All 15 contributions to the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 (Ministerial Extracts Only)

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Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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2nd reading
Monday 17th April 2023

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Commons Chamber
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Julia Lopez Portrait The Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure (Julia Lopez)
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I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Data is already the fuel driving the digital age: it powers the everyday apps that we use, public services are being improved by its better use and businesses rely on it to trade, produce goods and deliver services for their customers. But how we choose to use data going forward will become even more important: it will determine whether we can grow an innovative economy with well-paid, high-skill jobs, it will shape our ability to compete globally in developing the technologies of the future and it will increasingly say something about the nature of our democratic society. The great challenge for democracies, as I see it, will be how to use data to empower rather than control citizens, enhancing their privacy and sense of agency without letting authoritarian states—which, in contrast, use data as a tool to monitor and harvest information from citizens—dominate technological advancement and get a competitive advantage over our companies.

The UK cannot step aside from the debate by simply rubber-stamping whatever iteration of the GDPR comes out of Brussels. We have in our hands a critical opportunity to take a new path and, in doing so, to lead the global conversation about how we can best use data as a force for good—a conversation in which using data more effectively and maintaining high data protection standards are seen not as contradictory but as mutually reinforcing objectives, because trust in this more effective system will build the confidence to share information. We start today not by kicking off a revolution, turning over the apple cart and causing a compliance headache for UK firms, but by beginning an evolution away from an inflexible one-size-fits-all regime and towards one that is risk-based and focused on innovation, flexibility and the needs of our citizens, scientists, public services and companies.

Businesses need data to make better decisions and to reach the right consumers. Researchers need data to discover new treatments. Hospitals need it to deliver more personalised patient care. Our police and security services need data to keep our people safe. Right now, our rules are too vague, too complex and too confusing always to understand. The GDPR is a good standard, but it is not the gold standard. People are struggling to utilise data to innovate, because they are tied up in burdensome activities that are not fundamentally useful in enhancing privacy.

A recently published report on compliance found that 81% of European publishers were unknowingly in breach of the GDPR, despite doing what they thought the law required of them. A YouGov poll from this year found that one in five marketing professionals in the UK report knowing absolutely nothing about the GDPR, despite being bound by it. It is not just businesses: the people whose privacy our laws are supposed to protect do not understand it either. Instead, they click away the thicket of cookie pop-ups just so they can see their screen.

The Bill will maintain the high standards of data protection that British people rightly expect, but it will also help the people who are most affected by data regulation, because we have co-designed it with those people to ensure that our regulation reflects the way in which real people live their lives and run their businesses.

Christine Jardine Portrait Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)
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Does the Minister agree that the retention and enhancement of public trust in data is a major issue, that sharing data is a major issue for the public, and that the Government must do more—perhaps she can tell us whether they intend to do more—to educate the public about how and where our data is used, and what powers individuals have to find out this information?

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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I thank the hon. Lady for her helpful intervention. She is right: as I said earlier, trust in the system is fundamental to whether citizens have the confidence to share their data and whether we can therefore make use of that data. She made a good point about educating people, and I hope that this debate will mark the start of an important public conversation about how people use data. One of the challenges we face is a complex framework which means that people do not even know how to talk about data, and I think that some of the simplifications we wish to introduce will help us to understand one of the fundamental principles to which we want our new regime to adhere.

Julian Lewis Portrait Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
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My hon. Friend gave a long list of people who found the rules we had inherited from outside the UK challenging. She might add to that list Members of Parliament themselves. I am sure I am not alone in having been exasperated by being complained about to the Information Commissioner, in this case by a constituent who had written to me complaining about a local parish council. When I shared his letter with the parish council so that it could show how bogus his long-running complaint had been, he proceeded to file a complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office because I had shared his phone number—which he had not marked as private—with the parish council, with which he had been in correspondence for several years. The Information Commissioner’s Office took that seriously. This sort of nonsense shows how over-restrictive regulations can be abused by people who are out to stir up trouble unjustifiably.

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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Let me gently say that if my right hon. Friend’s constituent was going to pick on one Member of Parliament with whom to raise this point, the Member of Parliament who does not, I understand, use emails would be one of the worst candidates. However, I entirely understand Members’ frustration about the current rules. We are looking into what we can do in relation to democratic engagement, because, as my right hon. Friend says, this is one of the areas in which there is not enough clarity about what can and cannot be done.

We want to reduce burdens on businesses, and above all for the small businesses that account for more than 99% of UK firms. I am pleased that the Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), is present to back up those proposals. Businesses that do not have the time, the money or the staff to spend precious hours doing unnecessary form-filling are currently being forced to follow some of the same rules as a billion-dollar technology company. We are therefore cutting the amount of pointless paperwork, ensuring that organisations only have to comply with rules on record-keeping and risk assessment when their processing activities are high-risk. We are getting rid of excessively demanding requirements to appoint data protection officers, giving small businesses much more flexibility when it comes to how they manage data protection risks without procuring external resources.

Those changes will not just make the process simpler, clearer and easier for businesses, they will make it cheaper too. We are expecting micro and small businesses to save nearly £90 million in compliance costs every year: that is £90 million more for higher investment, faster growth and better jobs. According to figures published in 2021, data-driven trade already generates 85% of our services exports. Our new international transfers regime clarifies how we can build data bridges to support the close, free and safe exchange of data with other trusted allies.

John Penrose Portrait John Penrose (Weston-super-Mare) (Con)
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I am delighted to hear the Secretary of State talk about reducing regulatory burdens without compromising the standards that we are none the less delivering—that is the central distinction, and greatly to be welcomed for its benefits for the entrepreneurialism and fleetness of foot of British industry. Does she agree, however, that while the part of the Bill that deals with open data, or smart data, goes further than that and creates fresh opportunities for, in particular, the small challenger businesses of the kind she has described to take on the big incumbents that own the data lakes in many sectors, those possibilities will be greatly reduced if we take our time and move too slowly? Could it not potentially take 18 months to two years for us to start opening up those other sectors of our economy?

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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I am delighted, in turn, to hear my hon. Friend call me the Secretary of State—I am grateful for the promotion, even if it is not a reality. I know how passionate he feels about open data, which is a subject we have discussed before. As I said earlier, I am pleased that the Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade is present, because this morning he announced that a new council will be driving forward this work. As my hon. Friend knows, this is not necessarily about legislation being in place—I think the Bill gives him what he wants—but about that sense of momentum, and about onboarding new sectors into this regime and not being slow in doing so. As he says, a great deal of economic benefit can be gained from this, and we do not want it to be delayed any further.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
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Let me first draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Let me also apologise for missing the Minister’s opening remarks—I was taken by surprise by the shortness of the preceding statement and had to rush to the Chamber.

May I take the Minister back to the subject of compliance costs? I understand that the projected simplification will result in a reduction in those costs, but does she acknowledge that a new regime, or changes to the current regime, will kick off an enormous retraining exercise for businesses, many of which have already been through that process recently and reached a settled state of understanding of how they should be managing data? Even a modest amount of tinkering instils a sense among British businesses, particularly small businesses, that they must put everyone back through the system, at enormous cost. Unless the Minister is very careful and very clear about the changes being made, she will create a whole new industry for the next two or three years, as every data controller in a small business—often doing this part time alongside their main job—has to be retrained.

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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We have been very cognisant of that risk in developing our proposals. As I said in my opening remarks, we do not wish to upset the apple cart and create a compliance headache for businesses, which would be entirely contrary to the aims of the Bill. A small business that is currently compliant with the GDPR will continue to be compliant under the new regime. However, we want to give businesses flexibility in regard to how they deliver that compliance, so that, for instance, they do not have to employ a data protection officer.

Ben Lake Portrait Ben Lake (Ceredigion) (PC)
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I am grateful to the Minister for being so generous with her time. May I ask whether the Government intend to maintain data adequacy with the EU? I only ask because I have been contacted by some business owners who are concerned about the possible loss of EU data adequacy and the cost that might be levied on them as a result.

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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I thank the hon. Gentleman for pressing me on that important point. I know that many businesses are seeking to maintain adequacy. If we want a business-friendly regime, we do not want to create regulatory disruption for businesses, particularly those that trade with Europe and want to ensure that there is a free flow of data. I can reassure him that we have been in constant contact with the European Commission about our proposals. We want to make sure that there are no surprises. We are currently adequate, and we believe that we will maintain adequacy following the enactment of the Bill.

Rebecca Long Bailey Portrait Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)
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I was concerned to hear from the British Medical Association that if the EU were to conclude that data protection legislation in the UK was inadequate, that would present a significant problem for organisations conducting medical research in the UK. Given that so many amazing medical researchers across the UK currently work in collaboration with EU counterparts, can the Minister assure the House that the Bill will not represent an inadequacy in comparison with EU legislation as it stands?

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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I hope that my previous reply reassured the hon. Lady that we intend to maintain adequacy, and we do not consider that the Bill will present a risk in that regard. What we are trying to do, particularly in respect of medical research, is make it easier for scientists to innovate and conduct that research without constantly having to return for consent when it is apparent that consent has already been granted for particular medical data processing activities. We think that will help us to maintain our world-leading position as a scientific research powerhouse.

Alongside new data bridges, the Secretary of State will be able to recognise new transfer mechanisms for businesses to protect international transfers. Businesses will still be able to transfer data across borders with the compliance mechanisms that they already use, avoiding needless checks and costs. We are also delighted to be co-hosting, in partnership with the United States, the next workshop of the global cross-border privacy rules forum in London this week. The CBPR system is one of the few existing operational mechanisms that, by design, aims to facilitate data flows on a global scale.

World-class research requires world-class data, but right now many scientists are reluctant to get the data they need to get on with their research, for the simple reason that they do not know how research is defined. They can also be stopped in their tracks if they try to broaden their research or follow a new and potentially interesting avenue. When that happens, they can be required to go back and seek permission all over again, even though they have already gained that permission earlier to use personal data. We do not think that makes sense. The pandemic showed that we cannot risk delaying discoveries that could save lives. Nothing should be holding us back from curing cancer, tackling disease or producing new drugs and treatments. This Bill will simplify the legal requirements around research so that scientists can work to their strengths with legal clarity on what they can and cannot do.

The Bill will also ensure that people benefit from the results of research by unlocking the potential of transformative technologies. Taking artificial intelligence as an example, we have recently published our White Paper: “AI regulation: a pro-innovation approach”. In the meantime, the Bill will ensure that organisations know when they can use responsible automated decision making and that people know when they can request human intervention where those decisions impact their lives, whether that means getting a fair price for the insurance they receive after an accident or a fair chance of getting the job they have always wanted.

I spoke earlier about the currency of trust and how, by maintaining it through high data protection standards, we are likely to see more data sharing, not less. Fundamental to that trust will be confidence in the robustness of the regulator. We already have a world-leading independent regulator in the Information Commissioner’s Office, but the ICO needs to adapt to reflect the greater role that data now plays in our lives alongside its strategic importance to our economic competitiveness. The ICO was set up in the 1980s for a completely different world, and the pace, volume and power of the data we use today has changed dramatically since then.

It is only right that we give the regulator the tools it needs to keep pace and to keep our personal data safe while ensuring that, as an organisation, it remains accountable, flexible and fit for the modern world. The Bill will modernise the structure and objectives of the ICO. Under this legislation, protecting our personal data will remain the ICO’s primary focus, but it will also be asked to focus on how it can empower businesses and organisations to drive growth and innovation across the UK, and support public trust and confidence in the use of personal data.

The Bill is also important for consumers, helping them to share less data while getting more product. It will support smart data schemes that empower consumers and small businesses to make better use of their own data, building on the extraordinary success of open banking tools offered by innovative businesses, which help consumers and businesses to manage their finances and spending, track their carbon footprint and access credit.

Jim Shannon Portrait Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
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The Minister always delivers a very solid message and we all appreciate that. In relation to the high data protection standards that she is outlining, there is also a balance to be achieved when it comes to ensuring that there are no unnecessary barriers for individuals and businesses. Can she assure the House that that will be exactly what happens?

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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I am always happy to take an intervention from the hon. Member. I want to assure him that we are building high data protection standards that are built on the fundamental principles of the GDPR, and we are trying to get the right balance between high data protection standards that will protect the consumer and giving businesses the flexibility they need. I will continue this conversation with him as the Bill passes through the House.

Mike Amesbury Portrait Mike Amesbury (Weaver Vale) (Lab)
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I thank the Minster for being so generous with her time. With regard to the independent commissioner, the regulator, who will set the terms of reference? Will it be genuinely independent? It seems to me that a lot of power will fall on the shoulders of the Secretary of State, whoever that might be in the not-too-distant future.

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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The Secretary of State will have greater powers when it comes to some of the statutory codes that the ICO adheres to, but those powers will be brought to this House for its consent. The whole idea is to make the ICO much more democratically accountable. I know that concern about the independence of the regulator has been raised as we have been working up these proposals, but I wish to assure the House that we do not believe those concerns to be justified or legitimate. The Bill actually has the strong support of the current Information Commissioner, John Edwards.

The Bill will also put in place the foundations for data intermediaries, which are organisations that can help us to benefit from our data. In effect, we will be able to share less sensitive data about ourselves with businesses while securing greater benefits. As I say, one of the examples of this is open banking. Another way in which the Bill will help people to take back control of their data is by making it easier and more secure for people to prove things about themselves once, electronically, without having to dig out stacks of physical documents such as passports, bills, statements and birth certificates and then having to provide lots of copies of those documents to different organisations. Digital verification services already exist, but we want consumers to be able to identify trustworthy providers by creating a set of standards around them.

The Bill is designed not just to boost businesses, support scientists and deliver consumer benefits; it also contains measures to keep people healthy and safe. It will improve the way in which the NHS and adult social care organise data to deliver crucial health services. It will let the police get on with their jobs by allowing them to spend more time on the beat rather than on pointless paperwork. We believe that this will save up to 1.5 million hours of police time each year—

Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez
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I know that my hon. Friend has been passionate on this point, and we are looking actively into her proposals.

We are also updating the outdated system of registering births and deaths based on paper processes from the 19th century.

Data has become absolutely critical for keeping us healthy, for keeping us safe and for growing an economy with innovative businesses, providing jobs for generations to come. Britain is at its best when its businesses and scientists are at theirs. Right now, our rules risk holding them back, but this Bill will change that because it was co-designed with those businesses and scientists and with the help of consumer groups. Simpler, easier, clearer regulation gives the people using data to improve our lives the certainty they need to get on with their jobs. It maintains high standards for protecting people’s privacy while seeking to maintain our adequacy with the EU. Overall, this legislation will make data more useful for more people and more usable by businesses, and it will enable greater innovation by scientists. I commend the Bill to the House.

--- Later in debate ---
Damian Collins Portrait Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)
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I am delighted to speak in support of this long-awaited Bill. It is a necessary piece of legislation to learn the lessons from GDPR and look at how we can improve the system, both to make it easier for businesses to work with and to give users and citizens the certainty they need about how their data will be processed and used.

In bringing forward new measures, the Bill in no way suggests that we are looking to move away from our data adequacy agreements with the European Union. Around the world, in north America, Europe, Australia and elsewhere in the far east, we see Governments looking at developing trusted systems for sharing and using data and for allowing businesses to process data across international borders, knowing that those systems may not be exactly the same, but they work to the same standards and with similar levels of integrity. That is clearly the direction that the whole world wants to move in and we should play a leading role in that.

I want to talk briefly about an important area of the Bill: getting the balance between data rights and data safety and what the Bill refers to as the “legitimate interest” of a particular business. I should also note that this Bill, while important in its own right, sits alongside other legislation—some of it to be introduced in this Session and some of it already well on its way through the Parliamentary processes—dealing with other aspects of the digital world. The regulation of data is an aspect of digital regulation; it is in some ways the fuel that powers the digital experience and is relevant to other areas of digital life as well.

To take one example, we have already established and implemented the age-appropriate design code for children, which principally addresses the way data is gathered from children online and used to design services and products that they use. As this Bill goes through its parliamentary stages, it is important that we understand how the age-appropriate design code is applied as part of the new data regime, and that the safeguards set out in that code are guaranteed through the Bill as well.

There has been a lot of debate, as has already been mentioned, about companies such as TikTok. There is a concern that engineers who work for TikTok in China, some of whom may be members of the Chinese Communist party, have access to UK user data that may not be stored in China, but is accessed from China, and are using that data to develop products. There is legitimate concern about oversight of that process and what that data might be used for, particularly in a country such as China.

However, there is also a question about data, because one reason the TikTok app is being withdrawn from Government devices around the world is that it is incredibly data-acquisitive. It does not just analyse how people use TikTok and from that create data profiles of users to determine what content to recommend to them, although that is a fundamental part of the experience of using it; it is also gathering, as other big apps do, data from what people do on other apps on the same device. People may not realise that they have given consent, and it is certainly not informed consent, for companies such as TikTok to access data from what they do on other apps, not just when they are TikTok.

It is a question of having trusted systems for how data can be gathered, and giving users the right to opt out of such data systems more easily. Some users might say, “I’m quite happy for TikTok or Meta to have that data gathered about what I do across a range of services.” Others may say, “No, I only want them to see data about what I do when I am using their particular service, not other people’s.”

The Online Safety Bill is one of the principal ways in which we are seeking to regulate AI now. There is debate among people in the tech sectors; a letter was published recently, co-signed by a number of tech executives, including Elon Musk, to say that we should have a six-month pause in the development of AI systems, particularly for large language models. That suggests a problem in the near future of very sophisticated data systems that can make decisions faster than a human can analyse them.

People such as Eric Schmidt have raised concerns about AI in defence systems, where an aggressive system could make decisions faster than a human could respond to them, to which we would need an AI system to respond and where there is potentially no human oversight. That is a frightening scenario in which we might want to consider moratoriums and agreements, as we have in other areas of warfare such as the use of chemical weapons, that we will not allow such systems to be developed because they are so difficult to control.

If we look at the application of that sort of technology closer to home and some of the cases most referenced in the Online Safety Bill, for example the tragic death of the teenager Molly Russell, we see that what was driving the behaviour of concern was data gathered about a user to make recommendations to that person that were endangering their life. The Online Safety Bill seeks to regulate that practice by creating codes and responsibilities for businesses, but that behaviour is only possible because of the collection of data and decisions made by the company on how the data is processed.

This is where the Bill also links to the Government’s White Paper on AI, and this is particularly important: there must be an onus on companies to demonstrate that their systems are safe. The onus must not just be on the user to demonstrate that they have somehow suffered as a consequence of that system’s design. The company should have to demonstrate that they are designing systems with people’s safety and their rights in mind—be that their rights as a worker and a citizen, or their rights to have certain safeguards and protections over how their data is used.

Companies creating datasets should be able to demonstrate to the regulator what data they have gathered, how that data is being trained and what it is being used for. It should be easy for the regulator to see and, if the regulator has concerns up-front, it should be able to raise them with the company. We must try to create that shift, particularly on AI systems, in how systems are tested before they are deployed, with both safety and the principles set out in the legislation in mind.

Kit Malthouse Portrait Kit Malthouse
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My hon. Friend makes a strong point about safety being designed, but a secondary area of concern for many people is discrimination—that is, the more data companies acquire, the greater their ability to discriminate. For example, in an insurance context, we allow companies to discriminate on the basis of experience or behaviour; if someone has had a lot of crashes or speeding fines, we allow discrimination. However, for companies that process large amounts of data and may be making automated decisions or otherwise, there is no openly advertised line of acceptability drawn. In the future it may be that datasets come together that allow extreme levels of discrimination. For example, if they linked data science, psychometrics and genetic data, there is the possibility for significant levels of discrimination in society. Does he think that, as well as safety, we should be emphasising that line in the sand?

--- Later in debate ---
Paul Scully Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Paul Scully)
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I thank all Members for their contributions, including the hon. Members for Manchester Central (Lucy Powell), for Glasgow North West (Carol Monaghan), for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner), for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) and my hon. Friends the Members for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins), for Loughborough (Jane Hunt) and for Aberconwy (Robin Millar). The debate has been held in the right spirit, understanding the importance of data, and I will try to go through a number of the issues raised.

Adequacy has come up on a number of occasions. We have been straight from the beginning that adequacy is very important and we work with the EU Commission on this; we speak to it on a regular basis, but it is important to note that the EU does not require exactly the same rules to be in place to be adequate. We can see that from Japan and from New Zealand, so we are trying to get the balance right and making sure that we remain adequate not just with the EU but with other countries with which we want to have data bridges and collaboration. We are also making sure that we can strip back some of the bureaucracy not just for small businesses, but for public services including GPs, schools and similar institutions, as well as protecting the consumer, which must always be central.

Automated decision-making was also raised by a number of Members. The absence of meaningful human intervention in solely automated decisions, along with opacity in how those decisions can be reached, will be mitigated by providing data subjects with the opportunity to make representations about, and ultimately challenge, decisions of this nature that are unexpected or seem unwarranted. For example, if a person is denied a loan or access to a product or services because a solely automated decision-making process has identified a high risk of fraud or irregularities in their finances, that individual should be able to contest that decision and seek human review. If that decision is found to be unwarranted on review, the controller must re-evaluate the case and issue an appropriate decision.

Our reforms are addressing the uncertainty over the applications of safeguards. They will clarify when safeguards apply to ensure that they are available in appropriate circumstances. We will develop that with businesses and other organisations in guidance.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North West talked about joint-working designation notices and it is important to note that the police and intelligence services are working off different data regimes and that can make joint-working more difficult. Many of the changes made in this Bill have come from learning from the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist incident and the Manchester Arena bombing.

Members raised the question of algorithmic bias. We agree that it is important that organisations are aware of potential biases in data sets and algorithms and bias monitoring and correction can involve the use of personal data. As we set out in our response to the consultation on the Bill, we plan to introduce a statutory instrument that will provide for the monitoring and correction of bias in AI systems by allowing the processing of sensitive personal data for this purpose with appropriate safeguards. However, as we know from the AI White Paper we published recently, this is a changing area so it is important that we remain able to flex in Government in the context of AI and that type of decision-making.

The hon. Member for Bristol North West talked about biometrics. That is classed as sensitive data under the UK GDPR, so is already provided with additional protection. It can only be processed if a relevant condition is met under article 9 or schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act. That requirement provides sufficient safeguards for biometric data. There are significant overlaps in the current oversight framework, which is confusing for the police and the public, and it inhibits innovation. That is why the Bill simplifies the oversight for biometrics and overt surveillance technologies.

The hon. Gentleman talked about age-appropriate guidance. We are committed to protecting children and young people online. The Bill maintains the high standards of data protection that our citizens expect and organisations will still have to abide by our age-appropriate design code. Any breach of our data protection laws will result in enforcement action by the Information Commissioner’s Office.

The hon. Gentleman also talked about data portability. The Bill increases data portability by setting up smart data regulations. He talked about social media, but it is far wider than that. Smart data is the secure sharing of customer data with authorised third parties on the customer’s request. Those third parties can then use that data to provide innovative services for the consumer or business user, utilising AI and data-driven insights to empower customer choice. Services may include clear account management across services, easier switching between offers or providers, and advice on how to save money. Open banking is an obvious live example of that, but the Bill, with the smart data changes within it, will turbocharge the use of this matter.

My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough talked about policing. It will save 1.5 million police hours, but it is really important that we do more. We are looking at ways of easing redaction burdens for the police while ensuring we maintain victim and witness confidence. It is really important to them, and in the interests of public trust, that the police do not share information not relevant to a case with other organisations, including the Crown Prosecution Service and the defence. Removing information, as my hon. Friend says, places a resource burden on officers. We will continue to work with the police and the Home Office on that basis.

On UK-wide data standards, raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy, improving access to comparable data and evidence from across the UK is a crucial part of the Government’s work to strengthen the Union. The UK Government and the Office for National Statistics have an ongoing and wide-ranging work programme to increase coherency of data across the nations, as my hon. Friend is aware. We remain engaged in discussions and will continue to work with him, the Wales Office and the ONS to ensure that we can continue.

On international data transfer, it is important that we tackle the uncertainties and instabilities in the current regime, but the hon. Member for Strangford is absolutely right that in doing that, we must maintain public trust in the transfer system.

Finally, on the ICO, we believe that the Bill does not undercut its independence. It is really important that, for the trust issues I have talked about, we retain its independence. It is not about Government control over an independent regulator and it is not about a Government trying to exert influence or pressure for what are deemed to be more favourable outcomes. We are committed to the ICO’s ongoing independence and that is why we have worked closely with the ICO. The Information Commissioner himself is in favour of the changes we are making. He has spoken approvingly about them.

This is a really important Bill, because it will enable greater innovation while keeping personal protections to keep people’s data safe.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 13 June 2023.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Consideration and Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.—(Joy Morrissey.)

Question agreed to.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Money)

King’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of—

(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Secretary of State, the Treasury or a government department, and

(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.—(Joy Morrissey.)

Question agreed to.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Ways and Means)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill, it is expedient to authorise:

(1) the charging of fees or levies under or by virtue of the Act; and

(2) the payment of sums into the Consolidated Fund.—(Joy Morrissey.)

Question agreed to.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Carry-over)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 80A(1)(a)).

That if, at the conclusion of this Session of Parliament, proceedings on the Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill have not been completed, they shall be resumed in the next Session.—(Joy Morrissey.)

Question agreed to.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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Committee stage
Tuesday 16th May 2023

(11 months, 2 weeks ago)

Public Bill Committees
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 May 2023 - (16 May 2023)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Division 1

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Amendment proposed: 65, in clause 2, page 4, line 21, at end insert—
--- Later in debate ---

Division 2

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 3

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Amendment proposed: 67, in clause 5, page 7, line 18, at end insert—
--- Later in debate ---

Division 4

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 5

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 6

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Schedule 2 agreed to.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 7

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

--- Later in debate ---

Division 8

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Amendment proposed: 72, in clause 7, page 12, line 25, at end insert—
--- Later in debate ---

Division 9

Ayes: 6

Noes: 9

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 10

Ayes: 9

Noes: 6

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Fourth sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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Committee stage
Tuesday 16th May 2023

(11 months, 2 weeks ago)

Public Bill Committees
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 May 2023 - (16 May 2023)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Division 11

Ayes: 7

Noes: 10

Stephanie Peacock Portrait Stephanie Peacock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 11, page 19, line 12, at end insert

“and about the safeguards available to the subject in accordance with this paragraph and any regulations under Article 22D(4);”.

This amendment would require controllers proactively to provide data subjects with information about their rights in relation to automated decision-making.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 12

Ayes: 7

Noes: 10

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Ms Monaghan, do you wish to move amendment 120 formally?

--- Later in debate ---

Division 13

Ayes: 6

Noes: 10

Amendment proposed: 75, clause 11, page 19, line 36, at end insert—
--- Later in debate ---

Division 14

Ayes: 6

Noes: 10

Stephanie Peacock Portrait Stephanie Peacock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 121, in clause 11, page 19, line 36, at end insert—

“7. When exercising the power to make regulations under this Article, the Secretary of State must have regard to the following statement of principles:

Digital information principles at work

1. People should have access to a fair, inclusive and trustworthy digital environment at work.

2. Algorithmic systems should be designed and used to achieve better outcomes: to make work better, not worse, and not for surveillance. Workers and their representatives should be involved in this process.

3. People should be protected from unsafe, unaccountable and ineffective algorithmic systems at work. Impacts on individuals and groups must be assessed in advance and monitored, with reasonable and proportionate steps taken.

4. Algorithmic systems should not harm workers’ mental or physical health, or integrity.

5. Workers and their representatives should always know when an algorithmic system is being used, how and why it is being used, and what impacts it may have on them or their work.

6. Workers and their representatives should be involved in meaningful consultation before and during use of an algorithmic system that may significantly impact work or people.

7. Workers should have control over their own data and digital information collected about them at work.

8. Workers and their representatives should always have an opportunity for human contact, review and redress when an algorithmic system is used at work where it may significantly impact work or people. This includes a right to a written explanation when a decision is made.

9. Workers and their representatives should be able to use their data and digital technologies for contact and association to improve work quality and conditions.

10. Workers should be supported to build the information, literacy and skills needed to fulfil their capabilities through work transitions.”

This amendment would insert into new Article 22D of the UK GDPR a requirement for the Secretary of State to have regard to the statement of digital information principles at work when making regulations about automated decision-making.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 15

Ayes: 6

Noes: 10

Amendment proposed: 122, in clause 11, page 22, line 2, at end insert—
--- Later in debate ---

Division 16

Ayes: 6

Noes: 10

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 17

Ayes: 10

Noes: 6

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 18

Ayes: 6

Noes: 10

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 19

Ayes: 10

Noes: 6

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Fifth sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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Committee stage
Thursday 18th May 2023

(11 months, 2 weeks ago)

Public Bill Committees
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 May 2023 - (18 May 2023)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Division 20

Ayes: 6


Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9


Conservative: 9

Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 21

Ayes: 6


Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9


Conservative: 9

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 22

Ayes: 9


Conservative: 9

Noes: 6


Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 23

Ayes: 6


Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9


Conservative: 9

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 24

Ayes: 6


Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9


Conservative: 9

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 25

Ayes: 9


Conservative: 9

Noes: 6


Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 1

Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Seventh sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd May 2023

(11 months, 1 week ago)

Public Bill Committees
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 May 2023 - (23 May 2023)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Division 26

Ayes: 4


Labour: 3
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 8


Conservative: 8

Amendments made: 53, in clause 79, page 105, line 11, after “transitional” insert “, transitory”.
--- Later in debate ---

Division 27

Ayes: 4


Labour: 3
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 8


Conservative: 8

Amendment made: 33, in clause 85, page 113, line 28, at end insert—

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Eighth sitting)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd May 2023

(11 months, 1 week ago)

Public Bill Committees
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 May 2023 - (23 May 2023)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Division 28

Ayes: 4


Labour: 3
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9


Conservative: 9

--- Later in debate ---

Division 29

Ayes: 4


Labour: 3
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9


Conservative: 9

New Clause 10
--- Later in debate ---

Division 30

Ayes: 4


Labour: 3
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 9


Conservative: 9

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Read Full debate

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

John Whittingdale Portrait The Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure (Sir John Whittingdale)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

I begin by joining the hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) in expressing the condolences of the House to his predecessor, Allan Rogers. He served as a Member of Parliament during my first nine years in this place. I remember him as an assiduous constituency Member of Parliament, and I am sure we all share the sentiments expressed by the hon. Gentleman.

It is a pleasure to return to the Dispatch Box to lead the House through Report stage of the Bill. We spent considerable time discussing it in Committee, but the hon. Gentleman was not in his post at that time. I welcome him to his position. He may regret that he missed out on Committee stage, which makes him keen to return to it today.

The Bill is an essential piece of legislation that will update the UK’s data laws, making them among the most effective in the world. We scrutinised it in depth in Committee. The hon. Gentleman is right that the Government have tabled a number of amendments for the House to consider today, and he has done the same. The vast majority are technical, and the number sounds large because a lot are consequential on original amendments. One or two address new aspects, and I will be happy to speak to those as we go through them during this afternoon’s debate. Nevertheless, they represent important additions to the Bill.

The Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), who is sitting next to me, has drawn the House’s attention to the fact that amending the Bill to allow the Department for Work and Pensions access to financial data will make a significant contribution to identifying fraud. I would have thought that the Opposition would welcome that. It is not a new measure; it was contained in the fraud plan that the Government published back in May 2022. The Government have been examining that measure, and we have always made it clear that we would bring it forward at an appropriate parliamentary time when a vehicle was available. This is a data Bill, and the measure is specific to it. We estimate that it will result in a saving to the taxpayer of around £500 million by the end of 2028-29. I am surprised that the Opposition should question that.

As I said, the Bill has been considered at length in Committee. It is important that we consider it on Report, in order that it achieve the next stage of its progress through Parliament. On that basis, I reject the motion.

Question put.

--- Later in debate ---
13:24

Division 13

Ayes: 209


Labour: 147
Scottish National Party: 34
Liberal Democrat: 12
Democratic Unionist Party: 5
Independent: 5
Conservative: 2
Alliance: 1
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 1
Green Party: 1
Plaid Cymru: 1

Noes: 275


Conservative: 265
Independent: 3

--- Later in debate ---
1.37 pm
John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Rosie Winterton Portrait Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 48—Processing of personal data revealing political opinions.

Government new clause 7—Searches in response to data subjects’ requests.

Government new clause 8—Notices from the Information Commissioner.

Government new clause 9—Court procedure in connection with subject access requests.

Government new clause 10—Approval of a supplementary code.

Government new clause 11—Designation of a supplementary code.

Government new clause 12—List of recognised supplementary codes.

Government new clause 13—Change to conditions for approval or designation.

Government new clause 14—Revision of a recognised supplementary code.

Government new clause 15—Applications for approval and re-approval.

Government new clause 16—Fees for approval, re-approval and continued approval.

Government new clause 17—Request for withdrawal of approval.

Government new clause 18—Removal of designation.

Government new clause 19—Registration of additional services.

Government new clause 20—Supplementary notes.

Government new clause 21—Addition of services to supplementary notes.

Government new clause 22—Duty to remove services from the DVS register.

Government new clause 23—Duty to remove supplementary notes from the DVS register.

Government new clause 24—Duty to remove services from supplementary notes.

Government new clause 25—Index of defined terms for Part 2.

Government new clause 26—Powers relating to verification of identity or status.

Government new clause 27—Interface bodies.

Government new clause 28—The FCA and financial services interfaces.

Government new clause 29—The FCA and financial services interfaces: supplementary.

Government new clause 30—The FCA and financial services interfaces: penalties and levies.

Government new clause 31—Liability and damages.

Government new clause 32—Other data provision.

Government new clause 33—Duty to notify the Commissioner of personal data breach: time periods.

Government new clause 34—Power to require information for social security purposes.

Government new clause 35—Retention of information by providers of internet services in connection with death of child.

Government new clause 36—Retention of biometric data and recordable offences.

Government new clause 37—Retention of pseudonymised biometric data.

Government new clause 38—Retention of biometric data from INTERPOL.

Government new clause 39—National Underground Asset Register.

Government new clause 40—Information in relation to apparatus.

Government new clause 41—Pre-commencement consultation.

Government new clause 42—Transfer of certain functions of Secretary of State.

New clause 1—Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision

“(1) The 2018 Act is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In the 2018 Act, after section 40 insert—

“40A Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision

(1) This section applies to a set of processing operations consisting of the preparation of a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision, the making of a charging decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, and the return of the case-file by the Crown Prosecution Service to the police service after a charging decision has been made.

(2) The police service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.

(3) The Crown Prosecution Service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in making a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service.

(4) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will not be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.

(5) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must return the case-file to the police service and take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.

(6) Where the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service and returns the case-file to the police service under subsection (5), the police service must comply with the first data protection principle and the third data protection principle in relation to any subsequent processing of the data contained in the case-file.

(7) For the purposes of this section—

(a) The police service means—

(i) constabulary maintained by virtue of an enactment, or

(ii) subject to section 126 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (prison staff not to be regarded as in police service), any other service whose members have the powers or privileges of a constable.

(b) The preparation of, or preparing, a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision includes the submission of the file.

(c) A case-file includes all information obtained by the police service for the purpose of preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.””

This new clause adjusts Section 40 of the Data Protection Act 2018 to exempt the police service and the Crown Prosecution Service from the first and third data protection principles contained within the 2018 Act so that they can share unredacted data with one another when making a charging decision.

New clause 2—Common standards and timeline for implementation

“(1) Within one month of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations require those appointed as decision-makers to create, publish and update as required open and common standards for access to customer data and business data.

(2) Standards created by virtue of subsection (1) must be interoperable with those created as a consequence of Part 2 of the Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017, made by the Competition and Markets Authority.

(3) Regulations under section 66 and 68 must ensure interoperability of customer data and business data with standards created by virtue of subsection (1).

(4) Within one month of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a list of the sectors to which regulations under section 66 and section 68 will apply within three years of the passage of the Act, and the date by which those regulations will take effect in each case.”

This new clause, which is intended to be placed in Part 3 (Customer data and business data) of the Bill, would require interoperability across all sectors of the economy in smart data standards, including the Open Banking standards already in effect, and the publication of a timeline for implementation.

New clause 3—Provision about representation of data subjects

“(1) Section 190 of the Data Protection Act 2018 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), leave out “After the report under section 189(1) is laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State may” and insert “The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passage of the Data Protection and Digital Information Act 2024,”.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to exercise powers under s190 DPA2018 to allow organisations to raise data breach complaints on behalf of data subjects generally, in the absence of a particular subject who wishes to bring forward a claim about misuse of their own personal data.

New clause 4—Review of notification of changes of circumstances legislation

“(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review of the operation of the Social Security (Notification of Changes of Circumstances) Regulations 2010.

(2) In conducting the review, the designated reviewer must—

(a) consider the current operation and effectiveness of the legislation;

(b) identify any gaps in its operation and provisions;

(c) consider and publish recommendations as to how the scope of the legislation could be expanded to include non-public sector, voluntary and private sector holders of personal data.

(3) In undertaking the review, the reviewer must consult—

(a) specialists in data sharing;

(b) people and organisations who campaign for the interests of people affected by the legislation;

(c) people and organisations who use the legislation;

(d) any other persons and organisations the review considers appropriate.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before each House of Parliament within six months of this Act coming into force.”

This new clause requires a review of the operation of the “Tell Us Once” programme, which seeks to provide simpler mechanisms for citizens to pass information regarding births and deaths to government, and consideration of whether the progress of “Tell Us Once” could be extended to non-public sector holders of data.

New clause 5—Definition of “biometric data”

“Article 9 of the UK GDPR is amended by the omission, in paragraph 1, of the words “for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person”.”

This new clause would amend the UK General Data Protection Regulation to extend the protections currently in place for biometric data for identification to include biometric data for the purpose of classification.

New clause 43—Right to use non-digital verification services

“(1) This section applies when an organisation—

(a) requires an individual to use a verification service, and

(b) uses a digital verification service for that purpose.

(2) The organisation—

(a) must make a non-digital alternative method of verification available to any individual required to use a verification service, and

(b) must provide information about digital and non-digital methods of verification to those individuals before verification is required.”

This new clause, which is intended for insertion into Part 2 of the Bill (Digital verification services), creates the right for data subjects to use non-digital identity verification services as an alternative to digital verification services, thereby preventing digital verification from becoming mandatory in certain settings.

New clause 44—Transfer of functions to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office

“The functions of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner are transferred to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.”

New clause 45—Interoperability of data and collection of comparable healthcare statistics across the UK

“(1) The Health and Social Care Act 2012 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 250, insert the following section—

“250A Interoperability of data and collection of comparable healthcare statistics across the UK

(1) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish an information standard specifying binding data interoperability requirements which apply across the whole of the United Kingdom.

(2) An information standard prepared and published under this section—

(a) must include guidance about the implementation of the standard;

(b) may apply to any public body which exercises functions in connection with the provision of health services anywhere in the United Kingdom.

(3) A public body to which an information standard prepared and published under this section applies must have regard to the standard.

(4) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament each year on progress on the implementation of an information standard prepared in accordance with this section.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

“health services” has the same meaning as in section 250 of this Act, except that for “in England” there is substituted “anywhere in the United Kingdom”, and “the health service” in parts of the United Kingdom other than England has the meaning given by the relevant statute of that part of the United Kingdom;

“public body” has the same meaning as in section 250 of this Act.”

(3) In section 254 (Powers to direct NHS England to establish information systems), after subsection (2), insert—

“(2A) The Secretary of State must give a direction under subsection (1) directing NHS England to collect and publish information about healthcare performance and outcomes in all parts of the United Kingdom in a way which enables comparison between different parts of the United Kingdom.

(2B) Before giving a direction by virtue of subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the bodies responsible for the collection and publication of official statistics in each part of the United Kingdom,

(b) Scottish Ministers,

(c) Welsh Ministers, and

(d) Northern Ireland departments.

(2C) The Secretary of State may not give a direction by virtue of subsection (2A) unless a copy of the direction has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, both Houses of Parliament.

(2D) Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers and Northern Ireland departments must arrange for the information relating to the health services for which they have responsibility described in the direction given by virtue of subsection (2A) to be made available to NHS England in accordance with the direction.

(2E) For the purposes of a direction given by virtue of subsection (2A), the definition of “health and social care body” given in section 259(11) applies as if for “England” there were substituted “the United Kingdom”.””

New clause 46—Assessment of impact of Act on EU adequacy

“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out an assessment of the impact of the Act on EU adequacy, and lay a report of that assessment before both Houses of Parliament.

(2) The report must assess the impact on—

(a) data risk, and

(b) small and medium-sized businesses.

(3) The report must quantify the impact of the Act in financial terms.”

New clause 47—Review of the impact of the Act on anonymisation and the identifiability of data subjects

“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament the report of an assessment of the impact of the measures in the Act on anonymisation and the identifiability of data subjects.

(2) The report must include a comparison between the rights afforded to data subjects under this Act with those afforded to data subjects by the EU General Data Protection Regulation.”

Amendment 278, in clause 5, page 6, line 15, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c).

This amendment and Amendment 279 would remove the power for the Secretary of State to create pre-defined and pre-authorised “recognised legitimate interests”, for data processing. Instead, the current test would continue to apply in which personal data can only be processed in pursuit of a legitimate interest, as balanced with individual rights and freedoms.

Amendment 279, page 6, line 23, leave out subsections (4), (5) and (6).

See explanatory statement to Amendment 278.

Amendment 230, page 7, leave out lines 1 and 2 and insert—

“8. The Secretary of State may not make regulations under paragraph 6 unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before both Houses of Parliament for the 60-day period.

8A. The Secretary of State must consider any representations made during the 60-day period in respect of anything in the draft regulations laid under paragraph 8.

8B. If, after the end of the 60-day period, the Secretary of State wishes to proceed to make the regulations, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a draft of the regulations (incorporating any changes the Secretary of State considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 8A).

8C. Draft regulations laid under paragraph 8B must, before the end of the 40-day period, have been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

8D. In this Article—

“the 40-day period” means the period of 40 days beginning on the day on which the draft regulations mentioned in paragraph 8 are laid before Parliament (or, if it is not laid before each House of Parliament on the same day, the later of the days on which it is laid);

“the 60-day period” means the period of 60 days beginning on the day on which the draft regulations mentioned in paragraph 8B are laid before Parliament (or, if it is not laid before each House of Parliament on the same day, the later of the days on which it is laid).

8E. When calculating the 40-day period or the 60-day period for the purposes of paragraph 8D, ignore any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than 4 days.”

This amendment would make regulations made in respect of recognised legitimate interest subject to a super-affirmative Parliamentary procedure.

Amendment 11, page 7, line 12, at end insert—

““internal administrative purposes” , in relation to special category data, means the conditions set out for lawful processing in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act 2018.”

This amendment clarifies that the processing of special category data in employment must follow established principles for reasonable processing, as defined by paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act 2018.

Government amendment 252.

Amendment 222, page 10, line 8, leave out clause 8.

Amendment 3, in clause 8, page 10, leave out line 31.

This amendment would mean that the resources available to the controller could not be taken into account when determining whether a request is vexatious or excessive.

Amendment 2, page 11, line 34, at end insert—

“(6A) When informing the data subject of the reasons for not taking action on the request in accordance with subsection (6), the controller must provide evidence of why the request has been treated as vexatious or excessive.”

This amendment would require the data controller to provide evidence of why a request has been considered vexatious or excessive if the controller is refusing to take action on the request.

Government amendment 17.

Amendment 223, page 15, line 22, leave out clause 10.

Amendment 224, page 18, line 7, leave out clause 12.

Amendment 236, in clause 12, page 18, line 21, at end insert—

“(c) a data subject is an identified or identifiable individual who is affected by a significant decision, irrespective of the direct presence of their personal data in the decision-making process.”

This amendment would clarify that a “data subject” includes identifiable individuals who are subject to data-based and automated decision-making, whether or not their personal data is directly present in the decision-making process.

Amendment 232, page 19, line 12, leave out “solely” and insert “predominantly”.

This amendment would mean safeguards for data subjects’ rights, freedoms and legitimate interests would have to be in place in cases where a significant decision in relation to a data subject was taken based predominantly, rather than solely, on automated processing.

Amendment 5, page 19, line 12, after “solely” insert “or partly”.

This amendment would mean that the protections provided for by the new Article 22C would apply where a decision is based either solely or partly on automated processing, not only where it is based solely on such processing.

Amendment 233, page 19, line 18, at end insert

“including the reasons for the processing.”

This amendment would require data controllers to provide the data subject with the reasons for the processing of their data in cases where a significant decision in relation to a data subject was taken based on automated processing.

Amendment 225, page 19, line 18, at end insert—

“(aa) require the controller to inform the data subject when a decision described in paragraph 1 has been taken in relation to the data subject;”.

Amendment 221, page 20, line 3, at end insert—

“7. When exercising the power to make regulations under this Article, the Secretary

of State must have regard to the following statement of principles:

Digital information principles at work

1. People should have access to a fair, inclusive and trustworthy digital environment

at work.

2. Algorithmic systems should be designed and used to achieve better outcomes:

to make work better, not worse, and not for surveillance. Workers and their

representatives should be involved in this process.

3. People should be protected from unsafe, unaccountable and ineffective

algorithmic systems at work. Impacts on individuals and groups must be assessed

in advance and monitored, with reasonable and proportionate steps taken.

4. Algorithmic systems should not harm workers’ mental or physical health, or

integrity.

5. Workers and their representatives should always know when an algorithmic

system is being used, how and why it is being used, and what impacts it may

have on them or their work.

6. Workers and their representatives should be involved in meaningful consultation

before and during use of an algorithmic system that may significantly impact

work or people.

7. Workers should have control over their own data and digital information collected

about them at work.

8. Workers and their representatives should always have an opportunity for human

contact, review and redress when an algorithmic system is used at work where

it may significantly impact work or people. This includes a right to a written

explanation when a decision is made.

9. Workers and their representatives should be able to use their data and digital

technologies for contact and association to improve work quality and conditions.

10. Workers should be supported to build the information, literacy and skills needed

to fulfil their capabilities through work transitions.”

This amendment would insert into new Article 22D of the UK GDPR a requirement for the Secretary of State to have regard to the statement of digital information principles at work when making regulations about automated decision-making.

Amendment 4, in clause 15, page 25, line 4, at end insert

“(including in the cases specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of paragraph 3 of Article 35)”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 1, would provide a definition of what constitutes “high risk processing” for the purposes of applying Articles 27A, 27B and 27C, which require data controllers to designate, and specify the duties of, a “senior responsible individual” with responsibility for such processing.

Government amendments 18 to 44.

Amendment 12, in page 32, line 7, leave out clause 17.

This amendment keeps the current requirement on police in the Data Protection Act 2018 to justify why they have accessed an individual’s personal data.

Amendment 1, in clause 18, page 32, line 18, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—

“(c) omit paragraph 2,

(ca) in paragraph 3—

(i) for “data protection” substitute “high risk processing”,

(ii) in sub-paragraph (a), for “natural persons” substitute “individuals”,

(iii) in sub-paragraph (a) for “natural person” substitute “individual” in both places where it occurs,

(cb) omit paragraphs 4 and 5,”.

This amendment would leave paragraph 3 of Article 35 of the UK GDPR in place (with amendments reflecting amendments made by the Bill elsewhere in the Article), thereby ensuring that there is a definition of “high risk processing” on the face of the Regulation.

Amendment 226, page 39, line 38, leave out clause 26.

Amendment 227, page 43, line 2, leave out clause 27.

Amendment 228, page 46, line 32, leave out clause 28.

Government amendment 45.

Amendment 235, page 57, line 29, leave out clause 34.

This amendment would leave in place the existing regime, which refers to “manifestly unfounded” or excessive requests to the Information Commissioner, rather than the proposed change to “vexatious” or excessive requests.

Government amendments 46 and 47.

Amendment 237, in clause 48, page 77, line 4, leave out “individual” and insert “person”.

This amendment and Amendments 238 to 240 are intended to enable the digital verification services covered by the Bill to include verification of organisations as well as individuals.

Amendment 238, page 77, line 5, leave out “individual” and insert “person”.

See explanatory statement to Amendment 237.

Amendment 239, page 77, line 6, leave out “individual” and insert “person”.

See explanatory statement to Amendment 237.

Amendment 240, page 77, line 7, leave out “individual” and insert “person”.

See explanatory statement to Amendment 237.

Amendment 241, page 77, line 8, at end insert (on new line)—

“and the facts which may be so ascertained, verified or confirmed may include the fact that an individual has a claimed connection with a legal person.”

This amendment would ensure that the verification services covered by the Bill will include verification that an individual has a claimed connection with a legal person.

Government amendments 48 to 50.

Amendment 280, in clause 49, page 77, line 13, at end insert—

“(2A) The DVS trust framework must include a description of how the provision of digital verification services is expected to uphold the Identity Assurance Principles.

(2B) Schedule (Identity Assurance Principles) describes each Identity Assurance Principle and its effect.”

Amendment 281, page 77, line 13, at end insert—

“(2A) The DVS trust framework must allow valid attributes to be protected by zero-knowledge proof and other decentralised technologies, without restriction upon how and by whom those proofs may be held or processed.”

Government amendments 51 to 66.

Amendment 248, in clause 52, page 79, line 7, at end insert—

“(1A) A determination under subsection (1) may specify an amount which is tiered to the size of the person and its role as specified in the DVS trust framework.”

This amendment would enable fees for application for registration in the DVS register to be determined on the basis of the size and role of the organisation applying to be registered.

Amendment 243, page 79, line 8, after “may”, insert “not”.

This amendment would provide that the fee for application for registration in the DVS register could not exceed the administrative costs of determining the application.

Government amendment 67.

Amendment 244, page 79, line 13, after “may”, insert “not”.

This amendment would provide that the fee for continued registration in the DVS register could not exceed the administrative costs of that registration.

Government amendment 68.

Amendment 245, page 79, line 21, at end insert—

“(10) The fees payable under this section must be reviewed every two years by the National Audit Office.”

This amendment would provide that the fees payable for DVS registration must be reviewed every two years by the NAO.

Government amendments 69 to 77.

Amendment 247, in clause 54, page 80, line 38, after “person”, insert “or by other parties”.

This amendment would enable others, for example independent experts, to make representations about a decision to remove a person from the DVS register, as well as the person themselves.

Amendment 246, page 81, line 7, at end insert—

“(11) The Secretary of State may not exercise the power granted by subsection (1) until the Secretary of State has consulted on proposals for how a decision to remove a person from the DVS register will be reached, including—

(a) how information will be collected from persons impacted by a decision to remove the person from the register, and from others;

(b) how complaints will be managed;

(c) how evidence will be reviewed;

(d) what the burden of proof will be on which a decision will be based.”

This amendment would provide that the power to remove a person from the DVS register could not be exercised until the Secretary of State had consulted on the detail of how a decision to remove would be reached.

Government amendments 78 to 80.

Amendment 249, in clause 62, page 86, line 17, at end insert—

“(3A) A notice under this section must give the recipient of the notice an opportunity to consult the Secretary of State on the content of the notice before providing the information required by the notice.”

This amendment would provide an option for consultation between the Secretary of State and the recipient of an information notice before the information required by the notice has to be provided.

Government amendment 81.

Amendment 242, in clause 63, page 87, line 21, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make arrangements for a person to exercise the Secretary of State’s functions under this Part of the Bill, so that an independent regulator would perform the relevant functions and not the Secretary of State.

Amendment 250, in clause 64, page 87, line 34, at end insert—

“(1A) A report under subsection (1) must include a report on any arrangements made under section 63 for a third party to exercise functions under this Part.”

This amendment would require information about arrangements for a third party to exercise functions under this Part of the Bill to be included in the annual reports on the operation of the Part.

Government amendments 82 to 196.

Amendment 6, in clause 83, page 107, leave out from line 26 to the end of line 34 on page 108.

This amendment would leave out the proposed new regulation 6B of the PEC Regulations, which would enable consent to be given, or an objection to be made, to cookies automatically.

Amendment 217, page 109, line 20, leave out clause 86.

This amendment would leave out the clause which would enable the sending of direct marketing electronic mail on a “soft opt-in” basis.

Amendment 218, page 110, line 1, leave out clause 87.

This amendment would remove the clause which would enable direct marketing for the purposes of democratic engagement. See also Amendment 220.

Government amendments 253 to 255.

Amendment 219, page 111, line 6, leave out clause 88.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 218.

Government amendments 256 to 265.

Amendment 7, in clause 89, page 114, line 12, at end insert—

“(2A) A provider of a public electronic communications service or network is not required to intercept or examine the content of any communication in order to comply with their duty under this regulation.”

This amendment would clarify that a public electronic communications service or network is not required to intercept or examine the content of any communication in order to comply with their duty to notify the Commissioner of unlawful direct marketing.

Amendment 8, page 117, line 3, at end insert—

“(5) In regulation 1—

(a) at the start, insert “(1)”;

(b) after “shall”, insert “save for regulation 26A”;

(c) at end, insert—

“(2) Regulation 26A comes into force six months after the Commissioner has published guidance under regulation 26C (Guidance in relation to regulation 26A).””

This amendment would provide for the new regulation 26A, Duty to notify Commissioner of unlawful direct marketing, not to come into force until six months after the Commissioner has published guidance in relation to that duty.

Government amendment 197.

Amendment 251, in clause 101, page 127, line 3, leave out “and deaths” and insert “, deaths and deed polls”.

This amendment would require deed poll information to be kept to the same standard as records of births and deaths.

Amendment 9, page 127, line 24, at end insert—

“(2A) After section 25, insert—

“25A Review of form in which registers are to be kept

(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review of the provisions of this Act and of related legislation, with a view to the creation of a single digital register of births and deaths.

(2) The review must consider and make recommendations on the effect of the creation of a single digital register on—

(a) fraud,

(b) data collection, and

(c) ease of registration.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before each House of Parliament within six months of this section coming into force.””

This amendment would insert a new section into the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 requiring a review of relevant legislation, with consideration of creating a single digital register for registered births and registered deaths and recommendations on the effects of such a change on reducing fraud, improving data collection and streamlining digital registration.

Government amendment 198.

Amendment 229, in clause 112, page 135, line 8, leave out subsections (2) and (3).

Amendment 10, in clause 113, page 136, line 35, leave out

“which allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual”.

This amendment would amend the definition of “biometric data” for the purpose of the oversight of law enforcement biometrics databases so as to extend the protections currently in place for biometric data for identification to include biometric data for the purpose of classification.

Government amendments 199 to 207.

Government new schedule 1—Power to require information for social security purposes.

Government new schedule 2—National Underground Asset Register: monetary penalties.

New schedule 3—Identity Assurance Principles

“Part 1

Definitions

1 These Principles are limited to the processing of Identity Assurance Data (IdA Data) in an Identity Assurance Service (e.g. establishing and verifying identity of a Service User; conducting a transaction that uses a user identity; maintaining audit requirements in relation a transaction associated with the use of a service that needs identity verification etc.). They do not cover, for example, any data used to deliver a service, or to measure its quality.

2 In the context of the application of the Identity Assurance Principles to an Identity Assurance Service, “Identity Assurance Data” (“IdA Data”) means any recorded information that is connected with a “Service User” including—

“Audit Data.” This includes any recorded information that is connected with any log or audit associated with an Identity Assurance Service.

“General Data.” This means any other recorded information which is not personal data, audit data or relationship data, but is still connected with a “Service User”.

“Personal Data.” This takes its meaning from the Data Protection Act 2018 or subsequent legislation (e.g. any recorded information that relates to a “Service User” who is also an identified or identifiable living individual).

“Relationship Data.” This means any recorded information that describes (or infers) a relationship between a “Service User”, “Identity Provider” or “Service Provider” with another “Service User”, “Identity Provider” or “Service Provider” and includes any cookie or program whose purpose is to supply a means through which relationship data are collected.

3 Other terms used in relation to the Principles are defined as follows—

“save-line2Identity Assurance Service.” This includes relevant applications of the technology (e.g. hardware, software, database, documentation) in the possession or control of any “Service User”, “Identity Provider” or “Service Provider” that is used to facilitate identity assurance activities; it also includes any IdA Data processed by that technology or by an Identity Provider or by a Service Provider in the context of the Service; and any IdA Data processed by the underlying infrastructure for the purpose of delivering the IdA service or associated billing, management, audit and fraud prevention.

“Identity Provider.” This means the certified individual or certified organisation that provides an Identity Assurance Service (e.g. establishing an identity, verification of identity); it includes any agent of a certified Identity Provider that processes IdA data in connection with that Identity Assurance Service.

“Participant.” This means any “Identity Provider”, “Service Provider” or “Service User” in an Identity Assurance Service. A “Participant” includes any agent by definition.

“Processing.” In the context of IdA data means “collecting, using, disclosing, retaining, transmitting, copying, comparing, corroborating, correlating, aggregating, accessing” the data and includes any other operation performed on IdA data.

“Provider.” Includes both “Identity Provider” and/or “Service Provider”.

“Service Provider.” This means the certified individual or certified organisation that provides a service that uses an Identity Provider in order to verify identity of the Service User; it includes any agent of the Service Provider that processes IdA data from an Identity Assurance Service.

“Service User.” This means the person (i.e. an organisation (incorporated or not)) or an individual (dead or alive) who has established (or is establishing) an identity with an Identity Provider; it includes an agent (e.g. a solicitor, family member) who acts on behalf of a Service User with proper authority (e.g. a public guardian, or a Director of a company, or someone who possesses power of attorney). The person may be living or deceased (the identity may still need to be used once its owner is dead, for example by an executor).

“Third Party.” This means any person (i.e. any organisation or individual) who is not a “Participant” (e.g. the police or a Regulator).

Part 2

The Nine Identity Assurance Principles

Any exemptions from these Principles must be specified via the “Exceptional Circumstances Principle”. (See Principle 9).

1 User Control Principle

Statement of Principle: “I can exercise control over identity assurance activities affecting me and these can only take place if I consent or approve them.”

1.1 An Identity Provider or Service Provider must ensure any collection, use or disclosure of IdA data in, or from, an Identity Assurance Service is approved by each particular Service User who is connected with the IdA data.

1.2 There should be no compulsion to use the Identity Assurance Service and Service Providers should offer alternative mechanisms to access their services. Failing to do so would undermine the consensual nature of the service.

2 Transparency Principle

Statement of Principle: “Identity assurance can only take place in ways I understand and when I am fully informed.”

2.1 Each Identity Provider or Service Provider must be able to justify to Service Users why their IdA data are processed. Ensuring transparency of activity and effective oversight through auditing and other activities inspires public trust and confidence in how their details are used.

2.2 Each Service User must be offered a clear description about the processing of IdA data in advance of any processing. Identity Providers must be transparent with users about their particular models for service provision.

2.3 The information provided includes a clear explanation of why any specific information has to be provided by the Service User (e.g. in order that a particular level of identity assurance can be obtained) and identifies any obligation on the part of the Service User (e.g. in relation to the User’s role in securing his/her own identity information).

2.4 The Service User will be able to identify which Service Provider they are using at any given time.

2.5 Any subsequent and significant change to the processing arrangements that have been previously described to a Service User requires the prior consent or approval of that Service User before it comes into effect.

2.6 All procedures, including those involved with security, should be made publicly available at the appropriate time, unless such transparency presents a security or privacy risk. For example, the standards of encryption can be identified without jeopardy to the encryption keys being used.

3 Multiplicity Principle

Statement of Principle: “I can use and choose as many different identifiers or identity providers as I want to.”

3.1 A Service User is free to use any number of identifiers that each uniquely identifies the individual or business concerned.

3.2 A Service User can use any of his identities established with an Identity Provider with any Service Provider.

3.3 A Service User shall not be obliged to use any Identity Provider or Service Provider not chosen by that Service User; however, a Service Provider can require the Service User to provide a specific level of Identity Assurance, appropriate to the Service User’s request to a Service Provider.

3.4 A Service User can choose any number of Identity Providers and where possible can choose between Service Providers in order to meet his or her diverse needs. Where a Service User chooses to register with more than one Identity Provider, Identity Providers and Service Providers must not link the Service User’s different accounts or gain information about their use of other Providers.

3.5 A Service User can terminate, suspend or change Identity Provider and where possible can choose between Service Providers at any time.

3.6 A Service Provider does not know the identity of the Identity Provider used by a Service User to verify an identity in relation to a specific service. The Service Provider knows that the Identity Provider can be trusted because the Identity Provider has been certified, as set out in GPG43 – Requirements for Secure Delivery of Online Public Services (RSDOPS).

4 Data Minimisation Principle

Statement of Principle: “My interactions only use the minimum data necessary to meet my needs.”

4.1 Identity Assurance should only be used where a need has been established and only to the appropriate minimum level of assurance.

4.2 Identity Assurance data processed by an Identity Provider or a Service Provider to facilitate a request of a Service User must be the minimum necessary in order to fulfil that request in a secure and auditable manner.

4.3 When a Service User stops using a particular Identity Provider, their data should be deleted. Data should be retained only where required for specific targeted fraud, security or other criminal investigation purposes.

5 Data Quality Principle

Statement of Principle: “My interactions only use the minimum data necessary to meet my needs.”

5.1 Service Providers should enable Service Users (or authorised persons, such as the holder of a Power of Attorney) to be able to update their own personal data, at a time at their choosing, free of charge and in a simple and easy manner.

5.2 Identity Providers and Service Providers must take account of the appropriate level of identity assurance required before allowing any updating of personal data.

6 Service User Access and Portability Principle

Statement of Principle: “I have to be provided with copies of all of my data on request; I can move/remove my data whenever I want.”

6.1 Each Identity Provider or Service Provider must allow, promptly, on request and free of charge, each Service User access to any IdA data that relates to that Service User.

6.2 It shall be unlawful to make it a condition of doing anything in relation to a Service User to request or require that Service User to request IdA data.

6.3 The Service User must be able to require an Identity Provider to transfer his personal data, to a second Identity Provider in a standard electronic format, free of charge and without impediment or delay.

7 Certification Principle

Statement of Principle: “I can have confidence in the Identity Assurance Service because all the participants have to be certified against common governance requirements.”

7.1 As a baseline control, all Identity Providers and Service Providers will be certified against a shared standard. This is one important way of building trust and confidence in the service.

7.2 As part of the certification process, Identity Providers and Service Providers are obliged to co-operate with the independent Third Party and accept their impartial determination and to ensure that contractual arrangements—

• reinforce the application of the Identity Assurance Principles

• contain a reference to the independent Third Party as a mechanism for dispute resolution.

7.3 In the context of personal data, certification procedures include the use of Privacy Impact Assessments, Security Risk Assessments, Privacy by Design concepts and, in the context of information security, a commitment to using appropriate technical measures (e.g. encryption) and ever improving security management. Wherever possible, such certification processes and security procedures reliant on technical devices should be made publicly available at the appropriate time.

7.4 All Identity Providers and Service Providers will take all reasonable steps to ensure that a Third Party cannot capture IdA data that confirms (or infers) the existence of relationship between any Participant. No relationships between parties or records should be established without the consent of the Service User.

7.5 Certification can be revoked if there is significant non-compliance with any Identity Assurance Principle.

8 Dispute Resolution Principle

Statement of Principle: “If I have a dispute, I can go to an independent Third Party for a resolution.”

8.1 A Service User who, after a reasonable time, cannot, or is unable, to resolve a complaint or problem directly with an Identity Provider or Service Provider can call upon an independent Third Party to seek resolution of the issue. This could happen for example where there is a disagreement between the Service User and the Identity Provider about the accuracy of data.

8.2 The independent Third Party can resolve the same or similar complaints affecting a group of Service Users.

8.3 The independent Third Party can co-operate with other regulators in order to resolve problems and can raise relevant issues of importance concerning the Identity Assurance Service.

8.4 An adjudication/recommendation of the independent Third Party should be published. The independent Third Party must operate transparently, but detailed case histories should only be published subject to appropriate review and consent.

8.5 There can be more than one independent Third Party.

8.6 The independent Third Party can recommend changes to standards or certification procedures or that an Identity Provider or Service Provider should lose their certification.

9 Exceptional Circumstances Principle

Statement of Principle: “Any exception has to be approved by Parliament and is subject to independent scrutiny.”

9.1 Any exemption from the application of any of the above Principles to IdA data shall only be lawful if it is linked to a statutory framework that legitimises all Identity Assurance Services, or an Identity Assurance Service in the context of a specific service. In the absence of such a legal framework then alternative measures must be taken to ensure, transparency, scrutiny and accountability for any exceptions.

9.2 Any exemption from the application of any of the above Principles that relates to the processing of personal data must also be necessary and justifiable in terms of one of the criteria in Article 8(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights: namely in the interests of national security; public safety or the economic well-being of the country; for the prevention of disorder or crime; for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

9.3 Any subsequent processing of personal data by any Third Party who has obtained such data in exceptional circumstances (as identified by Article 8(2) above) must be the minimum necessary to achieve that (or another) exceptional circumstance.

9.4 Any exceptional circumstance involving the processing of personal data must be subject to a Privacy Impact Assessment by all relevant “data controllers” (where “data controller” takes its meaning from the Data Protection Act).

9.5 Any exemption from the application of any of the above Principles in relation to IdA data shall remain subject to the Dispute Resolution Principle.”

Amendment 220, in schedule 1, page 141, leave out from line 21 to the end of line 36 on page 144.

This amendment would remove from the new Annex 1 of the UK GDPR provisions which would enable direct marketing for the purposes of democratic engagement. See also Amendment 218.

Government amendments 266 to 277.

Government amendments 208 to 211.

Amendment 15, in schedule 5, page 154, line 2, at end insert—

“(g) the views of the Information Commission on suitability of international transfer of data to the country or organisation.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to seek the views of the Information Commission on whether a country or organisation has met the data protection test for international data transfer.

Amendment 14, page 154, line 25, at end insert—

“5. In relation to special category data, the Information Commissioner must assess whether the data protection test is met for data transfer to a third country or international organisation.”

This amendment requires the Information Commission to assess suitability for international transfer of special category data to a third country or international organisation.

Amendment 13, page 154, line 30, leave out “ongoing” and insert “annual”.

This amendment mandates that a country’s suitability for international transfer of data is monitored on an annual basis.

Amendment 16, in schedule 6, page 162, line 36, at end insert—

“(g) the views of the Information Commission on suitability of international transfer of data to the country or organisation.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to seek the views of the Information Commission on whether a country or organisation has met the data protection test for international data transfer in relation to law enforcement processing.

Government amendment 212.

Amendment 231, in schedule 13, page 202, line 33, at end insert—

“(2A) A person may not be appointed under sub-paragraph (2) unless the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee of the House of Commons has endorsed the proposed appointment.”

This amendment would ensure that non-executive members of the Information Commission may not be appointed unless the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has endorsed the Secretary of State’s proposed appointee.

Government amendments 213 to 216.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The current one-size-fits-all, top-down approach to data protection that we inherited from the European Union has led to public confusion, which has impeded the effective use of personal data to drive growth and competition, and to support key innovations. The Bill seizes on a post-Brexit opportunity to build on our existing foundations and create an innovative, flexible and risk-based data protection regime. This bespoke model will unlock the immense possibilities of data use to improve the lives of everyone in the UK, and help make the UK the most innovative society in the world through science and technology.

I want to make it absolutely clear that the Bill will continue to maintain the highest standards of data protection that the British people rightly expect, but it will also help those who use our data to make our lives healthier, safer and more prosperous. That is because we have convened industry leaders and experts to co-design the Bill at every step of the way. We have held numerous roundtables with both industry experts in the field and campaigning groups. The outcome, I believe, is that the legislation will ensure our regulation reflects the way real people live their lives and run their businesses.

Layla Moran Portrait Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way so early. Oxford West and Abingdon has a huge number of spin-offs and scientific businesses that have expressed concern that any material deviation on standards, particularly European Union data adequacy, would entangle them in more red tape, rather than remove it. He says he has spoken to industry leaders. Have he and his Department assessed the risk of any deviation? Is there any associated cost to businesses from any potential deviation? Who is going to bear that cost?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I share the hon. Lady’s appreciation of the importance of data adequacy with the European Union. It is not the case that we have to replicate every aspect of GDPR to be assessed as adequate by the European Union for the purposes of data exchange. Indeed, a number of other countries have data adequacy, even though they do not have precisely the same framework of data protection legislation.

