Oral Answers to Questions

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Steff Aquarone (North Norfolk) (LD)]

6. What steps she is taking to increase access to legal aid in rural areas.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

Wherever they are in England and Wales, people should benefit from equal access to legal support and legal aid. Remote technology and provision of online advice present the opportunity both to democratise legal advice and to deliver it to all who need to access it. We are investing an additional £92 million to support the sustainability of the criminal legal aid sector, and we are consulting on fee increases totalling £20 million for housing and immigration to increase access to civil legal aid. All of this will support legal aid across the country, including in rural areas.

[Steff Aquarone]

North Norfolk is a legal aid desert. My residents have precious little access to family, criminal and housing legal assistance, despite the best efforts of local organisations such as the Norfolk Community Law Service. We face huge barriers to recruitment and retention in rural areas, such as the cost of housing, poor public transport and fees that, despite the uprating, are still too low. Things need to change. Will the Minister meet me and those working in the legal aid sector in North Norfolk to discuss what we can do to support those in need in areas such as mine?

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for raising the issue of legal aid deserts, and I welcome his suggestion that he write to me about these things. I regularly meet legal aid providers, and that is why we are investing an additional £6 million in legal support, which provides that early advice that can make a real difference in areas such as his.

[Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)]

Cornwall is a big rural legal aid desert. We have many volunteers who would be prepared to help and Citizens Advice could act as an umbrella organisation. Will the Minister meet me to discuss how we can get some of that funding for access to legal aid in rural areas into Cornwall?

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend is right to raise the importance of early legal support and legal aid. That is why we are investing in online provision. As I have said, remote technology can make a real difference in areas such as hers. Before I came to this place, I volunteered in a free legal advice centre, so I know just how much of a difference such institutions can make.

[Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)]

7. What recent assessment she has made of the adequacy of policies applying to bail conditions in domestic violence cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)]

12. What steps she is taking to tackle court backlogs.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

This Government inherited a record rise in court backlogs. The last Conservative Government let down victims of crime, businesses, workers and families, all through their neglect and under-investment. This Government are gripping the crisis: to date we have funded a record high allocation of 110,000 Crown court sitting days for next year, and we are, and intend to be, at or close to the maximum in every jurisdiction. We are fixing the last Government’s mess.

[Zöe Franklin]

I recently met representatives of the Rape and Sexual Abuse Support Centre in my constituency. They support hundreds of survivors every year through counselling, advice, and carrying out vital prevention work in schools and the wider community, but, as they explained to me, their work is being undermined by a justice system that is in crisis. Trials are routinely delayed, sometimes for up to four years, owing to a chronic shortage of judges, and as a result some victims are considering dropping their cases—not because they do not want justice, but because they cannot cope with such a traumatic experience. That is a gross injustice. I am grateful to the Minister for her answer, but will she expand specifically on how the Government will help to prevent re-traumatisation in the court backlog process, and on how they will continue to fund organisations such as RASASC?

[Sarah Sackman]

We recognise the traumatic impact of delays in our Crown courts on victims of violence against women and girls and, indeed, victims of all crimes. The best thing we can do for those victims is deliver swifter justice. We will do that not just by spending extra money—which we have done—but through reform, so we have asked Sir Brian Leveson to propose bold and ambitious measures to deliver the swifter justice for which the hon. Member has asked.

[Chris Ward (Brighton Kemptown and Peacehaven) (Lab)]

I recently met, in my constituency, two people whose son and daughter-in-law had been brutally killed in June 2023. Nearly two years on, the case has yet to come to court. It has been delayed five times, and a date in October has now been set. On each occasion, the delays have caused huge anguish to the family. Will the Minister agree to meet me to discuss this matter, and can she tell me what steps the Government are taking to ensure that trials are conducted promptly so that justice can be received by such families?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am desperately sorry to hear about the case that my hon. Friend describes. Once again, the best thing that we can do for those families, to ensure that they get swifter justice and get their day in court in a timely fashion, is bear down on the Crown court backlog. That is why we are waiting for Sir Brian Leveson to report in the spring, and why we will act promptly on his recommendations.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

13. What steps her Department is taking to ensure child safety during private law proceedings.

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[Dr Rupa Huq (Ealing Central and Acton) (Lab)]

18. What steps she is taking to increase the provision of legal aid services.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

On prisons, the inheritance was dire; on Crown court backlogs, the inheritance was dire; and on legal aid services, once again the inheritance has been absolutely dire. This Government are rebuilding the legal aid system for those it serves and those who serve in it. That is why, in December, we announced up to £92 million more a year for criminal legal aid solicitors, on top of £24 million already announced for duty solicitors in police stations. We are also consulting on uplifts, as I said, in housing and immigration legal aid fees, worth an additional £20 million a year—the first increase in civil legal aid fees since 1996.

[Dr Huq]

The Conservatives left legal aid in a mess, like so many other things, so I welcome the sums the Minister is announcing, but can she assure me that the money will reach Ealing? We have never even had a citizens advice bureau—not in the 10 years I have been the MP, and not in the 50 years I have been on the planet—to refer constituents to. Can she assure us that my constituents can get the access to justice they deserve?

[Sarah Sackman]

I welcome my hon. Friend’s question. The Legal Aid Agency keeps contracts under review to ensure that there is provision right across the country, including in Ealing. As I said earlier, the additional money going into legal support, which includes advice services, such as citizens advice bureaux, law centres and other advice providers, will reach constituents just like hers, both remotely and face to face.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

T2. If she will make a statement on her departmental responsibilities.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

At a time when victims are waiting far too long for their day in court, it is right that we look at all options. We have asked Sir Brian Leveson to consider all options in his review, including the reclassification of some offences to summary only.

[Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

T7. We should all be really concerned that the Government have quietly abandoned their pledge to hold five local inquiries into grooming gangs. The victims still need justice, the public still need answers, and we still need a full inquiry. In the meantime, can the Minister tell us what specific actions—not just references to AI—her Department is taking to ensure full transparency and public confidence in the cases that do come to court?

[Bambos Charalambous (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)]

Although the extra sitting days to reduce court delays announced by the Secretary of State are welcome, does the Minister agree that the state of the court estate needs some attention, as some courts are out of action due to disrepair issues?

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The other day I visited the Telford justice centre, where one of the courtrooms was out of use because of mould and a leaky roof. The Government are making an additional capital investment of £20 million this year to maintain and restore our buildings so that they can be full and active for use. We are also investing in new court buildings; from Blackpool to the City of London there will be new courts, and they will serve the public well.

[Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)]

The passing of Pope Francis was a profound loss. Throughout his life, he was a passionate advocate for a justice system that put reconciliation at its heart. With the publication of the independent sentencing review expected imminently, will the Government take this opportunity to move our justice system towards one that contains, in the words of Pope Francis, a “horizon of hope” and reintegration, and will they commit to restorative justice being placed at the heart of our justice system?

Court Waiting Times: Kent

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Tuesday 8th April 2025 Westminster Hall

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tristan Osborne) for securing this important debate. Our ability to provide justice to the public and restore confidence in our criminal justice system, so bruised after the last 14 years, is of the utmost importance. I am grateful to be able to debate these issues today.

I will start by touching on the profound challenges that the Government face in the Crown court. When we came into power, we inherited a record and rising backlog. As others have pointed out, today it stands at 74,000 cases, which is around double what it was five years ago. I heard the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan) outline his somewhat fairytale account of how we got here. His Government neglected their responsibilities both in the context of prisons, which were at breaking point when we entered government, and the dire inheritance in our Crown courts. He seeks to blame it purely on external factors, such as the covid pandemic. Who does he think was responsible for the industrial strike and the failure to broker with the professions? Under whose watch was that Crown court backlog allowed to rise? The failure to invest and reform are failures that this Government are intent on reversing.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford pointed out, the backlog involves real people. Real people lie behind these statistics. As we heard, countless lives of both victims and accused people have been put on hold as they wait for cases to come to trial. It simply represents an affront to the concept of swift justice, and I am afraid it represents the failure of the previous Government to take decisive and significant action—action that we will not shirk taking. The issue is more complex than simply rising numbers. Receipts are increasingly high and rising. The nature of the case load is different than before the pandemic; it is now made up of a greater proportion of more serious and complex offences, which take up more court time and tend to have a lower guilty plea rate. We acknowledge that has real-life consequences for victims and witnesses and that we are letting people down, both those who serve in the system and those served by it.

Addressing the Crown court backlog is a priority for this Department and this Government. We are not dithering and delaying—far from it. We have actually gripped the crisis. Last year, the Lord Chancellor funded an additional 2,500 court sitting days on top of the allocation agreed by the previous Government, contrary again to what the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle said. His Government agreed one settlement; we looked to fund over and above that, with 2,500 additional court sitting days and additional sentencing powers given to magistrates to free up vital capacity within the Crown court.

We did not stop there. To deliver swifter justice for victims, we announced funding that will enable 110,000 crime court sitting days in this financial year. That is an additional 4,000 more days than the previous Government funded and the highest allocation in recorded history. The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle says, “Well, that’s not as many as the Lady Chief Justice could offer up.” The fact is there is a difference between sitting days and the capacity of the system. It is not simply a matter of judicial sitting days; it is about the capacity of our prosecutors, defence lawyers, legal aid and the entirety of the system to operate. We have allocated a record number of sitting days within that context.

I know my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford is specifically concerned with the situation in Kent, and I am thankful for his efforts and those of fellow Members of Parliament within the Kent area for raising this issue. I am sincerely sorry to hear about the experiences he describes and how they are impacting his constituents. With this record Crown court sitting day allocation, Kent can sit all its courts for the full year at capacity. That will include an additional courtroom at Canterbury, which we have equipped for Crown court use. To his question about flexibility, of course listing is a matter for the independent judiciary, but that additional capacity at Canterbury will enable some of the cases at Maidstone to be transferred there. There is also flexibility in the system to deal with additional capacity and pressures. In addition to the sixth courtroom at Canterbury, we are working closely with circuit-presiding judges to enable additional Kent cases to be heard in London. Some of that has already begun, with cases emanating from north-west Kent being dealt with at Woolwich Crown court. I hope that will alleviate some of the pressures faced by his constituents.

Just yesterday, I spoke to Lisa Killham, the delivery director for court services in the south-east region, to ask what additional steps she and her team can offer to provide additional capacity and flexibility within the system. I know they are working hard to alleviate some of the particular pressures felt at Maidstone. Some of that is a system design problem. The role of case co-ordinators, which the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle raised, is really important, as is the use of case progression meetings to strive to improve the effective trial rate. All those measures will be vital in bearing down on the Crown court backlog in the Kent area.

We know the backlog is serious and rising. Doing nothing is not an option. That is why we asked Sir Brian Leveson, one of our most distinguished judges, to conduct a wholesale review of our criminal courts and propose radical, once-in-a-generation reform to deliver swifter justice for victims. That is not outsourcing policy thinking; it is bringing the very best expertise and experience within our system to assist the Government in what needs to be a once-in-a-generation level of reform—and nothing is off the table. As Members will know, Sir Brian is looking at things such as re-classification of offences and what sorts of cases are appropriate for a jury trial.

Jury trial will always be a cornerstone of British justice, appropriate for the most serious cases, but the right to jury trial is not absolutely sacrosanct; what we need to ensure is the right to a fair trial. At the moment, victims of rape or serious sexual violence are having to wait one, two or even three years for their date in court, and that is not fairness at all. That is not a fair trial for any of the participants. That is why Sir Brian is looking at every single option. We inherited a justice system on its knees, and we steadfastly refuse to let it fall over entirely. Restoring swift justice in this country will require the courage to take decisions—big decisions that could and should have been taken by the last Government.

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Sojan Joseph) for raising the situation for victims who are badly let down by the current system. Court backlogs have an undeniable impact on victims. The disruption to victims’ lives affects their ability to function, work and maintain relationships and the Government take it very seriously indeed.

The Victims’ Commissioner recently published a report highlighting the profound effect of the delays on victims, including the particularly adverse effect on victims of rape and serious sexual offences. To ensure ongoing communication with victims in the pre-trial period, the Government will ensure that every Crown Prosecution Service area now has at least one dedicated victim liaison officer in its rape and serious sexual offences unit, and that pre-trial meetings with a prosecutor are offered to all adult victims of those crimes. That singular point of contact can make a real difference.

As part of our landmark ambition to halve violence against women and girls, the Government have committed to introducing free, independent legal advice for victims and survivors of adult rape across England and Wales, to help them to understand and uphold their legal rights. We aim to begin a phased roll-out of the service later this year.

In the upcoming financial year, as the hon. Member for Eastbourne rightly pointed out, we have protected dedicated victim spending in the Department by maintaining this year’s funding level for ringfenced sexual violence and domestic abuse support. The hon. Member challenged us to go further and is right to do so. We have ensured that the funding for victim support is spent in the most effective way. That is why we have victim liaison officers and why we are introducing independent legal advice for victims and survivors of rape. It is right that we target resource on the most vulnerable victims in our system.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ashford was right to raise the issue of backlogs not just in the Crown court jurisdiction, which is our focus today, but right across all jurisdictions. The Crown court is of course a significant priority for the Government, but as courts Minister I am focusing on managing demand across all our jurisdictions, including our magistrates and our civil jurisdictions.

The truth—the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle seems to have forgotten this as part of his party’s collective amnesia—is that the Conservatives left us with a mess in every single part of our justice system. On the civil justice side, whether someone was an employee, a tenant, a landlord, or an individual with a claim and a desire for redress, they were left with a mess. In our criminal justice system it was the same, whether in the magistrates or the Crown court.

More than 90% of all criminal cases are dealt with at the level of the magistrates court, where cases continue to be completed swiftly. That is a good news story. Although the open caseload rose by just under 14% in the year up until December 2024, timeliness in getting through cases has remained stable. We expect demand to continue to rise and, to keep pace, we will continue to invest in the recruitment of more magistrates. We are aiming to recruit 2,000 new and diverse magistrates this year. The diversity of our magistracy is highly important.

Whether it is the civil jurisdiction or our tribunal system, we are at capacity, sitting at the maximum, or close to the maximum, number of sitting days across all jurisdictions. That reflects the Government’s commitment to bear down on backlogs in every single part of our justice system.

The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle asked when Sir Brian is due to report; that will be later in the spring. When will the Government legislate? We want to get on with it, so we will legislate as soon as possible, either later this year or early in the new year. We are not hanging around; we have to get on top of this issue. Do we see a continued role for case co-ordinators? We absolutely do: effective case management is vital. Reducing delays in the criminal courts, maintaining our progress across all jurisdictions—including in the family court and in the civil justice space—and of course improving the experience of victims continue to be priorities for the Government.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ashford raised the issue of digitisation. I hot-footed it here from the Justice Committee, where we were talking about digitisation in the civil justice space. The Government are ambitious about what we can do, the efficiencies and the greater access to justice we can realise by end-to-end digitisation. A small example of that is the Government’s commitment, as part of our renters’ rights reform, to have fully digitised processes in the possession claims space—end-to-end digitisation vindicating the rights of renters. That is just one example. We can import the same learnings into our criminal justice space, as well as make greater use of remote hearings and alleviate the particular pressures that exist in my hon. Friend’s part of the world, and in the rest of Kent, which this debate is all about. We know of the particular pressures not just in the criminal jurisdiction but in the civil jurisdiction in London and the south-east. The Government are working hard to alleviate pressures in both places.

The hon. Member for Eastbourne was right to talk about prevention, not just cure. It is right that when we look at demand coming into the system, we look at the whole of the societal pressures that lead to the increasing demand. That is why the Government have a policy, in relation to youth hubs, that is introducing exactly the sorts of services to which the hon. Member once contributed so much.

Reducing delays in all areas is vital. We will deliver once-in-a-generation reform of our courts, to deliver swifter justice for all and adequately tackle the Crown court backlog not just in Kent but right across the United Kingdom. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford again for raising this important issue for debate.

Whiplash Injury (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Thursday 20th March 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

I would like to inform the House that I am laying the draft Whiplash Injury (Amendment) Regulations 2025 by way of affirmative procedure.

Subject to approval by both Houses, the regulations will increase the fixed tariff for compensation for whiplash injuries lasting up to two years which occur on or after 31 May 2025. The regulations will implement the recommendations made by the Lord Chancellor in her report of the statutory review of the Whiplash Injury Regulations 2021, published on 21 November 2024.

The whiplash tariff compensation figures will be around 15% higher than the original tariff, which was brought into force in 2021 by the Whiplash Injury Regulations 2021. This is both to account for the effects of inflation since 2021 (by measure of the consumer prices index) and to include a buffer for expected inflation until 2027. The uplift will ensure that claimants can continue to receive appropriate compensation for whiplash injuries that occur before the next statutory review of the tariff. The original whiplash tariff from 2021 will continue to apply to relevant whiplash injuries from road traffic accidents that occur before 31 May 2025.

