Home Office

This Government recognises that hotels are not a sustainable solution for accommodating asylum seekers and remains committed to ending their use, already reducing the number in operation. We do not provide a running commentary on hotel numbers, our objective is to close all asylum hotels by the end of this Parliament, reducing costs to the taxpayer and restoring control to local communities.

I wrote to the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police on 24 November to request an urgent update clarifying the provenance of the intelligence gathered by his force and his confidence in this. The Chief Constable replied on 28 November. I again wrote on 10 December, in the interests of transparency, seeking clarification of the engagement the West Midlands Police undertook with Jewish community stakeholders to inform its community impact assessment.

The Home Office routinely engages with international partners as part of its departmental interests in policing, border security and immigration. Officials have met with Dutch counterparts in recent weeks on these matters, including as part of efforts to ensure full transparency around the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending the fixture against Aston Villa in November.

The gathering and assessment of police intelligence is a matter for West Midlands Police, and the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit who undertake the role of National Football Information Point.

To ensure full independent scrutiny, the Home Secretary has commissioned His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to inspect how police forces in England and Wales provide risk assessment advice to local Safety Advisory Groups and other bodies responsible for licensing high-profile public events. HMICFRS has been asked to provide an initial response on the Aston Villa v Maccabi Tel Aviv match by 31 December.

Additionally, the Home Affairs Select Committee held an evidence session on 1 December to examine the decision-making process and intelligence assessments. The government awaits the Committee’s findings. Correspondence between the Committee and relevant parties is routinely published on the Committee’s official website.

I wrote to the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police on 24 November to request an urgent update clarifying the provenance of the intelligence gathered by his force and his confidence in this. The Chief Constable replied on 28 November. I again wrote on 10 December, in the interests of transparency, seeking clarification of the engagement the West Midlands Police undertook with Jewish community stakeholders to inform its community impact assessment.

The Home Office routinely engages with international partners as part of its departmental interests in policing, border security and immigration. Officials have met with Dutch counterparts in recent weeks on these matters, including as part of efforts to ensure full transparency around the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending the fixture against Aston Villa in November.

The gathering and assessment of police intelligence is a matter for West Midlands Police, and the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit who undertake the role of National Football Information Point.

To ensure full independent scrutiny, the Home Secretary has commissioned His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to inspect how police forces in England and Wales provide risk assessment advice to local Safety Advisory Groups and other bodies responsible for licensing high-profile public events. HMICFRS has been asked to provide an initial response on the Aston Villa v Maccabi Tel Aviv match by 31 December.

Additionally, the Home Affairs Select Committee held an evidence session on 1 December to examine the decision-making process and intelligence assessments. The government awaits the Committee’s findings. Correspondence between the Committee and relevant parties is routinely published on the Committee’s official website.

I wrote to the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police on 24 November to request an urgent update clarifying the provenance of the intelligence gathered by his force and his confidence in this. The Chief Constable replied on 28 November. I again wrote on 10 December, in the interests of transparency, seeking clarification of the engagement the West Midlands Police undertook with Jewish community stakeholders to inform its community impact assessment.

The Home Office routinely engages with international partners as part of its departmental interests in policing, border security and immigration. Officials have met with Dutch counterparts in recent weeks on these matters, including as part of efforts to ensure full transparency around the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending the fixture against Aston Villa in November.

The gathering and assessment of police intelligence is a matter for West Midlands Police, and the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit who undertake the role of National Football Information Point.

To ensure full independent scrutiny, the Home Secretary has commissioned His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to inspect how police forces in England and Wales provide risk assessment advice to local Safety Advisory Groups and other bodies responsible for licensing high-profile public events. HMICFRS has been asked to provide an initial response on the Aston Villa v Maccabi Tel Aviv match by 31 December.

Additionally, the Home Affairs Select Committee held an evidence session on 1 December to examine the decision-making process and intelligence assessments. The government awaits the Committee’s findings. Correspondence between the Committee and relevant parties is routinely published on the Committee’s official website.

I wrote to the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police on 24 November to request an urgent update clarifying the provenance of the intelligence gathered by his force and his confidence in this. The Chief Constable replied on 28 November. I again wrote on 10 December, in the interests of transparency, seeking clarification of the engagement the West Midlands Police undertook with Jewish community stakeholders to inform its community impact assessment.

The Home Office routinely engages with international partners as part of its departmental interests in policing, border security and immigration. Officials have met with Dutch counterparts in recent weeks on these matters, including as part of efforts to ensure full transparency around the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending the fixture against Aston Villa in November.