In drawing up the measures in the Bill, we have been very clear that we do not wish to put data adequacy at risk, and we are confident that nothing in the Bill does so. That is not only my view; it is the view of the expert witnesses who gave evidence in Committee. It is also the view of the Information Commissioner, who has been closely involved in all the measures before us today. I recognise the concern, but I do not believe it has any grounds.

Layla Moran Portrait Layla Moran
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister says, “We do not wish”. Is that a guarantee from the Dispatch Box that there will be absolutely no deviation that causes a material difference for businesses on EU data adequacy? Can he give that guarantee?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I can guarantee that there is nothing in the Government’s proposals that we believe puts data adequacy at risk. That is not just our view; it is the view of all those we have consulted, including the Information Commissioner. He was previously the information commissioner in New Zealand, which has its own data protection laws but is, nevertheless, recognised as adequate by the EU. He is very familiar with the process required to achieve and keep data adequacy, and it is his view, as well as ours, that the Bill achieves that objective.

We believe the Government amendments will strengthen the fundamental elements of the Bill and reflect the Government’s commitment to unleashing the power of data across our economy and society. I have already thanked all the external stakeholders who have worked with us to ensure that the Bill functions at its best. Taken together, we believe these amendments will benefit the economy by £10.6 billion over the next 10 years. That is more than double the estimated impact of the Bill when it was introduced in the spring.

Dawn Butler Portrait Dawn Butler (Brent Central) (Lab)
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Will the Minister confirm that no services will rely on digital identity checks?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will come on to that, because we have tabled a few amendments on digital verification and the accreditation of digital identity.

We are proposing a voluntary framework. We believe that using digital identity has many advantages, and those will become greater as the technology improves, but there is no compulsory or mandatory element to the use of digital identity. I understand why the hon. Lady raises that point, and I am happy to give her that assurance.

Jeremy Wright Portrait Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Before my right hon. Friend moves on to the specifics of the Government amendments, may I ask him about something they do not yet cover? The Bill does not address the availability of data to researchers so that they can assist in the process of, for example, identifying patterns in online safety. He will know that there was considerable discussion of this during the passage of the Online Safety Act 2023, when a succession of Ministers said that we might return to the subject in this Bill. Will he update the House on how that is going? When might we expect to see amendments to deal with this important area?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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It is true that we do not have Government amendments to that effect, but it is a central part of the Bill that we have already debated in Committee. Making data more available to researchers is, indeed, an objective of the Bill, and I share my right hon. and learned Friend’s view that it will produce great value. If he thinks more needs to be done in specific areas, I would be very happy to talk to him further or to respond in writing.

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Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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Broadly speaking, we support this measure. What negotiations and discussions has the Minister had about red notices under Interpol and the abuse of them, for instance by the Russian state? We have concerns about decent people being maltreated by the Russian state through the use of red notices. Are those concerns conflicted by the measure that the Government are introducing?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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As the hon. Gentleman knows, I strongly share his view about the need to act against abuse of legal procedures by the Russian state. As he will appreciate, this aspect of the Bill emanated from the Home Office. However, I have no doubt that my colleagues in the Home Office will have heard the perfectly valid point he makes. I hope that they will be able to provide him with further information about it, and I will draw the matter to their attention.

I wish to say just a few more words about the biometric material received from our international partners, as a tool in protecting the public from harm. Sometimes, counter-terrorism police receive biometrics from international partners with identifiable information. Under current laws, they are not allowed to retain these biometrics unless they were taken in the past three years. That can make it harder for our counter-terrorism police to carry out their job effectively. That is why we are making changes to allow the police to take proactive steps to pseudonymise biometric data received from international partners—obviously, that means holding the material without including information that identifies the person—and hold indefinitely under existing provisions in the Counter-Terrorism Act information that identifies the person it relates to. Again, those changes have been requested by counter-terrorism police and will support them to better protect the British public.

The national underground asset register, or NUAR, is a digital map that will improve both the efficiency and safety of underground works, by providing secure access to privately and publicly owned location data about the pipes and cables beneath our feet. This will underpin the Government’s priority to get the economy growing by expediting projects such as new roads, new houses and broadband roll-out—the hon. Gentleman and I also share a considerable interest in that.

The NUAR will bring together valuable data from more than 700 public and private sector organisations about the location of underground utilities assets. This will deliver £490 million per year of economic growth, through increased efficiency, reduced asset strikes and reduced disruptions for citizens and businesses. Once operational, the running of the register will be funded by those who benefit most. The Government’s amendments include powers to, through regulations, levy charges on apparatus owners and request relevant information. The introduction of reasonable charges payable by those who benefit from the service, rather than the taxpayer, will ensure that the NUAR is a sustainable service for the future. Other amendments will ensure that there is the ability to realise the full potential of this data for other high-value uses, while respecting the rights of asset owners.

Carol Monaghan Portrait Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)
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Is any consideration given to the fact that that information could be used by bad actors? If people are able to find out where particular cables or pipes are, they also have the ability to find weakness in the system, which could have implications for us all.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I understand the hon. Lady’s point. There would need to be a legitimate purpose for accessing such information and I am happy to supply her with further detail about precisely how that works.

The hon. Lady intervenes at an appropriate point, because I was about to say that the provision will allow the National Underground Asset Register service to operate in England and Wales. We intend to bring forward equivalent provisions as the Bill progresses in the other House, subject to the usual agreements, to allow the service to operate in Northern Ireland, but the Scottish Road Works Commissioner currently maintains its own register. It has helped us in the development of the NUAR, so the hon. Lady may like to talk to the Scottish Road Works Commissioner on that point.

I turn to the use of data for the purposes of democratic engagement, which is an issue of considerable interest to Members of the House. The Bill includes provisions to facilitate the responsible use of personal data by elected representatives, registered political parties and others for the purposes of “democratic engagement”. We have tabled further related amendments for consideration today, including adding a fuller definition of what constitutes “democratic engagement activities” to help the reader understand that term wherever it appears in the legislation.

The amendments provide for former MPs to continue to process personal data following a successful recall petition, to enable them to complete urgent casework or hand over casework to a successor, as they do following the Dissolution of Parliament. For consistency, related amendments are made to the definitions used in provisions relating to direct marketing for the purposes of democratic engagement.

Finally, hon. Members may be aware that the Data Protection Act 2018 currently permits registered political parties to process sensitive political opinions data without consent for the purposes of their political activities. The exemption does not however currently apply to elected representatives, candidates, recall petitioners and permitted participants in referendums. The amendment addresses that anomaly and allows those individuals to benefit from the same exemption as registered political parties.

Patrick Grady Portrait Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)
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Is the Minister prepared to look at how the proposals in the Bill and the amendments align with relevant legislation passed in the Scottish Government? A number of framework Bills to govern the operation of potential future referendums on a variety of subjects have been passed, particularly the Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020. It is important that there is alignment with the definitions used in the Bill, such as that for “a permitted participant”. Will he commit to looking at that and, if necessary, make changes to the Bill at a later stage in its progress, in discussion with the Scottish Government?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I am happy to look at that, as the hon. Gentleman suggests. I hope the changes we are making to the Bill will provide greater legal certainty for MPs and others who undertake the processing of personal data for the purposes of democratic engagement.

The Bill starts and ends with reducing burdens on businesses and, above all, on small businesses, which account for over 99% of UK firms. In the future, organisations will need to keep records of their processing activities only when those activities are likely to result in a high risk to individuals. Some organisations have queried whether that means they will have to keep records in relation to all their activities if only some of their processing activities are high risk. That is not the Government’s intention. To maximise the benefits to business and other organisations, the amendments make it absolutely clear that organisations have to keep records only in relation to their high-risk processing activities.

The Online Safety Act 2023 took crucial steps to shield our children, and it is also important that we support grieving families who are seeking answers after tragic events where a child has taken their own life, by removing obstacles to accessing social media information that could be relevant to the coroner’s investigations.

Layla Moran Portrait Layla Moran
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We welcome such measures, but is the Minister aware of the case of Breck Bednar, who was groomed and then murdered? His family is campaigning not just for new clause 35 but for measures that go further. In that case, the coroner would have wanted access to Breck’s online life but, as it currently stands, new clause 35 does not provide what the family needs without a change to widen the scope of the amendment to the Online Safety Act. Will the Minister look at that? I think it will just require a tweak in some of the wording.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I understand the concerns of the hon. Lady. We want to do all that we can to support the bereaved parents of children who have lost their lives. As it stands, the amendment will require Ofcom, following notification from a coroner, to issue information notices to specified providers of online services, requiring them to hold data they may have relating to a deceased child’s use of online services, in circumstances where the coroner suspects the child has taken their own life, which could later be required by a coroner as relevant to an inquest.

We will continue to work with bereaved families and Members of the other place who have raised concerns. During the passage of the Online Safety Act, my noble colleague Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay made it clear that we are aware of the importance of data preservation to bereaved parents, coroners and others involved in investigations. It is very important that we get this right. I hear what the hon. Lady says and give her an assurance that we will continue to work across Government, with the Ministry of Justice and others, in ensuring that we do so.

The hon. Member for Rhondda made reference to proposed new schedule 1, relating to improving our ability to identify and tackle fraud in the welfare system. I am grateful for the support of the Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove). In 2022-23, the Department for Work and Pensions overpaid £8.3 billion in fraud and error. A major area of loss is the under-declaration of financial assets, which we cannot currently tackle through existing powers. Given the need to address the scale of fraud and error in the welfare system, we need to modernise and strengthen the legal framework, to allow the Department for Work and Pensions to keep pace with change and stand up to future fraud challenges.

As I indicated earlier, the fraud plan, published in 2022, contains a provision outlining the DWP’s intention to bring forward new powers that would boost access to data held by third parties. The amendment will enable the DWP to access data held by third parties at scale where the information signals potential fraud or error. That will allow the DWP to detect fraud and error more proactively and protect taxpayers’ money from falling into the hands of fraudsters.

Stephen Timms Portrait Sir Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)
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My reading of the proposed new schedule is that it gives the Department the power to look into the bank accounts of people claiming the state pension. Am I right about that?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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The purpose of the proposed new schedule is narrowly focused. It will ensure that where benefit claimants may also have considerable financial assets, that is flagged with the DWP for further examination, but it does not allow people to go through the contents of people’s bank accounts. It is an alarm system where financial institutions that hold accounts of benefit claimants can match those against financial assets, so where it appears fraud might be taking place, they can refer that to the Department.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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But it does include the state pension, doesn’t it?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I am surprised that the Opposition regard this as something to question. Obviously, they are entitled to seek further information, but I would hope that they share the wish to identify where fraud is taking place and take action against it. This is about claimants of benefits, including universal credit—

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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The state pension will not currently be an area of focus for the use of these powers.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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The House of Commons Library makes it absolutely clear that the Bill, if taken forward in the way that the Government are proposing at the moment, does allow the Government to look at people in receipt of state pensions. That is the case, is it not?

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John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I can tell the hon. Gentleman that it is not the case that the DWP intends to focus on the state pension—and that is confirmed by my hon. Friend the Member for Corby. This is specifically about ensuring that means-related benefit claimants are eligible for the benefits for which they are currently claiming. In doing that, the identification and the avoidance of fraud will save the taxpayer a considerable amount of money.

David Davis Portrait Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
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I think everybody in the House understands the importance of getting this right. We all want to stop fraud in the state system. That being said, this is the only time that I am aware of where the state seeks the right to put people under surveillance without prior suspicion, and therefore such a power has to be restricted very carefully indeed. As we are not going to have time to debate this properly today, is my right hon. Friend open to having further discussion on this issue when the Bill goes to the Lords, so that we can seek further restrictions? I do not mean to undermine the effectiveness of the action; I just want to make it more targeted.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend for his contribution, and I share his principled concern that the powers of the state should be limited to those that are absolutely necessary. Those who are in receipt of benefits funded by the taxpayer have an obligation to meet the terms of those benefits, and this provision is one way of ensuring that they do so. My hon. Friend the Member for Corby has already said that he would be very happy to discuss this matter with my right hon. Friend further, and I am happy to do the same if that is helpful to him.

Stephen Timms Portrait Sir Stephen Timms
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Can the Minister give us an example of the circumstances in which the Department would need to look into the bank accounts of people claiming state pensions in order to tackle the fraud problem? Why is the state pension within the scope of this amendment?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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All I can say to the right hon. Gentleman is that the Government have made it clear that there is no intention to focus on claimants of the state pension. That is an undertaking that has been given. I am sure that Ministers from the DWP would be happy to give further evidence to the right hon. Gentleman, who may well wish to look at this further in his Committee.

Finally, I wish to touch on the framework around smart data, which is contained in part 3 of the Bill. The smart data powers will extend the Government’s ability to introduce smart data schemes, building on the success of open banking, which is the UK’s most developed data sharing scheme, with more than 7 million active users. The amendments will support the Government’s ability to meet their commitment, first, to provide open banking with a long-term regulatory framework, and, secondly, to establish an open data scheme for road fuel prices. It will also more generally strengthen the toolkit available to Government to deliver future smart data schemes.

The amendments ensure that the range of data and activities essential to smart data schemes are better captured and more accurately defined. That includes types of financial data and payment activities that are integral to open banking. The amendments, as I say, are complicated and technical and therefore I will not go into further detail.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I will give way to my hon. Friend as I know that he has taken a particular interest, and is very knowledgeable, in this area.

John Penrose Portrait John Penrose
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The Minister is very kind. I just wanted to pick up on his last point about smart data. He is right to say that the provisions are incredibly important and potentially extremely valuable to the economy. Can he just clarify a couple of points? I want to be clear on Government new clause 27 about interface bodies. Does that apply to the kinds of new data standards that will be required under smart data? If it does, can he please clarify how he will make sure that we do not end up with multiple different standards for each sector of our economy? It is absolutely in everybody’s interests that the standards are interoperable and, to the greatest possible extent, common between sectors so that they can talk to each other?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I do have a note on interface bodies, which I am happy to include for the benefit of my hon. Friend. However, he will be aware that this is a technical and complicated area. If he wants to pursue a further discussion, I would of course be happy to oblige. I can tell him that the amendments will ensure that smart data schemes can replicate and build on the open banking model by allowing the Government to require interface bodies to be set up by members of the scheme. Interface bodies will play a similar role to that of the open banking implementation entity, developing common standards on arrangements for data sharing. Learning from the lessons and successes of the open banking regime, regulations will be able to specify the responsibilities and requirements for interface bodies and ensure appropriate accountability to regulators. I hope that that goes some way to addressing the point that he makes, but I would be happy to discuss it further with him in due course.

I believe these amendments will generally improve the functioning of the Bill and address some specific concerns that I have identified. On that basis, I commend them to the House.

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Roger Gale Portrait Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)
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With the leave of the House, I call the Minister to wind up the debate.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I thank all hon. Members who have contributed to the debate. I believe that these matters are important, if sometimes very complicated and technical. My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr Fysh) was absolutely right to stress how fundamentally important they are, and they will become more so.

I also thank the shadow Minister for identifying the areas where we are in agreement. We had a good Committee stage with his colleague, the hon. Member for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock), where we agreed on the overall objectives of the Bill. It is welcome that the shadow Minister has supported us, particularly on the amendment that we moved this afternoon on the powers of the Information Commissioner’s Office, the provisions relating to digital verification services, and smart data. There were, however, some areas on which we will not agree.

Let me begin by addressing the main amendments that the hon. Gentleman has moved. Amendment 1 relates to high-risk processing. It is the case that one of the main aims of the Bill is to remove some of the UK GDPR’s unnecessary compliance burdens. That is why organisations will be required to designate only senior responsible individuals to carry out risk assessments and keep records of processing when their activities pose high risks to individuals. The amendments that the hon. Gentleman is proposing would reintroduce a prescriptive list of high-risk processing activities drawn from article 35 of the UK GDPR. We find that some of the language in article 35 is unclear and confusing, which is partly why we removed it in the first place. We think organisations should have the ability to make a judgment of risk based on the specific nature, scale and context of their own processing activities. We do not need to provide prescriptive examples of high-risk processing in the legislation, because any list could quickly become out of date. Instead, to help data controllers, clause 18 of the Bill requires the ICO to produce a document with examples of what the commissioner considers to be high-risk processing.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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But the Minister has already indicated that, basically, he will come forward with exactly the same list as is in the legislation that the Government are amending. All that is happening is that, in the Bill, the Information Commissioner will be doing what the Government or the House could be doing, and this is the one area where the Government disagree with the Information Commissioner.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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As I say, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to have a prescriptive list in the Bill. We feel that it is better that individuals make a judgment based on their assessment of the risk, with the guidance of the Information Commissioner.

Moving to the shadow Minister’s second amendment, the Government agree that controllers should not be able to refuse a request without proper thought or consideration. That is why the existing responsibilities of controllers to facilitate requests from data subjects as the default has not changed and why the new article 12A also ensures that the burden of proof for a request meeting the vexatious or excessive threshold remains with the controller. The Government believe that is sufficient, and stipulating that evidence must be provided each time a request is refused may not be appropriate in all circumstances and would likely bring further burdens for controllers. On that basis, we oppose that amendment.

On amendment 5, the safeguards set out in reformed article 22 of the UK GDPR ensure that individuals are able to seek human intervention when significant decisions about them are taken solely through automated means with no meaningful human involvement.

Partly automated decisions already involve meaningful human involvement, so there is no need to extend the safeguards in article 22 to all forms of automated decision making. In such instances, other data protection requirements continue to apply and offer relevant protections to data subjects, as set out in the broader UK data protection regime. Those protections include lawfulness, fairness, transparency and accountability.

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Stephen Timms Portrait Sir Stephen Timms
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My understanding was that the level of fraud among state pension claims was indeed extremely small. The Minister said earlier that the Government should take powers only where they are absolutely necessary; I think he is now saying that they are not necessary in the case of people claiming a state pension. Is he confident that that bit of this power—to look into the bank account of anybody claiming a state pension—is absolutely necessary?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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What I am saying is that the Government’s intention is to use the power only when there is clear evidence or suggestion that fraud is taking place on a significant scale. The Government simply want to retain the option to amend that should future evidence emerge; that is why the issue has been left open.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The trouble is that this is not about amending. The Government describe the relevant benefits in part 5 of proposed new schedule 3B, within new schedule 1, which is clear that pensions are included. The Minister has effectively said at the Dispatch Box that the Government do not need to tackle fraud in relation to pensions; perhaps it would be a good idea for us to all sit down and have a meeting to work out a more sensible set of measures to tackle fraud where it is necessary, rather than giving unending powers to the Government.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I agree, to the extent that levels of fraud in state pensions being currently nearly zero, the power is not needed in that case. However, the Government wish to retain an option should the position change in the future. But I am happy to take the hon. Gentleman up on his request on behalf of my hon. Friend the Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work, with whom he has already engaged. I am sure that the right hon. Member for East Ham will want to examine the issue further in the Work and Pensions Committee, which he chairs. It will undoubtedly also be subject to further discussions in the other place. We are certainly open to further discussion.

The right hon. Member for East Ham also raised the question of commencement. I can tell him that the test and learn phase will begin in 2025, with a steady roll-out to full-scale delivery by 2030. I am sure that he will want to examine these matters further.

The amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) focuses on digital exclusion. The Bill provides for the use of secure and inclusive digital identities across the economy. It does not force businesses or individuals to use them. Individual choice is integral to our approach. As the Bill makes clear, digital verification services can be provided only at the request of the individual. Where people want to use a digital verification service, the Government are committed to ensuring that available products and services are secure and privacy-focused. That is to be achieved through the high standards set out in the trust framework.

The trust framework also outlines how services can improve inclusion, and requires services to publish an annual inclusion monitoring report. There are businesses that operate only in the digital sphere, such as some online banks and energy companies, as I think has been acknowledged. We feel that to oblige them to offer manual document checking would place obligations on businesses that go beyond the Government’s commitment to do only what is necessary to enable the digital market to grow.

On amendment 224 from the Scottish National party, solely automated decision making that produces legal or similarly significant effects on individuals was not entirely prohibited previously under the UK’s data protection legal framework. The rules governing article 22 are confusing and complex, so clause 12 clarifies and simplifies the rules related to solely automated decision making, and will reduce barriers to responsible data use, help to drive innovation, and maintain high standards of data protection. The reforms do not water down any of the protections to data subjects offered under the broader UK data protection regime—that is, UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018.

On the other amendment tabled by the SNP, amendment 229, effective independent oversight of surveillance camera systems is crucial to public trust. The oversight framework is complex and confusing for the police and public because of substantial duplication between the surveillance camera commissioner functions and the code, which covers police and local authorities in England and Wales only, and the ICO and data protection legislation. The Bill addresses that, following public consultation, through abolishing the surveillance camera commissioner and code.

The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Glasgow North would negate that by retaining the code and transferring the surveillance camera commissioner functions to the investigatory powers commissioner. It would also blur the lines between overt and covert surveillance, which the investigatory powers commissioner oversees. Those two types of surveillance have distinct legislation and oversight, mainly because covert surveillance is generally considered to be significantly more intrusive.

On amendment 222, it is important to be clear that the ability to refuse or charge a reasonable fee for a request already exists, and clause 8 does not place new restrictions on reasonable requests from data subjects. The Government believe that it is proportionate to allow controllers to refuse or charge a reasonable fee for vexatious or excessive requests, and a clearer provision enables controllers to focus time and resources on responding to reasonable requests instead.

Amendments 278 and 279, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil, would remove the new lawful ground of recognised legitimate interests, which the Bill will add to article 6 of UK GDPR. Amendment 230 accepts that there is merit in retaining the recognised legitimate interests list, but would make any additions to it subject to a super-affirmative parliamentary procedure. It is true that the Bill removes the need for non-public-sector organisations to do a detailed legitimate interests assessment in relation to a small number of processing activities. Those include activities relating for example to the safeguarding of children, crime prevention and responding to emergencies. We heard from stakeholders that the need to do an assessment and the fear of getting it wrong could sometimes delay or deter those important processing activities from taking place. Future Governments would not be able to add new activities to the list lightly; clause 5 of the Bill already makes it clear that the Secretary of State must carefully consider the rights and interests of people, and in particular the special protection needed for children, before adding anything new to the list. Any new regulations would also need to be approved via the affirmative resolution procedure.

My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil has tabled a large number of other amendments, which are complicated in nature. I have written to him in some detail setting out the Government’s response to each of those, but if he wishes to pursue further any of the points contained therein I would be very happy to have further discussions with him.

I would like to comment on the amendments by several of my colleagues that I wish I was in a position to be able to support. In particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Jane Hunt) has been assiduous in pursuing her point both in the Bill Committee and in this debate. The problem she identifies is without question a very real one, and she set out in some detail how it is massively increasing the burden on the police, which clearly we would wish to reduce wherever possible.

I have had meetings with Home Office Ministers, as my hon. Friend has, and they absolutely identify that problem and share her wish. While we welcome her intent, the problem is that we do not think that her amendment as drafted would achieve her aims of removing the burden of redaction. To do so would require the amendment and exception of more principles than those identified in the amendment. Indeed, it would require the amendment of more laws than just the Data Protection Act 2018.

The Government are absolutely committed to reducing the burden on the police, but it is obviously important that, if we do so, we do it right, and that the solution works comprehensively. We are therefore actively working on ways to better address the issue, including through improved process, new technology, guidance and legislation. I am very happy to continue to work with her on achieving the aim that we all share and so too, I know, are colleagues in the Home Office.

With respect to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), as I indicated, we absolutely share his enthusiasm for smart data and ensuring that the powers within the Bill are implemented in a timely manner, with interoperability at their core. While I agree that we can only fully realise the benefits of smart data schemes if they enable interoperability, different sectors will have different levels of existing digital infrastructure and capability. Thus, we could inadvertently hinder the success of future schemes if we mandated the use of one universal set of standards based, for instance, on those used in open banking.

The Government will ensure that interoperability is central to the development of smart data schemes. To support our thinking, we are working with industry and regulators in the Smart Data Council to identify the technical infrastructure that needs to be replicated. With regard to the timeline—or even the timeline for a timeline—that my hon. Friend asked for, I recognise that it is important to build investor, industry and consumer confidence by outlining the Government’s planned timeline.

My hon. Friend is right to highlight the Chancellor’s comments in the autumn statement, where we set out plans to kick-start the smart data big bang, and our ambition for using those powers across seven sectors. At this stage I am afraid I am not able to accept his amendment, but it is our intention to set out those plans in more detail in the coming months. I know the Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and I will be happy to work with him to do so.

The aim of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Jarrow (Kate Osborne) was to clarify that, when special category data of employees such as health data is transferred between members of a group of undertakings for internal administrative purposes on grounds of legitimate interests, the conditions and safeguards outlined in schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act should apply to that processing. The Government agree with the sentiment of her amendment, but consider that it is unnecessary. The current legal framework already requires controllers to identify an exemption under article 9 of the UK GDPR if they are processing special category data. Those exemptions are supplemented by the conditions and safeguards outlined in schedule 1. Under those provisions, employers can process special category data where processing is necessary to comply with obligations under employment law. We do not therefore consider the amendment necessary.

Finally, I turn to new clause 45, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Robin Millar). The Government are absolutely committed to improving the availability of comparable UK-wide data. He, too, has been assiduous in promoting that cause, and we are very happy to work with him. We are extremely supportive of the principle underlying his amendment. He is right to point out that people have the right to know the extent of Labour’s failings with the NHS in Wales, as he pointed out, and his new clause sends an important message on our commitment to better data. I can commit to working at pace with him and the UK Statistics Authority to look at ways in which we may be able to implement the intentions of his amendment and bring forward legislative changes following those discussions.

On that basis, I commend the Government amendments to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 6 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Roger Gale Portrait Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)
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For the benefit of all Members, we are before the knife, so we will have to go through a sequence of procedures. It would help me, the Clerk and the Minister if we had a degree of silence. This will take a little time, and we need to be able to concentrate.

New Clause 48

Processing of personal data revealing political opinions

“(1) Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 2018 (special categories of personal data) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).

(2) After paragraph 21 insert—

‘Democratic engagement

21A (1) This condition is met where—

(a) the personal data processed is personal data revealing political opinions,

(b) the data subject is aged 14 or over, and

(c) the processing falls within sub-paragraph (2),

subject to the exceptions in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).

(2) Processing falls within this sub-paragraph if—

(a) the processing—

(i) is carried out by an elected representative or a person acting with the authority of such a representative, and

(ii) is necessary for the purposes of discharging the elected representative’s functions or for the purposes of the elected representative’s democratic engagement activities,

(b) the processing—

(i) is carried out by a registered political party, and

(ii) is necessary for the purposes of the party’s election activities or democratic engagement activities,

(c) the processing—

(i) is carried out by a candidate for election as an elected representative or a person acting with the authority of such a candidate, and

(ii) is necessary for the purposes of the candidate’s campaign for election,

(d) the processing—

(i) is carried out by a permitted participant in relation to a referendum or a person acting with the authority of such a person, and

(ii) is necessary for the purposes of the permitted participant’s campaigning in connection with the referendum, or

(e) the processing—

(i) is carried out by an accredited campaigner in relation to a recall petition or a person acting with the authority of such a person, and

(ii) is necessary for the purposes of the accredited campaigner’s campaigning in connection with the recall petition.

(3) Processing does not meet the condition in sub-paragraph (1) if it is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to an individual.

(4) Processing does not meet the condition in sub-paragraph (1) if—

(a) an individual who is the data subject (or one of the data subjects) has given notice in writing to the controller requiring the controller not to process personal data in respect of which the individual is the data subject (and has not given notice in writing withdrawing that requirement),

(b) the notice gave the controller a reasonable period in which to stop processing such data, and

(c) that period has ended.

(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(a) and (b)—

(a) “democratic engagement activities” means activities whose purpose is to support or promote democratic engagement;

(b) “democratic engagement” means engagement by the public, a section of the public or a particular person with, or with an aspect of, an electoral system or other democratic process in the United Kingdom, either generally or in connection with a particular matter, whether by participating in the system or process or engaging with it in another way;

(c) examples of democratic engagement activities include activities whose purpose is—

(i) to promote the registration of individuals as electors;

(ii) to increase the number of electors participating in elections for elected representatives, referendums or processes for recall petitions in which they are entitled to participate;

(iii) to support an elected representative or registered political party in discharging functions, or carrying on other activities, described in sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b);

(iv) to support a person to become a candidate for election as an elected representative;

(v) to support a campaign or campaigning referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c), (d) or (e);

(vi) to raise funds to support activities whose purpose is described in sub-paragraphs (i) to (v);

(d) examples of activities that may be democratic engagement activities include—

(i) gathering opinions, whether by carrying out a survey or by other means;

(ii) communicating with electors.

(6) In this paragraph—

“accredited campaigner” has the meaning given in Part 5 of Schedule 3 to the Recall of MPs Act 2015;

“candidate” , in relation to election as an elected representative, has the meaning given by the provision listed in the relevant entry in the second column of the table in sub-paragraph (7);

“elected representative” means a person listed in the first column of the table in sub-paragraph (7) and see also sub-paragraphs (8) to (10);

“election activities” , in relation to a registered political party, means—

(a) campaigning in connection with an election for an elected representative, and

(b) activities whose purpose is to enhance the standing of the party, or of a candidate standing for election in its name, with electors;

“elector” means a person who is entitled to vote in an election for an elected representative or in a referendum;

“permitted participant” has the same meaning as in Part 7 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (referendums) (see section 105 of that Act);

“recall petition” has the same meaning as in the Recall of MPs Act 2015 (see section 1(2) of that Act);

“referendum” means a referendum or other poll held on one or more questions specified in, or in accordance with, an enactment;

“registered political party” means a person or organisation included in a register maintained under section 23 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000;

“successful” , in relation to a recall petition, has the same meaning as in the Recall of MPs Act 2015 (see section 14 of that Act).

(7) This is the table referred to in the definitions of “candidate” and “elected representative” in sub-paragraph (6)—

Elected representative

Candidate for election as an elected representative

member of the House of Commons

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983

a member of the Senedd

article 84(2) of the National Assembly for Wales (Representation of the People) Order 2007 (S.I. 2007/236)

a member of the Scottish Parliament

article 80(1) of the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc) Order 2015 (S.S.I. 2015/425)

a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983, as applied by the Northern Ireland Assembly (Elections) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001/2599)

an elected member of a local authority within the meaning of section 270(1) of the Local Government Act 1972, namely—

(i) in England, a county council, a district council, a London borough council or a parish council;

(ii) in Wales, a county council, a county borough council or a community council;

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983

an elected mayor of a local authority within the meaning of Part 1A or 2 of the Local Government Act 2000

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983, as applied by the Local Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (England and Wales) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/1024)

a mayor for the area of a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983, as applied by the Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) Order 2017 (S.I. 2017/67)

a mayor for the area of a combined county authority established under section 9 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983, as applied by the Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) Order 2017 (S.I. 2017/67)

the Mayor of London or an elected member of the London Assembly

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983

an elected member of the Common Council of the City of London

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983

an elected member of the Council of the Isles of Scilly

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983

an elected member of a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994

section 118A of the Representation of the People Act 1983

an elected member of a district council within the meaning of the Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972 (c. 9 (N.I.))

section 130(3A) of the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962 (c. 14 (N.I.))

(n)a police and crime commissioner

article 3 of the Police and Crime Commissioner Elections Order 2012 (S.I. 2012/1917)



(8) For the purposes of the definition of “elected representative” in sub-paragraph (6), a person who is—

(a) a member of the House of Commons immediately before Parliament is dissolved,

(b) a member of the Senedd immediately before Senedd Cymru is dissolved,

(c) a member of the Scottish Parliament immediately before that Parliament is dissolved, or

(d) a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly immediately before that Assembly is dissolved,

is to be treated as if the person were such a member until the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day after the day on which the subsequent general election in relation to that Parliament or Assembly is held.

(9) For the purposes of the definition of “elected representative” in sub-paragraph (6), where a member of the House of Commons’s seat becomes vacant as a result of a successful recall petition, that person is to be treated as if they were a member of the House of Commons until the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day after—

(a) the day on which the resulting by-election is held, or

(b) if earlier, the day on which the next general election in relation to Parliament is held.

(10) For the purposes of the definition of “elected representative” in sub-paragraph (6), a person who is an elected member of the Common Council of the City of London and whose term of office comes to an end at the end of the day preceding the annual Wardmotes is to be treated as if the person were such a member until the end of the fourth day after the day on which those Wardmotes are held.’

(3) Omit paragraph 22 and the italic heading before it.

(4) In paragraph 23 (elected representatives responding to requests)—

(a) leave out sub-paragraphs (3) to (5), and

(b) at the end insert—

‘(6) In this paragraph, “elected representative” has the same meaning as in paragraph 21A.’

(5) In paragraph 24(3) (definition of ‘elected representative’), for ‘23’ substitute ‘21A’.

(6) In section 205(2) of the 2018 Act (general interpretation: periods of time), in paragraph (i), for ‘paragraph 23(4) and (5)’ substitute ‘paragraph 21A(8) to (10)’.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new Clause inserts into Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 2018 (conditions for processing of special categories of personal data) a condition relating to processing by elected representatives, registered political parties and others of information about an individual’s political opinions for the purposes of democratic engagement activities and campaigning.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 7

Searches in response to data subjects’ requests

“(1) In Article 15 of the UK GDPR (right of access by the data subject)—

(a) after paragraph 1 insert—

‘1A. Under paragraph 1, the data subject is only entitled to such confirmation, personal data and other information as the controller is able to provide based on a reasonable and proportionate search for the personal data and other information described in that paragraph.’, and

(b) in paragraph 3, after ‘processing’ insert ‘to which the data subject is entitled under paragraph 1’.

(2) The 2018 Act is amended in accordance with subsections (3) and (4).

(3) In section 45 (law enforcement processing: right of access by the data subject), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) Under subsection (1), the data subject is only entitled to such confirmation, personal data and other information as the controller is able to provide based on a reasonable and proportionate search for the personal data and other information described in that subsection.’

(4) In section 94 (intelligence services processing: right of access by the data subject), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2ZA) Under subsection (1), the data subject is only entitled to such confirmation, personal data and other information as the controller is able to provide based on a reasonable and proportionate search for the personal data and other information described in that subsection.’

(5) The amendments made by this section are to be treated as having come into force on 1 January 2024.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause confirms that, in responding to subject access requests, controllers are only required to undertake reasonable and proportionate searches for personal data and other information.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 8

Notices from the Information Commissioner

“(1) The 2018 Act is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) Omit section 141 (notices from the Commissioner).

(3) After that section insert—

‘141A Notices from the Commissioner

(1) This section applies in relation to a notice authorised or required by this Act to be given to a person by the Commissioner.

(2) The notice may be given to the person by—

(a) delivering it by hand to a relevant individual,

(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,

(c) sending it by post to the person at that address, or

(d) sending it by email to the person’s email address.

(3) A “relevant individual” means—

(a) in the case of a notice to an individual, that individual;

(b) in the case of a notice to a body corporate (other than a partnership), an officer of that body;

(c) in the case of a notice to a partnership, a partner in the partnership or a person who has the control or management of the partnership business;

(d) in the case of a notice to an unincorporated body (other than a partnership), a member of its governing body.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b) and (c), and section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (services of documents by post) in its application to those provisions, a person’s proper address is—

(a) in a case where the person has specified an address as one at which the person, or someone acting on the person’s behalf, will accept service of notices or other documents, that address;

(b) in any other case, the address determined in accordance with subsection (5).

(5) The address is—

(a) in a case where the person is a body corporate with a registered office in the United Kingdom, that office;

(b) in a case where paragraph (a) does not apply and the person is a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated body with a principal office in the United Kingdom, that office;

(c) in any other case, an address in the United Kingdom at which the Commissioner believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of the person.

(6) A person’s email address is—

(a) an email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person, or

(b) if there is no such published address, an email address by means of which the Commissioner believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of that person.

(7) A notice sent by email is treated as given 48 hours after it was sent, unless the contrary is proved.

(8) In this section “officer”, in relation to a body corporate, means a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body.

(9) This section does not limit other lawful means of giving a notice.’

(4) In Schedule 2 to the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016 (S.I. 2016/696) (Commissioner’s enforcement powers), in paragraph 1(b), for ‘141’ substitute ‘141A’.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment adjusts the procedure by which notices can be given by the Information Commissioner under the Data Protection Act 2018. In particular, it enables the Information Commissioner to give notices by email without obtaining the consent of the recipient to use that mode of delivery.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 9

Court procedure in connection with subject access requests

“(1) The Data Protection Act 2018 is amended as follows.

(2) For the italic heading before section 180 substitute—

‘Jurisdiction and court procedure’.

(3) After section 180 insert—

‘180A Procedure in connection with subject access requests

(1) This section applies where a court is required to determine whether a data subject is entitled to information by virtue of a right under—

(a) Article 15 of the UK GDPR (right of access by the data subject);

(b) Article 20 of the UK GDPR (right to data portability);

(c) section 45 of this Act (law enforcement processing: right of access by the data subject);

(d) section 94 of this Act (intelligence services processing: right of access by the data subject).

(2) The court may require the controller to make available for inspection by the court so much of the information as is available to the controller.

(3) But, unless and until the question in subsection (1) has been determined in the data subject’s favour, the court may not require the information to be disclosed to the data subject or the data subject’s representatives, whether by discovery (or, in Scotland, recovery) or otherwise.

(4) Where the question in subsection (1) relates to a right under a provision listed in subsection (1)(a), (c) or (d), this section does not confer power on the court to require the controller to carry out a search for information that is more extensive than the reasonable and proportionate search required by that provision.’”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause makes provision about courts’ powers to require information to be provided to them, and to a data subject, when determining whether a data subject is entitled to information under certain provisions of the data protection legislation.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 10

Approval of a supplementary code

“(1) This section applies to a supplementary code whose content is for the time being determined by a person other than the Secretary of State.

(2) The Secretary of State must approve the supplementary code if—

(a) the code meets the conditions set out in the DVS trust framework (so far as relevant),

(b) an application for approval of the code is made which complies with any requirements imposed by a determination under section (Applications for approval and re-approval), and

(c) the applicant pays any fee required to be paid by a determination under section (Fees for approval, re-approval and continued approval)(1).

(3) The Secretary of State must notify an applicant in writing of the outcome of an application for approval.

(4) The Secretary of State may not otherwise approve a supplementary code.

(5) In this Part, an “approved supplementary code” means a supplementary code for the time being approved under this section.

(6) For when a code ceases (or may cease) to be approved under this section, see sections (Change to conditions for approval or designation), (Revision of a recognised supplementary code) and (Request for withdrawal of approval).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment sets out when a supplementary code of someone other than the Secretary of State must be approved by the Secretary of State.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 11

Designation of a supplementary code

“(1) This section applies to a supplementary code whose content is for the time being determined by the Secretary of State.

(2) If the Secretary of State determines that the supplementary code meets the conditions set out in the DVS trust framework (so far as relevant), the Secretary of State may designate the code as one which complies with the conditions.

(3) In this Part, a ‘designated supplementary code’ means a supplementary code for the time being designated under this section.

(4) For when a code ceases (or may cease) to be designated under this section, see sections (Change to conditions for approval or designation), (Revision of a recognised supplementary code) and (Removal of designation).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This enables the Secretary of State to designate a supplementary code of the Secretary of State as one which complies with the conditions set out in the DVS trust framework.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

List of recognised supplementary codes

“(1) The Secretary of State must—

(a) maintain a list of recognised supplementary codes, and

(b) make the list publicly available.

(2) For the purposes of this Part, each of the following is a ‘recognised supplementary code’—

(a) an approved supplementary code, and

(b) a designated supplementary code.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment places the Secretary of State under a duty to publish, and keep up to date, a list of supplementary codes that are designated or approved.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13

Change to conditions for approval or designation

“(1) This section applies if the Secretary of State revises the DVS trust framework so as to change the conditions which must be met for the approval or designation of a supplementary code.

(2) An approved supplementary code which is affected by the change ceases to be an approved supplementary code at the end of the relevant period unless an application for re-approval of the code is made within that period.

(3) Pending determination of an application for re-approval the supplementary code remains an approved supplementary code.

(4) Before the end of the relevant period the Secretary of State must—

(a) review each designated supplementary code which is affected by the change (if any), and

(b) determine whether it meets the conditions as changed.

(5) If, on a review under subsection (4), the Secretary of State determines that a designated supplementary code does not meet the conditions as changed, the code ceases to be a designated supplementary code at the end of the relevant period.

(6) A supplementary code is affected by a change if the change alters, or adds, a condition which is or would be relevant to the supplementary code when deciding whether to approve it under section (Approval of a supplementary code) or designate it under section (Designation of a supplementary code).

(7) In this section “the relevant period” means the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which the DVS trust framework containing the change referred to in subsection (1) comes into force.

(8) Section (Approval of a supplementary code) applies to re-approval of a supplementary code as it applies to approval of such a code.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment provides that when conditions for approval or designation are changed this requires re-approval of an approved supplementary code and, in the case of a designated supplementary code, a re-assessment of whether the code meets the revised conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Revision of a recognised supplementary code

“(1) If an approved supplementary code is revised—

(a) the code before and after the revision are treated as the same code for the purposes of this Part, and

(b) the code ceases to be an approved supplementary code unless subsection (2) or (4) applies.

(2) This subsection applies if the supplementary code, in its revised form, has been approved under section (Approval of a supplementary code).

(3) If subsection (2) applies the approved supplementary code, in its revised form, remains an approved supplementary code.

(4) This subsection applies for so long as—

(a) a decision is pending under section (Approval of a supplementary code) on an application for approval of the supplementary code in its revised form, and

(b) the revisions to the code have not taken effect.

(5) If subsection (4) applies the supplementary code, in its unrevised form, remains an approved supplementary code.

(6) The Secretary of State may revise a designated supplementary code only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the code, in its revised form, meets the conditions set out in the DVS trust framework (so far as relevant).

(7) If a designated supplementary code is revised, the code before and after the revision are treated as the same code for the purposes of this Part.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment sets out the consequences where there are changes to a recognised supplementary code and, in particular, what needs to be done for the code to remain a recognised supplementary code.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15

Applications for approval and re-approval

“(1) The Secretary of State may determine—

(a) the form of an application for approval or re-approval under section (Approval of a supplementary code),

(b) the information to be contained in or provided with the application,

(c) the documents to be provided with the application,

(d) the manner in which the application is to be submitted, and

(e) who may make the application.

(2) A determination may make different provision for different purposes.

(3) The Secretary of State must publish a determination.

(4) The Secretary of State may revise a determination.

(5) If the Secretary of State revises a determination the Secretary of State must publish the determination as revised.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment enables the Secretary of State to determine the process for making a valid application for approval of a supplementary code.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 16

Fees for approval, re-approval and continued approval

“(1) The Secretary of State may determine that a person who applies for approval or re-approval of a supplementary code under section (Approval of a supplementary code) must pay a fee to the Secretary of State of an amount specified in the determination.

(2) A determination under subsection (1) may specify an amount which exceeds the administrative costs of determining the application for approval or re-approval.

(3) The Secretary of State may determine that a fee is payable to the Secretary of State, of an amount and at times specified in the determination, in connection with the continued approval of a supplementary code.

(4) A determination under subsection (3)—

(a) may specify an amount which exceeds the administrative costs associated with the continued approval of a supplementary code, and

(b) must specify, or describe, who must pay the fee.

(5) A fee payable under subsection (3) is recoverable summarily (or, in Scotland, recoverable) as a civil debt.

(6) A determination may make different provision for different purposes.

(7) The Secretary of State must publish a determination.

(8) The Secretary of State may revise a determination.

(9) If the Secretary of State revises a determination the Secretary of State must publish the determination as revised.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment enables the Secretary of State to determine that a fee is payable for approval/re-approval/continued approval of a supplementary code and the amount of such a fee.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 17

Request for withdrawal of approval

“(1) The Secretary of State must withdraw approval of a supplementary code if—

(a) the Secretary of State receives a notice requesting the withdrawal of approval of the supplementary code, and

(b) the notice complies with any requirements imposed by a determination under subsection (3).

(2) Before the day on which the approval is withdrawn, the Secretary of State must inform the person who gave the notice of when it will be withdrawn.

(3) The Secretary of State may determine—

(a) the form of a notice,

(b) the information to be contained in or provided with the notice,

(c) the documents to be provided with the notice,

(d) the manner in which the notice is to be submitted,

(e) who may give the notice.

(4) A determination may make different provision for different purposes.

(5) The Secretary of State must publish a determination.

(6) The Secretary of State may revise a determination.

(7) If the Secretary of State revises a determination the Secretary of State must publish the determination as revised.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment enables a supplementary code to be “de-approved”, on request.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 18

Removal of designation

“(1) The Secretary of State may determine to remove the designation of a supplementary code.

(2) A determination must—

(a) be published, and

(b) specify when the designation is to be removed, which must be a time after the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which the determination is published.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment enables the Secretary of State to determine that a designated supplementary code should cease to be designated.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 19

Registration of additional services

“(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a person is registered in the DVS register,

(b) the person applies for their entry in the register to be amended to record additional digital verification services that the person provides in accordance with the main code,

(c) the person holds a certificate from an accredited conformity assessment body certifying that the person provides the additional services in accordance with the main code,

(d) the application complies with any requirements imposed by a determination under section 51, and

(e) the person pays any fee required to be paid by a determination under section 52(1).

(2) The Secretary of State must amend the DVS register to record that the person is also registered in respect of the additional services referred to in subsection (1).

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), a certificate is to be ignored if—

(a) it has expired in accordance with its terms,

(b) it has been withdrawn by the body that issued it, or

(c) it is required to be ignored by reason of provision included in the DVS trust framework under 49(10).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment provides for a person to apply to add services to their entry in the DVS register and requires the Secretary of State to amend the register to record that a person is registered in respect of the additional services.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 20

Supplementary notes

“(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a person holds a certificate from an accredited conformity assessment body certifying that digital verification services provided by the person are provided in accordance with a recognised supplementary code,

(b) the person applies for a note about one or more of the services to which the certificate relates to be included in the entry relating to that person in the DVS register,

(c) the application complies with any requirements imposed by a determination under section 51, and

(d) the person pays any fee required to be paid by a determination under section 52(1).

(2) The Secretary of State must include a note in the entry relating to the person in the DVS register recording that the person provides, in accordance with the recognised supplementary code referred to in subsection (1), the services in respect of which the person made the application referred to in that subsection.

(3) The Secretary of State may not otherwise include a note described in subsection (2) in the DVS register.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a certificate is to be ignored if—

(a) it has expired in accordance with its terms,

(b) it has been withdrawn by the body that issued it, or

(c) subsection (5) applies.

(5) This subsection applies if—

(a) the recognised supplementary code to which the certificate relates has been revised since the certificate was issued,

(b) the certificate was issued before the revision to the supplementary code took effect, and

(c) the supplementary code (as revised) provides—

(i) that certificates issued before the time the revision takes effect are required to be ignored, or

(ii) that such certificates are to be ignored from a date, or from the end of a period, specified in the code and that date has passed or that period has elapsed.

(6) In this Part, a note included in the DVS register in accordance with subsection (2) is referred to as a supplementary note.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment provides for a person to apply for a note to be included in the DVS register that they provide digital verification services in accordance with a recognised supplementary code.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Addition of services to supplementary notes

“(1) Subsection (2) applies if—

(a) a person has a supplementary note included in the DVS register,

(b) the person applies for the note to be amended to record additional digital verification services that the person provides in accordance with a recognised supplementary code,

(c) the person holds a certificate from an accredited conformity assessment body certifying that the person provides the additional services in accordance with the recognised supplementary code referred to in paragraph (b),

(d) the application complies with any requirements imposed by a determination under section 51, and

(e) the person pays any fee required to be paid by a determination under section 52(1).

(2) The Secretary of State must amend the note to record that the person also provides the additional services referred to in subsection (1) in accordance with the recognised supplementary code referred to in that subsection.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), a certificate is to be ignored if—

(a) it has expired in accordance with its terms,

(b) it has been withdrawn by the body that issued it, or

(c) subsection (4) applies.

(4) This subsection applies if—

(a) the recognised supplementary code to which the certificate relates has been revised since the certificate was issued,

(b) the certificate was issued before the revision to the supplementary code took effect, and

(c) the supplementary code (as revised) provides—

(i) that certificates issued before the time the revision takes effect are required to be ignored, or

(ii) that such certificates are to be ignored from a date, or from the end of a period, specified in the code and that date has passed or that period has elapsed.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment provides for a person to add services to their supplementary note in the DVS register and requires the Secretary of State to amend the note to record that a person is registered in respect of the additional services.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Duty to remove services from the DVS register

“(1) Where a person is registered in the DVS register in respect of digital verification services, subsection (2) applies if the person—

(a) asks for the register to be amended so that the person is no longer registered in respect of one or more of those services,

(b) ceases to provide one or more of those services, or

(c) no longer holds a certificate from an accredited conformity assessment body certifying that all of those services are provided in accordance with the main code.

(2) The Secretary of State must amend the register to record that the person is no longer registered in respect of (as the case may be)—

(a) the service or services mentioned in a request described in subsection (1)(a),

(b) the service or services which the person has ceased to provide, or

(c) the service or services for which there is no longer a certificate as described in subsection (1)(c).

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), a certificate is to be ignored if—

(a) it has expired in accordance with its terms,

(b) it has been withdrawn by the body that issued it, or

(c) it is required to be ignored by reason of provision included in the DVS trust framework under section 49(10).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment places the Secretary of State under a duty to amend the DVS register, in certain circumstances, to record that a person is no longer registered in respect of certain services.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 23

Duty to remove supplementary notes from the DVS register

“(1) The Secretary of State must remove a supplementary note included in the entry in the DVS register relating to a person if—

(a) the person asks for the note to be removed,

(b) the person ceases to provide all of the digital verification services to which the note relates,

(c) the person no longer holds a certificate from an accredited conformity assessment body certifying that at least one of those digital verification services is provided in accordance with the supplementary code, or

(d) the person continues to hold a certificate described in paragraph (c) but the supplementary code is not a recognised supplementary code.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c) and (d), a certificate is to be ignored if—

(a) it has expired in accordance with its terms,

(b) it has been withdrawn by the body that issued it, or

(c) subsection (3) applies.

(3) This subsection applies if—

(a) the supplementary code to which the certificate relates has been revised since the certificate was issued,

(b) the certificate was issued before the revision to the supplementary code took effect, and

(c) the supplementary code (as revised) provides—

(i) that certificates issued before the time the revision takes effect are required to be ignored, or

(ii) that such certificates are to be ignored from a date, or from the end of a period, specified in the code and that date has passed or that period has elapsed.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment sets out the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must remove a supplementary note from the DVS register.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24

Duty to remove services from supplementary notes

“(1) Where a person has a supplementary note included in their entry in the DVS register in respect of digital verification services, subsection (2) applies if the person—

(a) asks for the register to be amended so that the note no longer records one or more of those services,

(b) ceases to provide one or more of the services recorded in the note, or

(c) no longer holds a certificate from an accredited conformity assessment body certifying that all of the services included in the note are provided in accordance with a supplementary code.

(2) The Secretary of State must amend the supplementary note so it no longer records (as the case maA24y be)—

(a) the service or services mentioned in a request described in subsection (1)(a),

(b) the service or services which the person has ceased to provide, or

(c) the service or services for which there is no longer a certificate as described in subsection (1)(c).

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), a certificate is to be ignored if—

(a) it has expired in accordance with its terms,

(b) it has been withdrawn by the body that issued it, or

(c) subsection (4) applies.

(4) This subsection applies if—

(a) the supplementary code to which the certificate relates has been revised since the certificate was issued,

(b) the certificate was issued before the revision to the supplementary code took effect, and

(c) the supplementary code (as revised) provides—

(i) that certificates issued before the time the revision takes effect are required to be ignored, or

(ii) that such certificates are to be ignored from a date, or from the end of a period, specified in the code and that date has passed or that period has elapsed.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment places the Secretary of State under a duty to amend a supplementary note on the DVS register relating to a person, in certain circumstances, to remove reference to certain services from the note.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 25

Index of defined terms for Part 2

“The Table below lists provisions that define or otherwise explain terms defined for the purposes of this Part of this Act.

Term

Provision

accredited conformity assessment body

section 50(7)

approved supplementary code

section (Approval of a supplementary code)(6)

designated supplementary code

section (Designation of a supplementary code)(3)

digital verification services

section 48(2)

the DVS register

section 50(2)

the DVS trust framework

section 49(2)(a)

the main code

section 49(2)(b)

recognised supplementary code

section (List of recognised supplementary codes)(2)

supplementary code

section 49(2)(c)

supplementary note

section (Supplementary notes)(6)”



(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment provides an index of terms which are defined in Part 2.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26

Powers relating to verification of identity or status

“(1) In section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (penalty for employing a person subject to immigration control), after subsection (7) insert—

“(8) An order under subsection (3) containing provision described in subsection (7)(a), (b) or (c) may, in particular—

(a) specify a document generated by a DVS-registered person or a DVS-registered person of a specified description;

(b) specify a document which was provided to such a person in order to generate such a document;

(c) specify steps involving the use of services provided by such a person.

(9) In subsection (8), “DVS-registered person” means a person who is registered in the DVS register maintained under Part 2 of the Data Protection and Digital Information Act 2024 (“the DVS register”).

(10) An order under subsection (3) which specifies a description of DVS-registered person may do so by, for example, describing a DVS-registered person whose entry in the DVS register includes a note relating to specified services (see section (Supplementary notes) of the Data Protection and Digital Information Act 2024).”

(2) In section 34 of the Immigration Act 2014 (requirements which may be prescribed for the purposes of provisions about occupying premises under a residential tenancy agreement)—

(a) in subsection (1)—

(i) in paragraph (a), after “occupiers” insert “, a DVS-registered person or a DVS-registered person of a prescribed description”,

(ii) in paragraph (b), after “occupiers” insert “, a DVS-registered person or a DVS-registered person of a prescribed description”, and

(iii) in paragraph (c), at the end insert “, including steps involving the use of services provided by a DVS-registered person or a DVS-registered person of a prescribed description”, and

(b) after that subsection insert—

“(1A) An order prescribing requirements for the purposes of this Chapter which contains provision described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) may, in particular—

(a) prescribe a document generated by a DVS-registered person or a DVS-registered person of a prescribed description;

(b) prescribe a document which was provided to such a person in order to generate such a document.

(1B) In subsections (1) and (1A), “DVS-registered person” means a person who is registered in the DVS register maintained under Part 2 of the Data Protection and Digital Information Act 2024 (“the DVS register”).

(1C) An order prescribing requirements for the purposes of this Chapter which prescribes a description of DVS-registered person may do so by, for example, describing a DVS-registered person whose entry in the DVS register includes a note relating to prescribed services (see section (Supplementary notes) of the Data Protection and Digital Information Act 2024).”

(3) In Schedule 6 to the Immigration Act 2016 (illegal working compliance orders etc), after paragraph 5 insert—

“Prescribed checks and documents

5A (1) Regulations under paragraph 5(6)(b) or (c) may, in particular—

(a) prescribe checks carried out using services provided by a DVS-registered person or a DVS-registered person of a prescribed description;

(b) prescribe documents generated by such a person;

(c) prescribe documents which were provided to such a person in order to generate such documents.

(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “DVS-registered person” means a person who is registered in the DVS register maintained under Part 2 of the Data Protection and Digital Information Act 2024 (“the DVS register”).

(3) Regulations under paragraph 5(6)(b) or (c) which prescribe a description of DVS-registered person may do so by, for example, describing a DVS-registered person whose entry in the DVS register includes a note relating to prescribed services (see section (Supplementary notes) of the Data Protection and Digital Information Act 2024).””—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment contains amendments of powers to make subordinate legislation so they can be exercised so as to make provision by reference to persons registered in the DVS register established under Part 2 of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 27

Interface bodies

“(1) This section is about the provision that regulations under section 66 or 68 may (among other things) contain about bodies with one or more of the following tasks—

(a) establishing a facility or service used, or capable of being used, for providing, publishing or otherwise processing customer data or business data or for taking action described in section 66(3) (an “interface”);

(b) setting standards (“interface standards”), or making other arrangements (“interface arrangements”), for use by other persons when establishing, maintaining or managing an interface;

(c) maintaining or managing an interface, interface standards or interface arrangements.

(2) Such bodies are referred to in this Part as “interface bodies”.

(3) The regulations may—

(a) require a data holder, an authorised person or a third party recipient to set up an interface body;

(b) make provision about the type of body to be set up.

(4) In relation to an interface body (whether or not it is required to be set up by regulations under section 66 or 68), the regulations may—

(a) make provision about the body’s composition and governance;

(b) make provision requiring a data holder, an authorised person or a third party recipient to provide, or arrange for, assistance for the body;

(c) impose other requirements relating to the body on a person required to set it up or to provide, or arrange for, assistance for the body;

(d) make provision requiring the body to carry on all or part of a task described in subsection (1);

(e) make provision requiring the body to do other things in connection with its interface, interface standards or interface arrangements;

(f) make provision about how the body carries out its functions (such as, for example, provision about the body’s objectives or matters to be taken into account by the body);

(g) confer powers on the body for the purpose of monitoring use of its interface, interface standards or interface arrangements (“monitoring powers”) (and see section 71 for provision about enforcement of requirements imposed in exercise of those powers);

(h) make provision for the body to arrange for its monitoring powers to be exercised by another person;

(i) make provision about the rights of persons affected by the exercise of the body’s functions under the regulations, including (among other things)—

(i) provision about the review of decisions made in exercise of those functions;

(ii) provision about appeals to a court or tribunal;

(j) make provision about complaints, including provision requiring the body to implement procedures for the handling of complaints;

(k) make provision enabling or requiring the body to publish, or provide to a specified person, specified documents or information relating to its interface, interface standards or interface arrangements;

(l) make provision enabling or requiring the body to produce guidance about how it proposes to exercise its functions under the regulations, to publish the guidance and to provide copies to specified persons.

(5) The monitoring powers that may be conferred on an interface body include power to require the provision of documents or information (but such powers are subject to the restrictions in section 72 as well as any restrictions included in the regulations).

(6) Examples of facilities or services referred to in subsection (1) include dashboard services, other electronic communications services and application programming interfaces.

(7) In subsection (4)(b) and (c), the references to assistance include actual or contingent financial assistance (such as, for example, a grant, loan, guarantee or indemnity or buying a company’s share capital).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause enables regulations under Part 3 to make provision about bodies providing facilities or services used for providing, publishing or processing customer data or business data, or setting standards or making other arrangements in connection with such facilities or services.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

The FCA and financial services interfaces

“(1) The Treasury may by regulations make provision enabling or requiring the Financial Conduct Authority (“the FCA”) to make rules—

(a) requiring financial services providers described in the regulations to use a prescribed interface, or prescribed interface standards or interface arrangements, when providing or receiving customer data or business data which is required to be provided by or to the financial services provider by data regulations;

(b) requiring persons described in the regulations to use a prescribed interface, or prescribed interface standards or interface arrangements, when the person, in the course of a business, receives, from a financial services provider, customer data or business data which is required to be provided to the person by data regulations;

(c) imposing interface-related requirements on a description of person falling within subsection (2),

and such rules are referred to in this Part as “FCA interface rules”.

(2) The following persons fall within this subsection—

(a) an interface body linked to the financial services sector on which requirements are imposed by regulations made in reliance on section (Interface bodies);

(b) a person required by regulations made in reliance on section (Interface bodies) to set up an interface body linked to the financial services sector;

(c) a person who uses an interface, interface standards or interface arrangements linked to the financial services sector or who is required to do so by data regulations or rules made by virtue of regulations under subsection (1)(a) or (b).

(3) For the purposes of this section, requirements are interface-related if they relate to—

(a) the composition, governance or activities of an interface body linked to the financial services sector,

(b) an interface, interface standards or interface arrangements linked to the financial services sector, or

(c) the use of such an interface, such interface standards or such interface arrangements.

(4) For the purposes of this section—

(a) an interface body is linked to the financial services sector to the extent that its interface, interface standards or interface arrangements are linked to the financial service sector;

(b) interfaces, interface standards and interface arrangements are linked to the financial services sector to the extent that they are used, or intended to be used, by financial services providers (whether or not they are used, or intended to be used, by other persons).

(5) The Treasury may by regulations make provision enabling or requiring the FCA to impose requirements on a person to whom FCA interface rules apply (referred to in this Part as “FCA additional requirements”) where the FCA considers it appropriate to impose the requirement—

(a) in response to a failure, or likely failure, by the person to comply with an FCA interface rule or FCA additional requirement, or

(b) in order to advance a purpose which the FCA is required to advance when exercising functions conferred by regulations under this section (see section (The FCA and financial services interfaces: supplementary)(3)(a)).

(6) Regulations under subsection (5) may, for example, provide for the FCA to impose requirements by giving a notice or direction.

(7) The restrictions in section 72 apply in connection with FCA interface rules and FCA additional requirements as they apply in connection with regulations under this Part.

(8) In section 72 as so applied—

(a) the references in subsections (1)(b) and (8) to an enforcer include the FCA, and

(b) the references in subsections (3) and (4) to data regulations include FCA interface rules and FCA additional requirements.

(9) In this section—

“financial services provider” means a person providing financial services;

“prescribed” means prescribed in FCA interface rules.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause and new clause NC29 enable the Treasury, by regulations, to confer powers on the Financial Conduct Authority to impose requirements (by means of rules or otherwise) on interface bodies used by the financial services sector and on persons participating in, or using facilities and services provided by, such bodies.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29

The FCA and financial services interfaces: supplementary

“(1) This section is about provision that regulations under section (The FCA and financial services interfaces) may or must (among other things) contain.

(2) The regulations—

(a) may enable or require the FCA to impose interface-related requirements that could be imposed by regulations made in reliance on section (Interface bodies)(4) or (5), but

(b) may not enable or require the FCA to require a person to set up an interface body.

(3) The regulations must—

(a) require the FCA, so far as is reasonably possible, to exercise functions conferred by the regulations in a manner which is compatible with, or which advances, one or more specified purposes;

(b) specify one or more matters to which the FCA must have regard when exercising functions conferred by the regulations;

(c) if they enable or require the FCA to make rules, make provision about the procedure for making rules, including provision requiring such consultation with persons likely to be affected by the rules or representatives of such persons as the FCA considers appropriate.

(4) The regulations may—

(a) require the FCA to carry out an analysis of the costs and benefits that will arise if proposed rules are made or proposed changes are made to rules and make provision about what the analysis must include;

(b) require the FCA to publish rules or changes to rules and to provide copies to specified persons;

(c) make provision about the effect of rules, including provision about circumstances in which rules are void and circumstances in which a person is not to be taken to have contravened a rule;

(d) make provision enabling or requiring the FCA to modify or waive rules as they apply to a particular case;

(e) make provision about the procedure for imposing FCA additional requirements;

(f) make provision enabling or requiring the FCA to produce guidance about how it proposes to exercise its functions under the regulations, to publish the guidance and to provide copies to specified persons.

(5) The regulations may enable or require the FCA to impose the following types of requirement on a person as FCA additional requirements—

(a) a requirement to review the person’s conduct;

(b) a requirement to take remedial action;

(c) a requirement to make redress for loss or damage suffered by others as a result of the person’s conduct.

(6) The regulations may enable or require the FCA to make rules requiring a person falling within section (The FCA and financial services interfaces)(2)(b) or (c) to pay fees to an interface body for the purpose of meeting expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by such a body in performing duties, or exercising powers, imposed or conferred by regulations under this Part or by rules made by virtue of regulations under section (The FCA and financial services interfaces).

(7) Regulations made in reliance on subsection (6)—

(a) may enable rules to provide for the amount of a fee to be an amount which is intended to exceed the cost of the things in respect of which the fee is charged;

(b) must require rules to provide for the amount of a fee to be—

(i) a prescribed amount or an amount determined in accordance with the rules, or

(ii) an amount not exceeding such an amount;

(c) may enable or require rules to provide for the amount, or maximum amount, of a fee to increase at specified times and by—

(i) a prescribed amount or an amount determined in accordance with the rules, or

(ii) an amount not exceeding such an amount;

(d) if they enable rules to enable a person to determine an amount, must require rules to require the person to publish information about the amount and how it is determined;

(e) may enable or require rules to make provision about—

(i) interest on any unpaid amounts;

(ii) the recovery of unpaid amounts.

(8) In this section—

“interface-related” has the meaning given in section (The FCA and financial services interfaces);

“prescribed” means prescribed in FCA interface rules.

(9) The reference in subsection (5)(c) to making redress includes—

(a) paying interest, and

(b) providing redress in the form of a remedy or relief which could not be awarded in legal proceedings.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

See the explanatory statement for new clause NC28.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 30

The FCA and financial services interfaces: penalties and levies

“(1) Subsections (2) and (3) are about the provision that regulations made by the Treasury under this Part providing for the FCA to enforce requirements under FCA interface rules may (among other things) contain in relation to financial penalties.

(2) The regulations may require or enable the FCA—

(a) to set the amount or maximum amount of, or of an increase in, a penalty imposed in respect of failure to comply with a requirement imposed by the FCA in exercise of a power conferred by regulations under section (The FCA and financial services interfaces) (whether imposed by means of FCA interface rules or an FCA additional requirement), or

(b) to set the method for determining such an amount.

(3) Regulations made in reliance on subsection (2)—

(a) must require the FCA to produce and publish a statement of its policy with respect to the amount of the penalties;

(b) may require the policy to include specified matters;

(c) may make provision about the procedure for producing the statement;

(d) may require copies of the statement to be provided to specified persons;

(e) may require the FCA to have regard to a statement published in accordance with the regulations.

(4) The Treasury may by regulations—

(a) impose, or provide for the FCA to impose, a levy on data holders, authorised persons or third party recipients for the purpose of meeting all or part of the expenses incurred, or to be incurred, during a period by the FCA, or by a person acting on the FCA’s behalf, in performing duties, or exercising powers, imposed or conferred on the FCA by regulations under section (The FCA and financial services interfaces), and

(b) make provision about how funds raised by means of the levy must or may be used.

(5) Regulations under subsection (4) may only provide for a levy in respect of expenses of the FCA to be imposed on persons that appear to the Treasury to be capable of being directly affected by the exercise of some or all of the functions conferred on the FCA by regulations under section (The FCA and financial services interfaces).

(6) Section 75(3) and (4) apply in relation to regulations under subsection (4) of this section as they apply in relation to regulations under section 75(1).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause enables the Treasury, by regulations, to confer power on the Financial Conduct Authority to set the amount of certain penalties. It also enables the Treasury to impose a levy in respect of expenses incurred by that Authority.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31

Liability in damages

“(1) The Secretary of State or the Treasury may by regulations provide that a person listed in subsection (2) is not liable in damages for anything done or omitted to be done in the exercise of functions conferred by regulations under this Part.

(2) Those persons are—

(a) a public authority;

(b) a member, officer or member of staff of a public authority;

(c) a person who could be held vicariously liable for things done or omitted by a public authority.

(3) Regulations under this section may not—

(a) make provision removing liability for an act or omission which is shown to have been in bad faith, or

(b) make provision so as to prevent an award of damages made in respect of an act or omission on the ground that the act or omission was unlawful as a result of section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.”— (Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause enables regulations under Part 3 to provide that certain persons are not liable in damages when exercising functions under such regulations.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 32

Other data provision

“(1) This section is about cases in which subordinate legislation other than regulations under this Part contains provision described in section 66(1) to (3) or 68(1) to (2A) (“other data provision”).

(2) The regulation-making powers under this Part may be exercised so as to make, in connection with the other data provision, any provision that they could be exercised to make as part of, or in connection with, provision made under section 66(1) to (3) or 68(1) to (2A) that is equivalent to the other data provision.