[HCWS534]

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful. With great respect to other members of the Committee, I think the hon. Gentleman is the most honest advocate of assisted dying among us, because he genuinely recognises that autonomy demands the widest possible range of eligibility. It might be that other Members feel that we have the balance exactly right. I recognise the force of his argument that if we are going to introduce a new human right, it is very difficult to circumscribe its boundaries. He himself thinks that there should be some boundaries: he proposed an amendment that specified 12 months, and he thinks that only certain people should be able to ask someone else to perform assisted death to them. Nevertheless, he is acknowledging that if we believe in autonomy, the Bill would not satisfy some people.

I think it would be intellectually coherent and more logical for proponents of the Bill to want to repeal section 2 of the Suicide Act, and I do not understand why they are not doing so. We could certainly continue to insist on prohibitions against any form of coercion, persuasion or inducement to take one’s own life, but if somebody is clearly in their right mind and wants to receive assistance to kill themselves, that is the principle of the Bill. It would be neater if we amended the Suicide Act accordingly.

The fact that proponents do not want to do so suggests that they see some value in the law and that they consider that that value trumps concerns about autonomy and the impact of the law on family members of someone who wishes to travel to Switzerland to end their life. I agree that there are such principles—namely, the intrinsic value of life and the protection of the vulnerable—but I do not see why proponents of the Bill consider that such principles trump autonomy when it comes to terminally ill adults in England.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. My remarks, as ever, will focus on the legal and practical impact of the amendments to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny. In exercising our duties to ensure that legislation that is passed is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to reflect her intent.

Clause 24, as amended by amendments 504 and 505, will mean that individuals who assist a person to end their life in accordance with the terms of the Bill are not subject to criminal prosecution. Currently, it is a criminal offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 for a person to do an act that is

“capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person”

and intended

“to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.”

That offence attracts a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. Amendment 504 would amend clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order.

--- Later in debate ---

On resuming—

[Sarah Sackman]

I was introducing amendment 504, which amends clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of providing assistance in accordance with, or performing a function under, the Bill—for example, by undertaking the first or second assessment or providing the approved substance. The effect of the amendment is to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with the Bill. The phrase “in accordance with” the Bill is key. For example, where someone accompanies a person to the appointment at which they will self-administer the substance, the amendment would carve out any criminal liability for the accompanying person.

As originally drafted, the wording would have limited the protection offered by subsection (1) to the far narrower situation of the medical professionals providing assistance under clause 18. The amendment will give effect to the policy intent of the hon. Member for Spen Valley of applying that protection to all those who provide assistance in accordance with, or by performing a function under, the Bill. Subsection (2) clarifies that the clause does not override other ways in which a court may find that a person is not guilty of an offence.

Clause 24(3) inserts proposed new section 2AA into the Suicide Act 1961. As amended by amendment 505, that new section ensures that it is not an offence under the Suicide Act to perform a function under the Bill, or to assist a person seeking to end their own life by doing anything under the Bill. That is for the same reasons that I set out in relation to subsection (1). The new section also provides a defence to the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide, where a person reasonably believes that they were acting in accordance with the Bill, and that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.

Taken as a package, the effect of these amendments is to make the Bill legally workable. To do that, it is necessary to ensure that those who assist a person to use the lawful route are not then subject to criminal liability for doing so. Clause 24 clause, taken together with amendments 504 and 505, gives effect to that.

Let me address some of the issues raised by Opposition Members. There was a question as to whether there is any overlap between offences under the Bill—we will come to some of those offences in due course with clauses 26 and 27—and offences that remain on the statute book under the Suicide Act. The short answer to the question from the hon. Member for Reigate, although I know she has written to my Department, and I will ensure that she receives a full written answer, is that it would remain an offence under the Suicide Act 1961 to encourage suicide, including an assisted death under this Bill.

To the extent that any overlapping offences remain, that is not an unusual approach to drafting in the criminal law. However, the effect of the clause is that it would remain an offence under the 1961 Act to encourage someone to commit suicide. Where a person’s “encouragement”—the hon. Member focused on that term—is such that it amounts to what the courts would understand to be pressure or coercion, that could be an offence under clause 26, which we will come to. As I said, it is not unusual to have a degree of overlap in criminal offences. Again, what someone is charged and prosecuted with falls to the prosecutor, depending on the specific circumstances of the case and what would be most appropriate in that scenario.

I also want to address the scenario that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire posited, about whether a pharmacist who acted in a way that amounted to gross negligence manslaughter would benefit from immunity under clause 24(1) as amended. Again, with the important caveat that it will depend on the particular facts of the case, the offence of gross negligence manslaughter is committed where a death is the result of gross negligence in what would otherwise be a lawful act or omission on the part of the defendant, and where the defendant owes a duty of care to the victim—there are a number of actors within the Bill’s process who owe a duty of care to the person applying for assisted dying.

Let us assume for a moment that, in the hon. Member’s scenario, we do have gross negligence manslaughter on the particular facts; in those circumstances, the Government are content that the pharmacist could not be properly said to be performing a function under the Bill, or in accordance with the Bill, so clause 24(1)—the carve-out from criminal liability—would not apply. I think that that covers most of the questions that were posited earlier.

[Danny Kruger]

It may well be that the Minister has clarified the case sufficiently, but will she explain something for my sake? She is suggesting that the pharmacist inadvertently but negligently caused the death of a patient, having performed the duties under the Bill and believing that they were doing so. Surely, they were performing duties under the Bill, so they would potentially be captured by the carve-out.

[Sarah Sackman]

Again, it would depend on the actual facts. However, if they were attempting to perform duties under the Bill, it is highly unlikely that, in circumstances where the facts establish and meet the threshold of gross negligence manslaughter, they could be said to have carried out those duties in accordance with the Bill. They might have been carrying out duties that they thought were what the Bill prescribed, but if they have done that in such a way that it amounts to gross negligence manslaughter, then clause 24(1) would not apply.

The hon. Gentleman makes the point about what the pharmacist in that scenario believes they are doing; that belief has to be reasonable, and that is a test that our courts are well used to applying. That is why the amendments introduce the belief that someone is acting in accordance with the Bill. It is not enough that they think they are doing it; it has to be a reasonable belief. That is an objective standard.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the Minister for those helpful clarifications. Was any consideration given to also exempting encouragement as an offence under the Suicide Act? I am interested in why it was not exempted in the same way as assistance, particularly given that if it did fall within coercion and pressure—based on what the Minister said—it would get picked up as a criminal offence anyway under the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister will write to me on some of this, but the issue comes back to what is encouragement. As the hon. Member for Spen Valley set out—

[Rebecca Paul]

My apologies, Mr Dowd, but it is a technical point. I think the Minister understands what I am asking.

[Sarah Sackman]

Helpfully, the hon. Member has also set out her questions fully and precisely in a letter to me, so I think I know what she is asking and I will try and answer it as best I can. I reiterate, as I and the Minister for Care have said throughout, that the policy choices have been for the promoter—the Government remain neutral. The offence of encouraging or assisting suicide or attempted suicide in section 2 of the Suicide Act is well established. Encouraging someone to go through the assisted dying process under the Bill with the intention of encouraging suicide or an attempt at suicide would therefore remain a criminal offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act. That is what I made clear earlier.

What we are talking about will always depend on the particular circumstances of the case. It is the Government’s view that in a scenario—I think this is what the hon. Member for Reigate is getting at—where a family member or friend simply suggests to a person with a terminal condition that the option of assisted death under the Bill is something they may wish to consider, and nothing more, it is unlikely—dare I say, inconceivable—that that would amount to an offence under the 1961 Act.

However, if someone encourages a person in a more tangible way, such as encouraging or pressuring them to make the first declaration, that could well amount to an offence under the 1961 Act. Where that encouragement crosses the threshold into what, interpreted in line with their natural meaning, the courts would understand as pressure or coercion, that could amount to an offence under clause 26 of the Bill, which we will come to in due course. I hope that that addresses the hon. Lady’s question. I will set that out to her in writing, and she is welcome to write back if there is any ambiguity.

I hope that that assists the Committee. I am going to sit down before anybody else intervenes.

[The Chair]

May I make an observation? I understand where the hon. Member for Reigate is coming from, but if letters have gone back and forth to the Department and other Committee members are not privy to what they say, the debate gets a little abstract. That is all I am trying to get to—we should not get too abstract, so that everybody knows what is being said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

Thank you, Chair.

[Sarah Sackman]

I will address the point about injunctions, which we have touched on at a number of junctures in our debate. In terms of applying for an interim injunction in a civil case, a very well-established test is the American Cyanamid test, which all the lawyers in the room would have learned at law school. The first of those tests is, “Is there a serious issue to be tried?” Someone does not have to establish to the civil standard—

[The Chair]

Order. Can we get the order of debate right? Members may make a speech for as long as they want, on the issues they want. They may intervene to get clarity from another Member, but that has to be short and sweet. There is nothing to stop a Member from making another speech, even if they have spoken before. I exhort Members, if they want clarity, to make a speech separately, unless it is a very short intervention. If it is going to be a long intervention, they may well want to make another de facto speech and get clarity through that. They are entitled to stand up as much as they want. I am not encouraging Members to do that, but that is the gist. If the Minister wants to stand up again and clarify the point in its own speech, that is fine.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful. With great respect to other members of the Committee, I think the hon. Gentleman is the most honest advocate of assisted dying among us, because he genuinely recognises that autonomy demands the widest possible range of eligibility. It might be that other Members feel that we have the balance exactly right. I recognise the force of his argument that if we are going to introduce a new human right, it is very difficult to circumscribe its boundaries. He himself thinks that there should be some boundaries: he proposed an amendment that specified 12 months, and he thinks that only certain people should be able to ask someone else to perform assisted death to them. Nevertheless, he is acknowledging that if we believe in autonomy, the Bill would not satisfy some people.

I think it would be intellectually coherent and more logical for proponents of the Bill to want to repeal section 2 of the Suicide Act, and I do not understand why they are not doing so. We could certainly continue to insist on prohibitions against any form of coercion, persuasion or inducement to take one’s own life, but if somebody is clearly in their right mind and wants to receive assistance to kill themselves, that is the principle of the Bill. It would be neater if we amended the Suicide Act accordingly.

The fact that proponents do not want to do so suggests that they see some value in the law and that they consider that that value trumps concerns about autonomy and the impact of the law on family members of someone who wishes to travel to Switzerland to end their life. I agree that there are such principles—namely, the intrinsic value of life and the protection of the vulnerable—but I do not see why proponents of the Bill consider that such principles trump autonomy when it comes to terminally ill adults in England.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. My remarks, as ever, will focus on the legal and practical impact of the amendments to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny. In exercising our duties to ensure that legislation that is passed is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to reflect her intent.

Clause 24, as amended by amendments 504 and 505, will mean that individuals who assist a person to end their life in accordance with the terms of the Bill are not subject to criminal prosecution. Currently, it is a criminal offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 for a person to do an act that is

“capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person”

and intended

“to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.”

That offence attracts a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. Amendment 504 would amend clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order.

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On resuming—

[Sarah Sackman]

I was introducing amendment 504, which amends clause 24(1) to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of providing assistance in accordance with, or performing a function under, the Bill—for example, by undertaking the first or second assessment or providing the approved substance. The effect of the amendment is to ensure that a person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with the Bill. The phrase “in accordance with” the Bill is key. For example, where someone accompanies a person to the appointment at which they will self-administer the substance, the amendment would carve out any criminal liability for the accompanying person.

As originally drafted, the wording would have limited the protection offered by subsection (1) to the far narrower situation of the medical professionals providing assistance under clause 18. The amendment will give effect to the policy intent of the hon. Member for Spen Valley of applying that protection to all those who provide assistance in accordance with, or by performing a function under, the Bill. Subsection (2) clarifies that the clause does not override other ways in which a court may find that a person is not guilty of an offence.

Clause 24(3) inserts proposed new section 2AA into the Suicide Act 1961. As amended by amendment 505, that new section ensures that it is not an offence under the Suicide Act to perform a function under the Bill, or to assist a person seeking to end their own life by doing anything under the Bill. That is for the same reasons that I set out in relation to subsection (1). The new section also provides a defence to the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide, where a person reasonably believes that they were acting in accordance with the Bill, and that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.

Taken as a package, the effect of these amendments is to make the Bill legally workable. To do that, it is necessary to ensure that those who assist a person to use the lawful route are not then subject to criminal liability for doing so. Clause 24 clause, taken together with amendments 504 and 505, gives effect to that.

Let me address some of the issues raised by Opposition Members. There was a question as to whether there is any overlap between offences under the Bill—we will come to some of those offences in due course with clauses 26 and 27—and offences that remain on the statute book under the Suicide Act. The short answer to the question from the hon. Member for Reigate, although I know she has written to my Department, and I will ensure that she receives a full written answer, is that it would remain an offence under the Suicide Act 1961 to encourage suicide, including an assisted death under this Bill.

To the extent that any overlapping offences remain, that is not an unusual approach to drafting in the criminal law. However, the effect of the clause is that it would remain an offence under the 1961 Act to encourage someone to commit suicide. Where a person’s “encouragement”—the hon. Member focused on that term—is such that it amounts to what the courts would understand to be pressure or coercion, that could be an offence under clause 26, which we will come to. As I said, it is not unusual to have a degree of overlap in criminal offences. Again, what someone is charged and prosecuted with falls to the prosecutor, depending on the specific circumstances of the case and what would be most appropriate in that scenario.

I also want to address the scenario that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire posited, about whether a pharmacist who acted in a way that amounted to gross negligence manslaughter would benefit from immunity under clause 24(1) as amended. Again, with the important caveat that it will depend on the particular facts of the case, the offence of gross negligence manslaughter is committed where a death is the result of gross negligence in what would otherwise be a lawful act or omission on the part of the defendant, and where the defendant owes a duty of care to the victim—there are a number of actors within the Bill’s process who owe a duty of care to the person applying for assisted dying.

Let us assume for a moment that, in the hon. Member’s scenario, we do have gross negligence manslaughter on the particular facts; in those circumstances, the Government are content that the pharmacist could not be properly said to be performing a function under the Bill, or in accordance with the Bill, so clause 24(1)—the carve-out from criminal liability—would not apply. I think that that covers most of the questions that were posited earlier.

[Danny Kruger]

It may well be that the Minister has clarified the case sufficiently, but will she explain something for my sake? She is suggesting that the pharmacist inadvertently but negligently caused the death of a patient, having performed the duties under the Bill and believing that they were doing so. Surely, they were performing duties under the Bill, so they would potentially be captured by the carve-out.

[Sarah Sackman]

Again, it would depend on the actual facts. However, if they were attempting to perform duties under the Bill, it is highly unlikely that, in circumstances where the facts establish and meet the threshold of gross negligence manslaughter, they could be said to have carried out those duties in accordance with the Bill. They might have been carrying out duties that they thought were what the Bill prescribed, but if they have done that in such a way that it amounts to gross negligence manslaughter, then clause 24(1) would not apply.

The hon. Gentleman makes the point about what the pharmacist in that scenario believes they are doing; that belief has to be reasonable, and that is a test that our courts are well used to applying. That is why the amendments introduce the belief that someone is acting in accordance with the Bill. It is not enough that they think they are doing it; it has to be a reasonable belief. That is an objective standard.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the Minister for those helpful clarifications. Was any consideration given to also exempting encouragement as an offence under the Suicide Act? I am interested in why it was not exempted in the same way as assistance, particularly given that if it did fall within coercion and pressure—based on what the Minister said—it would get picked up as a criminal offence anyway under the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister will write to me on some of this, but the issue comes back to what is encouragement. As the hon. Member for Spen Valley set out—

[Rebecca Paul]

My apologies, Mr Dowd, but it is a technical point. I think the Minister understands what I am asking.

[Sarah Sackman]

Helpfully, the hon. Member has also set out her questions fully and precisely in a letter to me, so I think I know what she is asking and I will try and answer it as best I can. I reiterate, as I and the Minister for Care have said throughout, that the policy choices have been for the promoter—the Government remain neutral. The offence of encouraging or assisting suicide or attempted suicide in section 2 of the Suicide Act is well established. Encouraging someone to go through the assisted dying process under the Bill with the intention of encouraging suicide or an attempt at suicide would therefore remain a criminal offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act. That is what I made clear earlier.

What we are talking about will always depend on the particular circumstances of the case. It is the Government’s view that in a scenario—I think this is what the hon. Member for Reigate is getting at—where a family member or friend simply suggests to a person with a terminal condition that the option of assisted death under the Bill is something they may wish to consider, and nothing more, it is unlikely—dare I say, inconceivable—that that would amount to an offence under the 1961 Act.

