British Indian Ocean Territory

Luke Evans Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

My right hon. Friend has made his point very clearly. This Government are not standing up for our values or interests. Nor are they making any effort to demonstrate that they are on the side of our national security. Fundamentally, that is what this debate is all about.

It is diligent work and scrutiny by Conservatives in this House and the other place that has led to the Government being forced to pause this surrender. That has been achieved by our diligent diplomatic engagement with the US Administration, by asking for over 400 parliamentary debates, by securing two Opposition day debates, and thanks to you Mr Speaker, by asking urgent question after urgent question. We are here to demand answers that they never provide, but only hide, all thanks to their shameful outright contempt for Parliament and the British public.

The Opposition have proudly made representations on behalf of the Chagossian people, who have not only been betrayed but are being threatened in Britain. Their families are being intimidated by people associated with the Government of Mauritius, who seem to be learning how to conduct transnational repression from their friends in the Chinese Communist party. This Labour Government will go down in history for many terrible things, but they can now add to that list of shame the repression and betrayal of the Chagossian people. Labour must rethink its deeply corrosive policy, which is putting at risk our security and the safety of the Chagossian people. Instead, we have a weak and feeble Prime Minister, currently on his knees in Beijing, who will do anything possible to push through this deal—a deal that has been constructed and negotiated by his left-wing international lawyer friends, whose views he seems to value much more than the British people and the Chagossian community.

We all know how this has gone completely wrong, although the Prime Minister could still take a different course. It has gone wrong because this surrender is completely unnecessary—because, as the Opposition know, it is based on an advisory opinion. Ministers have failed to give a convincing answer as to why we should accept it, and there is no answer on what enforcement mechanisms would exist, other than some hypothetical comments about the electromagnetic spectrum and the International Telecommunication Union. So tell us today, please.

We have not only a Government of incompetent politicians, but a Government of incompetent lawyers. In the words of President Trump, Labour is surrendering sovereignty “for no reason whatsoever.” Given this Labour Government’s obsession with international law, it is surprising and shocking that they are not just misinterpreting it, but have overlooked essential detail in the 1966 UK-US exchange of notes. This is now the third time I have brought the exchange of notes to the Dispatch Box in just the last week, Mr Speaker. For the avoidance of any doubt in the House or any ignorance on the Government Benches, the 1966 treaty with the USA, which establishes the military base on Diego Garcia, states that the whole of the British Indian Ocean Territory

“shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty.”

It goes on:

“Subject to the provisions set out below the islands”—

all the Chagos islands, not just Diego Garcia—

“shall be available to meet the needs of both Governments for defense”.

This is a legally binding treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States of America on the British Indian Ocean Territory, and any attempt by the UK to surrender sovereignty over BIOT violates international law. Yet when the Government signed and published their treaty on 22 May last year, and then published their surrender Bill, there was not a single mention in either the treaty or the Bill of the need for the exchange of notes.

On Monday, in response to our urgent question, the Minister for the Overseas Territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), said:

“we have been clear throughout that before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass primary and secondary legislation; update the UK-US agreement—the exchange of notes; and put in place arrangements on the environment, maritime security and migration”,—[Official Report, 26 January 2026; Vol. 779, c. 599.]

but this was not mentioned in any of the documents accompanying the legislation, let alone the treaty. When we have questioned this in both Houses, Ministers have merely said:

“Talks are ongoing to update the UK-US Exchange of Letters”,

but the exchange of notes was not even referred to in any of the documents accompanying the legislation.

I think this House deserves an explanation. When did the talks begin? What is the status of the talks? What is the timescale for making changes? Have the Americans raised concerns that the exchange of notes were not part of the original discussions with the US Government last year, when the Prime Minister said that the US supported the treaty? Why did the Government try to force through their surrender Bill without confirming the future of the exchange of notes?

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Negotiations may well be ongoing, but the key question is whether the UK can make a unilateral decision to give away sovereignty without the blessing of the US. This question was posed three times on Monday, and the Minister simply said it is under discussion. Ministers need to answer directly today, so I pose this question now: can this be done unilaterally or not?

[Priti Patel]

Well, this is the perfect debate and opportunity for the Government to answer. Perhaps the Minister would like to intervene right now—I would be very happy for her to answer that question.

I have another question for the Minister: have the American Administration questioned why the British Government would want to give up sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory and, in doing so, violate international law? For once, the Minister needs to just be straightforward and give precise answers to the precise questions asked by those on the Opposition Benches, because the Government have continuously failed to do so.

British taxpayers, by the way, rightly want an explanation as to why their taxes should line the pockets of the Government of Mauritius without full and proper scrutiny and the disclosure and transparency that they deserve. Perhaps the Minister can tell us what exactly the National Security Adviser, Mr Powell, and the former ambassador, Lord Mandelson—remember him?—told the US Administration about the surrender treaty. It is well known that the Government are run by their friends and cronies, and it is also well known that Jonathan Powell, a friend of China, accelerated the negotiations when he was appointed envoy in September 2024. And can anyone in this House really trust anything that Lord Mandelson would have been involved in? That is definitely a question for the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I will finish my remarks on this point. The ICJ concluded that

“the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible”.—[Interruption.]

The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) may want to listen the next bit. The 2019 advisory opinion was followed in 2021 by a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in a case about delimitation of the boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives, which ruled that Mauritian sovereignty was inferred from the ICJ’s determination.

[Dr Luke Evans]

rose—

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I give way to the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans).

[Dr Evans]

Specifically on that point, the 2021 judgment did not have any British representation and rested on the UN’s non-binding judgment. We also know from the 2015 ruling that that court cannot preside over sovereignty, so how does it stand up to scrutiny that the Minister is saying that there is a dire need to hand the islands over?

[Seema Malhotra]

The hon. Member will know that these matters have been shared before with the House. Perhaps I may remind him what US Secretary Hegseth said:

“The UK’s (very important) deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key”—[Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

I have actually enjoyed seeing what the Foreign Office has been doing over the past few weeks. I was trying to determine why I have been getting so much more enjoyment out of it, and I think it is because it has been taking advice from “Monty Python and the Holy Grail”. Every time we have a Foreign Office question, the Black Knight comes in front of us. They are honourable, brave and doughty; they will not answer a question; they are torn limb from limb, and their arguments are struck down one by one; but they still want to have the fight.

[Mr Francois]

It’s a flesh wound!

[Dr Evans]

It is indeed. I applaud the Government and their Ministers for doing that.

We hear time and again from Government Members that we have had ample time to debate these issues. I entirely agree, but that is exactly the problem. These debates have been going on for so long because we are not getting the answers that we need to do our job and scrutinise this deal. Anyone making a good argument should be able to justify their point and evidence it. I will summarise some of the key questions that I want answered, and will say why we seem stuck. I will then explain why that matters, and, finally, will give the context of this debate.

First, we ask about the legal position. The Government say that there is legal jeopardy, but the Conservatives contend that what the International Court of Justice says is non-binding, that there is no court that could pass judgment, and that there is a Commonwealth opt-out. The Government say that the cost is £3.4 billion; the Government Actuary says that the figure is £34 billion, and the Conservatives contend that the Government are using the wrong tool to make a judgment on cost, because net present value does not count. When it comes to the environment, the Government say that safeguards are in place, but the Conservatives contend that Mauritius does not have a navy that would enable it to hold up its side of the bargain and prevent damage to fishing.

Turning to the nuclear aspect, we Conservatives recognise that the Pelindaba treaty creates a conflict, and the Government have not explained why it does not. As for the US’s involvement and whether it has a veto, we believe that the 1966 agreement would need to be taken into account. Finally, although it has not been mentioned today or over the past few weeks, there is the long-term security of this base. At the end of 99 years, there is only an option for us to buy and continue, so what happens at that point? We have not secured the long-term security of the base at all.

[Lincoln Jopp]

My hon. Friend will have heard the Minister for the Indo-Pacific, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), list the preconditions before treaty ratification can take place. I am pretty sure that I asked about America, and she said that there needed to be an exchange of letters. The position of the American Administration is that the Chagos deal as proposed by His Majesty’s Government would be

“an act of GREAT STUPIDITY”.

We seem quite a long way from getting American agreement and acquiescence. Does my hon. Friend, like me, foresee that we would need a protracted period of negotiation with the United States of America to get its acquiescence to this deal?

[Dr Evans]

Fundamentally, the US should express its concerns publicly, and it has now done so. We have asked Ministers, both in this debate and on Monday, whether the UK Government can make a unilateral decision without amending the notes. The Government have said that they have to amend the notes, but they have not set out what happens if the US does not agree. That is the key part of this, but the Government keep reading out the same answer that I got on Monday when I asked that question, the same answer that I got when I intervened on the Minister, and the same answer that my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) got. They say that they have set out the process, which is primary legislation, secondary legislation, and then amendments to the notes. The question is: what happens if the Americans do not agree to that amendment of the 1966 notes? I will take an intervention if the Minister can tell us, because the fundamental point about US involvement is this: if they say no, but we say yes, where do the islands go? What happens to the agreement? What happens if they say yes and we say no? Those fundamental questions are why we keep coming back to this issue. If there was clarity and simple answers to simple questions, the Opposition would understand that and be able to make a balanced judgement. Instead, we have gaps in our understanding from the Government.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech, but I think he knows the answers to those simple questions. The answer to the question whether Mauritius could stop us having nuclear weapons stored on Diego Garcia is clearly that it would be able to do so. It is clear that the answer to what happens if the Americans say no to changing the 1966 agreement is that this deal to get rid of our sovereignty over the Chagos islands would be dead in the water. The reason that Ministers will not say those things, even though they know them to be true, is that they are afraid of a headline saying, “Minister admits that Chagos surrender can’t go ahead without American agreement”.

