Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the chair again, Ms Ryan. I support amendments 5 to 8 in the name of the hon. Member for Torfaen. As has been outlined at various stages, clause 3—and the Government’s three clicks policy—has received the most attention and probably the most public criticism of any part of the Bill. Furthermore, I think the Minister knows that it is imperfect in its current guise. He has been open about the fact that the Government are not fully aligned to the three clicks policy, as the Home Secretary commented on Second Reading.

The Minister and the Government have my sympathy on this. The first job of any Government is to keep their citizens safe in these difficult times of high terrorist threat combined with the constant march of technology and online communication. It is very hard to keep legislation up to date and answer the calls of police and security services for further powers, while maintaining the balance of freedom and civil liberties that we expect and enjoy.

The SNP has serious concerns about how the policy will work in practice, and the impact that it may have on innocent individuals who have no interest in, intent to engage in, or no wish to encourage terrorist acts. It is self-explanatory that anyone who downloads or streams content for the purpose of planning or encouraging terrorist activity should face a criminal charge and, if convicted, a long sentence. Nobody would disagree with that, but this is about finding the most effective approach that targets the right individuals.

I accept the Government’s point that more people now stream material online than download it to a computer or other device, and as such it is vital that we continue to review our counter-terrorism approaches and ensure they meet the current threat level, but the Government’s approach to tackling streaming content through the three click policy is riddled with difficulty. Amendment 5 deals primarily with timing and does not take into account when a prosecution may be made.

The Government suggest that the three clicks policy is designed as a protection for those who accidentally access certain content online, but we must consider how easy it is for someone to click on a relevant source that could put them into conflict with the provision. It could catch someone who had clicked on three articles or videos of a kind likely to be of use to a terrorist, even if they were entirely different and unrelated and the clicks occurred years apart. Timing is crucial, because it would be difficult to accuse someone of being involved in terrorist activity if they had clicked on a certain source three times over a 10, 15 or 25-year period. Those concerns were echoed in the evidence session, and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill—who we should all listen to—expressed his concern about the variable threshold proposed. We should act on that independent and expert advice by introducing a safeguard that could effectively help to identify a pattern of behaviour.

Richard Atkinson, the chair of the Law Society, also voiced his concerns about the Government’s three clicks policy, stating that it could undermine or restrict those with legitimate cases, and that the lack of any consideration of timing makes the measure very vague. He said:

“To leave the law in the hands of prosecutorial decision as to whether or not it meets the public interest is a step too far. I think there is a need for greater definition around what is being sought to be prohibited.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 31, Q74.]

Amendment 5 would add the safeguard that an individual would have to view the information three times or more in a 12-month period to have committed an offence, and that position was supported by Max Hill during the evidence session.

On Second Reading many Members made clear their concerns about the lack of other safeguards in clause 3, particularly regarding intent—for example, the clause does not take into account the length of time that anybody watches a video or views a website. That point was raised by the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine on Tuesday in a question to Gregor McGill, who confirmed that the length of time that someone watches a video is not defined in the Bill, so watching a video or viewing a website for one second by mistake could be counted under the Government’s three strikes policy.

I accept the point made by Mr McGill that such breaches would be harder to prosecute, and that discretion would be applied, but as I have said, I am not comfortable with leaving such a wide area open to prosecutorial discretion. More importantly, as Max Hill said, such an offence without a test of intent is too broad and would capture too many innocent individuals. It is important that the Home Secretary accepts that a balance can be struck between liberty and security. Hoda Hashem, a law student at Durham University and one of many individuals and groups who sent helpful briefings to the Committee—I thank them all on behalf of the SNP—summed it up well by saying,

“the certainty and precision of laws are essential principles of our legal system. It allows ordinary people to know when their behaviour might veer into the realm of criminality, and it also means that the government and police cannot arbitrarily choose who to prosecute. In effect, it is wrong for the Home Secretary to argue that it would be down to the Police and CPS to fix a bad law. As a matter of principle, it is for Parliament to ensure that the laws it passes are clear enough to be applied consistently and, more importantly, predictably…If the government is serious about striking the right balance between liberty and security, the offence must include a criminal intent, or it must be withdrawn altogether.”

The Government may claim that adequate safeguards are in place to protect innocent individuals, but as we have heard, few agree with that position. That is why we support amendments 7 and 8, which have been tabled by the Labour party. The Government are asking for wide and vague powers, and we need safeguards in place to protect innocent individuals by ensuring that they are not prosecuted in the first place, and to provide for an adequate defence in the event that non-terrorists are taken to court. The stress placed on someone who was being investigated in that scenario would be extreme. Unless the safeguards are strengthened, and notwithstanding the Minister’s commitment regarding journalists and academics, it would be a brave journalist or researcher who would not be deterred or at least have second thoughts before viewing such material. Max Hill warned that thought without action must not be criminalised. We all agree that real terrorists should have nowhere to hide. We should also agree that legislating in the name of terrorism when the targeted activity is not actually terrorism would be wrong.

As we have heard, the French courts struck down a similar attempt by the French Government. In addition, a UN special rapporteur, Professor Joe Cannataci, expressed concerns about this provision, saying:

“It seems to be pushing a bit too much towards thought crime…the difference between forming the intention to do something and then actually carrying out the act is still fundamental to criminal law. Whereas here you’re saying: ‘You’ve read it three times so you must be doing something wrong’.”

In our view, amendments 5 to 8 are eminently sensible and, indeed, vital if the Government are to have any chance of surviving a legal challenge to elements of clause 3 and—almost as importantly—if they want to make good on the Home Secretary’s commitment that a balance can be struck between liberty and security.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. I thought that instead of embarking on a long prosecution of clause 3, it would be best to meet the hon. Member for Torfaen to discuss his amendments. I have said from the outset of proceedings on the Bill that my intention was to seek advice and suggestions from all parts of the political spectrum, and I felt early on that the three clicks provision presented a challenge. It opens up a whole debate about whether there were three clicks or four clicks, how far apart the clicks were, whether a time limit should apply to the clicks and so on. We were getting away from what we all agree on, which is the need to amend the legislation to reflect modern use of the internet—the streaming of online content. Partly because of technological advancements and the speed of the internet, people no longer download podcasts in the way they used to; they just click on their 4G device and stream the content. That is, of course, a problem for our intelligence services and law enforcement agencies, which often have to deal with people streaming content rather than downloading and holding it.

As I said, I have spoken to the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman on this issue and the Government will go away and examine a better solution to the three clicks issue. I hear the strong views about a reasonable excuse, and a debate can be had about judicial discretion. Campaigners for judicial discretion are sometimes also those who want much more prescriptive legislation that can contradict their earlier motives. If we included a list of reasonable excuses, rather than leaving it up to a judge to decide, would we end up with a list of 150? That is a matter for further debate, but I have asked officials to see whether reasonable excuses are listed in full anywhere else in statute. I understand that it may be possible to give examples rather than a full list.

I can assuage some of the fears expressed by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about section 58. First, I cannot find a record of a journalist being prosecuted under the existing section 58, which has been in existence since 2000. Over 18 years, journalists and academics have downloaded some of this content, and they have not, I understand, been prosecuted even if they have failed to provide a reasonable excuse. That relates to section 58(3) of the original Act. We have heard claims of armageddon and the fear that suddenly everyone will be arrested, but that will not materialise—it certainly has not done in 18 years. I hope that that assuages the fear expressed by the hon. Gentleman.

I do not think that simply updating the provision should be cause for concern. It is an attempt to tackle the difficult issue that modern terrorism unfortunately uses incredibly slick recruiting videos—they are grooming videos—to pull people away from the society they are in, to radicalise them and to get them to do awful things. Recently, a young man was found on the way into Cardiff—not far from the constituency of the hon. Member for Torfaen—with knives and an ISIS flag. We found no evidence that that young man had ever met a Muslim, was from a Muslim family or had been to a mosque. He had simply been radicalised by watching streamed videos online. That is the power of such persuasion, and we also see it reflected in cyber-bullying and sexualisation. It is a real issue that we have to face.

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[Mr Wallace]

Section 58(3), as it stands, says:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for his action or possession.”

If we can build on that—whether that means expanding reasonable excuse or accepting that reasonable excuse is already in there—and couple it with new wording that does not sound like three clicks or three attempts, I think we can come to a position that is satisfactory. We will definitely try to do that on Report. If the Committee would like, I can deal with the individual amendments that have been put forward, but I am in contact with the hon. Member for Torfaen to ensure we progress this.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

Would it be fair to characterise the challenge my right hon. Friend has admitted the Bill faces as one of providing flexibility for law enforcement and uncertainty for perpetrators, while recognising the fact that, as he has alluded to, the down- loading and streaming culture has changed and there is a lacuna in the existing legislation that needs to be filled?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes. That is the challenge for all policy makers: where legislation is too tied to the technology of the day, they end up becoming a prisoner of that legislation. Obviously, when the Act was written in 2000, or probably in 1999, it talked about a person who was guilty of an offence if he collected or made a record of information. No one thought in 2000 that, with 4G, and with 5G around the corner, people would not be downloading everything and that things would be done much more in a live stream.

That is the challenge for not only law enforcement, but other policy, whatever regulations we are doing. If someone is sitting in the Treasury, I should think that they are perplexed—I am not going to wander off my brief, because I will get into trouble—at how certain companies exploit old tax regulation to make huge profits, simply based on the fact that that regulation was written for an analogue and not a digital day. That is the same challenge we face in law enforcement.

In the spirit of what I have said from the very start of the Bill, and as I said when the Criminal Finances Act 2017 went through the House previously, I am determined that we collectively try to get to a place that will help our law enforcement and intelligence services and meet their need, but also reflect the very real concerns that have been raised.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful to the Minister for that answer and for the constructive discussions he facilitated with me yesterday. It is important that we work constructively to get this clause absolutely right. I welcome the Minister’s approach in terms of not sticking to the three clicks approach—in fairness, he himself expressed reservations about it at an earlier stage—and in terms of the reasonable excuse defence, and I say that in respect of both the reverse burden, which is in the original Terrorism Act 2000 anyway, and of looking at whether we can put a non-exhaustive list of examples on the face of the Bill. All those things would be helpful in getting this clause into the right place. On that basis, I am happy not to press any of the amendments to a vote at this stage, and I look forward to what the Minister will bring forward on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wallace]

Clause 4 updates the law on the encouragement of terrorism, to ensure that it properly protects children and other vulnerable people. It amends sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which provide for the offences of encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications respectively. A statement containing an encouragement of terrorism for the purpose of section 1 and a terrorist publication for the purpose of section 2 are defined as a statement or publication that is likely either to be understood by members of the public to whom the statement or publication is published or made available as a direct or indirect encouragement to acts of terrorism or to be useful in the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism.

Those who radicalise others and who incite violence and hatred often target the most vulnerable in our society, seeking to spread their poison as wide as possible and to cause the maximum harm. Reflecting that, the focus of the section 1 and 2 offences is on the actions of the radicaliser, rather than of the person being radicalised. Specifically, it is on the nature of the encouragement to terrorism and on the intention, or recklessness, of the person doing the encouraging or disseminating the terrorist publication—that their actions should directly or indirectly result in another person preparing or committing an act of terrorism.

Other offences will of course apply if a person being encouraged goes on to prepare or commit an act of terrorism as a result, but those sections are specifically targeted at the harm intended, risked or actually caused by the radicaliser. That was Parliament’s intention when it created those offences in 2006, and clause 4 closes a gap so as to give full effect to that intention.

At present, the wording of sections 1 and 2 means that those offences are committed only if a person being encouraged or being shown a terrorist publication is objectively likely to understand what they are being encouraged to do. That produces Parliament’s intended result in cases in which encouragements are published or terrorist publications are disseminated to the general public and, in most cases, to a particular individual who has been targeted for radicalisation.

However, it also produces an unintended gap in cases in which a child or vulnerable adult is targeted for radicalisation and may lack the maturity or the mental capacity to fully understand what they are being encouraged to do, even when, to an objective bystander, it would be clear what the radicaliser was seeking to achieve. In such cases, the radicaliser may be purposefully seeking to indoctrinate and groom a child or vulnerable adult to become involved in terrorism but could potentially evade liability for doing so, despite their best efforts and their worst intentions to cause serious harm, if they could establish that the current tests in sections 1 and 2 were not met, because their target did not fully understand what they were being encouraged to do.

We do not believe that any case has so far arisen in which this issue has prevented a prosecution, and thankfully we do not anticipate it being relevant in large numbers of cases in the future. However, we consider it important to take this opportunity to close that gap, which is well highlighted by the recent and horrifying case of Umar Haque, who was jailed for life after pleading guilty to disseminating terrorist publications to large numbers of children, whom he encouraged to carry out Daesh-inspired attacks, as well as being found guilty of a number of other serious offences, including plotting terror attacks.

I am not sure whether hon. Members are aware of the case, but Haque taught at unregulated schools in north London, exposing his views to, we think, hundreds of children, getting them to swear allegiance to ISIS, to re-enact attacks and to watch beheading videos, and then threatening that they would go to hell if they told their parents or other people. That is an example of the campaigns deliberately targeting the vulnerable and the young that some Daesh members get involved in.

We have seen in a number of lone wolf attacks—individual attackers, rather than complex plots—people with significant conditions who have been groomed or encouraged to do things. That is a very real example of why we have to be alert to the desperate measures that Isis involve themselves in. They are totally indiscriminate about who they encourage or who they wish to use to spread their hate.

I do not think that that is entirely on one side of the spectrum, and we could look at some examples of neo-Nazis and the far right: they, too, are casting their net wider and wider. Lonely, often damaged, young individuals sitting in their bedrooms are attracted to being part of some white, superior ideology. Again, that is why we are trying to close this gap.

This measure will help to ensure that the most vulnerable people are protected from radicalisation and prevented from engaging in terrorist activity. By extension, it will help to protect the wider public from acts of terror perpetrated by those who are vulnerable and who, as we have seen, may be exploited and manipulated by others for terrorist ends. I beg to move that clause 4 stands part of the Bill.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I can deal with the clause relatively briefly, because the Opposition support it. The way in which sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 are drafted means that they do not capture some of the activity that we wish to criminalise. The drafting of the 2006 Act looks at the victim and at whether, objectively, they are likely to have understood. As the Minister set out, section 1(1) states:

“This section applies to a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published”.

That means that anyone who is a vulnerable adult or a child, or anyone who may, on that objective test, be unlikely to understand it, is not covered by the law as it stands. Clearly, that needs to be tightened up.

The second part of the clause, which refers to section 1(2) of the 2006 Act, substitutes the test of “a reasonable person” for the test that exists. That is an entirely sensible change. Taken together, the changes mean that when we look at dissemination of this material, we can consider vulnerable victims, whether they are adults or children, and not be stuck with the objective test, which means that they cannot be covered. On that basis, the Opposition support clause 4.

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[Mr Wallace]

I thank the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, who is right about that method. The tragedy is that we now see that in county lines and crime. Loaded 15-year-olds go off into the valleys—or the dales, in my part of the world—ensconce themselves there and are told, “We will treat you like a grown-up. Here are some free drugs, and here is something of value.” That grooming over a period allows some pretty nasty people to inflict county lines on our communities. The hon. Gentleman is right when he says that is a phenomenon of grooming.

It is important to note what clause 4 is really doing. Sections 1 and 2 on the encouragement of terrorism are already in the Terrorism Act 2006. At the moment, you have to prove both sides: that the people you are delivering the message to are willing and able to accept it, and that the message you are giving is encouraging terrorism. The offence is the encouragement of terrorism. As I said, this offence is often complemented, or a training-type offence is used instead. That is, effectively, where we see encouragement. Clearly, we have to prove that, and that is where the criminality starts and stops. For example, I am encouraging someone if I say, “This is great. Look at what ISIL is doing. Look at these beheadings. This is something we should get involved in.” That offence remains unchanged, and that, effectively, is the boundary of passive into active support.

At the moment, there is the double couple of that action plus the people having to be receptive. Our challenge is what to do when that is targeted at vulnerable people. That is why we have sought to close that gap. We do not expect this to be used in a major way. We have not seen much evidence yet of people using it as an excuse. We were worried about the offence that I quoted of the teacher being used, and we see a growth in unregulated space. I think my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset was talking about this earlier. Unfortunately, we are seeing more and more people being diverted into home schooling or unregulated space, where I am afraid people can get their hands on people to effectively brainwash them.

[Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)]

I am concerned about the issues the Minister is raising in terms of unregulated schools and about whether this measure on its own can tackle that problem. What else is being done to address this? I recognise that this may well involve working with other agencies. As the Minister has highlighted this as a major area of concern, it is important that we check that nothing else needs to be done to address it.

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman is right. All terrorist legislation always bumps into freedoms and liberties. Religious freedom is something we hold very dear to our hearts. In my constituency, most unregulated schooling space is perfectly fine and perfectly adequate. People receive their religious schooling there. There is a long tradition in this country of home schooling. From time to time, all of us will hear in our mailbags from the champions of home schooling.

The hon. Gentleman is right that, from my point of view as Security Minister, there is a genuine concern that safe spaces—which the next clause deals with—are where the modern terrorist operates. Whether that safe space is on the internet—streaming—or in unregulated or home schooling, it allows messages to be targeted at young people, and we have to be alert and explore what we can do.

On the hon. Gentleman’s specific point on unregulated schools, and in the light of the importance that we in this country attach to religious freedom, there are more than just straightforward primary legislation methods to address the problem. Those include working with regulators, other Departments and local authorities to make sure that they are alert to the issue. Working with religious leaders to make sure that they are alert to the quality of teaching in those settings is another way of dealing with it.

[Nic Dakin]

I am concerned about the rise in exclusions in some parts of the country, which is related to the rise in home schooling. This is creating a space in which, because of the greater fragmentation of the education service, intelligence is perhaps more likely to be lost. It is important that the work being done in this area tries to cohere things back together.

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[Mr Wallace]

Before I get dragged off and told I am speaking out of order—I got a look from the Chair—let me say that the vulnerability that the clause tries to deal with reflects the vulnerability being exploited in our communities. We need to be alert to safe spaces, whether they are in an educational setting, an internet setting or a social setting, such as sports clubs. We have historically seen paedophiles target football clubs and everything else, as happened in my constituency, but now, unfortunately, we see extremists targeting them as well. We all have to do what we can to make sure that such safe spaces, containing vulnerable people, are closed off.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

I also share the concerns on home education—as the Minister will know, because I have expressed them to him personally. I wonder whether, at the very least, an amendment could be tabled that would exclude from home educating any household of which a member has been convicted of a terrorist offence. I know how passionately a lot of home educators feel about their freedoms, and I respect those freedoms, but I wonder whether we could put such an amendment forward at the very least. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset is also looking into this area and that a home education consultation is under way.

[The Chair]

Before the Minister answers, I think we are wandering a little far from the purpose of the clause. Maybe we should come back and focus on that.

[Mr Wallace]

On the subject of clauses, my hon. Friend makes a valid point. I will ask officials to explore the concept of how we ensure the protection of the home-schooled. I will revert to her with all those details, probably in writing.

The point is that vulnerable people are being exploited and groomed, and unfortunately they are being encouraged into extremism. As the law stands, there is potentially a defence for people whom we would like to prosecute, because the vulnerable people they exploit are viewed as not being aware of what they may be doing. We are trying to plug that gap, which will hopefully go some way to making sure that these environments are not exploited.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Extra-territorial jurisdiction

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wallace]

We talked about safe spaces when considering clause 4. One of our biggest challenges, as it is for many of our European allies, is the number of foreign fighters and people who have gone abroad to fight. Some have been encouraged to do so and some of them have been conned into doing so. It breaks my heart to see 15-year-old girls effectively seduced to go off to throw their lives away in dangerous parts of the world. It might sound fun to run away from home, but I assure the Committee that when those girls see the horrors of Raqqa or Aleppo, it is no laughing matter —indeed, some of them have even lost their lives in doing so.

We have to do more to deal with offences that happen overseas, and with those who set themselves up in safe spaces, and reach back into the United Kingdom, destroy lives and encourage terrorism. We are not alone in that challenge. I met the German and French interior Ministers at a G7 event, and it is also a challenge for them. These things often happen a long way away, but can have a horrific impact on our streets and on families in this country. Some of the offences committed in this country have included killing people in places such as London Bridge and Borough market, and they were inspired by people who have sought sanctuary abroad, as they would see it. We must do more about that.

Clause 5 extends the jurisdiction of UK courts to cover further offences, so that we can bring to justice persons who commit acts of terrorism abroad. Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006 already provides extra- territorial jurisdiction for a number of terrorist offences. Extraterritorial jurisdiction means that a person may be prosecuted in the UK for conduct that took place outside the United Kingdom, but would have been unlawful had it taken place here. For the offences listed in section 17, it is not necessary for the individual to be a UK national or resident, and the offending need not be directly linked to the UK.

Through section 17 of the 2006 Act, and similar provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000, the UK already takes extraterritorial jurisdiction for most terrorism offences where that might be relevant. It means, for example, that the British courts are able to prosecute people who return to the UK having been involved in fighting with a terrorist organisation overseas, or been involved in a terrorist plot with a significant international dimension. That is an essential power for dealing with the threat posed by foreign fighters and to ensure that such people can be brought to justice. As I made clear on Second Reading, about 40 individuals who have returned from conflict in Syrian and Iraq have been convicted so far, many through the use of extraterritorial powers.

Clause 5 extends extraterritorial jurisdiction to three further offences, and widens the coverage of a fourth, with the result that all relevant terrorism offences will now be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction. That will ensure that there are no gaps in our ability to prosecute individuals who engage in terrorist activities overseas that would be unlawful in this country if they returned to the UK.

Specifically we are extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to the following offences: section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, under which it is an offence to display a flag or other article associated with a proscribed organisation; section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, under which it is an offence to disseminate terrorist publications; and section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, under which it is an offence to make or possess explosives under suspicious circumstances.

We are also extending the coverage of extraterritorial jurisdiction to section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, under which it is an offence to encourage terrorism. That offence already has extraterritorial jurisdiction for where an act of terrorism is encouraged that would constitute a “convention offence”, meaning an offence listed in certain international agreements. Clause 5 would remove that limitation so that it would be unlawful to encourage any act of terrorism while overseas. That is a particularly relevant and timely change to our terrorism legislation.

International travel for purposes such as training, receiving direction from or fighting with a terrorist organisation has long been a feature of the terrorist threat faced by this country. In response, we have taken an incremental and proportionate approach to extending the territorial reach of our criminal law in those areas where there is a persuasive operational case for doing so. We recognise that extraterritorial jurisdiction is an exceptional power, but it is also essential to ensure that modern terrorists can be brought to justice.

Most recently we added to section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006 the offences of preparing terrorist acts and training for terrorism—that was in 2015 in response to the then still developing threat from those who travelled to Iraq and Syria, in particular to join Daesh. Experience since then has shown a strong operational case for further extension of the extraterritorial jurisdiction provided by the clause. Some individuals located in Syria and Iraq have reached back to others in the UK and elsewhere, through social media and other online platforms. They have done so to spread propaganda, to disseminate terrorist publications, to promote Daesh and its aims, including through publishing flags and logos associated with organisations, and to encourage others to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK and other countries.

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[Stephen Doughty]

I agree with the comments the Minister and my hon. Friend have made on this clause 5, but I would be interested in the Minister’s remarks on this point: if an individual has committed these offences or any of the existing offences abroad, it is crucial to detain them at the border when they attempt to re-enter the UK. There have been some worrying reports in the last few weeks about stolen passports or identity documents being available, and being used by criminals and those who have potentially committed terrorist offences overseas. It is crucial that we co-operate with Europol and Interpol, through the databases on stolen documents, to stop individuals who are attempting to sneak back in, perhaps because they have committed the offences outlined in the clause—indeed, they are the most likely to be trying to avoid detection on entering the UK. Can the Minister say a little about what steps are being taken to enforce not only the existing measures, but the measures as outlined in clause 5?

[Mr Wallace]

First, on the point made by the hon. Member for Torfaen, I heard what was said by the reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill, about this issue, but the United Kingdom needs to protect itself in respect of certain offences that are being committed abroad and having an impact on us here. My memory is that the reviewer of terrorism legislation said that he was worried that we would be criminalising people here for things that might not be criminal in the country in which they are doing them.

Let me just reflect on the offences that we are bringing into scope. Under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, it is an offence to make or possess explosives “under suspicious circumstances”. I think back to the Manchester Arena bomber and the training videos that were used to show how to make that bomb. The training video was prepared and filmed potentially anywhere in the world. I see training videos that show people with immaculate English from the backstreets of Raqqa or wherever. It seems bizarre that in the safe space that they have been operating in, they can handle, possess or make explosives and use that as a way to bring back knowledge to train people here. Sometimes the only evidence we have is over there rather than over here, and it is important that we find the ability to prosecute these people.

Similarly, if someone is filmed in Syria dressed head to foot in a Daesh outfit, with a flag and sword and beheading-type posturing, and then they use the footage over here, that is a challenge at the moment. It may be easy in that environment, because Syria is a failed state. We are looking at a state that does not really have the rule of law: it has a dictator who does not really believe in the rule of law. It is clear, in relation to some examples, that we need to find some offences to deal with the problem; we need to bring them into scope. I think and hope that we will be able to raise more prosecutions against people who we know have been there, although we do not at the moment have the offences on the statute book to prosecute them.

I met with the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth on the issue of the border. There is a balance to be struck. How do we stop and examine data at the border? How do we verify people’s identity if they come in with an emergency passport or a passport that does not quite fit? Obviously, we will debate that again when we talk about the hostile state powers. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is often used with some success, but I am aware—the hon. Gentleman has discussed this with me—that we have to be mindful of its impact on the wider public. The cost to them of a schedule 7 stop may be missing a flight if they are on their way out of the country and so on. I have asked for us to look at what more we can do around that space to mitigate that.

The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that at the moment returnees from the areas where we are seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction are trying to take advantage of stolen identities. There is a country in Europe whose identity cards are pretty weak and are often exploited by organised criminals; it is very easy for them to get into the system and be used. We are alert to that. It is why we are trying to do more with things such as e-gates. I know that there is some negative reporting about them, but they can be quite positive in spotting fake passports. We have a range of methods, and I would be happy to brief the hon. Gentleman privately on how we try to keep our border safe, but yes, we have to be alert to that. Even when people get in, the hope is that through accessing digital media we can bring some of these new offences to bear on them for what they did abroad. That is where we are trying to get to. It is a challenge as we have tended to expect our terrorists to be here rather than abroad. That is another example of how the Bill is really about trying to reflect the modern internet space.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the Minister for his comments. One country that has been highlighted as a place where illegal documents can easily be obtained is Turkey. Given the proximity of Turkey to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, could the Minister say a bit about what work has been done with the Turkish authorities to try to deal with people who can easily sell stolen identity documents there, which may be used by people who have committed such offences and are trying to re-enter the UK?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I met the Turkish authorities when I visited Turkey not so long ago, and we discussed those issues. In their defence, the Turkish are actually pretty good at knowing who is in their country. One of our worries is the Italian identity card, because once people are in the EU, it is much easier. The ambition of a lot of those people is to get an EU identity card or an EU passport, and to move around freely.

We certainly find weaknesses in the system. The Italian identity card has caused our crime and terrorist fighters a challenge, because it is the one that is most used by illegal entrants to Europe, whether for immigration or any other purpose. I am more worried about some of the European issues than about Turkey at the moment. Generally, the Turkish detain people and then those people are managed back through temporary restraining orders. Usually, the Turks know who they are and they hand them over.

[Stephen Doughty]

Just to clarify, I am talking about stolen British documents and perhaps other EU documents, including the ones he suggests, being sold in Turkey to individuals. It is not just about whether the Turkish know who has come in and out, but about people gaining access to stolen Italian or British documents on sale in Turkey.

[Mr Wallace]

I will be quick, because this is definitely wandering off the clause. We wash millions of passenger name records at the National Border Targeting Centre, and if there are cancelled or stolen passports, they match. We are quite quick on that compared with our European allies, and we have a high detection rate, although it is not 100%. We have invested in that capability over the decades and I am confident that although we do not get them all, we do detect them. Obviously, we have to ensure that we continue to review that, and we are doing that as we speak.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Increase in maximum sentences

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 6, page 3, line 36, at end insert—

“(7) Sentencing guidelines for offences for which the maximum sentence has been increased under this section must be published within six months of the passing of this Act by the following bodies—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, the Sentencing Council for England and Wales;

(b) in relation to Scotland, the Scottish Sentencing Council; and

(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice’s Sentencing Group.”

This amendment would require the bodies responsible for sentencing guidelines to produce new guidelines in relation to offences for which the maximum sentence would be increased under Clause 6.

Clause 6 is the first of five clauses that facilitate the extended maximum sentencing periods with respect to the earlier clauses. I was uneasy about additional sentencing, given the state that clause 3 was in, but because of the Minister’s reassurances about the changes to that clause, I am less uneasy about it. Amendment 10 looks at the continuing role of the Sentencing Council. The council published its guidelines on this area in March, but they have not been updated to take into account the changes that are happening to offences as a result of clauses 1, 2 and 3, as I will set out.

In one of our earlier debates, the Minister said that it is of course always at the discretion of the judge to apply the law to the sentencing of an offender in an individual case and to take into account the circumstances, the background of the offender, the nature of the offence and so on. No parliamentarian would seek to interfere with that judicial discretion in particular cases, but the Sentencing Council’s guidelines fulfil a vital role when parliamentarians set maximum sentencing penalties, as the Bill does—it does not set minimum sentences.