However, if someone encourages a person in a more tangible way, such as encouraging or pressuring them to make the first declaration, that could well amount to an offence under the 1961 Act. Where that encouragement crosses the threshold into what, interpreted in line with their natural meaning, the courts would understand as pressure or coercion, that could amount to an offence under clause 26 of the Bill, which we will come to in due course. I hope that that addresses the hon. Lady’s question. I will set that out to her in writing, and she is welcome to write back if there is any ambiguity.

I hope that that assists the Committee. I am going to sit down before anybody else intervenes.

[The Chair]

May I make an observation? I understand where the hon. Member for Reigate is coming from, but if letters have gone back and forth to the Department and other Committee members are not privy to what they say, the debate gets a little abstract. That is all I am trying to get to—we should not get too abstract, so that everybody knows what is being said.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

Thank you, Chair.

[Sarah Sackman]

I will address the point about injunctions, which we have touched on at a number of junctures in our debate. In terms of applying for an interim injunction in a civil case, a very well-established test is the American Cyanamid test, which all the lawyers in the room would have learned at law school. The first of those tests is, “Is there a serious issue to be tried?” Someone does not have to establish to the civil standard—

[The Chair]

Order. Can we get the order of debate right? Members may make a speech for as long as they want, on the issues they want. They may intervene to get clarity from another Member, but that has to be short and sweet. There is nothing to stop a Member from making another speech, even if they have spoken before. I exhort Members, if they want clarity, to make a speech separately, unless it is a very short intervention. If it is going to be a long intervention, they may well want to make another de facto speech and get clarity through that. They are entitled to stand up as much as they want. I am not encouraging Members to do that, but that is the gist. If the Minister wants to stand up again and clarify the point in its own speech, that is fine.

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[Sarah Sackman]

The clause, as amended by amendments 506 to 509, creates two stand-alone criminal offences that apply when a person uses dishonesty, coercion or pressure to induce a person to do a particular act. Subsection (1) creates an offence of inducing another person to make a first or second declaration, or not to cancel such a declaration, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure. That offence, as we heard, will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment, ensuring consistency with the maximum penalty under the Suicide Act.

Subsection (2), as amended by amendment 506, creates an offence of inducing another person to self-administer and approve substances provided under the Bill, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure. Amendment 506 replaces “in accordance with” with “under” for this offence. That gives effect to the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley that the offence should capture those who induce a person to self-administer a substance that, due to some error in the process, has not been provided strictly in accordance with the processes in the Bill. The amendment therefore ensures that the offence in subsection (2) will operate effectively.

Amendment 508 inserts proposed new subsection (4) to establish life imprisonment as the maximum penalty for the offence in subsection (2). That amendment gives effect to the policy intent of my hon. Friend by emphasising that inducing someone to undergo an unwanted assisted death through a legal system established by Parliament is a grave offence warranting the most severe penalty of life imprisonment. Amendment 507 is consequential on amendment 508 and amends subsection (3) to reflect the policy intent of my hon. Friend that the offence in subsection (2) should carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, rather than 14 years’ imprisonment.

Amendment 509, which a number of Members mentioned, amends the clause to provide that neither of the offences could be prosecuted without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. That amendment achieves the policy intent of my hon. Friend that the legislation, first, be consistent with the Suicide Act 1961, which makes the same provision for the DPP’s involvement and where such consent is required; and, secondly, to ensure that spurious prosecutions are not brought, for example, by those who may oppose the process that the applicant for assisted dying is undergoing simply because they oppose it, rather than because of any illegality or criminality. That is the function of having the DPP consent baked into the legislation.

To be clear, the terms “coercion”, “dishonesty” and “pressure” remain undefined in the clause. That was an issue that we touched on right back in the early days of clause 1. Without a statutory definition, the terms will carry their natural, ordinary meaning, well understood by the public and the courts alike.

I want to pick up on two other points touched on in various speeches. The first has to do with the issue of coercion, coercive control and its subtleties, the way in which that is dealt with and, indeed, the painfully low conviction rates for domestic abuse and coercion. I am not seeking to make a wider political point beyond the amendments that we are discussing, but the hon. Member for Reigate and my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West know that the Government have a mission to halve violence against women and girls. I assure the Committee that, in my capacity as Minister of State in the Ministry of Justice, we are intently focused on addressing that, and ensuring that the criminal justice system plays its part more widely. The offences sit in that context.

The other point that I want to address, and touched on earlier, was the one made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire about our duties to the statute book. It is right that there is a degree of duplication and to acknowledge that, as the Government do in working with the promoter of the Bill to reflect her policy intent. That is not unusual. It is something those in law enforcement, in particular in the CPS, are well versed in. It will be for them to make the appropriate charging decisions, depending on the facts in the particular case.

The function of the offence created under subsection (2) and the penalty attached to it affect the gravity that the promoter of the Bill sought to indicate for the offence of inducing someone to undergo something through dishonesty, coercion or pressure, in the context of what we all acknowledge is a new process. If the Bill is passed, there will be a new legal regime for assisted dying. The manipulation of such a new regime to ends that are criminalised under the provision is reflected in that specific offence. To be clear, the degree of duplication is acknowledged, but the Government’s view is that that is neither unusual nor poses a problem for the CPS.

[Danny Kruger]

That is helpful and makes sense. The only justification for duplication must be that the duplication is only partial, which the Minister has just suggested it is. Not a complete overlap—some cases will fall into one category, but not into the other. I wonder if she could help us to understand with an example that would help the CPS when it makes its decisions about which offence to charge someone under—an example of an offence that would be illegal under this clause and not already illegal under the Suicide Act or the laws of homicide.

[Sarah Sackman]

I am not going to answer that question directly, because I will not get into hypotheticals, which would be a test. I understand the question the hon. Gentleman is asking. As I said, the policy intent here—the policy of including the specific offence within the context of this new legal regime and the signal that doing so would send to all those participating in this regime by attaching the severest penalty of life imprisonment to the offence created under subsection (2)—has been a matter for the Bill’s promoter. The Government have worked with her to create a workable regime.

I will not proffer on my feet a hypothetical factual scenario that would be caught by this offence, but would not be caught under other offences that exist in our criminal law. The point is that overlapping criminal offences exist in our criminal law. That is not unusual. The CPS is well versed in dealing with that. The charging decisions will be for the CPS, with the consent of the DPP. Satisfying the purpose of having criminal liability—to catch those who perpetrate what would be, in any view, a heinous crime, and to deter such crime—would be discharged by the drafting that we have here.

[Danny Kruger]

I respect the difficulty of the position that the Minister is in, but I am afraid that we have to consider hypothetical scenarios, because we are creating law. Does she acknowledge that, even if she cannot imagine, or cannot suggest to us, a case that falls under the provisions of this clause, but is not caught by the Suicide Act or law of murder, someone who is charged with murder could plausibly claim that, in fact, they should have been charged with the offence under clause 26(2) of the Bill? Plausibly, they could make a case, perhaps through judicial review, that the charging decision was wrong, and we would have months of litigation before we even got to the prosecution beginning. Can she envisage such a scenario happening?

[Sarah Sackman]

I find that highly implausible; the likelihood is that the CPS will apply the appropriate charging decision to fit the facts as they have arisen. If they have arisen within the context of this legal regime, for someone acting nefariously, dishonestly or coercively about assisted dying, the charge under this clause would be the appropriate one. I find it implausible that the other scenario would arise. As I said, the CPS is well versed in applying the appropriate charging decision to the appropriate crime on the facts of the crime. I will not speculate or hypothesise on what that might be.

[Kit Malthouse]

As the Minister said, this is not an unusual exercise for the CPS and operates in lots of other areas. For example, the CPS regularly makes decisions about whether to charge someone with grievous bodily harm under section 18 or section 20 of the relevant legislation—they are both forms of GBH. Which one the CPS chooses depends on the circumstances, the seriousness and the level of intent. As she said, the charge naturally—whether it falls under the same Act or a different Act—comes down to the circumstances.

[Sarah Sackman]

That is a good example. One knows from charging decisions that often, on indictment, one might have multiple offences to capture the totality of the criminal behaviour. Some of those may be made out, some of them may not. What the Government have sought to do here, working with the Bill’s promoter, is to reflect her policy intent: to convey the gravity of the offence in this wholly new legal regime. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out earlier, we are sanctioning and decriminalising conduct that has previously been criminal, while ensuring that this offence captures what would be criminal under the new legal regime. From the promoter’s point of view, it is important to signal that the Government have worked with her on this, and the Government’s position is that the result, in this amended form of the Bill, gives both some satisfaction to her policy intent and is compatible with how our criminal law routinely works, so it is workable from the point of view of the CPS.

[Danny Kruger]

I acknowledge the point that the Minister is making. To the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, we are talking not about two categories of offence within the same legal framework, namely GBH, but about two different legal frameworks altogether, the law of homicide and the law on assisted dying. Does the Minister agree that the clause as it is to be amended will create the opportunity for a murderer who would otherwise be convicted of or charged with murder to claim that, in fact, he was committing an offence under the assisted suicide law? We are creating a new opportunity for someone who would otherwise, were it not for this law, be legitimately charged with murder to claim that they are committing this offence instead.

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not consider that through this amended form of the Bill—if the Committee chooses to vote that way—we will have created an opportunity that could be exploited in that way. The hon. Gentleman said earlier that there has not been consultation on that point, but there has been close working of highly experienced Government lawyers with the promoter to reflect her policy intent.

What the clause interlocking—and indeed overlapping, as I have acknowledged—with the Suicide Act does is prescribe new forms of criminal offence and liability that will capture criminal behaviour, which is ultimately what the measure is about. Tellingly, the punishment attached to the clause 26 offence is the same as the maximum punishment for murder, that of life imprisonment, which is indicative of the gravity of the offence that would be caught.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is the point I would like to make: the penalty is the same, but it is important that the offence is specific, hence why I have put it in the Bill. The outcome for the criminal involved, however, would be the same.

[Sarah Sackman]

That is all I intend to say on this matter. I think we have probably ventilated this particular issue as far as we can.

Amendment 506 agreed to.

Amendments made: 507, in clause 26, page 16, line 9, leave out “or (2)”.

This amendment limits subsection (3) to offences under subsection (1).

Amendment 508, in clause 26, page 16, line 10, at end insert—

“(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (2) is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment provides for a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for an offence under subsection (2).

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[Danny Kruger]

It is good to see you this evening, Mrs Harris.

I have no objection to the hon. Lady’s amendments. I think there is value in broadening the offence to include actions performed intentionally or recklessly, as that is critical for patient safety. Given the finality of the result of assisted death, there should not be any room for carelessness, and liability must ensure that not only deliberate misconduct but negligent record keeping is subject to legal scrutiny. I want to put on the record the evidence we had from the British Journal of Nursing, which has documented the serious risks of poor record keeping in medical practice. That demonstrates how inadequate documentation contributes to clinical errors.

I think the hon. Lady recognises that this is not just a matter of bureaucratic tidying-up. The principle is straightforward: if the decision to assist in ending a life is to be lawful, the documentation supporting it must be unimpeachable. Expanding liability to cover reckless documentation is entirely consistent with existing legal and professional standards in the UK medical profession.

[Sarah Sackman]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I will be brief. As we have heard, clause 27 creates various stand-alone criminal offences regarding the falsification or destruction of documentation related to assisted dying. Amendment 510 replaces “wilfully” with “intentionally or recklessly” in subsection (1)(b), to align the wording with that used elsewhere in the clause. The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on the other amendments, to tighten up and improve the workability and operability of the Bill.

Amendment 510 agreed to.

Amendments made: 511, in clause 27, page 16, line 22, leave out “that person” and insert “a relevant matter”.

This amendment and amendment 512 clarify that the offence under subsection (2) relates only to an opinion about a matter relating to a function under the Bill.

Amendment 512, in clause 27, page 16, line 23, at end insert—

“(2A) In subsection (2) “relevant matter” means a matter relating to any function under this Act.”

See the statement for amendment 511.

Amendment 513, in clause 27, page 16, line 24, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

“(3) A person commits an offence if they intentionally or recklessly fail to comply with an obligation under—

(a) section 14(1A) or (2) (notification of cancellation of declaration), or

(b) section 17 (recording of cancellations).”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment clarifies the scope of the offence under subsection (3), by providing that the offence occurs where a doctor fails to comply with a notification or recording obligation in relation to the cancelling of a first or second declaration.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment 514, in clause 27, page 16, line 28, leave out subsection (4).

This amendment is consequential on NC24.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

In combination, amendments 514 to 516 and new clause 24 refine and strengthen the legal framework surrounding assisted dying, shifting the focus towards serious fraudulent misconduct and the falsification of documents, and ensuring that prosecutions are conducted with careful oversight by the Director of Public Prosecutions. These changes mark a clear departure from the original drafting, which focused clause 27 more generally on non-compliance with administrative duties, and introduce more severe consequences for deliberate wrongdoing related to the assisted dying process.

New clause 24 is an important addition to the Bill. It creates an offence in respect of certain conduct, where the person engaging in the conduct does so with the intention of enabling another person to obtain assistance under the Act. I made some comments about that previously, so I will leave it there for now, but I hope the Committee will join me in supporting the amendments and new clause.

[Sarah Sackman]

I intend to be brief. New clause 24 and amendments 514 to 516 create stand-alone criminal offences relating to the falsification or destruction of documentation where a person acts with the intention of facilitating the provision of assistance to another person to end their own life under the Bill. That reflects the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley that those who falsify documents with the specific intent of facilitating another to end their life should be subject to a higher maximum penalty than those offences in clause 27.

Amendment 514 agreed to.

Amendments made: 515, in clause 27, page 16, line 31, leave out from beginning to “an” and insert “A person who commits”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 514.

Amendment 516, in clause 27, page 16, line 36, at end insert—

“(6) Proceedings for an offence under this section may be instituted only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment provides that proceedings for an offence under this clause may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Clause 27, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Prescribing, dispensing, transporting etc of approved substances

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 442, in clause 28, page 17, line 3, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment will make it an obligation for the Secretary of State to make regulations on the prescribing and dispensing of approved substances, their transportation, storage, handling and disposal and the associated records with this.

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[Danny Kruger]

The concern is that it should be automatic. I just cite Professor Ahmedzai’s recognition of the frequent necessity, or the distinct possibility, of a referral to the coroner being appropriate. I suggest that it should happen as a matter of course. I would be grateful to understand from the hon. Lady or the Minister under what circumstances they feel it would be appropriate for a coroner to be involved. The difficulty is that we are putting a lot of emphasis on the role of the local medical examiner to decide whether it should be appropriate for the coroner to consider a case; I suggest that they should consider all cases.

The obligation on coroners need not be over-burdensome. Some coroner’s inquests can be dealt with in as little as 20 minutes if matters are simple and not in dispute, which they would be in the great majority of the cases we are talking about. The presence of this jurisdiction—the ability of the coroner to investigate—would be a most valuable safeguard. It would help to identify whether matters have gone wrong in the act of self-administration and the process of dying, which could significantly assist whatever regulatory regime—we are yet to discover that—oversees the process. It could assist the continuous improvement of the regime.

It would also help to identify issues relating to misdiagnosis, which we know happens often. It is remarkable—and worth pointing out in response to the suggestion that terminal diagnoses are always accurate—that one study found, after autopsy, that one in four cases had been misdiagnosed. Doctors might say somebody is dying of a certain condition, but it turns out they were not.

I take the point that a coroner would not be prohibited by clause 29(1) from launching an investigation in appropriate cases, but given that we do not know what we do not know, it might be hard to decide when that is required. With a new scheme like this, it would be best to start with an investigation in every case. If, in a few years’ time, it appears that the safeguard is not needed, a future Parliament could change the law to reduce it, but I implore the Committee to consider the idea that we should start with the safest Bill we can.

[Sarah Sackman]

Under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, coroners have a duty to investigate and certify deaths that are reported to them. That duty is triggered when they have a reason to suspect that the deceased died a violent or unnatural death, the cause of death is unknown, or the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention. There are also regulations made under the powers of the 2009 Act that require medical practitioners to notify such deaths to the coroner.

Clause 29(1) disapplies the coroner’s duty to investigate in the case of an assisted death that has been carried out in accordance with the Bill’s provisions. In practice, that would mean the assisted death would instead be certified by an attending practitioner—the doctor who has attended the patient—and scrutinised by an independent medical examiner working in the NHS. Therefore, the attending practitioner and medical examiner, rather than the coroner, would certify the cause of death. It would remain open to anyone—such as a family member or a medical practitioner who has interacted with the deceased and has concerns—to report a death to the coroner if they had concerns that it had not occurred in line with the provisions of the Bill.