[Dr Evans]

My right hon. Friend is entirely right in pinpointing some of the issues, and I will reverse my speech and deal with some of those first. On the 1996 Pelindaba treaty, formally ratified in 2009, although the whole treaty is about where countries can research and what they can do with nuclear weapons, the key part, article 4, is about the prevention of parking of nuclear explosives. Paragraph 1 states:

“Each Party undertakes to prohibit…the stationing of any nuclear explosive device”

on its territory. By definition, if the base goes across to Mauritius, it will be under the treaty, because Mauritius is a signatory. There is a slight misconstruing, because there is a specific carve-out. Paragraph 2 states:

“Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields”,

and it goes on.

What the treaty implies, and what it states specifically, is that Mauritius would have to be consulted and provide explicit permission for nuclear craft, whether submarine, boat or aircraft, to be there. Only yesterday we heard that that permission would not be granted. This question on the security of the nuclear aspect is unanswered, and I look forward to the Government trying to rectify that position, because they have not explained the interaction with the treaty. This is not operational; it is purely about legal text.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech, which contains more detail than the Government’s contribution. In a nutshell, is the fundamental problem not that when we give away British sovereign territory to another nation, we are vulnerable in perpetuity—whatever agreement we have sitting around it—to that agreement being torn up, disagreed with and not implemented?

[Dr Evans]

Absolutely. On a technicality, the Minister is right to say that the treaty in front of us has no problems, but at the end of the day it is about the interaction with other treaties once we have signed it and sovereignty has been given away. My hon. Friend is right that things would not be covered once Diego Garcia no longer belonged to us, and the Government are struggling to explain that difficulty.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I must tweak what my hon. Friend just said. Although there is discretion for the Mauritian Government to give permission for a nuclear-armed vessel to visit temporarily, for example, there is no discretion for nuclear weapons to be stored permanently on Diego Garcia.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

My right hon. Friend is right. From memory, I think he is referring to article 3 of the 1996 treaty, which explicitly talks about researching and so on. The Government need to set out the implications and how that treaty interacts with this treaty that they are signing or want us to ratify.

Let us step back a bit further. We are in this position, the Government argue, because of a non-binding ICJ judgment. I will ask the Minister again: with which court does he believe there would be a problem? The Government have said time and again that we could be brought into conflict with several courts. The Defence Secretary was worried about the United Nations convention on the law of the sea and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but we already know from a 2015 ruling against the UK over Mauritius that they cannot judge sovereignty, so that one is out the window.

Earlier, I asked the Minister, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) about this issue, and she mentioned the 2021 special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. As she will know, the UK was not party to give information to that, and it rested on the non-binding judgment of the ICJ, which is already contested. There is an opt-out, because it is a Commonwealth interaction. Months on, the Government still cannot answer these simple questions.

Another body that is often referred to—we will go over this again—is the International Telecommunication Union. We know from the Government’s own written answers that article 48 of the ITU constitution states that it cannot judge sovereignty. The Government know that, and I do not understand why they will not just stand here and say that.

On finances, the figures and what they are made up of is contested. The Government are right on their figure, and the Opposition are right on our figure, but how can that be? It is because of the mechanism being used to judge that value. The Opposition contest that the best way to work out the figure is the nominal value used by the Government actuaries. The deal is over 100 years, and we have to take into account what things will look like and other factors. The Government actuaries say that the cost is £34 billion, yet the Government are using net present value, which gives us £3.4 billion. I am glad that the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry is here, because I posed this question to him in the last debate, and his answer was that the figure is in the Green Book. I retorted:

“Can the Minister point to any other country in the world that has used NPV to give away sovereignty?”—[Official Report, 9 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 748.]

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I ran the Department for Work and Pensions, which spent the whole time looking at net present value. The key problem is that we do not use net present value when dealing with a foreign country for a very simple reason: we have no idea what social issues will erupt or change. While we have control in the UK, we do not have control of a foreign country. That immediately distorts the payment amount, plus net present value strips out relevant inflation, which makes it much cheaper, officially. The real cost that we have to bear is the £34.7 billion that the actuaries have stated, not this nonsense of net present value.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend, who has experience of running a Department. I find it all the more frustrating that Ministers cannot simply set out the difference between the two values when I as a Back Bencher can spot it and explain it. The question is which is the better tool and why.

Net present value has domestic use, and that is why the Office for National Statistics will not come out and say that there is a problem with it. It is a legitimate tool to use, but it is being used inappropriately when we are dealing with sovereignty. The assumptions that the Government are building their figure on are 3.5% for the first 30 years, but this is a 99-year lease. We do not even know what will happens with the other 70 years. If we compare with other countries, we see that the US uses a 7% social discount rate.

We are posing simple questions, doing our job on the Opposition Benches, trying to get answers from Ministers as to why we would use this net present value. When we take everything into account, if we use simply an inflation-adjusted amount, it is £10 billion. There are three figures out there that are all correct, but all stand to be used in a different way. The fact that a Minister repeatedly cannot answer those questions is of due concern to Opposition Members.

I will turn to the size of the environmental aspect. It has been pointed out multiple times that Mauritius does not have a navy or a force to protect the blue planet programme that is in place. Why am I concerned about that? We know that the 2015 UNCLOS tribunal was all about the fact that the UK wanted to put more protections in, but the Mauritians wanted fishing rights in the area—we already have history there—yet we would not have the Navy to enforce protections. It is a simple question for the Government to answer: how will they resolve that problem?

[Sir Alec Shelbrooke]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that were this deal to go ahead, there will be a need for more Navy, which is expensive? At the end of the day, the increases to the defence budget that we are being told about will be used to pay for this ridiculous deal.

[Dr Evans]

Quite possibly. We already know that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has its blue planet programme to help to protect environmental areas that were, or are, under British control. Does this come under the FCDO budget as well? We still do not know the answers to these questions—very simple questions, which we have been asking for the past year.

On the matter of the Chagossians, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) raised a very simple principle. Again, I am confused by what the Government are saying. The Prime Minister himself has said that Greenlanders will decide for Greenland, yet Chagossians cannot decide for Chagos. I understand that there could be an argument one way or the other, but the Government apparently will not make it. They do not seem to see the illogical nature of what they are putting forward when they make a statement referring to sovereignty in one area, but make no statement that would apply to the case that we are discussing today.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that British Chagossians will be given no say in how a trust fund is to be spent, and that it is simply wrong that they are being given no opportunity to have any personal say in the matters that will affect them and their futures?

[Dr Evans]

Absolutely. That is another perfectly sensible question to pose to the Government, and for them to answer and to set out the reasons and the rationale.

I am still concerned, when we are dealing with the detail, about the long-term nature of the deal and whether it is bomb-proof. When we come to the end of 99 years, what will happen? The only protection we have is that we have first say on taking it on. We have already heard, from Members on both sides of the House, how much China’s economy will grow. Will we even have the finances to buy that deal? Will we be outbid by the United States, by China, or by some other BRIC power? We are held over a barrel by the Mauritians, or, worse still, the Mauritians can simply say, “We don’t want it any more”, and the base is gone and we can do nothing about it.

Why does all this matter? Those are all technical questions that I want the Government to answer, but overall we must see the wider context, which has been explained here numerous times before. The United States is changing its foreign policy, China is changing its foreign policy, yet the UK does not appear to have an approach in either direction. It appears that we are looking towards a sphere of influence, with America having one side and China and Russia having another. So the question for the House is, “Why rush this through?” Why not think about it? Why not answer these simple questions, to get this side of the House on board, so that we could then say, “We think this is the right thing for the country?

The saddest aspect of this whole debate is the way in which the Government have turned it into a scapegoating of the Opposition as if we were playing political games, rather than seeing that the simple technical questions that need to be answered are the key to unlocking our understanding. If we as parliamentarians cannot get answers to these questions and do not understand the rationale, how can we explain it to our constituents, how can we explain it to the nation, and how can we explain it to the world? If the Government want us to stop—supposedly—playing politics, I ask them to give simple answers to simple questions, back them up and give evidence for them. Otherwise, we are left fighting the Black Knight, who is brave, who is forthright, who is keen to stand in the way of any progress, but who simply will not answer a question and is cut down, limb by limb, in a pool of blood.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I will now announce the result of today’s deferred Division on the Draft Medical Devices (Fees Amendment) Regulations 2026. The Ayes were 294 and the Noes were 108, so the Ayes have it.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry (Luke Pollard)]

What a terrible example of collective amnesia. In the entire debate, not a single Tory MP could say why they started the negotiations.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way?