(3) In this Part, references to “data regulations” include regulations made in reliance on subsection (2) to the extent that they make provision described in sections 66 to 70 or (Interface bodies).

(4) In this section, “subordinate legislation” has the same meaning as in the Interpretation Act 1978 (see section 21 of that Act).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause enables the regulation-making powers under Part 3 to be used to supplement existing subordinate legislation which requires customer data or business data to be provided to customers and others.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 33

Duty to notify the Commissioner of personal data breach: time periods

“(1) In regulation 5A of the PEC Regulations (personal data breach)—

(a) in paragraph (2), after “delay” insert “and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it”, and

(b) after paragraph (3) insert—

“(3A) Where notification under paragraph (2) is not made within 72 hours, it must be accompanied by reasons for the delay.”

(2) In Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 611/2013 of 24 June 2013 on the measures applicable to the notification of personal data breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on privacy and electronic communications (notification to the Information Commissioner)—

(a) in paragraph 2—

(i) in the first subparagraph, for the words from “no” to “feasible” substitute “without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having becoming aware of it”, and

(ii) in the second subparagraph, after “shall” insert “, subject to paragraph 3,”, and

(b) for paragraph 3 substitute—

“3. To the extent that the information set out in Annex 1 is not available to be included in the notification, it may be provided in phases without undue further delay.””—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This adjusts the period within which the Information Commissioner must be notified of a personal data breach. It also inserts a duty (into the PEC Regulations) to give reasons for not notifying within 72 hours and adjusts the duty (in Commission Regulation (EU) No 611/2013) to provide accompanying information.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 34

Power to require information for social security purposes

“In Schedule (Power to require information for social security purposes)—

(a) Part 1 amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to make provision about a power for the Secretary of State to obtain information for social security purposes;

(b) Part 2 amends the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 to make provision about a power for the Department for Communities to obtain information for such purposes;

(c) Part 3 makes related amendments of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause introduces a new Schedule NS1 which amends social security legislation to make provision about a new power for the Secretary of State or, in Northern Ireland, the Department for Communities, to obtain information for social security purposes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 35

Retention of information by providers of internet services in connection with death of child

“(1) The Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 100 (power to require information)—

(a) omit subsection (7);

(b) after subsection (8) insert—

“(8A) The power to give a notice conferred by subsection (1) does not include power to require processing of personal data that would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether processing of personal data would do so, the duty imposed by the notice is to be taken into account).”

(3) In section 101 (information in connection with investigation into death of child)—

(a) before subsection (1) insert—

“(A1) Subsection (D1) applies if a senior coroner (in England and Wales), a procurator fiscal (in Scotland) or a coroner (in Northern Ireland) (“the investigating authority”)—

(a) notifies OFCOM that—

(i) they are conducting an investigation, or are due to conduct an investigation, in connection with the death of a child, and

(ii) they suspect that the child may have taken their own life, and

(b) provides OFCOM with the details in subsection (B1).

(B1) The details are—

(a) the name of the child who has died,

(b) the child’s date of birth,

(c) any email addresses used by the child (so far as the investigating authority knows), and

(d) if any regulated service has been brought to the attention of the investigating authority as being of interest in connection with the child’s death, the name of the service.

(C1) Where this subsection applies, OFCOM—

(a) must give a notice to the provider of a service within subsection (E1) requiring the provider to ensure the retention of information relating to the use of the service by the child who has died, and

(b) may give a notice to any other relevant person requiring the person to ensure the retention of information relating to the use of a service within subsection (E1) by that child.

(D1) The references in subsection (C1) to ensuring the retention of information relating to the child’s use of a service include taking all reasonable steps, without delay, to prevent the deletion of such information by the routine operation of systems or processes.

(E1) A service is within this subsection if it is—

(a) a regulated service of a kind described in regulations made by the Secretary of State, or

(b) a regulated service notified to OFCOM by the investigating authority as described in subsection (B1)(d).

(F1) A notice under subsection (C1) may require information described in that subsection to be retained only if it is information—

(a) of a kind which OFCOM have power to require under a notice under subsection (1) (see, in particular, subsection (2)(a) to (d)), or

(b) which a person might need to retain to enable the person to provide information in response to a notice under subsection (1) (if such a notice were given).

(G1) OFCOM must share with the investigating authority any information they receive in response to requirements mentioned in section 102(5A)(d) that are included in a notice under subsection (C1).”

(b) in subsection (3), for “power conferred by subsection (1) includes” substitute “powers conferred by this section include”;

(c) after subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) The powers to give a notice conferred by this section do not include power to require processing of personal data that would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether processing of personal data would do so, the duty imposed by the notice is to be taken into account).”

(4) In section 102 (information notices)—

(a) in subsection (1), for “101(1)” substitute “101(C1) or (1)”;

(b) in subsection (3)—

(i) after “information notice” insert “under section 100(1) or 101(1)”,

(ii) omit “and” at the end of paragraph (c), and

(iii) after paragraph (c) insert—

“(ca) specify when the information must be provided (which may be on or by a specified date, within a specified period, or at specified intervals), and”;

(c) omit subsection (4);

(d) after subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) An information notice under section 101(C1) must—

(a) specify or describe the information to be retained,

(b) specify why OFCOM require the information to be retained,

(c) require the information to be retained for the period of one year beginning with the date of the notice,

(d) require the person to whom the notice is given—

(i) if the child to whom the notice relates used the service in question, to notify OFCOM by a specified date of steps taken to ensure the retention of information;

(ii) if the child did not use the service, or the person does not hold any information of the kind required, to notify OFCOM of that fact by a specified date, and

(e) contain information about the consequences of not complying with the notice.

(5B) If OFCOM give an information notice to a person under section 101(C1), they may, in response to information received from the investigating authority, extend the period for which the person is required to retain information by a maximum period of six months.

(5C) The power conferred by subsection (5B) is exercisable—

(a) by giving the person a notice varying the notice under section 101(C1) and stating the further period for which information must be retained and the reason for the extension;

(b) any number of times.”;

(e) after subsection (9) insert—

“(9A) OFCOM must cancel an information notice under section 101(C1) by notice to the person to whom it was given if advised by the investigating authority that the information in question no longer needs to be retained.”

(f) in subsection (10), after the definition of “information” insert—

““the investigating authority” has the same meaning as in section 101;”.

(5) In section 109 (offences in connection with information notices)—

(a) in subsection (2)(b), for “all reasonable steps” substitute “all of the steps that it was reasonable, and reasonably practicable, to take”;

(b) after subsection (6) insert—

“(6A) A person who is given an information notice under section 101(C1) commits an offence if—

(a) the person deletes or alters, or causes or permits the deletion or alteration of, any information required by the notice to be retained, and

(b) the person’s intention was to prevent the information being available, or (as the case may be) to prevent it being available in unaltered form, for the purposes of any official investigation into the death of the child to whom the notice relates.

(6B) For the purposes of subsection (6A) information has been deleted if it is irrecoverable (however that occurred).”

(6) In section 110 (senior managers’ liability: information offences)—

(a) after subsection (6) insert—

“(6A) An individual named as a senior manager of an entity commits an offence if—

(a) the entity commits an offence under section 109(6A) (deletion etc of information), and

(b) the individual has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed.”;

(b) in subsection (7), for “or (6)” substitute “, (6) or (6A)”.

(7) In section 113 (penalties for information offences), in subsection (2)—

(a) for “(4) or (5)” substitute “(4), (5) or (6A)”;

(b) for “(5) or (6)” substitute “(5), (6) or (6A)”.

(8) In section 114 (co-operation and disclosure of information: overseas regulators), in subsection (7), omit the definition of “the data protection legislation”.

(9) In section 225 (Parliamentary procedure for regulations), in subsection (10), after paragraph (c) insert—

“(ca) regulations under section 101(E1)(a),”

(10) In section 236(1) (interpretation)—

(a) after the definition of “country” insert—

““the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3(9) of that Act);”;

(b) in the definition of “information notice”, for “101(1)” substitute “101(C1) or (1)”.

(11) In section 237 (index of defined terms), after the entry for “CSEA content” insert—

“the data protection legislation

section 236”.”



(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause amends the Online Safety Act 2023 to enable OFCOM to give internet service providers a notice requiring them to retain information in connection with an investigation by a coroner (or, in Scotland, procurator fiscal) into the death of a child suspected to have taken their own life. The new clause also creates related offences.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 36

Retention of biometric data and recordable offences

“(1) Part 1 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (powers to gather and share information) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (10).

(2) In section 18A(3) (retention of material: general), after “recordable offence” insert “or recordable-equivalent offence”.

(3) Section 18E (supplementary provision) is amended in accordance with subsections (4) to (10).

(4) In subsection (1), after the definition of “recordable offence” insert—

““recordable-equivalent offence” means an offence under the law of a country or territory outside England and Wales and Northern Ireland where the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence if done in England and Wales or Northern Ireland (whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);”.

(5) In subsection (3), in the words before paragraph (a), after “offence” insert “in England and Wales or Northern Ireland”.

(6) After subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) For the purposes of section 18A, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence in a country or territory outside England and Wales and Northern Ireland if, in respect of such an offence, a court exercising jurisdiction under the law of that country or territory has made a finding equivalent to—

(a) a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity, or

(b) a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence.”

(7) In subsection (6)(a)—

(a) after “convicted” insert “—

(i) ‘”, and

(b) after “offence,” insert “or

(ii) in a country or territory outside England and Wales and Northern Ireland, of a recordable-equivalent offence,”.

(8) In subsection (6)(b)—

(a) omit “of a recordable offence”, and

(b) for “a recordable offence, other than a qualifying offence” substitute “an offence, other than a qualifying offence or qualifying-equivalent offence”.

(9) In subsection (7), for “subsection (6)” substitute “this section”.

(10) After subsection (7) insert—

“(7A) In subsection (6), “qualifying-equivalent offence” means an offence under the law of a country or territory outside England and Wales and Northern Ireland where the act constituting the offence would constitute a qualifying offence if done in England and Wales or Northern Ireland (whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).”

(11) The amendments made by this section apply only in connection with the retention of section 18 material that is or was obtained or acquired by a law enforcement authority—

(a) on or after the commencement day, or

(b) in the period of 3 years ending immediately before the commencement day.

(12) Subsection (13) of this section applies where—

(a) at the beginning of the commencement day, a law enforcement authority has section 18 material which it obtained or acquired in the period of 3 years ending immediately before the commencement day,

(b) at a time before the commencement day (a “pre-commencement time”), the law enforcement authority was required by section 18(4) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to destroy the material, and

(c) at the pre-commencement time, the law enforcement authority could have retained the material under section 18A of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, as it has effect taking account of the amendments made by subsections (2) to (10) of this section, if those amendments had been in force.

(13) Where this subsection applies—

(a) the law enforcement authority is to be treated as not having been required to destroy the material at the pre-commencement time, but

(b) the material may not be used in evidence against the person to whom the material relates—

(i) in criminal proceedings in England and Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland in relation to an offence where those proceedings, or other criminal proceedings in relation to the person and the offence, were instituted before the commencement day, or

(ii) in criminal proceedings in any other country or territory.

(14) In this section—

“the commencement day” means the day on which this Act is passed;

“law enforcement authority” has the meaning given by section 18E(1) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008;

“section 18 material” has the meaning given by section 18(2) of that Act.

(15) For the purposes of this section, proceedings in relation to an offence are instituted—

(a) in England and Wales, when they are instituted for the purposes of Part 1 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (see section 15(2) of that Act);

(b) in Northern Ireland, when they are instituted for the purposes of Part 2 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (see section 44(1) and (2) of that Act);

(c) in Scotland, when they are instituted for the purposes of Part 3 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (see section 151(1) and (2) of that Act).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause enables a law enforcement authority to retain fingerprints and DNA profiles where a person has been convicted of an offence equivalent to a recordable offence in a jurisdiction outside England and Wales and Northern Ireland.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 37

Retention of pseudonymised biometric data

“(1) Part 1 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (powers to gather and share information) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (6).

(2) Section 18A (retention of material: general) is amended in accordance with subsections (3) to (5).

(3) In subsection (1), for “subsection (5)” substitute “subsections (4) to (9)”.

(4) In subsection (4)(a), after “relates” insert “(a “pseudonymised form”)”.

(5) After subsection (6) insert—

“(7) Section 18 material which is not a DNA sample may be retained indefinitely by a law enforcement authority if—

(a) the authority obtains or acquires the material directly or indirectly from an overseas law enforcement authority,

(b) the authority obtains or acquires the material in a form which includes information which identifies the person to whom the material relates,

(c) as soon as reasonably practicable after obtaining or acquiring the material, the authority takes the steps necessary for it to hold the material in a pseudonymised form, and

(d) having taken those steps, the law enforcement authority continues to hold the material in a pseudonymised form.

(8) In a case where section 18 material is being retained by a law enforcement authority under subsection (7), if—

(a) the law enforcement authority ceases to hold the material in a pseudonymised form, and

(b) the material relates to a person who has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction,

the material may be retained by the law enforcement authority until the end of the retention period specified in subsection (9).

(9) The retention period is the period of 3 years beginning with the date on which the law enforcement authority first ceases to hold the material in a pseudonymised form.”

(6) In section 18E(1) (supplementary provision)—

(a) in the definition of “law enforcement authority”, for paragraph (d) substitute—

“(d) an overseas law enforcement authority;”, and

(b) after that definition insert—

““overseas law enforcement authority” means a person formed or existing under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom so far as exercising functions which—

(a) correspond to those of a police force, or

(b) otherwise involve the investigation or prosecution of offences;”.

(7) The amendments made by this section apply only in connection with the retention of section 18 material that is or was obtained or acquired by a law enforcement authority—

(a) on or after the commencement day, or

(b) in the period of 3 years ending immediately before the commencement day.

(8) Subsections (9) to (12) of this section apply where, at the beginning of the commencement day, a law enforcement authority has section 18 material which it obtained or acquired in the period of 3 years ending immediately before the commencement day.

(9) Where the law enforcement authority holds the material in a pseudonymised form at the beginning of the commencement day, the authority is to be treated for the purposes of section 18A(7)(c) and (d) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 as having—

(a) taken the steps necessary for it to hold the material in a pseudonymised form as soon as reasonably practicable after obtaining or acquiring the material, and

(b) continued to hold the material in a pseudonymised form until the commencement day.

(10) Where the law enforcement authority does not hold the material in a pseudonymised form at the beginning of the commencement day, the authority is to be treated for the purposes of section 18A(7)(c) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 as taking the steps necessary for it to hold the material in a pseudonymised form as soon as reasonably practicable after obtaining or acquiring the material if it takes those steps on, or as soon as reasonably practicable after, the commencement day.

(11) Subsection (12) of this section applies where, at a time before the commencement day (a “pre-commencement time”), the law enforcement authority was required by section 18(4) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to destroy the material but—

(a) at the pre-commencement time, the law enforcement authority could have retained the material under section 18A(7) to (9) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (as inserted by this section) if those provisions had been in force, or

(b) on or after the commencement day, the law enforcement authority may retain the material under those provisions by virtue of subsection (9) or (10) of this section.

(12) Where this subsection applies—

(a) the law enforcement authority is to be treated as not having been required to destroy the material at the pre-commencement time, but

(b) the material may not be used in evidence against the person to whom the material relates—

(i) in criminal proceedings in England and Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland in relation to an offence where those proceedings, or other criminal proceedings in relation to the person and the offence, were instituted before the commencement day, or

(ii) in criminal proceedings in any other country or territory.

(13) In this section—

“the commencement day” , “law enforcement authority” and “section 18 material” have the meaning given in section (Retention of biometric data and recordable offences)(14);

“instituted” , in relation to proceedings, has the meaning given in section (Retention of biometric data and recordable offences)(15);

“in a pseudonymised form” has the meaning given by section 18A(4) and (10) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (as amended or inserted by this section).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause enables a law enforcement authority to retain fingerprints and DNA profiles where, as soon as reasonably practicable after acquiring or obtaining them, the authority takes the steps necessary for it to hold the material in a form which does not include information which identifies the person to whom the material relates.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 38

Retention of biometric data from INTERPOL

“(1) Part 1 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (powers to gather and share information) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (4).

(2) In section 18(4) (destruction of national security material not subject to existing statutory restrictions), after “18A” insert “, 18AA”.

(3) After section 18A insert—

“18AA Retention of material from INTERPOL

(1) This section applies to section 18 material which is not a DNA sample where the law enforcement authority obtained or acquired the material as part of a request for assistance, or a notification of a threat, sent to the United Kingdom via INTERPOL’s systems.

(2) The law enforcement authority may retain the material until the National Central Bureau informs the authority that the request or notification has been cancelled or withdrawn.

(3) If the law enforcement authority is the National Central Bureau, it may retain the material until it becomes aware that the request or notification has been cancelled or withdrawn.

(4) In this section—

“INTERPOL” means the organisation called the International Criminal Police Organization - INTERPOL;

“the National Central Bureau” means the body appointed for the time being in accordance with INTERPOL’s constitution to serve as the United Kingdom’s National Central Bureau.

(5) The reference in subsection (1) to material obtained or acquired as part of a request or notification includes material obtained or acquired as part of a communication, sent to the United Kingdom via INTERPOL’s systems, correcting, updating or otherwise supplementing the request or notification.

18AB Retention of material from INTERPOL: supplementary

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend section 18AA to make such changes as the Secretary of State considers appropriate in consequence of—

(a) changes to the name of the organisation which, when section 18AA was enacted, was called the International Criminal Police Organization - INTERPOL (“the organisation”),

(b) changes to arrangements made by the organisation which involve fingerprints or DNA profiles being provided to members of the organisation (whether changes to existing arrangements or changes putting in place new arrangements), or

(c) changes to the organisation’s arrangements for liaison between the organisation and its members or between its members.

(2) Regulations under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.”

(4) In section 18BA(5)(a) (retention of further fingerprints), after “18A” insert “, 18AA”.

(5) Section 18AA of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 applies in relation to section 18 material obtained or acquired by a law enforcement authority before the commencement day (as well as material obtained or acquired on or after that day), except where the law enforcement authority was informed, or became aware, as described in subsection (2) or (3) of that section before the commencement day.

(6) Subsection (7) of this section applies where—

(a) at the beginning of the commencement day, a law enforcement authority has section 18 material,

(b) at a time before the commencement day (a “pre-commencement time”), the law enforcement authority was required by section 18(4) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to destroy the material, but

(c) at the pre-commencement time, the law enforcement authority could have retained the material under section 18AA of that Act (as inserted by this section) if it had been in force.

(7) Where this subsection applies—

(a) the law enforcement authority is to be treated as not having been required to destroy the material at the pre-commencement time, but

(b) the material may not be used in evidence against the person to whom the material relates—

(i) in criminal proceedings in England and Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland in relation to an offence where those proceedings, or other criminal proceedings in relation to the person and the offence, were instituted before the commencement day, or

(ii) in criminal proceedings in any other country or territory.

(8) In this section—

“the commencement day” , “law enforcement authority” and “section 18 material” have the meaning given in section (Retention of biometric data and recordable offences)(14);

“instituted” , in relation to proceedings, has the meaning given in section (Retention of biometric data and recordable offences)(15).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This new clause enables fingerprints and DNA profiles obtained as part of a request for assistance, or notification of a threat, from INTERPOL and held for national security purposes by a law enforcement authority to be retained until the authority is informed that the request or notification has been withdrawn or cancelled.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 39

National Underground Asset Register

“(1) After section 106 of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 insert—

“Part 3A

National Underground Asset Register: England and Wales

The register

106A National Underground Asset Register

(1) The Secretary of State must keep a register of information relating to apparatus in streets in England and Wales.

(2) The register is to be known as the National Underground Asset Register (and is referred to in this Act as “NUAR”).

(3) NUAR must be kept in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

(4) The Secretary of State must make arrangements so as to enable any person who is required, by a provision of Part 3, to enter information into NUAR to have access to NUAR for that purpose.

(5) Regulations under subsection (3) are subject to the negative procedure.

106B Access to information kept in NUAR

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision in connection with making information kept in NUAR available—

(a) under a licence, or

(b) without a licence.

(2) The regulations may (among other things)—

(a) make provision about which information, or descriptions of information, may be made available;

(b) make provision about the descriptions of person to whom information may be made available;

(c) make provision for information to be made available subject to exceptions;

(d) make provision requiring or authorising the Secretary of State to adapt, modify or obscure information before making it available;

(e) make provision authorising all information kept in NUAR to be made available to prescribed descriptions of person under prescribed conditions;

(f) make provision about the purposes for which information may be made available;

(g) make provision about the form and manner in which information may be made available.

(3) The regulations may make provision about licences under which information kept in NUAR is made available, including—

(a) provision about the form of a licence;

(b) provision about the terms and conditions of a licence;

(c) provision for information to be made available under a licence for free or for a fee;

(d) provision about the amount of the fees, including provision for the amount of a fee to be an amount which is intended to exceed the cost of the things in respect of which the fee is charged;

(e) provision about how funds raised by means of fees must or may be used, including provision for funds to be paid to persons who are required, by a provision of Part 3, to enter information into NUAR.

(4) Except as otherwise prescribed and subject to section 106G, processing of information by the Secretary of State in exercise of functions conferred by or under section 106A or this section does not breach—

(a) any obligation of confidence owed by the Secretary of State, or

(b) any other restriction on the processing of information (however imposed).

(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.

Requirements for undertakers to pay fees and provide information

106C Fees payable by undertakers in relation to NUAR

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision requiring undertakers having apparatus in a street to pay fees to the Secretary of State for or in connection with the exercise by the Secretary of State of any function conferred by or under this Part.

(2) The regulations may—

(a) specify the amounts of the fees, or the maximum amounts of the fees, or

(b) provide for the amounts of the fees, or the maximum amounts of the fees, to be determined in accordance with the regulations.

(3) In making the regulations the Secretary of State must seek to secure that, so far as possible and taking one year with another, the income from fees matches the expenses incurred by the Secretary of State in, or in connection with, exercising functions conferred by or under this Part (including expenses not directly connected with the keeping of NUAR).

(4) Except where the regulations specify the amounts of the fees—

(a) the amounts of the fees must be specified by the Secretary of State in a statement, and

(b) the Secretary of State must—

(i) publish the statement, and

(ii) lay it before Parliament.

(5) Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision about—

(a) when a fee is to be paid;

(b) the manner in which a fee is to be paid;

(c) the payment of discounted fees;

(d) exceptions to requirements to pay fees;

(e) the refund of all or part of a fee which has been paid.

(6) Before making regulations under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) such representatives of persons likely to be affected by the regulations as the Secretary of State considers appropriate, and

(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(7) Subject to the following provisions of this section regulations under subsection (1) are subject to the affirmative procedure.

(8) Regulations under subsection (1) that only make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (2) are subject to the negative procedure.

(9) But the first regulations under subsection (1) that make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (2) are subject to the affirmative procedure.

106D Providing information for purposes of regulations under section 106C

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision requiring undertakers having apparatus in a street to provide information to the Secretary of State for either or both of the following purposes—

(a) assisting the Secretary of State in determining the provision that it is appropriate for regulations under section 106C(1) or a statement under section 106C(4) to make;

(b) assisting the Secretary of State in determining whether it is appropriate to make changes to such provision.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision requiring undertakers having apparatus in a street to provide information to the Secretary of State for either or both of the following purposes—

(a) ascertaining whether a fee is payable by a person under regulations under section 106C(1);

(b) working out the amount of a fee payable by a person.

(3) Regulations under subsection (1) or (2) may require an undertaker to notify the Secretary of State of any changes to information previously provided under the regulations.

(4) Regulations under subsection (1) or (2) may make provision about—

(a) when information is to be provided (which may be at prescribed intervals);

(b) the form and manner in which information is to be provided;

(c) exceptions to requirements to provide information.

(5) Regulations under subsection (1) or (2) are subject to the negative procedure.

Monetary penalties

106E Monetary penalties

Schedule 5A makes provision about the imposition of penalties in connection with requirements imposed by regulations under sections 106C(1) and 106D(1) and (2).

Exercise of functions by third party

106F Arrangements for third party to exercise functions

(1) The Secretary of State may make arrangements for a prescribed person to exercise a relevant function of the Secretary of State.

(2) More than one person may be prescribed.

(3) Arrangements under this section may—

(a) provide for the Secretary of State to make payments to the person, and

(b) make provision as to the circumstances in which any such payments are to be repaid to the Secretary of State.

(4) In the case of the exercise of a function by a person authorised by arrangements under this section to exercise that function, any reference in this Part or in regulations under this Part to the Secretary of State in connection with that function is to be read as a reference to that person.

(5) Arrangements under this section do not prevent the Secretary of State from exercising a function to which the arrangements relate.

(6) Except as otherwise prescribed and subject to section 106G, the disclosure of information between the Secretary of State and a person in connection with the person’s entering into arrangements under this section or exercise of functions to which such arrangements relate does not breach—

(a) any obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure, or

(b) any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).

(7) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.

(8) In this section “relevant function” means any function of the Secretary of State conferred by or under this Part (including the function of charging or recovering fees under section 106C) other than—

(a) a power to make regulations, or

(b) a function under section 106C(4) (specifying of fees etc).

Data protection

106G Data protection

(1) A duty or power to process information that is imposed or conferred by or under this Part does not operate to require or authorise the processing of personal data that would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether processing of personal data would do so, that duty or power is to be taken into account).

(2) In this section—

“the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3(9) of that Act);

“personal data” has the same meaning as in that Act (see section 3(2) of that Act).

Supplementary provisions

106H Regulations under this Part

(1) In this Part “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(2) Regulations under this Part may make—

(a) different provision for different purposes;

(b) supplementary and incidental provision.

(3) Regulations under this Part are to be made by statutory instrument.

(4) Before making regulations under this Part the Secretary of State must consult the Welsh Ministers.

(5) Where regulations under this Part are subject to “the affirmative procedure” the regulations may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(6) Where regulations under this Part are subject to “the negative procedure” the statutory instrument containing the regulations is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(7) Any provision that may be made in regulations under this Part subject to the negative procedure may be made in regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.

106I Interpretation

(1) In this Part the following terms have the same meaning as in Part 3—

“apparatus” (see sections 89(3) and 105(1));

“in” (in a context referring to apparatus in a street) (see section 105(1));

“street” (see section 48(1) and (2));

“undertaker” (in relation to apparatus or in a context referring to having apparatus in a street) (see sections 48(5) and 89(4)).

(2) In this Part “processing” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3(4) of that Act) and “process” is to be read accordingly.”

(2) In section 167 of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (Crown application)—

(a) after subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) The provisions of Part 3A of this Act (National Underground Asset Register: England and Wales) bind the Crown.”;

(b) in subsection (5), for “(4)” substitute “(4) or (4A)”.

(3) Schedule (National Underground Asset Register: monetary penalties) to this Act inserts Schedule 5A into the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (monetary penalties).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment inserts Part 3A into the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 which requires, and makes provision in connection with, the keeping of a register of information relating to apparatus in streets (to be called the National Underground Asset Register).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 40

Information in relation to apparatus

“(1) The New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (6).

(2) For the italic heading before section 79 (records of location of apparatus) substitute “Duties in relation to recording and sharing of information about apparatus”.

(3) In section 79—

(a) for the heading substitute “Information in relation to apparatus”;

(b) in subsection (1), for paragraph (c) substitute—

“(c) being informed of its location under section 80(2),”;

(c) after subsection (1A) (as inserted by section 46(2) of the Traffic Management Act 2004) insert—

“(1B) An undertaker must, except in such cases as may be prescribed, record in relation to every item of apparatus belonging to the undertaker such other information as may be prescribed as soon as reasonably practicable after—

(a) placing the item in the street or altering its position,

(b) inspecting, maintaining, adjusting, repairing, altering or renewing the item,

(c) locating the item in the street in the course of executing any other works, or

(d) receiving any such information in relation to the item under section 80(2).”

(d) omit subsection (3);

(e) in subsection (3A) (as inserted by section 46(4) of the Traffic Management Act 2004)—

(i) for “to (3)” substitute “and (2A)”;

(ii) for “subsection (1)” substitute “this section”;

(f) after subsection (3A) insert—

“(3B) Before the end of the initial upload period an undertaker must enter into NUAR—

(a) all information that is included in the undertaker’s records under subsection (1) on the archive upload date, and

(b) any other information of a prescribed description that is held by the undertaker on that date.

(3C) Where an undertaker records information as required by subsection (1) or (1B), or updates such information, the undertaker must, within a prescribed period, enter the recorded or updated information into NUAR.

(3D) The duty under subsection (3C) does not apply in relation to information recorded or updated before the archive upload date.

(3E) A duty under subsection (3B) or (3C) does not apply in such cases as may be prescribed.

(3F) Information must be entered into NUAR under subsection (3B) or (3C) in such form and manner as may be prescribed.”

(g) in subsection (4)(a), omit “not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”;

(h) after subsection (6) insert—

“(7) For the purposes of subsection (3B) the Secretary of State must by regulations—

(a) specify a date as “the archive upload date”, and

(b) specify a period beginning with that date as the “initial upload period”.

(8) For the meaning of “NUAR”, see section 106A.”

(4) For section 80 (duty to inform undertakers of location of apparatus) substitute—

“80 Duties to report missing or incorrect information in relation to apparatus

(1) Subsection (2) applies where a person executing works of any description in a street finds an item of apparatus belonging to an undertaker in relation to which prescribed information—

(a) is not entered in NUAR, or

(b) is entered in NUAR but is incorrect.

(2) The person must take such steps as are reasonably practicable to inform the undertaker to whom the item belongs of the missing or incorrect information.

(3) Where a person executing works of any description in a street finds an item of apparatus which does not belong to the person and is unable, after taking such steps as are reasonably practicable, to ascertain to whom the item belongs, the person must—

(a) if the person is an undertaker, enter into NUAR, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, prescribed information in relation to the item;

(b) in any other case, inform the street authority of that information.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) have effect subject to such exceptions as may be prescribed.

(5) A person who fails to comply with subsection (2) or (3) commits an offence.

(6) A person who commits an offence under subsection (5) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.

(7) Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) such representatives of persons likely to be affected by the regulations as the Secretary of State considers appropriate, and

(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(8) For the meaning of “NUAR”, see section 106A.”

(5) Before section 81 (duty to maintain apparatus) insert—

“Other duties and liabilities of undertakers in relation to apparatus”.

(6) In section 104 (regulations), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) Before making regulations under section 79 or 80 the Secretary of State must consult the Welsh Ministers.

(1B) Regulations under this Part may make supplementary or incidental provision.”

(7) In consequence of the provision made by subsection (4), omit section 47 of the Traffic Management Act 2004.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment amends the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 so as to impose new duties on undertakers to keep records of, and share information relating to, apparatus in streets; and makes amendments consequential on those changes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 41

Pre-commencement consultation

“A requirement to consult under a provision inserted into the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 by section (National Underground Asset Register) or (Information in relation to apparatus) may be satisfied by consultation before, as well as consultation after, the provision inserting that provision comes into force.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment provides that a requirement that the Secretary of State consult under a provision inserted into the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 by the new clauses inserted by Amendments NC39 and NC40 may be satisfied by consultation undertaken before or after the provision inserting that provision comes into force.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 42

Transfer of certain functions to Secretary of State

“(1) The powers to make regulations under section 79(1) and (2) of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991, so far as exercisable in relation to Wales, are transferred to the Secretary of State.

(2) The power to make regulations under section 79(1A) of that Act (as inserted by section 46(2) A42of the Traffic Management Act 2004), so far as exercisable in relation to Wales, is transferred to the Secretary of State.

(3) The Street Works (Records) (England) Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/3217) have effect as if the reference to England in regulation 1(2) were a reference to England and Wales.

(4) The Street Works (Records) (Wales) Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/1812) are revoked.”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)

This amendment provides that certain powers to make regulations under section 79 of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991, so far as exercisable in relation to Wales, are transferred from the Welsh Ministers to the Secretary of State; and makes provision in relation to regulations already made under those powers.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 5

Lawfulness of processing

Amendment proposed: 11, page 7, line 12, at end insert—

““internal administrative purposes”, in relation to special category data, means the conditions set out for lawful processing in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act 2018.”—(Kate Osborne.)

This amendment clarifies that the processing of special category data in employment must follow established principles for reasonable processing, as defined by paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act 2018.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---
16:45

Division 14

Ayes: 200


Labour: 143
Scottish National Party: 33
Liberal Democrat: 12
Independent: 6
Plaid Cymru: 2
Green Party: 1
Alba Party: 1
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 276


Conservative: 271
Independent: 3

Clause 7
--- Later in debate ---
17:00

Division 15

Ayes: 37


Scottish National Party: 31
Independent: 2
Plaid Cymru: 2
Green Party: 1
Alba Party: 1

Noes: 279


Conservative: 271
Independent: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Clause 12
--- Later in debate ---
17:12

Division 16

Ayes: 195


Labour: 139
Scottish National Party: 32
Liberal Democrat: 12
Independent: 6
Plaid Cymru: 2
Green Party: 1
Alba Party: 1

Noes: 273


Conservative: 266
Independent: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Clause 16
--- Later in debate ---
17:25

Division 17

Ayes: 198


Labour: 141
Scottish National Party: 33
Liberal Democrat: 12
Independent: 6
Plaid Cymru: 2
Green Party: 1
Alba Party: 1

Noes: 275


Conservative: 268
Independent: 3
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Clause 33
--- Later in debate ---
17:37

Division 18

Ayes: 194


Labour: 140
Scottish National Party: 33
Liberal Democrat: 11
Independent: 6
Plaid Cymru: 2
Green Party: 1
Alba Party: 1

Noes: 275


Conservative: 270
Independent: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Amendments made: 253, page 110, line 4, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
--- Later in debate ---
17:49

Division 19

Ayes: 274


Conservative: 267
Independent: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 52


Scottish National Party: 30
Labour: 7
Liberal Democrat: 7
Independent: 2
Plaid Cymru: 2
Conservative: 1
Green Party: 1
Alba Party: 1

New schedule 1 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
--- Later in debate ---
John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

This Bill will deliver tangible benefits to British consumers and businesses alike, which would not have been possible if Britain had still been a member of the European Union. It delivers a more flexible and less burdensome data protection regime that maintains high standards of privacy protection while promoting growth and boosting innovation. It does so with the support of the Information Commissioner, and without jeopardising the UK’s European Union data adequacy.

I would like to thank all Members who contributed during the passage of the Bill, and all those who have helped get it right. I now commend it to the House on its onward passage to the other place.

Roger Gale Portrait Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---
18:05

Division 20

Ayes: 269


Conservative: 264
Independent: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 31


Scottish National Party: 24
Independent: 2
Plaid Cymru: 2
Conservative: 1
Green Party: 1

Bill read the Third time and passed.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Read Full debate

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Moved by
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

That the Bill be now read a second time.

Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, in a time of rapid technological change, we need people to trust in how we can use data for greater good. By building understanding and confidence in the rules surrounding how we use data, we can unlock its real potential, not only for businesses but for people going about their everyday lives.

In 2018 Parliament passed the Data Protection Act, which was the UK’s implementation of the EU general data protection regulation. While the EU GDPR protected the privacy rights of individuals, there were unintended consequences. It resulted in high costs and a disproportionate compliance burden for small businesses. These reforms deliver on the Government’s promise to use the opportunity afforded to us by leaving the European Union to create a new and improved UK data rights regime.

The Bill has five parts that deliver on individual elements of these reforms. Part 1 updates and simplifies the UK GDPR and DPA 2018 to ease compliance burdens on businesses and introduce safeguards from new technologies. It also updates the similar regimes that apply to law enforcement agencies and intelligence services. Part 2 enables DSIT’s digital verification services policy, giving people secure options to prove their identity digitally across different sectors of the economy if they choose to do so. Part 3 establishes a framework to set up smart data schemes across the economy. Part 4 reforms the privacy and electronic communications regulations—PECR—to bring stronger protection for consumers against nuisance calls. It also contains reforms to ensure the better use of data in health and adult social care, law enforcement and security. Part 5 will modernise the Information Commissioner’s Office by making sure that it has the capabilities and the powers to tackle organisations that breach data rules, giving the ICO freedom to better allocate its resources and ensuring that it is more accountable to Parliament and to the public.

I stress that the Bill will continue to maintain the highest standards of data protection that people rightly expect. It will also help those who use our data to make our lives healthier, safer and more prosperous. That is because we have convened industry leaders and experts to codesign the Bill with us throughout its creation. This legislation will ensure that our regulation reflects the way in which real people live their lives and run their businesses.

On Report in the other place, we tabled a number of amendments to strengthen the fundamental elements of the Bill and to reflect the Government’s commitment to unleash the power of data across our economy and society. I take this opportunity to thank Members of Parliament and the numerous external stakeholders who have worked with us to ensure that the Bill functions at its absolute best. Taken together, these amendments will benefit the economy by £10.6 billion over 10 years. This is more than double the estimated impact of the Bill when introduced in the spring.

These reforms are expected to lower the compliance burden on businesses. We expect small and micro-businesses to achieve greater overall compliance cost savings than larger business. We expect these compliance cost savings for small and micro-business compliance to be approximately £90 million a year as a result of the domestic data protection policies in the Bill.

The Bill makes it clear that the amount that any organisation needs to do to comply and demonstrate compliance should be directly related to the risk its processing activities pose to individuals. That means that in the future, organisations will have to keep records of their processing activities, undertake risk assessments and designate senior responsible individuals to manage data protection risks only if their processing activities are likely to pose high risks to individuals. We are also removing the need for organisations to do detailed legitimate interest assessments and document the outcomes when their activities are clearly in the public interest—for example, when they are reporting child safeguarding concerns. This will help reduce the amount of privacy paperwork and allow businesses to invest time and resources elsewhere.

Let me make this absolutely clear: enabling more effective use of data and ensuring high data protection standards are not contradictory objectives. Businesses need to understand and to trust in our data protection rules, and that is what these measures are designed to achieve. At the same time, people across the UK need to fundamentally trust that the system works for them too. We know that lots of organisations already have good processes for how they deal with data protection complaints, and it is right that we strengthen this. By making these a requirement, the Bill helps data subjects exercise their rights and directly challenge organisations they believe are misusing their data.

We already have a world-leading independent regulator, the Information Commissioner’s Office. It is only right that we continue to provide the ICO with the tools it needs to keep pace with our dramatically changing tech landscape. The ICO needs to keep our personal data safe while ensuring that it remains accountable, flexible and fit for the modern world. We are modernising the structure and objectives of the Information Commissioner’s Office. Under this legislation, protecting our personal data will remain the ICO’s primary focus, but it will also need to consider how it can empower businesses and organisations to drive growth and innovation across the UK and support public trust and confidence in the use of personal data. We must ensure that our world-leading regulator is equipped to tackle the biggest and most important threats and data breaches, protecting individuals from the highest harm. The Bill means that the ICO can take a more proportionate approach to how it gets involved in individual disputes, not having to do so too early in the process before people have had a chance to resolve things sensibly themselves, while still being the ultimate guardian of data subjects’ rights.

The Bill will create a modern ICO that can tackle the modern, more sophisticated challenges of today and support businesses across the UK to make safe, effective use of data to grow and to innovate. It will also unlock the potential of transformative technologies by making sure that organisations know when they can use responsible automated decision-making and that people know when they can request human intervention where these decisions impact their lives.

Alongside this, there are billions of pounds to be seized in the booming global data-driven trade. With the new international transfers regime, we are clarifying our regime for building data bridges to secure the close, free and safe exchange of data with trusted allies. Alongside new data bridges, the Secretary of State will be able to recognise new transfer mechanisms for businesses to protect international transfers. Businesses will still be able to transfer data across borders with the compliant mechanisms they already use, avoiding needless checks and costs.

The Bill will allow people to control more of their data. It will support smart data schemes that empower consumers and small businesses to make better use of their own data, building on the extraordinary success of open banking, where consumers and businesses access innovative services to manage their finances and spending, track their carbon footprint or access credit. Open banking is already estimated to have the potential to bring in £12 billion each year for consumers and £6 billion for small businesses, as well as boosting innovation in our world-leading fintech industry. With this Bill, we can extend the same benefits for consumers and business across the economy.

Another way the Bill ensures that people have control of their own data is by making it easier and more secure for people to prove things about themselves. Digital identities will help those who choose to use them to prove their identity electronically rather than always having to dig out stacks of physical documents such as passports, bills, statements and birth certificates. Digital verification services are already in existence and we want to put them on a secure and trusted footing, giving people more choice and confidence as they navigate everyday tasks, and saving businesses time and money.

The Bill supports the growing demand, domestic and global, for secure and trusted electronic transactions such as qualified electronic signatures. It also makes provision for the preservation of important data for coronial investigations in the event of a child taking their own life. Any death of a child is a tragedy, and the Government have the utmost sympathy for families affected by this tragic issue. I recognise, and I share, the strong feelings on this issue expressed by noble Lords on this matter and during the passage of the Online Safety Act.

The new provision requires Ofcom, following notification from a coroner, to issue data preservation notices requiring relevant tech companies to hold data that they may have relating to a deceased child’s use of online services in circumstances where the coroner suspects that the child has taken their own life. This greatly strengthens Ofcom’s and a coroner’s ability to access data from online services and provides them with the tools they need to carry out their job. It will include, for example, if a child had taken their own life after interacting with self-harm or other harmful content online, or if they suspect that a child may have been subjected to coercion, online bullying or harassment. It would also include cases where a child has done an intentional act that has caused their death but where they may not have intended to die, such as the tragic circumstances where a child dies accidentally when attempting to recreate an online challenge.

The new provisions do not cover children’s deaths caused by homicide, because the police already have extensive investigative powers in this context. These were strengthened last year by the entry into force of the UK-US data access agreement, which enables law enforcement to directly access content of communications held by US-based companies for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting serious crimes, such as murder and child sexual abuse and exploitation.

The families who have been courageously campaigning after their children were tragically murdered did not have access to this agreement because it entered into force only last October. To date, 10,000 requests for data have been made under it. However, we understand their concerns, and the Secretary of State, along with Justice Ministers, will work with noble Lords ahead of Committee and carefully listen to their arguments on potential amendments. We absolutely recognise the need to give families the answers they need and to ensure that there is no gap in the law.

Some aspects of the GDPR are very complex, causing uncertainty around how it applies and hampering private and public bodies’ ability to use data as dynamically as they could. The Bill will help scientists make the most of data by ensuring that they can be reused for other related studies. This is achieved by removing burdensome requirements for scientific researchers, so that they can dedicate more time to focus on what they do best. The Bill will also simplify the legal requirements around research and bring legal clarity. This is achieved by transposing definitions of scientific, historical and statistical-purposes research into the operative text.

The Bill will improve the way that the NHS and adult social care organise data to deliver crucial health services in England. It will also improve the efficiency of data protection for law enforcement and national security partners, encouraging better use of personal data to help protect the public. The Bill will save up to 1.5 million hours of police time each year.

The Bill will also allow us to take further steps to safeguard our national security, by addressing risks from hostile agents seeking to access our data or damage our data infrastructure. It will allow the DWP to protect taxpayers’ money from falling into the hands of fraudsters, as part of the DWP’s biggest reform to fraud legislation in 20 years. We know that, over this last year, overpayments to capital fraud and error in universal credit alone were almost £900 million. It is time to modernise and strengthen the DWP’s legislative framework to ensure that it gives those fighting fraud and error the tools that they need and so that it stands up to future challenges.

Through the Bill we are revolutionising the way we install, maintain, operate and repair pipes and cables buried beneath the ground. I am sure we have all, knowingly or not, been impacted by one of the 60,000 accidental strikes on an underground pipe or cable that happen every year. The national underground asset register—NUAR—is a brand new digital map that gives planners and excavators secure and instant access to the data they need, when they need it. This means not only that the safety and lives of workers will no longer be at risk but that NUAR will underpin the Government’s priority to get the economy growing, expediting projects such as new roads, new houses and broadband rollout.

The Bill gives the people using data to improve our lives the certainty that they need. It maintains high standards for protecting people’s privacy, while seeking to maintain the EU’s adequacy decisions for the UK. The Bill is a hugely important piece of legislation and I thank noble Lords across the House for their involvement in and support for the Bill so far. I look forward to hearing their views today and throughout the rest of the Bill’s passage. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I sincerely thank all of today’s speakers for their powerful and learned contributions to a fascinating and productive debate. I very much welcome the engagement in this legislation that has been shown from across the House and such a clear setting out, at this early stage, of the important issues and caveats.

As I said, the Bill reflects the extensive process of consultation that the Government have undertaken, with almost 3,000 responses to the document Data: A New Direction, and the support it enjoys from both the ICO and industry groups. The debate in which we have engaged is a demonstration of noble Lords’ desire to ensure that our data protection regime evolves and works more effectively, while maintaining the highest standards of data protection for all.

I will respond to as many of the questions and points raised as I can. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if, in the interests of time and clarity, I do not name every noble Lord who spoke to every issue. A number of noble Lords expressed the wish that the Government remain open to any and all conversations. Should I inadvertently fail to address any problem satisfactorily, I affirm that I am very willing to engage with all noble Lords throughout the Bill’s passage, recognising its importance and, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said, the opportunity it presents to do great good.

Many noble Lords raised concerns that the Bill does not go far enough to protect personal data rights. This is certainly not our intent. The fundamental data protection principles set out in the UK GDPR—as my noble friend Lord Kirkhope pointed out, they include lawfulness, fairness, transparency, purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, security and accountability—remain at the heart of the UK’s data protection regime. Certain kinds of data, such as health data, remain special categories to which extra protections rightly apply. Changes such as requiring a senior responsible individual, rather than a data protection officer, mean that organisations still need to be accountable for how they process personal data but will have more flexibility about how they manage the data protection risks within their organisations.

On other specific points raised on the data protection framework, I agree that the right of access is key to ensuring transparency in data processing. The proposals do not restrict the right of access for reasonable requests for information and keep reasonable requests free of charge. On the creation of the new recognised legitimate interests lawful grounds, evidence from our consultation indicated that some organisations worried about getting the balancing test wrong, while others said that the need to document the outcome of their assessment could slow down important processing activities.

To promote responsible data sharing in relation to a limited number of public interest tasks, the Bill acknowledges the importance of these activities, which include safeguarding, crime prevention and national security, responding to emergencies and democratic engagement, but data controllers should not be required to do a case-by-case balancing test.

On cookies, the Bill will allow the Secretary of State to remove the need for data controllers to seek consent for other purposes in future, when the appropriate technologies to do so are readily available. The aim is to offer the user a clear, meaningful choice that can be made once and respected throughout their use of the internet. However, before any such powers are used, we will consult further to make sure that people are more effectively enabled to use different technology to set their online preferences.

On democratic engagement, extending the exemption allows a limited number of individuals, such as elected representatives and referendum campaigners, to process political opinions data without consent where this is necessary for their political activities. In a healthy democracy, it is not just registered political parties that may need to process political opinions data, and these amendments reflect that reality. This amendment does not remove existing rights. If people do not want their data processed for these purposes, they can ask the controller to stop doing so at any time. Before laying any regulations under this clause, the Government would need to consult the Information Commissioner and other interested parties, as well as gaining parliamentary approval.

I turn now to concerns raised by many about the independence of the regulator, the Information Commissioner. The ICO remains an independent regulator, accountable to Parliament, not the Government, in its delivery of data protection regulation. The Bill ensures it has the powers it needs to remain the guardian of people’s personal data. It can and does produce guidance on what it deems necessary. The Government welcome this and will work closely with it ahead of and throughout the implementation of this legislation.

New powers will also help to ensure that the Information Commissioner is able to access the evidence he needs to inform investigations and has the time needed to discover and respond to representations. This will result in more informed investigations and better outcomes. The commissioner will be able to require individuals to attend interviews only if he suspects that an organisation has failed to comply with or has committed an offence under data protection legislation. This power is based on existing comparable powers for the Financial Conduct Authority and the Competition and Markets Authority. A person is not required to answer a question if it would breach legal professional privilege or reveal evidence of an offence.

As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, pointed out, EU adequacy was mentioned by almost everybody, and concerns were raised that the Bill would impact our adequacy agreement with the EU. The Government believe that our reforms are compatible with maintaining our data adequacy decisions from the EU. While the Bill removes the more prescriptive elements of the GDPR, the UK will maintain its high standards of data protection and continue to have one of the closest regimes to the EU in the world after our reform. The test for EU adequacy set out by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the cases relating to UK adequacy decisions requires essential equivalence to the level of protection under the GDPR. It does not require a third country to have exactly the same rules as the EU in order to be considered inadequate. Indeed, 14 countries have EU adequacy, including Japan, New Zealand and Canada. All of these nations pursue independent and often more divergent approaches to data protection.

Regarding our national security practices, in 2020 and 2021, the European Commission carried out a thorough assessment of the UK’s legislation and regulatory framework for personal data, including access by public authorities for national security purposes. It assessed that the UK provides an adequate level of data protection. We maintain an ongoing dialogue with the EU and have a positive, constructive relationship. We will continue to engage regularly with the EU to ensure our reforms are understood.

A great many noble Lords rightly commented on AI regulation, or the lack of it, in the Bill. Existing data protection legislation—the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018—regulate the development of AI systems and other technologies to the extent that there is personal data involved. This means that the ICO will continue to play an important role in applying the AI principles as they relate to matters of privacy and data protection. The Government’s view is that it would not be effective to regulate the use of AI in this context solely through the lens of data protection.

Article 22 of the UK GDPR is currently the primary piece of UK law setting out the requirements related to automated decision-making, and this Bill sets out the rights that data subjects have to be informed about significant decisions that are taken about them through solely automated means, to seek human review of those decisions and to have them corrected. This type of activity is, of course, increasingly AI-driven, and so it is important to align these reforms with the UK’s wider approach to AI governance that has been published in the White Paper developed by the Office for Artificial Intelligence. This includes ensuring terms such as “meaningful human involvement” remain up to date and relevant, and the Bill includes regulation-making powers to that effect. The White Paper on the regulation of AI commits to a principles-based approach that supports innovation, and we are considering how the framework will apply to the various actors in the AI development and deployment life cycle, with a particular focus on foundation models. We are analysing the views we heard during the White Paper consultation. We will publish a response imminently, and we do not want to get ahead of that process at this point.

I turn to the protection of children. Once again, I thank noble Lords across the House for their powerful comments on the importance of protecting children’s data, including in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. On the very serious issue of data preservation orders, the Government continue to make it clear—both in public, at the Dispatch Box, and in private discussions—that we are firmly on the side of the bereaved parents. We consider that we have acted in good faith, and we all want the same outcomes for these families struck by tragedy. We are focused on ensuring that no parent is put through the same ordeal as these families in the future.

I recognise the need to give families the answers they require and to ensure there is no gap in the law. Giving families the answers they need remains the Government’s motivation for the amendment in the other place; it is the reason we will ensure that the amendment is comprehensive and is viewed as such by the families. I reassure the House that the Government have heard and understand the concerns raised on this issue, and that is why the Secretary of State, along with Justice Ministers, will work with noble Lords ahead of Committee and carefully listen to their arguments on potential amendments.

I also hear the concerns of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Young, on surveillance, police powers and police access to data. Abolishing the Surveillance Camera Commissioner will not reduce data protection. The role overlaps with other oversight bodies, which is inefficient and confusing for police and the public. The Bill addresses the duplication, which means that the ICO will continue to regulate data processing across all sectors, including policing. The aim is to improve effective independent oversight, which is key to public confidence. Simplification through consolidation improves consistency and guidance on oversight, makes the most of the available expertise, improves organisational resilience, and ends confusing and inefficient duplication.

The Government also have a responsibility to safeguard national security. The reports into events such as the Manchester Arena and Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist incidents have clearly noted that better joined-up working between the intelligence services and law enforcement supports that responsibility. This is why the Bill creates the power for designation notices to be issued, enabling joint controllerships between the intelligence services and law enforcement. The Secretary of State must consider the processing contained in the notice to be required for the purpose of safeguarding national security to grant it. This mirrors the high threshold for interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act, which requires that such interference be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society.

Concerns were raised by, among others, the noble Baronesses, Lady Young and Lady Bennett, and the noble Lords, Lord Sikka and Lord Bassam, on the proportionality of the measure helping the Government to tackle both fraud and error. Despite taking positive steps to reduce these losses, the DWP remains reliant on powers derived from legislation that is in part over 20 years old. The DWP published the fraud plan in May 2022. It set out clearly a number of new powers that it would seek to secure when parliamentary time allowed. Tackling fraud and error in the DWP is a priority for the Government but parliamentary time is tight. In the time available, the DWP has prioritised our key third-party data-gathering measure which will help to tackle one of the largest causes of fraud and error in the welfare system. We remain committed to delivering all the legislation outlined in the DWP’s fraud plan when parliamentary time allows.

To develop and test these new proposals, the DWP has been working closely with the industry, which recognises the importance of modernising and strengthening these powers to enable us to better detect fraud and error in the benefit system. This includes collaboration on the practical design, implementation and delivery of this measure, including establishing a working group with banks and the financial industry. The DWP has also regularly engaged with UK finance as well as individual banks, building societies and fintechs during the development of this measure, and continues to do so. It is of course important that where personal data is involved there are appropriate checks and balances. Organisations have a right to appeal against the requirement to comply with a data notice issued by the DWP.

Through our appeal process, the Government would first seek to resolve all disputes by DWP internal review. If this failed, the appeal would be referred to the First-tier Tax Tribunal, as currently is used in similar circumstances by HMRC. The third-party data-gathering powers that the DWP is taking are only broad to the extent that this ensures that they can be future-proofed. This is because the nature of fraud has changed significantly in recent years and continues to change significantly. The current powers that the DWP has are not sufficient to tackle the new kinds of fraud that we are now seeing in the welfare system. We are including all benefits to ensure that benefits such as state pension retain low rates of fraud. The DWP will of course want to focus this measure on addressing areas with a significant fraud or error challenge. The DWP has set out in its fraud plan how it plans to focus the new powers, which in the first instance will be on fraud in universal credit.

I thank noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for the attention paid to the department’s impact assessment, which sets out the details of this measure and all the others in the Bill. As he notes, it is substantive and thorough and was found to be such by the Regulatory Policy Committee, which gave it a green rating.

I hope that I have responded to most of the points raised by noble Lords today. I look forward to continuing to discuss these and other items raised.

Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would like some clarification. The Minister in the other place said:

“I agree, to the extent that levels of fraud in state pensions being currently nearly zero, the power is not needed in that case. However, the Government wish to retain an option should the position change in the future”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/23; col. 912.]


Can the noble Viscount explain why the Government still want to focus on recipients of state pension given that there is virtually no fraud? That is about 12.6 million people, so why?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Although proportionately fraud in the state pension is very low, it is still there. That will not be the initial focus, but the purpose is to future-proof the legislation rather than to have to keep coming back to your Lordships’ House.

Let me once again thank all noble Lords for their contributions and engagement. I look forward to further and more detailed debates on these matters and more besides in Committee. I recognise that there are strong views and it is a wide-ranging Bill, so there will be a lot of meat in our sandwich.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord de Clifford, on his perfectly judged maiden speech. I thoroughly enjoyed his description of his background and his valuable contributions on the Bill, and I welcome him to this House.

Finally, on a lighter note, I take this opportunity to wish all noble Lords—both those who have spoken in this debate and others—a very happy Christmas and a productive new year, during which I very much look forward to working with them on the Bill.

Bill read a second time.
Moved by
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That the bill be committed to a Grand Committee, and that it be an instruction to the Grand Committee that they consider the bill in the following order:

Clauses 1 to 5, Schedule 1, Clause 6, Schedule 2, Clauses 7 to 14, Schedule 3, Clauses 15 to 24, Schedule 4, Clause 25, Schedules 5 to 7, Clauses 26 to 46, Schedule 8, Clauses 47 to 51, Schedule 9, Clauses 52 to 117, Schedule 10, Clauses 118 to 128, Schedule 11, Clauses 129 to 137, Schedule 12, Clause 138, Schedule 13, Clauses 139 to 142, Schedule 14, Clause 143, Schedule 15, Clauses 144 to 157, Title.

Motion agreed.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Read Full debate

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I was saying, it is important for the framework on data protection that we take a precautionary approach. I hope that the Minister will this afternoon be able to provide a plain English explanation of the changes, as well as giving us an assurance that those changes to definitions do not result in watering down the current legislation.

We broadly support Amendments 1 and 5 and the clause stand part notice, in the sense that they provide additional probing of the Government’s intentions in this area. We can see that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is trying with Amendment 1 to bring some much-needed clarity to the anonymisation issue and, with Amendment 5, to secure that data remains personal data in any event. I suspect that the Minister will tell us this afternoon that that is already the case, but a significant number of commentators have questioned this, since the definition of “personal data” is seemingly moving away from the EU GDPR standard towards a definition that is more subjective from the perspective of the controller, processor or recipient. We must be confident that the new definition does not narrow the circumstances in which the information is protected as personal data. That will be an important standard for this Committee to understand.

Amendment 288, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement- Jones, seeks a review and an impact assessment of the anonymisation and identifiability of data subjects. Examining that in the light of the EU GDPR seems to us to be a useful and novel way of making a judgment over which regime better suits and serves data subjects.

We will listen with interest to the Minister’s response. We want to be more than reassured that the previous high standards and fundamental principles of data protection will not be undermined and compromised.

Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
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I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief, interrupted but none the less interesting opening debate. I will speak to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones; I note that I plan to that form of words quite a lot in the next eight sessions on this Bill. I thank them for tabling these amendments so that we can debate what are, in the Government’s view, the significant benefits of Clause 1.

In response to the points from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the appetite for the reforms in the Bill, we take very seriously the criticisms of the parties that he mentioned—the civil society groups—but it is important to note that, when the Government consulted on these reforms, we received almost 3,000 responses. At that time, we proposed to clarify when data would be regarded as anonymous and proposed legislating to confirm that the test for whether anonymous data can be reidentified is relative to the means available to the controller to reidentify the data. The majority of respondents agreed that greater clarity in legislation would indeed be beneficial.

As noble Lords will know, the UK’s data protection legislation applies only to personal data, which is data relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. It does not apply to non-personal, anonymous data. This is important because, if organisations can be sure that the data they are handling is anonymous, they may be able to more confidently put it to good use in important activities such as research and product development. The current data protection legislation is already clear that a person can be identified in a number of ways by reference to details such as names, identification numbers, location data and online identifiers, or via information about a person’s physical, genetic, mental, economic or cultural characteristics. The Bill does not change the existing legislation in this respect.

With regard to genetic information, which was raised by my noble friend Lord Kamall and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, any information that includes enough genetic markers to be unique to an individual is personal data and special category genetic data, even if names and other identifiers have been removed. This means that it is subject to the additional protections set out in Article 9 of the UK GDPR. The Bill does not change this position.

However, the existing legislation is unclear about the specific factors that a data controller must consider when assessing whether any of this information relates to an identifiable living person. This uncertainty is leading to inconsistent application of anonymisation and to anonymous data being treated as personal data out of an abundance of caution. This, in turn, reduces the opportunities for anonymous data to be used effectively for projects in the public interest. It is this difficulty that Clause 1 seeks to address by providing a comprehensive statutory test on identifiability. The test will require data controllers and processors to consider the likelihood of people within or outside their organisations reidentifying individuals using reasonable means. It is drawn from recital 26 of the EU GDPR and should therefore not be completely unfamiliar to most organisations.

I turn now to the specific amendments that have been tabled in relation to this clause. Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would reiterate the position currently set out in the UK GDPR and its recitals: where individuals can be identified without the use of additional information because data controllers fail to put in place appropriate organisational measures, such as technical or contractual safeguards prohibiting reidentification, they would be considered directly identifiable. Technical and organisational measures put in place by organisations are factors that should be considered alongside others under new Section 3A of the Data Protection Act when assessing whether an individual is identifiable from the data being processed. Clause 1 sets out the threshold at which data—and, therefore, personal data—is identifiable and clarifies when data is anonymous.

On the technical capabilities of a respective data controller, these are already relevant factors under current law and ICO guidance in determining whether data is personal. This means that the test of identifiability is already a relative one today in respect of the data controller, the data concerned and the purpose of the processing. However, the intention of the data controller is not a relevant factor under current law, and nor does Clause 1 make it a factor. Clause 1 merely clarifies the position under existing law and follows very closely the wording of recital 26. Let me state this clearly: nothing in Clause 1 introduces the subjective intention of the data controller as a relevant factor in determining identifiability, and the position will remain the same as under the current law and as set out in ICO guidance.

In response to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others on pseudonymised personal data, noble Lords may be aware that the definition of personal data in Article 4(1) of the UK GDPR, when read in conjunction with the definition of pseudonymisation in Article 4(5), makes it clear that pseudonymised data is personal data, not anonymous data, and is thus covered by the UK’s data protection regime. I hope noble Lords are reassured by that. I also hope that, for the time being, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree to withdraw his amendment and not press the related Amendment 5, which seeks to make it clear that pseudonymised data is personal data.

Amendment 4 would require the Secretary of State to assess the difference in meaning and scope between the current statutory definition of personal data and the new statutory definition that the Bill will introduce two months after its passing. Similarly, Amendment 288 seeks to review the impact of Clause 1 six months after the enactment of the Bill. The Government feel that neither of these amendments is necessary as the clause is drawn from recital 26 of the EU GDPR and case law and, as I have already set out, is not seeking to substantially change the definition of personal data. Rather, it is seeking to provide clarity in legislation.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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I follow the argument, but what we are suggesting in our amendment is some sort of impact assessment for the scheme, including how it currently operates and how the Government wish it to operate under the new legislation. Have the Government undertaken a desktop exercise or any sort of review of how the two pieces of legislation might operate? Has any assessment of that been made? If they have done so, what have they found?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Obviously, the Bill has been in preparation for some time. I completely understand the point, which is about how we can be so confident in these claims. I suggest that I work with the Bill team to get an answer to that question and write to Members of the Committee, because it is a perfectly fair question to ask what makes us so sure.

In the future tense, I can assure noble Lords that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology will monitor and evaluate the impact of this Bill as a whole in the years to come, in line with cross-government evaluation guidance and through continued engagement with stakeholders.

The Government feel that the first limb of Amendment 5 is not necessary given that, as has been noted, pseudonymised data is already considered personal data under this Bill. In relation to the second limb of the amendment, if the data being processed is actually personal data, the ICO already has powers to require organisations to address non-compliance. These include requiring it to apply appropriate protections to personal data that it is processing, and are backed up by robust enforcement mechanisms.

That said, it would not be appropriate for the processing of data that was correctly assessed as anonymous at the time of processing to retrospectively be treated as processing of personal data and subject to data protection laws, simply because it became personal data at a later point in the processing due to a change in circumstances. That would make it extremely difficult for any organisation to treat any dataset as anonymous and would undermine the aim of the clause, significantly reducing the potential to use anonymous data for important research and development activities.

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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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My Lords, we on the Labour Benches have become co-signatories to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding. The noble Baroness set out very clearly and expertly the overarching purpose of retaining the level of protection currently afforded by the Data Protection Act 2018. Amendments 2 and 3 specifically stipulate that, where data controllers know, or should reasonably know, that a user is a child, they should be given the data protection codified in that Act. Amendment 9 takes it a stage further and includes children’s data in the definition of sensitive personal data, and gives it the benefit of being treated to a heightened level of protection—quite rightly, too. Finally, Amendment 290—the favourite of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—attempts to hold Ministers to the commitment made by Paul Scully in the Commons to maintain existing standards of data protection carried over from that 2018 Act.

Why is all this necessary? I suspect that the Minister will argue that it is not needed because Clause 5 already provides for the Secretary of State to consider the impact of any changes to the rights and freedoms of individuals and, in particular, of children, who require special protection.

We disagree with that argument. In the interests of brevity and the spirit of the recent Procedure Committee report, which says that we should not repeat each other’s arguments, I do not intend to speak at length, but we have a principal concern: to try to understand why the Government want to depart from the standards of protection set out in the age-appropriate design code—the international gold standard—which they so enthusiastically signed up to just five or six years ago. Given the rising levels of parental concern over harmful online content and well-known cases highlighting the harms that can flow from unregulated material, why do the Government consider it safe to water down the regulatory standards at this precise moment in time? The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, valuably highlighted the impact of the current regulatory framework on companies’ behaviour. That is exactly what legislation is designed to do: to change how we look at things and how we work. Why change that? As she has argued very persuasively, it is and has been hugely transformative. Why throw away that benefit now?

My attention was drawn to one example of what can happen by a briefing note from the 5Rights Foundation. As it argued, children are uniquely vulnerable to harm and risk online. I thought its set of statistics was really interesting. By the age of 13, 72 million data points have already been collected about children. They are often not used in children’s best interests; for example, the data is often used to feed recommender systems and algorithms designed to keep attention at all costs and have been found to push harmful content at children.

When this happens repeatedly over time, it can have catastrophic consequences, as we know. The coroner in the Molly Russell inquest found that she had been recommended a stream of depressive content by algorithms, leading the coroner to rule that she

“died from an act of self-harm whilst suffering from depression and the negative effects of online content”.

We do not want more Molly Russell cases. Progress has already been made in this field; we should consider dispensing with it at our peril. Can the Minister explain today the thinking and logic behind the changes that the Government have brought forward? Can he estimate the impact that the new lighter-touch regime, as we see it, will have on child protection? Have the Government consulted extensively with those in the sector who are properly concerned about child protection issues, and what sort of responses have the Government received?

Finally, why have the Government decided to take a risk with the sound framework that was already in place and built on during the course of the Online Safety Act? We need to hear very clearly from the Minister how they intend to engage with groups that are concerned about these child protection issues, given the apparent loosening of the current framework. The noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said that this is hard-fought ground; we intend to continue making it so because these protections are of great value to our society.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her Amendments 2, 3, 9 and 290 and to all noble Lords who have spoken, as ever, so clearly on these points.

All these amendments seek to add protections for children to various provisions in the Bill. I absolutely recognise the intent behind them; indeed, let me take this opportunity to say that the Government take child safety deeply seriously and agree with the noble Baroness that all organisations must take great care, both when making decisions about the use of children’s data and throughout the duration of their processing activities. That said, I respectfully submit that these amendments are not necessary for three main reasons; I will talk in more general terms before I come to the specifics of the amendments.

First, the Bill maintains a high standard of data protection for everybody in the UK, including—of course—children. The Government are not removing any of the existing data protection principles in relation to lawfulness, fairness, transparency, purpose limitation, data minimisation, storage limitation, accuracy, data security or accountability; nor are they removing the provisions in the UK GDPR that require organisations to build privacy into the design and development of new processing activities.

The existing legislation acknowledges that children require specific protection for their personal data, as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned, and of their rights in relation to the processing of personal data. Organisations will need to make sure that they continue to comply with the data protection principles on children’s data and follow the ICO’s guidance on children and the UK GDPR, following the changes we make in the Bill. Organisations that provide internet services likely to be accessed by children will need to continue to comply with their transparency and fairness obligations and the ICO’s age-appropriate design code. The Government welcome the AADC, as Minister Scully said, and remain fully committed to the high standards of protection that it sets out for children.

Secondly, some of the provisions in the Bill have been designed specifically with the rights and safety of children in mind. For example, one reason that the Government introduced the new lawful ground of recognised legitimate interest in Clause 5, which we will debate later, was that some consultation respondents said that the current legislation can deter organisations, particularly in the voluntary sector, from sharing information that might help to prevent crime or protect children from harm. The same goes for the list of exemptions to the purpose limitation principle introduced by Clause 6.

There could be many instances where personal data collected for one purpose may have to be reused to protect children from crime or safeguarding risks. The Bill will provide greater clarity around this and has been welcomed by stakeholders, including in the voluntary sector.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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While some provisions in the Bill do not specifically mention children or children’s rights, data controllers will still need to carefully consider the impact of their processing activities on children. For example, the new obligations on risk assessments, record keeping and the designation of senior responsible individuals will apply whenever an organisation’s processing activities are likely to result in high risks to people, including children.