The gathering and assessment of police intelligence is a matter for West Midlands Police, and the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit who undertake the role of National Football Information Point.

To ensure full independent scrutiny, the Home Secretary has commissioned His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to inspect how police forces in England and Wales provide risk assessment advice to local Safety Advisory Groups and other bodies responsible for licensing high-profile public events. HMICFRS has been asked to provide an initial response on the Aston Villa v Maccabi Tel Aviv match by 31 December.

Additionally, the Home Affairs Select Committee held an evidence session on 1 December to examine the decision-making process and intelligence assessments. The government awaits the Committee’s findings. Correspondence between the Committee and relevant parties is routinely published on the Committee’s official website.

I wrote to the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police on 24 November to request an urgent update clarifying the provenance of the intelligence gathered by his force and his confidence in this. The Chief Constable replied on 28 November. I again wrote on 10 December, in the interests of transparency, seeking clarification of the engagement the West Midlands Police undertook with Jewish community stakeholders to inform its community impact assessment.

The Home Office routinely engages with international partners as part of its departmental interests in policing, border security and immigration. Officials have met with Dutch counterparts in recent weeks on these matters, including as part of efforts to ensure full transparency around the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending the fixture against Aston Villa in November.

The gathering and assessment of police intelligence is a matter for West Midlands Police, and the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit who undertake the role of National Football Information Point.

To ensure full independent scrutiny, the Home Secretary has commissioned His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to inspect how police forces in England and Wales provide risk assessment advice to local Safety Advisory Groups and other bodies responsible for licensing high-profile public events. HMICFRS has been asked to provide an initial response on the Aston Villa v Maccabi Tel Aviv match by 31 December.

Additionally, the Home Affairs Select Committee held an evidence session on 1 December to examine the decision-making process and intelligence assessments. The government awaits the Committee’s findings. Correspondence between the Committee and relevant parties is routinely published on the Committee’s official website.

I wrote to the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police on 24 November to request an urgent update clarifying the provenance of the intelligence gathered by his force and his confidence in this. The Chief Constable replied on 28 November. I again wrote on 10 December, in the interests of transparency, seeking clarification of the engagement the West Midlands Police undertook with Jewish community stakeholders to inform its community impact assessment.

The Home Office routinely engages with international partners as part of its departmental interests in policing, border security and immigration. Officials have met with Dutch counterparts in recent weeks on these matters, including as part of efforts to ensure full transparency around the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending the fixture against Aston Villa in November.

The gathering and assessment of police intelligence is a matter for West Midlands Police, and the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit who undertake the role of National Football Information Point.

To ensure full independent scrutiny, the Home Secretary has commissioned His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to inspect how police forces in England and Wales provide risk assessment advice to local Safety Advisory Groups and other bodies responsible for licensing high-profile public events. HMICFRS has been asked to provide an initial response on the Aston Villa v Maccabi Tel Aviv match by 31 December.

Additionally, the Home Affairs Select Committee held an evidence session on 1 December to examine the decision-making process and intelligence assessments. The government awaits the Committee’s findings. Correspondence between the Committee and relevant parties is routinely published on the Committee’s official website.

The information requested is not held by the Home Office. Decisions on the procurement of cameras used in facial recognition technology are for individual police forces and other relevant authorities. Procurement decisions by police forces must comply with UK procurement law, including the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, Procurement Act 2023, and relevant Cabinet Office guidance on supply chain risk. They are also expected to follow the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice issued under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. In addition, forces have been advised to consider supply chain security and have received guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the Cabinet Office on the use of Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment.

Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour is a top priority for this Government.

Under the Government's Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee, we are putting neighbourhood officers back into communities and restoring public confidence by bringing back community-led, visible policing. West Mercia Police will receive £3,108,283 as part of the funding settlement for 2025-26.

In addition, the Home Office is providing £66.3 million funding in 2025-26 to all 43 forces in England and Wales to deliver high visibility patrols in the areas worst affected by knife crime, serious violence and anti-social behaviour. As part of the Hotspot Action Fund, West Mercia Police will be in receipt of £1,000,000.

The Winter of Action which commenced on the 1 December 2025 and will run to 31 January 2026, is currently underway, focusing on making town centres safer across England and Wales. This initiative builds on the Safer Streets Summer Initiative, continuing efforts to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, while also addressing retail crime and night-time economy offences, particularly during darker evenings when risks to public safety increase. West Mercia have listed 14 areas, and Shropshire have listed 3 areas as part of the Winter of Action.