[Luke Pollard]

I am happy to take interventions if Conservative MPs can start their intervention with the reason why their Government started the negotiations. If it is true, as the shadow Defence Secretary says, that this is a crazy deal, why did the Conservatives start it? If it is true that it damages our national security, why did they start it? There has not been an answer from a single one of them, but let us see if the hon. Member can give it a go.

[Dr Evans]

I am surprised that a party that represents trade unionists does not understand that when there is a dispute between one party and another, it is a good thing to try to talk about it. [Interruption.] Why did we start negotiations? Because there is a dispute, and we need to talk to other people to understand what is going on. That is exactly what any responsible country should do. There is a difference between signing off a treaty and entering into talks with someone. Trade unionists should know that.

[Luke Pollard]

It is a curious position to hold: the previous Conservative Government started negotiations because they wanted to act like a trade union. I think that is a poor example.

I was asked a number of important questions in the debate, and I am happy to reply to some of them, but I will start with some context. It is staggering that the Conservatives in government held 11 rounds of negotiations—85% of the negotiations were conducted with them—and yet seem to have collective amnesia. They seem to think that they stopped the deal, but according to a statement on gov.uk on 29 April 2024, the then Prime Minister and the Mauritian Prime Minister

“discussed the progress made in negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on the exercise of sovereignty”

over BIOT. It went on to say:

“Both leaders…instructed their teams to continue to work at pace.”

A general election was called less than a month later. It is staggering that the Conservatives are doing this.

Let me be absolutely clear: when we came into office, we inherited negotiations on this matter that had already had 11 rounds. We reinforced our terms, adding a 24-nautical mile buffer zone, so that no activity can take place there without our say so, and an effective veto on all development in the Chagos archipelago.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Pollard]

Again, the hon. Gentleman did not quite hit my bar, but I am sure I will get a parliamentary question from him about it.

The Conservatives started the negotiations, I am afraid, and they want everyone to forget it. They want the public to forget it; they want their own MPs to forget it. If they cannot do deals, they are in the wrong place.

Some interesting questions were asked today, and I want to try to deal with some of them.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way?

[Luke Pollard]

Madam Deputy Speaker, I have been asked to finish early so that the shadow Cabinet can sit. I do want to ensure that I can get through as many questions as I can before those on the shadow Front Bench need to go and busy themselves in a meeting.

I will try to answer a few of the questions. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller), asked a sensible question about the amendment that his party tabled in the other place. He will appreciate that it is a wrecking amendment, so we could not support it; he will also be clear, though, that we take the issues behind it very seriously. I am glad that he continues to raise the issues of the Chagossians, which are important.

The hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell), who now sits on a different Opposition Bench, raised the issue of resettlement on the outer islands. He made the case that resettlement on the outer islands will help to restore some dignity to the Chagossians, who have been treated appallingly for many decades. He will know that the deal we have signed with Mauritius includes the right to resettle on the outer islands and for visits to take place to Diego Garcia. It might not satisfy all his concerns on the matter, but I hope he can understand that that is a step forward.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) for his speech, in which he talked about uncertainty. As a Defence Minister, I am most concerned about uncertainty around the operation of the base and continuation of disruption. That is what this deal seeks to close off. He was right to raise the matter.

The right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), a former Defence Minister, said that he learns something new every day. Every day can indeed be a school day, and what I have learned today is that when the right hon. Gentleman swapped from the Government Benches to the Opposition Benches, his opinion on the deal miraculously changed, too. He backed it when he was a Minister, and now, on the Opposition Back Benches, he opposes it. That does say something.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (John Slinger) asked the very same question that I started with: why did the Conservatives start these negotiations? It is a question they still cannot answer.

I note that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan) has found his voice, but only after completing his chicken run from the seat he thought he was going to lose to his new one. Let me be absolutely clear on this point: it is shameful that the Conservatives are trying to drag other overseas territories into the mess they are arguing over here. In their speeches, Conservatives have tried to create the impression that the sovereignty of the Falklands is not secure. The Falkland Islands Government have noted that the agreement has

“no impact on the self-determination of the Falkland Islands people, and the existing and future relationship between the Falkland Islands and United Kingdom”.

Let us not hear any more Conservative MPs raising questions over the future of the Falkland Islands.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Luke Evans]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Minister specifically directed some comments at me, opening up an opportunity for me to speak. How can I respond to those comments when I cannot intervene?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

The hon. Member will know that it is entirely at the Minister’s discretion, as it would be for any other speaker, if he chooses to give way or not. It is not a matter for the Chair. I am sure the Minister has heard his comments.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Luke Evans Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

As I have said many times, we continue to engage with the United States every day, as we have throughout the process, and that will continue.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a surprise to see the Minister so ratty and full of bluster, so I am going to ask him a technical question that I would appreciate his answer to. We have talked about the 1966 UK-US exchange of notes; the question is whether the Government can go ahead with the Chagos deal without the US. Where do the Government stand? Does the deal have to have the US’s blessing, or can the Government do it without that blessing, and with no change or negotiation of the 1966 contract?

[Stephen Doughty]

Again, I am slightly baffled by the question, because I answered it right at the beginning when the shadow Foreign Secretary asked me. I will read out my answer again. I said that we had been consistently clear that before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass primary and secondary legislation; update the UK-US agreement—the exchange of notes; and put in place arrangements on the environment, maritime security and migration. Indeed, that was very much the tenor of the answer that was given to Lord Callanan in the other place.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Luke Evans Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

In answer to the intervention by the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), there is more than one veteran on the Labour Benches. I wonder what the veterans from the Conservative party who went through 11 rounds of negotiations under the previous Government were saying; they clearly supported this decision at that point, and there were clear reasons for doing so.

This is not an exercise in process; it is about whether this House chooses to protect on firm, enforceable terms an overseas base that is fundamental to British security and our closest alliances. Diego Garcia is a critical asset for the UK and our allies. It supports counter-terrorism, monitors hostile state activity, and enables the rapid deployment of UK and US forces across regions that matter deeply to our national interest. Those opposing the Bill need to be clear about what they are opposing. They are opposing a treaty that secures the base for 99 years with full operational freedom, one that is backed by our allies and was negotiated substantially under the previous Government.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman be supporting Lords amendment 1, given that he has just specified that the base needs to be used for military purposes? If that use becomes impossible, because the islands go under water, for example—which is a real risk—would he want to carry on paying for the deal?

[Alex Ballinger]

I will not be supporting Lords amendment 1, because it would require renegotiation. We already have a joint commission to deal with issues that arise, and international treaty law would provide routes to termination if we were in that sort of situation, so the amendment is not necessary at all. I will come back to this question later in my speech.

If we refused to comply, others—international organisations and partners—would not ignore any provisional measures that were put in place, undermining the practical operation of the base. That is the same reason that negotiations were started under the last Government, and the treaty contains safeguards that are not decorative, but operationally vital. The UK will control installations and the electromagnetic spectrum; we will control a buffer zone of 24 nautical miles, within which nothing can be built without UK consent; and there will be a strict ban on any foreign military or security presence on the outer islands. Those are precisely the kinds of protections that make the base secure, usable and resilient against interference.

As we are in the Chamber today to consider the Lords amendments, I will go through each in turn. Lords amendment 1 would require renegotiation so that the UK can stop payments if it cannot use the base. On the surface, as others have mentioned, this may sound prudent, but it is a recipe for uncertainty and delay at the very moment that we need clarity. The treaty already establishes a joint commission to deal with issues as they arise, and international treaty law provides routes to termination if an indispensable object for execution permanently disappears. The amendment adds risk, not security, undermining confidence in the treaty framework that we need to keep the base operational.

Lords amendments 2 and 3 were rejected by Mr Speaker. Lords amendment 4 deals with the procedure for orders under clause 6 of the Bill. It is a Government amendment; responding to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, it provides appropriate parliamentary procedure. It strengthens scrutiny and is a sensible refinement to how the Bill operates, and this House should support it.

Lords amendment 5, which deals with the publication of the total costs and methodology, is duplicative. The Government published full details of the financial arrangements on the day that the treaty was signed, including the relevant explanatory material. The methodology is clear: it uses the Office for Budget Responsibility’s inflation forecasts to calculate the average annual figures, and those figures have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. The House of Commons Library reached the same conclusion, and the Office for Statistics Regulation has welcomed this approach. The amendment is not about transparency; it is about rerunning an argument we have had time and again in this House, including through I do not know how many urgent questions.

Lords amendment 6 deals with Commons votes to cease payments if Mauritius breaches the treaty. This would require additional parliamentary steps on anticipated expenditure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Hayes]

Moving forward three pages—those pages were a condensed history of how our country was left completely insecure by the Opposition—to look at Diego Garcia, it is a critical UK asset for national security. We all agree on that in the House. It supports counter-terrorism, monitors hostile states and enables rapid deployment of US and UK forces worldwide. That is, in large part, why the US Administration have backed what this Government have been pushing forward. Recent operations against high-value ISIS targets show its vital role in keeping global trade routes and the British people safe.

