House of Lords
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill
Wednesday 7th March 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 View all European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 79-V(b) Amendment for Committee, supplementary to the fifth marshalled list (PDF, 55KB) - (7 Mar 2018)
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 49 I shall speak also to Amendment 52. I read the other day that the two most disbelieved statements are, “The cheque is in the post” and, “I am from the Government and I am here to help you”. Here is another one: this amendment is designed to be helpful to the Government, and I hope they will genuinely believe that. It seeks to formalise the agreement reached in December 2017 in the UK/EU joint report in relation to EU citizens and their ability to refer cases to the CJEU.
Clause 6(1)(b) states that, “A court or tribunal”,
“cannot refer any matter to the European Court on or after exit day”.
However, paragraph 38 of the joint report agreed by the UK Government last December states:
“This Part of the Agreement establishes rights for citizens following on from those established in Union law during the UK’s membership of the European Union; the CJEU is the ultimate arbiter of the interpretation of Union law. In the context of the application or interpretation of those rights, UK courts shall therefore have due regard to relevant decisions of the CJEU after the specified date. The Agreement should also establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it. This mechanism should be available for UK courts or tribunals for litigation brought within 8 years from the date of application of the citizens’ rights Part”.
We are not taking away any powers from the courts or tribunals. They decide whether to seek advice, and when they get it they then decide whether to take account of it. It does not in any way undermine the principles the Government have adduced for withdrawal. I hope, therefore, that this is helpful. All I am suggesting is that the joint agreement the UK Government have put their name to should be incorporated into the Bill, and I have helpfully provided an amendment to enable them to do that.
I also draw the Minister’s attention to the draft withdrawal agreement presented on 28 February by Michel Barnier to the Brexit Steering Group. I refer specifically to Article 83, which states:
“Where in a case before a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom a question is raised concerning the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union relating to facts that occurred before the end of the transition period and where that court or tribunal considers that a decision on that question is necessary to enable it to give judgment in that case, it may request the Court of Justice of the European Union to give a preliminary ruling on that question in accordance with the procedural requirements laid down in Article 267 TFEU. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on such requests”.
Do Her Majesty’s Government agree to that proposal by Monsieur Barnier in the draft withdrawal agreement and do they plan to amend the Bill accordingly?
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)
How would the noble Lord’s proposed new provision work in the event of there being no agreement and is he not anticipating the terms of an agreement?
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
As I understand it, all that we include depends on there being an agreement. It is not just my amendment; it is the whole legislation. I beg to move.
Lord Liddle (Lab)
My Lords, I fully support my noble friend’s decision to raise these questions, which are very important. I suspect the Minister will say that the Government have given a commitment that, when the withdrawal agreement is concluded, it will become before this House an Act of Parliament and we will therefore have the opportunity to debate it then. However, there are two powerful reasons why citizens’ rights should be incorporated in this Bill now.
The first is the high level of anxiety that EU citizens have about their position. I am sure there is relief that, in principle, an agreement was reached in December, but there could still be many a slip between cup and lip in its ratification. Those citizens’ rights should be guaranteed now to provide reassurance.
Secondly, I listened hard to an earlier contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, in which he said that the main utility of this Bill is to make sure there is legal certainty if we crash out of the EU—because, assuming that negotiations work, there will be a transition period during which EU citizens’ rights will not be affected. The problem we are dealing with particularly in this Bill is the risk of a crash-out. Of course, the Government will say to us, “Well, we’re very determined there won’t be a crash-out”, but they will not exclude that possibility. It was clear from the intervention at the end of my noble friend Lord Foulkes’ speech that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, actually relishes the possibility of a crash-out because he thinks, wrongly, that this is some bargaining leverage we have over the EU.
Lord Liddle
I will give way in a moment.
The question is whether we want the rights of EU citizens to be used by the likes of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, as a bargaining chip in these negotiations. If we do not, then we should support amendments along the lines of that in the name of my noble friends Lord Foulkes and Lord Adonis, to give people the security to which they are entitled.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I am most grateful to the noble Lord, but he must not put words into my mouth. I simply asked a straightforward question as to what the position would be if this amendment were carried in the event of no deal. Clearly, it would create enormous confusion. There is the separate issue of why we should allow extraterritorial jurisdiction on the part of a foreign court, but I was not embarking on that particular argument. If this is the best the noble Lord can do to support the amendment, I am sure he will support the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in withdrawing it in due course.
Lord Liddle
The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, is clearly saying that he thinks there is a real possibility we are going to crash out of the EU. We have heard that from him on other occasions and from people who agree with him. David Davis wrote to Conservative MPs to say that it was a possibility that we would not pay up the money unless we got a good free trade agreement. The fact is that any deal is better than no deal: no deal would be an absolute disaster for this country. But if there is a serious risk of no deal from Members of the governing party—I am sure the Government do not want that but there is pressure in that quarter—I believe we would be right in this Bill to guarantee the rights of EU citizens living in this country.
Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)
The noble Lord said that we seem to be able to crash out and to have no deal as a bargaining chip. Surely, we either crash out or we have no deal as a bargaining chip—we cannot have both.
Lord Liddle
The point I am focusing on is that this is our opportunity to guarantee the rights of EU citizens in the event of there being no deal.
Lord Cormack (Con)
My Lords, I deeply regret and resent the fact that we are having to discuss this and waste the House’s time. We had an opportunity at the beginning of the day to make an unequivocal declaration that we would grant these rights to EU citizens. We voted in that sense, a number of us spoke in that sense and we had a large majority in that sense. Yet here we are, arguing. Frankly, I agree that the amendment is necessary, but we are now arguing unnecessarily about something we could have taken the moral high ground over and dealt with immediately after we had activated Article 50. It is indicative of the mess into which we have got ourselves, and we are taking up so much parliamentary time that should be devoted to other things. I bitterly resent it and wanted to get that on the record.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)
My Lords, as someone who is a co-signatory of the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, I support what he said and also endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said. This should be a no-brainer.
The United Kingdom Government have agreed with the European Union; the terms of that agreement were set out in paragraph 38 of the document of 8 December 2017, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has spoken them into the record. If one goes back to paragraph 33 of the same document, it is interesting to read that:
“It is of paramount importance to both Parties to give as much certainty as possible to UK citizens living in the EU and EU citizens living in the UK about their future rights. The Parties have therefore reached agreement on the following specific set of arrangements to implement and enforce the citizens’ rights Part of the agreement”.
Admittedly, a later paragraph suggests that the bestowing of or guarantee of rights will come in the withdrawal agreement implementation Bill, but if one reads the paragraph on the consistent interpretation of citizens’ rights, one will see that there is no such commitment there with regard to a future Bill. It would not be right for this Parliament to pass a Bill which cuts off recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Union when we have already agreed that that avenue should be open in this specific case of ensuring consistency in determining the rights of EU citizens living in the United Kingdom and UK citizens living in the European Union.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that if at the end of the day there is no agreement and we go crashing out, surely he is not suggesting that we would not honour our commitment. We have made that commitment to European Union citizens living in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens living in the European Union. It must send some very alarming signs to UK citizens living abroad if it is suggested that, should we go crashing out, nothing will be done to establish or secure the rights of those citizens—
Lord Adonis (Lab)
Did the noble and learned Lord notice that in the Prime Minister’s Statement on Monday, she specifically mentioned that the United Kingdom might seek to achieve associate membership of certain European agencies? She said that,
“the UK would also have to respect the remit of the ECJ in that regard”.—[Official Report, Commons, 05/3/18; col. 26.]
Now that the Government themselves have recognised that there will be a continuing role for the European Court of Justice, is this not an absolutely appropriate further role that it should play?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
It is not only appropriate as a further role but one we have already agreed to. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, on many occasions noble Lords from all sides of the House have spoken about securing the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom and UK citizens in the European Union. This amendment fleshes that out and it would be wrong to pass a Bill which denied something we have already agreed.
Baroness Prosser (Lab)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Foulkes and I will speak to Amendment 54, which stands in my name. I will not detain noble Lords for long because much of what I intended to say has already been said and covered. Agreement on the wording of this amendment has been expressed by various Benches in this House, so this is not simply a one-sided argument. It seems to me that this country’s reputation globally will simply go down the Suwannee if we are prepared, at one moment, to say that we agree to certain protections for people who have become embroiled in this dreadful situation in which we find ourselves and then, a moment later, decide that, no, we do not agree with that and will not give those protections. What will people think of us as a nation if that is how the leadership of this country behaves?
My amendment would extend the requirement for certain persons to be able to refer their legal matters back to the European Court of Justice to a period of eight years. I trust that noble Lords will understand the need for such an extension. There is a statute of limitations existing for six years; if we do not include a period of coverage, people whose claims may well start quite late after the leaving date may well find themselves without that coverage, which I hope will be agreed.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 52, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and I support his comments and those made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, a moment ago. I wish to place the amendment within its context, which is EU citizenship—the citizenship of people resident in the United Kingdom, and on the European mainland. These comments are particularly relevant in the context of the interventions of the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth and Lord Liddle, a moment ago.
I am a European; that is my identity. I am Welsh; that is my nationality and, as noted on my European passport, I am a citizen of the United Kingdom. I have rights and obligations under each of these three headings. Some of those rights are protected by international law, some by European law, some by UK law and some by Welsh law. Taking established rights away from a citizen is a very serious matter. Citizens are protected in generality against any negative impact upon them that may arise from taking some of these rights away from them.
There is clearly a wide range of such rights but I shall refer to only one. Page 32 of my passport states that if you need consular assistance when you are outside the EU in a country where there is no British embassy or consulate, you can get help from the embassy or consulate of another member state of the EU. That is a right that I have today but which I may lose as a result of the UK leaving the EU. In other words, Brexit may be taking away from me a right that I currently have by virtue of being a European citizen. This is one of many rights that we have as citizens living within the EU. For those rights to be meaningful, there clearly has to be a process of redress whereby a citizen can seek to protect his or her rights through the courts, and in this context Amendment 52 is highly relevant as it would allow citizens to pursue their rights in the European courts after exit day, where that is relevant.
Lord Dykes (CB)
The noble Lord is making an extremely good speech with which I agree, so I am sorry to break in. He referred to being a citizen of the UK. Under Maastricht, he is also a citizen of the EU. Is he aware that the ECJ is beginning to receive many messages from British citizens, both here and living in other EU countries, asking for the ECJ to consider giving protection to them even post-Brexit if necessary?
Lord Wigley
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, for his helpful intervention. We are all European citizens; it is a European passport that we carry at the moment. Some of our rights are enshrined in the context of Europe, some in the context of the UK and some—in my case, as I mentioned a moment ago—in the context of Wales.
I am not going to speak at length to this amendment because there are several noble Lords who will speak with greater authority on the legal positions involved. However, I want to use the principles underpinning the rights of citizens in the EU to say a brief word about EU citizenship in a broader context: the rights afforded to us at present as citizens of the EU and the status of those rights once we leave. These matters are highly germane to the amendments before us—and they will not go away.
Baroness Altmann (Con)
I want to present to the Committee an observation: according to the December agreement reached by the Prime Minister, citizens of Northern Ireland will still be EU citizens after we leave. I am not sure where that leaves the rights of everyone else in the UK.
Lord Wigley
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for introducing that point; I was going to move on to it a little later but I shall do so now. Northern Ireland creates a precedent, if the undertakings that have been reported are indeed carried out. It is a part of a union of countries that may be retaining its rights after the other parts of the UK may lose theirs. Of course, there is a precedent in the context of Ireland: people in the Irish Republic maintained many of the rights relating to the UK that they previously enjoyed after the Republic was formed, and for many people those rights continue up to today. As the noble Baroness has said, many of the rights relating to the EU of citizens of Northern Ireland may well continue after Brexit. If it is possible to negotiate such rights for some of the citizens of the UK, why cannot such rights be ongoing for all its citizens?
Lord Cormack
Do we not have a particular responsibility for the smallest group of citizens for which this Government have responsibility—namely those living in Gibraltar?
Lord Wigley
I am sure we shall come on to the position of Gibraltar in greater detail at another time. In many ways this parallels the issues that arise in the context of Northern Ireland. If a solution to Northern Ireland were enshrined which allowed the free movement of people and goods across the border, that might well solve the problem of Gibraltar as well. We need to bear in mind our responsibilities to Gibraltar and to get an amicable settlement which would be acceptable in the European context, and therefore acceptable to Spain as well as to the people of Gibraltar. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, for raising this.
I want to use the principles underpinning the rights of citizens in the UK to say a brief word about citizenship in the broader context and about the rights afforded to us at present as citizens of the EU, as well as the status of these rights once we leave. These matters are highly germane to the amendments before us. Incidentally, there is an Opposition Day debate in the House of Commons this afternoon, initiated by my Plaid Cymru colleagues, on this precise topic.
By pursuing what may become a no-deal Brexit, the UK Government would, in effect, strip—at least potentially—our citizens of some of their rights. Our rights to travel, live and work across Europe will be curtailed. Our children’s rights—
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lord. Currently, a British lawyer, dentist or doctor can practise in any other European country. There is a reciprocal right for nationals of other EU countries to practise here. We are losing dentists and doctors because of the certification process which will be subject to negotiation on the basis of mutual recognition. Is this right, which could be curtailed, justiciable under his amendment?
Lord Wigley
Of course, this amendment provides a mechanism to create a redress for people who feel that they are losing these rights. It may not be the only mechanism available. There may be provisions under international law, which I shall mention before I close. It is not only our rights that are being curtailed but the rights of our children—the right to study in any of the other 27 countries across the EU may well be lost. It is questionable whether, in the context of these rights, we shall thereafter be able to call ourselves European in the full meaning of the word. I am a European. I am a Welsh European and no Government should be able to take away from me or from any citizen of these islands their right to their European identity, nor any of the practical rights they currently hold by virtue of that identity.
It is by virtue of their de facto European citizenship that the citizens of these islands currently have recourse to the European court. Stripping people of their citizenship against their will is illegal under international law. I have tabled another amendment which explores the retention of EU citizenship. I hope this will be debated at a later stage. Suffice it to say, at this stage we need these amendments to safeguard the position of people facing such a serious threat after Brexit. I am delighted to support the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
My Lords, of particular interest to me in this Bill is the way in which ordinary people would be most directly affected by leaving the EU. I have tabled Amendment 210, which asks the Government to support retention of European citizenship where the individual British citizen wishes to do so. Although not explicitly stated in the amendment, it would also cover those who had not yet acquired European citizenship at the time of Brexit. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, and the noble Lords, Lord Judd and Lord Davies of Stamford.
The importance of European citizenship and the effect of its loss at the individual level has not been sufficiently considered or explored, either before or in the 20 months since the referendum. Nevertheless, its retention has been consistently advocated by Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament’s representative on Brexit. Last year, it was the subject of a paper by Volker Roeben, then professor of international law at Swansea University, for Plaid Cymru MEP, Jill Evans. From the Government’s point of view, a useful conclusion of this paper was a belief in the feasibility of an associate citizenship, if citizenship rights were to be extinguished after Brexit. Roeben’s belief that this should be so was given some traction following the submission last month of a request to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in the case brought by British residents of Amsterdam. It is early days yet, but it is worth noting, in the context of my amendment, this statement from the judgment:
“Once legally acquired, EU citizenship is an independent source of rights and obligations that cannot be simply reduced or affected by actions of a national government”.
The loss of European citizenship would not just adversely affect the British abroad and, indeed, European citizens in the UK, but every British person living in the UK. Following the referral to the ECJ, QC Jolyon Maugham, supporter of those who brought the case in the Netherlands, made a particular point of saying that the final outcome of this case would have implications for residents of the UK as much as those abroad. The loss would be of all those rights that EU citizenship embodies, both in terms of the principle of that citizenship—the loss of identity that many would feel deeply, and which cannot be overestimated—and the very real practical concerns about rights and opportunities that would be lost or compromised, including being able to freely travel, work, study and raise a family abroad.
This is likely to have the greatest effect on young people living in the UK—an effect with no silver lining and which can only register negatively, as a loss. At the level of the individual citizen, it is not replaced by anything. European citizenship is additional to British citizenship, and that is the reality, whatever the outcome of the case begun in Amsterdam. As Sunday’s Observer editorial responding to Theresa May’s speech, but which might just as well have been referring to the potential loss of citizenship, put it:
“It was a defeat for young people, British and European, who, more so than older generations, will perforce inhabit an ugly new world of harder borders, work permits, bureaucracy and pervasive state intrusion”.
The referendum notwithstanding, many British people, both abroad and in this country, are angry that they should be stripped of their European citizenship without their own individual consent. For all these reasons, a Brexit that does not allow the retention of individual European citizenship for those who wish to retain that citizenship is a hard Brexit—more than that, it is a brutal Brexit, whatever the outcome on the wider national scale in terms of any trade deals.
What is being asked for in this amendment is very simple, and the precedent already exists, as this is no different from the dual citizenships that some in this House possess. The amendment asks only for the continuing acknowledgement of that additional citizenship. Do we now wish to start stripping people of all citizenships that are not British—for example, Australian, Canadian, American, Indian, Chinese? The list goes on.
At the level of the individual, the only solution that would be realistic or fair is that the 52%—or whatever the figure is now—may hand in their European passports and renounce their European citizenship, and the 48% retain theirs. The reality, of course, would be quite different. We have heard in the news about noted leavers who have bought, or are buying, EU citizenship as we speak. As I am sure others in this House do, I know of those who voted leave who, in circumstances where they are lucky enough to do so, are applying for European citizenship for themselves and/or their children, sometimes through having a husband or wife who is an EU citizen. Hypocritical? Of course it is, but it is also testament to the significance and desirability of retaining that citizenship and the real loss involved, with those who are lucky or rich enough becoming the first-class citizens of tomorrow, when previously it was an entirely equal arrangement for all of us.
The loss of European citizenship will in itself create an unequal society within the UK. Look too at Northern Ireland, as has been remarked upon: all those born there—about 89% of that country—will retain European citizenship, further turning the rest of us in the UK, in effect, into second-class citizens. Of course, I am not suggesting that Irish citizenship be given up. Late last year, Theresa May gave her agreement to an understanding that goes back to 1917 and that was rightly confirmed in the Good Friday agreement. Better, surely, that all of us who wish to should be able to retain our individual European citizenship. The Minister may say that that offer is not on the table, but a Government and a Parliament that really want to bring this country back together and heal the divisions would take the initiative and put it on the table. That is the right course of action, and I hope that the Government accept this amendment.
Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
I will stay away from the law on this, but when it comes to travel and so on to the EU, is there not a discussion to be had, the likelihood being that most people—unless they are going to work there—will be able to move around Europe without a visa? If I may say so, it is therefore not quite as disastrous as the noble Earl suggests.
The Earl of Clancarty
I am not sure that is the case at all. It is very likely that visas will be introduced.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
It may well be that we benefit from a visa waiver but it is also likely that we will have to apply for what is often called a “visa lite”, which similar to the United States’ ESTA. The EU is bringing in something called ETIAS and for most people it will not amount to a big difference: you have to go online, pay a fee and answer lots of questions about health, criminal background and so on. We may not require a visa but we will need a “visa lite”, so it will not be hassle-free.
The Earl of Clancarty
Absolutely. Whatever happens, we will be at a disadvantage to everyone else in Europe and that is really significant.
Lord Judd (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendment. When this whole matter originally came before the House, we had the firm assurance from the Front Bench opposite and the strong assurance from the Prime Minister that this was to be a top-priority issue in their considerations of our future. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said so powerfully, here we are, way down the road, and we have made no progress whatever.
The reason why I feel so strongly and passionately about this issue is that I fear that we are demeaning and undermining the whole concept of citizenship. Citizenship is something that people have fought for and struggled for centuries to establish. There are thousands and thousands of people from Britain in Europe. I declare an interest: in my extended family I have family members living in Europe and family members living in this country who are married to Poles, Czechs and so on, and it is a very rich experience. Such people have gone to Europe in the confidence of citizenship and all it has meant historically—to make new lives and build their future in the knowledge that they have citizenship of Europe.
Do we or do we not stand by the concept of citizenship? If we do, how can we contemplate any future in which we have not absolutely guaranteed that people have their rights of citizenship? My noble friend referred to anxiety being out there, and it certainly is. We are talking about men, women and children; about the futures of people who are working; about vulnerable people who have reached old age in the context of what they believed was European security—about real human situations. We need firm, unequivocal assurances from the Government that we believe not just in the right of citizenship, but in the whole concept of citizenship that has been established across Europe in our history. We want cast-iron guarantees that, in one way or another, that is going to be fulfilled.
Lord Haskel (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 211, which is in my name and deals with our rights but in a slightly different way. It would ensure that after withdrawal, our rights and protections remain intact by maintaining the standards at home and at work that we have come to expect in our daily life as part of our normal existence, and that those standards would not be sacrificed or lowered in any future negotiations.
I tabled this amendment some weeks ago and was pleased to see it reflected in the Prime Minister’s speech last Friday and in her Statement on Monday, when she spoke of maintaining current standards in some sectors. My amendment calls for them to be maintained in all sectors, because we cannot pick and choose where our quality of life is concerned. Even Monsieur Barnier seems to agree, and in his recent draft document he speaks of equivalent standards.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I am most grateful to the noble Lord and I understand the point he is making about international standards and international bodies. However, the effect of his amendment is, surely, that the British Parliament would be tied, in future, to decisions made by the European Union and the European court. Why does he not trust this Parliament to set regulations that are appropriate for the standards for our own people?
Lord Haskel
I do trust Britain to set its own standards, I just do not want to see them lowered. I am concerned that they will be lowered because of trade negotiations and the give and take that will go on in negotiating withdrawal.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
On that point, why does the noble Lord not think it possible that we might set higher standards, as for example we have done in respect of paternity rights and other matters?
Lord Haskel
I would very much welcome setting higher standards and am sure that all noble Lords would do so. My concern is that we should not lower them, because that is one of the rights we should not be giving away.
Lord Newby (LD)
My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that in her speech last week, the Prime Minister said that she wished us to retain an association with the European Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency, and the European Aviation Safety Agency, specifically to mirror 100% every standard that they set? The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, says that we still have a choice. No—if we are associate members of those bodies, not only do we not have a choice but we agree that we are bound by the decisions of the European Court. The Prime Minister set out very clearly how damaging it would be were we not to be members of those bodies, and therefore why we should retain membership of them.
Lord Haskel
The noble Lord is absolutely right and in a later amendment, I will call on the Government to set up institutions which would not accept the European standard but enforce our standards—institutions that are independent of the Government. The importance of independence is illustrated by the fact that the main reason why Ministers are doing something about poor air quality in some of our cities is the risk of fines or legal action from the EU, possibly through the European Court of Justice.
As other noble Lords have observed, we are now being less doctrinaire about the European Court of Justice. Being doctrinaire is the reason why we do not want EU standards because of the possibilities of disputes being settled by the European Court of Justice. But many institutions which enforce these standards have their own systems of settling disputes, and these systems have stood the test of time. So whatever the outcome of our withdrawal negotiations, a major concern for Ministers must be the disruption to our way of life and to trade. This amendment would go some way towards helping Ministers to deal with this concern and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Ludford
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 202, which is in the name of my noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham, who is unfortunately unable to attend because of illness. It is also in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Roberts of Llandudno and the noble Lord, Lord Judd. Before going on, I fully agree with what has been said in this debate about the need to retain EU citizenship for us all, and about the hypocrisy of some of those who supported and continue to support leave, but who have somehow managed to acquire a passport of an EU member state, such as Malta. That enables them to continue enjoying the benefits which they are quite happy to deprive the rest of us of.
Amendment 202 calls on the Government,
“to maintain, preserve and protect the rights of”,
EU citizens in the UK. I therefore very much agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, about the fact that that has not been done. We are seeking a guarantee that existing rights will remain unchanged. The Government have had the opportunity in the last 21 months to give a unilateral guarantee that existing rights would be retained. They were invited to do so by the EU Select Committee, in a report produced under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—I had the pleasure to serve on that sub-committee—but have not done so. They also had the opportunity to try to ring-fence the discussion about citizens’ rights from all the other matters being discussed within the withdrawal agreements but, unfortunately, they have not done that.
EU citizens resident in this country and British citizens resident in the EU 27 have indeed been used as bargaining chips. That has led to great distress for many of the 5 million affected citizens, who live in a state of anxiety and limbo that was not helped by the words of the Prime Minister in her speech to the Conservative Party in October 2016 about “citizens of nowhere”. She has now resiled from that kind of terminology, but unfortunately the damage has been done in that the tone is somehow one of, “You do not belong here if you have multiple allegiances. It is not good enough to be a contributing and responsible person in this country”. The Government still have a chance to offer unilateral guarantees and I invite the Minister to tell us today that he is going to ignore the mire into which all of this has become embroiled and just give a straightforward guarantee.
Many ambiguities and gaps still exist in the current state of play over the discussions about settled status. Some of the issues are being taken up in correspondence with Home Office Ministers on the part of the EU Select Committee. The problem is that settled status is not the retention of the same rights and protections that EU law currently confers on people; it is based on UK immigration law and has all the features of that law, including the hostile environment that is currently being created. People will have to apply for settled status. It will not just be a question of carryover or cut and paste—they will have to apply. Apparently, the Home Office expects the vast majority of cases to be granted, although that begs the question of which ones will not be granted to people who are currently resident here.
Lord Green of Deddington
Will the noble Baroness explain how we could possibly deal with several million people unless we invite them to apply?
Baroness Ludford
There could be a simple declaratory process. If any parliamentarians in this Chamber have ever had to deal with the Home Office on behalf of one of their constituents, as I did when I was an MEP, they will know what a happy—or otherwise—process that is. Something simple and declaratory such as going to the local town hall could be worked out. It should be light touch: a declaration of existing residence. That is quite different from having to apply to the Home Office.
The fear has been expressed on behalf of the group, the 3 million, that perhaps around 10% of people might fall through the cracks because their application is rejected or because they do not apply. Some people are not very aware of what is going on in the law or they do not have access to computers and so on. There is no legal presumption in favour of granting settled status to all residents who are legally living here before exit day, which begs another question. Perhaps the Minister could explain to us what exactly is going to happen to those people who arrive during the transition period. That, of course, is something the Prime Minister has conceded, in that they will have a status, but it is slightly unclear how it is going to work.
There has also been no clarification of the continuation of all the individual economic rights and recognition of qualifications that EU citizens currently enjoy and, as I have said, no guarantee that the registration will be simple and light touch. There is supposed to be a digital application system. Can the Minister tell us exactly where we are in the construction of that system? We all know that IT projects, in particular Home Office IT projects, have a habit of becoming problematic. Moreover, the backstop to all this is that the European Parliament will have to approve the withdrawal agreement, including the conditions for EU citizens. I note that Mr Verhofstadt tweeted yesterday,
“the European Parliament expects a cost free and burden free registration process”.
It wants to ensure that there is no discrimination between EU citizens and British citizens, which of course raises the question: are the Government planning to introduce ID cards by the back door in order to say that we are all being treated the same?
There are many holes and gaps that the Home Office is still unable to answer questions on. I do not have time to cover them all but I would like to ask about comprehensive sickness insurance—the requirement that people have private medical insurance—because very mixed messages are being given about it. The position of the European Commission has always been that if people are allowed to use the NHS, that amounts to comprehensive sickness insurance under the directive. It started legal action but that has apparently not progressed.
Lord Green of Deddington
I am very puzzled as to how any of this is relevant to the Bill we are discussing. Does the noble Baroness not understand that this kind of stuff, which is being repeated time and again, is actually doing more harm than good? It is raising issues for people who do not face them. It is quite clear that the maximum is being done to help people qualify for residence in the UK. We could not do more than we have done. Frankly, this is just making trouble.
Baroness Ludford
It is highly relevant to whether people are being guaranteed their existing rights to legally reside in this country. I am quite surprised that the noble Lord thinks it is not relevant to an amendment that is about maintaining and guaranteeing the existing rights of EU citizens. The confusion is caused by the Home Office’s lack of clarity, not by me.
I end on that note. I would like some answers from the Minister to these detailed questions and many others.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I want to make two short points. The first is that the precedent of giving rights in other countries when there is a separation is set up very well by the arrangements between ourselves and the Republic of Ireland in relation to Irish citizens and their rights in our country, which are guaranteed by statute in a number of cases.
Secondly, on the idea that we have to refer all these matters to the European court, anyone who reads the judgments of our courts from day to day will realise that the fairness they exhibit towards foreign citizens is of the highest possible standard. I know of no country in the world and no court in the world that succeeds in getting a higher standard; there are others that have an equally high standard, but I know of none that has a higher one. It would be a most retrograde step for this House to do anything that suggested to people in Europe that they could not get justice from the courts of this country.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Just to clarify, my amendment does not suggest that—quite the reverse. It would be the British court or the British tribunal that took the decision whether or not to refer such matters to the CJEU. It would still be the decision of a UK court.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
I think that is meant to be an intervention, because I have not quite finished. The situation is that the British courts, the Supreme Court in particular, have discretion to look at any judgment that they wish, and to raise any question they wish in these judgments. There is nothing in the present Bill that impedes that, except in respect of questions of European law, because the courts themselves, and the members of the Supreme Court, have been anxious that if they paid too much attention to the European court after Brexit, they might be accused of being involved in politics. They have sought a direction from Parliament on this matter, and that has been attempted, and I hope it is successful.
I personally do not share the animosity that exists in some quarters towards the European Court of Justice. It is over 30 years now since I often appeared before them, and I have nothing but praise for the way in which they do things. They do things very differently to us. There are far fewer oral hearings—at least, there were when I did it, which was a long time ago. There is much less oral pleading than there is in our courts. Actually, our courts have moved slightly in that direction in recent years, since I was last involved with them—and in some cases quite far in that direction.
The respect I have for the European Court is of the highest order, but I do think there is a difficulty because, after Brexit, no judges or advocates-general of the British Bar will be members of the court or advocates-general in the court. That is an important factor to be taken into account in the arrangements. I am not part of the negotiations—I have nothing to do with them—but I do believe that that point has to be taken into account. There is a usual rule that the people administering justice are the people who are in accordance with the arrangements between states. International courts, for example, may not have representatives from all the states that appear before them, but there is a question to be considered in that connection, because the Court of Justice referred to in the amendment will not be the Court of Justice as it is now.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I would like to intervene, following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, and referring to the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. One of the problems I have faced since looking at this Bill, is trying to find hard examples of situations in which the Supreme Court would wish to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice.
There is a very good example reported in Monday’s Times of a case called SM (Algeria) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer. I will take a moment to explain what the case is about, because it is a good example of citizens’ rights. SM was a little girl, who was placed into the legal guardianship of EU citizens, who happened to be in Algeria. The question concerned her position in coming to the United Kingdom as a member of that family under the Immigration (European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Merely referring to those regulations reminds us that they would become, as I understand the position, retained EU law under Clause 2 of the Bill.
The problem arose because the court saw that the regulation had been transposing wording from a directive, which is the normal way in which these things work, but the transposition was inaccurate. This is a situation I have encountered before—it happens from time to time. The question is how to deal with the inaccuracy. The inaccuracy was that while our regulation talked about “family member”—somebody who was put into the legal guardianship of a couple, would normally be regarded as a member of the family—the directive was talking about “direct descendants”, and she was not a direct descendant, because she was not actually related, in that sense, to the people who had become her guardians. In order to resolve that problem, the court found it necessary to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice—which it did on Monday. That was under the existing position.
In resolving the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it may help to ask how that matter would be handled after exit day. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that it would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. The directive would come into EU retained law under Clause 3, so we would have both pieces of legislation to look at. I think that the court, having regard particularly to the way in which we had translated the directive, would give great weight to our own language and regard this little girl as part of the family and therefore entitled to take the benefit of the regulation.
In explaining the situation, I hope I have not made it too complicated, but it is a good example of citizens’ rights, accorded by our own regulations, giving effect to EU law. There must be very many in the corpus of regulations which forms part of EU law. It comes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Supreme Court looks very carefully at the interests of children and would accord every weight to the normal rules about the priority given to the interests of the child in construing the regulation in a sense that fits with our own language. I should have thought that, after exit day, the question of referring the matter to the European Court of Justice simply would not arise because the court would be capable of resolving the issue itself without being bound by the problem of having to refer something which was not that clear. If I may use the English expression, it was not crystal clear; therefore they were bound to refer. Under the situation after exit day, any superior court will be fully able to resolve the problems of interpretation that arise. Will the Minister confirm that, in this situation, there would be no need for a reference because our courts would be able to deal with it perfectly properly, looking at the language of our own regulations, despite the problem that might have arisen in translating them from the directive into English?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in moving this amendment— I referred to it myself—was that, as part of the agreement that was struck between the United Kingdom and the European institutions in December, provision was made to,
“establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it”.
So it is not a case of questioning the ability of the Supreme Court. We have entered into an agreement which says that there must be an opportunity or a mechanism to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union. How does the noble and learned Lord see the mechanism for giving effect to what the United Kingdom Government have agreed?
Lord Hope of Craighead
I have listened with great care to what the noble and learned Lord has said but I cannot look into the future. I do not know what is going to happen as a result. We just have to look at the present situation. There are two factors to bear in mind. As far as the UK is concerned, for people looking to come here, an immense amount of citizens’ rights are guaranteed already under the regulations which implement directives. We ought not to lose sight of that. Secondly, problems of interpretation because of conflicts between the wording of the directive and our transposition of it, give rise to some doubt. Under the existing position, there is an obligation to refer which will not be present after exit day. This is a different situation with which I believe our courts will be able to cope perfectly well.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, in summary, was he saying that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is completely unnecessary?
Lord Hope of Craighead
With great respect, I would not put it in that way. It has given me an opportunity to bring forward an example which I am hoping the Minister will be able to comment on. The noble Lord has raised an important point. We all care about citizens’ rights. I hope I have drawn attention to the context in which one looks at the amendment. It is a well-crafted amendment to which the Minister may have an answer along the lines I have suggested.
Lord Roberts of Llandudno (LD)
My Lords, I speak not as a lawyer—I find it difficult to follow some of these legal arguments—but as a grandfather to seven grandchildren, each of whom was born into European citizenship after the treaty of Maastricht. They are just representative of the more than 18 million others who were born since that treaty was signed. If the Bill were to go through unamended, we would withdraw rights and hopes given to them during the past 25 years. What moral right do we have to do this?
If I spoke today in favour of this Bill, what would I say to Haf, Osian, Manon, Megan, Reuben—I am trying to remember their names—Ianto and Aiden? They would say, “Taid”—which is Welsh for grandfather—“why did you not oppose this? Why did you not oppose the loss of all these freedoms and the availability we had in the previous time? You didn’t do a thing”. I am not the only grandfather in this room; I am not the only grandparent in this room. If a grandparent can vote to withdraw rights that have been cherished by their grandchildren, they are doing a tremendous disservice. To the various concessions in travel, in education and in so many other ways that we get as members of the European Union there will now be barriers, and it will be because we went along with the Bill—I would nearly call it an insane Bill—to withdraw these rights from those who have cherished them and used them during the past 25 years. We were able to choose to be members of the European Union; they were not. They were born into British citizenship; they were born into European citizenship, and, as my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, they were born into Welsh citizenship. We cannot withdraw these things. It is a blind way of treating the future generation.
That is all that I will say at this point. Seriously, we have no right. How will the Minister defend the withdrawal of such rights from 18 million citizens? We should remember that only 17 million people voted to leave; we are talking here about 18 million. How on earth can the Minister defend such a move?
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I support the amendments. I speak not as a grandmother, although I am one, but as somebody who not only voted for Brexit but campaigned for it. Therefore, I carry quite a heavy burden to help ensure that we get the best outcomes for people living in our country.
When voting to leave, no one voted to lose their rights. The amendments would ensure that the Government safeguarded the rights and protections of people as we negotiate leaving the EU. It has been hard to get much sense out of the Government about their plans for Brexit. The default message is to refer to the Prime Minister's Florence speech or Lancaster House speech, but platitudes about “getting the best deal” or “making Brexit a success” simply are not enough to guarantee that our Government do not risk undermining our basic rights and protections during the Brexit negotiations.
The Government seem unable to agree on many of the big issues and it is unclear who is in charge. In the absence of principled, clear leadership, Parliament must take the reins and do what is right for the majority of people. The amendments would protect both British citizens and EU citizens, people who have built their lives around the opportunities given to them by EU membership. They would force the Government to stop abusing our rights as a political bargaining chip. There should never have been any question over the rights of EU citizens living in this country, but our Government insisted on using our basic rights as part of their struggle to gain bargaining power in negotiations.
It is often conceived by supporters of remaining in the EU that the main motivation for Brexit is a narrow-minded, nasty little racist attitude which blames all our country’s problems on foreigners. I could not be further away from that world view, although I believe that some of the Brexiteers—I have some names here but will not read them out—and others have a lot to answer for in the way that they used migrants as scapegoats for the very real destruction that our own Government have cast upon our society with their slash-and-burn austerity measures. The Government sowed the seeds for a lot of the division and anger that prevail in our country.
I celebrate migrants and migration. Humans have always moved around as we seek opportunities and form new communities. It is an essential part of what it means to be human and without migration we would probably be stuck in isolated little groups, still using flint tools and eating with our fingers. Instead, humans have done the most astonishing things and we have all gained enormously from the massive cultural and technological growth that results from humans meeting humans and sharing ideas, cultures, stories and lifestyles. These amendments would do what is absolutely right and fair. They are about breaking Brexit away from those who espouse anti-immigrant views and saying that Brexit is about being more open, tolerant and diverse than ever before. A Brexit that cannot achieve that is not a Brexit worth having and not one that I will support.
Baroness D'Souza (CB)
My Lords, if there is to be a commitment to the highest standards of protection of citizens’ rights—I go back to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Haskel—this would presumably include the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. But the Bill suggests that we omit that charter, so can the Minister say what would be the mechanism by which those charter rights would be guaranteed for EU citizens who remain resident in the UK?
Lord Adonis
My Lords, Amendments 160 and 170 are in my name and they would prevent regulations being made under Clause 9 if they,
“remove, reduce or … amend the rights of”,
an EU citizen,
“lawfully resident in the United Kingdom on any day before 30 March 2019”,
or until such time as Her Majesty’s Government have signed a reciprocal agreement with the European Union on the rights of citizens post-March 2019.
The issue here is simple. It is about giving legal effect to the assurance, which the Prime Minister has repeatedly given since Article 50 was invoked, that the rights of European citizens who are currently resident in the United Kingdom will be respected. The Prime Minister said in her October 2017 email to EU citizens not only, “I couldn’t be clearer”—actually, most of the Prime Minister’s statements which are not clear begin with “I want to be clear that”. She said she could not be clearer that,
“EU citizens … lawfully in the UK … will be able to stay”.
She also said:
“When we started this process, some accused us of treating EU nationals as bargaining chips. Nothing could have been further from the truth”.
If nothing could be further from the truth, why has Parliament not been invited by the Government immediately to give legal effect to the rights of EU citizens resident in this country? It is a very simple issue. The reason why it has not happened is precisely that the Government do want to use EU citizens as bargaining chips. Saying that they do not, when all the evidence is that they do, does not, I am afraid, cut the mustard at all.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, also raised a crucial issue, which I hope the Minister will address. What is to happen to EU citizens who come here during the transition? We all know what the Minister will say: that it all depends upon the agreement. When the Prime Minister brings that agreement down with her tablets of stone, whether that happens in October, November, December or January, it will have to include a precise set of legal commitments on what is to happen in the transition. The only point I make in respect of that, which I hope the Minister might address in his remarks, draws very much on what the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno, and the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, said: that this is a really shabby way of presenting this country abroad.
Let us be clear. People across the world, including people whom we want to work in our National Health Service and make a big contribution to this country, are having to make decisions as we deliberate on whether they can come to this country from the end of March next year. Quite soon, that will be a matter not of months but of days in which they will have to make these decisions.
I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will claim that we are open and that we welcome them coming here. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, made what I thought was an excellent speech in favour of remaining in the European Union because we would embrace all the rights set out in the treaties. How is it that we can look at people straight and say to them, “This is a great place to come and live. We are going to maintain your rights, but even now, we are not prepared to tell you what those rights will be in a year’s time”? This country is presenting a terrible face to the world. Frankly, I am ashamed of the position our Parliament is adopting towards the rights of existing EU citizens, who still do not have those rights enshrined in law, and of those we are seeking to attract to this country from the end of next March.
As the whole Brexit project starts to disintegrate, nothing is undermining its moral foundations more than our inability as a Parliament—and, indeed, the noble and learned Lord’s Government—to give firm legal undertakings in respect of people who are resident in this country and came here in good faith.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that the issue is important not only to those who might be thinking of coming here, but to the people living here now? It is perfectly clear that their confidence has been undermined and they are showing that by voting with their feet. They are leaving jobs which are important to the whole of our society. The longer this debate goes on, having started from a position of, “Let us be clear: no rights will be taken away”, the less confident many people feel about their future.
