Ministry of Defence

The US and UK remain steadfast allies and will continue to closely cooperate on a range of defence and security issues. But how the US Department of War manages the use of technology in their systems is a matter for them. The UK’s Defence AI Strategy recognises AI systems must be adopted to avoid falling behind adversaries, whilst mandating robust cybersecurity and safety measures for these systems. The MOD’s Joint Service Publication 936 mandates that AI systems deployed in UK defence environments must be safe, robust, and secure, must pass relevant assurance checks, and comply with the Government Cyber Security Standard and Secure By Design principles.

The UK solely funded the development and production of the first two prototype GRAVEHAWK air-defence systems. The additional 15 GRAVEHAWK systems, of which the first batch will be delivered shortly, are each equally funded by the UK and Denmark.

The current planned out of service date for Pinzgauer is 2030.

Out of service dates are continuously reviewed to ensure that the British Army has the capabilities it requires to deliver against Defence commitments.

Programme Euston is the Royal Navy’s solution to Additional Fleet Time Docking Capability. The programme aims to deliver a resilient out of water engineering capability at HMNB Clyde by the early 2030s.

The next key milestone will be the submission of a Programme Business Case in mid-2026. Timelines are kept under regular review as part of the Department’s major programmes portfolio. For reasons of commercial and operational sensitivities, the department is unable to provide detailed timelines.

All ships in service with the Royal Navy are commissioned warships.

The UK will procure one Early Capability Demonstrator platform as part of the Mobile Fires Platform programme with Germany procuring two additional demonstrators. This will allow all three to be used for joint trials and evaluation, providing both time and cost benefits.

Activities under the Trinity House partnership between the UK and Germany are progressing technical work to mature and inform choices for very long-range Deep Precision Strike capabilities that would expand the UK's options for retaliation to attack, or threat of attack, on the UK or its Allies.

I am withholding this information as its disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Ministry of Defence.

I am withholding this information as its disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Ministry of Defence.

Vessels being procured as part of the Defence Marine Services-Next Generation In-Port Services will not be built in China and future maintenance of the vessels will take place in the UK.

This Government is stepping up our support for UK shipbuilders. We are looking closely at the subcontracting supply chain as part of our Shipbuilding and Maritime Technology Action Plan, which will set out our plans to ensure that we are maximising our use of UK industry as an engine for growth.

All 589 Ajax hulls have been produced.

While it would be inappropriate to release details of the 11 limitations of use identified in the NAO report for security reasons, as a complete list of criteria could, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability of our Armed Forces, those limitations were resolved prior to Initial Operating Capability being met.

The Ajax programme utilises a Joint Acceptance Group to undertake acceptance testing. All 185 capability drop 3 vehicles have been through this process.

No Ajax vehicles have been manufactured and assembled in Spain.

No Ajax vehicles have been manufactured in Spain and assembled in Wales.

Assembly of all 589 Ajax platforms is forecast to be completed by December 2028.

There have been no concerns on the accuracy of the calculator since 2021.

Work was undertaken to address concerns raised about the accuracy of the findings of the calculator from both DSTL and Defence Equipment and Support staff prior to 2021. Recent evidence from testing on platforms demonstrates both the accuracy and the safety factor within the calculator. These concerns were raised five years ago and have been fully addressed.

An assessment of the future capability requirements remains ongoing. No decisions on a potential replacement have yet been taken.

Equipment to enable UK F-35Bs to undertake Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landings (SRVL) is fitted to HMS Prince Of Wales (PWLS) and underwent initial trials in 2023; the results of those trials continue to be analysed by a commercial partner. When complete, this will enable the Ministry of Defence to make an accurate assessment of the benefits and cost of further developing the SRVL system for operational use.

As previously announced, there are ongoing reviews into the Ajax programme. An assessment will be made should the outcomes identify any concerns with the vehicle acceptance process.

ASGARD will create a digitally enabled reconnaissance and strike network, bringing together sensors, decision-support tools and precision weapons to improve decision-making and increase lethality. With continued investment and oversight, ASGARD will deliver incremental capability upgrades between 2026 and 2029, aligned with the Army Command Plan, NATO standards and Defence’s Digital Target Web.

The overall cost of ASGARD will continue to develop and change as it progresses, however future funding plans for ASGARD are being considered as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

With regards to the implementation of ASGARD, I refer the hon. Member to Question 73577, which remains extant and explains the current position for the project.

The next iteration of ASGARD, focused at Corps level operations, will be tested in Quarter two 2026.

ASGARD will create a digitally enabled reconnaissance and strike network, bringing together sensors, decision-support tools and precision weapons to improve decision-making and increase lethality. With continued investment and oversight, ASGARD will deliver incremental capability upgrades between 2026 and 2029, aligned with the Army Command Plan, NATO standards and Defence’s Digital Target Web.

The overall cost of ASGARD will continue to develop and change as it progresses, however future funding plans for ASGARD are being considered as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

With regards to the implementation of ASGARD, I refer the hon. Member to Question 73577, which remains extant and explains the current position for the project.