Amendment 522 would remove the disapplication of the coroner’s duty to investigate in relation to assisted deaths, essentially reversing the Bill’s current provisions. Consequently, given that assisted deaths are inherently unnatural, the amendment would require that the coroner has a duty to investigate each and every assisted death and then certify the cause of death. To answer the hon. Member for East Wiltshire’s point, the bereaved family would, as I have said, be able to raise any concerns with the medical examiner, and the coroner’s duty to investigate would be triggered if they suspected that death had not occurred in line with the process prescribed.

It is important to note that medical examiners follow their own structured process of investigation. They review medical records, consult practitioners involved in the case and then apply the criteria set out from the Notification of Deaths Regulations 2019 to determine whether the death meets the threshold for a coroner referral. In doing so, they would proactively speak to family members, thereby providing the opportunity for any concerns to be raised; if there are any, they would make the referral to the coroner. I hope that assists the Committee.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I will be very brief. My understanding is—I think the Minister said this—that the attending practitioner, the medical examiner or anybody else, including family members, could refer to the coroner if they felt it was necessary or suspected anything untoward. If that is the case, I am content that the Bill is fit for purpose as it stands.

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[Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I was not planning to speak on this group either, but the debate speaks to a number of the things that we have talked about in the past few weeks. I add the caveat that all hon. Members present acknowledge that the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, has repeatedly made it clear that data collection is essential to what we are proposing. I am also sympathetic to what my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central said about not necessarily needing to put everything in the Bill.

Without trying to sound like a broken record, however—I have made this point several times over the past few weeks—it is critical that in certain situations, although there may be some regulations or inferences that exist that may lead to certain outcomes that we on this Committee would all like to see, there is nothing necessarily wrong with putting them explicitly in writing.

Hon. Members have used different stats from different jurisdictions in their own way to lend weight to their arguments, and although many of those stats are relatively consistent in a number of areas, they are not necessarily decisive. I cited a stat yesterday when speaking to an amendment that around 10% of people using the assisted dying route have complications during the final stages, but as I said then, that came from an incredibly small sample size of just over 100 people.

It is therefore critical that, if the Bill is passed and we go down this path, we pursue robust and expansive data gathering in a number of different areas, and I am sure that any Government would look to do so. As long as it does not create any loopholes or unintended consequences, that sort of evidence gathering should be in the Bill because, at the very least, that would provide reassurance that it will happen if the Bill is passed.

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not have a lot to add, but I point out that, as the Bill stands, clause 34 requires the chief medical officer to, among other things, submit an annual report to the relevant national authority on the operation of the Act. Amendment 382 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley would make the voluntary assisted dying commissioner responsible for that function instead. Amendment 274 would require that the report under clause 34 contains an analysis of the additional information to be collected under new clause 10 and amendment 273. I remind the Committee of that because we are discussing what information should be gathered, and at what point in the process. There is then the monitoring, reporting and co-ordinating function performed by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, should those later amendments be passed.

[Kit Malthouse]

My assumption is that once a commissioner is appointed, and in drawing up the regulations and guidelines for reporting, there will be consultation between the Government and the commissioner about what the commissioner actually wants to report on. From what the Minister is saying, I assume that, unless we collect the data, the commissioner will have nothing to say in their report.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and that is exactly why I made that point. One of the design features of the commissioner model is the monitoring function, through which they will undertake annual reporting and an assessment of patterns in the practice, should the legal regime come into force. That is exactly how I anticipate it working.

The commissioner can also be self-correcting and say, “We need to see more information on this because it is a concern. We have this equalities data”—or whatever data we have collected—“and we need to see more on this aspect, because this pattern is a concern to us or it would help to illuminate how the practice is operating.” That is all I wanted to add, because one has to appreciate the operation of the regime as a whole.

[Kim Leadbeater]

As has been alluded to by various Committee members, I fully support the intention behind amendment 273, but I think it will be covered already. I have mentioned my amendment 500, but amendment 455 is probably more pertinent. It looks at the annual report that the assisted dying commissioner would produce, which makes reference to protected characteristics, and sets out that any other such data can and should be collected under regulations.

I am therefore confident that that report would encompass the points made by amendment 273, and that reference is made to the analysis that is covered by amendment 274. I feel confident that the intention will be met by the introduction of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, but I wholeheartedly agree that data collection is a fundamentally important part of the process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

These amendments were tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. As discussed, clause 29 requires the Registrar General to

“prepare and lay before Parliament a report providing a statistical analysis of deaths”

arising. We have spoken before about the paucity of data from other jurisdictions and the problems arising when data is not collected from the start; when data is collected only in relation to one thing, such as disability in Canada; when data collection is suddenly discontinued, as in Washington state as I understand it; or when data is insufficiently granular, so that we get only the headlines. I therefore think that this approach is valuable, and I welcome the Committee’s decision to support amendment 273 tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. Amendments 446 and 486 would ensure that we fix those problems from the start.

Amendment 446 would give the Secretary of State the power to specify the datasets that must be made available, and those must be approved by Parliament. MPs would then be able to interrogate what data we are collecting and what questions that enables us to answer. Ensuring that that is determined by regulation places it in law, and ensures ministerial responsibility and parliamentary oversight.

Amendment 486 sets out the data that must be included. That includes demographic information, including breakdowns by protected characteristics—and I acknowledge the conversation that has just been had on that topic—and the length of time between the taking of the approved substances and the time of death. It strikes me that that is a very important consideration. I hope that that would be specified in the data that the Registrar General will provide, but that is not clear at the moment. It is also vital that any complications are properly reported—not just recorded, but reported.

I do not propose to push these amendments to a vote; I think that the argument has been sufficiently made. I am grateful to the Committee for supporting the previous amendment. However, I wish that things were otherwise and that we were specifying more clearly what data will be collected. I hope that perhaps this debate will encourage the Registrar General to ensure that the most comprehensive data is presented to Parliament.

[Sarah Sackman]

In light of the hon. Gentleman’s remarks, I do not have anything further to add, other than to note what he has said.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I have nothing to add.

Draft Online Procedure Rules (Specified Proceedings) Regulations 2025

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2025 General Committees

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Online Procedure Rules (Specified Proceedings) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris.

The purpose of the draft regulations is to specify proceedings for which the Online Procedure Rule Committee can make rules. The aim of the OPRC is to improve access to justice for all. It was established under the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 and it aims to modernise the civil, family and tribunal jurisdictions by developing rules governing the practice and procedure for specific types of online court and tribunal proceedings. These rules are intended to be simple, accessible and fair. They will streamline online processes and enhance the overall efficiency of the system.

I will outline the proceedings for which the draft regulations will enable the OPRC to develop rules. In the civil jurisdiction, the OPRC will be able to make online procedure rules for property proceedings. The Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are working closely with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to ensure that the justice system is fully prepared for the implementation of the Renters’ Rights Bill. As part of this, HMCTS will digitise the court process for landlords to regain possession of their property, introducing a digital service for both landlords and tenants. Procedure rules will be required to allow use of this service, and parliamentary approval of the draft regulations will enable the OPRC to make those rules. The digital possession service and the rules will reflect the law as it stands at the point that the service is deployed. However, the introduction of the digital possession service and the rules that underpin it is not tied to the timelines for bringing into force the measures in the Renters’ Rights Bill.

The OPRC will also be able to make online procedure rules for property proceedings in the first-tier and upper tribunals. That will allow certain cases currently dealt with by the property chamber or the lands chamber to be included in online procedure rules as and when HMCTS introduces digital systems to manage those cases online.

In the family jurisdiction, the OPRC will be able to make rules for financial remedies, including contested financial remedies and financial consent orders, for example following a divorce. Online procedure rules for these proceedings will be designed to support the existing online services provided by HMCTS, which are currently governed by practice directions made by the Family Procedure Rule Committee.

The OPRC is unable to make any online procedure rules until the proceedings are defined in regulations. The extent of the draft regulations is intended to be UK-wide. Their territorial application is England and Wales in respect of civil and family proceedings, and UK-wide in respect of tribunal proceedings.

The Government believe that the digitisation of court and tribunal processes requires the development of procedure rules that are suitable for the digital age. They must be concise and straightforward to understand. They must support His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and the judiciary to deliver online processes and to keep adapting to advances in technology. Those aims will be met by the transfer of these specified proceedings to the OPRC—a cross-jurisdictional rule committee whose members include experts in the law and in the development of digital services focused ultimately on the user.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the shadow Minister for his comments, and for the break-out of consensus on this progressive measure. He is absolutely right that access to justice, which lies at the heart of these reforms, is something we should be mindful of. I assure him that that is the guiding principle behind the reforms.

On the application of the OPRC rules in connection with the Renters’ Rights Bill, as I said, the timelines for the implementation of the Bill and the implementation of the rules are not pegged together. Of course, it will be proper to await the development of the rules and their implementation in order for them to become operable. I am happy to update the shadow Minister and other Members as to when those rules are ready.

On the potential for duplication, the shadow Minister will know that the rules will be developed in consultation with the judiciary, which is represented on the OPRC. The operation of the draft regulations does not prevent existing rule committees from making rules in their relevant areas, but clarity on which rules apply to particular types of proceedings is vital. It will become very clear that the online procedure rules apply to online proceedings where regulations have made provision for them to be the applicable rules, and that where they are not the applicable rules, other rules will apply. We cannot have different rules applying to the same proceedings, and that will of course be made clear.

Finally, on access to justice, the shadow Minister is absolutely right that nobody should be left behind by the digitisation of our courts. We need to ensure an equal service, particularly for those who are digitally disadvantaged and will not be able to access online processes, for whatever reason. That is why, even in the areas where we want to move to an almost entirely digital world, there will always be provision for people to engage in proceedings through a paper-based service. The Government are also ensuring that there is a digital support service so that access to justice really does what it says, and that all users, but particularly those who are vulnerable or digitally disadvantaged, are able to access our online proceedings. As I said, I am happy to update the shadow Minister and the rest of the House on the timeline for the implementation of the OPRC rules in respect of possession proceedings, and indeed the other areas, when they come into force.

Question put and agreed to.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting)

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Wednesday 12th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Naz Shah]

If I may, Ms McVey, I will speak to the issue of the judicial oversight of the panel and the whole of new clause 21. I would like to understand something, and perhaps the Minister or my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley could help me. We have been talking a lot about judicial oversight. My concern is that even if we had judicial oversight, there is no liability if something goes wrong. We would have had judicial oversight, but now we have panel oversight—non-judicial oversight—of the decision. Even then, what if somebody went down the assisted dying route and an issue was raised afterwards? What recourse would anybody—family members and so on—have to hold anybody liable if they did something wrong, including, potentially, the commissioner?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey.

As my hon. Friend the Minister for Care and I have made clear throughout debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not have a position on assisted dying. Once again, my remarks will focus on the legal and practical impacts of the amendments, with a view to assisting Committee members. I will first speak to amendments 371 to 373, 377, 378, 381, 388, 390 and 391, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and new schedules 1 and 2, all tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

In executing our duties to ensure that the legislation, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to the amendments, which propose the voluntary assisted dying commission and the panels. They reflect my hon. Friend’s intent to replace the court approval process that is currently set out in the Bill. I confirm that this change was driven not by capacity concerns from within Government, but by the Bill promoter’s policy intent. Let me be clear: the High Court stage could be made to work, but if the Committee and Parliament elect for the commissioner and panel model, the state will work to deliver that.

New clause 14 and consequential amendment 391 would provide for the establishment of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. In keeping with other appointments of this significance, the commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister, and the individual in post must hold or have held office—so it is not sitting judges, but could be a retired judge—as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.

New clause 14 sets out the central functions of the commissioner, which will be detailed further in new clauses 15 and 17 and new schedule 1. The commissioner would receive documents, including the reports from the co-ordinating doctor and declarations under the legislation, make appointments to the list of persons eligible to sit on assisted dying review panels, and refer cases to those panels, which would replace the role of the High Court in the original draft of the Bill. In addition, the commissioner would have the responsibility for monitoring the Bill’s operation and reporting annually to Parliament, which we will no doubt come to in clause 34. It is important to pause there, because that is one aspect in which the commissioner model is distinct from that of a court or tribunal. It will serve multiple functions, not least the monitoring of the Bill’s operation and reporting on that annually to Parliament.

New schedule 1 contains practical arrangements for the office of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, as established in new clause 14. In practice, we anticipate that the commissioner’s office will be a non-departmental public body. The establishment of such an office to support the Government-appointed chair or commissioner is common practice for roles of this nature. One such model is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which is chaired by a person who is holding or who has held high judicial office. The schedule also introduces the role of a deputy commissioner, who, like the commissioner, must have been appointed by the Prime Minister and hold or have held office as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.

Both the commissioner and deputy commissioner would be appointed for terms of five years, with their remuneration set by the Secretary of State. The commissioner would have the ability to appoint their own staff, having obtained approval from the Secretary of State in regard to the number of staff, the remuneration and the terms, as well as providing an annual statement of accounts. In the ordinary way, such a public body would be subject to other statutory provisions, not least the Equality Act 2010.

New clause 15 would establish the mechanism for the referral by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to an assisted dying review panel. When the commissioner receives a first declaration from the person seeking assistance, and reports from the co-ordinating and independent doctors as to their assessments of the person—including a statement by those doctors as to the person’s eligibility for assistance—they would be required to refer the case to a panel as soon as reasonably practical. In practice, the task of organising the work of each panel would fall to the commissioner’s office. The co-ordinating doctor would be required to inform the commissioner where a first or second declaration is cancelled. Where the commissioner is informed of the cancellation of the first declaration, they must not refer the case to a panel, or must inform the panel to disregard the application if already referred.

Amendments 371, 372, 373, 377, 378, 381, 388 and 390 are all consequential amendments on new clause 21, and together establish the mechanism for the consideration of cases by the assisted dying review panels in place of the High Court. Panels would be required to review each case and issue a certificate of eligibility where they are satisfied that all requirements set out in the Bill have been met.

[Sarah Olney]

I seek clarification. As drafted, in clause 12(1)(c), the High Court would give

“a declaration that the requirements of this Act have been met”,

but in new clause 21(6)(a), the panel is required to issue a certificate of eligibility, to which the Minister just referred. I seek the Minister’s guidance on whether it is the Government’s view that the High Court declaration has equal weight in law to the certificate of eligibility set out in new clause 21. I ask particularly because that certificate will be relied on for the purposes of suspending the Suicide Act 1961, under which a criminal offence would otherwise have been committed. The certificate of eligibility will need to be relied on to demonstrate that no criminal offence has been committed under that law. Is it the view of the Minister and the Government that a High Court direction, as originally required, can now be fully replaced by, and have equal weight with, a certificate of eligibility?

[Sarah Sackman]

As I understand it, everything has to be internally coherent in whatever the final draft of the Bill is. Within this structure, because in this case it is a panel that issues the certificate, it is its own sui generis certificate appropriate to this process. The declaration that was referred to in the earlier draft is one that the High Court would normally do. Given that this is on the face of the Bill, and will be in primary legislation, it would have legal force and would, if it were internally coherent with the rest of the legislation, have the legal effect of operating coherently with the criminal offences and, indeed, with the suspension of the Suicide Act, as the hon. Lady just asked. That is my understanding.

[Sarah Olney]

My original question was more about whether it has the same legal force as a High Court direction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

My understanding is that it would, yes. If I am wrong about that, I will obviously come back to the Committee and correct it, but my understanding is that it would. They are two different things—one is called a certificate of eligibility and one is a High Court declaration—but in terms of how they operate within this legal scheme, my understanding is that they would have the same legal effect, and they are intended to.

Under new clause 21, the panel must hear from, and may question, the person seeking assistance and the co-ordinating doctor, or the independent doctor, or both. The panel may also hear, and may question, the person’s proxy if that is relevant, and any other person, including those appearing to have relevant knowledge or experience. This could include family members, or other individuals with an interest in the welfare of the person, as well as other experts. The new clause is explicit that the panel must not grant the certificate of eligibility if it is not satisfied that all the requirements have been met. Further consequential amendments introduce references to the certificate of eligibility throughout the Bill. Once the panel has made a decision, it will be required to notify the person seeking assistance, the co-ordinating doctor, the commissioner and any other person specified in the regulations.

As others have pointed out, the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley do not spell out every step of the process or the procedure that the panels would be expected to follow. That is left to secondary legislation, and it will be for the commission and the commissioner to produce their own guidance on how the panels and the panel procedure are intended to be governed and regulated. That is in line with the approach to legislation more broadly, with main objectives typically set out in primary legislation, and secondary policy issues and technical and administrative matters, dealt with through secondary legislation, regulations and guidance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

We have heard before that the panel’s decision must be unanimous. However, I have tried looking in the Bill and it does not state that specifically. My understanding is that two people could nod their head, the other one would not have to, and it would still pass.