Before I finish, perhaps I may say that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, who also got off my chest a lot of the things I feel about this issue.
Lord Adonis
Perhaps I may respond to the noble Baroness and make one further brief point. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said that we should be proud of our courts and the work they do. I entirely agree with him; however, we are told time and again—indeed, it is part of the argument for Brexit—that our courts are of course subservient to Parliament. They implement and give judgments on the laws that are passed by Parliament, which has still not guaranteed the rights of European Union citizens resident in this country. Moreover, because it is not being invited to do so by the Government, at the moment it will not make any declaration about those rights after the end of March next year. That, I believe, is shameful.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I want to concentrate on the last point made by my noble friend Lord Adonis and on the arguments made, particularly on Amendments 49 and 52, by my noble friend Lord Foulkes and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I do so because the bit that is so critical is implementing what in December the Prime Minister said would be on offer to EU citizens already living here and which we need to put into law. That is an absolute priority and a priority for this Committee.
As we have heard, there is a particular need, because of what the Prime Minister agreed to in December, for the Government to rethink their blanket refusal to allow access to or take heed of the Court of Justice of the European Union within this Bill. It has been written out of the Bill precisely because of the draft withdrawal agreement—it is called a report, not an agreement—produced in December. As drafted, that document will allow access to what I still call the ECJ for EU citizens resident here for another eight years, which is why that is mentioned in the amendment. It would fulfil the undertaking written into the report last December with regard to their rights.
It was suggested in one of the meetings I had with a Minister—I cannot remember who—that everything is fine: we should not worry because it will be put into law by repealing parts of the Bill before us more or less as soon as Her Majesty’s ink is dry on Royal Assent. That is one way of dealing with it, and I gather the idea is that we pass this Bill and then start amending it. But to me, that seems a little weird, given that this Bill is before us now and can be amended in the way required by the December agreement so that we get it correct now. That would provide certainty and would ensure that it is in the correct form—I am sure that if the wording is not quite right, the noble and learned Lord can correct it. It would mean that it is done in good time and not at a rush after October or whenever everything else is settled.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to be able—I use that term advisedly—to respond to the issues raised in the context of these amendments. Given the scope of the contributions, I will perhaps begin by touching on one or two points that have been made by noble Lords in the debate.
The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to the content of the joint report and quoted, among other things, the phrase,
“the Agreement should also establish”.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, did likewise, and referred to the passage about the bestowal of rights that will come with the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, referred to Michel Barnier’s recent draft—quite accurately, if I may say so. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out that the European Parliament will have to agree to the terms of any withdrawal agreement. That is self-evident.
In other words, these matters are prospective. Why are they prospective? I do not want to be overly technical, and I do not believe that I will be, but we begin with the duality principle of our law. That means that we enter into international obligations at the level of international law and they have no direct impact on our domestic law. For example, the withdrawal agreement will be an international treaty entered into by the Executive. We then implement or bring the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by way of domestic legislation of this Parliament. That is the duality principle: you have international law and you have domestic law, and you can only have the domestic law once you have the international treaty, because it is from the international treaty rights and obligations that you allow the domestic rights and obligations to be brought into our domestic law. What we have at the present time is a joint report from December of last year. We acknowledge that.
Lord Keen of Elie
It is not yet a treaty, if I can anticipate the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, because the position of the EU has been, quite rightly, that there is no agreement until everything is agreed. This has been a staged process. We believe that it is important that we were able to achieve the first stage and that we were able to achieve consensus. It is perhaps better to use the word “consensus” here rather than “agreement”, which can be confusing and sometimes misleading. We have achieved consensus in a number of important areas and, as we carry that forward, we proceed into the negotiation of what will be an international treaty.
As we have said before, once we have that international treaty, we can then draw down from the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by virtue of the fact that we will bring forward a withdrawal agreement Bill for scrutiny by this Parliament.
Lord Adonis
Can the noble and learned Lord explain to the House the difference between consensus and agreement?
Lord Keen of Elie
One has to be careful in the matter of language. We are at one with regard to the first part of what we want to do in the context of withdrawal, but we do not yet have an agreement that is binding in law with the other EU 27. For example, going forward, and during the subsequent negotiations, the EU may come and go as to the terms of the joint report. Indeed, we saw some indications of that when it came out with its draft recently, where issue was taken with the way in which it expressed some aspects of the joint report, particularly with regard to Northern Ireland. I appreciate that, if you want to construe the term “consensus” in that way, it involves “agreement”. The reason why I am trying to move away from “agreement” is that some see the word and infer that there is some legally binding concept. That is not yet what we have. We have a joint report and, therefore, we have consensus. We are moving on to the overall negotiations on what will ultimately be an international treaty.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
We all hope that this agreement, or whatever word it is, is fixed soon, but it could be quite late. We may not have the withdrawal Bill until sometime next year and it could be that we are due to leave a month or so afterwards. This part of the Bill affects individuals more than businesses and they will not know whether they can go to court until it is fixed—we may not get Royal Assent until a month or two before we leave. Is that really a good way to treat individuals?
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect to the noble Baroness, businesses affect individuals, so it is not appropriate to try to draw a distinction between citizens’ rights and businesses in that context. The right to work involves the right to maintain a business in various countries; you cannot simply draw them apart in that way. As regards regards timing, of course we are concerned to ensure that we achieve a withdrawal agreement sooner rather than later. That is why these negotiations are under way. If perchance no agreement is achieved—and I am not aware of anyone who wishes this, although others will perhaps assert the contrary—we will have to look at how we then deal with matters in the absence of that international agreement.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I hear what he is saying about the duality principle. Can he conceive of any circumstances in which the consensus reached between the United Kingdom and the European Union on the way in which we should treat EU citizens in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens in the EU would not be taken forward or would fall apart? Can he see any circumstances where that might happen?
Lord Keen of Elie
At the present time, no, but we are only now undertaking the detailed negotiation of the withdrawal agreement. It may be, for example, that the situation of UK citizens in Europe will alter during the course of those negotiations. It may be that the European Parliament will take a different view on how the rights and interests of those UK citizens in Europe should be approached. The noble and learned Lord will recall that, at an earlier stage, there were some suggestions that the rights of UK citizens in Europe would be limited to the member state in which they were resident at the time of exit. There are all sorts of possibilities and I am not going to indulge in an analysis of those possibilities—we are concerned with achieving certainty. We have achieved, by way of the joint report in December, an expression of joint opinion about where we are going, with regard not only to the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom but also to the rights of UK citizens in the EU. Of course we want to bring that in to the final withdrawal agreement, in order that we can then draw it down and implement it in domestic law.
Lord Cormack
My noble and learned friend is being very honest with the Committee, but in a way that gives me some cause for alarm. He has made it absolutely plain that, at the moment, there is no guarantee. Would it still be possible—I believe that it would—for this Government to give and enact in Parliament a guarantee such as this House voted for at the time of the debates on the Article 50 Bill?
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect, no, my Lords, because we are not in a position to guarantee that which has been arrived at in terms of the joint report. For example, we cannot by ourselves guarantee the rights of UK citizens in Europe. To try to dissect the joint report and say, “We’ll take one piece out and leave another piece in”, is not a way forward in the context of an ongoing international-level negotiation. It is not the way in which this Government would proceed in that context.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering
My noble and learned friend is talking in the context of this being an international treaty that has to be transposed into UK law, but surely the amendment addresses the issue of the supremacy of European Union law, which citizens of the EU currently rely on when they live in this country. I thought that the purpose of the amendment was to make sure that those rights continued to exist and would be clarified. That is all that we asking in the Committee today.
Lord Keen of Elie
With great respect to the noble Baroness, I think that I must respond to my noble friend Lady McIntosh.
Again, that argument rather misses the point, because what we have at the moment is a belief on the basis of the joint report that rights of EU citizens in the UK may be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union after Brexit, but that is not finalised; it is not yet contained in an international treaty agreement.
Baroness Ludford
We have always understood that we cannot unilaterally guarantee in the context of what is now happening an agreement of two parties. What was said from the very beginning, immediately after the referendum, was, “Give a unilateral guarantee and then we can with almost 100% certainty expect full reciprocity”. That was always what was suggested.
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect to the noble Baroness—who I think invited me to drop all the mire; I am not sure what I am supposed to do about that—the expectation of reciprocity is something that we hope to achieve during the negotiation, and that is ongoing.
Lord Keen of Elie
Perhaps I may make a little progress.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, also raised the question of settled status. We are intent on putting in place provision for settled status, which can be done pursuant to regulations made under the immigration legislation, in particular the Immigration Act 1971. We plan to open that application process on a voluntary basis in late 2018 in order that people may begin on it. The noble Baroness suggested that it was inappropriate to have an application process and went on to suggest a light-touch process. I suggest that we have an efficient and effective process from the perspective both of the applicant and of those who have to process it.
The noble Baroness also raised the question of arrivals during the implementation period and the need during the implementation period for those arrivals to register. Again, the final outcome as to the rights and obligations of those who arrive during the implementation period will be the subject of negotiation. We hope to take that forward in due course.
Lord Wigley
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I am following what he is saying. Is he in fact confirming that there will be two classes of citizen in Northern Ireland: those who hold Irish citizenship as well and will be able, if there is a border, to cross it totally freely and thus into the rest of Europe, and a second class of UK citizens in Northern Ireland who will not be able to do so?
Lord Keen of Elie
No, my Lords, there will not be two classes of citizens. Let us take a simple example. If I hold USA citizenship and UK citizenship, I can pass between the UK and the USA because I am a citizen of both countries. If I am a citizen of the UK and a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, I can pass between the two countries because I am a citizen of each state. It is not a case of classification; it is simply a matter of status.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Will the noble and learned Lord clarify a point raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley? What is the position of citizens in Gibraltar?
Lord Keen of Elie
Gibraltar is an overseas territory whose people hold UK citizenship. However, if they do not retain citizenship of another EU country after Brexit, they will not be EU citizens.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
As I understand it, they can get a Spanish passport if they so wish, although I do not think that many of them do. Will they continue to be citizens of the United Kingdom and will they be eligible also to get EU citizenship?
Lord Keen of Elie
This seems to confuse a number of different issues because the parallels are the same as those in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. If you are a UK citizen in Gibraltar and you are also entitled to apply for and be granted citizenship of Spain, you will then hold dual nationality or dual citizenship, and as a citizen of Spain, for as long as it remains a member state of the EU, you will enjoy the right to EU citizenship. It is no different from the position in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the same way, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—perhaps referring to something she may have read in the Daily Mail—talked about people applying for citizenship of Malta in order to ensure they can maintain EU citizenship. This is how it happens, but the fundamental point is that you cannot be a citizen of the EU unless you are a citizen of a member state. That is written into the treaties.
It may appear—and it will almost certainly appear to the Chief Whip—that I have digressed slightly from some of the amendments; he will be watching. I just seek to touch on some of them. I hope I covered in my opening remarks some of the points made. Amendments 160 and 170 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and Amendment 202 by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. Unfortunately, she was not here to speak to it, but it was referred to. As I have indicated, at the end of the day, we will have to conclude the negotiations in respect of the withdrawal agreement treaty and then draw it down into our domestic law. Tying Clause 9 to a particular outcome is not going to assist that.
The noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, moved Amendment 210. Again, I hope I have set out the Government’s position on this. We appreciate what we have achieved by way of the joint report, and we go on to the detailed negotiations in the hope it will effectively mean that we can confirm in domestic law not only the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom, but the right of UK citizens in the EU.
The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, moved Amendment 211, which details a requirement to keep equivalence with the EU on rights and protections. Again, this is prospective. We are addressing it in the course of negotiations and we hope to achieve it in many respects. In my view and in the view of the Government, it would not be appropriate to bring this into our domestic law.
Finally, we have Amendments 49 and 52, which I hope I have gone some way to addressing so far. The Bill aims to provide a stable and certain domestic statute book on exit day. That is its point, irrespective of the result of the negotiations and of any final agreement with the EU. Of course, once we achieve a final agreement, we fully appreciate that we are going to have to draw it down into our domestic law. Parliament will have an opportunity to scrutinise it.
Lord Liddle
If, as I am sure we both do not want, the withdrawal agreement is not reached, what then happens to EU citizens’ rights? Do we not have the opportunity now to guarantee them, whatever the case?
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect, if there were no agreement, then it would be for this sovereign Parliament to decide what it was going to do about that in domestic law. We have already made clear expressions of intent as regards their status. There is an issue here of time and place. While I understand the expressions of concern that we have heard from across the House, this is not the time and this Bill is not the place for these amendments. In these circumstances, I invite noble Lords not to press them.
Lord Patten of Barnes
I wonder if I could put one point to the noble and learned Lord before he sits down. As ever, what he said was intellectually lucid and stimulating. I just want to jog back to what he said about consensus and agreement. It is a very important distinction and I am sure it will be interesting to all his ministerial colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to diplomats around the world. How does this distinction translate into other languages? Does he think that our interlocutors in Brussels regard what we appeared to accept in December as a consensus or as an agreement? Does he think that they will now be quite relaxed if we walk away from some of what was a consensus because it was not an agreement? I should like to be a little clearer on this. It is going to be very important as we go through this debate when we are told that things are part of a consensus and not part of an agreement. If, with his usual intellectual authority, he could explain that to naive, one-time make-believe diplomats like me, I should be grateful.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am most obliged to the noble Lord, if only for the compliment. As I sought to explain, we have the joint report and we have embraced it. We go on now to the next stage of negotiation. I used the term “consensus”, perhaps ill advisedly, to underline the point that we have not yet signed a binding agreement in international law—we have not yet achieved a treaty. We strive to achieve a treaty, and in striving to achieve that treaty we have in mind what we have already achieved in the joint report. But we acknowledge, as the EU itself has noted, that we have not yet placed that in the form of a treaty that is binding in international law. Until we do that, we do not draw it down into domestic law.
Lord Adonis
Does the noble and learned Lord envisage that Her Majesty’s Government might resile from any of the commitments they gave in the consensus they reached at the end of last year?
Lord Keen of Elie
I do not even imagine that Her Majesty’s Government would wish to do anything of the sort.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, one of my comrades, if I may use that word in this place, commented that I was unduly brief in my introduction—or perhaps it was unusually brief; it was one or the other. That was because I stuck precisely to the terms of my amendment. The debate, however, has gone much wider than that. We have heard some powerful, passionate pleas on behalf of the rights of European Union citizens. We have heard them from colleagues on all sides of the House, and it is important to note that it is not just the opposition parties arguing this: support has come from the Cross Benches and from the Conservative Benches.
One of the ironies is that if European Union citizens has been given the right to vote in the referendum—they are taxpayers: “no taxation without representation”—as they were in the Scottish referendum, we would not now be going through this tortuous procedure. We would be getting on with running the country, looking after education, health, justice and all the things we should be doing as the sovereign Parliament.
My noble friend Lady Prosser put it very well: the reputation of the United Kingdom is at stake in all the matters that we are looking at today. The arguments put forward by my colleagues on behalf of all the amendments in the group were very powerful.
Lord Bilimoria (CB)
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Could he add that European Union citizens will be allowed to vote in the forthcoming council elections in May?
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Indeed, and as I understand it, if I read the Evening Standard right, they are going to send a very strong message as far as London is concerned about what they think of this Government.
I conclude by saying that I wish I was learned as well as noble, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, because I would then be able to understand some of the detail rather more precisely.
Lord Adonis
Before my noble friend concludes, does he share my concern about what the Minister said about the difference between “consensus” and “agreement”? Does he agree that that is quite a significant statement on the part of the Government in the course of this debate? The only point in making the distinction, as I understand it, is that the Government do not regard themselves as fully committed to the terms of the “agreement” of last December.
Lord Keen of Elie
It is unusual for me to intervene, but I feel that if the noble Lord is going to make statements, he should make them accurately. If he is going to represent what a Minister has said, he should do so accurately. The distinction I drew was between an agreement that was now binding in international law and an agreement that was not now binding in international law. I hope the noble Lord’s recollection coincides with mine. If it does not, could he perhaps consult Hansard?
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
It is a very interesting point, and the noble Lord, Lord Patten, highlighted it in his intervention. I wish that while he was speaking I had been able to translate “consensus” and “agreement” into Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Welsh and so on to see whether there is a coincidence between one and the other. No doubt that is something that we can return to.
The Minister finished by saying that there is a time and a place, and that this is not the right time and not the right place for these amendments. There will be many more times and this will be the right place, and I look forward to speaking to the rights of European—
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
Does the noble Lord agree that although on the legalities we have heard an extremely lucid explanation that in my view nobody could disagree with, delivered with all the noble and learned Lord’s customary charm, what we have not heard is any indication that anybody is aware of the reality in the outside world: that these people are choosing to go home? The people we need are going back because the Government are not giving them an assurance. These people believe that we agreed something in November. What we are seeing now in this intellectually fascinating legal debate is a total betrayal of their belief that we had agreed something. The pace at which people move away from this country—people who we need—will speed up if we do not get this right.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, for pointing out that although the Minister has all the legality behind him, perhaps his argument is lacking in humanity. It is humanity that the European Union citizens deserve, not the legality that we have heard.
I was about to conclude by saying that this may not be the right time but it is certainly the right place. I look forward to returning to this, and I know that many noble Lords who have spoken do also, to argue and to fight for the rights of not just UK citizens on the continent, who matter as well, but the European Union citizens who have given so much to this country over the years and continue to do so.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
It is worth pointing out that these citizens have existing rights by law in this country, and that will remain the case until these provisions are repealed, if and when they are.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
The noble and learned Lord is a distinguished lawyer and had great distinction as the Lord Chancellor. Perhaps he can explain to the European Union citizens in Scotland, where he and I both live, why they were allowed to vote in the Scottish referendum but not in the European Union referendum. Many of them have asked me but I do not have the intellect or ability to answer them; perhaps the noble and learned Lord can.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
That does not appear to be entirely relevant to the present debate and it is a bit late anyway. I had very little to do with the formulation of the franchise.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
I think now it would be appropriate for me to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Bassam of Brighton
Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
My Lords, I rather hope that the modest amendments in my name do not take the House two hours to deliberate over. They focus on a narrow set of issues relating to pending cases.
Amendment 62 would allow our domestic courts, subject to the terms of the withdrawal or transitional agreement, to refer cases to the CJEU after exit day if the course of action arose before exit day. Amendment 61 would require the Government to obtain from the CJEU and then publish a list of pending cases referred to domestic courts before exit day. Amendment 64 changes the definition of retained EU case law to include case law relating to pending cases referred to the CJEU before exit day.
These amendments were drawn from the Constitution Committee’s excellent report on the Bill and essentially aim to deal with two issues: first, pending cases in domestic courts that might have been referred to the CJEU and, secondly, pending cases already lodged with the CJEU before exit day. In the first instance I am really asking for the Government’s assurance that, in any withdrawal or transition agreement, they will seek to clarify whether domestic courts can continue to make reference to the CJEU in relation to cases that began before exit day. I can see that there has to be a cut-off point for references but it is the timing of that point which concerns me. What criteria will Ministers apply and how will these be written into the agreement in such a way as to guarantee, and not undermine, procedural fairness and access to justice?
It may seem that this is a small or insignificant matter but, given the wide range of issues that the court considers, I think not. After all, it looks at everything from trademarks to intellectual property rights, workplace rights and even the distribution of EU funds. Given that cases started before the Prime Minister triggered Article 50 are likely to be treated differently from those which followed it, it is surely important that principles of fairness and consistency enter into any agreement which the Government can sign.
The second type of pending cases, dealt with in Amendment 64, will be those that are already with the CJEU. In another place, the Solicitor-General argued that these cases would simply continue. That is fine as far as it goes but, as the Constitution Committee pointed out, the Government intend to provide for these pending cases to be covered in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. But what happens to those cases if there is no deal? Would it not make sense to have a saving provision in the Bill saying simply that any case that is with the CJEU is determined to be treated as contributing to pre-exit case law, and in turn forms part of retained EU case law?
The Constitution Committee’s proposal that the Government should produce a list of cases on exit day that would be treated in this way made very good sense. To my way of thinking, that is a logical way of handling quite a complex set of legal issues, which are obviously well beyond my sort of competence as a non-lawyer. However, I hope that the Minister can satisfy my curiosity and set out how the Government intend to proceed. I also hope that he can satisfy the Constitution Committee, which I thought had a rather neat solution to the problem. Pending cases are of great value and will be of great interest to colleagues. I am hopeful that the Government can satisfy my simple concerns and provide us with an explanation that works. I fear that we will otherwise end up with something of a case law muddle. I beg to move.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My noble friend is absolutely right that this is not a small or insignificant matter. It is an important one with rule-of-law implications. The starting point, as he explained, is his proposed Amendment 62 which, if agreed, would add a new paragraph (6C), the purpose of which would be to encourage the negotiation of an agreement that cases can continue to be referred to the CJEU by our own courts after exit day. That would relate to new cases where the cause of action arose prior to exit day. This is logical because the important point is about whether the full remedies currently available to litigants, potential litigants and, importantly, our courts remain until we leave, while the law of the EU remains in place.
Of course, being able to refer such cases depends on an agreement, the very agreement that my noble friend’s amendment would make it an objective to negotiate. We will not be able to refer cases to the court in Luxembourg after exit day, except by agreement with the EU in such an agreement. But he is also right that there is a risk—although we hope very much that it will not happen—that if we end up without a withdrawal agreement, there would need to be legislation enabling this to continue to take place. So the principle of the amendments seems entirely right, and he is right to say that this was dealt with by the Constitution Committee at paragraphs 150 and 153 of its excellent report.
Perhaps I may refer to what the committee said in paragraph 153, having made the point that my noble friend has identified:
“We recommend that, irrespective of any implementation bill, pending cases are dealt with in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. We further recommend that rulings on cases that have been referred to the CJEU before exit day are treated as pre-exit case law—such that they form part of ‘retained EU case law’—and that the Government publishes, on exit day, a list of all such cases”.
The middle part of that, on what the significance is of,
“rulings on cases that have been referred … before exit day”,
is dealt with in a later amendment. But, as he has said, the requirement that the Government should publish a list of all such cases is dealt with in these amendments. He is right to say that the Solicitor-General in another place referred to the importance of knowing, at least as I read his remarks, what those cases are.
It seems that there has to be a justification, although I can see none, for depriving litigants and our courts of the ability to refer cases to the CJEU. It is important that noble Lords are clear on the fact that that does not mean sending cases to the CJEU for it to decide; it is for that court to determine questions of interpretation, as the treaty currently provides, although the interpretation given may in fact then decide the case. Our own courts would then take the interpretation provided by the European court and apply it to the case before them.
I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness or the noble and learned Lord, depending on who will respond to the debate—forgive me, of course it is the noble Baroness the Minister—will say to my noble friend.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, this may have been a short debate but it concerns a significant issue, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for their contributions. I am aware that a key issue of interest in this Committee is how pending cases before the European courts will be resolved, and I hope that I can respond relatively briefly to these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam.
As was acknowledged in their contributions, the Government have been clear regarding their approach to cases which have been referred to the European courts before exit day and we have made good progress in achieving this outcome in our negotiations with the EU. As such, I applaud the similar concern expressed by the noble Lord that there should be legal certainty in this area. However, as I have said previously, and indeed as my ministerial colleagues have also said, the purpose of this Bill is to provide a functioning statute book on the day we leave the EU, irrespective of the result of the negotiations on any final agreement with the EU.
The Government have been clear throughout the passage of the Bill through this House and the other place that it is not intended in any way to prejudge the negotiations or to predict an agreement between the UK and the EU on their future relationship. For that reason, I would submit that the Bill is not a suitable vehicle for such amendments to take effect. Future legislation will be needed to implement the withdrawal agreement, including the treatment of cases that are pending before the European Court of Justice. That legislation will need to be informed by the precise terms of the agreement. The Government have already committed to introducing a withdrawal agreement and an implementation Bill, but let me try to clarify a couple of the specific points raised.
I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who in effect asked about the status of a case that has been referred to the European court before exit, but does not proceed to a judgment until after then. The intention is that a case which starts and has been referred to that court before exit would proceed to a judgment, which our courts would be bound by. That is the intention but—let me make this clear—this is pending an agreement with the EU about these issues. In relation to the request of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for a list my understanding is that, at the moment, cases registered at the Court of Justice of the European Union are made available online, so after our withdrawal we will have certainty as to how many pending UK cases have been referred to the court.
I apologise to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord if I have not specifically addressed some of their concerns. The difficulty, as was made clear in December, is that there is a clear statement of intention made in good faith by the Government, surrounding heads of agreement that have been achieved between the United Kingdom and the EU. But we need to continue with our negotiations to fine tune that, and hopefully then reduce it all to the final agreement. But I cannot pre-empt what may be in the final agreement and I hope that, in these circumstances, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Goldsmith
I apologise for not having properly identified the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, as the Minister responding to this debate. I wonder whether she will allow me to just press one question. She has very helpfully identified the position in relation to pending cases that have started but for which rulings have not been given at the date of exit. These amendments include an additional category of cases, as I understand it, such as cases where the cause of action has arisen prior to exit: for example, where EU law is in place and there is an issue of EU law that a litigant wants to raise but they have not actually started the case at the moment we leave; or where the case has started but a reference has not been made at that stage, because the court does not make a reference until it comes to a particular point in the proceedings. In line with her helpful answer in relation to the category of cases that are pending in the CJEU at the date of exit, does she think the same principle ought to apply, subject to agreement, to cases where the cause of action has arisen before exit or the case has started but not got any further than that? Could she help on that point?
Baroness Goldie
I thank the noble and learned Lord for his point, but I am afraid my response is going to be slightly less encouraging for him. The position of the Government is that we do not agree that new cases should be initiated post exit, even when these refer to pre-exit causes of action, because it would lead to an uncertain environment. It would be impossible to predict for how long the European Court of Justice would continue to issue judgments in respect of the UK. That, in the opinion of the Government, would strike at the underlying purpose of this Bill, which is to try to achieve a snapshot—to use that phrase again—as at the date of exit.
Lord Bassam of Brighton
I am grateful to the Minister for her response. She partly satisfied my concern, but not wholly. I do not really think it is satisfactory that the cases that will be floating around in the ether will be left with the degree of uncertainty that she has suggested may be the case. The fact that the legislation that is going to cover this point will be left until the final Bill—the transition and withdrawal Bill or whatever it is finally called—does not satisfy me greatly. I think that will leave uncertainty for litigants in cases that could be incredibly complicated. I am rather worried that this issue is going to get caught up in the Government’s general dislike for the CJEU. My recollection is that this is one of Theresa May’s red lines: she does not like the CJEU and therefore part of taking back control is getting rid of it. We have got news for the Minister dealing with this: it is going to take the UK some time to extract itself from CJEU processes. The quicker the Government wake up to that fact, the easier it will be for us all to deal with it. In becoming more realistic in their approach to the court, the Government will give some greater certainty as to how we intend to proceed in future.
While I am happy to withdraw my amendment for the moment, I may come back to this at a later stage, because our legal system and litigants require greater certainty. This is not necessarily the small issue I dreamed it might be when I came across it in the Constitution Committee’s excellent report. I am grateful for the debate we have had, but I am not so grateful for the answer. We will probably require a bit more from the Minister at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Pannick
“(2) A court or tribunal may regard the decisions of the European Court made on or after exit day to be persuasive.”
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, the two amendments in this group address the important question of the weight, if any, to be given to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union which are delivered after exit day. Amendment 55 is in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock and Lord Adonis. Amendment 56 is in my name and those of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Goldsmith and Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham.
Amendment 56 would implement the recommendation of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee at paragraph 142 of our report on the Bill. After exit day, there is no dispute that our courts will make their own judgments on retained EU law. They will not be bound by judgments given by the court of justice after exit day. While judgments given before exit day will bind our courts up to the level of the Supreme Court, those given after exit day will not be binding. But our judges will wish to look at the judgments of the court of justice in Luxembourg delivered after exit day. That is not just because our judges are always interested, and rightly so, in seeing how courts in other jurisdictions address the same or similar issues. The connection here is much stronger. The retained EU law, which our courts will be interpreting, owes its origins to the institutions of the EU and there may be very good reasons for our courts looking carefully at how the court of justice has interpreted after exit day the same or a similar provision.
There are three problems with Clause 6(2) as currently drafted. First, it begins in a negative way by stating that a domestic court “need not have regard” to judgments delivered by the court of justice after exit day. That default position is unhelpful because it may be understood to suggest that our judges should not normally have any regard to post-exit day judgments of the court of justice.
Secondly, the end of Clause 6(2) allows the courts here to have regard to post-exit day judgments of the European court only if our courts consider it “appropriate to do so”. But judges do not look at foreign judgments because it is appropriate to do so; they look abroad for assistance because the foreign judgment is relevant to the issue that they are deciding. The terminology matters here. The use of “appropriate” wrongly suggests that our court will be making a policy choice to have regard to a post-exit day judgment from Luxembourg. Senior members of the judiciary have understandably expressed concern that if Clause 6(2) is left in its current form, the courts will inevitably be criticised for making a policy choice in this context.
I should make it clear that of course I do not speak for the judiciary, but I do speak to them. I can tell the Committee that many senior judges are very concerned about the content of Clause 6(2). Paragraphs 134 and 135 of the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee record the evidence that was given by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, the President of the Supreme Court, and her predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, who I am pleased to see in his place today. The concern of the senior judiciary is not that judges should be shielded from criticism or that they are not tough enough to withstand it. The point is that confidence in the rule of law is undermined if judges are seen to be taking sensitive policy decisions that are for Parliament to make. Clause 6 therefore needs to make it much clearer that although our judges are certainly not going to be bound by Luxembourg judgments handed down after exit day, Parliament does intend our judges to have regard to judgments of that court given after exit day where they consider that those judgments are relevant to the issues before our courts.
The third defect of Clause 6(2) as currently drafted is that it suggests that the same principles apply to decisions of “another EU entity or the EU” itself. I am doubtful that there is any need to mention other EU entities or the EU itself, or certainly to compare them with the European court itself.
Amendment 56 seeks to address the issues in a manner which gives much clearer guidance to our courts. It would make it clear that our judges must have regard to a post-exit day judgment of the European court if the domestic court considers it relevant to do so. It would also add that in deciding the significance of any such post-exit day European court judgment, the domestic court should have regard to the terms of any agreement that is reached between the UK and the EU which it considers to be relevant. The terms of the withdrawal agreement, if and when approved by Parliament, will identify the relationship between the UK and the EU post exit day, and that will give considerable guidance to the courts.
I emphasise, however, that at all times under Amendment 56 and indeed under Amendment 55, it will be for the domestic court to decide on the significance, if any, of the Luxembourg judgment. There is no dispute over the fact that our judges will remain in charge in relation to post-exit day judgments. However, Amendment 56 would provide the guidance that they are seeking and which, I suggest, they are entitled to expect. I beg to move.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, there is little to add to the excellent introduction made to these amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, except to say that decisions of the other courts which currently have persuasive authority include those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, decisions of higher-level foreign courts, especially in the Commonwealth and other similar jurisdictions, and one that I have a particular interest in, being a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; namely, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which under the Human Rights Act 1998 must be taken into account by UK courts. It is right that the European Court of Justice should have a similar role and persuasive powers.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (CB)
My Lords, Clause 6 is concerned with the issue of how the large body of retained EU law is to be interpreted by judges. It is an important issue because it is a fundamental principle that the law should be clear and consistent, but also because the topic could lead to ill-informed political and media attacks on the judges, to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has referred, which would undermine the rule of law at home, the reputation of English law abroad and the consequential attraction of London as a global dispute resolution centre. Your Lordships will no doubt recall one such Brexit-related attack on the judiciary that received worldwide publicity. Clause 6 should be worded with a view to clarifying the law and minimising the risk of such attacks. Quite apart from that, I suggest that we need to think through the implications for the UK legal system and its attraction to others when it comes to developing our own system of retained EU law. I cannot pretend that this issue is easy to resolve but it is an appropriate opportunity to explain the context from a judicial perspective.
At the moment, at any rate, the Government envisage that post-Brexit the UK courts will, at least in general, no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ and so will be free to interpret EU law as they see fit. This gives rise to two closely related problems. The first is: what principles of interpretation are to be applied to that retained EU law? Secondly, what use can be made of ECJ case law when carrying out that interpretation exercise?
On the first problem, unlike normal UK legislation, which is generally tightly drawn, EU legislation is relatively loosely drafted, leaving the judges to resolve ambiguities and fill gaps. Some EU legislation is of course drafted on the basis that it will be interpreted to give effect to fundamental EU aims, such as ever closer union and the strengthening of the internal market, which may well be no longer relevant to the UK after Brexit. In providing that general principles of interpretation set out in pre-Brexit ECJ decisions will be applied by UK judges after Brexit, Clause 6(3) in its present form none the less has the effect of maintaining all those interpretive principles, although by virtue of Clause 6(5) it would be open to the Supreme Court to depart from such decisions.
The second, related problem is the use of ECJ case law. In her speech last week, the Prime Minister said that,
“where appropriate, our courts will continue to look at the ECJ’s judgments, as they do for the appropriate jurisprudence of other countries’ courts”,
and added that,
“if, as part of our future partnership, Parliament passes an identical law to an EU law, it may make sense for our courts to look at the appropriate ECJ judgments so that we both interpret those laws consistently”.
That sounds fine but things are not quite so straightforward. The Bill sensibly provides that the UK courts must follow the pre-Brexit decisions of the ECJ although, as I have said, Clause 6(4) states that the Supreme Court can depart from those decisions in the same circumstances as it can depart from its own decisions. By contrast, where there is a post-Brexit ECJ decision, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has explained, Clause 6(2) provides that a court,
“need not have regard to”,
such a decision,
“but may do so if it considers it appropriate”.
That gives precious little guidance to a judge—indeed, as I will mention later, possibly unhelpful guidance from the point of view of the judiciary’s reputation—as to how to approach post-Brexit ECJ decisions.
It has been suggested that a judge could be assisted by the approach that courts have taken when looking for guidance from decisions of courts in other jurisdictions. However, courts in this country normally do this when looking for general principles or when considering the scope of human rights conventions. That is not really a sound analogy because Clause 6(2) would normally apply to a case where a judge was looking at an ECJ decision on the interpretation of specific legislation. It has also been suggested that a judge could get help from cases that have stressed the desirability of UK courts taking account of decisions of overseas courts so as to reach a uniform interpretation, but that does not provide a real analogy either because EU law is unlike those conventions: it is a law of a union from which the UK will have departed because it does not want to have such uniformity, although accepting that it may be desirable in some cases.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, Clause 6(2) in its present form appears to indicate that there is a presumption against following decisions of the ECJ but that judges can follow such judgments in this country if they think it appropriate. That would suggest, as again he says, that judges would be expected to make decisions that were essentially political—in particular, whether to align the UK with an ECJ interpretation against the statutory presumption for policy-type reasons, or to depart from the ECJ interpretation.
Given that pre-Brexit decisions of the ECJ are, sensibly, to be determinative on questions of interpretation, both consistency of approach and the experience of the ECJ as interpreters of EU law support the notion that post-Brexit ECJ decisions should be given the same effect, at least where the retained legislation has not been changed. However, if this is not to be the policy, rather than leaving any new policy to be worked out by the courts, which is the effect of Clause 6(2), there is obvious force in the notion that Parliament should clearly state what the new policy is. Similarly, Clause 6(4) is questionable in providing that the Supreme Court should decide whether to adhere to pre-Brexit ECJ decisions or whether new principles of interpretation should apply, because principles to sustain ever closer union or single market freedoms are no longer relevant interpretative considerations in the UK.
There are various possible solutions that need careful consideration, given that this issue is so important, and I shall present some examples. First, the interpretative approach should follow a policy decision set out either in the amendments to be made to EU legislation under powers granted in the Bill or in the final agreement reached between the UK and the EU, and given formal parliamentary approval. In relation to issues not covered by such arrangements, it could be provided that retained EU law was to be interpreted without any departure from existing principles of interpretation. If that were not an acceptable solution, the courts could be given more specific assistance as to how to interpret legislation, in particular whether or not to continue alignment.
Secondly, as some amendments before your Lordships’ House today indicate, including those that were moved just now, post-Brexit decisions of the ECJ could be regarded as persuasive or it could be provided that UK courts must have regard to them if relevant, and that in determining relevance the court should have regard to any relevant agreement between the EU and the UK. Such formulations would probably be better than the present Clause 6(2) but they do not address all the perceived problems.
Thirdly, Clause 6(2) could be omitted altogether. At the moment, it seems to me that, with respect, the present clause is worse than nothing from the judicial perspective. First, it creates the presumption to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has referred, and secondly it uses the word “appropriate”, which suggests a policy role for the judges. That would leave them more exposed in both what they do and what they may be perceived to be doing.
Fourthly, more specific interpretative guidance could be given, bearing in mind the particular circumstances of Brexit and the particular way in which EU legislation is crafted, so that decisions on differing political issues are not left to the judges. The argument that telling judges how to interpret the law could be a precedent for ordinary parliamentary legislation can arguably at least be met by the point that this is a unique circumstance. It would also have the advantage of providing clarity for the UK’s relationship, including its trading relationship, with the other states of Europe and elsewhere.
I hope these issues and the choices they reflect will be subject to proper scrutiny and discussion. The right solution will not only protect the independence of the judiciary but will demonstrate that decisions of a political nature should not be left to judges, and it will help to achieve the legal clarity that is so important to the rule of law and to the future of this country’s trading and other relationships with the EU and other states.
As I hope I have indicated, I accept that there are no perfect answers. That is unsurprising. The incorporation of pre-Brexit—but only pre-Brexit—EU law into UK law requires a sort of multidimensional Procrustean solution. In so far as the Bill requires the judges to perform the role of Procrustes, Parliament should do all that it can to ensure that the judges do not suffer the fate of Procrustes.
Lord Adonis
The noble and learned Lord has made a number of strong statements to the Committee about the impact, as he regards it, of Clause 6(2) on judicial independence and the reputation of the judiciary. In particular he objects, as did the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to giving the courts the discretion to reach a judgment on whether it is appropriate to have regard to the European court. Proposed subsection (2B) in Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, states:
“In determining the significance of any judgment … the court or tribunal must have regard to the terms of any agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU which it considers relevant”.
To a layman, this clearly involves an exercise of judicial discretion. So why is the judicial discretion in subsection (2B) set out in Amendment 56 potentially any less damaging and likely to be conducive to controversy than the existing Clause 6(2)?
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whose amendment it is, is better placed to answer. My answer would be twofold. First, it specifically tells the judge what to have regard to; it does not leave it completely open. Secondly, it uses a rather more familiar expression, “relevant”. A judge will be able to say, “When construing this, I have looked at the document”—namely, the agreement referred to in subsection (2B)—“to which I am required to have regard. In my view, it tells me to do this or that”. It is specific guidance, albeit indirect specific guidance, through the agreement referred to in subsection (2B), whereas the term “appropriate” leaves it completely open for the judge to decide whether it is appropriate, if I may use that word, to consider matters that he or she is not specifically told to take into account. The judge has to make the decision, “Do I think about x; do I take that into account?” Here, the judge knows what he or she has to take into account because it is spelled out; namely, the agreement.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, I hesitate to follow the very careful analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, but perhaps I can add a few words. We are all trying to find the best way of expressing in clear and simple language, in statutory form, the guidance that the courts and tribunals will need about the interpretation of retained EU law. In particular, Clause 3 is about direct EU legislation which we will be receiving in the language of the directives and regulations to which this clause refers.
The position is fairly clear about judgments or decisions of the CJEU before exit day. That is retained EU case law which is referred to in Clause 6(3) and we are not in any difficulty on that; rather, it is what to do about the future. Had it not been for the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about the risk of being criticised for being drawn into areas of policy, I would have been content to see Clause 6(2) deleted and to rely simply on the normal, traditional way in which comparative law is applied by courts up and down the country. I have been doing this ever since I started sitting as a judge. Of course, there are examples outside the particular area we are dealing with here of conventions to which we are a party and which need to be interpreted. One looks at other jurisdictions to see how the language of a convention is interpreted and applied. This is a normal part of our jurisprudence and it would have been enough. However, I recognise the force of the points made in their evidence to the Constitution Committee and today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and I think that we have to do something to give the guidance for which they are looking.
One should also bear in mind that it will be some time before the Supreme Court handles cases of this kind. We are talking about tribunals as well as courts at every level. I am sure that when the Supreme Court gets hold of the thing, it will be astute enough to give the kind of guidance that one normally gets from the higher courts, but we have to look at the beginning of the process.
On the table at the moment we have Clause 6(2) as it stands and Amendment 56 from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me when I say that I think his amendment is like the curate’s egg. There are bits of it which I rather like and bits which I would prefer to drop, and the same goes for Clause 6(2). I suggest an amalgamation of the best bits of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the best bits of Clause 6(2).