All I wish to say to the Minister on this amendment is that, although we would not wish to stray into that judicial discretion, it might be sensible for the Sentencing Council to look at these offences in updated form, to see whether they wish to publish new guidelines. That would be sensible for everybody.

[Mr Wallace]

Let me start on a positive note: I fully endorse the sentiment behind the amendment of the hon. Member for Torfaen. It is right that the bodies responsible for providing sentencing guidelines in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland can review and update any relevant guidelines in relation to terrorist offences to take account of the provisions in the Bill. As the Committee will be aware, the Sentencing Council for England and Wales published new guidelines for terrorism offences in March. Those came into force on 27 April. The new guidelines reflect the developing nature of the terrorist threat and the increasing concern about the availability of extremist material online, which can lead to people becoming self-radicalised.

The Sentencing Council has indicated that, in terms of the impact on sentencing levels,

“it is likely that in relation to some offences, such as the offences of preparing terrorist acts and building explosive devices, there will be increases in sentence for lower level offences. These are the kinds of situations where preparations might not be as well developed or an offender may be offering a small amount of assistance to others. The Council decided that, when considering these actions in the current climate, where a terrorist act could be planned in a very short time period, using readily available items such as vehicles as weapons, combined with online extremist material providing encouragement and inspiration, these lower-level offences are more serious than they have previously been perceived.”

That approach is very much to be welcomed, and I commend the Sentencing Council for its work on these guidelines.

I should also stress that the Sentencing Council, and its Scottish and Northern Ireland equivalents, are independent bodies. The Sentencing Council for England and Wales is governed by the statutory provisions of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The council has particular statutory duties, including a duty to consult on guidelines or amendments to guidelines. That consultation duty includes, for example, a requirement to consult with the Justice Committee. There are practical implications, therefore, with requiring the council to issue guidelines six months after Royal Assent, especially when the council cannot begin to consider guidelines until the Bill receives Royal Assent. However, the guidelines need to be kept up to date to reflect changes to the law, including those made by the Bill. I can assure the Committee that the council is alive to that; indeed, in its consultation on the draft terrorism offences guidelines, it was to some extent able to anticipate the increases to sentences contained in the Bill.

Clause 6 changes the maximum penalty for four offences. We are not rewriting the sentencing provisions for the entirety of terrorism offences, but seeking to update a specific set of offences to make sure that the maximum penalty reflects the severity of the offence. Consequently, we believe that the council will be able to modify the existing guidelines once the provisions to increase penalties in this Bill are enacted. We do not envisage that being a protracted process. As the Committee would expect, we have kept the Sentencing Council apprised of the provisions in the Bill, and the chairman has indicated that the council plans to revisit the guidelines once the Bill has completed its parliamentary passage.

The position in Scotland and Northern Ireland is different. In Scotland, I understand that the Scottish Sentencing Council has not issued any specific guidelines relating to terrorist or terrorism-related offences. There is a similar situation in Northern Ireland. Instead, the judiciary is guided by guideline judgments from the Court of Appeal. I would be happy to alert the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice to this debate, but we should otherwise leave it to the Scottish Sentencing Council and the Lord Chief Justice’s sentencing group to determine how best to proceed. I am sure that is a sentiment that the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North would endorse.

I thank the hon. Member for Torfaen for tabling this amendment, and I fully understand his reasons for doing so. However, I hope I have been able to persuade him that the mechanisms are already in place for the relevant sentencing guidelines to be updated to reflect the provisions in the Bill. On that basis, I ask that he withdraw his amendment.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am very grateful for those assurances. I welcome the assurance in respect of England and Wales, and the fact that the Sentencing Council is very much alive to this debate and prepared to make further recommendations. I also welcome what the Minister said with regard to Scotland and Northern Ireland. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 7 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Additional requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wallace]

Clause 11 strengthens the notification requirements that apply to individuals convicted of terrorism offences or offences with a terrorist connection to enable the police to better manage the risk posed by such individuals. The notification requirements apply to an individual over the age of 16 who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. Such terrorist offenders are required to notify the police of certain information, such as their name, address, date of birth and national insurance number, on release from custody, and to keep such information up to date. The notification requirements apply for up to 30 years, depending on the length of sentence imposed and the age of the offender. Those requirements provide the police and other operational partners with the necessary but proportionate means to monitor the whereabouts of convicted terrorists. They allow the police to assess the risk posed by a registered terrorist offender and, where appropriate, to take action to mitigate any risk posed by an individual.

The notification regime in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 operates in much the same way as a similar notification regime for convicted sex offenders. However, the range of information that registered sex offenders must provide to the police was updated in 2012 and is now far more extensive than the information that terrorist offenders must provide. This clause seeks to bring the notification scheme in the 2008 Act more closely into line with that in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The changes in respect of registered terrorist offenders will strengthen the requirements and ensure that they provide the police with an even more effective risk-management tool.

The changes provided for in this clause are as follows. First, we are adding to the information that RTOs are required to notify to the police to include details of bank accounts and credit, debit or other payment cards; details of passports and other identification documents; phone numbers and email addresses used by the RTO; and details of vehicles that are owned by the offender or that they are able to use. The provision of information about vehicles does not apply to registered sex offenders, but it is considered necessary for intelligence purposes to help build a picture of the RTO’s activities and movements.

Secondly, we will require offenders with no fixed address to re-notify their information to the police on a weekly basis. That is to ensure that the risk posed by offenders can be monitored appropriately. Finally, although the point is dealt with in schedule 4 rather than the clause, the Bill requires RTOs to give the police seven days’ notice of any overseas travel, rather than, as now, only travel that lasts for more than three days. As now, RTOs will be required to keep that information up to date, so the existing duty to notify the police of any changes will apply. Failure to comply with the notification requirements is a criminal offence, punishable by up to five years in prison.

As I have indicated, the changes to the notification regime will enable the police to better manage the risk of re-offending by convicted terrorist offenders. Much of the additional information that RTOs will be required to notify to the police is already reflected in the sex offender notification regime, and it is high time to bring the 2008 Act scheme into line.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I rise to support the clause. The registered terrorist offender regime is nothing new and is already set out in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. As the Minister set out, the Bill makes a number of extensions to it, so as to include details of bank accounts, credit cards, passports, phone numbers, email addresses and vehicles.

The Minister was right to draw parallels with the convicted sex offender regime, which was updated in 2012. There is the distinction that vehicle details do not apply to registered sex offenders, but given that vehicles have been used as weapons in terrorist atrocities that we have seen, I do not think it unreasonable to include vehicle details in the clause. In addition, it is welcome that we have the seven days’ notice for overseas travel, rather than simply looking at the duration of overseas travel, which was the previous requirement. For all those reasons, the Opposition support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 12

Power to enter and search home

--- Later in debate ---

We must remember that there are often innocent individuals in the close families and friendship groups of individuals who may be of interest, and they can be unnecessarily disrupted in this way. The purpose of my probing amendment 46 and the questions I have raised is to hear from the Minister what he understands reasonable force to entail, and how he would expect these powers to be used and applied, whether by the police and security services or by other authorities that might seek to enter a property for the purposes outlined in the clause.

[Mr Wallace]

Clause 12 confers on police the power to enter and search the home address of a registered terrorist offender. The police consider home visits an important tool to properly manage and risk-assess registered terrorist offenders while they are subject to the notification regime. The clause therefore gives police officers the power to enter under warrant—they have to go to a magistrate to get it—which will allow them to ascertain that an RTO does in fact reside at the address they have notified to the police, and allow them to check compliance with other aspects of the notification regime.

In response to the question from the hon. Member for Torfaen, some of the purposes would be home schooling. If someone was concerned about the welfare of the children of a serious terrorist offender who was back at home, the police would have the power to look at that after applying for a warrant. More importantly, the purpose is compliance with the regime and the conditions on the offender’s release. As has been rightly said, I suspect it would be about things such as flags and digital material, whether they have complied, and whether they are doing the sorts of things that they have undertaken not to do.

The sadness about a lot of terrorism is the re-engagement of terrorists. I still remember, 30 years later, a bizarre statistic from my days in Northern Ireland. If a man was convicted of a terrorist offence in Northern Ireland, after serving a sentence of about 10 years he usually stopped being proactive or a leading light in terrorism. He would perhaps engage in the political wing of an organisation, but he would not go back to his previous activity. Bizarrely, women would almost always re-engage. I do not know what that says about women’s determination and loyalty to the cause, but I have never forgotten that bizarre pattern. In today’s environment, in which some terrorism has a strong ideological bent, we are worried that some individuals re-engage, or try to re-engage, pretty quickly. Unfortunately, therefore, these measures are necessary for us to put certain restrictions on people.

As I said, these measures will allow officers to observe someone’s living conditions and identify any indications of a decline in their mental health, drug or alcohol use, family problems or other issues that may indicate an increase in the risk that that individual poses to the public. I will address the point made by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth later.

In providing for such a power of entry, we are not breaking new ground. The clause mirrors existing provisions in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in respect of registered sex offenders. Our experience has been that subjects are aware of their requirements and of the police’s power of entry, so they tend to co-operate with visits by officers and give them their consent. I am confident that extending that power to enable the management of RTOs will increase the extent to which they co-operate with visits by officers.

We have been careful to place a safeguard on the operation of the power. The clause provides that a warrant can be applied for only if a constable has tried on at least two occasions to gain consent from the RTO to enter their home to carry out a search for the purposes I outlined, and has failed to gain entry. I should also stress that the power is exercisable only on the authority of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace or equivalent, and that any application for such a warrant must be made by an officer of at least the rank of superintendent.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

The Minister suggests that the new power will be effective, but the Met has its lowest officer complement for more than 15 years. In the past eight years, my borough has lost more than 400 police officers and police community support officers. How will the Government keep the new power under review to ensure that it can be used by officers and, in the light of the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, to ensure its efficacy?

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman makes the fair point that it is all very well having lots of powers, but we must have the officers to deal with such matters. We have increased funding for counter-terrorism policing to ensure that we have as many such officers as possible. I am confident that the management of terrorist offenders is predominantly down to counter-terrorism officers. It would not be left up to a PCSO or a general beat constable. We have sufficient police officers to deal with this issue.

The power is as much an offender management tool as a criminal justice pursuit tool. It is about how we manage offenders effectively. That is why it is voluntary at first: we ask twice whether we can come and check up on someone, and only then do we resort to the law, which I think will happen rarely. There will probably be a reason when it happens, and that is when we will see a borough commander. People in the constabulary would move resources to address this.

I share the sentiment expressed by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth that the police and other law enforcement authorities should exercise their powers sensitively. Many members of the Muslim community in my constituency live together as large families. It may be that one person is a terrorist offender but no one else is. We all have good and bad neighbours and family members, and we have to respect that.

I reassure the hon. Gentleman that the power to enter and search will be exercised under the powers of entry code of practice, which is issued under section 48 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The code states that officers entering properties where people are subject to the notification regime in part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 must act reasonably and courteously to persons present and the property, and use reasonable force only where it is assessed to be necessary and proportionate to do so. We all know that that requirement is not always met, and we have to intercede with local police to ensure that our constituents’ concerns are addressed.

The amendment would therefore create a provision analogous to the code of practice by which the police already operate, in the context of their seeking twice to be granted entry voluntarily. One hopes that a good police officer would manage to get there without having to resort to the law.

I believe that the safeguards built into the clause are sufficient to ensure that the power will be used proportionately and only when it is absolutely needed by police officers. Introducing a requirement for police officers to have reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has been committed would restrict the use of the power to an unnecessary degree and undermine its primary purpose, which is to ensure that officers can assess the risk posed by a convicted registered terrorist offender at the address they have provided.

It is important to mention that we are dealing with people who have been convicted of an offence rather than those who are suspected of having committed one, so restricting the power of law enforcement forces would get the balance slightly wrong. These people are already offenders, so I believe that our police should have slightly wider powers in this respect.

I remind the Committee that Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu said last week that the power of entry

“is something that allows us to assess the ongoing risk of their re-engaging with terrorism…You might find a flag being displayed. You might find material that is of use to a terrorist. That is the purpose of it.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 25, Q52.]

Given the clear operational need for the provision, I ask the hon. Member for Torfaen to withdraw his amendment.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful for that further elucidation from the Minister. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Serious crime prevention orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wallace]

Clause 13 will make it clear in the Serious Crime Act 2007 that a serious crime prevention order may be made in respect of terrorism offences. SCPOs, which were introduced by the 2007 Act, are court orders that are used to protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting a person’s involvement in serious crime. They may impose various measures on an individual, proportionate to the risk of that person re-engaging in serious criminal activity.

Such an order may be made by a Crown court—or, in Scotland, by the High Court of Justiciary or a sheriff—in respect of an individual who is convicted of a serious crime, in which case the order would come into effect once its subject was released from custody. Additionally, such orders may be made by the High Court—or, in Scotland, by the Court of Session or a sheriff—where the Court is satisfied that a person has been involved in a serious crime, and where it has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing or disrupting the person’s involvement in serious crime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I rise to support the amendments, but I wish to raise a separate point about obstructions. First, I want to understand fully from the Minister why all the new powers are necessary. I represent a constituency where we host many major events. We have the National Assembly for Wales, we hosted part of the NATO summit, and we hosted the UEFA champions league final, including the fan zone. I regularly see such measures—bollards, traffic restrictions and blockages—being put in place anyway, so why are all the additional powers necessary? Substantial powers seem to be available to the police and other authorities already to restrict traffic or make areas safe.

Secondly, what steps will the Government take to ensure that appropriate notice of likely disruption is given to residents, or indeed to businesses, in areas that will be affected by the measures? Also, what compensation might be available to those who face significant disruption to, for example, business activity? Obviously, I appreciate that in very short-notice situations, when a specific threat arises, it may be impossible to give appropriate notice, and sometimes things need to be done to protect the public. That should be at the forefront of all our minds. However, we are talking about major events that are planned many months in advance. Unfortunately, I have seen many examples of businesses, in particular, and residents experiencing disruption that could quite easily have been avoided if better information had been made available about safe travel routes, or likely disruption of business opening hours and so on. That can be quite significant.

For the UEFA champions league final there were, rightly, extensive bollards and access gates, and all sorts of other road traffic measures, for several weeks in advance, as well as during and after the event. However, despite the availability of information about the fact that the event was happening, it was not always clear to Cardiff Bay residents—of whom I am one—or businesses what routes would be available, when they would be open, and what disruption was likely. I know of some businesses that lost substantial amounts because the placing of barriers and bollards obstructed the business and impeded access. Such things are side effects of necessary measures, but we must recognise that they are a consequence of holding major events, and of the provisions needed to keep them safe.

I would like, first, to understand why all the new powers are necessary and, secondly, what steps the Minister believes security authorities, police and local authorities should take to mitigate the effect on residents and businesses.

[Mr Wallace]

I should say at the outset that although ATTROs have been available for a long time they are not a substitute for the existing public order powers to put traffic management systems in place, and for the protection of large crowds. I would not want the measures to be used as a new opportunity for imposing charges when events are held, or for concocting a spurious terrorist link to try to regain money. They are designed for occasions when there is a specific terrorist threat to an event, or when an event is likely to attract a terrorist attack. That might be said of the recent Commonwealth summit, or similar events, as opposed to a champions league football match that is in the diary, a major sporting event that everyone knows is about to happen. For such events the local authority has always had the power under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 to charge the organisers. I would not want a situation in which everything—the galas or village fetes we attend—suddenly becomes a terrorist threat, to some over-eager person.

[Gavin Newlands]

I appreciate what the Minister is saying. Will he commit, on that basis, to giving further consideration to whether we can tighten the provisions and ensure that what he has said is in the Bill?

[Mr Wallace]

I was hoping that we would get to this moment, because I have good news: I shall now have to arbitrate on whether Scotland’s or Wales’s drafting is better.

[Nic Dakin]

Obviously Wales’s.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

As a former Member of the Scottish Parliament, I may have a different view.

I was going to try to speak to the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, but did not think we would reach the amendment this morning. I am keen to tell him that I agree with his point and—my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset should brace himself—the point raised by Liberty. [Interruption.] The Ministry of Wallace’s security portfolio is a broad church.

I am a great believer in the provisions not being used to curtail freedom of expression. I cannot give a 100% guarantee, because we shall have to go through the usual processes, but I have asked to be allowed to run the drafting of the amendments past our lawyers. No doubt they will have another view. Three lawyers in three rooms will produce three versions of the same thing, I suspect—and bill us three times. I am keen to see whether we can accommodate the points that have been made and make it clear that the measure is not a restriction on freedom of expression, and should not be used to restrict it in the future. As I said at the outset, I am keen to get contributions from all, and I look at each one on its merits. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North has a strong point, as does the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. We are drifting very much into a stand part debate, so I may take the view that we will not need a stand part debate after debating these amendments.

[Mr Wallace]

You will get no objection from me on that, Mrs Main, and we will certainly try to address these issues comprehensively. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, and part of this is about how good local authorities are at engaging with major events. It depends on whether the unitary, local or district authority is capable of planning for major events.

The police and intelligence services give huge assistance to buildings at the outset—we learned way back in the days of the IRA and the big lorry bombs that if we engage with the built space when buildings are designed and made, a lot of these measures are not necessary. They become part of the aesthetics of the building, and the public are none the wiser that actually they are in a much safer place. I have seen that first hand in the design of some of the newer parts of this building, and in football stadiums. In the long term, that is the best way to ensure that we do not end up with big metal barriers outside buildings and so on. I assure the Committee that parts of the Government engage with these issues on a daily basis—that is their day job. This is not just about protecting critical infrastructure; it is about protective security measures. Every local police force has a number of officers who specifically advise on protective counter-terrorism measures, and they will also engage with hon. Members about how they can make their offices secure, and so on.

The clause confers an express power on a local authority to charge the beneficiary of an ATTRO for the costs associated with the order. In this context, a beneficiary means a person promoting or organising a relevant event, such as a sporting event or street entertainment. Such costs might include the costs of publicising proposals to make an order—including by placing a notice in the local press—the cost of installing the protective security measures and the administrative costs of the local authority in making the order.

It is a long-established principle, under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and elsewhere, that the beneficiary of traffic regulation orders or similar authorisations should bear the cost. We are simply expressly extending this principle to ATTROs. If a critical national infrastructure site needs additional protective security measures that require an ATTRO, the reasonable costs of the order should be met by the operator of that facility. The same principle applies in the case of a temporary ATTRO used to protect, for example, a road race or, more importantly, a Christmas market, which we have seen targeted in the past. I stress that we are conferring a power, rather than a duty, on local authorities, so they will have discretion to determine when and where to levy a charge.

[Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)]

There are a large number of regular events in Torbay, such as the Bikers Make a Difference festival and others. Will the Minister work with the Local Government Association to make sure that clear guidance is issued to councils on the points he makes—that this should not be seen as something that they must do, and that this is not an excuse to levy further charges.

[Mr Wallace]

I totally agree with my hon. Friend. I will make it clear to police chiefs and to the LGA on the conclusion of the Bill’s passing that this should not become a wheeze to either not do something or to impose fines. That is important.

On reducing costs and maximising policing at events, we are also keen to enable the better use of personnel charged with protecting sites subject to ATTROs. To put this in context, the 1984 Act provides that an ATTRO may include a provision that enables a constable to direct that a provision of the order shall be commenced, suspended or revived, or that confers discretion on a constable. We want the police to be able to make more effective use of officers’ time and also of the other available resources in providing security for a site protected by an ATTRO.

To that end, subsection (9)(c) will provide that an ATTRO may

“enable a constable to authorise a person of a description specified in the order or notice to do anything that the constable could do by virtue of”

the 1984 Act. Under such delegated authority, it might be left to a security guard or steward to determine when a provision of an ATTRO is to commence or cease operating on a given day. The ATTRO might, for example, provide for a road to be closed off from 10 am to 10 pm, but a security guard could determine that, on a particular day, the road could be reopened an hour earlier.

An ATTRO’s ability to confer discretion on a constable may be utilised, in particular, to enable a police officer manning a barrier or gate that has closed off a road to exercise his or her discretion to allow accredited vehicles or persons through that barrier or gate. Subsection (9)(c) would enable another authorised person to exercise such discretion. I suppose that that is where I differ from the hon. Member for Torfaen. I want our police officers to be in a lead position at events. Freeing up constables from checking passes at barriers and handing that responsibility to a security guard enables them to better use their powers at an event. That is why we are keen to give that discretion to constables.

The clause will place on a statutory footing the power of the police to deploy obstructions to enforce compliance with temporary traffic restrictions imposed under section 67 of the 1984 Act. That section empowers the police to deploy temporary traffic restrictions in exceptional circumstances linked to the prospect of terrorism, and to deploy signs on the road indicating what those restrictions are. Those powers currently only relate to vehicular traffic, so the clause will apply them to pedestrian traffic.

[Gavin Newlands]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; indeed, I am heartened. If it makes any difference to his consideration, I am not concerned in the slightest whether he picks the Scottish or Welsh drafting—or the third way he will no doubt find—to amend the clause. With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fifth sitting)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Apparently the room was locked. We shall try to track things down for you, Mr Hoare.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move a manuscript amendment, in paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (d) of the order of the Committee of 26 June, leave out “and 2.00 pm”.

It is a delight to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Main. Following discussions through the usual channels, it was proposed not to sit on Thursday afternoon. Accordingly, I have moved a motion to amend the programme resolution.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 14

Traffic regulation

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 14, page 16, line 33, leave out from “authorise” to “to” in line 34, and insert “another constable”.

It is a pleasure to serve under you as Chair this afternoon, Mrs Main. I rise in unusual circumstances, because the Minister responded to parts of the amendment this morning, so I can anticipate some of the response. The amendment relates to proposed new subsection (5)(d) in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, in subsection (9)(c), which is the part of the clause that will empower a constable in connection with anti-terrorism regulation orders, or ATTROs. I am moving the amendment simply to draw some clarity from the Minister.

The explanatory note states that

“it might be left to a security guard or steward to determine when a provision of an ATTRO is to commence or cease operating on a given day”.

I can see the common sense in that. For example, where a particular restriction has a set number of hours and everyone has gone, it would be in everyone’s interest to have somebody on the ground who can say, perhaps an hour before the specified time, that the restriction is being brought to an end. What might be more problematic, however, is situations arising all over the country—for example, where a security firm or otherwise has taken on responsibility for particular things—where broad, strategic decisions are taken out of the police’s hands and put into the hands of different bodies that may be applying them inconsistently.

Will the Minister set out the balance? There is nothing wrong with making common-sense decisions on the ground in a limited way, and if that is what is envisaged, as it seems to be from the explanatory notes, I would be satisfied by that explanation. What I would be less in favour of is a lot of inconsistency around the country or for common-sense decisions on the ground to perhaps interfere with the overall strategy for these events, which I would expect to be in the hands of the police.

[Mr Wallace]

I hear the hon. Gentleman’s concerns. The key part of this provision, reflecting my earlier answers, is that it hands the constable the right to exercise his or her discretion about when to effectively delegate or allow the power to be used. I would trust the judgment of the police commanders I know—for example, Neil Basu, the counter-terrorism lead—to make that call in those situations. It is important to recognise that we do not want highly trained police officers with powers to be inappropriately used for something that a security guard, a steward or somebody else could do, which would be a better use of their time. I trust their discretion and think that the constable will get it right.

Most such events are properly planned. Where there has been an ATTRO, it will predominantly be because of a specific threat, or certainly enough threat to warrant it, which will clearly indicate a significant amount of deliberate planning, such that the local authority and, for example, the sporting event will be fully played into. I am therefore happy that that is where we are and we can allow those police officers to be used better.

I assure the hon. Gentleman that, all the way through, this is as much about the discretion of chief officers and local authorities in being able to police events properly, with the health warning that this is not to be used as a charging mechanism. It is thought that on average an ATTRO will cost between about £3,500 and £10,000, with approximately 90% of the cost usually going on ATTRO advertising. I do not think that is a significant impact. In fact, where an ATTRO is needed, the cost will sometimes fall on the Crown. I suspect that, for the Commonwealth summit at Lancaster House for example, the required costs will effectively mean Government paying Government.

I do not think we should remove the ability of a constable to delegate where they need to. That is the best way to get the correct policing and the right resources to the right event and also, perhaps, to limit the cost impact on some of these events. I would not want them to be unduly restricted. That is the thinking behind this part of the legislation, and I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Detention of terrorist suspects: hospital treatment

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wallace]

I want to speak to clause 16 because I am conscious that, even if no amendments are tabled, some parts of the Bill are important and the concerns that we heard in evidence should be reflected. Even if hon. Members on both sides of the Committee agree with the provision, it is important that those on the outside can hear some of our justification.

The clause amends the Terrorism Act 2000 to exclude time spent in, and travelling to and from, hospital from the calculation of the time a suspect spends in pre-charge detention. General criminal law has long recognised that it is appropriate to pause the detention clock so that the time an individual spends in pre-charge detention does not include any time they are receiving hospital treatment or travelling to or from hospital, in the relatively rare cases where a detainee needs hospital treatment.

At present, the calculation of the maximum period of pre-charge detention for an individual arrested under the 2000 Act makes no allowance for any time spent by the suspect receiving hospital treatment. Consequently, if a suspect were to be injured or fall ill in custody, the amount of time available to the police to interview the suspect would be reduced. That could impair the police investigation and prevent a proper decision from being reached on whether to charge the individual before they must be released. They could therefore evade justice and the public could be put at risk.

The change will ensure that the police can use the full amount of time permitted to them under the law to question a suspect, investigate the suspected offence, and work with the Crown Prosecution Service to reach a charging decision. Terrorist investigations are often exceedingly complex and can involve a high level of risk to the public. As such, it is important that the police are able to investigate fully and get such decisions right.

The change will also apply to the calculation of the maximum time for which an individual may be detained for the purpose of examination under schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, which stands at six hours including the initial hour during which a person may be examined without being detained. That will give effect to a recommendation made by the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, QC, and will bring the provisions of the 2000 Act in line with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

Retention of biometric data for counter-terrorism purposes etc

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 14, in schedule 2, page 26, line 5, leave out paragraph 2.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North referred to an example. I said at the time of hearing the evidence that it was remarkable that, as the witness was speaking, a verdict was returned in a trial of an individual who was arrested on Whitehall with three knives on him. It is our strong belief that he had been planning to carry out an attack and was en route to do so. The evidence that was used to help to convict that individual was based on biometrics taken from a number of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan four or five years ago. In fact, he subsequently admitted that he had taken part in the manufacture of 300 IEDs in Afghanistan.

Those biometrics were taken from a schedule 7 stop and retained, and the consequence was that he was convicted. If we had not been able to hold some of those biometric data for longer than two or maybe three years, I am not sure that that individual would have been convicted last week. We should reflect on the fact that not only was that individual seriously dangerous, he was probably on his way to attack people around this building, Downing Street and Whitehall, right in the heart of our democracy and what we hold so dear.

Like it or not, DNA is a successful part of the process. It is often what we need to convict people. Terrorist offences are often highly complex—there are huge amounts of encryption. The ability for us to use communications alone to prosecute people is getting harder and harder. Forensics are very often the key, and DNA forensics are incredibly important.

[Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)]

If that individual was convicted and arrested under the current legislative framework, why do we need this further change?

[Mr Wallace]

First, if his DNA had been taken under a schedule 7 stop longer than three years ago, it would not have been available. Secondly, we were fortunate that the United States had taken the DNA swabs in Afghanistan because it had a longer retention policy and was therefore available for us to exchange.

[Nic Dakin]

Going back to the evidence from Richard Atkinson, he said,

“any extension of time periods needs to be justified by objective evidence.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 32, Q76.]

Is the Minister saying that there is further objective evidence to support his argument?

[Mr Wallace]

The point is that if it is okay to hold it for three years—I did not get an answer from Liberty about whether it believed in holding any data—I do not see the justification for why it cannot be five years. If in principle retention of data is acceptable to people when someone is arrested for a terrorist offence but not charged or convicted, surely if three years are okay, why not four, and if four, why not five? Five years give us that extra time and some of these investigations take a lot of time.

I also refer the hon. Gentleman to the key quote by Paul Wiles, the Biometrics Commissioner. As I said on Second Reading, we have included lots of recommendations from the independent reviewers. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North himself says we should listen to the commissioner and the independent reviewers. The Biometrics Commissioner said in his annual report 2017: “NSDs”—that is when a police chief decides under the national security determination that biometric data of an individual is required—

“are being reviewed at two yearly intervals as Parliament intended. For some NSD cases…my judgment”—

not ours—

“is that the evidence/intelligence against the relevant individuals is such that they could be granted for longer than two years.”

The Biometrics Commissioner is recommending extending the two or three years, not shutting it down to one year or whatever. We have listened to that and we have looked at our intelligence case load. We know there are people in Syria right now and we do not know when they are coming back. We would like to have the provision of potentially being able to match them to a crime. The first main flush of people going to fight for Daesh was in 2014. We do not know how long they may be out there. They do not come back in bus loads, they come back in trickles, and this mechanism is an important tool for us. I am afraid that the amendments would prevent us from doing that and the Government cannot support them. For that reason, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Nic Dakin]

The Minister is making a strong case for extending the period. It is not clear why it is five years, rather than, as he says, six years, four years or three years. He also recognises that it should be a limited period and that the time should run out at some point, which is welcome. Will he deal with the issue of retaining biometrics from people who have not been charged or found guilty of committing any offence?

