(4 days, 18 hours ago)
Written StatementsI wish to update the House on the Government’s plans for the integrated security fund and how funding will be allocated over the next three years—2026-27, 2027-28 and 2028-29—to support delivery of the UK’s national security priorities. 2026/27 2027/28 2028/29 Non-ODA (£m) ODA (£m) Total (£m) Non-ODA (£m) ODA (£m) Total (£m) Non-ODA (£m) ODA (£m) Total (£m) Strategy Boards Asia Pacific 21.5 6.0 27.5 24.0 6.0 30.0 27.0 6.0 33.0 Russia 59.5 75.0 134.5 49.1 76.7 125.8 46.7 79.4 126.1 Middle East and North Africa 37.5 32.0 69.5 30.0 32.0 62.0 25.0 32.0 57.0 Counter-Terrorism 40.0 18.0 58.0 33.0 18.0 51.0 28.0 18.0 46.0 Serious Organised Crime, including Organised Immigration Crime 15.0 17.5 32.5 15.0 19.0 34.0 12.5 19.0 31.5 Biosecurity 15.0 0.0 15.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 Counter-State and Hybrid Threats 20.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 18.0 0.0 18.0 Economic Security 12.0 0.0 12.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 8.0 0.0 8.0 Cyber and Tech 113.3 5.2 118.5 102.0 5.5 107.5 95.0 5.5 100.5 Additional Costs Central Capabilities 3.4 0.2 3.6 2.6 0.2 2.8 2.3 0.2 2.5 Exit Costs 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Central Administration 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0
As the 2025 national security strategy made clear, threats to British national security and interests are proliferating. Foreign powers plot espionage, sabotage and cyber-attacks on British soil, colluding with criminal groups to achieve their aims. The threat posed by terrorism continues to persist and diversify. Hostile actors seek to undermine and destabilise the international order not only through conflict and aggression, but through hybrid tactics aimed at sowing and exploiting divisions within our societies.
In this increasingly complex and interconnected national security landscape, it is more important than ever that we take an integrated approach to protecting the UK and its people. This year, the ISF has already demonstrated its value in co-ordinating whole-of-Government responses to key threats, providing vital support for the Government of Ukraine’s efforts to oppose Russian aggression and investing in the UK’s own resilience to threats.
Over the next three years, the Government will continue to invest in the ISF as a cross-Government mechanism that can complement the work of individual Departments, while embarking on ambitious reforms to improve its efficiency and to directly align the fund’s work with the Government’s wider national security response and the national security strategy. This will support the ISF to deliver on its core purpose: protecting the UK’s national security domestically and overseas.
Reform
For 2025-26, the ISF delivered a series of structural changes, closing some ISF portfolios and consolidating others to streamline and focus the fund’s efforts. This was part of a phased transition towards a reformed ISF governance structure that will take effect from 2026-27. The second phase of ISF transformation will:
Deliver a more focused ISF strategic framework, concentrating ISF programming on tackling five key areas: Russia; Iran and its proxies; threats emanating from the Asia Pacific region; serious and organised crime, including organised immigration crime; and terrorism. The ISF will also focus on building sovereign capabilities in four areas: cyber and tech; biosecurity; counter state and hybrid threats; and economic security.
From 2026-27 onwards, funding will be allocated and programming overseen by cross-Government boards responsible for delivering the UK’s strategies related to each of the ISF’s nine strategic priorities. This will see an end to bespoke ISF governance arrangements, leading to greater accountability for spending through the ISF and reduced bureaucracy.
Set multi-year allocations to enable more efficient, longer-term programming. To preserve the ISF’s flexibility to respond to a crisis or a change in security priorities, this will be balanced by holding 20% of the allocations in 2027-28 and 2028-29 “at risk” and available for reprioritisation if necessary.
Transfer responsibility for funding the UK’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and other multilateral commitments to the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence. This is in line with the ISF’s sharper strategic focus on UK national security. The ISF will continue to fund wider programming to prevent and/or resolve conflict and instability where there is a direct link to UK national security.
Spending review 2025 allocations
These reforms will enable the ISF to maximise the national security impact of its budget over the SR25 period. This budget totals circa £820 million per year, of which circa £200 million per year is official development assistance. The ISF will transfer circa £250 million per year to the FCDO and the MOD to enable those departments to manage UN peacekeeping and multilateral commitments currently funded by the ISF. The ISF will also transfer a further £30 million, £70 million, and £100 million non-ODA to the Home Office over the three years of SR25 to support national security priorities and safeguard the UK’s homeland security. The ISF’s budget for national security programming will therefore total £545 million, £499 million and £471 million in 2026-27, 2027-28 and 2028-29 respectively.
The ISF will focus programming funding towards the most acute threats to UK national security. This includes increasing the ISF’s investment in its two largest areas of spend: countering Russian aggression, including in Ukraine; and strengthening the cyber and tech capabilities of the UK and our allies. Together, these areas make up 46% of the ISF’s budget in 2026-27. By 2028-29 the ISF will also increase funding by 33% to enable the UK to counter threats emanating from the Asia Pacific region, including engaging safely and securely with China while protecting UK interests, and supporting our partners around the world to do the same. The ISF will also invest in new cross-cutting, domestic counter-state threats programming, which will complement actor-specific international activity to counter Russia and other states.
The ISF’s counter-terrorism allocation will increase from £31 million this year to £58 million in 2026-27, before declining to £46 million by 2028-29. This front-loaded allocation will establish new domestic counter-terrorism capabilities from next year, while providing sufficient funding to maintain existing counter-terrorism activity in Africa and the middle east. In 2026-27, ISF funding on serious organised crime will also rise by circa £10 million from 2025-26 levels, to fund new activity disrupting and dismantling criminal groups facilitating illegal migration to the UK.
Prioritising funding in these areas means that greater fiscal discipline is required elsewhere in the fund. Programming in the middle east will narrow its focus to countering the highest priority threats in the region and to support work to secure a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict through a negotiated two state solution. The ISF allocation will therefore reduce by 20% by the end of the SR25 period. Following the ISF’s successful maturation of UK sanctions capabilities, which will be funded by Departments’ core budgets from next financial year, the ISF’s allocation to economic security will also reduce from £12 million in 2026-27 to £8 million in 2028-29. The ISF will maintain funding for strengthening UK resilience and preparedness in relation to biosecurity threats at £15 million per year through the SR25 period.
These allocations closely align ISF funding with the priorities of the national security strategy. They balance investment in capabilities to bolster domestic resilience and make the UK a harder target for hostile actors, with overseas activity to promote stability and help allies and friends bolster their own resilience. Together with the reforms to the ISF’s structure and operating model, they will ensure that the ISF is not only more efficient but more impactful in protecting the UK and our partners globally.
[HCWS1322]
(5 days, 18 hours ago)
Written StatementsSection 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Home Secretary to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their state threat prevention and investigation measures—STPIM—powers under the Act during that period.
STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases imposed to date.
[HCWS1312]
(5 days, 18 hours ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I begin by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for introducing this debate. He did an excellent job of providing the context we need to have a good discussion, and the House owes him a service for the work he has done. I also extend my gratitude to all the hon. Members who have spoken—I will try to reflect on their comments in a moment—and, as others have done, I extend the Government’s gratitude to all those who signed the e-petition that has brought us here today.
This has been a good, timely and useful debate and it provides an important opportunity to strengthen awareness of the threat, and to signal the resolve that exists across the House to confront the work of Russian threat actors. The Government’s first duty, as I hope any Government’s would be, is to keep the country safe. We are absolutely committed to taking all necessary measures to expose and disrupt any attempt to interfere with our sovereign affairs.
That is why on 18 October last year I set out the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, to ensure that our democracy is the hardest possible target for foreign threat actors. Just last Thursday, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre in briefing the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. On Wednesday last week, I joined the Skills Minister and the directors general of MI5 and the NCSC in hosting nearly 100 representatives from universities and sector bodies to discuss the risks that they face from foreign interference.
I am pleased to announce today that the Government will invest £3 million over the next three years to support the higher education sector to strengthen its resilience. That will include setting up a new foreign interference reporting route for UK universities and co-designing best practice guidance that will help universities to make proportionate, risk-based decisions on the threats to which they are exposed. As part of this work, we will also be considering the role of think-tanks, to which my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk referred specifically, given that they will share many of the same interference risks.
This e-petition calls for a public inquiry into Russian influence in UK democracy. As the Security Minister, I am proud to have the opportunity to work very closely with our intelligence and security agencies, who are working tirelessly to monitor and disrupt Russian threats to UK politics. Those threats range from cyber-espionage operations targeting sensitive or classified information to divisive information operations and attempts to influence UK policymaking through bribery and coercion, as we have seen with the shocking case of Nathan Gill.
Hon. Members will understand that it will not always be appropriate for the Government and our intelligence agencies to publicly reveal the extent of our understanding of Russian operations, due to the obvious importance of protecting the sources of that information and maintaining a competitive advantage over our adversaries. However, the UK Government continue to work tirelessly alongside our allies to expose Russian cyber-threats and information operations targeting democracy in the UK and worldwide. For example, since October 2024, the Government have exposed and sanctioned 38 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russian information warfare to undermine global democracies. The guidance that the National Protective Security Authority published in October also specifically highlighted the full range of vectors and tactics that foreign actors, including Russia, are using to target individuals working in UK politics.
Indeed, in the light of the deeply concerning evidence of Russia targeting our democratic system, the Government commissioned Philip Rycroft to deliver an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review will primarily focus on foreign interference via funding because that is an area of particular concern. However, to inform his recommendations, Philip Rycroft has been provided with a threat briefing that covers the full range of vectors used by states to target UK politics.
It is the Government’s position that launching a new inquiry at this time would be premature. It would risk prejudging the conclusions of the ongoing review and duplicating its efforts. However, the final report will be presented to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and to me by the end of March, after which there will be significant opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny and debate.
Let me address some of the points that have been raised in this debate. My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk asked about cryptocurrency tools. As he will know, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 makes it clear that foreign money is not permitted in UK politics. However, as tactics behind foreign interference operations develop, the Government recognise that our response also needs to evolve. The UK Government therefore reaffirmed their leadership and resolved to stamp out corruption and dodgy money in UK politics through the Home Office’s refreshed anti-corruption strategy. Corrupt insiders and criminal networks will be brought to justice by a strengthened specialist police unit and tougher safeguards across the public sector.
The forthcoming elections Bill will also further strengthen safeguards against covert political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties. The Rycroft review into foreign financial interference will assess opportunities for further improvement. Let me just say a word specifically about cryptocurrency, because the Bill specifically includes safeguarding against the potential use of cryptocurrency by foreign actors to obfuscate the source of their donations.
My hon. Friend also asked about media literacy education. Building media literacy skills for young people to critically engage with and assess information from a range of sources is a priority for the Government. Since 2022, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has provided £3 million of funding for media-literacy projects that empower users to navigate the online world safely.
My hon. Friend also asked about a dedicated disinformation agency. This issue will always require a co-ordinated, cross-Government effort. DSIT leads the Government’s policy on countering disinformation, but works closely with the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office. The Home Office is the departmental lead for state threats, working closely with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which leads on the Government’s efforts to counter foreign interference. A lot of meaningful activity is taking place across Government.
The hon. Member has only just entered the Chamber, but in an act of generosity, I will give way.
Mike Martin
The Minister is very generous. I have just come from the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, where we were looking at these issues in our inquiry on defending democracy. He has been in front of that inquiry. When will the new elections Bill be coming forward or—perhaps an easier way to ask the question—which will be the first election to take place under the new Bill, protected by the wider measures that he just set out?
