords, restauranteurs, hoteliers and people seeking urgent medical treatment or trying to get to work or to see family? There have been 600,000 cancelled appointments as a result of the strikes of recent months and £3.2 billion of economic detriment—much of that to our restaurateurs, hoteliers and pub owners. It is important that their voices are heard, too.

[Justin Madders]

I hear what the Minister is saying, but that is an argument to ban strikes altogether. Is that not what he is doing?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

We have been clear that there is a balance between people being able to seek industrial action and being able to go about their daily lives. That is the balance that we are trying to strike. He asked if we fear scrutiny; not at all. What we fear is delay. That is what the Opposition parties are trying to bring about: delay in wrecking amendments.

[Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough) (Lab)]

Will the Minister expand on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Justin Madders) and give us a list of the people whom he thinks should be able to go on strike? Who are the ones he approves of?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Any person who is legislated for in these measures should be able to go on strike, subject to minimum service levels. It is quite clear, and we have been consistent all the way through.

In response to the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown), our objection to the amendments is the delay that they will cause. We want to ensure that people can go about their daily lives. The right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) raised some points about reasonable steps. Unions will not somehow have to compel people to go to work; we are asking them to undertake reasonable steps to ensure that people comply with a work notice. In fact, we were willing to set out in the Bill what those reasonable steps would be, but the right hon. Gentleman’s counterparts in the other place rejected such measures.

The hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) talked about the independence of unions; of course we respect that. It is true that if a union fails to take reasonable steps, the strike would be unprotected, as it would if the trade union failed to meet other existing requirements in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, such as balancing requirements. This is not a departure from the existing position.

[Alan Brown]

The Minister keeps talking about wrecking amendments, but how is obliging an employer to ensure that an employee has received a work notice a wrecking amendment?

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to other points in Lords amendment 4B: proposed new section 234CA(4) of the 1992 Act is a wrecking amendment because it says there is no contractual obligation for someone to comply with a work notice. That drives a coach and horses through the Bill.

The hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens) talked about how other jurisdictions deal with requiring people to go to work under a work notice. He may be aware that in France, people can be subject to criminal charges if they do not comply with a work notice. These are proportionate measures. We must make the view of the elected House as clear as possible, and avoid any further delay to fulfilling our duty to protect the lives and livelihoods of those we represent.

Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 2B.

Post Office: Horizon Compensation

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Monday 19th June 2023 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

The Government are determined that postmasters affected by the Horizon IT scandal receive the compensation that they deserve. The historical shortfall scheme has made good progress in achieving this outcome, with over 99% of original claimants receiving an offer to date.

However, the tax treatment of awards has in some cases had the effect of unfairly reducing the net compensation received by postmasters. In particular, the problem that has arisen on the historical shortfall scheme is that awards for loss of earnings are paid as a lump sum through compensation, but if the postmaster had stayed in employment and received that income over several tax years, they may have faced a lower tax bill.

The Government are today announcing that we will support the Post Office with an estimated £26 million of funding to make additional payments to postmasters in the historical shortfall scheme to ensure that compensation is not unduly lost to tax.

Every postmaster involved in the scheme will benefit from these additional payments. To avoid further complexity, the Government intend to legislate to make these additional payments exempt from income tax, capital gains tax and national insurance contributions.

So that payments can be made as swiftly as possible, the top-ups will be calculated so that no postmaster pays more than the basic rate of tax on the taxable elements of their compensation. This approach ensures that postmasters do not need to provide any further information.

Additionally, all claimants involved in the scheme will be able to access funding for tax advice of up to £300 to support them in filling out their tax returns.

[HCWS860]

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Third sitting)

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Thank you—you actually outlined my final question, which was on that point. One of the things we have heard as legislators looking at the Bill is about those risks around confidentiality and how some of the smaller firms have wanted to submit evidence, but have felt unable to do so, due to commercial sensitivities, for example. Will you outline that a bit further? How does the Bill need to ensure that safeguarding is in place to protect those smaller firms with commercial sensitivities so that they are not disproportionately disadvantaged?

Neil Ross: We have seen this throughout the process of consultation on the Bill and in submitting evidence to the Committee. We have found that smaller and challenger firms, which often have very tight commercial relationships with the larger companies and often rely on and benefit from them for scale and various things, are very sensitive about what they can and cannot submit. The Bill says very little about confidentiality requirements, so the DMU will have to set out in a lot of detail how that is going to work. We really encourage it to ensure that it consults those firms closely, to make sure that there are clear guardrails around what confidentiality marks are put on evidence that is submitted, what could be shared in summaries, and so on. That is going to be absolutely critical to make sure that the DMU can actually gather the information it needs to do its job.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

Q I think I am right in saying that you said in your opening remarks that you may have concerns about the appeal standard. If we move to a full merits system, what is to stop huge tech giants, with almost endless resources, being able to tie up any actions that the DMU takes in the courts for a long time and, in doing so, providing a big deterrent to the DMU taking action in the first place?

Neil Ross: There is a risk of that, so we have put forward a position that aligns with what the Government want, which is an appeal standard that is principally based on judicial review principles, but has the flexibility to consider the different requirements of the case. Both techUK and the Government have pointed to the standard used by Ofcom as one that would be suitable in this case. The issue is that we are not sure that with the way the Government are applying the standard in the Bill, it will actually meet that test. As far as I understand it, the Government have set out a legal position that the appeal standard will be flexible because the Competition Appeal Tribunal will be able to look at human rights law, as well as private property rights, to consider how that standard will flex. We have tested that legal argument very widely with members—in-house legal counsel as well as other lawyers—and, to be blunt, a very limited number of people share that view.

Ultimately, what we want to do is work with the Government to see where we can go further to provide additional clarity on how that appeal standard would work—what the flex would look like. Ultimately, the standard will have to principally sit in JR principles, but have that flex higher up.

The point you made about speed is also hugely important. We set out a position saying we would like to see a standard that makes sure that any appeals are limited to about six months in length, because these are very fast-moving markets. If the standard means that things are bogged down, you know that the market might move on and the benefits might not be conferred across. We understand why hard limits might not be possible as part of the regime, but you could take steps in the Bill to try to encourage the courts to move a bit quicker, especially in more dynamic or high-impact cases.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q But you do accept that there is a risk of a greater deterrent to the DMU being able to take action against these big companies.

Neil Ross: Yes.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Thank you for the brevity of your answer. The other thing that we have heard from some of the people likely to be affected by SMS status is about the impact on innovation, for example. It has been said to us that they feel that they would have to go to the DMU or the Competition and Markets Authority for permission to innovate. Is that something you recognise from reading the Bill?

Neil Ross: It is a concern that has been raised. There is nothing in the legislation that would mean that that was what happened. It is going to rely much more on how the digital markets unit itself exercises its powers. I think that if we can make sure that the regime is proportionate, is accountable to Parliament and has a pro-innovation focus, we can get over that. But it could happen. It is just that it is much more dependent on the subsequent guidance and the role that the DMU itself plays.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Sure, but the criterion that it can intervene really only where there is entrenched market power should be a protection against those worries about innovation.

Neil Ross: If the digital markets unit, as I think the Government and the CMA intend, is focusing on a small number of firms with very significant market share in a select number of markets, then yes, that will be the case. However, some concerns have been brought by other companies, which are perhaps leading in their market but would not consider themselves as having a strategic position or causing serious consumer harms and which look at the Bill and think, “At its widest possible scope, I could be included.” That is why we have to make sure that, in exercising the powers, the regime is being held to account.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Thank you for your answers.

[The Chair]

Mr Ross, we will now have a quickfire round, because we have you for only another five minutes and there are three Members seeking to ask questions. It will be one question each and one answer each.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Brilliant, thank you.

[Rushanara Ali in the Chair]

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Mr Burrus, some concerns have been raised with us that the subscription traps requirements in the Bill might be too onerous for some people who work on a subscription basis to comply with. Do you think those are valid concerns?

Gene Burrus: I am not sure that those concerns are really valid. There is a consultation process in place. I agree with the prior witness that it is important for third-party input to be part of that process with the DMU, so it can fully understand what it is implementing and the ways in which it is doing that. We have seen problems emerge in the past in competition law cases with respect to trying to craft orders without sufficient input from industry, and those have fallen on the rocks as being ineffective or unwise. We saw that, for instance, when the European Commission attempted to settle cases with Google long ago. They would reach a settlement, then finally market test that settlement that they thought was great, and industry would pan it. I think that is why, with sufficient third-party input into the process with the DMU, those concerns can be addressed

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Thank you. On the innovation point, do you see anything in the Bill that would inhibit companies designated as SMS or make them think twice about innovating in any particular space?

Gene Burrus: Quite the opposite. I think it will drive their innovation as well. Right now they are in a position where they are not often faced with competitive constraints with respect to innovating on things such as the privacy and security of their app stores and features that they need to put out. Or, when they self-reference their own products, sometimes that means that they do not have to make the best product; they just have to make the product that they can ensure users will get whether they want it or not.