[Mr Wallace]

TACT—Terrorism Act 2000—offenders’ data can be retained if a national security determination is made by a police chief irrespective of whether or not they have been convicted. If someone is convicted of any offence—certainly a serious offence or terrorist offence; I will seek guidance as to whether this applies to a minor offence—their DNA data can be detained for a much longer period, if not indefinitely. This mainly concerns people who have been arrested but not convicted. That is why this measure is important. It is specifically aimed at the more serious offences of terrorism. One of the other challenges in the law is that if someone is arrested under PACE, it may be for terrorism, but it might not be for a terrorist offence. What someone is arrested for defines the subsequent powers that we have. We would like to match that to allow a PACE arrest to lead into us retaining that data.

To give the hon. Member for Scunthorpe some reassurance, the Biometrics Commissioner will review this. If he feels next year or the year after that we are holding data for too long or for too little time, no doubt the Government of the day, as the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North says, would be wise to listen to those recommendations, return to the House and do something about it. That is why we have these independent reviewers, tribunals or whatever they are making a judgment on us. Any responsible Government will listen to their advice.

[Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)]

Clearly there is an issue of trying to balance liberty and security. One of the points that the written evidence from Liberty pushes is that

“the retention of innocent people’s DNA has a disproportionate impact on people from BAME backgrounds. Estimates vary, but it has been projected that between a half and three-quarters of young black men have had their DNA stored on the DNA Database.”

What is the Minister’s view on this?

[Mr Wallace]

I would need to see whether Liberty means people convicted or people arrested but not convicted. If people are convicted of offences, it does not matter what their background is. They are convicted of an offence and their data is stored.

[Afzal Khan]

They are not convicted.

[Mr Wallace]

In the terrorist space, it would reflect the threat of the day. Undoubtedly, at the moment the single biggest threat to us going about our lives in the United Kingdom is from Daesh/al-Qaeda. There is our proscription of National Action and a growth in the number of people from the neo-Nazi far right. If we had had a DNA database in the ’80s, the vast amount of the DNA would probably have been from those of Irish descent linked to Irish nationalist and loyalist terrorism. I am afraid the database reflects the threat of the moment. Nearly all the terrorist operations I have ever seen are intelligence-led—they are not rustled up. It is a thoughtful, deliberate process. I do not think the database is indiscriminate or that it targets people based on their black and minority ethnic background. It is just a reflection of the threat we face at the moment, and I suspect that it will shift. In 10 years’ time, the hon. Gentleman and I might be standing here talking about another section of society. In the north-east of England, far-right referrals to Channel outstrip Islamist referrals. If that were to feed into the terrorist threat, in a few years’ time we may see a greater amount of DNA retained from white British people in the north-east.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I will try not to.

I will put the case for amendment 33, as I started to do in the last series of amendments. The amendment squarely aims at striking an appropriate balance between liberty and security. Two circumstances are highlighted. The first is when there has been a mistake, which can happen, such as a mistake involving identity, place or any material fact—or in the intelligence, which can also happen, as the security Minister would accept. The second circumstance is when a person has been arrested but not charged for the offence. My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton referred to the impact on the BAME community, which fits precisely into that category—people who do not end up being charged with an offence.

The amendment states that an application can be made to the commissioner for the destruction of data when the conditions are met. On receiving the appeal, the commissioner must seek representations from the chief officer of police in the area from which the biometrics data was taken as to whether it should be destroyed or not. Even if there is an appeal by an individual to the commissioner, that additional sub-paragraph means that the chief officer of police can make representations, which seems to strike a balance between the two. The individual person has the right, but if there are background concerns, the chief officer of police can make those representations.

There would also be a period of three months in which to determine the appeal, which is a reasonable period for collecting the necessary data from the chief officer of police and for consideration. Of course, there will be circumstances in which appeals will be turned down on that basis, but none the less it provides a framework. If people’s data is being retained in circumstances where a mistake has been made or when they have not ultimately been convicted of an offence, they can appeal to have it taken away, but that safeguard of representations from the chief officer of police remains. In those circumstances, I commend the amendment as a reasonable way through what I accept is a difficult problem.

[Mr Wallace]

The amendment provides for a person whose fingerprints and DNA profiles are retained under a power amended by schedule 2 to apply to the Biometrics Commissioner for the data to be deleted, if the commissioner has not previously authorised its retention. The grounds on which data might be deleted are if the individual was arrested or charged as a result of a mistake, for example mistaken identity, or if they were arrested but not subsequently charged.

In so far as the amendment relates to cases of mistaken identity, I am happy to inform the hon. Member for Torfaen that existing legislation already directly addresses this issue, and in fact provides a stronger safeguard than he is proposing. Section 63D(2) of PACE states that biometric data must be deleted by the police without the individual needing to appeal if it was taken where

“the arrest was unlawful or based on mistaken identity.”

This aspect of his amendment is therefore unnecessary, although I wholly support the principle behind it.

In so far as the amendment relates to cases where the individual was arrested lawfully and no mistakes were made but they were not subsequently charged, similar ground was covered by previous amendments. One of these amendments would have removed from the Bill—in its entirety—measures providing for an automatic retention period following arrest under PACE on suspicion of terrorist offences. I have already set out why those measures are appropriate and necessary, and I am pleased that the Committee did not pursue those earlier amendments. For a similar reason, I cannot support this amendment.

I have already said that the Bill does not depart from the principle established by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 in that the biometric data of a person who has been arrested but not charged should no longer be retained indefinitely in most cases, as it used to be. In passing that legislation in 2012, Parliament rightly recognised that it is appropriate and in the public interest for biometric data to be retained for limited periods in certain circumstances in the absence of conviction. One such circumstance is where a person is arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of being a terrorist but is not subsequently charged. Under current law, there is an automatic three-year retention period. Anything beyond this requires a national security determination to be made by the chief officer of police and approved by the Biometrics Commissioner. Schedule 2 makes equivalent provision for a case where the same person is arrested on suspicion of the same terrorist activity but under the general power of arrest in PACE. The flexibility to use either power of arrest—TACT or PACE—is open to the police and is a decision that will be taken based on operational considerations. It is a current gap that the same biometrics retention rules do not follow the two powers of arrest in terrorism cases despite the fact that there may otherwise be no material difference between the two cases. Schedule 2 attempts to close that gap.

I fully support the well-established principle that biometric data should be automatically deleted following a mistaken or unlawful arrest, but I cannot agree that we should overturn the equally well-established principle that there should be a limited period of automatic retention following a lawful and correct arrest on suspicion of terrorism. There are many reasons why a charge may ultimately not be brought in such circumstances. The individual might have been quite reasonably suspected and there might be extensive intelligence to indicate that they pose a very real threat, but if it is not possible to produce that intelligence in an open court, for example, or if it comes from intercept or from sensitive sources which we cannot put at risk then it cannot be used to support a prosecution.

Although the person will therefore be quite rightly treated as innocent as a matter of law, that does not mean that the police can simply wash their hands of them and take no further action to protect the public. It is right that there should be a limited, automatic period during which their fingerprints and DNA profile can be retained so that the police can identify their involvement in any further suspected terrorist activity. If there is no information to suggest that they pose a threat at the end of this limited period, then it will be neither necessary nor proportionate to seek a national security determination to authorise its ongoing retention, and the data will have to be deleted. This approach strikes the right balance. Although I appreciate the spirit of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, it would shift that balance and raise a number of difficulties.

Given the limited automatic retention period in question and the need for both a chief officer of police and the Biometrics Commissioner to approve any further retention, it is not necessary to introduce an additional review of the case in advance of the one that would occur at three years. Existing safeguards ensure the proportionality. The Biometrics Commissioner has not raised a concern about them in the case of TACT arrests and they have not been found to infringe disproportionately on the rights of suspects. To add an additional review would place an unnecessary and disproportionate burden on both the police and the Biometrics Commissioner. A more fundamental issue is that it would be difficult to have a meaningful and transparent application process in which the reasons for decisions could be provided to applicants. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment does not specify the criteria by which the Biometrics Commissioner might consider an application from a terror suspect, but presumably it would be the same as the test for retaining the data under a national security determination: that it is necessary and proportionate to do so. The Biometrics Commissioner and his staff have the necessary security clearance to make such a consideration on the basis of all relevant information, including sensitive intelligence.

In cases of the kind I have alluded to, where intelligence clearly suggests that a person poses a risk but it cannot be adduced in open court to support a prosecution, that would prevent the individual from being informed of the reasons for any decision to reject their application. It would also prevent any judicial review of the rejection of their application from being heard in open court. To do so could compromise sensitive sources of information and could reveal the extent of intelligence coverage of the individual. The simple fact of a decision to retain or delete the data could reveal the existence or absence of a hitherto covert investigation into them, and could indicate the level of the police’s interest in their activities. Such information could clearly be valuable to an active terrorist, as it could allow them to disguise their activities and avoid intelligence coverage, or it could provide assurance that the authorities are not aware of their activities. That would simply not be in the public interest and would strike the wrong balance. It would make such an application scheme very difficult to operate in practice. For those reasons, I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huq]

What I would say is that the hon. Gentleman needed to bear with me and hear what I was going to say as I developed my argument. I had barely finished my first sentence. If he bears with me, I will give examples of other communities, too—not just Muslims, of course. We do not want this to be a cover for people to do their illicit deeds. If he will bear with me, I would like to continue.

I would like to give two observations from the coalface to the Minister. Both the Minister and the shadow Minister go and see these projects all the time, I am sure. In the last week and a half, without my trying, I have come across two examples in our Prevent team at Ealing Council—the London borough of Ealing gets quite a lot of funding for this. The first example was the week before last. I had convened an interfaith meeting at our town hall. I go to a lot of civic services, because we have two synagogues, two mosques, loads of churches, Baha’is and all sorts of faith groups, and they all talk to me, but they do not talk to each other. My idea, therefore, was to bring them together in a room to see what sort of things they are doing—food banks and other services—but it is not a theological group. I had the Prevent officer there, but she was rounded on by some Muslims from one of our mosques, who said that Ealing council is getting a reputation for being Islamophobic. One group, MEND—it stands for Muslim Engagement and Development, and I have met some of its members in Parliament—had wanted to hold a meeting at the town hall, but had been banned by the Prevent team because red flags had been raised about it after a Channel 4 “Dispatches” documentary. I think the programme was called “Who Speaks for British Muslims?”

Banning the group was seen as an overreaction, because the programme was just a bit of shoddy and sensationalist journalism. There are always bad apples in any group—as in any political party, because we can be umbrellas for different interests—but people felt that it was a bit much to ban the group MEND, whose aim is to combat Islamophobia. People from MEND have been in this building, Portcullis House, to see me. They gave me a whole dossier, and were anticipating the attack, saying, “We’ve got a point-by-point rebuttal of the programme, which is coming out next week.” Again, that gave Prevent a bad name.

Sometimes these groups form an alphabet soup of acronyms, and some of them are a bit voguish and flavour of the month. The poor Prevent officer at my meeting had all these people saying, “Ealing council is Islamophobic”, and, although Channel and all the other bits deal with the far right and so on, perhaps Prevent falls disproportionately on Muslims. That is why a review is a good idea, and that is all my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen is asking for—a sensible review to take stock and to see whether the strategy is working.

My second example is from this weekend when I was at the Somali Advice and Development Centre which was celebrating receiving a Queen’s award. This SADC group in my constituency, which actually operates borough-wide, channels people away not only from extremism but from criminal activities generally—at the weekend the group was talking about knife crime a lot. Again, the Prevent officer was at the celebration. A young Somali girl said to me, in hushed tones, that Prevent did not trust them at all, not as far as it could throw them. She even works for the local authority in another guise, so she is a public servant, but she mentioned another group, Cage—the one that deals with prisoners—and said that she would rather deal with it than Prevent any day. Cage dealt with Moazzam Begg. Again, the Prevent officer’s face dropped, saying, “No, that’s on our banned list.”

[Mr Wallace]

I have listened to and understand the hon. Lady’s case. Much of what she says is genuine, but before she goes down the Cage line, she is right that there are groups and groups. I do not want her to wander inadvertently into thinking that Cage is some small representative of prisoner groups. The leadership of Cage praised Jihadi John as an individual before a Committee of this House. If there is one group that seeks to undermine Prevent for the wrong reasons—there are people who oppose Prevent for perfectly valid reasons—it is Cage, which would take the view that it is anti-state. Cage wants nothing from the state, including Prevent. It is one of the groups, similar to some of the far-right groups, that would like us to have a less integrated society and less of a common-values platform. She is perfectly right to express other concerns, but she should be cautious about Cage. I would never say that I would rather deal with Cage than Prevent. It would be a slippery slope.

[The Chair]

Before I call the hon. Lady to resume her remarks, I remind the Committee that at the beginning of the sitting I said that if comments were wide ranging, we would not have a clause stand-part debate. Given that she is ranging quite widely from the wording of the amendment, I shall probably not have a separate clause stand part, so she should be mindful of that as she carries on with her remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

Getting this right is at the heart of the challenge to our society and communities. People recognise that a lot of good work is going on. The challenge is to maintain trust, because we have a tradition of policing by consent. Whenever I meet the police, they tell me that when they have the eyes, ears and intelligence of the community, they can do so much more to keep that community safe. There is no other area where this is more important, which is why we need a proper review drawing on strengths and learning lessons, so that we can be even stronger in trust going forward, to ensure that we deliver for all our communities a good answer to Assistant Commissioner Basu’s challenge. The challenge—to all of us—of radicalisation is such an important thing to get right.

[Mr Wallace]

These Committees can be quite dry. We talk about, for example, “subsection (5), paragraphs (d) and (e)”. I am grateful to the Chair for her flexibility in merging the amendments with the stand part debate so that we can have a proper discussion about Prevent. Members of Bill Committees are often encouraged by the usual channels not to engage so much, and it is welcome that that has not been the case with the Bill. I am very keen that the Committee is about airing people’s policy initiatives, challenging the Government, helping to bring forward legislation that we all agree with and, I hope, doing the best job we can. That is what I have done in clause 3 and matters of public order.

I will let the Committee into a secret. The secret of Prevent is that we are always reviewing Prevent. It is a dynamic, evolving policy. It started under the former Labour Government, it has evolved and, as the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton said, it has moved a long way. It has adapted to the threat. In many parts of the country, it has become about tackling far right extremism. It is a maturing but evolving policy that is always reviewed. That is what I see as a Minister working with all the stakeholders. Prevent has to adapt and move, but I do not believe that there is a requirement for an independent reviewer effectively to take a snapshot in time of it.

I say that because of a number of measures that have been taken in the last two years since I have been the Minister to try to build that confidence in Prevent. First, we published the figures. When I started as a Minister, no one published Prevent figures or discussed it. I have been very keen to do that in order to demonstrate that Prevent is—

[The Chair]

Order. I am sorry, but it is rather discourteous to the Minister to be passing round wine gums. [Interruption.] Order. I will call the Minister again and I hope those wine gums will have disappeared.

[Mr Wallace]

We need a Prevent strategy on wine gums. The importance of publishing the data is to indicate how Prevent fits into broader safeguarding, putting it into perspective and challenging a number of the myths. How it fits into broader safeguarding is in the simple numbers: 7,000 Prevent referrals a year, of which just over half are youths under the age of about 25, I think, compared with 621,000 safeguarding referrals every year from teachers, social workers and health clinicians when dealing with everything from sexual and domestic abuse to a wider range of other types of safeguarding. So it is not the mass spying exercise that some critics allege it is.

[Dr Huq]

Taking on board the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark that those categories were stratified, taking account of some mental health issues, the Exeter Giraffe would-be nail bomber Nicky Reilly had quite serious Asperger’s syndrome. The inquest has not been done, but he has since died in Manchester prison. He was a convert, and that is something else that concerns me. The point has been made to me that a lot of these famous cases involve converts, including Richard Reid the shoe bomber; and Khalid Masood, who attacked us here in Westminster, was born Adrian. Converts and mental illness are an issue.

[Mr Wallace]

I would be happy to talk to the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton afterwards about the details of terrorists’ profiles rather than the Prevent element, but I would be ruled out of order if I wandered into that. The main issue about the Prevent duty was that within the numbers, we obviously see a significant number of young people. We see more people who are vulnerable, depending on the type of attack in which they are involved. To answer part of the point that the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton made, there is a higher number of significant mental health issues in lone wolves than there is in complex attack planners. Going back to the point about being vulnerable and radicalised and groomed in streaming: they may be loners, they may be on their own, and they may not have a wide friends network. We certainly see that.

The other reason I wanted to publish the data was to counter some of the myths, including the myth of there being a widespread spying operation. Clearly, Prevent is not that, if you compare it with the wider safeguarding of hundreds of thousands. Another part of the Prevent programme was to show that some of the myths peddled are the enemies of the myths themselves. They get repeated time and again, and people say, “Well there is a perception problem and we have to have a review” or, “There’s something wrong with it.”

Two of the big current myths doing the rounds are: “I live in a terraced house”, about a referral in Lancashire. It was not a Prevent referral; the statement was in fact, “I live in a terraced house and my uncle beats me”. It was a domestic abuse referral and it never went near a Prevent officer or a police officer, but you will hear the likes of CAGE peddle that every single week and month, as well as some people who do not want to check their facts. Another myth refers to a child in Bedford caught playing with a toy gun, the mother arrived and apparently there was a great Prevent operation. That was not a Prevent referral at all. One of the strongest myths—I am afraid the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton repeated it—is that the Prevent guidance issued by the Home Office includes things like someone going to a mosque and someone with a beard. That is categorically not part of the training package, and not part of the Home Office information at all. It is however part of the propaganda spouted by CAGE in reference to what Prevent is about.

[Dr Huq]

Will the Minister look into the materials put out by the London borough of Hillingdon? It may not be Home Office guidance, but somewhere in the food chain it has been told to me that that is what they are pumping out.

[Mr Wallace]

Have you seen it?

[The Chair]

Order. This is way beyond the scope of the amendment, and even ranges way beyond the debate we said we would have. I will bring the Minister back to his comments and maybe he can respond to the hon. Member later.

[Mr Wallace]

It is important to talk about whether we need a review. I say that we do not need a review because a lot of the perception issues out there are peddled by myths rather than facts. When you start to examine the facts, you realise that there is an element of Chinese whispers. People go round and round in circles and everyone else is now in a space in which people are confirming facts that are not facts, and the myth is undermining the policy in itself. If you look at the core of where some of these myths come from, it is from the enemies of Prevent, not people with a genuine worry about Prevent.

[Afzal Khan]

The point I am trying to get across is that there are major organisations that are not buying it. I gave two examples to the Minister: the Muslim Council of Britain and 500-plus affiliate organisations across the country, and the Muslim Women’s Network, which is the largest organisation of its kind. What steps are you taking to make sure that they buy into this? We need that.

[The Chair]

I am sure the Minister will answer, not me.

[Mr Wallace]

The first step was to publish the information, discuss it with whomever we liked and ensure the Prevent statistics are all out there. They show that a large number of referrals into the Channel programme came from the far right and that this is a safeguarding policy for the benefit of us all, whether Muslim, middle class, in a community or diaspora. We know that the way people are being radicalised and the groomers doing it have no worries about following traditional routes. They will go wherever they can to groom victims.

The important thing about publishing that is to show those communities, to ask the hon. Gentleman to say to the MCB or others, “Look, here are the statistics. Here is what Prevent is doing in the north-east of England to prevent the extreme right wing dividing our community. Here are the actual numbers.”

That is the first step. The second step is broader engagement. I met the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton last week when he raised the issue of the MCB and others. I am open to examining some of the suggestions about how much we engage with many of those groups. I represent north Preston but, in a sense, I am not fussed where people come from; I am interested in where people are going.

There are some groups I am aware of—I have named CAGE—to which I do not want to give the credibility of a meeting, so that they can spout what they do. I know their agenda and it does not benefit the communities they say they represent. That is the way it is. There are other groups I would be happy to meet; I know some of them are taking strong steps. Going back to the Prevent review requirement, it is interesting that when many of those groups espouse their “Prevent”—what they would do—it is the same. It might not be called Prevent but it is the same; it is safeguarding.

I said the reason we do not review is because Prevent is always evolving; we are always reviewing it in a sense. There are measures in the Bill to broaden Prevent to include more input from local authorities. It is not just a police-led initiative. It would allow local authorities to be part of the process. We have to start the process by saying communities are often and strongly represented by their local authorities and the local authorities should be able to shape that.

That goes to the observation of several Opposition Members that Prevent is working in some parts though not so well in others. That is all about the characteristics of the community, how it has approached Prevent and its background. I find more settled Muslim communities much more engaged in Prevent than very new communities, which are worried about any kind of state because they have probably come from a state that oppressed them.

In Kirklees, Lancashire, where I was not long ago, they are very happy to be engaged. In Scotland, they have done some amazing stuff around broadening delivery of community safety. We should all learn from the knife crime work they have done in Glasgow. Budgets have been just as restricted and tough but they have managed to deliver successes. We want that to evolve.

I spoke to Andy Burnham not long ago. He is doing a review that is out soon on effective community cohesion and that impact. Appointing a reviewer of something that is moving and evolving, on a subject that is working the vast majority of the time, is not what is required at this moment. Yes, we should all do more work in separating the myth from the reality, for example, the myth I have heard that if someone has a beard they will be referred to Prevent. I believe if we do that we demonstrate the success: 500 people have come through Channel. People go into Channel when there are serious concerns about them and, out the other end of Channel, in two years, they are no longer of concern. That is 500 people who were a real threat to our safety and security on the streets. Those were not peripheral people but ones we had real concern about. It took one person to attack Westminster bridge; think of the impact that had.

I understand the position about having a review. I am delighted we no longer hear much, “Let’s get rid of the Prevent duty.” Some 12 months ago, that was the call from a lot of people; now we are talking about review.

[Dr Huq]

I am listening to what the Minister is saying about the statistical evidence to counter the myths and all that stuff. If he is dead set against an independent review, does he accept the point that if some of these Muslim groups felt they had a hand in the design, they would feel less that they were being picked on? The ones I have spoken to feel that there are a lot of converts who are all being tarred with the same brush, and it is not them.

[Mr Wallace]

I am open to the hon. Lady’s suggestion. In fact, where Prevent works best already, those communities do help. In parts of Birmingham there are some good examples where those communities have helped to shape Prevent with the local Prevent co-ordinator, and it has a really good impact. I am completely pragmatic about how we design Prevent below the national level of the Government and about how it is delivered. On the point made by other colleagues about funding, I understand the pressure on funding. That is why the pilots we are looking at have a multi-agency approach, which again will broaden it out. The Home Office will fund those three pilots centrally, so it is not a pressure on the local authority.

A review of Prevent is not necessary. There are a lot of other things to do with Prevent, to improve it and evolve it, but I do not think that reviewing it is right. There are a lot of statutory bodies already out there. The lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism could, I am sure, do a review if she wants to: she is the lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism. There are independent commissioners out there who can look at these things from outside. Andy Burnham is undertaking a strong review.

[Afzal Khan]

First, the Minister uses the figure of 500, which we welcome, if we have been able to achieve that, but that figure of 500 is from over 9,000. If we look at the ratio, it is 1:18. Does he not want to see more improvement than that? Secondly, what is the loss if we have a proper review?

[Mr Wallace]

My rebuttal to that would be: what is the gain? What would the reviewer do? Yes, we can be more accurate; we can reduce from 7,000 referrals to fewer, but what is interesting is that in the two years of the published figures we see exactly that. Prevent is evolving; we are seeing better reporting and we are seeing the sections of society that are and are not reporting. We see exactly the same proportions that we see in wider safeguarding referrals. In Prevent, 30% of the 7,000 need other safeguarding. They do not need to go to Prevent for terrorism purposes, but they go into other safeguarding for domestic abuse or something else. That is exactly the same percentage as we see in the wider safeguarding. If Prevent is the entrance to getting my children better safeguarding, I am happy with that. If somebody is taking an interest in behaviour or actions being inflicted on a child or vulnerable person, I do not mind whether the person who spots it is a Prevent officer or a safeguarding officer; we just want it to be dealt with.

The hon. Gentleman is right that these figures allude to Prevent’s accuracy, but they also allude to its success, in my book. That is the first start point. A review that is frozen in time is not necessary when Prevent is starting to have real success. The Government think that people realise that it is for all of us and not just for the Muslim community. It is for all of us.

I will finish the point about the review by saying that I spoke recently to the headmaster of a pupil referral unit in one of the toughest parts of Lancashire. He had a 15-year-old boy who was referred for neo-Nazi, far-right extremism. The Prevent team came in and the boy is now in mainstream further education college, with a multi-ethnic group of friends, doing his higher-level qualifications. If hon. Members know anything about pupil referral units, they will know that very rarely do 15-year-olds move out of them. The headmaster said to me, “Give me Prevent every time; I wish I had it for the broader spectrum of troubled people.”

I am afraid I cannot agree with the Opposition that we need a review. I am happy to engage, to sell the policy more and to correct the perceptions, but I think a statutory review in the primary legislation is unnecessary.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I have three brief points. First, the Minister talked about myths. An independent review would assist in debunking those myths. Secondly, that a policy is evolving is not an argument against a review—otherwise, hardly any Government policies could actually be reviewed. Thirdly, the Minister said that the policy is being internally reviewed in any event. Why not give those reviews independent status and the weight that would come from that? I will press my amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

You will be pleased to hear that this relates to a very narrow point, Mrs Main. The change made by the Bill to how the current programme relates to local authorities is very narrow: it will give them the ability to refer directly to the Channel programme without the necessity of going through the police. That is one of a number of measures simultaneously going on regarding local councils.

Without going off-point, I should briefly mention that data will be shared with local authorities, which is something that was separately announced by the Government. It is in that context that I put the amendment forward. I just want to raise a number of concerns, and I hope the Minister will be able to offer some reassurance.

The first regards the whole idea of data security for local authorities. I appreciate that, through safeguarding, local authorities already possess sensitive data—on childcare cases and matters like that, for example— but this is clearly data of a different category, and keeping it secure will be important on a number of levels. Secondly, will local authorities be appropriately trained to deal with this data when it is passed on to them?

My third point, which goes to the heart of my amendment, regards resources. I appreciate that the Minister does not yet run the Treasury and so is not in a position to simply hand out money, as it were—it is only a matter of time, I am sure. However, related to the whole debate on Prevent and the wider aspect of community cohesion is that there is no doubt that cuts to local councils have meant that childcare services and youth services have been substantially reduced. If we are to expect local authorities to do more on our counter-terror agenda, I suggest that they should have the resources to do so. It is on those points that I seek reassurance from the Minister.

[Mr Wallace]

The amendment would require the Home Secretary to review whether local authorities have sufficient resource and expertise to carry out their duties relating to Prevent. In responding, I will say a little about the work of the Channel programme, on which the Home Office works closely with local authorities to support individuals vulnerable to terrorism, before turning to local authorities’ wider work in carrying out the Prevent duty.

A Channel panel is chaired by the local authority and works with multi-agency partners collectively to assess the risk of an individual being drawn into terrorism and to decide whether an intervention is necessary. The police are a key partner in this process and currently provide dedicated resources to administer and manage it.

If a Channel intervention is required, the panel works with local partners to develop an appropriate, tailored support package. Any specialist ideological interventions are directly funded by the Home Office and have no resource implications for the local authority. The support package is monitored closely and reviewed regularly by the Channel panel. The current arrangements are that the work of Channel panels is resourced from existing local authority budgets, which is in line with other safeguarding programmes.

Project Dovetail is a pilot currently under way through which the Home Office directly funds posts that support the Channel panel process within local authorities and removes some of the case management functions from the police. This frees the police to concentrate on issues where their unique skills, powers and expertise are best used and brings Channel into greater alignment with other safeguarding processes in local authorities. As the Home Office is directly funding the additional posts, that should come at no additional cost to local authorities. The resource requirements will be carefully monitored to ensure they are adequate before rolling out the project any further.

This pilot has been key to identifying the need to make the change provided for in clause 18 and enable local authorities, as well as the police, to make the formal referral of an individual to a Channel panel once the initial assessment phase has concluded that there are genuine vulnerabilities the panel needs to discuss.

Prevent is implemented in a proportionate manner that takes into account the level of risk in any given area or institution. We recognise the fundamental importance of working in partnership with a range of partners, including local authorities, to reduce the risk of radicalisation in communities and to support vulnerable individuals. That is why we supported 181 community-based projects in 2017-18, reaching over 88,000 participants.

We have supported the roll-out of the Prevent duty—set out in section 29 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015—with guidance for each sector and a dedicated package of training for frontline staff in the NHS, universities and schools, and local authorities. Since 2011, Prevent training has been completed more than 1.1 million times. The delivery of Prevent is led locally and driven by analysis of the threat in communities. Local authorities are among the most vital partners in our network. The Prevent duty requires local authorities to establish or make use of existing multi-agency groups to assess the local picture, co-ordinate activity and put in place arrangements to monitor the impact of safeguarding work.

In priority areas, where the risk of radicalisation is assessed as being the highest, Prevent co-ordinators employed by local authorities—again, funded by the Home Office—build partnerships in communities, oversee the delivery of local action plans to respond to the risk of radicalisation, and work with partners to embed safeguarding activity in statutory services, including social care, health and education.

The threat from terrorism is shifting, and there are increasing concerns about the far right. We have seen local authorities rise to the challenge in order to tackle this threat. As I set out in response to the previous amendment, over 500 individuals have received Channel support since April 2015—that is 500 fewer potential people of danger on our streets. To my mind, that demonstrates the success local authorities have had in delivering Prevent and Channel—we should remember that local authorities chair the Channel panel, not the police—and shows they have the resources and training to deliver this effectively.