Thirdly, the changes we are making in the Bill must be viewed in a wider context. Taken together, the UK GDPR, the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Online Safety Act 2023 provide a comprehensive legal framework for keeping children safe online. Although the data protection legislation and the age-appropriate design code make it clear how personal data can be processed, the Online Safety Act makes clear that companies must take steps to make their platforms safe by design. It requires social media companies to protect children from illegal, harmful and age-inappropriate content, to ensure they are more transparent about the risks and dangers posed to children on their sites, and to provide parents and children with clear and accessible ways to report problems online when they do arise.

After those general remarks, I turn to the specific amendments. The noble Baroness’s Amendments 2 and 3 would amend Clause 1 of the Bill, which relates to the test for assessing whether data is personal or anonymous. Her explanatory statement suggests that these amendments are aimed at placing a duty on organisations to determine whether the data they are processing relates to children, thereby creating a system of age verification. However, requiring data controllers to carry out widespread age verification of data subjects could create its own data protection and privacy risks, as it would require them to retain additional personal information such as dates of birth.

The test we have set out for reidentification is intended to apply to adults and children alike. If any person is likely to be identified from the data using reasonable means, the data protection legislation will apply. Introducing one test for adults and one for children is unlikely to be workable in practice and fundamentally undermines the clarity that this clause seeks to bring to organisations. Whether a person is identifiable will depend on a number of objective factors, such as the resources and technology available to organisations, regardless of whether they are an adult or a child. Creating wholly separate tests for adults and children, as set out in the amendment, would add unnecessary complexity to the clause and potentially lead to confusion.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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As I understand it, the basis on which we currently operate is that children get a heightened level of protection. Is the Minister saying that that is now unnecessary and is captured by the way in which the legislation has been reframed?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am saying, specifically on Clause 1, that separating the identifiability of children and the identifiability of adults would be detrimental to both but particularly, in this instance, to children.

Amendment 9 would ensure that children’s data is included in the definition of special category data and is subject to the heightened protections afforded to this category of data by Article 9 of the UK GDPR. This could have unintended consequences, because the legal position would be that processing of children’s data would be banned unless specifically permitted. This could create the need for considerable additional legislation to exempt routine and important processing from the ban; for example, banning a Girl Guides group from keeping a list of members unless specifically exempted would be disproportionate. However, more sensitive data such as records relating to children’s health or safeguarding concerns would already be subject to heightened protections in the UK GDPR, as soon as the latter type of data is processed.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for raising these issues and for the chance to set out why the Government feel that children’s protection is at least maintained, if not enhanced. I hope my answers have, for the time being, persuaded her of the Government’s view that the Bill does not reduce standards of protection for children’s data. On that basis, I ask her also not to move her Amendment 290 on the grounds that a further overarching statement on this is unnecessary and may cause confusion when interpreting the legislation. For all the reasons stated above, I hope that she will now reconsider whether her amendments in this group are necessary and agree not to press them.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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Can I press the Minister more on Amendment 290 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron? All it does is seek to maintain the existing standards of data protection for children, as carried over from the 2018 Act. If that is all it does, what is the problem with that proposed new clause? In its current formulation, does it not put the intention of the legislation in a place of certainty? I do not quite get why it would be damaging.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I believe it restates what the Government feel is clearly implied or stated throughout the Bill: that children’s safety is paramount. Therefore, putting it there is either duplicative or confusing; it reduces the clarity of the Bill. In no way is this to say that children are not protected—far from it. The Government feel it would diminish the clarity and overall cohesiveness of the Bill to include it.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, not to put too fine a point on it, the Minister is saying that nothing in the Bill diminishes children’s rights, whether in Clause 1, Clause 6 or the legitimate interest in Clause 5. He is saying that absolutely nothing in the Bill diminishes children’s rights in any way. Is that his position?

Baroness Harding of Winscombe Portrait Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
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Can I add to that question? Is my noble friend the Minister also saying that there is no risk of companies misinterpreting the Bill’s intentions and assuming that this might be some form of diminution of the protections for children?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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In answer to both questions, what I am saying is that, first, any risk of misinterpreting the Bill with respect to children’s safety is diminished, rather than increased, by the Bill. Overall, it is the Government’s belief and intention that the Bill in no way diminishes the safety or privacy of children online. Needless to say, if over the course of our deliberations the Committee identifies areas of the Bill where that is not the case, we will absolutely be open to listening on that, but let me state this clearly: the intent is to at least maintain, if not enhance, the safety and privacy of children and their data.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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My Lords, that creates another question, does it not? If that is the case, why amend the original wording from the 2018 Act?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Sorry, the 2018 Act? Or is the noble Lord referring to the amendments?

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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Why change the wording that provides the protection that is there currently?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I assume the noble Lord is referring to Amendment 290.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Okay. The Government feel that, in terms of the efficient and effective drafting of the Bill, that paragraph diminishes the clarity by being duplicative rather than adding to it by making a declaration. For the same reason, we have chosen not to make a series of declarations about other intentions of the Bill overall in the belief that the Bill’s intent and outcome are protected without such a statement.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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My Lords, before our break, the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said that this is hard-fought ground; I hope the Minister understands from the number of questions he has just received during his response that it will continue to be hard-fought ground.

I really regret having to say this at such an early stage on the Bill, but I think that some of what the Minister said was quite disingenuous. We will get to it in other parts of the Bill, but the thing that we have all agreed to disagree on at this point is the statement that the Bill maintains data privacy for everyone in the UK. That is a point of contention between noble Lords and the Minister. I absolutely accept and understand that we will come to a collective view on it in Committee. However, the Minister appeared to suggest—I ask him to correct me if I have got this wrong—that the changes on legitimate interest and purpose limitation are child safety measures because some people are saying that they are deterred from sharing data for child protection reasons. I have to tell him that they are not couched or formed like that; they are general-purpose shifts. There is absolutely no question but that the Government could have made specific changes for child protection, put them in the Bill and made them absolutely clear. I find that very worrying.

I also find it worrying, I am afraid—this is perhaps where we are heading and the thing that many organisations are worried about—that bundling the AADC in with the Online Safety Act and saying, “I’ve got it over here so you don’t need it over there” is not the same as maintaining the protections for children from a high level of data. It is not the same set of things. I specifically said that this was not an age-verification measure and would not require it; whatever response there was on that was therefore unnecessary because I made that quite clear in my remarks. The Committee can understand that, in order to set a high bar of data protection, you must either identify a child or give it to everyone. Those are your choices. You do not have to verify.

I will withdraw the amendment, but I must say that the Government may not have it both ways. The Bill cannot be different or necessary and at the same time do nothing. The piece that I want to leave with the Committee is that it is the underlying provisions that allow the ICO to take action on the age-appropriate design code. It does not matter what is in the code; if the underlying provisions change, so does the code. During Committee, I expect that there will be a report on the changes that have happened all around the world as a result of the code, and we will be able to measure whether the new Bill would be able to create those same changes. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this group. Amendment 6 to Clause 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, rightly tests the boundaries on the use of personal data for scientific research and, as he says, begins to ask, “What is the real purpose of this clause? Is it the clarification of existing good practice or is it something new? Do we fully understand what that new proposition is?”

As he said, there is particular public concern about the use of personal health data where it seems that some private companies are stretching the interpretation of “the public good”, for which authorisation for the use of this data was initially freely given, to something much wider. Although the clause seeks to provide some reassurance on this, we question whether it goes far enough and whether there are sufficient protections against the misuse of personal health data in the way the clause is worded.

This raises the question of whether it is only public health research that needs to be in the public interest, which is the way the clause is worded at the moment, because it could equally apply to research using personal data from other public services, such as measuring educational outcomes or accessing social housing. There is a range of uses for personal data. In an earlier debate, we heard about the plethora of data already held on people, much of which individuals do not understand or know about and which could be used for research or to make judgments about them. So we need to be sensitive about the way this might be used. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister why public health research has been singled out for special attention when, arguably, it should be a wider right across the board.

Noble Lords have asked questions about the wider concerns around Clause 2, which could enable private companies to use personal data to develop new products for commercial benefit without needing to inform the data subjects. As noble Lords have said, this is not what people would normally expect to be described as “scientific research”. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, was quite right that it has the potential to be unethical, so we need some standards and some clear understanding of what we mean by “scientific research”.

That is particularly important for Amendments 7 and 132 to 134 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which underline the need for data subjects to be empowered and given the opportunity to object to their data being used for a new purpose. Arguably, without these extra guarantees—particularly because there is a lack of trust about how a lot of this information is being used—data subjects will be increasingly reluctant to hand over personal data on a voluntary basis in the first place. It may well be that this is an area where the Information Commissioner needs to provide additional advice and guidance to ensure that we can reap the benefits of good-quality scientific research that is in the public interest and in which the citizens involved can have absolute trust. Noble Lords around the Room have stressed that point.

Finally, we have added our names to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on the use of children’s data for scientific research. As she rightly points out, the 2018 Act gave children a higher standard of protection on the uses for which their data is collected and processed. It is vital that this Bill, for all its intents to simplify and water down preceding rights, does not accidentally put at risk the higher protection agreed for children. In the earlier debate, the Minister said that he believed it will not do so. I am not sure that “believe” is a strong enough word here; we need guarantees that go beyond that. I think that this is an issue we will come back to again and again in terms of what is in the Bill and what guarantees exist for that protection.

In particular, there is a concern that relaxing the legal basis on which personal data can be processed for scientific research, including privately funded research carried out by commercial entities, could open the door for children’s data to be exploited for commercial purposes. We will consider the use of children’s data collected in schools in our debate on a separate group but we clearly need to ensure that the handling of pupils’ data by the Department for Education and the use of educational apps by private companies do not lead to a generation of exploited children who are vulnerable to direct marketing and manipulative messaging. The noble Baroness’s amendments are really important in this regard.

I also think that the noble Baroness’s Amendment 145 is a useful initiative to establish a code of practice on children’s data and scientific research. It would give us an opportunity to balance the best advantages of children’s research, which is clearly in the public and personal interest, with the maintenance of the highest level of protection from exploitation.

I hope that the Minister can see the sense in these amendments. In particular, I hope that he will take forward the noble Baroness’s proposals and agree to work with us on the code of practice principles and to put something like that in the Bill. I look forward to his response.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for this series of amendments.

I will first address Amendment 6, which seeks to amend Clause 2. As the noble Lord said, the definitions created by Clause 2, including “scientific research purposes”, are based on the current wording in recital 159 to the UK GDPR. We are changing not the scope of these definitions but their legal status. This amendment would require individual researchers to assess whether their research should be considered to be in the public interest, which could create uncertainty in the sector and discourage research. This would be more restrictive than the current position and would undermine the Government’s objectives to facilitate scientific research and empower researchers.

We have maintained a flexible scope as to what is covered by “scientific research” while ensuring that the definition is still sufficiently narrow in that it can cover only what would reasonably be seen as scientific research. This is because the legislation needs to be able to adapt to the emergence of new areas of innovative research. Therefore, the Government feel that it is more appropriate for the regulator to add more nuance and context to the definition. This includes the types of processing that are considered—

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I am sorry to interrupt but it may give the Box a chance to give the Minister a note on this. Is the Minister saying that recital 159 includes the word “commercial”?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am afraid I do not have an eidetic memory of recital 159, but I would be happy to—

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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That is precisely why I ask this question in the middle of the Minister’s speech to give the Box a chance to respond, I hope.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Researchers must also comply with the required safeguards to protect individuals’ privacy. All organisations conducting scientific research, including those with commercial interests, must also meet all the safeguards for research laid out in the UK GDPR and comply with the legislation’s core principles, such as fairness and transparency. Clause 26 sets out several safeguards that research organisations must comply with when processing personal data for research purposes. The ICO will update its non-statutory guidance to reflect many of the changes introduced by this Bill.

Scientific research currently holds a privileged place in the data protection framework because, by its nature, it is already viewed as generally being in the public interest. As has been observed, the Bill already applies a public interest test to processing for the purpose of public health studies in order to provide greater assurance for research that is particularly sensitive. Again, this reflects recital 159.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on why public health research is being singled out, as she stated, this part of the legislation just adds an additional safeguard to studies into public health ensuring that they must be in the public interest. This does not limit the scope for other research unrelated to public health. Studies in the area of public health will usually be in the public interest. For the rare, exceptional times that a study is not, this requirement provides an additional safeguard to help prevent misuse of the various exemptions and privileges for researchers in the UK GDPR. “Public interest” is not defined in the legislation, so the controller needs to make a case-by-case assessment based on its purposes.

On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about recitals and ICO guidance, although we of course respect and welcome ICO guidance, it does not have legislative effect and does not provide the certainty that legislation does. That is why we have done so via this Bill.

Amendment 7 to Clause 3 would undermine the broader consent concept for scientific research. Clause 3 places the existing concept of “broad consent” currently found in recital 33 to the UK GDPR on a statutory footing with the intention of improving awareness and confidence for researchers. This clause applies only to scientific research processing that is reliant on consent. It already contains various safeguards. For example, broad consent can be used only where it is not possible to identify at the outset the full purposes for which personal data might be processed. Additionally, to give individuals greater agency, where possible individuals will have the option to consent to only part of the processing and can withdraw their consent at any time.

Clause 3 clarifies an existing concept of broad consent which outlines how the conditions for consent will be met in certain circumstances when processing for scientific research purposes. This will enable consent to be obtained for an area of scientific research when researchers cannot at the outset identify fully the purposes for which they are collecting the data. For example, the initial aim may be the study of cancer, but it later becomes the study of a particular cancer type.

Furthermore, as part of the reforms around the reuse of personal data, we have further clarified that when personal data is originally collected on the basis of consent, a controller would need to get fresh consent to reuse that data for a new purpose unless a public interest exemption applied and it is unreasonable to expect the controller to obtain that consent. A controller cannot generally reuse personal data originally collected on the basis of consent for research purposes.

Turning to Amendments 132 and 133 to Clause 26, the general rule described in Article 13(3) of the UK GDPR is that controllers must inform data subjects about a change of purposes, which provides an opportunity to withdraw consent or object to the proposed processing where relevant. There are existing exceptions to the right to object, such as Article 21(6) of the UK GDPR, where processing is necessary for research in the public interest, and in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018, when applying the right would prevent or seriously impair the research. Removing these exemptions could undermine life-saving research and compromise long-term studies so that they are not able to continue.

Regarding Amendment 134, new Article 84B of the UK GDPR already sets out the requirement that personal data should be anonymised for research, archiving and statistical—RAS—purposes unless doing so would mean the research could not be carried through. Anonymisation is not always possible as personal data can be at the heart of valuable research, archiving and statistical activities, for example, in genetic research for the monitoring of new treatments of diseases. That is why new Article 84C of the UK GDPR also sets out protective measures for personal data that is used for RAS purposes, such as ensuring respect for the principle of data minimisation through pseudonymisation.

The stand part notice in this group seeks to remove Clause 6 and, consequentially, Schedule 2. In the Government’s consultation on data reform, Data: A New Direction, we heard that the current provisions in the UK GDPR on personal data reuse are difficult for controllers and individuals to navigate. This has led to uncertainty about when controllers can reuse personal data, causing delays for researchers and obstructing innovation. Clause 6 and Schedule 2 address the existing uncertainty around reusing personal data by setting out clearly the conditions in which the reuse of personal data for a new purpose is permitted. Clause 6 and Schedule 2 must therefore remain to give controllers legal certainty and individuals greater transparency.

Amendment 22 seeks to remove the power to add to or vary the conditions set out in Schedule 2. These conditions currently constitute a list of specific public interest purposes, such as safeguarding vulnerable individuals, for which an organisation is permitted to reuse data without needing consent or to identify a specific law elsewhere in legislation. Since this list is strictly limited and exhaustive, a power is needed to ensure that it is kept up to date with future developments in how personal data is used for important public interest purposes.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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I am interested that the safeguarding requirement is already in the Bill, so, in terms of children, which I believe the Minister is going to come to, the onward processing is not a question of safeguarding. Is that correct? As the Minister has just indicated, that is already a provision.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Just before we broke, I was on the verge of attempting to answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron; I hope my coming words will do that, but she can intervene again if she needs to.

I turn to the amendments that concern the use of children’s data in research and reuse. Amendment 8 would also amend Clause 3; the noble Baroness suggests that the measure should not apply to children’s data, but this would potentially prevent children, or their parents or guardians, from agreeing to participate in broad areas of pioneering research that could have a positive impact on children, such as on the causes of childhood diseases.

On the point about safeguarding, the provisions on recognised legitimate interests and further processing are required for safeguarding children for compliance with, respectively, the lawfulness and purpose limitation principles. The purpose limitation provision in this clause is meant for situations where the original processing purpose was not safeguarding and the controller then realises that there is a need to further process it for safeguarding.

Research organisations are already required to comply with the data protection principles, including on fairness and transparency, so that research participants can make informed decisions about how their data is used; and, where consent is the lawful basis for processing, children, or their parents or guardians, are free to choose not to provide their consent, or, if they do consent, they can withdraw it at any time. In addition, the further safeguards that are set out in Clause 26, which I mentioned earlier, will protect all personal data, whether it relates to children or adults.

Amendment 21 would require data controllers to have specific regard to the fact that children’s data requires a higher standard of protection for children when deciding whether reuse of their data is compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected. This is unnecessary because the situations in which personal data could be reused are limited to public interest purposes designed largely to protect the public and children, in so far as they are relevant to them. Controllers must also consider the possible consequences for data subjects and the relationship between the controller and the data subject. This includes taking into account that the data subject is a child, in addition to the need to generally consider the interests of children.

Amendment 23 seeks to limit use of the purpose limitation exemptions in Schedule 2 in relation to children’s data. This amendment is unnecessary because these provisions permit further processing only in a narrow range of circumstances and can be expanded only to serve important purposes of public interest. Furthermore, it may inadvertently be harmful to children. Current objectives include safeguarding children or vulnerable people, preventing crime or responding to emergencies. In seeking to limit the use of these provisions, there is a risk that the noble Baroness’s amendments might make data controllers more hesitant to reuse or disclose data for public interest purposes and undermine provisions in place to protect children. These amendments could also obstruct important research that could have a demonstrable positive impact on children, such as research into children’s diseases.

Amendment 145 would require the ICO to publish a statutory code on the use of children’s data in scientific research and technology development. Although the Government recognise the value that ICO codes can play in promoting good practice and improving compliance, we do not consider that it would be appropriate to add these provisions to the Bill without further detailed consultation with the ICO and the organisations likely to be affected by the new codes. Clause 33 of the Bill already includes a measure that would allow the Secretary of State to request the ICO to publish a code on any matter that it sees fit, so this is an issue that we could return to in the future if the evidence supports it.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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I will read Hansard very carefully, because I am not sure that I absolutely followed the Minister, but we will undoubtedly come back to this. I will ask two questions. Earlier, before we had a break, in response to some of the early amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, the Minister suggested that several things were being taken out of the recital to give them solidity in the Bill; so I am using this opportunity to suggest that recital 38, which is the special consideration of children’s data, might usefully be treated in a similar way and that we could then have a schedule that is the age-appropriate design code in the Bill. Perhaps I can leave that with the Minister, and perhaps he can undertake to have some further consultation with the ICO on Amendment 145 specifically.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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With respect to recital 38, that sounds like a really interesting idea. Yes, let us both have a look and see what the consultation involves and what the timing might look like. I confess to the Committee that I do not know what recital 38 says, off the top of my head. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept these amendments. I hope that noble Lords will therefore not press them.

Returning to the questions by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the contents of recital 159, the current UK GDPR and EU GDPR are silent on the specific definition of scientific research. It does not preclude commercial organisations performing scientific research; indeed, the ICO’s own guidance on research and its interpretation of recital 159 already mention commercial activities. Scientific research can be done by commercial organisations—for example, much of the research done into vaccines, and the research into AI referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Harding. The recital itself does not mention it but, as the ICO’s guidance is clear on this already, the Government feel that it is appropriate to put this on a statutory footing.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, that was intriguing. I thank the Minister for his response. It sounds as though, again, guidance would have been absolutely fine, but what is there not to like about the ICO bringing clarity? It was quite interesting that the Minister used the phrase “uncertainty in the sector” on numerous occasions and that is becoming a bit of a mantra as the Bill goes on. We cannot create uncertainty in the sector, so the poor old ICO has been labouring in the vineyard for the last few years to no purpose at all. Clearly there has been uncertainty in the sector of a major description, and all its guidance and all the work that it has put in over the years have been wholly fruitless, really. It is only this Government that have grabbed the agenda with this splendid 300-page data protection Bill that will clarify this for business. I do not know how much they will have to pay to get new compliance officers or whatever it happens to be, but the one thing that the Bill will absolutely not create is greater clarity.

I am a huge fan of making sure that we understand what the recitals have to say, and it is very interesting that the Minister is saying that the recital is silent but the ICO’s guidance is pretty clear on this. I am hugely attracted by the idea of including recital 38 in the Bill. It is another lightbulb moment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has these moments, rather like with the age-appropriate design code, which was a huge one.

We are back to the concern, whether in the ICO guidance, the Bill or wherever, that scientific research needs to be in the public interest to qualify and not have all the consents that are normally required for the use of personal data. The Minister said, “Well, of course we think that scientific research is in the public interest; that is its very definition”. So why does only public health research need that public interest test and not the other aspects? Is it because, for instance, the opt-out was a bit of a disaster and 3 million people opted out of allowing their health data to be shared or accessed by GPs? Yes, it probably is.

Do the Government want a similar kind of disaster to happen, in which people get really excited about Meta or other commercial organisations getting hold of their data, a public outcry ensues and they therefore have to introduce a public interest test on that? What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. I do not think that personal data should be treated in a particularly different way in terms of its public interest, just because it is in healthcare. I very much hope that the Minister will consider that.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I am also pleased to support these amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to which I have added my name. I am hugely enthusiastic about them, too, and think that this has been a lightbulb moment from the noble Baroness. I very much thank her for doing all of this background work because she has identified the current weakness in the data protection landscape: it is currently predicated on an arrangement between an individual and the organisation that holds their data.

That is an inherently unbalanced power construct. As the noble Baroness said, as tech companies become larger and more powerful, it is not surprising that many individuals feel overwhelmed by the task of questioning or challenging those that are processing their personal information. It assumes a degree of knowledge about their rights and a degree of digital literacy, which we know many people do not possess.

In the very good debate that we had on digital exclusion a few weeks ago, it was highlighted that around 2.4 million people are unable to complete a single basic task to get online, such as opening an internet browser, and that more than 5 million employed adults cannot complete essential digital work tasks. These individuals cannot be expected to access their digital data on their own; they need the safety of a larger group to do so. We need to protect the interests of an entire group that would otherwise be locked out of the system.

The noble Baroness referred to the example of Uber drivers who were helped by their trade union to access their data, sharing patterns of exploitation and subsequently strengthening their employment package, but this does not have to be about just union membership; it could be about the interests of a group of public sector service users who want to make sure that they are not being discriminated against, a community group that wants its bid for a local grant to be treated fairly, and so on. We can all imagine examples of where this would work in a group’s interest. As the noble Baroness said, these proposals would allow any group of people to assign their rights—rights that are more powerful together than apart.

There could be other benefits; if data controllers are concerned about the number of individual requests that they are receiving for data information—and a lot of this Bill is supposed to address that extra work—group requests, on behalf of a data community, could provide economies of scale and make the whole system more efficient.

Like the noble Baroness, I can see great advantages from this proposal; it could lay the foundation for other forms of data innovation and help to build trust with many citizens who currently see digitalisation as something to fear—this could allay those fears. Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I hope the Minister can provide some reassurance that the Government welcome this proposal, take it seriously and will be prepared to work with the noble Baroness and others to make it a reality, because there is the essence of a very good initiative here.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for raising this interesting and compelling set of ideas. I turn first to Amendments 10 and 35 relating to data communities. The Government recognise that individuals need to have the appropriate tools and mechanisms to easily exercise their rights under the data protection legislation. It is worth pointing out that current legislation does not prevent data subjects authorising third parties to exercise certain rights. Article 80 of the UK GDPR also explicitly gives data subjects the right to appoint not-for-profit bodies to exercise certain rights, including their right to bring a complaint to the ICO, to appeal against a decision of the ICO or to bring legal proceedings against a controller or processor and the right to receive compensation.

The concept of data communities exercising certain data subject rights is closely linked with the wider concept of data intermediaries. The Government recognise the existing and potential benefits of data intermediaries and are committed to supporting them. However, given that data intermediaries are new, we need to be careful not to distort the sector at such an early stage of development. As in many areas of the economy, officials are in regular contact with businesses, and the data intermediary sector is no different. One such engagement is the DBT’s Smart Data Council, which includes a number of intermediary businesses that advise the Government on the direction of smart data policy. The Government would welcome further and continued engagement with intermediary businesses to inform how data policy is developed.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I am sorry, but the Minister used a pretty pejorative word: “distort” the sector. What does he have in mind?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I did not mean to be pejorative; I merely point out that before embarking on quite a far-reaching policy—as noble Lords have pointed out—we would not want to jump the gun prior to consultation and researching the area properly. I certainly do not wish to paint a negative portrait.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Is this one of those “in due course” moments?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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It is a moment at which I cannot set a firm date for a firm set of actions, but on the other hand I am not attempting to punt it into the long grass either. The Government do not want to introduce a prescriptive framework without assessing potential risks, strengthening the evidence base and assessing the appropriate regulatory response. For these reasons, I hope that for the time being the noble Baroness will not press these amendments.

The noble Baroness has also proposed Amendments 147 and 148 relating to the role of the Information Commissioner’s Office. Given my response just now to the wider proposals, these amendments are no longer necessary and would complicate the statute book. We note that Clause 35 already includes a measure that will allow the Secretary of State to request the Information Commissioner’s Office to publish a code on any matter that she or he sees fit, so this is an issue we could return to in future if such a code were deemed necessary.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I am sorry to keep interrupting the Minister. Can he give us a bit of a picture of what he has in mind? He said that he did not want to distort things at the moment, that there were intermediaries out there and so on. That is all very well, but is he assuming that a market will be developed or is developing? What overview of this does he have? In a sense, we have a very clear proposition here, which the Government should respond to. I am assuming that this is not a question just of letting a thousand flowers bloom. What is the government policy towards this? If you look at the Hall-Pesenti review and read pretty much every government response—including to our AI Select Committee, where we talked about data trusts and picked up the Hall-Pesenti review recommendations —you see that the Government have been pretty much positive over time when they have talked about data trusts. The trouble is that they have not done anything.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Overall, as I say and as many have said in this brief debate, this is a potentially far-reaching and powerful idea with an enormous number of benefits. But the fact that it is far-reaching implies that we need to look at it further. I am afraid that I am not briefed on long-standing—

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

May I suggest that the Minister writes? On the one hand, he is saying that we will be distorting something—that something is happening out there—but, on the other hand, he is saying that he is not briefed on what is out there or what the intentions are. A letter unpacking all that would be enormously helpful.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am very happy to write on this. I will just say that I am not briefed on previous government policy towards it, dating back many years before my time in the role.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It was a few Prime Ministers ago.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It was even further. Yes, I am very happy to write on that. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept these amendments for now. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
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My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 and to whether Clauses 5 and 7 should stand part of the Bill. In doing so, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Kidron, for their amendments. The amendments in the group, as we have heard, relate to Clauses 5 and 7, which make some important changes to Article 6 of the UK GDPR on the lawfulness of processing.

The first amendment in the group, Amendment 11, would create a new lawful ground, under Article 6(1) of UK GDPR, to enable the use of personal data published by public bodies with a person’s consent and to enable processing by public bodies for the benefit of the wider public. The Government do not believe it would be necessary to create additional lawful grounds for processing in these circumstances. The collection and publication of information on public databases, such as the list of company directors published by Companies House, should already be permitted by existing lawful grounds under either Article 6(1)(c), in the case of a legal requirement to publish information, or Article 6(1)(e) in the case of a power.

Personal data published by public bodies can already be processed by other non-public body controllers where their legitimate interests outweigh the rights and interests of data subjects. However, they must comply with their requirements in relation to that personal data, including requirements to process personal data fairly and transparently. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for setting out where he thinks the gaps are, but I hope he will accept my reassurances that it should already be possible under the existing legislation and will agree to withdraw the amendment.

On Clause 5, the main objectives introduce a new lawful ground under Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR, known as “recognised legitimate interests”. It also introduces a new annexe to the UK GDPR, in Schedule 1 to the Bill, that sets out an exhaustive list of processing activities that may be undertaken by data controllers under this new lawful ground. If an activity appears on the list, processing may take place without a person’s consent and without balancing the controller’s interests against the rights and interests of the individual: the so-called legitimate interests balancing test.

The activities in the annexe are all of a public interest nature, for example, processing of data where necessary to prevent crime, safeguarding national security, protecting children, responding to emergencies or promoting democratic engagement. They also include situations where a public body requests a non-public body to share personal data with it to help deliver a public task sanctioned by law.

The clause was introduced as a result of stakeholders’ concerns raised in response to the public consultation Data: A New Direction in 2021. Some informed us that they were worried about the legal consequences of getting the balancing test in Article 6(1)(f) wrong. Others said that undertaking the balancing test can lead to delays in some important processing activities taking place.

As noble Lords will be aware, many data controllers have important roles in supporting activities that have a public interest nature. It is vital that data is shared without delay where necessary in areas such as safeguarding, prevention of crime and responding to emergencies. Of course, controllers who share data while relying on this new lawful ground would still have to comply with wider requirements of data protection legislation where relevant, such as data protection principles which ensure that the data is used fairly, lawfully and transparently, and is collected and used for specific purposes.

In addition to creating a new lawful ground of recognised legitimate interests, Clause 5 also clarifies the types of processing activities that may be permitted under the existing legitimate interests lawful ground under Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR. Even if a processing activity does not appear on the new list of recognised legitimate interests, data controllers may still have grounds for processing people’s data without consent if their interests in processing the data are not outweighed by the rights and freedoms that people have in relation to privacy. Clause 5(9) and (10) makes it clear this might be the case in relation to many common commercial activities, such as intragroup transfers.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, may I just revisit that with the Minister? I fear that he is going to move on to another subject. The Delegated Powers Committee said that it thought that the Government had not provided strong enough reasons for needing this power. The public interest list being proposed, which the Minister outlined, is quite broad, so it is hard to imagine the Government wanting something not already listed. I therefore return to what the committee said. Normally, noble Lords like to listen to recommendations from such committees. There is no strong reason for needing that extra power, so, to push back a little on the Minister, why, specifically, is it felt necessary? If it were a public safety interest, or one of the other examples he gave, it seems to me that that would come under the existing list of public interests.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Indeed. Needless to say, we take the recommendations of the DPRRC very seriously, as they deserve. However, because this is an exhaustive list, and because the technologies and practices around data are likely to evolve very rapidly in ways we are unable currently to predict, it is important to retain as a safety measure the ability to update that list. That is the position the Government are coming from. We will obviously continue to consider the DPRRC’s recommendations, but that has to come with a certain amount of adaptiveness as we go. Any addition to the list would of course be subject to parliamentary debate, via the affirmative resolution procedure, as well as the safeguards listed in the provision itself.

Clause 50 ensures that the ICO and any other interested persons should be consulted before making regulations.

Amendments 15, 16, 17 and 18 would amend the part of Clause 5 that is concerned with the types of activities that might be carried out under the current legitimate interest lawful ground, under Article 6(1)(f). Amendment 15 would prevent direct marketing organisations relying on the legitimate interest lawful ground under Article 6(1)(f) if the personal data being processed related to children. However, the age and vulnerability in general of data subjects is already an important factor for direct marketing organisations when considering whether the processing is justified. The ICO already provides specific guidance for controllers carrying out this balancing test in relation to children’s data. The fact that a data subject is a child, and the age of the child in question, will still be relevant factors to take into account in this process. For these reasons, the Government consider this amendment unnecessary.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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My Lords, am I to take it from that that none of the changes currently in the Bill will expose children on a routine basis to direct marketing?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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As is the case today and will be going forward, direct marketing organisations will be required to perform the balancing test; and as in the ICO guidance today and, no doubt, going forward—

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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I am sorry if I am a little confused—I may well be—but the balancing test that is no longer going to be there allows a certain level of processing, which was the subject of the first amendment. The suggestion now is that children will be protected by a balancing test. I would love to know where that balancing test exists.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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The balancing test remains there for legitimate interests, under Article 6(1)(f).

Amendment 16 seeks to prevent organisations that undertake third-party marketing relying on the legitimate interest lawful ground under Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR. As I have set out, organisations can rely on that ground for processing personal data without consent when they are satisfied that they have a legitimate interest to do so and that their commercial interests are not outweighed by the rights and interests of data subjects.

Clause 5(4) inserts in Article 6 new paragraph (9), which provides some illustrative examples of activities that may constitute legitimate interests, including direct marketing activities, but it does not mean that they will necessarily be able to process personal data for that purpose. Organisations will need to assess on a case-by-case basis where the balance of interest lies. If the impact on the individual’s privacy is too great, they will not be able to rely on the legitimate interest lawful ground. I should emphasise that this is not a new concept created by this Bill. Indeed, the provisions inserted by Clause 5(4) are drawn directly from the recitals to the UK GDPR, as incorporated from the EU GDPR.

I recognise that direct marketing can be a sensitive—indeed, disagreeable—issue for some, but direct marketing information can be very important for businesses as well as individuals and can be dealt with in a way that respects people’s privacy. The provisions in this Bill do not change the fact that direct marketing activities must be compliant with the data protection and privacy legislation and continue to respect the data subject’s absolute right to opt out of receiving direct marketing communications.

Amendment 17 would make sure that the processing of employee data for “internal administrative purposes” is subject to heightened safeguards, particularly when it relates to health. I understand that this amendment relates to representations made by the National AIDS Trust concerning the level of protection afforded to employees’ health data. We agree that the protection of people’s HIV status is vital and that it is right that it is subject to extra protection, as is the case for all health data and special category data. We have committed to further engagement and to working with the National AIDS Trust to explore solutions in order to prevent data breaches of people’s HIV status, which we feel is best achieved through non-legislative means given the continued high data protection standards afforded by our existing legislation. As such, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree not to press this amendment.

Amendment 18 seeks to allow businesses more confidently to rely on the existing legitimate interest lawful ground for the transmission of personal data within a group of businesses affiliated by contract for internal administrative purposes. In Clause 5, the list of activities in proposed new paragraphs (9) and (10) are intended to be illustrative of the types of activities that may be legitimate interests for the purposes of Article 6(1)(f). They are focused on processing activities that are currently listed in the recitals to the EU GDPR but are simply examples. Many other processing activities may be legitimate interests for the purposes of Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR. It is possible that the transmission of personal data for internal administrative purposes within a group affiliated by contract may constitute a legitimate interest, as may many other commercial activities. It would be for the controller to determine this on a case-by-case basis after carrying out a balancing test to assess the impact on the individual.

Finally, I turn to the clause stand part debate that seeks to remove Clause 7 from the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for this amendment because it allows me to explain why this clause is important to the success of the UK-US data access agreement. As noble Lords will know, that agreement helps the law enforcement agencies in both countries tackle crime. Under the UK GDPR, data controllers can process personal data without consent on public interest grounds if the basis for the processing is set out in domestic law. Clause 7 makes it clear that the processing of personal data can also be carried out on public interest grounds if the basis for the processing is set out in a relevant international treaty such as the UK-US data access agreement.

The agreement permits telecommunications operators in the UK to disclose data about serious crimes with law enforcement agencies in the US, and vice versa. The DAA has been operational since October 2022 and disclosures made by UK organisations under it are already lawful under the UK GDPR. Recent ICO guidance confirms this, but the Government want to remove any doubt in the minds of UK data controllers that disclosures under the DAA are permitted by the UK GDPR. Clause 7 makes it absolutely clear to telecoms operators in the UK that disclosures under the DAA can be made in reliance on the UK GDPR’s public tasks processing grounds; the clause therefore contributes to the continued, effective functioning of the agreement and to keeping the public in both the UK and the US safe.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My first reaction is “Phew”, my Lords. We are all having to keep to time limits now. The Minister did an admirable job within his limit.

I wholeheartedly support what the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Harding, said about Amendments 13 and 15 and what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said about her Amendment 12. I do not believe that we have yet got to the bottom of children’s data protection; there is still quite some way to go. It would be really helpful if the Minister could bring together the elements of children’s data about which he is trying to reassure us and write to us saying exactly what needs to be done, particularly in terms of direct marketing directed towards children. That is a real concern.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Harding and Lady Bennett, after the excellent introduction to the amendments in this group by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. The noble Baroness, Lady Harding, used the word “trust”, and this is another example of a potential hidden agenda in the Bill. Again, it is destructive of any public trust in the way their data is curated. This is a particularly egregious example, without, fundamentally, any explanation. Sir John Whittingdale said that a future Government

“may want to encourage democratic engagement in the run up to an election by temporarily ‘switching off’ some of the direct marketing rules”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/2023; col. 885.]

Nothing to see here—all very innocuous; but, as we know, in the past the ICO has been concerned about even the current rules on the use of data by political parties. It seems to me that, without being too Pollyannaish about this, we should be setting an example in the way we use the public’s data for campaigning. The ICO, understandably, is quoted as saying during the public consultation on the Bill that this is

“an area in which there are significant potential risks to people if any future policy is not implemented very carefully”.

That seems an understatement, but that is how regulators talk. It is entirely right to be concerned about these provisions.

Of course, they are hugely problematic, but they are particularly problematic given that it is envisaged that young people aged 14 and older should be able to be targeted by political parties when they cannot even vote, as we have heard. This would appear to contravene one of the basic principles of data protection law: that you should not process more personal data than you need for your purposes. If an individual cannot vote, it is hard to see how targeting them with material relating to an election is a proportionate interference with their privacy rights, particularly when they are a child. The question is, should we be soliciting support from 14 to 17 year-olds during elections when they do not have votes? Why do the rules need changing so that people can be targeted online without having consented? One of the consequences of these changes would be to allow a Government to switch off—the words used by Sir John Whittingdale—direct marketing rules in the run-up to an election, allowing candidates and parties to rely on “soft” opt-in to process data and make other changes without scrutiny.

Exactly as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said, respondents to the original consultation on the Bill wanted political communications to be covered by existing rules on direct marketing. Responses were very mixed on the soft opt-in, and there were worries that people might be encouraged to part with more of their personal data. More broadly, why are the Government changing the rules on democratic engagement if they say they will not use these powers? What assessment have they made of the impact of the use of the powers? Why are the powers not being overseen by the Electoral Commission? If anybody is going to have the power to introduce the ability to market directly to voters, it should be the Electoral Commission.

All this smacks of taking advantage of financial asymmetry. We talked about competition asymmetry with big tech when we debated the digital markets Bill; similarly, this seems a rather sneaky way of taking advantage of the financial resources one party might have versus others. It would allow it to do things other parties cannot, because it has granted itself permission to do that. The provisions should not be in the hands of any Secretary of State or governing party; if anything, they should be in entirely independent hands; but, even then, they are undesirable.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling her amendments. Amendment 19 would remove processing which is necessary for the purposes of democratic engagement from the list of recognised legitimate interests. It is essential in a healthy democracy that registered political parties, elected representatives and permitted participants in referendums can engage freely with the electorate without being impeded unnecessarily by data protection legislation.

The provisions in the Bill will mean that these individuals and organisations do not have to carry out legitimate interest assessments or look for a separate legal basis. They will, however, still need to comply with other requirements of data protection legislation, such as the data protection principles and the requirement for processing to be necessary.

On the question posed by the noble Baroness about the term “democratic engagement”, it is intended to cover a wide range of political activities inside and outside election periods. These include but are not limited to democratic representation; communicating with electors and interested parties; surveying and opinion gathering; campaigning activities; activities to increase voter turnout; supporting the work of elected representatives, prospective candidates and official candidates; and fundraising to support any of these activities. This is reflected in the drafting, which incorporates these concepts in the definition of democratic engagement and democratic engagement activities.

The ICO already has guidance on the use of personal data by political parties for campaigning purposes, which the Government anticipate it will update to reflect the changes in the Bill. We will of course work with the ICO to make sure it is familiar with our plans for commencement and that it does not benefit any party over another.

On the point made about the appropriate age for the provisions, in some parts of the UK the voting age is 16 for some elections, and children can join the electoral register as attainers at 14. The age of 14 reflects the variations in voting age across the nation; in some parts of the UK, such as Scotland, a person can register to vote at 14 as an attainer. An attainer is someone who is registered to vote in advance of their being able to do so, to allow them to be on the electoral roll as soon as they turn the required age. Children aged 14 and over are often politically engaged and are approaching voting age. The Government consider it important that political parties and elected representatives can engage freely with this age group—

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am interested in what the Minister says about the age of attainers. Surely it would be possible to remove attainers from those who could be subject to direct marketing. Given how young attainers could be, it would protect them from the unwarranted attentions of campaigning parties and so on. I do not see that as a great difficulty.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed. It is certainly worth looking at, but I remind noble Lords that such communications have to be necessary, and the test of their being necessary for someone of that age is obviously more stringent.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

But what is the test of necessity at that age?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The processor has to determine whether it is necessary to the desired democratic engagement outcome to communicate with someone at that age. But I take the point: for the vast majority of democratic engagement communications, 14 would be far too young to make that a worthwhile or necessary activity.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I recall, the ages are on the electoral register.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not aware one way or the other, but I will happily look into that to see what further safeguards we can add so that we are not bombarding people who are too young with this material.

Lord Kamall Portrait Lord Kamall (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

May I make a suggestion to my noble friend the Minister? It might be worth asking the legal people to get the right wording, but if there are different ages at which people can vote in different parts of the United Kingdom, surely it would be easier just to relate it to the age at which they are able to vote in those elections. That would address a lot of the concerns that many noble Lords are expressing here today.

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Baroness Harding of Winscombe Portrait Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
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I agree with the noble Baroness, but with one rider. We will keep coming back to the need for children to have a higher level of data protection than adults, and this is but one of many examples we will debate. However, I agree with her underlying point. The reason why I support removing both these clauses is the hubris of believing that you will engage the electorate by bombarding them with things they did not ask to receive.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

A fair number of points were made there. I will look at ages under 16 and see what further steps, in addition to being necessary and proportionate, we can think about to provide some reassurance. Guidance would need to be in effect before any of this is acted on by any of the political parties. I and my fellow Ministers will continue to work with the ICO—

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am sorry to press the Minister, but does the Bill state that guidance will be in place before this comes into effect?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not sure whether it is written in the Bill. I will check, but the Bill would not function without the existence of the guidance.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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I am sorry to drag this out but, on the guidance, can we be assured that the Minister will involve the Electoral Commission? It has a great deal of experience here; in fact, it has opined in the past on votes for younger cohorts of the population. It seems highly relevant to seek out its experience and the benefits of that.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would of course be very happy to continue to engage with the Electoral Commission.

We will continue to work with the ICO to make sure that it is familiar with the plans for commencement and that its plans for guidance fit into that. In parts of the UK where the voting age is 18 and the age of attainment is 16, it would be more difficult for candidates and parties to show that it was necessary or proportionate to process the personal data of 14 and 15 year-olds in reliance on the new lawful ground. In this context, creating an arbitrary distinction between children at or approaching voting age and adults may not be appropriate; in particular, many teenagers approaching voting age may be more politically engaged than some adults. These measures will give parties and candidates a clear lawful ground for engaging them in the process. Accepting this amendment would remove the benefits of greater ease of identification of a lawful ground for processing by elected representatives, candidates and registered political parties, which is designed to improve engagement with the electorate. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, will withdraw her amendment.

I now come to the clause stand part notice that would remove Clause 114, which gives the Secretary of State a power to make exceptions to the direct marketing rules for communications sent for the purposes of democratic engagement. As Clause 115 defines terms for the purposes of Clause 114, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is also seeking for that clause to be removed. Under the current law, many of the rules applying to electronic communications sent for commercial marketing apply to messages sent by registered political parties, elected representatives and others for the purposes of democratic engagement. It is conceivable that, after considering the risks and benefits, a future Government might want to treat communications sent for the purposes of democratic engagement differently from commercial marketing. For example, in areas where voter turnout is particularly low or there is a need to increase engagement with the electoral process, a future Government might decide that the direct marketing rules should be modified. This clause stand part notice would remove that option.

We have incorporated several safeguards that must be met prior to regulations being laid under this clause. They include the Secretary of State having specific regard to the effect the exceptions could have on an individual’s privacy; a requirement to consult the Information Commissioner and other interested parties, as the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and the regulations being subject to parliamentary approval via the affirmative procedure.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw or not press her amendments.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I am pleased that I have sparked such a lively debate. When I tabled these amendments, it was only me and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, so I thought, “This could be a bit sad, really”, but it has not been. Actually, it has been an excellent debate and we have identified some really good issues.

As a number of noble Lords said, the expression “democratic engagement” is weasel words: what is not to like about democratic engagement? We all like it. Only when you drill down into the proposals do you realise the traps that could befall us. As noble Lords and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, rightly said, we have to see this in the context of some of the other moves the Government are pursuing in trying to skew the electoral rules in their favour. I am not convinced that this is as saintly as the Government are trying to pretend.

The noble Baroness, Lady Harding, is absolutely right: this is about trust. It is about us setting an example. Of all the things we can do on data protection that we have control over, we could at least show the electorate how things could be done, so that they realise that we, as politicians, understand how precious their data is and that we do not want to misuse it.

I hope we have all knocked on doors, and I must say that I have never had a problem engaging with the electorate, and actually they have never had a problem engaging with us. This is not filling a gap that anybody has identified. We are all out there and finding ways of communicating that, by and large, I would say the electorate finds perfectly acceptable. People talk to us, and they get the briefings through the door. That is what they expect an election campaign to be about. They do not expect, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, to go to see their MP about one thing and then suddenly find that they are being sent information about something completely different or that assumptions are being made about them which were never the intention when they gave the information in the first place. I just feel that there is something slightly seedy about all this. I am sorry that the Minister did not pick up a little more on our concerns about all this.

There are some practical things that I think it was helpful for us to have talked about, such as the Electoral Commission. I do not think that it has been involved up to now. I would like to know in more detail what its views are on all this. It is also important that we come back to the Information Commissioner and check in more detail what his view is on all this. It would be nice to have guidance, but I do not think that that will be enough to satisfy us in terms of how we proceed with these amendments.

The Minister ultimately has not explained why this has been introduced at this late stage. He is talking about this as though conceivably, in the future, a Government might want to adopt these rules. If that is the case, I respectfully say that we should come back at that time with a proper set of proposals that go right through the democratic process that we have here in Parliament, scrutinise it properly and make a decision then, rather than being bounced into something at a very late stage.

I have to say that I am deeply unhappy at what the Minister has said. I will obviously look at Hansard, but I may well want to return to this.

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Moved by
20: Clause 6, page 8, leave out lines 20 to 22 and insert—
“(c) the nature of the processing, including whether it is processing described in Article 9(1) (processing of special categories of personal data) or Article 10(1) (processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions etc);”Member's explanatory statement
This technical amendment changes new Article 8A(2)(c) of the UK GDPR so that it refers to processing rather than personal data, reflecting the terms of Articles 9(1) and 10(1).
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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My Lords, I rise to speak to a series of minor and technical, yet necessary, government amendments which, overall, improve the functionality of the Bill. I hope the Committee will be content if I address them together. Amendments 20, 42, 61 and 63 are minor technical amendments to references to special category data in Clauses 6 and 14. All are intended to clarify that references to special category data mean references to the scope of Article 9(1) of the UK GDPR. They are simply designed to improve the clarity of the drafting.

I turn now to the series of amendments that clarify how time periods within the data protection legal framework are calculated. For the record, these are Amendments 136, 139, 141, 149, 151, 152, 176, 198, 206 to 208, 212 to 214, 216, 217, 253 and 285. Noble Lords will be aware that the data protection legislation sets a number of time periods or deadlines for certain things to happen, such as responding to subject access requests; in other words, at what day, minute or hour the clock starts and stops ticking in relation to a particular procedure. The Data Protection Act 2018 expressly applies the EU-derived rules on how these time periods should be calculated, except in a few incidences where it is more appropriate for the UK domestic approach to apply, for example time periods related to parliamentary procedures. I shall refer to these EU-derived rules as the time periods regulation.

In response to the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, we are making it clear that the time periods regulation continues to apply to the UK GDPR and other regulations that form part of the UK’s data protection and privacy framework, for example, the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003. By making such express provision, our aim is to ensure consistency and continuity and to provide certainty for organisations, individuals and the regulator. We have also made some minor changes to existing clauses in the Bill to ensure that application of the time periods regulation achieves the correct effect.

Secondly, Amendment 197 clarifies that the requirement to consult before making regulations that introduce smart data schemes may be satisfied by a consultation before the Bill comes into force. The regulations must also be subject to affirmative parliamentary scrutiny to allow Members of both Houses to scrutinise legislation. This will facilitate the rapid implementation of smart data schemes, so that consumers and businesses can start benefiting as soon as possible. The Government are committed to working closely with business and wider stakeholders in the development of smart data.

Furthermore, Clause 96(3) protects data holders from the levy that may be imposed to meet the expenses of persons and bodies performing functions under smart data regulations. This levy cannot be imposed on data holders that do not appear capable of being directly affected by the exercise of those functions.

Amendment 196 extends that protection to authorised persons and third-party recipients on whom the levy may also be imposed. Customers will not have to pay to access their data, only for the innovative services offered by third parties. We expect that smart data schemes will deliver significant time and cost savings for customers.

The Government are committed to balancing the incentives for businesses to innovate and provide smart data services with ensuring that all customers are empowered through their data use and do not face undue financial barriers or digital exclusion. Any regulations providing for payment of the levy or fees will be subject to consultation and to the affirmative resolution procedure in Parliament.

Amendments 283 and 285 to Schedule 15 confer a general incidental power on the information commission. It will have the implied power to do things incidental to or consequential upon the exercise of its functions, for example, to hold land and enter into agreements. This amendment makes those implicit powers explicit for the avoidance of doubt and in line with standard practice. It does not give the commission substantive new powers. I beg to move.

Lord Kamall Portrait Lord Kamall (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I know that these amendments were said to be technical amendments, so I thought I would just accept them, but when I saw the wording of Amendment 283 some alarm bells started ringing. It says:

“The Commission may do anything it thinks appropriate for the purposes of, or in connection with, its functions”.


I know that the Minister said that this is stating what the commission is already able to do, but I am concerned whenever I see those words anywhere. They give a blank cheque to any authority or organisation.

Many noble Lords will know that I have previously spoken about the principal-agent theory in politics, in which certain powers are delegated to an agency or regulator, but what accountability does it have? I worry when I see that it “may do anything … appropriate” to fulfil its tasks. I would like some assurance from the Minister that there is a limit to what the information commission can do and some accountability. At a time when many of us are asking who regulates the regulators and when we are looking at some of the arm’s-length bodies—need I mention the Post Office?—there is some real concern about accountability.

I understand the reason for wanting to clarify or formalise what the Minister believes the information commission is doing already, but I worry about this form of words. I would like some reassurance that it is not wide-ranging and that there is some limit and accountability to future Governments. I have seen this sentiment across the House; people are asking who regulates the regulators and to whom are they accountable.

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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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My Lords, I have been through this large group and, apart from my natural suspicion that there might be something dastardly hidden away in it, I am broadly content, but I have a few questions.

On Amendment 20, can the Minister conform that the new words “further processing” have the same meaning as the reuse of personal data? Can he confirm that Article 5(1)(b) will prohibit this further processing when it is not in line with the original purpose for which the data was collected? How will the data subject know that is the case?

On Amendment 196, to my untutored eye it looks like the regulation-making power is being extended away from the data holder to include authorised persons and third-party recipients. My questions are simple enough: was this an oversight on the part of the original drafters of that clause? Is the amendment an extension of those captured by the effect of the clause? Is it designed to achieve consistency across the Bill? Finally, can I assume that an authorised person or third party would usually be someone acting on behalf of an agent of the data holder?

I presume that Amendments 198, 212 and 213 are needed because of a glitch in the drafting—similarly with Amendment 206. I can see that Amendments 208, 216 and 217 clarify when time periods begin, but why are the Government seeking to disapply time periods in Amendment 253 when surely some consistency is required?

Finally—I am sure the Minister will be happy about this—I am all in favour of flexibility, but Amendment 283 states that the Information Commissioner has the power to do things to facilitate the exercise of his functions. The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, picked up on this. We need to understand what those limits are. On the face of it, one might say that the amendment is sensible, but it seems rather general and broad in its application. As the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, rightly said, we need to see what the limits of accountability are. This is one of those occasions.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Bassam, for their engagement with this group. On the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, these are powers that the ICO would already have in common law. As I am given to understand is now best practice, they are put on a statutory footing in the Bill as part of best practice with all Bills. The purpose is to align with best practice. It does not confer substantial new powers but clarifies the powers that the regulator has. I can also confirm that the ICO was and remains accountable to Parliament.

Lord Kamall Portrait Lord Kamall (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am sorry to intervene as I know that noble Lords want to move on to other groups, but the Minister said that the ICO remains accountable to Parliament. Will he clarify how it is accountable to Parliament for the record?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Information Commissioner is directly accountable to Parliament in that he makes regular appearances in front of Select Committees that scrutinise the regulator’s work, including progress against objectives.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, made multiple important and interesting points. I hope he will forgive me if I undertake to write to him about those; there is quite a range of topics to cover. If there are any on which he requires answers right away, he is welcome to intervene.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to be helpful to the Minister. I appreciate that these questions are probably irritating but I carefully read through the amendments and aligned them with the Explanatory Notes. I just wanted some clarification to make sure that we are clear on exactly what the Government are trying to do. “Minor and technical” covers a multitude of sins; I know that from my own time as a Minister.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed. I will make absolutely sure that we provide a full answer. By the way, I sincerely thank the noble Lord for taking the time to go through what is perhaps not the most rewarding of reads but is useful none the less.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On the question of the ICO being responsible to Parliament, in the then Online Safety Bill and the digital markets Bill we consistently asked for regulators to be directly responsible to Parliament. If that is something the Government believe they are, we would like to see an expression of it.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would be happy to provide such an expression. I will be astonished if that is not the subject of a later group of amendments. I have not yet prepared for that group, I am afraid, but yes, that is the intention.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. He raised even more questions about Clause 9 than I ever dreamed of. He has illustrated the real issues behind the clause and why it is so important to debate its standing part, because, in our view, it should certainly be removed from the Bill. It would seriously limit people’s ability to access information about how their personal data is collected and used. We are back to the dilution of data subject rights, within which the rights of data subject access are, of course, vital. This includes limiting access to information about automated decision-making processes to which people are subject.

A data subject is someone who can be identified directly or indirectly by personal data, such as a name, an ID number, location data, or information relating to their physical, economic, cultural or social identity. Under existing law, data subjects have a right to request confirmation of whether their personal data is being processed by a controller, to access that personal data and to obtain information about how it is being processed. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out that there is ample precedent for how the controller can refuse a request from a data subject only if it is manifestly unfounded or excessive. The meaning of that phrase is well established.

There are three main ways in which Clause 9 limits people’s ability to access information about how their personal data is being collected and used. First, it would lower the threshold for refusing a request from “manifestly unfounded or excessive” to “vexatious or excessive”. This is an inappropriately low threshold, given the nature of a data subject access request—namely, a request by an individual for their own data.

Secondly, Clause 9 would insert a new mandatory list of considerations for deciding whether the request is vexatious or excessive. This includes vague considerations, such as

“the relationship between the person making the request (the ‘sender’) and the person receiving it (the ‘recipient’)”.

The very fact that the recipient holds data relating to the sender means that there is already some form of relationship between them.

Thirdly, the weakening of an individual’s right to obtain information about how their data is being collected, used or shared is particularly troubling given the simultaneous effect of the provisions in Clause 10, which means that data subjects are less likely to be informed about how their data is being used for additional purposes other than those for which it was originally collected, in cases where the additional purposes are for scientific or historical research, archiving in the public interest or statistical purposes. Together, the two clauses mean that an individual is less likely to be proactively told how their data is being used, while it is harder to access information about their data when requested.

In the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons, the Minister, Sir John Whittingdale, claimed that:

“The new parameters are not intended to be reasons for refusal”,


but rather to give

“greater clarity than there has previously been”.—[Official Report, Commons, Data Protection and Digital Information Bill Committee, 16/5/23; cols. 113-14.]

But it was pointed out by Dr Jeni Tennison of Connected by Data in her oral evidence to the committee that the impact assessment for the Bill indicates that a significant proportion of the savings predicted would come from lighter burdens on organisations dealing with subject access requests as a result of this clause. This suggests that, while the Government claim that this clause is a clarification, it is intended to weaken obligations on controllers and, correspondingly, the rights of data subjects. Is that where the Secretary of State’s £10 billion of benefit from this Bill comes from? On these grounds alone, Clause 9 should be removed from the Bill.

We also oppose the question that Clause 12 stand part of the Bill. Clause 12 provides that, in responding to subject access requests, controllers are required only to undertake a

“reasonable and proportionate search for the personal data and other information”.

This clause also appears designed to weaken the right of subject access and will lead to confusion for organisations about what constitutes a reasonable and proportionate search in a particular circumstance. The right of subject access is central to individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, because it is a gateway to exercising other rights, either within the data subject rights regime or in relation to other legal rights, such as the rights to equality and non-discrimination. Again, the lowering of rights compared with the EU creates obvious risks, and this is a continuing theme of data adequacy.

Clause 12 does not provide a definition for reasonable and proportionate searches, but when introducing the amendment, Sir John Whittingdale suggested that a search for information may become unreasonable or disproportionate

“when the information is of low importance or of low relevance to the data subject”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/23; col. 873.]

Those considerations diverge from those provided in the Information Commissioner’s guidance on the rights of access, which states that when determining whether searches may be unreasonable or disproportionate, the data controller must consider the circumstances of the request, any difficulties involved in finding the information and the fundamental nature of the right of access.

We also continue to be concerned about the impact assessment for the Bill and the Government’s claims that the new provisions in relation to subject access requests are for clarification only. Again, Clause 12 appears to have the same impact as Clause 9 in the kinds of savings that the Government seem to imagine will emerge from the lowering of subject access rights. This is a clear dilution of subject access rights, and this clause should also be removed from the Bill.

We always allow for belt and braces and if our urging does not lead to the Minister agreeing to remove Clauses 9 and 12, at the very least we should have the new provisions set out either in Amendment 26, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, or in Amendment 25, which proposes that a data controller who refuses a subject access request must give reasons for their refusal and tell the subject about their right to seek a remedy. That is absolutely the bare minimum, but I would far prefer to see the deletion of Clauses 9 and 12 from the Bill.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As ever, I thank noble Lords for raising and speaking to these amendments. I start with the stand part notices on Clauses 9 and 36, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Clauses 9 and 36 clarify the new threshold to refuse or charge a reasonable fee for a request that is “vexatious or excessive”. Clause 36 also clarifies that the Information Commissioner may charge a fee for dealing with, or refuse to deal with, a vexatious or excessive request made by any persons and not just data subjects, providing necessary certainty.

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Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I apologise for intervening, but the Minister referred to resources. By that, he means the resources for the controller but, as I said earlier, there is no consideration of what the social cost may be. If this Bill had already become law, how would the victims of the Post Office scandal have been able to secure any information? Under this Bill, the threshold for providing information will be much lower than it is under the current legislation. Can the Minister say something about how the controllers will take social cost into account or how the Government have taken that into account?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

First, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, it is not to be argumentative—I am sure that there is much discussion to be had—but the intention is absolutely not to lower the standard for a well-intended request.

Sadly, a number of requests that are not well intended are made, with purposes of cynicism and an aim to disrupt. I can give a few examples. For instance, some requests are deliberately made with minimal time between them. Some are made to circumvent the process of legal disclosure in a trial. Some are made for other reasons designed to disrupt an organisation. The intent of using “vexatious” is not in any way to reduce well-founded, or even partially well-founded, attempts to secure information; it is to reduce less desirable, more cynical attempts to work in this way.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

But the two terms have a different legal meaning, surely.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The actual application of the terms will be set out in guidance by the ICO but the intention is to filter out the more disruptive and cynical ones. Designing these words is never an easy thing but there has been considerable consultation on this in order to achieve that intention.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords—sorry; it may be that the Minister was just about to answer my question. I will let him do so.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will have to go back to the impact assessment but I would be astonished if that was a significant part of the savings promised. By the way, the £10.6 billion—or whatever it is—in savings was given a green rating by the body that assesses these things; its name eludes me. It is a robust calculation. I will check and write to the noble Lord, but I do not believe that a significant part of that calculation leans on the difference between “vexatious” and “manifestly unfounded”.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It would be very useful to have the Minister respond on that but, of course, as far as the impact assessment is concerned, a lot of this depends on the Government’s own estimates of what this Bill will produce—some of which are somewhat optimistic.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has given me an idea: if an impact assessment has been made, clause by clause, it would be extremely interesting to know just where the Government believe the golden goose is.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am not quite sure what is being requested because the impact assessment has been not only made but published.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Yes, but it is a very broad impact assessment.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I see—so noble Lords would like an analysis of the different components of the impact assessment. It has been green-rated by the independent Regulatory Policy Committee. I have just been informed by the Box that the savings from these reforms to the wording of SARs are valued at less than 1% of the benefit of more than £10 billion that this Bill will bring.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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That begs the question of where on earth the rest is coming from.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Which I will be delighted to answer. With this interesting exchange, I have lost in my mind the specific questions that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, asked but I am coming on to some of his other ones; if I do not give satisfactory answers, no doubt he will intervene and ask again.

I appreciate the further comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, about the Freedom of Information Act. I hope he will be relieved to know that this Bill does nothing to amend that Act. On his accounting questions, he will be aware that most SARs are made by private individuals to private companies. The Government are therefore not involved in that process and do not collect the kind of information that he described.

Following the DPDI Bill, the Government will work with the ICO to update guidance on subject access requests. Guidance plays an important role in clarifying what a controller should consider when relying on the new “vexatious or excessive” provision. The Government are also exploring whether a code of practice on subject access requests can best address the needs of controllers and data subjects.

On whether Clause 12 should stand part of the Bill, Clause 12 is only putting on a statutory footing what has already been established—

Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
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My apologies. The Minister just said that the Government do not collect the data. Therefore, what is the basis for changing the threshold? No data, no reasonable case.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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The Government do not collect details of private interactions between those raising SARs and the companies they raise them with. The business case is based on extensive consultation—

Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
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I hope that the Government have some data about government departments and the public bodies over which they have influence. Can he provide us with a glimpse of how many requests are received, how many are rejected at the outset, how many go to the commissioners, what the cost is and how the cost is computed? At the moment, it sounds like the Government want to lower the threshold without any justification.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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As I say, I do not accept that the threshold is being lowered. On the other hand, I will undertake to find out what information can be reasonably provided. Again, as I said, the independent regulatory committee gave the business case set out a green rating; that is a high standard and gives credibility to the business case calculations, which I will share.

The reforms keep reasonable requests free of charge and instead seek to ensure that controllers can refuse or charge a reasonable fee for requests that are “vexatious or excessive”, which can consume a significant amount of time and resources. However, the scope of the current provision is unclear and, as I said, there are a variety of circumstances where controllers would benefit from being able confidently to refuse or charge the fee.

Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
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The Minister used the phrase “reasonable fee”. Can he provide some clues on that, especially for the people who may request information? We have around 17.8 million individuals living on less than £12,570. So, from what perspective is the fee reasonable and how is it determined?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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“Reasonable” would be set out in the guidance to be created by the ICO but it would need to reflect the costs and affordability. The right of access remains of paramount importance in the data protection framework.

Lastly, as I said before on EU data adequacy, the Government maintain an ongoing dialogue with the EU and believe that our reforms are compatible with maintaining our data adequacy decisions.

For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept these amendments. I hope that noble Lords will therefore agree to withdraw or not press them.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I can also be relatively brief. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their amendments, to many of which I have added my name.

At the heart of this debate is what constitutes a disproportionate or impossibility exemption for providing data to individuals when the data is not collected directly from data subjects. Amendments 29 to 33 provide further clarity on how exemptions on the grounds of disproportionate effort should be interpreted —for example, by taking into account whether there would be a limited impact on individuals, whether they would be caused any distress, what the exemptions were in the first place and whether the information had been made publicly available by a public body. All these provide some helpful context, which I hope the Minister will take on board.

I have also added my name to Amendments 27 and 28 from the noble Baroness, Lady Harding. They address the particular concerns about those using the open electoral register for direct marketing purposes. As the noble Baroness explained, the need for this amendment arises from the legal ruling that companies using the OER must first notify individuals at their postal addresses whenever their data is being used. As has been said, given that individuals already have an opt-out when they register on the electoral roll, it would seem unnecessary and impractical for companies using the register to follow up with individuals each time they want to access their data. These amendments seek to close that loophole and return the arrangements back to the previous incarnation, which seemed to work well.

All the amendments provide useful forms of words but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, if the wording is not quite right, we hope that the Minister will help us to craft something that is right and that solves the problem. I hope that he agrees that there is a useful job of work to be done on this and that he provides some guidance on how to go about it.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I thank my noble friend Lady Harding for moving this important amendment. I also thank the cosignatories—the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. As per my noble friend’s request, I acknowledge the importance of this measure and the difficulty of judging it quite right. It is a difficult balance and I will do my best to provide some reassurance, but I welcomed hearing the wise words of all those who spoke.

I turn first to the clarifying Amendments 27 and 32. I reassure my noble friend Lady Harding that, in my view, neither is necessary. Clause 11 amends the drafting of the list of cases when the exemption under Article 14(5) applies but the list closes with “or”, which makes it clear that you need to meet only one of the criteria listed in paragraph (5) to be exempt from the transparency requirements.

I turn now to Amendments 28 to 34, which collectively aim to expand the grounds of disproportionate effort to exempt controllers from providing certain information to individuals. The Government support the use of public data sources, such as the OER, which may be helpful for innovation and may have economic benefits. Sometimes, providing this information is simply not possible or is disproportionate. Existing exemptions apply when the data subject already has the information or in cases where personal data has been obtained from someone other than the data subject and it would be impossible to provide the information or disproportionate effort would be required to do so.

We must strike the right balance between supporting the use of these datasets and ensuring transparency for data subjects. We also want to be careful about protecting the integrity of the electoral register, open or closed, to ensure that it is used within the data subject’s reasonable expectations. The exemptions that apply when the data subject already has the information or when there would be a disproportionate effort in providing the information must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, particularly if personal data from public registers is to be combined with other sources of personal data to build a profile for direct marketing.

These amendments may infringe on transparency—a key principle in the data protection framework. The right to receive information about what is happening to your data is important for exercising other rights, such as the right to object. This could be seen as going beyond what individuals might expect to happen to their data.

The Government are not currently convinced that these amendments would be sufficient to prevent negative consequences to data subject rights and confidence in the open electoral register and other public registers, given the combination of data from various sources to build a profile—that was the subject of the tribunal case being referenced. Furthermore, the Government’s view is that there is no need to amend Article 14(6) explicitly to include the “reasonable expectation of the data subjects” as the drafting already includes reference to “appropriate safeguards”. This, in conjunction with the fairness principle, means that data controllers are already required to take this into account when applying the disproportionate effort exemption.

The above notwithstanding, the Government understand that the ICO may explore this question as part of its work on guidance in the future. That seems a better way of addressing this issue in the first instance, ensuring the right balance between the use of the open electoral register and the rights of data subjects. We will continue to work closely with the relevant stakeholders involved and monitor the situation.