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention and for his important work on the Joint Committee. I welcome the scrutiny that it provides, and I assure him of the seriousness with which we take such matters. I think he will have heard the comments that I made specifically about the Rycroft review. The scheduling of the review has been designed to ensure that it reports by the end of March, in order to inform further legislation. It is not for me, as the Security Minister, to talk about the scheduling of further legislation; that is very much a matter for the Leader of the House. That piece of legislation is being led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, working closely with colleagues across Government.
However, I owe the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) a response to the important point that he made about when those legislative tools will impact on our evolving democratic process. I give him an absolute assurance that, working through the defending democracy taskforce, which I chair, we have already done a lot of work in this Parliament to ensure that for the elections that will take place this May in Wales, Scotland or England, and the elections taking place in Northern Ireland in 2027, the local institutions in those areas are as prepared as they possibly can be. There are very close working relationships between central Government and the devolved institutions to ensure that those elections are as free and as reasonably and fairly contested as they possibly can be.
Let me turn to some of the other contributions. The hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) represents a beautiful part of the world, which I know and remember fondly from my time at Aberystwyth University. He rightly and entirely reasonably urged the Government to act at pace and not to waste any time. I repeat the point that I have just made about the Rycroft review: it will report by the end of March in order to inform the legislative agenda, including the elections Bill. Again, however, I give him the same assurance I did earlier: the elections that will take place in Wales are part of a process being led by the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that all the devolved institutions have the support that they need to make sure that the elections take place in the way that we would all want them to. I am working very closely with colleagues in Wales to ensure that that is the case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) speaks with great authority on such matters. I am grateful for all his work, including in the all-party parliamentary group. He spoke rightly about the important use of sanctions. He will understand that it would be unwise of me to signal from the Front Bench further intent with regard to such matters, but he has heard the recent words of the Prime Minister, and let me reiterate them: if Roman Abramovich fails to act quickly, we are fully prepared to go to court to enforce the commitment that has been made, if that is necessary.
The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) made a number of points, including specific concerns about the conduct of Reform, but also about the EU referendum that took place back in 2016. We completely recognise the enduring and significant threat that Russia poses to our UK democracy. Of course, we are absolutely committed to ensuring that we are well protected against all forms of foreign interference. That is why we are doing work through the defending democracy taskforce; that is why before Christmas I launched the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan; and that is why we have now commissioned an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics.
The hon. Member specifically mentioned the ISC, as did a couple of other hon. Members. Reports produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee, including the Russia report, contain highly classified material that could damage the operational capabilities of UK intelligence agencies if published unredacted, so I hope she understands that we have to be very careful with the publication of those reports. She also asked specifically about the elections Bill, which she will understand is an MHCLG lead. The Bill is an important opportunity to strengthen our legislative response to the threats that we face, and we very much welcome her contribution to that process.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) knows a lot about these matters. I am pleased that he will take the opportunity to engage directly with Philip Rycroft. My hon. Friend raised important points about the funding of Reform; I have to say that it is disappointing that no Reform Members are here to defend their record. Of course, it is absolutely right that all decisions taken by Government are scrutinised not only by this House but by the media: that is important, and I would not have it any other way. But it is also important that those individuals who aspire to serve in the highest office are similarly subjected to meaningful scrutiny. I am pleased that this House has done so this afternoon, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the critique that he helpfully offered.
The hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) made an important point about the importance of acting in concert with our allies. She is absolutely right: that is why we seek to work very closely with our international partners on these matters. She raised a number of other helpful and constructive points. I believe that some of her questions were being addressed in the statement given to the House by the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister at precisely the moment that she was asking them. I hope she might find a moment later to check the record, and I hope her questions have been answered.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) speaks with great authority on these matters. I know that the whole House appreciates his important work to support Ukraine and ensure that our friends and allies prevail in their struggle against Putin’s illegal invasion. I am particularly proud of the cross-party support for that endeavour, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the leadership role that he has played.
The hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) was the first but not the only Member to quote Clausewitz; I particularly enjoyed his reference. Like other hon. Members, he raised deeply concerning points about Reform. I have to say that it speaks volumes that not one Reform Member—not even one of their keenly recently recruited Members—is here to respond. That is a great shame. The hon. Member will have heard my response to the point that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire made about the ICS report, but I firmly believe that addressing the issue should be a cross-party endeavour, so I would be happy to discuss the matters further with him.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), made a good point about bots in her excellent contribution, and rightly raised activity in Moldova specifically. She is right to assert the need to ensure that our legislative framework and wider response are geared to the nature of the threat we face now, not the one we faced in the past. I can give her an assurance of how seriously the Government take such matters. She will know that the Government have introduced the cyber-security action plan; I heard the comment from the hon. and gallant Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) about that a moment ago, and I will take it away. I hope that my right hon. Friend is also aware of the work the Cabinet Office is leading on the production of a national cyber action plan.
I know that my right hon. Friend is proud to represent one of our country’s finest universities. She nodded to the particular challenge that has been experienced recently around lawfare. Her point on that was well made, and I am grateful that she welcomes the new reporting route announced by the Government, which is an initial step. We are working towards developing a more proactive advisory service alongside training to support our higher education sector, using the new money we have identified. I am grateful for her contribution.
I very much agree with the analysis and the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis). It is telling that we have heard from a number of Members from Wales. My hon. Friend emphasised the impact of Nathan Gill’s treachery, which cannot be overestimated; I know that my hon. Friend has raised the issue on several occasions, but I assure him again that the work that the Government lead through the defending democracy taskforce is aligned with our devolved institutions, which—as we have seen recently, not least in the case of Nathan Gill—are just as much on the frontline as those of us in this place. My hon. Friend made some important points about the elections Bill, and of course I agree with his important points about NATO.
Lincoln Jopp
Is the Minister aware that, as a result of actions by the Scottish and Welsh Governments, a loophole has been created whereby people living in Wales and Scotland can now make unlimited political donations to any political party or politician? Is that something that is going to be addressed by the Government?
The hon. and gallant Member makes an important point. I hope that Mr Rycroft is listening, because that is something that he will want to consider. I give an assurance that I will take it away and look at it as well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) made several important points. She is right that there is nothing new about the use of propaganda. She is also right about the information age that we are now living through. I am pleased that she mentioned Ian Lucas’s book, and I am grateful for the other points that she raised, including an important one about support for members of the LGBT+ community. I assure her of the priority we attach to the issues that she raised.
I am also grateful for the contribution made by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young). I say gently to her that the Rycroft review provides a vital opportunity to look at these issues, so I hope that she and her party will engage. I think there was an invitation, which I reiterate, from my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West to do so, and I hope that she will take it up. It is important that, where we can, we seek to maintain a cross-party consensus on these issues, which is precisely why, along with the director general of MI5, the other day I briefed the political parties on these matters, including the Lib Dems. I hope we can keep that conversation going.
The hon. Member for Spelthorne made a number of reasonable and fair-minded points. He nodded to the Scots Guards without actually mentioning them, so let me do that on his behalf. He also took the opportunity to mention Clausewitz, which was appreciated. I know that he takes these matters seriously. I was pleased to see him at the recent JCNSS meeting, to which the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells has just referred, and at which I gave evidence on national security the other day. He made an important and fair-minded observation about the threat perception. He is broadly right about that.
The hon. Member for Spelthorne will understand that a difficult balance has to be struck, informing the public while not alarming them. He is right that we need to debate these things in this House and more generally, not least because of the grave nature of the threat that we face and the potential requirement—I will be careful about what I say—of public resource that will have to be dedicated to these matters in the years to come. I welcome the comments he made. I hope he would agree—I think he would—that we should work collaboratively across the House on these most important matters. It is in that spirit that I always endeavour to engage with hon. Members.
The threats that the UK and our allies face are immediate and evolving. Russia views our democratic openness as a vulnerability to be exploited. Through the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, we are equipping everyone, from local councillors to parliamentary staff, with the tools that they need to help to disrupt and detect foreign espionage activity wherever we find it.
This Government’s clear commitments to upholding and restoring trust in standards and integrity in public life are not merely bureaucratic pledges. They are a vital line of defence, ensuring that the UK is not a permissive environment for foreign interference and safeguarding the sovereignty of our democratic future. From the comprehensive powers of the National Security Act 2023 to the protective work of the defending democracy taskforce, we are deploying a whole-of-Government approach to make the UK a much harder target. On this Government’s watch, we will do whatever is required to disrupt and degrade foreign interference operations and keep the British public safe.
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Written StatementsThe first report of the independent review of disclosure and fraud offences —“Disclosure in the Digital Age”—was presented to Parliament in March 2025. Since then, the Home Office, the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice have worked together on a joint response to its 45 recommendations. The Government are grateful to Jonathan Fisher KC for his thorough analysis of the criminal disclosure regime.
Building on that foundation, the Government are committed to modernising disclosure so that it is fit for purpose in the digital age. In particular, the review identifies practical opportunities to deploy technology in criminal cases to manage digital material more effectively, reduce administrative burdens and release police time for frontline duties. Any adoption of new tools will be underpinned by robust safeguards and full regard for the rights of the defence and the interests of justice.
The programme of reform is designed to strengthen the justice system as a whole: streamlining investigations and prosecutions, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and improving consistency across agencies, while maintaining fairness for all parties. Any delivery will be taken forward in partnership with law enforcement bodies, the Crown Prosecution Service and wider criminal justice stakeholders to ensure that changes are workable, proportionate and sustainable in practice.
The Government will publish its full response to the independent review by 20 May 2026, aligned with wider reforms across the criminal justice system. This response will include careful consideration of any linkages to the recommendations made in part two of Sir Brian Leveson’s independent review of the criminal courts on efficiency. Further updates will be provided to the House in due course.
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(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Commons Chamber
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
I was pleased to meet my hon. Friend when I visited Cornwall last week, and to meet the local leaders and first responders who have been working tirelessly to keep their communities safe. In response to Storm Goretti, the Government issued two emergency alerts reaching approximately 500,000 people and urging them to stay indoors due to the severe weather. The resilience action plan outlines how we will strengthen local resilience, which includes better integrating voluntary, community and faith organisations into emergency planning.
Jayne Kirkham
I thank the Minister for his answer. Storm Goretti was a wake-up call for Cornwall and nationally. It tested the resilience of rural and coastal Britain to these extreme weather events. In Cornwall alone, we lost over 1,000 trees and thousands of people were left without power and water. It exposed vulnerabilities, particularly in our communications in rural areas, where mobile and internet connectivity is fragile, hard to restore and not backed up. Would the Minister lead discussions with Science, Innovation and Technology Ministers on how to shore up communications in such circumstances, and consider in his own Department how to advise and make individuals and communities more resilient generally to the increasing number of storms?
Yes, my hon. Friend is right, and I will do that. She knows at first hand the importance of hyper-local resilience planning, and I pay tribute to her work supporting her constituents in recent times. The gov.uk Prepare website already provides advice on steps people can take to prepare for emergencies, including storms and power outages, as well as on some of the points she made. I have heard and understood the points she has raised both today and previously, and I will give them very careful attention.
As I have said many times, I represent one of the largest rural constituencies in the United Kingdom, and Eskdalemuir is one of the most rural parts of that constituency. Constituents there remain extremely concerned about BT’s proposal to switch off analogue lines, given that the area has very poor mobile reception and frequent power cuts. Will the Minister and the Cabinet Office more generally satisfy themselves that the arrangements in place for this switch-off will not impede resilience and will ensure communities such as Eskdalemuir are not cut off during extreme weather events?
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for the important points he raises, and I completely understand and agree with his point about rurality. I have heard the point he made about BT, and I know that the Department has been engaging closely with the company. I will look carefully at what he has to say and come back to him.