I thank the hon. Member for Torfaen for his amendment. I share his concern for protecting people who are vulnerable to terrorism and at risk of being drawn into violent and divisive ideology. I trust that I have been able to show that, as it stands, local authorities are able to fulfil this vital safeguarding role effectively with funding provided by the Home Office and that we keep the provision of that funding under close scrutiny to ensure that it is adequate to the task. Given that, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

While I appreciate the Minister’s reassurances, we will continue to hold the Government to account in other arenas on resourcing local authorities. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Simon Hoare]

The hon. Gentleman makes an apposite and valid point. My right hon. Friend the Minister will have heard it. I concur with it. I will not rise to speak in support of the probing nature of the hon. Gentleman’s other amendments, but I hope my right hon. Friend the Minister has taken the point about the need to talk to the Treasury and others responsible for City and insurance matters to ensure that we have a sector fit for purpose to both meet the security challenges and also—I see Clerks waving their hands as if I am saying something completely outrageous; I am not sure why. The Minister has heard what we have had to say.

[Mr Wallace]

I am very sympathetic to the aims of the amendment, and the clear issue that people who are going about their business not thinking about terrorism become victims. They run small businesses, and then without much ado they go through the terrible attack that we saw on London Bridge. Visiting people was amazing, and I pay tribute to the courage and bravery of the constituents of the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark. When individuals cut across the bridge and ran into people, the first thing the public did was run to help. The best of humanity came out that night, and also some of the worst. Not content with murdering people who came to help, the terrorists then embarked on an attack in Borough market, and we saw unarmed people challenging them and doing their best to make sure that they were not allowed to go any further. Then the police came and took very strong action.

I understand what the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark seeks to do, but I have to point out the difference between Pool Re and other insurance companies. Pool Re effectively insures insurers. It is not a customer-facing organisation where we make a claim against it. Individuals make a claim to an insurance company and that company goes to Pool Re, and under certain conditions the claim is paid out. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment would slightly change that relationship.

The amendment also does something that has been alluded to by Opposition Members. Our difference of opinion is about timing. The MIB, the Motor Insurance Bureau, is having a vote as we speak—a postal vote. Can we, as a Government, say to them, “Don’t worry, we’ll step in. Don’t worry about mutualising your risk”? That is ultimately where most countries solve that problem. It is where many other issues around niche insurance—it is pretty niche—is dealt with. The insurance industry mutually insures the risk out of its profits. I am often slightly frustrated by the insurance companies, but we should not forget that the risk of being involved in terrorism is tiny. I have raised this before. One by one, travel insurance companies have dropped covering counter-terrorism. The risk of it is very small and therefore the impact of standard cover for terrorism on profits will be minimal.

[Neil Coyle]

I appreciate that the risk to the individual of being involved in an attack is minimal, but we have been here before. The reason for Pool’s existence is the astronomical costs to insurers, as we saw in the case of the Provisional IRA attacks in the early ‘90s targeting physical infrastructure and not individuals. There were huge costs that the insurance market said it could not be expected to cover. That is why Pool exists. We are seeing a similar position emerge in motor insurance potentially, and the Minster is taking a slightly complacent attitude to that. If we saw—I very much hope we do not—a Nice-style large vehicle attack on civilians, those costs would be there and the insurance market would collapse.

[Mr Wallace]

That is why our preference is for those companies to mutualise their risk through their profits. As I said earlier, our challenge is perhaps a difference of opinion on timing. The MIB is having this vote, and if the Government were right now to indicate, “Don’t worry, we will take it out of Pool Re,” those insurance companies would feel less compelled to vote to mutualise that risk, not more. The Government will, for now, maintain the view that we step in when something is uninsurable and at the extreme of market failure. I do not think that now is the moment to indicate that somehow the MIB can pass it on to the system.

The hon. Gentleman refers to catastrophic losses and scale. Pool Re already covers that large pool of loss, to some extent. I would be interested to see the insurers’ calculations of the actuarial risk, if we extended it to personal injury through motor vehicle. Whether we like it or not, the catastrophic costs of the big IRA bombs, for example, were because of the scale of the truck bombs, which led to the sealing off of large parts of city centres of high retail value and high-expense property. That cost is extreme. He talks about Nice, but the current indication is that that scale of threat to people and personal injury is still very rare. The Government’s position is, therefore, that we would like the industry to mutualise that risk.

At the same time—this is good news—we are moving in the Bill to ensure that loss of business is covered by Pool Re. When areas are shut down, we think Pool Re has a role to play in that, and not enough has been done by the insurance companies. Perhaps it is a matter of timing that divides us, rather than what we both want to achieve. I will get on to timing at a later amendment. I am slightly thrown, because I think the timings have changed for the Committee.

[The Chair]

Order. The Committee finishes—

[The Chair]

No; it is the Whips who will decide.

[Mr Wallace]

I hear hon. Members’ concerns, but for that reason, and to see where we get to with the MIB and its vote, I ask that the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark does not press his amendment. We will explore what more can be done. I understand the concerns, especially about vehicles being used as weapons. I believe that our insurance companies, which are on the frontline in their relationship with customers, should deal with this risk. The Government should step in only if those companies fundamentally fail to do so.

[Neil Coyle]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

I ask that the Government extend coverage to 1 Jan last year, to retrofit the extension of cover. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic. If Ministers are unable to work with this very limited amendment, the Government must show what they will do. Will they produce a different means of reflecting on the losses and supporting those British businesses to ensure that terrorists cannot win? Will the Treasury build in a new cost to the public purse—a new compensation system—that ignores the viable alternative that is available now? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Mr Wallace]

I listened to the passion that the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark has about his constituency. I have heard similar passion from my colleague the hon. Member for Manchester Central (Lucy Powell), who also argued for such things after the arena attack.

I understand the challenges that businesses—especially small businesses—have faced, but this is one of those moments where the Government have to say difficult things. Retrospectively changing the terms of insurance would go far wider than the hon. Gentleman’s constituents. If we put in law a retrospective date, the unfortunate consequence would be that we would all pay—not for the particular issue that he has raised, but by adding risk to the insurance market, which is obviously what insurance products are based on. Insurance would never know whether at any moment the Government of the day might change the risk and table an amendment to set the date back in time. If it was not 1 January 2017, it could be the bomb damage we have seen over decades. Where would we draw the line?

[Neil Coyle]

As the Minister suggests, we draw the line at 1 January 2017 to acknowledge the unique circumstances faced by people who experienced terror attacks in our country last year, and the unique failure of the Government to address a gap that they knew about in advance.

[Mr Wallace]

I dispute the hon. Gentleman’s view of our failure to address the gap. If someone is a victim of another terrorist attack—even one that happened five years ago—they would quite rightly see it as completely unjust that their event, their damage, their loss of business or their injury was not deemed important enough to make it into the deadline of 1 January 2017. I spent my early life in places that were bombed and blown up, and I spent my early career with victims of terrorism. When I meet them, even to this day, they hold that loss to them personally. To say to them, “Yours isn’t valid, but others are,” would be deeply unfair.

[Neil Coyle]

But with respect, the Bill specifically deals with Pool Reinsurance and the Government’s extension to cover business interruption. That is all we are dealing with and that is why 1 January 2017 makes sense, as the amendment proposes.

[Mr Wallace]

The Government’s proposal in the Bill is about the future. It is about recognising, because of the lessons learned from attacks such as Borough market and the Manchester Arena, that the type of attack we are seeing now is having a major impact on business continuity and that the terrorism insurance market does not cover that enough in some areas. That is why we are taking action.

I wish I could do something about the past, and about people who did not have insurance or whose insurance companies were unreasonable, but the principle of the Government retrospectively putting that type of legislation in place would, I am afraid, have a significant impact on the insurance markets. I do not mean on their profits; I mean on us, as customers, who would understandably feel the change in risk profile. There are lots of other examples of losses, which are perhaps not as tragic as terrorism, but for which the constituents of many hon. Members would seek to claim for retrospective loss. It is not that I disagree with trying to help the victims of terrorism. It is just a simple fact about how our insurance market and the private sector work.

The principle of retrospective legislation means that it will not be possible for us to accept the amendment, not least because it raises the question of who would go and talk to all who were victims of terrorism in 2015, 2010, 1998 or 1992, when I lost 30% of my sight—would I get retrospective insurance? I am afraid that that is just the way we try to frame our legislation. The Government do not seek to denigrate people’s experiences in Borough market by saying no, but we must accept the way the insurance market and risk work. We seek to deal with that by trying to head off the problem in the future, but we cannot do it retrospectively for the last year.

Where we can, and where there are requests for financial assistance, I am happy to listen to the hon. Gentleman and help him to champion that cause, if he feels that he has not got any money for Borough market from the Government. I did the same for the hon. Member for Manchester Central and for Andy Burnham to ensure that we got the money for Manchester in that bigger pot and that No. 10 understood the importance of it. I am happy to take that on board.

[Neil Coyle]

Again, that comes back to the point and purpose of Pool Reinsurance. We have the system and funding in Pool Reinsurance to cover that event and others like it. Why would the Minister suggest a new compensation, a new tax, a new use of public money, a new job for the Government and new civil servants when there is an existing system that the amendment would allow to help to cover?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

Pool Re insures insurers. Because of the way in which Pool Re works, the amendment would effectively intervene in existing contracts made between insurers liable for additional risk, and customers. It is not customer-facing insurance; it is not a state version of Aviva or anyone else. That is one of our biggest challenges.

There are cases in which the Government seek to use grant money to help business rate relief. We gave money to Manchester, as I think we will to Salisbury, to help tourism, to help it get back on its feet and a whole load of other things. I think we gave Manchester £23 million to deal with that.

As the hon. Gentleman alluded to, some insurance companies have been quite helpful, but not all of them; some have paid out outside their remit. I agreed with him on Second Reading in hoping that Aviva would respond with flexibility. It has since written to me to say that, contrary to my comments, it had been flexible and paid out, even for people who did not have that part of terrorism insurance—although I do not think that affects people who did not have terrorism insurance. However, I should certainly put on the record that Aviva says it has been flexible.

The Government cannot retrospectively interfere in contracts between insurers and customers, which would be the amendment’s effect. I am afraid that is why we can only try to deal with this for the future. By doing so, we will hopefully make sure that future events like that at Borough market have a minimal impact on people and that the terrorists do not win. While I do not think it is likely, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment. I hope he understands that this is not about motives, but simply about the structure of the insurance market and the Government’s relationship to retrospective legislation.

[Neil Coyle]

In the debate on the last amendment, the Minister seemed to say that insurers need to up their game. On this amendment, he says that insurers must resolve again, despite there being outstanding claims. My constituents will note the Government’s muteness about their ability to help and to step in, even through this very limited amendment.

I cannot say that I am happy to withdraw my amendment at this stage, but I am hopeful that the Government will reconsider it as the Bill progresses. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Maynard.)

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Third sitting)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I am delighted to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan, on this hot Thursday morning. At the beginning, I want to refer to the importance of the Bill. As we sat listening to Liberty give evidence on Tuesday, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Mr Khalid Ali. He was convicted for being about to mount an attack on Whitehall last year. What is interesting is that his conviction was based on biometrics collected in Afghanistan four years ago and a schedule 7 stop at a point of entry to the UK that allowed us to collect those biometrics. If there was ever an ironic or coincidental time to show the importance of biometrics and schedule 7 in combating such deliberate, planned crime, this is it. That individual has since admitted to making 300 improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan. He was en route, we think, to pose a threat to either this House or the Downing Street-Whitehall area. That is a pertinent example, and we should reflect on it as we progress through the Bill.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Torfaen for raising his points. I fully recognise the spirit in which all Members have contributed to the Bill, which is to try to improve it. We want to deliver a Bill that will work and that does not impinge on freedom of speech or tackle the values we hold. It is about striking the balance between that necessity and keeping us safe and secure. The Bill is also about adapting to the moving threat, which is exactly what terrorists do. Good terrorists spot the flaws in our legislation and move to exploit them. Here I evoke Mr Choudary, who is currently at Her Majesty’s pleasure. For well over 10 years, he managed to skilfully exploit that bit about encouragement versus inspiration to send hundreds of people to their deaths—no doubt a number of them at their own hands. There were the young girls from north London—sometimes deluded, sometimes seduced or groomed—who I suspect did not really know what they were getting themselves into. That is why the Government think it important to try to address the gap.

Dealing effectively with the power of inspiration or incitement is not new. We have it in both the Public Order Act 1986 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which the last Labour Government brought in to try to deal with inspiration. Effectively, that meant that if someone incites the hatred of a race, they are guilty of an offence. They do not necessarily have to directly direct people to go out and attack Jewish or Muslim people; they can be found guilty of incitement. It is not a new concept in our law, and we are trying to reflect it in terms of those being inspired to join a proscribed terrorist organisation or take action. That at its heart is what clause 1 is trying to do.

A valid point was made about the issue of recklessness and that people must have regard to whether their comments are reckless. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), who is a practising criminal barrister, pointed out that recklessness is a well-established concept. He used an example, although in the physical assault space, of someone walking down a high street with a baseball bat and whanging it round someone’s head. It would not need to be proved that they went out to break someone’s jaw with a baseball bat. A direct motive or intent would not need to be proved; recklessness would be recognised and that person would probably be found guilty of assault, grievous bodily harm or actual bodily harm, depending on the severity of the hit with the baseball bat.

Recklessness is therefore well established, and I recognise what the hon. Member for Torfaen is trying to achieve. Amendment 1 would remove the recklessness element of the new subsection (1A) offence, which clause 1 inserts into section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and replace that with a mens rea requirement to prove that a person expressing an opinion or belief in support of a proscribed activity intended to influence another person to support the organisation rather than that they had been reckless as to whether that would be the result.

Amendment 2 would add a recklessness limb to the existing offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation at section 12(1) of the 2000 Act. I am alive to the concerns raised about the case and agree that it is a sensitive area in which we must tread carefully to ensure that the laws we pass are proportionate and go no further than necessary.

As the Security Minister, I am acutely aware of the need to ensure that those tasked with keeping us safe from a very real and serious terrorist threat have the powers they need. Those two imperatives are not mutually exclusive, and it is not an either/or question. However, measures such as this, which come closer than most laws to delicate issues such as the right to freedom of expression, can none the less bring the intersection between the two into sharp focus.

The Committee’s role is to consider whether the Bill strikes the right balance. I respect the contributions of the hon. Members for Torfaen and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, which were made in the spirit of improving the Bill. However, I must respectfully disagree with the hon. Member for Torfaen. His amendments would not merely moderate the clause or tip its balance in one direction or another; rather, they would entirely negate its intended effect such that it would have little—if any—impact on the current operation of section 12. As a result, a gap that has been clearly highlighted by the police, MI5 and the CPS in their ability to act against individuals who mean us harm would not be closed.

While the hon. Gentleman’s amendments are well intentioned, they would continue to leave a gap in the law and therefore put the public at unnecessary risk. I hope that the Committee will be persuaded of that if I explain in more detail the background to this measure, why it is necessary and how it will operate. Since 2000, it has been illegal to invite another person to support a proscribed terrorist organisation such as Daesh or the neo-Nazi group National Action, whether an invitation is explicit or implicit. What matters is that there is an invitation, which is to say a deliberate encouragement to someone to support the group.

I will not refer to the cases that the hon. Gentleman mentioned in pointing out the necessity of trying to close that gap. It is not always possible to prosecute individuals who make public speeches or otherwise express views in support of proscribed organisations if it cannot be proved that those statements amounted to deliberate invitations to others to support an organisation. That is the case even if a speech or statement is clearly inflammatory, clear about the individual’s support for the terrorist organisation and, on any reasonable assessment, likely to cause the audience to be influenced to support the organisation such that it would be reckless for the person to make such a statement.

As I have said, the police, MI5 and the CPS have been very clear that that represents a gap in our ability to prosecute people who may be engaged in radicalisation. That was clear in Tuesday’s evidence from Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu and Greg McGill from the Crown Prosecution Service. The clause will close that gap by amending section 12 of the 2000 Act so that it will be an offence for an individual to express support for a proscribed organisation if, in doing so, they are reckless as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support a proscribed organisation.

In recent years, the police and intelligence services have seen individuals progress—very quickly in some cases—from the initial stages of radicalisation to actual planning or carrying out of attacks. Such activities covered by this provision can have a powerful and a very harmful effect in initiating or moving along that process. It is therefore imperative that the police have the powers they need to intervene to stop such radicalisation from taking place. In that, they will not only protect potentially vulnerable individuals who are the target of the radicalisation from further harm, but possibly stop terrorist activity that stems from an individual who has been radicalised and indoctrinated, which could cause immense harm to the public.

We have discussed the case of Anjem Choudary. Numerous people who have appeared before the courts on trial for the most serious terrorism offences have been his associates or contacts and have been members of al-Muhajiroun. They have also attended meetings and lectures at which he has spoken or have otherwise been influenced by him. I could equally mention other preachers, such as Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza. I cannot give the Committee an absolute assurance that these individuals would have been prosecuted sooner had clause 1 been in force—that would be a matter for the independent CPS upon careful consideration of all the available evidence—but clause 1 would have given the police and the CPS a very important and potentially much more fruitful option to pursue.

I will mention the two more recent examples provided by Neil Basu in his evidence where this provision might have made a difference. First, Mohammed Shamsuddin, who appeared in Channel 4’s “The Jihadis Next Door”, had an extensive history of involvement in radicalisation and the spreading of extremist propaganda. In one instance, he gave an inflammatory public speech that was clearly supportive of Daesh. He mocked a sheikh who had spoken against the killing of Lee Rigby.

Secondly, Omar Brooks was convicted in 2008 of terrorist fundraising and inciting terrorism overseas, and again in 2016 of breaching travel restrictions imposed under notification requirements that clauses 11 and 12 of the Bill deal with. A prolific preacher of hate, in a public speech following the 2015 Kuwait mosque bombing and the Sousse attack in Tunisia, Brooks shouted anti-kufr rhetoric in relation to the attacks and said, “The spark was lit”. It was clear from the tone and content of the speech that he supported Daesh and what it was doing.

Of course, in a free society, we should not seek to criminalise individuals just because what they say is offensive or shocking, but there comes a point where such speeches cross a line, because in this instance they incite support for terrorist groups. I do not raise those examples simply to drag the names of the individuals through the mud. Rather, I want to illustrate to the Committee the type of case we are dealing with, which this clause is intended to capture.

[Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)]

It is a delight to serve under your chairship, Ms Ryan. For my sake—I may be being a bit slow—could the Minister be precise about why the amendments would prevent action being taken against the sort of individuals that he describes, who, rightly, we want action to be taken against? That would be very helpful.

[Mr Wallace]

I will get to it technically, but in summary, if recklessness is added to someone already inviting support, support is already being invited. The recklessness bit is secondary, because the person has invited the support. The problem with one of those amendments is that it tacks on recklessness to something that is already an offence, but it will not change that offence, because the person has already done the inviting.

[Nic Dakin]

Is the argument that it is unnecessary rather than restrictive?

[Mr Wallace]

I will get to that. These amendments would prevent clause 1 from having effect. If the reckless element were removed from the proposed new offence and replaced with a mens rea requirement, it would have to be proven that the person invited it. If that can be proven, it would be the existing offence. It is unnecessary and it would narrow back to the original, existing statute, rather than broaden to deal with recklessness where the person is using themselves to incite or inspire.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am not sure that is quite it, but let us use that second example. There is the original offence of invitation of support and the new offence, which talks about expression of opinion. At the moment, recklessness is attached to that, but intention could be attached to it. It would not be as broad, but it would be broader than the existing offence.

[Mr Wallace]

That is my point: it will narrow it from what we are proposing. It would pretty much mirror the existing offence. One of the alternatives in the amendments would add recklessness to the existing offence, if I am not mistaken, but the existing offence is that the person has invited support, so whether or not they are reckless does not really matter, because they are guilty of an offence.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

The overall point is correct: the two amendments taken as alternatives certainly would not broaden the first offence to the extent that the new clause does, but they would both broaden it. At the moment, the first offence is intentional, so you can add recklessness to it, or you can put intention on the first part of the new offence. In both cases you would broaden it, but you certainly would not have the impact of going back to the original one; you just would not broaden it to the extent that the full clause 1 does.

[Mr Wallace]

The point is that both your amendments would require us to prove intent. You are saying, “If you add it to the old offence, you have to prove intent, because the old offence as it stands includes intent.” If you add intent to the new offence, you are effectively mirroring the existing one. Clause 1 is about trying to deal with a gap where you find yourself unable to prove direct intent but—I go back to the idea of the baseball bat—know that someone is recklessly inspiring people to join or follow a proscribed organisation.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful to the Minister for being so generous in giving way. If you add recklessness to the offence as it is, you broaden it. Similarly, if you broaden it out to expressions of opinion and you add intention, that also broadens it. What it does not do is broaden it to the extent that the new clause as a totality does. That is the point.

[The Chair]

Can I just remind hon. Members that if you refer to “you”, you are referring to me? The same rules apply as in the Chamber.

[Mr Wallace]

I think we are referring to the subject of the law.

[The Chair]

On some occasions you are, and on other occasions you are referring to each other.

[Mr Wallace]

Madam Chair, I think the point is that both amendments require more proof of intent than we have currently decided we are trying to sort. The hon. Member for Torfaen is seeking with his amendments for us to have to prove intent. If it is to prove intent in the old existing statute—intent plus recklessness—we still have to prove intent. If we add intent to the new thing, it will still bring it in. My view and the Government’s view is that that is effectively starting to mirror the existing offence, and therefore this is about recognising that intent is already in existence in the statute book. This is where you use yourself—not yourself, Ms Ryan, but a person—

[The Chair]

Correct.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Not that we are saying the Chair is not inspirational. [Interruption.]

[Mr Wallace]

I am backed up from nowhere by Lord Diplock. The hon. Member for Torfaen makes valid points, but the issue here is what Lord Diplock said in the case of Sweet v. Parsley—you could not make that name up, could you? He did not say it to me, but nevertheless it came to me. He said that it is

“difficult to see how an invitation could be inadvertent.”

The point is that, if the hon. Gentleman is saying that by adding “reckless” we inadvertently go to intent, we must get that challenge right. We are trying to plug the fact that at the moment, unless we can prove intent, we find it very hard to deal with that aspiration.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

With the greatest respect to Lord Diplock, subjective recklessness is not necessarily inadvertent. That is the whole point. However, it is not my intention to press the matter today and I would be very happy to enter into further discussions with the Minister on that point.

[Mr Wallace]

Lord Diplock has thrown me off my stride, or more likely it was Sweet v. Parsley that threw me off my stride, as it is lunchtime. Our contention is that, if we accept the amendment, there would be no point to clause 1, and that the new section 12(1A) offence would simply mirror the effect of the existing section.

Similarly, the addition of a recklessness test to the existing offence of inviting support at section 12(1) would not address the difficulty. The requirement to prove that an invitation—that is, a deliberate encouragement—had been made would not be removed, and would still need to be met in a case in order to make out the offence. Again, therefore, the current gap would remain. Recognising what the hon. Gentleman has said, I invite him to withdraw the amendment and support clause 1. However, in light of his comments I would be happy to meet him to discuss it.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful for that final point, and on the basis that the Minister is happy to meet me to discuss the matter, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. I will raise a separate imagery issue, particularly on flags, that I hope the Minister will address.

I am well aware that several organisations use slight variants of logos, wording and other insignia on flags and other material. I also know that that has been an issue on what most of us would look at and consider to be an ISIS flag in support of that organisation, but on which clever alterations have been made by individuals trying to evade prosecution for displaying that item. For imagery displayed on the internet or elsewhere, it may be that individuals will seek to avoid prosecution under the clause or other ways by making slight alterations to that imagery. Will the Minister explain his definition of “reasonable suspicion” that those individuals support such an organisation?

[Mr Wallace]

Clause 2 makes it an offence to publish an image of an item of clothing or other article associated with a proscribed organisation in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that that person is a member or supporter of that organisation. As the hon. Member for Torfaen explained, the amendment would add a reasonable excuse defence to the new subsection (3)(1A) offence. The hon. Gentleman indicated that his intention is to ensure that the offence does not bite on those who may have a legitimate reason to publish such images, such as journalists or academics.

I am happy to assure the hon. Gentleman that the Government share that intention, and that that outcome is in fact already secured by the current drafting of clause 2. The words “in such a way” will hopefully answer both the fears of the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about his T-shirt and the general issue of having not only to display such an image but to do so

“in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”

It is important to recognise that the mere publication of an image associated with a proscribed organisation is not enough on its own to constitute an offence. The offence will only be made out if the image is published in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of the proscribed organisation. In cases of a journalist featuring an image of a flag in a news report or an academic publishing such an image in a book or research paper, it would be clear from the circumstances that they are not themselves a member or supporter of the organisation. This approach provides certainty to such individuals that they will not be caught by the offence. It also offers the advantage that the same formulation has been in force since 2000 with the existing section 13 offence in the 2000 Act of wearing or displaying such an article in a public place, and is therefore well understood by the courts.

For that reason, although I totally agree with the objectives behind the amendment, it is not necessary to add “reasonable excuse”. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Torfaen to withdraw the amendment.

On the point raised by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, the existing offence of displaying a flag talks about doing so “in such a way” that inspires people. If there is evidence that someone is doing it in such a way as to commit that offence, they will be prosecuted.

As to the T-shirt, I will give the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North an alternative. If I bought one with a statement on it such as “Scotland Forever”—the sentiment is shared by the vast majority of decent Scottish people and not just a few lunatics in the Scottish National Liberation Army or whatever they are called—I doubt that that would be as clearly synonymous with any terrorist organisation as a National Action one. Clearly, if someone had bought a National Action T-shirt—and they could fit into it, which would probably be a challenge for some of its supporters—and it then became proscribed, of course they should remove it, because I do not want people walking around with terrorist T-shirts once an organisation has been proscribed. However, I do not think that “Scotland Forever” would fall into the category of a symbol of a terrorist organisation. I hope that gives him some comfort that we will not arrest people who think that Scotland is forever.

[Nic Dakin]

The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North pointed to Mr Hill’s evidence. He talked about the vulnerability in clause 2 and said:

“I understand where the Government are trying to get to, but some tighter definition might be of use.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 41, Q88.]

Has the Minister reflected on that? Can he deal with the point that Mr Hill, with all his experience, raised?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, I can. The way I reflected on that was to seek to find out what happened with the existing offence, which has the same wording of “in such a way”, and how many failed prosecutions of people who are journalists or academics there had been under it. My understanding is that there have been no cases of prosecuting people who use the fair reason that they are a journalist or are researching something. The fact that it has been on the statute book for a long time already, and that it has not produced the failures that some people feared, suggests that the law has already accepted that wording in such offences. I do not fear that there will be a surge in wrong or failed prosecutions.

[Stephen Doughty]

I am sorry to press the Minister, but I would like clarification on variants. Material that glorifies the activities of the IRA, for example, has been published by organisations and is available on the internet. Individuals are removing the “I” from IRA and putting an asterisk or something like that into the imagery, but the rest clearly glorifies the activities of a proscribed organisation. In his view, would that be caught be the legislation? Would someone photo-editing an ISIS flag and leaving everything else such as guns in the picture—they are glorifying terrorist activities but making a slight alteration—be caught in the legislation?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, because the key is “in such a way”. Someone does not have to fly a swastika. The hon. Gentleman may have seen that some of the far right used to fly a red flag with a white circle but no swastika in it. Someone on an al-Quds parade might think that they can alter the Hezbollah flag and somehow pretend it is not to do with the military side, but that will not save them if they are using it in such a way as to commit that offence. Someone does not have to use the full wording, but we, the prosecuting authorities, have to prove that they are doing it in such a way as to incite or commit that offence. I warn those clever terrorists out there who think they can get away with it by swapping a few letters around that that will not make a difference.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful for the Minister’s response and the additional reassurance he has given about “in such a way” or “in such circumstances”. On this occasion, he is right to say that the Bill uses the same wording as the Terrorism Act 2000, which has a solid body of interpretation from the courts behind it. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Maynard.)

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Second sitting)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)]

Q Thank you, Mrs Main. Given your experience, Mr Hill, do you have any other misgivings about the Bill as drafted that you have not already raised?

Max Hill: I hope I have given appropriate credit for other matters that might have been brought forward in this Bill but have not been. What I would say, looking at the five offence-creating clauses in general, is that clause 4 is something against which there is no pushback—no adverse reaction from me. In other words, amending sections 1 and 2 of the 2006 Act to place the jury’s view at the heart of offence creation—the view of a reasonable person as to whether encouragement is actually what the defendant is about—strikes me as eminently sensible, so I agree with clause 4.

I agree with clause 5 as to the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the extension of the remit of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 and sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. There is no comment from me—I agree. However, I am worried about the extension of section 13 of the 2000 Act—the proscription offence—and affording extraterritorial jurisdiction to that, because of the dual criminality issue; forgive me for using lawyer’s shorthand. This country takes a robust and appropriate approach to proscription, which may be different from that taken by other countries. I suggest that clause 5, at the very least, needs reconsideration as to whether extraterritorial jurisdiction concerning section 13 should be limited to UK citizens, who are deemed to know how we deal with proscription here, as opposed to foreign nationals.

On clause 3, I have answered as far as can. Regarding clauses 1 and 2, recklessness as used in clause 1 is a term of art that I know caused discussion on Second Reading and may do so again. From a simple lawyer’s perspective, however, this is nothing new: subjective recklessness is a feature of the criminal law away from counter-terrorism legislation. It is defined with some precision in section 1(2)(b)(ii) of the 2006 Act, which defines recklessness for the purpose of encouragement of terrorism. Provided that the Government intend the same definition when they refer to recklessness under clause 1 of this Bill, I have nothing to add. My assumption is that that is the intention.