Lord Hope of Craighead
Not at all. It is curing the curate’s egg and producing an acceptable piece of guidance which has the best bits of both, which is what we need to look for. I am not cherry-picking; I am analysing.
Lord Hope of Craighead
No, this is analysis. Let me explain what I would like to do.
I quite like the words of Clause 6(2) as it stands:
“A court or tribunal need not have regard to”,
a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after the exit day because that fits very well with the way we are looking at the position before exit day. It is certainly true that it is a negative way of putting it, but I regard it as a helpful transition to the new situation. However, I do not like the remainder of Clause 6(2) for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained. That is where I would like to bring in the passages from the latter part of his formula, which are that a court or tribunal may have regard to such judgments or decisions where it considers them relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law.
I would take out “appropriate” from Clause 6(2), for reasons that have been referred to already, and would leave out the early part of proposed new subsection (2A) in Amendment 56 where “must” is used. I would prefer “may” to “must”, leaving it to the court to make its own decision regarding whether the matter is relevant.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Would Amendment 55 tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Adonis not deal with the noble and learned Lord’s points?
Lord Hope of Craighead
I am very grateful to the noble Lord and I apologise for not having paid due regard to that formula because the wording is exactly what I am looking for, but I am trying to fit it into the opening words of Clause 6(2). However, it is certainly right; I respectfully suggest that “may” is the right word to use. It is better to add in the bit about,
“where it considers it relevant”,
which is what comes from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. So one is putting together bits and pieces of thought from various attempts to produce a formula.
Perhaps I may read out again for Hansard’s benefit how I suggest the provision might run: “A court or tribunal need not have regard to a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after exit day, but it may have regard to it where it considers this relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law”. If “may” is used—although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will correct me—proposed new subsection (2C) in Amendment 56 will no longer be relevant. I say nothing about subsection (2B) which may have force and value if the court requires guidance as to what to do with the agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU.
I hope that that contribution will give the Minister something else to think about. I think that we all hope that on Report he may be able to come back with a formula which we can all endorse.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, perhaps I may add a few words, simply because of the devoted affection in the Bill for the word “appropriate”. It is larded through the document. Its inappropriateness in this particular context needs to be underlined—I shall come back to it at a later stage under different clauses. It is terribly simple: if something is relevant to a court’s decision, it is likely to be appropriate that the court should look at it. If something is irrelevant to the court’s decision, it cannot possibly be appropriate for the court to look at it. So the term “appropriate” should go.
Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, I rather agree that “appropriate” is not particularly desirable. I wonder whether putting “helpful” in Clause 6(2) would more accurately reflect the way that courts generally consider law from other jurisdictions in developing the law—one always invites courts if they find a particular decision to be helpful—whereas I understand that “appropriate” is considered perhaps to have too much of a political charge. However, I do not wholly understand why the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, finds the initial words of Clause 6(2) rather offensive, where it says:
“A court or tribunal need not have regard”.
All that is saying is that they are not obliged to have regard—I do not think it says any more. I personally read no particular charge in it, and I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, would agree.
There is something of an irony about these amendments, in that the only way to have real certainty would be to tell the court either to disregard it or to follow it. In a sense, we are dealing with an imperfect situation. We are trying, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, said, to craft something which helps judges by reducing any political element in their decision-making but which—I am sorry to use a political expression—allows our courts to take back control. In order to take back control, I am happy that they should have a great deal of freedom to do so without in any sense involving them in a political decision.
Amendment 56 from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others is of course much longer than the original wording, with three subsections as opposed to one. Respectfully, I say that using words such as “relevant” is only quite helpful, because in any event a court will ignore matters that are irrelevant. I feel similarly about the word “significance”: a court will itself have to decide significance. That of course may offend the political element but, if something is insignificant, the court will disregard it in any event. Although I understand what lies behind this amendment, I am not sure that it really does the trick.
It is not just out of nominative loyalty that I turn to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, but because he may be on to something. I agree with the use of “may”, which was endorsed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I am not quite so sure about “persuasive”, but I will listen to what the noble and learned Lord says. However, I like the succinct nature of the amendment and it seems to me to allow our courts the freedom that we have, as it were, granted them by the decision that the country has made in the referendum, but nevertheless not to compromise them.
Lord Hope of Craighead
Does the noble Lord have any reaction to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the reference to,
“another EU entity or the EU”,
in Clause 6(2) as it stands? Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 does not mention these and refers only to the European Court of Justice, so it may be that there is no need to refer to these entities and we can confine it to the European Court of Justice.
Lord Faulks
I take that point from the noble and learned Lord. I wait to hear from the Minister why he considers that it needs to be included; at the moment, I am none the wiser.
Lord Adonis
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Foulkes and I are basking in the judicial praise we have received this afternoon for Amendment 55. We put our pen to paper on it with no legal training whatever. Perhaps we should offer advice, which no doubt will be very expensively provided after this Bill becomes law, because we are able to cut through the issues with such great clarity. I note also that Amendment 55 is by far the shorter of those we are currently debating, so clearly we were able to summarise these matters succinctly.
I have listened to the debate and I am still none the wiser about the real difference, in plain English, between “relevant” and “appropriate”. I simply cannot understand it. I was astonished at the vehemence of the statement from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about the impact that this would have on the judiciary where a court is expected to decide that something is relevant rather than appropriate. It seems to me that in plain English these words have precisely the same meaning. They both require a court to exercise discretion and, to me, they look to require it to exercise precisely the same discretion. Unless the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, can lay out for us some compelling arguments, as he always does with such lucidity, it looks as if it does not matter one way or the other what we do here. It is a straightforward matter of whether or not courts are prepared to be robust in reaching their decisions.
Lord Pannick
There is no doubt that there has to be judicial discretion, the question is the extent to which guidance is given to the court. To suggest to the court that it should exercise its discretion by reference to whether something is appropriate suggests, does it not, that it is to make a policy decision? The question is whether something is relevant, meaning legally relevant by reference to the particular issue that arises before the court in its legal context.
Lord Adonis
The word “relevant” does not, in any normal meaning of the word, mean legally relevant, any more than the word “appropriate” means legally inappropriate.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, can I make a confession before we go further? I cannot claim credit for the wording of this amendment. The credit must go to Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland—that is why it is better than I would have done. The Law Society of Scotland says that,
“‘persuasive authority’ is a recognised aspect of the doctrine of stare decisis or precedent. Persuasive decisions are not technically binding but the courts can pay special attention to them”.
I mentioned the three courts earlier: the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of Human Rights and the supreme courts of Commonwealth countries. It seems to me to be a very good amendment, but I do not want to take credit for it, as that must go to someone else.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is wondering why the word “appropriate” does not fit into the context of trying to limit judicial discretion, he should look at how many times it is used in this and other Bills to give Ministers the opportunity to decide one way or the other, in what are quite clearly different kinds of decisions from those you would expect judges to make.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.
Lord Goldsmith
My Lords, given the time, it may be relevant, appropriate or even helpful to try to wind up this particular debate, although not in such a way that undermines the very real importance of the amendment.
I want to underline two aspects. The first aspect is legal certainty, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is very important, for example, that in considering cases where retained EU law is in question, people and businesses are able to recognise that if there are decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union that are relevant, then it is likely—though not an obligation—that the courts will take them into account. They can order their affairs on that basis, and that is a critical part of legal certainty. It seems right, therefore, that this amendment, to which I have added my name, gives direction or guidance that where such decisions are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law they should be paid regard.
The second principle is the independence of our judiciary. It is right in this context to refer to the shocking instance of the attack on our judiciary that took place at the time of the Article 50 decision. It was shocking not just that our judiciary was referred to in such terms by a popular newspaper but that it was not immediately defended and the accusation rejected by the Government, including Ministers whose job it was to do so. In dealing with this particular amendment we have to be alive to the risk that if after exit day a judge chooses—because he or she believes it right or relevant to do so; whatever word you want to use—to make reference to a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that judge is not then subjected to a barrage of criticism and the accusation, “How dare you take refuge in decisions of this hated institution, one which we have left, in making decisions on this law?” It is important that we should look at this carefully and make sure that judges are protected.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
Does my noble and learned friend agree that, in all fairness, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, distinctly and clearly criticised those attacking the judiciary at the time that my noble and learned friend mentioned?
Lord Goldsmith
I am grateful for that unexpected intervention from my own Front Bench, but I am happy to take the opportunity to say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was one of the few to say the right thing and uphold the independence of the judiciary at the time of that attack. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Beecham for making the point because it deserves to be made.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for making that point. I would add only that I spoke as a Minister of this Government in expressing that view, because I spoke from the Dispatch Box when I made it clear. I can refer the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, to Hansard in regard to that point. Of course, the origins of the remark may not have had quite the impact that it could otherwise have had if coming from another source—I do not seek to elaborate on that point.
Sometimes it comes ill to counsel to listen rather than to speak, but this is an occasion when it is entirely appropriate for me and for the Government to listen to what has been said. I am extremely grateful for the contributions of all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords with regard to the formulation of Clause 6(2). I refer to the formulation of the clause because I believe we have a common desire to ensure that we give appropriate, effective and clear guidance, in so far as it is required, to the judiciary regarding what is a relatively complex issue. Of course the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out that in the normal way one might delete Clause 6(2) and allow the courts to deal with this as they deal with other matters of comparative law, but he went on to point out—quite correctly, I submit—that here we are dealing with a very particular situation where guidance may be needed. I am conscious of the way in which the various amendments have evolved.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, also referred to Clause 6(4) and the issue of whether and when the Supreme Court might decide whether to adhere to precedents in this context. I bow to the far greater experience of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope, who sat in the UK Supreme Court. My limited experience is that, where I attempted to persuade them to adhere or not to adhere to a particular precedent, they had no difficulty in making their own minds up.
Be that as it may, I recognise the force of the points that have been made. They have come from beyond this House as well because, as noble Lords will be aware, the Constitution Committee also made some recommendations about this. Indeed, its early recommendation in March 2017 was,
“the Government may wish to consider whether the Bill should provide that, as a general rule, UK courts ‘may have regard to’ the case law of the Court of Justice (and we stress that it should be optional)”.
Indeed, we were having regard to that as we looked at Clause 6(2).
A point was made about the distinction between “may” and “must” in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It occurs to me that, where he uses “must”, he goes on in his amendment at (2C) to qualify the context in which that word is used, and there may not be a vast gulf between “may” and “must” in the context of the two amendments that have been tabled. Of course, that which was recommended by the Law Society of Scotland has the merit of some simplicity and embraces the same point.
At this stage I would add only that the Bingham Centre looked at the current recommendations of the Constitution Committee that lie behind the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and raised concerns about a number of aspects of the formulation put forward by the committee. However, I make it clear that we greatly appreciate the contributions that have been made to this part of the Committee’s debate. We will go away and consider the various formulations, and I believe it would be sensible for the Government to engage with various interested parties once we have come to a view about how we can properly express what we all understand is necessary policy guidance in the context of this exceptional step. Against that background, I invite noble Lords to consider not pressing their amendments at this stage.
Baroness Ludford
I know I will not be popular by holding things up, but the Minister was specifically asked if he could explain the reference to,
“another EU entity or the EU”,
in Clause 6(2). I do not know whether he feels he could do that. Does it have any reference to the European Commission? The Prime Minister said we would have a binding commitment to follow EU state aid and competition law, and I wondered if it had any relevance in that context.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am not going to elaborate at this stage because, as I say, the Government are going to go away and consider the proposals for an amendment to Clause 6(2).
Lord Pannick
I am very grateful to the Minister for that encouraging response, and I am grateful to the noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this debate.
On a matter of detail, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about new subsection (2B) in Amendment 56, giving guidance to the judges to look to the relevance of an EU agreement. The noble Lord asked how that would work. I shall give him an example. If the judge is seeking to interpret a provision of retained EU law, relating to, say, medicinal products; if the Court of Justice after exit day pronounces on a regulation which has become part of retained EU law, and if the withdrawal agreement has said that there will be close regulatory alignment between the EU and the United Kingdom in that particular area, then the judge would be encouraged to pay close regard to what the Court of Justice had said about the meaning of the regulation. Our court would still be in control but it would pay particular regard—that is the whole point of new subsection (2B).
There is widespread agreement around the House that the wording of Clause 6(2) is unsatisfactory and that Parliament needs to give as much guidance as possible to judges in this context to protect them from being seen to be required to take policy decisions, which would undermine confidence in the rule of law. The Government and Parliament would be very unwise to reject, in particular, the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. It is much more difficult to identify precisely what should be put in place of Clause 6(2). I am encouraged by what the Minister said—that the Government are listening and considering this matter. I am sure that all noble Lords who have spoken would be happy to contribute to the discussions that will take place before Report. I hope that, on Report, the Government will bring forward amendments to Clause 6(2).
Lord Goldsmith
Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, as I suspect he is going to do, can I ask him to clarify one point? He talked a moment ago about the need to protect the judges. Would he agree that it is a question not of protecting the judges from attack, but of protecting the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law?
Lord Pannick
I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord. I think I said in opening this debate that it is not that the judges cannot withstand criticism of their judgments, it is rather that we are all concerned about confidence in the rule of law. As the noble and learned Lord said, if the judges are left to take policy decisions in a very sensitive context, where a decision will have to be made as to the weight—if any—to give to Court of Justice judgments handed down after Brexit, there is no doubt that they will be exposed. They will be the subject of criticism which will undermine the rule of law unless we do our job and give very clear guidance on what Parliament thinks should be the appropriate approach.
I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Housing: Holiday Lets
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Gardner of Parkes
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact on the availability of long-term housing for rent of holiday lets, including those listed as rooms to let, particularly in London.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes (Con)
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I remind the House of my interests as declared in the register.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Wales Office (Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth) (Con)
My Lords, the Government support the sharing economy. We do not hold information on short-term holiday lets. We believe that it is for local authorities to assess the impact within their area. The Government monitor broader trends in private rented housing through the English Housing Survey. We condemn, however, any abuse of planning laws, and those in breach face a fine of up to £20,000.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes
I thank the Minister for that Answer, but remind him that I have asked this Question since 2015. In the previous Session, I tabled a Question for Written Answer on a number of occasions: for example, on 14 September, then again in October and in February. Each time the answer that came back was just, “No”, or sometimes, “No, it is not possible”, or, “No, we are not thinking of it”—but it was basically “No”. Why can I not be given the reason why the answer is just “No” without any accompanying explanation, when the role of local authorities in protecting residents who are being abused in their blocks is terribly important?
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for a reminder that I did not really need: namely, that she has asked this Question over a period of time. If she reviews the Answers that she has had, she will see that they go into considerable detail. Suffice it to say that significant progress has been made. The noble Baroness would probably do well to discuss her circumstances with the Short Term Accommodation Association, as I have suggested previously. However, Airbnb physically cannot let a property for more than 90 days in a year; it has a system designed to stop that. I think that goes some considerable way to addressing this, but I would be happy to direct the noble Baroness to meet people at the Short Term Accommodation Association who are responsible for this significant progress.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, I refer the House to my relevant interests in the register. The noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, has raised this issue many times and deserves great credit for her persistence. Can the noble Lord say what work he and his department have done to make sure that holiday lets are not used by landlords to get round their legal obligations?
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
My Lords, I certainly can. I have spent a considerable time speaking to the Short Term Accommodation Association, which makes up the bulk of the people in this market, and in particular Airbnb. It proposes a data-sharing protocol with Westminster council to enable the sharing of data. The basic problem at present is that different suppliers cannot share the data one to another—so Airbnb can take care of a particular problem relating to it but cannot share the data with other providers. Airbnb is by far the largest provider, but there are many others. To enable providers to share data, they need a trigger from the local authority—any local authority that has a concern—so they can then share the data. This would take care of the problem. I will send a letter to the noble Lord on the progress being made, copy it to all noble Lords participating in the debate, and leave a copy in the Library. However, I invite my noble friend to speak to the Short Term Accommodation Association, as I know that she has particular concerns about her properties.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, the problem is enforcement, as the Minister rightly said. Westminster is probably the best example of an authority that uses the enforcement procedure, but most authorities do not use the enforcement procedure for the 90-day limit to which the Minister referred. The market has completely changed. Will the Minister also address the fact that holiday lets and Airbnb lets are now dealt with very much on a commercial basis, but in blocks of flats very often one person or one company owns all the flats and let them through Airbnb? It is not people just earning a buck or two on their own home.
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
I remind the noble Lord that of course this is a London issue. The 90-day limit applies only in London—and, significantly, it is a real issue only in the inner London boroughs. I am encouraging the Short Term Accommodation Association to speak to those boroughs—as indeed it is doing—to see if it can carry forward the process that it is engaged in with Westminster into the other boroughs. For example, it is developing a Considerate Nightly Letting Charter with Westminster Council—again, that could be replicated for other councils. I remind noble Lords that, where a local authority has a suspicion that the law is being breached, it can apply to the Secretary of State to restrict the 90-day power and can take enforcement action. There is the power there; it is for local authorities to do that.
Baroness Couttie (Con)
My Lords, I refer noble Lords to my interest in the register. Is my noble friend the Minister aware that in one of our wards in Westminster, where I was the leader until January last year, as much as 10% of the properties are let out on short-term lets, many on a commercial basis and for far more than 90 days because multiple agencies are used? Is it not the case that a simple registration system to allow local authorities to know when the 90 days had been breached would allow cost-effective enforcement of the 90-day rule?
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
I thank my noble friend for that question. As I indicated, the action that the Short Term Accommodation Association is proposing will get round the particular problem that we have with the Data Protection Act, because it will then be able to share the data. The power lies with local authorities and I would gently say to my noble friend that if Westminster has a suspicion that the law is being breached, it really should pursue the matter.
Lord Whitty (Lab)
My Lords, does the Minister recognise that in Westminster and other inner London authorities, in places that were originally social housing, Airbnb and other organisations are setting up short-term lets that in most cases are in breach of the leasehold or tenancy? Does he also recognise that local authorities should enforce the leases and tenancies they already have and should be backed by central government in doing so?
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
Obviously if there is an issue between landlord and tenant, it is for the landlord to enforce that. The Government have no role in ensuring that leases are enforced. We would encourage that, but that is a matter for the landlord. It happened relatively recently in relation to a case called, I think, Nemcova in the London Borough of Barnet. There is the power to do just that—but it is, as I am sure the noble Lord appreciates, a matter of contract, not a matter in relation to the law regarding landlord and tenant. I will say, in support of what Airbnb is doing, that it is within the law because it is ensuring that there is no let of more than 90 days on its watch. I do not think that we can reasonably ask it to do more. It cannot share the data under the law; it is looking at this protocol to enable it to do so.
Lord Clark of Windermere (Lab)
My Lords, although this question is related, to a certain extent, to London—but not entirely, as the Question says—is the Minister aware that in certain national parks, we are not talking about 10% short-term lets: in some villages we are talking about 50%, 60% or 70% and the local authorities have no authority at all to stop it? Will the Government look into this, because it is destroying rural communities right across the country?
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
I appreciate that the noble Lord is speaking about his home area. I know he speaks with authority on the Lake District. I am very happy to look at that issue if he would like to come forward and arrange to see me with some evidence. It is obviously a very different issue because there is no suggestion of a breach of the law; it is about whether there is a particular problem.
Schools: Music
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Earl of Clancarty
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will take steps to improve opportunities for the study of music in schools.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Education (Lord Agnew of Oulton) (Con)
My Lords, the Government believe that all pupils should have access to an excellent, well-rounded education. Music is an integral part of a pupil’s education and a compulsory subject in the national curriculum at key stages 1 to 3. Between 2016 and 2020, we will provide £300 million of funding for music education hubs to ensure that all pupils have the opportunity to learn an instrument, sing and perform regularly and have access to clear routes of progression.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
My Lords, the Minister will know that, in the last year alone, take-up of GCSE music in England fell by 8%. Is he aware that the University of Sussex survey of 6,500 schools found that teachers, who should certainly know, held the EBacc primarily responsible for this decline—a view supported by a recent Education Policy Institute report? Will the Minister agree to meet to discuss these concerns with myself, other interested Peers and Bacc for the Future, whose members include many organisations who are worried about the increasing marginalisation of music in our schools?
Lord Agnew of Oulton
To reassure the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, I will be happy to meet with him and colleagues from this Chamber to discuss the matter further. However, there is no evidence that arts subjects have declined as a result of the introduction of the EBacc. Indeed, the proportion of time spent studying music has remained broadly stable since 2010. Since the EBacc was announced, the proportion of pupils in state-funded schools taking at least one arts subject has also remained stable. I have a very strong personal commitment to music. My own father was cured of a debilitating stammer through learning to sing and so breathe properly. I am doing everything I can to encourage music in the system.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)
My Lords, I am very interested in what the Minister just said about his own family experience. While I fully accept that there is an issue about the academic study of music in schools, music also makes an important contribution to the health of schools as communities. As there is so much concern at the moment about child and adolescent mental health, would he accept that it is important that there are opportunities in schools for children to participate in music for the therapeutic and social benefits it conveys, and that that is particularly true of performing music in groups?
Lord Agnew of Oulton
I agree with the noble Baroness entirely. Some case studies that I pulled in ahead of this Question bear out what she said. In my own academy trust, the Inspiration Trust, I appointed a director of music just before I took on this role, and I asked him to give me his early feedback—he started only in September. He said: “On listening and music appreciation, the pupils find listening easier and can listen for longer; pupils more readily try new things. Improved multitasking skills: pupils react, listen, move, hum along to music while focused on their main task”. With regard to extracurricular ensemble, he talks about pupils being better able to understand commitment, time management, perseverance and co-operation. So I completely agree with the noble Baroness.
Lord Lexden (Con)
Has my noble friend noted that nearly 650 independent and state schools are now collaborating in the teaching and performing of music, and would he agree that further scope exists to increase these joint ventures as independent schools seek to play a larger part in the education system as a whole, in accordance with the Government’s wishes?
Lord Agnew of Oulton
I agree with my noble friend. Indeed, apart from the 641 independent schools in music partnerships, 492 independent schools invite pupils to attend lessons or performances, and 51 second music teaching staff to state schools. Since I took on this post, I have met once the chairman of the Independent Schools Council, and I am meeting him again soon to review collaboration between the two sectors.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a trustee of a musical education charity, the VCM Foundation. Can the Minister give us figures on the numbers of music teachers in schools? We as a foundation have discovered that large numbers of primary schools, in particular, now have no teachers with any musical experience. We and some others are now helping to train teachers without musical experience to ensure that all schools have the opportunity to sing together and to learn to work together in the way that one can do through music.
Lord Agnew of Oulton
My Lords, the most recent figures I have for 2016 show that there is only a 0.5% vacancy rate for teachers of music in state schools.
Lord Palmer (CB)
My Lords, what steps are being taken to ensure that the £5-a-week charge for students taking GCSE music, as at Bingley, for example, will not become more widespread?
Lord Agnew of Oulton
My Lords, I believe that when that was raised in the media recently, the school in question removed the charge, and I am not aware of any other examples of that happening. Certainly, if the noble Lord is aware, I would be pleased to hear from him and I will investigate it.
Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Kennedy once played the bassoon in the London schools orchestra. The chances of a young person from his school in Peckham doing so this year are considerably less because of the cuts to funding in many state schools for arts and creative subjects. Despite what the Minister said, I concur with the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty—in 2017 the number of pupils taking GCSE music is down to an all-time low of 5.5%, which is a very serious situation.
I have told the Minister before that Labour will introduce an arts pupil premium to ensure that every child in a primary school in England has the chance to learn a musical instrument, go to the theatre, or take part in dance and drama. The funding necessary for this cannot be escaped by the Government. Will the Minister say why the facilities in state schools are still so much worse than they are in many private schools—a situation which would be reversed by Labour’s arts pupil premium—or are the Conservative Government quite content for the study of music to be the preserve of the wealthy?
Lord Agnew of Oulton
My Lords, spending on music and cultural education programmes has been stable for the last four years—it declined in 2013-14 and 2014-15, but we increased it. The noble Lord asked me a Question about EBacc in November, and I gave the response then that we probably have different priorities. I believe EBacc has been an enormous tool for improving social mobility in children from less advantaged backgrounds. We are seeing a dramatic increase in the number of children who are studying EBacc subjects such as science, geography, history and modern foreign languages. The reason we were so keen on this is that it provides an opportunity for these children to have a shot at a good university. We know good universities have facilitating subjects, which tend to be the EBacc subjects. Overall, the commitment to music remains and 120 music hubs are supporting some 14,000 ensembles across the country.
Nurses: Training
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Clark of Windermere
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what specific proposals they have to increase the number of fully trained nurses working in the National Health Service and the associated care services.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, there are record numbers of nurses working in the NHS in England, including 13,900 more acute, elderly and general nurses. To increase the future supply of registered nurses, the Government are funding over 5,000 more student nursing places for those entering training each year from September 2018. We are opening up new training opportunities to increase the number of professionally qualified nursing staff across the health and social care workforce through the apprenticeship route.
Lord Clark of Windermere (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for his reply, but I do not think the Government really grasp the seriousness of the shortage of nurses. In the last two years, 33% fewer students came forward. We have a shortage of 40,000 nurses and it will take years to put that right. Can I make a suggestion to him? The best and quickest way to increase the number of trained nurses is for the Government to drop their opposition to the bursary scheme for postgraduate students. These two-year courses are cheaper; it would cost the average funder £33,500 for the two-year course, which is half as much as the average trust would pay simply to employ an agency nurse for a year to fill the gaps. Why will the Government not follow that route?
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, we take very seriously the need to train more nurses. There are 52,000 nurses in training and, as I have said, there is a commitment to increase the number of training places by 25%, which is obviously how we get to a long-term solution. On the issue that the noble Lord has raised about postgraduate bursaries, the policy intention is to bring these courses in line with other courses. I know that this is an issue of great concern. The Royal College of Nursing has expressed its concerns and we take those seriously. I also know that the regulations have been prayed against in the other place; they are also being looked at in the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and we await its report. I reassure him that the issue is being considered and we will respond once the committee has reported.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, as someone who is frequently involved in regulatory work involving nurses, I ask my noble friend what is being done to ensure a proper standard of clinical performance and a proficiency in languages on the part of nurses trained abroad and, most especially, on the part of those trained outside the European Union.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I thank my noble friend for highlighting that important issue. A very stringent language test is imposed by the Nursing and Midwifery Council—indeed, it is perhaps so stringent that it has excluded some nurses who are perfectly capable of practising in this country. A review of that is going on at the moment to make sure that a proper line is drawn—ensuring professional competence, including in technical language, while not excluding people who would be perfectly capable of practising well in this country.
Baroness Walmsley (LD)
My Lords, is the Minister aware that the vacancy rate for nurses in social care settings has doubled over the last four years? Given the other pressures on nursing homes, will the Government take specific action—perhaps grants for placements—to relieve this problem, which the NAO has described as dangerous?
Lord O'Shaughnessy
The noble Baroness has highlighted an important issue, which is the number of nurses in social care. I recognise that to be a problem, as does the department. A specific social care workforce consultation will get under way and is linked to the overall draft workforce plan that Health Education England has published. This is something that we are looking at. We can solve it to some extent by increasing the overall number of nurses, but we need to find ways of attracting them into the social care profession.
Lord Patel (CB)
My Lords, does the Minister agree that the lack of NHS nurses and other healthcare workers is due to the lack of a long-term sustainable workforce plan, as identified by the House of Lords committee report? If, following that report, the Government now have a long-term workforce plan for the NHS, when might it be published?
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I congratulate the noble Lord on his committee’s work in this area and on making a proposal, which we have followed in putting forward a 10-year draft plan. I hope that he will have had the chance to see that—it will of course firm into a concrete plan. It is fair to say that it is honest about both the successes and the challenges that we face in needing to train more nurses. We are trying to find new ways of doing that, not just through the university route but through apprenticeships.
Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
My Lords, yesterday evening I went home and turned on my local news to find that the Royal Sussex County Hospital was calling on people who might otherwise use its services to keep away. The hospital has some 900 vacancies. How can the noble Lord come to the Dispatch Box and tell us about the wonderful figures that suggest that all is well and good in the health service regarding nursing vacancies, when the reality on the ground is somewhat different? My local hospital is facing a crisis.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I do not pretend that all is well and good; I merely state what has happened. We know that there are challenges from increasing demand in the health service. We need more staff, which is why we are committed to training more staff. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to comment on the challenges of the noble Lord’s trust but I will be delighted to look at them with him. However, as we know, there is more demand and we have an ageing population. We need more staff and we are trying to train those staff.
Baroness Rawlings (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest which is not in the register. One of my first jobs was as a VAD nurse, which some of your Lordships might remember—it was a long time ago. What do the Government think of bringing back VAD nurses, or, as they are called today, auxiliary or volunteer nurses, to help in the nursing crisis?
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I thank my noble friend for that question. I think that we need to diversify the routes into nursing and this is probably how we do it. One way in which that is happening is through the creation of nursing associates, which is a level 5 apprenticeship programme. To be clear, these are not nursing positions—they are not registered nurses—but they provide an opportunity for those who have a desire to get into that career and want to learn on the job but who do not yet have the skills to start working towards a full-time registered nursing position.
Emergency Hospital Admissions
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O’Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, NHS England and NHS Improvement are implementing a number of national programmes to transform NHS services so that, where clinically appropriate, a patient’s care is managed without the need for a stay in hospital. This is being achieved through services becoming better integrated across health and social care, as well as managing hospital care differently, so that more patients are treated as day patients in A&E or streamed to see a general practitioner.
Lord Bird (CB)
I thank the Minister for that Answer. The recent report of the National Audit Office stated that nearly 25% of people who go into hospital do so in an avoidable situation, which could be sorted out in the community. This is a clear case of why we need more prevention. What extra thinking and resources will the Government bring into the community so that we do not have the ridiculous situation of such people going into hospital, where we have the problem of a shortage of nurses and all the other things that knock on?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
The noble Lord makes an important point. It was good to study the report and the noble Lord is right about avoidable hospital admissions. Two changes are happening. One is GP extended access, which now has 95% coverage across the country—that is, evenings, weekends and so on—as primary care. We also have interesting results coming from the new models of care programme. I highlight one that is happening in mid-Nottinghamshire. It is called PRISM and it is a virtual ward for at-risk patients which enables multidisciplinary teams to look at vulnerable people before they come to hospital. It has reduced A&E attendance for those aged over 80 by 17%, which is significant. It is precisely this kind of thing that will make the difference that we need.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)
Is the Minister aware that in 2016-17, 30% of admissions to A&E of people aged 65 and over were alcohol-related? Is he further aware that, given the need for the services of psychiatrists to look after those people, training for psychiatrists has reduced dramatically in the past 10 years and we have no facilities available to look after them? Turning to a longer-term public health policy, when will the Government do something about the increasing number of people going into hospital due to alcohol problems?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
It is now the case that thousands of GPs and hospital staff have been trained to screen for the signs of alcohol abuse and to provide intervention. So not only are there dedicated staff and dedicated public health programmes, but hospital and primary care staff have now been specifically trained to look for the signs and to signpost people to care when they need it.
Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)
Does the Minister agree that one of the causes of the recent pressure on acute hospital beds is that young people and children who are waiting for scarce specialist mental health beds are frequently put into inappropriate adult wards because there is no room for them anywhere else? Would the Minister look into that again?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I thank my noble friend for making that point. Unfortunately, we have a growing prevalence of the kind of mental illness he is describing. We are in the process of increasing the number of in-patient beds available for young people going through those kinds of episodes. That is the right thing to do. It means that they will not have to travel so far from their homes and has the benefit of relieving the impact on adult acute beds.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
Is the Department of Health and Social Care, in conjunction with NHS England, monitoring the completeness of 24/7 nursing coverage in the community? Even though the pilots, which will have a virtual ward, will help determine the most vulnerable patients, those patients will still need hands-on nursing at the time they need it. If it is not available, they will inevitably end up being transported to hospital.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
One of the issues the NAO reports is that we do not yet have good enough data on what is happening in the community. The creation of the community services dataset will enable us to track precisely what is available in the community in every area. Concerns have been raised in this House before about the number of district nurses, which unfortunately has fallen over recent years. It has now shown a small increase year on year and we hope we are starting to turn the corner on community nursing numbers, too.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, there are two stark facts from the NAO report. First, the real problem has been the reduction in social care funding. Surely the real answer to this problem, above all else, is to restore what has been cut. Secondly, I refer the Minister to the chart in that report which shows that, despite the increase in demand, bed capacity has been cut by 6,000 beds since 2010-11. I understand that in February the occupancy rate reached a dangerously high level of 95%. Does the Minister accept that, while we need to prevent avoidable admissions, it is very unwise to reduce acute care capacity at the moment?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I agree with the noble Lord about funding. The Government have now made £9.4 billion of extra funding available to local authorities over three years, including in the most recent local government funding settlement. The noble Lord makes a good point about bed capacity: it had shown a downward trend for a long time before stabilising in recent years. I point to two successes this winter. The first is the improvement in delayed transfers of care—we have really started to get some traction on that. The second is about £60 million, I believe, of funding that went into providing extra bed capacity over winter. Occupancy levels are too high. The NHS is getting better at managing it more efficiently, but we certainly need to do better.
Lord Rennard (LD)
My Lords, does the Minister accept that part of the problem with emergency hospital admissions is the difficulty people have in accessing their GPs? Some of this is perhaps because of the high levels of stress among GPs, but there is also recent evidence suggesting that it is because of the £1 million pension cap imposed on GPs, which means many more of them are retiring before the age of 60. Surely, in the interests of the NHS, this particular cap should be looked at again.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Although the number of early GP retirements has been rising, the number of total GP retirements has been falling, which is encouraging. It is also important to point out that, while the pension cap obviously applies to everybody, it has not had the impact that the noble Lord described on dentists or consultants, so there is something more to it. It is to do with how GP services are structured and providing support for that partnership model. That is what we are trying to do at the moment.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 57 in my name is to Clause 6(3) which says:
“Any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law is to be decided, so far as that law is unmodified on or after exit day and so far as they are relevant to it … in accordance with any retained case law … general principles … and EU competences”.
My amendment would delete the words,
“so far as that law is unmodified on or after exit day”.
This would mean that retained EU law was continuing to run using EU-derived interpretation, including for the amended parts. This is by no means a perfect amendment, but it is intended to probe the relationship between the wording in subsection (3) and that in subsection (6), which says that modified law can be incorporated as in subsection (3) if it,
“is consistent with the intention of the modifications”.
I want to gain some more clarity on the presumptive path around those two subsections.
The general message that we are being given by Government—the high-level presumptive path, if you like—is that there is not really an intention for policy change via modification. But, there are no absolute commitments to state that on the face of the Bill, perhaps because incidental things may nevertheless count as policy change.
My submission, which applies to other clauses and the schedules as well, is that the need for adaptability does not remove the possibility for a more granular laying out of the presumptive path. That leads me to query what presumption comes from the order of the subsections. I submit that the default presumption should be that EU case law, principles and competences apply unless the Government have specifically explained why that does not work in connection with a particular modification. That seems a clearer and easier way to do things because the modifications are the focus of the attention, presumably with explanation. That will surely then be fed into the scrutiny when we get to the delegated legislation.
However, I also have in mind some of the debate we got into late on Monday night about rights in Schedule 1. The structure of Schedule 1 is somewhat similar in so far as all challenges are first disallowed and then some might be allowed by regulation. I contrast that with the present clause, which disallows interpretation to apply to modifications, and then subsequently says that it does not stop it being as in subsection (3). I note it does not say who is making it clear whether the modifications come under EU law. I wonder whether it will be left to the judges—if it is, they may want better clarity—or will the modifications themselves make it clear when they are put before us?
In the context of Schedule 1, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, referred to the regulation that provides the right to challenge validity as an exceptional power, which I suppose it is by the way it is formulated as an exception to the earlier general exclusion of challenges. I took the noble and learned Lord to mean that the power would be used rarely, rather than, for example, as a list prepared in advance, which was the point probed by my noble friend Lord Beith. If I follow a similar logic on the follow-on positioning of Clause 6, does that mean that the situation envisaged in subsection (6), with the retaining of EU interpretation for some modified parts, will be exceptional, in the rare sense, or will it be normal in the sense of maximising the status quo? We need to know.
Also, again reflecting the Schedule 1 debate, Clause 6(3) refers to a question of validity of retained EU law, so is it correct that retained EU law can be struck down unless we follow the primary legislation suggestion of the Constitution Committee or unless it is already primary legislation, and that it would be struck down by common law, not EU principles or case law, which would just help with interpretation? If that is so, might some EU retained law be struck down in effect because it came under common law plus EU interpretation, whereas it might not have been struck down if it had been under common law alone? That is what I deduced from reading Hansard and the response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on common law. I confess that I did not necessarily hear the response properly at the time. That is nothing against the noble and learned Lord’s diction and more to do with the temporary impairment of my hearing due to my head cold, as well as to my voice today.
The other amendments in the group are of a different nature. They relate to things that can be taken into account in interpretation. My Amendment 59 and Amendment 58 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, are similar, referencing recitals and preambles. My amendment is to subsection (3)(b), which relates to EU competences, because I wanted to draw attention to the fact that not only does the content of recitals need to be used for casting light on interpretation, but they are part of the competences architecture and directions relating to what is expected of delegated legislation, just as can be the case with empowerments for regulations in UK legislation. It is part of the definition of EU competences for interpretation purposes.
To make my position clear, Amendment 60 specifically references powers of delegation. Footnote 24 to paragraph 83 of the Explanatory Notes says:
“Recitals will continue to be interpreted as they were prior to the UK’s exit from the EU … casting light on the interpretation … but they will not themselves have the status of a legal rule”,
I do not think that that explanation is necessarily sufficient to encompass what I have just tried to lay out. Given that the role of EU agencies will be taken over by UK bodies, they should also take over the constraints that are written in, at least until Parliament decides otherwise. Therefore, recitals need to have a greater role than previously, or at least that possibility should not be excluded.
As a general point, I mention that there is a symmetry between how EU legislative Acts can be allocated as between those that should require primary legislation to amend and those which can be considered delegated, and the EU architecture of competences: those two are symmetrical. If that mapping is got right, getting returning powers allocated into their proper place in the UK, particularly between Parliament and regulators, then that logic of how interpretation is influenced, not just by EU competences versus member states but also with regard to internal EU levels of competences, will flow naturally into the structure.
There are other important policy points within preambles and recitals and I will leave those for other speakers to elaborate on. I will just say that I agree with all that I am expecting them to say on that point about their importance to policy. I beg to move.
Lord Krebs (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 58, in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Jones of Whitchurch, and my noble friend Lady Brown of Cambridge. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has already mentioned, her Amendment 59 has a similar intent to Amendment 58 and therefore I support it.
The purpose of this amendment is very simple: it is to ensure that recitals and preambles to EU laws are given a clear legal status by the Bill. Why is that important? The recitals and preambles explain the background to, and objectives of, legislation and are therefore essential to understanding the legislation that follows. While in UK law the purpose of any piece of legislation will be clear as a result of the process leading up to the legislation—for instance, a Green Paper, a White Paper and a parliamentary debate—with EU-derived law there is no equivalent process. Therefore, the recitals and preambles are essential for placing the legislation in context. If they are not given a clear legal status they may be forgotten or ignored by decision-makers and the courts. As has already been mentioned, although the great repeal Bill White Paper, in footnotes 17 and 24, recognised the importance of recitals and preambles, this does not provide the legal certainty that is needed.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, has explained why these recitals and preambles are so important, and I thought that I would give an example. They are important because of the purposive approach of EU law, which is quite alien to our UK law, which has a literal approach. This is particularly important in the area of environmental law. For example, the European court relied on the recitals and preambles to interpret article 22 of the air quality directive in the ClientEarth litigation, where it successfully forced the Government to publish their air quality plans. This ruling was absolutely crucial for our health and well-being in the UK and without using the preambles the court would not have been able to properly interpret the wording of the substantive article. The courts in our country will have a huge job on their hands of making sense of all this retained EU law that we are going to thrust upon them if they do not have the recitals and preambles; these are essential to understanding the law and their job will be much harder without them. I beg the Government to look at this issue and rethink their position.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, my name is also added to Amendment 58 and I support the very compelling case made by the noble Lord, Lords Krebs, and, indeed, by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.
I, too, speak as an environmentalist. As has already been highlighted, the implementation of EU environmental law in the UK is drawn from several sources, all of which, in our application of it, have equal weight. For the most part, it is a welcome and uncontroversial addition to our UK environmental legal framework; it is often uncontentious and applied without legal recourse. Indeed, few people would argue that we should revert to dirty beaches and polluted bathing water and there is a common consensus that we need to adopt the EU regulations and directives.
Though these standards are very much taken for granted they do not always originate from the same legal source, which is why amendments such as Amendment 58 are so important. All the amendment does is to seek to protect what we have now—nothing more than that. The recitals and preambles which preface the formal wording of the legislation are important for explaining, in layperson’s terms, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, explained, what the legislation intends to achieve. They often include important principles which underpin the legislation. I have referred previously to examples of these preambles, such as article 1 of the environmental liability directive, which includes reference to the polluter pays principle, and article 1 of the habitats directive, which spells out the aim to deliver biodiversity conservation. However, there are many others, some of which have gone on to be tested and captured in UK legal judgments, but others have not.