Baroness Harding of Winscombe Portrait Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
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I wonder whether I heard my noble friend correctly. He said “may”, “could” and “not currently convinced” several times, but, for the companies concerned, there is a very real, near and present deadline. How is my noble friend the Minister suggesting that deadline should be considered?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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On the first point, I used the words carefully because the Government cannot instruct the ICO specifically on how to act in any of these cases. The question about the May deadline is important. With the best will in the world, none of the provisions in the Bill are likely to be in effect by the time of that deadline in any case. That being the case, I would feel slightly uneasy about advising the ICO on how to act.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I am not quite getting from the Minister whether he has an understanding of and sympathy with the case that is being made or whether he is standing on ceremony on its legalities. Is he saying, “No, we think that would be going too far”, or that there is a good case and that guidance or some action by the ICO would be more appropriate? I do not get the feeling that somebody has made a decision about the policy on this. It may be that conversations with the Minister between Committee and Report would be useful, and it may be early days yet until he hears the arguments made in Committee; I do not know, but it would be useful to get an indication from him.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Yes. I repeat that I very much recognise the seriousness of the case. There is a balance to be drawn here. In my view, the best way to identify the most appropriate balancing point is to continue to work closely with the ICO, because I strongly suspect that, at least at this stage, it may be very difficult to draw a legislative dividing line that balances the conflicting needs. That said, I am happy to continue to engage with noble Lords on this really important issue between Committee and Report, and I commit to doing so.

On the question of whether Clause 11 should stand part of the Bill, Clause 11 extends the existing disproportionate effort exemption to cases where the controller collected the personal data directly from the data subject and intends to carry out further processing for research purposes, subject to the research safeguards outlined in Clause 26. This exemption is important to ensure that life-saving research can continue unimpeded.

Research holds a privileged position in the data protection framework because, by its nature, it is viewed as generally being in the public interest. The framework has various exemptions in place to facilitate and encourage research in the UK. During the consultation, we were informed of various longitudinal studies, such as those into degenerative neurological conditions, where it is impossible or nearly impossible to recontact data subjects. To ensure that this vital research can continue unimpeded, Clause 11 provides a limited exemption that applies only to researchers who are complying with the safeguards set out in Clause 26.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised concerns that Clause 11 would allow unfair processing. I assure him that this is not the case, as any processing that uses the disproportionate effort exemption in Article 13 must comply with the overarching data protection principles, including lawfulness, fairness and transparency, so that even if data controllers rely on this exemption they should consider other ways to make the processing they undertake as fair and transparent as possible.

Finally, returning to EU data adequacy, the Government recognise its importance and, as I said earlier, are confident that the proposals in Clause 11 are complemented by robust safeguards, which reinforces our view that they are compatible with EU adequacy. For the reasons that I have set out, I am unable to accept these amendments, and I hope that noble Lords will not press them.

Baroness Harding of Winscombe Portrait Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
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My Lords, I am not quite sure that I understand where my noble friend the Minister is on this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, summed it up well in his recent intervention. I will try to take at face value my noble friend’s assurances that he is happy to continue to engage with us on these issues, but I worry that he sees this as two sides of an issue—I hear from him that there may be some issues and there could be some problems—whereas we on all sides of the Committee have set out a clear black and white problem. I do not think they are the same thing.

I appreciate that the wording might create some unintended consequences, but I have not really understood what my noble friend’s real concerns are, so we will need to come back to this on Report. If anything, this debate has made it even clearer to me that it is worth pushing for clarity on this. I look forward to ongoing discussions with a cross-section of noble Lords, my noble friend and the ICO to see if we can find a way through to resolve the very real issues that we have identified today. With that, and with thanks to all who have spoken in this debate, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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We very much support Amendments 36 and 37, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on profiling. My 10 minutes are running out very quickly so, sadly, I must leave it there.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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As ever, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their detailed consideration of Clause 14, and all other noble Lord who spoke so well. I carefully note the references to the DWP’s measure on fraud and error. For now, I reassure noble Lords that a human will always be involved in all decision-making relating to that measure, but I note that this Committee will have a further debate specifically on that measure later.

The Government recognise the importance of solely automated decision-making to the UK’s future success and productivity. These reforms ensure that it can be responsibly implemented, while any such decisions with legal or similarly significant effects have the appropriate safeguards in place, including the rights to request a review and to request one from a human. These reforms clarify and simplify the rules related to solely automated decision-making without watering down any of the protections for data subjects or the fundamental data protection principles. In doing so, they will provide confidence to organisations looking to use these technologies in a responsible way while driving economic growth and innovation.

The Government also recognise that AI presents huge opportunities for the public sector. It is important that AI is used responsibly and transparently in the public sector; we are already taking steps to build trust and transparency. Following a successful pilot, we are making the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard—the ATRS—a requirement for all government departments, with plans to expand this across the broader public sector over time. This will ensure that there is a standardised way for government departments proactively to publish information about how and why they are using algorithms in their decision-making. In addition, the Central Digital and Data Office—the CDDO—has already published guidance on the procurement and use of generative AI for the UK Government and, later this year, DSIT will launch the AI management essentials scheme, setting a minimum good practice standard for companies selling AI products and services.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, could I just interrupt the Minister? It may be that he can get an answer from the Box to my question. One intriguing aspect is that, as the Minister said, the pledge is to bring the algorithmic recording standard into each government department and there will be an obligation to use that standard. However, what compliance mechanism will there be to ensure that that is happening? Does the accountable Permanent Secretary have a duty to make sure that that is embedded in the department? Who has the responsibility for that?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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That is a fair question. I must confess that I do not know the answer. There will be mechanisms in place, department by department, I imagine, but one would also need to report on it across government. Either it will magically appear in my answer or I will write to the Committee.

The CDDO has already published guidance on the procurement and use of generative AI for the Government. We will consult on introducing this as a mandatory requirement for public sector procurement, using purchasing power to drive responsible innovation in the broader economy.

I turn to the amendments in relation to meaningful involvement. I will first take together Amendments 36 and 37, which aim to clarify that the safeguards mentioned under Clause 14 are applicable to profiling operations. New Article 22A(2) already clearly sets out that, in cases where profiling activity has formed part of the decision-making process, controllers have to consider the extent to which a decision about an individual has been taken by means of profiling when establishing whether human involvement has been meaningful. Clause 14 makes clear that a solely automated significant decision is one without meaningful human involvement and that, in these cases, controllers are required to provide the safeguards in new Article 22C. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary; I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, not to press them.

Turning to Amendment 38, the Government are confident that the existing reference to “data subject” already captures the intent of this amendment. The existing definition of “personal data” makes it clear that a data subject is a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, whether he would be willing not to press it.

Amendments 38A and 40 seek to clarify that, for human involvement to be considered meaningful, the review must be carried out by a competent person. We feel that these amendments are unnecessary as meaningful human involvement may vary depending on the use case and context. The reformed clause already introduces a power for the Secretary of State to provide legal clarity on what is or is not to be taken as meaningful human involvement. This power is subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament and allows the provision to be future-proofed in the wake of technological advances. As such, I ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bennett, not to press their amendments.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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That means no compliance mechanism.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am not sure I agree with that characterisation. The ATRS is a relatively new development. It needs time to bed in and needs to be bedded in on an agile basis in order to ensure not only quality but speed of implementation. That said, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister has taken us through what Clause 14 does and rebutted the need for anything other than “solely”. He has gone through the sensitive data and the special category data aspects, and so on, but is he reiterating his view that this clause is purely for clarification; or is he saying that it allows greater use of automated decision-making, in particular in public services, so that greater efficiencies can be found and therefore it is freeing up the public sector at the expense of the rights of the individual? Where does he sit in all this?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I said, the intent of the Government is: yes to more automated data processing to take advantage of emerging technologies, but also yes to maintaining appropriate safeguards. The safeguards in the present system consist—if I may characterise it in a slightly blunt way—of providing quite a lot of uncertainty, so that people do not take the decision to positively embrace the technology in a safe way. By bringing in this clarity, we will see an increase not only in the safety of their applications but in their use, driving up productivity in both the public and private sectors.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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My Lords, I said at the outset that I thought this was the beginning of a particular debate, and I was right, looking at the amendments coming along. The theme of the debate was touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, when she talked about these amendments, in essence, being about keeping humans in the loop and the need for them to be able to review decisions. Support for that came from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who made some important points. The point the BMA made about risking eroding trust cut to what we have been talking about all afternoon: trust in these processes.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, talked about this effectively being the watering down of Article 22A, and the need for some core ethical principles in AI use and for the Government to ensure a right to human review. Clause 14 reverses the presumption of that human reviewing process, other than where solely automated decision-making exists, where it will be more widely allowed, as the Minister argued.

However, I am not satisfied by the responses, and I do not think other Members of your Lordships’ Committee will be either. We need more safeguards. We have moved from one clear position to another, which can be described as watering down or shifting the goalposts; I do not mind which, but that is how it seems to me. Of course, we accept that there are huge opportunities for AI in the delivery of public services, particularly in healthcare and the operation of the welfare system, but we need to ensure that citizens in this country have a higher level of protection than the Bill currently affords them.

At one point I thought the Minister said that a solely automated decision was a rubber-stamped decision. To me, that gave the game away. I will have to read carefully what he said in Hansard¸ but that is how it sounded, and it really gets our alarm bells ringing. I am happy to withdraw my amendment, but we will come back to this subject from time to time and throughout our debates on the rest of the Bill.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 48. By some quirk of fate, I failed to sign up to the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, so cogently introduced. I would have signed up if I had realised that I had not, so to speak.

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. She has a track record of being extremely persuasive, so I hope the Minister pays heed in what happens between Committee and Report. I very much hope that there will be some room for manoeuvre and that there is not just permanent push-back, with the Minister saying that everything is about clarifying and us saying that everything is about dilution. There comes a point when we have to find some accommodation on some of these areas.

Amendments 48 and 49 are very similar—I was going to say, “Great minds think alike”, but I am not sure that my brain feels like much of a great mind at the moment. “Partly” or “predominantly” rather than “solely”, if you look at it the other way round, is really the crux of what I think many of us are concerned about. It is easy to avoid the terms of Article 22 just by slipping in some sort of token human involvement. Defining “meaningful” is so difficult in these circumstances. I am concerned that we are opening the door to something that could be avoided. Even then, the terms of the new clause—we will have a clause stand part debate on Wednesday, obviously—put all the onus on the data subject, whereas that was not the case previously under Article 22. The Minister has not really explained why that change has been made.

I conclude by saying that I very much support Amendment 41. This whole suite of amendments is well drafted. The point about the Equality Act is extremely well made. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, also has a very good amendment here. It seems to me that involving the ICO right in the middle of this will be absolutely crucial—and we are back to public trust again. If nothing else, I would like explicitly to include that under Clause 14 in relation to Article 22 by the time this Bill goes through.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank noble Lords and the noble Baroness for their further detailed consideration of Clause 14.

Let me take first the amendments that deal with restrictions on and safeguards for ADM and degree of ADM. Amendment 41 aims to make clear that solely automated decisions that contravene any part of the Equality Act 2010 are prohibited. We feel that this amendment is unnecessary for two reasons. First, this is already the case under the Equality Act, which is reinforced by the lawfulness principle under the present data protection framework, meaning that controllers are already required to adhere to the Equality Act 2010. Secondly, explicitly stating in the legislation that contravening one type of legislation is prohibited—in this case, the Equality Act 2010—and not referring to other legislation that is also prohibited will lead to an inconsistent approach. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to withdraw it.

Amendment 44 seeks to limit the conditions for special category data processing for this type of automated decision-making. Again, we feel that this is not needed given that a set of conditions already provides enhanced levels of protection for the processing of special category data, as set out in Article 9 of the UK GDPR. In order to lawfully process special category data, you must identify both a lawful basis under Article 6 of the UK GDPR and a separate condition for processing under Article 9. Furthermore, where an organisation seeks to process special category data under solely automated decision-making on the basis that it is necessary for contract, in addition to the Articles 6 and 9 lawful bases, they would also have to demonstrate that the processing was necessary for substantial public interest.

Similarly, Amendment 45 seeks to apply safeguards when processing special category data; however, these are not needed as the safeguards in new Article 22C already apply to all forms of processing, including the processing of special category data, by providing sufficient safeguards for data subjects’ rights, freedoms and legitimate interests. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary; I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, not to press them.

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Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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Can the Minister give me an indication of the level at which that kicks in? For example, say there is a child in a classroom and a decision has been made about their ability in a particular subject. Is it automatic that the parent and the child get some sort of read-out on that? I would be curious to know where the Government feel that possibility starts.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In that example, where a child was subject to a solely ADM decision, the school would be required to inform the child of the decision and the reasons behind it. The child and their parent would have the right to seek a human review of the decision.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We may come on to this when we get to edtech but a lot of those decisions are happening automatically right now, without any kind of review. I am curious as to why it is on the school whereas the person actually doing the processing may well be a technology company.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It may be either the controller or the processor but for any legal or similarly significant decision right now—today—there is a requirement before the Bill comes into effect. That requirement is retained by the Bill.

In line with ICO guidance, children need particular protection when organisations collect and process their personal data because they may be less aware of the risks involved. If organisations process children’s personal data they should think about the need to protect them from the outset and should design their systems and processes with this in mind. This is the case for organisations processing children’s data during solely automated decision-making, just as it is for all processing of children’s data.

Building on this, the Government’s view is that automated decision-making has an important role to play in protecting children online, for example with online content moderation. The current provisions in the Bill will help online service providers understand how they can use these technologies and strike the right balance between enabling the best use of automated decision-making technology while continuing to protect the rights of data subjects, including children. As such, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Baroness if she would be willing not to press it.

Amendments 48 and 49 seek to extend the Article 22 provisions to “predominantly” and “partly” automated decision-making. These types of processing already involve meaningful human involvement. In such instances, other data protection requirements, including transparency and fairness, continue to apply and offer relevant protections. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary; I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, if they would be willing not to press them.

Amendment 50 seeks to ensure that the Article 22C safeguards will apply alongside, rather than instead of, the transparency obligations in the UK GDPR. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that the general transparency obligations in Articles 12 to 15 will continue to apply and thus will operate alongside the safeguards in the reformed Article 22. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Baroness if she would be willing not to press it.

The changes proposed by Amendment 52A are unnecessary as Clause 50 already provides for an overarching requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the ICO and other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making regulations under the UK GDPR, including for the measures within Article 22. Also, any changes to the regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure so must be approved by both Houses of Parliament. As with other provisions of the Bill, the ICO will seek to provide organisations with timely guidance and support to assist them in interpreting and applying the legislation. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary and, if he were here, I would ask my noble friend Lord Holmes if he would be willing not to press it.

Amendments 98A and 104A are related to workplace rights. Existing data protection legislation and our proposed reforms provide sufficient safeguards for automated decision making where personal data is being processed, including in workplaces. The UK’s human rights law, and existing employment and equality laws, also ensure that employees are informed and consulted about any workplace developments, which means that surveillance of employees is regulated. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary and I ask the noble Baroness not to move them.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I hear what the Minister said about the workplace algorithmic assessment. However, if the Government believe it is right to have something like an algorithmic recording standard in the public sector, why is it not appropriate to have something equivalent in the private sector?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would not say it is not right, but if we want to make the ATRS a standard, we should make it a standard in the public sector first and then allow it to be adopted as a means for all private organisations using ADM and AI to meet the transparency principles that they are required to adopt.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

So would the Minister not be averse to it? It is merely so that the public sector is ahead of the game, allowing it to show the way and then there may be a little bit of regulation for the private sector.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not philosophically averse to such regulation. As to implementing it in the immediate future, however, I have my doubts about that possibility.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, this has been an interesting and challenging session. I hope that we have given the Minister and his team plenty to think about—I am sure we have. A lot of questions remain unanswered, and although the Committee Room is not full this afternoon, I am sure that colleagues reading the debate will be studying the responses that we have received very carefully.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her persuasive support. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his support for our amendments. It is a shame the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, was not here this afternoon, but I am sure we will hear persuasively from him on his amendment later in Committee.

The Minister is to be congratulated for his consistency. I think I heard the phrase “not needed” or “not necessary” pretty constantly this afternoon, but particularly with this group of amendments. He probably topped the lot with his response on the Equality Act on Amendment 41.

I want to go away with my colleagues to study the responses to the amendments very carefully. That being said, however, I am happy to withdraw Amendment 41 at this stage.

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Moved by
42: Clause 14, page 26, line 22, leave out from “on” to “may” in line 23 and insert “processing described in Article 9(1) (processing of special categories of personal data)”
Member's explanatory statement
This technical amendment adjusts the wording of new Article 22B(1) of the UK GDPR to reflect the terms of Article 9(1).

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Read Full debate

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. We have had a major common theme, which is that any powers exercised by the Secretary of State in Clause 14 should be to enhance, rather than diminish, the protections for a data subject affected by automated decision-making. We have heard some stark and painful examples of the way in which this can go wrong if it is not properly regulated. As noble Lords have said, this seems to be regulation on automated decision-making by the backdoor, but with none of the protections and promises that have been made on this subject.

Our Amendment 59 goes back to our earlier debate about rights at work when automated decision-making is solely or partly in operation. It provides an essential underpinning of the Secretary of State’s powers. The Minister has argued that ADM is a new development and that it would be wrong to be too explicit about the rules that should apply as it becomes more commonplace, but our amendment cuts through those concerns by putting key principles in the Bill. They are timeless principles that should apply regardless of advances in the adoption of these new technologies. They address the many concerns raised by workers and their representatives, about how they might be disfranchised or exploited by machines, and put human contact at the heart of any new processes being developed. I hope that the Minister sees the sense of this amendment, which will provide considerable reassurance for the many people who fear the impact of ADM in their working lives.

I draw attention to my Amendments 58 and 73, which implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. In the Bill, the new Articles 22A to 22D enable the Secretary of State to make further provisions about safeguards when automated decision-making is in place. The current wording of new Article 22D makes it clear that regulations can be amended

“by adding or varying safeguards”.

The Delegated Powers Committee quotes the department saying that

“it does not include a power to remove safeguards provided in new Article 22C and therefore cannot be exercised to weaken the protections”

afforded to data subjects. The committee is not convinced that the department is right about this, and we agree with its analysis. Surely “vary” means that the safeguards can move in either direction—to improve or reduce protection.

The committee also flags up concerns that the Bill’s amendments to Sections 49 and 50 of the Data Protection Act make specific provision about the use of automated decision-making in the context of law enforcement processing. In this new clause, there is an equivalent wording, which is that the regulations may add or vary safeguards. Again, we agree with its concerns about the application of these powers to the Secretary of State. It is not enough to say that these powers are subject to the affirmative procedure because, as we know and have discussed, the limits on effective scrutiny of secondary legislation are manifest.

We have therefore tabled Amendments 58 and 73, which make it much clearer that the safeguards cannot be reduced by the Secretary of State. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has a number of amendments with a similar intent, which is to ensure that the Secretary of State can add new safeguards but not remove them. I hope the Minister is able to commit to taking on board the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee in this respect.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, once again made the powerful point that the Secretary of State’s powers to amend the Data Protection Act should not be used to reduce the hard-won standards and protections for children’s data. As she says, safeguards do not constitute a right, and having regard to the issues is a poor substitute for putting those rights back into the Bill. So I hope the Minister is able to provide some reassurance that the Bill will be amended to put these hard-won rights back into the Bill, where they belong.

I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, is not here. His amendment raises an important point about the need to build in the views of the Information Commissioner, which is a running theme throughout the Bill. He makes the point that we need to ensure, in addition, that a proper consultation of a range of stakeholders goes into the Secretary of State’s deliberations on safeguards. We agree that full consultation should be the hallmark of the powers that the Secretary of State is seeking, and I hope the Minister can commit to taking those amendments on board.

I echo the specific concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the impact assessment and the supposed savings from changing the rules on subject access requests. This is not specifically an issue for today’s debate but, since it has been raised, I would like to know whether he is right that the savings are estimated to be 50% and not 1%, which the Minister suggested when we last debated this. I hope the Minister can clarify this discrepancy on the record, and I look forward to his response.

Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
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I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Knight, my noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones, Lady Kidron and Lady Bennett—

None Portrait Noble Lords
- Hansard -

Lady Harding.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I apologise to my noble friend. I cannot be having a senior moment already—we have only just started. I look forward to reading that part in Hansard.

I can reassure noble Lords that data subjects still have the right to object to solely automated decision-making. It is not an absolute right in all circumstances, but I note that it never has been. The approach taken in the Bill complements the UK’s AI regulation framework, and the Government are committed to addressing the risks that AI poses to data protection and wider society. Following the publication of the AI regulation White Paper last year, the Government started taking steps to establish a central AI risk function that brings together policymakers and AI experts with the objective of identifying, assessing and preparing for AI risks. To track identified risks, we have established an initial AI risk register, which is owned by the central AI risk function. The AI risk register lists individual risks associated with AI that could impact the UK, spanning national security, defence, the economy and society, and outlines their likelihood and impact. We have also committed to engaging on and publishing the AI risk register in spring this year.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I am processing what the Minister has just said. He said it complements the AI regulation framework, and then he went on to talk about the central risk function, the AI risk register and what the ICO is up to in terms of guidance, but I did not hear that the loosening of safeguards or rights under Clause 14 and Article 22 of the GDPR was heralded in the White Paper or the consultation. Where does that fit with the Government’s AI regulation strategy? There is a disjunct somewhere.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I reject the characterisation of Clause 14 or any part of the Bill as loosening the safeguards. It focuses on the outcomes and by being less prescriptive and more adaptive, its goal is to heighten the levels of safety of AI, whether through privacy or anything else. That is the purpose.

On Secretary of State powers in relation to ADM, the reforms will enable the Government to further describe what is and is not to be taken as a significant effect on a data subject and what is and is not to be taken as meaningful human—

Baroness Harding of Winscombe Portrait Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
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I may be tired or just not very smart, but I am not really sure that I understand how being less prescriptive and more adaptive can heighten safeguards. Can my noble friend the Minister elaborate a little more and perhaps give us an example of how that can be the case?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Certainly. Being prescriptive and applying one-size-fits-all measures for all processes covered by the Bill encourages organisations to follow a process, but focusing on outcomes encourages organisations to take better ownership of the outcomes and pursue the optimal privacy and safety mechanisms for those organisations. That is guidance that came out very strongly in the Data: A New Direction consultation. Indeed, in the debate on a later group we will discuss the use of senior responsible individuals rather than data protection officers, which is a good example of removing prescriptiveness to enhance adherence to the overall framework and enhance safety.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This seems like a very good moment to ask whether, if the variation is based on outcome and necessity, the Minister agrees that the higher bar of safety for children should be specifically required as an outcome.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I absolutely agree about the outcome of higher safety for children. We will come to debate whether the mechanism for determining or specifying that outcome is writing that down specifically, as suggested.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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I am sure the Minister knew I was going to stand up to say that, if it is not part of the regulatory instruction, it will not be part of the outcome. The point of regulation is to determine a floor— never a ceiling—below which people cannot go. Therefore, if we wish to safeguard children, we must have that floor as part of the regulatory instruction.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed. That may well be the case, but how that regulatory instruction is expressed can be done in multiple ways. Let me continue; otherwise, I will run out of time.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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I am having a senior moment as well. Where are the outcomes written? What are we measuring this against? I like the idea; it sounds great—management terminology—but I presume that it is written somewhere and that we could easily add children’s rights to the outcomes as the noble Baroness suggests. Where are they listed?

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am sorry, but I just do not accept that intervention. This is one of the most important clauses in the whole Bill and we have to spend quite a bit of time teasing it out. The Minister has just electrified us all in what he said about the nature of this clause, what the Government are trying to achieve and how it fits within their strategy, which is even more concerning than previously. I am very sorry, but I really do not believe that this is the right point for the Whip to intervene. I have been in this House for 25 years and have never seen an intervention of that kind.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Let me make the broad point that there is no single list of outcomes for the whole Bill but, as we go through clause by clause, I hope the philosophy behind it, of being less prescriptive about process and more prescriptive about the results of the process that we desire, should emerge—not just on Clause 14 but as the overall philosophy underlying the Bill. Regulation-making powers can also be used to vary the existing safeguards, add additional safeguards and remove additional safeguards added at a later date.

On the point about having regard, it is important that the law is drafted in a way that allows it to adapt as technology advances. Including prescriptive requirements in the legislation reduces this flexibility and undermines the purpose of this clause and these powers to provide additional legal clarity when it is deemed necessary and appropriate in the light of the fast-moving advances in and adoption of technologies relevant to automated decision-making. I would like to reassure noble Lords that the powers can be used only to vary the existing safeguards, add additional ones and remove them. They cannot remove any of the safeguards written into the legislation.

Amendments 53 to 55 and 69 to 71 concern the Secretary of State powers relating to the terms “significant decisions” and “meaningful human involvement”. These powers enable the Secretary of State to provide a description of decisions that do or do not have a significant effect on data subjects, and describe cases that can be taken to have, or not to have, meaningful human involvement. As technology adoption grows and new technologies emerge, these powers will enable the Government to provide legal clarity, if and when deemed necessary, to ensure that people are protected and have access to safeguards when they matter most. In respect of Amendment 59A, Clause 50 already provides for an overarching requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the ICO and other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making regulations under the UK GDPR, including for the measures within Article 22.

Also, as has been observed—I take the point about the limitations of this, but I would like to make the point anyway—any changes to the regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure and so must be approved by both Houses. As with other provisions of the Bill, the ICO will seek to provide organisations with timely guidance and support to assist them in interpreting and applying the legislation. As such, I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes—were he here—not to press their amendments.

Amendment 57 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, seeks to ensure that, when exercising regulation-making powers in relation to the safeguards in Article 22 of the UK GDPR, the Secretary of State should uphold the level of protection that children are entitled to in the Data Protection Act 2018. As I have said before, Clause 50 requires the Secretary of State to consult the ICO and other persons he or she considers appropriate. The digital landscape and its technologies evolve rapidly, presenting new challenges in safeguarding children. Regular consultations with the ICO and stakeholders ensure that regulations remain relevant and responsive to emerging risks associated with solely automated decision-making. The ICO has a robust position on the protection of children, as evidenced through its guidance and, in particular, the age-appropriate design code. As such, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

Amendments 58, 72 and 73 seek to prevent the Secretary of State varying any of the safeguards mentioned in the reformed clauses. As I assured noble Lords earlier, the powers in this provision can be used only to vary the existing safeguards, add additional safeguards and remove additional safeguards added by regulation in future; there is not a power to remove any of the safeguards.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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I apologise for breaking the Minister’s flow, especially as he had moved on a little, but I have a number of questions. Given the time, perhaps he can write to me to answer them specifically. They are all designed to show the difference between what children now have and what they will have under the Bill.

I have to put on the record that I do not accept what the Minister just said—that, without instruction, the ICO can use its old instruction to uphold the current safety for children—if the Government are taking the instruction out of the Bill and leaving it with the old regulator. I ask the Minister to tell the Committee whether it is envisaged that the ICO will have to rewrite the age-appropriate design code to marry it with the new Bill, rather than it being the reason why it is upheld. I do not think the Government can have it both ways where, on the one hand, the ICO is the keeper of the children, and, on the other, they take out things that allow the ICO to be the keeper of the children in this Bill.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I absolutely recognise the seriousness and importance of the points made by the noble Baroness. Of course, I would be happy to write to her and meet her, as I would be for any Member in the Committee, to give—I hope—more satisfactory answers on these important points.

As an initial clarification before I write, it is perhaps worth me saying that the ICO has a responsibility to keep guidance up to date but, because it is an independent regulator, it is not for the Government to prescribe this, only to allow it to do so for flexibility. As I say, I will write and set out that important point in more detail.

Amendment 59 relates to workplace rights. I reiterate that the existing data protection legislation and our proposed reforms—

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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Has the Minister moved on from our Amendments 58 and 59? He was talking about varying safeguards. I am not quite sure where he is.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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It is entirely my fault; when I sit down and stand up again, I lose my place.

We would always take the views of the DPRRC very seriously on that. Clearly, the Bill is being designed without the idea in mind of losing or diminishing any of those safeguards; otherwise, it would have simply said in the Bill that we could do that. I understand the concern that, by varying them, there is a risk that they would be diminished. We will continue to find a way to take into account the concerns that the noble Baroness has set out, along with the DPRRC. In the interim, let me perhaps provide some reassurance that that is, of course, not the intention.

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Moved by
61: Clause 14, page 28, line 17, leave out “using sensitive personal data” and insert “based on sensitive processing”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment of a heading is consequential on the amendment in my name to clause 14, page 28, line 19.
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Moved by
63: Clause 14, page 28, line 19, leave out “sensitive personal data” and insert “sensitive processing (as defined in section 35(8))”
Member’s explanatory statement
This technical amendment adjusts the wording of new section 50B(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to refer to “sensitive processing”, rather than “sensitive personal data”, to reflect the terms of section 35(8) of that Act.
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We have an open mind on Amendment 252 because there is a balance to be struck between privacy issues and the need to ensure that service delivery and commercial activity operate on a level playing field. I listened to the passionate argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, also made some powerful points on this, but I would like to hear what the Minister has to say because we need to get this right as well. We cannot have a situation where one part of the public service is holding up or getting wrong public service delivery and the operation of physical delivery services to our homes and households. With that, I am content to let the Minister have his say. I hope he gets all our names right.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I feel under amazing pressure to get the names right, especially given the number of hours we spend together.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling Amendments 74 to 78, 144 and 252 in this group. I also extend my thanks to noble Lords who have signed the amendments and spoken so eloquently in this debate.

Amendments 74 to 78 would place a legislative obligation on public authorities and all persons in the exercise of a public function to publish reports under the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard—ATRS—or to publish algorithmic impact assessments. These would provide information on algorithmic tools and algorithm-assisted decisions that process personal data in the exercise of a public function or those that have a direct or indirect public effect or directly interact with the general public. I remind noble Lords that the UK’s data protection laws will continue to apply throughout the processing of personal data.

The Government are already taking action to establish the necessary guard-rails for AI, including to promote transparency. In the AI regulation White Paper response, we announced that the use of the ATRS will now become a requirement for all government departments and the broader public sector. The Government are phasing this in as we speak and will check compliance accordingly, as DSIT has been in contact with every department on this issue.

In making this policy, the Government are taking an approach that provides increasing degrees of mandation of the ATRS, with appropriate exemptions, allowing them to monitor compliance and effectiveness. The announcement in the White Paper response has already led to more engagement from across government, and more records are under way. The existing process focuses on the importance of continuous improvement and development. Enshrining the standard into law prematurely, amid exponential technological change, could hinder its adaptability.

More broadly, our AI White Paper outlined a proportionate and adaptable framework for regulating AI. As part of that, we expect AI development and use to be fair, transparent and secure. We set out five key principles for UK regulators to interpret and apply within their remits. This approach reflects the fact that AI systems are not unregulated and need to be compliant with existing regulatory frameworks, including employment, human rights, health and safety and data protection law.

For instance, the UK’s data protection legislation imposes obligations on data controllers, including providers and users of AI systems, to process personal data fairly, lawfully and transparently. Our reforms in this Bill will ensure that, where solely automated decision-making is undertaken—that is, ADM without any meaningful human involvement that has significant effects on data subjects—data subjects will have a right to the relevant safeguards. These safeguards include being provided with information on the ADM that has been carried out and the right to contest those decisions and seek human review, enabling controllers to take suitable measures to correct those that have produced wrongful outcomes.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I wonder whether the Minister can comment on this; he can write if he needs to. Is he saying that, in effect, the ATRS is giving the citizen greater rights than are ordinarily available under Article 22? Is that the actual outcome? If, for instance, every government department adopted ATRS, would that, in practice, give citizens a greater degree of what he might put as safeguards but, in this context, he is describing as rights?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am very happy to write to the noble Lord, but I do not believe that the existence of an ATRS-generated report in and of itself confers more rights on anybody. Rather, it makes it easier for citizens to understand how their rights are being used, what rights they have, or what data about them is being used by the department concerned. The existence of data does not in and of itself confer new rights on anybody.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I understand that, but if he rewinds the reel he will find that he was talking about the citizen’s right of access, or something of that sort, at that point. Once you know what data is being used, the citizen has certain rights. I do not know whether that follows from the ATRS or he was just describing that at large.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I said, I will write. I do not believe that follows axiomatically from the ATRS’s existence.

On Amendment 144, the Government are sympathetic to the idea that the ICO should respond to new and emerging technologies, including the use of children’s data in the development of AI. I assure noble Lords that this area will continue to be a focus of the ICO’s work and that it already has extensive powers to provide additional guidance or make updates to the age-appropriate design code, to ensure that it reflects new developments, and a responsibility to keep it up to date. The ICO has a public task under Article 57(1)(b) of the UK GDPR to

“promote public awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to processing”.

It is already explicit that:

“Activities addressed specifically to children shall receive specific attention”.


That code already includes a chapter on profiling and provides guidance on fairness and transparency requirements around automated decision-making.

Taking the specific point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on the contents of the ICO’s guidance, while I cannot speak to the ICO’s decisions about the drafting of its guidance, I am content to undertake to speak to it about this issue. I note that it is important to be careful to avoid a requirement for the ICO to duplicate work. The creation of an additional children’s code focused on AI could risk fragmenting approaches to children’s protections in the existing AADC—a point made by the noble Baroness and by my noble friend Lady Harding.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have a question on this. If the Minister is arguing that this should be by way of amendment of the age-related code, would there not be an argument for giving that code some statutory effect?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I believe that the AADC already has statutory standing.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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On that point, I think that the Minister said—forgive me if I am misquoting him —risk, rules and rights, or some list to that effect. While the intention of what he said was that we have to be careful where children are using it, and the ICO has to make them aware of the risks, the purpose of a code—whether it is part of the AADC or stand-alone—is to put those responsibilities on the designers of service products and so on by default. It is upstream where we need the action, not downstream, where the children are.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes, I entirely agree with that, but I add that we need it upstream and downstream.

For the reasons I have set out, the Government do not believe that it would be appropriate to add these provisions to the Bill at this time without further detailed consultation with the ICO and the other organisations involved in regulating AI in the United Kingdom. Clause 33—

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Can we agree that there will be some discussions with the ICO between now and Report? If those take place, I will not bring this point back on Report unnecessarily.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes, I am happy to commit to that. As I said, we look forward to talking with the noble Baroness and others who take an interest in this important area.

Clause 33 already includes a measure that would allow the Secretary of State to request the ICO to publish a code on any matter that she sees fit, so this is an issue that we could return to in the future, if the evidence supports it, but, as I said, we consider the amendments unnecessary at this time.

Finally, Amendment 252 would place a legislative obligation on the Secretary of State regularly to publish address data maintained by local authorities under open terms—that is, accessible by anyone for any purpose and for free. High-quality, authoritative address data for the UK is currently used by more than 50,000 public and private sector organisations, which demonstrates that current licensing arrangements are not prohibitive. This data is already accessible for a reasonable fee from local authorities and Royal Mail, with prices starting at 1.68p per address or £95 for national coverage.

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle Portrait Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Some 50,000 organisations access that information, but does the Government have any data on it? I am not asking for it now, but maybe the Minister could go away and have a look at this. We have heard that other countries have opened up this data. Are they seeing an increase? That is just a number; it does not tell us how many people are denied access to the data.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We have some numbers that I will come to, but I am very happy to share deeper analysis of that with all noble Lords.

There is also free access to this data for developers to innovate in the market. The Government also make this data available for free at the point of use to more than 6,000 public sector organisations, as well as postcode, unique identifier and location data available under open terms. The Government explored opening address data in 2016. At that time, it became clear that the Government would have to pay to make this data available openly or to recreate it. That was previously attempted, and the resulting dataset had, I am afraid, critical quality issues. As such, it was determined at that time that the changes would result in significant additional cost to taxpayers and represent low value for money, given the current widespread accessibility of the data. For the reasons I have set out, I hope that the noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. There are a number of different elements to this group.

The one bright spot in the White Paper consultation is the ATRS. That was what the initial amendments in this group were designed to give a fair wind to. As the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said, this is designed to assist in the adoption of the ATRS, and I am grateful for his support on that.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this very wide-ranging debate. Our amendments cover a lot of common ground, and we are in broad agreement on most issues, so I hope noble Lords will bear with me if I primarily focus on the amendments that I have tabled, although I will come back to other points.

We have given notice of our intention to oppose Clause 16 standing part of the Bill which is similar to Amendment 80 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which probes why the Government have found it necessary to remove the requirement that companies outside the UK should appoint a representative within the UK. The current GDPR rules apply to all those active in the UK market, regardless of whether their organisation is based or located in the UK. The intention is that the representative will ensure UK compliance and act as a primary source of contact for data subjects. Without this clause, data subjects will be forced to deal with overseas data handlers, with all the cultural and language barriers that might ensue. There is no doubt that this will limit their rights to apply UK data standards.

In addition, as my colleagues in the Commons identified, the removal of the provisions in Clause 16 was not included in the Government’s consultation, so stakeholders have not had the chance to register some of the many practical concerns that they feel will arise from this change. There is also little evidence that compliance with Article 27 is an unnecessary barrier to responsible data use by reputable overseas companies. Again, this was a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. In fact, the international trend is for more countries to add a representative obligation to their data protection laws, so we are becoming outriders on the global stage.

Not only is this an unnecessary change but, compared to other countries, it will send a signal that our data protection rights are being eroded in the UK. Of course, this raises the spectre of the EU revisiting whether our UK adequacy status should be retained. It also has implications for the different rules that might apply north and south of the border in Ireland so, again, if we are moving away from the standard rules applied by other countries, this has wider implications that we need to consider.

For many reasons, I challenge the Government to explain why this change was felt to be necessary. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, talked about whether the cost was really a factor. It did not seem that there were huge costs, compared to the benefits of maintaining the current system, and I would like to know in more detail why the Government are doing this.

Our Amendments 81 and 90 seek to ensure that there is a definition of “high-risk processing” in the Bill. The current changes in Clauses 17 and 20 have the effect of watering down data controllers’ responsibilities, from carrying out data protection impact assessments to assessing high-risk processing on the basis of whether it was necessary and what risks are posed. But nowhere does it say what constitutes high-risk processing—it is left to individual organisations to make that judgment—and nowhere does it explain what “necessary” means in this context. Is it also expected to be proportionate, as in the existing standards? This lack of clarity has caused some consternation among stakeholders.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission argues that the proposed wording means that

“data controllers are unlikely to go beyond minimum requirements”,

so the wording needs to be more explicit. It also recommends that

“the ICO be required to provide detailed guidance on how ‘the rights and freedoms of individuals’ are to be considered in an Assessment of High Risk Processing”.

More crucially, the ICO has written to Peers, saying that the Bill should contain a list of

“activities that government and Parliament view as high-risk processing, similar to the current list set out at Article 35(3) of the UK GDPR”.

This is what our Amendments 81 and 90 aim to achieve. I hope the Minister can agree to take these points on board and come back with amendments to achieve this.

The ICO also makes the case for future-proofing the way in which high-risk processing is regulated by making a provision in the Bill for the ICO to further designate high-risk processing activities with parliamentary approval. This would go further than the current drafting of Clause 20, which contains powers for the ICO to give examples of high-risk profiling, but only for guidance. Again, I hope that the Minister can agree to take these points on board and come back with suitable amendments.

Our Amendments 99, 100 and 102 specify the need for wider factors in the proposed risk assessment list to ensure that it underpins our equality laws. Again, this was an issue about which stakeholders have raised concerns. The TUC and the Institute for the Future of Work make the point that data protection impact assessments are a crucial basis for consultation with workers and trade unions about the use of technology at work, and this is even more important as the complexities of AI come on stream. The Public Law Project argues that, without rigorous risk and impact analysis, disproportionate and discriminatory processes could be carried out before the harm comes to light.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission argues that data protection impact assessments

“provide a key mechanism for ensuring equality impacts are assessed when public and private sector organisations embed AI systems in their operations”.

It specifically recommends that express references in Article 35(7) of GDPR to “legitimate interests” and

“the rights and freedoms of data subjects”,

as well as the consultation obligations in Article 35(2), should be retained. I hope that the Minister can agree to take these recommendations on board and come back with suitable amendments to ensure that our equalities legislation is protected.

Our Amendments 106 and 108 focus on the particular responsibilities of data controllers to handle health data with specific obligations. This is an issue that we know, from previous debates, is a major cause for concern among the general public, who would be alarmed if they thought that the protections were being weakened.

The BMA has raised concerns that Clauses 20 and 21 will water down our high standards of data governance, which are necessary when organisations are handling health data. As it says,

“Removing the requirement to conduct a thorough assessment of risks posed to health data is likely to lead to a less diligent approach to data protection for individuals”.


It also argues that removing the requirement for organisations to consult the ICO on high-risk processing is,

“a backward step from good governance … when organisations are processing large quantities of sensitive health data.

Our amendments aim to address these concerns by specifying that, with regard to specific cases, such as the handling of health data, prior consultation with the ICO should remain mandatory. I hope that the Minister will see the sense in these amendments and recognise that further action is needed in this Bill to maintain public trust in how health data is managed for individual care and systemwide scientific development.

I realise that we have covered a vast range of issues, but I want to touch briefly on those raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. She is right that, in particular, applications of risk assessments by public bodies should be maintained, and we agree with her that Article 35’s privacy-by-design requirements should be retained. She once again highlighted the downgrading of children’s rights in this Bill, whether by accident or intent, and we look forward to seeing the exchange of letters with the Minister on this. I hope that we will all be copied in and that the Minister will take on board the widespread view that we should have more engagement on this before Report, because there are so many outstanding issues to be resolved. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their amendments, and I look forward to receiving the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which I will respond to as quickly as I can. As everybody observed, this is a huge group, and it has been very difficult for everybody to do justice to all the points. I shall do my best, but these are points that go to the heart of the changes we are making. I am very happy to continue engaging on that basis, because we need plenty of time to review them—but, that said, off we go.

The changes the Government are making to the accountability obligations are intended to make the law clearer and less prescriptive. They will enable organisations to focus on areas that pose high risks to people resulting, the Government believe, in improved outcomes. The new provisions on assessments of high-risk processing are less prescriptive about the precise circumstances in which a risk assessment would be required, as we think organisations are best placed to judge whether a particular activity poses a high risk to individuals in the context of the situation.

However, the Government are still committed to high standards of data protection, and there are many similarities between our new risk assessment measures and the previous provisions. When an organisation is carrying out processing activities that are likely to pose a high risk to individuals, it will still be expected to document that processing, assess risks and identify mitigations. As before, no such document would be required where organisations are carrying out low-risk processing activities.

One of the main aims of the Bill is to remove some of the UK GDPR’s unnecessary compliance burdens. That is why organisations will be required to designate senior responsible individuals, keep records of processing and carry out the risk assessments above only when their activities pose high risks to individuals.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The noble Viscount is very interestingly unpacking a risk-based approach to data protection under the Bill. Why are the Government not taking a risk-based approach to their AI regulation? After all, the AI Act approaches it in exactly that way.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is a very interesting question, but I am not sure that there is a read-across between the AI Act and our approach here. The fundamental starting point was that, although the provisions of the original GDPR are extremely important, the burdens of compliance were not proportionate to the results. The overall foundation of the DPDI is, while at least maintaining existing levels of protection, to reduce the burdens of demonstrating or complying with that regulation. That is the thrust of it—that is what we are trying to achieve—but noble Lords will have different views about how successful we are being at either of those. It is an attempt to make it easier to be safe and to comply with the regulations of the DPDI and the other Acts that govern data protection. That is where we are coming from and the thrust of what we are trying to achieve.

I note that, as we have previously discussed, children need particular protection when organisations are collecting and processing their personal data.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I did not interrupt before because I thought that the Minister would say more about the difference between high-risk and low-risk processing, but he is going on to talk about children. One of my points was about the request from the Information Commissioner—it is very unusual for him to intervene. He said that a list of high-risk processing activities should be set out in the Bill. I do not know whether the Minister was going to address that important point.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will briefly address it now. Based on that letter, the Government’s view is to avoid prescription and I believe that the ICO’s view— I cannot speak for it—is generally the same, except for a few examples where prescription needs to be specified in the Bill. I will continue to engage with the ICO on where exactly to draw that line.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I can see that there is a difference of opinion, but it is unusual for a regulator to go into print with it. Not only that, but he has set it all out in an annexe. What discussion is taking place directly between the Minister and his team and the ICO? There seems to be quite a gulf between them. This is number 1 among his “areas of ongoing concern”.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not know whether it is usual or unusual for the regulator to engage in this way, but the Bill team engages with the Information Commissioner frequently and regularly, and, needless to say, it will continue to do so on this and other matters.

Children need particular protection when organisations are collecting and processing their personal data, because they may be less aware of the risks involved. If organisations process children’s personal data, they should think about the need to protect them from the outset and design their systems and processes with this in mind.

Before I turn to the substance of what the Bill does with the provisions on high-risk processing, I will deal with the first amendment in this group: Amendment 79. It would require data processors to consider data protection-by-design requirements in the same way that data controllers do, because there is a concern that controllers may not always be able to foresee what processors do with people’s data for services such as AI and cloud computing.

However, under the current legislation, it should not be for the processor to determine the nature or purposes of the processing activity, as it will enter a binding controller-processor agreement or contract to deliver a specific task. Processors also have specific duties under the UK GDPR to keep personal data safe and secure, which should mean that this amendment is not necessary.

I turn to the Clause 16 stand part notice, which seeks to remove Clause 16 from the Bill and reinstate Article 27, and Amendment 80, which seeks to do the same but just in respect of overseas data controllers, not processors. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that, even without the Article 27 representative requirement, controllers and processors will still have to maintain contact and co-operation with UK data subjects and the ICO to comply with the UK GDPR provisions. These include Articles 12 to 14, which, taken together, require controllers to provide their contact details in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, particularly for any information addressed specifically to a child.

By offering firms a choice on whether to appoint a representative in the UK to help them with UK GDPR compliance and no longer mandating organisations to appoint a representative, we are allowing organisations to decide for themselves the best way to comply with the existing requirements for effective communication and co-operation. Removing the representative requirement will also reduce unnecessary burdens on non-UK controllers and processors while maintaining data subjects’ safeguards and rights. Any costs associated with appointing a representative are a burden on and a barrier to trade. Although the variety of packages made available by representative provider organisations differ, our assessments show that the cost of appointing representatives increases with the size of a firm. Furthermore, there are several jurisdictions that do not have a mandatory or equivalent representative requirement in their data protection law, including other countries in receipt of EU data adequacy decisions.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Nevertheless, does the Minister accept that quite a lot of countries have now begun the process of requiring representatives to be appointed? How does he account for that? Does he accept that what the Government are doing is placing the interests of business over those of data subjects in this context?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, I do not accept that at all. I would suggest that we are saying to businesses, “You must provide access to the ICO and data subjects in a way that is usable by all parties, but you must do so in the manner that makes the most sense to you”. That is a good example of going after outcomes but not insisting on any particular process or methodology in a one-size-fits-all way.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister mentioned the freedom to choose the best solution. Would it be possible for someone to be told that their contact was someone who spoke a different language to them? Do they have to be able to communicate properly with the data subjects in this country?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes—if the person they were supposed to communicate with did not speak English or was not available during reasonable hours, that would be in violation of the requirement.

I apologise if we briefly revisit some of our earlier discussion here, but Amendment 81 would reintroduce a list of high-risk processing activities drawn from Article 35 of the UK GDPR, with a view to helping data controllers comply with the new requirements around designating a senior responsible individual.

The Government have consulted closely with the ICO throughout the development of all the provisions in the Bill, and we welcome its feedback as it upholds data subjects’ rights. We recognise and respect that the ICO’s view on this issue is different to the Government’s, but the Government feel that adding a prescriptive list to the legislation would not be appropriate for the reasons we have discussed. However, as I say, we will continue to engage with it over the course of the passage of the Bill.

Some of the language in Article 35 of the UK GDPR is unclear and confusing, which is partly why we removed it in the first place. We believe organisations should have the ability to make a judgment of risk based on the specific nature, scale and context of their own processing activities. We do not need to provide prescriptive examples of high-risk processing on the face of legislation because any list could quickly become out of date. Instead, to help data controllers, Clause 20 requires the ICO to produce a document with examples of what the commissioner considers to be high-risk processing activities.

I turn to Clause 17 and Amendment 82. The changes we are making in the Bill will reduce prescription by removing the requirement to appoint a data protection officer in certain circumstances. Instead, public bodies and other organisations carrying out high-risk processing activities will have to designate a senior responsible individual to ensure that data protection risks are managed effectively within their organisations. That person will have flexibility about how they manage data protection risks. They might decide to delegate tasks to independent data protection experts or upskill existing staff members, but they will not be forced to appoint data protection officers if suitable alternatives are available.

The primary rationale for moving to a senior responsible individual model is to embed data protection at the heart of an organisation by ensuring that someone in senior management takes responsibility and accountability for it if the organisation is a public body or is carrying out high-risk processing. If organisations have already appointed data protection officers and want to keep an independent expert to advise them, they will be free to do so, providing that they also designate a senior manager to take overall accountability and provide sufficient support, including resources.

Amendment 83, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require the senior responsible individual to specifically consider the risks to children when advising the controller on its responsibilities. As drafted, Clause 17 of the Bill requires the senior responsible individual to perform a number of tasks or, if they cannot do so themselves, to make sure that they are performed by another person. They include monitoring the controller’s compliance with the legislation, advising the controller of its obligations and organising relevant training for employees who carry out the processing of personal data. Where the organisation is processing children’s data, all these requirements will be relevant. The senior responsible individual will need to make sure that any guidance and training reflects the type of data being processed and any specific obligations the controller has in respect of that data. I hope that this goes some way to convincing the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister has not really explained the reason for the switch from the DPO to the new system. Is it another one of his “We don’t want a one-size-fits-all approach” arguments? What is the underlying rationale for it? Looking at compliance costs, which the Government seem to be very keen on, we will potentially have a whole new cadre of people who will need to be trained in compliance requirements.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The data protection officer—I speak as a recovering data protection officer—is tasked with certain specific outcomes but does not necessarily have to be a senior person within the organisation. Indeed, in many cases, they can be an external adviser to the organisation. On the other hand, the senior responsible individual is a senior or board-level representative within the organisation and can take overall accountability for data privacy and data protection for that organisation. Once that accountable person is appointed, he or she can of course appoint a DPO or equivalent role or separate the role among other people as they see fit. That gives everybody the flexibility to meet the needs of privacy as they see fit, but not necessarily in a one-size-fits-all way. That is the philosophical approach.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the Minister accept that the SRI will have to cope with having at least a glimmering of an understanding of what will be a rather large Act?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes, the SRI will absolutely have to understand all the organisation’s obligations under this Act and indeed other Acts. As with any senior person in any organisation responsible for compliance, they will need to understand the laws that they are complying with.

Amendment 84, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is about the advice given to senior responsible individuals by the ICO. We believe that the commissioner should have full discretion to enforce data protection in an independent, flexible, risk-based and proportionate manner. The amendment would tie the hands of the regulator and force them to give binding advice and proactive assurance without full knowledge of the facts, undermining their regulatory enforcement role.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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The Minister has reached his 20 minutes. We nudged him at 15 minutes.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Do I have to shut up?

Lord Harlech Portrait Lord Harlech (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, just for clarification, because a number of questions were raised, if the Committee feels that it would like to hear more from the Minister, it can. It is for the mood of the Committee to decide.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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As long as that applies to us on occasion as well.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I apologise for going over. I will try to be as quick as possible.

I turn now to the amendments on the new provisions on assessments of high-risk processing in Clause 20. Amendments 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98 and 101 seek to reinstate requirements in new Article 35 of the UK GDPR on data protection impact assessments, and, in some areas, make them even more onerous for public authorities. Amendment 90 seeks to reintroduce a list of high-risk processing activities drawn from new Article 35, with a view to help data controllers comply with the new requirements on carrying out assessments of high-risk processing.

Amendment 96, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, seeks to amend Clause 20, so that, where an internet service is likely to be accessed by children, the processing is automatically classed as high risk and the controller must do a children’s data protection impact assessment. Of course, I fully understand why the noble Baroness would like those measures to apply automatically to organisations processing children’s data, and particularly to internet services likely to be accessed by children. It is highly likely that many of the internet services that she is most concerned about will be undertaking high-risk activities, and they would therefore need to undertake a risk assessment.

Under the current provisions in Clause 20, organisations will still have to undertake risk assessments where their processing activities are likely to pose high risks to individuals, but they should have the ability to assess the level of risk based on the specific nature, scale and context of their own processing activities. Data controllers do not need to be directed by government or Parliament about every processing activity that will likely require a risk assessment, but the amendments would reintroduce a level of prescriptiveness that we were seeking to remove.

Clause 20 requires the ICO to publish a list of examples of the types of processing activities that it considers would pose high risks for the purposes of these provisions, which will help controllers to determine whether a risk assessment is needed. This will provide organisations with more contemporary and practical help than a fixed list of examples in primary legislation could. The ICO will be required to publish a document with a list of examples that it considers to be high-risk processing activities, and we fully expect the vulnerability age of data subjects to be a feature of that. The commissioner’s current guidance on data protection impact assessments already describes the use of the personal data of children or other vulnerable individuals for marketing purposes, profiling or offering internet services directly to children as examples of high-risk processing, although the Government cannot of course tell the ICO what to include in its new guidance.

Similarly, in relation to Amendments 99, 100 and 102 from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, it should not be necessary for this clause to specifically require organisations to consider risks associated with automated decision-making or obligations under equalities legislation. That is because the existing clause already requires controllers to consider any risks to individuals and to describe

“how the controller proposes to mitigate those risks”.

I am being asked to wrap up and so, in the interests of time, I shall write with my remaining comments. I have no doubt that noble Lords are sick of the sound of my voice by now.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I hope that no noble Lord expects me to pull all that together. However, I will mention a couple of things.

With this group, the Minister finally has said all the reasons why everything will be different and less. Those responsible for writing the Minister’s speeches should be more transparent about the Government’s intention, because “organisations are best placed to determine what is high-risk”—not the ICO, not Parliament, not existing data law. Organisations are also for themselves. They are “best placed to decide on their representation”, whether it is here or there and whether it speaks English or not, and they “get to decide whether they have a DPO or a senior responsible individual”. Those are three quotes from the Minister’s speech. If organisations are in charge of the bar of data protection and the definition of data protection, I do believe that this is a weakening of the data protection regime. He also said that organisations are responsible for the quality of their risk assessment. Those are four places in this group alone.

At the beginning, the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, talked about the trust of consumers and citizens. I do not think that this engenders trust. The architecture is so keen to get rid of ways of accessing rights that some organisations may have to have a DPO and a DPIA—a doubling rather than a reducing of burden. Very early on—it feels a long time ago—a number of noble Lords talked about the granular detail. I tried in my own contribution to show how very different it is in detail. So I ask the Minister to reflect on the assertion that you can take out the detail and have the same outcome. All the burden being removed is on one side of the equation, just as we enter into a world in which AI, which is built on people’s data, is coming in the other direction.

I will of course withdraw my amendment, but I believe that Clauses 20, 18 and the other clauses we just discussed are deregulation measures. That should be made clear from the Dispatch Box, and that is a choice that the House will have to make.

Before I sit down, I do want to recognise one thing, which is that the Minister said that he would work alongside us between now and Report; I thank him for that, and I accept that. I also noted that he said that it was a responsibility to take care of children by default. I agree with him; I would like to see that in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, explained, his intention to oppose the question that Clause 19 stands part seeks to retain the status quo. As I read Section 62 of the Data Protection Act 2016, it obliges competent authorities to keep logs of their processing activities, whether they be for collection, alteration, consultation, disclosure, combination or the erasing of personal data. The primary purpose is for self-monitoring purposes, largely linked to disciplinary proceedings, as the noble Lord said, where an officer has become a suspect by virtue of inappropriately accessing PNC-held data.

Clause 19 removes the requirement for a competent authority to record a justification in the logs only when consulting or disclosing personal data. The Explanatory Note to the Bill explains this change as follows:

“It is … technologically challenging for systems to automatically record the justification without manual input”.


That is not a sufficiently strong reason for removing the requirement, not least because the remaining requirements of Section 62 of the Data Protection Act 2018 relating to the logs of consultation and disclosure activity will be retained and include the need to record the date and time and the identity of the person accessing the log. Presumably they will be able to be manually input, so why remove the one piece of data that might, in an investigation of abuse or misuse of the system, be useful in terms of evidence and self-incrimination? I do not understand the logic behind that at all.

I rather think the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has an important point. He has linked it to those who have been unfortunate enough to be AIDS sufferers, and I am sure that there are other people who have become victims where cases would be brought forward. I am not convinced that the clause should stand part, and we support the noble Lord in seeking its deletion.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This is a mercifully short group on this occasion. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for the amendment, which seeks to remove Clause 19 from the Bill. Section 62 of the Data Protection Act requires law enforcement agencies to record when personal data has been accessed and why. Clause 19 does not remove the need for police to justify their processing; it simply removes the ineffective administrative requirement to record that justification in a log.

The justification entry was intended to help to monitor and detect unlawful access. However, the reality is that anyone accessing data unlawfully is very unlikely to record an honest justification, making this in practice an unreliable means of monitoring misconduct or unlawful processing. Records of when data was accessed and by whom can be automatically captured and will remain, thereby continuing to ensure accountability.

In addition, the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s view is that this change will not hamper any investigations to identify the unlawful processing of data. That is because it is unlikely that an individual accessing data unlawfully would enter an honest justification, so capturing this information is unlikely to be useful in any investigation into misconduct. The requirements to record the time, date and, as far as possible, the identity of the person accessing the data will remain, as will the obligation that there is lawful reason for the access, ensuring that accountability and protection for data subjects is maintained.

Police officers inform us that the current requirement places an unnecessary burden on them as they have to update the log manually. The Government estimate that the clause could save approximately 1.5 million policing hours, representing a saving in the region of £46.5 million per year.

I understand that the amendment relates to representations made by the National AIDS Trust concerning the level of protection for people’s HIV status. As I believe I said on Monday, the Government agree that the protection of people’s HIV status is vital. We have met the National AIDS Trust to discuss the best solutions to the problems it has raised. For these reasons, I hope the noble Lord will not oppose Clause 19 standing part.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister for his response, but he has left us tantalised about the outcome of his meeting. What is the solution that he has suggested? We are none the wiser as a result of his response.

This pudding has been well over-egged by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Already, only certain senior officers and the data protection leads in police forces have access to this functionality. There will continue to be a legal requirement to record the time and date of access. They are required to follow a College of Policing code of practice. Is the Minister really saying that recording a justification for accessing personal data is such an onerous requirement that £46.5 million in police time will be saved as a result of this? Over what period? That sounds completely disproportionate.

The fact is that the recording of the justification, whether or not it is false and cannot be relied upon as evidence, is rather useful because it is evidence of police misconduct in relation to inappropriately accessing personal data. They are actually saying: “We did it for this purpose”, when it clearly was not. I am not at all surprised that the National AIDS Trust is worried about this. The College of Policing code of practice does not mention logging requirements in detail. It references them just once in relation to automated systems that process data.

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for what he had to say. It seems to me that we do not have any confidence on this side of the House that removing this requirement provides enough security that officers will be held to account if they share an individual’s special category data inappropriately. I do not think the Minister has really answered the concerns, but I beg leave to withdraw my objection to the clause standing part.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I, too, will be relatively brief. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her amendments, to which I was very pleased to add my name. She raised an important point about the practice of web scrapers, who take data from a variety of sources to construct large language models without the knowledge or permission of web owners and data subjects. This is a huge issue that should have been a much more central focus of the Bill. Like the noble Baroness, I am sorry that the Government did not see fit to use the Bill to bring in some controls on this increasingly prevalent practice, because that would have been a more constructive use of our time than debating the many unnecessary changes that we have been debating so far.

As the noble Baroness said, large language models are built on capturing text, data and images from infinite sources without the permission of the original creator of the material. As she also said, it is making a mockery of our existing data rights. It raises issues around copyright and intellectual property, and around personal information that is provided for one purpose and commandeered by web scrapers for another. That process often happens in the shadows, whereby the owner of the information finds out only much later that their content has been repurposed.

What is worse is that the application of AI means that material provided in good faith can be distorted or corrupted by the bots scraping the internet. The current generation of LLMs are notorious for hallucinations in which good quality research or journalistic copy is misrepresented or misquoted in its new incarnation. There are also numerous examples of bias creeping into the LLM output, which includes personal data. As the noble Baroness rightly said, the casual scraping of children’s images and data is undermining the very essence of our existing data protection legislation.

It is welcome that the Information Commissioner has intervened on this. He argued that LLMs should be compliant with the Data Protection Act and should evidence how they are complying with their legal obligations. This includes individuals being able to exercise their information rights. Currently, we are a long way from that being a reality and a practice. This is about enforcement as much as giving guidance.

I am pleased that the noble Baroness tabled these amendments. They raise important issues about individuals giving prior permission for their data to be used unless there is an easily accessible opt-out mechanism. I would like to know what the Minister thinks about all this. Does he think that the current legislation is sufficient to regulate the rise of LLMs? If it is not, what are the Government doing to address the increasingly widespread concerns about the legitimacy of web scraping? Have the Government considered using the Bill to introduce additional powers to protect against the misuse of personal and creative output?

In the meantime, does the Minister accept the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron? As we have said, they are only a small part of a much bigger problem, but they are a helpful initiative to build in some basic protections in the use of personal data. This is a real challenge to the Government to step up to the mark and be seen to address these important issues. I hope the Minister will say that he is happy to work with the noble Baroness and others to take these issues forward. We would be doing a good service to data citizens around the country if we did so.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling these amendments. I absolutely recognise their intent. I understand that they are motivated by a concern about invisible types of processing or repurposing of data when it may not be clear to people how their data is being used or how they can exercise their rights in respect of the data.

On the specific points raised by noble Lords about intellectual property rather than personal data, I note that, in their response to the AI White Paper consultation, the Government committed soon to provide a public update on their approach to AI and intellectual property, noting the importance of greater transparency in the use of copyrighted material to train models, as well as labelling and attribution of outputs.

Amendment 103 would amend the risk-assessment provisions in Clause 20 so that any assessment of high-risk processing would always include an assessment of how the data controller would comply with the purpose limitation principle and how any new processing activity would be designed so that people could exercise their rights in respect of the data at the time it was collected and at any subsequent occasion.

I respectfully submit that this amendment is not necessary. The existing provisions in Clause 20, on risk assessments, already require controllers to assess the potential risks their processing activities pose to individuals and to describe how those risks would be mitigated. This would clearly include any risk that the proposed processing activities would not comply with the data protection principles—for example, because they lacked transparency—and would make it impossible for people to exercise their rights.

Similarly, any assessment of risk would need to take account of any risks related to difficulties in complying with the purpose limitation principle—for example, if the organisation had no way of limiting who the data would be shared with as a result of the proposed processing activity.

According to draft ICO guidance on generative AI, the legitimate interests lawful ground under Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR can be a valid lawful ground for training generative AI models on web-scrape data, but only when the model’s developer can ensure that they pass the three-part test—that is, they identify a legitimate interest, demonstrate that the processing is necessary for that purpose and demonstrate that the individual’s interests do not override the interest being pursued by the controller.

Controllers must consider the balancing test particularly carefully when they do not or cannot exercise meaningful control over the use of the model. The draft guidance further notes that it would be very difficult for data controllers to carry out their processing activities in reliance on the legitimate interests lawful ground if those considerations were not taken into account.

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Moved by
110: Clause 25, page 44, line 18, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) In Schedule 7—(a) Part 1 contains minor and consequential amendments, and(b) Part 2 contains transitional provision.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting amendments of section 119A of the Data Protection Act 2018 into Schedule 7 to the Bill.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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My Lords, UK law enforcement authorities processing personal data for law enforcement purposes currently use internationally based companies for data processing services, including cloud storage. The use of international processors is critical for modern organisations and law enforcement is no exception. The use of these international processors enhances law enforcement capabilities and underpins day-to-day functions.

Transfers from a UK law enforcement authority to an international processor are currently permissible under the Data Protection Act 2018. However, there is currently no bespoke mechanism for these transfers in Part 3, which has led to confusion and ambiguity as to how law enforcement authorities should approach the use of such processors. The aim of this amendment is to provide legal certainty to law enforcement authorities in the UK, as well as transparency to the public, so that they can use internationally based processors with confidence.

I have therefore tabled Amendments 110, 117 to 120, 122 to 129 and 131 to provide a clear, bespoke mechanism in Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 for UK law enforcement authorities to use when transferring data to their contracted processors based outside the UK. This will bring Part 3 into line with the UK GDPR while clarifying the current law, and give UK law enforcement authorities greater confidence when making such transfers to their contracted processors for law enforcement purposes.

We have amended Section 73—the general principles for transfer—to include a specific reference to processors, ensuring that international processors can be a recipient of data transfers. In doing so, we have ensured that the safeguards within Chapter 5 that UK law enforcement authorities routinely apply to transfers of data to their international operational equivalents are equally applicable to transfers to processors. We are keeping open all the transfer mechanisms so that data can be transferred on the basis of an applicable adequacy regulation, the appropriate safeguards or potentially the special circumstances.

We have further amended Section 75—the appropriate safeguards provision—to include a power for the ICO to create, specifically for Part 3, an international data transfer agreement, or IDTA, to complement the IDTA which it has already produced to facilitate transfers using Article 46(2)(d) of the UK GDPR.

In respect of transfers to processors, we have disapplied the duty to inform the Information Commissioner about international transfers made subject to appropriate safeguards. As such, a requirement would be out of line with equivalent provisions in the UK GDPR. There is no strong rationale for complying with the provision, given that processors are limited in what they can do with data because of the nature of their contracts and that it would be unlikely to contribute to the effective functioning of the ICO.

Likewise, we have also disapplied the duty to document such transfers and to provide the documentation to the commissioner on request. This is because extending these provisions would duplicate requirements that already exist elsewhere in legislation, including in Section 61, which has extensive recording requirements that enable full accountability to the ICO.

We have also disapplied the majority of Section 78. While it provides a useful function in the context of UK law enforcement authorities transferring to their international operational equivalents, in the law enforcement to international processor context it is not appropriate because processors cannot decide to transfer data onwards on their own volition. They can only do so under instruction from the UK law enforcement authority controller.

Instead, we have retained the general prohibition on any further transfers to processors based in a separate third country by requiring UK law enforcement authority controllers to make it a condition of a transfer to its processor that data is only to be further transferred in line with the terms of the contract with or authorisation given by the controller, and where the further transfer is permitted under Section 73. We have also taken the opportunity to tidy up Section 77 which governs transfers to non-relevant authorities, relevant international organisations or international processors.

In respect of Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on consultation with the Information Commissioner, I reassure the noble Lord that there is a memorandum of understanding between the Home Office and the Information Commissioner regarding international transfers approved by regulations, which sets out the role and responsibilities of the ICO. As part of this, the Home Office consults the Information Commissioner at various stages in the process. The commissioner, in turn, provides independent assurance and advice on the process followed and on the factors taken into consideration.

I understand that this amendment also relates to representations made by the National AIDS Trust. Perhaps the simplest thing is merely to reference my earlier remarks and commitment to engage with the National AIDS Trust ongoing. I beg to move that the government amendments which lead this group stand part of the Bill.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, very briefly, I thank the Minister for unpacking his amendments with some care, and for giving me the answer to my amendment before I spoke to it—that saves time.