That only leaves clause 2, which amends section 13 of the 2006 Act—the flags and paraphernalia offence. As a legal historian, it is interesting to note that we are moving away from the public order origin of legislating in this space. The public order Acts of the 1930s were intended to deal with demonstrations on the streets; clause 2 now takes this out of a public space and into a private space, and, as the explanatory notes make clear, a particular flag on a bedroom wall is sufficient for the commission of the offence. I would suggest that evidence of what is on the bedroom wall of a perpetrator is already admissible and routinely referred to by prosecutors as supporting material for indictments for other offences; the only debate is whether it is the commission of an offence on its own.

Whatever the answer on that initial concern, the extra concern that I have about clause 2 is that, without more, it begs some serious questions about the display of historical images. There is no statute of limitations on clause 2. I wonder whether one is intended, whether there should be one, or what clause 2 unamended says about those who seek to display in private historical images of individuals working for organisations that were proscribed decades ago where it is a matter of historical interest and nothing more. It seems to me there is a vulnerability in clause 2. I understand where the Government are trying to get to, but some tighter definition might be of use.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

Q Can I go back to the clause pertaining to section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000—the streaming clause or the three clicks provision? The original section of the Terrorism Act 2000 is very clear: it is about collecting material, which can include a record which is electronic. Back in 2000, broadband was pretty slow, if it worked at all, so most people watched things by down- loading; nowadays it is streamed, because, first, you do not want to use up your own data and secondly, that is how most of us live our lives. If you are going to watch iPlayer, you do not download each programme before you watch it. Streaming is a reality that is not reflected in the 2000 Act; that simply refers to the way that people look at records. In your experience of doing the job so far, is streaming now used quite broadly by terrorist suspects in learning things, spreading belief or radicalisation, or indeed training? Do you see a lot of that?

Max Hill: Let me answer you this way. I am with you on the digital fix, because I think that is what you are referring to. It is undoubtedly a new variant that, instead of downloading, there are some circumstances—although technically they are quite few—in which one goes no further than streaming and there is no download imprint that has been caused. I add that prosecutors are already alive to the risk of using as prosecution evidence cached material, within an internet cache, from which it does not follow that the perpetrator has ever actually read that which appears in the cache. I know that the clause is not designed to capture information of that sort, but we need to be very clear that a cache on a laptop or phone is not evidence of personal interest by the owner of the device in the material in question.

Streaming is a modern phenomenon and to that extent I am with you, but section 58 in its origin might be looked at as an “anti-proliferation offence”—my phrase and nobody else’s. I would suggest that one of the reasons Parliament originally looked to section 58 is to stop the proliferation and perpetuation of material that we deem to be extreme terrorist propaganda, which should not go to other places. This does not deal in the same way with that. This is not anti-proliferation, because, by definition, somebody who streams and does not go any further is not bringing to the attention of third parties—still less is he or she storing for dissemination later on—material that is already online.

So there are some very strict limitations to what somebody is actually doing by streaming without more. They are not straying into the section 2 of the 2006 Act dissemination territory, which they might with section 58 in its current form. Download might be issue number one, and then issue number 2 might be later proliferation, perhaps with additions or amendments to whatever was originally downloaded. That is not what we are talking about here. We are talking about merely online streaming in—as I am afraid I have described it—rather imprecise circumstances as to time and circumstance, and that is why I am concerned.

[Mr Wallace]

Q If we all agree that streaming is a problem and is a modern reflection of how people are viewing things, would another solution to your worries be simply to amend section 58? The first line of section 58 says:

“A person commits an offence if (a) he collects or makes a record of information of a kind—”

so that in and of itself is an offence with a reasonable excuse defence in it.

Max Hill: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Are you happy with section 58 of the 2000 Act as it stands?

Max Hill: Yes. I hope I have made clear that I do not seek to undermine that. I have a practical question—it is nothing more than that—as to whether it forms an indictment pure and simple. I am very familiar with it and have prosecuted indictments myself where section 58 offences on their own, or in multiples, are used as supporting evidence for more serious preparatory or terrorist plotting activities, but it is very rarely used on its own.

[Mr Wallace]

Q But as it stands at the moment, it can be an offence on its own?

Max Hill: It can be, technically, yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q If you were to just amend subsection (a)—

“A person commits an offence if…he collects or makes”—

and added “, or streams”, would you be satisfied with that? Would that address the issue we are getting at?

Max Hill: In one sense it would, but I am afraid it still begs the questions as to how much you are streaming, on how many occasions, and how much interest you are actually showing in material that you do not go on to download or store. Reasonable excuse, as you say, remains. The concern I have is that, whether the French example is a good one or a bad one, the legislators there have sought to provide exemptions and licences for obvious categories—professionals, academics, journalists—which we do not have in this draft clause. There must be a danger that individuals will be put to the trouble, and often considerable expense, of facing an indictment, raising reasonable excuse at trial, and it then being incumbent on the prosecution to disprove it where they should not have stood trial at all.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Could that already be the case for academics downloading, recording or collection information under the existing section 58?

Max Hill: It could.

[Mr Wallace]

Q And it has not been struck down by any of our courts?

Max Hill: No, it has not been struck down. There is appellate judicial guidance on what reasonable excuse means. I suppose that my point is that if we are extending the ambit of activity that is likely to require that reasonable excuse defence, it becomes more important that we do more to define circumstances in which the offence is not committed, rather than leave a generic reasonable excuse defence currently undefined.

[Mr Wallace]

Q The Government are always being probed for judicial discretion. There is the idea that we have a tendency to be too prescriptive and want to encourage judicial discretion. Is that not, a bit like the appellate guidance that you talk about, a place for judicial discretion?

Max Hill: There is judicial discretion and before that, of course, there is prosecutorial discretion. The Director of Public Prosecutions, or her designates, will have a discretion as to whether to prosecute. But I am afraid, from my position as an independent reviewer, I am bound to say that although that is a valuable safeguard, it would be better, given the opportunity, if we defined as matter of legislation more closely the circumstances in which an indictment should follow, rather than left it to prosecutorial discretion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Thank you for coming along, Mr Clancy. I appreciate your evidence about terrorism legislation being reserved to the UK and about the memorandum of understanding between the Attorney General and the Lord Advocate and so on. However, moving beyond that, do you have any concerns about clause 3 of the Bill that you have not already referred to?

Michael Clancy: I think we were generally in favour of the idea that this area should be updated to take account of the digital revolution. The fact that the review of terrorism legislation that the Government precipitated last year has resulted in no further offences, as Max Hill described, is a vindication of the extent to which the law captures most of the issues. However, there are always questions that can be asked—some of which you have already heard about—about the balance between the right of expression and the requirements under the Bill.

It is fair to say that the courts have been quite explicit about where they fall on that balance. The right to freedom of expression under ECHR article 10 is not an absolute right; it has to be balanced with the other rights that the rest of us enjoy, such as the right to life, and so on. Therefore, although others may not subscribe to this view, the case has to be made that the provisions in the Bill will upset those rights to the extent that we would be considerably concerned about them, given that they build on existing provisions that have already been tested in the courts.

In that context, we have to look at all the legislation we have got—several Acts relate to counter-terrorism—and construct some sort of codification or consolidation of it. I do not know about you, ladies and gentlemen, but flitting between three or four Acts of Parliament within the compass of one Bill is difficult enough. It is difficult to imagine that those who will be subject to the legislation will do that kind of thing. We should make the law as simple and easily understood as we can.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Thank you very much for coming today. May I ask your view of clause 1, which is obviously the part of the Bill that talks about expressions of support, and the challenge around that? Critics have used the phrase “thought police”. Obviously, we are trying to grapple with the threat from inspiring—people who do not specifically stand up and say, “Join ISIS”, but use their position recklessly to promote such organisations by saying, “I think they are great,” and so on. Correct me, because I may not know this. Is the previous legislation that deals with the area of incitement and religious hatred devolved or reserved?

Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 effectively do the same thing: they set out that, for an offence to have been committed, you do not have to tell people to hate, or say, “You must attack Muslim people,” or, “You must attack Jewish people”. You can express in a private or public place sentiments or views that could have the consequence of inciting racial or religious hatred. Do you see a read-across from that position, which is accepted in established law, to clause 1, so it relates to encouragement towards a proscribed organisation?

Michael Clancy: I have not, I confess, made that read-across myself, Mr Wallace, but I will go back to Edinburgh and do so later on today. The general proposition about someone making a reckless statement and about whether the person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support a proscribed organisation raises a couple of issues. What is reckless? It is taking a risk, in terms of the information you convey about the outcome of what you say. What is a proscribed organisation might, too, be a difficulty, because if I were to ask members of the Committee to list all the proscribed organisations they might not be able to do that. It might also pose a difficulty regarding whether some people making statements are supporting a proscribed organisation as we understand that to be the case.

There are some issues. There is a read-across to the analogous provisions in race and religion. Of course, if we have those models to follow, and those have been followed without any difficulty since they were enacted, the Government are probably on safe ground in extending the provisions to the kind of incitement envisaged in clause 1.

[The Chair]

Does anybody else have more questions for Mr Clancy? Yes, Mr—

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Q Just one question, Mr Clancy, arising out of the Minister’s question about section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. Both Acts are about the use of abusive, threatening or insulting behaviour to stir up hatred, but do you agree that there is a distinction between that and actual recruitment to the cause, which is what the clause in this Bill is talking about? Are they different things?

Michael Clancy: Clearly, there is a legislative distinction between the two. It depends on what the abuse in terms of race or religion is intended to do. Is it simply to make someone feel uncomfortable, aggrieved or violated, because of their religion or race? Or is it in some kind of a way to encourage others to take up that same kind of attitude toward people based on their religion or race?

Legislation in this area, countering discrimination on the basis of religion or race, is something that we have had in this country since the 1960s. Therefore, the fact that we are continually having to look at this again means that the educative value of that legislation has not yet reached its optimum. We have to be aware of pushing that further, to make sure that those who would fall into that pattern of behaviour know that it is wrong, illegal and that they must desist from doing it.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I want to follow on from the previous issue of the person collecting the materials and the three clicks. I do not know if you heard my question to Max Hill, which was that given that section 58 of the 2000 Act is well established, has been used and has not been struck down by challenge in a European court setting, if instead of defining by three clicks it was to explore simply adding in streaming, with the reasonable excuse defence, do you think that would solve the problem of streaming as opposed to holding or downloading information?

Michael Clancy: If you have an adequate definition of streaming, that might work, but for me it is just a word that people use when they are accessing information and videos on the internet. I suspect that the kinds of videos that are covered by this legislation will not have a pop-up window that says, “Do you want to play from the start or resume from where you left off?” The idea that these might be formal productions is not the case.

If we can do something that makes the legislation tighter and more usable, of course. But we may get into those difficulties about what is meant by streaming, how long does the stream have to be and what kind of document or record is being streamed.

[Mr Wallace]

Q To reflect on section 58, when we talk about collecting electronic records or making a copy, we do not qualify that by saying that the definition is that it has to be longer than 10 seconds long or it has to be an hour long. We do not do that already; we do not seek to narrow it there.

Michael Clancy: That is a good point. Perhaps we have to look at that and say whether it is covering everything we need to cover there.

I am also interested in the defence provisions about having a reasonable excuse. Reasonable excuse covers most of the instances, but under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 of course, someone can have lawful authority, justification or excuse. If we look at Section 57(2) in the Terrorism Act 2000, it says there is a defence if

“possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.”

There may be a way in which one could look at that element of defence to make sure that those who are anxious about this provision have their concerns allayed.

[Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)]

Q You mentioned in passing in an answer to Mr Newlands that access to legal advice and issues surrounding confidentiality were different in the Scottish and English legal contexts. As this is a whole UK Bill, I wondered if you might expand on that. I would also ask what your experiences have been in the Scottish context of the operation of the counter-terrorism ports power, in terms of detainees having access to legal advice.

Michael Clancy: The distinction between reserved and devolved matters is that if it is listed in schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998, it is reserved. If it is not, it is devolved. That is why aspects such as the legal system, the courts and the legal professions are devolved, because they are not listed as being reserved. It means that the justice agencies in Scotland, including the courts, the police and the legal profession, have to exercise a law that is reserved, but they exercise it in a devolved context. That covers areas where advice is given and where the police have to act, except in provisions where they might be directed in the Bill, or the Act, to do so. I hope that that gives you enough on that.

I am afraid to say I have no experience of the ports provisions that I can offer, but I will ask the question back in Edinburgh and see if anybody can enlighten me. If so, I will write to you.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you. That is now very much on the record.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Can I ask all three of you the same questions, to hear your views? First, to Liberty, as it stands section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 basically hinges on the collecting or downloading of material. Is it your view that that, too, should be struck out?

Corey Stoughton: Liberty opposed the introduction of that offence. We certainly understand that this is not the time or place to take that step.

[Mr Wallace]

It is either a principle or it is not. You either think it is wrong or it is not. Would you venture that section 58 is not needed?

Corey Stoughton: We would, yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q So downloading terrorist content and manuals on how to make a bomb and all that sort of stuff should not be an offence?

Corey Stoughton: Downloading terrorist manuals on how to make a bomb is already criminalised under the collection of material that would be useful for the purposes of terrorism, which is already an offence under terrorism legislation. Those things would be illegal.

[Mr Wallace]

That is training. What about downloading ISIS or al-Qaeda propaganda materials?

Corey Stoughton: Liberty’s position is that merely looking at that material should not be an offence. It may well be reasonable grounds to further investigate whether a person is planning to engage in terrorist activity.

[Mr Wallace]

Q On the broader issue of biometric data, the Government have responded to the Biometrics Commissioner’s recommendations. I hear the points about there not being enough safeguards and there being other issues previously. Does that mean that two years is too much already?

Corey Stoughton: I have to think about that a little bit more. It has been a while since we engaged with that provision of the Bill. At this stage, there are obviously occasions on which the retention of biometric data is appropriate, but I think it is clear enough to say that, for the purposes of the Bill, expanding that power, when there are already existing concerns over the way similar powers are being used, is not the right way forward. We need to clean up the system that currently exists and ensure that the important safeguards that currently exist in the system are maintained or, if not perfectly maintained, at least substituted with safeguards that continue to ensure that those powers are exercised wisely and consistent with human rights laws.

Peter Carter: Can I deal with clause 3 and the amendment to section 58? Section 58 of the 2000 Act deals with the collection of information that can then be used, or is likely to be used or of benefit, for an act of terrorism. Simply looking at something is not a predicate act to providing that information for a terrorist purpose. It would be better to make a distinction between the act of simply looking and the act of deliberately retaining something with the potential intention or purpose of it being used or passed on to somebody else.

I therefore think that clause 3 and its amendment of section 58 add a new and undesirable dimension to section 58. It is undesirable because it expands the ambit of the offence in an unnecessary way. By adding something extra, we are making the life of the counter-terrorism command, and the life of judges who have to direct juries, more difficult. In this area of law, simplicity is very desirable, and this is over-complex.

[Mr Wallace]

Q First, the head of counter-terrorism would not have agreed with that. If you heard his evidence this morning, I think he welcomed the ability to deal with the streaming challenge. Secondly, on its own, as a stand-alone, section 58 is an offence—simply to collect material—and it does not necessarily have to be linked. Obviously you can deploy a reasonable excuse. My question to other witnesses has been: it may be that people do not like the three clicks and that sort of route, but if we were simply to amend section 58 to add in “he collects, makes or streams”, would that not achieve the same issue? There would still be reasonable excuse as a defence.

Peter Carter: I think “collecting”—our making a record—is different from accessing. There is perfect justification for having an amendment that accepts the new changes in technology, and that is necessary. But if it is going to be purely accessing, you need a contingent intention: in other words, you are doing it for the purpose of an act preparatory to terrorism, or intending to use it for terrorism or to make it available for terrorism. Simply accessing is too remote.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Would that not already exist? If I were to bring a charge under the existing section 58, and I proved that you had downloaded lots of things but you had not done anything with them, it is likely that a prosecutor would not prosecute. I do not think there has been a case in that environment. So as the offence stands at the moment you have to do more with it than just effectively download it.

Peter Carter: But you are extending an offence which is at the periphery of what is certain—how it is connected, certainly, to a potential act of criminality. In order to protect the right of people, whether they be journalists, academics or those doing research, as Max Hill said, you should not have people facing a risk of needing to raise a defence, having been arrested, charged and had their life interrupted for however long it takes before they can put that before the jury.

[Mr Wallace]

Q There are hundreds of examples of academics and journalists downloading some of this data, and they have not been prosecuted. There is no evidence of a chilling effect on existing journalists under the existing section 58. There is no evidence that prosecutors have been abusing their discretion to bring charges—or, indeed, that the judiciary has successfully allowed a prosecution.

Peter Carter: That is because, as I say, section 58 as it exists has, as its apparent purpose, an element of an activity predicate to a potential terrorist offence. There is nothing to stop the security services from tracing and tracking people who simply access the material. The question is whether you transform that material, available to the security services to keep an eye on people, to make it a specific criminal offence. You should not transform one to the other.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I just want to explore reasonable grounds in the schedule. How focused is reasonable grounds in the law that currently governs stop-and-search? Is it very specific to an individual? Is it currently able to be used in a broader environment where you simply have an indication that a knife is about to be used in an area? In other words, how elastic is that concept?

Peter Carter: It is elastic: it depends on the circumstances. It may be that, depending on the nature of the intelligence available to the officer—the person doing the stop-and-search—it needs to be specific if there is a person of a particular description, but it may be that the nature of the threat is so serious and the information about the individual so amorphous that it is perfectly justifiable to stop a large number of people in a specific area.

[Mr Wallace]

Q If I had intelligence that we suspected that a hostile state would move some radioactive material via a passenger on an aeroplane into this country over the next six months, would that be too broad to target flights from a certain part of the world? For reasonable grounds to be satisfied, would that need to be narrower?

Peter Carter: I am not going to say that it would not be satisfied in certain circumstances; I have prosecuted lots of drug trafficking cases where the customs officers have had intelligence of that nature. That has then been refined, which meant that they could focus on a finite number of planes or ships, but they have had to do covert surveillance on a potentially large number of persons and transits. If that transforms itself into focusing down on to, “Right, this is an individual on this flight or on this ship who satisfies what we think our refined intelligence is,” then yes, it can be quite a few people.

[Mr Wallace]

Q But it may not get that narrow. It may not be something you can further explore. It may simply be that you know that between June and September, there is a plan to bring something—a radioactive material—into this country, and that is what I, as the Security Minister, will have to take a defence against.

Peter Carter: I would suggest that it is a question of proportionality. If the threat is extreme, I would not want to say that your hands are tied.

[Mr Wallace]

Q But would not using reasonable grounds or grounds of suspicion be doing that?

Peter Carter: You would do, because if you were able to identify that it was coming from a particular place and was of a particular kind, in reality, you would not search everything and everyone. As I say, it is a question of proportionality. If there was a really major threat to the security of this nation, I would hope that appropriate powers would be available to ensure that it never came to pass. If that meant an extensive number of searches, that would be proportionate and reasonable.

[Nic Dakin]

Q Looking at the powers of detention at the border, I see that there is no access to a solicitor for an hour, and there is a power for someone to have to speak to their solicitor within the hearing of an officer. Does that concern you?

Abigail Bright: The first part certainly does—having no access to a lawyer, on the face of it for no good reason. If there is a good reason, of course that will present itself—it will be case-specific or fact-specific—but I do not see why the hands of law enforcement officers should be tied to one hour, or why the rights of a suspect, who is potentially an accused person, should be diminished with reference to that. That would be my observation about that first part.

Peter Carter: I agree.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julia Lopez]

Q So a beheading would not be considered the same?

Corey Stoughton: Extremist content is what the current provision would cover. Extremist content is not inherently harmful in the same way as child pornography is. For example, there may be a range of legitimate reasons for a range of people to engage in viewing extremist content, whether because you knew that a student of yours in your secondary school had viewed it, or your child had viewed it, and you wanted to understand what they were looking at, or for journalistic and academic activity, which we have covered.

Child pornography really is in a class by itself, because the harm in the creation and the viewing of it is so unique and different that it is appropriate for it to be criminalised in that way. Extremist content, although quite serious—I do not mean to diminish the seriousness of the problem of the proliferation of extremist content and the challenges it legitimately poses to law enforcement —is of a different kind from child pornography for that reason.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I just wanted to clarify: terrorism content or extremist content?

Corey Stoughton: I am not sure I know what the difference is.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Inspire, a magazine written by al-Qaeda and promoted around the internet, or an ISIL document? Are those terrorist? I would say it is created by terrorists for spreading terrorist theology and hate.

Corey Stoughton: Would I still distinguish that from child pornography? Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q No, would you say that was terrorist content or extremism content?

Corey Stoughton: I do not know. Part of the problem with these laws is that the terms are fluid and not very well defined. What one person might consider extremist content another person might not consider extremist.

[Mr Wallace]

Q So a magazine written by al-Qaeda, claiming to be by al-Qaeda, which gives a theology about kufr and attacking everyone else, is inherently a terrorist publication?

Corey Stoughton: Sure. I would agree with that, absolutely.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I understand the issue about extremism content, but when it comes to terrorist content, surely there is a crossover to the paedophile streaming and viewing?

Corey Stoughton: I still think there is quite an important distinction to be drawn from that, because no child is harmed in the creation. If a child was harmed and it was child pornography, obviously it would be different.

[The Chair]

Order. I am just conscious that the Minister is asking the questions.

[Mr Wallace]

You should just watch them; you will see people being executed in the background. I would guess that is harm.

[The Chair]

If there is a moment left, I will come back, but I am conscious that Dr Huq would like to ask a question before we run out of time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huq]

Q I have another short question. Are the three of you aware of the Prevent programme having lost the confidence of certain communities? Do you have any comments on that?

Peter Carter: I was involved in training the counter-terrorism command when the Prevent policy started. I was an enthusiastic supporter of it, because it was subtle and very effective. It has gone slightly off track and lost the support of some communities. That is a great shame, because it really needs to be supported.

I shared a panel recently at the Law Society with the Metropolitan Police Commissioner; I am glad to say that she and I agreed about just about everything. One of those things was the importance of the Prevent strategy and of getting back the confidence of the communities, because their engagement in it is vital. As a concept, it is a vital part of fighting terrorism.

Abigail Bright: A very specific part of the community is the family doctor—the general practitioners. One only needs to look at The BMJ to see the concern expressed by medical practitioners about the Prevent programme. In principle, there is no resistance to it among the medical fraternity, but how it is executed and how it risks trespassing on medical confidentiality and trust between doctor and patient is a very discrete part of how it is problematic in the community.

[Mr Wallace]

GPs are not covered by the Prevent duty.

Abigail Bright: On another view, much training of general practitioners goes into how to deal with Prevent.

[Gavin Newlands]

Q I think we have covered a fairly wide area. I want to go back to biometrics, because we missed out on that answer previously. Ms Bright and Mr Carter, do you think it is justifiable to retain biometrics information for five years, without oversight by a Biometrics Commissioner of those people who are not charged, whose charges are dropped or who are found innocent? Do you think that is of any use to the police and the security services?

Peter Carter: I am afraid I am going to disagree slightly with Liberty on this one. It is a bit like personal data: it needs to be constantly reviewed. There needs to be a finite term to begin with; then if necessary, continued retention needs to be justified. I do not think there should be an automatic prohibition on the retention of data by those who are not prosecuted, because it might well be that a person is diverted from prosecution even though there is very good reason and very strong evidence that they did actually have the material and were on the verge of getting involved with terrorist activity. In those kinds of cases, it is justified to retain the material. I think it is a question of proportionality—two years to begin with, with the possibility of extending it to five or further, if there is justification.

Abigail Bright: From the specialist Bar associations, I would add two things. First, the Bill incorporates a review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That is very welcome and it is a good part of the Bill as drafted. As the Committee knows, the commissioner is to have two functions: to monitor and to keep under review the operation of provisions of the Act, and after that to report as a long backstop every calendar year. Within that, the commissioner has the power to report to the Secretary of State as and when the commissioner thinks appropriate much before a year.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (First sitting)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, let me say that you are welcome to remove jackets or ties—I would call it a day at that—because it is very hot. I have just a few preliminary points. Please make sure that your electronic devices are switched off. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings—I have been asked to say that because people keep walking in with coffee cups and so on.

We will consider the programme motion on the amendment paper and then take the motion enabling the reporting of written evidence for publication, before taking a motion to enable us to deliberate in private. We will then talk about the order in which Members may wish to kick off and look at the questions provided—you can of course add in any of your own.

I call the Minister to move the programme motion, which was agreed by the Programming Sub-Committee yesterday.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move,

That—

(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 26 June) meet—

(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 26 June;

(b) at 11.30 am on Thursday 28 June;

(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 3 July;

(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 5 July;

(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 10 July;

(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 12 July;

(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 17 July;

(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:

[The Chair]

Copies of the written evidence the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.

Resolved,

That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Mr Wallace.)

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

As we are in an oral evidence session, I am taking people in the order in which they indicate, which I think is fair. Mr Chapman will have to wait.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Assistant Commissioner, can I bring you back to clause 1—expressions of support? How dangerous was Anjem Choudary over the years? Obviously he is convicted at the moment, but how dangerous is an individual of such inspiration to radicalisation and to people around the country?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: It is the comment I made earlier: it is the greatest threat to this country that people such as Anjem Choudary have been able to speak very persuasively and charismatically for long periods of time. The difficulty in prosecuting him, as Mr McGill will know, was immense over many, many years. If my MI5 colleagues were sitting here today, they would be able to give exact numbers on how many terrorist atrocities al-Muhajiroun—he is a leader of ALM—have a footprint in, not just here in the UK but abroad, and on the number of disruptions we have had where people have been influenced by ALM rhetoric or material.

[Mr Wallace]

Q The number of those cases is in the hundreds—is that not correct?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q How long did it take us effectively to get a conviction against him? For how many years was he on our radar, and we were worried about him?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Many years.

[Mr Wallace]

Dozens? I think it was 20 years.

Assistant Commissioner Basu: I would not be able to give you the exact number.

Gregor McGill: It was certainly a significant number of years, and I think it was into double figures. I think it was somewhere around 10 years, at least.

[Mr Wallace]

Q We knew he was dangerous, so why did it take us so long to achieve a conviction? Was one of the factors the gaps in that legislation—the difference between inviting support and inspiration for support?

Gregor McGill: Precisely so. He was a very charismatic and intelligent man who was very able to stay just the right side of the legislation as it was at the time. That provided a real difficulty for investigative colleagues to gather evidence and for prosecutors to bring a case.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Would it be right for me to say that you see this clause as trying to deal with the significance of inspirers, people who use their profile and presence to inspire people recklessly into joining a proscribed organisation or following those beliefs?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Exactly.

[Mr Wallace]

Q One of the criticisms will be: “But what if four blokes are down the pub and they say, ‘You know that bloke Tommy Robinson, I think he’s a good geezer’.” Those blokes, as they would have been described to me, would not necessarily be prosecuted because the discretion of the prosecutor would say: “Well that is just freedom of thought, that’s people chatting around a bar, versus someone addressing loads of people at Speakers’ Corner”. Is that where you see the prosecutor’s discretion being able to stop that happening?

Gregor McGill: It is not the job of a prosecutor to stop people having odious thoughts and opinions. In a democracy, people are entitled to hold whatever opinions they want to. When the expressions of those opinions become criminal and go into what has been called “the radicalisation agenda”, that is where we think there is a lacuna in the law and where we think it needs addressing.

[Mr Wallace]

Q If I were to take the Hitler test, the inspiration test—Adolf Hitler stood up at a Nuremberg rally and did not say to his followers, “Join the fascists in Britain”, but said, “I think they’re fantastic”—at the moment, he probably could not be prosecuted for that offence, unless he said, “Go out and join them”. Would that be right?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes

Gregor McGill: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q So the power of inspiration is our biggest danger to radicalisation and this clause seeks to deal with that, would that be fair?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes

Gregor McGill: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q The last Labour Government rightly brought in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which effectively deals with incitement both in public and private places. It was not called thought police at the time. It dealt with people using hate against religions as a cause, as opposed to proscribed terrorist groups. Is that why we cannot use that Act to prosecute? If people stand up and say: “I hate the Jews”, you could prosecute them now for inspiring or inciting hatred, but you could not prosecute them if they stood up and said: “I think ISIL”—or National Action—“is fantastic”?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

So the principle is already embedded in law around inspiration when it comes to racial hatred, but not when it comes to terrorism?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes, precisely so.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Have we had any problems with the use of the Religious Hatred Act over the last 12 years?

Gregor McGill: Prosecution is fraught with problems, but none have come out. It is a perfectly workable piece of legislation and another tool in the prosecutor’s armour to be able to deal with this type of behaviour.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Could I move on to the publication of images, the clause 2 issue? Assistant commissioner, do we see quite a few cases where people use their Facebook page or upload images of themselves standing behind flags or speaking to a group of people, for example, in the back of a house, with a black flag or a Hezbollah flag or a National Action flag or whatever else behind them. The image is up there, but because it is in a photograph, it is difficult to prosecute. Is that a challenge?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes, it is a challenge and it is quite common.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Is it common for some of the foreign fighters in Syria beaming themselves backwards, effectively, saying to people, “Look at me, aren’t I great?”

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Would you say this clause is more of a modernisation reflecting how the internet is used, rather than anything new or magical? Is it just that people are using the internet differently and we need to adapt to that?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: That is exactly what it is. If you marched down the street with that flag, you would be in a different place.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Yes, and if you dressed up in some of the bizarre uniforms.

On clause 3, I am keen to be open to solutions on the three clicks issue. Would you both agree that streaming, again reflecting modernisation, is a major problem and that the law as it sits is not capable of defining the difference between streaming and downloading?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Maybe, for those who are worried about three clicks, a definition of streaming that does not use clicks but a more technical term might be a solution, as long as we deal with streaming as a problem; that is the main challenge.