[Sarah Sackman]

I believe it is in there. Let me find the relevant provision so that I can refer my hon. Friend to it.

[Naz Shah]

It is a majority vote, not unanimous.

[Sarah Sackman]

It is a majority vote for the other decisions that a panel may make, but in respect of certification, the decision is unanimous. Paragraph 5(2) of new schedule 2 states:

“Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote”.

Such decisions include whether to hear from an additional expert, or whether further investigation is required in respect of an aspect that the panel may be concerned about, such as coercion or capacity. While those decisions can be taken by a majority vote, in respect of certification and granting a certificate of eligibility, I refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 5(3), which states:

“The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.”

That is a slightly mealy-mouthed way of saying that if any member of the panel resists the grant of the certificate, no certificate can be issued.

[Danny Kruger]

I just want to support the hon. Member for Bradford West. She is absolutely right. It is clearly intended that there should be a unanimous decision but, in fact, as the hon. Lady pointed out, if one of the members decides effectively to abstain, the procedure does go ahead. It is not that they all have to actively support the decision; only two of them have to do that. One of them could have their doubts and sit on their hands, and it would still go ahead.

[Sarah Sackman]

That might be something that other hon. Members wish to take away with them, whatever the policy intent may have been. In fairness, I do not think that the question of whether there is a requirement to give a positive indication of a decision either way is on the face of the Bill. However, I think that clearly the intention behind paragraph 5(3) of new schedule 2 is that there is unanimity in relation to the grant of an eligibility certificate.

[Daniel Francis]

I was once on a planning committee in which one member of the committee voted in favour and all the other members abstained, so the recommendation went through one to zero. Technically, given the way in which new schedule 2 reads to me, that could happen, because one member could vote in favour and two could abstain, and that would therefore be considered unanimous. Will the Minister comment on that?

[Sarah Sackman]

We are discussing how to construe the provision in paragraph 5 of new schedule 2. I should reiterate that, obviously, it is the promoter’s intent to have—hon. Members may call it what they will—the safeguard of unanimity behind that provision. If there is any feeling that the drafting does not fully reflect that intent, it can be tightened up. However, under of the Bill, there is clearly an intent to have unanimity in respect of the final decision about certification.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It absolutely is the policy intent that there should be a unanimous decision of the panel. If there is any lack of clarity, I am very happy to look into working with official draftspeople to tighten that up.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank hon. Members for their interventions.

In respect of the standard that would be applied in order for the panel to be satisfied, in practice, as I was saying, the panel would establish a case on the balance of probability in those circumstances only on the basis of strong evidence. In other words, the more serious the issue to be determined, the closer the scrutiny and the stronger the evidence required.

Introducing a requirement for the panel to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt at this stage would create a difference to, or a divergence from, the standard applied by professionals earlier in the process, such as by the doctors in the first and second assessments, and—I think the hon. Member for Reigate acknowledged this in her speech—to ascertain whether, among other things, the person has capacity to make the decision to end their own life, whether they have a clear, settled and informed wish to do so, and that they have not been pressured or coerced. Such a requirement would create the problem of making the application of the Bill incoherent because, of course, if a civil standard has been applied earlier in the process, the higher, criminal bar could never be satisfied at the panel stage. The principal decision is what standard should be applied and, as I have said, the civil standard is used in other end-of-life decisions, but there is also a question of the internal coherence of the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the Minister for the very clear way in which she is explaining everything. I completely acknowledge what she has just said. As she rightly said, I alluded to the fact that I tried to make the change at an earlier stage, but was unsuccessful, and I am now trying to put it through here. Can the Minister comment on the meaning of “satisfied”? If we are not going to have “beyond reasonable doubt”, can she expand a little on the meaning of “satisfied” and whether she is comfortable that that is clear enough for these purposes?

[Sarah Sackman]

The answer is yes. I, on behalf of the Government, am satisfied that that would be commonly and well understood by those applying it, and any court construing it, that the standard to be applied is the civil standard. That would be understood by not just the commissioner in terms of laying down the rules for the panels, but the panels themselves. It is important to recall that as Lord Bingham, one of the most distinguished judges that this country has ever produced, once said,

“The civil standard is a flexible standard to be applied with greater or lesser strictness according to the seriousness of what has to be proved”,

and there is no doubt, based on what Parliament has debated, about the utmost seriousness of these issues. To answer the hon. Member’s question, the answer is yes, I think it is clear. That is the Government’s position.

Amendment (b) to new clause 21 would give the panel discretion to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility where the requirements stated in the Bill are met if it believes there are

“particular circumstances which make it inappropriate for the person”

to be provided with assistance. The Government’s view is that this could risk unpredictability and inconsistency in the panel’s decision making and reduce legal certainty for the person seeking assistance, as well as for the panel.

Amendment (c) to new clause 21 concerns three specific requirements under subsection (2):

“(c) that the person has capacity…(h) that the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”

and

“(i) that the person made the first declaration voluntarily and was not coerced or pressured by any other person”.

The amendment would mean that despite finding that those criteria had been met on the balance of probabilities, the panel could stay proceedings when it believed there was a real risk that they have not been satisfied. As with amendment (b) to new clause 21, this could result in uncertainty for the applicant and in terms of what is required of the panel in its decision making.

As I referred to earlier, in a lot of these decisions, the question of whether somebody has capacity or is being coerced is ultimately a binary decision for each panel member. The person has capacity or they do not. In applying the civil standard with the rigour that Lord Bingham spoke about in the most serious cases in circumstances when the panel or its members identify that there is a real risk, one would expect them to exercise their discretionary powers to seek more evidence to remove that risk and doubt, and if that persists, to refuse and make the binary choice that the person does not have capacity or is being coerced, or vice versa.

Amendment (d) to new clause 21 would require the panel to hear from and question both assessing doctors, as opposed to the requirement that the person must hear from, and may question, one of the doctors, and may hear from and question both. The amendment would also require the panel to hear from and question the person seeking assistance and the person’s proxy when clause 15 applies. Under new clause 21, the panel must hear from and may question the person seeking assistance and would have the ability to hear from and question their proxy.

The amendment would also make it explicit that the panel must consider hearing from and questioning parties interested in the welfare of the person and those involved in the person’s care. Under new clause 21, the panel would have the ability to hear from any other person, which could include family members, caregivers and whomever else it deems appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the Bill as drafted, a panel and the commission are not invested with powers of summons, and the evidence that is heard and requested is not conveyed under oath. It is not a court or a tribunal. Those provisions do not apply, so she is absolutely right. They can make the request, but they cannot compel someone to attend.

Amendment (e) to new clause 21 would make it explicit that, when considered appropriate for medical reasons, the panel would be able to use pre-recorded audio or video material when considering evidence for the purposes of determining a person’s eligibility for assistance. Panel procedure would be set out in guidance issued by the commissioner, which would detail the processes governing the panel process in general, but also for the use of that form of evidence.

New schedule 2, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the. Member for Spen Valley, builds on the new clause 21. The new schedule further details the composition and the intended proceedings of the assisted dying review panels. As we have heard, panels would be formed of three members, including a legal member sitting as chair, a psychiatrist and a social worker.

Thanks to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, we have dealt with the provision on decisions to grant the certificate of eligibility and how they will be determined by members of the panel. We heard from the promoter herself, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, that the intention is that such decisions are unanimous.

The commissioner would be responsible for making appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of the multidisciplinary panels, and for establishing those panels. Under the schedule, the legal member as chair of the panel must hold or have held high judicial office, be one of His Majesty’s counsel—that is a KC—or have been authorised as a temporary judge in the High Court. The psychiatrist member must be a registered medical practitioner and a practising registered psychiatrist, and the social worker member must appear on the register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being generous with her time. I just want to confirm that the Bill does not require the social worker to be a palliative care specialist. Am I right in thinking that?

[Sarah Sackman]

I think the hon. Lady is right that that is not specified as a requirement. All three panel members would be drawn from the relevant professions and would therefore be subject to the standards pertaining to those professions. In the legal profession, they will be practitioners who are experienced in analysis and reaching decisions based on facts and law. The professional standards for all three regulated professions place a high value not just on integrity, but on impartiality. For the commissioner and for any judges on the panel, the “Guide to Judicial Conduct” makes the principles explicit.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister mentions impartiality. As things stand, the doctors who take part in the process will have made the choice to do so. Would the same yardstick be applied to the panel, or would its members just be appointed? Could they choose not to participate in the process?

[Sarah Sackman]

I anticipate that members of the professions will apply to be members of the panel. There will have to be a recruitment process, which is something that the commissioner, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, will undertake. I emphasise the point that all the professions, in their different ways—I am obviously most familiar with the legal profession, particularly the Bar—are governed by professional standards that specify the need for and place a high value on not just integrity, but impartiality.

[Naz Shah]

I struggle to agree that there would be impartiality, because there are people who are committed, believe in, agree with or are advocates for assisted dying. Does that not raise a concern about potential bias—subconscious bias, even?

[Sarah Sackman]

There is no doubt that, as we will see later, the panel would be subject in all its decisions to public law principles, including procedural propriety. The absence of any suggestion of bias—even of the appearance of bias—is an important public law principle. In any event, given the recruitment process, the interviews that would be undertaken and the professional standards to which all these people would be held, I think that they would apply their independent and impartial skills and judgment to the decision making and the assessment of eligibility in a manner appropriate to the task set out in the Bill.

One would expect professionals on the panel to adhere to their professional standards and act with impartiality in ascertaining whether the eligibility criteria have been met. Speaking as the Minister—indeed, even speaking for myself—I have no reason to doubt the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the panel or see any suggestion of bias.

[Danny Kruger]

I appreciate that an impact assessment is due to come later, after we have debated whether we should have this system or not. Nevertheless, will the Minister tell the Committee whether officials in her Department or in the Department of Health and Social Care have informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley whether the workforce will have sufficient capacity to provide the professionals required? Has any estimate been made of the number of people who will be required to step forward to take part in these panels?

I note the point that the reason why the proposed High Court stage was dropped was not that Ministry of Justice officials had informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley that the family court system would be overwhelmed. Can the Minister confirm that there was no communication to the hon. Member that the courts would not be able to cope with the demand? That was clearly reported in the media at the time, but can she confirm that it was not the case?

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Gentleman’s first point is a matter for the impact assessment itself. Clearly both Departments have data on the state of the professions, on how many KCs there are in the country and on how many people will be needed to provide the service. As I say, if Parliament wishes it and legislates for it, the state will work to deliver it, but the detail will come in the impact assessment.

On the hon. Gentleman’s second question, as I made clear earlier, the effective shift away from the High Court model in clause 12 to the model in the new clauses has been driven by the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I will not get into the precise chronology of when the matter was raised, but it came from my hon. Friend.

Yesterday, I hotfooted it from the Committee to Justice questions, where I was delighted to see the hon. Member for Reigate. We discussed capacity issues in our Crown courts and civil courts. Those issues are well reported in the media, but there is no connection between them and the policy shift here. If this is what Parliament chooses to legislate, the state will work to deliver it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is important to acknowledge that it will be a number of years before this law will be implemented. Hopefully, the Government will continue the fantastic job that they are doing to improve capacity in our courts, so that even if capacity is an issue now, a few years down the line it will not be.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank my hon. Friend for that encouragement. The Government’s position throughout the entire process, in so far as we have worked with her on these amendments and others to give effect to her intent, is to ensure that they are workable and operable. If this were not workable, we would not be here discussing it.

There are several examples across Government of judges or senior lawyers and KCs sitting on decision-making panels or in organisations or bodies that sit outside the framework of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. We have discussed some examples, such as public inquiries. I say this as the Minister for courts: it speaks to the trust and public confidence in both judges and KCs that when there is a public policy challenge to which many of us as politicians struggle to find a resolution, we so often turn to judge-led and KC-led inquiries to establish either what has happened or how systems can be improved. That is partly because of the impartiality and integrity that they bring to that work. I offer the example of the judicial commissioners who operate on behalf of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and who provide independent authorisation of application for the use of the most intrusive investigatory powers.

We have mentioned inquiries; I have also mentioned Parole Board panels as an example of inquisitorial rather than adversarial panels. They are often multidisciplinary, and many of their members are current or retired judges. They sit and hear issues of the most complex nature, assessing the risk that prisoners may present to the public on release.

[Danny Kruger]

I appreciate the Minister’s point about the Parole Board. Does she acknowledge that in the Parole Board example there is the essence of an adversarial system, because the victim is invited to give a statement? The board therefore hears opinions from, as it were, both sides of the case. Who will fulfil that second role in the proposals before the Committee?

[Sarah Sackman]

I drew the comparison for the purpose of showing where judges and legal experts are deployed in a multidisciplinary forum that is not a court or tribunal. I was not suggesting that there is a straight-line analogy. After all, a Parole Board panel is performing a different function to make a global assessment of risk. That is what it is ultimately doing; it is not strictly speaking an adversarial process in that sense.

The situation that the Bill addresses is that of an individual seeking to establish their eligibility for a right that—if the Act is passed—Parliament will have conferred on those who meet the criteria. It is not an adjudication. It is the panel’s function to assess, through the various conversations and provisions and by interrogating the information that has been provided, whether it is properly satisfied that the eligibility of the person’s election to avail themselves of that right is sound.

[Sarah Olney]

I am trying to clarify this for my own benefit, because I am not familiar with some of these procedures. Is there a difference between a High Court judge leading an inquiry or sitting on a panel, using their legal experience to provide advice or recommendations or give an opinion, and having a judge sitting in the High Court, who, under the original wording of clause 12, would be giving a direction? If there is a difference, have we not crossed from one role to the other by introducing a panel rather than a High Court direction? Does that matter for the purposes of the legislation?

[Sarah Sackman]

To be absolutely clear, what we are discussing reflects the intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. It is important to break it down. We have a judge in the role of the commissioner, and the commissioner will set up the framework and guidance for how the panels will operate and will lend their expertise. Our judges often sit on the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, developing the appropriate practice to govern the process in question. In this case, it would be the process of providing the third layer and the assessment whether the eligibility criteria have been met.

The commissioner would also—and this is where the role is distinct from that of a court or tribunal—provide a monitoring and reporting function to Parliament on the operation of the Act. That is a fundamental distinction from the model that we will have if we pursue clause 12, because in that case each application for an assisted death would go to whichever High Court judge happened to be sitting on that day. There would be no requirement for particular expertise on the part of the High Court judge, and that judge would not have to report on the operation of the Act. It is a different model that my hon. Friend has elected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Liz Saville Roberts]

The situation exists already in Wales. For example, people are prepared to travel in order to facilitate Welsh-medium coroner inquests. There are local authorities such as my own, Gwynedd, that have a requirement that all social workers be able to work in the medium of Welsh. The requirement will already be there, but this is a process of acknowledging those psychiatrists who are able to meet it. It is critical for the Bill, if we are to put the person and their needs first.

I urge the Minister to consider the amendment. We are already familiar with this matter in relation to digital technology and the operations that we already need to put in place to allow people to use their language in Wales. The amendment recognises the dire situation. It recognises the absolute urgency of people who are at the most stressful time in their life being able to use the language that they prefer.

[Sarah Sackman]

I want to reassure the right hon. Lady about the provisions that will apply even if her amendment is not accepted. The Welsh Language Act 1993 requires public bodies that are either named in the Act or named by Welsh Ministers, and which provide services to the public in Wales, to prepare a Welsh language scheme setting out the steps that the body will take in relation to the use of the Welsh language while providing those services. As I understand it, this approach is used all the time in legal proceedings in Wales.

In an instance in which a party wishes to speak in Welsh at the proceedings, section 22 of the 1993 Act will apply. Any party to the legal proceedings can express themselves in Welsh, at which point a Welsh interpreter would be commissioned to facilitate the discussion. That will happen. That will be the status quo—the backstop, if you like—without the amendment. Requiring all members of the panel to speak fluent Welsh would, in the Government’s view, be a significant operational challenge that could lead to undue delay at the end of life.

[Tom Gordon]

I speak only one language and it is definitely not Welsh, even though I did have a stint working in Wales. With any language, things can be lost in translation. When we are talking about something like assisted dying, does the Minister acknowledge that even with very skilled interpreters, there would have to be a suitable level of training to make sure that everything was fully thought through and there were no cracks—that nothing would slip through the net. That is not covered under the Welsh Language Act currently, and that is why the amendment has been tabled. Does she appreciate the severity of that?