Through our Crime and Policing Bill, we are making our streets and neighbourhoods safer by strengthening the powers available to the police and other agencies to tackle anti-social behaviour. This includes introducing new Respect Orders to give local agencies stronger enforcement capability to tackle the most persistent adult anti-social behaviour offenders, and powers for the police to seize nuisance off-road bikes, and other vehicles which are being used in an anti-social manner, without having to first give a warning to the offender.

Rural crime can have devastating consequences for countryside communities and the agricultural sector.

We are improving the protections for rural communities, with tougher measures to clamp down on equipment theft, anti-social behaviour, strengthened neighbourhood policing and stronger measures to prevent farm theft and fly-tipping.

This financial year the Home Office has provided the first Government funding since 2023 for the National Rural Crime Unit (£365,000) as well as continuing funding for the National Wildlife Crime Unit (£450,000). The National Rural Crime Unit work with police forces and rural communities to promote the use of crime prevention measures such as Rural Watch.

We have also worked closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to deliver their updated Rural and Wildlife Crime Strategy for 2025-2028. The strategy highlights how policing can assist in the prevention of crime in rural areas.

It is the responsibility of Chief Constables and locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), including Mayors who exercise PCC or equivalent functions, to take decisions around the allocation of their funding and resources.

The Government recognises the importance of the effective and timelyhandling of written parliamentary questions (PQs).The House of Commons Procedure Committee monitors departmental PQ performance and publishes a report of the government’s consolidated PQ data following the end of each session.

The information requested on the number of foreign national offenders (including the previous request under UIN 74872) and irregular migrants who are classified as absconders is not currently available from published statistics. Nor is the breakdown of those figures by risk category, criminal history and nationality.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data.

Whilst local management information is held on absconder numbers and updated in line with operational need, this is used only for local management purposes. This data has not been verified or checked for accuracy to a standard that would make it suitable for publication, or to be provided to Members of Parliament. Obtaining the detailed information that has been requested would involve collating and verifying information from multiple Home Office systems and could only be obtained at a disproportionate cost.

With regard to the question about foreign national offenders who have been either re-apprehended or deported, such individuals in these circumstances would no longer be classified as absconders on Home Office systems. Similarly, irregular migrants in the total absconder pool who have been located or removed from the UK would no longer be classified as absconders.

With regard to the assessment of the potential public safety risk posed by foreign national offenders and irregular migrants recorded in the total absconder pool, joint working between Immigration Enforcement (IE), National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) helps tackle threats posed by high-harm foreign national offenders within the community. This initiative is not directly linked to individuals who have absconded.

This initiative has developed a harm score threat assessment to ensure that multiagency efforts are able to utilise a risk-based prioritisation approach. The release of the methods utilised to calculate these risks would prejudice ongoing operational activity and is therefore not considered to be in the public interest to disclose this methodology.

The information requested on the number of foreign national offenders (including the previous request under UIN 74872) and irregular migrants who are classified as absconders is not currently available from published statistics. Nor is the breakdown of those figures by risk category, criminal history and nationality.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data.

Whilst local management information is held on absconder numbers and updated in line with operational need, this is used only for local management purposes. This data has not been verified or checked for accuracy to a standard that would make it suitable for publication, or to be provided to Members of Parliament. Obtaining the detailed information that has been requested would involve collating and verifying information from multiple Home Office systems and could only be obtained at a disproportionate cost.

With regard to the question about foreign national offenders who have been either re-apprehended or deported, such individuals in these circumstances would no longer be classified as absconders on Home Office systems. Similarly, irregular migrants in the total absconder pool who have been located or removed from the UK would no longer be classified as absconders.

With regard to the assessment of the potential public safety risk posed by foreign national offenders and irregular migrants recorded in the total absconder pool, joint working between Immigration Enforcement (IE), National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) helps tackle threats posed by high-harm foreign national offenders within the community. This initiative is not directly linked to individuals who have absconded.

This initiative has developed a harm score threat assessment to ensure that multiagency efforts are able to utilise a risk-based prioritisation approach. The release of the methods utilised to calculate these risks would prejudice ongoing operational activity and is therefore not considered to be in the public interest to disclose this methodology.

The information requested on the number of foreign national offenders (including the previous request under UIN 74872) and irregular migrants who are classified as absconders is not currently available from published statistics. Nor is the breakdown of those figures by risk category, criminal history and nationality.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data.

Whilst local management information is held on absconder numbers and updated in line with operational need, this is used only for local management purposes. This data has not been verified or checked for accuracy to a standard that would make it suitable for publication, or to be provided to Members of Parliament. Obtaining the detailed information that has been requested would involve collating and verifying information from multiple Home Office systems and could only be obtained at a disproportionate cost.