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q May I fast forward and ask a question about the hostile state powers on the border? How important is “no suspicion” in the use of these powers? Why would we need to maintain it?

Gregor McGill: From a prosecutor’s point of view, although these probably would not be exercised, they would be more investigative powers, if you are using an evidence base or intelligence base, you would have to make that intelligence or evidence available.

There are some complications and difficulties with that. There are some legal difficulties with making some intelligence available. There are some operational difficulties in making such material available, which may impact investigative colleagues’ ability to run some of their operations. On that basis, if we had to disclose that, it may limit the powers significantly.

[Mr Wallace]

Q If I had intelligence, let’s say, that a hostile agent—maybe an assassination team or people using non-official cover—were going to come to the UK and take the nine o’clock flight from Amsterdam, but we did not know who they were, only that they were taking a flight. If we had to have suspicion, would that prevent us being able effectively just to target the flight, because we would have to have suspicion about an individual? Or is just suspicion that they might be on a particular flight enough to be grounds for suspicion? Or is it too general?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes, I think it would be too general; that is the problem. It would need to be a reasonable suspicion test. If you look at section 1 stop-and-search powers, it would have to be much more directive than that. Certainly, in counter-terrorism and the example you have given, that would not be uncommon. Intelligence is very fragmented; it is very incomplete. We might have very limited material, possibly just on the travel method or a particular flight, and nothing more than that.

To echo Mr McGill’s point about having a suspicion threshold undermining the utility of this particular investigative power, certainly very sensitive sources and methodology could be disclosed. Certainly, the people who were targeted could quickly work out how to bypass our methods. Certainly, it would be open to those people to displace their travel by passing on evidence to a travel companion, who would not be under suspicion. The lack of suspicion in terms of the power is critical to the utility of actually using it.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Would that breadth of suspicion being challenged as not narrow enough, also apply to a method? Let’s say that we had intelligence that a hostile state agent was moving a radioactive substance in a flask but we did not know which flight, so we decided to target all people carrying flasks. That would be too broad because that would potentially cover every flight coming into the country. So, we would not be able to do that if we had a suspicion test.

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Yes.

[Matt Warman (Boston and Skegness) (Con)]

Q Earlier you mentioned the prospect of extraterritorial powers and that Australia has them and we do not. As you know, a lot of MPs brought that up on Second Reading. Could you say a little more about how helpful they would be and how they might be used in practice? Would you just like to cut and paste the rules that Australia has or would you like to do something slightly different, if you could start with a blank piece of paper?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Do you mean the designated area offence that we discussed earlier?

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Q I have a narrow question. Clause 12 concerns the power to enter and search houses. I am trying to get a practical sense of that. There are, of course, various requirements. On at least two occasions there has to have been attempts at entry before. The purpose is this:

“to enter premises specified in the warrant for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the person to whom the warrant relates;”

Could you expand on that? Mr Basu, what exactly do you think is meant by “assessing the risks”? What practically would be likely in a situation like that?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: This is based around lifetime offender management of terrorism. The parallel is obviously registered sex offenders, where this power exists. You are looking for anything that looks as though they have re-engaged or are breaching their notification requirements, if they are on notification. It is something that allows us to assess the ongoing risk of their re-engaging with terrorism. You might find material if you were to do such a warrant. You might find a flag being displayed. You might find material that is of use to a terrorist. That is the purpose of it.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I think we are coming towards the end. Can I just thank you very much for your evidence? Could I ask you to set the scene, assistant commissioner, of where we are with today’s threat and to put in context why these powers are needed?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: Certainly. You can listen to me or you can listen to Andrew Parker from MI5, who has spent 35 years in terrorism and says he has never seen anything like it. If I wanted to describe the threat, that is where I would start. It is definitely a shift, not a spike. We saw the start of problems that were predictable when the military push went into Mosul and Raqqa at the beginning of 2017.

Before Khalid Masood hit Westminster Bridge on 22 March, the number of leads from international partners, covert means and here in the UK were starting to increase in January. What we reached, post Khalid Masood’s attack, was probably a lowering of the bar for terrorism in this country, where people thought that perhaps we were not as hostile to terrorism as we could be and, therefore, they were capable of committing attacks. The attacks that followed were not connected in any way, shape or form, but they say something about the inspiration and the radicalisation that we have discussed.

That has left us with a trebling of our leads; on a monthly basis we deal with three times the number of investigative leads that might later work themselves through into a priority investigation against terrorism. There is more attack planning here in the UK, which is why section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is so important. Holding information is often a precursor for people seeking to do a much more serious offence down the line. We are seeing something in the region of about a 30% increase in case load.

We talk about somewhere between about 500 and 600 cases. Taking the cases that are not police and MI5-led and including the ones that are led by police alone, it is more like 650. We have talked openly about the fact that 3,000 subjects are of acute interest to us, which means 3,000 open cases of individuals who are considered a national security threat. We talk about the growing pool of those we have looked at and are no longer considered a national security threat, but who may re-engage in the future, as being 20,000.

We also have a number of issues, as we have discussed, of people who have been exposed to this in countries overseas. Now that the caliphate has collapsed, what will happen to those people? Will they return to their countries of origin? We still have a substantial number of people who could return against whom we do not have prosecutable case.

Within our communities, we continue to see a rise in extremism. Most disturbingly, along with the jihadist Islamist threat that we see in international counter-terrorism, we now see the extreme right wing growing as well. Those probably feed off of each other, which is why this becomes a whole-society problem, because we are seeing both sides of the coin. The previous Home Secretary proscribed National Action. We have done a great deal of work against National Action.

The most disturbing thing about the extreme right-wing threat, in terms of how it transfigured as National Action, is that it shows very similar signs to what was discussed about al-Muhajiroun—ALM—many years ago. It probably took years to get on top of ALM, and we did not want to make that same mistake with the extreme right-wing threat. Counting that together with the scale of the pace, our ability to counter that level of threat will be severely challenged over the next couple of years. This legislation provides me with some help on that.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the assistant commissioner and Mr McGill for giving evidence this morning and for their time. It has been most helpful to the Committee. Thank you very much. We will now move on to our next panel.

Examination of Witness

Richard Atkinson gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Q From what you are saying, there is a practical solution for any legitimate concerns there may be. There is also a situation—in a police station, for example—where you can have a duty solicitor or lawyer made available. That person could be someone of particular standing and reputation in whom we could all have faith and whom we would not have those concerns about.

Richard Atkinson: Absolutely. Again, code H allows exactly for that. If there are specific concerns about a lawyer, the duty lawyer or solicitor can be called to come and advise. That maintains privilege and maintains the defendant’s access to advice at that point.

[Mr Wallace]

Q In your earlier replies, you talked about how an individual who was detained could have a conversation without legal advice or compromising themselves. It is right, is it not, that in this environment such a conversation would not be admissible in court, under the grounds of the stop?

Richard Atkinson: Not necessarily, because although there is a provision to limit its use, it is not absolute, is it? There are three exceptions where it can be used.

[Mr Wallace]

Q What are those exceptions?

Richard Atkinson: If I am right, the three are proceedings for an offence under schedule 7(18) of the Terrorism Act 2000; on a prosecution for perjury; and on a prosecution for another offence where, in giving evidence, the defendant makes a statement inconsistent with the answer or information provided by him or her in response to the schedule 7 examination.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Let us take perjury. Whenever any of us goes to the airport, a passport control person will ask us, potentially, where we are going or where we have been. They will question us, won’t they? They have the power to do that.

Richard Atkinson: They will.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Do we have a right at that stage—because this is all about being at the border—to ask for a lawyer then?

Richard Atkinson: No. I think, though, there are three almost categories of questioning recognised in the legislation. You have screening, examination and detention. What you are talking about is much more akin to screening, and no one is suggesting that those sorts of questions require someone to be offered legal advice. Having gone past the screening exercise and moving into the position of examination, where someone can be held for up to an hour, they are now someone of interest. Their status has moved on from simply that person who walks through passport control.

[Mr Wallace]

Q What about customs, because we are really talking about a customs screening in the example of a passport? If I am coming in from a country with my baggage, a customs officer stops me and asks me where I have come from—there is the screening—and they wish to search my bag or my person, they will take me away. They can take me to a side room. They can hold me while they examine my bag, screen it, and take it through an X-ray machine. Do you have a right to a lawyer in that environment at the border?

Richard Atkinson: No.

[Mr Wallace]

Q But that is a detention. You can be held, I think, for quite some time. We have all seen the television programmes; it happens all the time. How long has that power been held at the border by customs officers?

Richard Atkinson: I am afraid I do not know the answer to that.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Because you started your critique of this part of the law by referring to the long established view, the cornerstone of British advice. If I may give you a clue, it has been centuries that customs has had that power at our border in order to protect our border.

Richard Atkinson: Sorry, I think you are conflating things that I have said. The cornerstone is legal professional privilege. That is not access to a lawyer; it is the confidential nature of discussions between a lawyer and their client. That is the cornerstone that has been in existence for hundreds of years and that is held out internationally as a gold standard that we have in this country. That is what is being undermined by this Bill saying that a police officer can stand and listen to the consultation that is going on between the client and the lawyer. That is not the same as access to a lawyer, which is none the less important but is not of the same nature as I was describing in relation to legal professional privilege.

[Mr Wallace]

Q That is the particular bit that you would have the most beef with—the discussion between, effectively, a client and a lawyer when they are allowed access to a lawyer at that stage.

Richard Atkinson: That is the most alarming part, yes. Access to a lawyer is important, but you were seeking to conflate the two. I am happy to discuss either, but not the two together.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Let us go to the access to a lawyer point, because I think there is an amendment down about that. On access to a lawyer, would you venture, therefore, it should happen from the first—not from the screening? Not from the initial detention, in the way customs is done? Or would you say that they should really have access as soon as they have gone beyond the screening?

Richard Atkinson: Yes, I think they should, and under the code of practice that currently applies to schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, if a suspect requests legal advice, that is entitled to be considered and they may be given it, so this is not something new to terrorism legislation. It is already there in the code of practice that suspects are entitled to ask for legal advice at that point.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I am just trying to get consistency. Does that mean you think that when a Border Force person, a customs person, seeks to detain you for an hour or however long to examine and question you further, they, too, should have access to a lawyer?

Richard Atkinson: If they are questioning you, yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q But they do that every day in their thousands across the country, because that is how we control our borders.

Richard Atkinson: If it has gone beyond screening, then yes.

[Mr Wallace]

Q That is a significant shift in what you would desire on the borders of our country. There would be thousands of lawyers. Let’s say someone goes beyond “Are you Ben Wallace? Did you come from Jamaica on this aeroplane? What’s in your bag?” They start taking my bag away, screening it, X-raying it, and asking me questions about what hotel I stayed in. Are you saying they should have a lawyer there?

Richard Atkinson: I would separate out some of those actions. If they are X-raying your bag, if they are looking for physical evidence to support a suspicion, then no, you do not have a lawyer at that point. If they have formed a suspicion and are now looking to ask you questions, then yes. However, more particularly under this legislation, the concern is that you have no right to remain silent, you have to answer these questions. So, devoid of legal advice and required to answer the questions is a significant act on the part of the state.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I think it is right to say that access to a lawyer on the border has been qualified quite considerably over many years. Would you not say that? Whether it is a customs stop or not conducive to the public good or a whole load of establishing, it often goes beyond screening.

Richard Atkinson: That is not something I can comment on. It may be correct. I do not know.

[Mr Wallace]

Q As the Minister, I definitely take your point about access to legal advice and that privileged space. Do you understand why we are trying to use schedule 7 and schedule 3 on the hostile state? Do you understand why there is a need to try to establish people coming into our country? What alternatives would you proffer as a way to deal with people who sometimes do not want to answer the screening questions, obviously, but may have a lot of evidence on their telephones?

Richard Atkinson: I do understand what is being sought. What I am saying is that there is a need for legal safeguards for those individuals. I do not see how those prevent evidence of the type you are talking about from being obtained. With a telephone, you are talking about the material being taken away and examined. It is not a matter of questioning at that point, and I have not sought to say that that should not be the case.

If you want to move on to the wider issue around seizure of legally privileged material, that is a different issue and I would have comments on that.

[Mr Wallace]

Q So the Law Society does not oppose the concept of the schedule 7 or 3 type stop; it just wishes better access to legal advice.

Richard Atkinson: That is correct.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Does it oppose the lack of reasonable grounds, the no suspicion?

Richard Atkinson: No.

[Afzal Khan]

Q I would like to ask about the confidentiality between the solicitor and the client. It has been long-established that that is a privileged sort of advice. You also said you understand where the legislation is trying to go and why the Government are trying to pass it. Is an alternative available where both could be achieved without compromising and losing one?

Richard Atkinson: I do not think the two prevent one another. Obtaining legal advice, bearing in mind that the individual has to answer questions, is not going to stop the objectives of the legislation or investigation. As I have already indicated, if there are specific concerns about the individual adviser, they can be met in the way that the codes of practice attached to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act currently address the matter. So, no, I do not think there is any problem in maintaining legal professional privilege and achieving the objectives that are sought.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nic Dakin]

Q The provisions under clause 17 and schedule 2 will bring terrorism offences under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in line with those under the Terrorism Act 2000, in relation to biometric data. To what extent do you think it is necessary and proportionate to retain biometric data for individuals who are arrested for terrorist offences but not charged?

Richard Atkinson: It is an area of concern for us because, clearly, it is right that individuals’ data is not routinely withheld, and we have looked at that in the past. I do not think I am qualified to answer on the need to extend the period, but your question very much enunciates our position, which is that any extension of time periods needs to be justified by objective evidence. I know the Committee were asking for examples of that from the two earlier witnesses. Before one could be satisfied of the need to extend periods of retention of biometric data, there would need to be a case made out. I certainly have not seen it. It was not something that could readily be articulated this morning, and great caution needs to be expressed before extending the periods of the retention of that data without an evidential base.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Can I just come back on the oversight of retained material? That is mainly paragraph 11 of schedule 3, on page 40 of the Bill. You have talked about an independent barrister or legal view about legally protected privilege. The Bill says that when a number of things are seized, including legally protected privileged material, but also broader material such as journalistic material and even health material, it has to go before the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office is an independent body, headed by Lord Justice Fulford. That body will then have to make the decision on whether that material could be examined or destroyed and so on. They are all judges. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner is Lord Justice Fulford, and his judicial commissioners are obviously former judges. What is the gap—what is missing—therefore between that oversight and the oversight that you think needs to be improved?

Richard Atkinson: First, the conflation of journalistic material and legally privileged material is unfortunate. I understand the importance of journalistic material, but I would respectfully submit that it is not in the same category as legally privileged material. It is a different category of material and should be treated differently. I may have misunderstood the process, but as I understand it, the investigator views the material, seizes it and then seeks power to retain it, which means that the privileged material has already been viewed and the privilege breached.

[Mr Wallace]

Q I am not entirely sure that that is correct. I think he will initially seize it. I think he needs permission. He must be informed of the retention. The Bill talks about the retention by the commissioner where

“there are reasonable grounds to believe”.

Richard Atkinson: So you have seized it, viewed it and seek permission to retain it.

[Mr Wallace]

Q The Bill states in schedule 3 that

“an examining officer may retain the article…for the purpose…while the officer believes”.

Paragraph 12 states:

“This paragraph applies in relation to an article retained by virtue of paragraph 11(2)(d) or (e)…The Investigatory Powers Commissioner…must be informed of the article’s retention”.

Paragraph 12(4) states:

“The Commissioner may…direct that the article is destroyed, or…authorise the retention and use of the article”

subject to whatever.

Richard Atkinson: My understanding—I could be wrong—is that that material will have been viewed prior to the application to retain it, which is a breach of legal professional privilege. The breach occurs, and then in order to perpetuate the breach, if I may put it that way, an application is made. That is too late, so far as legal professional privilege is concerned. Whether that is the case with journalistic material, I leave for others to argue. For legal professional privilege, to breach it and then seek permission to retain it is too late. It should be that as soon as privilege is claimed, that material is then examined. Ordinarily, you cannot go behind privilege, and that is it, but I understand that, in the particular circumstances being addressed here, it is important that the veracity of the claim is properly checked. That is what I am saying the first stage is. It is someone saying, “I am taking your briefcase.” The person says, “Don’t look at that file. That is a privileged file.” The other person responds, “Right. I will put it in a bag, and we will see whether it is.”

[Mr Wallace]

Q We should get some clarity on this. The legislation talks about seizing, rather than viewing. That may be enough to trigger it. If I claim something has legal privilege, that may be enough to trigger that a judicial commissioner looks at it—it is then referred to the commissioner, as opposed to your assumption that it will have to have been viewed before the request for judicial oversight.

Richard Atkinson: If your proposition is correct and there is therefore judicial oversight of that material, I would not have concerns, but that is not how I read it operating. We differ on that.

[Mr Wallace]

Q Are you happy with the Bill’s oversight of that process, with the judicial commissioners and the independent commissioners being the ones who give the authorisation to retain or destroy material?

Richard Atkinson: Yes, but the issue is whether privilege is breached prior to that.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Q Staying on this point, but moving away from the distinction about whether a document is privileged, do you think it would help if the Bill said, “Every single time this power is used, the commissioner will be informed about it”?

Richard Atkinson: Yes, I do.

[Mr Wallace]

The judicial commissioners will be the oversight for the use of the hostile port stops overall—the annual report or whatever it is.

[The Chair]

As there are no further questions from Members, I thank you, Mr Atkinson, for your time and evidence this morning. As the Committee is not due to meet again until 2 pm, I invite the Government Whip to move the adjournment.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Maynard.)

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Ben Wallace Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons
Monday 11th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes), who made some thoughtful remarks but inexplicably failed to stick to his 15-minute time limit, which was a surprise to us all in the Chamber.

In the past couple of years, we have seen deadly terrorist attacks across the world, including in Mosul, Baghdad, Istanbul, Kabul, New York, Paris, Nice, Munich and Stockholm, and last year the UK was subjected to five terrorist attacks in London and Manchester that killed 36 innocent victims and injured many more. We may have honourable disagreements about many aspects of the Bill, but we owe it to the people affected by last year’s attacks to debate these differences as a matter of principle and efficacy rather than on the basis of petty party political interests.

Glasgow airport, in my constituency, was the target of an attempted terror attack in 2007. It came as a huge shock to all Scots given that we had had very little experience of dealing with terrorist acts on Scottish soil. It proved that nowhere and no one is immune to the threat of terrorism. With that in mind, I can assure the Minister and the House that the Scottish National party will engage in this debate in the appropriate manner, treating it with the respect and seriousness that it deserves.

In an increasingly changing and digital world, the SNP supports giving law enforcement agencies the necessary powers to fight serious crime and terrorism. The world is becoming ever more complex, and terrorists are utilising sophisticated measures to plan their attacks. As such, it is of extreme importance that we keep our response and policies under continual review to ensure that we take the most effective action possible to prevent terrorist acts from occurring, while—crucially—respecting and upholding our civil liberties.

During the debates that will follow, the SNP will judge any proposed new powers or the extension of existing ones according to whether they are appropriate, effective, proportionate and respectful of civil liberties. This is the approach we adopted during the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act, during which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and I argued that aspects of the Bill were unlawful. We might have been defeated in this place, but we were not alone, and successful court challenges by the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Tom Watson) West Bromwich and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), and subsequently by Liberty, proved that we had been right to oppose the measures. I hope that the Government have learned from that experience.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I just want to clarify the point about the Investigatory Powers Act. It is important for the House to know that in the legal challenge the Government were successful in defending the Act on three out of four measures. It was on the measure about judicial oversight that we conceded, as hon. Members will see in the Bill.

[Gavin Newlands]

I appreciate the Minister’s intervention. As I outlined, my hon. and learned Friend made these points during the Committee stage of the 2016 Act, but I accept his point.

I hope that the Government have learned the lesson and will work with all parties to ensure that the policy can survive any potential legal challenge and carry the support of the House. There will be no petty opposition for opposition’s sake, but we will cast a critical eye on the Bill and table amendments to improve it in Committee and on Report.

After the London Bridge attack last year, the Prime Minister announced a review of the Contest strategy to establish whether the police and the security forces had the powers that they needed to tackle those who would seek to cause us harm. Following David Anderson’s very thorough review, the Bill is intended to bolster the Government’s counter-terrorism approach and strengthen a variety of measures to respond to the terrorist threat, allowing earlier intervention to disrupt terrorism.

I agree with the Government’s desire to intervene at an early stage. Such intervention is not only effective in stopping terrorist attacks, but helpful in preventing young people from becoming radicalised. Terrorist organisations are using 21st-century measures, including social media, to promote their propaganda as a means of radicalising youngsters. It is only right for the Government to review their approach to ensure that it is fit for the 21st century and future-proofed as far as is practically possible, but the internet providers and the social media companies also have a responsibility to ensure that terrorists cannot exploit their systems to promote their poisonous agenda. They must be involved in this process as well. On too many occasions they have been unwilling to take down terrorist content, and slow in doing so.

We are broadly in favour of the aims of the Bill but, while some of its provisions will attract our support, others will need to be tested in Committee. We must ensure that lowering thresholds and the burden of proof does not become so extreme that it impinges severely on civil liberties.

The Bill seeks to amend the offence of collecting terrorist information to cover the repeated viewing or streaming of material online. I accept the point that streaming material has become far more common since the previous legislation was drafted, and that we need a more robust approach. The implementation of this policy will give our police and security services the power to compel internet companies to assist them in carrying out covert surveillance on suspects streaming terror-related content. However, the way in which the process is set in motion is key.

In Committee, the Government will need to set out their case very well, explaining their proposed definition of “streaming” and the new three strikes, three clicks approach to people who stream extremist terror content. The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) pressed the Home Secretary on that point earlier. In all likelihood, the approach will prove to be over-simplistic. While we are sympathetic to the Government’s goal of early prevention of potential terrorist acts, we must ensure that their proposals are evidence-based, and that civil liberties are not eroded or forgotten in the process. Like others who have spoken, I feel that the Government should be doing much more to stop the material at source by placing a statutory duty on the online platforms on which the material is viewed.

The Government intend the offence to cover circumstances in which the defendant is in control of a computer but, in addition, and with a much higher degree of difficulty, circumstances in which an individual is viewing the material, for example, over the controller’s shoulder. That may prove to be impossible, and is an obvious example of parts of the Bill which, if unamended, may be open to challenge in court. Campaigners have already voiced concerns about the proposed policy, suggesting that it unfairly targets innocent people. Rachel Robinson, of Liberty, has said:

“Blurring the boundary between thought and action by locking people up simply for exploring ideas undermines the foundations of our criminal justice system. Terrorists’ primary goal is to undermine our freedom. With proposals like this, the government risks giving them exactly what they want.”

Along with the Scottish Government. we will work with the Minister to ensure that that is not the case and that we get this important part of the Bill right. Campaigners have also pointed out that an attempt to introduce a similar terror streaming law in France last year was struck down twice. I should be keen to learn from the Minister what discussions he has had with his counterparts in France about their experience of trying to introduce a similar law, and whether the Government have been able to learn any lessons from them.

The Home Secretary also seeks to amend the offence of encouragement of terrorism so that action can be taken to target those who seek to radicalise children or young people who may not understand what they are being encouraged to do. It is vital that we reassess our approach to preventing vulnerable youngsters from becoming radicalised, and send a clear message to the recruiters that they will face the full force of the law if they attempt to prey on our young people. In my role on the Justice Committee, I had a long conversation with a now convicted terrorist. That has had a profound effect on me and, in particular, on my thoughts about how we can try to protect young people from terrorist influence online.

I understand the arguments that certain provisions in this Bill unfairly target innocent individuals’ personal liberty. The fact that the Home Office guidance that accompanies the Bill also accepts that point is telling. However, it attempts to alleviate the concern by stating that it would not be

“unlawful to hold a private view in support of a terrorist organisation”;

it would be unlawful only to

“recklessly express those views, with the risk others could be influenced”.

I think that the Government will need to clarify what is meant by recklessly expressing a particular view. That seems to me to be an unnecessarily wide and vague phrase that will undoubtedly be tested later in the Bill’s progress.

There will always be a fine balance between giving the police, the security services and the judiciary enough powers to keep us safe, and liberty itself. Ultimately, it could be argued that, if we restrict our personal freedoms excessively, the terrorists have already won. The Government must tread very carefully, and engage fully not only with the Opposition, the Scottish Government and other Administrations, but with those who instinctively oppose any perceived restrictions of liberty.

The Scottish Government support giving law enforcement agencies and the intelligence services the necessary and proportionate powers that are required to fight terrorism. In the past, the UK Government have chosen not to engage with the Scottish Government before publishing Bills and guidelines on the issue. I am pleased that that has not happened in this instance. I also welcome last week’s telephone conversation with the Minister, but will he assure me that he will engage with the Scottish Government at every opportunity and throughout this process?

Keeping people safe is the primary function of any Government. By means of the Prevent strategy, the Scottish Government will continue to work with key partners to tackle all forms of violent extremism—for instance, through Police Scotland’s model of community engagement. Working with the Scottish Government will enable people to learn lessons about the range of positive work that Police Scotland and other agencies do in our local communities to keep people safe. The distinct Scottish approach to the delivery of Prevent benefits from the positive relationships that are fostered in our communities. That includes our work to develop a range of credible grassroots community-led projects that help to challenge extremist narratives, giving support and guidance to people who are potentially vulnerable to radicalisation.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Ind)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walsall North (Eddie Hughes). I have sat here and listened to some thoughtful speeches. In particular, the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) gave us a lot to think about on an issue that I had hoped the Home Secretary would cover in his opening remarks—the new provision on encouragement, effectively, of terrorism through statements that fall short of specifically inciting support for proscribed terrorist organisations. This is a really important provision, as the hon. Gentleman set out cogently in relation to Northern Ireland.

This is a difficult subject to raise, but I am brought back to remarks made in the past by Members who sit on the Labour Benches, some when they were MPs. We have the man who would be Chancellor of the United Kingdom having apparently, in 1986, praised the ballot, the bomb and the bullet. That is deeply, deeply serious. If my understanding of the new legislation is right, had it been in place at the time that that Member apparently made those remarks, he would have been guilty of a terrorist offence. Is the Minister able to share his understanding on that, or is he going to let me raise the matter alone? This is a serious matter in and of itself, but how wide-ranging these new powers could be deserves great thought from Members who will consider the Bill in Committee.

I want to spend a little time talking about the case of Ethan Stables, a young man from Barrow, aged 20, who has just been committed under existing terrorism legislation. On 23 June last year, Ethan Stables posted on Facebook that he was going to war, that he was preparing for a slaughter and planning to attack a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Pride event at the New Empire pub. Fortunately, those posts were immediately seen by someone local. The alarm was raised and he was picked up by the police as he was walking to the New Empire pub. He was convicted of terrorism offences. It was found that he had a machete and knives in his home, that he was a neo-Nazi sympathiser and that he had googled things such as “I want to go on a killing spree” and “What is prison like for a murderer?” Clearly, the signs were all there. There is a separate question about why it took so long to pick up Mr Stables. He was literally on the verge of attacking people who were celebrating a community event in the New Empire pub. If the legislation had been in place, the fact that Mr Stables had repeatedly viewed violent videos online and looked at how to download and create his own bombs, would have made him guilty of an offence long before he got to the stage of actively planning. That in itself is surely a reason to welcome this new legislation.

The case of Mr Stables raises the wider question of resources. It is all very well having the offences in place, but the Government will need to explain how they will be able to secure prosecutions earlier on in the process, rather than finding a reason, once someone has been apprehended for other reasons, to go through their viewing history.

It is my understanding that there is no requirement, or indeed any legal possibility at the moment, for internet companies such as YouTube routinely to provide the IP addresses of people who have viewed banned material more than three times, which would make them subject to criminal action under this terrorist legislation. I am talking about videos which would potentially see YouTube found guilty of a criminal offence, or certainly a civil offence, if it kept them up after having being warned about them. Will the Minister address that matter in his summing up? Will he consider bringing that forward so that there is potential to catch more people who are online at the time they are doing this, rather than as part of some retrofitting?

The Home Affairs Committee took evidence last week from the Met police commissioner, Cressida Dick. She was quite clear about the scale of pressure that her resources are under, even at present. She went through a number of areas, including, of course, counter-terror, where more resource was needed and where the amount available was inadequate at the time. Yet this legislation creates a new tranche of offences, which, unless the Minister can explain otherwise, will not be sufficiently resourced to be properly policed.

The other major omission, which the Minister will expect me to raise as we have been backwards and forwards on it both inside and outside the House for many months now, is on the issue of returning jihadis. It is good to get the recognition from the Home Secretary in this debate that he is considering introducing the Australian-style offence at the amendment stage. I can see no other way in which the Government will be able to get close to securing sufficient evidence to prosecute people who are returning from places such as Iraq, Syria or wherever the next terror hotspot is.

The Minister knows that I was able to interview at length someone who was being held in a removal centre in Izmir, Turkey on suspicion of supporting Daesh. She was being removed back to the UK on those grounds. There was a suspicion at the time about what would happen to the woman whom we interviewed. The very tough rhetoric that we hear from the Government, which is that we always seek to prosecute individuals, is not actually commensurate with being able successfully to prosecute individuals once they are here. Clearly, people are going over. They are travelling to Syria without a specific or verifiable reason, such as being part of aid work. They are clearly not going for a valid reason, yet, at the moment, we need verifiable proof, which is very hard to find, to be able to prosecute such people.