[Sarah Sackman]

]The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and the hon. Members for Chesham and Amersham and for Harrogate and Knaresborough have all put their case incredibly powerfully. In emphasising the operational difficulties that the Government have identified, I will make this point. The approach under section 22 of the Welsh Language Act is that the ability to speak in Welsh and have interpretation services is adopted in very serious legal proceedings indeed. The hon. Gentleman is right: we are talking about nuances that can determine civil or criminal liability; those are very serious issues indeed. I am not saying that that is quite as serious as matters of life or death, but getting right the sorts of things that interpreters need to ensure they are getting right, as well as vindicating the person’s ability to express themselves in their mother tongue or their preferred tongue, is something that happens already and would happen under the operation of this legislation.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I wonder whether the Minister appreciates that when it comes to Welsh speakers using their language in the face of the majority language, English, with its status, what we are doing here is putting another barrier in their way: “I am making a nuisance of myself; I have to ask a favour and get interpreters.” That is not what we should be doing with this legislation. We should be putting those people first and making sure that they can express themselves at this most emotional time as effectively as possible. Interpreters should not be in the room with the assisted dying panels. That is fundamentally against the nature of the Bill.

[Sarah Sackman]

I appreciate the passion and force with which the right hon. Lady makes that point. I have set out the Government’s concerns about deliverability—the operational challenges around delivering what has been suggested. This is a case of applying section 22 of the Welsh Language Act to the commissioner, who under the promoter’s new schedule 2 would be able to give guidance to panels on how exactly they should facilitate exactly what the right hon. Lady is seeking—the ability of the dying person who is seeking an assisted death to express themselves through the Welsh language within those most sensitive of proceedings. There could be facilitation by the commissioner in order to commission an interpreter and assist the person to speak in Welsh.

I appreciate that the right hon. Lady feels that that would create a barrier that is not appropriate to this context, but I think it is a reflection of the fact that certainly the Government are not seeking to stand in the way of people expressing themselves in Welsh. We want to vindicate that. It is in line with our wider commitment to devolution and to working with the devolved Governments in the context of the Bill. The right hon. Lady has made her point forcefully, and no doubt the Committee will come to vote on this amendment, but I have to, on behalf of the Government, acting responsibly, lay out some of the challenges that it would mean to the operability and deliverability of the Bill.

[Sarah Green (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)]

I accept that the Minister is in a difficult position, because she is presenting the case for the Government’s position and cannot take a position herself. I will just gently ask whether she accepts the weariness of Welsh language speakers and campaigners over generations, who have been faced time and again with the same argument—of operational challenges, whatever that issue may be. I suggest to her that perhaps it is time that the Government stopped using that excuse.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. She has heard the Government’s position on the operation of the Bill. As I said, it is important that, in the event that this amendment is not taken forward, the points and the force with which they are made are fed into the commissioner’s modus operandi in order, as far as possible and within what resources allow, to allow people to express themselves in the Welsh language. As I said, I want to put on record our continued commitment to devolution in that context, and to working with the Welsh Government to resolve in a thoughtful and constructive way any of the outstanding legal, technical and constitutional issues that may arise.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Surely many of the constitutional issues that we are discussing should be decided by the Senedd and the Welsh Government. It is a matter of urgency now that we discuss the “appropriate authority”, which is a term used in other legislation. I believe that in the Crime and Policing Bill, “appropriate authority” is used in relation to England and Scotland. We need to have clarity on these decisions as we move ahead.

[Sarah Sackman]

The right hon. Lady is absolutely right that we do need clarity. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has made clear, the intention is for the legislation to apply across both England and Wales, and the model being proposed under these provisions is a single commission. We need to ensure close working to resolve those technical and legal issues.

Amendment (b) to new schedule 2 deals with the issue of the Official Solicitor. It seeks to establish a process through which a person nominated by the Official Solicitor acts as an advocate to the panel. It is important to remind ourselves of the role that the Official Solicitor typically plays. They act as a litigation friend, and where they do act as an advocate to the court, the purpose of that function is to assist courts on a difficult or novel point of law. The focus of the Official Solicitor is in representing adults who lack mental capacity, and children. Both groups are plainly out of the scope of the Bill. The Bill applies to someone who has capacity and who is applying for an assisted death.

The amendment would require a significant and radical change in the function and focus of the Official Solicitor. Under new schedule 2, assisted dying review panels would have their own powers to determine whether the requirements of the Bill had been met, including the ability to hear from and question any other person.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being very generous in giving way. I want to understand something. She says that the Official Solicitor is there to help with adults who lack capacity, but in the cases before the Court of Protection of the girls who had anorexia, the judges took a decision that they should not continue to be force-fed. The judges concluded in nine of 10 cases that they lacked capacity, and yet accepted that these girls were inevitably going to die. In that case, would the role of the Official Solicitor not be helpful as a further safeguard?

[Sarah Sackman]

It is important to look at this issue in the context of what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is setting out to do through the legislation, and what the panel’s function is, which is the function that was discussed in the debate. This is not a trial or an inquiry. That is not what is being undertaken by the panel. The panel’s purpose is to ensure that the eligibility criteria process has been followed in a correct, lawful and safe way. As others have pointed out, it is not adversarial, and will not be described as such in the Bill.

All that I am saying on behalf of the Government is that the Official Solicitor’s role is most frequently to assist in court with a difficult or novel point of law when the person cannot do it themselves. Well, we do not have that here. We are not determining points of law; we are determining whether this person has met the eligibility criteria. Secondly, the Official Solicitor’s role is for when individuals lack capacity. In the Bill, by definition, the person who is applying has already satisfied two doctors that they have capacity. Of course, the question of capacity may be something that the panel wishes to explore further—it has the three panel members and the ability to draw on its powers to seek further information to test that—but it is not clear, without altering the current role that the Official Solicitor plays within our legal system, what role they would be serving.

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate the Minister’s position and am grateful for her explanation, but it does not address the central point, which is that nine girls were deemed not to have capacity. Despite all the amendments that have been tabled and the letter from all the charities about anorexia, that has not been addressed. In absence of any impact assessment on one of the issues that most frustrates me, how do the Government conclude that the workability of the Bill is sufficient? Will it work, given that we do not have the protection for those girls who may have anorexia? There is precedent for such girls who did not have capacity. How will the Government safeguard those girls in particular?

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. She has brought up that case a number of times in various debates on the Bill. In this context, part of the provision—in terms of the design and operation of the commissioner and the panels to which the various cases are referred—is the development of guidance. If the commissioner deems specific processes appropriate to the consideration of applications for assisted death where anorexia is an issue, that guidance can be developed. Again, that is a matter for the promoter of the Bill, but one might have thought that having a dedicated body in relation to assisted death—which also has the monitoring function that we will come to in clause 34—means the development of expertise in dealing with cases, in particular those especially difficult cases of the nature my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West raises. From a Government point of view, that would not necessarily flow—it is hard to see why it would at all—from the High Court, if we revert to that. That is a distinction between the two models that the Bill’s promoter has explored.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is another important argument for having the panel. Where a terminally ill person with an eating disorder has been deemed to have capacity by two doctors and—I surmise, as we now have the compulsory referral—a psychiatrist, we will have on the panel another psychiatrist and a social worker. The panel does help to address concerns about capacity. Does the Minister agree?

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend has developed her thinking, and the Government have worked with her to reflect that policy intent. I think she is right that the panel is capable of doing just that and it could operate in that way.

Amendment (c) to new schedule 2 relates to the issue of domestic abuse training. It would make the voluntary assisted dying commissioner responsible for ensuring that all panel members had received training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. Persons appointed to the list of eligible panel members would already be qualified in the field of law, psychiatry or social work, and would have done all the training that pertains to receiving a professional qualification in those fields.

In addition, under new schedule 2 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the commissioner would be able to give guidance to the panels, which could include training requirements, and the panels must have regard to that guidance in the exercise of their functions. That is all I propose to say about that. It might be seen as an example of something that would typically—I am not saying it has to—be left to regulation or the guidance, rather than being in primary legislation.

Amendment (d) to new schedule 2 relates to the panel sitting in private or in public. It seeks to ensure that panels sit in private by default.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am not sure that my amendment (d) was selected—unfortunately, I missed the deadline—so the Minister does not need to cover it.

[The Chair]

Order. I will suspend the sitting—

[Sarah Sackman]

Put us all out of our misery!

[The Chair]

I did not wish to say that, but the Minister did. We will come back at 5.10 pm.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting)

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Naz Shah]

If I may, Ms McVey, I will speak to the issue of the judicial oversight of the panel and the whole of new clause 21. I would like to understand something, and perhaps the Minister or my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley could help me. We have been talking a lot about judicial oversight. My concern is that even if we had judicial oversight, there is no liability if something goes wrong. We would have had judicial oversight, but now we have panel oversight—non-judicial oversight—of the decision. Even then, what if somebody went down the assisted dying route and an issue was raised afterwards? What recourse would anybody—family members and so on—have to hold anybody liable if they did something wrong, including, potentially, the commissioner?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey.

As my hon. Friend the Minister for Care and I have made clear throughout debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not have a position on assisted dying. Once again, my remarks will focus on the legal and practical impacts of the amendments, with a view to assisting Committee members. I will first speak to amendments 371 to 373, 377, 378, 381, 388, 390 and 391, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and new schedules 1 and 2, all tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

In executing our duties to ensure that the legislation, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to the amendments, which propose the voluntary assisted dying commission and the panels. They reflect my hon. Friend’s intent to replace the court approval process that is currently set out in the Bill. I confirm that this change was driven not by capacity concerns from within Government, but by the Bill promoter’s policy intent. Let me be clear: the High Court stage could be made to work, but if the Committee and Parliament elect for the commissioner and panel model, the state will work to deliver that.

New clause 14 and consequential amendment 391 would provide for the establishment of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. In keeping with other appointments of this significance, the commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister, and the individual in post must hold or have held office—so it is not sitting judges, but could be a retired judge—as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.

New clause 14 sets out the central functions of the commissioner, which will be detailed further in new clauses 15 and 17 and new schedule 1. The commissioner would receive documents, including the reports from the co-ordinating doctor and declarations under the legislation, make appointments to the list of persons eligible to sit on assisted dying review panels, and refer cases to those panels, which would replace the role of the High Court in the original draft of the Bill. In addition, the commissioner would have the responsibility for monitoring the Bill’s operation and reporting annually to Parliament, which we will no doubt come to in clause 34. It is important to pause there, because that is one aspect in which the commissioner model is distinct from that of a court or tribunal. It will serve multiple functions, not least the monitoring of the Bill’s operation and reporting on that annually to Parliament.

New schedule 1 contains practical arrangements for the office of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, as established in new clause 14. In practice, we anticipate that the commissioner’s office will be a non-departmental public body. The establishment of such an office to support the Government-appointed chair or commissioner is common practice for roles of this nature. One such model is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which is chaired by a person who is holding or who has held high judicial office. The schedule also introduces the role of a deputy commissioner, who, like the commissioner, must have been appointed by the Prime Minister and hold or have held office as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.

Both the commissioner and deputy commissioner would be appointed for terms of five years, with their remuneration set by the Secretary of State. The commissioner would have the ability to appoint their own staff, having obtained approval from the Secretary of State in regard to the number of staff, the remuneration and the terms, as well as providing an annual statement of accounts. In the ordinary way, such a public body would be subject to other statutory provisions, not least the Equality Act 2010.

New clause 15 would establish the mechanism for the referral by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to an assisted dying review panel. When the commissioner receives a first declaration from the person seeking assistance, and reports from the co-ordinating and independent doctors as to their assessments of the person—including a statement by those doctors as to the person’s eligibility for assistance—they would be required to refer the case to a panel as soon as reasonably practical. In practice, the task of organising the work of each panel would fall to the commissioner’s office. The co-ordinating doctor would be required to inform the commissioner where a first or second declaration is cancelled. Where the commissioner is informed of the cancellation of the first declaration, they must not refer the case to a panel, or must inform the panel to disregard the application if already referred.

Amendments 371, 372, 373, 377, 378, 381, 388 and 390 are all consequential amendments on new clause 21, and together establish the mechanism for the consideration of cases by the assisted dying review panels in place of the High Court. Panels would be required to review each case and issue a certificate of eligibility where they are satisfied that all requirements set out in the Bill have been met.

[Sarah Olney]

I seek clarification. As drafted, in clause 12(1)(c), the High Court would give

“a declaration that the requirements of this Act have been met”,

but in new clause 21(6)(a), the panel is required to issue a certificate of eligibility, to which the Minister just referred. I seek the Minister’s guidance on whether it is the Government’s view that the High Court declaration has equal weight in law to the certificate of eligibility set out in new clause 21. I ask particularly because that certificate will be relied on for the purposes of suspending the Suicide Act 1961, under which a criminal offence would otherwise have been committed. The certificate of eligibility will need to be relied on to demonstrate that no criminal offence has been committed under that law. Is it the view of the Minister and the Government that a High Court direction, as originally required, can now be fully replaced by, and have equal weight with, a certificate of eligibility?

[Sarah Sackman]

As I understand it, everything has to be internally coherent in whatever the final draft of the Bill is. Within this structure, because in this case it is a panel that issues the certificate, it is its own sui generis certificate appropriate to this process. The declaration that was referred to in the earlier draft is one that the High Court would normally do. Given that this is on the face of the Bill, and will be in primary legislation, it would have legal force and would, if it were internally coherent with the rest of the legislation, have the legal effect of operating coherently with the criminal offences and, indeed, with the suspension of the Suicide Act, as the hon. Lady just asked. That is my understanding.

[Sarah Olney]

My original question was more about whether it has the same legal force as a High Court direction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

My understanding is that it would, yes. If I am wrong about that, I will obviously come back to the Committee and correct it, but my understanding is that it would. They are two different things—one is called a certificate of eligibility and one is a High Court declaration—but in terms of how they operate within this legal scheme, my understanding is that they would have the same legal effect, and they are intended to.

Under new clause 21, the panel must hear from, and may question, the person seeking assistance and the co-ordinating doctor, or the independent doctor, or both. The panel may also hear, and may question, the person’s proxy if that is relevant, and any other person, including those appearing to have relevant knowledge or experience. This could include family members, or other individuals with an interest in the welfare of the person, as well as other experts. The new clause is explicit that the panel must not grant the certificate of eligibility if it is not satisfied that all the requirements have been met. Further consequential amendments introduce references to the certificate of eligibility throughout the Bill. Once the panel has made a decision, it will be required to notify the person seeking assistance, the co-ordinating doctor, the commissioner and any other person specified in the regulations.

As others have pointed out, the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley do not spell out every step of the process or the procedure that the panels would be expected to follow. That is left to secondary legislation, and it will be for the commission and the commissioner to produce their own guidance on how the panels and the panel procedure are intended to be governed and regulated. That is in line with the approach to legislation more broadly, with main objectives typically set out in primary legislation, and secondary policy issues and technical and administrative matters, dealt with through secondary legislation, regulations and guidance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

We have heard before that the panel’s decision must be unanimous. However, I have tried looking in the Bill and it does not state that specifically. My understanding is that two people could nod their head, the other one would not have to, and it would still pass.

[Sarah Sackman]

I believe it is in there. Let me find the relevant provision so that I can refer my hon. Friend to it.

[Naz Shah]

It is a majority vote, not unanimous.

[Sarah Sackman]

It is a majority vote for the other decisions that a panel may make, but in respect of certification, the decision is unanimous. Paragraph 5(2) of new schedule 2 states:

“Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote”.

Such decisions include whether to hear from an additional expert, or whether further investigation is required in respect of an aspect that the panel may be concerned about, such as coercion or capacity. While those decisions can be taken by a majority vote, in respect of certification and granting a certificate of eligibility, I refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 5(3), which states:

“The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.”

That is a slightly mealy-mouthed way of saying that if any member of the panel resists the grant of the certificate, no certificate can be issued.

[Danny Kruger]

I just want to support the hon. Member for Bradford West. She is absolutely right. It is clearly intended that there should be a unanimous decision but, in fact, as the hon. Lady pointed out, if one of the members decides effectively to abstain, the procedure does go ahead. It is not that they all have to actively support the decision; only two of them have to do that. One of them could have their doubts and sit on their hands, and it would still go ahead.

[Sarah Sackman]

That might be something that other hon. Members wish to take away with them, whatever the policy intent may have been. In fairness, I do not think that the question of whether there is a requirement to give a positive indication of a decision either way is on the face of the Bill. However, I think that clearly the intention behind paragraph 5(3) of new schedule 2 is that there is unanimity in relation to the grant of an eligibility certificate.

[Daniel Francis]

I was once on a planning committee in which one member of the committee voted in favour and all the other members abstained, so the recommendation went through one to zero. Technically, given the way in which new schedule 2 reads to me, that could happen, because one member could vote in favour and two could abstain, and that would therefore be considered unanimous. Will the Minister comment on that?