Ms Julie Minns (Carlisle) (Lab)
I recently met representatives of Cumbria Council for Voluntary Service and ACTion with Communities in Cumbria to discuss community resilience in Carlisle and north Cumbria. One of the challenges we face in geographically remote areas such as mine is the speed with which local authorities and other agencies are able to deploy staff to close floodgates and shut roads when we have an area affected by flooding. Will the Minister set out what steps the Government are taking to encourage statutory bodies to train and equip community emergency volunteers to carry out those vital tasks?
I can do that, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising it. I know that her constituency has suffered from significant flooding in the past. The Environment Agency, local risk management authorities and the local resilience forum have worked hard to deliver new flood schemes, and improve the warnings and information to communities so that they are better prepared. The Government are considering both regulatory and non-regulatory options to integrate the vital work of the voluntary, community and faith sectors and statutory emergency responders. I will soon be meeting the flooding Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice (Emma Hardy), to discuss this further.
Andrew George (St Ives) (LD)
I am very grateful to the Minister for coming to Cornwall last week and visiting my constituency, which was noted and very much appreciated. He will know that west Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly took the brunt of Storm Goretti, and we have many lessons to learn, not least the point made by the right hon. Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell) about our—I think, evangelical—faith in modern systems and technologies, which have made us more dependent and less resilient. When we are learning such lessons, will the Minister make sure that it is not simply left to local authorities to do so, but that they are learned across the UK?
I absolutely will. I was very pleased to have the opportunity to spend quite a lot of time with the hon. Gentleman in his beautiful constituency, and to meet his local council colleagues as well as many other stakeholders. I agree with the points he has made. I think the response overall was an effective one, but I am working with Ministers across the Government to ensure that we learn all the lessons from Storm Goretti, and I am keen to work with him and other Members in that endeavour.
Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)
My constituency of Camborne, Redruth and Hayle is 624th out of 650 constituencies for resilience in mobile communications. It cannot be right that a constituency such as mine is exposed in the way that it was during Storm Goretti, meaning that villages such as Mawnan Smith were completely cut off. Does the Minister agree that we need to review those constituencies where mobile communications are inadequate at the moment?
I was pleased to meet my hon. Friend at the Eden Project on Friday of last week, along with local leaders, to discuss these matters. I agree with his points and I give him an absolute commitment that we will work closely with Government colleagues, local authorities and other stakeholders to ensure that, where there are lessons that need to be learned from this storm, we will learn them.
I can tell the Minister that the promises made by telecoms companies about the withdrawal of copper landlines have not been kept. A recent power outage that covered both Caithness and Orkney left my constituents without any landline connectivity or mobile connectivity, as there was no power to the mobile masts. As well as talking to BT, will the Minister speak to the mobile phone operators and find out why there are not doing what they promised they would do?
Yes, I will. I am looking forward to meeting the right hon. Gentleman soon to discuss these things. It is important to say that we worked closely with mobile phone operators and National Grid Electricity Distribution to get more than 900 engineers out and about reconnecting homes in the south-west, but I have heard the right hon. Gentleman’s points and I look forward to discussing them with him soon.
The Government are absolutely committed to using all available tools to disrupt cyber-threats and to keep the public safe. Our new national cyber action plan will address the evolving cyber-threat and technological opportunities. We are working with partners across Government and law enforcement to deliver real-world impact against cyber-criminals. Through the Crime and Policing Bill, we will introduce measures to empower police to suspend IP addresses and domains being used for serious criminality.
There has been a tendency to offshore much cyber-support, but we are producing excellent cyber-security talent at Ebbw Vale college to protect our digital infrastructure. Will the Minister please outline what is being done to develop our home-grown workforce and security resilience to help reduce the risks from cyber-attacks in future?
My hon. Friend is right, and I am very interested to hear about the course at his local college. Skills are the foundation of the UK’s cyber-security, and the Government are investing £187 million in the TechFirst programme. That initiative will bring digital skills and AI learning into classrooms and communities, and aims to reach 1 million students by 2026 and provide a thousand annual scholarships. Those skills projects will help bridge the gap in our cyber-resilience.
May I thank the Minister for his answers? They are always very helpful. Cyber-crime and fraud are now the most common crime in the UK, accounting for some 50% of all offences and costing the economy billions of pounds per year. Will he please discuss with Cabinet colleagues providing additional funding to ensure that our universities and colleges can provide high-level training in cyber-security, and to ensure—if he does not mind my saying so—that Belfast’s title of cyber-security capital is retained?
I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman, as I always am, for the important points that he raises. I think he knows how seriously we take these issues. He is right to raise the point about skills and education. We are doing a lot of work to support the victims of cyber-crime and providing free guidance, tools and incident response advice through the National Cyber Security Centre, alongside targeted awareness campaigns. I give an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters.
Graham Leadbitter (Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey) (SNP)
Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)
The Government’s Prepare website provides emergency preparedness advice to the public, including information about signing up for emergency alerts and warnings and preparing their home for emergencies. By using this advice, including the downloadable household emergency plan, people can improve their emergency preparedness, regardless of the cause of the emergency.
Caroline Voaden
As the Minister will know, a recent gas outage in my constituency left thousands of people without power, many for several days, and Cornwall has recently seen huge disruption from storm Goretti. Those incidents highlight how vulnerable households can be when essential services are disrupted. Given impending climate breakdown and the increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment, will he outline whether the Government are considering any kind of personalised, nationwide information campaign to help people prepare for a crisis? Not everyone will look at the gov.uk website. The Dutch Government have recently sent a 33-page booklet on emergency preparedness to every home in the country, so that people know what they need to do in a crisis.
I am grateful for the points the hon. Lady raises. We look very carefully at what international allies are saying about these matters. I am concerned to hear about the situation in her constituency. The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero works closely with industry, regulators and other stakeholders to improve and maintain the resilience and security of energy infrastructure. When incidents occur, as they have in her constituency—even exceptionally disruptive ones—industry has tried and tested response plans to minimise disruption to customers as quickly as possible. That said, I am keen to further increase our resilience, so if she would like to write to me, I will look closely at what she has to say.
The advice from the previous Government was that households should stockpile three day’s-worth of non-perishable food and water. This week, The Guardian has reported that other European countries are looking at creating strategic food reserves. Can the Minister tell us a little more about his thinking on these issues?
I could, and I welcome my hon. Friend’s interest and expertise in this area. The Government’s Prepare website includes a suggested list of supplies to improve household resilience, including non-perishable food. I take a close interest in the messaging of our partners in Europe on this subject. The Government are committed to ensuring that the whole of society—particularly the most vulnerable—are best prepared for and supported during crises.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
As I made clear in a lengthy and detailed statement to Parliament earlier this week, we will not get into the technical detail of the mitigations. I was reassured to see the letter from the director general of MI5 and the director of GCHQ, in which they pointed out that there are clear security advantages from the proposal. I also sought to make the point that we have agreed with the Chinese Government that there will be a reduction in their current diplomatic footprint from seven sites down to one.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
The 10-year bus pipeline is yet to be published, and a media report about the investigation by the National Cyber Security Centre and the Department for Transport into kill switches suggests that 700-plus Chinese buses on British roads have remote disabling technology. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government are delaying the publication of the 10-year bus pipeline until the report on Chinese kill switches is concluded?
I believe that my hon. Friend has had a meeting with a Transport Minister to discuss these matters, but I would be very happy to discuss them with him further.
The Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill is still under consideration in the Scottish Parliament and has not been passed, contrary to the views of a number of Members of this House. This week, a number of measures had to be removed from the Bill because they were not compliant with the powers of the Scottish Parliament, but Scottish Ministers suggested that they were in an ongoing discussion with the UK Government about a future section 104 order. Can Ministers update the House on the current discussions with the Scottish Government? And do they agree with me that ultimately—
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Commons ChamberI would like to make a statement on the national security considerations of China’s proposal to build a new embassy at the Royal Mint Court in Tower Hamlets. I know that Members will by now be well aware that the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government has approved China’s planning application. Some right hon. Members have been briefed by my security officials, and some Members will have seen the statement from the Intelligence and Security Committee, as well as the letter from the director general of MI5 and the director of GCHQ.
The decision made by the Secretary of State for Housing was an independent, quasi-judicial planning one. It concludes a process that began in 2018 when the then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, gave formal diplomatic consent for China to use the Royal Mint site for its new embassy, subject to planning permission, and welcomed it as China’s largest overseas investment. Given the potential for legal proceedings, it would not be appropriate to give a commentary on the grounds for the decision. In its decision, MHCLG notes that
“the package of security measures proposed would be proportionate to the proposed use of the site”
and that
“no bodies with responsibility for national security, including HO and FCDO, have raised concerns or objected to the proposal on the basis of the proximity of the cables or other underground infrastructure.”
I know that some Members have raised concerns regarding the security implications of the new embassy, and it is on that issue that I want to update the House. National security is the first duty of any Government, and that is why the intelligence and security agencies have been absolutely integral to this process. The ISC, which is the Committee entrusted and empowered by this House to scrutinise the Government’s most sensitive information, has today released its judgment on the security implications. I thank it for its work, and I am reassured by the depth of its scrutiny throughout this process. In its statement, the ISC concluded,
“On the basis of the evidence we have received, and having carefully reviewed the nuanced national security considerations, the Committee has concluded that, taken as a whole, the national security concerns that arise can be satisfactorily mitigated.”
I can confirm today that the Home Office has received a letter from the director of GCHQ and director general of MI5 that makes it clear that
“as with any foreign embassy on UK soil, it is not realistic to expect to be able wholly to eliminate each and every potential risk…However, the collective work across UK intelligence agencies and HMG departments to formulate a package of national security mitigations for the site has been, in our view, expert, professional and proportionate.”
They judge that
“the package of mitigations deals acceptably with a wide range of sensitive national security issues, including cabling.”
Indeed, they note that the consolidation has “clear security advantages”.
Our security services have over a century of experience of managing security matters relating to foreign embassies on UK soil. This Government, and the last, have been aware of the potential for a new embassy at this site since the Chinese Government completed the purchase in 2018. The issues that continue to be raised in media reports are not new to the Government or the intelligence community, and an extensive range of measures have been developed to protect national security. We have acted to increase the resilience of cables in the area through an extensive series of measures to protect sensitive data, and I can confirm that, contrary to reporting, the Government had seen the unredacted plans for the embassy and the Government have agreed with China that the publicly accessible forecourt on the embassy grounds will not have diplomatic immunity, managing the risk to the public.
Based on all that, and given our extensive work on this matter, I am content that any risks are being appropriately managed, but let me be clear: the build also brings clear national security advantages. Following extensive negotiations led by this Government, the Chinese Government have agreed to consolidate their seven current sites in London into one site. That is why, following deep scrutiny by security officials, the Government have been able to conclude that we can manage the security concerns related to the embassy.
Although there are those who have, and who will no doubt continue to have, concerns about the embassy, it is a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries agree to establish embassies in each other’s capitals. While some would stick their heads in the sand and ignore the obvious need to engage, this Government are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically, recognising the complexity of the world as it is and challenging where we need to, because for our security, our economy and our climate, China matters. To be clear, this is not a question of balancing economic and security considerations; we do not trade off security for economic access.
Of course we recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber-attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hongkongers and China’s support for Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. That is why I announced a package in November to protect our national security, which set out the range of work the Government are taking forward to strengthen the security of our democracy against the threat from foreign interference and espionage. It is also why, for example, in December 2025 the UK sanctioned two China-based companies that have carried out cyber-attacks against the UK and its allies; why we have completed work to remove Chinese-made surveillance equipment from sensitive sites; why the UK has sanctioned 50 Chinese companies under the Russia sanctions regulations as part of our efforts to take action against entities operating in third countries over economic and military support for Russia; and why I will be hosting a closed event in February with vice-chancellors to discuss the risks posed by foreign interference from a range of states and to signpost our plans to further increase the sector’s resilience.
