Home Office

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.

The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:

• the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
• the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
• Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.

It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.

Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.

Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.

Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

The White Paper “From Local to National: A New Model for Policing” sets out the Government’s proposals on the National Police Service. Further details will be set out in legislation when Parliamentary time allows.

The White Paper “From Local to National: A New Model for Policing” sets out the Government’s proposals on the National Police Service. Further details will be set out in legislation when Parliamentary time allows.

The right to peaceful protest is a vital part of our democracy, and people are free to gather and express their views, provided they do so within the law. The Public Order Act 1986 grants the police powers to manage protests by imposing conditions on public processions and assemblies to prevent serious disorder, disruption, or intimidation, while balancing the right to peaceful protest. It is for local police forces to determine whether to impose conditions.

The Home Office engages with policing partners and relevant stakeholders, including the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, on issues relating to public order and protest activity. The policing of protests, including any activity outside commercial premises, is an operational decision for the police who must balance the right to peaceful protest with the rights and safety of others.

The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.

It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.

The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.

It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.

The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.

It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.

The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.

It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.

The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.

It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.

The Ukraine schemes are temporary humanitarian routes and do not provide a route to settlement. However, Ukrainians in the UK under any of the Ukraine Schemes may apply to switch into other immigration routes for which they meet the eligibility and suitability requirements, including work, study, family and private life routes.

The Government keeps the Ukraine schemes and the evolving situation in Ukraine under review and is actively considering the future position. I intend to make a further statement later this year to support Ukrainians in planning effectively for their futures.

We value the contribution of the higher education sector and continue to engage regularly with representatives, including Universities UK and the Russell Group, on the challenges the system faces. The visa brake is a temporary, evidence‑led measure and will be lifted only when the Government judges it appropriate to do so.

The brake does not apply to those who already hold a valid Student visa, nor to applications submitted before it came into force on 26 March. In order to allow those prospective students with an offer from a licensed sponsor and a valid Confirmation of Acceptance of Studies (CAS) to apply for visas, we provided 21 days’ notice of the implementation of the visa brakes. There are no plans for any further exceptions to the brake.

The decision to introduce the visa brakes was driven by clear evidence of high levels of visa‑linked asylum claims across all four nationalities. In the case of Sudan, in the year ending September 2025, the proportion of asylum claims to visas issued on the student route was 46%, constituting one of the highest visa-linked asylum conversion rates, consistent with a rise across the past five years. This continued and rising asylum risk from this cohort necessitated swift and decisive action through the introduction of a visa brake.

We value the contribution of the higher education sector and continue to engage regularly with representatives, including Universities UK and the Russell Group, on the challenges the system faces. The visa brake is a temporary, evidence‑led measure and will be lifted only when the Government judges it appropriate to do so.

The brake does not apply to those who already hold a valid Student visa, nor to applications submitted before it came into force on 26 March. In order to allow those prospective students with an offer from a licensed sponsor and a valid Confirmation of Acceptance of Studies (CAS) to apply for visas, we provided 21 days’ notice of the implementation of the visa brakes. There are no plans for any further exceptions to the brake.

The decision to introduce the visa brakes was driven by clear evidence of high levels of visa‑linked asylum claims across all four nationalities. In the case of Sudan, in the year ending September 2025, the proportion of asylum claims to visas issued on the student route was 46%, constituting one of the highest visa-linked asylum conversion rates, consistent with a rise across the past five years. This continued and rising asylum risk from this cohort necessitated swift and decisive action through the introduction of a visa brake.

We value the contribution of the higher education sector and continue to engage regularly with representatives, including Universities UK and the Russell Group, on the challenges the system faces. The visa brake is a temporary, evidence‑led measure and will be lifted only when the Government judges it appropriate to do so.