[Sarah Sackman]

We are discussing how to construe the provision in paragraph 5 of new schedule 2. I should reiterate that, obviously, it is the promoter’s intent to have—hon. Members may call it what they will—the safeguard of unanimity behind that provision. If there is any feeling that the drafting does not fully reflect that intent, it can be tightened up. However, under of the Bill, there is clearly an intent to have unanimity in respect of the final decision about certification.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It absolutely is the policy intent that there should be a unanimous decision of the panel. If there is any lack of clarity, I am very happy to look into working with official draftspeople to tighten that up.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank hon. Members for their interventions.

In respect of the standard that would be applied in order for the panel to be satisfied, in practice, as I was saying, the panel would establish a case on the balance of probability in those circumstances only on the basis of strong evidence. In other words, the more serious the issue to be determined, the closer the scrutiny and the stronger the evidence required.

Introducing a requirement for the panel to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt at this stage would create a difference to, or a divergence from, the standard applied by professionals earlier in the process, such as by the doctors in the first and second assessments, and—I think the hon. Member for Reigate acknowledged this in her speech—to ascertain whether, among other things, the person has capacity to make the decision to end their own life, whether they have a clear, settled and informed wish to do so, and that they have not been pressured or coerced. Such a requirement would create the problem of making the application of the Bill incoherent because, of course, if a civil standard has been applied earlier in the process, the higher, criminal bar could never be satisfied at the panel stage. The principal decision is what standard should be applied and, as I have said, the civil standard is used in other end-of-life decisions, but there is also a question of the internal coherence of the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the Minister for the very clear way in which she is explaining everything. I completely acknowledge what she has just said. As she rightly said, I alluded to the fact that I tried to make the change at an earlier stage, but was unsuccessful, and I am now trying to put it through here. Can the Minister comment on the meaning of “satisfied”? If we are not going to have “beyond reasonable doubt”, can she expand a little on the meaning of “satisfied” and whether she is comfortable that that is clear enough for these purposes?

[Sarah Sackman]

The answer is yes. I, on behalf of the Government, am satisfied that that would be commonly and well understood by those applying it, and any court construing it, that the standard to be applied is the civil standard. That would be understood by not just the commissioner in terms of laying down the rules for the panels, but the panels themselves. It is important to recall that as Lord Bingham, one of the most distinguished judges that this country has ever produced, once said,

“The civil standard is a flexible standard to be applied with greater or lesser strictness according to the seriousness of what has to be proved”,

and there is no doubt, based on what Parliament has debated, about the utmost seriousness of these issues. To answer the hon. Member’s question, the answer is yes, I think it is clear. That is the Government’s position.

Amendment (b) to new clause 21 would give the panel discretion to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility where the requirements stated in the Bill are met if it believes there are

“particular circumstances which make it inappropriate for the person”

to be provided with assistance. The Government’s view is that this could risk unpredictability and inconsistency in the panel’s decision making and reduce legal certainty for the person seeking assistance, as well as for the panel.

Amendment (c) to new clause 21 concerns three specific requirements under subsection (2):

“(c) that the person has capacity…(h) that the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”

and

“(i) that the person made the first declaration voluntarily and was not coerced or pressured by any other person”.

The amendment would mean that despite finding that those criteria had been met on the balance of probabilities, the panel could stay proceedings when it believed there was a real risk that they have not been satisfied. As with amendment (b) to new clause 21, this could result in uncertainty for the applicant and in terms of what is required of the panel in its decision making.

As I referred to earlier, in a lot of these decisions, the question of whether somebody has capacity or is being coerced is ultimately a binary decision for each panel member. The person has capacity or they do not. In applying the civil standard with the rigour that Lord Bingham spoke about in the most serious cases in circumstances when the panel or its members identify that there is a real risk, one would expect them to exercise their discretionary powers to seek more evidence to remove that risk and doubt, and if that persists, to refuse and make the binary choice that the person does not have capacity or is being coerced, or vice versa.

Amendment (d) to new clause 21 would require the panel to hear from and question both assessing doctors, as opposed to the requirement that the person must hear from, and may question, one of the doctors, and may hear from and question both. The amendment would also require the panel to hear from and question the person seeking assistance and the person’s proxy when clause 15 applies. Under new clause 21, the panel must hear from and may question the person seeking assistance and would have the ability to hear from and question their proxy.

The amendment would also make it explicit that the panel must consider hearing from and questioning parties interested in the welfare of the person and those involved in the person’s care. Under new clause 21, the panel would have the ability to hear from any other person, which could include family members, caregivers and whomever else it deems appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the Bill as drafted, a panel and the commission are not invested with powers of summons, and the evidence that is heard and requested is not conveyed under oath. It is not a court or a tribunal. Those provisions do not apply, so she is absolutely right. They can make the request, but they cannot compel someone to attend.

Amendment (e) to new clause 21 would make it explicit that, when considered appropriate for medical reasons, the panel would be able to use pre-recorded audio or video material when considering evidence for the purposes of determining a person’s eligibility for assistance. Panel procedure would be set out in guidance issued by the commissioner, which would detail the processes governing the panel process in general, but also for the use of that form of evidence.

New schedule 2, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the. Member for Spen Valley, builds on the new clause 21. The new schedule further details the composition and the intended proceedings of the assisted dying review panels. As we have heard, panels would be formed of three members, including a legal member sitting as chair, a psychiatrist and a social worker.

Thanks to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, we have dealt with the provision on decisions to grant the certificate of eligibility and how they will be determined by members of the panel. We heard from the promoter herself, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, that the intention is that such decisions are unanimous.

The commissioner would be responsible for making appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of the multidisciplinary panels, and for establishing those panels. Under the schedule, the legal member as chair of the panel must hold or have held high judicial office, be one of His Majesty’s counsel—that is a KC—or have been authorised as a temporary judge in the High Court. The psychiatrist member must be a registered medical practitioner and a practising registered psychiatrist, and the social worker member must appear on the register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being generous with her time. I just want to confirm that the Bill does not require the social worker to be a palliative care specialist. Am I right in thinking that?

[Sarah Sackman]

I think the hon. Lady is right that that is not specified as a requirement. All three panel members would be drawn from the relevant professions and would therefore be subject to the standards pertaining to those professions. In the legal profession, they will be practitioners who are experienced in analysis and reaching decisions based on facts and law. The professional standards for all three regulated professions place a high value not just on integrity, but on impartiality. For the commissioner and for any judges on the panel, the “Guide to Judicial Conduct” makes the principles explicit.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister mentions impartiality. As things stand, the doctors who take part in the process will have made the choice to do so. Would the same yardstick be applied to the panel, or would its members just be appointed? Could they choose not to participate in the process?

[Sarah Sackman]

I anticipate that members of the professions will apply to be members of the panel. There will have to be a recruitment process, which is something that the commissioner, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, will undertake. I emphasise the point that all the professions, in their different ways—I am obviously most familiar with the legal profession, particularly the Bar—are governed by professional standards that specify the need for and place a high value on not just integrity, but impartiality.

[Naz Shah]

I struggle to agree that there would be impartiality, because there are people who are committed, believe in, agree with or are advocates for assisted dying. Does that not raise a concern about potential bias—subconscious bias, even?

[Sarah Sackman]

There is no doubt that, as we will see later, the panel would be subject in all its decisions to public law principles, including procedural propriety. The absence of any suggestion of bias—even of the appearance of bias—is an important public law principle. In any event, given the recruitment process, the interviews that would be undertaken and the professional standards to which all these people would be held, I think that they would apply their independent and impartial skills and judgment to the decision making and the assessment of eligibility in a manner appropriate to the task set out in the Bill.

One would expect professionals on the panel to adhere to their professional standards and act with impartiality in ascertaining whether the eligibility criteria have been met. Speaking as the Minister—indeed, even speaking for myself—I have no reason to doubt the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the panel or see any suggestion of bias.

[Danny Kruger]

I appreciate that an impact assessment is due to come later, after we have debated whether we should have this system or not. Nevertheless, will the Minister tell the Committee whether officials in her Department or in the Department of Health and Social Care have informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley whether the workforce will have sufficient capacity to provide the professionals required? Has any estimate been made of the number of people who will be required to step forward to take part in these panels?

I note the point that the reason why the proposed High Court stage was dropped was not that Ministry of Justice officials had informed the hon. Member for Spen Valley that the family court system would be overwhelmed. Can the Minister confirm that there was no communication to the hon. Member that the courts would not be able to cope with the demand? That was clearly reported in the media at the time, but can she confirm that it was not the case?

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Gentleman’s first point is a matter for the impact assessment itself. Clearly both Departments have data on the state of the professions, on how many KCs there are in the country and on how many people will be needed to provide the service. As I say, if Parliament wishes it and legislates for it, the state will work to deliver it, but the detail will come in the impact assessment.

On the hon. Gentleman’s second question, as I made clear earlier, the effective shift away from the High Court model in clause 12 to the model in the new clauses has been driven by the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I will not get into the precise chronology of when the matter was raised, but it came from my hon. Friend.

Yesterday, I hotfooted it from the Committee to Justice questions, where I was delighted to see the hon. Member for Reigate. We discussed capacity issues in our Crown courts and civil courts. Those issues are well reported in the media, but there is no connection between them and the policy shift here. If this is what Parliament chooses to legislate, the state will work to deliver it.

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is important to acknowledge that it will be a number of years before this law will be implemented. Hopefully, the Government will continue the fantastic job that they are doing to improve capacity in our courts, so that even if capacity is an issue now, a few years down the line it will not be.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank my hon. Friend for that encouragement. The Government’s position throughout the entire process, in so far as we have worked with her on these amendments and others to give effect to her intent, is to ensure that they are workable and operable. If this were not workable, we would not be here discussing it.

There are several examples across Government of judges or senior lawyers and KCs sitting on decision-making panels or in organisations or bodies that sit outside the framework of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. We have discussed some examples, such as public inquiries. I say this as the Minister for courts: it speaks to the trust and public confidence in both judges and KCs that when there is a public policy challenge to which many of us as politicians struggle to find a resolution, we so often turn to judge-led and KC-led inquiries to establish either what has happened or how systems can be improved. That is partly because of the impartiality and integrity that they bring to that work. I offer the example of the judicial commissioners who operate on behalf of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and who provide independent authorisation of application for the use of the most intrusive investigatory powers.

We have mentioned inquiries; I have also mentioned Parole Board panels as an example of inquisitorial rather than adversarial panels. They are often multidisciplinary, and many of their members are current or retired judges. They sit and hear issues of the most complex nature, assessing the risk that prisoners may present to the public on release.

[Danny Kruger]

I appreciate the Minister’s point about the Parole Board. Does she acknowledge that in the Parole Board example there is the essence of an adversarial system, because the victim is invited to give a statement? The board therefore hears opinions from, as it were, both sides of the case. Who will fulfil that second role in the proposals before the Committee?

[Sarah Sackman]

I drew the comparison for the purpose of showing where judges and legal experts are deployed in a multidisciplinary forum that is not a court or tribunal. I was not suggesting that there is a straight-line analogy. After all, a Parole Board panel is performing a different function to make a global assessment of risk. That is what it is ultimately doing; it is not strictly speaking an adversarial process in that sense.

The situation that the Bill addresses is that of an individual seeking to establish their eligibility for a right that—if the Act is passed—Parliament will have conferred on those who meet the criteria. It is not an adjudication. It is the panel’s function to assess, through the various conversations and provisions and by interrogating the information that has been provided, whether it is properly satisfied that the eligibility of the person’s election to avail themselves of that right is sound.

[Sarah Olney]

I am trying to clarify this for my own benefit, because I am not familiar with some of these procedures. Is there a difference between a High Court judge leading an inquiry or sitting on a panel, using their legal experience to provide advice or recommendations or give an opinion, and having a judge sitting in the High Court, who, under the original wording of clause 12, would be giving a direction? If there is a difference, have we not crossed from one role to the other by introducing a panel rather than a High Court direction? Does that matter for the purposes of the legislation?

[Sarah Sackman]

To be absolutely clear, what we are discussing reflects the intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. It is important to break it down. We have a judge in the role of the commissioner, and the commissioner will set up the framework and guidance for how the panels will operate and will lend their expertise. Our judges often sit on the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, developing the appropriate practice to govern the process in question. In this case, it would be the process of providing the third layer and the assessment whether the eligibility criteria have been met.

The commissioner would also—and this is where the role is distinct from that of a court or tribunal—provide a monitoring and reporting function to Parliament on the operation of the Act. That is a fundamental distinction from the model that we will have if we pursue clause 12, because in that case each application for an assisted death would go to whichever High Court judge happened to be sitting on that day. There would be no requirement for particular expertise on the part of the High Court judge, and that judge would not have to report on the operation of the Act. It is a different model that my hon. Friend has elected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Liz Saville Roberts]

The situation exists already in Wales. For example, people are prepared to travel in order to facilitate Welsh-medium coroner inquests. There are local authorities such as my own, Gwynedd, that have a requirement that all social workers be able to work in the medium of Welsh. The requirement will already be there, but this is a process of acknowledging those psychiatrists who are able to meet it. It is critical for the Bill, if we are to put the person and their needs first.

I urge the Minister to consider the amendment. We are already familiar with this matter in relation to digital technology and the operations that we already need to put in place to allow people to use their language in Wales. The amendment recognises the dire situation. It recognises the absolute urgency of people who are at the most stressful time in their life being able to use the language that they prefer.

[Sarah Sackman]

I want to reassure the right hon. Lady about the provisions that will apply even if her amendment is not accepted. The Welsh Language Act 1993 requires public bodies that are either named in the Act or named by Welsh Ministers, and which provide services to the public in Wales, to prepare a Welsh language scheme setting out the steps that the body will take in relation to the use of the Welsh language while providing those services. As I understand it, this approach is used all the time in legal proceedings in Wales.

In an instance in which a party wishes to speak in Welsh at the proceedings, section 22 of the 1993 Act will apply. Any party to the legal proceedings can express themselves in Welsh, at which point a Welsh interpreter would be commissioned to facilitate the discussion. That will happen. That will be the status quo—the backstop, if you like—without the amendment. Requiring all members of the panel to speak fluent Welsh would, in the Government’s view, be a significant operational challenge that could lead to undue delay at the end of life.

[Tom Gordon]

I speak only one language and it is definitely not Welsh, even though I did have a stint working in Wales. With any language, things can be lost in translation. When we are talking about something like assisted dying, does the Minister acknowledge that even with very skilled interpreters, there would have to be a suitable level of training to make sure that everything was fully thought through and there were no cracks—that nothing would slip through the net. That is not covered under the Welsh Language Act currently, and that is why the amendment has been tabled. Does she appreciate the severity of that?

[Sarah Sackman]

]The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and the hon. Members for Chesham and Amersham and for Harrogate and Knaresborough have all put their case incredibly powerfully. In emphasising the operational difficulties that the Government have identified, I will make this point. The approach under section 22 of the Welsh Language Act is that the ability to speak in Welsh and have interpretation services is adopted in very serious legal proceedings indeed. The hon. Gentleman is right: we are talking about nuances that can determine civil or criminal liability; those are very serious issues indeed. I am not saying that that is quite as serious as matters of life or death, but getting right the sorts of things that interpreters need to ensure they are getting right, as well as vindicating the person’s ability to express themselves in their mother tongue or their preferred tongue, is something that happens already and would happen under the operation of this legislation.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I wonder whether the Minister appreciates that when it comes to Welsh speakers using their language in the face of the majority language, English, with its status, what we are doing here is putting another barrier in their way: “I am making a nuisance of myself; I have to ask a favour and get interpreters.” That is not what we should be doing with this legislation. We should be putting those people first and making sure that they can express themselves at this most emotional time as effectively as possible. Interpreters should not be in the room with the assisted dying panels. That is fundamentally against the nature of the Bill.

[Sarah Sackman]

I appreciate the passion and force with which the right hon. Lady makes that point. I have set out the Government’s concerns about deliverability—the operational challenges around delivering what has been suggested. This is a case of applying section 22 of the Welsh Language Act to the commissioner, who under the promoter’s new schedule 2 would be able to give guidance to panels on how exactly they should facilitate exactly what the right hon. Lady is seeking—the ability of the dying person who is seeking an assisted death to express themselves through the Welsh language within those most sensitive of proceedings. There could be facilitation by the commissioner in order to commission an interpreter and assist the person to speak in Welsh.

I appreciate that the right hon. Lady feels that that would create a barrier that is not appropriate to this context, but I think it is a reflection of the fact that certainly the Government are not seeking to stand in the way of people expressing themselves in Welsh. We want to vindicate that. It is in line with our wider commitment to devolution and to working with the devolved Governments in the context of the Bill. The right hon. Lady has made her point forcefully, and no doubt the Committee will come to vote on this amendment, but I have to, on behalf of the Government, acting responsibly, lay out some of the challenges that it would mean to the operability and deliverability of the Bill.