Taking a robust approach to our national security also includes engaging with China. Under the previous Government, engagement with China had ground to a halt. That made us no safer; indeed, it is only through engagement that we can directly challenge China on its malicious activity. By taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas, including in pursuit of safe economic opportunities in the UK’s interest, and in areas such as organised immigration crime, narcotics trafficking, and serious and organised crime. This is what our allies do and this is what we are doing: delivering for the public, putting more money in their pockets and keeping them safe through hard-headed, risk-based engagement with the world’s most consequential powers.
I am grateful to right hon. and hon. Members for the ongoing attention that they give to protecting the UK’s national security. China has posed, and will continue to pose, threats to our national security. However, following detailed consideration of all possible risks around the new embassy by expert officials across Government, I am assured that the UK’s national security is protected. Let me assure this House and the country: upholding national security is the first duty of Government and we will continue to take all measures necessary to defeat these threats. I commend this statement to the House.
Order. Before I call the Minister, I gently remind shadow Ministers and spokesmen that there is a time limit, which the right hon. Gentleman exceeded somewhat.
I listened carefully to what the shadow Home Secretary had to say. There was a glaring gap in his analysis: he did not seem to want to say anything about the level of challenge that we inherited from the previous Government in the laydown of the diplomatic estate. He did not want to accept that, as with other countries, there is a degree of risk that has to be managed. I explained that very carefully and made sure that he had the opportunity to come in this morning for a briefing. I was also at pains to stress in my opening remarks that although, of course, balanced views have to be taken about these things, there are national security advantages to the proposals that have been agreed. I know that he and other Conservative Members do not want to agree with that, but I think it is important that we debate—
The right hon. Gentleman says it is nonsense. He is entitled to his opinion, as are this Government. I hope that he takes the opportunity to look carefully at what the director general of MI5 and the director of GCHQ have to say. I also say to him and to some, but not all, Conservative Members that this is a moment when I would have hoped we could discuss these things in a sensible and reasonable way. That is how we should approach matters relating to national security.
I do not think it would be such a bad thing to hear a bit of humility from some Conservative Members, not least because the attack that we heard from the shadow Home Secretary and which other hon. Members have already engaged in might have landed a bit fairer and a bit truer if they had not spent 14 years in government flitting between hot and cold, neither consistent nor credible on what is, after all, one of the most complex geopolitical challenges that we face. The Conservatives went from golden age to ice age, and from welcoming China with open arms to choosing to disengage almost entirely with the world’s largest nation, which, along with Hong Kong, is our second-largest trading partner. It is convenient for some Conservative Members to forget that it was Boris Johnson, as Conservative Foreign Secretary in 2018, who granted consent for the Royal Mint site to be used as diplomatic premises. He said he was proud to
“welcome the fact this is China’s largest overseas diplomatic investment.”
That was a Conservative Foreign Secretary. In recent times, we have seen Conservative MPs U-turn on the original position of their Government and take a different approach.
This Government will ensure that the approach we take is underpinned by consistent and pragmatic engagement with China, but we will do so a way that absolutely ensures our national security. The House will have heard the important contributions that have been made by the ISC, and the conclusion that it has drawn. The House and the country will have heard the comments from the directors general. These are important contributions. Nobody should underestimate how seriously the Government have taken this matter. We have engaged with it incredibly closely. The intelligence and security agencies have been involved in the process from the outset. I can give an assurance to those who have doubts that we will, of course, continue to monitor this process carefully, but we believe that this is the right judgment.
I respectfully say to the Minister that that was an incredibly long answer—indeed, longer even than the question. Perhaps questions and responses need to be briefer.
Many of my constituents will continue to have serious concerns about the proposed new embassy in my constituency. These include concerns about China’s human rights record, espionage and, in particular, local disruption. A development of this scale would cause significant disruption for local residents, especially those in Royal Mint Court, who now face considerable uncertainty, including privacy concerns and the fear of losing their homes. What assurances can the Government provide to my constituents, particularly those residents, regarding their concerns? Can the Minister also say more about the national security concerns and how they will be satisfactorily mitigated?
My hon. Friend is an assiduous Member of the House and represents her constituents incredibly seriously. She will understand that, for obvious reasons, there are limits to what I can say about the specific measures and mitigations that will be put in place, but I am grateful to her for entirely understandably raising the concerns that some of her constituents have expressed. I assure her that we will want to work closely with her to minimise any disruption to local residents, and of course I would be happy to discuss these matters with her further.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement and for the time his officials took to brief me earlier today.
The Government’s decision to approve plans for the Chinese mega-embassy represents far more than a planning matter. It shows that Ministers have learned very little from the evidence exposed in recent months of Chinese spying efforts to infiltrate British politics and this House. Throughout this stunted process, the Liberal Democrats have consistently called these plans out for what they are: a mistake. The Government know that the decision they have made today will further amplify China’s surveillance efforts here in the UK, endangering the security of our data. Planning conditions are meaningless without proper enforcement. Given the unprecedented security concerns surrounding this site, how will the Government ensure that planning conditions are rigorously monitored and enforced, particularly in regard to the underground cables that the current plans come dangerously close to?
No amount of planning conditions can address the fundamental problem. The embassy does not clean Chinese officials of their human rights abuses. It is shocking that China has placed bounties on the heads of democracy activists from Hong Kong who live in the UK. That type of interference and intimidation in our country is totally unacceptable, so in the light of this decision, will the Government include all Chinese officials, Hong Kong special administrative region officials and Chinese Communist party-linked organisations on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?
Beyond the security and diplomatic concerns, there are fundamental questions about our democratic freedoms. The previous Conservative Government attacked our fundamental right to protest, and this Labour Government have continued to erode those freedoms. As a democratic society, we must protect the right to protest peacefully, including near embassies and including for Hongkongers living in the UK. Will the Government continue to guarantee the right to protest, even as this embassy moves ahead?
I am grateful to the hon. Lady, not least because she came along in good faith this morning and attended the briefing at our invitation. I hope she found it helpful. I am acutely conscious that there are technical details that the House will understand I am not able to get into, and that is why we took the opportunity to brief the hon. Lady and other right hon. Members this morning. I am afraid that I do not agree with her analysis of our understanding of the threat. I referred earlier to the significant number of measures that we have taken in recent times to protect our national security.
The hon. Lady also asked me about the cables, so let me take this opportunity to update her and the House on that specific point. The allegations that have been much discussed in the media are not new to us or to the security agencies. Our intelligence services have scrutinised the plans, and an extensive range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect national security, including putting in place additional resilience measures to protect sensitive data—
What does that mean?
The hon. Member asks me what that means. I hope he will understand that it would be unwise of me to get into the technical detail of the mitigations that we are seeking to put in place. Surely he understands that the Security Minister is not able to get into the guts and the detail of precisely what we are going to do—[Interruption.] If he is just patient for—[Interruption.]
Order. I am simply not going to have this. There is too much chuntering, and indeed yelling, across the Chamber from a sedentary position. The Minister might like to focus on responding to the question that was asked by the Lib Dem spokesperson, not to heckling from the rest of the Chamber.
I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Opposition Members have made points about transparency, and it is important that I take this opportunity to give as much detail as I can, but it is important for the hon. Member for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk (John Lamont) to understand that, as Security Minister, I cannot get into the detail of precisely what we are going to do, for what I thought would have been fairly obvious reasons.
Let me say to the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) that the Government have been aware of the potential new embassy proposal since 2018. Our security services have been involved throughout that process, and an extensive range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect our national security. I can give her the assurance that she seeks that an extensive range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect our national security.
The hon. Lady also—quite unfairly, I have to say—criticised the Government’s belief in the right to protest. I do not think that that is a fair critique. The Government take very seriously the right of people to protest in our country. It is a cornerstone of our democracy and the Government will always ensure that people have the ability to protest in a peaceful way.
The hon. Lady asked, entirely reasonably, about the foreign influence registration scheme. I am waiting for Conservative Members to ask me about that as well. She will know that FIRS is still a new scheme. It came into force relatively recently, on 1 July, and more effectively on 1 October. She will understand that any decision with regard to FIRS will be brought to Parliament in the usual way.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend for his statement, which is of course complex and raises significant issues that are shared on both sides of the House. He has referred to the issue of national security, and I fully appreciate that he is unable to talk about the mitigations that have been put in place. I am grateful that he has re-emphasised that point a number of times. As part of the evergreen nature of assessing the risks that we face, both during the building of the embassy, if it continues, and beyond, is he able to assure the House that, wherever possible, he will keep this place updated about any change in the risk assessments and that, if a more detailed analysis is required, the ISC will be fully apprised of that?
My hon. Friend is right to say that these are complex decisions, and right to make the point that there are significant restrictions on what can be said in this Chamber. I can give him the assurances that he seeks. Ultimately, of course, it is for the Intelligence and Security Committee to decide what lines of inquiry it wants to proceed with, but we have given it close assurances of the work being done, and it has had access to material, so that it can take its own view. I make a commitment to him and to the vice-chair of the Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), that we will continue to engage with the Committee in a constructive way, and that when we feel that it is necessary or appropriate to update the House further, we will of course do that.
As you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and the House would expect, the Intelligence and Security Committee has investigated the security implications of this proposal, and specifically whether the intelligence community had sufficient opportunity to feed in any security concerns, and whether Ministers had the necessary information on which to base a decision. I want to quote directly from our conclusions, which represent the Committee’s unanimous view:
“On the basis of the evidence we have received, and having carefully reviewed the nuanced national security considerations, the Committee has concluded that, taken as a whole, the national security concerns that arise can be satisfactorily mitigated.”
I will say, though, that we have been concerned solely with the national security perspective, not with the other arguments for or against a new embassy.
It has proved more difficult than it should have been to get straightforward answers to our basic questions. The process in Government does not seem to be effectively co-ordinated, or as robust as would have been expected. In particular, there was a lack of clarity about the role that national security considerations play in planning decisions. We will take those matters up further with the Government, as I know the Minister would expect.
I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and to all members of his Committee. Parliament entrusts the ISC with holding Government to account, and the ISC is able to do that in a way that other right hon. and hon. Members cannot. He made two key points. First, he shared the Committee’s analysis of the concerns expressed about national security. I hope that Members in all parts of the House listen carefully to what he says, and look carefully at the judgment that his Committee arrived at. Secondly, he made an important point about process, which I take seriously. I have no doubt that quite a lot can be learned from the process, and I am happy to talk with him and his Committee to identify the lessons that should be learned, and to ensure that we do things better next time.
I place on the record that I support completely what the deputy Chair of the ISC, of which I am also a member, just said. The process issue needs looking at urgently, and the deputy Chair was clear about the problems we faced. An important letter today from the GCHQ and MI5 heads to the Foreign and Home Secretaries says clearly:
“the collective work across UK intelligence agencies and HMG departments to formulate a package of national security mitigations for the site has been, in our view, expert, professional and proportionate.”
Would the Minister like to comment on that?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I reiterate the points I made about process. I have a huge amount of respect for the Committee. I had the pleasure—that is how I will describe it—of appearing in front of the Committee not so long ago. I do not think it is a state secret to say that the Committee gave me a pretty tough grilling, and that is absolutely how it should be. The point he made about process is important, as is his point about the letter from the director generals. It is a rare occurrence for the director generals to make public comments. They are both extremely professional, and I have the pleasure of working with them regularly. They are both people of great integrity, and the House and the country should listen very carefully to what they have to say. They have made the point that, collectively, our security services have 100 years of experience in dealing with the challenges from foreign embassies. That is not to be remotely complacent about the nature of the threat that we face, because clearly it is very different from what it was in the past.