Obviously, we all understand the importance of transfers of personal data between law enforcement authorities, but perhaps the crux of this, and the one question in our mind is, what is—perhaps the Minister could remind us—the process for making sure that the country that we are sending it to is data adequate? Amendment 121 was tabled as a way of probing that. It would be extremely useful if the Minister can answer that. This should apply to transfers between law enforcement authorities just as much as it does for other, more general transfers under Schedule 5. If the Minister can give me the answer, that would be useful, but if he does not have the answer to hand, I am very happy to suspend my curiosity until after Easter.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendment and his response, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. The mechanism for monitoring international transfers was intended to be the subject for the next group in any case, and I would have hoped to give a full answer. I know we are all deeply disappointed that it looks as if we may not get to that group but, if the noble Lord is not willing to wait until we have that debate, I am very happy to write.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

I hope the Minister can give us a more positive response on this and confirm that the Government take these issues seriously. I go back to the letter: we are pleased that he acknowledged the issues but, in terms of protections, I do not know whether the guarantees that we are looking at are there. Whether or not this is a sledgehammer, or whatever other expression the noble Lord may use about his amendment, it provides a simple solution. If the Minister is not going to support it, I would like to know what he proposes to do instead. I look forward to his response.
Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
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I welcome the Committee back after what I hope was a good Easter break for everybody. I thank all those noble Lords who, as ever, have spoken so powerfully in this debate.

I turn to Amendments 111 to 116 and 130. I thank noble Lords for their proposed amendments relating both to Schedule 5, which reforms the UK’s general processing regime for transferring personal data internationally and consolidates the relevant provisions in Chapter 5 of the UK GDPR, and to Schedule 7, which introduces consequential and transitional provisions associated with the reforms.

Amendment 111 seeks to revert to the current list of factors under the UK GDPR that the Secretary of State must consider when making data bridges. With respect, this more detailed list is not necessary as the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the standard of protection in the other country, viewed as a whole, is not materially lower than the standard of protection in the UK. Our new list of key factors is non-exhaustive. The UK courts will continue to be entitled to have regard to CJEU judgments if they choose to do so; ultimately, it will be for them to decide how much regard to have to any CJEU judgment on a similar matter.

I completely understand the strength of noble Lords’ concerns about ensuring that our EU adequacy decisions are maintained. This is also a priority for the UK Government, as I and my fellow Ministers have repeatedly made clear in public and on the Floor of the House. The UK is firmly committed to maintaining high data protection standards, now and in future. Protecting the privacy of individuals will continue to be a national priority. We will continue to operate a high-quality regime that promotes growth and innovation and underpins the trustworthy use of data.

Our reforms are underpinned by this commitment. We believe they are compatible with maintaining our data adequacy decisions from the EU. We have maintained a positive, ongoing dialogue with the EU to make sure that our reforms are understood. We will continue to engage with the European Commission at official and ministerial levels with a view to ensuring that our respective arrangements for the free flow of personal data can remain in place, which is in the best interests of both the UK and the EU.

We understand that Amendments 112 to 114 relate to representations made by the National AIDS Trust concerning the level of protection for special category data such as health data. We agree that the protection of people’s HIV status is vital. It is right that this is subject to extra protection, as is the case for all health data and special category data. As I have said before this Committee previously, we have met the National AIDS Trust to discuss the best solutions to the problems it has raised. As such, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree not to press these amendments.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Can the Minister just recap? He said that he met the trust then swiftly moved on without saying what solution he is proposing. Would he like to repeat that, or at least lift the veil slightly?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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The point I was making was only that we have met with it and will continue to do so in order to identify the best possible way to keep that critical data safe.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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The Minister is not suggesting a solution at the moment. Is it in the “too difficult” box?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I doubt that it will be too difficult, but identifying and implementing the correct solution is the goal that we are pursuing, alongside our colleagues at the National AIDS Trust.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I am sorry to keep interrogating the Minister, but that is quite an admission. The Minister says that there is a real problem, which is under discussion with the National AIDS Trust. At the moment the Government are proposing a significant amendment to both the GDPR and the DPA, and in this Committee they are not able to say that they have any kind of solution to the problem that has been identified. That is quite something.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am not sure I accept that it is “quite something”, in the noble Lord’s words. As and when the appropriate solution emerges, we will bring it forward—no doubt between Committee and Report.

On Amendment 115, we share the noble Lords’ feelings on the importance of redress for data subjects. That is why the Secretary of State must already consider the arrangements for redress for data subjects when making a data bridge. There is already an obligation for the Secretary of State to consult the ICO on these regulations. Similarly, when considering whether the data protection test is met before making a transfer subject to appropriate safeguards using Article 46, the Government expect that data exporters will also give consideration to relevant enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects.

Our rules mean that companies that transfer UK personal data must uphold the high data protection standards we expect in this country. Otherwise, they face action from the ICO, which has powers to conduct investigations, issue fines and compel companies to take corrective action if they fail to comply. We will continue to monitor and mitigate a wide range of data security risks, regardless of provenance. If there is evidence of threats to our data, we will not hesitate to take the necessary action to protect our national security.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, we heard from the two noble Lords some concrete examples of where those data breaches are already occurring, and it does not appear to me that appropriate action has been taken. There seems to be a mismatch between what the Minister is saying about the processes and the day-to-day reality of what is happening now. That is our concern, and it is not clear how the Government are going to address it.

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Lord Bethell Portrait Lord Bethell (Con)
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The Minister mentioned prosecutions and legal redress in the UK from international data transfer breaches. Can he share some examples of that, maybe by letter? I am not aware of that being something with a long precedent.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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A number of important points were raised there. Yes, of course I will share—

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Portrait Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
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I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but the point I made—this now follows on from other remarks—was that these requirements have been in place for a long time, and we are seeing abuses. Therefore, I was hoping that my noble friend would be able to offer changes in the Bill that would put more emphasis on dealing with these breaches. Otherwise, as has been said, we look as though we are going backwards, not forwards.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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As I said, a number of important points were raised there. First, I would not categorise the changes to Article 45 as watering down—they are intended to better focus the work of the ICO. Secondly, the important points raised with respect to Amendment 115 are points primarily relating to enforcement, and I will write to noble Lords setting out examples of where that enforcement has happened. I stress that the ICO is, as noble Lords have mentioned, an independent regulator that conducts the enforcement of this itself. What was described—I cannot judge for sure—certainly sounded like completely illegal infringements on the data privacy of those subjects. I am happy to look further into that and to write to noble Lords.

Amendment 116 seeks to remove a power allowing the Secretary of State to make regulations recognising additional transfer mechanisms. This power is necessary for the Government to react quickly to global trends and to ensure that UK businesses trading internationally are not held back. Furthermore, before using this power, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the transfer mechanism is capable of meeting the new Article 46 data protection test. They are also required to consult with the Information Commissioner and such other persons felt appropriate. The affirmative resolution procedure will also ensure appropriate parliamentary scrutiny.

I reiterate that the UK Government’s assessment of the reforms in the Bill is that they are compatible with maintaining adequacy. We have been proactively engaging with the European Commission since the start of the Bill’s consultation process to ensure that it understands our reforms and that we have a positive, constructive relationship. Noble Lords will appreciate that it is important that officials have the ability to conduct candid discussions during the policy-making process. However, I would like to reassure noble Lords once again that the UK Government take the matter of retaining our adequacy decisions very seriously.

Finally, Amendment 130 pertains to EU exit transitional provisions in Schedule 21 to the Data Protection Act 2018, which provide that certain countries are currently deemed as adequate. These countries include the EU and EEA member states and those countries that the EU had found adequate at the time of the UK’s exit from the EU. Such countries are, and will continue to be, subject to ongoing monitoring. As is the case now, if the Secretary of State becomes aware of developments such as changes to legislation or specific practices that negatively impact data protection standards, the UK Government will engage with the relevant authorities and, where necessary, amend or revoke data bridge arrangements.

For these reasons, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, but I am still absolutely baffled as to why the Government are doing what they are doing on Article 45. The Minister has not given any particular rationale. He has given a bit of a rationale for resisting the amendments, many of which try to make sure that Article 45 is fully effective, that these international transfers are properly scrutinised and that we remain data adequate.

By the way, I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, made a splendid entry into our debate, so I hope that he stays on for a number of further amendments—what a début.

The only point on which I disagreed with the noble Lord, Lord Bethell—as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said—was when he said that this is a terrific Bill. It is a terrifying Bill, not a terrific one, as we have debated. There are so many worrying aspects—for example, that there is no solution yet for sensitive special category data and the whole issue of these contractual clauses. The Government seem almost to be saying that it is up to the companies to assess all this and whether a country in which they are doing business is data adequate. That cannot be right. They seem to be abrogating their responsibility for no good reason. What is the motive? Is it because they are so enthusiastic about transfer of data to other countries for business purposes that they are ignoring the rights of data subjects?

The Minister resisted describing this as watering down. Why get rid of the list of considerations that the Secretary of State needs to have so that they are just in the mix as something that may or may not be taken into consideration? In the existing article they are specified. It is quite a long list and the Government have chopped it back. What is the motive for that? It looks like data subjects’ rights are being curtailed. We were baffled by previous elements that the Government have introduced into the Bill, but this is probably the most baffling of all because of the real importance of this—its national security implications and the existing examples, such as Yandex, that we heard about from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope.

Of course we understand that there are nuances and that there is a difference between adequacy and equivalence. We have to be pragmatic sometimes, but the question of whether these countries having data transferred to them are adequate must be based on principle. This seems to me a prime candidate for Report. I am sure we will come back to it, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw.

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Moved by
117: Schedule 6, page 212, line 27, leave out “In section 72 (overview and interpretation),” and insert—
“(1) Section 72 (overview and interpretation) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1)(b)—(a) for “the special conditions that apply” substitute “additional conditions that apply in certain cases”, and(b) after “organisation” insert “(see section 73(4)(b))”.Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting amendments of section 77 of the Data Protection Act 2018 into Schedule 6 to the Bill.
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Moved by
122: Schedule 6, page 217, line 27, before “this” insert “section 73(4)(a) or (b) and”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the controller’s duty to inform the Information Commissioner about international transfers of personal data made subject to appropriate safeguards does not apply where a transfer is made to a processor in reliance on paragraph (aa) of section 73(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (inserted by an amendment in my name).
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Moved by
128: Schedule 7, page 221, line 5, at end insert—
“6A In Article 46(2)(d) (transfers subject to appropriate safeguards: standard data protection clauses), after “Commissioner” insert “for the purposes of this Article”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting amendments of section 119A of the Data Protection Act 2018 into Schedule 7 to the Bill.
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Moved by
131: Schedule 7, page 226, leave out lines 37 to 39 and insert “the requirement in section 75(1)(a) of the 2018 Act (binding legal instrument containing appropriate safeguards) would have been satisfied by virtue of that instrument.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment enables transitional provision in paragraph 30 of Schedule 7 to the Bill to be relied on in connection with transfers of personal data described in paragraph (aa) of section 73(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (inserted by an amendment in my name).
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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, and his cosignatories for bringing this comprehensive amendment before us this afternoon. As we have heard, this is an issue that was debated at length in the Online Safety Act. It is, in effect, unfinished business. I pay tribute to the noble Lords who shepherded that Bill through the House so effectively. It is important that we tie up the ends of all the issues. The noble Lord made significant progress, but those issues that remain unresolved come, quite rightly, before us now, and this Bill is an appropriate vehicle for resolving those outstanding issues.

As has been said, the heart of the problem is that tech companies are hugely protective of the data they hold. They are reluctant to share it or to give any insight on how their data is farmed and stored. They get to decide what access is given, even when there are potentially illegal consequences, and they get to judge the risk levels of their actions without any independent oversight.

During the course of the Online Safety Bill, the issue was raised not only by noble Lords but by a range of respected academics and organisations representing civil society. They supported the cross-party initiative from Peers calling for more independent research, democratic oversight and accountability into online safety issues. In particular, as we have heard, colleagues identified a real need for approved researchers to check the risks of non-compliance in the regulated sectors of UK law by large tech companies—particularly those with large numbers of children accessing the services. This arose because of the increasing anecdotal evidence that children’s rights were being ignored or exploited. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, have given an excellent exposition of the potential and real harms that continue to be identified by the lack of regulatory action on these issues.

Like other noble Lords, I welcome this amendment. It is well-crafted, takes a holistic approach to the problem, makes the responsibilities of the large tech companies clear and establishes a systematic research base of vetted researchers to check compliance. It also creates important criteria for the authorisation of those vetted researchers: the research must be in the public interest, must be transparent, must be carried out by respected researchers, and must be free from commercial interests so that companies cannot mark their own homework. As has been said, it mirrors the provisions in the EU Digital Services Act and ensures comparable research opportunities. That is an opportunity for the UK to maintain its status as one of the top places in the world for expertise on the impact of online harms.

Since the Online Safety Act was passed, the Information Commissioner has been carrying out further work on the children’s code of practice. The latest update report says:

“There has been significant progress and many organisations have started to assess and mitigate the potential privacy risks to children on their platforms”.


That is all well and good but the ICO and other regulators are still reliant on the information provided by the tech companies on how their data is used and stored and how they mitigate risk. Their responsibilities would be made much easier if they had access to properly approved and vetted independent research information that could inform their decisions.

I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling this amendment. I hope that the Minister hears its urgency and necessity and that he can assure us that the Government intend to table a similar amendment on Report—as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, no more “wait and see”. The time has come to stop talking about this issue and take action. Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I was in awe of the questions that the noble Baroness came up with and do not envy the Minister in trying to answer them all. She asked whether, if necessary, it could be done via a letter but I think that the time has come on this and some other issues to roll up our sleeves, get round the table and thrash it out. We have waited too long for a solution and I am not sure that exchanges of letters will progress this in the way we would hope. I hope that the Minister will agree to convene some meetings of interested parties—maybe then we will make some real progress.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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My Lords, as ever, many thanks to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate.

Amendment 135, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bethell, would enable researchers to access data from data controllers and processors in relation to systemic risks to the UK and non-compliance with regulatory law. The regime would be overseen by the ICO. Let me take this opportunity to thank both my noble friend for the ongoing discussions we have had and the honourable Members in the other place who are also interested in this measure.

Following debates during the passage of the Online Safety Act, the Government have been undertaking further work in relation to access to data for online safety researchers. This work is ongoing and, as my noble friend Lord Bethell will be aware, the Government are having ongoing conversations on this issue. As he knows, the online safety regime is very broad and covers issues that have an impact on national security and fraud. I intend to write to the Committee with an update on this matter, setting out our progress ahead of Report, which should move us forward.

While we recognise the benefits of improving researchers’ access to data—for example, using data to better understand the impact of social media on users—this is a highly complex issue with several risks that are not currently well understood. Further analysis has reiterated the complexities of the issue. My noble friend will agree that it is vital that we get this right and that any policy interventions are grounded in the evidence base. For example, there are risks in relation to personal data protection, user consent and the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Introducing a framework to give researchers access to data without better understanding these risks could have significant consequences for data security and commercially sensitive information, and could potentially destabilise any data access regime as it is implemented.

In the meantime, the Online Safety Act will improve the information available to researchers by empowering Ofcom to require major providers to publish a broad range of online safety information through annual transparency reports. Ofcom will also be able to appoint a skilled person to undertake a report to assess compliance or to develop its understanding of the risk of non-compliance and how to mitigate it. This may include the appointment of independent researchers as skilled persons. Further, Ofcom is required to conduct research into online harms and has the power to require companies to provide information to support this research activity.

Moving on to the amendment specifically, it is significantly broader than online safety and the EU’s parallel Digital Services Act regime. Any data controllers and processors would be in scope if they have more than 1 million UK users or customers, if there is a large concentration of child users or if the service is high-risk. This would include not just social media platforms but any organisation, including those in financial services, broadcasting and telecoms as well as any other large businesses. Although we are carefully considering international approaches to this issue, it is worth noting that much of the detail about how the data access provisions in the Digital Services Act will work in practice is yet to be determined. Any policy interventions in this space should be predicated on a robust evidence base, which we are in the process of developing.

The amendment would also enable researchers to access data to research systemic risks to compliance with any UK regulatory law that is upheld by the ICO, Ofcom, the Competition and Markets Authority, and the Financial Conduct Authority. The benefits and risks of such a broad regime are not understood and are likely to vary across sectors. It is also likely to be inappropriate for the ICO to be the sole regulator tasked with vetting researchers across the remits of the other regulators. The ICO may not have the necessary expertise to make this determination about areas of law that it does not regulate.

Ofcom already has the power to gather information that it requires for the purpose of exercising its online safety functions. This power applies to companies in scope of the duties and, where necessary, to other organisations or persons who may have relevant information. Ofcom can also issue information request notices to overseas companies as well as to UK-based companies. The amendment is also not clear about the different types of information that a researcher may want to access. It refers to a data controller and processors—concepts that relate to the processing of personal data under data protection law—yet researchers may also be interested in other kinds of data, such as information about a service’s systems and processes.

Although the Government continue to consider this issue—I look forward to setting out our progress between now and Report—for the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept this amendment. I will certainly write to the Committee on this matter and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, with a more detailed response to her questions—there were more than four of them, I think—in particular those about Ofcom.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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Perhaps I could encourage the Minister to say at least whether he is concerned that a lack of evidence might be impacting on the codes and powers that we have given to Ofcom in order to create the regime. I share his slight regret that Ofcom does not have this provision that is in front of us. It may be that more than one regulator needs access to research data but it is the independents that we are talking about. We are not talking about Ofcom doing things and the ICO doing things. We are talking about independent researchers doing things so that the evidence exists. I would like to hear just a little concern that the regime is suffering from a lack of evidence.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am thinking very carefully about how best to answer. Yes, I do share that concern. I will set this out in more detail when I write to the noble Baroness and will place that letter in the House of Lords Library. In the meantime, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Bethell Portrait Lord Bethell (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am enormously grateful to the Minister for his response. However, it falls short of my hopes. Obviously, I have not seen the letter that he is going to send us, but I hope that the department will have taken on board the commitments made by previous Ministers during discussions on the Online Safety Bill and the very clear evidence that the situation is getting worse, not better.

Any hope that the tech companies would somehow have heard the debate in the House of Lords and that it would have occurred to them that they needed to step up to their responsibilities has, I am afraid, been dashed by their behaviours in the last 18 months. We have seen a serious withdrawal of existing data-sharing provisions. As we approach even more use of AI, the excitement of the metaverse, a massive escalation in the amount of data and the impact of their technologies on society, it is extremely sobering to think that there is almost no access to the black box of their data.

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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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My Lords, we have heard some fine words from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in putting the case for his Amendments 135A, 135B, 135C and 135D, which are grouped with the clause stand part debates. As he explained, they seek to test and probe why the Government have sought to extend the ability of the security and intelligence services to disapply basic data protection principles.

The new Government-drafted clause essentially, as well as disapplying current provisions, disapplies the rights of data subjects and the obligations placed on competent authorities and processors. The Explanatory Notes say that this is to create a regime that

“ensures that there is consistency in approach”.

Section 29 is designed to facilitate joint processing by the various agencies with a common regime. Like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I well understand why they might want to do that. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has done the Committee a service in tabling these amendments because, as he said, during the passage of the 2018 Act assurances were given that law enforcement would always abide by basic data protection principles. On the face of it, that assurance no longer applies. Is this because it is inconvenient for the security and intelligence services? What are the Government seeking to do here?

Can the Minister explain from the Government’s perspective what has changed since 2018 that has led Ministers to conclude that those critical principles should be compromised? The amendments also seek to assert the importance of proportionality considerations when deciding whether national security exemptions apply. This principle is again raised in relation to the issuing of a national security certificate.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, with Amendment 135E effectively poses the question of where the balance of oversight should rest. Should it be with the Secretary of State or the commissioner? All that new Clause 29 does is oblige the Secretary of State to consult the commissioner with the expectation that the commissioner then makes public a record of designation orders. However, it strips out quite a lot of the commissioner’s current roles and responsibilities. We should surely have something more convincing than that to guarantee transparency in the process. We on these Benches will take some convincing that the Government have got the right balance in regard to the interests of national security and the security services. Why, for instance, is Parliament being sidelined in the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers? Did Ministers give any consideration to reporting duties and obligations so far as Parliament is concerned? If not, why not?

Labour does not want to see national security compromised in any way, nor do we want to undermine the essential and vital work that our intelligence services have to perform to protect us all. However, we must also ensure that we build confidence in our security and intelligence services by making them properly accountable, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, argued, and that the checks and balances are sufficient and the right ones.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, got it right in questioning the change of language, and I want to better understand from the Minister what that really means. But why extend the range of exemptions? We could do with some specific reasons as to why that is being changed and why that is the case. Why has the Information Commissioner’s role been so fundamentally changed with regard to these clauses and the exemptions?

We will, as always, listen carefully to the Minister’s reply before we give further thought to this framework on Report, but we are very unhappy with the changes that are taking away some of the fundamental protections that were in place before, and we will need quite a lot of convincing on these government changes.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and thank the other noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. These amendments seek to remove Clauses 28, 29 and 30 in their entirety, or, as an alternative, to make amendments to Clauses 28 and 29. I will first speak to Clause 28, and if I fail to answer any questions I will of course guarantee to write.

Clause 28 replaces the current provision under the law enforcement regime for the protection of national security data, with a revised version that mirrors the existing exemptions available to organisations operating under the UK GDPR and intelligence services regimes. It is also similar to what was available to law enforcement agencies under the 1998 Data Protection Act. It is essential that law enforcement agencies can properly protect data where required for national security reasons, and they should certainly be able to apply the same protections that are available to other organisations.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether the exemption was in breach of a person’s Article 8 rights, but the national security exemption will permit law enforcement agencies to apply an exemption to the need to comply with certain parts of the law enforcement data protection regime, such as the data protection principles or the rights of the data subject. It is not a blanket exemption and it will be able to be applied only where this is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security—for instance, in order to prevent the tipping-off of a terror suspect. It can be applied only on a case-by-case basis. We do not, therefore, believe that the exemption breaches the right to privacy.

In terms of the Government taking away the right to lodge a complaint with the commissioner, that is not the case—the Government are not removing that right. Those rights are being consolidated under Clause 44 of this DPDI Bill. We are omitting Article 77 as Clause 44 will introduce provisions that allow a data subject to lodge a complaint with a controller.

In terms of how the subject themselves will know how to complain to the Information Commissioner, all organisations, including law enforcement agencies, are required to provide certain information to individuals, including their right to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner and, where applicable, the contact details of the organisation’s data protection officer or, in line with other amendments under the Bill, the organisation’s senior responsible individual, if they suspect that their personal information is being process unlawfully.

Amendments 135A and 135D seek to introduce a proportionality test in relation to the application of the national security exemption and the issuing of a ministerial certificate for law enforcement agencies operating under Part 3 of the Data Protection Act. The approach we propose is consistent with the similar exemptions for the UK GDPR and intelligence services, which all require a controller to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether an exemption from a provision is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Amendment 135B will remove the ability for law enforcement agencies to apply the national security exemption to data protection principles, whereas the approach we propose is consistent with the other data protection regimes and will provide for exemption from the data protection principles in Chapter 2—where required and on a case-by-case basis—but not from the requirement for processing to be lawful and the safeguards which apply to sensitive data.

The ability to disapply certain principles laid out in Chapter 2 is crucial for the efficacy of the national security exemption. This is evident in the UK GDPR and Part 4 exemption which disapplies similar principles. To remove the ability to apply the national security exemption to any of the data protection principles for law enforcement agencies only would undermine their ability to offer the same protections as those processing under the other data protection regimes.

Not all the principles laid out in Chapter 2 can be exempted from; for example, law enforcement agencies are still required to ensure that all processing is lawful and cannot exempt from the safeguards that apply to sensitive data. There are safeguards in place to ensure that the exemption is used correctly by law enforcement agencies. Where a data subject feels that the national security exemption has not been applied correctly, the legislation allows them to complain to the Information Commissioner and, ultimately, to the courts. Additionally, the reforms require law enforcement agencies to appoint a senior responsible individual whose tasks include monitoring compliance with the legislation.

Amendment 135C would make it a mandatory requirement for a certificate to be sought from and approved by a judicial commissioner whenever the national security exemption is to be invoked by law enforcement agencies only. This bureaucratic process does not apply to organisations processing under the other data protection regimes; forcing law enforcement agencies to apply for a certificate every time they need to apply the exemption would be unworkable as it would remove their ability to act quickly in relation to matters of national security. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will not press his amendments.

On Clauses 29 and 30 of the Bill, currently, only the intelligence services can operate under Part 4 of the Data Protection Act. This means that, even when working together, the intelligence services and law enforcement cannot work on a single shared dataset but must instead transfer data back and forth, applying the provisions of their applicable data protection regimes, which creates significant friction. Removing barriers to joint working was flagged as a recommendation following the Manchester Arena inquiry, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and following Fishmongers’ Hall, which also recommended closer working.

Clauses 29 and 30 enable qualifying competent authorities and an intelligence service jointly to process data under a single data protection regime in authorised, specific circumstances to safeguard national security. In order to jointly process data in this manner, the Secretary of State must issue a designation notice to authorise it. A notice can be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the processing is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security and following consultation with the ICO.

Amendment 135E would make the ICO the final arbiter of whether a designation notice is granted by requiring it to—

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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May I just intrude on the Minister’s flow? As I understand it, there is a possibility that relatives of the families affected by the Manchester Arena bombing will take to court matters relating to the operation of the security services, including relating to intelligence that it is felt they may have had prior to the bombing. How will this new regime, as set out in the Bill, affect the rights of those who may seek to hold the security services to account in the courts? Will their legal advisers ever be able to discover materials that might otherwise be exempt from public view?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
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That is a very good question but the noble Lord will understand that I am somewhat reluctant to pontificate about a potential forthcoming court case. I cannot really answer the question, I am afraid.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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But understanding the impact on people’s rights is important in the context of this legislation.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
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As I say, it is a good question but I cannot comment further on that one. I will see whether there is anything that we can commit to in writing and have a further chat about this subject but I will leave it for now, if I may.

Amendment 135E would make the ICO the final arbiter of whether a designation notice is granted by requiring it to judge whether the notice is required for the purposes of the safeguarding of national security. It would be wholly inappropriate for the ICO to act as a judge of national security; that is not a function of the ICO in its capacity as regulator and should be reserved to the Secretary of State. As is generally the case with decisions by public bodies, the decision of the Secretary of State to grant a designation notice can be challenged legally; this is expressly provided for under new Section 82E, as is proposed to be included in the DPA by Clause 29.

On the subject of how a data subject is supposed to exercise their rights if they do not know that their data is being processed under a notice subject to Part 4, the ICO will publish designation notices as soon as is reasonably practical. Privacy information notices will also be updated if necessary to enable data subjects to identify a single point of contact should they wish to exercise their rights in relation to data that might be processed under a designation notice. This single point of contact will ease the process of exercising their data rights.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked which law enforcement agencies this will apply to. That will be set out separately in the subsequent affirmative SI. I cannot be more precise than that at the moment.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
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The Minister left us on a tantalising note. He was unable to say whether the law enforcement organisations affected by these clauses will be limited to Counter Terrorism Policing and the NCA or whether they will include others as well. I am rather at a loss to think who else might be included. Do we really have to wait for the affirmative regulations before we can be told about that? It seems pretty important. As the Minister knows well, there are quite a few precedents—following some recent ones—for extending to those bodies some of the privileges and powers that attach to the intelligence agencies. I suspect that a number of noble Lords might be quite alarmed if they felt that those powers or privileges were being extended more widely—certainly without knowing, or at least having some idea, in advance to whom they might be extended.

While I am on my feet and causing mischief for the Minister, may I return to the rather lawyerly question that I put to him? I do not think I had an answer about the formulation in new Section 78A, which talks about an exemption applying

“if exemption from the provision is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security”.

What does “required” mean? Does it simply mean the same as “necessary”—in which case, why not stick with that? Or does it mean something else? Does it mean that someone has required or requested it? It could be a pretty significant difference and this is a pretty significant ambiguity in the Bill. If the Minister is not willing to explain it now, perhaps he will feel able to write to us to explain exactly what is meant by replacing the well-worn phrase “necessary and proportionate” with “required”.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
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I thank the noble Lord for that. It is a lawyerly question and, as he knows, I am not a lawyer. With respect, I will endeavour to write and clarify on that point, as well as on his other good point about the sorts of authorities that we are talking about.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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Perhaps the same correspondence could cover the point I raised as well.

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Moved by
136: Clause 29, page 52, line 33, leave out “with the day on which it” and insert “when the notice”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new section 82B(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.
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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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My Lords, we should be very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for her amendment. I listened very carefully to her line of argument and find much that we can support in the approach. In that context, we should also thank the Police Federation of England and Wales for a particularly useful and enlightening briefing paper.

We may well be suffering under the law of unintended consequences in this context; it seems to have hit quite hard and acted as a barrier to the sensible processing and transfer of data between two parts of the law enforcement machinery. It is quite interesting coming off the back of the previous debate, when we were discussing making the transfer of information and intelligence between different agencies easier and having a common approach. It is a very relevant discussion to have.

I do not think that the legislation, when it was originally drafted, could ever have been intended to work in the way the Police Federation has set out. The implementation of the Data Protection Act 2018, in so far as law enforcement agencies are concerned, is supposed to be guided by recital 4, which the noble Baroness read into the record and which makes good sense.

As the noble Baroness explained, the Police Federation’s argument that the DPA makes no provisions at all that are designed to facilitate, in effect, the free flow of information, that it should be able to hold all the relevant data prior to the charging decision being made by the CPS, and that redaction should take place only after a decision on charging has been made seems quite a sensible approach. As she argued, it would significantly lighten the burden on police investigating teams and enable the decision on charging to be more broadly informed.

So this is a piece of simplification that we can all support. The case has been made very well. If it helps speed up charging and policing processes, which I know the Government are very concerned about, as all Governments should be, it seems a sensible move—but this is the Home Office. We do not always expect the most sensible things to be delivered by that department, but we hope that they are.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
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I thank all noble Lords for their contributions—I think. I thank my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes for her amendment and for raising what is an important issue. Amendment 137 seeks to permit the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to share unredacted data with one another when making a charging decision. Perhaps to the surprise of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, we agree: we must reduce the burden of redaction on the police. As my noble friend noted, this is very substantial and costly.

We welcome the intent of the amendment. However, as my noble friend has noted, we do not believe that, as drafted, it would achieve the stated aim. To fully remove it would require the amendment of more than just the Data Protection Act.

However, the Government are committed to reducing the burden on the police, but it is important that we get it right and that the solution is comprehensive. We consider that the objective which my noble friend is seeking would be better achieved through other means, including improved technology and new, simplified guidance to prevent overredaction, as all speakers, including the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted.

The Home Office provided £960,000 of funding for text and audio-visual multimedia redaction in the 2023-24 financial year. Thanks to that funding, police forces have been able to procure automated text redaction tools, the trials of which have demonstrated that they could save up 80% of the time spent by the police on this redaction. Furthermore, in the latest Budget, the Chancellor announced an additional £230 million of funding for technology to boost police productivity. This will be used to develop, test and roll out automated audio-visual redaction tools, saving thousands more hours of police time. I would say to my noble friend that, as the technology improves, we hope that the need for it to be supervised by individuals will diminish.

I can also tell your Lordships’ House that officials from the Home Office have consulted with the Information Commissioner’s Office and have agreed that a significant proportion of the burden caused by existing pre-charge redaction processes could be reduced safely and lawfully within the current data protection framework in a way that will maintain standards and protections for individuals. We are, therefore, actively working to tackle this issue in the most appropriate way by exploring how we can significantly reduce the redaction burden at the pre-charge stage through process change within the existing legislative framework. This will involve creating simplified guidance and, obviously, the use of better technology.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Is the Minister almost agreeing with some of my analysis in that case?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
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No, I think I was agreeing with my noble friend’s analysis.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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It does not sound like that to me.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
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I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. We acknowledge this particular problem and we are working to fix it. I would ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Morgan of Cotes Portrait Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Con)
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My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for his response. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bassam, for their support. I hope that those watching from outside will be heartened by what they have heard. I think there is general agreement that this problem should be simplified, and the burden taken off policing.

I am interested to hear about redaction but, with bodycams and images, as well as the mass amount of data on items such as mobile phones, it is complicated. My noble friend the Minister mentioned that the Home Office and the Information Commissioner’s Office were consulting with each other to reduce this pre-charge redaction burden. Perhaps he could write to me, or we could have a meeting to work it out. The challenge in all this is that we have a debate in which everybody agrees and then it all slows down again. Perhaps we can keep the momentum going by continuing discussions outside, involving the Police Federation as well. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling these amendments and raising important points about the Information Commissioner’s independence and authority to carry out his role efficiently. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, range widely, and I have to say that I have more sympathy with some of them than others.

I start by welcoming some of the things in the Bill—I am very pleased to be able to do this. It is important that we have an independent regulator that is properly accountable to Parliament, and this is vital for a properly functioning data protection regime. We welcome a number of the changes that have been made to the ICO’s role in the Bill. In particular, we think the move to have a board and a chief executive model, with His Majesty appointing the chair of the board, is the right way to go. We also welcome the strengthening of enforcement powers and the obligation to establish stakeholder panels to inform the content of codes of practice. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, also highlighted that.

However, we share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the Secretary of State’s requirement every three years to publish a statement of strategic priorities for the commissioner to consider, respond to and have regard to. We share his view, and that of many stakeholder groups, that this crosses the line into political involvement and exposes the ICO to unwarranted political direction and manipulation. We do not believe that this wording provides sufficient safeguards from that in its current form.

I have listened carefully to the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, of Amendment 138. I understand his concern, but we are going in a slightly different direction to him on this. We believe that the reality is that the ICO does not have the resources to investigate every complaint. He needs to apply a degree of strategic prioritisation in the public interest. I think that the original wording in the Bill, rather than the noble Lord’s amendment, achieved that objective more clearly.

Amendment 140, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raises a significant point about businesses being given assured advice to ensure that they follow the procedures correctly, and we welcome that proposal. There is a role for leadership of the ICO in this regard. His proposal also addresses the Government’s concern that data controllers struggle to understand how they should be applying the rules. This is one of the reasons for many of the changes that we have considered up until now. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on this proposal and agree that we need to give more support to businesses in how they follow the procedures.

Finally, I have added my name to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which rightly puts a deadline on the production of any new codes of practice, and a deadline on the application of any transitional arrangements which apply in the meantime. We have started using the analogy of the codes losing their champions, and in general terms she is right. Therefore, it is useful to have a deadline, and that is important to ensure delivery. This seems eminently sensible, and I hope the Minister agrees with this too.

Amendment 150 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, also requires the ICO annual report to spell out specifically the steps being taken to roll out the age-appropriate design code and to specifically uphold children’s data rights. Going back to the codes losing their champions, I am sure that the Minister got the message from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Harding, that in this particular case, this is not going to happen, and that this code and the drive to deliver it will be with us for some time to come.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, raised concerns about the approach of the ICO, which need to be addressed. We do not want a short-term approach but a longer-term approach, and we want some guarantees that the ICO is going to address some of the bigger issues that are being raised by the age-appropriate design code and other codes. Given the huge interest in the application of children’s data rights in this and other Bills, I am sure that the Information Commissioner will want to focus his report on his achievements in this space. Nevertheless, for the avoidance of doubt, it is useful to have it in the Bill as a specific obligation, and I hope the Minister agrees with the proposal.

We have a patchwork of amendments here. I am strongly in support of some; on others, perhaps the noble Lord and I can debate further outside this Room. In the meantime, I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and other noble Lords who have tabled and signed amendments in this group. I also observe what a pleasure it is to be on a Committee with Batman and Robin—which I was not expecting to say, and which may be Hansard’s first mention of those two.

The reforms to the Information Commissioner’s Office within the Bill introduce a strategic framework of objectives and duties to provide context and clarity on the commissioner’s overarching objectives. The reforms also put best regulatory practice on to a statutory footing and bring the ICO’s responsibilities into line with that of other regulators.

With regard to Amendment 138, the principal objective upholds data protection in an outcomes-focused manner that highlights the discretion of the Information Commissioner in securing those objectives, while reinforcing the primacy of data protection. The requirement to promote trust and confidence in the use of data will encourage innovation across current and emerging technologies.

I turn now to the question of Clause 32 standing part. As part of our further reforms, the Secretary of State can prepare a statement of strategic priorities for data protection, which positions these aims within its wider policy agenda, thereby giving the commissioner helpful context for its activities. While the commissioner must take the statement into account when carrying out functions, they are not required to act in accordance with it. This means that the statement will not be used in a way to direct what the commissioner may and may not do when carrying out their functions.

Turning to Amendment 140, we believe that the commissioner should have full discretion to enforce data protection in an independent, flexible, risk-based and proportionate manner. This amendment would tie the hands of the regulator and force them to give binding advice and proactive assurance without necessarily full knowledge of the facts, undermining their regulatory enforcement role.

In response to the amendments concerning Clauses 33 to 35 standing part, I can say that we are introducing a series of measures to increase accountability, robustness and transparency in the codes of practice process, while safeguarding the Information Commissioner’s role. The requirements for impact assessments and panel of experts mean that the codes will consider the application to, and impact on, all potential use cases. Given that the codes will have the force of law, the Secretary of State must have the ability to give her or his comments. The Information Commissioner is required to consider but not to act on those comments, preserving the commissioner’s independence. It remains for Parliament to give approval for any statutory code produced.

Amendments 142 and 143 impose a requirement on the ICO to prepare codes and for the Secretary of State to lay them in Parliament as quickly as practicable. They also limit the time that transitional provisions can be in place to a maximum of 12 months. This could mean that drafting processes are truncated or valid concerns are overlooked to hit a statutory deadline, rather than the codes being considered properly to reflect the relevant perspectives.

Given the importance of ensuring that any new codes are robust, comprehensive and considered, we do not consider imposing time limits on the production of codes to be a useful tool.

Finally, Amendment 150—

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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We had this debate during the passage of the Online Safety Act. In the end, we all agreed—the House, including the Government, came to the view—that two and a half years, which is 18 months plus a transition period, was an almost egregious amount of time considering the rate at which the digital world moves. So, to consider that more than two and a half years might be required seems a little bit strange.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I absolutely recognise the need for speed, and my noble friend Lady Harding made this point very powerfully as well, but what we are trying to do is juggle that need with the need to go through the process properly to design these things well. Let me take it away and think about it more, to make sure that we have the right balancing point. I very much see the need; it is a question of the machinery that produces the right outcome in the right timing.

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Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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Before the Minister sits down, I would very much welcome a meeting, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, suggested. I do not think it is useful for me to keep standing up and saying, “You are watering down the code”, and for the Minister to stand up and say, “Oh no, we’re not”. We are not in panto here, we are in Parliament, and it would be a fantastic use of all our time to sit down and work it out. I would like to believe that the Government are committed to data protection for children, because they have brought forward important legislation in this area. I would also like to believe that the Government are proud of a piece of legislation that has spread so far and wide—and been so impactful—and that they would not want to undermine it. On that basis, I ask the Minister to accede to the noble Baroness’s request.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am very happy to try to find a way forward on this. Let me think about how best to take this forward.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and, in particular, for that exchange. There is a bit of a contrast here—the mood of the Committee is probably to go with the grain of these clauses and to see whether they can be improved, rather than throw out the idea of an information commission and revert to the ICO on the basis that perhaps the information commission is a more logical way of setting up a regulator. I am not sure that I personally agree, but I understand the reservations of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and I welcome her support on the aspect of the Secretary of State power.

We keep being reassured by the Minister, in all sorts of different ways. I am sure that the spirit is willing, but whether it is all in black and white is the big question. Where are the real safeguards? The proposals in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to which she has spoken to so well, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, are very modest, to use the phrase from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I hope those discussions will take place because they fit entirely with the architecture of the Bill, which the Government have set out, and it would be a huge reassurance to those who believe that the Bill is watering down data subject rights and is not strengthening children’s rights.

I am less reassured by other aspects of what the Minister had to say, particularly about the Secretary of State’s powers in relation to the codes. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, we had a lot of discussion about that in relation to the Ofcom codes, under the Online Safety Bill, and I do not think we got very far on that either. Nevertheless, there is disquiet about whether the Secretary of State should have those powers. The Minister said that the ICO is not required to act in accordance with the advice of the Secretary of State so perhaps the Minister has provided a chink of light. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by
139: Clause 32, page 58, line 24, leave out “with the day of the designation” and insert “when the Secretary of State designates the statement”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new section 120F(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.
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Moved by
141: Clause 32, page 61, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) In section 205(2) (references to periods of time), after paragraph (za) insert—“(zb) section 120H(3) and (4);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) does not apply to new section 120H(3) and (4) of the Data Protection Act 2018.
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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 146 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken.

These days, most children learn to swipe an iPad long before they learn to ride a bike. They are accessing the internet at ever younger ages on a multitude of devices. Children are choosing to spend more time online, browsing social media, playing games and using apps. However, we also force children to spend an increasing amount of time online for their education. A growing trend over the last decade or more, this escalated during the pandemic. Screen time at home became lesson time; it was a vital educational lifeline for many in lockdown.

Like other noble Lords, I am not against edtech, but the reality is that the necessary speed of the transition meant that insufficient regard was paid to children’s rights and the data practices of edtech. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as ever, has given us a catalogue of abuses of children’s data which have already taken place in schools, so there is a degree of urgency about this, and Amendment 146 seeks to rectify the situation.

One in five UK internet users are children. Schools are assessing their work online; teachers are using online resources and recording enormous amounts of sensitive data about every pupil. Edtech companies have identified that such a large and captive population is potentially profitable. This amendment reinforces that children are also a vulnerable population and that we must safeguard their data and personal information on this basis. Their rights should not be traded in as the edtech companies chase profits.

The code of practice proposed in this amendment establishes standards for companies to follow, in line with the fundamental rights and freedoms as set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It asserts that they are entitled to a higher degree of protection than adults in the digital realm. It would oblige the commissioner to prepare a code of practice which ensures this. It underlines that consultations with individuals and organisations who have the best interests of children at heart is vital, so that the enormous edtech companies cannot bamboozle already overstretched teachers and school leaders.

In education, data has always been processed from children in school. It is necessary for the school’s functioning and to monitor the educational development of individual children. Edtech is now becoming a permanent fixture in children’s schooling and education, but it is largely untested, unregulated and unaccountable. Currently, it is impossible to know what data is collected by edtech providers and how they are using it. This blurs the boundaries between the privacy-preserving and commercial parts of services profiting from children’s data.

Why is this important? First, education data can reveal particularly sensitive and protected characteristics about children: their ethnicity, religion, disability or health status. Such data can also be used to create algorithms that profile children and predict or assess their academic ability and performance; it could reinforce prejudice, create siloed populations or entrench low expectations. Secondly, there is a risk that data-profiling children can lead to deterministic outcomes, defining too early what subjects a child is good at, how creative they are and what they are interested in. Safeguards must be put in place in relation to the processing of children’s personal data in schools to protect those fundamental rights. Thirdly, of course, is money. Data is appreciating in value, resulting in market pressure for data to be collected, processed, shared and reused. Increasingly, such data processed from children in schools is facilitated by edtech, an already major and expanding sector with a projected value of £3.4 billion.

The growth of edtech’s use in schools is promoted by the Department for Education’s edtech strategy, which sets out a vision for edtech to be an

“inseparable thread woven throughout the processes of teaching and learning”.

Yet the strategy gives little weight to data protection beyond noting the importance of preventing data breaching. Tech giants have become the biggest companies in the world because they own data on us. Schoolchildren have little choice as to their involvement with these companies in the classroom, so we have a moral duty to ensure that they are protected, not commodified or exploited, when learning. It must be a priority for the Government to keep emerging technologies in education under regular review.

Equally important is that the ICO should invest in expertise specific to the domain of education. By regularly reviewing emerging technologies—those already in use and those proposed for use—in education, and their potential risks and impacts, such experts could provide clear and timely guidance for schools to protect individual children and entire cohorts. Amendment 146 would introduce a new code of practice on the processing and use of children’s data by edtech providers. It would also ensure that edtech met their legal obligations under the law, protected children’s data and empowered schools.

I was pleased to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has had constructive discussions with the Education Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran. The way forward on this matter is some sort of joint work between the two departments. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said that she hopes the Minister today will respond with equal positivity; he could start by supporting the principles of this amendment. Beyond that, I hope that he will agree to liaise with the Department for Education and embrace the noble Baroness’s request for more meetings to discuss this issue on a joint basis.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am grateful, as ever, to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for both Amendment 146 and her continued work in championing the protection of children.

Let me start by saying that the Government strongly agree with the noble Baroness that all providers of edtech services must comply with the law when collecting and making decisions about the use of children’s data throughout the duration of their processing activities. That said, I respectfully submit that this amendment is not necessary, for the reasons I shall set out.

The ICO already has existing codes and guidance for children and has set out guidance about how the children’s code, data protection and e-privacy legislation apply to edtech providers. Although the Government recognise the value that ICO codes can have in promoting good practice and improving compliance, they do not consider that it would be appropriate to add these provisions to the Bill without further detailed consultation with the ICO and the organisations likely to be affected by them.

The guidance covers broad topics, including choosing a lawful basis for the processing; rules around information society services; targeting children with marketing; profiling children or making automated decisions about them; data sharing; children’s data rights; and exemptions relating to children’s data. Separately, as we have discussed throughout this debate, the age-appropriate design code deals specifically with the provision of online services likely to be accessed by children in the UK; this includes online edtech services. I am pleased to say that the Department for Education has begun discussions with commercial specialists to look at strengthening the contractual clauses relating to the procurement of edtech resources to ensure that they comply with the standards set out in the UK GDPR and the age-appropriate design code.

On the subject of requiring the ICO to develop a report with the edtech sector, with a view to creating a certification scheme and assessing compliance and conformity with data protection, we believe that such an approach should be at the discretion of the independent regulator.

The issues that have been raised in this very good, short debate are deeply important. Edtech is an issue that the Government are considering carefully—especially the Department for Education, given the increasing time spent online for education. I note that the DPA 2018 already contains a power for the Secretary of State to request new codes of practice, which could include one on edtech if the evidence warranted it. I would be happy to return to this in future but consider the amendment unnecessary at this time. For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the amendment and hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw it.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank everyone who spoke, particularly for making it absolutely clear that not one of us, including myself, is against edtech. We just want it to be fair and want the rules to be adequate.

I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for detailing what education data includes. It might feel as though it is just about someone’s exam results or something that might already be public but it can include things such as how often they go to see the nurse, what their parents’ immigration status is or whether they are late. There is a lot of information quite apart from this personalised education provision, to which the noble Baroness referred. In fact, we have a great deal of emerging evidence that it has no pedagogical background to it. There is also the question of huge investment right across the sector in things where we do not know what they are. I thank the noble Baroness for that.

As to the Minister’s response, I hope that he will forgive me for being disappointed. I am grateful to him for reminding us that the Secretary of State has that power under the DPA 2018. I would love for her to use that power but, so far, it has not been forthcoming. The evidence we saw from the freedom of information request is that the scheme the department wanted to put in place has been totally retracted—and clearly for resource reasons rather than because it is not needed. I find it quite surprising that the Minister can suggest that it is all gung ho here in the UK but that Germany, Holland, France, et cetera are being hysterical in regard to this issue. Each one of them has found it to be egregious.

Finally, the AADC applies only to internet society services; there is an exception for education. Where they are joint controllers, they are outsourcing the problems to the schools, which have no level of expertise in this and just take default settings. It is not good enough, I am afraid. I feel bound to say this: I understand the needs of parliamentary business, which puts just a handful of us in this Room to discuss things out of sight, but, if the Government are not willing to protect children’s data at school, when they are in loco parentis to our children, I am really bewildered as to what this Bill is for. Education is widely understood to be a social good but we are downgrading the data protections for children and rejecting every single positive move that anybody has made in Committee. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment but I will bring this back on Report.

--- Later in debate ---
Moved by
149: Clause 42, page 76, line 14, leave out “with the day” and insert “when”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new paragraph 4(A2) of Schedule 16 to the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.
--- Later in debate ---
Moved by
151: Clause 44, page 78, line 17, leave out “with the day on which it” and insert “when the complaint”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new section 164A(3) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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Committee stage
Wednesday 17th April 2024

(1 week, 4 days ago)

Grand Committee
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 30-V Fifth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (16 Apr 2024)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I listened carefully to the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his stand part notice on Clause 44. I will have to read Hansard, as I may have missed something, but I am not sure I am convinced by his arguments against Clause 44 standing part. He described his stand part notice as “innocuous”, but I am concerned that if the clause were removed it would have a slightly wider implication than that.

We feel that there are some advantages to how Clause 44 is currently worded. As it stands, it simply makes it clear that data subjects have to use the internal processes to make complaints to controllers first, and then the controller has the obligation to respond without undue delay. Although this could place an extra burden on businesses to manage and reply to complaints in a timely manner, I would have thought that this was a positive step to be welcomed. It would require controllers to have clear processes in place for handling complaints; I hope that that in itself would be an incentive against their conducting the kind of unlawful processing that prompts complaints in the first place. This seems the best practice, which would apply anyway in most organisations and complaint and arbitration systems, including, perhaps, ombudsmen, which I know the noble Lord knows more about than I do these days. There should be a requirement to use the internal processes first.

The clause makes it clear that the data subject has a right to complain directly to the controller and it makes clear that the controller has an obligation to respond. Clause 45 then goes on to make a different point, which is that the commissioner has a right to refuse to act on certain complaints. We touched on this in an earlier debate. Clearly, to be in line with Clause 44, the controller would have to have finished handling the case within the allotted time. We agree with that process. However, an alternative reason for the commissioner to refuse is when the complaint is “vexatious or excessive”. We have rehearsed our arguments about the interpretation of those words in previous debates on the application of subject access requests. I do not intend to repeat them here, but our concern about that wording rightly remains. What is important here is that the ICO should not be able to reject complaints simply because the complainant is distressed or angry. It is helpful that the clause states that in these circumstances,

“the Commissioner must inform the complainant”

of the reasons it is considered vexatious or excessive. It is also helpful that the clause states that this

“does not prevent the complainant from making it a complaint again”,

presumably in a way more compliant with the rules. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones—as I said, I will look at what he said in more detail—on balance, we are content with the wording as it stands.

On a slightly different tack, we have added our name to Amendment 154, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and we support Amendment 287 on a similar subject. This touches on a similar principle to our previous debate on the right of data communities to raise data-breach complaints on behalf of individuals. In these amendments, we are proposing that there should be a collective right for organisations to raise data-breach complaints for individuals or groups of individuals who do not necessarily feel sufficiently empowered or confident to raise the complaints on their own behalf. There are many reasons why this reticence might occur, not least that the individuals may feel that making a complaint would put their employment on the line or that they would suffer discrimination at work in the future. We therefore believe that these amendments are important to widen people’s access to work with others to raise these complaints.

Since these amendments were tabled, we have received the letter from the Minister that addresses our earlier debate on data communities. I am pleased to see the general support for data intermediaries that he set out in his letter. We argue that a data community is a separate distinct collective body, which is different from the wider concept of data intermediaries. This seems to be an area in which the ICO could take a lead in clarifying rights and set standards. Our Amendment 154 would therefore set a deadline for the ICO to do that work and for those rights to be enacted.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made a good case for broadening these rights in the Bill and, on that basis, I hope the Minister will agree to follow this up, and follow up his letter so that we can make further progress on this issue.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has tabled a number of amendments that modify the courts and tribunals functions. I was hoping that when I stood here and listened to him, I would understand a bit more about the issues. I hope he will forgive me for not responding in detail to these arguments. I do not feel that I know enough about the legal background to the concerns but he seems to have made a clear case in clarifying whether the courts or tribunals should have jurisdiction in data protection issues.

On that basis, I hope that the Minister will also provide some clarification on these issues and I look forward to his response.

Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling these amendments to Clauses 44 and 45, which would reform the framework for data protection complaints to the Information Commissioner.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has given notice of his intention to oppose Clause 44 standing part of the Bill. That would remove new provisions from the Bill that have been carefully designed to provide a more direct route to resolution for data subjects’ complaints. I should stress that these measures do not limit rights for data subjects to bring complaints forward, but instead provide a more direct route to resolution with the relevant data controller. The measures formalise current best practice, requiring the complainant to approach the relevant data controller, where appropriate, to attempt to resolve the issue prior to regulatory involvement.

The Bill creates a requirement for data controllers to facilitate the making of complaints and look into what may have gone wrong. This should, in most cases, result in a much quicker resolution of data protection-related complaints. The provisions will also have the impact of enabling the Information Commissioner to redeploy resources away from handling premature complaints where such complaints may be dealt with more effectively, in the first instance, by controllers and towards value-added regulatory activity, supporting businesses to use data lawfully and in innovative ways.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 153 seeks, in effect, to expand the scope of the Information Commissioner’s duty to investigate complaints under Section 165 of the Data Protection Act. However, that Section of the Act already provides robust redress routes, requiring the commissioner to take appropriate steps to respond to complaints and offer an outcome or conclude an investigation within a specified period.

The noble Lord raised the enforcement of the UK’s data protection framework. I can provide more context on the ICO’s approach, although noble Lords will be aware that it is enforced independently of government by the ICO; it would of course be inappropriate for me to comment on how the ICO exercises its enforcement powers. The ICO aims to be fair, proportionate and effective, focusing on areas with the highest risk and most harm, but this does not mean that it will enforce every case that crosses its books.

The Government have introduced a new requirement on the ICO—Clause 43—to publish an annual report on how it has exercised its enforcement powers, the number and nature of investigations, the enforcement powers used, how long investigations took and the outcome of the investigations that ended in that period. This will provide greater transparency and accountability in the ICO’s exercise of its enforcement powers. For these reasons, I am not able to accept these amendments.

I also thank the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their Amendments 154 and 287 concerning Section 190 of the Data Protection Act. These amendments would require the Secretary of State to legislate to give effect to Article 80(2) of the UK GDPR to enable relevant non-profit organisations to make claims against data controllers for alleged data breaches on behalf of data subjects, without those data subjects having requested or agreeing to the claim being brought. Currently, such non-profit organisations can already pursue such actions on behalf of individuals who have granted them specific authorisation, as outlined in Article 80(1).

In 2021, following consultation, the Government concluded that there was insufficient evidence to justify implementing Article 80(2) to allow non-profit organisations to bring data protection claims without the authorisation of the people affected. The Government’s response to the consultation noted that the regulator can and does investigate complaints raised by civil society groups, even when they are not made on behalf of named individuals. The ICO’s investigations into the use of live facial recognition technology at King’s Cross station and in some supermarkets in southern England are examples of this.

I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for raising her concerns about the protection of children throughout the debate—indeed, throughout all the days in Committee. The existing regime already allows civil society groups to make complaints to the ICO about data-processing activities that affect children and vulnerable people. The ICO has a range of powers to investigate systemic data breaches under the current framework and is already capable of forcing data controllers to take decisive action to address non-compliance. We are strengthening its powers in this Bill. I note that only a few member states of the EU have allowed non-governmental organisations to launch actions without a mandate, in line with the possibility provided by the GDPR.

I turn now to Amendments 154A, 154B—

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Before the noble Lord gets there and we move too far from Amendment 154, where does the Government’s thinking leave us regarding a group of class actions? Trade unions take up causes on behalf of their membership at large. I guess, in the issue of the Post Office and Mr Bates, not every sub-postmaster or sub-postmistress would have signed up to that class action, even though they may have ended up being beneficiaries of its effects. So where does it leave people with regard to data protection and the way that the data protection scheme operates where there might be a class action?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If the action is raised on behalf of named individuals, those named individuals have to have given consent for that. If the action is for a general class of people, those people would not have to give their explicit consent, because they are not named in the action. Article 80(2) of the GDPR said that going that further step was optional for all member states. I do not know which member states have taken it up, but a great many have not, just because of the complexities to which it gives rise.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, just so that the Minister might get a little note, I will ask a question. He has explained what is possible—what can be done—but not why the Government still resist putting Article 80(2) into effect. What is the reason for not adopting that article?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The reason was that an extensive consultation was undertaken in 2021 by the Government, and the Government concluded at that time that there was insufficient evidence to take what would necessarily be a complex step. That was largely on the grounds that class actions of this type can go forward either as long as they have the consent of any named individuals in the class action or on behalf of a group of individuals who are unnamed and not specifically raised by name within the investigation itself.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Perhaps the Minister could in due course say what evidence would help to persuade the Government to adopt the article.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to help the Minister. Perhaps he could give us some more detail on the nature of that consultation and the number of responses and what people said in it. It strikes me as rather important.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Fair enough. Maybe for the time being, it will satisfy the Committee if I share a copy of that consultation and what evidence was considered, if that would work.

I will turn now to Amendments 154A to 155 and Amendment 175, which propose sweeping modifications to the jurisdiction of the court and tribunal for proceedings under the Data Protection Act 2018. These amendments would have the effect of making the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal responsible for all data protection cases, transferring both ongoing and future cases out of the court system and to the relevant tribunals.

The Government of course want to ensure that proceedings for enforcement of data protection rules, including redress routes available to data subjects, are appropriate for the nature of the complaint. As the Committee will be well aware, at present there is a mixture of jurisdiction for tribunals and courts under data protection legislation, depending on the precise nature of the proceedings in question. Tribunals are indeed the appropriate venue for some data protection proceedings, and the legislation already recognises that—for example, for application by data subjects for an order requiring the ICO to progress their complaint. However, courts are generally the more appropriate venue for cases involving claims for compensation and successful parties can usually recover their costs. Courts also apply stricter rules of procedure and evidence than tribunals. That is because some cases are appropriate to fall under the jurisdiction of the tribunal, while others are more appropriate for court jurisdiction. For example, claims by individuals against organisations for breaches of legal requirements can result in awards of compensatory damages for the individuals and financial and reputational damage for the organisations. It is appropriate that such cases are handled by a court in accordance with its strict procedural and evidential rules, where the data subject may recover their costs if successful.

As such, the Government are confident that the current system is balanced and proportionate and provides clear and effective administrative and judicial redress routes for data subjects seeking to exercise their rights.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, is the Minister saying that there is absolutely no confusion between the jurisdiction of the tribunals and the courts? That is, no court has come to a different conclusion about jurisdiction—for example, as to whether procedural matters are for tribunals and merits are for courts or vice versa. Is he saying that everything is hunky-dory and clear and that we do not need to concern ourselves with this crossover of jurisdiction?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, as I was about to say, we need to take these issues seriously. The noble Lord raised a number of specific cases. I was unfamiliar with them at the start of the debate—

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will go away and look at those; I look forward to learning more about them. There are obvious implications in what the noble Lord said as to the most effective ways of distributing cases between courts and other channels.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am intrigued by the balance between what goes to a tribunal and what goes to the courts. I took the spirit behind the stand-part notice in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as being about finding the right place for the right case and ensuring that the wheels of justice are much more accessible. I am not entirely persuaded by what the Minister has said. It would probably help the Committee if we had a better understanding of where the cases go, how they are distributed and on what basis.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Lord; that is an important point. The question is: how does the Sorting Hat operate to distribute cases between the various tribunals and the court system? We believe that the courts have an important role to play in this but it is about how, in the early stages of a complaint, the case is allocated to a tribunal or a court. I can see that more detail is needed there; I would be happy to write to noble Lords.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Before we come to the end of this debate, I just want to raise something. I am grateful to the Minister for offering to bring forward the 2021 consultation on Article 80(2)—that will be interesting—but I wonder whether, as we look at the consultation and seek to understand the objections, the Government would be willing to listen to our experiences over the past two or three years. I know I said this on our previous day in Committee but there is, I hope, some point in ironing out some of the problems of the data regime that we are experiencing in action. I could bring forward a number of colleagues on that issue and on why it is a blind spot for both the ICO and the specialist organisations that are trying to bring systemic issues to its attention. It is very resource-heavy. I want a bit of goose and gander here: if we are trying to sort out some of the resourcing and administrative nightmares in dealing with the data regime, from a user perspective, perhaps a bit of kindness could be shown to that problem as well as to the problem of business.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would be very happy to participate in that discussion, absolutely.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I have surprised myself: I have taken something positive away from the Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was quite right to be more positive about Clause 44 than I was. The Minister unpacked its relationship with Clause 45 well and satisfactorily. Obviously, we will read Hansard before we jump to too positive a conclusion.

On Article 80(2), I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing both to go back to the consultation and to look at the kinds of evidence that were brought forward, because this is a really important aspect for many civil society organisations. He underestimates the difficulties faced when bringing complaints of this nature. I would very much like this conversation to go forward because this issue has been quite a bone of contention; the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, remembers that only too well. We may even have had ping-pong on the matter back in 2017. There is an appetite to keep on the case so, the more we can discuss this matter—between Committee and Report in particular—the better, because there is quite a head of steam behind it.

As far as the jurisdiction point is concerned, I think this may be the first time I have heard a Minister talk about the Sorting Hat. I was impressed: I have often compared this place to Hogwarts but the concept of using the Sorting Hat to decide whether a case goes to a tribunal or a court is a wonderful one. You would probably need artificial intelligence to do that kind of thing nowadays; that in itself is a bit of an issue because, after all, these may be elaborate amendments but, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said, the case being made here is about the possibility of there being confusion and things not being clear in terms of where jurisdiction lies. It is really important that we determine whether the courts and tribunals themselves understand this and, perhaps more appropriately, whether they have differing views about it.

We need to get to grips with this; the more the Minister can dig into it, and into Delo, Killock and so on, the better. We are all in the foothills here but I am certainly not going to try to unpack those two judgments and the differences between Mrs Justice Farbey and Mr Justice Mostyn, which are well beyond my competency. I thank the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---
Moved by
152: Clause 45, page 79, line 30, leave out “with the day” and insert “when”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of new section 165A(3) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) will apply to it.
--- Later in debate ---
Moved by
156: Clause 49, page 83, line 21, leave out “and (3)” and insert “to (3A)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendments in my name inserting additional subsections into this clause.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, the UK has rightly moved away from the EU concept of supremacy, under which retained EU law would always take precedence over domestic law when they were in conflict. That is clearly unacceptable now that we have left the EU. However, we understand that the effective functioning of our data protection legislation is of critical importance and it is appropriate for us to specify the appropriate relationship between UK and EU-derived pieces of legislation following implementation of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act, or REUL. That is why I am introducing a number of specific government amendments to ensure that the hierarchy of legislation works in the data protection context. These are Amendments 156 to 164 and 297.

Noble Lords may be aware that Clause 49 originally sought to clarify the relationship between the UK’s data protection legislation, specifically the UK GDPR and EU-derived aspects of the Data Protection Act 2018, and future data processing provisions in other legislation, such as powers to share or duties to disclose personal data, as a result of some legal uncertainty created by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. To resolve this uncertainty, Clause 49 makes it clear that all new data processing provisions in legislation should be read consistently with the key requirements of the UK data protection legislation unless it is expressly indicated otherwise. Since its introduction, the interpretation of pre-EU exit legislation has been altered and there is a risk that this would produce the wrong effect in respect of the interpretation of existing data processing provisions that are silent about their relationship with the data protection legislation.

Amendment 159 will make it clear that the full removal of the principle of EU law supremacy and the creation of a reverse hierarchy in relation to assimilated direct legislation, as provided for in the REUL Act, do not change the relationship between the UK data protection legislation and existing legislation that is in force prior to commencement of Clause 49(2). Amendment 163 makes a technical amendment to the EU withdrawal Act, as amended, to support this amendment.

Amendment 162 is similar to the previous amendment but it concerns the relationship between provisions relating to certain obligations and rights under data protection legislation and on restrictions and prohibitions on the disclosure of information under other existing legislation. Existing Section 186 of the Data Protection Act 2018 governs this relationship. Amendment 162 makes it clear that the relationship between these two types of provision is not affected by the changes to the interpretation of legislation that I have already referred to made by the REUL Act. Additionally, it clarifies that, in relation to pre-commencement legislation, Section 186(1) may be disapplied expressly or impliedly.

Amendment 164 relates to the changes brought about by the REUL Act and sets out that the provisions detailed in earlier Amendments 159, 162 and 163 are to be treated as having come into force on 1 January 2024—in other words, at the same time as commencement of the relevant provisions of the REUL Act.

Amendment 297 provides a limited power to remove provisions that achieve the same effect as new Section 183A from legislation made or passed after this Bill receives Royal Assent, as their presence could cause confusion.

Finally, Amendments 156 and 157 are consequential. Amendments 158, 160 and 161 are minor drafting changes made for consistency, updating and consequential purposes.

Turning to the amendments introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I hope that he can see from the government amendments to Clause 49 that we have given a good deal of thought to the impact of the REUL Act 2023 on the UK’s data protection framework and have been prepared to take action on this where necessary. We have also considered whether some of the changes made by the REUL Act could cause confusion about how the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 interrelate. Following careful analysis, we have concluded that they would largely continue to be read alongside each other in the intended way, with the rules of the REUL Act unlikely to interfere with this. Any new general rule such as that suggested by the noble Lord could create confusion and uncertainty.

Amendments 168 to 170, 174, 174A and 174B seek to reverse changes introduced by the REUL Act at the end of 2023, specifically the removal of EU general principles from the statute book. EU general principles and certain EU-derived rights had originally been retained by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act to ensure legal continuity at the end of the transition period, but this was constitutionally novel and inappropriate for the long term.

The Government’s position is that EU law concepts should not be used to interpret domestic legislation in perpetuity. The REUL Act provided a solution to this by repealing EU general principles from UK law and clarifying the approach to be taken domestically. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would undo this important work by reintroducing to the statute book references to rights and principles which have not been clearly defined and are inappropriate now that we have left the EU.

The protection of personal data already forms part of the protection offered by the European Convention on Human Rights, under the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life, and is further protected by our data protection legislation. The UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 provide a comprehensive set of rules for organisations to follow and rights for people in relation to the use of their data. Seeking to apply an additional EU right to data protection in UK law would not significantly affect the way the data protection framework functions or enhance the protections it affords to individuals. Indeed, doing so may well add unnecessary uncertainty and complexity.

Amendments 171 to 173 pertain to exemptions to specified data subject rights and obligations on data controllers set out in Schedules 2 to 4 to the DPA 2018. The 36 exemptions apply only in specified circumstances and are subject to various safeguards. Before addressing the amendments the noble Lord has tabled, it is perhaps helpful to set out how these exemptions are used. Personal data must be processed according to the requirements set out in the UK GDPR and the DPA 2018. This includes the key principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency, data minimisation and purpose limitation, among others. The decision to restrict data subjects’ rights, such as the right to be notified that their personal data is being processed, or limit obligations on the data controller, comes into effect only if and when the decision to apply an exemption is taken. In all cases, the use of the exemption must be both necessary and proportionate.

One of these exemptions, the immigration exemption, was recently amended in line with a court ruling that found it was incompatible with the requirements set out in Article 23. This exemption is used by the Home Office. The purpose of Amendments 171 to 173 is to extend the protections applied to the immigration exemption across the other exemptions subject to Article 23, apart from in Schedule 4, where the requirement to consider whether its application prejudices the relevant purposes is not considered relevant.

The other exemptions are each used in very different circumstances, by different data controllers—from government departments to SMEs—and work by applying different tests that function in a wholly different manner from the immigration exemption. This is important to bear in mind when considering these broad-brush amendments. A one-size-fits-all approach would not work across the exemption regime.

It is the Government’s position that any changes to these important exemptions should be made only after due consideration of the circumstances of that particular exemption. In many cases, these amendments seek to make changes that run counter to how the exemption functions. Making changes across the exemptions via this Bill, as the noble Lord’s amendments propose, has the potential to have significant negative impacts on the functioning of the exemptions regime. Any potential amendments to the other exemptions would require careful consideration. The Government note that there is a power to make changes to the exemptions in the DPA 2018, if deemed necessary.

For the reasons I have given, I look forward to hearing more from the noble Lord on his amendments, but I hope that he will not press them. I beg to move.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very careful exposition. I feel that we are heavily into wet towel, if not painkiller, territory here, because this is a tricky area. As the Minister might imagine, I will not respond to his exposition in detail, at this point; I need to run away and get some external advice on the impact of what he said. He is really suggesting that the Government prefer a pick ‘n’ mix approach to what he regards as a one size fits all. I can boil it down to that. He is saying that you cannot just apply the rules, in the sense that we are trying to reverse some of the impacts of the previous legislation. I will set out my stall; no doubt the Minister and I, the Box and others, will read Hansard and draw our own conclusions at the end, because this is a complicated area.