With regard to the question about foreign national offenders who have been either re-apprehended or deported, such individuals in these circumstances would no longer be classified as absconders on Home Office systems. Similarly, irregular migrants in the total absconder pool who have been located or removed from the UK would no longer be classified as absconders.

With regard to the assessment of the potential public safety risk posed by foreign national offenders and irregular migrants recorded in the total absconder pool, joint working between Immigration Enforcement (IE), National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) helps tackle threats posed by high-harm foreign national offenders within the community. This initiative is not directly linked to individuals who have absconded.

This initiative has developed a harm score threat assessment to ensure that multiagency efforts are able to utilise a risk-based prioritisation approach. The release of the methods utilised to calculate these risks would prejudice ongoing operational activity and is therefore not considered to be in the public interest to disclose this methodology.

The information requested on the number of foreign national offenders (including the previous request under UIN 74872) and irregular migrants who are classified as absconders is not currently available from published statistics. Nor is the breakdown of those figures by risk category, criminal history and nationality.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data.

Whilst local management information is held on absconder numbers and updated in line with operational need, this is used only for local management purposes. This data has not been verified or checked for accuracy to a standard that would make it suitable for publication, or to be provided to Members of Parliament. Obtaining the detailed information that has been requested would involve collating and verifying information from multiple Home Office systems and could only be obtained at a disproportionate cost.

With regard to the question about foreign national offenders who have been either re-apprehended or deported, such individuals in these circumstances would no longer be classified as absconders on Home Office systems. Similarly, irregular migrants in the total absconder pool who have been located or removed from the UK would no longer be classified as absconders.

With regard to the assessment of the potential public safety risk posed by foreign national offenders and irregular migrants recorded in the total absconder pool, joint working between Immigration Enforcement (IE), National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) helps tackle threats posed by high-harm foreign national offenders within the community. This initiative is not directly linked to individuals who have absconded.

This initiative has developed a harm score threat assessment to ensure that multiagency efforts are able to utilise a risk-based prioritisation approach. The release of the methods utilised to calculate these risks would prejudice ongoing operational activity and is therefore not considered to be in the public interest to disclose this methodology.

The information requested on the number of foreign national offenders (including the previous request under UIN 74872) and irregular migrants who are classified as absconders is not currently available from published statistics. Nor is the breakdown of those figures by risk category, criminal history and nationality.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data.

Whilst local management information is held on absconder numbers and updated in line with operational need, this is used only for local management purposes. This data has not been verified or checked for accuracy to a standard that would make it suitable for publication, or to be provided to Members of Parliament. Obtaining the detailed information that has been requested would involve collating and verifying information from multiple Home Office systems and could only be obtained at a disproportionate cost.

With regard to the question about foreign national offenders who have been either re-apprehended or deported, such individuals in these circumstances would no longer be classified as absconders on Home Office systems. Similarly, irregular migrants in the total absconder pool who have been located or removed from the UK would no longer be classified as absconders.

With regard to the assessment of the potential public safety risk posed by foreign national offenders and irregular migrants recorded in the total absconder pool, joint working between Immigration Enforcement (IE), National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) helps tackle threats posed by high-harm foreign national offenders within the community. This initiative is not directly linked to individuals who have absconded.

This initiative has developed a harm score threat assessment to ensure that multiagency efforts are able to utilise a risk-based prioritisation approach. The release of the methods utilised to calculate these risks would prejudice ongoing operational activity and is therefore not considered to be in the public interest to disclose this methodology.

The information requested on the number of foreign national offenders (including the previous request under UIN 74872) and irregular migrants who are classified as absconders is not currently available from published statistics. Nor is the breakdown of those figures by risk category, criminal history and nationality.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data.

Whilst local management information is held on absconder numbers and updated in line with operational need, this is used only for local management purposes. This data has not been verified or checked for accuracy to a standard that would make it suitable for publication, or to be provided to Members of Parliament. Obtaining the detailed information that has been requested would involve collating and verifying information from multiple Home Office systems and could only be obtained at a disproportionate cost.

With regard to the question about foreign national offenders who have been either re-apprehended or deported, such individuals in these circumstances would no longer be classified as absconders on Home Office systems. Similarly, irregular migrants in the total absconder pool who have been located or removed from the UK would no longer be classified as absconders.

With regard to the assessment of the potential public safety risk posed by foreign national offenders and irregular migrants recorded in the total absconder pool, joint working between Immigration Enforcement (IE), National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) helps tackle threats posed by high-harm foreign national offenders within the community. This initiative is not directly linked to individuals who have absconded.