The Bill will not only unleash innovation for third parties, but force the SMS firms to innovate more in order to keep up. I think history proves that is true. I will go back again to that point in time 25 years ago. Even with all the constraints that were put on Microsoft, nothing has prevented it from innovating. In fact, Microsoft is still a great innovative company today.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Sure. That is very useful, thank you. Mr Smith, I do not need to ask you any questions. I think you were very clear on the appeal standard; I was very comfortable with your answer.

Tom Smith: May I add something quickly on the JR-plus proposal? I think it is strange to come up with a whole new appeal standard when we have perfectly good ones already. Also, the JR-plus standard came in, as far as I understand it, to comply with an EU telecoms directive. It is strange in this period in our country’s history to start putting that standard in place again. The direction of travel is in fact the opposite—to go from merits to JR—and another place in the Bill actually does that. It is the same for Ofcom; that went from merits to JR in the Digital Economy Act. I really do not see the JR-plus standard working.

Also, it is all very well putting a deadline on an appeal, but you need to explain how you will complete the process in that time. It will not work if you just put a deadline on it, then expect everyone to do 18 months’ work in six months. I think you need to explain how on earth that would work, because I do not see it working.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Very useful. Thank you.

[Andy Carter]

Q Mr Burrus, could I just put to you something that I suspect some of the platforms might say? They have spent billions and billions and billions developing their platforms. Is it not reasonable that they make charges for app users to access those platforms? What they are doing is just recouping their costs, so making a reasonable profit from your members who get access to these fantastic platforms.

Gene Burrus: I think that ignores and rewrites the history of how these platforms got to be as powerful as they are today. If you go back in time to 2008, for example, when there was intense competition among mobile platforms to be your phone, right? There were dozens of firms that you barely know exist any more, like Blackberry, like Nokia, like Microsoft. There were lots of firms competing in that space. And the game then was actually to be as attractive as possible to developers, to the point where those platforms were paying developers to be on their platform, because they were going to recoup that investment through the sale—in Apple’s case—of very expensive mobile devices. And that is where they have recouped—handsomely recouped. It is probably the best business in human history, actually. It is only after they gained a degree of market power that they then began to use that power to try to flip the game and try to extract. Once they had developers in a place where they could not leave, that is when they attempted to go and extract those rents from developers.

I think that argument is a false argument. Apple has recouped its investment in these markets through the sale of very expensive hardware, and Google has recouped its investment in Android through billions and billions of dollars in ad revenue that it has continued to generate. The recoupment argument is a false one, I think.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q You are buying a service to reach the same number of eyeballs. The process does not have greater reach. You said that, to achieve the same outcome as a facilitating business, they charge 30% to 40% more. Why doesn’t everyone use Bing?

Tom Smith: You may have seen yesterday that the European Commission is threatening to break up Google in the ad-tech business. The European Commission is formally alleging that Google is abusing its dominant position in ad tech. That is on the display side of the business. On the search side, Google has a 90%-plus market share in this country. It is a must-have product, and people are buying that product. There are lots of allegations about why it should be able to sustain such prices, but I do not want to make an unfounded allegation.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q We have put subscription traps in the Bill. I will ask the same question I asked Mr Burrus earlier: do you see anything in the legislation that would make it difficult for companies that currently operate on a subscription basis to comply with what we have set out?

Tom Smith: No, I do not think so. In fact, one of the problems with subscriptions that are operated through mobile devices is that Apple inserts itself and Google inserts itself in between the developer and the customer. If you are a British person who subscribes to an app and then something goes wrong or you want to cancel your subscription, quite naturally you might want to contact the developer, such as Tinder or whatever other developer—you are talking to Mr Buse later. At that point the developer has to say, “I’m terribly sorry; you might think you are dealing with us, but you have a contract with Apple,” and that is a major source of complaints. It is pretty confusing for consumers.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q On the innovation point, there are concerns that if you are designated SMS you will have to go to the CMA or DMU to seek permission to enter a new marketplace or bring forward a new product. Is that something you see anywhere in the legislation?

Tom Smith: No, it is nowhere in the legislation. The idea that the CMA wants to stop SMS firms innovating is not based in any evidence that I can see anywhere. There is a leveraging principle in clause 20, which is extremely narrowly written and I think should be made slightly wider, but that is the only thing that could touch a non-SMS activity.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

I thank our witnesses for their evidence. If there are no further questions, we will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Tom Fish, Richard Stables and Mark Buse gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mary Kelly Foy]

Q Tom, do you want to add anything?

Tom Fish: You certainly cannot blame the companies for wanting to put their points across to politicians who are potentially radically transforming their markets. I certainly echo the point about being wary of supposed bodies that represent small businesses in these areas. If you receive views from those types of organisation, think carefully about who they are really speaking for.

The one thing I would add is that knowing that those big companies will be lobbying hard is why companies such as Gener8 and others are willing to take the risk to speak out publicly and share our experience, because it is just so important that you hear both sides of the argument.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Mr Buse, I think you will be pleased to know that everybody in the Committee has now moved their subscription for Tinder from the app store to the website to get cheaper subscriptions, so thank you for that—[Laughter.]

You are a very successful company. You own plenty of brands—Plenty Of Fish, as well as Tinder and the like. What do you make of the argument that, actually, far from inhibiting investment, these companies have encouraged investment by giving you a platform that can access lots of customers around the world?

Mark Buse: We do not deny, first, that what they have created is revolutionary and, secondly, that they should be paid for their intellectual property and their ongoing work. We have always stated that we support their ability to recoup and to profit off of this. There is no issue on that for Match. What causes us so much concern is that they make their decisions arbitrarily in a black box, with no transparency.

If you look at Tinder’s algorithm and Uber’s algorithm, they operate, at the base level, almost identically. We connect two strangers in real time for the purpose of a date. Uber connects two strangers in real time for the purpose of a ride. Uber does not own the car and it does not employ the driver; we encourage you to use an Uber, to not meet somebody in a dark alley in their car. Essentially, it works the same. Yet, on Uber, Uber pays nothing. We and our users have to only use Apple or Google and have to pay 30%. So there is a fundamental problem here.

Some of that is just due to a historical anomaly back when there was a competitive marketplace, but that competitive marketplace no longer exists. Again, we think this Bill gives flexibility, in that it does not have the CMA declare these companies as regulated utilities. Recently, a Minister in the Netherlands said that he believes Apple and Google should be treated like regulated utilities, such as a bank. That is not for me to decide; it is up to parliamentarians to decide. We would have concerns about that, just for precedent, but we think this Bill balances that and creates a flexible marketplace where, as long as Apple and Google are treating entities in a fair and transparent manner, they are entitled to earn profit.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Would you say that the situation has hampered your willingness to invest and the growth of your company?

Mark Buse: Absolutely. It has hampered it in an actual way, in that 30% of the money we should bring in goes to Apple and Google. To put it into context, we do a little over $3 billion a year in revenue. Last year we paid Apple and Google around $700 million, which we could be investing in employees, research and lowering prices. The question is, $700 million for what? What are we paying for? Are we subsidising Uber? We would say yes, in fact we are. What do our users get from that? To show you how the stores recognise the value, Apple buys ads within the app store search for Tinder. We do not buy ads for Tinder; Apple buys ads for Tinder. You might ask why. It is because Apple knows that the average user of an online dating product will have four or five different dating apps on their phone—us and all our competitors—and will bounce back and forth between them all non-stop. That is just the way the user behaviour is. Once you meet somebody, you do not use any of them, so it is a high-churn business.

With Tinder being the most well-known brand, Apple knows that if it can convince a 19-year-old to open a Tinder account, that 19-year-old will also then open a Bumble account, an OkCupid account, a Grindr account or whatever. Apple knows that they are going to start subscribing to all of them, so that is all free money. The system is already built. Uber is using it, Walmart is using it and Tesco is using it, but 16% of the companies are paying the extra 30%, which is subsidising all of this and enriching Google and Apple’s profits, so there are issues there.

[The Chair]

Minister Scully, do you want to come in on any of the points that have been made?

Insolvency Law and Director Disqualifications

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Wednesday 14th June 2023 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Fovargue. I add my grateful thanks to the hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey) for bringing forward this important debate. Members may know that I spoke out on this subject a lot from the Back Benches, and my appetite for change in this area—when parliamentary time allows—remains the same.

There is no doubt that the Government absolutely believe in strong corporate governance and an effective insolvency regime. The hon. Lady rightly referred to the demise of Carillion. Years have passed since that happened, but it is very important that we do not forget the lesson learned from the impact that had on all stakeholders, including employees and small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain.

I have great sympathy for those affected when companies declare themselves insolvent or go through insolvency in any circumstances, including the SMEs in those companies’ supply chain. The hon. Lady referred to the case in her constituency of Orchard House Foods; the redundancy protection service stepped in rapidly after the insolvency to make sure that people were properly compensated. Nevertheless, it was a worrying time for many people. Clearly, it would not be appropriate to talk about any ongoing investigations, but it is important that the Insolvency Service follows through on these matters and ensures that proper procedure is followed.