I do not think I am breaking the Official Secrets Act if I gently point out that when I used to chair the Intelligence and Security Committee, I repeatedly deprecated the use of the word “mitigation”, because it covers such a wide range of sins, but leaving aside security considerations just this once, does the Minister accept, as he should, that this is a colossal propaganda win for totalitarian, communist China? Is there any argument that was used in favour of China getting this embassy that would not have carried exactly the same weight if totalitarian, imperialist Russia had wanted to buy this building? Would the Government have stopped Russia from doing it, and if they would have done, on what grounds?
I genuinely am, because I respect the wisdom of someone who has served in this House for many years. The right hon. Lady questions my gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman. I can give her an assurance that I have a huge amount of respect—
I am answering the question. I have a huge amount of respect for Members who have served for a long time, and particularly those who have chaired the ISC. We need to find a mechanism to ensure that Members like the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) have access to some of this information, so that they can make informed comments in this House. I take his point, although I do not agree with it, about mitigations. He understands that there are limits to what I can say on the mitigations. On his substantive point, I do not agree with him that this is a win for China, not least because I could not have been clearer about the importance of the consolidation of the estate. The Government have reached an agreement with China that the existing diplomatic footprint in London will be reduced in size from seven diplomatic sites to one. I am not sure that that constitutes a particularly big win in my book—
Well, it is a statement of truth, and I think it undermines the right hon. Gentleman’s argument.
Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)
Even if we accept that the national security concerns about this new embassy have been mitigated, as evidenced by the letters from the security agencies today, and even if we accept that consolidating the seven properties that China owns into one gives us a security advantage, that is still cold comfort to the Hongkongers whom I represent in Leeds South West and Morley. They still have to live with transnational repression. In the case of Chloe Cheung, she still has to live with a £100,000 bounty on her head. Of course, they now have to live in fear that this new embassy might become their prison. What assurances can the Minister give Hongkongers in my constituency and, indeed, the UK that they will be protected from the ever-lengthening arm of the Chinese Communist party?
I do not accept the basis of the argument that my hon. Friend has made. He would be well advised to place more emphasis on the point about consolidation, because I am confident that that will deliver meaningful operational benefits; that has been agreed by the security experts. Let me find what I hope is an important point of consensus: I am absolutely clear about how unacceptable it is for China, or any other nation for that matter, to seek to persecute individuals who are resident in the United Kingdom. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. That is why the defending democracy taskforce, which I chair, has completed an extensive piece of work looking at transnational repression.
A number of actions have come from that piece of work, which have been routed right across Government. We take this incredibly seriously; I have met a number of people who have been the victim of TNR. It is completely unacceptable for China or anyone else to persecute people in this country. However, I ask my hon. Friend to consider the fact that we are talking about a proposal that will deliver an embassy for China at some point in the future. The Government and I have to deal with the level of threat as it is. Given the point about consolidation, I am confident that this is a proposal that we will be able to make work in the national interests of our country and all the people who live here.
While I associate myself with the wider security concerns, will the Minister forgive me if I raise a narrow point? He knows what I am going to ask, because I have asked this twice already and not had an answer. The correspondence between the Government and the Chinese reveals that the medieval monastery on the site—an important monastery called Eastminster, rather than Westminster, where we are now—will remain on inviolable Chinese territory. Any UK citizens visiting it will have to be frisked, and will effectively be in China. What reassurance can the Minister give to those who have bounties on their head—the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) mentioned them—or to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who has been sanctioned by the Chinese state? What further reassurances can the Minister give that UK citizens visiting their own heritage will not be in danger when going on to the site?
I am grateful to the Father of the House, who has consistently made this point; this is at least the third time that I have heard him raise it. I hope that he heard the point I made earlier—I looked at him purposefully—about the question that he asks, but let me take this opportunity to say that the bounties are completely unacceptable behaviour, and the Government will not stand for it. The point that he raised is one that I have looked at very carefully, and I responded to it earlier, in my statement.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
I have been sceptical about this new embassy, but I take the points made today by Members on the Intelligence and Security Committee, as well as the response from GCHQ and MI5. I have also listened to my constituents, including the Bracknell Forest Hong Kong community, who tell me that they are concerned about the ongoing transnational repression that they are experiencing. My hon. Friend has talked a lot about the work that the Government have already done. Will he commit to continuing to engage with the Hong Kong community, so that we can continue to adapt our response to the emerging threats that they experience?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who has consistently raised points on behalf of his constituents, and I can give him the assurances that he seeks. Let me say to him and the House that we condemn the Hong Kong police’s efforts to coerce, intimidate, harass and harm those living in the UK and overseas. These acts of repression will not be tolerated in our country. Along with other ministerial colleagues, I have taken the opportunity to raise these concerns directly with the Chinese authorities, reaffirming that the extraterritorial application of Hong Kong’s national security law is unacceptable and will not be tolerated in the UK. I can give him the assurances that he seeks, and I am very happy to discuss this matter with him further.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
Hongkongers and other Chinese dissidents in the UK will be rightly concerned about this news. I want to make it completely clear that the Liberal Democrats have serious concerns that this project will enhance China’s ability to conduct transnational repression against Britons and Hongkongers on British soil. What is the timeline for closing the seven existing Chinese consulate buildings, once Royal Mint Court is opened? Will the Government publish the 2018 note verbale confirming that the embassy was contingent on planning approval, ensuring that the Government did not prejudge the application? Finally, paragraph 62 of the Secretary of State’s permission letter states that
“lawful embassy use of the site”
would give no cause for worry about interference with the sensitive cabling that runs adjacent to the secret basement rooms. After China’s proven record of unlawful espionage against MPs and British institutions, does the Minister agree that this is a catastrophic misjudgment, and that we have no hope of our laws being observed by the Chinese Communist party?
Order. When questions run to two pages and take a minute, perhaps Members might think about cutting them down slightly.
The hon. Gentleman has expressed an opinion, and he is entirely within his rights to do that, but I hope he understands that I am also entirely within my rights to point out that his opinion is not backed up by the intelligence services or the security agencies, which have looked incredibly carefully at the detail of the proposal. He states baldly that the proposed embassy site will deliver additional capability to China, but I again make the point about consolidation, and about the security advantages that we think will accrue from this proposal. I hope the hon. Gentleman understands that I will not get into the timeline today, not least because I have to be incredibly careful about what I say, given the likelihood of further legal proceedings, but I am very happy to discuss these matters further with him and his Liberal Democrat colleagues.
I want first to make it clear that I do not agree with this decision. It will have a chilling effect on Tibetans, Hongkongers and Uyghurs, and other Chinese people who merely dissent from the regime in Beijing. I have three questions about the application. First, what guarantees do the Government have that the seven other sites will be closed and disposed of? Will the new site be built by British construction companies hiring workers in the usual way, or by Chinese construction companies bringing in their own labour? What forms of building inspection control will be present during and after the construction?
My hon. Friend has a long and proud track record in this area, and I listen carefully to what he has to say. He will forgive me if I disagree with his analysis of the chilling effect of this decision, not least given the points about consolidation and the security advantage. He has asked about the seven sites. Let me give him and the House an absolute assurance that that is part of the deal agreed with China. The deal is that the seven diplomatic sites forming the existing diplomatic footprint in London will be consolidated in the individual site.
In terms of the precise details about construction and other activities, my hon. Friend will understand that there are agreed procedures for these kinds of activities. I think a point was made earlier about the relationship with the United States and the concerns that they might have expressed—which I do not recognise—but it is useful to note that China built a new embassy in the United States not so long ago, so this is not a particularly uncommon occurrence. However, I give my hon. Friend an assurance that we will keep a close eye on the points he makes.
I say gently to the hon. Gentleman that I raise these issues as a sanctioned individual. Not only am I sanctioned, but my whole family is sanctioned, I have been trolled by operatives from the security service of China, and I am under constant watch by them, all the way through. On the basis of that, I simply ask him this. When the Secretary of State issued his letter, he said—this was quoted earlier—that the concern about cables should not present a problem for “a lawful embassy use”. Nothing about the Chinese is lawful here in the United Kingdom. Is it lawful for them to attack Hongkongers who have fled here? Is it lawful for pop-up police stations to go on pulling people in? Is it lawful for them to place bounties on people’s heads? Is it lawful for them to be asking British citizens living next door to Hongkongers to bring them into the embassy, so they may collect their bounty? These are all unlawful acts. The truth is that this Chinese embassy, with its 200 extra staff, will increase that. In every place where China has put more people in its embassy, transnational repression has increased. Does the Minister not agree with that?
Try though I might, there was never going to be a scenario where I would be able to satisfy the right hon. Gentleman today in what I have been able to say. He and I have had exchanges on these matters on many occasions. It is completely intolerable and unacceptable that he and members of his family have been sanctioned, and he knows the Government’s position on that.
The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the issue of law. UK law is sacrosanct, and where anyone—whoever they might be—falls short of it, they will be held to account by this Government. He made a specific point about the potential for an increase in staff. Again, there are clear procedures that rest with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office: where a foreign nation seeks to bring additional staff resource into a country, that all has to go through the normal diplomatic channels and has to be agreed by the Foreign Secretary.
I know that the right hon. Gentleman does not support these proposals. I understand that he has strong views, which I have a lot of respect for, but I hope he can respect the fact that we have engaged seriously with this proposal. The security services have been involved from the outset. Ultimately, Government have to take a view. We have taken the view that the national security implications can be mitigated. We have also taken the view—and I know that some Opposition Members do not agree with it—that there could well be some security advantages as a consequence of these proposals. I undertake to keep him and other Members up to date, and if he wishes to discuss it outside this Chamber, I would be happy to do that.
Will the Minister confirm that the UK Government are happy with rewarding and emboldening a nation that has one of the worst human rights records, that conducts espionage on these islands and in our Parliament, that has imprisoned a UK national—Jimmy Lai—on trumped-up charges, that has committed crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs and that is the single most important enabler of Russia’s illegal war machine against Ukraine and its civilian population, which we as parliamentarians have stood united against?
I am sorry to say that I do not agree with the framing of the hon. Gentleman’s question. While he is entirely right to raise specific concerns, this is not about rewarding China.
It is not. It is about the importance of engaging confidently and pragmatically, in a way that will enable us to take opportunities where they present themselves and where it is in our national security. As I made clear in my earlier remarks, that is not just about economic co-operation; there are other areas where we need to co-operate with China. I referenced three in my opening comments: organised immigration crime, serious organised crime and narcotics trafficking. Those are important areas where we need to work with China. Ultimately, the most important thing is that we safeguard our national security. That is why we have worked incredibly hard to look carefully at the detail of this proposal and to make sure we have the right mitigations in place.
Will the Minister explain how, by giving China the embassy it wants, the Government are demonstrating that they are holding China responsible for—in his words—“unacceptable behaviour” that they will not stand for?
In part, it is because of the reduction in the diplomatic estate from seven sites to one.
Richard Tice (Boston and Skegness) (Reform)
So the Chinese communist regime sanctions Members of this House, spies on Members of this House and carries out more cyber-attacks than any other country. The Minister admits that they are a national security threat, yet the Government think it is a good idea to kowtow to the Beijing bullies and allow this mega-embassy. If the decision is in the national economic interest, could the Minister confirm that some British steel might be used in this Chinese embassy? Can he guarantee that it is in the national security interests of British citizens?
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on getting the clip that he no doubt will be posting on social media in the not-too-distant future; that is up to him. He seems to operate in a world that is quite selective in the decisions it seeks to make. I looked over to him earlier when I referenced the requirement for co-operation on areas such as organised immigration crime. I do not know whether he thinks that is a good thing. I do not know whether he or his party have a policy about whether, given the concerns that are shared across this House, we should be engaging with China on matters relating to immigration. He will understand, I hope, that as part of the work to stop the small boat crossings in the channel, it is necessary to engage with our near neighbours, but it is also necessary to engage internationally. I am not clear whether he thinks that is a good thing, and I am not clear whether he thinks we should engage with China on those matters.
