Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 3 and 10. Superficially, Amendment 3 may look radical, in seeking to reduce the age from 18 to 14. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, certainly might not like it, but, if we want to tackle the lack of respect or anti-social behaviour of those aged 18-plus, that will not be possible unless we tackle all the anti-social behaviour that has built up from age 10 or even younger.

We cannot get into pre-14 behaviour today, but I discovered some frightening statistics from the Met Police, which it was forced to publish under an FOI request last year. They show that, for the year ending December 2023, 879 crimes were committed by children aged 10 to 17. Of these, 173 were violence against the person, 64 were robbery, 81 were theft, 28 were arson, 385 were drug offences and 81 involved possession of weapons. That is fairly frightening. But if that was not bad enough, the Met also published a breakdown of crimes committed by children aged one to nine, of which there were 653 offences. Some 128 were theft and 95 were arson and criminal damage, but the really frightening statistics were the 85 sexual offences and—the largest group—191 crimes of violence against the person. As I say, we cannot deal with that age group today, but I simply ask what kind of sick society we are becoming when in the Met area alone we have 85 children aged between one and nine accused of sexual offences and 191 accused of violence against the person.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

In the spirit of Committee, I wonder whether I might challenge the noble Lord a little on this epidemic of child criminality to which he so graphically referred. I think we should park these arguably very rare cases of child homicide outside a debate on anti-social behaviour, but would he agree with me that, when it comes to fisticuffs—what would be common assault—or even theft, we know that quite small children in every home in the country are capable of fisticuffs with each other, between siblings, and taking things that are not their own? But is not a crucial difference in our response to those children? Anti-social behaviour on the playing fields of Eton rarely ends up anywhere near the criminal justice system, but looked-after children in particular are more likely to be reported to the police and end up criminalised at a very early age. So does the noble Lord agree that children in, for example, England and Wales are no more malign than children in Scotland, where the age of responsibility is 14? We should look to ourselves as adult society and our responses to these vulnerable children.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The noble Baroness says that child homicides are very rare, but they have doubled in the past 12 years. All the statistics that I quoted were from the Youth Justice Board and the Office for National Statistics, showing a huge increase in knife crime. Then there are the police forces themselves; there is an article relating to the Met, or a discussion on a blog from yesterday, asking whether knife crime by children was out of control—and those are their words, not mine.

There has been a huge increase in viciousness, knife use and violent crime by children, and I suggest in my amendments that lowering the age to include 14 to 18 year-olds in respect orders might make a difference, if we could hive them off early. Of course, I accept that children in Scotland, as in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, will also have violent tendencies. My concern is that we are failing to intervene early enough to do anything about them; that is the whole cause of the problem in the past 30 years—a lack of early intervention to deal properly with children. For some, that will mean a caution or restorative justice; for others, it could mean better work from social services. But some prolific young offenders may need to be taken out of circulation, for their own benefit and to save the lives of other children.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, accurately pointed out that a respect order may be made merely on the balance of probabilities—the civil standard of proof. Will the Minister confirm my understanding that, if a criminal charge is to be brought for breaching a respect order, it will be brought under new Section I1, and the offence of breach of respect order? It is then for the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, on the criminal standard, that the person concerned has not merely breached the respect order but has done so without reasonable excuse. That may provide an answer to some of the more graphic and extreme examples that have been given in this debate of when a respect order may apply. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether my understanding is correct.

In this debate we need to take account of the fact that anti-social behaviour occurs in our society with alarming regularity and causes misery to law-abiding citizens. There needs to be some effective means of addressing it. Having said all that, I share some of the concerns that have been expressed as to the width of the powers that we are being invited to endorse. There are two particular concerns that I have.

The first is that in new Section A1(1)(b), it is sufficient for the court to consider it “just and convenient” to impose a respect order. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to that—and I have great sympathy with the argument that that really ought to be a test of “necessary and proportionate”. All the sorts of cases that one would want to see prohibited by law could be brought within a necessary and proportionate test.

The other concern that I have—and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was the one who mentioned this—is that in new Section A1(9), the test of anti-social behaviour is

“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person”.

That means any person, however vulnerable they may be, or weak-minded, which is a purely subjective test. I suggest in this context that there really needs to be some objectivity written into the definition, whether or not by referring to a reasonable person; other types of drafting mechanism could be adopted. I share some of the concerns, but I also see the need for an effective and functioning system in this context.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have great respect for the noble Lord’s contributions. I have heard what he said, but I believe that this is the right way forward. We can always examine his comments again and I appreciate the way in which he has contributed to the debate.

Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that any positive requirements placed on the recipient of a respect order are restricted to those which would prevent a future breach of the order. Positive requirements to address the underlying causes of the behaviour are an important aspect of the respect order. That is a key point that I want to impress on noble Lords today. While the legislation sets out a number of restrictions on how positive requirements can be used, it is the Government’s view that the amendment is unnecessarily restrictive and that courts and agencies should have the discretion to tailor positive requirements to the particular needs of each case.

Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and also spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, would limit the amount of time that a respect order may be in effect to two years. As it stands, there is no limit on the time a respect order might be in effect for, and I think that is the right thing to do. Again, there will be secondary action under the respect order only in the event of a breach taking place. If, for example, someone has previously been a persistent offender and the order puts in place an unlimited time, that would be reasonable until such time as the behaviour is noted. Implementing a two-year time limit might be of some difficulty and would not necessarily tailor against the individual’s behaviour. I come back to the central point that, ultimately, no action is taken against the individual if they do not breach the order.

The duration of a respect order is dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. That will be determined by the courts. I do not expect that every respect order will be imposed for an indefinite period, but that option should be available if there are relentless adult ASB perpetrators. The legislation makes provision for respect orders to be varied or discharged depending on the circumstances of the case.

Amendment 9, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would make it a requirement that an applicant must gain full council approval for all local authority-led applications for a respect order. It is proper quite that, while some councils may seek full council approval for PSPOs, there is no legislative requirement for them to do so. It should be noted that respect orders, unlike PSPOs, are granted by the courts, which provides additional safeguards to ensure that respect orders are used proportionately—this goes back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Whereas PSPOs impose prohibitions on the general public, respect orders will be for individuals who have a history of disruptive, anti-social behaviour.

I return to the fact that, if individuals do not breach an order, the matter will go no further. It is the Government’s view that, given this distinction, it would not be appropriate to require full council approval for all respect orders—which quite honestly is self-evident. I have been a councillor and spent time in council committees, so I know that there is potential for delay. It might take a long time to make an order, which would risk us not taking action quickly and supportively for the benefit of victims and communities at large. The amendment might also require a full public consultation when applying for a respect order, but I do not believe that that is the way to run respect orders or to impact on individuals.

Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to add non-crime hate incidents to the definition of anti-social behaviour. I respectfully say to him that we are going to use the phrase “non-crime hate incidents” during the course of the Bill in relation to a number of amendments, including those tabled by his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Young. As I have previously said publicly in the House, the College of Policing—under the chairmanship of his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs—will very shortly produce a review of non-crime hate incidents. There has also been discussion by the Metropolitan Police on what it is doing. I hope that the review will help inform later stages of the Bill. At this stage, I believe that, while we should not kick Amendment 10 down the line—we will come back to the subject of the amendment—we should not deal with it in relation to Clause 1.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I may have misheard the Minister, but if I heard him correctly, I want to correct what he said. I do not want to add it to the Bill; I want to add to the Bill a provision that it is not included under prevention orders.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I appreciate that. If I have misunderstood his intention, I apologise. None the less, the principle is still the same for me. There are specific amendments about this downstream. By the time we reach them, I hope that we will have further enlightenment from the College of Policing and that we can determine government policy on non-crime hate incidents in the light of that review. That is what I have said on a number of occasions in response to similar questions. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that Amendment 10 is slightly premature at this stage, and we will discuss that matter in full detail downstream.

Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to remove the provision for the Secretary of State to amend, by regulations, the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. The Secretary of State needs that power to look at the range of contexts, and a multiagency approach is often needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. To ensure that we have that, I believe that the Secretary of State needs to retain that power—that may be a source of disagreement between us, but that is where I think we stand. The Secretary of State should be able to add an agency to the list. It would not be done unilaterally; new regulations would have to be laid. Those made under new Section B1 of the 2014 Act would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure and, as such, subject to debate and approval in both Houses. It is not an unfettered power for the Secretary of State.

A number of important issues have been raised in relation to Amendment 12, which seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home as part of a respect order in cases of violence or risk of harm. As noble Lords have said, including the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Meston, excluding a person from their home is of course not something that should be taken lightly. However, we know that anti-social behaviour is not always trivial and can escalate into violence. We also know that, sadly, in some cases, anti-social behaviour is accompanied by domestic abuse. The ability to exclude perpetrators from their homes in such scenarios is a valuable safeguard in protecting vulnerable victims and ensuring that they do not face eviction for the wrongs of their perpetrator.