Very simply, my challenge to the Minister is: if these amendments are not acceptable, what will be the future status of these preambles, and how can we be assured that they will have the same effect as we have previously enjoyed? We regard them as an integral part of current EU law, so if there is no place for them in the transposed UK law, does the Minister accept that this will represent a watering-down of the Government’s promise to enhance, rather than diminish, our environmental standards? I hope he can clarify that.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I would have thought it was clear that when we are incorporating EU law into United Kingdom law, the law in question will not be edited—apart from questions of not working and so on, which are separate—and the whole instrument will be transformed into UK law. Judges always try to understand the legislation as a whole and read the document as a whole. Therefore, I think I can assure noble Lords that the courts here will look with great interest at these recitals and preambles—particularly in view of what the noble Baroness said about the difficulty of some of them—to see if they can help them understand properly and make a proper construction of the instrument in question.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
My Lords, in that case, what is the point of not keeping them in?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
There is no question of not leaving them in. They will be left in in any case. There is no question of putting them out. I will see what my noble and learned friend the Minister has to say about this but so far as I am concerned, it is not necessary because the whole instrument will be incorporated. There is no question of editing it or leaving out half of it or the beginning or anything. My noble and learned friend may be willing to give the assurance that the whole instrument will go in. I must say, I would have hoped that that would be understood without it having to be said.
Lord Whitty (Lab)
My Lords, I hesitate to challenge the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, on points of law, but the fact of the matter is that when we have transposed directives and regulations previously, they have excluded the preambles and the recitals, as they have excluded aspects that are in the treaties rather than the individual directives and regulations. It may well be that the courts, in their wisdom, will take into account something that European law has previously said, but unless that is laid down as a central principle of this transposition, whether or not to take it into account will be at the courts’ discretion.
The Government’s commitment was that we would have the European law on day one of Brexit in exactly the same form as we did the day before. That has broken down in the way in which the Bill has been presented in a number of respects. It has broken down on the European Charter of Fundamental Rights; it has broken down with regard to animal sentience, as we debated the other day; it has broken down on the environmental law which the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, referred to; and I was going to use the air quality example that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, referred to. Unless Parliament gives a signal to the courts that these preambles and recitals must be taken into account —as must, in my view, the principles laid down in the treaties—we are not doing what the Government have promised the people of this country that they would do; namely, that European law would not be changed on day one of Brexit and then only if it was necessary or Parliament so decided. Unless we do something very similar to what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, does, we are not doing what the Government have promised the nation.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendment 58 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs. I was greatly relieved by the noble and learned Lord’s rebuttal because my interpretation of what we are doing is that we will not have the protection of the recitals and the preambles. Our problem is that any law leaves room for interpretation. EU law in particular is often a reflection of the manner of its birth: it has 28 single parents.
To reassure those of us, particularly from my point of view as the spokesperson on energy and climate change, who do not necessarily trust things to naturally follow and for this Government or possible future Governments to be as keen on some of the standards required in EU regulations and directives, it is in the recitals and preambles that we can gain some measure of comfort, as a guide to the intention of a particular instrument. The recitals supplement the operative part of the directive. They are interpretive tools in the EU legal order, and if we simply transfer the law but not the recitals we are removing a beneficial tool. I am afraid that assurances and good intentions from the Government are not adequate when it comes to something as important as our environmental protection.
It is quite clear that the Bill does not deliver that security and surety. We need certainty in the Bill, so I hope that the Minister will be able to accept the amendment. This amendment is only part of that certainty and protection.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments fall into two, possibly three, groups. I shall start with the group that has been the subject of the recent speeches from noble Lords—the interpretation of EU retained law. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, particularly require that the preambles and recitals should be capable of being taken into account when it comes to interpreting EU law. They are completely right, as are other noble Lords who have spoken, that at the moment under EU law the recitals and the preambles are an important part of the interpretation. I have had the privilege of appearing on a number of occasions before the European Court of Justice, both in my capacity as a government Minister and before that as a lawyer retained to argue cases, and it absolutely is the case that, unlike the techniques that we apply when we come to interpret British statutes, the preambles and recitals are very important. It therefore would be significant that they should be capable of being applied in the interpretation of EU retained law after exit day. If they were not it could lead, for example, to the result that a piece of law applied and interpreted before exit day using the preambles and recitals could be interpreted differently after exit day, and that would be damaging to legal certainty.
I very much doubt that the Government intend that there should be any difference, and I believe they intend that the preamble and recitals should be capable of being used in the interpretation, as they so often are. The question then becomes whether it is important and right to make reference to that specifically in the Act as it goes forward so that everybody, including the public, know that application of the recitals and preambles to these EU instruments is something that Parliament intends. Where I might part company a little with the way that Amendment 58 is drafted is in its apparently requiring that the interpretation should be in accordance with the recitals and preambles. The recitals and preambles should certainly be taken account of and proper regard should be given to them, but it is possible that requiring that they be interpreted in accordance with the preambles is going a little too far. No doubt the Minister will have something to say about that, as I hope he will have something to say about the principle.
The principle, which I support from these Benches, is that it should be clear, one way or another, that the recitals and preambles should be capable of being taken into account in interpretation because that is an important part of understanding that legislation. I have no doubt that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is right that the process of transposition which is intended by Clause 1 does not involve excising the recitals and preambles. What will come in is everything that is in that which is defined as EU retained law at the moment, but that does not quite cover the point about whether there is a risk that somebody might think that they are not allowed to, or should not, take account of the recitals and preambles. Of course, that depends on what the judges say. That is the principle in relation to the first part of this group of amendments. I support the need to be clear that those recitals and preambles can be taken into account, but will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say on that.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
My Lords, what I am about to say is designed to help—although whether it achieves that may of course be doubted. The Government have stated that the central object of the Bill is to ensure that the law on the day after Brexit is the same as on the day before. But it is also the Government’s stated aim—one I would hope is shared by all, or certainly the great majority, in the Chamber—that the EU law retained is certain and clear rather than left in very considerable doubt. I would suggest it is that which explains provisions such as paragraph 2 of Schedule 1, relevant to the question of whether the general principles of EU law are retained, which features in the provision under Clause 6(3), which we are now discussing. Indeed, it also explains Clause 4(2)(b), which we talked about a few days ago—although it seems like weeks—and the non-incorporation of the charter, although I shall show very considerable restraint and not go further down that road. We keep straying on to it—although I had thought that, at least for Committee stage, we had put it to bed some while back.
The amendments in this group, I suggest, will not assist in clarifying and making certain and predictable the application of retained EU law. I therefore cannot support them.
Baroness Young of Old Scone (Lab)
My Lords, I support Amendment 58. This comes down very simply to the fact that, as a result of the discussion we have heard today, the recitals and preambles either are brought across automatically—in which case, some of the statements made in the debate in the other place on this issue, which were quite lengthy and considerable, need to be re-examined, because my impression of those was that there was no guarantee of preambles and recitals being brought across—or they are not clearly brought across, in which case we need something in the Bill that does so. So I would be very grateful if the Minister would clarify, first of all, whether he believes the Government are convinced that they are already clearly brought across.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, first of all perhaps I may observe that, pursuant to Clause 3 of the Bill:
“Direct EU legislation, so far as operative immediately before exit day, forms part of domestic law on and after exit day”.
That brings over direct legislation, including recitals, as I believe a number of noble Lords have understood.
The Government’s position is that, as long as retained EU law remains as part of the UK statute book, it is essential that there is a common understanding of what the law means. Therefore, to maximise certainty, any question as to the meaning of retained EU law will be determined in the UK courts, in accordance with the CJEU’s case law as it exists immediately before the UK leaves the EU. That is set out in Clause 6(3). Any other starting point would lead to a change in the law and risk creating considerable uncertainty, if not confusion, on exit day.
However, we do not want to fossilise that case law. That is why, pursuant to Clauses 6(4) and 6(5) of the Bill, there is provision for the Supreme Court, and indeed for the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, to depart from that situation when employing their own jurisprudence. The test would be that which they apply at the present time in departing from their domestic jurisprudence.
While it would be fair to say that the Constitution Committee has not always seen eye to eye with us on the Bill, on this particular issue it described the Government’s position as clear and sensible. Retained EU law will of course be modified after exit day by Parliament, and indeed by the devolved legislatures. It is right and sensible that it should no longer be interpreted in line with retained EU case law, following those modifications. But, in other cases, it may be appropriate that, even where there has been some modification, it should continue to be interpreted in that same way. What we have in mind is a situation in which a modification simply changes a reference, for example from an EU commission or agency to a UK public body, but leaves the substantive scheme of the retained EU law exactly as it was before. That is the purpose of Clause 6(6): to ensure that, where there is a modification that has no impact on the operation of the scheme, we should continue, pursuant to Clause 6(3), to amend in an appropriate fashion.
Amendment 57, which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would remove the reference to unmodified law from Clause 6(3). But one effect of that would be to cast doubt on the operation of Clause 6(6) and the ability of modifications to retained EU law to displace the binding effect of pre-exit CJEU case law. That uncertainty, we suggest, should be avoided.
Can I come on to the issue of recitals?
Lord Goldsmith
I intervene on the Minister before he moves on to that topic. If the words that the noble Baroness’s amendment would remove—
“so far as that law is unmodified on or after exit day”—
remain in, would it still be the Government’s position that any part of an EU law can be interpreted in accordance with these principles, even if another part of that law has been modified? Could he explain precisely? Is it a question of looking at a law and saying that part of it has been modified, and therefore we no longer look at EU retained law to interpret what is left—or is it that, once it has been modified a bit, it means that it is no longer subject to that interpretative technique? It would be very helpful to have that clarification.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am not sure that I am entirely following the noble and learned Lord’s point. To express it this way, where after exit there is a modification to retained EU law but that modification does not go to the substance of the retained EU law, which would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, Clause 6(6) then allows for the continued interpretation of that retained EU law by reference to Clause 6(3), notwithstanding the relevant modification. That is why I sought to give the example of a modification that simply took out the reference to an EU agency and substituted a UK agency.
Lord Goldsmith
I hope that the noble and learned Lord and the Committee will permit me to intervene, because it is important to know how this is going to be interpreted. I do not see in these words anything about a proviso where the modification does or does not go to the substance of the directive. What my question had in mind was that, if you had a directive that has 10 provisions in it, for example, and if one of those was modified, or indeed nine of them, when it comes to the one provision that has not been modified, does one treat the proviso as applying or not applying? In other words, is that therefore modified retained EU law, which cannot be interpreted in accordance with retained case law?
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect, it could all be interpreted with reference to retained case law. Clause 6(6) says:
“Subsection (3) does not prevent the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law which has been modified on or after exit day from being decided as provided for in that subsection if doing so is consistent with the intention of the modifications”.
So the point is being made that, even where there has been modification post exit to retained EU law, you may still find yourself on a case-by-case basis deciding that you can construe that retained EU law, notwithstanding the modification, in accordance with Clause 6(3). If the noble and learned Lord wishes to discuss the matter in some detail later, I am quite happy to take him up on that.
Lord Goldsmith
That is why I did not stand up, because I think that it is better if we discuss it outside the Committee.
Lord Keen of Elie
So be it. And there was me thinking that I was being clear.
I shall touch on Amendments 58 and 59 as well as Amendment 60, which are really concerned with what is being brought over into retained EU law. I reiterate the point that I made earlier that, pursuant to Clause 3, we bring over into retained EU law all the recitals and other material in the EU regulations and directives for the purposes of interpretation and then application—a point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern earlier. If I may say so, that is reinforced, although perhaps not quite as patently as some noble Lords would wish, by Clause 6(3), which refers to the requirement to address the matter in accordance with any retained case law and retained general principles of EU law. The retained case law includes a body of case law that is establishing and has established clearly the principle of interpretation by reference to the relevant recitals in the directives and regulations.
Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, observed, when addressing the matter in the context of the ECJ, as it was, or the CJEU, one finds that these recitals sometimes play a very material part in the way in which they interpret and apply legislation that is drafted in a rather—if I may say so, without being pejorative—looser way than is perhaps the norm in domestic statutory provision.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted
I thank the noble and learned Lord for his response. I appreciate that some of what I was trying to outline was complicated, and made more so by it no doubt being difficult to listen to. I am not convinced that the point is nailed with regard to the recitals of directives, not least because there is no provision to publish those in Schedule 5. If you are going to rely on them in court, you will have to adduce some other evidence, whereas regulations are going to be published. That lies behind the amendment that I tabled to Schedule 5—it is for advance information, if you like.
I think this is a technical fix—I may be wrong, and I just bring that to noble Lords’ attention. I think I understand what has been said about Clause 6(6) in that, if the modification is trivial then, for that bit of the legislation, nothing changes and another bit in the same legislation would probably remain unaffected. So, within an individual piece of legislation, the impact of the recitals might have been removed from some bits and not from others. I think that is what was being said, and that is where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, was trying to get some clarity. Maybe we can take that offline to get that clarity. I am still not quite sure who makes that decision in Clause 6(6), and whether it will be something that appears when we get the schedule modifications or whether the courts and others will be left trying to decide it for themselves.
This may be something that we have to return to but, with the Committee’s agreement, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Maintenance of EU environmental principles
(1) Public authorities must have special regard to and apply the principles set out in this section.(2) The principles in this section are—(a) the precautionary principle as it relates to the environment,(b) that preventive action should be taken to avert environmental damage,(c) that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source,(d) the polluter pays principle, and(e) that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development.(3) The principles in subsection (2) may be called the “environmental principles”.(4) In carrying out their duties and functions arising by virtue of this Act, public authorities must take account of the public interest in—(a) promoting sustainable development in the United Kingdom and overseas,(b) preserving, protecting and improving the environment, (c) the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources,(d) promoting measures at the international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and combat climate change,(e) guaranteeing participatory rights including—(i) access to information,(ii) public participation in decision making, and(iii) access to justice,in relation to environmental matters, and(f) acting in a way that takes account of available scientific and technical data.(5) When making proposals concerning environmental protection, public authorities shall take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts.(6) Subsection (7) applies in any proceedings in which a court or tribunal determines whether a provision of primary or subordinate legislation is compatible with the environmental principles.(7) If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with the environmental principles, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.”
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
My Lords, this amendment stands in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Krebs and Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville. Amendment 108 stands in my name and I have added my name to Amendments 112 and 113 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs.
This group of amendments goes to the heart of the concerns about the potential impact of the Bill on established environmental safeguards in the UK. On earlier amendments we rehearsed the gap in environmental protection that might occur if the transfer of legal rights is limited in the way that we have spelled out, particularly in its reliance on case law. The Minister may put forward a similar argument in answering these questions but it would be useful to have it on the record so that we can look at it in detail after the debate.
Amendment 66 tackles the issue of environmental principles head on and spells out the core principles that are needed to achieve the Government’s promise of equivalence in environmental standards. These are: the precautionary principle, the preventive action principle, the principle that environmental damage should be rectified at source, the polluter pays principle and the principle that environmental protection should be integrated into policies to promote sustainable development. To avoid any uncertainty these principles should be part of domestic law on day one, the public should be able to rely on them, the court should apply them and public bodies should follow them. These principles matter. For example, as we have discussed, the precautionary principle is important in the application of pesticides, where the impact of neonicotinoids on bee populations was suspected but not backed by scientific certainty. It created enough time and space for further research to be carried out which confirmed that the ban was justified.
Similarly, the polluter pays principle, which has been used, for example, in the application of the water framework directive, has enabled the Environment Agency to impose fines on water companies found to have polluted rivers and required them to repair the damage and invest in preventive measures for the future.
These principles have existing legal status. For example, in a recent case Friends of the Earth successfully argued that the Northern Ireland department had failed to consider the precautionary principle when it refused to issue a stop notice to prevent sand extraction in Lough Neagh. I hope that I have pronounced that properly. As a result partly of that argument, the department had to reconsider its position.
These principles of environmental law are not new, nor are they unique to EU law. They are also found in a number of international environmental treaties to which the UK is a signatory. These include the Convention on Biodiversity, the Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Currently, the UK gives effect to these international obligations through its membership of the EU as these principles are contained in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This is why, although we have strong support for the concept of enhancing biodiversity as set out in Amendment 67, in the name of my noble friend Lord Judd, in the spirit of transposing rather than refining the legislation we have tried to be true to the existing principles and objectives in Article 191, which do not yet include enhancing biodiversity, although, of course, we wish that they did.
When a similar amendment to Amendment 66 was debated in the Commons, it received strong support. In fact, Dominic Raab MP, who was then the Minister of State responsible for courts and justice, stated:
“Leaving the EU will not diminish our commitment to environmental principles. Indeed, it is an opportunity to reinforce them”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/11/17; col. 501.]
So we believe that by restating the principles in the Bill by inserting this proposed coherent new clause, the Government can avoid the ambiguities which result from relying excessively on case law and make good their promise to enhance environmental protection.
More recently, the Government have announced that they plan to publish a new national policy statement setting out the environmental principles which will underpin future policy-making. In theory, we welcome this initiative as it would allow us to build on the existing principles, making them relevant and durable for the longer term—including, of course, the importance of biodiversity. This would be a document for the future. However, we have not seen a draft of it yet; it would then need to be subject to full consultation before becoming a reality. In addition, its legal status would be less clear as it could be changed by government without a parliamentary veto. In the meantime, as the date for leaving Europe grows nearer, it is important that we protect the existing principles that have stood us in good stead for so long. That is what Amendment 66 seeks to do.
The next amendment in my name is Amendment 108. It addresses the serious threat to air quality, which we were rehearsing just a moment ago, by seeking to ensure that the EU ambient air quality directive 2008, the other directives listed and the UK regulations that transpose it remain the law of the land. We know this is an issue of huge public concern, with public health implications. That concern is reflected by the courts, which have consistently ruled that the Government are in breach of the ambient air quality directive; and, of course, we saw the latest episode of this in the High Court last week, when the Government’s latest plans were declared unlawful. The Government’s reluctance to comply with the directive is a worrying indication of their likely approach to implementing air quality standards after the UK leaves the EU. Our amendment aims to put certainty into the withdrawal Bill so that existing standards and oversight remain in place.
Currently, the air quality standards regulations are secondary legislation; under the current terms of the Bill, they could be amended or repealed with minimum parliamentary scrutiny. In any event, the regulations will lose much of their effectiveness unless the courts are required to enforce them, in line with the principles established by case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. Anyway, once the UK leaves the EU, the European Commission will have no authority to bring infringement proceedings against the UK. Without this amendment, air quality protection is under threat, either by repeal or amendment—or, more subtly, through the removal of any effective enforcement mechanism. The air quality regulations could cease to be effective on Brexit day. It is therefore vital that the directive and the Air Quality Standards Regulations 2010 are transposed in full, with no weakening amendments. To guarantee public protection in the future, these air quality laws should be given the status of primary legislation, so that future changes require a full Act of Parliament. It is also vital that establishing EU case law applies in the interpretation and enforcement of these laws in the UK.
Finally, as explored in Amendments 112 and 113, there needs to be a robust and independent governance structure that deals with accountability and enforcement. We believe that the package set out in Amendment 108 is vital to delivering effective regulation and enforcement of air quality standards in the future. There are a number of other amendments in this group that explore different aspects of environmental protection and enforcement. We support these amendments, but I will leave those who have tabled them to make their case in more detail. In the meantime, I beg to move Amendment 66.
Amendment 67 (to Amendment 66)
“( ) protecting, enhancing and encouraging biodiversity,”
Lord Judd (Lab)
My Lords, I endorse every word that my noble friend said. There is nothing more important, it seems to me, for the qualitative future of the United Kingdom than the ground covered by these amendments. What kind of Britain do we want to leave to our children and grandchildren? Therefore, it seems that we have got tied up over how we can have firm policy in the future if we are to leave the European Union.
My amendment simply sanctions, I hope, what my noble friend said. She referred very strongly to biodiversity because it seems such a crucial issue. It needs very specific and precise attention; it needs to be covered very specifically in the legislation we are considering.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 317 in this group. Before I do so, I warmly endorse the comments that have already been made on the importance of getting the environmental dimensions right as we leave the European Union, if we have to.
Amendment 317 proposes a new clause on common frameworks for environmental protection, touching on a number of matters that have already been discussed. I hope that the Minister, when responding to this group of amendments, will see Amendment 317 as a constructive proposal for a possible way forward as we have to change our relationships as we move out of Europe. This amendment goes to the very heart of why I am both a Welsh nationalist and a European federalist, and those two attachments are in no way incompatible. I believe that every community should make as many decisions as possible that affect them for themselves, and where they cannot, for practical reasons—where, by their nature, some decisions have to be taken on a broader basis—those communities should have an effective voice in that wider decision-taking process The environment is one such issue.
Environmental protection is a devolved matter. However, while the UK is a European Union member state, most environmental law in the four countries of the UK is guided by common frameworks set at EU level. This amendment would require the four Governments to work together on proposals to establish minimum common environmental objectives and standards. As such, I hope it will appeal to all parts of the House. UK-wide frameworks will be needed to establish areas of common policy across the UK, even in areas of devolved competence. Crucially, this amendment would insist that devolved legislatures are equal stakeholders in the forming of those common policy areas. I will cover the principle of UK-wide frameworks, and my major concerns about Clause 11, when we get to that point of the Bill. Today, I will focus on the substantive relevance of this issue to the environment.
First, I will say a word about why common frameworks are needed. No area of policy will be more affected by the outcome of the common frameworks debate than the environment. According to analysis by the Institute for Government, there are more than 140 distinct policy areas where EU law intersects with devolved powers. The greatest number of these relate to the environment, which is unsurprising given that the EU frameworks have been widely created for environmental policy purposes.
Approximately 80% of environmental laws in the UK, including in the devolved nations, have some basis in EU legislation. Transboundary co-operation and common standards are widely recognised as important for the effective protection of the environment and the prevention of unfair regulatory competition. There are persuasive reasons for seeking to maintain common standards across the four nations of these islands post Brexit. Such frameworks would provide a set of minimum common standards and should be jointly agreed between the UK and devolved Governments. They will be important in a range of areas, such as the conservation of wildlife on land and at sea, environmental assessment and the co-ordination of action to address air and water pollution.
I shall give some examples of common frameworks. EU legislation relating to the natural environment—including the birds and habitats directives—currently helps to underpin effective environmental action by providing minimum common standards for site and species protection across the four nations. This facilitates the creation of a more ecologically coherent network of protected sites than would otherwise be the case. Such an approach will still be needed for the UK outside the EU, helping to ensure that actions in one jurisdiction complement, and do not counteract, conservation outcomes across these islands.
Similarly, the common frameworks provided by EU legislation—relating to the assessment of the likely environmental impacts of plans, programmes and projects—mean that consistent mechanisms are in place for assessing transboundary effects as well as allowing for public participation and transparency in decision-making across the four nations. Co-operation and joint agreement on common frameworks that provide minimum standards and shared high-level objectives are therefore needed.
I now turn to the role of the Joint Ministerial Committee. Most environmental issues are transboundary in nature and represent a shared concern across the four nations. In a welcome sign of progress, the UK and devolved Governments reached an agreement in October 2017, via the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations, to develop and agree common frameworks in some of these areas post Brexit—to ensure the effective management of common resources that cross boundaries between the four nations.
For the sake of our shared environment, failure to recognise the importance of agreeing a set of common frameworks in these areas would be of great concern. We urgently need the UK and devolved Governments to commit to working more openly and transparently together, to secure the best possible system of environmental governance across the four nations following the UK’s exit from the EU. This should be informed by a robust assessment of the environmental implications and a transparent process that allows for public consultation and input from stakeholders across the UK.
In conclusion, I ask the Minister to accept that, in the absence of a replacement set of jointly agreed frameworks, environmental co-operation across the four nations would be undermined. Secondly, I ask the Minister to confirm that the views of the JMC will be subject to public consultation and parliamentary scrutiny. Finally, will the Minister provide clarity as to what will be the process with respect to pursuing common frameworks once the JMC analysis is published?
Lord Krebs (CB)
My Lords, I rise to move Amendments 112 and 113, which are in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Whitchurch and Lady Byford, and my noble friend Lady Brown of Cambridge.
The Countess of Mar (CB)
My Lords, I hate to interrupt my noble friend but he is not moving his amendment now; he is speaking to it. The same applies to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley.
Lord Krebs
I thank my noble friend Lady Mar for that correction. As well as speaking to my amendment, I shall be supporting Amendments 66 and 108, with which my name is associated and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, has already spoken.
It was very encouraging to hear the Prime Minister reaffirm in her Mansion House speech on Friday that:
“As we leave the EU we will uphold environmental standards and go further to protect our shared natural heritage”.
As the Chief Medical Officer for England made clear in her annual report published last week, our own health is intimately dependent on the health of our environment. We all recognise that the improvements over past decades in the UK’s environmental standards have been driven primarily by EU laws that cover roughly 80% of environmental legislation in this country, and a key part of that has been enforcement. There is no point in having high aspirations unless you have an effective mechanism to ensure that you deliver. As a member of the European Union, we have been subject to scrutiny and enforcement by the Commission, ultimately through infraction notices. As I pointed out at Second Reading, 46% of the judgments handed down by the European Court of Justice on UK infringements since 2003 related to the environment.
The Government have accepted that after Brexit there will be a governance gap and that therefore a new green watchdog will be required to hold the Government to account on their environmental performance. The purpose of Amendments 112 and 113 is to ensure that this new green watchdog is in place by exit day and that it will mirror as closely as possible the current arrangements that we have as a member of the EU.
When the Energy and Environment Sub-Committee of the EU Select Committee, of which I am a member, took evidence on this, the very strong view was that a new watchdog would be essential. I quote from our report:
“The importance of the role of EU institutions in ensuring effective enforcement of environmental protection and standards, underpinned as it is by the power to take infraction proceedings against the United Kingdom or against any other Member State, cannot be overstated ... The evidence we have heard strongly suggests that an effective and independent domestic enforcement mechanism will be necessary, in order to fill the vacuum left by the European Commission in ensuring the compliance of the Government and public authorities with environmental obligations ... It will be important for any effective domestic enforcement mechanism to have both regular oversight of the Government’s progress towards its environmental objectives, and the ability, through the courts, to sanction non-compliance as necessary”.
I can imagine that in his reply at the end of this debate the Minister will say that we are going out to consultation on a new green watchdog. Indeed, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has already indicated that there will be a consultation on a new statutory body early in 2018. Just checking my clock, “early” is moving quickly beyond us. In the Committee debate in the other place, Dominic Raab said on 15 November 2017 that the consultation was “coming imminently”. If one of my students at Oxford said that her essay would arrive imminently but nearly four months later it had not appeared, it would be a case for disciplinary action. Monsieur Barnier has repeatedly said that the clock is ticking, so can the Minister assure the Committee that the new green watchdog will be in place on a statutory basis by exit day?
Amendments 112 and 113 set out a number of key requirements for the new watchdog. First, as I have already said, it should be in place by exit day. Secondly—this resonates with what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has just said—the UK Government and the devolved Administrations should work together to ensure that the watchdog functions apply to the whole of the UK. If there are different watchdogs for the four countries of the UK, they should operate according to the same principles and should be established jointly and in the same timescale. Thirdly, as we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, the Government should consult on incorporating EU environmental principles into primary legislation, support decision-making by the watchdog or watchdogs and ensure that the principles inform decision-making more broadly. Fourthly, there should be absolute transparency about the environmental governance functions that are transferred to the new watchdog or watchdogs by creating a publicly available register of functions.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendment 66, to which I have added my name; Amendment 67 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Judd; and Amendment 67A in the name of my noble friend Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer. These amendments are key to ensuring that the protection of our environmental heritage is enshrined in law in the Bill. This group of amendments is crux to the environmental agenda and must be included in the Bill. I fully support the thorough introduction to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, and I am grateful to Rescue, the Chartered Institute for Archaeologists, the Environmental Policy Forum and Greener UK for their briefings.
As we all know, on 29 March 2019 key pieces of legislation such as the environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental directives will be transposed into domestic law, with the aim that planning policy will continue to function as currently. However, the Bill does not directly reference some important overarching principles established in the EU treaty, potentially weakening environmental protections which underpin planning-led archaeology. This process is difficult—not least because of the perceived weakness in the Bill, which may prevent its stated ambition of ensuring a smooth transition and avoiding a black hole in the statute book on the day of the UK’s exit next year.
For the Chartered Institute for Archaeologists and the Council for British Archaeology, the key issues are: the de facto weakening of environmental principles enshrined in the European treaty, which are not within the scope of the Bill as proposed; the loss of supranational jurisdiction to provide opportunities to bring legal challenges on environmental principles; the uncertainty over how the Government will use so-called Henry VIII powers to amend technical aspects of EU law when transposed, to ensure that they remain workable in a domestic context; and the uncertainty over how previously held EU powers—brought back to the UK after Brexit—will be reserved to devolve to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.
In February, during the recess, I went to Cyprus for a holiday. During the week, my husband and I visited the marvellous and numerous archaeological remains on the island, including Aphrodite’s Temple, Aphrodite’s Rock, the Tombs of the Kings and the main archaeological site in Paphos. The Cypriot Government have spent considerable sums of money over many years excavating these sites and preserving the wonderful mosaics uncovered and other historical artefacts. I was struck by the number of non-Cypriot archaeologists who had funded and worked on the sites over the decades to bring the history to life for future generations. Many of these came from the UK.
To be clear on how important archaeological heritage is, we must turn to the survey of adults in England called Taking Part Focus On: Heritage. This was a DCMS survey of 2017 demonstrating both the cultural and economic value that heritage provides to our society and community. Some 74.2% of adults visited a heritage site in 2016-17, with a remarkable 94.2% of adults agreeing that it is important to them that,
“heritage buildings or places are well looked after”.
Another report, Heritage and the Economy 2017, by Historic England—again reporting English statistics—shows that,
“heritage directly contributed £11.9 billion in GVA”,
equivalent to 2% of our national GVA, and that:
“Heritage tourism generated £16.4 billion in spending by domestic and international visitors”.
The Welsh equivalent showed that it contributed 1.6% of GVA and Scotland’s Historic Environment Audit 2016 showed that heritage contributed,
“in excess of £2.3 billion to Scotland’s economy”.
The Countess of Mar
My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, but these amendments are about environment, not heritage. Does she have her right speech?
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville
I thank the noble Countess for that intervention, but I believe I have the right speech and I hope she will bear with me until I get to the end.
With this in mind, it is important that the UK retains at least an equivalent provision for environmental protection in domestic legislation and policy to compensate for the loss of EU funding to the historic environment with domestic funding, ensure free movement of skilled and accredited archaeologists between the EU and the UK—
The Countess of Mar
My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness again, but this is an amendment about the environment. We are asked in Committee to pay our attentions to the particular amendments that we are looking at. I have looked through the list of amendments and none of them applies to architectural heritage. Will the noble Baroness kindly let noble Lords who wish to speak on the environment have their turn?
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville
I am sorry that the noble Countess is frustrated with me trying to link the environment to archaeology. However, Article 191 aims for a “high level” protection of the environment and is based on “preventive action” in which,
“environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay”.
The principles, including the polluter pays principle, the prevention principle and the precautionary principle, have all been the fundamental base of environmental—
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I am sure that the noble Baroness will realise that the interruption was not a personal allusion to her speech or its content.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville
I am sure it was not.
These principles have been the fundamental base of environmental protection and the way archaeology is carried out in the UK. The rejection by a very close margin in the other place last November of Amendment 67, which aimed to adopt these principles into UK law with other EU legislation, leaves historical environment protection vulnerable to future changes in British policy. This is not something that the public who visit archaeological sites would welcome.
The weakening of environmental principles enshrined in the environmental treaty has captured the attention of many in the sector in recent weeks and has promoted serious questions about environmental protections after Brexit. A significant amount of time was spent debating the importance of environmental protections and there has been universal acceptance of their value, with cross-party consensus on a need for statutory protections for these principles being evidenced. Discussions are under way towards including a new environmental protection Bill, to which the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, referred, to be brought forward before exit day. Given the legislative timetable and the scope of Bills that the Government hope to bring forward, surely it would be better to enshrine the principles of Amendment 66 in the Bill, rather than leave to chance bringing forward an environmental protection Bill prior to exit day.
The Government’s 25-year environment plan is wide-ranging and encouraging. Those in the natural environment sector have been encouraged by changes in the Government’s stance that have occurred since the new Secretary of State took office. However, the Government’s drive towards streamlined planning has demonstrated how easy it is to introduce provisions that—apparently unwittingly—undermine historical environment protections. We must be vigilant to ensure that damage does not happen by default.
I turn lastly to the impact of the large number of Henry V powers contained in the Bill.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville
Sorry, Henry VIII powers. They have caused such concern in the environment protection world and elsewhere. The withdrawal Bill’s aim is to convert EU law into UK law wherever practical and appropriate. Clause 7 confers major executive powers on the Government to bring about legal and institutional changes that would normally be the subject of detailed parliamentary debate and scrutiny. These powers are incredibly broad and would be able to achieve anything that could be done through an Act of Parliament, including repealing or amending existing pieces of primary legislation. It is estimated that around 800 to 1,000 statutory instruments are likely to be needed to address deficiencies in retained EU law through these powers. I look forward to this with trepidation.
The Environmental Policy Forum has made a number of extremely valid points, including supporting the House’s Constitution Committee’s recommendations that the Bill should require Ministers to demonstrate good reason for exercising Henry VIII powers and that the sifting committee’s powers be decisive in calling for the affirmative procedure for a statutory instrument as it deems necessary. The EPF also recommends that the Bill should require the Government to establish a new body or bodies to fulfil the roles and functions currently undertaken by the EU institutions to ensure effective governance of environmental law and an appropriate level of independence and authority. The new body should be funded by and directly accountable to the UK Assemblies and Parliaments and, in a similar way, to the National Audit Office.
It is vital that the UK and devolved Governments work together throughout the passage of the Bill to ensure that common frameworks can be established to set minimum environmental standards across the UK at or above current EU standards. This should allow each country to set higher standards should they wish to do so. This process should be jointly initiated to allow for genuine shared ownership. I fully support all the amendments in this group and I hope that the Minister—although probably somewhat weary of the Committee’s deliberations—has his listening hat on.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, I rise to be helpful to the Minister because I think Amendment 66, to which I have added my name, merely ensures that we do what the Government have said they want to do. I speak as chairman of the Committee on Climate Change because this amendment, as the noble Baroness mentioned, refers to international obligations beyond the European Union, one of which is the Convention on Climate Change.
I am particularly interested in this because for four years I was Secretary of State for the Environment at a time when the British did not have a great reputation for environmental action. I have to say to the Committee that I found the presence of EU law, particularly on bathing waters and water quality, extremely helpful. It was not always easy to convince my colleagues that we really did have less good drinking water than much of the rest of the European Union. They rather took my mother’s view, which was that the reason that people had bottled water in France was because their ordinary water was unacceptable. There was a general view, much promoted in the Daily Telegraph, that there was no need for improvement. I have to say that there was need. There was even more need, as Surfers Against Sewage made clear, to do something about our appalling bathing water standards. We were, after all, in much of the country pouring unreformed ordure—I do try very hard to use phrases that the Committee will not object to—into the sea. We were able to change that, not, I may say, without very considerable difficulty and arguments about the price and cost of doing it. It was within a context of EU law, and not just precise pieces of law but the context in which we accepted certain standards and values to which we could refer when it came to making our own legislation.
I have looked at this amendment very carefully, and I cannot find anything in it to which the Government could possibly object. If my noble friend is busy looking it up at the moment, no doubt he may find something, but I do not see anything to which the Government could object. There is nothing here which does not pass from EU law into our law, and that, after all, is the purpose of the withdrawal Bill. My noble friend has sometimes been somewhat sharp with me in suggesting that I am asking for something more, so I have not put my name to those things which have asked for something more—mind you, I might well come back and ask for that—but this amendment asks for nothing more than that which has been promised by the Prime Minister, by the Secretary of State for Defra and by other Ministers: namely, that our standards would be at least those of the European Union were we to leave the EU. This merely puts down that contention.
Frankly, I think that my noble friend, if he were to say that we cannot have this amendment—I very much hope that he is not going to say that—has to explain, first, what in it is additional to the mere passing of the law from the EU into our national law. Secondly, he must explain why it is unacceptable to the Government for this House to repeat what the Government have themselves said: not an unreasonable thing, I think, for it to do.
I said earlier that I rose to be helpful, and I meant it. There is very considerable concern throughout the country, not just from environmental organisations but from civic society generally, that the Government will not be bound in the future, were we to leave the European Union, in the same way as they are bound now within the European Union. There is widespread concern, felt not just by those who are opposed to our leaving the EU but also by people who voted to leave because they were promised that leaving would not make a difference, in any sense, to these things. I want to be helpful because, if we do not do this, very large numbers of people will vote with their feet because they will not trust any Government. I do not trust any Government on these issues. I do not just mean that I do not trust this Government: I have not trusted previous Governments. I have fought with all of them one way or another on these principles. That is why this amendment is so important.
The vital issue is that the environment needs to have a framework within which people can have confidence that their interests will in fact be met. In the past, we have had the framework of the European Union. The Government say we can have just as good a framework outside the European Union—well, this is the framework, and there is no reason why they should refuse it.
In the Pope’s encyclical Laudato Si’, he makes the absolutely fascinating statement that climate change is in fact to be seen as a symptom of the way human beings have dealt with each other and the planet upon which we live. He goes on to express his desire that we should learn again how we should behave not only to each other but also to the world. The very best series of explanations of how we should behave are to be found in this amendment. They have been honed and argued over the years in the European Union, and I spent a good number of years of my life debating them both in the Environment Council and in the Agriculture Council.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Before the noble Lord, Lord Deben, finishes, does he agree that one essential EU measure is the urban wastewater directive of 1991, without which we would not have built the Thames super-sewer? I am less reticent than the noble Lord because, on a weekly basis, untreated raw sewage flows into the Thames right outside this House. We are already nearly two decades overdue in implementing that directive, and without EU law we would not be doing so at all.
Lord Deben
I am very glad to acknowledge the noble Baroness’s point, but I have tried hard not to stray into other things because I want the Minister to accept this amendment. If he does not, I have a fundamental question to ask him, because I do not think the Government are serious about what they have promised. If they are, they cannot oppose this amendment, and if they do not oppose it, why on earth can they not accept it? If the Minister tells me that we do not need it because of this, that and the other, he will have to go through each item and explain how it is totally passed into our law without this amendment. He will also have to explain it in such a way that it can be understood by all those people outside this House who are worried and concerned about this change from our membership of the EU.
Viscount Ridley (Con)
Will my noble friend explain something to me? He has just said “passed into our law”, but there is confusion, particularly in relation to what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, about environmental law. This is surely about environmental principles, which are really quite different. They are, on the whole, aspirations, with which many of us may agree, but they are not part of the legislation as such.
Lord Deben
I fear that my noble friend is not right on that, for two reasons. First, all environmental law in the European Union has been intimately connected with the principles upon which it is based. Indeed, you cannot understand the law unless you understand the principles. That has always been the situation. All we are saying is: let us make our law understandable by the principles to which we have assented and to which, we are told, the present Government wish to continue to assent. The distinction between principles and law is not correct in this case. Secondly, even if he were right—and I am not sure that he and I would always agree on the same aspirations as far as the law is concerned—it is very peculiar for the Government, having said that this is what they want, not to be prepared to put it into the law, because these are the very words to which the Prime Minister and other Ministers have referred. This is a distinction without a difference in this case.
Since my noble friend has raised it, I say that when we voted on these laws—some of which I did as a Minister—we did so on the whole package, which was the principles as adumbrated in the law itself. It is not possible to take the legal bits out without the principles, as he would suggest, because it is the principles that enable one to interpret what the law says. That has always been accepted. The Government, in their statements, certainly gave every impression that that was what they wanted to do. I very much hope that whatever my noble friend says about additionality—
Lord Pannick (CB)
I will to try to help the noble Lord out. It is not just what the Government say; it is what is in the Bill. Clause 6(3) makes it absolutely clear that retained EU law must be interpreted,
“in accordance with … retained general principles of EU law”.
The Bill recognises it.
Lord Deben
I am so pleased to have been supported by the noble Lord. I was rather afraid that he was going to find something that I had got wrong in the law and I would not like to argue with him, although I have done on occasions, as he knows, because I do not like lawyers to be left to themselves. But he has, with legal elegance, expressed what seems so obvious for anybody who has dealt with European law.