With this deal, we have full operational freedom. We have control of installations, communications, logistics and land use with strict safeguards, a UK-controlled electromagnetic spectrum, a 24 nautical mile buffer zone and a ban on foreign military presence on the outer islands. In the interests of giving a briefer speech, I am going to put down the two pages that further explain the way in which the treaty reinforces the UK’s relationship with the Chagos islands and supports our national security.

We have talked about this issue at great length. There have been many urgent questions, statements and debates in the House. The Opposition talk about the importance of national security. This country is facing some of the gravest threats to our national security. We are repelling Russian cyber-attacks and disinformation daily. Our security services are having to fight against Russian spying and sabotage of our infrastructure.

[Dr Luke Evans]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am not sure which amendments are being addressed. There are at least five on the amendment paper to be talked about. I just wondered if Russia is relevant to any of those amendments.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Dr Luke Evans, you need to stop using points of order to continue debates. No doubt Mr Hayes is going to get right to the point and then conclude very quickly.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Wendy Morton]

The point, though, is where is this money coming from? This House has not had a vote. Where is the transparency? Where is the democracy ?

Turning to new clause 2 and amendment 2, as we have already discussed, the duration of the agreement is a matter of serious national security concern. There are too many unanswered questions about what could happen to the base. We need to understand the basis on which the Government have settled that, especially as the then Foreign Secretary told this House on 7 October 2024 that the Government would have a right to extend the lease, which we do not, and the Mauritian Government claim the UK gave up a unilateral right of extension at their request. If that is true, it would be a scandal. No wonder we never get straight answers from Ministers. But then, it was also a scandal for Labour to sign the agreement with a previous Mauritian Government just before that country went into an election, only for there to be a change of Government who then wanted to change the deal and extract more money. Extending the agreement is essential, because we simply cannot lose the base. The House deserves to see the advice that the Government are relying on when they ask us to sign this £35 billion blank cheque.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that under the Bill, if there is no agreement, although we can be first offer, Mauritius can decide simply to close and fold the base, leaving it completely void, so there is no protection against that?

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend is 100% right. This goes to the heart of the Bill. There are so many unanswered questions, which Conservative Members have been raising time and again. For example, how likely are we to be able to extend the base? What will the structure of the negotiations be? What conditions could Mauritius impose, given that it will have our negotiators over a proverbial barrel? How watertight is the first right of refusal?

--- Later in debate ---

[Wendy Morton]

I have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman on many of those matters. We have raised questions about this issue time and again, and we have simply not received the answers from Ministers.

[Dr Luke Evans]

This issue has been disputed. Is it not the point that the United Nations convention on the law of the sea cannot pass judgment on sovereignty because of the ruling that was made between Mauritius and the UK on marine protection back in 2015? That was under annexe VII, which was tried and tested. Britain was found wanting on that, because we had not properly talked through what should happen with the Mauritians. What the Mauritians actually wanted to do was to open it for fishing. How can we assure the protection for this area? That is why we need to amend the Bill.

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly why we have continued and will continue to probe the Government on the MPA. We have not had answers to our questions; we have not had the transparency that I think this House deserves.

It is very possible—in fact, it is very likely—that Labour has committed Britain to helping Mauritius dismantle an MPA that we ourselves established. There are no assurances that we will not be committing British resources to actively harm our own interests and undo our work. Mauritius does not have the capability to manage, monitor or enforce an MPA. It does not have the infrastructure at sea or any such experience. It would leave the stocks in those waters exposed to real risk of pillaging, including by Chinese vessels. It is not likely to have the will to do so either, as we know the economic potential of the waters is of interest to Mauritius.

Despite the Government’s ludicrous and insulting claim that those who oppose this deal side with Russia and its friends, Mauritius has been developing closer ties with Russia on marine matters, announcing as recently as May 2025 that the two countries are strengthening their ties on marine innovation, including marine research, while Mauritius’s close relationship with China—a strategic partnership, no less—opens up the possibility of Chinese fishing trawlers in these waters. It is therefore absolutely right that this House gets a say over the fate of the MPA, and the CRaG-equivalent process set out in our new clause would provide for an appropriate level of scrutiny.

New clause 4 would require regular reporting on the ecological status of the Chagos MPA, which is necessary for the same reason as new clause 3. The Government have bound us to support Mauritius to manage the MPA, so there must be scrutiny of what the Government are doing and the ecological consequences. There are widespread concerns across the House on the future of the MPA, and Ministers have so far failed to give any answers or any assurances; when asked, they have said that they do not know about the future and cannot tell us what resources and costs will be incurred to meet these obligations. Given our role in managing the MPA, the UK should be able to access the data required for this report. This new clause reaffirms our commitment to the MPA.

We recognise the sensitive nature of the military arrangements on Diego Garcia, but oversight of the agreement is none the less essential. New clause 5 would allow for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny while respecting the need to protect critical information. The new clause covers the key areas of security consideration and will act as a catalyst for the Government to maintain their own monitoring of each area. We believe that that is critical as there are holes in the provisions. There must, for example, be agreement on upgrading infrastructure in the buffer zone, such as sensors—but what if there is no agreement? Likewise, the treaty stipulates that Mauritius and Britain must jointly decide on the management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Of particular importance in new clause 5 are paragraphs (d) and (e). On (d), we must ensure that only vessels that should be in the area are in the area, and that Russian and potentially even Chinese vessels are deterred from entering—I have already mentioned the closer ties and partnerships between Mauritius and those countries, which should concern all of us.

With reference to paragraph (e), the treaty states that the United Kingdom agrees

“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia”.

Given the huge range of security threats in the Indo-Pacific and the middle east, it is far from impossible that in future this mechanism may need to be used. It is important that the notifications are presented to the Intelligence and Security Committee, as once again it would force the Government to log and monitor the mechanism, including any operational impacts it might have. We know that there are genuine concerns that third countries—potentially even China—might try to establish themselves in the archipelago, and the arrangements in the treaty must be monitored to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to stop that happening.

New clause 6 probes the Government’s argument that a legally binding ruling under UNCLOS would have an impact on our ability to operate the electromagnetic spectrum, and impede air and sea access as well as the ability to patrol the area around the base. We take issue with that assertion, not least because there is an argument that provisions under article 298 of UNCLOS allow for exemptions relevant to disputes concerning military activities. The Government have not addressed this issue when we have probed, including on Second Reading, so we have had no choice but to table this new clause to test the Government’s assertion.

I turn finally to new clause 7. The British Chagossian community have been treated appallingly by this Labour Government. Twice the deal has ended up in the courts because of the way Labour has ridden roughshod over their concerns. This Bill sells them short, too. The resettlement programme for the Chagos islands under this treaty is entirely in the hands of Mauritius—a country to which, I should add, Chagossians feel little affinity. Indeed, we have seen many Chagossians arriving in the UK from Mauritius in recent weeks. I hope the Minister will respond to that from the Dispatch Box, because it is clearly concerning that they have been moved to take this action.

The Bill also stops British overseas territories citizenship being awarded on the basis of descent from a person born on the Chagos archipelago. Sadly, we cannot amend the treaty through the Bill; it just is not within the parliamentary rules. However, new clause 7 would require the Government to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of the treaty—including on the establishment of the trust fund, which we capitalise and Mauritius distributes—and on areas of dispute arising between the UK and Mauritian Governments prior to their being discussed at the joint committee created by the treaty. It also requires the Foreign Secretary to present a report to Parliament within six months of the Act becoming law, and in every subsequent year, on how Chagossian rights are being upheld under this agreement. We have a national obligation and responsibility to the Chagossian community, and the Conservatives will always stand up for their rights.

To conclude, taken together, our amendments and new clauses will hold the Government to account. Let us be clear: the Conservatives oppose this surrender Bill, its colossal costs and the adverse impact on our defence and security. Accepting these amendments and new clauses will simply strengthen accountability and transparency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The key demand that this House is making is for greater transparency about what is going on behind the scenes with this deal. I implore the House to insist that, before Parliament accepts any new arrangements for the sovereignty of the Chagos islands, Ministers explain what is going on. Specifically, is the Minister aware of any effect on our nuclear posture? Is there any relationship between the deal that is being done today and implications for our deterrent? The base is vital to our national interest, and I would be grateful to understand whether any discussions have been had with reference to the deals that were done many years ago about the relationship with the nuclear deterrent.

[Dr Luke Evans]

I will speak to the amendments, starting with amendments 1 and 7, and take a canter through my position, as my constituents will have an interest in that.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart) asked the important question why. Amendments 1 and 7 try to address the most important issue: context. As my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) pointed out, our signing this deal does not make sense. The Government have been weak in presenting the evidence for why they think we should sign the deal. I wrote to the Government to ask them to explain, and I was able to pull their response apart on Second Reading, one step at a time, explaining why their reasons do not fit.