The key point on Amendment 12—this goes to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston—is that an exclusion can happen only when there is a significant risk of violence or harm. This will be key for protecting vulnerable victims who live with perpetrators or are in the same building. The applicant for the respect order will be able to make a proper risk assessment; that is the purpose and focus of that. The power to exclude remains a decision for the court and will be used only when it considers it necessary, in order to protect victims from the risk of violence or harm. I do not know whether that satisfies the noble Lord, but that is the Government’s rationale for the discussions we are bringing forward today.

This is a long group of amendments, so I apologise to the Committee for continuing to deal with them. Amendment 13 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to ensure that

“the appropriate chief officer of police”

is specified where a respect order has been issued. The Bill also provides that a supervisor must provide details of the respondent’s compliance with positive requirements to the chief officer of police. While the police are among the agencies that can apply for these orders, the operational responsibility for enforcing requirement lies with the designated supervisor and not with the chief officer of police. It is intended that positive requirements would be managed by those closest to the respondent’s circumstances.

Amendment 14 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that the supervisor does not make the final decision on who the relevant chief officer of the police would be, where it appears that the respondent lives in more than one police area. Supervisors are directly involved in managing the positive requirements of respect orders. They have first-hand knowledge of the respondent’s living arrangements and which police areas are most impacted by the respondent’s behaviour. Specifying the chief officer of police prior to issuing a respect order could be an unnecessary burden on police forces that have minimal involvement, and therefore it is appropriate that the supervisor makes the final decision on these matters.

Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seeks to remove the provision enabling courts to make interim respect orders. Again, I highlight that interim court orders are not a novel concept; they are generally available to courts in exceptional cases. There is currently the possibility for a civil injunction, and it remains the case for the respect order where it is necessary for the courts to grant an interim respect order to prevent serious harm to victims.

Victims are central to the proposals we are bringing forward. If an interim order has been granted, it is because there has been a case made to a court that victims need some assistance to prevent serious harm to them. An interim respect order can be granted by the court only when all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails are met, and it requires the court to be satisfied that it is just to make an order. That goes back to the point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. If that order is placed, it is because the court has determined on the evidence before it that there is a real risk of threat to an individual and therefore that order has to be made.

Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that a respect order is based on a risk assessment. The introduction of the risk assessment offers a further safeguard in ensuring that respect order applications consider contextual vulnerabilities and agencies take a joint multilateral approach. I hope I can make it clear to the noble Lord that this is a statutory requirement, and all agencies must complete a risk assessment prior to applying for a respect order, so we have met the provisions that he wants in Amendment 20 to date.

Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would place a duty on the Home Secretary to conduct a public consultation before introducing new statutory guidance for practitioners on respect orders. I make it clear to the Committee that any updates or additions to the ASB statutory guidance are already subject to extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders. That will include the front-line practitioners for whom the guidance is intended. This will be the case for statutory guidance on respect orders, and I hope that satisfies the noble Lord. As respect orders partially replace an existing power, the civil injunction, a large portion of the guidance will therefore already be familiar to practitioners.

Finally, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. For-profit social housing providers have grown in prominence since the 2014 Act came into force, and I recognise the importance of the relevant agencies having the powers needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. That is why, for example, we are giving both for-profit and non-profit social housing providers the power to apply for and issue closure notices. However, these are powerful tools, and it is also important that further challenges to the agencies that can use the powers, including respect orders, are considered carefully. But the noble Lord has raised some very important issues, and we will consider them carefully. I really appreciate his bringing them to the Committee today.

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These are quite draconian challenges to our civil liberties regime and we do not even know whether they work. We are told by the Minister that the pilot scheme has been put off because it is urgent that we get on with using these orders. I would suggest that what is urgent is that we get on with enforcing the laws that we have and ensuring that those laws are used to punish wrongdoing, rather than creating a whole new legislative framework that also will probably not be enforced, but none the less gives the state a lot of powers that I would rather it did not have without much more scrutiny. I do not want this clause to stand part of the Bill, and I do want to get rid of respect orders altogether.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am prompted to rise following the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with which I largely agree. I am not sure whether I should be offended or pleased by some of the other remarks she made about me, but I think her crucial point is that anti-social behaviour orders have been around for years.