The brake does not apply to those who already hold a valid Student visa, nor to applications submitted before it came into force on 26 March. In order to allow those prospective students with an offer from a licensed sponsor and a valid Confirmation of Acceptance of Studies (CAS) to apply for visas, we provided 21 days’ notice of the implementation of the visa brakes. There are no plans for any further exceptions to the brake.

The decision to introduce the visa brakes was driven by clear evidence of high levels of visa‑linked asylum claims across all four nationalities. In the case of Sudan, in the year ending September 2025, the proportion of asylum claims to visas issued on the student route was 46%, constituting one of the highest visa-linked asylum conversion rates, consistent with a rise across the past five years. This continued and rising asylum risk from this cohort necessitated swift and decisive action through the introduction of a visa brake.

Priority Service decisions are typically made within five working days once payment is received, significantly faster than our current service level agreement for standard applications.

This expedites requests for additional undefined certificate of sponsorship (CoS) allocations and annual CoS allocation changes and we have already this year increased the availability of the priority service by 20% with a view to increasing further throughout the financial year.

The Government recognises the wide-reaching impact of commercial burglary, including the profound impact these crimes can have on business owners, retail workers and the wider community.

The offences for non-residential burglaries such as business and commercial burglary across England and Wales decreased by 13% in the year to September 2025 compared with the previous year.

The table below shows the proportion of non-residential (commercial) burglaries reported to police in England resulted in a charge or summons in the last three years:

Police recorded offences, burglary - business and community, England

Note 1: Figures for year ending Sep 2023 exclude Devon and Cornwall

The Government is determined that robust action should be taken to prevent commercial burglaries from happening and ensure swift justice for perpetrators.

We are doing this by focusing our efforts on delivering our ambitious police reform agenda, the central aim of which is to protect and revitalise neighbourhood policing. We are lifting national responsibilities off local forces, so they focus on tackling local issues, like tackling commercial burglary. In addition, the Government has already taken steps to boost the neighbourhood policing response, ensuring that every neighbourhood has named, contactable officers and more visible patrols, with over 3,000 additional police officers and police community support officers put into neighbourhood roles in less than a year.

Through the Crime and Policing Bill we are giving police the powers they need, including to enter and search premises where stolen items are reasonably believed to have been stolen and located, and where it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a court warrant. This will significantly enhance the ability of the police to act swiftly and effectively in recovering stolen property.

Guidance for the police, including authorised professional practice guidance, is a matter for the College of Policing. The National Business Crime Centre (NBCC) works closely with businesses, law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders to prevent and reduce the impact of business crime in the UK. National Police Chief Council leads for business crime work closely with the NBCC to support the policing response to business crime, including on improved outcomes.

The Government recognises the wide-reaching impact of commercial burglary, including the profound impact these crimes can have on business owners, retail workers and the wider community.

The offences for non-residential burglaries such as business and commercial burglary across England and Wales decreased by 13% in the year to September 2025 compared with the previous year.

The table below shows the proportion of non-residential (commercial) burglaries reported to police in England resulted in a charge or summons in the last three years:

Police recorded offences, burglary - business and community, England

Note 1: Figures for year ending Sep 2023 exclude Devon and Cornwall

The Government is determined that robust action should be taken to prevent commercial burglaries from happening and ensure swift justice for perpetrators.

We are doing this by focusing our efforts on delivering our ambitious police reform agenda, the central aim of which is to protect and revitalise neighbourhood policing. We are lifting national responsibilities off local forces, so they focus on tackling local issues, like tackling commercial burglary. In addition, the Government has already taken steps to boost the neighbourhood policing response, ensuring that every neighbourhood has named, contactable officers and more visible patrols, with over 3,000 additional police officers and police community support officers put into neighbourhood roles in less than a year.

Through the Crime and Policing Bill we are giving police the powers they need, including to enter and search premises where stolen items are reasonably believed to have been stolen and located, and where it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a court warrant. This will significantly enhance the ability of the police to act swiftly and effectively in recovering stolen property.