This initiative has developed a harm score threat assessment to ensure that multiagency efforts are able to utilise a risk-based prioritisation approach. The release of the methods utilised to calculate these risks would prejudice ongoing operational activity and is therefore not considered to be in the public interest to disclose this methodology.

The information requested on the number of foreign national offenders (including the previous request under UIN 74872) and irregular migrants who are classified as absconders is not currently available from published statistics. Nor is the breakdown of those figures by risk category, criminal history and nationality.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data.

Whilst local management information is held on absconder numbers and updated in line with operational need, this is used only for local management purposes. This data has not been verified or checked for accuracy to a standard that would make it suitable for publication, or to be provided to Members of Parliament. Obtaining the detailed information that has been requested would involve collating and verifying information from multiple Home Office systems and could only be obtained at a disproportionate cost.

With regard to the question about foreign national offenders who have been either re-apprehended or deported, such individuals in these circumstances would no longer be classified as absconders on Home Office systems. Similarly, irregular migrants in the total absconder pool who have been located or removed from the UK would no longer be classified as absconders.

With regard to the assessment of the potential public safety risk posed by foreign national offenders and irregular migrants recorded in the total absconder pool, joint working between Immigration Enforcement (IE), National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) helps tackle threats posed by high-harm foreign national offenders within the community. This initiative is not directly linked to individuals who have absconded.

This initiative has developed a harm score threat assessment to ensure that multiagency efforts are able to utilise a risk-based prioritisation approach. The release of the methods utilised to calculate these risks would prejudice ongoing operational activity and is therefore not considered to be in the public interest to disclose this methodology.

The police are the lead agency for collision investigation and have the primary duty to investigate and establish the circumstances that have led to road deaths and life changing injuries.

The policing of fatal and serious injury road collisions and how available resources are deployed in Surrey is the responsibility of Surrey Police’s Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner, taking into account the specific local problems and demands with which they are faced.

The cost of collating information on absconders will depend on a range of variable factors, including the level of detail required and where the information is held. Extracting information from multiple databases and datasets may also involve manual scrutiny of individual records. Given these variables, any general estimate would be unreliable with assessments instead being made in response to individual requests and the specific circumstances.

The Home Office has a range of tools to trace those who abscond, the number of staff involved in tracing activity varies across Immigration Enforcement depending on operational need, with c.65 staff currently dedicated to tracing activities, aswell as resources elsewhere within the Migration and Borders System, who are responsible for recording information when individuals are found or come back into contact. The number of absconders recorded on Home Office systems can fluctuate and there are no formal targets linked to a reduction in the number. The Home Office works closely with the police, other government agencies, commercial companies and international partners to trace absconders and bring them back into contact. Where new contact details are found we will consider the most appropriate intervention for the person including arrest and detention.

The cost of collating information on absconders will depend on a range of variable factors, including the level of detail required and where the information is held. Extracting information from multiple databases and datasets may also involve manual scrutiny of individual records. Given these variables, any general estimate would be unreliable with assessments instead being made in response to individual requests and the specific circumstances.

The Home Office has a range of tools to trace those who abscond, the number of staff involved in tracing activity varies across Immigration Enforcement depending on operational need, with c.65 staff currently dedicated to tracing activities, aswell as resources elsewhere within the Migration and Borders System, who are responsible for recording information when individuals are found or come back into contact. The number of absconders recorded on Home Office systems can fluctuate and there are no formal targets linked to a reduction in the number. The Home Office works closely with the police, other government agencies, commercial companies and international partners to trace absconders and bring them back into contact. Where new contact details are found we will consider the most appropriate intervention for the person including arrest and detention.

The Government has already taken action to address the findings of the National Physical Laboratory’s report on the algorithm used for retrospective facial recognition within the Police National Database.

The Home Office commissioned the report as the provider of the system, to enable police forces as the users of the system to assure themselves that they were meeting their Public Sector Equality Duty, specifically with respect to bias mitigation. The National Police Chiefs Council have led on this for policing by reviewing training and guidance. The Home Office has also commissioned His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) to ensure these mitigations are consistent and robust.

Furthermore, a replacement system with a new algorithm has been procured and independently tested. This testing has been published and shows that the system can be used with no statistically significant bias. It is due to be operationally tested early next year and will be subject to further evaluation.

On 4 December 2025, we also started a public consultation that asks for views on a new legal framework for law enforcement use of facial recognition and other biometric technologies. The consultation includes questions on oversight arrangements and proposes creating a new regulatory and oversight body. We envisage this body would directly address issues such as potential bias in algorithms, potentially through powers, subject to legislation, to provide assurance that law enforcement use of biometric technologies is legal, responsible, and necessary.