A number of us have repeatedly pressed the Government on this. The Minister can enlighten us all on this in his closing remarks if he wishes, but for many months now the Government have refused to give the number of people who have returned from Syria who have been successfully prosecuted. The response now is that those numbers are not quantified in that fashion. Well, they were quantified in May 2016, when the Advocate General, Lord Keen, in the other place gave a written response. Back then, he said that 54 people had been successfully prosecuted, with 30 ongoing cases. Clearly, it is possible to update the House on this and the Government are choosing not to do so. Our strong suspicion is that that is because so few are able to be prosecuted—

[Mr Wallace]

I may be able to help the hon. Gentleman. Approximately 40 have been prosecuted so far—either because of direct action they have carried out in Syria or, subsequent to coming back, linked to that foreign fighting.

[John Woodcock]

I thank the Minister very much for updating the House. I note that 40 is fewer than the 54, the number we apparently prosecuted, according to Lord Keen, in May 2016. I need to examine those figures to see why they are different. I am grateful that, after many months of pushing, the Minister has given us a figure of 40. As he will know, the Government have said that 400 have come back, so we have been able to prosecute successfully only one 10th of those people. That is very significant.

Ministers in response are now saying that a significant proportion of the people coming back are no longer of concern to the security services. That is as may be, and we want the number of people who are no longer of concern to be as high as possible, but that does not mean that they are innocent of terrorism charges. If they have been to Iraq or Syria, have been aiding Daesh, in whatever form, and they are British citizens and they are returning, they have been aiding enemies of the British state. They are people who are wanted for enacting violence on our civilians and on our armed forces and they should be able to be prosecuted, which is why the Australian-style legislation, the declared area offence, is a step forward. It would mean that anyone who has visited a designated terror hotspot without good reason—with declarations overseen by a judge—can be prosecuted for terror offences on their return. That would go a long way towards the deterrent effect that the Government understandably want to create to stop people from taking the crazy journey into war zones to support jihadi organisations that seek to destroy our way of life.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

This has been a good debate, and Members on both sides of the House have demonstrated a desire to take a collaborative approach to counter-terrorism legislation. I am heartened by that, and delighted that we can start the process in that spirit. Every point that I have heard today has been made with passion, consideration and genuine belief. I might not have agreed with some of the points, but I certainly recognise that this is not about posturing or anything other than trying to make an effective piece of legislation that will make us safer. Over time, while we are doing this Bill, I intend to do as much as I can to work with Members on both sides of the House and to be as collaborative as possible. I shall work to see whether there are better ideas to improve the legislation, to ensure that we can deliver it in such a way as to enable the intelligence services, the police and local communities to feel safer than they do today.

On 22 March last year, many of us who were in the House heard shots being fired outside and heard about the horrendous events on Westminster Bridge. I was about to come into the Chamber when I heard a police officer say, “Shots fired.” We lost our friend PC Keith Palmer that day. He did his very best to defend us from a man intent on killing indiscriminately and spreading terror. On 22 May last year, in this job as Security Minister, I remember being woken just after 11.30 pm by a phone call from my office telling me of the dreadful news that a bomb had been detonated at the Manchester Arena and killed a significant number of people. Manchester is my local city, and my own daughter had been at the Arena only the week before. Those events brought home to us the vulnerability that we face.

Every one of us in the House, while not directly affected by terrorism, will have fought the general election feeling—perhaps for the first time and perhaps because of social media—the level of hate and bile that is directed at us all. I think that that made us feel a little uneasy about the society that we are in, and about what lies at the extremes behind that hate. Some of my friends on the Opposition Benches are right now under threat from the extreme right, and we remember our dear fallen colleague. Also, a good friend in my part of the world has been under real threat from some particularly nasty people. I think that we have to reflect on these issues.

There is often pressure after such attacks to have new legislation—something must be done—and I am proud that this Government did not rush to legislation. We set up several significant reviews that were consolidated into four main reviews. The operational review produced a classified report of some 1,300 pages that went into every single decision, piece of intelligence and bit of work that went on in the lead-up to some of the attacks. I read all 1,300 pages not just because I am incredibly interested and because it is my duty, but because only then could I learn what legislation will put right, what is reasonable to be asked by our security services and police and what should not necessarily need to be placed on the statute book.

We also had the Home Office’s counter-terrorism legislative review, and we reviewed Contest, pausing its relaunch to see whether anything needed to be handled. Several of those reviews were “oversighted” by David Anderson, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, or Max Hill, the current reviewer, who reviewed how police used their powers in the aftermath. That gentle but solid consideration is why we are here today with legislation that hopefully helps to answer some of the challenges we face.

When the terrorists unleashed attacks on us in 2017, that demonstrated clearly not only the empowerment that they now have through social media and encrypted communication, but how they had adapted to our statute book to find new vulnerabilities. They have shifted their ambitions to find where we are not as protected as perhaps we should be, and they have exploited that. Good terrorists do that. Terrorists are all about our soft underbelly and our vulnerability. If they cannot get an AK-47, they get a truck. If they cannot get a truck, they get a knife. That is part of what they do, and if they cannot do any of that, they intimidate and scare us with words and propaganda. They exploit our constituents, whether they are vulnerable or children.

Daesh are the among the worst. They have no fuss about who they twist and corrupt. They do not care whether they are Muslim, young, abused or vulnerable or whether they suffer from mental illness. Anyone will do to carry out their twisted, murderous campaign. Despite the loss of territory in Syria, they keep their flame alive. They are adapting, and as we speak there are people in this country planning to repeat what we saw last year. There were five attacks last year, four extreme right-wing, neo-Nazi attacks have been stopped over the past 12 months, and 25 plots have been disrupted since the murder of Lee Rigby. We have 3,000 current subjects of interest involved in nearly 500 live operations. I have never seen things at such a scale, and the threat is a great challenge not only due to encrypted communications, but due to the speed at which someone who does not mind getting caught can reach out, grab a knife, go out of their front door and literally kill people as they see fit.

I will now answer some of the points made today. The shadow Home Secretary offered some positive support for the Bill in principle, which I welcome, but she highlighted some of her concerns, which I may be able to answer. In clause 1, there was a worry about reckless encouragement, but it is our challenge to deal with people who go out to inspire others. It is no coincidence that al-Qaeda’s online publication, which contains sections such as “Just Terror Tactics”, is called “Inspire” because inspiration is one of the challenges we face. There are some very charismatic people in our communities, some of whom are currently in prison but are due to be released, who have used their presence and their inspiration to recruit without actually muttering the words, “And I want you to join Daesh, and I want you to go and fight in Syria.” That has been part of the challenge, and some of them—one individual, in particular, has been responsible for hundreds of people being drawn into extremism—have used it so well for so long, which is why we have sought to plug the gap in the space of inspiration.

I agree with a number of colleagues on both sides of the House on the substance of Prevent. Whenever I hear people criticise Prevent and I ask, “Okay, what would you do?”, they just describe Prevent, and they come back to the bit about the Prevent brand being tainted. Fine, the brand is safeguarding; I will sell safeguarding all day long. We call it Prevent, but it is about safeguarding people from being exploited.

The shadow Home Secretary is worried about whether local authorities have the expertise. They do not have expertise in counter-terrorism, but, by golly, they have expertise in safeguarding vulnerable people and children. We should put Prevent referrals in perspective. There are 9,000 Prevent referrals a year, of which half are of people aged up to young adolescence. There are 621,000 referrals a year to safeguard people from domestic abuse, sexual abuse and grooming. Let us put this in perspective. Prevent is not a Big Brother spying operation.

The end result has been that, in two years, more than 500 people about whom we had serious concerns they were on the path towards, or were about to engage in, violent extremism are now deemed no longer to be a threat. That is 500 people—it takes one man to drive a van across Westminster bridge—and, in my book, that is a success.

Yes, there are people who are worried about the branding of Prevent, about which I have two things to say. First, when I raise the extreme right or the neo-Nazis, people say, “Prevent is quite a good thing for them.” Secondly, when I look people in the eye whose families have been prevented from going to Syria, they do not argue with Prevent; they say that Prevent works. One of the reasons we publish the figures is that they put it in perspective and show that there are successes. It is not 100%, but 30% of the people it picks up need other types of safeguarding.

Often the people who attack Prevent the most are the ones who do not want Prevent to work because they are the flipside of the recruiters of extremism in this country. We should not forget that some people want the narrative to be, “Don’t trust the state. We don’t like the state, and we don’t want the state. Our way is the best way.” They peddle this myth that a child was reported to have said, “My uncle lives in a terrorist household”—we have all heard that one trotted out by the anti-Prevent lobby. What the child actually said was, “I live in a terraced house, and my uncle beats me.” It never was a Prevent referral; it was a referral because the child was being abused. The same people will peddle that myth until the cows come home.

Our ambition is to broaden Prevent, to get the local community engaged and to get local authorities alongside the police on referrals. One of the criticisms of Prevent is that it is too police-focused. Local authorities may understand some of the nuances in their community to determine whether a person is really being radicalised. If the local authority says, “We think they are being radicalised,” why should it not be allowed directly to refer that person to Channel? I think that is a good thing. It is not a step backwards; it is listening to some of those criticisms about Prevent.

My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes) is right to talk about keeping people safe. This is about safeguarding. On whether we have too much legislation or legislation enough, there are two things to say. Britain is a world leader in counter-terrorism. All our legislation has got us to a point where most countries come to ask us how to do it. Most countries around the world are envious of what we have.

Also, unlike other countries, we have probably the most oversighted intelligence services, security services, police and law enforcement in the world. A number of the measures in the Bill were recommended by the independent reviewers. The hostile activity port stop power has been included because the independent reviewer identified two occasions on which our police were abusing the counter-terrorism power to stop people we thought were from hostile states and recommended a separate power. The Biometrics Commissioner was the one who recommended the changes to the biometrics. So the Government have listened to some of these independent reviewers and thought, “That is a good thing to do.”

May I say to the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands) that I welcome the Scottish National party’s support in principle for the Bill? Of course I will continue to work with him and the Scottish Government. I first entered the Scottish Parliament at the same time as his Justice Minister. I had a phone call with him last night. If he feels at any stage that they are not getting the engagement, he should not hesitate to get in touch and I will make sure that it is done. It is incredibly important that Contest and our counter-terrorism legislation reach all the fingertips of the United Kingdom. I note that when National Action was proscribed, something called Scottish Dawn popped up quickly—it is now proscribed, too. It is important that we do not muddy the waters where we all agree to agree.

On the issue about recklessness, part of this is about how we deal with those who are targeting people without caring whether they understand or not—I refer to the issue of vulnerability. In March, Umar Haque was convicted of trying to radicalise hundreds of children at school. He got them to swear allegiance to ISIL. He got them to re-enact the Westminster Bridge attack in their classroom and he showed them footage of people being beheaded. He said to those children, “If you tell your parents, you will go to prison.” Those people were vulnerable—they were children—and we have to find a way to make sure we close the gap in determining how much intent has to be involved and how much the receiver of that information has to know what they are getting.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk)—my learned friend—gave an excellent example about recklessness when he talked about a baseball bat. What we are dealing with here is not that different—I may disagree here with the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey)—and the law has established on a number of occasions where recklessness comes in. My notes tell me to cite R v. G and another from 2003, and I think my hon. Friend is the only person who would understand what case that refers to. It was not an enlightening note, but it shows that this has been done.

Points have been made about hostile activity stops on the border. One way we temper the no suspicion issue is by the fact that whatever oral statements are made then cannot be used in court as evidence. That is an important way to try to balance this, but there is the issue about suspicion to address. If I were an agent of a foreign country, I would be trained. I would know the law of the country I am coming into, so I would give my electronic equipment to a family member. If we had to have reasonable suspicion, we would have to have reasonable suspicion about everyone else travelling with that person; it would be harder to adapt to something as it happens.

I hear what the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) says, as he is right, about the impact the current schedule has had, including on my constituency, and the cost and what people perhaps lose when they are stopped under counter-terrorism powers. We have to look at whether we can make sure the information is provided in a timely way, so that people do not miss flights. Sometimes things are too last-minute, but this has been incredibly useful.

The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) talked about the challenges of dealing with foreign fighters. Some 150 people have been prevented from going to train, fight or engage in terrorism because of that schedule. We managed at the airport to stop them, and in examining their electronic devices, we saw that they were not really going on a family holiday to Turkey but were in fact, for example, taking their three young children to Raqqa. No one wants to go on such a holiday, and those three children had no say in that.

I hope and believe that the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle) will be meeting the Economic Secretary to discuss the issue he raised further. I hear what he says, and I also want to pay tribute to his colleague the hon. Member for Manchester Central (Lucy Powell), as she has talked a lot about loss of business around the Manchester Arena. It is right to raise this. I am also glad he has called out Aviva. It is important for us to remember—this is the same for our constituents going on a summer holiday—that slowly but surely over the past 10 years travel insurance firms have dropped terrorism from their coverage, yet the odds of being a victim of terrorism are still absolutely tiny. So I have asked to see what we can do with insurance companies more widely to ensure that, although people are at only a tiny, tiny risk of being a victim, this is not just casually dropped out of people’s schedules.

My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) referenced Hezbollah. Of course we always keep proscription under review. I hear what he says about it and I understand the hurt people feel here when they see others flying flags of Hezbollah on the streets—for example, on al-Quds day. He also talked about the Council of Europe. It is absolutely the case, on the border point, that we need to engage those partnerships post Brexit. We need to make sure that we continue with all the tools that we use at the moment. The United Kingdom Government’s position is unconditional on that. That is what we would like to engage with. The question is for the European Commission—whether it would like to have that.

Security is not a competition. Trade might be, but security is not. I think that is something they understand in Europe, going by my private conversations, and I hope that, by the time we get to Brexit, we will see it in place, because that partnership, both domestically and internationally, is why we are so successful in counter-terrorism.

I can already give the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) some good news from the Dispatch Box: there is no 20-year bar on glorification of terrorism offences, nor will there be. In that sense, hopefully, he will be able to progress and go forward.

The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness is right that we have to find ways to explore the foreign fighter challenge. That is not just us—it is the French and the Germans, too—where we might have intelligence that someone is out there engaging, but it is hard to get the evidence. During the passage of the Bill, we are going to explore new measures or other measures on which I am happy to work together that I hope will do that for us.

We have also extended extraterritorial jurisdiction, because it is ridiculous that someone can sit in Syria and try to recruit people from the United Kingdom and somehow not be prosecuted correctly.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Forgive me. Am I right in thinking that the Minister of State is approaching a peroration as eloquent as Demosthenes but markedly briefer?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

The usual channels have taken over. I have lost the first battle.

In summing up, I apologise to the other Members who contributed so eloquently to the debate. I would, of course, be happy to meet them outside the usual channels. I should say very clearly that we owe a great duty to our intelligence services and police in thanking them for all the hard work that they do. We will progress with this legislation. I will work as much as possible in partnership with Members from all parts of the House to get a deal and a Bill that works to keep us safe.

[Mr Speaker]

The Chair was merely making an inquiry, and there was a question mark at the end of it, but I get the impression that the peroration was not altogether unwelcome to the House. We are very grateful to the Minister of State.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND BORDER SECURITY BILL (PROGRAMME)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 17 July.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Paul Maynard.)

Question agreed to.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Money)

Queen’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any amounts payable by the Treasury in respect of obligations incurred, under any agreement of reinsurance or guarantee, as a result of the amendments made by the Act to the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993.—(Paul Maynard.)

Question agreed to.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Ways and Means)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, it is expedient to authorise the charging of fees, under amendments made by the Act to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, in connection with traffic regulation orders or notices made or issued for the purpose of protecting events or sites from risks associated with terrorism.—(Paul Maynard.)

Question agreed to.

Women and Equalities Committee

Ordered,

That Teresa Pearce be discharged from the Women and Equalities Committee and Tulip Siddiq be added.—(Bill Wiggin, on behalf of the Selection Committee.)

Biometrics Commissioner

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Tuesday 5th June 2018 Written Statements

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

My hon. Friend the Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) has today made the following written ministerial statement:

I am pleased to announce that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is today publishing the fourth annual report of the Biometrics Commissioner, together with the Government’s response.

The Commissioner, Paul Wiles, is appointed under section 20 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. His responsibilities are:

to decide applications by the police for extended retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints from persons arrested for serious offences but not charged or convicted;

to keep under review national security determinations made by chief officers under which DNA profiles and fingerprints may be retained for national security purposes;

to exercise general oversight of police use of DNA samples, DNA profiles and fingerprints.

His report is a statutory requirement of section 21 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

I am grateful to Mr Wiles for this report, which we have published in full.

Copies of the report will be available from the Vote Office. The Government’s response will be placed in the House Library.

[HCWS736]

Oral Answers to Questions

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 4th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

11. What discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on tackling cyber-attacks.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

The Government recognise that cyber is a tier 1 risk to the UK’s economic and national security. The Home Secretary and I hold regular discussions with ministerial colleagues, the National Security Council, GCHQ and other Government Departments, both to tackle the overall threat and in response to specific incidents.

[Mr Dhesi]

With respect to cyber-attacks, what steps have the Minister and the Home Secretary taken to ensure that the major media and social media companies are more vigilant in their approach to cyber-crime and how that connects with what the Government are doing?

[Mr Wallace]

Through both the Joint Fraud Taskforce and broader cyber-security meetings in the Home Office, we work with the industry to produce a common cyber aware campaign, to make sure that everyone is reading from the same hymn sheet and advice is consistent across government. We also work hand in hand with the National Cyber Security Centre to make sure that advice is given both to small businesses and the charitable sector, so that they are not made vulnerable. By investing £1.9 billion in the national cyber-capability programme, we can invest in the capability to see this off.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend join me in paying tribute to the personnel at GCHQ Scarborough, which is known locally as “Wireless station”? Together with their colleagues in Cheltenham, they work day and night to keep us safe from cyber-attacks and cyber-crime.

[Mr Wallace]

The workforce at GCHQ do a tremendous job of keeping us safe from our enemies, and have done since all the way back to GCHQ’s history in Bletchley Park. I was delighted that some new GCHQ jobs were recently announced in my region, the north-west, which shows that it is not just a Cheltenham-based organisation, with sites in Yorkshire, Cornwall and now Manchester.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

The Security Minister indicated on the radio this morning that counter-terror intelligence will now be shared with local organisations, including the police and local councils. Will he explain how the cyber-security of that data will be guaranteed at a local level and what training will be given to those who handle it? Crucially, will he confirm that additional resources will be given to every organisation that is asked to store it?

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s question. We are sharing the information more widely in three pilot schemes that will be funded by the Home Office, so the funding will be met by central Government. The first three pilots are going to be based in Birmingham, Manchester and London. Of course, local authorities, social services and mainstream county police forces deal with sensitive information every day, and that is already subject to data protection rules and appropriate levels of security. We will continue to advise them on that, and the information that we share will of course be declassified before they get it.

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

13. What steps he is taking to tackle domestic violence.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Penrose (Weston-super-Mare) (Con)]

T8. On 6 April the USA announced tough sanctions against 24 Russian Government officials and oligarchs, including Oleg Deripaska, whose company floated here in London last year. When will we publish an equivalent British sanctions list on people whose presence and dirty money are not welcome on our shores?

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for the work he has done on this issue as the Government’s anti-corruption tsar. Like him, I was incredibly interested in the sanctions list that the United States published. He will be aware that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 has gone through this House. There are further opportunities to strengthen the regime with, I hope, a Bill coming forward from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy with regard to designations. We will be exploring that issue. It is important to note that the United Kingdom has recently been at the forefront of driving out dirty Russian money—or indeed other dirty money. It is important that we tackle this issue head on.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

T2. The Home Secretary said yesterday that he is open to looking again at the inclusion of international students in net migration targets. He will know that there is strong support for that move on both sides of the House. Will he therefore meet me and other officers of the all-party parliamentary group on international students, prior to the publication of the Migration Advisory Committee review that his predecessor so wisely commissioned?

BAME Communities: Stop and Search

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd May 2018 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen. I thank the hon. Member for Bradford West (Naz Shah) for bringing this debate before us and for her contribution. Stop-and-search is a vital policing tool, and I welcome the fact that everyone who has spoken in this debate has recognised that it has a place in policing. I believe, however, that if that power is misused, it is counterproductive, has a negative impact on police-community relations, and is a waste of police time.

I patrolled some of the most hostile community areas in my early life. I patrolled the Turf Lodge in west Belfast, Northern Ireland and carried out stop-and-search there. At the time, that community was far more hostile than any on the mainland of the United Kingdom. I was also an intelligence officer two years later.

The nub of the issue is that stop-and-search is a tool that is often tactical rather than strategic. As the Minister responsible for security in the United Kingdom, I have the strategic responsibility of trying to keep people safe. That is what I am here to do. I will empower our police, intelligence services and communities to use whatever tools they can to do that. Sometimes we have to balance tactical and strategic needs.

I agree with Opposition Members that what really stops crime is gathering good intelligence, when communities speak to police and community representatives and tell them, as they would say in Lancashire, who’s a wrong’un. As a Lancashire MP stuck between two Yorkshire MPs from either side of the House, I felt in a somewhat difficult position in this debate. What stops crime in the long term is when the community is on the side of the police and gives them information. That can be casual information or well-sourced information, and it could come from police working hand in hand with community groups to deliver the knowledge needed to use targeted searches. Sometimes that will mean doing less stop-and-search, if it means that there is a longer-term investment in communities to ensure a better flow of intelligence.

We should be slightly cautious about that, because every community is different. I joke about west Yorkshire, but it is different from Lancashire. Our communities behave differently and our ethnic communities often behave differently among themselves, so we have to be acutely aware of individual sensitivities at a local policing level. In my view, one of the most important decisions a chief constable can make is the right appointment of the chief superintendents in the divisions that they police, because at that rank of the police force people hold in their hands the relations with the community. If they get it right there is a massive decline in crime, but there can sometimes be a rise just across divisional borders when they get it wrong.

After being spat at, abused or petrol-bombed, or after one of my soldiers had been murdered, it used to be tempting for me to walk down the street in west Belfast and abuse back. That would be tempting and understandable for any human being who had seen people killed who they owed a duty of care to, who they valued and, sometimes, who they loved. But it does not fix the problem in the long run. In the long run, the problem is solved when the community realises that the police are its help and saviour, not its enemy. That is why we have to get the balance right on stop-and-search, and why the Government started that process by introducing a reform package in 2014.

I make the point to the Opposition that if we are to be less tactical and more intelligence-led, it is important to give our police and intelligence services the power to gather that intelligence. It is no good saying on the one hand that we want less indiscriminate or blanket targeting, but on the other that we oppose Prevent or some of the investigatory powers measures that allow us to gather that intelligence, to be more targeted at people committing or planning wrongdoing and to ensure that we can leave the population alone to live their lives free of interference. That is an important point.

Good intelligence gathering and good intelligence measures and powers are how we can allow our police to leave people alone to carry on their daily business freely, and how we can ensure that we do not end up with such a disparity that we get into the circular debate that I have heard today about whether we go after more people from certain groups because those groups commit more crimes, or vice versa. I urge the Opposition to reflect on that in discussions about Prevent and other issues.

[Ms Abbott]

The Minister has raised the issue of Prevent. I certainly have called for a review of it, but the concern is not that we do not need that type of strategy, but that the current Prevent operation has done what I have argued that stop-and-search has done: it has not helped to heal relationships or promote better relationships between certain communities and the state. We want a Prevent-type strategy, but we want one that works. The problem with Prevent is that in many communities—not all, but many—it has become a tainted brand.

[Mr Wallace]

I have published the figures, and I would venture that Prevent is working. It allows people who have set off on a path of violent extremism to be diverted from that path and to re-engage in society, and in doing so, it protects many of us on the streets. The figures show that hundreds of people who had been a serious concern are not in prison—we did not cut corners and lock them up without trial, or that sort of thing—but back in their communities, and some of them, hopefully, are back in the mainstream.

We all have a job of recognising and communicating that Prevent is about safeguarding. When we do, and when I speak to communities up and down the United Kingdom, we find that although some in the communities are worried about it or do not like it, a growing number of people realise that it is a safeguarding tool that works.

We have had many debates about Prevent before, but it is about allowing communities, alongside local police, to engage, and about seeing what we can do to make people desist, disengage and turn around. In some communities it works, but I know that, as the right hon. Lady says, we have more work to do in other areas. Whenever I say, “Please give me an example of your version of Prevent,” every single person just describes Prevent. They do not usually come up with anything different, because at the end of the day it is effectively a safeguarding measure.

I need to press on to the heart of the debate about stop-and-search. In 2014, when we started work on a major public consultation on the use of the power, troubling evidence came to light that it was not being used fairly, effectively or, in some cases, lawfully. For example, figures showed that of 1.2 million stop-and-searches carried out in 2010-11, only 9% led to an arrest. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, as it was known at the time, found that potentially more than a quarter of stops carried out by the police were without sufficient legal grounds, and it also found poor knowledge of the law on stop-and-search among officers and their supervisors.

Statistics also showed that if someone was black, they were seven times more likely to be stopped and searched than if they were white, and three times more likely if they were Asian. That was a cause for considerable concern, and still is. It is not that we have forgotten about it, and I would not like the Opposition to venture that that was the case.

As a result of extensive public consultation and community engagement, and of working closely with the police and other partners, the Government introduced several measures, such as clarifying “reasonable grounds for suspicion” in PACE code A, which governs the use of stop-and-search powers, and publishing stop-and-search data on police.uk, which offers local transparency to understand how the police serve their communities.

I take the point of the hon. Member for Bradford West, who asked how there could be oversight. She made a point about police and crime commissioners that I was disappointed with, and if what she said is the case, we should all do more to ensure that it is not. They should have a role in that regard, and they should have it further up their agenda. They have the power to hold chief constables to account. I do not know what the response from her local chief constable is, but if something is troubling the local community, that is the point of our PCCs. They should be communicating, taking those things on board and seeing what steps they can take to ensure that such things are not happening.

[Philip Davies]

The Minister trotted out a rather meaningless statistic about the proportion of stop-and-searches on different communities. Is he saying that it is Government policy that there should be the same proportion of stop-and-searches for each ethnic group of the country as their make-up of the population? Otherwise, what on earth is the point of him saying that a certain ethnic group is stopped and searched more often than another? Does he accept that it is inevitable that some ethnic groups will be stopped more often than others, or is he saying that it should be the same figure for every ethnic group?

[Mr Wallace]

I am saying that it should always be clearly targeted. The geographic breakdowns give a better picture. The hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq) talked about sociology and statistics, and it is important to look below the national figure at the local figures. Often, they show where we can put things right, where there is a disparity, or where the figures are just a reflection of the crime trends, as my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) talked about.

Before this debate, I asked for some regional statistics. In 2016, in Merseyside, if someone was Asian, they were less likely to be stopped than if they were white, and someone was 2.8 times more likely to be stopped if they were black. In West Yorkshire, they were 1.5 times more likely to be stopped than if they were white. In Lincolnshire, someone was less likely to be stopped if they were Asian than if they were white, but if they were black, they were 4.8 times more likely to be stopped.

Those regional or county statistics are really useful, because they help to answer other questions. I had assumed that the figure of black people being 8 times more likely to be stopped was predominantly driven by London, but in the Metropolitan police area, someone who was black was only 3.8 times more likely to be stopped. If they were Asian, it was about the same as if they were white.

When I look at those figures, I ask myself about community relationships, about whether we have a tactical rather than a strategic approach, and about the relationship between PCCs and the chief constables. By looking at the information at force level, we will get a more informed picture on the circular debate about whether it is because people commit more crimes, whether we as the state are doing something wrong, whether communities are not supporting the police, or whether there is a particular problem with organised crime groups in certain areas.

The 1981 riots are important to consider, and they came up in yesterday’s debate on serious violent crime. One of the biggest differences between crime in 1981 and today is the scale of organised crime and the ability for it to be organised through mobile telephones and encryption, as I said yesterday. We should recognise that organised crime is colour-blind. It does not care whether someone is black or white; it will shoot or stab them, and sell them drugs, no matter what. I suspect that some of the least racist people in this country are the drug dealers—they are delighted to sell anyone their poison.

We must remember that one of the differences between 1981 and now is the modus operandi of organised crime. It targets communities using county lines, meaning that some of our communities are more vulnerable to being exploited than they were before. I do not know the exact answer to that. Some of it will be an increase in stop-and-search where there is a particular problem with organised crime groups, because that may be the only tool that the local police have at that moment in time. Some organised crime groups have become much quicker at moving into a community before the community spots them, and then delivering their drugs, moving people around and moving couriers from outside an area into it so that the local community does not recognise them.

Also, communities are much less settled now than they were in 1981, which is a challenge. How do our frontline police deal with what is sometimes a very dangerous threat but short-term threat, whereby people move in, carry out their crime and then move on again? Addressing that will be a challenge. Stop-and-search will play a strong role in meeting that challenge, but more than anything, intelligence will play a role in stopping these criminals and hopefully preventing them from getting ahead of us.

We rolled out the voluntary Best Use of Stop and Search scheme, introducing greater transparency and public scrutiny, and the measures in that scheme have all been delivered. Every force in England and Wales signed up to the scheme, putting in place all of its components, which enable the public and the police to better understand how stop-and-search is used and how it can be improved upon. PACE code A, which governs how stop-and-search is carried out, was changed to make it clear that “reasonable grounds” cannot be based on race or stereotypical images, and the College of Policing developed and rolled out national standards and training, including mandatory unconscious bias awareness. We expect to see further improvements following on from those changes.