What I am clear about is that this Government will engage pragmatically, do the right thing and secure the economic opportunities, but fundamentally, we will always make sure that we underpin our national security. The hon. Gentleman’s point about British steel is a fair one. This Government will always want to support UK-based manufacturers and UK-based industry. To end on a point of consensus, let us always look for opportunities to buy British.
Several hon. Members rose—
There is a pattern of behaviour here: the failure to act meaningfully over Jimmy Lai, the mysterious collapse of the Chinese spy case and now this abject national humiliation. Let’s call this what it is: this is appeasement of communist China for economic gain. We tried that in the 1930s, and look where it got us. Why are this Labour Government kowtowing to China—a communist regime that imprisons 1 million Uyghur Muslims in concentration camps for having the temerity to believe in God?
In one sense, I can agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is a pattern of behaviour; he is right about that. The pattern of behaviour is doing the right thing and making sure that we safeguard our national security.
The right hon. Gentleman might roll his eyes, but he was a Minister in the previous Government, and he has served in this House for a number of years. He knows that under his Conservative Government there was a complete lack of consistency with regard to our policy on China. This is a significant geostrategic challenge. In the end, Government have to make decisions and have a clear-eyed policy. Anyone who thinks that we should not be engaging with China is naive.
The right hon. Gentleman uses language that I think is inappropriate, unhelpful and inaccurate. I have made the point about consolidation, about the national security advantages and about this Government’s commitment to securing our national interests. Let me say one final thing. He is right to raise the case of Jimmy Lai. He knows the Government’s clear commitment that Jimmy Lai should be released immediately.
Does the Minister believe that the approval of this Chinese mega-embassy makes the British people safer?
The right hon. Gentleman is very experienced from his own time in government, and he will know that difficult decisions have to be made. It is my judgment that, ultimately, this is the right way to proceed and that we have to engage with China for the reasons I have explained. Ultimately, nothing—nothing—will prevent this Government from ensuring our national security. That is why we have progressed this proposal incredibly carefully and made sure we have the right mitigations in place.
Last week, I made it clear that any hostile intelligence service would struggle to find a better location for espionage than the now approved Chinese mega-embassy. What assessment has been made of the risk that this site could be used for surveillance, intimidation or coercion of critics of the oppressive communist regime who are living in the UK? How do Government justify a decision that is both shameful and reckless in its disregard for national security?
I am grateful for the points the hon. Lady has made, but of course, we are already dealing with those challenges. Some Members seem to think that we do not have to mitigate and manage those risks at the moment. We do. There are those who think—and it is an entirely reasonable position if people want to take it—that the situation could get worse with the agreement of this embassy. As I have tried to explain, because of the mitigations we have put in place and the consolidation of the diplomatic estate, there are clear national security advantages as a consequence of this proposal. She does not perhaps agree now, but I hope she understands that the Government take these matters incredibly seriously and will do everything they can to safeguard our national security.
China is notoriously transactional in its international relations, so what do we get in return?
I always listen carefully to the right hon. Gentleman, not least because I seem to remember that he was the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the then Prime Minister, Lord Cameron, whose Government had quite a different relationship with China from the one we have now. He will remember that very well, as do I. While I am grateful for his advice, I hope he has borne in mind the points I made about the consistency of the previous Government, including the one he served in.
In the light of what you have said, Madam Deputy Speaker, I hope that you see this as short question and I hope that I get a short answer.
Does the Minister know if the security services have any concerns at all about the proposed new Chinese super-embassy—yes or no?
The right hon. Lady has seen the letter that has been published today by the director general—
I do not know how much time the right hon. Lady spends thinking about matters relating to national security or understands the nature of the—
Not at all—I am seeking to explain to her that this Government, like the last Government, manage a range of national security risks. That would be the case whatever decision was taken around this proposal.
I am going to ask again: does this make the British public safer—yes or no?
Fundamentally, Government are there to make the British people safer. For the reasons that I have explained, I am confident that this is the right decision from a national security perspective.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
Is not the plain truth that this was a predetermined political decision from the moment that the political decision was taken to call it in, when the Government were faced with due process because the council had refused the planning application? After all that has gone on, does this not simply bring the whole planning process into disrepute? London’s Labour group has condemned the decision, so is not one of its members right when he says:
“wrong embassy, in the wrong place, at the wrong time”?
I do not agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman’s analysis. I have been crystal clear that people are entitled to their opinions and will have different views. What sensible members of the public will be interested in is what the security professionals—the security agencies, the intelligence services, those people who really understand the nature of the risk and the threat—have said and what they think, and I have been clear about what they think and about the way in which we have approached the process, which I believe will deliver national security benefits for our country.
Let me point out that when the previous Conservative Government proclaimed a “golden era” of relations with China—when David Cameron welcomed President Xi for a state visit in 2015, as Theresa May was championing Huawei for our 5G infrastructure—the security services supported their then Prime Minister; or they were brought into line, which I expect is what happens under these circumstances. Can we ensure that we are not using the security services for propaganda purposes? I predict that in the fullness of history, we will look back at this decision with great regret.
I know that the hon. Gentleman gives a lot of thought and dedication to these matters. He reflected on the engagement that had taken place under the previous Government, under former Prime Minister David Cameron. The hon. Gentleman will understand, because he thinks about these things very carefully, that there is obviously a need to engage with China. President Trump will be visiting China in the next couple of months. President Macron has been, I think, three times over the past years. Prime Minister Carney has been there recently. Serious, grown-up people understand the need to have engagement and to work closely with countries like China. Sensible people will get that and will also understand that sometimes that involves tough choices. This Government do not shy away from making the tough choices. I accept the challenge that the hon. Gentleman offers—that the decision will be judged over the long term—but I think that this is the right thing to do and I am pleased that the security services agree.
Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
The Minister says that China continues to pose a risk, and yet the Government today welcome this Trojan horse of an embassy into the heart of our capital. Consolidation helps China, not us, and planning conditions deal with the establishment but not the actual, real use inside the building in years to come. This has been asked many times before, but I ask again: are the British people safer as a result of this embassy—yes or no?
I do not agree with the hon. Lady’s analysis with regard to consolidation. This Government will always work to ensure that the British public are safer—that is our job, our abiding mission and the first responsibility of Government. I am confident that the decision that has been taken, with the mitigations in place, will deliver good national security outcomes for our country.
The Government’s decision to approve China’s spy embassy is utterly wrong and puts national security at risk. Now that the embassy has been approved, if—or rather when—we get evidence that China is using the embassy for surveillance, torture or other inappropriate means, will the Government guarantee to close that embassy?
As with any embassy, either in this country or around the world—let us not be naive about the fact that Britain has embassies right around the world—the Vienna convention lays down the way in which different Governments should behave with regard to the conduct of their diplomatic presences. We take our responsibilities under the Vienna convention very seriously, and we expect every other country, including China, to do the same.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
The Minister will be pleased to know that I am not going to ask him about the FIRS, but he quoted extensively from the weighty tome of the planning approval letter. It says that the Secretary of State
“notes that no bodies with responsibility for national security, including HO and FCDO, have raised concerns”,
but he did not mention that it goes on to say that the Secretary of State
“considers that the lack of objection from these bodies on this issue carries significant weight”.
Given that extensive measures had to be put in place to protect sensitive data, will he explain why neither the Home Office not the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office put in any objections to the proximity of the data cables and their vulnerabilities? On the issue of the consolidation of the consular buildings, last week the Government informed me that they had no record of how many properties within London or within the UK are owned by the Chinese state, so how will they keep track on other buildings that are used unofficially by the Chinese state?
I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman has not asked me about the FIRS—I have a very good response for him that I will not be able to give now. He is not quite right to say that I quoted extensively from the planning document. I did not—I referenced it only very fleetingly and then explained why that was the case. His key point is about the points that have been brought forward by the Home Office and the Foreign Office. No specific objections were raised by both those Departments because they had both satisfied themselves that the mitigations could be put in place to safeguard against the risk that might be faced. That is the reason.
(1 month ago)
Commons Chamber
Andrew George (St Ives) (LD)
(Urgent Question): To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster if he will make a statement following Storm Goretti.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for securing this urgent question. May I express my deepest condolences to the family and friends of the man who tragically lost his life in Cornwall during Storm Goretti? Last week, the Met Office issued a red weather warning for wind covering south-east England, with wider parts of the UK covered by amber and yellow warnings for wind, snow and rain. As is normal when these alerts are issued, the Government took action to ensure the necessary preparations for the arrival of the storm were in place. In view of the potential threat to life in Cornwall and in St Ives specifically, the Cabinet Office issued two emergency alerts to approximately 500,000 people on the Isles of Scilly and in Cornwall, both of which were under a red weather warning urging people to stay indoors during the severe winds.
Storm Goretti caused disruption across the UK. However, some of its most significant impacts were felt in the south-west. The storm saw a peak gust of 99 mph on the Isles of Scilly, and it was the worst windstorm in parts of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly for 30 years. It damaged infrastructure, resulting in impacts on transport, power and telecoms, particularly impacting rural communities in the south-west.
More than 250,000 customers lost power during the storm. This morning, 193 customers remained without power in the south-west as a result of Storm Goretti, with 82 identified as vulnerable customers who continue to be offered support by local authorities. The industry expects that all remaining customers will have their power restored by later this afternoon.
While reconnections are continuing at pace, I am aware that a small number of customers have been off supply for an extended period. They are in some of the hardest-to-reach parts of the network in remote rural areas. My right hon. Friend the Energy Secretary remains in close contact with National Grid Electricity Distribution on the progress of restoration and to ensure remaining supplies are reconnected as soon as possible. Support is being provided to vulnerable customers by local authorities while the power supply is restored. Yesterday, National Grid Electricity Distribution deployed 900 engineers and field staff across the south-west to further support restoration efforts and to reconnect those without power as soon as possible.
Overall, the response to the storm has been managed effectively and the local response mechanisms have worked well. That is testament to the work of the local resilience forum, which includes emergency responders and utility workers, as well as the local communities who have pulled together to work so hard in difficult conditions to keep people safe. During these periods of disruption and damage for so many, it is ordinary people looking out for their neighbours and those most vulnerable who help us to recover and repair and to begin to get back to normal life. I am sure that the whole House will join me in paying tribute to those communities and in committing to do all we can to support them now and when severe weather hits again.
Order. Before I call the Minister, I make it clear to Members that I intend to prioritise those representing areas of the country most affected by Storm Goretti. This may be a test of my geography.
I very much appreciate the reasonable and diligent way in which the hon. Gentleman has made his points. He is absolutely right to come here to represent his constituents, and he has done so very effectively. While he will understand that it is not for me to take a view on how these matters are portrayed by the national media, I can give him an absolute, categoric assurance that the Government care just as deeply about his constituents in Cornwall as we do about residents right across the country. I personally know Cornwall incredibly well, and I think it is an extremely important part of the United Kingdom.
My own constituency also feels that it is a long way from the centre, and often feels that it is being neglected and that other parts of the country get preferential treatment. I can therefore say to the hon. Gentleman, and to other Members from the county of Cornwall, that we take the points they are raising today very seriously, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that Government Departments, agencies and local partners have worked, and will continue to work, very closely together to ensure that Cornwall has the same emergency support, recovery funding and resilience measures that would be available to other parts of the country, including the parts that he mentioned. Those measures include support for affected households and for businesses, the important co-ordinating activity that takes place with local authorities, and the engagement with utility providers and the emergency services, to ensure that we are working collectively to restore services as quickly as possible.