I say to my noble friend is that one of the problems we all have is that those of us who have worked in the European Union, who have argued these laws line by line, and who have worked with our neighbours to do this wonderful thing of bringing countries together to have common laws, encounter the constant difficulty that those who do not like the European Union do not understand the way it is done. Very often, the reason they are opposed to it is because they have never understood the brilliance of the mechanisms that we have there. We may lose them—I say “may”—but we do not want to lose the environmental protection that they have given us.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
The last time I checked, the environmental directorate of the EU had taken 34 cases against the UK Government, of which it had won 30. I did not want to interrupt the noble Lord, who was an absolutely first-class Environment Secretary. I know that because later I worked in planning with John Prescott, as he was then, and we were always referring back to the good work that he had done.
I would have asked the noble Lord: when he was Environment Secretary, how often was he assisted, in his dealings with the Treasury in delivering on our legal obligations, by the threat of infraction? The power to fine the Government that the Commission has does not exist anywhere in the UK. The Supreme Court does not fine the Government. I discovered, when I was at MAFF for two years, Defra for two years and the Northern Ireland environment office for a year, that the threat of infraction was a powerful sanction to the Treasury. When you were arguing about the money to do something—which we were required to do anyway but resources were short—the case to the Treasury was, “Enable us to do this, we will do a deal with our budget and everything else, because paying a fine is an absolute waste of public resources”, and that is what happened.
Most of our environmental protection today is as a result of being in the EU. Ministers wanting to deliver have been helped to do so by the threat of infraction. So the thing that is missing from all this—although the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, touched on it—is the governance and delivery of the sanction. If it is not delivered, what is the sanction? If it is not money, it will not work. The evidence is there. It has to be money. It cannot be the chair or board of whatever is set up saying to the Minister, “We don’t like what you’re doing. You’ve got to do something different”. The first time they use the nuclear option, they will not be on the board the following year unless their independence is locked in solid in legislation. The threat of a sanction of money is pretty important. Without that, the principles cannot be delivered.
Baroness Byford (Con)
I shall follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, because I put my name to Amendment 112, which calls on the Government to look at the independent body. When I spoke at Second Reading I said that it was essential that the proposed new body should have teeth, and I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for reinforcing that point. The questions that I posed then—I shall not repeat the excellent contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, because that would test the temper of the Committee to say the least—were: who staffs it? Who pays for it? Who interprets it? What relationship does it have with other agencies? It is key that the new independent body that we are promised should be set up in time, and Clause 112 sets down a timescale. It may be that the Minister is not able to accept the amendment as it stands, but it is hugely important that we realise the strength of feeling about getting this body in place in time so that the laws will be regulated in the way that they have been traditionally—so I totally accept what the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, mentioned the 25-year environment plan earlier. I hope I misunderstood her, because she is very good on her brief, but I think she indicated that there was no 25-year environment plan. I thought it was out: I have read it and was looking forward to responding to it. The Government are looking to go out to consultation on it. Is the Minister able to give the Committee any direction on the timing of that? Will it be a UK consultation or an England one with the devolved assemblies looking at it from their point of view as well, and will the new body reflect this? It is hugely important that it is a UK one because that is the law that, hopefully, we are taking over from the EU in the way it is now.
On the question of feedback on the environment side, there will be very great differences, I suspect, between how England responds and how Scotland, particularly, and Northern Ireland and maybe Wales do. There are some very real and slightly wider issues here. I think it comes to the amendment to which I added my name because I was clearly very unhappy that we had no timetable. We have no idea whether the body will have teeth or who will impose it—and, importantly for me, who will pay for it and how independent the person paying for it will be. These are questions that we need answered today. I have others, but that is enough from me.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
I will just clarify that I did not mention the 25-year environment plan. I referred to a new national policy statement setting out environmental principles, which I think is a different document. Otherwise, I agree with everything the noble Baroness said.
Baroness Young of Old Scone
My Lords, I share the anxiety of the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, about the timescales, particularly in respect of the consultation on EU environment principles and the establishment of a new independent environmental watchdog. A large amount of environmentally related legislation has to be got through over the next few months or a year: a fisheries Bill, an agriculture Bill and a huge wall of statutory instruments on environmental law are coming towards us. There are something in excess of 800 instruments in total, the last I heard, with a considerable number of those being environmental. I am anxious, along with many other noble Lords, about whether there is air time for this consultation before the legislation that needs to follow to establish the new watchdog. I would press the Minister to tell us about the plans for the consultation.
I also share the anxiety of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, about whether there will be real welly behind the regulator. I was chief executive of the Environment Agency, the environmental regulator, which had to help negotiate the urban wastewater treatment directive infraction proceedings that produced the Thames tideway. In spite of wanting and willing there to be an example elsewhere in the world of a body established by a Government that is capable of fining its own Government —and hence its own establishing power—I have not been able to find one. I hope, however, that Ministers will look assiduously at producing that result.
In the spirit of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, with the great hope that I am not going to be his unrefined ordure, I will also briefly help the Committee with another couple of examples about why the environmental principles are important. When I was chairman of English Nature, the debate about genetically modified crops was raging. There was huge public concern and the Government were in an impossible position, with the multinational American-based companies pressing very hard to have GM crops introduced. There was huge alarm about the release of triffid-like plants resistant to all known weed-killers and capable of killing insects stone dead at a distance of 100 paces. But the reality is that had there been an uncontrollable release of GM crops, it would have been more than unfortunate for biodiversity, agriculture and food security.
Viscount Ridley
Let me give the noble Baroness the chance to get her voice back by intervening on what she knows is one of my favourite subjects. Would she not accept that, many years down the line, we now know, because of the meta-analysis by Göttingen University, among other research, that the introduction of genetically modified crops has not led to triffid-like explosions, but has led to a reduction in the use of pesticides, on average, by 37% across the globe? That is something I think she would support.
Baroness Young of Old Scone
Perhaps I could continue our long-standing discussion with the noble Viscount outside the Chamber, to avoid the Committee having to listen to us going through that. The important point is that the principles helped us get a framework for thinking about the issues. That was very important at a time when that meta-analysis was not available.
Another example is our current position on the common agricultural policy. It was introduced before some of these environmental principles were refined and used in European legislation. As a result, we are now in the ridiculous position where the polluter pays principle would have helped us, as taxpayers and as water company customers and payers, avoid paying farmers twice. We are paying water companies to pay farmers to stop doing something that, as taxpayers, we are paying farmers to do. The polluter pays principle, had it existed when the common agricultural policy was first set in place, would have been a hugely valuable way of preventing that very wasteful situation.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)
I shall speak to my Amendment 67A, which sets food production within the context of Amendment 66. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said at the beginning and I completely appreciate that Amendment 66 is predicated, or modelled, on the original frameworks. But I want to draw out what is implicit in proposed new subsection (4)(c), which concerns,
“the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources”.
Part of that is about farming and food production, which we touched on when we debated animal sentience. But the importance of food security, the quality of the food available to us and the price at which that food comes will be founded on the sort of principles that we choose to put into the Bill. I shall give a couple of examples that illustrate this very well.
The first of these would be pre-emptively dosing intensively farmed animals with antibiotics. Is that reckless; is it against the precautionary principle? Yes, it is. It has led to massively increased incidences of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in both animals and humans. Of course, that has had huge cost implications.
We have often talked in this House about the implications of agriculture for climate change. There is a choice coming up for agriculture, which contributes an estimated 11% to total global warming potential. There are better ways. We are looking at no-till agriculture, which will enable the soil to retain more carbon, and so on. I will not detain the Committee with all the details.
The amendment rightly talks of,
“the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources”.
We have taken for granted for a long time that we have possibly the best grass-growing conditions in the UK: good soil and sufficient rainfall. The amendment is important because it says we must not go on taking any of this for granted. The issue of food production is something the public are rightly very concerned about. Food security is another issue. The principles in the Bill may seem a little esoteric, but when you bring it down to food—what is on the shelves of your local shops or, in the worst-case scenario, is not on the shelves of your local shops—the public will appreciate how right this House would be to debate and insist on these environmental principles being in this Bill.
The Earl of Caithness (Con)
I shall speak to Amendments 112 and 113 and support what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and my noble friend Lady Byford. It will come as no surprise to the Committee, because I have talked on this subject in our debates on the environment. I reinforce what my noble friend Lady Byford said: the new body that is to hold the Government to account must be independent and properly financed. I suggest to my noble friend the Minister that it should be financed by more than one department; if it just comes out of Defra’s budget, that will not be satisfactory. It needs to tie in with all the other departments, which need to contribute financially towards it.
Lord Deben
Is it not also important that the funding should in some way be protected? One of the real ways to overcome the toughness of independence is by funding being restricted. There needs to be some kind of exterior auditor that ensures that the funding is sufficient for the job.
The Earl of Caithness
That is a very valid point. Whatever Government are in power have always found funding bodies an extremely difficult thing to do on a continuous basis.
I was going to come to my noble friend Lord Deben and say just a couple of things to him. He should read what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern said on the previous amendment, on principles. Also, when he was Secretary of State he took on an improving situation—and, of course, he forgot to mention that we were world leaders in combating the damage to the ozone layer.
We are speaking to Amendment 67, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I am sure we all agree with him on the question of biodiversity, but whether it is relevant to have that in the Bill is debatable. I disagree with him, however, on how good the EU has been about biodiversity. If he is giving so much praise to the EU, why has biodiversity continued to decline? Why have the wild birds he mentioned continued to decline? It is largely due to EU policies, particularly the common agricultural policy. One benefit from getting out of the EU is that we will be able to do something quite positive and new for biodiversity and our wildlife, but that will mean a divergence from Europe.
The Countess of Mar
My Lords, I support Amendment 66 and the words of my noble friend Lord Krebs. I put in a note of caution here. The noble Lord asked that we mirror European law as it stands. Hot off the press came an announcement yesterday—I thank the European Environmental Bureau for this—with the headline, “Precautionary in principle, flawed in fact: European Commission review accepts environmental groups’ criticism of chemical regulation”.
The noble Lord, Lord Gardiner of Kimble, whom I am pleased to see is in his seat, knows how I have campaigned tirelessly about Roundup and glyphosate. I cite some of the points that have been made. There was a five-year review of the REACH regulation—the manner by which chemicals are regulated in the European Union. These are usually single chemicals, not mixtures. The licensing of mixtures depends on each country individually. It says:
“However, the Commission review highlights problems with substance registration dossiers, the failure to correctly apply the crucial precautionary and burden of proof principles and specific issues with REACH processes, particularly evaluation, restriction and authorisation”.
In the case of glyphosate, Monsanto has consistently hidden research that has shown that it is carcinogenic and affects the kidneys and liver. It is only now coming out after huge freedom of information requests in the United States. The European Union has chosen to ignore all that evidence; it has not asked Monsanto for it. As a result, we are being exposed to glyphosate; something like 90% of the population has glyphosate in their urine. We do not really know what the health effects are. We do know that the effects on the environment are not good. I therefore support the amendment, but I also ask that we do not mirror the behaviour of the REACH organisation and that we tighten up our own principles and make sure that we get it right.
Baroness Featherstone
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 108, to which I added my name. We have become used to relying on the EU to oversee our compliance with directives—including those highlighted in Amendment 108—and that what we commit to is delivered. We are tested and, if we are found wanting, there are consequences. However, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee said in its 19th report:
“The UK’s withdrawal from the EU raises questions about the effectiveness of oversight and enforcement of these commitments in the longer term”.
As the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, said, without enforcement, what is the point of the law?
Given that in Amendment 108 we are talking about a range of pollutants, including the five main air pollutants, the ambient air quality directive—which sets legally binding limits for concentrations in outdoor air of major air pollutants that impact public health, such as particulate matter and nitrogen dioxide—and other directives, this is a really crucial issue. We know from Defra that some of the existing mechanisms that we currently rely on to scrutinise whether we are keeping up to the environmental standards to which we are signed up are not being carried across.
As has been raised by other noble Lords, the Government said when they presented the 25-year development plan, “Don’t worry, we are setting up a new body to oversee all of that”, but what will it comprise? To what standard will it be judging? What powers will it have? If the consultation on all that is yet to start, what is the timetable for it to be up and running? And where is it in the Bill? Surely we need it in the Bill. Maybe the Government will come forward with an air quality Bill, but how on earth will that get into our law in time?
This amendment makes certain that we cannot fall foul of not having thought of something or set up new arrangements in a timely manner. It means that those of us who are concerned in this regard can cease our concern. The Government must not leave us in a situation where there is any chance or ability to lessen—whether by accident, desire or timing—the environmental protections that we currently enjoy, and I hope that the Minister can give us assurance on that.
On Amendments 66, 112 and 113, I simply say that, if the Government are sincere in their stated commitment —as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said—to uphold all the environmental commitments that we are signed up to and to uphold the spirit of the transfer of EU law into UK law, they should have absolutely no hesitation in supporting all these amendments.
Lord Renfrew of Kaimsthorn (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 66 and, in particular, to indicate my concern that these environmental principles should apply as much to the historic environment—including the built environment—and to the archaeological record as to the natural environment. It may be that—and I think that the noble Countess, Lady Mar, would prefer it—for the sake of clarity, a separate amendment should be introduced on Report to deal with archaeological and historical concerns.
It is now well established that the scheduling of ancient monuments and the listing of historic buildings, valuable though they are for the most conspicuous sites, are insufficient to protect rural landscapes and historic town centres. Indeed, planning authorities regularly make the provision of prior archaeological investigation a condition for the granting of planning consent for developments, whether for roadworks, motorways or new buildings.
Archaeological concerns are enabled and can be met by the application of environmental principles, which are codified in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. These principles provide safeguards against adverse policy change and provide a basis for legal challenge. At a time when the Government are rightly encouraging the building of new housing—which is to be welcomed when proper safeguards apply—it is important that damage to the historic environment should be avoided where possible and that the polluter should pay when mitigation is needed. They should, for instance, fund the necessary archaeological excavation and the publication that should necessarily follow archaeological fieldwork undertaken in advance of development.
The Council for British Archaeology and the Chartered Institute for Archaeologists support Amendment 66, as well as Amendments 112 and 113, and would welcome a statutory footing in United Kingdom law for these principles. The Minister in his reply may give assurance that such an amendment is not necessary. Such an assurance could, indeed, give some comfort to the archaeologists who are concerned about these issues and who do not wish to see any weakening in the way archaeological remains are currently protected by the laws relating to planning and by the planning policy guidance. The guidance which is at present followed in general works quite well but a policy does not have the strength of legislation, and this is surely the time to work in that direction. For these reasons I support Amendment 66 and would welcome an assurance that either this amendment will be accepted or that a government amendment will be introduced on Report which would meet these concerns.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
My Lords, as a passionate environmental campaigner, I am distressed by the Government’s attempt to cut out social and environmental protections from the Bill. Their record on these issues is not particularly good and so I hope that they will rethink their opposition to these amendments. As an environmental campaigner I have had quite a few brushes with the law, but I have never had much to do with lawyers. Here in your Lordships’ House we are very fortunate to have a considerable number of noble and learned Lords who give us the benefit of their expertise. I have noticed that they often disagree, and very strongly. Therefore, surely keeping these issues in the Bill would save an awful lot of legal time and legal argument and would be better for the Government. I say that in a spirit of total helpfulness and support. Therefore, I urge the Government to rethink their opposition to these amendments. That seems axiomatic to me given that they promised to keep EU law as it is and to bring it all over. As the noble Lords, Lord Deben and Lord Whitty, mentioned, the Government promised to do that. I ask them please just to do it.
Baroness Brown of Cambridge (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendments 66, 108, 112, 113 and 317, but noble Lords will be glad to hear that I will not speak to them. However, I would like to speak to Amendment 186 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, to which I have added my name. This amendment is something of a change of subject as it is about the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and seeks to keep the UK in the EU ETS. The clean growth strategy says that the Government are considering the UK’s future participation in the EU ETS post Brexit. It would certainly appear possible to stay in the EU ETS. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway participate in it. For a range of reasons it certainly appears to be a good idea.
On Friday, the Prime Minister told us that she wants to secure,
“broad energy co-operation with the EU”,
and to protect the single energy market on the island of Ireland and the UK’s participation in the EU internal energy market. This will be easier if we are in the EU ETS. The clean growth plan anticipates increases in electricity imports from Europe via interconnectors. This will be easier and fairer on UK generators if we are in the EU ETS.
The global direction of travel is one of growth in global carbon markets. The larger they are, the more efficient at delivering decarbonisation at least cost. The EU ETS and the Chinese market are the two biggest global markets, so I suggest that we might want to stay in the EU ETS. If the UK continues to make good progress in reducing emissions compared with our European neighbours, which I sincerely hope it will, we will have credits to sell in the EU ETS as the carbon price rises, bringing income to the Exchequer. That is another good reason to stay in the EU ETS. The accounting for our current carbon budgets is based on the fact that we are members of the EU ETS, so to retain the same level of ambition in emissions reduction, we would need to reset the levels of the fourth and fifth carbon budgets in legislation. It is not a huge challenge to redo the accounting but I think it would just make it slightly easier if we stayed in the EU ETS. I would like to ask the Minister to tell us more about the Government’s intentions. Should we not stay in the EU ETS?
Lord Cormack (Con)
My Lords, I wish to make two very brief points. First, I want to endorse entirely what my noble friend Lord Renfrew said. The points he made on the archaeological issues are of very great importance indeed, and it is crucial—I speak as a fellow of the Society of Antiquaries and a former vice-president of that body—that these points are taken into account.
My other point, in a slightly lighter vein—but still with serious intent—is to support my noble friend Lord Deben, who made a splendid speech. As he made it, I could not help but remember an Adjournment debate in the other place, over 30 years ago, when the late, great Reggie Bennett mentioned the problems that he had enjoying his favourite sport of swimming off the south coast. He said, “Mr Speaker, there are very few beaches onto which I can now go and swim. All I can do is go through the motions”. That just brings home, in a very simple but important way, that we owe a lot to directives that have come from Europe and been brought into our laws. My noble friend Lord Deben referred to that in his speech; he played a very important part in that regard. It is easy to bash directives—we have all done it; I have done it—but collectively, we owe a great deal to what has come out of Europe on the environment, and been sustained and endorsed in this country.
The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)
My Lords, the issue of environmental protection was widely debated during the Bill’s passage through the other place. Of course, it has now been widely debated, with great ability, by many noble Lords here. We have already had a thorough debate on the important topic of animal sentience and I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments on that issue and on the wider issue of maintenance of EU environmental principles.
Although I welcome the sentiments behind these amendments—Amendments 66 and 108, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones; Amendments 112 and 113, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs; Amendment 67, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Judd; and those in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer—I believe them to be ultimately unnecessary, for reasons I will now set out.
As my noble friend Lady Byford indicated, on 11 January, the Prime Minister launched the 25-year environment plan. That sets out our determination to leave our environment in a better state than how we found it and outlines steps to achieve this. Launching the plan, the Prime Minister stated:
“Let me be very clear. Brexit will not mean a lowering of environmental standards”.
Of course, we are committed to internationally recognised environmental principles, as set out in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992, known as the Rio principles. This declaration includes the ideas behind a number of the environmental principles listed in Amendment 66, including sustainable development, the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle and access to environmental information. These, as well as other principles, are also features of multilateral environmental agreements to which the UK is a party. For example, the OSPAR Convention—the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic—and the Gothenburg Protocol on air pollution both apply the precautionary principle.
Although these principles are already central to government environmental policy, they are not set out in one place. That is why the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced on 12 November our intention to create a new comprehensive policy statement setting out our environmental principles. The new policy statement will draw on current EU and international principles and will underpin all our future policy-making. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs also announced on 12 November our intention to consult on a new, independent and statutory body to advise and challenge government, and potentially other public bodies, on environmental legislation, stepping in when needed to hold these bodies to account and to be a champion for the environment.
In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, my noble friends Lady Byford and Lord Caithness and other noble Lords, this year we will consult widely on the details of the announcement from the Secretary of State for the Environment—I apologise to noble Lords that I cannot be more specific about a date at the moment. That consultation will explore the precise functions, the remit and powers of the new environmental body, and the nature, scope and content of the new statement on environmental principles. This will be the start of a detailed conversation with stakeholders. There are many stakeholders in this area and it is important to gather their views before coming to any decisions, which is why I cannot be more definitive at this stage on timescales.
Lord Krebs
My Lords, is the Minister familiar with Einstein’s theory of relativity? The reason I ask is because if you do the sums, I reckon that there is just over 12 months to go between now and the proposed date of exit from the European Union. We are talking about a three-month consultation period—starting heaven knows when, because we still do not know when the document for the consultation will be launched—then we have perhaps another nine months to pass an environment Bill through Parliament, if it is to be a statutory body, and then perhaps another six months to set up the organisation, fund it and appoint the staff. That sounds like a minimum of 18 months to go into 12. But of course, as Einstein pointed out, if you can travel at a speed faster than 186,000 miles per second, you can stretch time, so I hope that the Minister is proposing to invoke Einstein’s theory of relativity in ensuring that the body will be in place by the proposed date of exit.
Lord Callanan
I will take that as an observation rather than a question.
Amendments 66 and 67 would prejudge the outcome of the forthcoming consultation by setting requirements in legislation now. The result could be that we need to amend the legislation after we have considered this important input from stakeholders. I will say a few words in response to my noble friend Lord Deben’s points in a second. I am disappointed that he thinks that I am sometimes a little sharp with him; obviously, we do not often agree on many things, but I hope that I am as transparent as I can be with him.
Amendment 66 also goes further than the existing principles set out in EU and UK law today. In particular, it would introduce a new power for courts to declare provisions in primary or secondary legislation to be incompatible with the environmental principles. This power does not currently exist in either EU or UK law.
I will go a little further. The precautionary principle is included in, for instance, the REACH regulation and the invasive species regulation, so it will be preserved by the Bill in those areas. Similarly, the polluter pays principle, referred to by a number of noble Lords, is referred to in the Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2017, which will also be preserved by the Bill. EU case law on chemicals, waste and habitats, for example, includes judgments on the application of the precautionary principle to those areas, which will, likewise, be preserved by the Bill.
The purpose of the Bill is to convert and preserve the law so that after exit it continues to operate as intended. This includes many of the directives referred to, such as the wild birds and habitats directives, as transposed through domestic legislation. It is not appropriate for the Bill to introduce new powers of this kind.
Lord Deben
My noble friend has explained that some things are already there. Can he give me an undertaking that if we were in consultation to remove from this amendment anything that is additional to where the European Union now is, he would accept this amendment? That is the issue. If we were to do that, would he accept the amendment?
Lord Callanan
I cannot give an assurance that we would do that. This is about legal certainty—taking a snapshot of existing laws and transferring them into UK law as it is. It is not about creating new powers within the Bill. There will be a further opportunity to discuss this when we publish our proposals for the new body.
Lord Deben
I have not said “new powers” or talked about creating legal certainty. He keeps using that phrase. I merely said that if we amend this so that there is no additionality to what is already in European law, will he accept that as an amendment?
Lord Callanan
If a new amendment is put forward, of course we will look at it and consider its legal implications. I can give that assurance.
On Amendment 112, our starting point is that the new statement of principles and the environmental body should cover England and environmental matters that are not devolved. To respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, if the devolved Administrations would also like to take action on these issues, we are open to co-designing the proposals to ensure they work more widely across the UK. We would need to take account of the different government and legal systems in the home nations, as well as the different circumstances in the different parts of the UK. This amendment risks compromising consideration of these important issues as well as the wider devolution settlement by requiring the UK Government and devolved Administrations to consult jointly on UK-wide proposals for governance and principles.
On Amendment 113, the secondary legislation made using the powers under Clause 7 will be subject to parliamentary oversight, using well-established procedures. This amendment would require us to make all the regulations within one month of Royal Assent. This would not allow time for stakeholder consultation and would also not allow sufficient time to make all the SIs—noting that affirmative SIs take longer than one month to be laid and made.
Many areas of environmental policy are devolved. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make regulations for all the UK, which would be contrary to the devolution settlement. It would also require the creation and maintenance of a register of functions indicating who is responsible to perform them before leaving the EU and who will be responsible after we leave the EU. This is a bit of bureaucratic procedure that has no added value. The SIs under the Bill will set which UK body will perform functions, such as the various regulatory functions.
On Amendment 108, the UK Government laid legislation transposing the national emission ceilings directive in Parliament on 1 February 2018, demonstrating our clear commitment to improving air quality. This legislation implements ambitious, binding emission reduction commitments for 2020 and 2030 into domestic law. Air quality has improved significantly over recent decades, with the UK reducing emissions of all the major five air pollutants. For example, since 1970 we have reduced emissions of nitrogen oxides by 69%, emissions of PM10 by 73%, and emissions of PM2.5 by 76%. Emissions will continue to reduce thanks to the action we have already taken, and we will publish a new clean air strategy in 2018 setting out how we will work towards our 2020 and 2030 commitments.
The Bill will ensure that the body of existing EU environmental law continues to have effect in UK law. It will be for Parliament—and, in some cases, for the devolved legislatures—to make any future changes in legislation after we have left the EU. The power under Clause 7 will be used to amend legislation to ensure continued operation of legislation, enabling the Government to continue to meet their environmental objectives.
Amendment 186, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, spoke, would compel the Government to set out a strategy on the EU emissions trading system. This amendment is unnecessary given that our Clean Growth Strategy, published last year, clearly sets out our guiding principles on reducing emissions. We are considering the UK’s future participation in the EU ETS after our exit. We remain firmly committed to carbon pricing as an emissions reduction tool, while ensuring that energy-intensive and trade-intensive businesses are appropriately protected from any detrimental impacts on competitiveness.
Lord Adonis
The Minister said that the Government are “considering”; does that mean that they might propose to continue our membership?
Lord Callanan
This is a matter for the negotiations but it is certainly one of the factors we are considering. We will seek to ensure that our future approach is at least as ambitious as the current arrangements. Furthermore, we have set ambitious emissions reduction targets framed by the Climate Change Act 2008; leaving the EU does not change that.
As I have said, the purpose of the Bill is to ensure continuity and clarity in our laws without prejudice to the ongoing negotiations with the EU. I do not believe this amendment would help to achieve that, and I hope noble Lords will not press it.
I shall say a word on Amendment 260, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, which seeks to restrict the use of the Clause 17 power to weaken environmental protection. I reassure the noble Lord of the Government’s commitment to maintaining our strong environmental protection as we leave the EU. As such, it is essential that we ensure that the legislation which protects the environment remains coherent and tidy, so that it continues to function effectively after our exit.
While the noble Lord’s amendment is well intentioned, we cannot accept it. This is because it would restrict the Government’s ability to ensure that the consequences of the Bill—most notably the repeal of the ECA—were reflected throughout the statute book. It would also restrict the Government’s ability to bring to an end tidily the law and procedures that the Bill repeals. This is a vital part of providing businesses and individuals with the continuity and clarity needed for when the UK leaves the EU.
I want to make clear that these powers may be used only in consequence of, or in connection with, the coming into force of a provision of the Bill itself, not our withdrawal from the EU. Any changes made to environmental legislation to deal with the consequences of provisions of the Bill will be purely to ensure that the changes caused by this Bill are properly reflected in the statute book. To continue to work effectively and appropriately, the statute book must be tidy. It would not be proper, for example, that once the Act has been repealed, there are still references to the ECA lingering in a ghostly way across the statute book. This does not include adjusting important environmental legislation where—although I cannot imagine how this would diminish environmental protection—there must be no uncertainty as to whether the Government can make these statutes clear and up to date, ensuring their effectiveness by reflecting the consequences of this Act.
Case law and an array of legal authorities provide a very narrow scope for Governments to exercise powers of this type. As such, they cannot be used to make bigger, more substantive changes to equalities, human rights or environmental legislation; if needed, these will likely arise from our withdrawal from the EU and not from the effects of this Bill. They would therefore be made using the Clause 7(1) power where there is a deficiency arising from withdrawal. In this way, both minor technical amendments and more substantial amendments will be subject to appropriate scrutiny procedures. I hope the noble Lord is satisfied that the Government remain committed to maintaining environmental protections throughout the process of leaving the EU, and that this will enable him not to press this amendment.
I turn to Amendment 317, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, which proposes a new clause in relation to common frameworks for environmental protection. As noble Lords will agree, protection of the environment is a key concern and I am grateful to him for raising this important issue. Common approaches are being considered in a number of areas, which will help to provide the necessary environmental protections. While the UK Government and the devolved Administrations sometimes make different choices on implementation of some policies, these common rules provide significant benefits, such as making it simple for businesses from different parts of the UK to trade with each other and enabling us to meet our international obligations and, therefore, protect our common resources. This is pertinent to the environmental commitments and protections that he rightly raised.
The proposed new clause would require the Government to publish consultation proposals for the replacement of European frameworks with UK ones. It is not the position of the UK Government, nor of the devolved Administrations, that the existing EU frameworks will be replaced by our own common frameworks in every instance. Noble Lords will be aware that the Government have been working closely with the devolved Administrations to determine where future frameworks—legislative or non-legislative—will be required when the UK leaves the EU. We are making good progress in constructive discussions, which continue to be guided by the principles agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee on European negotiations in October 2017.
We hope, of course, to make further significant progress over the coming weeks and months. However, I recognise the importance that this is not just a conversation between Governments. The increased scrutiny and input of Parliament, the devolved legislatures and wider stakeholders are therefore welcomed as discussions on these issues move into a greater level of detail. As we move forward, this wider engagement will include stakeholders interested in the environmental issues that the noble Lord has raised. I therefore hope my reassurances will enable him not to press his amendment.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 67A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller. I agree that it is vital to continue to support our fantastic farmers and growers as we leave the EU. The Government are determined to grow more, sell more and export more of our great British food and drink. Indeed, such exports reached a record level of £22 billion in 2017. On 27 February, the Government launched a formal public consultation, inviting views on a range of possible paths to a brighter future for farming. Health and Harmony: The Future of Food, Farming and the Environment in a Green Brexit describes how, in future, money can be redirected from direct payments under the common agricultural policy—which are purely based on the amount of land farmed—to a new, more appropriate system of paying farmers public money for public goods such as, principally, their work to enhance the environment and invest in sustainable food production. Other public goods which could be supported include investments in technology and in skills to improve productivity.
The consultation seeks views on the huge opportunities that exist for UK agriculture to improve its competitiveness: developing the next generation of food and farming technology, adopting the latest agronomic techniques, reducing the impact of pests and diseases, investing in skills and equipment and collaborating with other farmers and processors. It also discusses the introduction of an agriculture Bill that breaks from the common agricultural policy, providing the UK with the ability to set out a domestic policy that will stand the test of time. This could provide legislative powers, including measures to create new schemes to promote and increase agricultural productivity and resilience.
The Government are vigorously pursuing the measures needed to create a strong, profitable and sustainable future for food producers in this country. Our plans will be strongly influenced by information and evidence from the very many stakeholders in the industry. I hope my reassurances will enable the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
Baroness Crawley (Lab)
We understand that consultation has yet to start on this new watchdog—that is, on the type of watchdog that we want in the future. However, perhaps the Minister would give us a clue as to what the Government would like to see as far as powers for this watchdog are concerned. For example, would they like the new watchdog to have the same sanctioning powers on Governments that the European Commission has at the moment, to which my noble friend Lord Rooker referred?
Lord Callanan
I thank the noble Baroness for her interest in this. I am sure she will understand that I cannot go any further at the moment. We hope to launch the paper shortly, but all these matters—what powers it will have, et cetera—will be a matter for the consultation.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
The noble Lord has given us a trailer on the consultation for the new agricultural system. Will he tell us which of the elements that he has referred to could not be introduced under the common agricultural policy as it is currently practised?
Lord Callanan
As the noble Lord is aware, I said that the common agricultural policy is based on land-based production subsidies, whereas we can now move to other, different policies instead. This is one of the benefits of Brexit; the common agricultural policy has been one of the worst things the European Union is responsible for.
Lord Wigley
On that very point, if there is going to be a new, overarching agricultural Bill, will the Minister confirm that this would be applicable only to England, since agriculture is totally devolved to the three other nations?
Lord Callanan
Yes, I believe Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will be able to pursue their own policies in this regard—which is another benefit of Brexit.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
My Lords, I thank everyone who has contributed to this debate, and I thank the Minister for trying to set the record straight on this issue. As the Bill has progressed, I have sat through many happy hours listening to lawyers around the Chamber making some very thoughtful and considered contributions about the meaning of different parts of the Bill. Very often, we non-lawyers end up wondering whether these things matter or whether it is a case of dancing on the head of a pin. Then, of course, you begin to realise that they do matter and that some of these disagreements concern very profound and important points for our future, and I have felt that again today.
I have listened to a number of disagreements about what is and is not in the Bill and what guarantees we can and cannot have on the environmental principles that are already in the Bill. I have also listened to the guarantees that the Minister has attempted to give. However, in addition to the views that have been aired around the Chamber today, we have had our own legal opinion, which says something very different—that the principles that we are trying to outline are not readily embraced by and incorporated in the Bill. That is why we are trying to put them in with this new wording. Those legal differences are not just about the environmental principles that we have been debating; they are also about the recitals and preambles that we dealt with in an earlier debate. Therefore, there are some profound legal differences that need to be resolved at some point.
The Minister kept saying that he wanted to provide legal certainty, but I think that we are ending up with legal uncertainty, which is precisely what our amendments attempt to deal with. Amendments 66, 112, 113 and 317 give clarity. They spell out in detail in one simple form what the principles and the Government are attempting to achieve. You do not have to cross-reference different parts here and there to see what that might entail; the amendments spell it out in simple detail. I think that there is a lot to be said for proceeding on that basis as far as a layperson is concerned. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, we are not asking for anything more; we are just asking for what is in the existing provisions. We are just trying to put it into language that most people would be able to understand and not tie it up in legal knots.
Lord Deben
Perhaps I may ask a single question. Would the noble Baroness be willing to sit down with the Minister and go through this amendment, removing anything from it which is not in the present law so that he would have a chance to accept it on Report?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
Yes, absolutely. In fact, I would go further than that. I am sure that we could provide the evidence not only in terms of international obligations but in terms of Article 191, where all these things can be found. However, let us do that trade and see where the gaps lie, and perhaps we can make some progress on that basis. Certainly, we would welcome any opportunity to iron out some of the differences that appear to exist.
The Minister made reference to the 25-year environment plan—which is great—and to the PM speaking about the need to have comparable environmental rights. Again, of course that is fine, but it is not the same as having the legal certainty of something being in the Bill. Furthermore, I think I said in my opening speech that the new policy statement on environmental principles will not have the same legal status as something that is on the face of the Bill. Therefore, we need that further certainty.
The Minister made reference to a number of consultations that are taking place. That is fine but we get only one stab at this Bill and we are being asked to accept an awful lot of promises regarding things coming on stream in months or, sadly, even longer—issues that should be set out in the Bill. It is unfortunate that we are being asked to accept that there will be deadlines for these things. The noble Lord, Lord Krebs, referred to Einstein’s theory of relativity, clearly making the point that these timetables are just impractical in terms of getting everything consulted on and in place by Brexit day. As I said, we would very much welcome the chance to work some of these things through so that we can have more certainty.
The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, made a very strong case for common frameworks. Again, I do not think that they are properly captured in the Bill, and I know that this comes up again in other sections of the Bill. Quite frankly, I would have thought that the Government would bite his hand off for the opportunity to sit down and talk about it. The noble Lord made a very compelling case. Certainly on the environment, the need for those common frameworks, despite devolution, is absolutely imperative. Therefore, I hope that there can be further discussions around that as well.
“Equality and discrimination
(1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU does not diminish protection for equality in domestic law.(2) All individuals are equal before the law and have the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law.(3) All individuals have a right not to be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground including sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.(4) The following provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 apply in relation to the rights conferred by subsections (2) and (3) as they apply in relation to Convention rights within the meaning of that Act—(a) section 3 (interpretation of legislation);(b) section 4 (declaration of incompatibility);(c) section 5 (right of Crown to intervene);(d) section 6 (acts of public authorities);(e) section 7 (proceedings);(f) section 8 (judicial remedies);(g) section 9 (judicial acts);(h) section 10 (power to take remedial action);(i) section 11 (safeguard for existing human rights); and(j) section 19 (statements of compatibility).”
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 70A stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett. It seeks to insert a new clause on equality and discrimination to ensure that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union does not diminish protection of equality in our domestic law.
In their White Paper Legislating for the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union, it is fair to say that the Government set out very strong commitments to continuing many of the equality laws that exist. Indeed, on Monday evening the noble Lord, Lord Duncan of Springbank, in replying to a debate on family and employment law, gave a very forthright and unequivocal commitment to retaining employment law and things such as the working time directive after we leave the European Union. On page 16 of that White Paper we were promised that,
“all the protections covered in the Equality Act 2006, the Equality Act 2010 and equivalent legislation in Northern Ireland will continue to apply once the UK has left the EU”.
As I said, the purpose of the amendment is to ensure that that is future-proofed.
It is fair to say that the relationship between the development of equality law in the European Union and domestically in the United Kingdom is almost what you could describe as symbiotic. There is no doubt that in many cases—I think this has already been aired in earlier debates—the minimum standards set down by the European Union have been exceeded by what has been brought in in the United Kingdom. On other occasions, the changes that have come about—for example, in 2003 with the expansion of protected characteristics to cover sexual orientation and religion or belief and a subsequent extension to cover age—have been as a result of European law. However, the extension to cover goods and services saw our domestic law overtake that of the European Union. Therefore, there has been progress, but an important part of that has been our membership of the European Union.
It is important to recognise that the Women and Equalities Select Committee of the House of Commons, in a report in February 2017, concluded:
“Ensuring that equality protections are maintained is not simply a matter of transposing existing EU law. In order to protect rights, the Government needs to take active steps to embed equality into domestic law and policy. The steps we recommend would entrench equality into the UK legal and policy framework and would ensure that the UK retains a strong, undiminished record of equality after it leaves the European Union”.
The purpose of the amendment is to give substance to that conclusion of the Women and Equalities Select Committee in the other place, and I am indebted to the Equality and Human Rights Commission for instigating this amendment.
As I have indicated, equality rights are currently underpinned by EU law. The right to equal pay for work of equal value, the protection of pregnant workers and many others cannot be removed from our domestic law as long as we are part of the European Union. However there are concerns that at some stage in the future a Government—not necessarily the present Government—may seek to erode these rights. The amendment seeks to provide an overarching domestic guarantee of non-discrimination by the state—in other words, a homegrown replacement for the safety net for equality rights which are currently provided under EU law.
Of course, a sovereign United Kingdom Parliament could at any stage repeal this provision but if it is in statute it would be much more difficult to take it away after it has been clearly set out. The Government’s difficulties in trying to remove the Human Rights Act show that when legislation is in statute it achieves a certain safeguard which Governments have to think twice—if not three or four times—about before trying to dismantle.
The right of equality builds on our common law principle of equal treatment without discrimination and is an important signifier of what kind of country we want to be after we leave the European Union. It is similar to what was said in the previous debate on environmental protection. Many of the environmental protection laws have come into the United Kingdom through the European Union. We have often built on them but, as we look forward, we want to be a green country which values fairness and equality.
The amendment’s application would not be confined to Brexit-related legislation but will be an enduring new right in United Kingdom law. It will strengthen protection, for example, for children, who currently have limited protection from unjustifiable discrimination under our domestic law. Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in the amendment provides:
“All individuals are equal before the law and have the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law… All individuals have a right not to be discriminated against by a public authority”.
Although they sound similar they are different things. Equality before the law means that the law must apply equally to everyone, so outlawing laws that have a directly discriminatory purpose. However, equal protection and benefit of the law means that laws must not have a discriminatory impact or effect unless it is justifiable having regard to the policy aim—for example, a law which caps benefits may apply to everyone but, in practice, a large proportion of those affected may be lone mothers and children and therefore such a law could affect them disproportionately and be incompatible with the new right unless it could be justified.
The proposed new clause also calls for a ministerial statement of compatibility, which parallels what is required in the Human Rights Act. It will support effective parliamentary scrutiny of new laws as parliamentarians in both this House and the other place consider the Government’s explicit policy justification for any potentially regressive measure. The right to challenge discriminatory laws in the courts provides an essential mechanism to ensure that the new right is enforceable by those affected. It will not impact solely on justifiable different treatment, so ensuring that the courts can take account of the policy justification for the measure in question, and will provide the flexibility necessary to deal with new and unforeseen circumstances.
The enforcement mechanism in the amendment is the same as for the convention rights under the Human Rights Act, with which our courts are wholly familiar when considering compatibility of laws with fundamental rights. It is completely different and distinct from the scheme under the Equality Act 2010. The provision will operate alongside existing rights in the Equality Act 2010 but will not replace them. Where the Equality Act 2010 provides an exception to the prohibition of discrimination because Parliament has determined that specific conduct should not be unlawful, this would also be expected to be treated by the courts as justifiable under the new right for the same reasons.
This is an important proposal. It is intended to apply across the United Kingdom but obviously its application in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would require discussion with the devolved Administrations. The amendment seeks to ensure that the equality rights which have been developed as part of our membership of the European Union—of which we are justifiably proud—will be proofed into the future as we leave the European Union. I commend the amendment to the House. I beg to move.