Given the comments made in the debate, it is important to say that most directors and businesses are bona fide and do the right thing. Of course we are concerned when companies go into insolvency, for all the reasons that have been outlined in the debate. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), who is no longer in his place, commented on cases in his constituency. Such cases have immense knock-on effects for stakeholders in our constituencies. Indeed, this is one of the issues on which I get the most letters from colleagues.

We must consider any changes we make to the regime in the light of the fact that most directors and businesses do the right thing. It is important to recognise that our economic system is not a zero-failure system. Failure is part of the process, and unfortunately many bona fide businesses that seek to do the right thing and invest their hard-earned money enter insolvency—in many cases through no fault of their own. We need a regime that reflects that context.

I think that most people accept that the FRC has significantly improved its oversight of the sector in recent years, particularly under the stewardship of Jon Thompson. There have been significant improvements. The right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) referred to the regulator as being asleep at the wheel. That may have been a fair accusation years ago, but it is probably inappropriate now. However, when parliamentary time allows, it is right to replace the regulator with a new one—the audit, reporting and governance authority.

The hon. Member for Salford and Eccles referred to the US’s Sarbanes-Oxley system. Should we adopt that kind of system? We believe that there is a balance to be struck. We do not want anything that would be counter-productive to our economic system, in which competition is ultimately the best outcome for consumers. High competition drives down prices for consumers and drives up service. It is therefore important that we do not move to a system of a new generation of professional directors. It is important that our system is entrepreneurial, encourages investment, and encourages people to start up and expand businesses. We are, however, planning new corporate governance rules, which I will talk about in a second.

A number of hon. Members asked whether we will reform the Companies Act 2006 duties. The Act already requires all company directors to have regard to employee, consumer, environmental and other interests while pursuing the success of the company. Since 2019, large companies have been required to report annually on how those wider interests have been taken into account in boardroom decision making. I think the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) made a point about reform of those duties. It is important that we parliamentarians are cognisant of the burden on businesses; I applaud her for referring to that. Many businesses are under significant pressure right now from a number of angles, and it is important that we do not add to the burdens on them.

The right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington raised the issue highlighted by Baron Sikka. I have worked very closely with Baron Sikka on economic crime and money laundering, and on the fact that there are 41 regulators in the financial system. It is important that we have straightforward corporate governance reform, so that we can hold people to account on their duties under the Companies Act 2006 and other requirements.

The Government response in May 2022 to our consultation on the “Restoring trust in audit and governance” White Paper confirmed plans to require very large companies to provide targeted new annual reporting on their management of risk and certain other matters. The new reporting will apply to UK-listed and private companies with more than 750 employees and an annual turnover of more than £750 million. Crucially, it will consist of four new statements in those companies’ annual reports: a resilience statement setting out how the company is managing significant risks over the short, medium and long term; confirmation that the company has sufficient realised profits to pay out any proposed dividends, and a statement about the company’s approach to profit distribution; a statement on the directors’ actions to prevent or detect material fraud; and an audit and assurance policy setting out how the company is assuring the quality of non-financial information that largely lies outside the statutory audit.

The new reporting requirement responds to concerns identified followed the sudden collapse of Carillion and other very large companies. Shareholders and other stakeholders need more information to understand the steps being taken by directors to ensure the future prospects of the company. We are developing secondary legislation, which we hope to lay before Parliament soon, to implement those new measures.

I often spoke about insolvency reform from the Back Benches; indeed, I co-authored a report called “Resolving Insolvency” on behalf of the all-party group on fair business banking. That relates to a point raised by the hon. Members for Feltham, and for Strangford, about insolvency reform. The Insolvency Service primarily investigates company directors and corporate misbehaviour. That includes investigating trading companies, and taking court action to wind them up when they have been acting against the public interest—for example, when there is evidence of fraud or corporate abuse. About 150 companies are investigated each year for that reason. The Insolvency Service also works collaboratively with other enforcement agencies to ensure the public are protected.

The bulk of the Insolvency Service’s enforcement work relates to investigating the conduct of directors of companies that are subject to formal insolvency, such as liquidation or administration. If an investigation finds evidence of misconduct by a company’s directors, the Insolvency Service may bring disqualification proceedings where that is in the public interest. Disqualification can be for a period of up to 15 years, and breach of a disqualification order is a criminal offence. Disqualification is therefore a significant interference with a person’s rights, and the courts take it very seriously. High standards of evidence are required. If a disqualification order is made, in certain circumstances there is the option to seek a compensation order against the disqualified director, who is personally required to pay back the losses they caused.

Having said that, we can go further on insolvency reform. It is the Government’s intention, when parliamentary time allows, to move towards a system of regulation with a single independent regulator, and away from the recognised professional bodies that we see today. I am very keen to take that forward when parliamentary time allows.

The hon. Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson) spoke about money laundering, the number of supervisors who act in that space, and the need to streamline that regime. His Majesty’s Treasury is looking at that, and is due to report on how we do that more effectively. I do not recognise his comments about the changes we are making as a consequence of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. That is the most significant change to Companies House in 170 years, and I look forward to the Scottish Government introducing a legislative consent motion so that Bill is fully effected in Scotland. Some of the hon. Gentleman’s comments, such as those on verification , were about the situation today, rather than the situation as it will be. We are all on the same page on the need to replace the dumb register with a database with integrity. That is one of the registrar’s four main objectives.

On fees, we are keen to make sure that it is quick, easy and affordable to start up a company in this country, but we recognise that fees need to increase to make sure that Companies House, and potentially the Insolvency Service, have the resources to do their work. We will therefore bring forward plans to make sure that those resources are there, through increases to the incorporation fee and the annual fees for registration.

On the hon. Member for Gordon’s points about directors’ limits, we do not feel that is a key issue. Setting an arbitrary limit on the number of directorships would not be the right way forward. I was the Minister responsible for taking the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill through the House, and if I remember rightly, the SNP suggested a limit of 20 directorships. I had more than 20 directorships at any one time in my past business life, so that limit would have restricted me from making some investments in the economy that created jobs and raised taxes. I do not think those kinds of arbitrary limits are right; instead, we see the regime working on the basis of red flags. If a high number of directorships is connected with other potential issues, we expect the registrar to investigate.

The hon. Member for Gordon raised an important point about phoenixing. That has certainly been of concern to many hon. Members, and we are keen to act on it. We have made significant changes around phoenixing. Individuals who have acted as a director of an insolvent company at any time in the preceding 12 months are prevented from forming, managing or promoting any business, including a company with the same name as, or a similar name to, the liquidated company for a period of five years from the date of insolvency. There are both criminal and civil penalties for a breach of that restriction, including director disqualification proceedings.

The Government strengthened the law in that area in 2021 by introducing changes to the disqualification regime to make sure that directors cannot avoid investigations by simply dissolving their companies. That point was also made by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston. Twenty-five directors have been disqualified under that legislation. None of those disqualifications would have happened without the Government’s legislation in that area. We want to make sure that legislation goes further, and more investigations are ongoing. I will not specify the numbers, but it is fair to say that when the IS looks for cases of phoenixing, that is not the only misconduct identified. Often, those cases are dealt with as more serious offences that it is more important to prosecute. The hon. Lady gave a figure of 25, but that does not reflect some of the detriment and misconduct that we have identified.

We absolutely think there is a case for reform, and we are determined to take reforms forward quickly, as soon as parliamentary time allows. We also want to make sure that the UK is the best place in the world to do business, and that we do not interfere with people’s ability to start up and scale their business; however, we also want to maintain proper fiduciary responsibilities and have a system that properly oversees the conduct of directors. We will bring forward the legislation that strikes that balance as soon as parliamentary time allows.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (First sitting)

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

Q Good morning. We have talked a lot this morning about accountability to Parliament. That was highlighted quite heavily on Second Reading by Members from across the House. One of the other things that we have already discussed is the need for the CMA’s strategic priorities to be directed and advised by Parliament. Could you expand on your thoughts on that point? Also, where do you see the priorities for the Digital Markets Bill? That is not intended to be a loaded question.

Sarah Cardell: I will give a high-level response, and Will might come in on some of the specific priorities for the DMU. It is really important to highlight the difference between accountability and independence. The CMA is independent when we take our individual decisions, but, as you say, it is absolutely accountable for those decisions, both to Parliament and to the courts. That is accountability for the choices that we make about where we set our priorities, accountability for the decisions that we take when we are exercising our functions, and accountability for the way that we go about doing that work. I think it is important to have accountability across all three areas.

On the strategic priorities, since I came into the role as chief executive and our new chair, Marcus Bokkerink, came into post, we have put a lot of focus on really setting out very clearly what our strategic priorities are, looking at impact and beneficial outcomes for people, businesses and the economy as a whole. We see those as a trio of objectives that are fundamentally reinforcing, rather than in tension with one another.

We also take account of the Government’s strategic steer. That is in draft at the moment. You can see that there is a lot of commonality between our own strategic priorities that we set out in our annual plan and in the Government’s strategic steer. That sets a very clear framework for our prioritisation.

Will might want to come in on how we will set the priorities for the DMU.