Context is really important. I thought that the deal did not make sense, but factoring in the collapsed spy trial, the billion pounds provided to the steel factories, the pending decision on the embassy—yes, maybe no—and the change in the language used around the subject of China, we need to get to the heart of what is going on. The amendments are an attempt to do that in the name of transparency, which is hugely important.

[Blake Stephenson]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government are treating China like it is our friend, rather than the threat that it is?

[Dr Evans]

I would be interested to hear an answer to that, as we have tried several times to get the Government to quantify whether China is a threat, a friend, an ally or a foe.

Amendment 7 tries to look at

“an analysis of the status of UK’s sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory under international law;”.

From talking about this previously, we know that UNCLOS, which is often used as the example of why we have to secede the territory, cannot preside over sovereignty, as was said in 2015 when dealing with the marine protected area. We have also heard the Government stress the importance of the International Telecommunications Union, saying that the issue is to do with spectre and spies. However, we know that there is a carve-out, because we heard about that on Second Reading.

That leaves us with the International Court of Justice, which is often held up as the key point. On Second Reading, I was taken by the fact that it is alleged that we have an opt-out under the Commonwealth, so I went away to have a quick look. On the ICJ website, as hon. Members can see, the “Declarations recognising the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory—United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” were published on 22 February 2017. I quote:

“1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland accepts as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, ln conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after 1 January 1987, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date, other than:”—

these are critical points—

“(i) any dispute which the United Kingdom has agreed with the other Party or Parties thereto to settle by some other method of peaceful settlement; (ii) any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth;”.

That is there in black and white.

However, the Government have yet to mention that in any of debates or letters about their legal position. We need amendments 1 and 7 to be able to understand why the Government do not see that as a strong enough argument to hold up. This nonsense about whether or not there are negotiations is answered there too, because those declarations say:

“any method of peaceful settlement”.

Any good Government would try to resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner.

I am surprised at that from a Labour party whose Members pride themselves on being trade unionists, who make a living from negotiating and trying to come to a solution without the matter going to a court. That is exactly what they should be doing, but the Conservatives are being chastised for trying to have a conversation to resolve the situation. The fact was that we did not come up with a deal because the deal was not good enough.

The Labour Opposition moved into power and have now put forward this horrendous Bill that gives away power, but at what cost? They are not even going to try in court or use some of the simple arguments which I, as a doctor, have found after spending time researching. I am sure that in this great country we have many legal buffs that could put forward that argument, but if the government do not feel that it stands, they should come to this House and tell us why—put it in evidence, write it out and tell us all, and we will go quietly. However, we are not hearing or seeing that from this Government, which is why we need amendments 1 and 7.

Turning to amendments 3, 4 and 6, as has been rightly pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness it is clear that the Bill gives carte blanche to this Government, or any other, to do whatever they want. We may as well not even bother having a debate about the Bill—it is not worth the paper it is written on—because the Henry VIII powers mean that Ministers can do what they will, when they will without coming to Parliament. At least these amendments try to ensure some accountability of the Executive to this House, because this House should be making these decisions, especially given their magnitude. We have heard from the Government that it is a priceless base and we have heard from the Conservative Benches about its geopolitical and security importance. Should the House not be making decisions about what that looks like?

New clause 1 talks about the payments. On Second Reading, I asked the Minister whether he could give me any example, from any part of the world, of when we have dealt with sovereignty using net present value. He said it was in the Green Book, but that is for domestic sites and used by the Treasury to look at civil development. I hope the Minister has gone away and done some research, because I think he will find that there is not a precedent, as net present value is not the correct measure and is open to political interference. For example, we use 3.5% and America uses 7%. We can fudge the numbers to fit the narrative that we would like to set.

There is one other problem. The explanatory notes stipulate only 30 years. Unless I have misquoted, this deal goes for 99 years, so what happens in the remaining 70 years? That is why new clause 1 would bring in a robust check to ensure that when the finances are paid out, we know exactly why we are paying, who we are paying and what we are paying for. Most importantly, we would know the mechanism of how the finances were calculated, because the Government still have not come to this place and set that out exactly.

Let me turn to new clause 2. What happens at the end? I raised that as my final point when I spoke on Second Reading. We have heard about long-term security, but in this place we think only on a five-year cycle; this is a 99-year cycle. My biggest fear is that my children’s children’s children, if they are ever elected to this Parliament, will be having a debate in 99 years with the same issues about what happens. It is a dereliction of duty on our behalf in this House not to think things through.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. I am surprised that nobody has referred to Hong Kong. When the decision was taken and the agreement was reached in 1984 for the handover in 1997, China agreed that it would be “one country, two systems” for at least 50 years. Within less than half that time, Britain came to the conclusion that all those safeguards were being deliberately violated.

[Dr Evans]

As ever, my learned right hon. Friend has pipped me to the punch. That is exactly a good example of the kind of sites we are worried about. What has that meant? We have taken on British nationals overseas and invited them in to give them security, because they feared for political interference and, worse still, for the safety of themselves and their families.

We are not doing our duties if we are not thinking about these things, because, as we have already seen, it is hard enough to predict things in two or three years’ time, let alone 100 years. At that point, as it is written, we will get the best offer, but it will be only offered to us. We could be outstripped by China, Russia or a BRIC country in the future—we do not know; it is 100 years away—and there is no mechanism to solve that. Worse still, Mauritius could simply say, “We do not want a base here at all,” and there is nothing in this Bill that would stop that. The Government repeatedly have been asked those questions, and they cannot set that out. That is why new clause 2 asks for those impacts to be considered and looked at.

New clause 3 would move the marine protected area. I will return to a point I made earlier. The fact is that when Britain and the United Kingdom were taken under UNCLOS in 2010 by Mauritius under annex VII, we wanted to implement protections in the area. Mauritius felt that that impeded on its ability to make its own decisions, which the court found in favour of, and it also wanted to fish in the area. Hang on a second! We are putting weaknesses into this Bill when we know that Mauritius has set its intent. I hope it has moved on, as the debate on climate has, but this new clause would be a guarantee to ensure that that has been thought about.

Let me turn to new clause 5. I appreciate the Minister stepping up, because there has already been debate about the Peros Banhos islands, and he has said there are no concerns that they will be leased to China. Let us be real: this Bill has only just come out—the ink is barely dry—and we already hear stories. Many journalists have already talked about this issue. Maybe I am wrong, but that shows the examples of what could and will come without paying attention to the security and the geopolitical and strategic advantage that these islands have, which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson) talked about. All new clause 5 asks us to do is ensure that that is reported on and looked at. Again, there is a dereliction of duty by not having that reported.

I could go on, because there are many more amendments, but the salient points in this debate have been made. All the amendments tabled in the names of Conservatives— and, to be fair, in the names of Members of many other Opposition parties—ask for one simple thing: transparency and explanation. They ask for a simple way of seeing what the legal advice does and where the financial outcome comes.

[Stephen Doughty]

indicated assent.

[Dr Evans]

The Minister is nodding along, but there must be something wrong if the public and Opposition Members cannot simply understand the arguments for what is being put in place. We cannot see the wood for the trees. It is a Government’s duty to show those arguments, and I look forward to the Minister doing that in his response and putting these arguments to bed once and for all. Otherwise, the British public will not forgive him.

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

I will primarily focus on new clause 8, which is in my name and the names of colleagues. First and foremost, this Bill is about perfecting the decolonisation of the British Indian Ocean Territory—that is self-evident in clause 2—but it does that in a way that ignores a primary component of decolonisation. We subscribe to United Nations resolution 1514. That resolution talks about respecting not only the integrity of territory, but self-determination. The British Indian Ocean Territory has existed, de facto and de jure, for over 50 years, yet the Government’s approach in justifying this completion of decolonisation is to focus solely on territorial integrity by claiming that the Chagos islands are, in fact, part of Mauritius.

Resolution 1514 contains a number of components. Its first point is that

“The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights”.

Its second point is that

“All peoples have the right to self-determination”.

The question for this House is surely this: are the Chagossians a people? I certainly think that they are. They are distinct from the Mauritians by their ethnic background, by their religion and by geography. Mauritius and the Chagos islands are over 1,300 miles apart, approximately as far as it is from this House to north Africa, so after 50 years of the existence of the BIOT, it really is a stretch to say that the sole defining issue is that of territorial integrity. To say that is to ignore the right to self-determination.

This nation has dealt with decolonisation before, and we did not approach it on the basis that it is only about territorial integrity. Take the example of India. We decolonised in India, but we allowed it to be subject to self-determination—that is why we have India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is quite clear that this is not a situation in which territorial integrity trumps everything else. It does not trump self-determination. An experience of decolonisation such as India’s shows that territorial integrity is secondary to self-determination, yet the right of the people who claim the Chagos islands as their homeland to any measure of self-determination is the one thing that has been utterly ignored in this process. We have in our history the shameful episode of their forceful removal from the Chagos islands, and now under this treaty, we are going to compound that shame by legitimising that removal. Saying that this is only about territorial integrity is to legitimise their forceful removal from the Chagos islands—that is how we get around the question of self-determination. That is wrong. The people of the Chagos islands are a people. They are a people with a homeland; therefore, under international law, they are a people with a right to self-determination, so why do this treaty and this Bill trash that right? That is the fundamental haunting question when it comes to the humanity and international legal requirements of the situation that prevails.