We fully recognise the particular vulnerabilities of coastal and rural communities like the one that the hon. Gentleman represents, and the fact that severe weather and the conditions that we have seen over the past few days will inevitably cause significant disruption to infrastructure and livelihoods in areas such as Cornwall. However, the Government remain absolutely committed to standing alongside Cornwall as the recovery effort continues, and to ensuring that no community in Cornwall—or anywhere else in the United Kingdom, for that matter—feels overlooked or treated differently because of where it is located.
I recognise that the impacts of severe weather like Storm Goretti are hugely disruptive and distressing for those who are affected, and of course that can be even more acute in the case of vulnerable individuals and those in more remote communities who may feel isolated from support. The Government took the decision to deploy an emergency alert following the Met Office red weather warning. I was in the situation room when we took that decision and issued that alert, which we did to ensure that all communities across Cornwall—including St Ives, the hon. Gentleman’s constituency—were aware of the incoming storm and could take the necessary precautions to stay safe.
I am pleased to see that communities have been coming together to respond to the impacts of the storm. I know that the hon. Gentleman will join with me in commending the tireless work of the network operators to reconnect the remaining properties with power. For the final 193 customers, power restoration is challenging, because repairs may be required at individual properties in remote locations and access to those properties may be still blocked by fallen trees or debris.
I am pleased that the Minister for Energy is present; the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is continuing to work closely with National Grid to deploy generators to individual properties while repairs take place. That is in addition to the further 900 engineers and field staff who were deployed yesterday. Vulnerable people are being supported and have been offered alternative accommodation, transportation support and hot food. I can give the hon. Gentleman and the House an assurance that the Cabinet Office continues to work closely with the DESNZ, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to ensure that the recovery efforts are progressing.
Several hon. Members rose—
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
Let me first take this opportunity to thank members of the emergency services teams and the utilities, the volunteers and everyone across Cornwall who has looked after their neighbours and responded so brilliantly to a storm that tested the resilience of rural and coastal Britain to the hilt. It exposed vulnerabilities in our infrastructure and emergency planning that could affect any part of the country.
The hon. Member for St Ives (Andrew George) mentioned the communications technology that proved unreliable after the shift from digital to analogue. It failed without power, leaving people completely cut off. Could that be taken into account for the purpose of future back-up, perhaps through satellite communication? Could we move towards that more quickly? The priority response services for vulnerable people rely on sign-up and the ability to contact those people. Will the Minister agree to look at that when it comes to future incidents, given that the climate is changing? This storm was incredibly ferocious and terrifying, but there are likely to be more like it.
I am extremely mindful of your earlier guidance, Madam Deputy Speaker, with regard to brevity. I hope the House will understand that I was just seeking to convey the seriousness with which the Government take these issues.
My hon. Friend has made an important point about telecoms, and I give her an absolute assurance that we will look carefully at this—as, I know, will the local resilience forums. Having discussed the matter with colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government earlier today, I know that there is a process in place whereby the forums will conduct both a hot debrief and, subsequently, a cold debrief, in order to look carefully at what has happened and what lessons can be learnt from it. My hon. Friend has made an important point, and we will of course consider it carefully.
I join the Minister in thanking the emergency services, local authority and Environment Agency staff and volunteers, who have worked tirelessly to recover from the storm and to keep the public safe. I also join him in sending our condolences to those families who are grieving and whose lives have been upended by the storm.
Given the severity of this and earlier extreme weather events, what further preparations will the Government make for future storms and for adverse weather? Do they plan to carry out further storm preparedness exercises, and to implement lessons learnt from the previous test of the emergency alert system in response to these extreme weather events? What further discussions have they had, internally and with local authorities, utility providers and emergency services, to co-ordinate the continued response to this storm? Does the Minister agree that the latest mass power outages in the south-west show that the Government should reconsider their drive for more electricity pylons and instead back faster undergrounding of cables, particularly in high-wind zones?
As we heard from the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham), many people reported that when the power failed, mobile signal followed shortly after. What are the Government doing to ensure that telecommunications masts have enough battery or generator back-up to remain operative during 48 or 72-hour storm cycles? What assessment has the Minister made of the implementation and operation of the severe weather emergency protocol to support the most vulnerable, particularly those sleeping rough, in rural areas such as Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly? Storm Goretti has led to significant rainfall in many parts of the country. What assessment have the Government made of localised flooding, and will support be made available to those affected by the storm through the flood recovery network? I understand that the floods resilience taskforce met on 8 September. I should be grateful if the Minister could outline what actions were taken following that meeting to prepare for eventualities such as this.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for the points that he has raised. He is right to recognise the efforts of all those involved in the operations to support local residents and to restore power where it has been lost. I think it worth pointing out that while normal people will hunker down in these very difficult conditions, we should collectively pay tribute to those who do not that, but go out and brave the elements in order to restore power and provide support for residents who need it.
The shadow Minister made some good points about the importance of looking carefully at these matters and ensuring that Governments are properly prepared for future incidents. I have looked carefully at the response to Storm Arwen a number of years ago, and I think that the Government can learn a fair amount from that particular response. I will ensure through the Cabinet Office, working with colleagues across Government, that we look very carefully at the response to this recent storm and ensure that we are drawing lessons from it so that, as a country, we can be as resilient and as well prepared as we can be for the future challenges that we will undoubtedly face.
The shadow Minister specifically raised the issue of telecoms. While I know he will understand that telecoms equipment is usually highly resilient and major outages are extremely rare, most telecoms equipment relies on a power supply, which of course can be disrupted by severe weather. On the rare occasion that the sector does experience an outage, there are statutory obligations on telecoms providers to maintain the availability of services and report significant outages to Ofcom. However, in general terms, I give the shadow Minister an absolute assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters. We will look very carefully at the response and ensure that we draw all the right lessons from it.
Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)
Meur ras, Madam Deputy Speaker. Jutting out into the Atlantic, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly have often found themselves on the frontline of nationally significant weather events. As my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham) mentioned, the predictions are that storms like Goretti will become more and more frequent. This is a reality that I am not convinced has been taken seriously enough by consecutive Governments.
The response from the people of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly before, during and after Storm Goretti has been nothing short of remarkable, but can I urge the Minister to please commit to a comprehensive cross-departmental review of the resilience of essential Cornish and Scillonian infrastructure, communications and priority list support?
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for the good and reasonable point he has made. I reiterate the point I made earlier to the hon. Member for St Ives (Andrew George) about the Government’s commitment to Cornwall. I absolutely recognise that Cornwall, like many other coastal communities, can feel geographically isolated and a very long way from the centre. The Government understand that, as do I as the Minister for resilience.
My hon. Friend made good points about looking in the round at the resilience of Cornwall specifically. Let me give him an assurance that I am very happy to continue the conversation with him and other colleagues. I will look carefully at the detail of the point he has made and, as I say, I am happy to discuss it further with him.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives (Andrew George) for his characteristic passion and energy in defending his communities in St Ives. I also wish to send my and the Liberal Democrats’ collective deep sympathy to the family of the man who lost his life in the storm, and to add my thanks to our amazing emergency services and frontline utilities staff.
The Minister rightly says that it is not up to him or the Government how the media cover things. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that when Storm Eunice hit London and the south-east four years ago, hitting 200,000 homes, Cobra was convened. However, 200,000 homes have been hit in the west country, and Cobra has not been convened. He will understand why people from Cornwall, Caithness and Cumbria sometimes feel that they are a bit of an afterthought.
Does the Minister agree that this storm exposes the frailty of our energy, water and communications infrastructure and the vulnerability of those who rely on them, especially in this entirely—and, dare I say it, foolishly—post-analogue age? Given that so much land, especially in our rural communities, lies saturated, causing water supply and waste water crises at the moment, will he ensure that this issue is reflected in the qualifying criteria for farming recovery funding? Does he agree that the damaging impact that flooding has on food security means that the environmental land management schemes budget should be increased by a minimum of £1 billion a year to underpin that vital resilience?
The hon. Gentleman is a proud representative not just of his party, but of his part of the world, and I know he speaks with great authority and experience on these matters. I want to respond to the specific point he made about Cobra, because I think that is an entirely fair challenge. I am incredibly keen to ensure that we are using all of the machinery of government to best effect, so I spend quite a lot of my time considering whether we need to convene Cobra and deciding whether the set of circumstances we face or are responding to requires that level of Government response. In truth, Cobra tends to sit when there is concern about the nature of the response. We took the decision last week that, because we thought the response was being conducted in an effective way, there was no requirement to bring Ministers together. However, I give him an assurance that we think very carefully about these things and keep them under constant review.
I thought the hon. Gentleman made a number of good and useful points about vulnerabilities and flooding. I can give him and others an assurance that we consider these things, both specifically and collectively, as part of the work we do on resilience. We work very closely on them with other Government Departments, including DEFRA, but should he wish to discuss them further, I would always be very happy to do so.
Anna Gelderd (South East Cornwall) (Lab)
Meur ras, Madam Deputy Speaker. I align myself with the previous comments regarding the tragic loss of life in Cornwall and add my thanks to the local emergency services, utilities companies and local people who worked tirelessly over the weekend to make sure that arms have been put around the most vulnerable in our community. With its ageing population, South East Cornwall has many vulnerable residents who rely on consistent power and water supplies. The extended outages during Storm Goretti left families in unmanageable conditions, and such storms are only likely to increase if we do not tackle climate change. Will the Government work with utility companies to prioritise vulnerable households and ensure faster restoration times during severe weather events?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the very important points she makes and, yes, I can give her those assurances. I mentioned earlier that currently—the numbers have probably reduced slightly—193 customers remain without power in the south-west, with 82 identified as vulnerable customers. Working with National Grid Electricity Distribution, vulnerable customers have been supported by local authorities and local resilience forums throughout the incident. This has included the provision of alternative accommodation, battery packs for medical equipment, transportation, warm spaces, crisis packs containing torches, blankets, hand warmers and warm clothes, and a welfare van providing hot food and drinks. I am also aware that National Grid Electricity Distribution is exploring the deployment of generators to get customers back on supply as quickly as possible. Finally, I would like to take the opportunity to say—and I know my hon. Friend and others will agree with me—that I am very grateful for the support the British Red Cross has provided to the most vulnerable customers.
Several hon. Members rose—
David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
I place on record my thanks to the Met Office, which is based in my constituency, for its sterling work throughout Storm Goretti and all year round. It has international expertise and is a real asset to our country.
One of the main issues that comes up when we have big storms such as Goretti is rail in the south-west. Our main line from Paddington was cut off, and many constituents from across the south-west were unable to get home. There are practical solutions to put in place, such as a passing loop on the Waterloo line. I have raised that directly with the Rail Minister and the Prime Minister, and although I get warm words, no action seems to be taken. From a Cabinet Office perspective, what more can be done to add resilience to our train infrastructure?
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about the Met Office in his constituency. I completely agree with that, and I pay tribute to the vital work it does. He raises an important point about connectivity, and I agree with him. I want our country to be as resilient as it possibly can be, which is why I can say to him that National Rail’s winter preparedness regime begins in September each year, when special trains and equipment are fully checked, any repairs are carried out and contingency plans are reviewed. I give him an assurance that we take these matters seriously, and we work closely with Transport Ministers.
Noah Law (St Austell and Newquay) (Lab)
I, too, put on record my thanks to the emergency services for their work over this long and difficult weekend. In particular, I thank National Grid for its swift work, at least in my part of Cornwall, in reconnecting people to the grid. However, other infrastructure has been unacceptably slow to come back online. With many of my constituents still without access to rail and some still without access to broadband and their phone lines, what assurances can the Minister give that he is working with Great Western Railway and National Rail to ensure that, four days after the storm, those closed railway lines can be reopened? Will he reiterate the commitment he made to my hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth (Perran Moon) to work with us to continue to build infrastructure resilience in Cornwall?