Guidance for the police, including authorised professional practice guidance, is a matter for the College of Policing. The National Business Crime Centre (NBCC) works closely with businesses, law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders to prevent and reduce the impact of business crime in the UK. National Police Chief Council leads for business crime work closely with the NBCC to support the policing response to business crime, including on improved outcomes.

The Government recognises the wide-reaching impact of commercial burglary, including the profound impact these crimes can have on business owners, retail workers and the wider community.

The offences for non-residential burglaries such as business and commercial burglary across England and Wales decreased by 13% in the year to September 2025 compared with the previous year.

The table below shows the proportion of non-residential (commercial) burglaries reported to police in England resulted in a charge or summons in the last three years:

Police recorded offences, burglary - business and community, England

Note 1: Figures for year ending Sep 2023 exclude Devon and Cornwall

The Government is determined that robust action should be taken to prevent commercial burglaries from happening and ensure swift justice for perpetrators.

We are doing this by focusing our efforts on delivering our ambitious police reform agenda, the central aim of which is to protect and revitalise neighbourhood policing. We are lifting national responsibilities off local forces, so they focus on tackling local issues, like tackling commercial burglary. In addition, the Government has already taken steps to boost the neighbourhood policing response, ensuring that every neighbourhood has named, contactable officers and more visible patrols, with over 3,000 additional police officers and police community support officers put into neighbourhood roles in less than a year.

Through the Crime and Policing Bill we are giving police the powers they need, including to enter and search premises where stolen items are reasonably believed to have been stolen and located, and where it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a court warrant. This will significantly enhance the ability of the police to act swiftly and effectively in recovering stolen property.

Guidance for the police, including authorised professional practice guidance, is a matter for the College of Policing. The National Business Crime Centre (NBCC) works closely with businesses, law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders to prevent and reduce the impact of business crime in the UK. National Police Chief Council leads for business crime work closely with the NBCC to support the policing response to business crime, including on improved outcomes.

The Government recognises the wide-reaching impact of commercial burglary, including the profound impact these crimes can have on business owners, retail workers and the wider community.

The offences for non-residential burglaries such as business and commercial burglary across England and Wales decreased by 13% in the year to September 2025 compared with the previous year.

The table below shows the proportion of non-residential (commercial) burglaries reported to police in England resulted in a charge or summons in the last three years:

Police recorded offences, burglary - business and community, England

Note 1: Figures for year ending Sep 2023 exclude Devon and Cornwall

The Government is determined that robust action should be taken to prevent commercial burglaries from happening and ensure swift justice for perpetrators.

We are doing this by focusing our efforts on delivering our ambitious police reform agenda, the central aim of which is to protect and revitalise neighbourhood policing. We are lifting national responsibilities off local forces, so they focus on tackling local issues, like tackling commercial burglary. In addition, the Government has already taken steps to boost the neighbourhood policing response, ensuring that every neighbourhood has named, contactable officers and more visible patrols, with over 3,000 additional police officers and police community support officers put into neighbourhood roles in less than a year.

Through the Crime and Policing Bill we are giving police the powers they need, including to enter and search premises where stolen items are reasonably believed to have been stolen and located, and where it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a court warrant. This will significantly enhance the ability of the police to act swiftly and effectively in recovering stolen property.

Guidance for the police, including authorised professional practice guidance, is a matter for the College of Policing. The National Business Crime Centre (NBCC) works closely with businesses, law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders to prevent and reduce the impact of business crime in the UK. National Police Chief Council leads for business crime work closely with the NBCC to support the policing response to business crime, including on improved outcomes.

Information about passport application volumes and performance are published quarterly, and can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/migration-transparency-data.

There have been no changes to the published customer guidance for the expected timeframe to process passport applications.

Quarterly data for the issuing of Certificates of Entitlement can be found in the detailed entry clearance visa dataset (Vis-D02) at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/immigration-system-statistics-data-tables.