The Government are obviously holding to the line, “It is only about territorial integrity,” but they are hoisted by their own petard, because they have recognised the Chagossians as a people by setting aside some millions of pounds for them. They cannot say it is only about territorial integrity, and there is no people to whom to give the right to self-determination, and then say, “For those people to whom we deny the right to self-determination, here is some conscience money.” They cannot do that, yet that is what the treaty does.

The BIOT recognised the separateness of the people of the Chagos islands, and even the much-vaunted advisory judgment of the International Court of Justice gives respect and acknowledgment—to an extent—to the question of self-determination. At one point, the judgment states:

“It follows that any detachment by the administering Power of part of a non-self-governing territory, unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned, is contrary to the right to self-determination.”

Even that advisory judgment recognised the exception of the freely expressed and genuine will of the people, but that is what we have not had on this issue. This Government have gone out of their way to deny the free and genuine expression of opinion by the people whose homeland is the Chagos islands. That shameful indictment compounds what we did to those people at the end of the 1960s. The Government now totally dehumanise their human rights by saying, “You have no rights whatever when it comes to self-determination.” That is fundamentally wrong.

If the splitting of that wider colony in 1965 was illegitimate because there was no self-determination, according to the advisory judgment of the Court, then equally the Chagos islands rejoining Mauritius without self-determination is illegitimate. The Government cannot have it both ways, but that is what this Bill is seeking to do. The Government say that because it was illegitimate to split the Chagos islands off from Mauritius in 1965 because there was no self-determination, the Bill is about territorial integrity only, but if the basis of rejoining the Chagos islands to Mauritius is without self-determination, then that equally is illegitimate. Those are some of the points that this Government have not faced, and if they have faced them, they have not answered them. This House is legitimately asking those questions tonight, and waiting for answers. If those answers do not come, it will illustrate how this is the tawdry, unacceptable and unenforceable Bill that it will ultimately be seen to be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to ask those questions—questions that have been asked of the Government time and again throughout this legislative process, but to which we simply have not had an answer.

The Government seem to be blind to the risk of the craven withdrawal of influence from the Indo-Pacific region. This is more Jonathan Powell. He was, of course, the Prime Minister’s envoy, and the architect of the negotiation and the deal. The more I learn of Jonathan Powell, the more I realise that he seems to have a long-term instinct to downplay the threat from China—a threat in the Indian Ocean through this negotiated deal. Let us not forget that this is the same Jonathan Powell who now wears a different hat. He is now the National Security Adviser, and that, very unusually, was a political appointment. There is the question of his involvement—or perhaps it is not his involvement— in the collapse of the Chinese spying case. We are asked to believe that he was not involved in it, and that seems baffling as well.

[Dr Evans]

Was my hon. Friend as surprised as I was to find out that the National Security Adviser does not speak to his deputy? [Interruption.]

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. I do not think we need this chuntering from the Front Bench. Can we ensure that the speech remains within the legislation that we are debating and voting on tonight?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sammy Wilson]

Of course there are many who take a totally different point of view and whose wishes are not reflected in this Bill. The amendments that have been tabled to seek to remedy that situation are being ignored and opposed by the Government.

The second issue is the economy. On a regular basis, we hear how difficult the fiscal position is for this country—black holes we have to fill by taking money off pensioners, reducing benefits, cutting here and cutting there, and taxing people to the hilt. Yet when amendments are tabled that simply request transparency and the opportunity to look at the expenditure involved in this treaty, we hear no support from the Government. Either we are concerned about the fiscal position of this country or we are not. I would suggest that £35 billion—and rising—is a significant figure that we should be looking at.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The right hon. Member is making a powerful point. Is not part of the problem that we do not even know which budget the money is coming out of? That is the kind of simple question that the man or woman on the street would expect us to be able answer.

[Sammy Wilson]

We may not know which budget it is coming from, but we know whose pockets it is coming from: the pockets of taxpayers. To a certain extent it does not really matter, because all our constituents will pay for this deal. The Minister said that the Chagos islands were priceless, yet we are giving them away and giving away taxpayers’ money for them—and we do not even know how much we will be giving in the long run. I would have thought that some Government Members have concerns, if not about human rights then about the financial implications of the deal.

Especially at this time, national security is an important issue for every Member of the House, yet amendments that seek to ensure that there is scrutiny over what happens to these islands, who has influence in them and whether the treaty that has been entered into guarantees that our security will not be jeopardised are being refused. The Government are not even attacking the amendments or explaining their opposition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank all hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions. I will attempt to respond to the specifics of the amendments and new clauses in due course, but I want to come back to some of the fundamental points that have been raised during the debate first, and I also want to respond to some of the specific questions that were raised.

With the exception of some genuine questions in relation to the Chagossians, the MPA and the environmental protections, and the implementation of this treaty, it was a shame to see the rehash of the same arguments that were made on Second Reading. There were some outrageous and nonsensical arguments and claims, particularly relating to the costs and to other matters, which I will come to.

I was shocked by some of the anti-American, conspiracy-fuelled nonsense that we heard at various points during the debate. The base is critical to the United Kingdom, the United States, our allies and our national security, and the Bill and the treaty protect the functioning of that base. It does not surrender it; it secures it into the future. This is a Government who inherited a mess from the former Ministers on the Opposition Benches. We are getting stuff done. We are a patriotic Government; our first duty is to protect the national security of this country, and that is why we have got this deal done. It is why it is backed by the United States. It is why it is backed by our Five Eyes partners. It is absolutely crucial to protect the British people and our allies.

We have been very transparent about the reasons for it, and they are the exact opposite of what has been suggested. I come back, as I always have done, to the fundamental question: if there were not a problem and a risk to the operations of this crucial base, why did the previous Government start the negotiations, why did they continue them through 11 rounds of negotiations, and why did they continue them right up until the general election? Those are the facts.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen Doughty]

I will happily take interventions, but first I want to respond to the points that have been made. This agreement has been backed by our key allies and international partners, including the US and our Five Eyes allies. India, Japan and South Korea have also made clear their strong support.

Many questions were asked about the robust security provisions that we have in place to protect the UK and the base for decades to come. The treaty and the Bill secure full operational control of Diego Garcia, a strict ban on foreign security forces across the archipelago and an effective veto on any activity that threatens the base on Diego Garcia. It has been welcomed by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Development Committee in the other place, which said that they

“were assured that the Agreement preserves the UK’s and the US’s freedom of action.”

The legal rationale has been referred to many times, but legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, for example, affecting our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia, and even if we did not comply, international organisations and other countries would. We have set out the legal rationale on a number of occasions. We have been very clear. We also published documents around it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

Could the Minister give any example worldwide where NPV has been used for sovereignty purposes?

[Stephen Doughty]

I have been clear throughout. We have set and published the methodology. It has been backed by the Office for Budget Responsibility, the statistics regulator and others, and I am happy to set that all out again in writing for the hon. Member if that would be helpful.

I was quite surprised to hear some of the unfortunate remarks made by some Members about the United States and its commitment to this base. The United States pays for the operating costs. We have a crucial national security relationship, which keeps us, the United States and our allies safe. This is a joint base on Diego Garcia. It is absolutely right that those arrangements are in place. As I said, the value from the capability of the base is priceless. This is absolutely the right investment to make.

I was appalled by some of the comments being made. I remind the Committee that President Trump, Secretary of War Hegseth and Secretary Rubio have publicly supported the treaty, as have Five Eyes partners and others.

Ambassador to the United States

Luke Evans Excerpts

Tuesday 16th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[David Davis]

I agree—the hon. Member is right. Lord Mandelson’s continued support of Epstein shows an attitude that I find completely reprehensible in exactly that respect, because Epstein’s victims were women—young women, girls, children. So, yes, I do agree.

It has long been clear that Mandelson was not suitable to be our ambassador, so the question is: what changed last week? The Bloomberg emails revealing further details of Epstein’s relationship with him and the birthday book in which he referred to Epstein as his “best pal” were with Mandelson by Monday evening and with the Foreign Office overnight or by Tuesday morning at the latest. The Prime Minister is said to have known of the investigation by Tuesday afternoon, but not of the content of the emails. Why, when our most important diplomat in our most important international relationship is under question or under investigation, would the Prime Minister not want to know the details of the investigation immediately?

We understand that the Prime Minister’s chief of staff, Morgan McSweeney, was talking to Mandelson all day on Tuesday, so what was Mandelson saying to McSweeney and was this passed to the Prime Minister? One of the things I would ask the Minister is if, later on, he can give the House an undertaking that we can have a record of that conversation, because we need to know. Mandelson gave an immediate interview on Wednesday morning—hours before Prime Minister’s questions—admitting that more embarrassing revelations would come out. Mandelson’s past scandals and his links to Epstein were crystal clear by the time the Prime Minister rose to speak in PMQs last Wednesday.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that James Matthews, the Sky News reporter, cornered Lord Mandelson on 27 May to ask him specifically about staying in Epstein’s flat? Mandelson did not deny it, but simply said that he regretted having any connection with him. These are the kinds of questions that should have been asked, and were being asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) and many other Members back in May, about the suitability of the ambassador. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Prime Minister should have looked into this further at that point?