Until the end of 2023, the Data Protection Act 2018 had to be read compatibly with the UK GDPR. In a conflict between the two instruments, the provisions of the UK GDPR would prevail. The reversing of the relationship between the 2018 Act and the UK GDPR, through the operation of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act—REUL, as the Minister described it—has had the effect of lowering data protection rights in the UK. The case of the Open Rights Group and the3million v the Secretary of State for the Home Office and the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport was decided after the UK had left the EU, but before the end of 2023. The Court of Appeal held that exemptions from data subject rights in an immigration context, as set out in the Data Protection Act, were overly broad, contained insufficient safeguards and were incompatible with the UK GDPR. The court disapplied the exemptions and ordered the Home Office to redraft them to include the required safeguards. We debated the regulations the other day, and many noble Lords welcomed them on the basis that they had been revised for the second time.

This sort of challenge is now not possible, because the relationship between the DPA and the UK GDPR has been turned on its head. If the case were brought now, the overly broad exemptions in the DPA would take precedence over the requirement for safeguards set out in the UK GDPR. These points were raised by me in the debate of 12 December, when the Data Protection (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) (Amendment) Regulations 2023 were under consideration. In that debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Swinburne, stated that

“we acknowledge the importance of making sure that data processing provisions in wider legislation continue to be read consistently with the data protection principles in the UK GDPR … Replication of the effect of UK GDPR supremacy is a significant decision, and we consider that the use of primary legislation is the more appropriate way to achieve these effects, such as under Clause 49 where the Government consider it appropriate”.—[Official Report, 12/12/23; col. GC 203.]

This debate on Clause 49 therefore offers an opportunity to reinstate the previous relationship between the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act. The amendment restores the hierarchy, so that it guarantees the same rights to individuals as existed before the end of 2023, and avoids unforeseen consequences by resetting the relationship between the UK GDPR and the DPA 2018 to what the parliamentary draftsmen intended when the Act was written. The provisions in Clause 49, as currently drafted, address the relationship between domestic law and data protection legislation as a whole, but the relationship between the UK GDPR and the DPA is left in its “reversed” state. This is confirmed in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill at paragraph 503.

The purpose of these amendments is to restore data protection rights in the UK to what they were before the end of 2023, prior to the coming into force of REUL. The amendments would restore the fundamental right to the protection of personal data in UK law; ensure that the UK GDPR and the DPA continue to be interpreted in accordance with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data; ensure that there is certainty that assimilated case law that references the fundamental right to the protection of personal data still applies; and apply the protections required in Article 23 of the UK GDPR to all the relevant exemptions in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act. This is crucial in avoiding diminishing trust in our data protection frameworks. If people do not trust that their data is protected, they will refuse to share it. Without this data, new technologies cannot be developed, because these technologies rely on personal data. By creating uncertainty and diminishing standards, the Government are undermining the very growth in new technologies that they want.

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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I have looked at the government amendments in this group and have listened very carefully to what the Minister has said—that it is largely about interpretation. There are no amendments that I wish to comment on, save to say that they seem to be about consistency of language and bringing in part EU positions into UK law. They seem also to be about consistency of meaning, and for the most part the intention seems to be to ensure that nothing in EU retained law undoes the pre-existing legal framework.

However, I would appreciate the Minister giving us a bit more detail on the operation of Amendment 164. Amendment 297 seems to deal with a duplication issue, so perhaps he can confirm for the Committee that this is the case. We have had swathes of government amendments of a minor and technical nature, largely about chasing out gremlins from the drafting process. Can he confirm that this is the case and assure the Committee that we will not be left with any nasty surprises in the drafting that need correction at a later date?

The amendments tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, are of course of a different order altogether. The first two—Amendments 165 and 166—would restore the relationship between the UK GDPR and the 2018 Act and the relevant provisions of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. Amendment 168 would ensure that assimilated case law referring to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights would still be relevant in interpreting the UK GDPR. It would give greater certainty in how the UK’s data protection framework is interpreted. Amendment 169 would ensure that the interpretation is carried over from the UK GDPR and 2018 legislation in accordance with the general principle of the protection of personal data.

The noble Lord’s Amendments 170 to 174B would bring back into law protections that existed previously when UK law was more closely aligned with EU law and regulation. There is also an extension of the EU data protection of personal data to the assimilated standard that existed by virtue of Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. I can well understand the noble Lord’s desire to take the UK back to a position where we are broadly in the same place in terms of protections as our former EU partners. First, having—broadly speaking—protections that are common across multiple jurisdictions makes it easier and simpler for companies operating in those markets. Secondly, from the perspective of data subjects, it is much easier to comprehend common standards of data protection and to seek redress when required. The Government, for their part, will no doubt argue that there is some sort of big Brexit benefit in this, although I think that advisers and experts are divided on the degree of that benefit, and indeed who benefits.

Later, we will get to discuss data adequacy standards. Concern exists in some quarters as to whether we have this right and what this legislative opportunity might be missing to ensure that the UK meets those international standards that the EU requires. That is a debate for later, but we are broadly sympathetic to the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to find the highest level of protection for UK citizens. That is the primary motivation for many of the amendments and debates that we have had today. We do not want to weaken what were previously carefully crafted and aligned protections. I do not entirely buy the argument that the Minister made earlier about this group of amendments causing legal uncertainty. I believe it is the reverse of that: the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is trying to provide greater certainty and a degree of jurisdictional uniformity.

I hope that I have understood what the noble Lord is trying to achieve here. For those reasons, we will listen to the Minister’s concluding comments—and read Hansard—very carefully.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bassam, for their comments. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, points out, it is a pretty complex and demanding area, but that in no way diminishes the importance of getting it right. I hope that in my remarks I can continue that work, but of course I am happy to discuss this: it is a very technical area and, as all speakers have pointed out, it is crucial for our purposes that it be executed correctly.

While the UK remains committed to strong protections for personal data through the UK GDPR and Data Protection Act, it is important that it is able to diverge from the EU legislation where this is appropriate for the UK. We have carefully assessed the effects of EU withdrawal legislation and the REUL Act and are making adjustments to ensure that the right effect is achieved. The government amendments are designed to ensure legal certainty and protect the coherence of the data protection framework following commencement of the REUL Act—for example, by maintaining the pre-REUL Act relationship in certain ways between key elements of the UK data protection legislation and other existing legislation.

The purpose of the REUL Act is to ensure that the UK has control over its laws. Resurrecting the principle of EU law supremacy in its entirety or continuing to apply case law principles is not consistent with the UK’s departure from the EU and taking back control over our own laws. These amendments make it clear that changes made to the application of the principle of EU law supremacy and new rules relating to the interpretation of direct assimilated legislation under the REUL Act do not have any impact on existing provisions that involve the processing of personal data.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for more detail about Amendment 164. It relates to changes brought about by the REUL Act and sets out that the provisions detailed in Amendments 159, 162 and 163 are to be treated as having come into force on 1 January 2024—in other words, at the same time as commencement of the relevant provisions of the REUL Act. The retrospective effect of this provision addresses the gap between the commencement of the REUL Act 2023 and the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill.

On the immigration exemption case, I note that it was confined to the immigration exemption and did not rule on the other exemptions. The Government will continue to keep the exemptions under review and, should it be required, the Government have the power to amend the other exemptions using an existing power in the DPA 2018. Before doing so, of course the Government would want to ensure that due consideration is given to how the particular exemptions are used. Meanwhile, I thank noble Lords for what has been a fascinating, if demanding, debate.

Amendment 156 agreed.
Moved by
157: Clause 49, page 83, line 24, at end insert “: relevant enactments”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting section 183B of the Data Protection Act 2018.
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Moved by
176: Schedule 9, page 231, line 35, at end insert—
“2A After Article 4 insert—“Article 4APeriods of time1. References in this Regulation to a period expressed in hours, days, weeks, months or years are to be interpreted in accordance with Article 3 of the Periods of Time Regulation, except in—(a) Article 91A(8) and (9);(b) paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of Annex 1.2. In this Article, “the Periods of Time Regulation” means Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No. 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the rules of interpretation in Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) to apply to the UK GDPR, subject to some listed exceptions.
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This seems an extraordinary situation, whereby the Government are sitting on their hands. There is a clear issue with identity theft, yet they are refusing—they have gone into print, in response to the committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan—and saying, “No, no, we don’t need anything like that; everything is absolutely fine”. I hope that the Minister can give a better answer this time around.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Kamall for their amendments. To address the elephant in the room first, I can reassure noble Lords that the use of digital identity will not be mandatory, and privacy will remain one of the guiding principles of the Government’s approach to digital identity. There are no plans to introduce a centralised, compulsory digital ID system for public services, and the Government’s position on physical ID cards remains unchanged. The Government are committed to realising the benefits of digital identity technologies without creating ID cards.

I shall speak now to Amendment 177, which would require the rules of the DVS trust framework to be set out in regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I recognise that this amendment, and others in this group, reflect recommendations from the DPRRC. Obviously, we take that committee very seriously, and we will respond to that report in due course, but ahead of Report.

Part 2 of the Bill will underpin the DVS trust framework, a document of auditable rules, which include technical standards. The trust framework refers to data protection legislation and ICO guidance. It has undergone four years of development, consultation and testing within the digital identity market. Organisations can choose to have their services certified against the trust framework to prove that they provide secure and trustworthy digital verification services. Certification is provided by independent conformity assessment bodies that have been accredited by the UK Accreditation Service. Annual reviews of the trust framework are subject to consultation with the ICO and other appropriate persons.

Requiring the trust framework to be set out in regulations would make it hard to introduce reactive changes. For example, if a new cybersecurity threat emerged which required the rapid deployment of a fix across the industry, the trust framework would need to be updated very quickly. Developments in this fast-growing industry require an agile approach to standards and rule-making. We cannot risk the document becoming outdated and losing credibility with industry. For these reasons, the Government feel that it is more appropriate for the Secretary of State to have the power to set the rules of the trust framework with appropriate consultation, rather than for the power to be exercised by regulations.

I turn to Amendments 178 to 195, which would require the fees that may be charged under this part of the Bill to be set out in regulations subject to the negative resolution procedure. The Government have committed to growing a market of secure and inclusive digital identities as an alternative to physical proofs of identity, for those that choose to use them. Fees will be introduced only once we are confident that doing so will not restrict the growth of this market, but the fee structure, when introduced, is likely to be complex and will need to flex to support growth in an evolving market.

There are built-in safeguards to this fee-charging power. First, there is a strong incentive for the Secretary of State to set fees that are competitive, fair and reasonable, because failing to do so would prevent the Government realising their commitment to grow this market. Secondly, these fee-raising powers have a well-defined purpose and limited scope. Thirdly, the Secretary of State will explain in advance what fees she intends to charge and when she intends to charge them, which will ensure the appropriate level of transparency.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about the arrangements for the office for digital identities and attributes. It will not initially be independent, as it will be located within the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. As we announced in the government response to our 2021 consultation, we intend for this to be an interim arrangement until a suitable long-term home for the governing body can be identified. Delegating the role of Ofdia—as I suppose we will call it—to a third party in the future, is subject to parliamentary scrutiny, as provided for by the clauses in the Bill. Initially placing Ofdia inside government will ensure that its oversight role could mature in the most effective way and that it supports the digital identity market in meeting the needs of individual users, relying parties and industry.

Digital verification services are independently certified against the trust framework rules by conformity assessment bodies. Conformity assessment bodies are themselves independently accredited by the UK Accreditation Service to ensure that they have the competence and impartiality to perform certification. The trust framework certification scheme will be accredited by the UK Accreditation Service to give confidence that the scheme can be efficiently and competently used to certify products, processes and services. All schemes will need to meet internationally agreed standards set out by the UK Accreditation Service. Ofdia, as the owner of the main code, will work with UKAS to ensure that schemes are robust, capable of certification and operated in line with the trust framework.

Amendment 184A proposes to exclude certified public bodies from registering to provide digital verification services. The term “public bodies” could include a wide range of public sector entities, including institutions such as universities, that receive any public funding. The Government take the view that this exclusion would be unnecessarily restrictive in the UK’s nascent digital identity market.

Amendment 195ZA seeks to mandate organisations to implement a non-digital form of verification in every instance where a digital method is required. The Bill enables the use of secure and inclusive digital identities across the economy. It does not force businesses or individuals to use them, nor does it insist that businesses which currently accept non-digital methods of verification must transition to digital methods. As Clause 52 makes clear, digital verification services are services that are provided at the request of the individual. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that, when people want to use a digital verification service, they know which of the available products and services they can trust.

Some organisations operate only in the digital sphere, such as online-only banks and energy companies. To oblige such organisations to offer manual document checking would place obligations on them that would go beyond the Government’s commitment to do only what is necessary to enable the digital identity market to grow. In so far as this amendment would apply to public authorities, the Equality Act requires those organisations to consider how their services will affect people with protected characteristics, including those who, for various reasons, might not be able or might choose not to use a digital identity product.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Is the Minister saying that, as a result of the Equality Act, there is an absolute right to that analogue—if you like—form of identification if, for instance, someone does not have access to digital services?

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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On this point, the argument that the Government are making is that, where consumers want to use a digital verification service, all the Bill does is to provide a mechanism for those DVSs to be certified and assured to be safe. It does not seek to require anything beyond that, other than creating a list of safe DVSs.

The Equality Act applies to the public sector space, where it needs to be followed to ensure that there is an absolute right to inclusive access to digital technologies.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, in essence, the Minister is admitting that there is a gap when somebody who does not have access to digital services needs an identity to deal with the private sector. Is that right?

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In the example I gave, I was not willing to use a digital system to provide a guarantee for my son’s accommodation in the private sector. I understand that that would not be protected and that, therefore, someone might not be able to rent a flat, for example, because they cannot provide physical ID.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Bill does not change the requirements in this sense. If any organisation chooses to provide its services on a digital basis only, that is up to that organisation, and it is up to consumers whether they choose to use it. It makes no changes to the requirements in that space.

I will now speak to the amendment that seeks to remove Clause 80. Clause 80 enables the Secretary of State to ask accredited conformity assessment bodies and registered DVS providers to provide information which is reasonably required to carry out her functions under Part 2 of the Bill. The Bill sets out a clear process that the Secretary of State must follow when requesting this information, as well as explicit safeguards for her use of the power. These safeguards will ensure that DVS providers and conformity assessment bodies have to provide only information necessary for the functioning of this part of the Bill.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, the clause stand part amendment was clearly probing. Does the Minister have anything to say about the relationship with OneLogin? Is he saying that it is only information about systems, not individuals, which does not feed into the OneLogin identity system that the Government are setting up?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is very important that the OneLogin system is entirely separate and not considered a DVS. We considered whether it should be, but the view was that that comes close to mandating a digital identity system, which we absolutely want to avoid. Hence the two are treated entirely differently.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is a good reassurance, but if the Minister wants to unpack that further by correspondence, I would be very happy to have that.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am very happy to do so.

I turn finally to Amendments 289 and 300, which aim to introduce a criminal offence of digital identity theft. The Government are committed to tackling fraud and are confident that criminal offences already exist to cover the behaviour targeted by these amendments. Under the Fraud Act 2006, it is a criminal offence to make a gain from the use of another person’s identity or to cause or risk a loss by such use. Where accounts or databases are hacked into, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 criminalises the unauthorised access to a computer programme or data held on a computer.

Furthermore, the trust framework contains rules, standards and good practice requirements for fraud monitoring and responding to fraud. These rules will further defend systems and reduce opportunities for digital identity theft.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I am sorry, but this is a broad-ranging set of amendments, so I need to intervene on this one as well. When the Minister does his will write letter in response to today’s proceedings, could he tell us what guidance there is to the police on this? Because when the individual, Mr Arron, approached the police, they said, “Oh, sorry, there’s nothing we can do; identity theft is not a criminal offence”. The Minister seems to be saying, “No, it is fine; it is all encompassed within these provisions”. While he may be saying that, and I am sure he will be shouting it from the rooftops in the future, the question is whether the police have guidance; does the College of Policing have guidance and does the Home Office have guidance? The ordinary individual needs to know that it is exactly as the Minister says, and identity theft is covered by these other criminal offences. There is no point in having those offences if nobody knows about them.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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That is absolutely fair enough: I will of course write. Sadly, we are not joined today by ministerial colleagues from the Home Office, who have some other Bill going on.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We always enjoy having input from the Home Office.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have no doubt that its contribution to the letter will be equally enjoyable. However, for all the reasons I set out above, I am not able to accept these amendments and respectfully encourage the noble Baroness and noble Lords not to press them.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I suppose I am meant to say that I thank the Minister for his response, but I cannot say that it was particularly optimistic or satisfying. On my amendments, the Minister said he would be responding to the DPRRC in due course, and obviously I am interested to see that response, but as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, the committee could not have been clearer and I thought made a very compelling case for why there should be some parliamentary oversight of this main code and, indeed, the fees arrangements.

I understand that it is a fast-moving sector, but the sort of things that the Delegated Powers Committee was talking about was that the main code should have some fundamental principles, some user rights and so on. We are not trying to spell out every sort of service that is going to be provided—as the Minister said, it is a fast-moving sector—but people need to have some trust in it and they need to know what this verification service is going to be about. Just saying that there is going to be a code, on such an important area, and that the Secretary of State will write it, is simply not acceptable in terms of basic parliamentary democracy. If it cannot be done through an affirmative procedure, the Government need to come up with another way to make sure that there is appropriate parliamentary input into what is being proposed here.

On the subject of the fees, the Delegated Powers Committee and our amendment was saying only that there should be a negative SI. I thought that was perfectly reasonable on its part and I am sorry that the Minister is not even prepared to accept that perfectly suggestion. All in all, I thought that the response on that element was very disappointing.

The response was equally disappointing on the whole issue that the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Vaux, raised about the right not to have to use the digital verification schemes but to do things on a non-digital basis. The arguments are well made about the numbers of people who are digitally excluded. I was in the debate that the noble Lord referred to, and I cannot remember the statistics now, but something like 17% of the population do not have proper digital access, so we are excluding a large number of people from a whole range of services. It could be applying for jobs, accessing bank accounts or applying to pay the rent for your son’s flat or whatever. We are creating a two-tier system here, for those who are involved and those who are on the margins who cannot use a lot of the services. I would have hoped that the Government would have been much more engaged in trying to find ways through that and providing some guarantees to people.

We know that we are taking a big leap, with so many different services going online. There is a lot of suspicion about how these services are going to work and people do not trust that computers are always as accurate as we would like them to be, so they would like to feel that there is another way of doing it if it all goes wrong. It worries me that the Minister is not able to give that commitment.

I have to say that I am rather concerned by what the Minister said about the private sector—in effect, that it can already have a requirement to have digital only. Surely, in this brave new world we are going towards, we do not want a digital-only service; this goes back to the point about a whole range of people being excluded. What is wrong with saying, even to people who collect people’s bank account details to pay their son’s rent, “There is an alternative way of doing this as well as you providing all the information digitally”? I am very worried about where all this is going, including who will be part of it and who will not. If the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Vaux, wish to pursue this at a later point, I would be sympathetic to their arguments.

On identity theft, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made a compelling case. The briefing that he read out from the Metropolitan Police said that your data is one of your most valuable assets, which is absolutely right. He also rightly made the point that this is linked to organised crime. It does not happen by accident; some major people are farming our details and using them for all sorts of nefarious activities. There is a need to tighten up the regulation and laws on this. The Minister read out where he thinks this is already dealt with under existing legislation but we will all want to scrutinise that and see whether that really is the case. There are lots of examples of where the police have not been able to help people and do not know what their rights are, so we just need to know exactly what advice has been given to the police.

I feel that the Minister could have done more on this whole group to assure us that we are not moving towards a two-tier world. I will withdraw my amendment, obviously, but I have a feeling that we will come back to this issue; it may be something that we can talk to the Minister about before we get to Report.

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Adding that to what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, talked about when he mentioned the chairman of the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, the Government should not think that they can simply water down data subject rights and ramp up the Secretary of State’s rights without it being noticed across the water and without consequences. That is why they need to think carefully about this Bill and accept the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, which is the least we can do, quite apart from scrapping the Bill.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett, Lady Young of Old Scone and Lady Jones, for their proposed amendments on extending the definition of business data in smart data schemes, the disclosure of climate and nature information to improve public service delivery and the publication of an EU adequacy risk assessment.

On Amendment 195A, we consider that information about the carbon and energy intensity of goods, services or digital content already falls within the scope of “business data” as information about goods, services and digital content supplied or provided by a trader. Development of smart data schemes will, where relevant, be informed by—among other things—the Government’s Environmental Principles Policy Statement, under the Environment Act 2021.

With regard to Amendment 218, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, for her sympathies; they are gratefully received. I will do my best in what she correctly pointed out is quite a new area for me. The powers to share information under Part 5 of the Digital Economy Act 2017—the DEA—are supplemented by statutory codes of practice. These require impact assessments to be carried out, particularly for significant changes or proposals that could have wide-ranging effects on various sectors or stakeholders. These impact assessments are crucial for understanding the implications of the Digital Economy Act and ensuring that it achieves its intended objectives, while minimising any negative consequences for individuals, businesses and society as a whole. As these assessments already cover economic, social and environmental impact, significant changes in approach are already likely to be accounted for. This is in addition to the duty placed on Ministers by the Environment Act 2021 to have due regard to the Environmental Principles Policy Statement.

Lastly, turning to Amendment 296, the Government are committed to maintaining their data adequacy decisions from the EU, which we absolutely recognise play a pivotal role in enabling trade and fighting crime. As noble Lords alluded to, we maintain regular engagement with the European Commission on the Bill to ensure that our reforms are understood.

The EU adequacy assessment of the UK is, of course, a unilateral, autonomous process for the EU to undertake. However, we remain confident that our reforms deliver against UK interests and are compatible with maintaining EU adequacy. As the European Commission itself has made clear, a third country—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, alluded to this point—is not required to have the same rules as the EU to be considered adequate. Indeed, 15 countries have EU adequacy, including Japan, Israel and the Republic of Korea. All these nations pursue independent and, often, more divergent approaches to data protection.

The Government will provide both written and oral evidence to the House of Lords European Affairs Committee inquiry on UK-EU data adequacy and respond to its final report, which is expected to be published in the summer. Many expert witnesses already provided evidence to the committee and have stated that they believe that the Bill is compatible with maintaining adequacy.

As noble Lords have noted, the Government have published a full impact assessment alongside the Bill, which sets out in more detail what both the costs and financial benefits of the Bill would be—including in the unlikely scenario of the EU revoking the UK’s adequacy decision. I also note that UK adequacy is good for the EU too: every EU company, from multinationals to start-ups, with customers, suppliers or operations in the UK relies on EU-UK data transfers. Leading European businesses and organisations have consistently emphasised the importance of maintaining these free flows of data to the UK.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Baronesses will agree to withdraw or not move these amendments.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister made the point at the end there that it is in the EU’s interest to agree to our data adequacy. That is an important point but is that what the Government are relying on—the fact that it is in the EU’s interest as much as ours to continue to agree to our data adequacy provisions? If so, what the Minister has said does not make me feel more reassured. If the Government are relying on just that, it is not a particularly strong argument.

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Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, can I point out, on the interests of the EU, that it does not go just one way? There is a question around investment as well. For example, any large bank that is currently running a data-processing facility in this country that covers the whole of Europe may decide, if we lose data adequacy, to move it to Europe. Anyone considering setting up such a thing would probably go for Europe rather than here. There is therefore an investment draw for the EU here.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not know what I could possibly have said to create the impression that the Government are flying blind on this matter. We continue to engage extensively with the EU at junior official, senior official and ministerial level in order to ensure that our proposed reforms are fully understood and that there are no surprises. We engage with multiple expert stakeholders from both the EU side and the UK side. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, a number of experts have submitted evidence to the House’s inquiry on EU-UK data adequacy and have made clear their views that the DPDI reforms set out in this Bill are compatible with EU adequacy. We continue to engage with the EU throughout. I do not want to be glib or blithe about the risks; we recognise the risks but it is vital—

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Could we have a list of the people the noble Lord is talking about?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes. I would be happy to provide a list of the people we have spoken to about adequacy; it may be a long one. That concludes the remarks I wanted to make, I think.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Perhaps the Minister could just tweak that a bit by listing not just the people who have made positive noises but those who have their doubts.

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Moved by
196: Clause 96, page 123, line 42, after “holders” insert “, authorised persons or third party recipients”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the restriction in clause 96(3) on the exercise of the regulation-making power in clause 96(1) (power to impose a levy) applies in connection with regulations imposing a levy on authorised persons or third party recipients as well as regulations imposing a levy on data holders.
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Moved by
197: Clause 103, page 131, line 7, at end insert—
“(9A) The requirement in subsection (9) may be satisfied by consultation undertaken before the coming into force of this section.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes clear that the requirement under clause 103(9) to consult before making regulations described in clause 103(7) may be satisfied by consultation carried out before clause 103 comes into force.
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I think that we are all in agreement, although we do not have the same wording. I think that with a little effort we could find that wording. These are important issues. I hope that the Minister can give a more positive response than to the last debate that I spoke in. We are going to carry on working on it, even if he does not want to—so I hope that we are able to make some progress on this issue.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I thank my noble friend Lord Holmes, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as well as other co-signatories for detailed examination of the Bill through these amendments.

I begin by addressing Amendments 197A, 197B and 197C tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes, which seek to establish a biometrics office responsible for overseeing biometric data use, and place new obligations on organisations processing such data. The Information Commissioner already has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the processing of biometric data, and these functions will continue to sit with the new information commission, once established. For example, in March 2023 it investigated the use of live facial recognition in a retail security setting by Facewatch. In February 2024, it took action against Serco Leisure in relation to its use of biometric data to monitor attendance of leisure centre employees.

Schedule 15 to this Bill will also enable the information commission to establish committees of external experts with skills in any number of specialist areas, including biometrics, to provide specialist advice to the commission. Given that the Information Commissioner already has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the processing of biometric data, the Government are therefore of the firm view that the information commission is best placed to continue to oversee the processing of biometric data. The Bill also allows the new information commission to establish specialist committees and require them to provide the commission with specialist advice. The committees may include specialists from outside the organisation, with key skills and expertise in specific areas, including biometrics.

The processing of biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual is also subject to heightened safeguards, and organisations can process such data only if they meet one of the conditions of Article 9 of UK GDPR—for example, where processing is necessary to comply with employment law provisions, or for reasons of substantial public interest. Without a lawful basis and compliance with relevant conditions, such processing of biometric data is prohibited.

Amendments 197B and 197C in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes would also impose new, prescriptive requirements on organisations processing, and intending to process, biometric data and setting unlimited fines for non-compliance. We consider that such amendments would have significant unintended consequences. There are many everyday uses of biometrics data, such as using your thumbprint to access your phone. If every organisation that launched a new product had to comply with the proposed requirements, it would introduce significant and unnecessary new burdens and would discourage innovation, undermining the aims of this Bill. For these reasons, I respectfully ask my noble friend not to move these amendments.

The Government deem Amendment 238 unnecessary, as using biometric data—

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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I am sorry, but I am wondering whether the Minister is going to say any more on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Can I be clear? The Minister said that the ICO is the best place to oversee these issues, but the noble Lord’s amendment recognises that; it just says that there should be a dedicated biometrics unit with specialists, et cetera, underneath it. I am looking towards the noble Lord—yes, he is nodding in agreement. I do not know that the Minister dismissed that idea, but I think that this would be a good compromise in terms of assuaging our concerns on this issue.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I apologise if I have misunderstood. It sounds like it would be a unit within the ICO responsible for that matter. Let me take that away if I have misunderstood—I understood it to be a separate organisation altogether.

The Government deem Amendment 238 unnecessary, as using biometric data to categorise or make inferences about people, whether using algorithms or otherwise, is already subject to the general data protection principles and the high data protection standards of the UK’s data protection framework as personal data. In line with ICO guidance, where the processing of biometric data is intended to make an inference linked to one of the special categories of data—for example, race or ethnic origin—or the biometric data is processed for the intention of treating someone differently on the basis of inferred information linked to one of the special categories of data, organisations should treat this as special category data. These protections ensure that this data, which is not used for identification purposes, is sufficiently protected.

Similarly, Amendment 286 intends to widen the scope of the Forensic Information Databases Service—FINDS—strategy board beyond oversight of biometrics databases for the purpose of identification to include “classification” purposes as well. The FINDS strategy board currently provides oversight of the national DNA database and the national fingerprint database. The Bill puts oversight of the fingerprint database on the same statutory footing as that of the DNA database and provides the flexibility to add oversight of new biometric databases, where appropriate, to provide more consistent oversight in future. The delegated power could be used in the medium term to expand the scope of the board to include a national custody image database, but no decisions have yet been taken. Of course, this will be kept under review, and other biometric databases could be added to the board’s remit in future should these be created and should this be appropriate. For the reasons I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, will therefore agree not to move Amendments 238 and 286.

Responses to the data reform public consultation in 2021 supported the simplification of the complex oversight framework for police use of biometrics and surveillance cameras. Clauses 147 and 148 of the Bill reflect that by abolishing the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s roles while transferring the commissioner’s casework functions to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office.

Noble Lords referred to the CRISP report, which was commissioned by Fraser Sampson—the previous commissioner—and directly contradicts the outcome of the public consultation on data reform in 2021, including on the simplification of the oversight of biometrics and surveillance cameras. The Government took account of all the responses, including from the former commissioner, in developing the policies set out in the DPDI Bill.

There will not be a gap in the oversight of surveillance as it will remain within the statutory regulatory remit of other organisations, such as the Information Commissioner’s Office, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Forensic Science Regulator and the Forensic Information Databases Service strategy board.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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One of the crucial aspects has been the reporting of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner. Where is there going to be and who is going to have a comprehensive report relating to the use of surveillance cameras and the biometric data contained within them? Why have the Government decided that they are going to separate out the oversight of biometrics from, in essence, the surveillance aspects? Are not the two irretrievably brought together by things such as live facial recognition?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Yes. There are indeed a number of different elements of surveillance camera oversight; those are reflected in the range of different bodies doing that it. As to the mechanics of the production of the report, I am afraid that I do not know the answer.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Does the Minister accept that the police are one of the key agencies that will be using surveillance cameras? He now seems to be saying, “No, it’s fine. We don’t have one single oversight body; we had four at the last count”. He probably has more to say on this subject but is that not highly confusing for the police when they have so many different bodies that they need to look at in terms of oversight? Is it any wonder that people think the Bill is watering down the oversight of surveillance camera use?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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No. I was saying that there was extensive consultation, including with the police, and that that has resulted in these new arrangements. As to the actual mechanics of the production of an overall report, I am afraid that I do not know but I will find out and advise noble Lords.

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services also inspects, monitors and reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, including their use of surveillance cameras. All of these bodies have statutory powers to take the necessary action when required. The ICO will continue to regulate all organisations’ use of these technologies, including being able to take action against those not complying with data protection law, and a wide range of other bodies will continue to operate in this space.

On the first point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, where any of the privacy concerns he raises concern information that relates to an identified or identifiable living individual, I can assure him that this information is covered by the UK’s data protection regime. This also includes another issue raised by the noble Lord—where the ANPR captures a number-plate that can be linked to an identifiable living individual—as this would be the processing of personal data and thus governed by the UK’s data protection regime and regulated by the ICO.

For the reasons I have set out, I maintain that these clauses should stand part of the Bill. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his stand part notices on Clauses 147 and 148.

Clause 149 does not affect the office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, which the noble Lord seeks to maintain through his amendment. The clause’s purpose is to update the name of the national DNA database board and update its scope to include the national fingerprint database within its remit. It will allow the board to produce codes of practice and introduce a new delegated power to add or remove biometric databases from its remit in future via the affirmative procedure. I therefore maintain that this clause should stand part of the Bill and hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his stand part notice.

Clauses 147 and 148 will improve consistency in the guidance and oversight of biometrics and surveillance cameras by simplifying the framework. This follows public consultation, makes the most of the available expertise, improves organisational resilience, and ends confusing and inefficient duplication. The Government feel that a review, as proposed, so quickly after the Bill is enacted is unnecessary. It is for these reasons that I cannot accept Amendment 292 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.

I turn now to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which seek to remove Clauses 130 to 132. These clauses make changes to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which provides the retention regime for biometric data held on national security grounds. The changes have been made only following a formal request from Counter Terrorism Policing to the Home Office. The exploitation of biometric material, including from international partners, is a valuable tool in maintaining the UK’s national security, particularly for ensuring that there is effective tripwire coverage at the UK border. For example, where a foreign national applies for a visa to enter the UK, or enters the UK via a small boat, their biometrics can be checked against Counter Terrorism Policing’s holdings and appropriate action to mitigate risk can be taken, if needed.

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Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
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My Lords, to go back to some of the surveillance points, one of the issues is the speed at which technology is changing, with artificial intelligence and all the other things we are seeing. One of the roles of the commissioner has been to keep an eye on how technology is changing and to make recommendations as to what we do about the impacts of that. I cannot hear, in anything the noble Viscount is saying, how that role is replicated in what is being proposed. Can he enlighten me?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Yes, indeed. In many ways, this is advantageous. The Information Commissioner obviously has a focus on data privacy, whereas the various other organisations, particularly BSCC, EHRC and the FINDS Board, have subject-specific areas of expertise on which they will be better placed to horizon-scan and identify new emerging risks from technologies most relevant to their area.

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Is the noble Viscount saying that splitting it all up into multiple different places is more effective than having a single dedicated office to consider these things? I must say, I find that very hard to understand.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I do not think we are moving from a simple position. We are moving from a very complex position to a less complex position.

Viscount Stansgate Portrait Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
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Can the Minister reassure the Committee that, under the Government’s proposals, there will be sufficient reporting to Parliament, every year, from all the various bodies to which he has already referred, so that Parliament can have ample opportunity to review the operation of this legislation as the Bill stands at the moment?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes, indeed. The information commission will be accountable to Parliament. It is required to produce transparency and other reports annually. For the other groups, I am afraid that many of them are quite new to me, as this is normally a Home Office area, but I will establish what their accountability is specifically to Parliament, for BSSC and the—

Viscount Stansgate Portrait Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
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Will the Minister write to the Committee, having taken advice from his Home Office colleagues?

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Lord Holmes of Richmond Portrait Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who participated in the excellent debate on this set of amendments. I also thank my noble friend the Minister for part of his response; he furiously agreed with at least a substantial part of my amendments, even though he may not have appreciated it at the time. I look forward to some fruitful and positive discussions on some of those elements between Committee and Report.

When a Bill passes into statute, a Minister and the Government may wish for a number of things in terms of how it is seen and described. One thing that I do not imagine is on the list is for it to be said that this statute generates significant gaps—those words were put perfectly by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. That it generates significant gaps is certainly the current position. I hope that we have conversations between Committee and Report to address at least some of those gaps and restate some of the positions that exist, before the Bill passes. That would be positive for individuals, citizens and the whole of the country. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and look forward to those subsequent conversations.

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Moved by
198: After Clause 108, insert the following new Clause—
“Interpretation of the PEC RegulationsIn regulation 2 of the PEC Regulations (interpretation)—(a) in paragraph (4) omit “, without prejudice to paragraph (3),”, and(b) at the end insert—“(5) References in these regulations to a period expressed in hours, days, weeks, months or years are to be interpreted in accordance with Article 3 of the Periods of Time Regulation, except that Article 3(4) of that Regulation does not apply to the interpretation of a reference to a period in regulation 16A.(6) In paragraph (5), “the Periods of Time Regulation” means Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No. 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the rules of interpretation in Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) to apply to the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, with an exception for regulation 16A. It also removes a superfluous cross-reference.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Read Full debate
Committee stage
Monday 22nd April 2024

(6 days, 11 hours ago)

Grand Committee
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 30-VI Sixth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (18 Apr 2024)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Moved by
206: Clause 112, page 139, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) In regulation 5C of the PEC Regulations (personal data breach: enforcement)—(a) in paragraph (4)(f), for “from the service of the notice of intent” substitute “beginning when the notice of intent is served”, and(b) in paragraph (5), for “21 days of receipt of the notice of intent” substitute “the period of 21 days beginning when the notice of intent is received”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the language of regulation 5C of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 so it is consistent with language used in new provisions inserted into those Regulations by clause 116 of the Bill.
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Moved by
208: After Clause 112, insert the following new Clause—
“Emergency alerts: interpretation of time periodsIn regulation 16A of the PEC Regulations (emergency alerts), in paragraph (6), for the words from “7 days” to “paragraph (3)(b)” substitute “the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which the time period specified by the relevant public authority pursuant to paragraph (3)(b) expires”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts a description of a period of time in regulation 16A(6) of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 to clarify that the day on which the time period specified under regulation 26A(3)(b) expires (which triggers the 7 day period mentioned in regulation 16A) is included in the 7 days.
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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, tracking the provenance of Clause 113 has been a very interesting exercise. If we think that Clause 114 is pretty politically motivated, Clause 113 is likewise. These rules relating to the fact that political parties cannot avail themselves of the soft opt-in provision have been there since 2005. The Information Commissioner issued guidance on political campaigning, and it was brought within the rules. Subsequently, there has been a ruling in a tribunal case which confirmed that: the SNP was issued with an enforcement notice and the information tribunal dismissed the appeal.

The Conservative Party was fined in 2021 for sending emails to people who did not ask for them. Then, lo and behold, there was a Conservative Party submission to the House of Lords Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee in 2020, and that submission has been repeated on a number of occasions. I have been trying to track how many times the submission has been made by the Conservative Party. The submission makes it quite clear that there is frustration in the Conservative Party. I have the written evidence here. It says:

“We have a number of concerns about the Information Commissioner’s draft code”—


as it then was: it is now a full code—

“on the use of data for political campaigning. In the interests of transparency, I enclose a copy of the response that the Conservative Party sent to the consultation. I … particularly flag the potential chilling effect on long-standing practices of MPs and councillors from engaging with their local constituents”.

Now, exactly as the noble Baroness has said, I do not think there is any call from other political parties to change the rules. I have not seen any submissions from any other political party, so I would very much like to know why the Government have decided to favour the Conservative Party in these circumstances by changing the rules. It seems rather peculiar.

The guidance for personal data in political campaigning, which I read while preparing for this debate, seems to be admirably clear. It is quite long, but it is admirably clear, and I congratulate the ICO on tiptoeing through the tulips rather successfully. However, the fact is that we have very clear guidance and a very clear situation, and I entirely agree with the noble Baroness that we are wholly in favour of charities being able to avail themselves of the new provisions, but allowing political parties to do so is a bridge too far and, on that basis, I very much support the amendment.

Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for Amendments 209 and 210, which would amend Clause 113 by removing electronic communications sent by political parties from the scope of the soft opt-in direct marketing rule. A similar rule to this already exists for commercial organisations so that they can message customers who have previously purchased goods or services about similar products without their express consent. However, the rule does not apply if a customer has opted out of receiving direct marketing material.

The Government consider that similar rules should apply to non-commercial organisations. Clause 113 therefore allows political parties, charities and other non-commercial organisations that have collected contact details from people who have expressed an interest in their objectives to send them direct marketing material without their express consent. If people do not want to receive political messaging, we have included several privacy safeguards around the soft opt-in measure that allow people to easily opt out of receiving further communications.

Support for a political party’s objectives could be demonstrated, for example, through a person’s attendance at a party conference or other event, or via a donation made to the party. In these circumstances, it seems perfectly reasonable for the party to reach out to that person again with direct marketing material, provided that the individual has not objected to receiving it. I reassure the Committee that no partisan advantage is intended via these measures.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, perhaps the Minister could elucidate exactly what is meant by “supporting the party’s objectives”. For instance, if we had a high street petition, would that be sufficient to grab their email address and start communicating with them?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I suppose it would depend on the petition and who was raising it. If it were a petition raised or an activity supported by a particular party, that would indicate grounds for a soft opt-in, but of course anyone choosing not to receive these things could opt out either at the time or later, on receipt of the first item of material.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

So what the Minister is saying is that the solicitor, if you like, who is asking you to sign this petition does not have to say, “Do you mind if I use your email address or if we communicate with you in future?” The person who is signing has to say, “By the way, I may support this local campaign or petition, but you’re not going to send me any emails”. People need to beware, do they not?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed. Many such petitions are of course initiated by charitable organisations or other not-for-profits and they would equally benefit from the soft opt-in rule, but anyone under any of those circumstances who wished not to receive those communications could opt out either at the time or on receipt of the first communication on becoming aware that they were due to receive these. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendments in relation to these provisions.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for digging and delving into the background of all this. That is helpful because, all the way through our previous debate, we kept saying, “We don’t understand why these provisions are here”. When the Minister in the Commons was challenged, he said, “We have no intention of using this; it’s just a general power that might be there for anyone to use”, but the noble Lord has put the lie to all that. It is clear that only one party wants to pursue this issue: the Conservative Party.

The Minister said that there is no partisan objective or reason for this but, to be honest, I do not know how he can say that. If only one party wants it and no one else does, then only one party is going to implement it. Without going over the whole of the previous debate, I think a lot of people felt that we as political parties have a lot to do to improve our relationships with the electorate and be seen to represent them on an honest and authentic basis.

This goes in the opposite direction. It is almost collecting data for one purpose and using it for a different one. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the Minister discussed the example of collecting information on a street stall; we have all done that a bit, in that you can put very generalised questions on a questionnaire which could then be used for all sorts of purposes.

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Moved by
212: Clause 116, page 145, line 14, leave out “with the day on which” and insert “when”
Member's explanatory statement
The amendment in my name to insert a new clause after clause 108 will apply the rules of interpretation in Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 to the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003. This amendment adjusts the language of new regulation 26A(3) of those Regulations to ensure that Article 3 is able to apply.
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Moved by
216: Clause 120, page 151, line 25, leave out “124” and insert “(Time periods: the eIDAS Regulation and the EITSET Regulations)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name to insert a new clause after clause 124.
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Moved by
217: After Clause 124, insert the following new Clause—
“Time periods: the eIDAS Regulation and the EITSET Regulations(1) In Chapter 1 of the eIDAS Regulation (general provisions), after Article 3 insert—“Article 3APeriods of timeReferences in this Regulation to a period expressed in hours, days, months or years are to be interpreted in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No. 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits.”(2) The Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016 (S.I. 2016/696) are amended as follows.(3) In regulation 2 (interpretation), at the end insert—“(3) References in these regulations to a period expressed in days or years are to be interpreted in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No. 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits.”(4) In Schedule 1 (monetary penalties)—(a) in paragraph 4(f), for the words from “a period” to the end substitute “the period of 21 days beginning when the notice of intent is served”,(b) in paragraph 5, for the words from “a period” to the end substitute “the period of 21 days beginning when the notice of intent is received”, and(c) in paragraph 6, for the words from “a period” to the end substitute “the period of 21 days beginning when the notice of intent is served”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the rules of interpretation in Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) to apply to Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services and to the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016.
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Baroness Sherlock Portrait Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Sikka for introducing their amendments. I also thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I will speak to Amendments 223, 299, 302 and 303 in my name. I should probably say at this point that I am late to this party but, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I am not a data protection specialist, I am afraid. However, I am a social security nerd, so I am here for this bit right now.

Since this is the first part of the Bill on DWP powers to tackle fraud, I need to add my little statement on the “fraud is bad” move. Fraud is a problem and has been getting worse across this Government. There have been scandals in procurement, of which the infamous PPE contracts are just one example. There is tax due that goes unpaid at scale and, in social security, the percentage of benefit expenditure lost to fraud has been rising under this Government. However, as my honourable friends made clear in the Commons, a Labour Government would take fraud seriously and pursue all those who seek to take money fraudulently or illegally from the state. They would also focus on helping people to avoid inadvertent overpayments rather than just waiting for them to make mistakes then coming down hard on them at that point. This should not need saying but, in some of the discussions on this Bill elsewhere, there has been a tendency to frame the debates rather along the lines of a classical fallacy: “Fraud is really bad. This will tackle fraud. Therefore, this must be really good”. I know that we are fortunate that in the Minister we have someone who is able to have a much more nuanced debate. I look forward to having exchanges in a way that recognises the important role of this House in scrutinising the powers that the Executive want to take unto themselves, which is exactly what Committees in the House of Lords do so well.

Scrutiny particularly matters here because, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend Lord Davies pointed out, all these amendments—more than 200 amendments, 38 new clauses and two new schedules—were introduced on Report in the Commons. My honourable friend Chris Bryant tried to recommit the Bill so that the Commons could discuss it, but the Government refused. The interesting thing is that in their anti-fraud plan back in May 2022, the Government announced that they planned to boost the DWP’s powers to get information from third parties when parliamentary time allowed. The noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, made a fair point that departments have to wait for the right Bill to come along in order to use it, but the Government have known about this since 2022. They have had two years to draft the amendments, so although they might have had to wait for the Bill to come along, that does not seem a good enough reason for them to have waited until Report in the Commons to deposit them into the process. I hope the Minister will be able to explain the reasons for that.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and others have asked some important questions about the scale on which these powers will be used; I am going to come back to that in our debate on the next group. It is hard to know the scale from the information we have so far, but DWP clearly does know, or has a sense of it, because paragraph 85 of the impact assessment states:

“Using our model to estimate volumes of hits for this measure, over the 10-year appraisal period, internal analysis has estimated that in total there will be an additional 74,000 prosecution cases, 2,500 custodial sentences and 23,000 applications for legal aid”.


It has modelled the volume of matching hits that would require investigation. Can the Minister tell the Committee what that number is? Also, what assurance can he give us that DWP has the resources to investigate that number of hits in a timely manner?

Paragraph 2 of new Schedule 3B says that the account information notices can only cover data going back a year and that they must be done in the week before they are given to DWP. Is there any time limit on how long DWP has to act on the results that have been handed over to it?

I turn now to the amendments in my name. Some of them are quite detailed because these powers are astonishingly wide and it is not at all clear how they could be used. I have deliberately tabled a series of amendments—in three groups in order to make sure that we have a chance to go into detail—to try to get information out of the Government and find out what this is about.

Amendment 223 is a minor probing amendment that would delete paragraph 3(1) of new Schedule 3B, which Schedule 11 to the Bill would insert into the 1992 Act. I will not rehearse it here but can the Minister explain what that provision is for and what its limits are? Neither I nor the people I have spoken to in financial services can understand why it is needed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others mentioned the fact that the Information Commissioner said he could not provide to Parliament his assurance that this measure is proportionate. My other amendments in this group are therefore designed to try to understand the impacts better. Amendment 302 would prevent these new powers coming into force automatically, while Amendment 303 would require the Secretary of State to fulfil several requirements before laying regulations to commence the powers. Amendment 299 is a minor consequential amendment. The effect of this is that the Secretary of State would have to issue a call for evidence, to inform the creation of the first code of practice, and consult relevant bodies. They would also have to lay before Parliament statements on key issues, of which I will highlight two.

The first would say whether and how AI will be used in exercising these powers, as well as how those proposals will take account of protected characteristics; this was touched on by my noble friend Lady Lister and others. That benefits often engage protected characteristics is in the nature of social security. Sickness and disability benefits engage disability, obviously; pensions engage age; benefits relating to children may engage age and also indirectly engage sex; and so on. The National Audit Office has warned that machine learning risks bias towards certain vulnerable groups and people with protected characteristics. So, what external governance or oversight is there to ensure that, once data are collected on the scale envisaged here, we do not end up with a mass breach of equality law?

The second issue I want to highlight concerns the provision that will be made to ensure that individuals subject to investigation do not experience hardship during it or lasting detriment afterwards. Given the comments of my noble friend Lady Lister about the cases from CPAG, can the Minister say whether a claimant’s benefits will be kept in payment while they are investigated following the data that are surfaced as a result of these trawls?

I am concerned that, given the potential scale of hits, a claimant who had, say, inadvertently breached the capital limit but then found themselves at the back of a long queue to be investigated could find themselves ending up paying back really large sums. The Minister will be aware of the recent media coverage, which others have mentioned, of how the DWP is treating people who were overpaid the carer’s allowance, a benefit that gives £81.90 a week to people providing at least 35 hours a week of unpaid care. It is a cliff-edge benefit—if your net earnings are under £150 a week, you get the lot; if they are over it, you get nothing—so a small rise in the minimum wage or a change in tax thresholds or rates can be enough to make someone entirely ineligible overnight, even if nothing changes in their circumstances.

As my noble friend Lady Lister said, apparently, DWP’s IT systems can flag when a carer’s income breaches the threshold but it does not necessarily do that, allowing them then to rack up potentially thousands of pounds’ worth of overpayments. The Guardian has investigated this issue; I shall mention two cases that it offered. First, an unpaid carer with a part-time charity job unknowingly breached the threshold by an average of £4.40 a week—£58 in total—caused by the automatic uprating of the national minimum wage. Because that left her not eligible for anything, she ended up being told to repay £1,715, including a civil penalty.

In the second example, a woman caring for her husband with dementia and Parkinson’s was told to repay nearly £4,000 for inadvertently exceeding the earnings threshold by calculating earnings from her zero-hours job on a monthly basis, as she thought the rules required, rather than a four-weekly basis, which they actually do; the rules around allowable costs and earnings are quite complicated. Crucially, according to the Guardian, she was told that, if she appealed, it could cost her even more. The Guardian quotes from a DWP letter telling her that, if she challenged the repayment order,

“the entire claim from the date it started will be looked at, which could potentially result in the overpayment increasing”.

Is that standard practice? Is DWP currently acting on all the alerts it receives of overpayments? If these powers are switched on, what safeguards will there be when that happens to protect millions of people from ending up paying back years of overpayments that DWP could have prevented?

Before embarking on investigations on this scale, we need to understand more about how this measure will work. We have had some excellent questions in Committee from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and others; I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Viscount Younger of Leckie) (Con)
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My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken today. I have been made well aware of the strong views expressed about this measure in Committee. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, for her kind remarks. She is right: I take all these matters extremely seriously. I have listened carefully to all the speeches, although I might not agree with them. Many questions have been asked. I will attempt to cover them all, of course; I doubt that I will be able to but I assure noble Lords that it is likely that a long letter will be required after this. Obviously, I will reflect on all the speeches made in Committee today.

I start by talking about the timing of the introduction of this measure. The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, said that the measure was introduced, in her words, “on the late side”. As she alluded to, the DWP published the Fraud Plan in May 2022, where it outlined a number of new powers that it would seek to secure when parliamentary time allowed. In answer to her question and others, in the parliamentary time available, the DWP has prioritised our key third-party data-gathering measure, which will help it tackle one of the largest causes of fraud and error in the welfare system. We will not sit back and ignore an opportunity to bring down these unacceptable losses and better protect taxpayers’ money. I will expand on all of that later in my remarks.

Before attending to the themes raised and addressing the amendments, it is important to set out the context for the power for which we are legislating. Fraud is a serious and damaging UK-wide issue, accounting for more than 40% of all crime. To be fair, many speeches alluded to that. The welfare system is also a target for fraudsters, and we are seeing increasingly sophisticated attacks occur on a scale that we have not seen in the past. We all have our own experiences at home of fraudsters who try completely different methods, not linked to the benefits system at all, to try to gain money through ill-gotten uses and methods.

In 2022-23, the DWP paid out more than £230 billion in benefits and payments to people across Great Britain. I very much took note of the figure that my noble friend Lady Buscombe raised. I say to the Committee that this figure is forecast to rise to nearly £300 billion by 2024-25, in quite short order, so this is a really serious issue to address. However, more than £8 billion has been overpaid in each of the past three years because of deliberate fraud against the state or because genuine errors have been made.

To assist the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to whose speech I listened carefully, fraud, not error, is the biggest cause of welfare overpayments, totalling £6.4 billion of the £8.3 billion overpaid last year. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also asked about the figures. These losses are largely because people are intentionally and knowingly taking money that they are not entitled to. This is not organised fraud either; the vast majority comes from individuals who are not entitled to the money. We cannot underestimate the lengths to which some will go in order to take money they are not entitled to or promote ways to defraud us to a wider audience. This new legislation is not just about protecting the taxpayer; it will help those who make genuine mistakes in their claim, and our swift action will avoid them building up large overpayments.

Some people have said that the department has the powers that it needs to fight fraud and error—I think that was alluded to even today. However, some of the current powers that we have to ensure benefit correctness are over 20 years old—a point that I think my noble friend Lady Buscombe made. In this time, fraud has evolved and become increasingly sophisticated and we must keep pace with the fraudsters. It is for this reason that the Government are bringing these new third-party data powers, as set out, as said earlier, in the fraud plan.

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Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
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I apologise for interrupting, but can the Minister show us in the Bill where those restrictions on the information that can be requested reside? As I read it, as I mentioned to the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, paragraph 2(1) of new Schedule 3B, as inserted by Schedule 11 of the Bill, is pretty wide when it refers to

“names of holders … other specified information relating to the holders … and … such further information in connection with those accounts as may be specified”.

So it appears that the DWP can ask for whatever it wants, rather than what the Minister just described.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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That is a fair challenge and I will certainly be coming on to that. I have in my speech some remarks and a much more limited reassurance for the noble Lord.

It is only when there is a signal of potential fraud or error that the DWP may undertake a further review, using our business-as-usual processes and existing powers—an important point. DWP will not share any personal information with third parties under this power, and only very limited data on accounts that indicate a potential risk of fraud or error will be shared with DWP in order to identify a claimant on our system. As I said earlier, I will say more about the limited aspects of this later in my remarks.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but will he be coming on to explain what these signals are? He is almost coming to a mid-point between innocence and suspicion called “signals”—is this a new concept in law? What are we talking about and where in all of Schedule 11 is the word “signal”?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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If the noble Lord will allow me, I would like to make some progress and I hope that this will come out in terms of what we may be seeking on a limited basis.

The first third parties that we will designate will be banks and other financial institutions, as the Committee is aware. We know that they hold existing data that will help to independently verify key eligibility factors for benefits.

This clause does not give DWP access to any bank accounts—a very important point—nor will it allow DWP to monitor how people spend their money or to receive sensitive information, such as medical records or data on opinions or beliefs.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, mentioned—I want to try to answer one of her questions—this power cannot be used to suspend someone’s benefit. Cases that are flagged must be reviewed under existing processes and powers—business as usual, which I mentioned earlier—to determine whether incorrect payments are being made.

Our approach is not new. HMRC has long been using powers to request data at scale from banks on all taxpayers under Schedule 23 to the Finance Act 2011. Our approach carries similar safeguards. Tax fraud is no different from welfare fraud and should be treated similarly. This was a key point that the Prime Minister made only on Friday when he committed to bring DWP’s fraud and error powers more in line with those of HMRC. This is one clear area where we are seeking to do this.

This allows me to go on to very important points about safeguards. Not all the cases found through this power will be fraud. Some will be errors which the power will help to correct, preventing overpayment debt building up. Some cases may also have legitimate reasons for seemingly not meeting eligibility requirements, for example where claimants have certain compensation payments that are disregarded for benefit eligibility rules. In those cases, no further action will be taken. Our robust business-as-usual processes will ensure that all cases are dealt with appropriately.

Another question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on safeguards was to do with the legislation. A key safeguard is that we cannot approach any third party either; there must be a three-way relationship with the department, the claimant and the third party. This safeguard will narrow the use of this power substantially and ensure that it is used proportionately, as these three-way relationships are limited, meaning that data cannot be gathered at scale from just any source for any purpose. Any third party we will want to get data from will need to be designated in affirmative regulations that noble Lords will have an opportunity to scrutinise. These regulations will be accompanied by a code of practice. We will be bringing that forward, and we will consult on the code before presenting it to Parliament—which answers a question raised by, I think, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.

The power also ensures that we can request only very limited data on benefit recipients. I think this addresses a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. We must work with key third parties to define what is shared, but our expectation is that this would be a name and date of birth or a unique payment number, along with the eligibility criteria someone has matched against: for example, a benefit claimant who has more savings than the benefit rules would normally allow.

Outside controls will apply here, too. DWP already handles vast amounts of data, including personal data, and must adhere to the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018.

On the point, which again was raised during this debate, about the remarks made by the Information Commissioner’s Office and its updated report on this measure, published as Committee started and which the Committee may be aware of, I was pleased to see that the commissioner now acknowledges that the third-party data measure is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, stating:

“I understand and recognise the scale of the problem with benefit fraud and error that government is seeking to address and accept that the measure is in pursuit of a legitimate aim. I am not aware of any alternative, less intrusive, means of achieving the government’s stated policy intent based on their analysis”.


I think that is a significant point to make, and it is a point with which I very strongly agree.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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It is also worth pointing out that the paragraph I quoted follows immediately on that. That is the qualification that I quoted.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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Yes, I am aware of that. I think the noble Lord was alluding to the point about proportionality. I listened carefully and took note of that, but do not entirely agree with it. I hope that I can provide further reassurances, if not now then in the coming days and weeks. The point is that there is no other reasonable way to independently verify claimants’ eligibility for the payment that they are receiving.

I turn to the amendments raised, starting with the stand part notice from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. They and my noble friend Lord Kamall, who is not in his place, interestingly, all made their case for removing the clause, of which I am well aware. However, for the reasons that I just set out, this clause should stand part of the Bill.

In raising her questions, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made some comparisons with HMRC. There are appropriate safeguards in place for this data-gathering power, which will be included in the code of practice. The safeguards for this measure will be equivalent to those in place for the similar HMRC power which Parliament approved in the Finance Act 2011.

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
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When might we see the code of practice? It would be extremely helpful to see it before Report, as that might short-cut some of these discussions.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I will need to get back to the noble Lord on that, but perhaps can reassure him that it is already being worked on. You can imagine that, because of the sensitivity of these powers, we are working very carefully on this and making sure that it will be fit for purpose.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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Can we see the draft code of practice before Report?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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That is part of the answer that I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which I think is a fair point.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked about the code of practice and what steps my department will take to ensure transparency and accountability in the exercise of these powers if they are implemented. In the primary legislation, we will make provision to publish the code of practice, which will set out general guidance on how the third-party data power will work, as I have mentioned. We will develop the code of practice with relevant third parties and it will be consulted on publicly before being laid in Parliament. We will explain what the expectation is for data holders and ensure full compliance for the DWP. This will provide assurance that we will operate transparently and mirror the approach that we have taken with other DWP powers. Any changes to the code of practice, other than minor changes, will also be done in consultation with stakeholders.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, stated that the power was too broad and the gist of one of her questions was that there is no need for all these benefits to be in scope. As the noble Baroness has demonstrated, there is a wide range of benefits and therefore potential avenues for fraudsters to seek to exploit or for error to creep in. That is why it is important that the power enables the department to respond proactively, as new fraud risks emerge.

That said, as the noble Baroness knows, the power will not be exercisable in all the benefits that she listed, such as child benefit, because the legislation is drafted in such a way that it could reasonably be exercised only in relation to benefits for which the Secretary of State is responsible. I reassure the Committee that using Section 121DA of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 is a consistent approach that we take to defining benefits in this way to safeguard all existing legislation and account for a benefit being, for example, renamed or amended. It should be stressed that the listing of a benefit does not mean that this power can or will be exercised upon it. The conditions in the third-party data legislation must still apply, and therefore not all benefits will be subject to this measure. That is a very important point.

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Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
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I would be convinced about the Government’s intentions, and would not press this amendment at the next stage, if the Minister can name just one big accounting firm which since 2010, as a result of a court judgment that said it was selling unlawful tax avoidance schemes, has been investigated, fined or prosecuted. If he can give me such an example then I will be convinced that the Government are seriously tackling tax fraud and its enablers.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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The noble Lord has set me quite a challenge at the Dispatch Box. It is out of scope of today’s session but, having said that, I will reflect on his question afterwards.

I am aware that time is marching on. My noble friend Lord Kamall asked about burdens on banks. We believe that the burdens on banks will be relatively low.

The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, made a number of points; I may have to write to her to expand on what I am about to say. Removing the requirement for third parties to provide legible copies of information means that DWP could receive the information but there is a risk that the information is not usable; that is my answer to her points. This could limit the data that DWP receives and prevent us utilising the power in full, which could in turn impact the savings due to be realised from this important measure.

I turn to the final amendments in this group, which were raised by the noble Baroness. They would place requirements on the Secretary of State to issue statements in the House and consult on the code of practice. We will talk more about the code of practice later on in this debate, and I have already made clear my firm opinions on it: we will take it forward and are already working on it. There will be a consultation that will, of course, allow anybody with an interest in this to give their views.

I turn to the number of statements that must be made in the House regarding the practical use of the measures before powers can commence, such as the role that artificial intelligence will play or assurances on any outsourcing of subsequent investigations. This is an important point to make and was raised by other Peers. I want to make it clear that this measure will be rolled out carefully and slowly through a “test and learn” approach from 2025, in conjunction with key third parties. To make these statements in the House would pre-empt the crucial “test and learn” period. I say again that discussions with the third parties are deep and detailed and we are already making progress; this point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the link with banks and third parties.

Importantly, I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, that we will not make any automated decisions off the back of this power; this was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. The final decision must and will always involve a human being—a human agent in these cases—and any signals of potential fraud or error will be looked at comprehensively. I am grateful for the remarks of my noble friend Lady Buscombe on this matter.

I know that I have not answered a number of questions. Perhaps I can do so in our debate on another group; otherwise, I certainly wish to answer them fully in a letter. I hope that I have explained clearly, from our perspective, why this power is so important; why it is the right power to take; and how we have carefully designed it, and continue to design it, with the key safeguards in mind. I strongly value the input from all those who have contributed today but I remain unconvinced that the proposed amendments are necessary and strengthen the power beyond the clear safeguards I have set out. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her opposition to Clause 128.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I may have missed something, but can I just check that the Minister will deal with the matter of signals, which he mentioned at the beginning of his response? Will he deal with where that phrase comes from, what they are, whether they will be in the code, et cetera? There are a lot of questions around that. Does it amount to actual suspicion?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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Absolutely; I am keen to make sure that I answer on that. It may be possible to do so in the next group but, if not, I will certainly do so in the form of a precise letter—added to the larger letter that I suspect is coming the noble Lord’s way.

Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
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A number of pensioner groups are watching these proceedings. I have received some messages. They are asking, “When is the Minister going to answer the questions asked about the operation of the surveillance of recipients of the state pension, especially those who have foreign accounts?” I assume that the Minister will clarify that in any subsequent letter to me.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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Absolutely; the noble Lord will know that I have not managed to answer all the questions. I have tried to bring in everybody on this important and serious debate. The answers will be forthcoming.

Baroness Buscombe Portrait Baroness Buscombe (Con)
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I thank my noble friend very much for all the explanation that he has given thus far. I just want to add a word that has not been mentioned: deterrent. One of the reasons why the Government have sought to introduce this in the Bill, I believe, is that it is hugely important that we are much more thoughtful about what will stop people doing the wrong thing. It has become an old-fashioned word but, from a legal, practical and moral standpoint, does my noble friend agree that this is a practical deterrent to make sure that people do the right thing?

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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Is it not one of the dangers that this is a deterrent to people claiming these benefits?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I have a response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about signals. The signal is where the criteria or rules for benefit eligibility appear not to be met, and Parliament will have agreed those rules.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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My Lords, the Committee will be grateful to hear, I hope, that I will not try to capture such a rich conversation. I thank the Minister for his careful listening and consideration. I will read carefully what was said at the Dispatch Box and what is about to be said during our discussion on the next two groupings because, without seeing all that in the round, I cannot truthfully say whether the questions asked by noble Lords have been answered.

I share a little of the concern that I can see agitating the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the words “signals”, “criteria” and “codes”, which are not promised in the Bill but are suddenly appearing. Indeed, the Minister will remember that, in a private meeting, we talked about how those criteria might be gamed and, therefore, how detailed they could possibly be. There may still be some differences of opinion, and possibly differences of practice, that need to be worked out.

Of course, for now, I will not press my opposition to Clause 128 standing part. I welcome further conversation between now and Report but, I have to say, I lost count of the number of times noble Lords have said “proportionate” in this debate and how many times the issues of scope, sweeping powers and so on were stated by some very expert people—both in and outside of this Room, not simply noble Lords.

The noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, mentioned a pilot but I seem to remember that some of the outcomes on equality in that pilot got lost in translation. Perhaps it would be good to find out exactly what the pilot did and did not reveal—that is, not just the things that the department would like to reveal but some of the things that were not tested.

I do not doubt the personal integrity of the Minister in the slightest but I am unsure about the idea that the “test and learn” approach has no boundaries around it in the Bill. It is like saying, “Trust us. We test and learn, and all those powers exist”. With that, I will withdraw my stand part notice on Clause 128, but we have quite a lot of questions still to answer in our discussions on the next group of amendments and beyond.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I would of course much prefer Clause 128 not to stand part, but we were just privileged by a master class from the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. She talked about these being probing amendments, but I do not think that I have seen a schedule so expertly sliced and diced before. If those are probing, they are pretty lethal. I agree with so many of those elements. If we are to have provisions, those are the kinds of additions that we would want and the questions that we would want to ask about them. I very much hope that the Minister has lots of answers, especially for the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, but also for the other noble lords who have spoken.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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My Lords, the debate on this group has focused largely on the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, regarding using powers only where there is a suspicion of fraud, making provisions so that information collected can be used only for the narrow purpose of determining overpayment, removing pension-age benefits from the scope of the powers and requiring approval from Parliament before the power can be used on specific working-age benefits.

I was going to go over the reason behind these measures once again, but I will not delay the Committee on why we are bringing them forward. I believe I did that at some length in the previous group, so I am going to turn to the amendments raised.

Narrowing these powers as suggested by the noble Baroness, with Amendments 220, 221, 222 and 222A, will leave us exposed to those who are deliberately aiming to defraud the welfare system and undermine the policy intent of this measure. In fact, taken together, these amendments would render the power unworkable and ineffective.

To restrict the power to cases where DWP already has a suspicion of fraud, as suggested by the noble Baroness, would defeat the purpose of this measure. The intent is to enable us to use data from third parties to independently check that benefit eligibility rules are being complied with. We use data from other sources to do this already. For example, we use data from HMRC to verify earnings in UC and check that the benefit eligibility rules are being complied with. Parliament has determined that, to be eligible for a benefit, certain rules and requirements must be met, and the Government have a responsibility to ensure that taxpayers’ money is spent responsibly. Therefore, the DWP should be able to utilise information from third parties to discharge that duty. This is an appropriate and proportionate response to a significant fraud and error challenge.

The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, also proposed that the power should be restricted such that it would not apply to persons who hold an account into which a benefit is paid on behalf of someone who cannot manage their own financial affairs—such persons are referred to as “appointees”. An appointee is a person who may be appointed by the Secretary of State to act on behalf of the benefit customer. Usually, the appointee becomes legally responsible for acting on the customer’s behalf in all matters related to the claim. It is also made clear to the appointee, in the documents that they sign, that we may get information about them or the person they are acting for from other parties, or for any other purposes that the law allows, to check the information they provide.

Under our proposed legislation, it is right to say that there may be some people who are not themselves benefit claimants but who have given a person permission to pay benefits into their bank account, who may be picked up in the data returned by third parties. Under the noble Baroness’s amendment, we would not be able to gather data on appointees, which would make the power unworkable, because third parties would not be able to distinguish between an individual managing their own benefit and an appointee. It also assumes that no fraud or error can occur in these cases, which is definitely wrong. I assure the noble Baroness that we handle such cases regularly and have robust existing processes for identifying appointees on our own database and for carefully handling cases of this nature.