In answer to the hon. Member for Bradford West, the Home Office—in collaboration with the College of Policing through its national policing curriculum, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and community interest group representatives—is reviewing the Best Use of Stop and Search scheme, to take into account the three years of operational experience and feedback from practitioners, organisations and the public. A refreshed version of the scheme is currently being developed, with a view to a nationwide launch by the end of the year. The refreshed version will place further emphasis on community involvement and the need for forces to monitor and explain their use of stop-and-search.

HMIC has observed improvements across the 43 forces in a number of areas. For example, in 2012 the inspectorate found that 27% of stop-and-search forms that it examined did not show that there had been sufficient grounds for a lawful search. By 2017, that figure had dropped to 6%.

As for race and ethnicity, in 2016-17 substantially fewer black individuals were stopped and searched than before; the figure was down by 74% from 2010-11, when there were more than 110 searches for every thousand black people. The number of Asian individuals being stopped and searched has also fallen by 79% since 2010-11. By anyone’s yardstick, those figures represent a significant change and show that things are going in the right direction.

Nevertheless, the figures still show that if someone is black, they are more than eight times more likely to be stopped and searched than someone who is white. As I said earlier, I think that to explore those statistics further and perhaps understand what is behind them, we should look more at our force levels.

[Philip Davies]

I appreciate that the Minister is in a difficult position, because he has to defend the remarks on stop-and-search that the Prime Minister made when she was Home Secretary, which are virtually indefensible and which are unravelling, as we speak, on the streets of London. However, it is reported in the newspapers today that the Home Secretary is at the Police Federation conference and will say that he has only been in his job a few weeks and he is not going there to tell the police how to do their job. Yet I get the impression here that the Government are still trying to tell police officers how to do their job. What I want to hear the Minister say today is that we have a great police force, they do a great job, we trust them to get on and do their job, and the Government will support them. Can he bring himself to give that message to our police officers today?

[Albert Owen (in the Chair)]

Order. Before the Minister responds, I ask him to leave a couple of minutes at the end of the debate for the hon. Member who secured the debate to sum up.

[Mr Wallace]

I am not sure whether my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley attended the debate in the main Chamber on serious and violent crime yesterday. If he had, he would have heard me say, as I also said on the radio yesterday morning, that I believe we have the finest police force and intelligence services in the world. I have absolutely no doubt of that.

However I also know, from my own experience, the tension between a tactical response and a strategic response. Providing such responses is what I have experience of doing in very dangerous conditions, and yes, sometimes I stopped and searched. I stopped and searched and found a grenade; I stopped and searched and found a car full of Semtex, despite the mob that appeared when I did that. But I also know, from when I was an intelligence officer, that if the police either stopped and searched in a heavy-handed manner or did it in an untargeted way, all my sources dried up. And then guess what happened? The IRA made a bomb and killed lots of people.

One response is strategic and one is tactical, and we can all play to the gallery and just play to the tactical side for the daily headline. However, my hon. Friend might want to reflect that my job is to deliver strategic security for this United Kingdom, which means balancing risks. Getting the right stop-and-search, which is intelligence-targeted, without setting communities against each other, will be the best way to deliver a strong, strategic and secure community.

So I am not playing for the Daily Mail headline for my hon. Friend; I am playing making my community safe. That is the reality. The Prime Minister had the wisdom to spot that and we in the Home Office are going to deliver it. We will listen to the Opposition and urge them to support us on some of our intelligence-gathering measures, which may mean their having to balance risks. It is important to do things that way. I am determined to deliver, and we are on the right track. I want to make sure our communities are engaged with that approach.

We all accept that stop-and-search is a tool, and we can use it and use it well. Nevertheless, the best tool is when someone in the community picks up the telephone and speaks to their local police force, and as a result we manage to arrest the people carrying the knives and dealing the drugs before they are on our streets.

[Albert Owen (in the Chair)]

I am grateful to the Minister for leaving time for Naz Shah to wind up the debate.

Serious Violence Strategy

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd May 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Serious Violence Strategy.

A year ago today, 22 innocent people, including many children, lost their lives in an appalling and cowardly attack on the Manchester Arena. Today, we remember their lives and share a thought for all the families who were affected on that tragic day.

We are reminded today of the devastating consequences that hatred and violence can have for ordinary lives. This Government’s absolute priority is the safety and security of their citizens. No one should feel unsafe on our streets and in our communities. That is why I am here today to talk about another issue affecting the lives of ordinary citizens and to lay out the Government’s strategy for tackling violent crime.

This Government are determined to end the deadly cycle of violence we see on our streets today. We are clear that these crimes are unacceptable, that there is no place in society for these horrendous crimes and that anyone committing these acts of violence must feel the full force of the law.

The recent increase in serious violence is of deep concern to us all in both Houses, and I assure Members that the Government take this very seriously. That is why on 9 April we published our “Serious violence strategy”, which sets out the action we are taking to address serious violence and in particular the recent increase in knife crime, gun crime and homicide.

The Government have also made a commitment to bring forward legislation in the coming weeks. Our strategy represents a step change in the way we think about and respond to serious violence, establishing a new balance between prevention and the rigorous law enforcement activity that is already happening up and down the country.

[David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

The Minister will know that recorded incidents of violent crime have risen from 700,000 in 2009 to over 1.3 million in 2018. Does he think in any way, shape or form that the 20,000-plus reduction in the number of police officers in that time has any connection to that rise in crime?

[Mr Wallace]

I hear the right hon. Gentleman’s observation. What I do know is that, during the last spike in knife crime, in 2009-10, there were more knife crime offences than there are now and police numbers were at much higher levels, so it is not entirely connected, as he will know. If it were, his logic would have said that there would have been fewer knife crime incidents, when the police numbers were much higher, than there are today. Perhaps he can answer this question: in 2009-10, why was there a spike in knife crime given that there were such high police numbers then?

[David Hanson]

The figures are clear: there were 700,000 violent incidents in 2009 and 1.3 million now. I was the Minister dealing with knife crime then and there was a spike. We put investment into early prevention, after-school activities, higher policing visibility at the school gates, visibility at night and alternative activities for people in the streets and we reduced knife crime incidents; they were recorded at hospitals and at accident and emergency. In his violent crime strategy, the Minister is now reinventing those measures, having cut them in 2010.

[Mr Wallace]

I note the right hon. Gentleman’s examples, but none of them—hospitals, local schools, local government—was about police numbers; they were about similar things to the things we are talking about today in the strategy and the broader response by society to tackling why violence is being embedded in communities. So it is not purely about the police numbers debate.

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

I reject utterly that connection. We would have to swamp the streets with policemen; there would have to be policemen available at every violent incident for it to make that form of difference. We would be back to Cromwell saying, “If I arm one in 10 will that be enough?” Of much more significance in terms of the propensity to violence is the lack of attention to the question of young people—particularly very young people—and parenting. That is where the Government’s efforts must be directed.

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s point. It is certainly the case with any type of crime, whether violent crime, serious crime, organised crime or terrorism, that it has to be dealt with not purely by arresting our way out of the problem.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Wallace]

I am going to press on.

We can debate police numbers all we like in the House, but the simple fact of the matter is that, unless we get involved in prevention and share the burden more broadly in society—[Interruption.] As important, because it often slips the mind of the Opposition, is the fact that if we do not live within our means we will not be able to sustain the spending on our communities and public sector. I regularly have to remind the Opposition that in 2010 the deficit in this country was £150 billion. We were spending more than we got in tax receipts. Unless we start to live within our means we cannot sustain the investment in our communities. We can live with the Opposition’s fantasy politics of nationalising everything on a Monday, funding everything on a Tuesday and borrowing all year round, but we will pay for that in the end. That is why we have set about balancing the economy and taking a strong and stable determination in how we invest in our policemen.

Our approach is not solely focused on law enforcement, important though that is, but depends also on a range of partnerships across many sectors such as education, health, social services, housing, youth services and victim services. It requires a multiple-strand approach, involving a range of partners across different sectors, such as those framed in our four pillars: early intervention and prevention; tackling county lines and misuse of drugs; supporting communities and partnerships; and an effective law enforcement and criminal justice response.

[Chris Skidmore (Kingswood) (Con)]

I am encouraged by what the Minister says about partnership models. Can he set out some localised examples of best practice at work, so we can get away from this artificial debate around police numbers and look at what actually works on the ground and how to put these solutions into practice?

[Mr Wallace]

Here is a good example. I visited Merseyside recently to see the work it has done on organised crime groups and county lines. A particularly nasty organised crime group was operating from one part of Merseyside and sending people up into Lancashire; a 15-year-old was sent into Lancashire to deal drugs in the Rossendale valley.

We decided to take action against that organised crime group. The local police, alongside some first-rate leadership from Merseyside council and officials in the council, set about dismantling that group. They dismantled, effectively, the café where it met; they co-ordinated with Lancashire police so they could deal with the 15-year-old who was in Rossendale; through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 they targeted the huge amounts of cash being used by that organised crime group; and they dismantled the whole group. We used the local authorities in both Merseyside and Lancashire and both police forces, and we used imaginative methods and the powers that POCA and other legislation have given these people to make sure we took apart the money that enabled them to operate. That crime group is no longer active, and that community has taken back control and managed to deliver a successful response.

[Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)]

The Minister knows that there are difficulties in London at the moment. He is also aware that Cressida Dick has requested additional resources to deal with them. I came here today in the hope that we would have a fair and balanced debate about what we need on our streets, rather than this Punch and Judy nonsense. What he has suggested is that it is okay for nine children to have died in my local authority area because we do not have the money for the police force. May I ask him to be a bit more sensitive in the way he is dealing with this debate?

[Mr Wallace]

Is the hon. Lady suggesting that I said it was okay for nine people in her constituency to die? That is the worst example of Punch and Judy and immature politics I have heard in this House for a very long time. It is fine for her to ask about resources, and it is fine for her to say that she does not think the response is correct, but she seems to suggest that a Government Minister is saying it is okay for nine people to die. Is that the measure of the debate we are going to have today from the Opposition? She insults the police, the local authority and her own constituents. The reality is that people are dying on the streets because of a whole range of issues. Tragically, people were dying on the streets long before the Tory Government or the Labour Government were here. I remember patrolling the streets where people had died, and people were not going round half the time saying that it was purely the Government’s fault. There are lots of factors involved.

One of the factors behind the rise in violent crime is the use of smartphones and encryption, where we have seen a big shift. Those networks empower people to trade drugs and to communicate in a safe space. They allow connections between groups in a way that never happened before and that makes those groups much less vulnerable to the work of the law enforcement agencies.

In the old days, if anyone wanted to import huge amounts of cocaine to this country, somebody had to go to Colombia and meet people there. They had to physically go there and order the drugs. Then they had to take the cash and launder it. In the space of about eight years, these changes have meant that no one has to do that anymore. People can sit at home and order and deal drugs, and they can launder the money almost instantaneously through Bitcoin and elsewhere. That is a real challenge for the police, and it will not be fixed purely by putting more patrols into communities. It is also about changing how policing is done and investing in upstream National Crime Agency issues—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown) is right to say that there are issues of resource, and that is why we have increased some of the resource. I am informed that £49 million more is going into the Met, and the violent crime strategy comes with some new money.

[Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)]

I really want us to get back to a serious tone. I am grateful to the Minister for specifically mentioning the cocaine market. Will he say something about our Border Force? Will he also say something about resources for the National Crime Agency? He will understand that the average black teenager in Tottenham barely knows where Colombia is and certainly does not have the means to organise trans-shipment routes. Will he also say something about eastern European gangs?

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a clear point. In the past, there were plenty of middlemen between the local gangs and the big serious organised criminals running out of Colombia or the Balkans. That has now reduced. Through safe and secure encryption, young people have the ability to order drugs and gangs have the ability to have delivered to their door large packets of drugs from Albanian or Serbian drug gangs, or indeed from local drug gangs: United Kingdom citizens—it is not the copyright of the western Balkans. That has put real power into the system.

At the same time, the United Kingdom is fast becoming the biggest consumer of cocaine in Europe. There is high demand from the consumer, and cocaine is no longer the preserve of the yuppie or the rich. We are seeing cocaine in my villages, in rural communities and in communities in London that would not previously have used it. It is a high-margin, high-supply drug at the moment, and that is fuelling the increase in violence.

With those Albanians or those serious organised criminals comes the enforcement of the county lines. They do not just put a 15-year-old into a house or “cuckoo” the house; they provide a weapon to enforce the drug line. Sometimes, if the 15-year-old is not a willing participant, the gangs will ruthlessly enforce that county line with violence. They will kill those people and they will kill the local drug dealers if they get in their way.

[Sarah Jones (Croydon Central) (Lab)]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and I, through the all-party parliamentary group on knife crime, recently met some girls who had been involved in county lines. They had become involved because of boyfriends, because of money and because it was a solution to the problems they faced in their lives. They said that nobody had ever told them not to do it. No one at school or earlier on in their lives had explained that these things might be offered to them and that there were choices to be made. There was no one in their school telling them about that. Does the Minister agree that schools have a duty to keep our children safe, and that they need more resources to ensure that children know what good choices to make?

[Mr Wallace]

I totally agree that we have to educate children about the dangers that they are exposed to.

I go back to the point about modern communications and smartphones. In the past there was often a gulf between streetwise communities where young people grew up exposed to crime and were sometimes exploited by it, and other areas where people would say, “I never see gun crime in my village”. In the past, there was no connection between the two, but now it is all joined up. Now, young people can be exploited wherever they are, and whatever their background, by being able to access drugs using their smartphones. That is why we are seeing this problem seeping in, and that is why the first place to go is the schools—as low as the primary schools—to teach children about how vulnerable they can be online and how vulnerable they can be to being approached.

Another part of my portfolio involves child sexual exploitation. People are being exploited, manipulated and organised through those telephones. That is a real challenge, and I am not going to pretend that we have a solution.

[Chuka Umunna (Streatham) (Lab)]

I take the Minister’s point about this impacting on young people of all backgrounds, but there is no doubt that there is a clear link between what is going on and deprivation, inequality and poverty. Does he agree that if this issue were affecting a different group—a privileged, more wealthy group of young people—it would be headline news every day of the week? Surely this is why we must think about how we approach our young people, and why we must adopt what many are describing as a public health approach to this issue. We are not looking after the mental health and wellbeing of too many of our young people living in deprived communities, including some of the wards in my constituency.

[Mr Wallace]

I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman, who I know is on the violent crime taskforce. I often find that the crimes in my communities do not get reported. As a north-west MP, I sometimes feel that when crimes happen in London they get a higher profile than they would in Lancashire. We have a duty to point out to all our young people where they are vulnerable. I agree that some communities do not get the attention they deserve. Certainly, some of the crime we have seen in London has too quickly been put down to gang crime, rather than to serious organised crime. It is often serious organised crime groups that are exploiting these young people, but because this crime is put down to gang crime, there is a tendency to say, “Well, we have dealt with gangs like that for many years.” Those young people are just as vulnerable and exploited as any other type of child.

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

Five young men have been stabbed in my constituency in the past month alone. The community is traumatised, and people are worried that things are going to get worse, as they always do, as the long summer nights roll in. I know that lots of London Members here will be wondering what can be done in the immediate term, in addition to the strategy, in terms of extra funding for prevention and diversionary programmes to ensure that we do not have a summer of escalating violence in our capital.

[Mr Wallace]

I understand the fear about the challenges on summer nights. If five people had been killed in my communities, I would feel as horrified as the hon. Gentleman.

First, we are building on the things that have been happening for years. We are getting everyone around the table—the Mayor of London is on the serious violence taskforce—because it is about engaging everyone. I am not deaf to the resource issue, and I do not pretend that the police have not been under stress. We can disagree about why they have not had more money. We also have to recognise that policing has to change as crime changes. We have seen them do some good stuff. We have sometimes seen money spent in the wrong place. We have to work on making sure money is spent in the right places.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

So-called drill music often glamorises violence, stabbings and even murder. When allied with social media, drill music can amplify tensions between gangs and groups. How can we call the social media platforms to account and encourage them to wake up to their responsibilities?

[Mr Wallace]

I welcome the statement over the weekend from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport on consulting on measures to remove both illegal and legal harms from the internet, and on the exposure of people, certainly young people, to those harms on the internet. I would welcome any suggestions from either side of the House, and the Home Office, alongside DCMS, will tackle those harms.

I met Google this morning to discuss how it can do more to take down violence-inspiring videos. The level of violence to which my young children are exposed quite early in the day on television, let alone the internet, will come back to haunt us.

[Sir Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD)]

In his answer to the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), the Minister said that he was not blind to the idea of resources, particularly in relation to London and the real crisis that is happening in our city. Will he give us a little more hope because, like the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich and many London Members here, I worry about the trend continuing into the summer months?

[Mr Wallace]

In the Home Office we are always open to listening to more demands. After Manchester last year I, as Security Minister, received a demand from Mark Rowley and the head of MI5, and we worked hard at the Treasury to get £50 million of extra money to respond to the operational pressures.

It is not just London. Merseyside MPs saw a spate of murders and gun crime at the start of last year. There is a real pressure that we have to try to address. Of course the Home Office will work with colleagues to see where we can get more out of the resources we have.

We have found more resources. We have put £49 million into the strategy, and we have put more money into some of the broader responses, including local government and community responses. We will work with the Mayor of London, with whom we will discuss what his priorities may or may not be, on which we may or may not agree.

I wish I had more money. We did not come into Government to cut things. There is sometimes a suggestion that we had a choice and we chose not to spend money. We will try to do our best to meet the resources, but burden share is important, and it is the same in other growing areas of crime. We cannot arrest our way out of some of these things. We have to burden share, and we are doing a whole range of things. A new contest will be launched in the next few weeks and, in order to meet the growing scale of the threat, we have to burden share with both the private sector and the public sector on keeping us safe on the ground. That is the scale we face not just here but internationally.

[John Cryer (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Wallace]

I will give way, and then I will have to make some progress.

[John Cryer]

The Minister is right to say it is not just about the police, because it is also about the other agencies. The problem is that every agency across the board has faced cuts, certainly in London. My east London constituency covers two boroughs. Waltham Forest has faced cuts of around £100 million, and Redbridge has faced similar cuts. The boroughs cannot mount early intervention and provide greater resources through schools and social services while, at the same time, carrying the burden of £100 million in cuts over seven or eight years.

[Mr Wallace]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. As I have said throughout, where we can find more resource to meet this pressure, we will. We might disagree on the wider economy issue but, nevertheless, we are trying to balance the books. Without doubt, it is important that we have this framework in place, with £49 million of early investment, as well as other sums, to make sure that we start the process of gelling together all the people who can help to deliver on some of these issues.

[Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Wallace]

No, I really have to press on. I have given way quite a lot. I am about to read my speech backwards, and Members will not want to hear it twice.

As I have said, it is vital that we steer young people away from crime in the first place. We have to support positive alternatives and timely interventions to provide them with the skills and resilience to lead productive lives free from violence. In the strategy we propose a range of universal targeted interventions, including the early intervention youth fund, which will be launched this summer and to which police and crime commissioners can apply to support early intervention and prevention activity with young people. We will also provide support to Redthread to expand the pilot and its youth violence intervention programme outside London and to develop its services in London hospitals.

We have reviewed the evidence, and the strategy sets out the trends and drivers of serious violence. The analysis makes it clear that the rise in serious violence is due to a range of factors, but the changes in the drug market are a key driver of recent increases in knife crime, gun crime and homicides, which marks the second element of the strategy.

Crack cocaine markets have strong links to serious violence, and evidence suggests that crack use is rising in England and Wales due to a mix of supply and demand factors. County lines drug dealing is also associated with violence and exploitation, and its spread is also a key factor.

In addition, it is thought that drugs market violence may be facilitated and spread by the social media I talked about earlier. The strategy sets out a range of activity we will undertake to tackle serious violence, including more than 60 specific commitments on action. We are providing £40 million over two years to support the initiatives in the serious violence strategy, including £11 million for the early intervention youth fund and £3.6 million for a new national county lines co-ordination centre that will sit in the National Crime Agency.

We are particularly concerned about county lines because of the violence they are now developing. The links behind the county lines are complicated, and the threat crosses police and local authority boundaries, which is why the national county lines co-ordination centre will be key not only in sharing intelligence but in co-ordinating responses and in making sure that victims are supported or diverted away from the county lines.

We will also work with the Department for Education on the support and advice offered to children who are educated in alternative provision, including those who have been excluded, to reduce their risk of being drawn into crime or on to the pathways into crime. In addition, we will work with the Department for Education and Ofsted to explore what more can be done to support schools in England in responding to potential crime.

However, taking effective action means that the issue needs to be understood and owned locally as much as nationally. Communities and relevant partners must also see tackling serious violence as their problem, which is the third pillar of our approach. We are supporting communities to build local resilience and awareness by continuing to match fund local area reviews, which identify the resilience and capability of local areas to respond to gang-related threats, including county lines. That follows on from our support to help partners.

Police and crime commissioners have a vital role in working with community safety partnerships, or the local equivalent, in providing local leadership to bring communities together. That is why the Government are also committing £1 million to our community fund for each of the next two years. The fund, which was launched last week, provides support for local initiatives that work with young people to tackle knife crime. Those initiatives include early intervention and education, as well as mentoring and outreach work. In March we launched a major new media advertising campaign, #knifefree, aimed at young people and young adults to raise awareness of the risks of carrying knives. That was chiefly delivered through social media targeted at young people and it has had a positive response from our partners. We must pursue, disrupt and prosecute those who commit violent crimes, and a robust response from law enforcement therefore remains critical. As I have said, we will bring forward legislation to strengthen our response to violent crime. That includes the introduction of new measures such as—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Colleagues, we will now hold a one-minute silence to remember all those affected by the terror attack in Manchester a year ago today.

The House observed a one-minute silence.

[Mr Wallace]

A year ago, I was in Manchester, from very early in the morning of the attack, and I wish to take this opportunity to place on the record my appreciation of Andy Burnham, the Mayor of Manchester, of the leader of the council and of chief constable Ian Hopkins for the fantastic and amazing work they have done over the past 12 months in helping to heal Manchester and bring that community together. Having visited the investigation on many occasions, I cannot say just how much regard I have for the police and intelligence services, who are still pursuing leads and still working to keep people safe. I believe we have the best police and intelligence services in the world, which is why Manchester is back on its feet, alongside a great community who are determined to make sure that the spirit of Manchester lives on. Although I am not there with them today, many of us are there in spirit and we stand ready to continue to help that great city.

We must pursue, disrupt and prosecute those who commit violent crimes, and a robust response from law enforcement therefore remains critical. As I have said, we will introduce legislation to strengthen our response to violent crime. That will include the introduction of new measures such as restrictions on buying and carrying knives and corrosive substances; and banning certain firearms. An offensive weapons Bill will be introduced into the Commons or the Lords in the next few weeks. We will also continue to support and facilitate police action such as Operation Sceptre—weeks of action designed to tackle knife crime—and action to prevent violent gang material on social media. The serious violence taskforce has been established to drive the implementation of the strategy and support the delivery of key objectives. The taskforce brings together Ministers, Members of Parliament, the Mayor of London, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, the director general of the National Crime Agency, other senior police leaders, and public sector and voluntary sector chief executives.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

The Minister mentioned social media. The Met police have reported more than 400 incitement to violence videos on YouTube alone that are still online today. Do the Government support police authorities across the country having the power to compel YouTube and other social media outlets to remove content that is violent or incites people to violence?

[Mr Wallace]

I absolutely support our forcing these outlets to take this material down where we can. I met Google and YouTube this morning to discuss exactly that subject. The challenge around the world on videos and YouTube stuff is not on cases where a clear crime is involved, such as bomb-making manuals or child abuse; it is where companies—often based abroad—decide that our version of incitement or extremism is not their version of it. That is where we have to look at all alternatives. That is what the announcement at the weekend on the consultation by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport was about. We have to have a proper collective discussion and ask, “Where do we start and stop? How do we draw a line about what is freedom of speech, what is incitement and what is violent extremism?” That is not as straightforward as people say. However, 98% of violent extremism on those internet platforms is being taken down within 24 hours and some of it is being taken down within two hours. We are pushing for this to happen even quicker, through using artificial intelligence and machine learning to recognise those issues. We want these companies to put more of their resources into that, to make sure these things are taken down. I also want them to report this content when they take it down so that our police and agencies can do something about it.

[Thangam Debbonaire (Bristol West) (Lab)]

The Minister makes the point that it is difficult to tell, but we do not have a problem deciding whether something is incitement to violence offline. I fail to see why we cannot apply that logic to online content and why he cannot work with the internet providers and the platforms to administer online what we have offline.

[Mr Wallace]

When we see these things and we report them, these providers take them down. We are asking them to spot them in advance before they are uploaded. That is what we want. On the plus side, when, through the Met police’s internet referral unit, we report these things, the providers do take them down. The simple scale of the internet means that we want them to do this before or during the uploading. They have made some progress on this matter, although we still think they can do more. I am acutely aware that they have made more effort only when we have talked about regulation, tax and harder things; it is not as though they jumped through the front door offering. However, I think they have had a realisation, through seeing the patience that is being tested internationally.

I was at the G7 recently with people from France and Germany, and they were all saying to the lead four companies, “We have sort of had enough.” Those companies are now starting to move and move rapidly. We have supported the Global Internet Forum, set up and chaired at the moment by both Governments and the big four. We have to make sure that they do more about the small providers, because as they are taking more stuff down, small providers and platforms, based in jurisdictions we cannot get at, are popping up and handling most of that content. We have to do more on that. We have to put more pressure on the United States about some of the far right websites. As the Select Committee on Home Affairs rightly pointed out, we will proscribe National Action yet it will still be running a website—or it has in the past—in the US. However, we are working hard with the Americans and they have said they will do more, as will the internet companies. They are now moving, although they could have moved a bit faster—that is how I would probably say it.

[Gareth Thomas]

Nigh on three weeks ago, two teenagers in my constituency were shot at and seriously injured. I do not doubt the commitment of Cressida Dick and the Metropolitan police to finding the perpetrators of that shocking incident, but my constituents and I worry about the decline in the visibility of the police presence on our streets in Harrow. I therefore take this opportunity to underline to the Minister the profound concern, particularly from London MPs, across party, as well as from others, about the lack of sufficient resources for the Metropolitan police. I urge him to do whatever he can to lobby the Chancellor for further funding for the Met.

[Mr Wallace]

I hear the hon. Gentleman’s point on the funding. I also say that it is important to work with Cressida Dick and to ask about policing priorities and how she chooses to deploy her force. All police forces do things differently. Members may recall significant gun violence in Nottingham a few years ago, when the city went through a patch that included the murder of a jeweller’s wife. Interestingly, Nottingham got a bad reputation in the early-90s or mid-90s, but that was driven by two people and when they were taken out it had a profound effect on that community. There are definitely operational decisions here as to how police forces spend their resources, but I also hear the point about resources.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Wallace]

I really have to move on. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State will respond to the debate and can certainly answer more questions on those points.

I believe that the approach set out in the strategy—a multi-strand approach with a greater emphasis on early intervention—will address the increase in serious violence and help young people to develop the skills and resilience to live happy and productive lives away from violence, and it will also ensure that people feel safe in their communities and homes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Abbott]

I have heard of that initiative, and it is certainly worth trying. Dealing with violent crime is not just a question of policing and arresting. The initiatives used in Glasgow are well worth looking at. Anybody who thinks that we can simply arrest or stop-and-search our way out of this crisis is deluding themselves.

A senior commander at the Met told me recently that an entire gang operating in one part of London was put away for lengthy sentences for drug crime. The result was not that the level of drug crime and the level of violence dropped, but that violent crime in the area actually surged, as competing gangs moved into the vacant territory. We need an integrated, joined-up approach. Seizures, arrests and sentencing will all play a part, but we also need the right level of resources, and those can only ever be a part of a much broader strategy involving schools, hospitals, local communities, social workers, resources for youth centres and recreation and much more. Of course, all those things have been cut as a result of this Government’s austerity, and we are now living with the consequences. We cannot keep people, and our young people, safe on the cheap.

I try to visit the families of every young person who is stabbed or a victim of homicide in my constituency. I remember visiting a family recently. They were broken, and the mother could not stop crying. In my closing remarks, I want to say to the House as a whole that we need to remember that, whatever the circumstances, violent crime is a tragedy for the protagonist, a tragedy for the family, and traumatising for entire communities. That is why the Opposition believe that the Government must give the issue their continued attention and the right level of resources. In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), the Minister said that if five people in his constituency died, he, too, would be very upset. Communities want Ministers to behave as though five people in their constituencies had died. Our constituents want the Government to pay more than lip service to the issue and to learn from strategies that have succeeded, whether in America or in Glasgow.

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Lady can question our policies or our funding, but to question our motives or suggest that we do not care is just insulting. Glasgow has done a fantastic job in reducing knife crime to zero—[Interruption.] Police Scotland has done that; it is a devolved matter. According to Police Scotland, the number of police in Glasgow in 2015 was 5,544. In 2017, when knife crime had been reduced to zero, the number was 5,530. Therefore, on the numbers, police in Glasgow managed a reduction, but they used broader shoulders to solve the crimes and the problem, and they should be rewarded for that. If there is an example to show that it is not all about police numbers, that is it.

[Ms Abbott]

I said earlier that I am not arguing that this is all about police numbers, and I touched on some of the other issues, such as education, youth services and community services, that are also part of the answer.

I have always believed that part of my role in this Parliament is to be a voice for the people who would not otherwise have one. In my community and in others that I have visited, there is serious concern about how much the Government are prepared to do about this issue. We want Ministers to act as though they believe that every young person’s life has a value. We want Ministers not just to talk the talk, but to put resources, police officers and support into strategies that can relieve our communities of the burden of constant reports of death and killing.