[David Davis]

Exactly, and in fact earlier than that point. I will come back to that when I talk briefly about the vetting process.

What precisely did the Prime Minister learn from reading the Bloomberg emails that was not already known about Lord Mandelson from public information and vetting done before the appointment? Each day that goes by, we see more shocking revelations not only about his misconduct and his links to Jeffrey Epstein, but about the failures of both the vetting process and the political judgment of those at the top of Government. I say to the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) that that relates not just to their political judgment, but to their moral standards and the equity in how they apply those moral standards across the board.

That brings us to the question: what happened to the vetting process? Most of what I have described was in the public domain. It does not take James Bond; Google could do this. What was not in the public domain was in the official records, or known to the intelligence agencies—in other words, it was all available to the Government. We know there was a two-page propriety and ethics briefing, which should have flagged concerns, but it merely triggered an unpenetrating email inquiry. That goes straight to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), which is: where were the questions? Someone does not just send a three-line email and forget about it; they pursue the questions and cross-question the person under suspicion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

My Committee first asked for the opportunity to question Lord Mandelson at the end of last year, when rumours first surfaced about his appointment as ambassador to the United States. We continued to ask after his appointment was confirmed. Indeed, the Minister may remember our exchange, on 14 January in this Chamber, when I asked him to

“allow Lord Mandelson the time to come before my Committee before he leaves for the United States”

to

“allow my colleagues to hear directly why the Prime Minister has appointed him”.—[Official Report, 14 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 143.]

Requests were made more often, and privately, after that, and in the eight months since. They have been turned down. I understand that there have been some Chinese whispers going on. It has been claimed that the FCDO has been telling journalists that the Committee had the opportunity to meet and question Lord Mandelson when we were in Washington. Obviously, there has been a break in the chain, because the reality is that we had a 15-minute interaction over breakfast while receiving a formal briefing from diplomatic staff about other meetings that day, which is quite materially different from the type of formal evidence session required to conduct meaningful scrutiny.

I want to make it clear that we have not sought to question Lord Mandelson out of a desire to frustrate the Government or their diplomatic agenda. In fact, quite the opposite. It is our responsibility to scrutinise the FCDO to prevent exactly this sort of mistake from damaging Britain’s reputation on the international stage. We want to make the Foreign Office the best it can be and in so many ways it is doing an absolutely excellent job. It is fantastic to see the way in which Britain’s reputation has been so enhanced. However, mistakes can be, and obviously have been, made.

The shocking revelations of the last week were not in the public domain in December, but Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein was very widely known. Had my Committee had the opportunity to question Lord Mandelson, I am confident that our members would have raised a range of questions, along with these ones, as journalists, particularly those at the Financial Times, have tried to do. It is quite possible that those questions may have provoked evasive answers, possibly not true answers, or even the same sort of response met by journalists, particularly those from the Financial Times, but that would all have been in the public sphere. It would have been on the record, and Lord Mandelson would have had the opportunity to tell the truth before the House.

Having failed to convince the Government to permit my Committee to question Lord Mandelson, I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on Friday, posing a number of questions about the apparent failures in the due diligence and vetting processes conducted before and after the announcement of Lord Mandelson’s appointment. Those questions included whether there were any concerns raised by agencies undertaking security clearance ahead of Lord Mandelson’s appointment and whether a decision was taken to dismiss any such security concerns, and, if so, whether such a decision was taken by the FCDO or by No. 10. I also asked whether any decision was taken to suspend or alter the usual vetting requirements or the usual timeframe for vetting procedures.

I thank the Foreign Secretary for her prompt response to that letter, which I received this morning. In her reply, she informs me that the initial due diligence process had been carried out by the Cabinet Office propriety and ethics team before the announcement of Lord Mandelson’s appointment, as has been widely reported. She assures me that the Foreign Office did not contribute to that process, and that no issues were raised by the FCDO as a result.

[Dr Luke Evans]

Will the right hon. Lady give way?

[Emily Thornberry]

I think this is quite important, and I would like to have the opportunity to inform the House with clarity so that we all know where we stand. I believe that this contribution to the debate is an important one. It is not a party political point; it is just trying to ensure that we learn from what we have heard.

The Foreign Secretary assures me that the Foreign Office did not contribute to that Cabinet Office process, and that no issues were raised by the FCDO as a result. The question is this: did the Cabinet Office miss the glaring red flag of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein, or did it fail to pass those concerns on? If so, why?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

When I heard that this debate had been granted, I thought long and hard about what I could add and whether I should even take part. Many of the questions that spring to mind about the process—where, when, why, how and so on—have already been asked far more eloquently and in more detail than I could. In essence, it comes down to the fact that this was a political appointment, so the PM is the person who should carry the risk—that is the job. If it is someone else’s, we need to know who that is. Stepping back a bit, I thought, “What would the man and woman on Hinckley high street say if I talked to them about it?” They do talk about it, and it hits hard. They have many of the process questions that we have.

This seems a bit of a pyrrhic victory. I am acutely aware that the sword of hypocrisy has a blade on both sides, and swung heavily in this House, it can hit both sides equally, but it is not the wound that can kill; it is the subsequent infection. That is the problem we are seeing today. The hon. Member for Rugby (John Slinger) pointed to the past and talked about context. He is right: context is important to the public in this debate, and we on the Conservative Benches are paying the price for some of the decisions that were taken before. It was not the fact that a previous Prime Minister ate cake. It was the fact that it was then covered up, and we had to come to this House following the report to say that we felt the Prime Minister had lied.

The new Prime Minister came in saying, “There will be change. There will be something different.” Those were his words. It was even on the lectern: “Plan for change”. Herein lies the problem. When the Transport Secretary was found to have committed fraud, when the anti-corruption Minister was investigated for corruption, when the homelessness Minister had to resign for making people homeless, and when the Deputy Prime Minister and Housing Secretary was found not to have paid her tax, it was not because the Prime Minister pushed them out there—it was because the media and this place did their job in holding them to account. That is the difference I am looking for today.

[Sir Alec Shelbrooke]

Does my hon. Friend agree it is a vital point that if our right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition had not taken down the Prime Minister step by step last week, we may have gone into a recess with this scrutiny still not happening?

[Dr Evans]

My right hon. Friend is spot on. Respect should be given to the many people who have raised concerns, including the Leader of the Opposition, many in the media and many Back Benchers on both sides of the House.

This is my primary point: the Prime Minister said he wanted to do something different. Well, what could he do differently? He could come to this House, tell people the truth and answer the questions. There is nothing stopping him from delivering a statement, putting himself up for scrutiny and answering these questions. He could convene a Committee of the House—I am sure many would be happy to attend—to answer the questions put to him.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The point keeps being raised about the three-week gap that is coming, but the reality is that key Select Committees can continue to investigate this issue through the recess, which they should, and could call the Prime Minister to give evidence, so that we do not wait three weeks, with the Government hoping that it dies. That is the key.

[Dr Evans]

My right hon. Friend is spot on.

The Prime Minister said he would do things differently. If he wants to show leadership, he could come to the Dispatch Box himself. I have a huge amount of respect for the Minister who will have to defend this situation, but he is not the decision maker—he is not the risk holder when it comes to this decision. Therein lies the point. I am sad today, because the public will look on and see that a new Prime Minister came in on a landslide majority saying he would do things differently, by his own standards that he set, and he has chosen not to. He has ignored the questions. He has answered the media, saying in his one outing, “I wouldn’t have made the decision if I knew the information.” That is not good enough to allow the public to understand.

I finish where I started: today is a pyrrhic victory—a hollow victory—but I live in hope. On the day that the Government have introduced the Public Office (Accountability) Bill, I am hopeful that the Prime Minister could still lead the change that he set out. He could still live by his own standards that he set for himself and his Government, and he could still clear up once and for all exactly what happened. I live in hope that that might be the case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

I want to use the few minutes that I have to focus on how it could be that, just last Wednesday, the Prime Minister of this country came to tell this House that he had “confidence” in Lord Mandelson, the friend of the paedophile, in his role as a key ambassador for the Government. The Prime Minister said that not once but twice, when the Leader of the Opposition rightly asked him, declaring:

“I have confidence in him”,

and

“I have confidence in the ambassador”.—[Official Report, 10 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 860.]

Those were his ringing endorsements of Lord Mandelson.

I want to examine the circumstances that then prevailed when he said that he had confidence in Lord Mandelson. What is confidence? Confidence is having trust, faith and belief in someone. That is what the Prime Minister was telling this House in respect of Lord Mandelson last Wednesday, yet by Monday it was a matter of public knowledge that the Bloomberg emails had been published.