The next iteration of ASGARD, focused at Corps level operations, will be tested in Quarter two 2026.

ASGARD will create a digitally enabled reconnaissance and strike network, bringing together sensors, decision-support tools and precision weapons to improve decision-making and increase lethality. With continued investment and oversight, ASGARD will deliver incremental capability upgrades between 2026 and 2029, aligned with the Army Command Plan, NATO standards and Defence’s Digital Target Web.

The overall cost of ASGARD will continue to develop and change as it progresses, however future funding plans for ASGARD are being considered as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

With regards to the implementation of ASGARD, I refer the hon. Member to Question 73577, which remains extant and explains the current position for the project.

The next iteration of ASGARD, focused at Corps level operations, will be tested in Quarter two 2026.

The Department, through Cyber and Specialist Operations Command, is progressing plans to create a wider digital targeting web across the UK’s Armed Forces by 2027. This includes the establishment of the Defence Targeting Enterprise Office, which will enable the orchestration of cross-defence activity.

The Ministry of Defence remains committed to delivering this Strategic Defence Review recommendation and will continue to monitor progress to ensure that delivery remains on track.

Currently, posts for the UK in the Global Combat Air Programme – International Government Organisation (GIGO) are filled primarily by staff from the Ministry of Defence, or other Departments when specific skills are required.

The GIGO Treaty states that Personnel for the GIGO shall primarily be composed of Government officials drawn from the Parties.

For reasons of safeguarding national security, I am not able to outline the process for developing rules of engagement, as to do so would be prejudicial to our operations.

The Multinational Force for Ukraine will deploy at the invitation of the Government of Ukraine, with the Declaration of Intent forming part of the framework to establish the status of international forces deployed as part of the Multinational Force for Ukraine.

Alongside the French, we continue to work closely with Ukraine to finalise the overarching governance and legal framework for the deployment of the force. As stated by the Prime Minister, the details of a deployment as relating to the Declaration of Intent will be set out in a statement at the earliest opportunity.

The Multinational Force for Ukraine will deploy at the invitation of the Government of Ukraine, with the Declaration of Intent forming part of the framework to establish the status of international forces deployed as part of the Multinational Force for Ukraine.

Alongside the French, we continue to work closely with Ukraine to finalise the overarching governance and legal framework for the deployment of the force. As stated by the Prime Minister, the details of a deployment as relating to the Declaration of Intent will be set out in a statement at the earliest opportunity.

The Multinational Force for Ukraine will deploy at the invitation of the Government of Ukraine, with the Declaration of Intent forming part of the framework to establish the status of international forces deployed as part of the Multinational Force for Ukraine.

Alongside the French, we continue to work closely with Ukraine to finalise the overarching governance and legal framework for the deployment of the force. As stated by the Prime Minister, the details of a deployment as relating to the Declaration of Intent will be set out in a statement at the earliest opportunity.

The Multinational Force for Ukraine will deploy at the invitation of the Government of Ukraine, with the Declaration of Intent forming part of the framework to establish the status of international forces deployed as part of the Multinational Force for Ukraine.

Alongside the French, we continue to work closely with Ukraine to finalise the overarching governance and legal framework for the deployment of the force. As stated by the Prime Minister, the details of a deployment as relating to the Declaration of Intent will be set out in a statement at the earliest opportunity.

While any deployment of multinational forces in support of Ukraine, under the Declaration of Intent, would not be part of a NATO operation, the privileges and immunities applicable to the Multinational Force-Ukraine will be those provided for in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement dated 19 June 1951.

The UK has a strong record of delivering tailored training to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and remains committed to adapting its support to meet Ukraine’s evolving needs.

Operation INTERFLEX, the UK-led training programme, has already trained over 62,000 Ukrainian personnel and will continue until at least the end of 2026.  Since the inception of Operation INTERFLEX, the programme has continually adapted to reflect the changing requirements of the AFU and the operational environment. This includes regular review of the budget, as funding allocations are adjusted to ensure maximum impact in areas of greatest need. Any future adjustments, including potential increases in numbers trained, will be designed to complement these requirements and further strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Following the cessation of hostilities, the Multinational Force Ukraine is expected to play a key role in regenerating Ukraine’s land forces, providing logistic, armament and training expertise to support their reconstitution. Any future UK training programmes will be designed to complement these efforts and further strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The UK has a strong record of delivering tailored training to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and remains committed to adapting its support to meet Ukraine’s evolving needs.

Operation INTERFLEX, the UK-led training programme, has already trained over 62,000 Ukrainian personnel and will continue until at least the end of 2026.  Since the inception of Operation INTERFLEX, the programme has continually adapted to reflect the changing requirements of the AFU and the operational environment. This includes regular review of the budget, as funding allocations are adjusted to ensure maximum impact in areas of greatest need. Any future adjustments, including potential increases in numbers trained, will be designed to complement these requirements and further strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Following the cessation of hostilities, the Multinational Force Ukraine is expected to play a key role in regenerating Ukraine’s land forces, providing logistic, armament and training expertise to support their reconstitution. Any future UK training programmes will be designed to complement these efforts and further strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The UK has a strong record of delivering tailored training to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and remains committed to adapting its support to meet Ukraine’s evolving needs.