Will Hayter: We are obviously thinking very carefully about where to prioritise action under the strategic market status regime. We cannot jump too far ahead with that, because Parliament is going through this process now and we have to see where the Bill comes out, but, as Sarah says, we will be targeting our effort very firmly at those areas where the biggest problems and the biggest current harmful impacts on people, businesses and the economy are likely to be.

You can get a bit of a sense of what those areas might be from the areas we have looked at already, particularly the digital advertising market, search, social media, interactions between the platforms and news publishers, and also mobile ecosystems. We did a big study there, where we see a range of problems stemming from the market power of the two big operating systems.

We will continue to update our thinking as we go through the next year-plus, building on our horizon-scanning work and understanding of how developments in the markets are shaping up and what that might mean for where the problems are.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

Q First, thank you for the work that you do. You are obviously an independent body and you make difficult decisions. You receive more scrutiny than we have ever seen before, with the CMA’s higher profile, and at times that must put you under quite a lot of strain. I appreciate the work that you do. You make the decisions as you see fit, of course, but those often come with criticisms, so thank you.

My question is about innovation. If you speak to some of those who are likely to be designated SMS—strategic market status—businesses, many of them might say, “Well, this will inhibit innovation from our businesses.” I think part of that is about the power to look ahead at where this may take us. What do you say to that? If one of those platforms was opening a new type of supermarket, for example, it might be claimed that this would limit innovation. How would you respond to that?

Sarah Cardell: I have a couple of points, and Will might come in. The general point is that this regime is very much pro-competition and pro-innovation, both from the major platforms, which are likely to be designated in relation to some of their activities, and across the economy. It is important that we encourage innovation that supports competing businesses, large and small. You can have innovation that supports an incumbent by allowing that incumbent to offer additional services, but sometimes at the cost of entrenching their market position. We want to ensure that we have an environment that enables those major players to continue to innovate, sparked and incentivised by the competitive pressure that they are facing, but equally allows smaller competitors to thrive and innovate too. That is the broad point.

As we have said, it is a very targeted and bespoke regime. We will be focusing only on areas where there is substantial and entrenched market power already. Therefore, the principal point is that businesses, large and small, will continue to be free to innovate and to develop their products and services. Of course we want to ensure that that happens in a way that does not reinforce positions of market power. Will, you might want to come in on that.

Will Hayter: As Sarah says, this is all about creating a fertile environment for innovation, and you can think about that at at least three levels. First, it might be that those companies are innovating on top of the platforms that we are talking about here—in mobile ecosystems, through app stores, mobile browsers, and so on. Secondly, there are companies that are seeking to compete directly against some of the big platforms, and we want to ensure that there is a possibility that the current incumbents will be knocked off their perch by tomorrow’s innovators. Finally, increasing competition should increase the pressure on the incumbents—the most powerful firms—to innovate further themselves, in a way that delivers the greatest benefits for people, businesses and the economy.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Would you therefore say that those kinds of worries are ill-founded and that that is not something that would prohibit an SMS organisation from innovating?

Sarah Cardell: I do not think that there is anything in the Bill that prohibits innovation. The fundamental design, and certainly the way that we would intend to operate it, is entirely pro-innovation. We want to ensure that, as the designated companies continue to seek to develop and grow their businesses—of course they will want to, and that brings many benefits—that happens in a way that does not entrench their position, which is disadvantageous either to consumers or to competing businesses. That does not inhibit innovation, but it puts some guardrails around that innovation to ensure that the impact of that is beneficial and positive.

[The Chair]

We now come to a quick-fire round. We have six minutes left and four Members seeking to ask questions, so we want quick questions and quick answers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you very much. This question may be more for Mr Upton. The Bill goes some way towards tackling the problem of subscription traps, but it does not go as far as what Citizens Advice has called for, or indeed the Labour party’s policy of making subscription renewals opt in rather than opt out. Why do you think that the legislation needs further safeguards? Why, in the light of your experience, is that important for protecting consumers from harm?

Matthew Upton: We have been asking for action on subscription traps for a long time. Any action is positive, but we are seeing this in the context of a cost of living crisis, where anything that takes cash out of people’s pockets stops them getting by from day to day. To be honest, we think that the intent is right, but this is potentially a huge missed opportunity for action on subscription traps. We have to understand how high the incentive is for firms to trap people in subscriptions. There is a huge amount of money to be made, to the extent that it changes the whole incentive structure so that for many firms, rather than thinking about how to provide a quality subscription, the rational thing to do is think about how to design the worst possible customer journey and to trap someone, whether through an online process that makes it difficult to cancel something—you will all have experience of this—or, to give a slightly facetious example, a process whereby you can cancel only when you ring between 2 and 2.30 on a Tuesday and you have wait for 45 minutes in the queue.

Obviously, we want to change that incentive structure so that we have a flourishing subscription economy, which should be encouraged, where consumers want to stay in subscriptions and firms focus on providing quality subscriptions. We do not think that the Bill as it stands will do that. For example, it says that exit has to be timely and straightforward. We do not think that that will work. We have been here before, if we think back to utility bills four or five years ago, when there was a big push to stop people rolling on to expensive contracts and to get them to switch. Regulators were focused on trying to dictate what went into letters to consumers about their renewals. Firms could make so much money by obeying the letter but not the spirit of the regulation that they would find ways round it, and switching rates did not go up. We think that the same will happen here.

The specific change that would make a huge difference and is legislatively straightforward is to provide that, at the end of an annual trial subscription, the default is that the consumer opts out. That is not about things like car insurance, where there is a detriment to people opting out, but for basic subscriptions, opt-out should be the default. That would allow firms to use all their ingenuity, power and influence to persuade consumers to stay in. They could go for it—send as many reminders as they wanted; that is absolutely fine. If the subscription is good, a consumer will stay in. That change will make the difference. We have done some polling on this and about 80% of people agree that that should happen. We think that it will put millions of pounds back in people’s pockets, that it is proportionate and that it will encourage a flourishing subscription economy.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Rocio, on your point about including fake reviews on the face of the Bill, our intention is to legislate in this area. I do not know whether you have seen the evidence from Trustpilot, which was submitted as written evidence. It rightly points to the fact that most of the discussion around fake reviews thus far has been about products rather than services. Does not that illustrate that we need to consult properly about that to ensure that we get the legislation right? Isn’t there a risk that we could get it wrong by rushing to stick this on the face of the Bill?

Rocio Concha: A provision on fake reviews in the Bill should apply to both products and services. There is evidence to show that fake reviews also harm services. I do not think that there is a major risk. We and the CMA have produced a lot of evidence about how fake reviews are endemic on some sites. We have demonstrated the harm that they cause. It is clear what is needed. We know that we need to look at selling, buying and hosting. I do not see a risk to including such a provision on the face of the Bill. Then, in secondary legislation—

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Even though there might be some things we have not thought about at this point in time. That would be a good example in terms of Trustpilot’s evidence.

Rocio Concha: If there is something that needs to be improved, you can always do it with the Secretary of State’s power later. There is quite clear evidence to provide a clear steer on what is an unfair practice. Obviously, as with anything in schedule 18, you have that power to modify, to add to the practice as more evidence comes in. We will provide enough evidence to the Committee to show that it can be introduced on the face of the Bill.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Sure, okay. Mr Upton, on subscription traps, do you not feel that the powers that the Bill affords the CMA on civil penalties will address some of the concerns you highlight of people trying to get around the rules, for example? Would that not be something it could act on when it sees gratuitous behaviour such as what you describe?

Matthew Upton: I think it could, but we worry that it will not in reality. It is quite difficult to decide, for example, what constitutes easy and timely exit from a contract. You cannot necessarily measure it incredibly specifically, and I could imagine enforcement being really complicated. I could imagine firms dragging their feet, despite the way powers would speed up the ability of the CMA to act, as I say, because the incentive structure is so great.

One reason for the growth of the subscription economy is that it is a great way to provide services, but another is that it is such an easy way to make money by trapping people in. That is our firm belief and what our evidence shows. I just think a simple default would be much more effective than basically having the CMA chasing its tail and chasing firms. It would not be of any detriment to good firms who want to provide really solid subscriptions that people should want to stay in.

[Richard Thomson (Gordon) (SNP)]

Q The EU has a right to redress for consumers, and there is a schedule in the Bill that would allow the Secretary of State to introduce that again in future through secondary legislation. Do either of you have any sort of sense of the extent to which UK consumers might be at risk of being at detriment compared with their EU counterparts while that secondary legislation is not in place?

Rocio Concha: Our view is that it should be on the face of the Bill. We do not know why the right to redress has not been transposed into the Bill. From our perspective, we do not want to leave it for the Secretary of State to decide once we have an Act. It should be included.

The other thing is that the right of redress does not cover all the practice in schedule 18, only misleading practice and aggressive practice. It does not really cover all the list of unfair practice in schedule 18. I think that the right to redress should also cover that.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Second sitting)

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Professor Fletcher?