Lord Adonis (Lab)
My Lords, I have four amendments in this group. They raise exactly the same issues as those raised by the noble and learned Lord and I have nothing to add.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I support Amendment 70A, to which I have added my name. It has a forward-looking approach which addresses the need to set our homegrown equality standards against which new laws will be measured by our courts after we have left the EU. I am grateful to the EHRC for promoting this amendment and for its assistance with it.
Returning to our earlier debate about children’s rights, among other things, as the noble and learned Lord said, the proposed new clause provides protection for children against unjustified discrimination. This contrasts with the provision under the Equality Act 2010, under which children are not protected from age discrimination in the provision of services and public functions. It requires a Minister to make a statement of compatibility when introducing new legislation, which will include that it does not unjustifiably discriminate against children. It also provides a mechanism for children to challenge laws and actions by the state which have a discriminatory impact on them.
As I argued on Monday, it is important, as the UK leaves the EU, that children do not lose the important protections they currently enjoy under the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The proposed new clause would replace the EU safety net for children’s rights with the UK’s own guarantee of fair and equal treatment for children. In doing so, it sets domestic equality standards against which new laws will be measured and makes our domestic courts the arbiter of equality compliance. It is a necessary addition to our equality laws to protect rights as we leave the EU.
The need for adequate legal protection for children against the discriminatory impact of laws is demonstrated by the way different cases have fared in the courts recently. In one case, currently the subject of appeal by the Government, the High Court held that regulations implementing the social security benefit cap, to which the noble and learned Lord referred, are discriminatory and unlawful in their impact on lone parents with children under the age of two. In his judgment, Mr Justice Collins referred to the difficulty, and often impossibility, of lone parents with children under two being able to do paid work and concluded:
“Most lone parents with children under two are not the sort of households the cap was intended to cover…Real misery is being caused to no good purpose”.
In this case the claimants were able to rely on convention rights, yet an earlier case on the same issue but from a slightly different perspective had failed in part because of the difficulties in doing so. The point of the example is to ask why discrimination that affects the welfare of children should be subject to such legal complexities. We have heard today about the problems created by legal complexities. The proposed new clause provides a straightforward domestic solution to a clear right to non-discrimination by the state to replace the loss of protection provided to children as we leave the EU.
Women are another group for whom this amendment is especially important, not least because of the responsibility they still tend to have for the everyday care of children and older people. Organisations representing women such as Fawcett and the Women’s Budget Group, of which I am a member, are concerned about the potential impact on women of our withdrawal from the EU and fear the possible regression of women’s and related rights despite welcome assurances from Ministers. Like the noble and learned Lord, I too welcome the strong statement made by the noble Lord, Lord Duncan of Springbank, on Monday in our debates then. He gave strong assurances, particularly on the working time directive. Nevertheless, the research to which I referred on Monday and the experience of my noble friend Lady Crawley, which she recounted in the same debate, suggest that the history of the UK Government’s engagement with the EU on the development of equality law is not as rosy as Ministers repeatedly suggest. I am afraid that concerns remain about what might happen if and when we leave. In response to such concerns, as noble Lords have already heard, the Women and Equalities Committee stressed—to take a slightly different quote from its report—that:
“It is therefore important for the Government, during the process of leaving the EU, to ensure that robust equality protection is embedded at each milestone”.
This amendment is a means of doing just that at this very important milestone. Given all the Government’s assurances about their commitment to equality, I cannot think of a single reason why they should not want to accept this amendment.
At the start of Second Reading, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds asked us: at the end of this process, what sort of Britain do we want to inhabit? Many noble Lords subsequently referred back to that vital question. I believe that equality and human rights are fundamental values, which must stand at the heart of that Britain. Acceptance of this amendment would send a strong signal about the kind of country we want Britain to be.
Lord Low of Dalston (CB)
My Lords, I too rise to speak in support of Amendment 70A, which has just been moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.
I apologise that I did not speak at Second Reading. My apology is in the same terms as that of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on the second day in Committee, who explained that he had taken the view that he was unlikely to be able to add anything new, bearing in mind the large number of speakers.
As we have heard from the last two speakers, the Government have strongly proclaimed their intention of maintaining existing equality protections once we leave the European Union. The proposed new clause contained in Amendment 70A provides the means of ensuring that this intention is fulfilled. It is thus in very much the same case as Amendment 66, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, pointed out, does nothing more than what the Government want to ensure. It addresses concerns raised by the Women and Equalities Committee in another place, as we have heard—concerns that our exit from the European Union risks losing the entrenchment of our rights, provided by their under- pinning in EU law. To achieve this, the UK needs to replace the EU’s equality safety net with our own right to equality.
We in Britain are rightly proud that we have the strongest equality law in the world, which, in many areas, goes beyond what EU law requires. Yet some important protections—for example, for disabled people, who are naturally very close to my heart—as a result of the impact of EU law go beyond what we have been ready to do domestically. For example, the Coleman case in the European Court of Justice established that it is unlawful to discriminate against individuals because they care for a disabled person. When the underpinning of the EU law is taken away, there is a real risk that a future Government could seek to chip away at such protections. We have already seen this in the Red Tape Challenge under the coalition Government, when the existence of the EU safety net protected much of the Equality Act 2010, but we still saw provisions outside the EU directives being undermined. Many important protections in the Equality Acts could not have been changed at that time because they were part of EU law, as well as our own law. After Brexit, this will no longer be the case. Areas that some commentators have suggested may be at risk post Brexit even include aspects of equal pay legislation. This clause will set the equality standard against which new laws will be measured and make our courts the arbiter of equality compliance.
We have already heard what the Women and Equalities Committee stressed: ensuring that equality protections are maintained is not simply a matter of transposing existing EU law. To protect rights, the Government need to take active steps to embed equality into domestic law and policy. The proposed new clause specifically protects against disability discrimination and requires that a Minister must make a statement of compatibility when introducing new legislation. Specifically, this must include an undertaking that it does not discriminate on grounds of disability. This establishes an important mechanism for holding the Government to account in relation to new measures with a potential impact on disabled people. The clause also provides a mechanism for disabled people to challenge laws and actions taken by the state that have a discriminatory impact.
Sadly, it is all too true that the rights of disabled people need further protection in this way. For example, the High Court found, as recently as December of last year, that regulations determining entitlement to personal independence payment unlawfully discriminated against disabled people. The court held that the regulations were “blatantly discriminatory” against those with mental health impairments and that they were manifestly without reasonable foundation. In that case, the claimant was able to rely on her rights under the European Convention on Human Rights because she was able to show that the personal independence payment scheme falls within article 1 of the first protocol to the convention, which protects property rights. Therefore, the right not to suffer discrimination in the enjoyment of a convention right under article 14 of the convention was engaged. However, obtaining a remedy for such discrimination should not depend on whether the discrimination can be tied to a convention right. That is why a free-standing right to equality in UK law is needed, which is what the proposed new clause is intended to achieve.
Lord Cashman (Lab)
My Lords, I rise briefly to speak in favour of these amendments. I preface my remarks by saying that I agree absolutely with my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett. Human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties define a country and its approach to civilisation. I remember 30 years ago looking on in horror as discrimination was visited on lesbians, gay men and bisexuals in this country by the then Conservative Government in Section 28 of the Local Government Act. That should remind us that there is never a continuous progressive line on equalities and human rights, and that we need to reinforce the protections that we have.
It is essential to guard against the excessive transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive and to ensure that any changes to fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. I believe that is a matter of constitutional principle, as I have said on many occasions in your Lordships’ House and it bears repetition.
New scrutiny procedures introduced in the other place do not address this concern. They provide a mechanism, in the form of a sifting committee, to recommend—I emphasise “to recommend”—that the affirmative scrutiny procedure be used. I look forward to the Minister’s confirmation that such a recommendation does not have to be accepted by the Minister. Furthermore, stronger safeguards are required in the Bill to exclude changes to equality and human rights from the scope of these delegated powers.
I turn to Amendment 70A, having dealt with the principles of Amendments 161, 259 and the others in this group. I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, on the way he introduced it, and the noble Lord, Lord Low, and my noble friend Lady Lister. Amendment 70A would introduce a new clause to ensure that the rights to equality presently enjoyed in accordance with EU law are enshrined in domestic law after the UK leaves the EU. Therefore, there is arguably no reason why the amendment should not be accepted. Indeed, for the Government to deliver on their commitment to non-regression on these rights, the UK needs to replace the EU’s equality safety net, referred to by the noble and learned Lord, with our own domestic right to equality. Amendment 70A would achieve this by setting a standard that all individuals are equal before the law and have a right not to be discriminated against by a public authority. For these reasons and many others, particularly the lessons of history, I support the amendment and others in the group.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, I add my support to this group of amendments for all the reasons so eloquently set out by noble Lords. It would indeed be a retrograde step if the Government did not take advantage of these amendments to provide safeguards for our citizens.
Lord Judd
My Lords, I hope we are not going to end up with a minimalist position whereby if there is anything in which we are found to be lagging behind Europe, it has to be incorporated in the arrangements being made for the future. I agree totally with those who said that the kind of Britain I want to leave to my children and grandchildren is one that is a beacon for the principles of human rights and equality, in which we are seen to be leaders in the world. From that standpoint, I hope we will take this opportunity to make sure that we are making the necessary arrangements to ensure this.
Baroness Crawley
My Lords, I also support these amendments. The further embedding of equality principles in our legislation is an argument we would all accept.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness: assuming the amendment proposed on the status of EU law brought into this country’s law is passed—in other words, if it became primary legislation—what would be the relationship between that and the amendment?
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, we have heard repeatedly and correctly in the Chamber, given the Government’s assurance that all the rights enjoyed by British citizens on 29 March next year will still be in place on 1 April, that our task is to make sure that is the case. Clearly that is what these amendments are framed to do: ensure that the rights to equality we presently enjoy in accordance with EU law are enshrined in domestic law after exit day. That is needed because we have that safety net at the moment, which means that those rights cannot be removed, but, as I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said, we will need our own homegrown safety net to ensure the rights are protected. As we have heard, Amendment 70A sets the standards that all individuals are equal before the law and all individuals have a right not to be discriminated against by a public authority, which I am sure we all accept. As my noble friend Lord Cashman reminded us, we cannot take those for granted. He dealt with Amendments 161 and 259, so I will not repeat that. I repeat the words of my noble friend Lady Whitaker: we must make sure that there can be no retrograde move away from where we are now.
I feel fairly sure that the Minister concurs absolutely with what we are trying to achieve. I hope he can either accept this method or undertake to provide a similar one so that it can be written into the Bill and does what he and others want: to preserve all the rights we have, so that, on April Fools’ Day next year, we are not April fools.
Lord Low of Dalston
My Lords, if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, does not want to respond to the question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, perhaps I might have a go. If I heard him and remember correctly, the noble and learned Lord asked what the relationship to this amendment would be if the Government were to introduce their own right to equality. If that is the question, the answer is quite straightforward. If the Government were to bring in their own freestanding right to equality, they would essentially have accepted the amendment and there would be no need for it because they would have introduced it into primary legislation of their own motion.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, I am sorry but that is not exactly the question, which was on the effect of the retained EU law brought into this country, assuming it is given the status of primary legislation. That is a different question from the one the noble Lord, Lord Low, has kindly answered. But it is quite an important question, because there is a danger at least of a degree of conflict between the two. It is just a question that I do not know the answer to.
The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, will have the opportunity to respond to the question posed by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay after I have set out the Government’s position.
I thank noble Lords for this brief debate on this extremely important subject. Amendment 70A, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, seeks to ensure a firm basis for equalities protections as we leave the EU. In that sense, and in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I of course understand and sympathise with the motivation behind the amendment and recognise the noble and learned Lord’s interest, shared by many others on all sides of the Committee. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, tabled Amendments 101A, 133A, 161 and 259 —I thank him for his brevity in not addressing them—which seek to restrict the powers in Clause 7 from making any changes to equalities and human rights legislation.
However, as I will endeavour to set out for the benefit of the Committee, we believe that these amendments are unnecessary given our commitment to maintaining existing equality and human rights legislation and, more widely, to sustaining our strong track record in this area. Amendment 70A would in fact give rise to significant new rights—which is not, of course, the purpose of the Bill—and in all likelihood would raise difficult questions, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay indicated, regarding legal certainty.
The Government have already made clear our commitment that all the protections in and under the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 and equivalent legislation in Northern Ireland will continue to apply once the UK has left the EU. This has been stated unequivocally on several occasions, including in the March 2017 White Paper that preceded the Bill, the equality analysis we published in July 2017, and in the government response of October 2017 to the Women and Equalities Select Committee’s report, Ensuring Strong Equalities Legislation after the EU Exit.
As further assurance, the Government tabled an amendment in the other place—now paragraph 22 of Schedule 7—that will secure transparency in this area by requiring ministerial statements to be made about amendments made to the Equality Acts under each piece of secondary legislation under key powers in the Bill. These statements will in effect flag up any amendment to the Equality Acts and secondary legislation made under those Acts, while also ensuring that Ministers confirm that, in developing their draft legislation, they have had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and other conduct prohibited under the 2010 Act. We further confirmed in the other place that similar statements will be made in relation to other Brexit Bills. So we have clearly shown our commitment to maintaining the protections in our existing equality legislation, and ensuring that Brexit will not see the UK somehow regressing in this area. In contrast, Amendment 70A would go much further by creating new freestanding rights which would, indeed, apply in circumstances where the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not. Let me take a few moments to explain this in a little more detail.
First, subsection (3) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 70A takes an element from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, strips it of its original context and creates from it an exceptionally wide-ranging anti-discrimination duty. The effect of this is to go well beyond the requirements of the equivalent charter rights, which, as has been said, apply to member states only when they are acting within the scope of EU law, and well beyond the requirements of current domestic law. It would, for instance, introduce a legal duty on public bodies not to discriminate on grounds of language, property, birth or political opinion. That may sound reasonable on the face of it, but if we consider language for a moment, this duty could, for example, give all non-English speaking users of government services a right to claim discrimination if any of those services is available only in English and not in their own first language. This could ultimately mean that all public services would have to be provided in a very wide array of languages, at a substantial and disproportionate cost, which perhaps would even make some discretionary services unviable.
As many noble Lords will be aware, the key wording of subsection (3) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 70A originates in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Again, I want to be very clear on this point: nothing in the Bill affects the Government’s ongoing commitment to the ECHR, which is, of course, given further effect in domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. Against this backdrop of clear commitments to the European Convention and to maintaining all the protections in and under the Equality Acts, I respectfully suggest that the concern expressed about the future of equality rights after we leave the EU and the assumption that new freestanding anti-discrimination rights are in some way needed to offset the impact of our exit is misplaced.
The Equality Act 2010 is the cornerstone of our equalities legislation. It covers all the requirements of the four existing EU equality directives but also goes much further. For example, our ground-breaking gender pay gap reporting requirements and our public sector equality duty have no equivalent in EU law. Also, there is no existing EU directive that prohibits, as our Equality Act does, discrimination by providers of goods or services because of age, disability, religion or belief and sexual orientation. We are proud of the UK’s track record on equalities and we do not need to be part of the EU to sustain that excellent record.
Subsection (2) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 70A seeks to establish a legal provision that everyone is equal before the law. However, that very principle is already reflected in the rule of law in the UK and is one of the longest-established fundamental principles of the UK’s constitution. The common law requires public authorities to act reasonably when exercising their powers, and this includes a requirement not to discriminate arbitrarily between different cases.
Finally, subsection (4) of the clause proposed by Amendment 70A would, albeit without directly amending the Human Rights Act 1998, have the effect of linking the new rights created by subsections (2) and (3) to the framework of key provisions in the 1998 Act. Again, with respect, I must say that I do not think that this is appropriate. We believe that it would create legal uncertainty and confusion, not least around the existing prohibition on discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR, as set out in the Human Rights Act 1998. The bottom line is that substantive new rights are not consistent with the intended purpose of the Bill, which is about maintaining the same level of protection on the day after exit as before. It is not intended to be a vehicle for substantive legislative changes such as those proposed and so we cannot accept Amendment 70A, and I hope that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw it.
It is also to this end that, while we agree with and understand the honourable intentions behind the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, we cannot accept them as the legislation that underpins these rights and protections will contain many provisions that will become deficient after our exit. Indeed, the response that the Government put out in October 2017 highlighted some of these deficiencies. For example, the Equality Act refers in several places to EU or to Community law. These references are likely to need to be replaced with the term, “retained EU law”. As such, we believe that it is essential that the Clause 7 power is able to address these deficiencies so that we can ensure that the legislation that safeguards these rights and protections can continue to function effectively—which is what I would have thought we all wanted to see. Without this ability, businesses and individuals may be vulnerable to the resultant gaps in the law, which would be counterintuitive to the intentions of the noble Lord.
Equally, it cannot be the intention of the noble Lord to prevent the Government remedying a breach of our existing international obligations using Clause 8. Both these clauses are subject to the same restrictions on amending the Human Rights Act and the same equalities transparency requirements. In relation to Clause 9, to which Amendment 161, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, refers, one of our clearest similarities with the EU is our shared historic belief in the values of peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is extremely difficult therefore to envisage that any withdrawal agreement we negotiate with the EU, and by extension the Clause 9 power to implement parts of that agreement, will somehow undermine human rights and equalities law. Rather perversely, Amendment 161 would actually prevent Clause 9 strengthening human rights or equality law on the basis of something agreed in the withdrawal agreement with that effect.
However, as I have already set out, Clause 9 is, like Clause 7(1) and Clause 8, explicitly prohibited from being used to amend, repeal or revoke the Human Rights Act or any subordinate legislation made under it. In the case of Clause 17, I reassure the Committee that these powers may be used only in consequence of, or in connection with, the coming into force of a provision of the Bill itself. We expect that any changes made to equalities or human rights legislation to deal with the provisions of the Bill will be to ensure that the changes caused by the Bill are properly reflected in the statute book and that there is smooth transition in the law. To continue to work effectively and appropriately, the statute book must be tidy. Case law and other legal authorities provide a narrow scope for Governments to exercise consequential and transitional powers of this type. As such, they cannot be used to make truly substantive changes to equalities or human rights legislation.
I hope that what I have been able to say has satisfied noble Lords that the Government remain committed to maintaining equalities and human rights protections throughout the process of leaving the EU and I hope that that will enable the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Cashman
Before the Minister sits down, I asked him a direct question about the sifting committee and whether the recommendations had to be accepted by the Minister. Perhaps he could address that question.
Lord Callanan
I think my noble friend the Leader will be setting out our proposals for the sifting committee in this House. I have not seen the details, but my understanding is that there will be recommendations to the Minister.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate and I thank the Minister for his reply. He will perhaps not be surprised to learn that I was not wholly satisfied with his reply—although in fairness there was some common ground. He, like me, referred to the White Paper of March 2017 and the commitments that the Government made. Indeed, I accepted and acknowledged that in many cases the rights that have been established in relation to equality in this country have sometimes exceeded those in the European Union. However, that somewhat misses the point, because what I sought to do with this amendment was to ensure that, as we go forward and leave the European Union, these rights will still be there and that no future Government will be able to row back on them without having to give a proper explanation to Parliament.
The Minister made a couple of other points and I will reflect on what he said. I wonder about making the same offer as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, made in the previous debate: if he thinks that some of these go too far, if he and I were to meet and he were to excise the ones he thinks take it beyond what is already there, would he then be prepared to accept an amendment on Report without these? That might be something he would wish to consider.
I also note that while he made the point in relation to subsection (2):
“All individuals are equal before the law”,
as I did in my remarks, that that is part and parcel of our common law, he did not have anything to say about the second part, which refers to having,
“the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, very graphically described the recent case which shows that treating everyone equally before the law does not take account of the fact that some laws might impact disproportionately on some categories of people and end up in discrimination.
Saudi Arabia
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)
My Lords, with the leave of the House I would like to repeat the Answer given by my right honourable friend the Minister for the Middle East in response to an Urgent Question asked in the other place today. The Answer is as follows:
“I have been asked to respond on behalf of the Foreign Secretary as he is currently at an engagement at the Palace.
The Prime Minister has invited the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Royal Highness Mohammad bin Salman, to visit the United Kingdom. We are delighted to welcome him and his delegation on his first official visit to the UK, taking place from today until Friday.
During the visit the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince will launch a new and ambitious strategic partnership between our two countries, which will allow us to discuss a range of bilateral matters and foreign policy issues of mutual interest.
The UK Government have a close and wide-ranging relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the UK’s third-fastest growing market for exports, and we continue to work together to address regional and international issues, including Yemen.
The visit will allow for a substantive discussion between the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister on the need for a political resolution to the conflict in Yemen, and how to address the humanitarian crisis.
The United Kingdom fully supports the Crown Prince’s social and economic reform programme, Vision 2030. His visit is an opportunity for him to underline his vision of an outward-looking Saudi Arabia, one that embraces a moderate and tolerant form of Islam and a more inclusive Saudi society. This includes greater freedom for women, in line with the recent statements and reforms made by the Crown Prince.
We believe these reforms are the best course for Saudi Arabia’s future security, stability and prosperity, and it is right that the UK supports the Crown Prince in his Vision 2030 endeavours”.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for repeating that response to the Urgent Question. There is no doubt that we need a good diplomatic and economic relationship with Saudi Arabia. But as in any good relationship, we must have honesty. I fear that the United Kingdom’s protests against serious human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia are so subtle that they are clearly not being heard. In the eight months since he became Crown Prince we have seen the number of executions in Saudi Arabia double. We, like the Prince, who was rightly enraged at the Houthi rebels’ missile attack on Riyadh in December, condemned that attack. But the response from the Saudis was a 10-day barrage of indiscriminate air strikes on civilian areas, killing and injuring hundreds, including dozens of children.
In July last year, the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury said,
“the depth of our relationship with Saudi Arabia in trade and finance … would indicate that we have the options for significantly more leverage than mere condemnation”.—[Official Report, 18/7/17; col. 1523.]
Like the most reverend Primate I wonder what other measures the Government are taking which involve action as well as condemnation.
The Government talk about the peace process in Yemen. What has happened to the United Nations resolution that we drafted, with which the Saudis refuse to co-operate? Will the Minister tonight pledge that we will, as a pen holder on Yemen, demand at the United Nations an immediate ceasefire, proper peace talks and a permanent end to this dreadful war?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, as the noble Lord is aware, reforms have been initiated by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince. He is right to raise the important issue of human rights. On the issue of Yemen, we will continue to push for a political settlement with all the influence we have, both through international forums and directly and bilaterally with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the general issue of human rights, we should look at the record of the Crown Prince. While there are, of course, many areas still to focus on, we must look at the starting point. Some of the announcements that have been made on issues of greater gender equality may, from our perspective, seem like a small step forward. But if we look at the recent history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the reforms we have seen on women’s rights in particular, both in terms of driving and attending sports events, are a positive step forward.
Another area of reform on which I have been encouraged is greater expression and freedom of religion and belief. As the noble Lord may be aware, on the Crown Prince’s visit to the United Kingdom he stopped in Egypt. Another area we have often discussed at the Dispatch Box is the plight of Coptic Christians in Egypt, and I was heartened that during the Crown Prince’s visit he visited the Pope of the Coptic Church and actually did so in the cathedral. We believe these are positive steps forward, especially if looked at through the lens of Saudi society. We will therefore continue to work on a strong bilateral basis to ensure that many of the issues the noble Lord and I have discussed before will continue to be raised, including the important issue of human rights. Because of our relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia I believe we will be able to see further movement in that respect.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I recognise that our leaving the European Union makes Saudi Arabia even more important as a partner than it has been up to now, and also more important as an export market. However, can we have an assurance, first, that the closeness of our military relationship will not either implicate us in what is happening in Yemen or prevent us from making the necessary criticisms of the mistakes that the Saudis appear to be making there? Secondly, since many wealthy Saudis and members of the royal family have homes and investments in Britain, can we have an assurance that in the fight against corruption we will assist with transparency and that, when it comes to the likely applications for asylum in Britain from some of those who have fallen out, they are taken one by one and fairly? I appreciate that that is a very delicate area. Lastly, will the Minister tell us how we will help with the process of social reform? We have all learned that revolution is much worse than evolution. If the Saudis are just starting on a very long and painful process of evolution, how are we going to assist in that?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I thank the noble Lord. He will know from his own experience at the Foreign Office that the relationship is important, as he has rightly articulated. We will continue, on a bilateral basis, to implore reform upon the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, primarily through the drive we have seen from His Royal Highness with some of the reforms he has brought forward such as those on business relations. He raised the important issue of defence. I can give him the reassurance that our defence relationship and any contracts in that respect are subject to the strictest criteria in making those assessments, and those continue to be looked at on a case-by-case basis. He is right to say that the process of reform within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is very slow and challenging, but through Saudi Vision 2030, which sets out a broad agenda for social reform and greater equality for women, we will continue to support the efforts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and His Royal Highness in this respect.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
Perhaps the Minister could reply to two questions on Yemen. First, what is the duration of the lifting of the blockade on humanitarian supplies by Saudi Arabia—which was very welcome when it came—and do we believe that the humanitarian supplies are really getting through now and that the blockade is not inhibiting them in any way? Secondly, does he not see the force of the request made by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that we reactivate things in the Security Council? The peace process in Yemen is pretty moribund and it needs a new breath of life. If we really are leading the drafting on this in the Security Council, surely we should start some work on it now, not sit there with the pen paralysed in our hands.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
Taking the noble Lord’s second question first, it is not about being paralysed with a pen in the hand, but as the pen holder of course we take our responsibility seriously. It is also important, as we see the reform agenda in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to use our bilateral relationship to get the political solution in Yemen that we all desire. In answer to his first question, a positive stance has been taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, as the noble Lord will know, in Yemen both the ports of Hudaydah and Saleef have been opened. Since 20 December 2017, when the blockade was lifted, there have been 53 visits by different vessels, of which 32 have delivered food and 23 have delivered fuel. But I also acknowledge that when you look at the challenges in Yemen—I was looking at the background to this—21 million people in Yemen need aid. That is 76% of the population. This is very much just the beginning and we will continue to work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure that the traction we have seen—the visits that have been made by different vessels—continues to focus on bringing relief and aid to those 21 million people.
Baroness Manzoor (Con)
I welcome the visit of the delegation from Saudi Arabia and I hope it is successful, for both the UK and Saudi Arabia. I also welcome the reforms that are taking place in Saudi Arabia. We must not forget that Saudi Arabia is a new country and is only 50 years or so into its development. Therefore, the changes that have been made are quite significant. Social reform—the 2030 vision—is really important. Can my noble friend the Minister say how the UK will help support that reform to go at a much faster pace than it currently is?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I think we have seen the reforms. My noble friend is quite right to raise that. I have already alluded to the fact that we have seen a beginning—and it is a beginning—of addressing some of the issues of gender equality, such as women driving or women attending sporting events. Tomorrow is International Women’s Day and I understand that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will officially mark it for the first time. There is a long road still ahead but cinemas are also opening in Saudi Arabia—I believe Vue is opening 30 cinemas. These are small steps but we should continue to give encouragement across the piece.
Leveson Part 2: Sunday Times
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat in the form of a Statement the Answer given by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to an Urgent Question in the other place. The Statement is as follows:
“This morning we saw reports in the media of a potential fraud and data protection breach by a former private investigator. The allegations are of behaviour that appears totally unacceptable and potentially criminal. Investigation is therefore a matter for the police and the House will understand that there is only so far I can go in discussing the specific details and allegations. More broadly, some people have already formed the conclusion that this revelation should require us to change policy on press regulation. Policy, of course, should always be based on all available information.
It is worth noting that the activity described apparently stopped around 2010, before the establishment of the Leveson inquiry. Indeed, it was precisely because of cases such as this that the Leveson inquiry was set up. This sort of behaviour was covered by the terms of reference of that inquiry, and Mr Ford’s activities were raised as part of the inquiry.
As we discussed in the House last week, and then again on Monday, there have been three detailed police investigations. A wide range of offences were examined and more than 40 people were convicted, and many went to prison. Today’s revelations, if proven, are clearly already covered by the law, and appear to be in contravention of Section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998. As described, they would also appear to be in contravention of the new Data Protection Bill currently before this House.
What is more, the fact that this activity stopped in 2010 underlines the point that the world has changed. Practices such as these have been investigated, and newspapers today are in a very different position from when these alleged offences took place. This view is in fact strengthened by today’s example because the behaviour we have discovered today took place before the Leveson inquiry, and existing law is in place to deal with it. Criminal behaviour should be dealt with by the police and the courts, and anyone who has committed a criminal offence should face the full force of the law.
The future of a vibrant, free and independent press matters to us all. We are committed to protecting it. We want to see the highest of standards. We must face the challenges of today to ensure that Britain has high-quality journalism and a high-quality discourse to underpin our democracy for the years to come”.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, the shocking revelations some of the press and other media earlier today about allegations of blagging commissioned by the Sunday Times are, in the words of the Secretary of State,
“totally unacceptable and potentially criminal”,
and the right thing is for them to be investigated by the police. However, the key issue is that the Secretary of State has refused to reconsider the decision to close the Leveson inquiry. Let us be clear: this decision was not supported by the vast majority of those who responded to the public consultation and it was strongly opposed by the chair of the inquiry, Sir Brian Leveson, whose letter is available in the Library.
I say again to the Government that letting down the victims of this type of press activity is breaking all the promises they were given, and is a disgrace. In light of this, I wonder whether Minister can explain why it is not in the public interest to complete the Leveson inquiry, given that, far from being an isolated event from a previous age, today’s revelations confirm that phone hacking and other criminal behaviour was more widespread and affected a wider range of individuals than was disclosed in the written evidence given to part 1 of the inquiry, and that some of the oral evidence given to the inquiry was, at the very least, incomplete, so that, in Sir Brian’s words, it,
“remains unclear exactly how widespread these and similar practices have been throughout the print media”.
It may be that this sort of behaviour has ceased but it is in the public interest to be certain about that. Neither Leveson part 1 nor the civil or criminal trials have provided definitive answers about who did what to whom. Sir Brian suggests that the public interest would be served only by,
“a detailed, reasoned report which covers the whole of the available evidence”.
While there is much about the new press regulator—IPSO—that can be welcomed, the Secretary of State indicated in the other place today that more needs to be done in terms of IPSO’s as yet untested low-cost arbitration system, and in relation to the way apologies and retractions are dealt with. It is surely in the public interest to get this right so that victims of press intrusion can actually get the redress they so patently have not had in the past. Although included in the original terms of reference, there has been no proper investigation of failures of corporate governance and management at News International and other newspapers.
On how to go forward, we currently have two press regulation models, and that is clearly unsustainable. Voluntary self-regulation may well be the right approach, but it will not work unless there is public confidence, particularly when so much has been revealed about wrongdoing, including the events occurring after the publication of the first Leveson report.
When he announced last week that he was dropping the Leveson inquiry, the Culture Secretary said that he was doing do so because he felt the public interest lay in looking forward. I still believe that there is more that unites us on this than divides us. We all want a review of the future of quality journalism and for there to be an assessment of what is required to sustain that for the benefit of our democracy and polity. Where we differ is that we think that the public interest demands that the new inquiry should start with an examination of the recent history, culture and practice of the press, police and politicians. The Government clearly want to draw a veil over that. They should be very careful, particularly when they think they are acting in the public interest.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, the Government have to take decisions about what is proportionate, appropriate and in the public interest. Our analysis is that the terms of reference for part 2 have already largely been met and that the cost and time of part 2 would be disproportionate and not in the public interest.
Lord McNally (LD)
My Lords, one of the things we did not have last Thursday when the noble and learned Lord made his Statement was Sir Brian Leveson’s letter. In both Houses, an impression was given that Sir Brian basically accepted what was going along. Through Hansard I urge every Member of this House to go to the House of Lords Library and look at the letter, which is a devastating six-page indictment of what this Government have done. He makes it very clear that he wanted to go on with it. He does not accept that IPSO is up and running so wonderfully. He points out examples, such as the Manchester terrorist outrage reported by the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, where there was intrusive press behaviour, and in the letter he quotes recent worrying police and media collusion. He also challenges the Government about cost. It is a devastating indictment. Does the Minister think that the way the Government have handled this is in any way in the spirit of the Inquiries Act 2005, which requires consultation with the chairman as a safeguard so that no Government will cut and run from an inquiry? That is exactly what this Government have done. Will he again consider a more constructive response to what was said by the Official Opposition? We were getting this right when we were working together. It has gone badly wrong since the Government have started cutting their own deals with the press barons.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, of course since the 2005 Act we have to consult the chairman of an inquiry, and that is exactly what we did. Thereafter we had to make a judgment about the way forward. Newspapers today are in a very different position from when the phone-hacking scandal occurred back in 2011. The events just reported relate to a period between 1995 and 2010. We have seen significant reforms to press regulation, and we have discussed that before in this House. It is our considered opinion and judgment that it is not appropriate or proportionate to proceed with part 2 of the inquiry.
Lord Prescott (Lab)
My Lords, as an active victim of telephone hacking, I was shocked to hear a private investigator working for the Sunday Times announce that he was sent on fishing expeditions to look at what information there was about me and the whole Labour Cabinet and that in his investigations he conducted illegal acts. That is shocking and totally unacceptable and it is why Lord Justice Leveson has made it clear that he wants to see the inquiry continue. Since the Government continue to take the view that they will not proceed with part 2 or implement Section 40, can the Minister confirm that the House will have legislation before it to make the changes which the Government have talked about? That would presumably mean that we would be allowed to have a vote on the very issue of whether we agree with the Government’s conclusion against the unanimous view of both Houses on having such an inquiry. If that is to be the case on such legislation, would it be useful to have Lord Justice Leveson look at this incident of blagging with the Sunday Times and Mr John Ford so that we could be informed when we have the debate in this House on whether we agree with the Government’s objective to close down a second inquiry or Section 40?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, the conduct of John Ford is indicative of criminal conduct. That will be a matter for investigation by the police and, in due course, upon their report, in appropriate terms, consideration of prosecution, with the law in place being sufficient to address it in that way. I am sure the noble Lord will agree that in cases where we see reports of such conduct, it is not for us to prejudge them but to approach them in a calm, considered and coherent way. As regards the proposal to repeal Section 40, as indicated before, it is the Government’s intention to bring forward legislation on that point at an appropriate time.
Lord Inglewood (Con)
My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend may be able to clarify something which has slightly puzzled me about the Statement. The second paragraph states:
“this sort of behaviour was covered by the terms of reference of that inquiry”—
that is the Leveson inquiry—
“and Mr Ford’s activities were raised as part of the inquiry”.
Then the penultimate paragraph states:
“This view is in fact strengthened by today’s example because the behaviour we have discovered today took place before the Leveson inquiry, and existing law is in place to deal with it”.
It seems to me that if the behaviour has been discovered today, it cannot have been in front of the Leveson inquiry. I would like clarification of exactly what is meant here.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, my understanding is that some of the allegations attributed to Mr John Ford were known of at the time of the Leveson inquiry and it is in that context that the Statement was made. As to the scope of the inquiry at the time, there are aspects of part 1 that touched upon this, but the terms of reference of the inquiry have also been partly met through the police investigations which took place.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill
Wednesday 7th March 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 View all European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 79-V(b) Amendment for Committee, supplementary to the fifth marshalled list (PDF, 55KB) - (7 Mar 2018)
Lord Wilson of Dinton
Lord Wilson of Dinton (CB)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 71, I will also speak to Amendments 116, 253 and 257, which are in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Lisvane and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. My noble friend Lord Lisvane has asked me to convey his apologies for not being here to move the amendment himself, but he has to be absent to speak at a memorial service in Cardiff for an old friend. I am sure the Committee will understand that reason.
I feel we are now coming to the heart of the Bill. I confess that, while listening to the debates, I have found myself thinking of the Bill as creating a Frankenstein’s monster. It is sewing together 40 years of EU law, snipped around to fit with this country’s law. Clause 7 gives a Minister of the Crown the power to snip away at EU law and British law to try to get them to fit together. It is a task on a huge scale, and I do not believe anyone, wherever they are working, can quite get their mind round it at the moment or round what the consequences will be.
These amendments would tighten, in two ways, the threshold which the Minister of the Crown has to reach in order to be able to exercise the powers. They would tighten it by providing, first, that the powers could be used only where it was “necessary” to use them, not where it was considered “appropriate”. Secondly, they would give an objective test for whether the use of the powers was necessary, rather than the subjective test of whether the Minister considered it appropriate.
I believe that such changes are needed and would be justified by three things. First, there is the sheer scale of the task being undertaken. Of course, there are limits to the power—it can only be used to correct deficiencies in EU retained law which arise from withdrawal from the European Union and do so in areas which are not excluded by Clause 7(7)—which are important. But there are still huge swathes of law which could be amended under the powers. From listening to a sample of the debates that the Committee has had over the last days, those include human rights, the environment, the welfare of animals—there is very little in the legislation we are dealing with that does not affect most aspects of people’s lives in this country.
The power itself is very broad: to make law which has the status of an Act of Parliament. An extraordinary subsection, Clause 7(5), says:
“Regulations under subsection (1) may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament”.
We are talking about the power to make Acts of Parliament without going through the processes of Parliament, which I find breath-taking.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
And in an unamendable sense, because it is to be done by resolution—there can be no amendment to those resolutions.
Lord Wilson of Dinton
The noble Viscount reinforces the point which I am trying to make. The Explanatory Notes explain that the power also extends to,
“altering Acts of Parliament where appropriate”.
We are talking about the power to make law and to amend existing law. This is the dream of tyrants through the ages. It is something which is repugnant to the history of this country and the development of our legal system. My argument to the Committee is that the House should lean as hard against it as it can, provided that does not get in the way of achieving the desired result of a functioning legal system. We should not leave leeway which allows Ministers to do things which would be policy changes. I am uneasy about the danger that policy changes could come through the use of the power.
When you try to marry 40 years of legislation with British law, there will be endless choices to be made: you could go this way; you could go that way. Policy is tied up in the interstices of quite small decisions about how the laws should be married together. We should lean against anything which encourages policy change and we should focus the Minister’s power exclusively on achieving a functioning legal system, without going wider. If the law as it emerges needs to be improved, it should be improved by separate legislation that goes through proper processes. We should give only the power that is strictly necessary from the point of view of the objects of this legislation.
Another point I draw to the Committee’s attention is the number of people who will be able to make and amend law. I am not a lawyer—I was 50 years ago, but I am not now—but if I read the Bill correctly, it gives the power to a Minister of the Crown, as defined in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975. Section 8 of the Act says that a Minister of the Crown is anyone who holds,
“office in Her Majesty’s Government”.
I have not checked this, but my memory is—it used to be imprinted on me when I was working in the Civil Service—that you can have up to 109 Ministers in the Government, so 109 people are being authorised to make or to amend law. In addition, the Commissioners of Customs and Excise will be given the power to make law and amend law, subject to the restrictions. That is another seven people—a Permanent Secretary and a number of directors-general—being given this power which tyrants dream of.
In addition, I draw the Committee’s attention to where the Explanatory Notes say that the power could include,
“sub-delegating the power to a public authority where they are best placed to deal with the deficiencies”.
So we are talking about giving public authorities the power to make law without going through parliamentary processes and to amend law. What is a public authority? According to Section 14, “public authority” is defined by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. If you read that Section 6, which I will give in its entirety, it says in subsection (3) that,
“‘public authority’ includes … a court or tribunal”.
I ask the Minister: are we seriously proposing to give the power to make law to a court? This is constitutional territory which is completely novel. Paragraph (b) in that subsection says that “public authority” includes,
“any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”.
The proposal before this Committee is that the power to make and amend law within the conditions set out in the clause could be capable of being given to any person certain of whose functions are of a public nature, which in essence is any public servant. I put it to the Committee: is this necessary or reasonable?
Lord Wilson of Dinton
Is this reasonable without reference to Parliament, or to the lightest sifting procedure where any recommendations can be made?
I ask the Minister whether he has an estimate of how many people may be given the power to amend law and make law. I would be interested just to know the number. If you have so many people, possibly hundreds, given the power, you should restrict it as much as you possibly can, so far as is consistent with the objects of the Bill.
Why do I think that the phrase “the Minister considers appropriate” is inadequate? First of all, “appropriate” is a word which should be avoided as much as it possibly can. In my last jobs in the Civil Service, I was sometimes faced with proposals that the Minister should be able to do something “when appropriate”. I always reached for my red pen and struck it out.
Lord Wilson of Dinton
I think we are making the same point, which is that it either conceals inadequate thought, or it is devious.
Of course, the truth is that, if you are in government, you want to surround the Minister and yourself with plump cushions of legal protection. The legal phrase is “ex abundanti cautela”. It is about excessive caution—you do not want to take risks. I have to say to the Committee that, in this case, I think the scale of the powers proposed is so extensive that we should lean against giving Ministers plump cushions of legal protection; it should be the strict discipline of an objective test of what is necessary.