In-country immigration routes, and any associated in country appeals rights, are designed to operate while the applicant remains physically present in the UK.

Where an applicant leaves the UK before a decision is made, the application can no longer be considered on the basis on which it was made and is therefore treated as withdrawn.

This approach maintains the distinction between in country and overseas routes, ensuring consistency with section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (which can extend a person’s right to remain in the UK whilst their current visa has expired but they have an outstanding valid application under consideration) and aligns appeal rights with the appropriate procedural framework.

Applicants have the ability to apply for priority services if they know travel is likely to be imminent, alternatively if a person has an urgent need to travel outside the UK and do not wish their application to be treated as withdrawn, they can contact the UK Visas and Immigration hotline and we will consider whether expedition of the decision can be made on a case-by-case basis.

The announced audit carried out at MBR Acres in November 2025 identified no critical or major findings, and no low‑level concerns. Three minor findings were identified and, where required, actions to address these areas were issued to the establishment. The minor findings involved a small amount of rust on a surface, small areas of floor damage in a walkway, and a small portion of loose drain cover which was dealt with immediately.

ASRU conducts both announced and unannounced audits in line with the requirements of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (ASPA), using a risk‑informed approach.

Audit frequency is determined by a range of factors including consideration of an establishment’s compliance history, the nature and scale of licensed activities, the species and numbers of animals used, and the licence holder’s record.

As a minimum, ASRU audits a third of all establishments each year and audits all establishments carrying out regulated procedures on non‑human primates annually, as required by ASPA. ASPA does not mandate whether these audits are announced or unannounced and does not mandate a specific frequency for unannounced audits.

ASRU has planned to increase the number of unannounced audits as part of its work to strength regulatory oversight. ASRU has also increased its number of inspectors, enabling a greater volume of risk-based audits across the system.

The announced audit carried out at MBR Acres in November 2025 identified no critical or major findings, and no low‑level concerns. Three minor findings were identified and, where required, actions to address these areas were issued to the establishment. The minor findings involved a small amount of rust on a surface, small areas of floor damage in a walkway, and a small portion of loose drain cover which was dealt with immediately.

ASRU conducts both announced and unannounced audits in line with the requirements of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (ASPA), using a risk‑informed approach.

Audit frequency is determined by a range of factors including consideration of an establishment’s compliance history, the nature and scale of licensed activities, the species and numbers of animals used, and the licence holder’s record.

As a minimum, ASRU audits a third of all establishments each year and audits all establishments carrying out regulated procedures on non‑human primates annually, as required by ASPA. ASPA does not mandate whether these audits are announced or unannounced and does not mandate a specific frequency for unannounced audits.

ASRU has planned to increase the number of unannounced audits as part of its work to strength regulatory oversight. ASRU has also increased its number of inspectors, enabling a greater volume of risk-based audits across the system.

UKVI are constantly seeking to improve efficiency and reduce processing times however, we need to clarify that the 18 weeks is a service level agreement (SLA) not the processing time and the majority of applications are processed well within this SLA.

The Home Office has taken steps to ensure British citizens with dual nationality were informed well in advance of Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) enforcement to make sure they have a valid UK passport or Certificate of Entitlement.

Clear guidance advising British dual nationals to carry the correct documentation has been available since October 2024. In November 2025, the Home Office announced the enforcement of ETA from 25 February 2026, which included information about the requirement for dual citizens.

Communications and engagement activities have included sustained public guidance on GOV.UK including at Dual-Citizenship-GOV.UK, Foreign travel advice - GOV.UK, Returning to the UK - GOV.UK with clear messaging, so British dual nationals can quickly understand what to do.

Additionally, a substantive communications campaign about the introduction of ETA has also been running since 2023, alongside updated guidance and direct reminders to newly naturalised British citizens about correct travel documentation and coordinated international and carrier engagement.

Every asylum claim is considered on its individual merits by assessing all the evidence provided by the claimant in light of published country information guidance.