Professor Fletcher: I fully endorse that. When we did the review, we spoke to a lot of firms that were seeking to innovate in the digital space but were struggling. We heard that they really needed access to a whole number of things such as data. They needed access to customers and to be interoperable with systems out there. They needed access to finance. They found, essentially—some of them, at least—that the way in which the biggest platforms were working was making all that very difficult. They were concerned that although there had been a huge amount of innovation, at that point—and still, I think—firms’ ability to innovate was being gradually increasingly stymied by the conduct of the biggest tech platforms. We very much saw the Bill as a pro-innovation piece of regulation.

Professor Furman: This question is so fundamental. This legislation would have benefits for consumers in terms of price and choice, but far and away the most important benefit would be innovation. It was designed with that in mind; our recommendations, which the legislation took on, established firms with strategic market status. They would fall under these rules, which would give a lot of leeway to small and medium-sized UK businesses to really innovate and come up with their own models rather than being constrained. More competition would help innovation by the large platforms as well.

The other thing that is so important is that the speed in the digital sector is just so much faster than in other parts of the economy, so traditional anti-trust rules just take too long: by the time a case is settled or decided, everyone has moved on. Getting there at the front end and having something that is much more flexible and faster is critical in this sector.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

Q Thank you very much for your answers. Amazon has recently said the complete opposite of what you are saying. It has said that the Bill will stop it from innovating. It has started these new stores where you can go and shop and there are no staff—people just go in, take the stuff off the shelf and walk out. Amazon says that this Bill would have stopped it from taking forward that kind of innovation. What particular areas in the Bill is Amazon referring to? Do you recognise those as valid concerns?

Professor Fletcher: Amazon would have to be more precise about what it thought in the Bill would stop that. I think the Bill has trod a very careful, innovation- focused line between stopping the biggest tech platforms from inhibiting innovation by third parties and facilitating them to innovate themselves. The Bill is designed to only address the very biggest platforms in the first place, but also only to address the elements of their business where they have very strong market positions and entrenched market power. I think that way is the right way. As far as I know, Amazon would not be inhibited by the Bill from setting up those stores.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q There is a forward-looking provision, is there not, for the CMA to look five years into the future and decide whether a company will have entrenched market power then? Is that what Amazon is referring to? Is that their concern, and would that be valid?

Professor Fletcher: I think the concern is to ensure that it is entrenched market power that we are addressing. The CMA recognises, as do we, that these are intrusive measures and you do not want to do them unless you are trying to address entrenched market power.

Professor Marsden: Personally, I agree that there is an aspect where the five-year period, which I find a bit too long, can be gamed by some of the potentially SMS—strategic market status—firms, but I understand why it is in there. I probably would have been more comfortable with a two or three-year period, because that is traditional for competition authorities and as far as they can look ahead in terms of crystal ball gazing. But I understand why it is there.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q How would they game the system, Professor Marsden? What do you mean by that?

Professor Marsden: They could game the system in the sense of one thing being done by just slowly walking backwards, for example—“We are introducing so many innovations and having so many thoughts and thanks from various small businesses.” They could drown the CMA with a range of evidence that actually does not go to the point, which is: who is being excluded, who is being locked out and what are we as consumers and citizens missing by relying only on three or four types of seed in the environment, as opposed to a whole globe of seeds? That is the metaphor I would like to use.

Professor Fletcher: It is worth highlighting that if you compare the UK regulation with the equivalent in the EU, the EU has taken a less bespoke, less evidence-based approach. It basically gets a quantitative presumption, and that presumption is going to be relatively hard to shake. What we have done is much more evidence-based, bespoke and proportionate. Whenever you do that, it makes it slightly less administrable and slightly harder to actually make stick.

Again, I think a very delicate balance has been trodden, and it is the right balance. I think all of us would agree on that, and on the fact that Brussels has made it easier for itself, but it is arguably then not proportionate nor sufficiently bespoke. It is a very delicate thing, but I think it is in the right place.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Professor Furman, I saw your hand up. Do you have any comments?

Professor Furman: Look at the tools that the Digital Markets Unit would have under these provisions; the conduct requirements, such as fair dealing and open choices, are not brand new inventions. They largely draw on existing roles under anti-trust measures. It is just that they would be more explicit and clearer up front, and enforced more quickly. To some degree, at least in terms of the conduct requirements, this is not about imposing some brand new set of rules; a lot of it is about taking existing things and ensuring that they can be enforced in a clear and transparent manner.

[The Chair]

I call shadow Minister Seema Malhotra.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q In the interests of time, I will move on to Ms Reilly. What is your view of how this will affect/benefit consumers in Scotland? Are there any other specific issues that we should consider in relation to Scotland?

Tracey Reilly: Broadly speaking, we welcome the Bill. As your previous panellists said, it has lots of good stuff in it. It should provide the CMA with more flexible powers, which can be used in a more responsive and timely way to prevent detriment. On how the Bill will affect individual consumers, we hope that it will lead to consumers experiencing lower levels of detriment and being less subject to unfair, misleading or aggressive trade practices so that if and when such practices occur, they can be stamped out more quickly and easily, and it is easier for consumers to seek redress through ADR systems that are appropriately regulated and standardised.

In terms of how the Bill will affect Scottish interests, in many ways the level of detriment experienced by consumers across the UK is similar. The consumer protection survey is UK-wide and the patterns of detriment for Scottish consumers are generally not hugely different from those experienced in the rest of the UK. That said, there are obviously differences between the two nations in the regulatory enforcement and judicial landscapes, and it is important that we understand and pay attention to them. Equally, I understand that the Department has been engaging with Scottish stakeholders. We welcome that and would obviously like that to continue through the implementation process.

Some markets operate differently in Scotland, either because they are entirely devolved because there are fewer providers and therefore lower levels of competition, or because consumers access services differently, for example, due to geography. It is important that, within the overall UK framework, the system can respond to those regional differences or local issues. We hope that the additional levels of flexibility granted to the CMA under the Bill will allow for a more flexible and targeted response, particularly if any local practices cause detriment. We look forward to liaising with the CMA on that. Noyona may wish to make additional comments, given that she is in Northern Ireland.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Noyona, you mentioned that you felt that the CMA should not be the only enforcement body that oversees the legislation. Who else do you think has the experience and expertise to perform some of those significant obligations?

Noyona Chundur: There is a heightened risk, Minister, if the new direct enforcement powers sit only with the CMA. Ultimately, the purpose of those powers is to be much more agile, flexible and responsive to consumer detriment in the market. Is there a heightened risk that enforcement will default to the CMA because perhaps it may deliver a solution that is much more agile and responsive and much more in keeping with the pace of detriment in the marketplace compared with a courts-based system? The sector regulators and trading standards could therefore have the same or similar powers. The question is about agility and responsiveness to detriment, which is exploding in the marketplace. We see it increasingly, particularly in digital markets, which evolve so quickly. That is our perspective.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Q The Bill aims to protect consumers and challenge unfair competition online, but one significant disadvantage for British companies and consumers is counterfeit goods sold on platforms such as Amazon. For example, the British company that holds a licence to make Peppa Pig toys has the trademark and the patent, and meets the standards, including safety standards, but counterfeit goods, particularly those imported from other countries such as China, are dangerous and do not meet safety conditions. Will the Bill help end that situation for consumers and companies here? Is it an opportunity to do so or, if not, is it amendable to achieve that?

Peter Eisenegger: The Bill has clauses that allow us to address that in terms of, “Has the information put before the consumer been complete and accurate?” If something does not comply with safety standards, that has been omitted. It is a question of interpretation that we would have to nail down and make clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Finally, the other thing we have heard a lot around this Bill is the length of time it has taken us to get to this place. We had the digital competition expert panel set up in 2018, and the Bill’s impact assessment now suggests that the provisions in the Bill will not be fully operational until 2025 at the earliest. Can our digital economy wait that long?

Professor Myers: I do not think I have seen that full timeline to 2025, but I guess what I would say in that respect is that, yes, this legislation has taken a while to come to fruition. At one point the UK looked like it was going to legislate before the European Union, but the CMA has done a lot of preparatory work, and I am sure that it recognises that it needs to hit the ground running as soon as this legislation is passed. It is doing market studies and other work now. It is a well-resourced regulator in this area. The digital markets unit is up and running and doing active work, and obviously my digital expert role is trying to assist them in that work. There will undoubtedly be a time for implementation, but the CMA is well aware of the need to get on with it.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q You may have heard my question earlier. Some of the firms that are likely to be designated as SMS might argue that this Bill will prevent them from innovating. Do you see any chance of that? Are there any areas within the Bill that make it likely that innovation will be inhibited?

Professor Myers: I do not think it is that likely. It would be interesting to hear specific examples. As for the one that was commented on earlier, I did not quite see why this Bill would prevent that, as Professor Fletcher outlined. It may be that I have not heard the full set of reasons as to why it might prevent Amazon’s innovation in the very different area of retail outlets. The reason, which again goes back to the targeted and tailored approach in the UK, is that when the CMA designates specific digital activities where there is substantial entrenched market power and indeed a position of strategic significance, that is not going to include peripheral areas. It is going to be focused on what some people call the core areas of market power of the large tech companies, because that is where the market power concerns are largest. There is significant freedom outside that.