It is interesting that the Government themselves, in their White Paper last March, used the language of necessity. The White Paper twice said that the powers would only be usable “where necessary”. In the cases which it provided where the powers might be used, it used the word “need”: it used the language of necessity; it did not use this language of appropriateness. I think it is only recently, with the sudden alarm that the scale is going to be so great, that the desire for plump cushions has arisen. I think that the Government are backing away from an undertaking only to have the power usable where it is necessary, which they gave in March last year and which they should have stuck to.
There are all sorts of arguments which may be used, such as that the word “appropriate” is used in other legislation. I think that is true, but I do not think that it is justified in this case, where the scale is so extensive. It could be argued that, when faced with a choice, there are different solutions and, therefore, there is no solution which is necessary. That is a flimsy argument—that horse will not run. What we are saying in this amendment is that the power should be used where its use is necessary, not where the solution is necessary.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
My Lords, if this Amendment is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 72 or 73 because of pre-emption.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My noble friend Lord Tyler has added his name to Amendments 71, 116, 253 and 257. Unfortunately, he is unwell and unable to be in his place today. He has, however, advised me —extensively—to rely heavily in my remarks on the report of the DPRRC published on 1 February. As I am sure that Members will know, the report was highly critical of this Bill. It noted that:
“The Bill confers on Ministers wider Henry VIII powers than we have ever seen”,
and went on to discuss some of these powers in detail. The first it examined was the use in the Bill of “appropriate” instead of “necessary” as a test for action by secondary legislation. The committee pointed out that this gives the Minister much wider discretion than the Government’s White Paper commitment not to make major changes to policy beyond those necessary to ensure continued proper functioning of the law after we leave the EU. Instead of a test based on objective necessity, the Government have substituted the much wider and entirely subjective test of the Minister’s judgment about what he or she considers appropriate. The Government must explain why they have abandoned the White Paper commitment. It would help us to understand their reasoning if the Government could also provide the House with concrete and substantive examples of where a test of necessity may fail to produce continued proper functioning of the law.
I am sure that when he does this, the Minister will want to acknowledge and deal with paragraphs 8 to 10 of the DPRRC report, which concluded, via a worked example, that a proper test of necessity does not prevent his choosing between possible solutions when the “necessary” threshold is in fact met. I am sure that he will tell the House why he disagrees with the DPRRC’s recommendation in paragraph 12, which simply says:
“The subjective ‘appropriateness’ test in clause 7 should be circumscribed in favour of a test based on objective necessity”.
As the DPRRC remarked, the Bill is packed with Henry VIII clauses, and it might be worth remembering what actually happened when the Minister’s predecessors, Thomas Cromwell and Lord Audley, presented the original Henry VIII power, the Bill of Proclamations, to Parliament. Historians have disagreed about Cromwell’s motives but not about what the Bill sought to do—to make the King’s proclamations enforceable as law by the courts. Both Houses of Parliament saw the evident dangers in this and both resisted. The eventual outcome, the Act of Proclamations, was a heavily revised version of the original Bill. It showed Parliament’s strength of feeling on the issue and its skill in avoiding direct confrontation with the King. In those days, the penalty for defying the Executive was a little sharper-edged than a visit from the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. In the end, Parliament passed the Bill but amended it to ensure that the provisions for enforcement would be wholly unworkable—and so it proved.
I am not suggesting exactly the same approach, but I do suggest that we take the same view as our predecessors about giving wide, direct law-making powers to the Executive. We should do what Parliament did in 1539—we should resist.
Lord Lang of Monkton (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to speak to this group of amendments and support those spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton. I congratulate him on how he exposed the ramifications that reach so far into our constitution. It saves me the task of trying to tackle it.
It is a shame that the House is not more fully attended tonight. That is nothing to do with my personal egotism—quite the reverse—but this is such an important subject; I am very glad that we have reached it in the Bill, and it deserves the closest of attention. I speak in support of Amendments 71 and 72, as well as Amendments 76, 77 and others in this group. In so doing, I am keen to focus less on the Brexit-related provisions than on the constitutional implications of granting Ministers special powers to undertake the Bill’s purpose, while not limiting and containing such powers and enhancing scrutiny of the resultant secondary legislation.
The amendments themselves rein in Ministers’ powers from when they are appropriate to only when they are necessary, and are very straightforward. In the case of the amendment yet to be spoken to by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, “essential” is injected into the proceedings as well, giving a threefold choice to your Lordships. However, it is a transparent illustration of why the amendments are needed. “Appropriate” is so bland, broad and subjective as to be almost meaningless, as has been said, and it gives the Minister excessive influence and discretion. “Necessary”, by contrast, is more specific and requires justification—and I believe that the courts prefer to handle litigation over “necessary” than “appropriate”, for reasons one can understand. Clause 7 is stuffed with powers that need to be addressed in this way. It is time limited to some extent by subsection (8). I welcome that, and I welcome in passing the concession on sifting granted by my noble friend the Leader of the House in her Second Reading speech. But the clause is one that cries out for tighter control and closer scrutiny.
The Constitution Committee reported extensively on the Bill in three volumes—a unique event—so the Government have known for a whole year of the concern that we expressed on such matters and have heard it often repeated since. I am no longer a member of the committee, but I plead guilty to being partly responsible for the first of those three reports. Again unusually, that report was published before even the White Paper was produced, let alone the Bill itself, a procedure that I rather recommend to Select Committees. It makes life very much easier and gives room for one’s imagination to fly. However, the essence of the report was to recognise that the massive task of legislative retrieval would need special powers for Ministers. The Government repeated that in their White Paper and quoted our report in support, but they rather cynically omitted and ignored the vital qualification that we had stressed that such new powers had to be accompanied by tighter controls and the safeguards that we recommended—explanatory memorandums, certification of statutory instruments by Ministers, strengthened scrutiny procedures and so on. I heard the comment that the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, made about the Constitution Committee’s recommendation as an alternative to “appropriate”. I am glad to say, “Not me, guv”—I was off the committee by the time that report came out.
Our recommendations were largely ignored in the first report, such that when the Bill appeared last autumn the Constitution Committee, then under the capable hands of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, felt obliged to point out that,
“the Bill weaves a tapestry of delegated powers that are breath-taking in terms of both their scope and potency”.
Since then, there has been some progress, but not very much and not nearly enough.
The amendments in this group are not just a matter of trivial semantics; they are the granular embodiment in microcosm of a fundamental principle—namely, that one pillar of our democracy is the balance of power between the Executive and Parliament. This Bill, if unamended, would tilt that balance quite heavily towards the Executive. To do that would be to degrade what will be an historic Act in due course and jeopardise the rights of Parliament. These amendments and others to come are not about Brexit itself; Brexit is important and the Bill is vital to help us to secure that. I want it to pass into law and soon. But the amendments are about something every bit as important —who is going to guard the constitution if not this House?
Ministers want their legislation to get through quickly and painlessly; officials are loyal to their Ministers and fancy a quiet life. The other place has an interest, but one that is often secondary to political obligations of Members, and the pressure on them from other events. I hope that my noble friend is listening to this debate and that the Government will at last respond to the case being put to them and respond not just in this clause but throughout the Bill, right up to and including Clause 17, perhaps by reference to changes that they have already agreed to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. Debate in Committee would then proceed just a little faster.
It falls to us in this House to guard the gate on behalf of Parliament and democracy and to uphold the role of the constitution in protecting both. If the balance between Parliament and the Executive is lost, the rule of law and our freedoms are at risk. The time when we take back control of our laws is not the time to allow the corrosion of our law-making process.
Lord Bilimoria (CB)
My Lords, if I may just follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Lang, I often say that this House’s role is to be the guardian of the nation. To build on what the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, said, when we go back to the beginning of all this—the referendum—it was all about taking back control and sovereignty and not bypassing Parliament. What happened with Article 50? The Government tried to bypass Parliament. Now we have this withdrawal Bill, giving powers to make and amend law. As the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, said, there are over 100 Ministers, and it can be delegated to government departments—once again trying to bypass Parliament.
Under an earlier amendment, I quoted Dominic Grieve, a former Attorney-General, who recently said:
“Having just spent four months considering the EU (Withdrawal) Bill … I don’t think I have ever seen a piece of legislation that conferred such power on the executive to change the law of the land by statutory instrument … and where the entire structure was so closely interwoven that the same end could often be achieved by different routes”.
That is a former Attorney-General from the government party.
Then there was the Strathclyde review. Let us not forget what happened in 2015 when this House was criticised for flexing its political muscle. The review said that we should,
“understand better the expectations of both Houses when it comes to secondary legislation and, in particular, whether the House of Lords should retain its veto”.
We were openly bullied and told, “Don’t you dare challenge a statutory instrument again”. In fact, I remember in that debate, the Government went so far as to say, “You are threatening the very existence of this House if you threaten us any more”. Now we have the potential for thousands and thousands of statutory instruments. Are we going to challenge every one of them and threaten our very existence every day? Do Henry VIII clauses give Governments the power of royal despots?
Viscount Hailsham
Not only that, but the more tightly constrained the language of the Bill, the more readily the courts will intervene.
Lord Bilimoria
I thank the noble Viscount for that intervention. At the moment, the courts very rarely intervene. They had to intervene with Article 50 being put through Parliament; that was fundamental. This House defeated the Government twice by almost 100 votes each time in two of the biggest votes in the history of our Parliament—614 of us voted in one and 634 in the other. Do we want a situation where this Parliament or the Government are continually challenged by the courts? We do not want to go there, and this is why these amendments are important.
I conclude that the power to amend all EU-derived primary and secondary legislation by the Government without sufficient scrutiny, checks and control, bypassing Parliament, goes against the ultimate supremacy of Parliament itself.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, from this side of the Committee I shall speak to Amendment 244A, in my name, which comes from the Constitution Committee and was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, in his opening remarks. The amendment’s purpose is to provide a more objective test and a requirement for Ministers to state that they have applied an objective test. Should they have failed to do so, they become accountable for not having done so. That is the value of it. It is in no way exclusive of the series of amendments in the remainder of the group, almost all of which replace “appropriate” with “necessary”. I will come to that in a moment. I want to appreciate the words a few moments ago from the noble Lord who is the former—and much respected—chairman of the Constitution Committee. His contribution is one that Ministers really ought to note.
We are dealing with wording in this legislation that worries us enough in this context. However, noble Lords should be in no doubt that, if this wording remains in this legislation, subsequent debates will take place around the idea that, “It was included in the withdrawal Bill and there were some very serious issues raised in that, so it must be acceptable” and that it must be reasonable to use such a shallow test of appropriateness for very far-reaching statutory instrument powers. Numerous other Bills will come before us in the course of this Parliament which have statutory instrument powers in them, and this and future Governments will draw on the precedent of how this legislation is worded.
As to the distinction between “appropriate” and “necessary”, the suggestion I have heard that Ministers do not realise they are open to legal challenge is, I think, quite wrong. Ministers are well aware that they might be open to legal challenge, and that is why they prefer “appropriate” to “necessary”. It gives them a “plump legal cushion”—that wonderful expression of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson—behind which they can hide. It is just not good enough; we have to find better wording. If Ministers are unhappy with necessity, they must come up with something more effective. We find the word “appropriate” used in many contexts. It conjures to mind the sort of instructions for a day out that say “Appropriate footwear should be worn”. That clearly indicates to the person who has to make the decision that they have a fair degree of discretion—it could mean hiking boots or other firm-soled shoes, as long as it is not stilettos or ballet pumps. They have a choice. Ministers are desperately trying to preserve choice for when they bring forward statutory instruments under this legislation.
The problems of the statutory instruments are not confined to Henry VIII provisions, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out. There is the inability to amend any of these statutory instruments, whether they are Henry VIII in their impact or whether they impact merely on previous statutory instruments. The inability to amend them grossly weakens Parliament’s ability to deal with matters that would normally be in primary legislation.
I am not only sympathetic to the amendment that the committee itself has put forward, which has my name on it, or something like it, but I am also very supportive of the attempt to find a better word than “appropriate”. So far, at any rate, necessity seems the right provision.
Lord Cormack
My Lords, I have added my name to a number of amendments that delete “appropriate” and insert “necessary”. They are all in this group. I do not claim any particular merit for that amendment: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is, I believe, the lead name on this amendment. The fact is, we have one thing in common. Whether is it “essential”, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham will doubtless seek to persuade us in a few minutes, whether it is “necessary”, used in the context described by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, when he moved his amendment so admirably, or whether it is a bare “necessary”, I do not mind. I frankly have a slight preference for the wording of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson.
We are in a very sad place when, having been told that we were taking back control, what we are doing is bestowing control. Parliament is bestowing control—if this goes through—on the Executive. I have quoted before in your Lordships’ House the famous Motion moved in 1781, I believe, in another place by Colonel Dunning: “The power of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished”. Substitute “Executive” for “Crown” and that is what this is all about. I also think of the immortal words of my friend the late father of my noble friend Lord Hailsham, who talked about an “elected dictatorship”.
Are we really seeking to leave the European Union—which I believe is a foolish step—to bestow on the Government the power which Parliament should take? That is the fundamental question. We should not bestow the power on or allow any Minister—whether he or she be ever so high or ever so low, whether he or she be at the top of the 109 or at the bottom, it matters not—to change the law of the land, and then indeed extend it, as the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, pointed out in his admirable speech, to public bodies and to the courts. We live in a parliamentary democracy. Your Lordships’ House rightly has much less power than the elected House, but we can act as a check and a balance and as an encourager to those in another place. These are probing amendments tonight, of course, but I am confident that this will come to a vote on Report, and we should say to our colleagues in another place, “Do not give up the power which you exercise as representatives, not delegates, of your constituents, because if you do that, it will be a real nail in the coffin of democracy”.
I personally believe that a referendum is inimical to representative democracy. But, as we have said before, we are where we are. We are moving away from the European Union, but we must move away as a parliamentary democracy, where power ultimately resides not in No. 10 Downing Street, the Treasury, or in any ministerial office but in the Chamber at the other end of the Corridor. Your Lordships’ House has a particularly important role in stiffening the sinews of those at the other end of the Corridor. There is an enormous wealth of experience in your Lordships’ House, which was demonstrated by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, this evening, and which would have been demonstrated, I am sure, with equal eloquence by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, had he been able to be with us. We in a sense must see ourselves as the servants of democracy, but with a duty to put some real strength in the directly elected House.
I hope that we will have a response from the Minister this evening that will indicate that he understands what this is about. He, of course, is one of the 109. He may be low down on the list, but he is there. Whether he is 109, 108 or 73, I know not and I care not—but he is there. I hope that at the very least he will repudiate any notion of exercising power that it is not for him to exercise. We have to address this issue, whether we think in terms of Henry VIII or Thomas Cromwell or Oliver Cromwell, all three of whom would have looked upon this as a marvellous mandate. We have a duty. Tonight we are probing, but there will come a night when we must vote if the response is not as it should be this evening.
The Lord Bishop of Leeds
My Lords, I add my voice to those who are expressing caution. I sympathise with Ministers. Somehow a balance has to be struck between the technical freedom and flexibility to deal with matters as they arise—that is a legitimate concern—and the constitutional questions that have been raised this evening. The words matter. The word “significant” is one of my pet hates, where people use it because they do not want to find a more precise word. You always want to ask, “Significant of what?” They probably mean, “It’s important” or “It matters to me”.
“Appropriate” is another one. It is a word that creates space when we do not want to be precise—but when you are dealing with matters of law you need precision. It seems to me that the very simple mechanism of changing “appropriate” to “necessary”, with some criteria by which it could be deemed to be necessary or unnecessary, offers the sort of balance that the Committee is looking for.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, said that it was 50 years since he had practised as a lawyer. Perhaps I may observe to him, once a lawyer, always a lawyer—and he certainly demonstrated that in the way in which he introduced this amendment. The effect of the statute before us is to provide an unfettered discretion, and we should be extremely slow to provide unfettered discretions to anyone. You would not give an unfettered discretion to the captain of a golf club. The idea that we will give 109 Ministers an unfettered discretion seems to me to fly in the face of all constitutional propriety.
It is not even the Secretary of State who is asked to exercise these powers. That frequently appears in statutes where a power is afforded. In this case it is any Minister of the Crown—and, added to that, public authorities, as widely defined. It is difficult to imagine public authorities understanding the whole question of discretion, as we see time and again in the courts when judicial review is successfully taken against local authorities, for example. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out a moment or two ago, if you have the power to make by regulation such provision as you consider appropriate, the prospects of judicial review are nil. There will be no review because, in any circumstance where a subjective test has been imposed or offered to the Minister, there can be no challenge. Necessity, on the other hand, is capable of challenge and leaves open the whole question of judicial review where the test of reasonableness arises in the course of the action—in this case of a Minister, or indeed of any of these public authorities.
When the bus with “£350 million a week” was going around the country, and when those who emerged from it, including the blonde bus conductor, told people, “We want to take power back from the European Union and Brussels”, no one said, “We want to take power back so we can give it to 109 Ministers or public authorities”. If they had said that, I rather fancy that the bus would not have received the generous welcome that it did on many occasions.
Lord Dykes (CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow five or six scintillating and convincing speeches, all saying similar things, and I entirely concur with what was said. Therefore, I can be very brief. First, I thank my noble friend Lord Wilson for his remarks. I apologise to him for missing the first minute and a half of his speech because I naively thought that two government Statements would last a bit longer than they did; they were very brief indeed. I surmise that my noble friend referred to my noble friend Lord Lisvane, a very good friend to many of us. I assume he is on onerous public duties in Herefordshire. Sadly, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, cannot be present due to illness. Therefore, two sponsors of the amendment are sadly unable to be here but that in no way weakens the strength of this message for the Government. I hope the Ministers on the Front Bench will listen very carefully to these words.
It is also worth noting that, apart from a later big grouping, this group contains the largest number of amendments of any group since the Committee proceedings began. This is the subject that most exercises the Members of this Committee and, I think too, quite a number of MPs although they are sometimes under much greater pressure for obvious reasons not to say too much about it.
I was very struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said and by what he said representing the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Since I am an amateur and not an expert on these matters, I was impressed by the comments of the Bar Council on its worries about these matters. In paragraph 60 of its general statement, it said:
“Clause 7 empowers Ministers to make regulations to ‘prevent, remedy or mitigate’ any ‘failure of retained EU law to operate effectively’ or ‘any other deficiency in retained EU law’. Clause 7(5) includes an open-ended power to make ‘any provision that could be made by Act of Parliament’. There are comparable Henry VIII powers in Clauses 8(2) (in respect of regulations to ‘prevent or remedy’ any breach, arising from Brexit, of the UK’s international obligations”.
It went on to say in paragraph 61:
“We consider that these provisions (and in particular Clause 7) continue to raise serious concerns both from the perspective of the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament and in respect of legal certainty”,
which we sometimes forget. By the way, as the sunset clause possibilities in Clause 8 have been mentioned by at least one speaker, in paragraph 67, the Bar Council adds:
“While we recognise that the Henry VIII power in all three clauses (7-9) is subject to sunset provisions, we do not think that this is sufficient to address the above concerns. As noted in the introduction to this paper, the operation of the amending powers and sunset clauses will need to be carefully reconsidered in the light of whatever is ultimately agreed for any transitional period or under the Withdrawal Agreement”.
I agree with the passionate remarks of my good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, about the dangers facing this Parliament—mainly the other House, of course, but also this one—in allowing these dangerous provisions to go through without any amendment. I anticipate a major expression of unease, to put it mildly, when Report stage comes along. I hope and pray that will be so, and we look forward to the Minister speaking in the framework of that need to assuage our anxiety when he comes to reply.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I rise to speak primarily —subject to pre-emption, whatever that means—to Amendments 73 to 79 and Amendments 117 to 119, which are in my name.
I think we ought to start the debate—although we have started it already—by reflecting on how very wide the powers contained in Clauses 7 to 9 are. They are powers exercised by regulation: mostly by the negative procedure, but some by the affirmative procedure. However—this is the critical point—in both instances, the regulations when laid cannot be amended. That raises an issue that I hope this House will come to on some subsequent occasion, because I have a number of amendments in my name on that very subject.
These powers are very wide-reaching. One way of ascertaining how significant they are—I hope the right reverend Prelate will forgive me if I use the word “significant” in this context—is to look at paragraph 2 of Schedule 7, which lists the provisions that can be made only by the affirmative procedure. I cite a few examples: the creation of a public authority and presumably the powers to be given to it; the transfer of legislative powers from an EU entity to a UK-based public authority; the levying of fees without specific limit, which I am sure noble Lords know we will come to later in Committee; the creation of criminal offences that attract a custodial sentence of up to two years, which, again, we will come to later in our debate; and the creation of powers to legislate or amend existing powers. These powers are not trivial in character. I have not sought to identify the various powers that could be exercised by way of the negative procedure, because their name is legion.
There is one fundamental rule in politics, which I have learned from 31 years in the House of Commons: if you give powers to Ministers and officials, those powers will be abused—sometimes by design and sometimes by inadvertence, but the abuse will happen and that is certain. It is especially so when the powers are created by secondary legislation because the parliamentary oversight is slight and ministerial oversight is often non-existent. So the question your Lordships should be asking—I agree with my noble friend Lord Lang that it is a pity more noble Lords are not asking themselves this question tonight—is whether the language in the Bill is sufficiently tightly drawn to prevent abuse. The answer to that question is manifest to all of us and all noble Lords who have spoken: no. The Bill does not prevent abuse; it enables abuse.
The powers given to Ministers are “appropriate”. That is a weasel word. Nobody is better placed than I to describe it as such. It is a subjective word, very difficult to define in advance, impossible to challenge and non-judicable. That is why, when I was a Minister, I used it often—at the Dispatch Box, in drafting and in correspondence. I knew full well, as does every person who has stood at the Dispatch Box, that “appropriate” means precisely what the Minister wants it to mean. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, is quite right about that. Might I suggest the Corbyn/Johnson test to your Lordships? It is very useful. I look to my side of the House and ask, “How many of your Lordships want to see Mr Corbyn possessed of these powers?” I now turn to the other side of the House, lest noble Lords think I am being partisan, and ask, “How many of your Lordships want to see Mr Johnson possessed of these powers?” The joke is that you can reverse the question and get the same answer.
We should not allow the draft as it is. I accept that the distinction between “necessary” and “essential” is pretty minor. I can live perfectly well with the word “necessary”. “Essential” is one notch higher in the hierarchy of requirement but I accept that “necessity” has been hallowed by legislation in the past. I encounter that word frequently in regulatory law, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, was absolutely right to touch on the point of judicial review. If you use the word “necessary”, it makes things easier to challenge. There have been many appeals in the regulatory framework where the courts have held that the test has not been laid out.
I want to comment on two other amendments I have ventured to propose. Amendments 74 and 117 require the Minister to have “reasonable grounds” for his or her decision on the need to trigger the regulation-making powers. I will be open about this: my purpose is to tighten the test, to make it judicable and to limit the discretion. I would very much like to know from the Minister why he objects to the use of reasonable grounds as the criterion for exercising the power. I am sure he is not going to say that he wants to rely on unreasonable grounds; that is not, I think, an argument he would like to put forward. We are entitled to know the justification.
I have one very small point on Amendment 75, which includes a reference to redundancy. What does that reference add to what is already covered by the retained part of Clause 7(2)(a)? It comes to this: the main issue for this House is to require a test of necessity to be imported into these three clauses and elsewhere in the Bill where the Government want us to accept a lower threshold of need—or, more precisely, put no threshold at all. I regard this as matter of considerable importance and I want to know—as I am sure the Committee does—why the Government want us to prefer a word that gives the maximum discretion to Ministers, but the minimum control and influence to Parliament and the courts.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, my name is on some of these amendments. I will be extremely brief. We are now at the core of the Bill, and at the core of how the Government respond to it. I cannot recall reading two such critical reports from committees of this House as the two we have had on these clauses— for example the suggestion that Clause 9 is wholly unacceptable and the suggestion that Clause 7 leaves very considerable uncertainty, both of which are from the Delegated Powers Committee. I therefore ask the Minister to offer us the prospect that the Government will come back on Report with their own recognition of the strength of feeling in this House. Without question, the Government will lose heavily on this the first time it is tested, and quite possibly again after it has gone back to the other place if the Commons sustains it.
We are in a position at which we need from the Government some reassurance on these constitutional issues, as well as these issues of trust, as they put through a Bill with a huge range of flexibility. We need reassurance on the Government’s future intentions, as their future intentions on much of this are still not entirely clear. I simply ask the Minister to be generous and to stretch his freedom of action as far as he can in the way he responds.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lang, pointed out that we are a bit thin on the ground for such an important set of amendments, but the Minister should know that there is behind us an army. I have had more representations on Clause 7 than on any other part of the Bill—representations from national organisations, human rights organisations, advocacy organisations, legal organisations, professional organisations, and from individuals. There is very widespread civic concern over these clauses, and the Government should heed it and accept these amendments, which have such widespread support also in your Lordships’ House.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, the existence of these powers in the Bill has created an apprehension in a lot of people that the Government are proposing to use the powers in some way to undermine something that is valuable to them. It is therefore important—apart altogether from the argument that examines the detail—that we examine this carefully. The noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton—with his background of great success as a civil servant, no doubt contributed to by his early experience as a lawyer—has moved the amendment in a way that has made it extremely clear. It is quite clear to me that necessity is a better test on which to leave these powers than the discretionary test of “appropriate”. It is not absolutely right that discretion is not subject to judicial review, but at least an objective test is certainly more likely to lead to successful judicial review if it is transgressed.
We have to remember the huge task involved in trying to put these two systems together; the European system, which has been here for 45 years, has been working alongside our system and kept separate from it over all that time. That is by no means an easy task. Indeed, what we already discussed with regard to Clauses 2 and 3 illustrate that. It is difficult and time consuming, and we must ensure that the solutions we suggest to the Government are practical and will enable this to be done in a reasonable time so that the statute book can be right on Brexit day.
I anticipate that the test of necessity will be an easier one to apply for those entrusted with the power than the test of what is appropriate. The latter involves an element of judgment, which is not always easy to exercise; whereas if it is obvious that these two bits do not fit together, it is necessary to do something about it. As the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, said, it is not necessary to circumscribe the solution. The argument that necessity suggests not only that the amendment is required but also what particular amendment is required stretches the matter a little far. So long as it is necessary to do it, that is a sufficient test for our purpose, and then it is for the Minister to do his best to sew these two pieces together.
I am somewhat alarmed at the survey by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, of the people entitled to use this power, and the Minister may well have something to say about that. However, there is a lot of work to do, and we do not want to overwork the Ministers with necessary adjustments when they ought to be doing something else. There is certainly plenty to do between now and Brexit.
In addition, it has been said that this is surrendering the power of Parliament to the Executive. To an extent that is true, but Parliament retains a veto in respect of every single regulation, either by a negative or an affirmative resolution. It is true that we do not want to have thousands of these if we can possibly avoid it, apart from anything else. But there is an element of control there. How practical that would be is, I think, doubtful. There is an urgent need now to circumscribe these powers so that they work properly and effectively but not excessively. As I said, a lot of people have worries about human rights, equality rights and a whole lot of other rights. Sometimes people have spoken in conversation or in observations to the press or whatever, which does not represent the Government’s policy. This helps to inflame the idea that the Government are using these powers to take away all that has been so dearly won. I do not think that is true, but we should try to remove the possibility that this idea can be represented.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, these are hugely important amendments. The Minister will have noted that not a single Member of the Committee has spoken in favour of the present position in the Bill. From all sides of the Committee, it has been stated that the Bill, as it stands, is not acceptable. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is not present today, for reasons that we all entirely understand. Noble Lords will recall what he said at Second Reading, when he talked about this as the biggest transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive in peacetime. I entirely agree. I agree with what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Wilson of Dinton, Lord Cormack and Lord Lang of Monkton—with whom, or rather under whom, I was privileged to serve on the Constitution Committee, when he chaired it. I agree also with the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. Everybody has taken the same position in relation to that.
Let us look at the key amendment, Amendment 71, to which I am privileged to have added my name, just to note the importance of what it does. It would replace the statement that “the Minister considers it appropriate” with “it is necessary”. As a former Minister, as a former adviser to Ministers and as a practising lawyer, I fully see the significance of that change. I know as a lawyer that if I am able to say to the judge, “All that is required is that the Minister considers it appropriate—how can you say that he did not? How can you second guess that?”, I am home and dry. If, on the other hand, I have to show that it is necessary—not just in the Minister’s decision, not just on reasonable grounds, but that it is in fact necessary—then that is the test that the court has to undertake in order to satisfy itself. The point behind these amendments is that nothing less than that will do to enable this huge transfer of power to the Executive from this House.
I do not need to repeat the remarks made by other noble Lords about how taking back control should not mean taking back control by the Executive—that is not what anybody had in mind. I do not need to repeat the remarks about the number of Ministers that this gives power to. I am not even sure that the figure of 109 is right. I recall, in government—no doubt the Minister will tell me that it does not apply here—that all Ministers can act, and often do act, by their officials. The Carltona principle means they can sign the instruments, so it may mean that the 109 is multiplied manifold. I have no doubts about their good intentions, but this is not what our system requires, and we should not be giving it up in these circumstances.
Other noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Dykes, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, have also spoken powerfully in favour of these amendments.
I have a couple of other points to make, as most of what I wanted to say has already been powerfully and clearly expressed by noble Lords. The most important point is the one I started with, which is that the Minister must see the unanimity of view, as it appears at the moment, around the Committee about the change that needs to be made. We can debate whether it is essential or necessary. I rather agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that “necessary” has become a term well understood by the courts and so it is probably the better one to have, but the end aim is the same. That it is not a decision for the subjective view of the Ministers is the other key point on which we agree.
One point that I want to deal with, which has not had much discussion so far—although the noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised it—is Amendment 244A. It proposes that there should be a statement by a Minister as to the need for the change, and it is not simply a policy change. There is merit in that proposal, I would suggest, though not as a substitute for the amendments we are proposing. I draw attention to the similarity with Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, an excellent provision which requires that a Minister has to certify that a piece of legislation is compatible with the convention rights. We see it on the very front of this Bill itself. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, is not in his place. He had a lot of involvement in making sure that that worked, by insisting that when it came to certifying that legislation was compatible, it was not just on a wing and a prayer.
Viscount Hailsham
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. Taking his point, if you were to combine the certification together with the requirement that the Minister had to have reasonable grounds for triggering regulatory power, then one has a very high degree of protection, does one not?
Lord Goldsmith
I am grateful to the noble Viscount. I would go further. First, I would say that the amendment needs to change the test so that it is “necessary”, not “considers necessary”, not “considered on reasonable grounds”. Secondly, the way the Human Rights Act certification works is that it is not enough for the Minister to have “reasonable grounds” that it may be compatible. What is required—at least when I was in government, and as a result of the diktat that was given to the Civil Service—is that the Minister must have legal advice that, more likely than not, the court would agree. I am glad to see the Minister nodding because that means that the same principle is being applied under this Administration as under the Administration in which I was privileged to serve.
Therefore, I take the noble Viscount’s point, but it is important that it is not just a consideration but an actuality based not on reasonable grounds but on fact. Obviously there is some judgment to be made about “fact” but it needs to be clear and there might, in addition, be a role for something like Amendment 244A.
This is the second time today that this Committee has considered the use of the word “appropriate”. Those who were not able to be present may wish to read the report of the earlier debate when we considered the use of the word “appropriate” in rather different circumstances—whether judges could and should rely on European case law in reaching decisions and whether it was enough that they should find it relevant or appropriate. One noble Lord who is not in his place suggested that the judges could use the law if they found it “helpful”. My worry is that that is exactly what the Government think “appropriate” means here. If this power means that Ministers can make regulations and changes because they think it helpful to do so, that is not what this House should allow them to do.
The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for what has been an excellent debate. I use the word “debate” but only one point of view has been expressed and I have heard the message from all sides. However, I shall address the issues under consideration.
I say, first, to my noble friend Lord Cormack that he has put an intriguing thought into my mind. I will speak to my officials first thing tomorrow morning to find out where I, as a Minister of State, come in this list of 109—I suspect more towards the bottom than the top but we will find out.
The noble Lord, Lord Wilson, asked me about the number of people who will be able to exercise this power without parliamentary scrutiny—a question that I suspect is almost impossible to answer. I think that the main issue is not the number of people but the number of limitations on the exercise of that power. The power is time limited and clearly limited in what it can be used for. It may only prevent, remedy or mitigate deficiencies in EU law, and of course secondary legislation is subject to well-established parliamentary procedures. Where legislative powers are sub-delegated to public authorities, this will always be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to revisit what is clearly a very important issue in the context of the Bill. The Government will place some additional draft examples of statutory instruments or parts thereof in the Library of the House. That is something that a number of noble Lords have asked for in meetings that I have had with them, so I will ensure that that happens—most likely tomorrow.
I have listened with interest to the many contributions today, and to the extensive contributions of the Constitution Committee, which I had the pleasure of speaking to this morning along with my colleague in the other place, the Solicitor-General. I have read the reports of that committee and of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which have very much helped to frame our thoughts on this issue.
As a number of noble Lords have said, both those reports go into great detail on the scope of the delegated powers. As many noble Lords will also be aware, they come out with quite different recommendations. As I said at Second Reading, we are approaching this matter in a spirit of collaboration. The Government are looking very closely at how the powers in the Bill are drawn and how they will be exercised, particularly in the light of the committee recommendations and developments in other pieces of legislation.
As the Constitution Committee notes, comparable arguments were made during the passage of the sanctions Bill through this House and a mutually agreeable position was found in that instance. That has clearly informed the committee’s recommendation and we are receptive to the arguments made in its report. I am confident that a mutually agreeable position will be found.
As I will explain in a moment, the Government do not see the DPRRC’s recommendation as workable. However, we would very much like to talk to noble Lords following the debate, with an eye to coming back to this issue on Report.
As noble Lords will appreciate, the situation that this Bill responds to is, quite simply, unprecedented. A vast amount of EU law is being transferred to our statute book, including thousands of EU regulations. As such, the programme of secondary legislation to ensure that this law operates effectively must match that. In the face of such a task, it has always been clear that the Government will need relatively broad delegated powers to deliver a functioning statute book. Indeed, the Constitution Committee outlined in its interim report that “relatively wide” delegated powers were inevitable.
I understand that there are noble Lords who have had concerns about delegated powers for some time, and the Government are keen to continue listening to suggestions in order to improve those areas of the Bill. That listening process started during this Bill’s passage through the other place, where a number of changes were introduced to reduce the scope and increase the parliamentary scrutiny of the delegated powers. However, we cannot significantly restrict the scope of these powers, which, it is acknowledged, need to be broad.
Let me deal directly with the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson. Much of the concern about the delegated powers focuses on the use of “appropriate” to describe the discretion afforded to Ministers when making regulations to correct deficiencies. In case there is some misunderstanding here, let me be clear: “appropriate” in Clause 7 does not give Ministers unrestricted discretion to correct anything that they may wish or like. Corrections must not be appropriate per se; they must be appropriate to correct the particular deficiency they are addressing. The threshold for ministerial decisions is set firmly within the context of those purposes.
I appreciate that there is a degree of subjectivity to these tests—but that is true of almost all tests, and it is important to acknowledge that there are limitations on the power. Parliament polices the Government’s interpretation of its vires to act through the mechanism of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, which I have no doubt will take a keen interest in instruments under this Bill; and ultimately, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out, these tests are litigable in the courts. So we cannot responsibly remove “appropriate” from the Bill.
I will now delve into the detail of the various different permutations of amendments seeking to restrict the scope of the delegated powers. The first amendments I would like to discuss are Amendments 201, 243 and 245, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, which attempt to ensure that Ministers have considered that exercises of the main powers are made for good reasons and are reasonable courses of action. These match the Constitution Committee’s recommendation, and a smaller group were added to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill.
Amendments 74, 117 and 139, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, seek to write into the Bill that Ministers’ consideration of the appropriateness of any exercise of the delegated powers must be made on reasonable grounds. This is the right type of approach in not altering the fundamental scope of the powers.
Lord Cormack
Is my noble friend saying that he has made his mind up—or the Government have made their collective mind up—on retaining “appropriate”?
Lord Callanan
If my noble friend will forgive me, I will discuss that in a second.
Ministers make their decisions on secondary legislation based on reasonable grounds in the normal course of events. The use of these powers will be subject to the usual public law principles designed to ensure that the Executive act reasonably, in good faith and for proper purposes. I accept, however, that noble Lords have principled and legitimate concerns and we will ensure that these are addressed and that the reasonableness of a Minister’s courses of action is made clearer. Given the views expressed today, I would like to engage in further discussions with noble Lords with a view to returning to this issue on Report.
Amendments 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 116, 118, 140, 229, 253, 254, 257, 258, 264, 265, 276, 277, 290 and 291, which were tabled by noble Lords including the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane—to whom I spoke yesterday and I understand why he is not in his place today—the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seek to exchange “appropriate” for “necessary”, about which we have had a great deal of debate, in the main powers and schedules in which it can be found. I understand noble Lords’ concerns but, as I have stated, this would have a serious impact on our vital programme of secondary legislation to prepare our statute book for exit day. “Necessary” is a high bar to meet. The courts have said that the nearest paraphrase for “necessary” is “really needed”, but such a test would be too constrictive.
Lord Newby (LD)
Can the noble Lord give an example of where something is not really needed? Surely the whole point of this legislation is only to do things that are really needed—not to do anything that you think, when you wake up in the morning, might be a jolly good idea.
Lord Callanan
If the noble Lord will have a little patience I will get on to that in a second.
If regulations could only make “necessary” provisions, the powers would be heavily restricted to a much smaller set of essential changes. For example, if the Government wanted to change references in legislation from euros to sterling, we would expect such a change to be considered “appropriate” both by the courts and, I hope, by this House, but it might not be considered “necessary”.
We might manage to ensure that our statute book is in a legally operable state, but it would not be in its most coherent form, or arranged in a way that best promotes our national interest. I am sure that this Committee does not intend to restrict the Government from legislating coherently or in the national interest, but that may be the unintended consequence of amendments which swap “appropriate” for “necessary”.
I note that some of the amendments in this group contain wording suggested by the DPRRC in its report on the powers in this Bill. In particular, I was interested in the assertion that:
“The operative test in Clause 7 should be whether it is necessary to deal with the problem, not whether only one solution follows inexorably”.
I first highlight that I do not believe that these amendments break up the necessity process in the way that the committee intends. I also question the merits of breaking up the necessity test in the way that the committee suggests. In its report, the committee cites the example of a deficiency in which there is:
“A requirement to collect and send information that will no longer be accepted by the EU”.
The committee states that it,
“is clearly a deficiency that it is necessary to remove from the statute book: it cannot be right to retain a redundant legal duty that amounts to a waste of time, effort and public money”.
However, I question whether this change is strictly necessary, or whether it is merely appropriate. The committee asserts that it cannot be “right” for this arrangement to continue—and I agree with it—but is it strictly “necessary” that it be removed? What great harm, after all, would be done if the information were still sent? The statute book would continue to function, albeit illogically and not in the public interest. But is it necessary, in a strict legalistic sense, to have the statute book working logically and in the public interest, or are all our changes merely appropriate? In these sorts of instance we cannot with any certainty predict the way in which a court might rule. It is precisely to guard against such a decision that the Government cannot support the suggestion made by the committee.
Viscount Hailsham
Is the Minister saying that he will not accept these amendments because he might be defeated in court? If so, that is a thoroughly bad reason.
Lord Callanan
I think I have made my position clear on that but, nevertheless, I also said that we are listening and endeavouring to satisfy the concerns of noble Lords.
Amendments 73, 119 and 141 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and also spoken to by my noble friend Lord Lang, meanwhile used “essential” rather than “appropriate” to limit the discretion of Ministers in exercising the delegated powers. This really is very similar to the amendments which propose the use of “necessary”. I think that a court would likely interpret the meaning of “necessary” and “essential”—in this context—in much the same way and, therefore, I will not repeat the arguments that I have already made.
Lord Cormack
I beg my noble friend to talk to his ministerial colleagues and think again, otherwise the Government will suffer the most massive, crushing defeat when this comes up on Report.
Lord Callanan
I said at the start that I am setting out a position, but I have heard the messages that came to me from all sides of the Committee and I very much take on board the point that my noble friend makes. I shall state again that, despite their breadth, these are not powers designed to deliver major policy changes and they can only be read in light of their purpose. For Clause 7(1), that is to “prevent, remedy or mitigate” deficiencies arising from withdrawal.
Amendment 244A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Dunlop, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, touches on a point to which I will return to in more detail later, but I will stress now the risks of introducing additional legal uncertainty by creating new and untested definitions to the law. However, I am conscious of the need for transparency in this process and we will look to see how, in line with developments and other legislation, we can ensure that ministerial decision-making about the appropriate exercise of the powers is more transparent to the Committee.