Given the importance of this issue, we have also asked the HMICFRS, alongside the Forensic Science Regulator, to review law enforcement’s use of facial recognition. They will assess the effectiveness of the mitigations, which the National Police Chiefs Council supports.

Whilst the data specifically requested is not recorded in a reportable format, the Home Office does publish data on the number of people who have claimed asylum in the UK and the number of people granted asylum in the UK - Immigration system statistics, year ending September 2025 - GOV.UK.

In addition, the Home Office publishes data on the number of people who arrived under the Refugee Family Reunion route - How many people come to the UK via safe and legal (humanitarian) routes? - GOV.UK.

The Refugee Family Reunion Route was available to those granted protection status in the UK, until 4 September 2025, when the Government introduced a temporary suspension for all new applications, as we undertake a full review and reform of the current family rules to ensure we have a fair and properly balanced system.

Under the Refugee Family Reunion route, applicants did not have to meet the minimum income requirement. Following the publication of the the Government’s asylum and returns policy statement last month, we intend to change the Refugee Family Reunion and end the automatic right for refugees to bring their immediate family to the UK.

A range of measures is employed to maintain contact with individuals, including both face-to-face and digital reporting mechanisms. Immigration Enforcement possesses powers to trace and locate individuals who abscond, with a dedicated team that works in collaboration with the police, other government departments, and commercial organisations.

Through our Crime and Policing Bill, this Government has introduced a new specific standalone offence of assaulting a retail worker to help tackle the epidemic of shop theft and violence towards shop workers that we have seen in recent years and protect the hardworking and dedicated staff that work in stores.

This definition of a retail worker captures someone working in or about retail premises for or on behalf of the owner or occupier of the retail premises.

Our definition is intentionally narrow and does not include hospitality staff, given the vital need to provide legal clarity and ensure there is no ambiguity for courts in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker and impacted during their job. Any ambiguity in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker, will likely lead the courts to take the case forward as common assault meaning specific recording attributed to a retail worker would not occur.

Those workers whose roles are not included within the definition are already covered under other legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which also covers more serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

Public facing workers, including those in the transport and hospitality sectors, are also covered under legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which covers serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

We introduced a statutory aggravating factor for assault against any public facing worker via section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those providing a public service, performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. This ensures the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence.

Through our Crime and Policing Bill, this Government has introduced a new specific standalone offence of assaulting a retail worker to help tackle the epidemic of shop theft and violence towards shop workers that we have seen in recent years and protect the hardworking and dedicated staff that work in stores.

This definition of a retail worker captures someone working in or about retail premises for or on behalf of the owner or occupier of the retail premises.

Our definition is intentionally narrow and does not include hospitality staff, given the vital need to provide legal clarity and ensure there is no ambiguity for courts in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker and impacted during their job. Any ambiguity in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker, will likely lead the courts to take the case forward as common assault meaning specific recording attributed to a retail worker would not occur.

Those workers whose roles are not included within the definition are already covered under other legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which also covers more serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

Public facing workers, including those in the transport and hospitality sectors, are also covered under legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which covers serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

We introduced a statutory aggravating factor for assault against any public facing worker via section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those providing a public service, performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. This ensures the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence.

Through our Crime and Policing Bill, this Government has introduced a new specific standalone offence of assaulting a retail worker to help tackle the epidemic of shop theft and violence towards shop workers that we have seen in recent years and protect the hardworking and dedicated staff that work in stores.

This definition of a retail worker captures someone working in or about retail premises for or on behalf of the owner or occupier of the retail premises.

Our definition is intentionally narrow and does not include hospitality staff, given the vital need to provide legal clarity and ensure there is no ambiguity for courts in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker and impacted during their job. Any ambiguity in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker, will likely lead the courts to take the case forward as common assault meaning specific recording attributed to a retail worker would not occur.

Those workers whose roles are not included within the definition are already covered under other legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which also covers more serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

Public facing workers, including those in the transport and hospitality sectors, are also covered under legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which covers serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

We introduced a statutory aggravating factor for assault against any public facing worker via section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those providing a public service, performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. This ensures the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence.

Through our Crime and Policing Bill, this Government has introduced a new specific standalone offence of assaulting a retail worker to help tackle the epidemic of shop theft and violence towards shop workers that we have seen in recent years and protect the hardworking and dedicated staff that work in stores.

This definition of a retail worker captures someone working in or about retail premises for or on behalf of the owner or occupier of the retail premises.