There are concerns about leveraging market power in the core markets into other markets, and it is appropriate for there to be an ability to address that through things like conduct requirements. However, you cannot introduce a new regulatory regime without some risk around how the incumbents—the regulated companies—are going to respond. Obviously you are looking for good responses, but it is almost impossible to avoid some undesirable effects. The way this Bill is set up, however, looks to minimise those adverse effects.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q I know you are an expert in ex ante regulation. Obviously the way in which people can appeal any intervention by the CMA or the DMU would be only by JR, rather than on the merits method. Is that the right standard?

Professor Myers: Again, I think the Bill strikes quite a good balance with the judicial review approach. To bring in some practical experience from my days at Ofcom, I have had a role as an expert witness in quite a number of appeals of Ofcom decisions, in front of both the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the High Court. At the Competition Appeal Tribunal, those have been under different standards: there used to be a full-merits review, but recently that was changed to a judicial review.

I think what matters, as well as the legal standard of review as laid out in this legislation, is the nature of the appeal body. In this case, it is the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Compared with the High Court, these are specialists—both judges and lay members—with specialist knowledge and experience of dealing with both competition and regulatory cases. They have a greater appetite to get into the detail and merit issues, to the extent that that is compatible with the judicial review standard, than the High Court would. Having appeared in front of the Competition Appeal Tribunal under a judicial review standard, I can say, as I think Professor Fletcher did, that that is not a walk in the park for the regulator. You get a thorough testing, and what the Competition Appeal Tribunal is looking to identify is clear errors of either law or reasoning. I think that that is an appropriate way to strike a balance here.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I want to pick up on the answers you gave earlier when my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd was talking about the delays in reaching this point and the length of time it will take for the Bill to go through. If there are any further delays, particularly if we reach 2025 before this is operational, what do you see some of the risks being in the meantime?

Professor Myers: You heard some evidence earlier this afternoon about the relationship between jurisdictions in different countries. Clearly, the Digital Markets Act in the European Union is being implemented at the moment and the effects of that will come in. The longer the UK legislation takes, the more that will condition the context within which the CMA will have to operate in implementing this regime. That is probably the most likely thing. There are obviously some other countries that are looking into that, but that is probably the main issue I would point to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q In your view, should more powers be given to trading standards as well? I was not quite clear on where you saw a role for the CMA and trading standards together.

Graham Wynn: I think it is important that they co-operate and that there is a clear line of responsibility for each and a clear demarcation. The real problem with trading standards is not so much their powers but their lack of resources. One business with over 2,000 stores —not a supermarket—said the other day that the number of inspections and the number of times they see a trading standards officer has come down dramatically in the last few years. It makes it very difficult for those who are responsible for compliance in the business to persuade those who are responsible for, say, marketing and promotions to keep in line. The lack of trading standards activity makes that more difficult and also leads to a playing field that is not totally level. The problem is resources.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Mr Wynn, you mentioned schedule 18 and not adding to the list without proper evidence. Is it your position then that we should not at this point in time add fake reviews to that list and that we should go through a proper process of consultation before we decide what to do about that?

Graham Wynn: The view is, as I said, that we do not want to see what I call knee-jerk reactions to Daily Mail items that are politically sensitive or are political problems. The obvious answer is to say, “Let’s add it to schedule 18 as a banned practice.” It really is important that the schedule and what is in it is clear, clearly understood and that we do not add or subtract from it just on the basis of needing to get over a political problem, for example.

You can make sure that you do proper consultation and all that sort of thing, but we can understand why the Government would want to be able to add to it more quickly—obviously, primary legislation takes a while. In Europe, we certainly argued against Governments or the Commission being able to add to it willy-nilly. We were keen to keep it as something that had to be put in the directive originally. On balance, we would rather it was debated fully and that it amended legislation. Alternatively, you could decide to make changes once a year, say, rather than as you go along. That might be an alternative answer to the danger of a knee-jerk reaction.

[Neil Coyle]

Q I want to see the wild west tackled. As the Bill is drafted, will the consumer detriment provisions be sufficient to tackle producers or suppliers of products that reach UK consumers via platforms such as Amazon, or do the platforms need tackling for responsibility and enforcement action?

Graham Wynn: I should say that Amazon is a member of the BRC, so I preface my comments with that. Amazon does tell me that it is using AI and other means of ensuring there are not fake reviews, and that it takes as much responsibility as it can for product safety on its sites and for illegal products. Clearly others have a different view and think that it would be possible to go further and Amazon should be legally obliged to take more responsibility.

Again, throughout the Bill, the issue will be resources for enforcement, as it is in general. Be it fake reviews, subscription traps or the responsibilities of marketplaces and platforms, unless there is real, effective enforcement, people get the impression that something has been done without really having the rights that the Government say they have—when I say people, I mean consumers.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q On that very point, it is something that we are keen to tackle—and Mr Coyle is right to raise it, as he has done several times today. You have talked about an evidence-based approach to this. You will be aware that we will shortly launch the product safety review, which will tackle some of these issues, including the clarification of online marketplaces’ responsibilities in terms of ensuring the safety of products. Do you think that is the right place to deal with this, rather than the Bill?

Graham Wynn: Yes. I think it needs to be done, but without committing us, we would expect it to be done in the context of a product safety review and how you are going to deal with product safety issues in the future. It needs a thorough examination, including the role of marketplaces, their general obligations and what is practical and proportionate. I would not add that to this Bill now, because it requires more of an assessment and consideration than would be possible.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q An area that we have not covered is much is alternative dispute resolution. Part 4 of the Bill would make accreditation of ADR providers compulsory unless an exception applies. How effective do you think that provision will in protecting consumers, and do you think it is the right approach?

Graham Wynn: ADR is not something that our members are exercised about in the same way as some other people are. Those who are responsible for selling high-value items tend to be members of ADR schemes. Their criticism of the current arrangement has been that they are not convinced that there is a full assessment of the ADR providers, so everything that is necessary to give them the confidence to use the systems. They believe that that perhaps has held back ADR schemes from really taking off in some places.

Those who sell high-value items—kitchens, some white goods and furniture items—generally are members of ADR schemes. Those who sell groceries, as they are generally called these days, including food and non-food, tend to feel that it is not really appropriate for them because of the cost. When dealing with something worth only a few pounds, it is much cheaper and much more sensible to just deal with the consumer and, ideally, give them their money back if there is a problem, rather than take everyone through ADR. It is not necessarily the best approach. However, the accreditation system and making sure that companies abide by what they are supposed to do in ADR is vital to have confidence in general.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Carter]

Q You wrote an article in The Times recently about fast-growing British tech firms seeing acquisition by the US giants as a viable exit route. Do you think the Bill might change any of that?

Max von Thun: Yes, to an extent. The merger requirements for SMS firms are really just about reporting. They require SMS firms to let the CMA know if they are acquiring companies that meet certain thresholds. That will allow the CMA to avoid things slipping under its radar. Another part of the Bill is about what is called an acquirer-focused threshold, which is basically designed to prevent what have often been called killer acquisitions from taking place. Those are acquisitions that do not meet the UK’s merger control thresholds when it comes to turnover or market share, because they are very small start-ups that do not generate much revenue but that often produce very innovative technology.

The tech giants buy them up either to prevent eventual rivals from emerging or to use that technology to extend their dominance into new markets. The Bill will prevent some of that. That means, to an extent, that in some cases involving very large platforms it will be harder to be bought up if you are a start-up. It is important to acknowledge that to an individual founder being bought up by a big tech firm can often be attractive. Big tech firms can pay a lot of money to acquire you. They can offer all sorts of technical and logistical expertise to help you to grow, but if we look at the wider ecosystem, those deals can be very harmful, essentially by eliminating competition.

Think of what Instagram might have become had it not been bought up by Facebook. Rather than just being part of Meta’s business model, it could be challenging Facebook. To take a more local example, DeepMind, a leading AI company, was bought by Google in 2014. Had it not been, it would be an independent AI company. That would have put the UK at the forefront of a lot of the development in general AI. Obviously, the UK is already doing well in AI, but now DeepMind is part of Google’s empire and subordinate to Google’s business objectives. Those are some of the reasons we should care about this.

Also, if you make it a little harder for these companies to buy up start-ups, the market will respond. The UK already has a lot of alternatives. It has a very healthy venture capital scene—I think the best in Europe. If it is harder for big tech purchases to take place, investors will partly fill that space. I am sure that there are things that the Government can do as well to incentivise private investment—maybe investing themselves in some cases, as they did with the Future Fund, and so on. There are a lot of other routes that, in the long run, are better for the tech sector than these types of deals.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q Thank you for your evidence. You probably heard my questions from earlier. We are very keen to ensure that innovation continues, not just in terms of the start-ups and scale-ups but with our big tech firms. Do you see anything in the Bill that will inhibit that?