Amendment 75, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, allows me the opportunity to expand upon the reasons why we are taking the correcting power and to build upon the arguments made in previous days of debate. Areas of our domestic law, such as those relating to EU obligations, will be redundant when we leave the EU. The Bills repealed by Schedule 9 are an example of this. Some noble Lords will consider that having provisions that do nothing on the statute book is not harmful. Indeed, the Easter Act 1928, which was never commenced, continues to sit on the statute book with no effect and causes no harm. My noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, also argued that there is no legal recourse under the use of powers under Clause 7. That is not strictly correct. If the threshold set out in the Act is overstepped the regulations can be struck down by judicial review.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem
The noble Lord was helpful in trying to give an example for something else. Could he give an example of where something that was “appropriate” could not be covered by the principle of necessity?
Lord Callanan
I do not have any additional examples beyond the ones I have already given, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord with alternative information on that.
However, the Government and I believe that a majority of noble Lords in this House will agree that the statute book is not truly effective unless it is tidy. The Bill is designed to provide clarity and certainty on the law; if we cannot remove or correct these redundant provisions this goal will be undermined. However, having said all that, as I have set out, I would be very happy to engage in further discussions with noble Lords. I have very much heard the messages given from all sides of the Committee with a view to returning to this issue on Report. On the basis of those assurances, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.
Lord Wilson of Dinton
My Lords, I thank the 13 noble Lords who spoke on the amendment, all of whom were unanimous in their support of the need to change Clause 7(1). There was a lot of support for the substitution of “necessary” for “appropriate”. I am not going to go through what was said because, first, I agreed with everything; and secondly, it was said so eloquently that it would be otiose for me to add to it at this hour of night.
The Minister has clearly heard the voices of so many noble Lords in favour of some change to Clause 7(1). I say respectfully that he seemed to be speaking with two voices. One was a clear, fierce defence of “appropriate”. I have to confess that I found some of it surprising. I would have thought, faced with EU retained law expressed in the euro, that that would be a deficiency that one needed to correct and that it would be necessary to correct it. However, I will study what the Minister said with interest. On the one hand he spoke with a fierce voice defending the present drafting. On the other, he referred three or four times to the need to discuss before Report. At one point, he said that he was sure that a mutually agreeable position would be found. We need to study exactly what he said. Against that background, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, when we discussed Clause 2 and the Constitution Committee’s amendments, I said I did not wish to exclude the three paragraphs that the Constitution Committee wanted to exclude; I wish to exclude them instead from amendment under this paragraph. With the discussion we just had about what is necessary rather than just appropriate, to put as much as possible beyond the temptation of amendment by the Government seems to be a good idea. That was the approach I outlined previously. As far as this clause is concerned, it is in line with the Constitution Committee and with the Bingham Centre report, and in view of the state of my voice, I think it is best if I just say that I beg to move.
Lord Callanan
My Lords, I am tempted to send some cough sweets to the noble Baroness to help her: she certainly has my sympathy, and I suspect the Prime Minister’s sympathy, for the difficult position she is in. I am grateful to her for the amendment and this debate.
The noble Baroness has proposed to limit the Clause 7(1) power so that it is only possible to correct deficiencies in domestic legislation in two circumstances. The first is where the deficiency is of any type provided for in this Bill and that the legislation was a statutory instrument made under Section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of Schedule 2 to, the European Communities Act. The second, for all other EU derived domestic legislation, is that inappropriate EU references are the only type of deficiency which may be corrected.
I understand the noble Baroness’s well-intentioned desire to, where possible, protect from amendment legislation which has already been considered in detail by this House. However, while Section 2(2) of the ECA has been a crucial tool in the Government’s implementation of our EU obligations, it is far from the only way the Government have implemented EU obligations in the 45 years of our EU membership. Indeed, many noble Lords have been vociferous in encouraging Governments past and present to do more under primary legislation and specific powers and less under Section 2(2). Furthermore, whether a deficiency is in primary or secondary legislation is not, I believe, a meaningful indication of the type of deficiencies which might arise in it, or the significance of the correction that needs to be made.
To be ready for exit day a large number of fairly straight-forward changes will need to be made to primary legislation in exactly the same way as in secondary legislation made under the ECA. For example, Section 42(5) of the Employment Relations Act 2004, concerning information and consultation, will require amendment as outlined in the draft regulations the Government have already published. This power relates to the implementation of a directive. This directive has already been implemented in our domestic law and the relevant implementing legislation will be converted to retained EU law by the Bill. Once the UK has withdrawn from the EU, this power will have no practical application. I hope noble Lords will accept that we need to be able to make appropriate corrections to such deficiencies. The power therefore needs to be broad enough to allow for corrections to be made to both primary and secondary legislation for the full range of deficiencies. Textual and technical changes must be made in primary legislation if we are to have a functioning statute book on exit day.
The Government’s contention is that what matters is not the status of the law that is being amended but the purpose of the amendment. Indeed, some provisions of secondary legislation made under Section 2(2) are extremely important, which is why the Government have provided for the sifting committee and affirmative procedure to ensure that all regulations are subject to the appropriate level of scrutiny. For example, much of the vital statutory protections of the rights of workers in this country lies in regulations made under Section 2(2) of the ECA. We have already published details of some of the corrections that will be required here, and I hope they have laid concerns to rest. They are also representative of the type of corrections that will arise throughout the statute book and will need to be corrected to ensure that important areas of law continue to function.
I hope I have persuaded the noble Baroness of the Government’s position that it is the substance of the change, not where it is being made, that matters, and that she therefore feels able—if she can do so—to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted
My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 82, which itself is amended—or, in truth, corrected—by Amendment 82A.
Amendment 80 is pretty simple and is very much in line with the amendments we have debated today, which aim to restrict the very wide powers that Ministers—be they Minister number 1 or number 109 —have dreamed up for themselves in this Bill. The amendment would remove from Ministers the discretion to extend the definition of what constitutes a deficiency in retained law. That is important, given that Ministers have taken considerable powers to correct what they consider to be deficiencies. So it would be a two-way gain for Ministers: first, they could extend what they define as a deficiency and then they could use their powers to correct it.
The main thrust of Amendment 82 is to prevent secondary legislation under Clause 7 from being able to change the Equality Act 2010 or subordinate legislation made under that Act, or, indeed, later legislation, as in Amendment 82A. Again, it is about not reducing the rights and remedies that are available under EU retained law. While we were drafting Amendment 82 we also put in wording to restrict the ability under Clause 7 to impose taxes, fees, charges and to create quangos or introduce new criminal offences under secondary legislation. However, as I have alerted the Minister, we will not deal with that at this point because three separate groups are coming up and we will discuss the issue of criminal offences and fees later. The important thing for now is not allowing Ministers to extend the definition of deficiency or to use the regulations under Clause 7 to change the Equality Act and the subordinate legislation that flows from it. I beg to move.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendment 80 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I cannot speak for her, but my remarks will also encompass Amendment 80A in the name of my noble friend Lady Bowles who, as the Committee will appreciate, is not in a fit state to speak to her amendment, although it relates to Clause 7(3).
Clause 7(3) is rather strange. It was inserted by the Government on Report in the other place. I am trying to resist the word “sneaky”, but the Government gave with one hand and took with another. On 16 January, David Lidington said in the other place:
“The Government remain of the view that the power in clause 7(1) is crucial. We do not take delegated powers lightly, and we want them to be tailored as tightly to their purpose as possible. We have therefore listened to hon. Members’ concerns about the scope of the power in clause 7(1), and in bringing forward Government amendments 14 and 15, we have built on the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/1/18; col. 838.]
Amendment 14 was the one that led to the change in Clause 7(1) to put in “are” instead of “consist of but are not limited to”. So it was more specific on what ministerial powers could cover.
Baroness Whitaker
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 82. Yet again it is the issue of using secondary legislation under Clause 7 to make changes, in this case to the Equality Act 2010 or to subordinate legislation made under that Act, or to reduce rights or remedies under EU retained law,
“in comparison with the position immediately before exit day”.
Your Lordships’ Committee made its views on the abuse of Clause 7 abundantly clear during the earlier debate. Surely the same reasoning applies.
Lord Beith
My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Ludford in querying what is intended by Clause 7(3) and hope that the Minister will be able to draw on his limited stock of examples to provide me with one—indeed, with something that fulfils this definition:
“There is also a deficiency in retained EU law where the Minister considers that there is … anything in retained EU law which is of a similar kind to any deficiency which falls within subsection (2)”.
In that case, why does it not fall within subsection (2)? Can the Minister give me an example of something which subsection (3)(a) would provide for but which subsection (2) has not provided for?
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, this has been a short but interesting debate covering an important point. When my ministerial colleagues in the other place moved the amendment that inserted into the Bill the subsection that Amendment 80 would remove, the Government’s reasoning was accepted by the other place without a Division. That is an onerous responsibility upon me, and I hope I can replicate that performance and satisfy any concerns the noble Baroness has.
As we heard at Second Reading, most of the House accept that the power in Clause 7(1) is essential but, was as said then, the Government are looking forward to using the expertise of this House to tighten any slack in the power and ensure that it is capable of neither too much nor too little. I have just addressed the importance of retaining Clause 7(3)(b), but I repeat that the Government believe we can be a responsible Government only by ensuring that we can provide for all the types of deficiency we discover.
Subsection (3)(a) provides that the meaning of “deficiencies” in Clause 7 includes those of a similar kind to those set out in subsection (2). The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, asked what this means and whether there are any examples. This ensures that, for example, deficiencies relating to arrangements between public authorities in the British Overseas Territories and the EU and its member states, or between the UK and the EEA and EFTA states are caught by the definition of a deficiency. They are not included in the list in subsection (2) but are very much of a similar kind to the types of deficiencies listed, and it is important that the power is wide enough to allow the Government to correct them. This House accepted at Second Reading the principle of resolving all the deficiencies in retained EU law using the power in Clause 7, and we cannot do this without both a type of sweeper—I think the legal term is “ejusdem generis”—and a power to provide for additional kinds of deficiency if they are later identified. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that that is why the clause is drafted the way that it is.
May I seek clarification from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter? I was not quite clear whether she wanted to speak to Amendment 82 or whether she is forgoing that for the moment for the purposes of this debate.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
I am speaking to only a part of Amendment 82 and to Amendment 82A —in other words, to the bits about not using Clause 7 to remove any rights and standards or to repeal or revoke the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 or any subordinate legislation made under them. There is obviously much more in Amendment 82. There is stuff about criminal sanctions, raising taxes and setting up public bodies. I was making the point that I am not talking about those now because we have separate groups on those topics. The bit of Amendment 82 and Amendment 82A are about not using this power to make any changes under the Equality Acts.
Baroness Goldie
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. I am looking at my speaking notes. It is a little difficult to disentangle the points to which she has just alluded. If the Committee will indulge me, I will perhaps try to cover the general points.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
I emailed the Minister’s advisers very early this morning and spoke to them earlier, so I would hope they had got the Minister’s notes in the right place.
Baroness Goldie
I thank the noble Baroness. I shall soldier on as best I can with the material I have. By way of general comment on Amendment 82, I hope I can reassure the Committee that I understand the concerns many noble Lords have regarding the scope of the powers we are seeking to take in the Bill. I shall use this opportunity to allay, I hope, some of the concerns as we look at the general premise of this amendment in relation to the Clause 7(1) power.
The general concern is about the ability to create new public authorities, which was alluded to by the noble Baroness. Let me make it clear that we have been listening to Members of this House and the other place; the noble Baroness is not alone in having these concerns. As such, we have made it a priority to find a solution that will satisfy both Parliament and the objectives of the Bill, and the Government are looking very closely at whether the key powers need to be drawn as widely as they are in this regard. We will revisit this matter in more detail when we reach the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, but I hope this satisfies the noble Baroness on this point for now and signals our commitment to listen to the concerns of noble Lords.
The noble Baroness, in her amendment, expressed some concerns about the power to create criminal offences. We will come back to this in more detail later in the debate on these clauses when we respond to the amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. If the noble Baroness wishes me to do so, I will deal with that in more detail now, but perhaps that is one of the areas she is happy for us to deal with later.
The noble Baroness also expressed concern about not losing any EU functions. The Government are committed to ensuring continuity, but there are a small number of functions it would be inappropriate for us to transfer to a UK public authority after exit. Examples might include the functions of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union or the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations. The Clause 7(1) power makes provision to remove these functions, but only if, outside the EU, they were somehow deficient, not simply because the Government disliked them as a matter of policy.
The noble Baroness raised the important matter of maintaining rights, standards and equalities protections, and I want to make it clear to noble Lords it is not the intention of this Government to weaken these as a result of our exit from the EU. It is for that very reason that it is necessary for Ministers to have the ability to make adjustments to any relevant legislation to ensure we can continue to enjoy these rights, standards and equalities as we currently do when we are no longer part of the EU.
To reassure noble Lords of the Government’s commitment to ensuring transparency around any amendments made to equalities legislation, we tabled an amendment in the other place that will require Ministers to make a statement in the Explanatory Memoranda of all SIs made under this power and the Clause 8 and 9 powers confirming that they have had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct prohibited under the Equality Act 2010.
Would the noble Baroness like me to respond on data protection? It is very helpful to get that reassuring shake of the head. In conclusion, I thank the noble Baroness for perhaps simplifying the matters immediately before us. I hope that the points I have raised in addressing her first amendment, and then those parts of her Amendment 82 she is concerned about, are enough to demonstrate the need for the power to have such scope and to be able to address all the deficiencies, including those alike to the types listed in Clause 7(2). In these circumstances, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Ludford
Before the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, responds, forgive me, but I am not sure I have entirely grasped this. Are the Government going to have another look at Clause 7(3)? In the other place, the Government changed Clause 7(2) so that instead of saying that deficiencies “included” but were “not limited to” those in a list, it now says “the deficiencies are” the list. However, Clause 7(3) adds, “Oh, but by the way, we can do things ‘similar’ to those in the list”. The Minister has not explained why the Government cannot lengthen the list to obviate the need for a provision that says Ministers can do “similar” things. That is why I say the Government are giving with one hand, in Clause 7(2), but then coming back with Clause 7(3) and saying, “Oh well, we’ve limited ourselves there, but we’re going to expand our powers here”.
The noble Baroness referred to these changes being passed without a Division, but a bloc of five or six government amendments was voted on in one Division. I am not aware that in the other place they really distinguished between the amendments, because the one tightening this up was lumped in with the one expanding it. I do not know whether I am being overly cynical here, but it seems to me that a fairly clever government operation in the other place gave with one hand and took with another. I would like an assurance that the Government will have another look at this.
Baroness Goldie
I would say to the noble Baroness that our elected counterparts in the other place were able to scrutinise this Bill in detail. The Government were transparent in what they were doing when they brought forward the amendment that passed without a Division. Indeed, it was for Members of that place to raise objection to the way in which the amendments were structured, and I understand that no such objections arose—and at the end of the day, it passed without a Division.
Let me deal with the substantive point raised by the noble Baroness. I was trying to explain that if we accept the principle, as the House appears to, that we need this corrective provision to let us deal with deficiencies on withdrawal, the Government are trying to ensure that there is a flexibility. I made it clear in responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that this is about having the powers to do what we need to do, but being conscious that we do not want these powers to enable Governments to do too much. It is equally important that they are empowered to do what they need to do and that the powers do not restrict them so that they are only able to do too little.
Part of the difficulty with the complexity of what confronts the statute book is that there is a degree of unpredictability in the events with which we are dealing. We do not know quite what difficulties may arise. That is why there is a desire to build in the flexibility created by Clause 7(3). I did endeavour, in responding to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to give an example of the kind of things that are not in Clause 7(2) but would actually be covered by subsection (3). There is no further comment I can make to the noble Baroness, other than to repeat my reassurance that the Government are anxious to work with this House in trying to make sure that this clause is responsible, but also workmanlike and capable of managing the difficult situations that may arise, so that action can be taken to correct deficiencies without harm being caused because the power does not exist to do that.
Lord Adonis
I took it as quite a significant move on the Government’s part for the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, to say that she was open to discussions about limiting the power to create new public bodies—and it is one that we welcome. That power, I know, has caused concern in the House. The noble Baroness has shown herself to be so emollient that we very much hope to hear a great deal more from her in the next six days of Committee. We will welcome her presence at whatever hour of the night she wishes to speak.
Baroness Goldie
I am not one to spurn the comments of attractive gentlemen, particularly when they are honeyed compliments uttered by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. As I have said in previous debates, I may not always be able to acquiesce on points that he makes, but I understand that my noble friend the Minister is prepared to look again at the creation of new bodies. I cannot provide further detail at this stage, but it is an area where we have an open mind.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
I thank the noble Baroness for that. Obviously, we will come on to a grouping of amendments specifically about public bodies—perhaps even tonight. I will deal firstly with the amendment to take out Clause 7(3) on page 5. I was a little worried when the Minister said that it allowed some flexibility—which I take to mean wriggle room, or wanting to do something that is not quite allowed for. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, described the problem of subsection (3) better than I could. Our concern is partly that we are again back to the implications of where the Minister considers something—which is a very wide way of saying that where a Minister considers, without any test, they can then define something as “similar” to another deficiency. We may have to return to this, because I do not think that it is robust enough.
Her particular example did not help her case, given that Clause 7(2)(d)(i) involves the EU, an EU entity, a member state, or a public authority and a member state. EFTA and NATO must be the only other two bodies: could we just not write those in? To put in a whole clause just to allow for EFTA does not seem to me, with all that discretion, very appropriate. So I think we may want to return to that.
Amendment 82, as amended by Amendment 82A, is very much about not using regulations to amend, repeal or revoke either the Equality Act 2006 or the Equality Act 2010—or, indeed, to reduce any right conferred on a person by retained EU law, if it were to be made less favourable. The Minister may have said that that was not the intention but, without the words in our amendment, clearly that would be possible. For the moment, I hope that we can revert to the specifics, such as public bodies, taxes and criminal offences and put that to one side. However, we may need to return later to subsection (3). I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am most grateful to speak to Amendment 81, which for these purposes is joined with Amendments 95, 96, 100, 227C and 244. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is not in his place. I would be interested to hear the content of the other amendments, but they seem to make very positive noises that there should be no increase in legislative burdens on individuals in businesses; that we should not exceed what is essential and not impose greater burdens; and that the Government should seek to make only technical changes and not to change policy materially.
I speak specifically to Amendment 81, which relates to deficiencies arising from withdrawal from the EU and considered in this group. The difficulty that I have with the wording as it stands in Clause 7(4) is partly because it contains a double negative and does not seem to be plain English, saying,
“retained EU law is not deficient merely because it does not contain any modification of EU law”—
and so it goes on. So partly the amendment is to express what is clearly meant, to seek greater clarity, but it also goes to the timing of the laws deemed to be deficient.
I think that it was my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern who said earlier that it was for Parliament to veto any statutory instrument put forward by government through the normal procedures of negative or affirmative resolution. Someone else in an earlier debate said that it should be the right of Parliament to be able to scrutinise amendments that fall under this clause—and, I would argue, particularly under Clause 7(4). So the question really to the Minister is to ask, if there is to be this scrutiny, at what stage this scrutiny would take place. My understanding is that the Minister is going to be able to act before Brexit to be able to prevent a deficiency from arising. My question is at what stage that would be and how Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise that. Also, if failure of retained EU law is a type of deficiency, and a failure means that the law does not operate effectively, we have already established that deficiency could cover a wider range of cases where it does not function appropriately or sensibly. Guidance as to who will actually decide what the deficiency is and when it will apply will be extremely helpful.
I mentioned at the outset that subsection (4) is not immediately clear. One turns to the Explanatory Notes and particularly paragraph 120, which says:
“Subsection (4) provides that the retained EU law in the UK is not deficient just because the EU subsequently makes changes to the law in the EU after the UK has left, or planned changes come into effect after exit. The law is being preserved and converted as it was immediately before exit day. The EU might go on to make changes to its law but those subsequent changes and the consequent divergence between UK and EU law do not by themselves automatically make the UK law deficient”.
I am not sure that this entirely clarifies the situation, nor does paragraph 116, relating to the earlier subsection (2). I want to probe the Minister to perhaps tease out what is the legislative deficiency, whether there is more than one stage at which it can apply, and who actually decides. If it is the Executive, at what stage can Parliament call them to account to scrutinise that? I hope that, in summing up on Amendment 81, the Minister can clarify, to create greater legal certainty, the legal basis for the functional restriction—where this is contained in a directive and therefore not retained or transposed into domestic law—to be described as a deficiency.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted
My Lords, I speak only to Amendment 227C, just to say that this is a sort of “double omnibus” amendment in that it covers the whole Bill and also puts together, in its proposed new paragraphs from (e) onwards, some ideas about how to address in a generic way some of the concerns that other noble Lords have expressed in what I call the “Thou shalt not” clauses. Clearly, we cannot go through the Lobbies 20 times to deal with them all but, if this kind of formulation is adopted, we could achieve something that was both votable and covered a lot of the common ground that there appears to be when looking at other amendments, many of which will be spoken to later. I will limit my comments to that for now.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
In the absence of my noble friend Lord Bassam, I just want to encourage the Minister—though I am sure it is already in his notes—to comment on Amendment 244, which appears in this group. It requires that:
“The statement under sub-paragraph (2) must include a certification that the regulation does no more than make technical changes to retained EU law in order for it to work following exit, and that no policy decisions are being made”.
I appreciate that the Minister and other Ministers have said all the way along that this is not about making policy, so it should be an easy certification on this occasion for a Minister to sign. I hope that that might be accepted.
Lord Callanan
My Lords, Amendment 81 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, concerns the core concept of this Bill, namely that it preserves and makes functional the law at the moment of the UK’s exit from the EU. As the long and learned debates in this House and the other place demonstrate, this is of course something much simpler said than done. We can all agree that the law in the UK should not be considered deficient simply because the EU adopts a new law once the UK has left. The Bill reflects that with the provision in Clause 7(4) and, therefore, this would not constitute a valid trigger for the use of the power in Clause 7(1).
It is also the case that the law is not deficient simply because EU law, as is often the case in some areas, contains provisions that are adopted before our withdrawal but only come into force or apply after exit day. This reflects the approach taken in Clause 3, which provides for the conversion of direct EU legislation that is operative in the UK immediately before exit day. As the Government set out when we debated Clause 3, we believe that it is right that we incorporate only that law which is operative at the time of our exit. It is surely not taking back control to this Parliament and the devolved legislatures if we simultaneously preserve the automaticity of new provisions of what was EU law becoming operative in our law, months or perhaps years later. It would be unacceptable for EU law provisions to flow automatically into the UK many years after we have left and would undermine the clarity and certainty this Bill is designed to provide. That is why Clause 3 preserves only the law as individuals and businesses were bound by it immediately before exit day, and why that decision is reflected in Clause 7(4), which makes it clear that the law is not deficient simply because it does not contain planned future changes to EU law. In preserving EU law, the Government have drawn a line in the legal sand on exit day. Wherever the line was drawn, the outcomes would, of course, please some and not others. I note that the controversial ports regulation, although already in force, will enter into application only days before exit day. Clause 7(4) merely reflects this line in the legal sand.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
Although Amendment 244, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, asks for,
“a certification that the regulation does no more than make technical changes … and that no policy decisions are being made”,
I take the point that policy choices may be being made. Although it is not in this group, Amendment 244A says that there would be a certificate saying that either the change was just technical or a policy choice has been made. That amendment may not be in this group, but I am interested whether the Minister is closing his mind to the idea that there should be a certificate from the relevant Minister. That is what this amendment aims to do.
Lord Callanan
No. As I have made clear throughout the Bill, our minds are not closed on many of these matters. I think I gave the noble Baroness an example. It is a difficult distinction to draw about what is making policy or what is a policy choice. As I said, the choice between two regulators can be said to be a policy choice, but it is certainly not our intention to use any of the power in the Bill to massively expand on different levels of policy. It is our intention to impose a snapshot on exit day and ensure that the law is compliant and tidy, as we have said.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister and to all who have contributed to this little group. While I am grateful to my noble friend for his reply, I am not sure that he addressed the question of timings, and I am slightly concerned about the scope for judicial reviews. I end with the comment that the wording I seek to delete refers to the earlier Amendment 18, on which we had a lengthier debate, and to which I will return on Report. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)
Amendment 82A, which is an amendment to Amendment 82, therefore falls.
Amendment 83
Lord Newby
Lord Newby
My Lords, this amendment simply asserts a long-established principle of British practice and law, namely that public bodies are created via primary legislation. There are good reasons for this principle. Public bodies perform important functions. They cost money to establish and run, and they can often themselves levy fees and charges or bring enforcement actions in the courts. They typically have quite a big impact on the people and organisations that they regulate. They are, in short, important. They should not be capable of being established via secondary legislation for the simple reason that such legislation does not allow their purposes, scope and operating practices to be subject to adequate debate.
In the Commons, debate on any statutory instrument is limited to 90 minutes. While we can take slightly longer in your Lordships’ House, the nature of statutory instruments, as the Minister knows, is that they can only be approved unamended or rejected outright, except in the most extreme circumstances. If we attempt, as we very rarely do, to reject them outright, we are accused by the Government of exceeding our powers, and the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, is wheeled out to threaten us with dire consequences.
I had rather hoped that the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who had planned to be in his place, was in his place, because he wrote the Cabinet Office guidance which clearly explains to Ministers that they should use primary legislation when establishing public bodies. However, in order to check whether I was right in thinking that it was normal practice to establish public bodies by primary legislation, I had a look at the public bodies that the Government proposed to abolish in the Public Bodies Act. These were a very wide range, from the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council to the Victims’ Advisory Panel.
I asked the Library to discover by what power this random cross-section of public bodies had been established. Of the 34 listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill they looked at 27. They were without exception established by primary legislation, and while it is unsurprising in the case of larger entities such as the Competition Service—established by the Enterprise Act 2002—it was also the case with relatively insignificant ones such as the Home Grown Timber Advisory Committee, established by the Forestry Act 1967, or the Railway Heritage Committee, established by the Railway Heritage Act 1996. So what the Government are proposing in the Bill is without precedent. Certainly, any body established to fill a gap created by our exit from the EU would be more important than some of those I have already mentioned.
Is such a departure justified? I do not, as a matter of principle, believe that it is, but if it were to be justified, the only grounds I could imagine the Government plausibly advancing were that there were simply far too many bodies to be established by primary legislation by exit day. At first sight this argument looks as though it might have some merit. There are, excluding the EU’s core institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament, some 54 other EU bodies described by the EU as,
“specialised agencies and decentralised bodies”.
Virtually all of them are set out in Amendment 263, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. But the truth is that we will not need to replicate anything like that number.
Clearly, we will not need to replicate the functions of the European Police College, or the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, or the European Institute for Gender Equality. We will not need to create new bodies in the area of financial regulation. In some cases, the question of whether we need to create new bodies or not is extremely unclear. The Prime Minister, in her speech last week, suggested we would be seeking associate membership of three bodies, which we are already members of by virtue of our European membership—namely, the European Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency and the European Aviation Safety Agency. It is clear that, if we stayed in those bodies, the need to replicate them would be very small, if needed at all. However, the negotiating mandate published today by the European Council states that:
“The European Council further reiterates that the Union will preserve its autonomy as regards its decision making and excludes participation of the United Kingdom as a third country to EU institutions, agencies or bodies”.
It seems that, since the point at which I first drafted my speech for this evening, we may need to create three more bodies than I had originally envisaged. None the less, the total number we are talking about is substantially smaller than 54 and, almost certainly, is less than 10. Indeed the Government have already admitted that some bodies which will need to be created, will be created by primary legislation. We heard earlier today, when we were talking about environmental protections, that there will be an environmental protection Bill with a new environmental body created within it which replicates some of the functions of European environmental agencies.
So, despite the lack of clarity, we are talking about a relatively small number of bodies for which primary legislation should be needed—and there is almost certainly time for that legislation. Before leaving the subject, I would like to refer back to the debate we had earlier, when we discussed Euratom, and also discussed Amendment 263 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. That debate asked an extremely important question of the Government, which was: will they publish strategies explaining how these various bodies are to be replicated, or not replicated, and what we should do to fill any gaps, so that we know what is happening? The answer given by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, consisted of a single sentence. He said that it,
“would be neither helpful to Parliament, nor in the national interest”.—[Official Report, 21/2/18; col. 252.]
I suggest to the noble Lord that both those statements were false. It will be in the interest of Parliament to know how the Government intend to fill gaps in respect of public bodies caused by our leaving the EU. For the noble Lord to assume that he knows what is in the interest of Parliament is rather extraordinary. What he really means is that it is not in the interest of the Government to say what they will do to fill the gaps, because they clearly do not know. They do not know where they will get to in the negotiations and I suspect that, regarding some of these bodies, they do not know, full stop. I invite the Minister in his reply this evening to be a bit more gracious towards the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and his suggestion, and to commit the Government to come forward with some suggestions as to how they are going to fill the gaps that they are about to create.
On the amendment itself, it is very straightforward. There is a well-established principle in British practice and law that public bodies are established by primary legislation. The Government are seeking to tear up that convention for no good reason and they should desist.
Lord Adonis
My Lords, the difficulty with having been in this House for a number of years is that all these debates come round and round. I wish that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, was right in saying that this is the first time we have been faced with sweeping powers for Governments to reform public bodies by secondary legislation. He may remember that one of the first acts of the coalition Government in 2010 was to introduce the Public Bodies Bill. I vividly remember the debates on that Bill because it gave sweeping powers to the Government to abolish public bodies by statutory instrument. Because it is the job of the Opposition to oppose draconian attempts by Governments to seize Henry VIII powers, those of us on this side of the House made exactly the same speech as the noble Lord, who was then sitting on the Bench opposite, has made, saying why that should not happen.
There was then one of those classic showdowns between the House of Lords and the House of Commons. From memory, it centred on whether the Youth Justice Board, which at that time was threatened with abolition, should be capable of being abolished and whether it should be done by primary or secondary legislation. We all thought that was a very bad idea because it was doing such a brilliant job of dealing with the problem of young offender institutions. I believe we saved the Youth Justice Board, and all the brilliant developments in penal policy that we have seen in this country in the last eight years, which have been such a phenomenal success, are no doubt due to its survival at the insistence of the House of Lords in 2010.
The proposal put forward by the noble Lord is all immensely worthy and I obviously support everything he has said. The power grab by the Government which the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who I see is now back in his place, is trying to undertake is utterly reprehensible. I thought I heard the noble Baroness say earlier that the Government are prepared to move on this. I hope that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness have been speaking so that we can bank this great act of liberalism on the part of the noble Lord. It will be the first one that we have heard since he assumed his current place but we would welcome it greatly.
I simply note that in the great scheme of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, this is a small issue. It is a classic House of Lords issue where we will probably achieve a great victory. It will make no difference whatever in the great scheme of things but I suppose that is why we are here.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
My Lords, I rise to take the place of my noble friend Lord O’Donnell, who unfortunately cannot be here, to make it clear that there are quite a few others on these Benches who share his views. I would not be so unwise as to talk about the collectivity of Cross-Benchers—I have been around long enough to know that that does not exist—but there are quite a few, and for the same reason. I hope that when he comes to reply to this debate, the Minister will not again trot out the “housemaid’s baby” argument that he has been using all evening—that it is a very small one and nothing terrible is going to happen, et cetera. We are talking here about some quite significant decisions which, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, said, have invariably, and quite correctly, in the past been taken by primary legislation.
I know—this is very welcome—that in her Mansion House speech the Prime Minister rather reduced the number of public bodies that might have to be created following our leaving. She has recognised that we would do much better to stay in a number of the public bodies that already exist in the European Union, and we will see whether that bears fruit in the negotiations. That might reduce the list but it does not remove the problem. Therefore, this amendment deserves wide support from all round the Committee. It would be an extremely unwelcome and dangerous precedent if we started delegating the powers to set up these public bodies to a government Minister with only a resolution available and the nuclear option to stop it. I support the amendment.
Lord Whitty (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, was kind enough to refer to my amendment, which was probably misgrouped at an earlier stage when we were discussing Euratom, I wish to underline the points that he makes. At that time I asked the Minister to set out for Parliament the approach to the EU agencies that the Government were going to take in the negotiations. Frankly, the noble Lord was far too dismissive of that approach, and it would do him some good now if he were to say that at some point during the course of the Bill the Government will set out the line that they will take. After all, as has been said, the Prime Minister has set out her line in relation to some of those agencies. Unfortunately, within 48 hours, the EU has effectively said, “Sorry, that is not on”—not only for the post-transition period but for the transition period itself. While we were continuing to follow the rules and procedures of those agencies, we would no longer take part in their activities. We have an issue here.
I was a bit diffident about the coalition’s Public Bodies Bill—I did not want to embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Newby, who has been so kind to me—but, as my noble friend said, the achievement of the House of Lords was to knock out an enormous schedule. The Chief Whip, who was the Minister in charge of the Bill at that time—he is now in his place—looks less fraught with this Bill than he did when he was dealing with the Public Bodies Bill. In the end he wisely convinced his colleagues that he had to drop the huge schedule that gave carte blanche powers to the Government to abolish or tweak the responsibilities of a host of public bodies. That Bill was to abolish bodies or alter their remit; this Bill is to set up entirely new bodies. Unless we do that knowing what the overall approach is, this House cannot give the Government that degree of power.
Mention has been made of the new environmental body. Strictly speaking, under this clause as it currently stands, the Government would be able to establish, under secondary legislation, the kind of body that the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, who is no longer in his place, was arguing for earlier—a body so powerful it could sanction other public bodies, including the Government, if it was able to reproduce the powers that presently rest with the European Commission. That is an enormous power, which this House would not allow the Executive arm of government on its own without primary legislation conducted through the two Houses.
I recognise that there is a timescale problem for the Government, but might it be possible to set up some of these bodies in shadow form? If there are 10 bodies, as the noble Lord suggests, there may be a need at least to stop the process before the final passage of this Bill. To have permanent public bodies to regulate large swathes of our public life, industry and personal behaviour—even if there are only a dozen of them—would require primary legislation. This House needs to assert that it does and the Government need to accept that.
Lord Beith
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Newby on one specific reason why it is primary legislation that we use, and should use, for the creation of public bodies, even in these circumstances. He referred to the somewhat limited procedures in both Houses, but particularly in the Commons, for dealing with statutory instruments, but one abiding characteristic of them is that they do not admit of amendment. When a public body is being created, even in the short timescale we are talking about here, its remit, terms of reference, composition and the powers it can exercise are incapable of amendment. The idea that the Government would produce so perfect a form that it would not benefit from amendment, or even discussion of amendment, is so fanciful that I am sure the Minister will not advance it. Surely primary legislation capable of amendment, even if addressed with greater speed than normal because of the circumstances, is the only defensible way of doing something as extensive as creating a public body.
Baroness Altmann (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments. I believe that public bodies should be established by primary legislation. Parliament must have the opportunity to properly scrutinise and access the expenditure associated with trying to replicate bodies to which we already belong. The Bill, and in particular Clause 7, contains elements that are frightening to those of us who believe in parliamentary democracy. Handing such powers to the Executive is a gross dereliction of duty. I encourage my noble friend to urgently ask his department to reconsider the Government’s current intention to leave so many excellent EU agencies and try to recreate our own versions.
Baroness Whitaker
My Lords, it must be inherently undemocratic for bodies that have significant obligations, for instance under the Equality Act or the Human Rights Act, not to be set up with the full parliamentary scrutiny of primary legislation, so I support these amendments.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, I think the good news is that we heard a hint earlier that this might be one of the areas where we are going to hear a bit of movement tonight. If the Chief Whip will allow us to go home after this group, we will be sent home in a very happy mood.
My name is also on these two amendments and I will not make the case again, because the noble Lord, Lord Newby, made the clearest of cases against the use of secondary powers to create new quangos, with others adding similar reasons for why this is not just a power too far but is in breach of government guidelines.
I will add only two points. First—this is a slight gripe, I am afraid—in answer to my Written Question as to whether there were other examples of NGOs established by secondary legislation, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, said that it was not possible to answer other than “at disproportionate cost”. But the Government must have known why I was asking this Question—they have a brain—and I would have thought that if there were some public bodies set up by secondary legislation they could have found a few examples. This was some time ago. Unfortunately it is an undated letter—like many I get from the Government —but it is HL1651, so I think it was probably last year that I asked it.
My second point—and in a sense it is really the point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Beith—arises from my experience both as a consumer representative and as a former member of various regulatory bodies set up always by statute. It is simply to say that the very way we establish those bodies—whether it is the Charity Commission, the Competition Commission, the Legal Services Board or the National Consumer Council of which my noble friend Lord Whitty was such an eminent chair until the Public Bodies Act abolished it—affects how they do their job. The founding statute will spell out their task and set out the “have regards to” that influence how they set about their work. It will also define who sits on their boards, how they are appointed, to whom they report and whether, for example, they have a duty to heed consumers in the relevant industry, the regulated industry itself, the employees, the wider social considerations such as the environment or things like that—and indeed their degree of independence from the Government. It is a crucial part of the function of many public bodies.
Such limitations on the powers of those public bodies, and the requirements for how they operate, are written in primary legislation. They can be discussed carefully, they can be amended—as we did before with others, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said—they can be debated in this Chamber or in the other place, and they could have pre-legislative scrutiny. For example, setting up a new public ombudsman—as the Member in the other place Mr Jenkins has been recommending—could come by a Bill and could be amended after consultation with the relevant interested parties. That is the way that we should set up public bodies. Instead, this Bill says to a Minister, “Well, you decide. You decide how to set it up; you decide how its board will be established; you decide who to appoint it—probably you could decide to appoint your friends to it”—and Parliament will nod it through. That is not good enough and this power must be dispensed with.
Lord Callanan
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to respond to the debate, if only to confound all the prejudices of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that I am some inflexible hardliner who never gives him anything he might want and that only my noble friend Lady Goldie can—I was going to say “satisfy him”, but perhaps I should not use that word. He could not put a cigarette paper between us, by the way. She might do so with more charm than me, but we are saying essentially the same thing.
I understand that a number of noble Lords are concerned about the scope of this power and I reassure your Lordships that the Government are listening to those concerns. When Clause 7 was drafted, we thought it would be only sensible for the sake of contingency to include in its scope the ability to establish new public authorities to ensure, as many amendments in the other place sought to ensure, against losing any important functions as they are transferred over from the EU, as no such public authority may currently exist in the UK. Certainty and continuity are, after all, the watchwords of the Bill.
We have been clear that our preference will always be, where possible, to transfer any functions returning from the EU to existing bodies in the UK, but it has proven necessary to legislate in parallel with negotiations because of the strict Article 50 timeline. Therefore, we do not know at this stage exactly which functions are returning. We must make this legislation without prejudice to those negotiations, where, as the Prime Minister said in her Mansion House speech last week, we are looking to continue a productive relationship with various EU bodies as part of our deep and special partnership.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked about our strategy towards the agencies. Where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with any EU body or agency, the Government will consider carefully whether we should do so. However, as he knows, it is ultimately a matter for negotiations. We remain committed to keep Parliament as fully informed as possible without prejudice to our negotiating position.
However, we already know of one function that we expect to return to the UK and which it is agreed does not sit happily with any existing public body: our environmental protections. This prompted the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to announce our intention to consult on a new, independent and statutory body to advise and challenge the Government and potentially other public bodies on the environment—we discussed this extensively earlier—stepping in when needed to hold these bodies to account and enforce standards. As such, we need to retain the power until we can be confident of delivering all necessary legislative changes without it.
It is for this reason that I am sorry to say that we will not be accepting Amendments 83 and 94 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, which seek to remove this ability from the scope of the power. The Government have a responsibility to safeguard against the potential disruption and confusion caused to businesses and individuals as we exit the EU, and we believe that the ability to create new public authorities plays a big part in ensuring this. However, the Government also recognise their responsibility to Parliament in listening to Members’ concerns regarding the legislation it seeks to pass. Therefore, I can assure noble Lords that the Government are working hard on finding a resolution to this matter that will satisfy the concerns of noble Lords—maybe even the noble Lord, Lord Adonis—and we will revisit it on Report. In the meantime, with those assurances, I hope the noble Lord will be able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I am most grateful to everybody who has spoken in this debate and to the Minister for his reply. On several occasions this evening he has managed to combine Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde in the same speech and he has repeated that performance here. I am pleased, none the less, that the Government are considering how to deal with this issue. The only thing that slightly concerns me, both in this case and others where we have had the same response from the Government Front Bench, is that that clock is ticking quite quickly towards Report. The fact that the Government are thinking about it is better than their not thinking about it, but we will soon come to a point at which their thoughts need to be crystallised in something that we can look at.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, made an extremely sensible suggestion for how we can deal with some of these issues in the short term, with the establishment of shadow bodies, and I hope that is one of the options the Government will consider as they move forward. We shall return to this, in one form or another, on Report, but for this evening I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.