The noble Baroness would also like to see the power—

Baroness Sherlock Portrait Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
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Rather than asking all my questions at the end—I only have four—I will try to get answers as we go. On the appointees, I think that the Minister has just said that the reason the Government need these powers is that some appointees will have their benefit money paid into their own account, not into a separate second account, so that therefore needs to be the case. I am very happy to reword this amendment to make that clear. I was talking specifically about the linking arrangements; the amendment does not talk about excluding appointee accounts. It specifically says that accounts that are linked to an account into which the benefit is paid are not there. I am happy to reframe that in a way that defines it—I am sure we can find a way around this—but does the Minister accept the principle behind this: that, if there is a separate account that, say, I hold for a child who is there, this should not give a reason to look into my own accounts? Or is he saying that the Government want to look into my own accounts, or business accounts, or family accounts as well? Which is it?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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The Government do wish to have that power. I should make it clear that an appointee could be a claimant as well, so there is a dual issue. It is important that we retain that power, to be sure that we cover the whole ground. But I will reflect on the noble Baroness’s point.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

There were a number of questions on the other group that related specifically to people’s willingness to take these roles on and what the unintended consequence of putting appointees and carers in this position might be for the DWP, with people saying, “Actually, not me, then”.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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The noble Baroness makes a very good point. I may be able to give her further reassurances in a letter because, on the one hand, we do want the power to be able to cover the ground. On the other hand, there are necessary protections that we must put in place. So further reassurances probably need to be given. There is that balance to be struck, but I hope I can continue to do that.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If I may pursue this, I am not sure I heard the Minister’s answer to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—or maybe I did. If it was a charitable bank account, a business account or anything else, I think the Minister said that it would be subject to that scrutiny as well. Once someone acts for a carer, all of their bank accounts could be scrutinised—surely that is ridiculously unfair.

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Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not sure I agree with that. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness, as I tried to on the previous group. Using our test and learn process, which is already under way working closely with the banks, bringing them along with us and them bringing us along with them—there is a good relationship there—we are working through these important matters.

The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is important, as is that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Again, it is important to give those reassurances. They will be forthcoming, and that is all part of our test and learn process, which I hope provides some reassurance.

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
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I want to be absolutely clear on this point, because I am still not totally sure I am—I raised this the first time around on the last group. If I, as a landlord, have been paid rent as housing benefit directly, my accounts are caught. If I am a trustee of a charity and a cosignatory on a bank account, is the Minister saying that that charity’s account will be caught or not? I want to be absolutely crystal clear on that.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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This is part of the filtering discussions that are already taking place at the moment.

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Under the terms of the Bill, would this allow that to be caught?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes it would. Landlords are in scope. We will filter this through in terms of the business as usual. If we receive any information—

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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Given that, has the department done an assessment of the likely impact on landlords being willing to take people on housing benefit? It is already an issue that landlords are reluctant to take housing benefit recipients, but, with this, I could see the market completely freezing for people on benefit.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I clearly cannot go far enough today, but, because this is important and we are in Committee, I need to give some further reassurances on where we are in the process in terms of filtering. If I may conclude my remarks, I will finish this particular point. This is all part of the test and learn, and I give some reassurance that we are working through these important issues in relation to appointees and landlords.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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It is precisely as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said on the last group—this is a massive net. It feels as though this is so experimental that there is no certainty about how it will operate, and the powers are so broad that anything could be subject to it. It sounds extremely dangerous, and it is no wonder that everybody is so concerned.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I do not agree with that. We have done quite a lot of business together across the Chamber. That is a slightly sweeping issue, because I have given some reassurance that we are already working with the third parties to make sure that we have robust processes in place. For instance, when we are talking about landlords, while it is possible that a landlord’s account may be matched under the measure, only minimum information will be provided by the third parties to enable my department to identify an individual within our own database. With all the data received, we will make further inquiries only where appropriate and where the information is relevant to the benefit claim. This is already part of our business-as-usual processes.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but, throughout these two groups, he has, in a sense, introduced wholly new concepts. We have “test and learn”, “filtering”—which sounds extraordinary—and “signals” but none seem to be in the black letter of the schedule, nor in the rest of the Bill. We have a set of intentions and we are meant to trust what the DWP is doing with these powers. Does the Minister not recognise that the Committee is clearly concerned about this? It needs tying down, whether we need to start from scratch and get rid of the clause or take on board the amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. The uncertainty around this is massive.

--- Later in debate ---
Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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Right. A number of questions have been asked. I am not sure that I can give too much more clarity—only that I will go back to what I said on the first group in terms of the limited nature of what we are trying to do. I was very clear about its limited nature, I think.

This leads on to the numbers that noble Lords are asking me about. Of course, I cannot give that figure, as we do not honestly know it. Until we move forward on bringing the measure in, we will not know it. What is certain is that we need this power to be able to gain the limited data that we need. When we receive the data, it may be the case that we need to follow up. I am sure that we will not need to follow up in the vast majority of cases but we must have this power.

To the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I say this: this measure is for UK accounts only. I hope that that is also helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett.

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
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This is the problem. We have been talking about limited information, a limited nature and the limited things that we will look at, but that is not what the Bill says. We need to think seriously about how we should limit the rights in the Bill to match the requirements of the DWP. At the moment, there seems to be a huge gap.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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That point is very much noted. I will certainly take it back. Clearly, we need to provide greater reassurance on the limits and scope, as well as on what we are trying to do. I regret that I am not able to give those answers in full to the Committee now but I hope that, today, I have already taken us further forward than we were before we started. That is quite an important point to make.

I shall touch on the benefits that are in scope of this measure, a point that was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. I think the noble Baroness wishes to restrict the power to working-age benefits, but pension-age benefits are not immune to fraud and error—I wanted to address that—and it is our duty to ensure that these benefits are paid correctly and in line with the benefit eligibility rules that Parliament has previously agreed. Every payment that the DWP makes has eligibility criteria to it. Parliament has considered these criteria in the passage of the relevant social security legislation, and the Government have a responsibility to check that payments are being made in line with those rules so that taxpayers’ money is spent responsibly.

Lord Davies of Brixton Portrait Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
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Pension benefits other than pension credit have eligibility criteria attached, but I do not know any eligibility criteria applying to pensions that you could discover from someone’s bank account.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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The example that the noble Lord will be aware of links to what the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was saying about some pensioners who have moved abroad but, for whatever reason, have not told us that they have done so and continue to receive the uprating. The figure for the fraud aspect—or it could be error—linked to state pensions is £100 million.

Lord Davies of Brixton Portrait Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
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Presumably the DWP already knows the address of the bank account to which an overseas pension is being paid. Why does it need to know any more?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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My understanding is that it needs to have these powers to be able to cover the ground properly. I say again that these powers are limited, and whatever comes from the data that is requested from the third parties will end up being, we hope, limited. Even then, it may not be used by us because there is no need to do so.

The power covers all relevant benefits, grants and other payments set out in paragraph 16 of new Schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992, as inserted by Schedule 11 to the Bill. To remove pension-age payments from the scope of the power would significantly undermine our power to tackle fraud and error where it occurs. Pension-age payments are not immune to fraud and error, as I have mentioned. I will give an example of that. The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, asked whether people would be notified of their bank accounts being accessed.

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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Before the Minister moves on, I asked specifically about child benefit. Could he please answer that?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I know that I said earlier that child benefit was not included. I will clarify that child benefit is not a benefit for which the DWP is responsible or has any functionality for. This measure will be exercised by the DWP Secretary of State, and we cannot use this power for that benefit.

I was in the middle of answering a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I will finish this answer, if I may. The DWP personal information charter lists banks and financial institutions, and other parties, among the parties with which DWP may share data and from which we may receive data. It also lists checking accuracy and preventing and detecting fraud among the purposes for which we may share or receive information.

A claimant will not be notified if their account details have been returned to DWP by a third party as that could alert fraudsters to the criteria, enabling them to evade detection—I think that is a valid point—but they will be notified if a DWP agent determines that a review is required as a result of the information provided by the third party. That notification will be done through the business-as-usual processes.

Moving on to defining working-age payments in legislation, which relates to the final amendment in this group, Amendment 235, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, it would require the Government to specify in regulations the working-age benefits with which this power could be used. As she demonstrated, there is a wide range of benefits and therefore potential avenues for fraudsters to seek or exploit or for error to creep in. That is why it is important that the power enables the department to respond proactively as new fraud risks emerge.

That said, as the noble Baroness knows, the power will not be exercisable in all the benefits she listed—I took note of her long list—such as child benefit, which we have just mentioned, because the legislation is drafted in such a way that it could reasonably be exercised in relation to benefits for which the Secretary of State is responsible. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, and the Committee that in the first instance, we plan to use this with universal credit, employment and support allowance—ESA, pension credit and housing benefit. That is the way forward.

There may be a number of questions that I have not addressed, but I hope that I have continued to make the case for why this measure is so important and our aim to tackle fraud and error. I continue to make the case that it is proportionate and that proportionate safeguards are in place. With that, I hope the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will people with power of attorney over the account of someone who receives a benefit also be caught up in all this? That is another vulnerable group, so this could be extensive and quite worrying. Secondly, I am concerned by the Minister’s answers on this group. They have made me feel somewhat more strongly than I did when giving my response on the previous group, so I feel I should put that on the record.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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That is understood. I know that I need to provide further reassurances. Attorneys are included for the reasons that I set out for appointees.

Baroness Sherlock Portrait Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for taking the time to try to answer the questions. I know that we have given him a hard time, but I thank him for responding so graciously.

He did not take the opportunity to explain the process simply to the Committee. It may be that it is too difficult to explain simply or that, in fact, he can explain what they intend to do, but the powers allow them to do something much wider than that. It would be helpful if he could reflect before he writes as to how best to frame this. I think I heard him trying to say to the Committee that people think that more information is being handed over than will in fact be handed over. If that is the case, it would be helpful if he could spell that out because that would at least begin to help people understand better what is going on.

Secondly, in responding to me, the Minister focused, understandably, on the content of the amendments. I was trying to explain that the reason they are probing is that it is quite hard to get a handle on this. It is a big, sprawly thing, and I am trying to find a way of nailing some jelly to the table; I am trying to find ways of containing it. I still do not know which benefits the Government can use the powers over and which ones they intend to. It is a great step forward to know where they are going to start; that is really helpful. I am also grateful for the clarity, whether people are happy or not, that the Government intend to use the powers on the state pension and make that clear because that was not the impression given in the House of Commons when the matter was debated there. That is a helpful piece of clarity for the Committee and the wider community.

I know this is hard; fraud is difficult. A case was mentioned where an organised fraud gang stole more than £50 million in social security benefits. I know it is hard, and I know it is hard for the DWP to understand precisely where these things will lead when you begin to go there. I understand that if it is too boxed in, it makes it difficult to be able to follow where the fraudsters go, who are often one step ahead of the Government. I get all of that, but there is a risk that when it has spread so widely, the level of concern gets to the point that it will not be as publicly acceptable as the Minister thinks it is. I ask him to take the opportunity, when he goes back to the department, to talk to colleagues and think about what kind of assurances the Government could try to find a way of giving to people, either staging processes or government oversight. I ask him to think about that because the kinds of concerns he has heard here will only increase as the powers start to unfold.

In the next group of amendments, which I think will now be discussed on Wednesday, I want to dig further into the question of who the data and account notice can be given to and what criteria will be used. That will be another chance to flush out some things, so I give notice now that I would like the Minister to look into those areas next. I am grateful for his efforts and to all Members of the Committee who have explored this matter. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

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Committee stage
Wednesday 24th April 2024

(4 days, 11 hours ago)

Grand Committee
Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 30-VII Seventh marshalled list for Grand Committee - (23 Apr 2024)

This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 passage through Parliament.

In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.

This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, it has been a privilege to be at the ringside during these three groups. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, is well ahead on points and that, when we last left the Minister, he was on the ropes, so I hope that to avoid the knock- out he comes up with some pretty good responses today, especially as we have been lucky enough to have the pleasure of reading Hansard between the second and third groups. I think the best phrase that noble Baroness had was the “astonishing breadth” of Clause 128 and Schedule 11 that we explored with horror last time. I very much support what she says.

The current provisions seem to make the code non-mandatory, yet we discovered they are without “reasonable suspicion”, the words that are in the national security legislation—fancy having the Home Office as our model in these circumstances. Does that not put the DWP to shame? If we have to base best practice on the Home Office, we are in deep trouble.

That aside, we talked about “filtering” and “signals” last time. The Minister used that phrase twice, I think, and we discovered about “test and learn”. Will all that be included in the code?

All this points to the fragility and breadth of this schedule. It has been dreamt up in an extraordinarily expansive way without considering all the points that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has mentioned, including the KC’s opinion, all of which point to the fact that this schedule is going to infringe Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I hope the Minister comes up with some pretty good arguments.

My final question relates to the impact assessment–or non-impact assessment. The Minister talked about the estimate of DWP fraud, which is £6.4 billion. What does the DWP estimate it will be after these powers are implemented, if they are ever implemented? Should we not have an idea of the DWP’s ambitions in this respect?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Viscount Younger of Leckie) (Con)
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My Lords, this has been a somewhat shorter debate than we have been used to, bearing in mind Monday’s experience. As with the first two groups debated then, many contributions have been made today and I will of course aim to answer as many questions as I can. I should say that, on this group, the Committee is primarily focusing on the amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, and I will certainly do my very best to answer her questions.

From the debate that we have had on this measure, I believe that there is agreement in the Committee that we must do more to clamp down on benefit fraud. That is surely something on which we can agree. In 2022-23, £8.3 billion was overpaid due to fraud and error in the benefit system. We must tackle fraud and error and ensure that benefits are paid to those genuinely entitled to the help. These powers are key to ensuring that we can do this.

I will start by answering a question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—I welcome him to the Committee for the first time today. He described himself as a “surveillance nerd”, but perhaps I can entreat him to rename himself a “data-gathering nerd”. As I said on Monday, this is not a surveillance power and suggesting that it is simply causes unnecessary worry. This is a power that enables better data gathering; it is not a surveillance or investigation power.

The third-party data measure does not allow the DWP to see how claimants spend their money, nor does it give the DWP access to millions of people’s bank accounts, as has been inaccurately presented. When the DWP examines the data that it receives from third parties, this data may suggest that there is fraud or error and require a further review. This will be done through our normal, regular, business-as-usual processes to determine whether incorrect payments are indeed being made. This approach is not new. As alluded to in this debate, through the Finance Act 2011, Parliament has already determined that this type of power is proportionate and appropriate, as HMRC already owns similar powers regarding banking institutions and third parties in relation to all taxpayers.

I listened very carefully to the noble Lord and will, however, take back his points and refer again to our own legal team. I think the point was made about the legality of all this. It is a very important point that he has made with all his experience, and I will take it back and reflect on it.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
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I take the Minister’s point and I will settle for the appellation “investigatory powers nerd”; I am quite happy with that. Does the Minister agree with me, however, that the legal difficulty —we see this with the other bulk powers already in our law—is that Article 8 of the European convention locks in not when a human eye gets stuck into the detail, but as soon as a machine harvests the data in bulk? Most of that data relates to people in respect of whom there could be no possible suspicion. Satisfying the requirements of necessity and proportionality must be done even at that stage. I understand that that is awkward and I am sure a lot of people would prefer that it was otherwise, but that is, as I understand it, the law. That renders the distinction that the Minister seeks to draw between data gathering and surveillance perhaps slightly difficult to maintain.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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If I may just answer that question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson; I think it is important to take one question at a time.

I have every sympathy with what the noble Lord has said. As I mentioned on Monday, points could easily raised about that—I think it may have been the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who raised points about computers and their robustness. This is the very point that we agree with. It is incredibly important and we have started already to draw up a proper code of practice to work with the banks on how this will actually work. We need continued time to work these issues through. I also made the point on Monday that, at the end of the day, a human being will be there—must be there—to determine where we go from there.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
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In relation to the code of practice, which I am glad the Minister mentioned, we have just seen the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill through this place. It makes some relatively minor changes to the powers of the intelligence agencies to harvest data in bulk and, to ensure the orderly passage of that Bill through both Houses of Parliament, the key excerpts of the draft code of practice were made available before Committee in either House to enable it to be properly scrutinised. We seem to have left it terribly late in the day still to be talking about a draft code of practice on this Bill, which we have not even seen. Can the Minister assure us that before we come to Report, that code of practice will be available in draft?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed, I was going to come on to that later in my remarks, particularly to address the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. We need the necessary time to continue to develop this code of practice, and that is particularly important in respect of this measure. The answer is no, I cannot guarantee to have the code of practice ready by Report. Indeed, I am saying that it will be ready sometime in the summer. It is important to make that point but also a further one, which is that there are many instances, as the noble Lord will know, when a code of practice is finalised and brought forward after the primary legislation is brought through, and this is one of those cases. That is not abnormal but normal. The noble Lord may not like it but there is considerable precedent for that to happen.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have a question. I am slightly puzzled about the difference between data collection and surveillance. Surely the collection and gathering of data would be to enable officials to survey someone’s bank account. If that is not the case, what is the purpose of collecting the data if not to interrogate the behaviour of an individual to understand how their money is being brought in and spent, so that the department can exercise some judgment over whether the individual is revealing the truth about their income and outgoings?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed, I think we are going back to the debates that we had on Monday. However, this chimes with a question from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, so it might be helpful briefly to rehearse what we are doing here and to be clear about the limitations and the checks and balances on the power that we are bringing forward.

As per paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 11 to the draft legislation, the DWP can use this power only for the purposes of checking whether someone is eligible for the benefit that they are receiving. In practice, this means that the DWP will request information only on specific criteria, which I laid out on Monday, linked to benefit eligibility rules, which, if met may—I emphasise “may”—indicate fraud or error. If accounts do not match these criteria, no data will be shared with the DWP. The effect of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft legislation is that the DWP can ask for data only where there is this three-way relationship between the DWP, the third party and the recipient of the payment. In addition, the DWP can ask for data only from third parties designated in secondary legislation, subject to the affirmative procedure. There are debates to come as further reassurance to your Lordships.

As per paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 11 to the draft legislation, the power does not allow the DWP to share personal information with third parties, which means that the power can be used only with third parties who are able to identify benefit recipients independently. Just to add further to this, we are obliged, under Article 5(1)(c) of the UK GDPR, to ask only for the minimum of information to serve our purposes. In accordance with the DWP’s existing commitments on the use of automation, no automatic benefit decisions will be taken based on any information supplied by third parties to the DWP. As I said earlier and on Monday, a human will always be involved in decision-making. I hope that helps.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Portrait Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
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I am sorry to interrupt the noble Viscount, but I just want to be clear about what he is saying in relation to the code of practice, which obviously is at the heart of this section of the debate, although there will be other things to come. Am I right that he said—obviously he has to cover himself—that there is a chance that the Report stage of this Bill might be entered into before we have sight of the draft code of practice? He makes the point that that is not an unusual occasion. I understand that—we have both served in Parliament long enough to know that that is the case—but this is clearly an issue on which the Committee has made very strong representations to the Government. Will he do what is in his power to make sure that we do not enter Report without seeing at least an early draft, if that is possible, of the code of practice?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will certainly take that back. I do not want to make any commitments today. I have already set out our stall as to where we are. I make the further point—I am perhaps repeating myself—that given the sensitivities that there clearly are, which I have been listening to carefully, it is important that this code of practice is developed at a pace that is right for what is needed, in bringing those involved along and making sure that it is right, secure, safe and with all the safeguards involved. It is quite a serious piece of work, as noble Lords would expect me to say. I will take that back. I will certainly not be able to guarantee to produce anything before Report, which may disappoint the noble Lord, but at least I have gone as far as I can. I hope that that is helpful.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Portrait Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
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I am grateful to the noble Viscount. This is just a thought, but we are happy to help, as we often have done in the past on other Bills. If there is any opportunity for us to be shown early drafts, to give some help and assurance to the noble Viscount that he is on the right track, I am sure that that would be accepted.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I appreciate the tone of the noble Lord and, if there is anything that comes from behind me before I conclude my remarks, to be helpful, I will certainly do that.

Our debates on this measure have covered many issues. This group, as mentioned earlier, focuses primarily on the operational delivery of the power, so it would be quite good to move on. Just before I do, for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in terms of the late introduction—his words—of this measure, as mentioned on Monday the DWP published a fraud plan in May 2022, where it outlined a number of new powers that it would seek to secure when parliamentary time allowed. In the parliamentary time available, DWP has prioritised our key third-party data-gathering measure, which will help it to tackle one of the largest causes of fraud and error in the welfare system. That is a short version of what I said on Monday, but I hope that it might be helpful.

Before I turn to the amendments, it might be helpful to set out how the legislation will frame the delivery of this measure. When we issue a request for data to a third party or, as it is set out, an account information notice or AIN, which is in the Bill, we can only ask it to provide data where it may help the DWP to establish whether benefits have been properly paid in accordance with the rules relating to those benefits. As mentioned earlier, this is defined clearly at paragraph 1(2) of the new schedule. This is where the data that DWP receives may signal—to use the word raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—potential fraud and error. The noble Lord asked for further clarification on that point. To be clear, a signal of fraud and error is where the rules of benefit eligibility appear not to be met. For example, this might be where a claimant has more capital than the benefit rules allow. As I made clear on Monday, all benefits and payments have rules that determine eligibility, which Parliament has agreed are the right rules in its consideration of other social security legislation. To issue an AIN, we must also have designated a third party in affirmative regulations, which need to be passed by both Houses.

As has been covered, we can also only request data from third parties where there is this relationship, which I will not repeat again and which I think the Committee will be familiar with. Our intention is to designate banks and financial institutions as the first third parties that we can approach, enabling us to request information on accounts only held in the UK. Just to clarify that point, we will not be able to request information on overseas accounts.

On the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, on examples of non-financial organisations that the power could appropriately be used on, we will bring forward regulations to specify the data holders in scope. I hope that this is helpful. In the first instance, this will be, as mentioned, banks and financial institutions. The power also has potential use cases with other third parties, such as housing or childcare providers, but, just to reassure the Committee, this would be subject to further parliamentary approval.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
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I am grateful to the Minister—I am just trying to catch up. On the point that he made about regulations, I imagine that the power to prescribe the descriptions of persons to whom an account information notice may be sent comes under paragraph 1(1) of the schedule. I think that that is what he was saying. In paragraph 2, on the content of the account information notices, there is a reference to

“other specified information relating to the holders of those accounts, and … such further information in connection with those accounts as may be specified”.

Does that simply mean anything specified in the account information notice or is there a power to make regulations that will limit the types of information that can be specified in an AIN?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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Again, I hope that I might have covered this earlier. If I read the noble Lord’s question correctly, the definitions will need to be debated by both Houses. I have made clear what we are bringing in at the moment for banks and financial institutions, but this will need to be looked at by both Houses in future. I hope that that is clear.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I apologise; I did not make myself clear. I think that we are on entirely the same wavelength on the persons to whom an information notice can be given; the Minister has reassured us that they will be specified in regulations and considered by both Houses. My question relates to the content of an account information notice under paragraph 2 and the very broad references to “other specified information”, “such further information” and so on. I did not read that as a regulation-making power. I rather assume that the discretion over the choice of information that is specified remains entirely at large. If the Minister is saying that there will be regulations that will specify the information that an AIN can include, hence mitigating the breadth of paragraph 2, I would be glad if he could make that clear.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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My understanding —with his experience, I am sure that the noble Lord will be ahead of me on this—is that this is defined. We define it pretty clearly in paragraph 1(2). In the interests of time, I will reflect on what he has asked and will be absolutely sure to add this to the letter that I pledged to write on Monday—it is getting bigger by the moment, as I fully expected.

Baroness Sherlock Portrait Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
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My Lords, as I asked only four questions, I want to try to nail each one as we go. I am grateful to the Minister. Before we leave the matter of the kind of organisations to which this applies, I think that he is saying that the Bill would allow the DWP to request information from any kind of organisation, including phone companies, which I asked about specifically. The kinds of organisations are to be specified in regulations, which the Government will bring forward, initially naming financial institutions. By virtue of further regulations, could they extend that to anything—to Garmin, the people who monitor your runs, to gyms and to anyone else? Is that correct?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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That is correct. I hope indeed that it provides some reassurance that extending it to the banks and financial institutions initially is deliberately designed to be narrow. It would be subject to both Houses to debate other areas beyond those. I am coming on to address that. The noble Baroness asked about phone companies. Simply put, we will be able to designate the third parties that fit within the provisions of this legislation where they hold information that would help us to verify whether someone meets the eligibility criteria for the benefit that they are receiving. However, ultimately, it would be for Parliament to decide whether a third party can be designated under this power, as we must bring affirmative regulations forward to do this. We have that power.

Lord Davies of Brixton Portrait Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To be clear, they already have some information about claimants or recipients. Does this Bill make any difference to that information? Can they already use the information that they have for these purposes, for example the name and address of a claimant’s bank account, or does this Bill extend the use of information to other information that they already have?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed, that is correct. I hope that is helpful and gives the noble Lord reassurance. To clarify, we have our normal business-as-usual processes so, where we are able to—with the restriction of not at present being able to use the banks and financial institutions as a conduit—we have those powers. However, obviously, as has been made clear by the ICO, there is no alternative to needing the help of banks and financial institutions to go further in tackling the ever-greater sophistication of fraud.

The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, asked whether we could issue an AIN to a bank other than that into which the benefit is paid. The answer is no. The power is exercisable only in respect of a matching account that meets the criteria in an AIN and receives a benefit payment. If this is not the case, the Secretary of State cannot require them to supply that information.

When it comes to issuing an AIN, DWP will be able to exercise these powers only for payments for which it is responsible. This means that DWP cannot exercise this power with some benefits that fall under the legislation, such as child benefit, as was mentioned on Monday. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, raised this issue. As I committed to do on Monday, I will provide in writing more detail on the scope of the measure and on these limitations, which will require more time.

I will also ensure that my letter is clear on how the measure will impact appointees, joint claims and other such accounts. I am well aware that a number of questions were asked about this matter on Monday but, in the interests of time, I will move on.

I turn to proofs of concept. I also want to speak about our approach to delivery, in particular how we plan to test delivery before we gradually scale up operational delivery; I am aware of the time, but I hope that the Committee will indulge me. Our planned period of “test and learn” will build on our learning from our two previous proofs of concept, which we conducted in 2017 and 2022. These demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach and contributed to the OBR’s certification that the measure will save up to £600 million over the next five years.

The two proofs of concept that I mention are important. I hope that the Committee will be interested to read the results, which demonstrate why we need to do this. Without further ado, let me say that I will set out the details of these two examples in the letter as well, which will, I hope, be helpful.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who is in his place, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, spoke about the regulatory impact assessment on Monday. I just want to use this time to reassure them on that. More information on these proofs are contained within the RIA, which was, as noble Lords will know, green-rated by the RPC.

On “test and learn”, we have a clear view on how this power may work. We are already working with third parties in readiness to commence the formal “test and learn” period in early 2025 and preparing the code of practice in advance of that. I will come on to that in just a second—in fact, I will come on to it right now, given the time. I shall refer to Amendments 225 to 232 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock.

To support the delivery of this measure, we will produce the code of practice to help define how the measure will work, with explanations. I assure the noble Baroness and the Committee that the code of practice is already in development; we are working positively with around eight leading financial institutions through an established working group that meets regularly to shape the code. We are fully committed to continuing that work; I think I covered the timing of that earlier in my remarks. Accepting Amendments 225 and 226 in the name of the noble Baroness would therefore, we believe, have minimal effect. I am clear that DWP will produce a code of practice, which will be consulted on; I have also set out the sort of detail that it will contain. Accepting them may also potentially restrict our ability to develop the code of practice further as we understand more from “test and learn”.

Because we are developing this collaboratively with banks, I am not yet in a position to share the draft code, as I mentioned; I have given certain reassurances on that. However, I can say that it will provide guidance on issues such as the nature of the power and to whom it will apply. It will also provide information on safeguards, cover data security responsibilities and provide information on the appeals processes should a third party wish to dispute a request. We will engage with SSAC, to help the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, as we bring forward the affirmative regulations. On balance, I believe that the best course is to consult on the code of practice rather than rushing to define it now.

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Baroness Sherlock Portrait Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
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I am most grateful to the Minister. There is one question, so I apologise if he answered it and I did not quite pick it up. I specifically asked if these powers would allow the DWP to devise criteria designed to identify if a claimant was in fact living with another adult. With the appropriate regulation, would the powers allow it to do that?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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That is one of the questions that I can now answer. The power will allow this, in so far as it pertains to helping the Secretary of State establish whether the benefits are being paid properly, as with paragraph 1(2) of new Schedule 3B. Rules around living together are relevant only to some benefits. That is a very short answer, but I could expand on it.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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May I add to the very long letter? I have been sitting here worrying about this idea that one of the “signals” will be excess capital and then there are matching accounts. If the matching account has more capital—for example, the person who has a connected account is breaking the £16,000 or £6,000—does that signal trigger some sort of investigation?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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That is a very fair question, and I hope that I understand it correctly. I can say that the limit for the DWP is that it can gain only from what the third party produces. Whatever goes on behind the doors of the third party is for them and not us. Whether there is a related account and how best to operate is a matter for the bank to decide. We may therefore end up getting very limited information, in terms of the limits of our powers. I hope that helps, but I will add some more detail in the letter.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, the Minister extolled the green-rated nature of this impact assessment. In the midst of all that, did he answer my question?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I need to be reminded of the question.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I asked about the amount of fraud that the Government plan to detect, on top of the £6.4 billion in welfare overpayments that was detected last year.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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The figure that we have is £600 million but, again, I will reflect on the actual question that we are looking to address—the actual amount of fraud in the system.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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The Minister is saying that that figure is not to be found in this green-rated impact assessment, which most of us find to be completely opaque.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I will certainly take that back, but it is green rated.

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Lord Vaux of Harrowden Portrait Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
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My Lords, the Minister was kind enough to mention me a little earlier. Can I just follow up on that? In the impact assessment, which I have here, nowhere can I find the £600 million figure, nor can I find anywhere the costs related to this. There will be a burden on the banks and clearly quite a burden on the DWP, actually, if it has got to trawl through this information, as the noble Viscount says, using people rather than machines. The costs are going to be enormous to save, it would appear, up to £120 million per year out of £6.4 billion per year of fraud. It does seem odd. It would be really helpful to have those cost numbers and to understand in what document they are, because I cannot find in the impact assessment where these numbers are.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I hope I can help both noble Lords. Although I must admit that I have not read every single page, I understand that the figure of £500 million is in the IA.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Did the Minister say £500 million?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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Yes, £500 million. I mentioned £600 million altogether; that was mentioned by the OBR, which had certified this, and by the way, that figure was in the Autumn Statement.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, has not that demonstrated the disproportionality of these measures?

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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The noble Viscount explained in response to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that at every stage where the powers are going to be expanded, it would come back as an affirmative regulation. I might have been a bit slow about this, but I have been having a look and I cannot see where it says that. Perhaps he could point that out to me, because that would provide some reassurance that each stage of this is coming back to us.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I understand, very quickly, that it is in paragraph 1(1), but again, in the interests of time, maybe we could talk about that outside the Room.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Could the Minister clarify: was that paragraph 1(1)?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I can reassure the noble Lord that that is the case, yes.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
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I do not know whether I can help. I agree with the noble Baroness: I do not think it is very clear from paragraph 1(1) that there is a regulation-making power. However, if you look at paragraph 5 of the new schedule, there is a reference there to regulations under paragraph 1(1) as well as two other paragraphs of the schedule. That is the rather tortuous route by which I came to the conclusion that the Minister is quite right.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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I reassure noble Lords that is correct—it is paragraph 1(1). It may be rather complex, but it is in there, just to reassure all noble Lords.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am sorry to keep coming back, but did the Minister give us the paragraph in the impact assessment that referred to £500 million?

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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No, I did not, but that is something which surely we can deal with outside the Room. However, I can assure noble Lords that it is in there.

Baroness Sherlock Portrait Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for his attempts to answer my questions and those of many noble Lords. I will not detain the Committee for very long at all.

I am grateful to know that there will be a code and that it will be consulted on. Given that, it would have saved an awful lot of trouble if the Government had simply not put “may” in the Bill in the first place—that would have cut out a whole loop of this. I am very grateful to know that that is there. I agree with the Minister that we all want to know about and to clamp down on fraud and error; the question is one of proportionality.

When the Minister comes to write—I realise that this letter is turning into “War and Peace”, but it will make us all come to Report in a much better place if we can get a clearer answer to many of these questions— I still wonder whether he properly answered the question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the legality of these powers, because the point about when they engage is crucial. The Minister is still coming back to a distinction between the gathering of the data and what the DWP will do using its existing “business as usual” powers, to investigate. I think the point the noble Lord was making is that the question of legality engages at the point of that data gathering, not at the point at which it is used, if I am correct. I am not sure that the Minister answered that—I am not inviting him to do it now—but I specifically suggest that he takes advice on that point before we come back on Report.

The other issue is that, if the Government have come in so late in the day introducing these powers into the Bill, it would have been better to have draft regulations before Report at the first stage. The Minister thinks the code can be available in the summer, but the summer is fast approaching so I see no reason why the usual channels could not accommodate the date for Report to allow us to go past the date for producing a draft code if the Government wish to. I realise that they may not wish to, but it must be perfectly possible—unless the Minister knows something I do not about a likely date of a general election, presumably we should still have time to do that. So I commend that thought to him.

However, we also know that a lot of the constraints he has described will happen solely in regulations. Everybody in this Committee is aware of the limitations of the capacity of both Houses to do anything about regulations. We cannot amend them here. The Government will bring them forward, but the capacity of us to do anything about that is small, so that is not as much of an assurance as it would be in other circumstances.

Finally, what I am left with is that these powers could do anything from something that might sound very proportionate to something that might sound entirely disproportionate, and we simply have not heard anything that enables us to make a judgment early enough to know where that is contained. I therefore ask the Government to think again before Report about ways in which they might provide assurance about a more contained and proportionate approach to these measures.

Since we are in Committee, in the meantime, I thank all noble Lords for their work on this and the Minister for his response. Before I beg leave to withdraw, I see that the Minister is intervening on me now, which is a joyful change.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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Before the noble Baroness sits down, I want to say one very important thing. As ever with Bills, there is an opportunity to engage, and I pledge right now to engage with all noble Lords who wish to, and we would like to as well, on these particular measures, to provide, I hope, further reassurances to those that I have given. I hope there is some acceptance that I have given some reassurances.

Baroness Sherlock Portrait Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
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My Lords, I am sure that on behalf of the Committee I can thank the Minister for that generous offer, and we look forward to taking it up. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by
236: Clause 129, page 158, line 27, leave out “, or are due to conduct an investigation,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes a technical change to wording about investigations by a coroner or procurator fiscal. The omitted words are not required because there is no stage at which a coroner or procurator fiscal would be “due to” conduct an investigation into a death (as opposed to conducting an investigation into it).
Viscount Camrose Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, having listened carefully to representations from across the House at Second Reading, I am introducing this amendment to address concerns about the data preservation powers established in the Bill. The amendment provides for coroners, and procurators fiscal in Scotland, to initiate the data preservation process when they decide it is necessary and appropriate to support their investigations into a child’s death, irrespective of the suspected cause of death.

This amendment demonstrates our commitment to ensuring that coroners and procurators fiscal can access the online data they may need to support their investigation into a child’s death. It is important to emphasise that coroners and procurators fiscal, as independent judges, have discretion about whether to trigger the data preservation process. We are grateful to the families, Peers and coroners whom we spoke to in developing these measures. In particular, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who is in her place. I beg to move.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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My Lords, it is an unusual pleasure to support the Minister and to say that this is a very welcome amendment to address a terrible error of judgment made when the Government first added the measure to the Bill in the other place and excluded data access for coroners in respect of children who died by means other than suicide. I shall not replay here the reasons why it was wrong, but I am extremely glad that the Government have put it right. I wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to those past and present at 5Rights and the NSPCC for their support and to those journalists who understood why data access for coroners is a central plank of online safety.

I too recognise the role of the Bereaved Families for Online Safety. They bear the pain of losing a child and, as their testimony has repeatedly attested, not knowing the circumstances surrounding that death is a particularly cruel revictimisation for families, who never lose their grief but simply learn to live with it. We owe them a debt of gratitude for putting their grief to work for the benefit of other families and other children.

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Lord Leong Portrait Lord Leong (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the amendment and all noble Lords who spoke. I am sure the Minister will be pleased to hear that we support his Amendment 236 and his Amendment 237, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has added her name.

Amendment 236 is a technical amendment. It seeks the straightforward deletion of words from a clause, accounting for the fact that investigations by a coroner, or procurator fiscal in Scotland, must start upon them being notified of the death of a child. The words

“or are due to conduct an investigation”

are indeed superfluous.

We also support Amendment 237. The deletion of this part of the clause would bring into effect a material change. It would empower Ofcom to issue a notice to an internet service provider to retain information in all cases of a child’s death, not just cases of suspected suicide. Sadly, as many of us have discovered in the course of our work on this Bill, there is an increasing number of ways in which communication online can be directly or indirectly linked to a child’s death. These include areas of material that is appropriate for adults only; the inability to filter harmful information, which may adversely affect mental health and decision-making; and, of course, the deliberate targeting of children by adults and, in some cases, by other children.

There are adults who use the internet with the intention of doing harm to children through coercion, grooming or abuse. What initially starts online can lead to contact in person. Often, this will lead to a criminal investigation, but, even if it does not, the changes proposed by this amendment could help prevent additional tragic deaths of children, not just those caused by suspected child suicides. If the investigating authorities have access to online communications that may have been a contributing factor in a child’s death, additional areas of concern can be identified by organisations and individuals with responsibility for children’s welfare and action taken to save many other young lives.

Before I sit down, I want to take this opportunity to say a big thank you to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and all those who have campaigned on this issue relentlessly and brought it to our attention.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Let me begin by reiterating my thanks to the noble Baroness, Peers, families and coroners for their help in developing these measures. My momentary pleasure in being supported on these amendments is, of course, tempered by the desperate sadness of the situations that they are designed to address.

I acknowledge the powerful advocacy that has taken place on this issue. I am glad that we have been able to address the concerns with the amendment to the Online Safety Act, which takes a zero-tolerance approach to protecting children by making sure that the buck stops with social media platforms for the content they host. I sincerely hope that this demonstrates our commitment to ensuring that coroners can fully access the online data needed to provide answers for grieving families.

On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, guidance from the Chief Coroner is likely to be necessary to ensure both that this provision works effectively and that coroners feel supported in their decisions on whether to trigger the data preservation process. Decisions on how and when to issue guidance are a matter for the Chief Coroner, of course, but we understand that he is very likely to issue guidance to coroners on this matter. His office is working with my department and Ofcom to ensure that our processes are aligned. The Government will also work with the regulators and interested parties to see whether any guidance is required to support parents in understanding the data preservation process. Needless to say, I would be more than happy to arrange a meeting with the noble Baroness to discuss the development of the guidance; other Members may wish to join that as well.

Once again, I thank noble Lords for their support on this matter.

Amendment 236 agreed.
Moved by
237: Clause 129, page 158, leave out lines 30 and 31
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment concerns OFCOM’s power to issue a notice requiring an internet service provider to retain information about the use of the service by a child who has died, where a coroner or procurator fiscal is investigating the child’s death. The amendment has the effect that the power is no longer limited to cases of suspected child suicide.
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Moved by
240: Clause 138, page 172, line 14, leave out “Part 3” and insert “this Act”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment to this clause in my name moving provision about the initial upload of information into the National Underground Asset Register into a new section to be inserted into Part 3A of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (inserted by this clause).
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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I now turn to the national underground asset register, which I will refer to as NUAR. It is a new digital map of buried pipes and cables that is revolutionising the way that we install, maintain, operate and repair our buried infrastructure. The provisions contained in the Bill will ensure workers have complete and up-to-date access to the data that they need, when they need it, through the new register. NUAR is estimated to deliver more than £400 million per year of economic growth through increased efficiency, reduced accidental damage and fewer disruptions for citizens and businesses. I am therefore introducing several government amendments, which are minor in nature and aim to improve the clarity of the Bill. I hope that the Committee will be content if I address these together.

Amendment 244 clarifies responsibilities in relation to the licensing of NUAR data. As NUAR includes data from across public and private sector organisations, it involves both Crown and third-party intellectual property rights, including database rights. This amendment clarifies that the role of the Keeper of the National Archives in determining the licence terms for Crown IP remains unchanged. This will require the Secretary of State to work through the National Archives to determine licence terms for Crown data, as was always intended. Amendments 243 and 245 are consequential to this change.

Similarly, Amendment 241 moves the provision relating to the first initial upload of data to the register under new Part 3A to make the Bill clearer, with Amendments 248 and 249 consequential to this change.

Amendment 242 is a minor and technical amendment that clarifies that regulations made under new Section 106B(1) can be made “for or in connection with”—rather than solely “in connection with”—the making of information kept in NUAR available, with or without a licence.

Amendment 247 is another minor and technical amendment to ensure that consistent language is used throughout Schedule 13 and so further improve the clarity of these provisions. These amendments provide clarity to the Bill; they do not change the underlying policy.

Although Amendment 298 is not solely focused on NUAR, this might perhaps be a convenient point for me to briefly explain it to your Lordships. Amendment 298 makes a minor and technical amendment to Clause 154, the clause which sets out the extent of the Bill. Subsection (4) of that clause currently provides that an amendment, repeal or revocation made by the Bill

“has the same extent as the enactment amended, repealed or revoked”.

Subsection (4) also makes clear that this approach is subject to subsection (3), which provides for certain provisions to extend only to England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Upon further reviewing the Bill, we have identified that subsection (4) should, of course, also be subject to subsection (2), which provides for certain provisions to extend only to England and Wales. Amendment 298 therefore makes provision to ensure that the various subsections of Clause 154 operate effectively together as a coherent package.

I now turn to a series of amendments raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Amendments 240A and 240B relate to new Section 106A, which places a duty on the Secretary of State to keep a register of information relating to apparatus in streets in England and Wales. Section 106A allows for the Secretary of State to make regulations that establish the form and manner in which the register is kept. The Bill as currently drafted provides for these regulations to be subject to the negative procedure. Amendment 240A calls for this to be changed to the affirmative procedure, while Amendment 240B would require the publication of draft regulations, a call for evidence and the subsequent laying before Parliament of a statement by the Secretary of State before such regulations can be made.

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I know that those sounded like fairly hard-nosed questions but, as I said at the outset, we are entirely supportive of the direction of travel of NUAR. Our principal concerns are, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put it, to ensure that critical national infrastructure developments are not placed at risk during the creation, development and emergence of this service. It would be deeply ironic if, in developing a service that is designed to protect our most important underground utilities, we ended up putting them in jeopardy simply because of a system failure in data capture and mapping. I think that both the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and I require answers to those questions.
Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I start by thanking the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bassam, for their respective replies. As I have said, the Geospatial Commission has been engaging extensively with stakeholders, including the security services, on NUAR since 2018. This has included a call for evidence, a pilot project, a public consultation, focus groups, various workshops and other interactions. All major gas and water companies have signed up, as well as several large telecoms firms.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

While the Minister is speaking, maybe the Box could tell him whether the figure of only 33% of asset owners having signed up is correct? Both I and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, mentioned that; it would be very useful to know.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It did complete a pilot phase this year. As it operationalises, more and more will sign up. I do not know the actual number that have signed up today, but I will find out.

NUAR does not duplicate existing commercial services. It is a standardised, interactive digital map of buried infrastructure, which no existing service is able to provide. It will significantly enhance data sharing and access efficiency. Current services—

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am concerned. We get the principle behind NUAR, but is there an interface between NUAR and this other service—which, on the face of it, looks quite extensive—currently in place? Is there a dialogue between the two? That seems to be quite important, given that there is some doubt over NUAR’s current scope.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not sure that there is doubt over the current scope of NUAR; it is meant to address all buried infrastructure in the United Kingdom. LSBUD does make extensive representations, as indeed it has to parliamentarians of both Houses, and has spoken several times to the Geospatial Commission. I am very happy to commit to continuing to do so.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is absolutely right to be asking that question. We can go only on the briefs we get. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, I have not been underground very recently, but we do rely on the briefings we get. LSBUD is described as a

“sustainably-funded UK success story”—

okay, give or take a bit of puff—that

“responds to most requests in 5 minutes or less”.

It has

“150+ asset-owners covering nearly 2 million km and 98% of high-risk assets—like gas, electric, and fuel pipelines”.

That sounds as though we are in the same kind of territory. How can the Minister just baldly state that NUAR is entirely different? Can he perhaps give us a paragraph on how they differ? I do not think that “completely different” can possibly characterise this relationship.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I understand it, LSBUD services are provided on a pdf, on request. It is not interactive; it is not vector-based graphics presented on a map, so it cannot be interrogated in the same way. Furthermore, as I understand it—and I am happy to be corrected if I am misstating—LSBUD has a great many private sector asset owners, but no public sector data is provided. All of it is provided on a much more manualised basis. The two services simply do not brook comparison. I would be delighted to speak to LSBUD.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, we are beginning to tease out something quite useful here. Basically, NUAR will be pretty much an automatic service, because it will be available online, I assume, which has implications on data protection, on who owns the copyright and so on. I am sure there are all kinds of issues there. It is the way the service is delivered, and then you have the public sector, which has not taken part in LSBUD. Are those the two key distinctions?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed, there are two key distinctions. One is the way that the information is provided online, in a live format, and the other is the quantity and nature of the data that is provided, which will eventually be all relevant data in the United Kingdom under NUAR, versus those who choose to sign up on LSBUD and equivalent services. I am very happy to write on the various figures. Maybe it would help if I were to arrange a demonstration of the technology. Would that be useful? I will do that.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, I do not have that background in seeing what happens with the excavators, but I would very much welcome that. The Minister again is really making the case for greater co-operation. The public sector has access to the public sector information, and LSBUD has access to a lot of private sector information. Does that not speak to co-operation between the two systems? We seem to have warring camps, where the Government are determined to prove that they are forging ahead with their new service and are trampling on quite a lot of rights, interests and concerns in doing so—by the sound of it. The Minister looks rather sceptical.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am not sure whose rights are being trampled on by having a shared database of these things. However, I will arrange a demonstration, and I confidently state that nobody who sees that demonstration will have any cynicism any more about the quality of the service provided.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

All I can say is that, in that case, the Minister has been worked on extremely well.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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In addition to the situation that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, described, I was braced for a really horrible situation, because these things very often lead to danger and death, and there is a very serious safety argument to providing this information reliably and rapidly, as NUAR will.

Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, it took them half a day to discover where the hole had gone and what the damage was. The water flooded several main roads and there were traffic delays and the rest. So these things are very serious. I was trying to make a serious point while being slightly frivolous about it.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

No, indeed, it is a deeply serious point. I do not know the number off the top of my head but there are a number of deaths every year as a result of these things.

As I was saying, a thorough impact assessment was undertaken for the NUAR measures, which received a green rating from the Regulatory Policy Committee. Impacts on organisations that help facilitate the exchange of data related to assets in the street were included in the modelling. Although NUAR could impact existing utility—

Lord Davies of Brixton Portrait Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I cannot resist drawing the Minister’s attention to the story in today’s Financial Times, which reports that two major water companies do not know where their sewers are. So I think the impact is going to be a little bit greater than he is saying.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I saw that story. Obviously, regardless of how they report the data, if they do not know, they do not know. But my thought was that, if there are maps available for everything that is known, that tends to encourage people who do not know to take better control of the assets that they manage.

A discovery project is under way to potentially allow these organisations—these alternative providers—to access NUAR data; LSBUD has been referenced, among others. It attended the last three workshops we conducted on this, which I hope could enable it to adapt its services and business models potentially to mitigate any negative impacts. Such opportunities will be taken forward in future years should they be technically feasible, of value, in the public interest and in light of the views of stakeholders, including asset owners.

A national underground asset register depends on bringing data together from asset owners on to a single standardised database. This will allow data to be shared more efficiently than was possible before. Asset owners have existing processes that have been developed to allow them to manage risks associated with excavations. These processes will be developed in compliance with existing guidance in the form of HSG47. To achieve this, those working on NUAR are already working closely with relevant stakeholders as part of a dedicated adoption group. This will allow for a safe and planned rollout of NUAR to those who will benefit from it.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Before the Minister’s peroration, I just want to check something. He talked about the discovery project and contact with the industry; by that, I assume he was talking about asset owners as part of the project. What contact is proposed with the existing company, LinesearchbeforeUdig, and some of its major supporters? Can the Government assure us that they will have greater contact or try to align? Can they give greater assurance than they have been able to give today? Clearly, there is suspicion here of the Government’s intentions and how things will work out. If we are to achieve this safety agenda—I absolutely support it; it is the fundamental issue here—more work needs to be done in building bridges, to use another construction metaphor.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As I said, the Government have met the Geospatial Commission many times. I would be happy to meet it in order to help it adapt its business model for the NUAR future. As I said, it has attended the last three discovery workshops, allowing this data.

I close by thanking noble Lords for their contributions. I hope they look forward to the demonstration.

Amendment 240 agreed.
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Moved by
241: Clause 138, page 172, line 16, at end insert—
“106AA Initial upload of information into NUAR(1) Before the end of the initial upload period an undertaker having apparatus in a street must enter into NUAR— (a) all information that is included in the undertaker’s records under section 79(1) on the archive upload date, and(b) any other information of a prescribed description that is held by the undertaker on that date.(2) The duty under subsection (1) does not apply in such cases as may be prescribed.(3) Information must be entered into NUAR under subsection (1) in such form and manner as may be prescribed.(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) the Secretary of State must by regulations—(a) specify a date as “the archive upload date”, and(b) specify a period beginning with that date as the “initial upload period”.(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the negative procedure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment moves provision about the initial upload of information into the National Underground Asset Register into a new section to be inserted into Part 3A of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (inserted by this clause).
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Moved by
242: Clause 138, page 172, line 18, after “provision” insert “for or”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes clear that regulations under section 106B(1) of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (inserted by this clause) may make provision for, as well as provision in connection with, making information kept in the National Underground Asset Register available.
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Moved by
247: Schedule 13, page 271, leave out lines 22 and 23 and insert “the date specified in the warning notice in accordance with paragraph 2(2)(d).”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that language used in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Schedule 5A to the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (inserted by this Schedule) is consistent.
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Moved by
248: Clause 139, page 178, line 19, leave out paragraph (f) and insert—
“(f) after subsection (3A) insert—“(3B) Except in such cases as may be prescribed, where an undertaker records information as required by subsection (1) or (1B), or updates such information, the undertaker must, within a prescribed period, enter the recorded or updated information into NUAR.(3C) Information must be entered into NUAR under subsection (3B) in such form and manner as may be prescribed.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the next amendment to this clause in my name are consequential on the amendment to clause 138 in my name moving provision about the initial upload of information into the National Underground Asset Register into a new section to be inserted into Part 3A of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (inserted by clause 138).
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Lord Leong Portrait Lord Leong (Lab)
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My Lords, I support this probing amendment, Amendment 251. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. From this side of the Committee, I say how grateful we are to the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for all that he has done and continues to do in his campaign to find justice for those sub-postmasters who have been wronged by the system.

This amendment seeks to reinstate the substantive provisions of Section 69 of PACE, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, revoking this dangerous assumption. I would like to imagine that legislators in 1984 were perhaps alert to the warning in George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, written some 40 years earlier, about relying on an apparently infallible but ultimately corruptible technological system to define the truth. The Horizon scandal is, of course, the most glaring example of the dangers of assuming that computers are always right. Sadly, as hundreds of sub-postmasters have known for years, and as the wider public have more recently become aware, computer systems can be horribly inaccurate.

However, the Horizon system is very primitive compared to some of the programs which now process billions of pieces of our sensitive data every day. The AI revolution, which has already begun, will exponentially accelerate the risk of compounded errors being multiplied. To take just one example, some noble Lords may be aware of the concept of AI hallucinations. This is a term used to describe when computer models make inaccurate predictions based on seeing incorrect patterns in data, which may be caused by incomplete, biased or simply poor-quality inputs. In an earlier debate, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, said that account information notices will be decided. How will these decisions be made? Will they be made by individual human beings or by some AI-configured algorithms? Can the Minister share with us how such decisions will be taken?

Humans can look at clouds in the sky or outlines on the hillside and see patterns that look like faces, animals or symbols, but ultimately we know that we are looking at water vapour or rock formations. Computer systems do not necessarily have this innate common sense—this reality check. Increasingly, we will depend on computer systems talking to each other without any human intervention. This will deliver some great efficiencies, but it could lead to greater injustices on a scale which would terrify even the most dystopian science fiction writers. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has already shared with us some of the cases where a computer has made errors and people have been wronged.

Amendment 251 would reintroduce the opportunity for some healthy human scepticism by enabling the investigation of whether there are reasonable grounds for questioning information in documents produced by a computer. The digital world of 2024 depends more on computers than the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four in actual legislation or in an Orwellian fiction. Amendment 251 enables ordinary people to question whether our modern “Big Brother” artificial intelligence is telling the truth when he or it is watching us. I look forward to the Minister’s responses to all the various questions and on the current assumption in law that information provided by the computer is always accurate.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I recognise the feeling of the Committee on this issue and, frankly, I recognise the feeling of the whole country with respect to Horizon. I thank all those who have spoken for a really enlightening debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling the amendment and my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot for speaking to it and—if I may depart from the script—his heroic behaviour with respect to the sub-postmasters.

There can be no doubt that hundreds of innocent sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses have suffered an intolerable miscarriage of justice at the hands of the Post Office. I hope noble Lords will indulge me if I speak very briefly on that. On 13 March, the Government introduced the Post Office (Horizon System) Offences Bill into Parliament, which is due to go before a Committee of the whole House in the House of Commons on 29 April. The Bill will quash relevant convictions of individuals who worked, including on a voluntary basis, in Post Office branches and who have suffered as a result of the Post Office Horizon IT scandal. It will quash, on a blanket basis, convictions for various theft, fraud and related offences during the period of the Horizon scandal in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This is to be followed by swift financial redress delivered by the Department for Business and Trade.

On the amendment laid by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—I thank her and the noble Lords who have supported it—I fully understand the intent behind this amendment, which aims to address issues with computer evidence such as those arising from the Post Office cases. The common law presumption, as has been said, is that the computer which has produced evidence in a case was operating effectively at the material time unless there is evidence to the contrary, in which case the party relying on the computer evidence will need to satisfy the court that the evidence is reliable and therefore admissible.

This amendment would require a party relying on computer evidence to provide proof up front that the computer was operating effectively at the time and that there is no evidence of improper use. I and my fellow Ministers, including those at the MoJ, understand the intent behind this amendment, and we are considering very carefully the issues raised by the Post Office cases in relation to computer evidence, including these wider concerns. So I would welcome the opportunity for further meetings with the noble Baroness, alongside MoJ colleagues. I was pleased to hear that she had met with my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor on this matter.

We are considering, for example, the way reliability of evidence from the Horizon system was presented, how failures of investigation and disclosure prevented that evidence from being effectively challenged, and the lack of corroborating evidence in many cases. These issues need to be considered carefully, with the full facts in front of us. Sir Wyn Williams is examining in detail the failings that led to the Post Office scandal. These issues are not straightforward. The prosecution of those cases relied on assertions that the Horizon system was accurate and reliable, which the Post Office knew to be wrong. This was supported by expert evidence, which it knew to be misleading. The issue was that the Post Office chose to withhold the fact that the computer evidence itself was wrong.

This amendment would also have a significant impact on the criminal justice system. Almost all criminal cases rely on computer evidence to some extent, so any change to the burden of proof would or could impede the work of the Crown Prosecution Service and other prosecutors.

Although I am not able to accept this amendment for these reasons, I share the desire to find an appropriate way forward along with my colleagues at the Ministry of Justice, who will bear the brunt of this work, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, alluded to. I look forward to meeting the noble Baroness to discuss this ahead of Report. Meanwhile, I hope she will withdraw her amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Can the Minister pass on the following suggestion? Paul Marshall, who has been mentioned by all of us, is absolutely au fait with the exact procedure. He has experience of how it has worked in practice, and he has made some constructive suggestions. If there is not a full return to Section 69, there could be other, more nuanced, ways of doing this, meeting the Minister’s objections. But can I suggest that the MoJ has contact with him and discusses what the best way forward would be? He has been writing about this for some years now, and it would be extremely useful, if the MoJ has not already engaged with him, to do so.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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It may have already done so, but I will certainly pass that on.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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I thank everyone who spoke and the Minister for the offer of a meeting alongside his colleagues from the MoJ. I believe he will have a very busy diary between Committee and Report, based on the number of meetings we have agreed to.

However, I want to be very clear here. We have all recognised that the story of the Post Office sub-postmasters makes this issue clear, but it is not about the sub-postmasters. I commend the Government for what they are doing. We await the inquiry with urgent interest, and I am sure I speak for everyone in wishing the sub-postmasters a fair settlement—that is not in question. What is in question is the fact that we do not have unlimited Lord Arbuthnots to be heroic about all the other things that are about to happen. I took it seriously when he said not one moment longer: it could be tomorrow.

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Moved by
253: Clause 143, page 181, line 14, at end insert—
“(3A) In section 205(2) (references to periods of time)—(a) omit paragraph (l), and(b) after that paragraph insert—“(la) paragraph 22(6) of Schedule 12A;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that Article 3 of Regulation No 1182/71 (rules of interpretation regarding periods of time etc) does not apply to paragraph 22(6) of Schedule 12A to the Data Protection Act 2018 (inserted by Schedule 15 to the Bill).
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Moved by
283: Schedule 15, page 287, line 26, at end insert—
“Supplementary powers
23A The Commission may do anything it thinks appropriate for the purposes of, or in connection with, its functions.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes clear that the Information Commission has power to do things to facilitate the exercise of its functions.
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Moved by
285: Schedule 15, page 288, line 25, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
“(3) For the purposes of paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 12A to the 2018 Act (extension of chair’s term), the term of the person’s appointment as chair of the Information Commission is to be treated as a term beginning when the person began to hold the office of Information Commissioner.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that provision limiting the extension of a person’s term of appointment as chair of the Information Commission (in paragraph 7 of new Schedule 12A to the Data Protection Act 2018, read with section 205(2) of that Act) applies in the same manner to the transitional appointment of the current Information Commissioner as chair.
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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, I am pleased that we were able to sign this amendment. Once again, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has demonstrated her acute ability to dissect and to make a brilliant argument about why an amendment is so important.

As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others have said previously, what is the point of this Bill? Passing this amendment and putting these new offences on the statute book would give the Bill the purpose and clout that it has so far lacked. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has made clear, although it is currently an offence to possess or distribute child sex abuse material, it is not an offence to create these images artificially using AI techniques. So, quite innocent images of a child—or even an adult—can be manipulated to create child sex abuse imagery, pornography and degrading or violent scenarios. As the noble Baroness pointed out, this could be your child or a neighbour’s child being depicted for sexual gratification by the increasingly sophisticated AI creators of these digital models or files.

Yesterday’s report from the Internet Watch Foundation said that a manual found on the dark web encourages “nudifying” tools to remove clothes from child images, which can then be used to blackmail them into sending more graphic content. The IWF reports that the scale of this abuse is increasing year on year, with 275,000 web pages containing child sex abuse being found last year; I suspect that this is the tip of the iceberg as much of this activity is occurring on the dark web, which is very difficult to track. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made a powerful point: there is a danger that access to such materials will also encourage offenders who then want to participate in real-world child sex abuse, so the scale of the horror could be multiplied. There are many reasons why these trends are shocking and abhorrent. It seems that, as ever, the offenders are one step ahead of the legislation needed for police enforcers to close down this trade.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made clear, this amendment is “laser focused” on criminalising those who are developing and using AI to create these images. I am pleased to say that Labour is already working on a ban on creating so-called nudification tools. The prevalence of deepfakes and child abuse on the internet is increasing the public’s fear of the overall safety of AI, so we need to win their trust back if we are to harness the undoubted benefits that it can deliver to our public services and economy. Tackling this area is one step towards that.

Action to regulate AI by requiring transparency and safety reports from all those at the forefront of AI development should be a key part of that strategy, but we have a particular task to do here. In the meantime, this amendment is an opportunity for the Government to take a lead on these very specific proposals to help clean up the web and rid us of these vile crimes. I hope the Minister can confirm that this amendment, or a government amendment along the same lines, will be included in the Bill. I look forward to his response.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling Amendment 291, which would create several new criminal offences relating to the use of AI to collect, collate and distribute child abuse images or to possess such images after they have been created. Nobody can dispute the intention behind this amendment.

We recognise the importance of this area. We will continue to assess whether and what new offences are needed to further bolster the legislation relating to child sexual abuse and AI, as part of our wider ongoing review of how our laws need to adapt to AI risks and opportunities. We need to get the answers to these complex questions right, and we need to ensure that we are equipping law enforcement with the capabilities and the powers needed to combat child sexual abuse. Perhaps, when I meet the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on the previous group, we can also discuss this important matter.

However, for now, I reassure noble Lords that any child sex abuse material, whether AI generated or not, is already illegal in the UK, as has been said. The criminal law is comprehensive with regard to the production and distribution of this material. For example, it is already an offence to produce, store or share any material that contains or depicts child sexual abuse, regardless of whether the material depicts a real child or not. This prohibition includes AI-generated child sexual abuse material and other pseudo imagery that may have been AI or computer generated.

We are committed to bringing to justice offenders who deliberately misuse AI to generate child sexual abuse material. We demonstrated this as part of the road to the AI Safety Summit, where we secured agreement from NGO, industry and international partners to take action to tackle AI-enabled child sexual abuse. The strongest protections in the Online Safety Act are for children, and all companies in scope of the legislation will need to tackle child sexual abuse material as a priority. Applications that use artificial intelligence will not be exempt and must incorporate robust guard-rails and safety measures to ensure that AI models and technology cannot be manipulated for child sexual abuse purposes.

Furthermore, I reassure noble Lords that the offence of taking, making, distributing and possessing with a view to distribution any indecent photograph or pseudophotograph of a child under the age of 18 carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Possession alone of indecent photographs or pseudophotographs of children can carry a maximum sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment.

However, I am not able to accept the amendment, as the current drafting would capture legitimate AI models that have been deliberately misused by offenders without the knowledge or intent of their creators to produce child sexual abuse material. It would also inadvertently criminalise individual users who possess perfectly legal digital files with no criminal intent, due to the fact that they could, when combined, enable the creation of child sexual abuse material.

I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment, while recognising the strength of feeling and the strong arguments made on this issue and reiterating my offer to meet with her to discuss this ahead of Report.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not know how to express in parliamentary terms the depth of my disappointment, so I will leave that. Whoever helped the noble Viscount draft his response should be ashamed. We do not have a comprehensive system and the police do not have the capability; they came to me after months of trying to get the Home Office to act, so that is an untruth: the police do not have the capability.

I remind the noble Viscount that in previous debates his response on the bigger picture of AI has been to wait and see, but this is a here and now problem. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, set out, this would give purpose and reason—and here it is in front of us; we can act.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, for tabling the amendments in this important group. I very much share the concerns about all the uses of deepfake images that are highlighted by these amendments. I will speak more briefly than I otherwise would with a view to trying to—

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I would be very happy to get a letter from the Minister.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would be happy to write one. I will go for the abbreviated version of my speech.

I turn first to the part of the amendment that would seek to criminalise the creation, alteration or otherwise generation of deepfake images depicting a person engaged in an intimate act. The Government recognise that there is significant public concern about the simple creation of sexually explicit deepfake images, and this is why they have announced their intention to table an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill, currently in the other place, to criminalise the creation of purposed sexual images of adults without consent.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 294 would create an offence explicitly targeting the creation or alteration of deepfake content when a person knows or suspects that the deepfake will be or is likely to be used to commit fraud. It is already an offence under Section 7 of the Fraud Act 2006 to generate software or deepfakes known to be designed for or intended to be used in the commission of fraud, and the Online Safety Act lists fraud as a priority offence and as a relevant offence for the duties on major services to remove paid-for fraudulent advertising.

Amendment 295 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, seeks to create an offence of creating or sharing political deepfakes. The Government recognise the threats to democracy that harmful actors pose. At the same time, the UK also wants to ensure that we safeguard the ability for robust debate and protect freedom of expression. It is crucial that we get that balance right.

Let me first reassure noble Lords that the UK already has criminal offences that protect our democratic processes, such as the National Security Act 2023 and the false communications offence introduced in the Online Safety Act 2023. It is also already an election offence to make false statements of fact about the personal character or conduct of a candidate or about the withdrawal of a candidate before or during an election. These offences have appropriate tests to ensure that we protect the integrity of democratic processes while also ensuring that we do not impede the ability for robust political debate.

I assure noble Lords that we continue to work across government to ensure that we are ready to respond to the risks to democracy from deepfakes. The Defending Democracy Taskforce, which seeks to protect the democratic integrity of the UK, is engaging across government and with Parliament, the UK’s intelligence community, the devolved Administrations, local authorities and others on the full range of threats facing our democratic institutions. We also continue to meet regularly with social media companies to ensure that they continue to take action to protect users from election interference.

Turning to Amendments 295A to 295F, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for them. Taken together, they would in effect establish a new regulatory regime in relation to the creation and dissemination of deepfakes. The Government recognise the concerns raised around harmful deepfakes and have already taken action against illegal content online. We absolutely recognise the intention behind these amendments but they pose significant risks, including to freedom of expression; I will write to noble Lords about those in order to make my arguments in more detail.

For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept these amendments. I hope that the noble Lord will therefore withdraw his amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that rather breathless response and his consideration. I look forward to his letter. We have arguments about regulation in the AI field; this is, if you like, a subset of that—but a rather important subset. My underlying theme is “must try harder”. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Leong, for his support and pay tribute to Control AI, which is vigorously campaigning on this subject in terms of the supply chain for the creation of these deepfakes.

Pending the Minister’s letter, which I look forward to, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Committee will be relieved to know that I will be brief. I do not have much to say because, in general terms, this seems an eminently sensible amendment.

We should congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his drafting ingenuity. He has managed to compose an amendment that brings together the need for scrutiny of emerging national security and data privacy risks relating to advanced technology, aims to inform regulatory developments and guidance that might be required to mitigate risks, and would protect the privacy of people’s genomics data. It also picks up along the way the issue of the security services scrutinising malign entities and guiding researchers, businesses, consumers and public bodies. Bringing all those things together at the end of a long and rather messy Bill is quite a feat—congratulations to the noble Lord.

I am rather hoping that the Minister will tell the Committee either that the Government will accept this wisely crafted amendment or that everything it contains is already covered. If the latter is the case, can he point noble Lords to where those things are covered in the Bill? Can he also reassure the Committee that the safety and security issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, are covered? Having said all that, we support the general direction of travel that the amendment takes.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will be very brief as well.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would be extremely happy for the Minister to write.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Nothing makes me happier than the noble Lord’s happiness. I thank him for his amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for his points; I will write to them on those, given the Committee’s desire for brevity and the desire to complete this stage tonight.

I wish to say some final words overall. I sincerely thank the Committee for its vigorous—I think that is the right word—scrutiny of this Bill. We have not necessarily agreed on a great deal, but I am in awe of the level of scrutiny and the commitment to making the Bill as good as possible. Let us be absolutely honest—this is not the most entertaining subject, but it is something that we all take extremely seriously and I pay tribute to the Committee for its work. I also extend sincere thanks to the clerks and our Hansard colleagues for agreeing to stay a little later than agreed, although that may not even be necessary. I very much look forward to engaging with noble Lords again before and during Report.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and all the team. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, whose first name we now know; these things are always useful to know. This has been quite a marathon. I hope that we will have many conversations between now and Report. I also hope that Report is not too early as there is a lot to sort out. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and I will be putting together our priority list imminently but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by
297: Clause 150, page 188, line 3, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under this section made in consequence of section 183A of the 2018 Act (inserted by section 49 of this Act) may amend, repeal or revoke provision which refers to the data protection legislation (as defined in section 3 of the 2018 Act) as they could if the provision referred instead to the main data protection legislation (as defined in section 183A of the 2018 Act).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes clear that regulations making amendments consequential on new section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018 (inserted by clause 49 of the Bill) can remove provision which duplicates the effect of that section but which refers to the “data protection legislation” generally, rather than the “main data protection legislation”.
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Moved by
298: Clause 154, page 189, line 24, leave out “subsection (3)” and insert “subsections (2) and (3)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that subsection (4) of this clause is subject to subsection (2) of this clause, as well as subsection (3).