Max von Thun: Honestly, not really. If I look at what is in the legislation, focusing on the conduct requirements and the PCIs that the large firms will have to comply with, what I see is something that says, “You’re allowed to operate in the UK. You’re allowed to grow in the UK. You’re allowed to invest. You just have to play by the rules. You can’t use your dominance to unfairly exploit small businesses or prevent rivals from emerging.” It does not stop them investing lots of money in R&D or hiring top talent. We are seeing all the innovation that they are doing now, and I do not see anything in the Bill that will stop that.

More broadly, there is quite a lot of evidence, not just in tech but in other sectors, that more competitive and less concentrated markets are better for innovation because challengers invest a lot of money in trying to take on the incumbents because they believe that they can replace them. The dominant firms have to defend themselves, and they invest more to protect themselves. The Bill will have that effect.

Lastly, particularly since the whole debate around Microsoft and Activision, we have seen to an extent an attempt to conflate the interests of a small subset of dominant firms with the wider tech sector. That is often a mistake. What is good for a large majority of tech start-ups may not necessarily be good for big tech firms. It may be, but it is important to separate out the two.

[The Chair]

Are there any further questions? In that case, on behalf of the Committee, thank you very much for coming to give evidence.

Examination of Witnesses

John Herriman and David MacKenzie gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Sorry, in the interests of time—we may have to go to a vote shortly—I have just one small question, and then I will hand over to colleagues. You said in your evidence that it is important that more is done, because there is nothing requiring online marketplaces and other collaborative platforms to make buyers aware of who the seller is—whether it is a business or a private seller—and that that has implications for consumer rights. Could you explain a bit more about what you think needs to happen that is not in the Bill?

David MacKenzie: Absolutely. A lot of the stuff in the Bill that replaces the consumer protection regulations is really good, and we really welcome it. There is still some stuff around the definition of “trader” that we think is a little bit of a missed opportunity.

There are two angles. When does a consumer become a trader? How many things do you have to sell in an online marketplace before you become a trader? That is a difficult judgment for us to make and we feel that some work should be done on that. The point you have made is equally important: the status of the seller in an online marketplace. We think there should be a requirement for the online marketplace to declare whether the seller is a consumer or a business because that makes a massive difference to the consumer rights of the buyer and it also makes a difference to what we do.

If someone is a business seller, they have to comply with all consumer law; if they are a private seller, they do not really have to comply with anything, so this is for both consumers and for us. To be fair to other businesses that operate on the site, we think this is a necessary change that is not in the Bill.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q You make some important points that we seek to deal with in creating a fair and level playing field and protecting consumers at the same time. There is the whole point about whether an online marketplace is a distributor, retailer or whatever else. Do you think those questions are best resolved in this legislation or in the product safety review, which we have committed to do and brings in many other things that you have referenced already?

John Herriman: That was another point that we wanted to make. This is not the only legislation that impacts on the landscape: the product safety review is fundamentally important in this space. The key point there is being clear on where those boundaries are.

We will be contributing to the product safety review. It is fundamentally important that it should come out quickly, so that we can address it and respond to the consultation. We can then look at that in the context of this Bill and others that it might impact on as well. We think that some things would be best placed in the product safety review—anything to do with legislation there—and would not appear here. But it is important that those provisions work hand in hand over a similar period, so that we can make sure that there are not any gaps. Consumers will then be better protected and businesses will have the clarity that they need, which is really important for them.

David MacKenzie: I agree with everything John said, but if we leave all these issues to the product safety review, presumably that would apply only to unsafe products. There is a wider range of situations for which we need these take-down powers when it comes to fair trading—scams and so on.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q And the Online Safety Bill does not deal with that?

David MacKenzie: No.

[The Chair]

If there are no other brief questions, I bring this session to a close. I thank the panel on behalf of the Committee. This is perfectly timed as there will be votes shortly and we will be away for quite a long time. Thank you very much. We have spared you having to wait an hour or so.

Examination of Witnesses

Owen Meredith, Peter Wright and Dan Conway gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q You answered my question, but are you concerned that by that point the tech companies will use this as a delaying mechanism, which will help proliferate disinformation and misinformation online by people who claim to be journalists? Provisions in the Online Safety Bill enable anybody to be a journalist, and will prevent that information or fake news—for want of a better phrase—from being taken down.

Peter Wright: The crossover between the two Bills is not that great. The real risk regarding fake news is that the most expensive news to produce is the high-quality public interest journalism that I am sure everybody in this room wants to encourage. If you cannot fund it, and at the moment it is a great struggle to fund it, the space will be taken by people who are not proper journalists and are not working for responsible news organisations with complaints procedures and people you can sue if you get it wrong.

The really serious danger is that because the online platforms have over the last 20 years sucked billions of pounds out of the news production in this country, the internet will be filled with conspiracy theorists and people producing cheap, easy-to-manufacture news, largely copied from other outlets.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q In your organisation’s written evidence, you took a different view from some of our earlier witnesses, who think we are not going far enough in terms of making it easy for people to exit a subscription only to opt back in. Yours said that actually we should make it slightly more difficult, for example, by taking away the cooling off periods and making the exit subscription slightly different in terms of allowing people to take advantage of other offers, which might confuse the process of unsubscribing. I am interested to hear your views on that.

Owen Meredith: We broadly support the Government’s policy and intent as I understand it in terms of helping consumers to manage subscriptions, particularly subscriptions that they are not aware they are in or for services they are not using. My concern and our organisational concern is that currently it is set out in the Bill too prescriptively, and there is a real danger that you end up in a situation where consumers are being bombarded by subscription notices and they become blind to them.

I would put the analogy out there of the cookie banner, which I think they are hoping to get rid of through different legislation before the House at the moment. There is a danger that consumers are just blinded by the amount of information they are being presented with as stand-alone notices, with the frequency and nature in which they have been spelt out in legislation. While I do not fundamentally disagree with the Government’s policy intent, I do not think how it has been crafted in the Bill at the moment necessarily achieves that in the way we would need it to.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q I get that, but if you are in a situation where you are subscribed to just one service and there is not a forest of different emails coming in saying your subscription is ending, the effects of your suggestions would make it more difficult for people to exit contracts.

Owen Meredith: It would not make it more difficult for people to exit contracts; it would ensure that consumers still have access—

[Kevin Hollinrake]

The cooling off period was—

Owen Meredith: It would ensure that consumers still have access to the offers that would be available to them in the current system of processing. If you subscribe to a service that you are using and you wish to terminate it, there are multiple ways you can do that, either via online touchpoints for most of our subscribed services at the moment or via a call centre. If a call centre phoned you and said, “You’ve been using this service for 12 months. We can identify through data that you have been reading the content. Can we ask you what the reason for cancelling is and if we can retain you as a customer with the right promotion?”, I think that would be in the consumer’s interest.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Q But the removal of the cooling off period would make it more difficult for some people to exit a contract, wouldn’t it?

Owen Meredith: The removal of the cooling off period for us is a concern around how that technically applies and whether consumers have had benefit that they are then seeking to be refunded for, despite having engaged with and received the benefit.

[Dean Russell]

Q We live in an era where we talk about consumers, who might be consuming services or products—but they also might be consuming news. How will the consumers of journalism benefit from or be impacted by the Bill?

Peter Wright: They will benefit through the quality of the journalism they are offered. Every news organisation —we are no exception; we went through a period of redundancies earlier this year—is having to trim their editorial budgets, because you cannot make sufficient revenue in the present digital advertising market to support the scale of editorial resource that you would really like.

Commercial news publishers have seen revenues falling, despite inflation, over the last two decades. At some point, we need to have a mechanism that gives us—this particularly applies to smaller and regional publishers—a level playing field and levers we can pull to bargain with these vast companies. I have colleagues who work at not inconsiderable regional publishing companies, who do not even have a telephone number they can ring at Google, so they just have to accept whatever terms Google offers. We are slightly more fortunate in that we can ring Google, but we do not necessarily get an answer.

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Great Yarmouth

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Wednesday 7th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Kevin Hollinrake)]

I am sorry that I cannot emulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Great Yarmouth (Brandon Lewis) by speaking without notes, but I will do my best to ad lib a little. I thank him for securing this important debate. I love his words that SMEs drive the whole economy. It brought back the words of Winston Churchill about the private sector; he said that some people see private enterprise as a predatory tiger that needs to be shot. Some people see it as a cow that needs to be milked. Few people see it for what it really is: the strong horse that pulls the whole cart. That is exactly right. Everything we see in the public sector and in this House is paid for by the private sector, the taxes it raises and the jobs it creates.

I totally agree with my right hon. Friend on the title and the primary content of this debate—SMEs are the most important part of the sector. As he said, I started a very small business and grew it over time, but the pressure we were always under as our business grew was from smaller businesses starting up and putting pressure on our market share. I listened carefully to his points about his father’s business and the legacy effect it has had on Great Yarmouth. That is my experience. Many people go into business for the potential financial reward, but also for the legacy: the jobs they can create and the business that they leave behind. That has a long-lasting effect on towns such as Great Yarmouth.

The Department for Business and Trade is seeking to make the UK the best place to do business in the world. We want to make it easier to do business every single day. My ministerial colleagues and I, as well as many others including my right hon. Friend, the Chancellor and the Prime Minister, are for business because we are from business. We understand how this works.