Our definition is intentionally narrow and does not include hospitality staff, given the vital need to provide legal clarity and ensure there is no ambiguity for courts in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker and impacted during their job. Any ambiguity in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker, will likely lead the courts to take the case forward as common assault meaning specific recording attributed to a retail worker would not occur.

Those workers whose roles are not included within the definition are already covered under other legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which also covers more serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

Public facing workers, including those in the transport and hospitality sectors, are also covered under legislation such as the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which covers serious violence, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm.

We introduced a statutory aggravating factor for assault against any public facing worker via section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those providing a public service, performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. This ensures the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence.

On 18 May 2023, the Home Office launched an eight-week Call for Evidence, targeted at those who may be affected by the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023, including manufacturers, dealers, retailers, forensic marking companies, trade associations, tradespeople, law enforcement practitioners and rural organisations.

We made use of a number of different means to encourage as many people as possible to make their views known. The total number of responses received was 218. There was no obligation on respondents to disclose if they were responding on behalf of an organisation, but we do know that the National Farmers’ Union submitted its views.

On 9 December 2025 the Home Secretary announced to Parliament the appointment of Baroness Anne Longfield CBE as Chair of the new Independent Inquiry into Grooming Gangs, and Zoë Billingham CBE and Eleanor Kelly CBE as Panel.

The Home Office has had regular discussions with the Welsh Government while the Inquiry was being established. The Inquiry is independent of Government. The draft Terms of Reference for the Inquiry make clear that it will establish its own process for how local investigations are determined, with no location able to resist if one is declared. All areas of Wales are within scope of the inquiry.

There is no risk to the continuity of leave for sponsored workers currently with the Sheiling Educational Trust.

Baroness Casey’s rapid national audit into group-based child sexual exploitation set out stark findings on the scale and nature of grooming gang offending. This government is absolutely committed to exposing the failures that have happened across the country and making sure that it can never happen again. We accepted all of Baroness Casey’s twelve recommendations and are working across government to implement these as quickly as possible. The Home Secretary announced the leadership and draft terms of reference of the new Independent Inquiry into Grooming Gangs on 9 December 2025.

To improve our understanding of and response to these crimes, the Home Office funds a number of policing capabilities, including the Tackling Organised Exploitation programme which uses data and intelligence to increase law enforcement’s capability to respond to organised exploitation. We also fund the Child Sexual Exploitation Police Taskforce to improve how the police investigate child sexual exploitation and bring more offenders to justice. The Taskforce work directly with forces to improve data collection and analyse data on a national level. On 10 December 2025, the Taskforce published an annual data report for group-based offending in 2024, which can be found here: https://www.hydrantprogramme.co.uk/latest-news/new-police-recorded-csae-crime-data-analysis.

Neither the Taskforce nor the Home Office publishes data on offending within specific cities.

Baroness Casey’s rapid national audit into group-based child sexual exploitation set out stark findings on the scale and nature of grooming gang offending. This government is absolutely committed to exposing the failures that have happened across the country and making sure that it can never happen again. We accepted all of Baroness Casey’s twelve recommendations and are working across government to implement these as quickly as possible. The Home Secretary announced the leadership and draft terms of reference of the new Independent Inquiry into Grooming Gangs on 9 December 2025.

To improve our understanding of and response to these crimes, the Home Office funds a number of policing capabilities, including the Tackling Organised Exploitation programme which uses data and intelligence to increase law enforcement’s capability to respond to organised exploitation. We also fund the Child Sexual Exploitation Police Taskforce to improve how the police investigate child sexual exploitation and bring more offenders to justice. The Taskforce work directly with forces to improve data collection and analyse data on a national level. On 10 December 2025, the Taskforce published an annual data report for group-based offending in 2024, which can be found here: https://www.hydrantprogramme.co.uk/latest-news/new-police-recorded-csae-crime-data-analysis.

Neither the Taskforce nor the Home Office publishes data on offending within specific cities.

Baroness Casey’s rapid national audit into group-based child sexual exploitation set out stark findings on the scale and nature of grooming gang offending. This government is absolutely committed to exposing the failures that have happened across the country and making sure that it can never happen again. We accepted all of Baroness Casey’s twelve recommendations and are working across government to implement these as quickly as possible. The Home Secretary announced the leadership and draft terms of reference of the new Independent Inquiry into Grooming Gangs on 9 December 2025.