Refugee status is granted when someone has a well-founded fear of persecution under the Refugee Convention for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. They must show that they cannot seek protection from the authorities in their country and cannot reasonably move to another part of their country to avoid persecution. However, we can deny protection to those who commit serious crimes or represent a threat to national security. Article 1F of the Refugee Convention allows signatory states to exclude those who would otherwise be refugees where there are serious reasons for considering they are guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes or acts contrary to the purpose and principles of the United Nations.

This Government has published an asylum policy statement, setting out a fair and firm approach to restoring order to the system, which is essential for building community cohesion. By increasing public confidence in the integrity of the asylum system, the reforms will help build trust and reduce tensions within communities. At the same time, they support successful integration for those granted protection, enabling them to contribute positively to society. Integration brings significant benefits for individuals, taxpayers, and communities. These measures will encourage and enable people granted protection to become self-sufficient, law-abiding members of UK society.

For visa applications, decisions are made against the specific suitability and eligibility requirements set out in the Immigration Rules for the relevant route.

In all cases, decisions are made on the basis of the law and published policy, ensuring that applications are considered fairly, consistently, and without discrimination.

The information requested is not currently available from published statistics, and the relevant data could only be collated and verified for the purpose of answering this question at disproportionate cost.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues, the Government recognises the impact that uncertainty can have on Ukrainian individuals and families who have built their lives in the UK, including pressures relating to housing, employment, and education. We recognise that this uncertainty can be particularly acute for families with children who have lived in the UK for extended periods. The Government has therefore taken concrete steps to provide greater certainty and stability, including extending the Ukraine Permission Extension scheme and widening the application window to support effective forward planning.

In exercising immigration functions, the Home Secretary has regard to the statutory duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom. In line with this duty, the best interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration in immigration decisions affecting Ukrainian families, while recognising that they are not the only consideration.

The Government keeps the situation in Ukraine under close and active review, taking into account security conditions, humanitarian infrastructure, and the ability of civilians to return safely and sustainably. No single criterion determines when Ukraine would be considered sufficiently safe for the purposes of ending temporary protection arrangements, and no decisions have been taken at this stage.

The Ukraine schemes are temporary in nature and do not provide a route to settlement. Time spent in the UK under the Ukraine schemes does not count towards the Long Residence route.

The Government recognises the importance of longer‑term clarity and is actively considering the future position. In doing so, it is drawing on a wide range of evidence from across government, academia, civil society, and stakeholder engagement. It will respond in a responsible and considered manner, and intends to make a further statement later this year to support Ukrainians in planning effectively for their futures.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues, the Government recognises the impact that uncertainty can have on Ukrainian individuals and families who have built their lives in the UK, including pressures relating to housing, employment and education. We recognise that this uncertainty can be particularly acute for families with children who have lived in the UK for extended periods. The Government has therefore taken concrete steps to provide greater certainty and stability, including extending the Ukraine Permission Extension scheme and widening the application window to support effective forward planning.

In exercising immigration functions, the Home Secretary has regard to the statutory duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom. In line with this duty, the best interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration in immigration decisions affecting Ukrainian families, while recognising that they are not the only consideration.

The Government keeps the situation in Ukraine under close and active review, taking into account security conditions, humanitarian infrastructure and the ability of civilians to return safely and sustainably. No single criterion determines when Ukraine would be considered sufficiently safe for the purposes of ending temporary protection arrangements, and no decisions have been taken at this stage.

The Ukraine schemes are temporary in nature and do not provide a route to settlement. Time spent in the UK under the Ukraine schemes does not count towards the Long Residence route.