My right hon. Friend made the point about smaller businesses that start up and grow to become larger businesses. That is the fundamental basis of our strategy to scale up Britain. We want the start-ups to become scale-ups. That is one of our areas for development. We are No. 1 in the OECD for start-ups per capita, but in a survey of 14 OECD nations, we were 13th for scale-ups—businesses that have 10 employees or more after three years. That is our focus, and there are three key focus areas underneath that: access to finance, support and advice, and removing barriers and red tape. Those are critical issues for the SMEs I speak to.

When we speak about business, it is important to speak about the entire world of businesses in all sectors. Hospitality is very important in Great Yarmouth, where 23% of all jobs are in the tourism industry. In his intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Robin Millar) rightly said that the hospitality business feels that cold wind first, but also sees the benefit of the improvement in the economy first, too. It is truly the canary in the coalmine, as he put it.

In Great Yarmouth there are some fantastic opportunities for the future, not least in green energy. My right hon. Friend pointed out the businesses that are benefiting from that. I am aware of ASCO, which employs more than 100 people, providing services to the North sea opportunity that is green energy—30 wind turbines on the Scroby sandbank. There are many more opportunities in that sector.

In the Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth enterprise zone in his constituency, South Denes energy park and Beacon Park are boosting innovation and growth in the region. More recently, investment through the Great Yarmouth town deal and the future high street funds, building on previous support from the local growth fund, is helping the local area by supporting jobs and growth in that region.

I will go into some specifics about the three areas of focus I referred to earlier. First, access to finance is one of the primary concerns for small businesses as they open their doors and grow. We work closely with the British Business Bank to improve access to finance. I am pleased that as of March 2022, the British Business Bank programme has supported over 96,000 small and medium-sized businesses nationally with over £12.2 billion of finance. The programme is designed to bring benefits to start-up businesses, businesses with high-growth potential looking to scale up and businesses looking to stay ahead in the market.

I know my right hon. Friend the Member for Great Yarmouth has supported many initiatives in his time in this place, such as the important start-up loan scheme, which has delivered around £1 billion of finance to 100,000 companies. Those unsecured loans are vital to many people who cannot access finance to start a business. In his constituency, 95 loans have been provided, to a value of almost £800,000.

Inclusion is a priority of this Government, so I am pleased that in terms of all the start-up loans issued up until April 2023, 40% went to women, 20% went to people from a black, Asian or minority background and 32% went to people who were previously unemployed. Those are all disproportionately high numbers, which we should welcome.

Within the space of access to finance, we are also undertaking the payment and cash flow review. We know that is an issue for SMEs and we want to make it easier for them to be paid, as that is another source of finance. We have improved our equity finance offering through schemes such as the regional angels programme, supported by the British Business Bank, and the enterprise investment scheme, the remit of which has been extended.

We are looking at potential new opportunities on the back of open banking. Open banking was a huge success in this country and has been emulated around the world. There are now 7 billion API calls every month for open banking, connecting one banking app with another, and there are other fintech solutions. Open finance provides the opportunity to completely liberate opportunities for SMEs to access finance. Rather than going to their own bank and asking for a loan, they can ask many different providers for that finance, which will increase choice and opportunity.

[Robin Millar]

The Minister is following the speech given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Great Yarmouth (Brandon Lewis) with another very interesting and helpful speech about what SMEs need. He is describing the Government’s role in creating an environment in which SMEs can flourish. Will he comment on the importance of the regulation to which he referred, not just to say that there should be as little of it as possible but to set out what regulation is effective? Will he comment on whether it is right for the Government to intervene when the market is failing?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Hollinrake]

My hon. Friend raises an important point, which I will come to shortly. He is right to say that we should intervene only where there is an exceptional circumstance, such as covid or a cost of living crisis, or where there is market failure, which is where we want to focus. For example, with SMEs working in the hospitality and house building industries, which he and my right hon. Friend the Member for Great Yarmouth both referred to, we know there is market failure and a need for them to access finance. We need to focus on those areas and ensure those sectors are provided with finance, when they cannot get it elsewhere.

The Government provide extensive business support, which is another key focus area, including through the business support helpline, the Help To Grow management scheme and a network of 38 growth hubs across the UK. The Help To Grow management scheme was launched in June 2021, to help close the productivity gap and lay the foundations for growth by providing SMEs with key skills in financial management, marketing and innovation. Our evaluation showed that approximately 90% of SME leaders surveyed reported that the scheme helped and Help To Grow management contributed to improved leadership and management of their business. I encourage my right hon. Friend, and all Members of the House, to share information about the scheme with local SMEs that could benefit from the opportunities it offers.

We know that businesses have emerged from the covid-19 pandemic, only to be faced with rising costs and dampened demand. In the autumn statement, we announced £13.6 billion of support for businesses over the next five years, including through reducing the burden of business rates for SMEs by freezing the business rates multiplier for yet another year, to protect businesses from rising inflation.

Over the winter, the Government intervened in the energy crisis by providing unprecedented support, in the form of the energy bill relief scheme and, more recently, the energy ill discount scheme.

The Government are freezing fuel duty, maintaining the 5p cut for a further year, and reversing the national insurance rise, which will save small businesses an average of approximately £4,200. That is in addition to the support previously announced in the form of an increase in the employment allowance to £5,000, the introduction of a zero rate of VAT on energy-saving materials, and the exemption of small businesses and microbusinesses from regulations where possible. That was raised by my right hon. Friend in his speech. These interventions show that the Government are on the side of small businesses, and understand the unprecedented difficulties that many have faced.

The last key focus is on removing barriers and cutting red tape. We are doing that through many mechanisms, such as improving the processes for public procurement, trade deals with Australia and New Zealand, and the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-Pacific partnership. The working time directive recording requirements will potentially save businesses more than £1 billion a year. Landmark legislation in the form of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill will make it easier for SMEs to access digital marketplaces.

The Government acknowledge that one of the significant barriers faced by SMEs across the country is late payments. We are determined to see those reduced to ensure that SMEs are given the best chance of succeeding and growing. That is why we are conducting a review of business-to-business payment policy, the prompt payment and cash flow review, which is scrutinising existing payment practices and measures. We need a stronger culture of responsibility in large businesses to support the smaller suppliers on which they rely. The Small Business Commissioner addresses small businesses’ complaints about payments and the payment practices reporting duty creates transparency by requiring large companies to report on their payment times, while the prompt payment code sets standards and best practice in payment culture.

We are making substantial investments in Great Yarmouth to help the area to thrive and succeed. The borough secured a £20.1 million towns deal in 2021 to help level up the town. One of the fantastic projects supported by this intervention is the operations and maintenance campus for the energy sector. The town has also secured £13.8 million of future high street funding to help revive the town centre as a vibrant economic, cultural and community hub. That will help the town centre to develop sustainably into the future, supporting footfall, further regeneration and investment.

Great Yarmouth bid successfully in the second round of the levelling-up fund, and the Great Yarmouth riverside gateway project received £20 million to regenerate the railway station and the North Quay area of the town. We recently agreed a landmark devolution deal with Norfolk County Council, which will bring a wide range of benefits to residents and businesses in Great Yarmouth. It includes a £600 million investment for a further 30 years, equating to £20 million per annum, and Norfolk County Council can borrow against that further funding. The Norfolk broadband programme was awarded £5 million through the local growth fund to extend superfast broadband in the county, and it is estimated that that will lead to a £2 billion growth in the local economy and the creation of 1,500 jobs within 15 years.

The Government recognise that this is a challenging time for all businesses and we have provided unprecedented levels of support to help businesses and workers through these difficult times. However, data for Great Yarmouth show a 4% positive difference between the birth and death rates of businesses in Great Yarmouth in 2021, an encouraging sign that businesses are flourishing in the local area and that the local Member of Parliament is being highly effective. Furthermore, 667 Great Yarmouth businesses have been supported by their local growth hub and other partners, and there are 3,585 SMEs in Great Yarmouth in total. Over the last six months, there has been a sharp rise in job postings—vacancies, in other words—in Great Yarmouth, from 1,004 job postings in November 2022 to 2,229 in May 2023. That is a 122% rise. These are the highest vacancy volumes since October 2012 and they illustrate the health of the Great Yarmouth economy and the excellent work and representation by its local Member of Parliament.

Question put and agreed to.

Business and Trade

Kevin Hollinrake Excerpts

Monday 5th June 2023 Ministerial Corrections

The following is an extract from the Second Reading debate on the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill on 17 May 2023.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Between 2009 and 2019, GAFAM—Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft—made more than 400 acquisitions without any regulatory intervention or referral through the voluntary mechanisms.

[Official Report, 17 May 2023, Vol. 732, c. 880.]

Letter of correction from the Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake):

An error has been identified in my opening speech in the Second Reading debate.

The correct information should have been:

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Between 2009 and 2019, GAFAM—Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft—made more than 400 acquisitions with minimal regulatory intervention or referral through the voluntary mechanisms.