I reiterate the commitment I gave earlier. My hon. Friend is right to raise these concerns. I want the country to be as resilient and as connected as it possibly can be, and where services are lost there is an absolute requirement to work at pace to get them restored. I give him the assurance that the Government will work carefully to ensure that that happens, and I am very happy to work with him and other hon. Members to make sure that it does.
Ben Maguire (North Cornwall) (LD)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives (Andrew George) on securing the urgent question and showing leadership on this crisis in the absence of a Government response. There has been no Cobra meeting and no declaration of a national emergency, and many of my North Cornwall constituents did not even receive the emergency alert. I have great respect for the Minister, but he does not even seem to have the correct number for households currently without power.
The Bellwin scheme, which is activated in emergencies such as this, reimburses local authorities for the extra costs incurred, but the scheme is unfair for larger authorities such Cornwall council, which can apply only once it has spent 0.2% of its budget—£1.6 million. If the storm had hit South Hams, for instance, the district council would need to spend only £260,000. Now that Cornwall council faces a real-terms cut in funding over the next three years, will the Government commit to emergency financial support for it to assist those who have been drastically affected by this storm?
Minister, please be short and brief.
I have to say that I am disappointed with the point that the hon. Gentleman made at the beginning of his question, which I do not think is in keeping with the spirit of the debate. I could not have been clearer about the seriousness that the Government attach to these matters, or about the urgency and the pace with which we have worked, all through last week and weekend, and into this week. We take these matters very seriously. We want to work with Members right across the House to ensure the best possible response. Where there are lessons to be identified and learnt, we will of course take them on board, but the Government took this situation very seriously and I think that, in the main, the response was a good one.
Jenny Riddell-Carpenter (Suffolk Coastal) (Lab)
Suffolk Coastal is in the east of England, but we did not escape the storms by any stretch of the imagination. The coastal erosion at Thorpeness has really sped up and we now have homes facing the worst-case scenario. Indeed, last night a home was demolished, marking four homes that have succumbed to coastal erosion since October. Three have been as a consequence of the rapidly eroding shoreline, sped up by the storm. Will the Minister arrange to meet me to discuss a number of issues, including the coastal erosion assistance grant? The owner of one of the homes, who will not qualify for the grant, may pay £40,000 for the privilege of demolishing their own home. That feels incredibly unfair, and East Suffolk council is working to ensure that does not happen, but will the Minister meet to talk about that and what can be done to support my community and others affected?
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for the points she raises. I am concerned to hear about the situation in her constituency. To ensure that she gets the best response and support from the Government, let me confirm whether it is a matter for DEFRA or for the Cabinet Office. I will then ensure that she gets a meeting with the most appropriate Minister.
Will the Minister join me in putting on record my thanks to West Mercia police, Shropshire Fire and Rescue Service, West Midlands ambulance service and all the local government officers at Telford and Wrekin council and Shropshire council who helped? At its peak, 10,000 homes were without power. Currently, there are 200 homes throughout the county of Shropshire, some in my constituency, still without power. Will he urge his officials to press National Grid to do far more, and to ensure that it is part of the generator scheme? He will know that many trees have fallen in many storms over many years, but this time there was a particular issue with trees falling throughout Shropshire. In high winds and heavy snow, they blocked the M54 for a large part of the storm and they blocked the main railway line into Birmingham. This might seem a minor point, but could we have a review of the number of chainsaws and the number of people available to operate them at Network Rail, Highways England and National Grid?
The right hon. Gentleman made a significant number of very good and constructive points, including one about chainsaws. I am told that work has taken place to look at the number of chainsaws, so the Government are looking at that, working with partners. Let me join him in paying tribute to the organisations he listed, including West Mercia police, the fire and rescue services, and other local services that have been involved in the recovery effort. They do sterling work, they are the best of us, and I join him in paying tribute to them. He always takes the opportunity to raise a number of good and considered points. I will look very carefully at them and, as he knows, I am always very happy to discuss them with him, as is the Minister for Energy, my hon. Friend the Member for Rutherglen (Michael Shanks), who was also listening intently to what he had to say.
Patricia Ferguson (Glasgow West) (Lab)
My constituency is rather a long way away from Cornwall and the Scilly Isles, but I do live in a part of the country that is not immune to major storms. The Scottish Affairs Committee, which I chair, has undertaken an inquiry into connectivity, particularly in the islands and in rural areas. It has been reported to us that, after a recent storm, islanders on the isle of Tiree were without any connection to even the 999 service for six days. That is clearly unacceptable and should not be happening anywhere on these islands. The point made to us already in the early part of our inquiry is that people want resilience, and resilience is difficult when connectivity is very poor to begin with. Will the Minister look at the issue of resilience, so that people across the country have some assurance about future activity?
Yes, I can give my hon. Friend that assurance. Resilience now sits within my brief, and it is something I take very seriously. I would be very happy to work with her and with colleagues across the House, including of course from Scotland. She is right about connectivity. We want the country to be as resilient as possible, and we are working at pace to ensure that it is.
Despite the best efforts of people on the ground, during the storm an entire county in the United Kingdom, namely Caithness, was completely cut off—no road access, no rail access, and flying a chopper in that blizzard weather was unthinkable. The House knows how appalled I am that pregnant women have to make a 200-mile round trip to give birth in Inverness. Frankly, it is a miracle that something horrible did not happen. May I suggest to the Minister that Cobra should, as a matter of some urgency, formally look at why the Scottish Government were so utterly and appallingly ill-prepared for something that could have become a major disaster?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making those points and those representations on behalf of his constituents. He will understand that, from a UK Government perspective, we want to work very closely and co-operatively with the devolved nations right across the country. We want to work closely with the Scottish Government, as we do with other parts of the United Kingdom. I have heard the points he has made and I am very happy to discuss them with him further. He makes a good point and I give him an assurance that we will look at it.
Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)
Storm Goretti had a big impact back home in Newcastle-under-Lyme, made all the worse by the disgraceful response of Staffordshire county council. I wrote to the council on 28 November, asking what plans were in place to ensure that it was prepared for bad weather. I was told on 18 December that it was prepared. It was not—rural communities cut off, schools closed, vulnerable people stuck at home, empty grit bins all over my constituency, and roads left ungritted. What pressure can the Minister apply to Staffordshire county council, and what guidance can it be given, to ensure that it gets a grip in keeping my community safe the next time we have such bad weather?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He is right about the important role that councils play during challenging circumstances. From work I have done recently with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, I know there is a process of review—what I described earlier as the hot review and the cold review—to look closely at what has happened in a particular set of circumstances. I am sure that there will be opportunities for him, as a local Member, to feed into that process, but I have heard the points he has made and I am very happy to discuss them with him further.
Alison Bennett (Mid Sussex) (LD)
I was very grateful to receive a phone call from the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the hon. Member for Coventry East (Mary Creagh), on Friday afternoon warning that, because of Storm Goretti, Haywards Heath in my constituency might lose its water supply. In the event it was East Grinstead, which is not getting its water back until tomorrow. What are the Government doing to address the evident frailty in the resilience of our water treatment systems?
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for referring to my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry East (Mary Creagh), who was with me on the Government Front Bench very recently. I can give the hon. Lady the assurances she seeks. We work very closely across Government, including with DEFRA, and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister would be very happy to meet the hon. Lady.
Helena Dollimore (Hastings and Rye) (Lab/Co-op)
The Minister will be aware that in a number of places in Sussex and Kent—including in your Sussex Weald constituency, Madam Deputy Speaker—people are still without water as a result of the power outages that occurred during the storm. The power supply to waterworks is interrupted briefly, but then the water supply goes off for days, if not longer, which is a really serious interruption for people. The national risk register, which the Cabinet Office oversees, currently ranks loss of water supply as the lowest form of risk—one out of five—which I think many of us who have constituents living without water for days would struggle with. Will the Minister have a look at whether it is ranked correctly in the national risk register, and what preparations there need to be for major incidents such as this?
My hon. Friend makes important points, and I will undertake to look at her specific point about the risk register. She will have heard the comments made by the DEFRA Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice (Emma Hardy), in the House yesterday with regard to the water outages in Sussex and Kent. She will know that the Government take these matters very seriously. Colleagues in DEFRA continue to monitor the situation closely and are engaging with industry partners.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
A cargo ship lost a number of shipping containers along the shipping route off the south coast during Storm Goretti. It is the second cargo ship in a couple of weeks to lose shipping containers, which are now washing up on the shoreline in my constituency, posing a risk to the public and the environment. What lessons can the Government learn regarding maritime resilience during extreme weather events, which we know will keep occurring?
The hon. Lady makes an important point, and it will have been heard by ministerial colleagues in a number of Government Departments. I will ensure that she gets a response from the appropriate Minister.
I am pleased that the hon. Member made it back to Northern Ireland last Thursday. I know that ministerial colleagues in the Department for Transport will have heard his first point. To his second point, I can assure him that we take matters relating to resilience incredibly seriously, and we seek to ensure that it is an effort joined up right across the United Kingdom.
(1 month ago)
Written StatementsSection 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their TPIM powers under the Act during that period. TPIM notices in force (as of 30 November 2025) 2 Number of new TPIM notices served (during this period) 0 TPIM notices in respect of British citizens (as of 30 November 2025) 2 TPIM notices extended (during the reporting period) 1 TPIM notices revoked (during the reporting period) 1 TPIM notices expired (during reporting period) 0 TPIM notices revived (during the reporting period) 1 Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices (during the reporting period) 0 Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused (during the reporting period) 0 The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation (during the reporting period) 1
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
The TPIM Review Group keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. TRG meetings were convened on 4 and 13 November 2025.
One individual has been sentenced for breach of their TPIM measures in the period. On 2 October 2025 TPIM subject, TPD, was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment with an additional year to serve on extended licence conditions having pleaded guilty to four breaches of their TPIM measures.
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(1 month ago)
Written StatementsThis Government are today publishing a memorandum of understanding between the Information Commissioner’s Office and HMG.
It is essential that we have strong public trust in the Government’s protection of sensitive personal information. This memorandum of understanding sets out a shared understanding of how Government and the ICO will work towards better Government data security and use.
The memorandum of understanding will help ensure that the measures we have in place to protect sensitive data are robust and support this Government’s ambition to use new technologies to transform public services, create a modern digital Government, and drive economic growth.
I have placed a copy of the memorandum of understanding between the Information Commissioner’s Office and HM Government in the Library of each House. The memorandum of understanding will also be published on gov.uk.
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(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Written StatementsToday the Government are launching a public consultation relating to the private security industry, specifically on Manchester arena inquiry monitored recommendations MR7 (in-house CCTV operatives should be licensed by the Security Industry Authority) and MR8 (security businesses should be licensed by the Security Industry Authority).
The safety and security of our citizens is the Government’s top priority, and private security operatives play a crucial role in that. They hold positions of responsibility, interact with vulnerable individuals—especially in the night-time economy—and can be first responders to terrorist incidents. It is therefore essential that high standards of regulatory oversight of private security are delivered consistently. This regulatory oversight is provided by the Security Industry Authority through its licensing regime, and the Manchester arena inquiry found that this regime could be extended to improve preparedness.
The consultation is open to the public, and is targeted at security businesses, in-house and SIA-licensed security operatives, in-house employers of security operatives, buyers of security, local and public authorities, and industry associations. It seeks views on a range of options to understand which, if any, should be implemented. These include regulatory and non-regulatory options, aimed at ensuring that any new costs and regulatory burdens are proportionate, consider the impact on business, and are highly effective in improving public safety.
The consultation will run for 12 weeks. A copy of the consultation document and consultation options assessment will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and published on gov.uk.
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