The Government recognises the importance of longer‑term clarity and is actively considering the future position. In doing so, it is drawing on a wide range of evidence from across government, academia, civil society and stakeholder engagement. It will respond in a responsible and considered manner, and intends to make a further statement later this year to support Ukrainians in planning effectively for their futures.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues, the Government recognises the impact that uncertainty can have on Ukrainian individuals and families who have built their lives in the UK, including pressures relating to housing, employment and education. We recognise that this uncertainty can be particularly acute for families with children who have lived in the UK for extended periods. The Government has therefore taken concrete steps to provide greater certainty and stability, including extending the Ukraine Permission Extension scheme and widening the application window to support effective forward planning.

In exercising immigration functions, the Home Secretary has regard to the statutory duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom. In line with this duty, the best interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration in immigration decisions affecting Ukrainian families, while recognising that they are not the only consideration.

The Government keeps the situation in Ukraine under close and active review, taking into account security conditions, humanitarian infrastructure and the ability of civilians to return safely and sustainably. No single criterion determines when Ukraine would be considered sufficiently safe for the purposes of ending temporary protection arrangements, and no decisions have been taken at this stage.

The Ukraine schemes are temporary in nature and do not provide a route to settlement. Time spent in the UK under the Ukraine schemes does not count towards the Long Residence route.

The Government recognises the importance of longer‑term clarity and is actively considering the future position. In doing so, it is drawing on a wide range of evidence from across government, academia, civil society and stakeholder engagement. It will respond in a responsible and considered manner, and intends to make a further statement later this year to support Ukrainians in planning effectively for their futures.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues, the Government recognises the impact that uncertainty can have on Ukrainian individuals and families who have built their lives in the UK, including pressures relating to housing, employment and education. We recognise that this uncertainty can be particularly acute for families with children who have lived in the UK for extended periods. The Government has therefore taken concrete steps to provide greater certainty and stability, including extending the Ukraine Permission Extension scheme and widening the application window to support effective forward planning.

In exercising immigration functions, the Home Secretary has regard to the statutory duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom. In line with this duty, the best interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration in immigration decisions affecting Ukrainian families, while recognising that they are not the only consideration.

The Government keeps the situation in Ukraine under close and active review, taking into account security conditions, humanitarian infrastructure and the ability of civilians to return safely and sustainably. No single criterion determines when Ukraine would be considered sufficiently safe for the purposes of ending temporary protection arrangements, and no decisions have been taken at this stage.

The Ukraine schemes are temporary in nature and do not provide a route to settlement. Time spent in the UK under the Ukraine schemes does not count towards the Long Residence route.

The Government recognises the importance of longer‑term clarity and is actively considering the future position. In doing so, it is drawing on a wide range of evidence from across government, academia, civil society and stakeholder engagement. It will respond in a responsible and considered manner, and intends to make a further statement later this year to support Ukrainians in planning effectively for their futures.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues, the Government recognises the impact that uncertainty can have on Ukrainian individuals and families who have built their lives in the UK, including pressures relating to housing, employment and education. We recognise that this uncertainty can be particularly acute for families with children who have lived in the UK for extended periods. The Government has therefore taken concrete steps to provide greater certainty and stability, including extending the Ukraine Permission Extension scheme and widening the application window to support effective forward planning.

In exercising immigration functions, the Home Secretary has regard to the statutory duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom. In line with this duty, the best interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration in immigration decisions affecting Ukrainian families, while recognising that they are not the only consideration.

The Government keeps the situation in Ukraine under close and active review, taking into account security conditions, humanitarian infrastructure and the ability of civilians to return safely and sustainably. No single criterion determines when Ukraine would be considered sufficiently safe for the purposes of ending temporary protection arrangements, and no decisions have been taken at this stage.

The Ukraine schemes are temporary in nature and do not provide a route to settlement. Time spent in the UK under the Ukraine schemes does not count towards the Long Residence route.

The Government recognises the importance of longer‑term clarity and is actively considering the future position. In doing so, it is drawing on a wide range of evidence from across government, academia, civil society and stakeholder engagement. It will respond in a responsible and considered manner, and intends to make a further statement later this year to support Ukrainians in planning effectively for their futures.