The Prime Minister has since made some startling claims. He said that when he was answering Prime Minister’s questions he knew that questions were being asked, but he knew only about media inquiries about the emails and that questions were being put to Lord Mandelson. Our Prime Minister is a King’s Counsel. The natural instinct of a lawyer is to interrogate, and the training of a lawyer is to equip them to interrogate. However, this House is being told that when the Prime Minister stood at the Dispatch Box and said “I have confidence” in Lord Mandelson, even though he knew that questions were being asked, he did not interrogate them for himself or ask about what was being asked. When he told the House that he knew that there were media inquiries about emails, we are being asked to believe that he did not ask, “What emails? What did they say?”

[Dr Luke Evans]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is making a fantastic speech. The Prime Minister said that he had “confidence in the ambassador”. He did not say “pending investigation or a suspension”, “I’ll look into it” or “I’ll follow process”, but “I have confidence.” Why does the hon. and learned Gentleman think that the Prime Minister did not say that he would look into the situation seriously, and instead said from the Dispatch Box specifically that he had “confidence”?

[Jim Allister]

That is the most troubling thing about this. Equipped with the knowledge that he inevitably had—Monday night’s publication, and the knowledge that questions had been asked and that there were media inquiries about the emails—the credibility of the House is stretched to be asked to believe that the Prime Minister, a trained lawyer, never interrogated any of that and never asked, “What emails? What did they say? What questions have we asked?” We are asked to believe that he came to the House blind to all of that.

Not only in the appointment of Lord Mandelson do we see serious flaws in the judgment of the Prime Minister. If it is truly the situation, that he came to the House with a limited but uninterrogated knowledge of these matters, then that raises further questions about his judgment. I fear that this House has many answers yet to receive. It is a matter of regret to me, as it is to other hon. Members, that the Prime Minister is not here today to answer those demanding, alarming yet simple questions: they are questions that go not only to the heart of the Prime Minister’s confidence in Lord Mandelson, but to the question of whether this House, and this people, can have confidence in the Prime Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)]

On Thursday, I came to this House to announce that the Prime Minister had asked the Foreign Secretary to withdraw Lord Mandelson as the UK’s ambassador to the United States. At the outset, may I say—there were many comments to this effect from across the House—that all of us are appalled by Epstein’s crimes, and all those who have suffered as a result need to be at the forefront of our minds today.

I also thank a number of right hon. and hon. Members for what I think were genuine suggestions about scrutiny of processes in relation to ambassadorial appointments. In particular, the Government have listened to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), on this matter, and we will consider all options to support the Committee in its work in future.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen Doughty]

I will not give way at first. I need to respond to many of the points that have been made in the debate, after which I will happily take some interventions.

The Prime Minister took this decision after new information showed that the nature and extent of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein was materially different from what was known at the time of his appointment. In particular, Lord Mandelson suggested that Epstein’s conviction was wrongful, encouraged him to fight for early release, and said that Epstein had been through “years of torture”. We know that the only people tortured were the women and girls whose lives were destroyed by Epstein’s heinous crimes. I associate myself with the remarks that a number of right hon. and hon. Members made on that point, both about the crimes and the victims.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

The Prime Minister has been explicitly clear that the new information was not compatible with the duty that we owe to the victims of Jeffrey Epstein’s horrendous crimes against women and girls, and with this Government’s clear commitment to tackling that kind of violence and abuse. As such, the Prime Minister took decisive action to withdraw Lord Mandelson as ambassador. He has also been clear—he undertook a number of media interviews yesterday—that Lord Mandelson would not have been appointed if all the information we now have was available at the time. I point the House to what the Prime Minister had to say yesterday:

“Had I known then what I know now, I’d have never appointed him.”

Following Lord Mandelson’s departure and in line with standard diplomatic practice, the deputy head of mission, James Roscoe—an experienced and capable diplomat—has been put in place as the chargé d’affaires.

[Dr Evans]

The Minister is doing a fair job, but I have one simple question for him: why is he, not the Prime Minister, in the Chamber answering the House’s questions? The Minister clearly cannot answer them—no disrespect to him. The Prime Minister said that he did not know something, but now he knows something. Where is the Prime Minister, and why is he not at the Dispatch Box?

[Stephen Doughty]

I am in the Chamber responding for the Government as the Minister for North America. The hon. Gentleman will understand that there are very important matters taking place today that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are involved with. We have also seen the new Hillsborough law launched today, which has been referenced during the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

Perhaps the Leader of the Opposition was not in her seat at the start of the debate, because I made very clear our position on Epstein’s victims and our horror at the revelations, and said that all our thoughts are with them. I did that in sincerity in response to the points that have been made across this House, and I say that again. However, she could not answer my question. She did not raise this issue before last Wednesday. If it was all so obvious, why did not she do that?

[Dr Luke Evans]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I hope it is a proper point of order.

[Dr Evans]

I would hate for the Minister to mislead the House inadvertently, because I raised the examples earlier of Sky News and of my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), who raised concerns about Mr Mandelson. Even in this debate, we heard evidence of what the Opposition have been doing, including talking about the inappropriateness of this ambassador back in May.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I have heard enough. That is not a point of order.

UK Ambassador to the US: Appointment Process

Luke Evans Excerpts

Thursday 11th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Member is rightly known as one of the kindest and most generous Members of this House. I thank him for his comments about my hon. Friend the Member for Washington and Gateshead South (Mrs Hodgson) and the attack that she endured this morning. I wholeheartedly agree with his comments on Charlie Kirk. He can be assured that we are already conveying our condolences to the United States. I expect to be with the United States ambassador in London later today, where I will be able to do that in person.

From a practical point of view, as the hon. Member will know, many ambassadors or high commissioner posts are vacant for a time. We have excellent teams who then do that job. Of course, when ambassadors or high commissioners are travelling, there is a team in post who are able to represent this country and ensure our that interests are pursued. That is exactly what will happen in this case.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

This is about the Prime Minister’s judgment. By Mandelson’s own admission, there is more very embarrassing information coming, so the Prime Minister could have said to the House yesterday, “I will suspend him, pending further investigation,” but he did not; he backed him. Can the Prime Minister be 100% sure that, in making any trade deals, or in any negotiations, Mr Mandelson has not been compromised by the information that has now come forward, and will he commit to investigating that?

[Stephen Doughty]

I bring the hon. Member back to the fundamental point, which is that in the light of the additional information and emails written by Lord Mandelson, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign Secretary to withdraw him as ambassador.

Oral Answers to Questions

Luke Evans Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

Yesterday, the Foreign Secretary set out the long-standing position of Ministers on such determinations. Under the previous Government, the threshold that this House set Governments was whether there was a real risk. We have applied ourselves to that test, and we have found that there is a real risk. Our actions from September onwards have flowed from that determination.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

4. What discussions he has had with his international counterparts on the Chagos Islands.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)]

The Diego Garcia military base is essential to the security of the United Kingdom and our key allies, and to keeping the British people safe. The treaty was tested at the highest level of the United States’ security establishment, which supported the deal. The agreement has been backed by our key allies and international partners, including the US and all our Five Eyes partners. India, Japan and South Korea have made clear their support for the deal.

[Dr Evans]

By not even trying to go to court or argue the case, the Government have cost the taxpayer £30 billion. Does the Minister agree with the Defence Minister who said that the deal represents “good value” for UK taxpayers?

[Stephen Doughty]

As I have explained many times in the House, those figures are completely misleading. The net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. The average cost of the deal in today’s money is £101 million per year. That is just a fraction of our Defence budget, and represents a few hours of spending on our NHS. This Government will not scrimp when it comes to the national security of the United Kingdom and our allies.

British Indian Ocean Territory: Sovereignty

Luke Evans Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

I am genuinely surprised by the comments of the right hon. Gentleman. As a former Defence Minister and someone who has served, he will know the importance of this base and the need to secure it, and he will know the risks to our operations that were inherent under the previous Government. That is why his Government started this process and why we have concluded it. It is also why our costs under the deal are broadly comparable with what France pays for its base in Djibouti, even though our base 15 times larger and has immeasurably more capability, as he well knows.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

In the Minister’s response, he quoted the answer from the Defence Secretary to my question, saying that he had no choice. But the reason for doing this deal is the worry about being taken to court—so the Government do have a choice, and that is what my constituents and Opposition Members are so upset about. The Government could have a fight in the court and appeal the decision, yet they have chosen not to, and they will not explain why.

Will the Minister set out what the need was for immediacy and why he and his Government will not go to the court for the tribunal he is so worried about to have that fight? If the case were shut down, Opposition Members would understand, and if it was found that we had a legal responsibility to pay, we would do so, but we do not, and we have not had our day in court as a country. That is the travesty of the deal.

[Stephen Doughty]

I have to correct the hon. Member as we have had days in court on this issue. That is one of the reasons—[Interruption.] There was the non-binding judgment in the International Court of Justice. He also forgets to mention the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the votes in the United Nations and all the other legal processes. The fact is, it is our view—indeed, it was the view of the previous Government—that a legally binding judgment would inevitably follow. Leaving such a key national security asset in that way is not responsible; no, the responsible thing to do is to secure the base with our allies, and that is exactly what we have done.