Operation INTERFLEX, the UK-led training programme, has already trained over 62,000 Ukrainian personnel and will continue until at least the end of 2026.  Since the inception of Operation INTERFLEX, the programme has continually adapted to reflect the changing requirements of the AFU and the operational environment. This includes regular review of the budget, as funding allocations are adjusted to ensure maximum impact in areas of greatest need. Any future adjustments, including potential increases in numbers trained, will be designed to complement these requirements and further strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Following the cessation of hostilities, the Multinational Force Ukraine is expected to play a key role in regenerating Ukraine’s land forces, providing logistic, armament and training expertise to support their reconstitution. Any future UK training programmes will be designed to complement these efforts and further strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The UK contributes significantly to Ukraine's defence industrial resilience through Task Force HIRST and Programme LYRA. A key strength of the UK's approach lies in our ability to consistently support Ukraine by bringing together our industrial base and technologists to partner with Ukrainian companies, establishing new joint ventures.

The deployment of a Multinational Force to Ukraine will further reinforce our support and provide the right environment to exploit and rapidly scale the significant work the UK has already done.

We will continue to use UK and international funding and the interest on immobilised Russian assets to support Ukrainian and UK industrial collaboration and continue to work with our Ukrainian partners to reduce frictions and increase materiel production.

This will build on the UK's successes under HIRST: trade missions, megaprojects, equipment support; and leverage the evolution of our support under the 100 Year Partnership, through the sharing of battlefield technology and joint capability development under Programme LYRA.

I refer the hon. Member to my previous answer recently provided to Questions 105112 and 105113.

The Scheme received 381 applications, of which 249 were approved. Since its launch, the Scheme has successfully fulfilled its intended purpose, having awarded more than £21 million and providing meaningful recognition to those who were eligible. Following an internal review and a decline in application numbers, the Scheme closed on the 15 October 2025, as originally outlined at its inception.

I refer the hon. Member to my previous answer recently provided to Questions 105112 and 105113.

The Scheme received 381 applications, of which 249 were approved. Since its launch, the Scheme has successfully fulfilled its intended purpose, having awarded more than £21 million and providing meaningful recognition to those who were eligible. Following an internal review and a decline in application numbers, the Scheme closed on the 15 October 2025, as originally outlined at its inception.

The Ministry of Defence are aware of the open-source reports on the sinking of the Ursa Major, however we judge that such an incident would be unlikely to have had a significant impact on the conflict in Ukraine.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) on 16 January 2026, to Question 104233.

https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-01-08/104233

In early 2025, the Royal Navy’s NavyX was amalgamated with the Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO) and the Navy Artificial Intelligence Cell (NAIC) to form the Disruptive Capabilities and Technologies Office (DCTO).

The new Disruptive Capabilities and Technologies Office (DCTO) unites the knowledge and skills of innovation specialists from NavyX, the Office of the Chief Technology Officer and the Navy AI Cell. Together, the unit rapidly prototypes, test and deploys advanced technologies to support operations at sea and will address the Royal Navy’s more pressing operational challenges.

The UK currently has six designated NATO facilities:

• Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) – Northwood Headquarters
• NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS) – Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton
• NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) – Royal Air Force Molesworth
• 280 Signal Squadron, 1st NATO Signals Battalion - Blandford Camp
• Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) – Imjin Barracks
• European Regional Office of NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) – London

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May 2025 is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO.

The work and costs involved in negotiating and implementing the Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union are carried out as part of officials' routine duties. As such, the costs specific to negotiating and implementing the SDP cannot be calculated separately.

We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this Government’s NATO First defence policy. Any commitments made will be in support of our defence objectives and will provide value for the UK taxpayer.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May 2025 is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO.

The work and costs involved in negotiating and implementing the Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union are carried out as part of officials' routine duties. As such, the costs specific to negotiating and implementing the SDP cannot be calculated separately.

We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this Government’s NATO First defence policy. Any commitments made will be in support of our defence objectives and will provide value for the UK taxpayer.

As reiterated by the Prime Minister, we have seen excellent progress in US-led negotiations in recent weeks.

At the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Paris on 6 January, Leaders committed to work together to provide robust security guarantees and economic recovery support measures for Ukraine as part of any peace agreement. We are working closely with our US allies on the nature of these guarantees, and discussions remain ongoing.

The decision on who needs a Dismounted Close Combat rifle versus a Generalist rifle will be based upon a wide range of criteria. The exact criteria will be determined during the Concept Phase. However, the list of criteria is likely to include the user role, likely engagement ranges, their likely targets, plus human factors.

Decisions on barrel length will also be determined during the Concept Phase. The barrel length of each variant will be based upon considerations such as user role (for example, Light Infantry, Light Calvary, Armoured), likely engagement ranges, likely targets, and human factors.