[Sarah Green (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)]

I accept that the Minister is in a difficult position, because she is presenting the case for the Government’s position and cannot take a position herself. I will just gently ask whether she accepts the weariness of Welsh language speakers and campaigners over generations, who have been faced time and again with the same argument—of operational challenges, whatever that issue may be. I suggest to her that perhaps it is time that the Government stopped using that excuse.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. She has heard the Government’s position on the operation of the Bill. As I said, it is important that, in the event that this amendment is not taken forward, the points and the force with which they are made are fed into the commissioner’s modus operandi in order, as far as possible and within what resources allow, to allow people to express themselves in the Welsh language. As I said, I want to put on record our continued commitment to devolution in that context, and to working with the Welsh Government to resolve in a thoughtful and constructive way any of the outstanding legal, technical and constitutional issues that may arise.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Surely many of the constitutional issues that we are discussing should be decided by the Senedd and the Welsh Government. It is a matter of urgency now that we discuss the “appropriate authority”, which is a term used in other legislation. I believe that in the Crime and Policing Bill, “appropriate authority” is used in relation to England and Scotland. We need to have clarity on these decisions as we move ahead.

[Sarah Sackman]

The right hon. Lady is absolutely right that we do need clarity. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has made clear, the intention is for the legislation to apply across both England and Wales, and the model being proposed under these provisions is a single commission. We need to ensure close working to resolve those technical and legal issues.

Amendment (b) to new schedule 2 deals with the issue of the Official Solicitor. It seeks to establish a process through which a person nominated by the Official Solicitor acts as an advocate to the panel. It is important to remind ourselves of the role that the Official Solicitor typically plays. They act as a litigation friend, and where they do act as an advocate to the court, the purpose of that function is to assist courts on a difficult or novel point of law. The focus of the Official Solicitor is in representing adults who lack mental capacity, and children. Both groups are plainly out of the scope of the Bill. The Bill applies to someone who has capacity and who is applying for an assisted death.

The amendment would require a significant and radical change in the function and focus of the Official Solicitor. Under new schedule 2, assisted dying review panels would have their own powers to determine whether the requirements of the Bill had been met, including the ability to hear from and question any other person.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being very generous in giving way. I want to understand something. She says that the Official Solicitor is there to help with adults who lack capacity, but in the cases before the Court of Protection of the girls who had anorexia, the judges took a decision that they should not continue to be force-fed. The judges concluded in nine of 10 cases that they lacked capacity, and yet accepted that these girls were inevitably going to die. In that case, would the role of the Official Solicitor not be helpful as a further safeguard?

[Sarah Sackman]

It is important to look at this issue in the context of what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is setting out to do through the legislation, and what the panel’s function is, which is the function that was discussed in the debate. This is not a trial or an inquiry. That is not what is being undertaken by the panel. The panel’s purpose is to ensure that the eligibility criteria process has been followed in a correct, lawful and safe way. As others have pointed out, it is not adversarial, and will not be described as such in the Bill.

All that I am saying on behalf of the Government is that the Official Solicitor’s role is most frequently to assist in court with a difficult or novel point of law when the person cannot do it themselves. Well, we do not have that here. We are not determining points of law; we are determining whether this person has met the eligibility criteria. Secondly, the Official Solicitor’s role is for when individuals lack capacity. In the Bill, by definition, the person who is applying has already satisfied two doctors that they have capacity. Of course, the question of capacity may be something that the panel wishes to explore further—it has the three panel members and the ability to draw on its powers to seek further information to test that—but it is not clear, without altering the current role that the Official Solicitor plays within our legal system, what role they would be serving.

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate the Minister’s position and am grateful for her explanation, but it does not address the central point, which is that nine girls were deemed not to have capacity. Despite all the amendments that have been tabled and the letter from all the charities about anorexia, that has not been addressed. In absence of any impact assessment on one of the issues that most frustrates me, how do the Government conclude that the workability of the Bill is sufficient? Will it work, given that we do not have the protection for those girls who may have anorexia? There is precedent for such girls who did not have capacity. How will the Government safeguard those girls in particular?

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. She has brought up that case a number of times in various debates on the Bill. In this context, part of the provision—in terms of the design and operation of the commissioner and the panels to which the various cases are referred—is the development of guidance. If the commissioner deems specific processes appropriate to the consideration of applications for assisted death where anorexia is an issue, that guidance can be developed. Again, that is a matter for the promoter of the Bill, but one might have thought that having a dedicated body in relation to assisted death—which also has the monitoring function that we will come to in clause 34—means the development of expertise in dealing with cases, in particular those especially difficult cases of the nature my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West raises. From a Government point of view, that would not necessarily flow—it is hard to see why it would at all—from the High Court, if we revert to that. That is a distinction between the two models that the Bill’s promoter has explored.

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is another important argument for having the panel. Where a terminally ill person with an eating disorder has been deemed to have capacity by two doctors and—I surmise, as we now have the compulsory referral—a psychiatrist, we will have on the panel another psychiatrist and a social worker. The panel does help to address concerns about capacity. Does the Minister agree?

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend has developed her thinking, and the Government have worked with her to reflect that policy intent. I think she is right that the panel is capable of doing just that and it could operate in that way.

Amendment (c) to new schedule 2 relates to the issue of domestic abuse training. It would make the voluntary assisted dying commissioner responsible for ensuring that all panel members had received training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. Persons appointed to the list of eligible panel members would already be qualified in the field of law, psychiatry or social work, and would have done all the training that pertains to receiving a professional qualification in those fields.

In addition, under new schedule 2 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the commissioner would be able to give guidance to the panels, which could include training requirements, and the panels must have regard to that guidance in the exercise of their functions. That is all I propose to say about that. It might be seen as an example of something that would typically—I am not saying it has to—be left to regulation or the guidance, rather than being in primary legislation.

Amendment (d) to new schedule 2 relates to the panel sitting in private or in public. It seeks to ensure that panels sit in private by default.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am not sure that my amendment (d) was selected—unfortunately, I missed the deadline— so the Minister does not need to cover it.

[The Chair]

Order. I will suspend the sitting—

[Sarah Sackman]

Put us all out of our misery!

[The Chair]

I did not wish to say that, but the Minister did. We will come back at 5.10 pm.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Roger Gale in the Chair]

[Sarah Sackman]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger.

New clause 17, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, will establish an internal review process. Where a panel refuses to grant a certificate of eligibility, the person seeking assistance would have the option to apply to the commissioner for their case to be reconsidered on the grounds that the first panel’s decision contains an error of law, is irrational or is procedurally unfair—essentially public law grounds. If the commissioner is satisfied that any of those grounds apply, having considered the case without a hearing, they must refer the case to the second panel for a fresh determination. The commissioner will be required to give reasons for their decision in writing. The decision should be shared with the person seeking assistance, the co-ordinating doctor and any other person specified in regulations.

In addition to this internal review process, decisions made by the commissioner or a panel will be amenable to judicial review. It will be for the court to decide whether an individual or group is sufficiently impacted to have standing.

Amendment (a) to new clause 17 proposes a change to who can apply for reconsideration of the initial panel’s decision. This amendment, tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate, seeks to make changes to the process of applying to the commissioner for reconsideration of a panel’s decision, as set out in new clause 17. It would widen the range of persons eligible to apply for a reconsideration, to include not just the person seeking assistance but their next of kin and other relatives, the medical practitioners treating them, and any other person who engaged in the first panel’s proceedings.

Secondly, the commissioner would be able to allow the application for reconsideration on the basis that the first panel’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings. This could include scenarios where a person wishes to challenge the panel’s decision to grant a certificate of eligibility. “Wrong” is an unspecific, subjective and uncertain term that is not typically used in legislation for these reasons: it is a far broader criterion than that set out in new clause 17 and would give the commissioner a significant degree of discretion on whether to exercise the power to have the matter reconsidered.

Lastly, amendment (a) to new clause 17 would make it mandatory for the commissioner to consider each reconsideration with a hearing, unless they consider it to be in the interests of justice to proceed without a hearing. This could increase the time it takes to complete the process, as well as the complexity of the process.

In addition to the internal review process under new clause 17, any decision made by the commissioner or any individual panel would be amenable to judicial review. It would be for the court to decide in each and every case whether an individual or group challenging any such decisions is sufficiently impacted to have standing for the purposes of judicial review.

[Danny Kruger]

I would be grateful for the Minister’s advice on whether she thinks a family member will always have standing. I appreciate her point that it will be for the panel to consider, but is it her view that in law, as in our experience, family members, in the normal understanding of the term—again, we are conscious of the definition of “family members”—will have sufficient standing? Or can she foresee circumstances in which it might be concluded that family members do not have sufficient standing to make a representation?

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Gentleman asks about standing and the process of judicial review. It is fair to say that, in our corpus of administrative law, the rules of standing are fairly liberal. On having a sufficient interest to bring a case, the case needs to be meritorious and would need to meet the permission threshold, which again is a relatively low standard: does one have an arguable case? A family member who has identified a procedural irregularity or a public law error that is arguable will have standing, I would have thought, to bring a judicial review.

The hon. Gentleman also asks about the potential for judicial review of individual decisions to issue a certificate of eligibility, but of course any decision by the commission, the commissioner or any of the subordinate panels will be amenable to judicial review. For example, the decision to issue guidance or policy documents relating to the commission’s operations will be amenable to judicial review. One can imagine that, under our broadly liberal rules of standing within the administrative court, a range of bodies not pertaining to the case of an individual and their family, but having an interest in those rules, might be eligible. Ultimately—as the Minister for courts, I would say this—that will be a matter for the independent judiciary, but it is right that, within our public law system, the rules of standing are fairly broad.

Oral Answers to Questions

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Tuesday 11th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Liz Jarvis (Eastleigh) (LD)]

4. What steps she is taking to reduce the cost of court transcripts for victims.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

The Government recognise just how important accessing transcripts can be for certain victims. That is why transcripts of sentencing remarks are available free of charge to the families of victims of fatal road offences, murder and manslaughter. It is also why this Government are running a one-year pilot that offers free sentencing remarks to victims of rape and sexual offences. That is due to conclude in May. We are also looking in the round at how we lower the cost of obtaining a court transcript through increased use of technology.

[Liz Jarvis]

The previous Government launched a pilot scheme to provide free sentencing remarks to victims of sexual violence. However, thousands of eligible survivors only found out about it months after it started. Poor communication meant that victims missed out on the opportunity for some closure. Will the Justice Secretary confirm whether the pilot has been properly evaluated, whether its findings will be made public, and what steps will be taken to improve awareness and accessibility for those who need to use the scheme?

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Member is absolutely right that initially there was not enough uptake. The Government acted to drum up awareness of the scheme precisely because we want to test its effectiveness for victims of rape and serious sexual offences. I reassure her that application numbers are up. We are conducting the evaluation, and once we have the results, we will be able to test whether we can implement the scheme in the future.

[Richard Baker (Glenrothes and Mid Fife) (Lab)]

5. What steps her Department is taking to help support victims of knife crime through the criminal justice system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)]

18. What steps she is taking to tackle backlogs in the courts.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

The last Government left a mess in every single corner of our justice system—our criminal courts and our civil courts. In the process, they let down not just victims of crime but businesses, employees, employers and children in care; every part of our system was left in a complete mess. That is what we are sorting out, with record Crown court sitting days—a commitment of 110,000 sitting days—and running almost to a maximum across all jurisdictions to bring down the backlog. We are sorting out the mess that we were left with.

[Mr Dillon]

I agree with the Minister’s assessment of the previous Conservative Government. However, with more than 382,000 cases still in the backlog for magistrates, have the Government done an assessment of whether that will increase, given the doubled sentencing powers that have been passed down to those courts?

[Sarah Sackman]

The magistrates court is being run in a sustainable way. We extended the sentencing powers in order to free up capacity in the Crown court, and that has been sustainable, and we are increasing capacity in our magistracy by recruiting an additional 2,000 magistrates from diverse backgrounds every year. But that is why we are looking at system reform, whether in the magistrates court or the Crown courts. We are going to need once-in-a-generation reform, and when Sir Brian Leveson reports back, that is what we will get.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

Shockingly, just 4% of rape and sexual offences reported to Derbyshire police in the last year resulted in a charge. When offenders are not prosecuted, victims understandably lose faith in our justice system. What steps has the Minister taken to reduce backlogs in Derbyshire courts so that justice can be served for these despicable crimes?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am sorry to hear how long victims in my hon. Friend’s constituency are waiting. That is why we are taking urgent action to bear down on the Crown court backlog, not only by increasing sitting days this year, but by committing to record numbers of sitting days next year. Of course that will not be sufficient to bring down the backlog and deliver swifter justice for victims, and that is why we need to hear from Sir Brian Leveson and implement reform in due course.

[Mrs Sarah Russell (Congleton) (Lab)]

19. What steps her Department is taking to reduce the Crown court backlog.

--- Later in debate ---

[Darren Paffey (Southampton Itchen) (Lab)]

T6. A constituent of mine, aged just 21, tragically died after accessing pro-suicide online forums that not only encouraged self-harm, but advertised how to get lethal drugs and how to exploit loopholes that allowed this. The substance used in her death can still be bought on Amazon today. What steps will the Minister take to close those loopholes for those who enable criminality and ensure that the law is actively keeping our young people safe?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

I am sorry to hear about that tragic case in my hon. Friend’s constituency. Encouraging or assisting suicide is an offence under the Suicide Act 1961, and sending communications that encourage or assist serious self-harm is an offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, but we are going to tighten up the law to address the situation that my hon. Friend has described. Of course, this is about not just the law, but the enforcement of the law as well.

[Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

T9.   We all agree that the court backlogs must be cleared, as justice for victims is essential. However, are the Government heeding the Law Society’s advice to not waste precious time and resources on an intermediate court, and what engagement have they had with the Law Society on that?

[Sarah Sackman]

As the Lord Chancellor has said, our priority is delivering swifter justice for victims and bearing down on the Crown court backlog. That is why we have asked Sir Brian Leveson to consider all options, which have to include reclassification of offences and the intermediate court. We have to have a whole-system reform, but I fear that if we were to exclude those options, we would not be gripping the problem.

[Paula Barker (Liverpool Wavertree) (Lab)]

T8. A significant proportion of those who experience homelessness are ex-offenders. I have previously raised concerns that the drive to alleviate the prison places crisis must not add to the homelessness emergency. The Deputy Prime Minister is in the process of establishing an inter-ministerial group on tackling homelessness. Will my right hon. Friend’s Department play a full and active role in that inter-ministerial group, and ensure that Ministers and officials from the Ministry of Justice are adequately represented?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

On several occasions I have met my constituent Beverley, whose son suffered a horrific murder. He was stabbed more than 140 times. She has been desperately attempting to get hold of the court transcripts, but to no avail. Will Ministers please meet me to help this still grieving mum?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am really horrified to hear of that case. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, the transcript of sentencing remarks should have been made available free of charge, but I am happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss how transcripts of trials more broadly can be made available.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

On Radio 4’s “Today” programme last week, Matthew Ryder KC, who sits as a judge, praised the extreme helpfulness of pre-sentencing reports for passing effective sentences. Will the Secretary of State do as he asks and endorse the importance, value and independence of the Sentencing Council?

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

What are this Government doing to crack down on unqualified people representing themselves as solicitors?

[Sarah Sackman]

As the hon. Member well knows, the solicitors profession is highly regulated. We have the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which itself is regulated by the Legal Services Board. All our professionals, whether they are practising in criminal or civil law, are highly respected and highly regulated, and we are indebted to them.

[Jonathan Hinder (Pendle and Clitheroe) (Lab)]

I was shocked to read the Sentencing Council’s response to the Secretary of State last night, with its arrogant tone. As she has said, this Parliament is sovereign, and the fact is that we have given too much power away to these unelected bodies in recent years. Can I reassure her of my support, and can she reassure me that she will not rest until we retain equality before the law?

Ministry of Justice Contingency Fund Advance: 2024-25

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

The Ministry of Justice requires an advance to discharge its commitments which are set out in its supplementary estimate 2024-25, published on 11 February 2025 as “HC 655 (Central Government Supply Estimates 2024-25, Supplementary Estimates)”.

This is a temporary cash advance due to the timing of Royal Assent for the Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Bill (“the Supply Bill”), and does not reflect an overspend.

Once the Supply Bill achieves Royal Assent the advance will be repaid in full.

Parliamentary approval for additional resources of £300,000,000 will be sought in a supplementary estimate for the Ministry of Justice. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £300,000,000 will be met by repayable cash advances from the Contingencies Fund.

[HCWS491]