To improve our understanding of and response to these crimes, the Home Office funds a number of policing capabilities, including the Tackling Organised Exploitation programme which uses data and intelligence to increase law enforcement’s capability to respond to organised exploitation. We also fund the Child Sexual Exploitation Police Taskforce to improve how the police investigate child sexual exploitation and bring more offenders to justice. The Taskforce work directly with forces to improve data collection and analyse data on a national level. On 10 December 2025, the Taskforce published an annual data report for group-based offending in 2024, which can be found here: https://www.hydrantprogramme.co.uk/latest-news/new-police-recorded-csae-crime-data-analysis.

Neither the Taskforce nor the Home Office publishes data on offending within specific cities.

Pathways for unaccompanied children, families with children, and other vulnerable asylum seekers will be reviewed with full consideration of our EQIA and Section 55 duties to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK.

As now, children will not be detained in Immigration Removal Centres.

The department publishes asylum expenditure data at national or regional level, which is more robust and meaningful for policy and operational purposes.

All available information on asylum expenditure is published in the Home Office Annual Report and accounts at Home Office annual reports and accounts - GOV.UK (opens in a new tab). Data on the number of supported asylum seekers in accommodation, including hotels, and by local authority can be found within the Asy_D11 tab for our most recent statistics release: Immigration system statistics data tables - GOV.UK (opens in a new tab).

The Home Office conducts mandatory identity and security checks on all small boat arrivals.

As part of this process, the Home Office collects biometric data—such as facial images and fingerprints—to verify identity. These biometrics are checked against Home Office systems and other law enforcement databases, including Interpol’s wanted list. This enables us to identify individuals, assess whether they pose a risk to public safety, and determine any breaches of immigration law. These checks are essential to maintaining a secure, fair, and effective immigration system.

Under previous legislation anyone convicted of a serious crime with a conviction of 12 months or more and are considered a danger to the UK, will be denied asylum and will be considered for removal from the UK. This Government has gone further under the new Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act to ensure anyone convicted of any offence under Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 will be excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention.

Those refused protection status who cannot be removed will be subject to regular review until they can be removed at the earliest opportunity.

Asylum support spend in FY 2024/25 was £4.0 billion and for 2025/26 the budget is £3.6 billion. As per the Spending Review, by FY 2028/29, we plan to reduce this by £1.1 billion, bringing the total spend down to £2.5 billion. The allocations process is ongoing to profile this expenditure and confirm budgets for each year, which will then be published in the Main Estimate.

At its peak under the previous government, around 400 hotels were used to accommodate asylum seekers – costing £9 million per day. That figure is now under 200, and the government remains committed to closing every hotel by the end of this Parliament. We have already saved £700 million in hotel costs. Now we are recouping millions more in excess profits. And, by the end of this parliament, we will have closed every asylum hotel.

The Home Office publishes all available information on asylum expenditure in the Home Office annual reports and accounts - GOV.UK (opens an new tab).

The Home Office has, since 2022, operated a system of Full Dispersal which works to ensure that asylum accommodation is spread equitably and fairly across the UK. Procurement of accommodation is driven by a set of evidence-based plans, which are reviewed regularly with Local Government, and which consider a range of factors, including the availability of housing, pressure on services and community cohesion, to ensure that no one area is overburdened.

Data, published quarterly, on the number of supported asylum seekers in accommodation, including accommodation type, and broken down into Local Authority area, can be found within the Asy_D11 tab of our most recent statistics release: Immigration system statistics data tables - GOV.UK (opens in a new tab).

The Home Office has, since 2022, operated a system of Full Dispersal which works to ensure that asylum accommodation is spread equitably and fairly across the UK. Procurement of accommodation is driven by a set of evidence-based plans, which are reviewed regularly with Local Government, and which consider a range of factors, including the availability of housing, pressure on services and community cohesion, to ensure that no one area is overburdened.

Data, published quarterly, on the number of supported asylum seekers in accommodation, including accommodation type, and broken down into Local Authority area, can be found within the Asy_D11 tab of our most recent statistics release: Immigration system statistics data tables - GOV.UK (opens in a new tab).

We continue to engage Member States, including France, on the use of technology for remote EES registration. Ultimately, this is a matter for the European Commission and Member States.

Hotel closure will be prioritised based on a wide range of criteria. The hotel exit plan will continue to be carefully managed to ensure that all supported asylum seekers are accommodated in suitable alternative accommodation, including large sites, elsewhere in the estate.

The Home Office takes the issue of illegal working seriously and continues to take robust enforcement action against those who breach immigration laws.

Official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review in line with the Code of Practice for Statistics, taking into account a number of factors including user needs, the resources required to compile the statistics, as well as quality and availability of data. These reviews allow us to balance the production of our regular statistics whilst developing new statistics for future release.