We heard from the Lib Dems that they are worried that orders may be imposed inappropriately on people who should not have them. The Government are worried that they do not have enough powers; therefore, they want respect orders instead. People generally know what anti-social behaviour orders are. My question to the Minister is: why not amend the anti-social behaviour orders to tighten them up as the Lib Dems want and impose the penalties the Government want?

I know the Government will say they used the word “respect” in their manifesto and have to stick to it, but it would seem to me to be introducing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, has said, a whole new concept which people maybe do not understand—they may think it is more magical than it actually is. Why not use the existing system and amend it to make it work the way the Government want it, the way the Lib Dems want it and the way my noble friends in the Official Opposition want it to? That is all I ask.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned in his remarks on the first group that there are over a million instances of anti-social behaviour in the United Kingdom, and he is seeking broad new powers in the early part of the Bill. Can he give the House any guidance as to what sort of effect, if the House were to give the Government these powers, will be seen in terms of a projected reduction in anti-social behaviour as a result?

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 23 would remove subsections that increase the maximum level of fines attached to fixed penalty notices for breach of public space protection orders and community protection notices. The core proposal of Clause 4 is to increase the maximum FPN for these breaches from £100 to a punitive £500. This represents a 400% increase in the penalty for infractions often issued without judicial oversight.

The Manifesto Club—a body which I mentioned previously and with which I have engaged extensively on these powers—rightly labels this increase as a

“grossly out-of-proportion penalty”.

We must look at the nature of the offences that these fines target. The Home Office claims that this increase shows a “zero-tolerance approach” to anti-social behaviour, but that ignores the actual activities being punished. Manifesto Club research, relying on freedom of information data, shows that the vast majority of penalties are issued for innocuous actions that fall far outside anyone’s definition of serious anti-social behaviour. This is leading to what the Manifesto Club calls

“the hyper-regulation of public spaces”.

For instance, in 2023, Hillingdon Council issued PSPO penalties largely for idling—leaving a car engine running for more than two minutes. This affected 2,335 people, including a man waiting to collect his wife from a doctor’s surgery. Other commonly banned activities that face this grossly increased penalty include loitering, swearing, begging, wild swimming, busking and feeding birds.

The Manifesto Club has documented community protection notices that target non-harmful behaviours, which are also subject to the increased fine. Orders have been issued banning two people from closing their front door too loudly, prohibiting a man from storing his wheelbarrow behind his shed and banning an 82 year-old from wearing a bikini in her own garden. The increase in fines to £500 for these so-called busybody offences appears to be simply a form of message sending, rather than a proportionate penalty designed to resolve community harm.

The second, and perhaps most corrosive, effect of Clause 4 is that it will spark a boom in the enforcement industry and intensify the practice of fining for profit. The Manifesto Club found that 75% of PSPO penalties in 2023 were issued by private enforcement companies. These companies are typically paid per fine issued, which creates an overt financial incentive to pursue volume regardless of genuine harm or proportionality. They target easy infractions rather than the most serious offenders.

Increasing the financial reward fivefold heightens this perverse incentive to issue as many FPNs as possible for anodyne activities. Crucially, while Defra has published guidance stating that environmental enforcement should never be a means to raise revenue, the Home Office has not prohibited fining for profit for anti-social behaviour offences such as PSPO and CPN breaches, nor even formally acknowledged the issue. I have raised this many times in the House.

Rather than authorising this increase in fines, we should be prohibiting incentivised enforcement for all ASB penalties in primary legislation or statutory guidance. The system of FPNs is already heavily criticised for undermining due process. They are issued solely based on the decision of an official and do not involve the production of evidence in court. This lack of judicial scrutiny means that, when innocent people are fined for innocuous actions, they often feel completely helpless, lacking the means to appeal a decision made by incentive-driven officers.

If we are serious about addressing serious anti-social behaviour, the enforcement should focus on serious criminality and nuisance, not extracting revenue from arbitrary restrictions. We must resist measures that intensify arbitrary law enforcement and injustice. This increase in penalties must be abandoned. I therefore urge the Government to support Amendment 23 and reject subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 4. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 24 and 25. In some aspects, I take a slightly different view from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because I approve of the increased £500 penalty, provided it is for real anti-social behaviour. I accept the noble Lord’s point that there seem to have been quite a few ASBOs granted for “busybody offences”, and that is not right.

However, my concern here is making sure that the fines are properly paid. If we give the rise to £500, what will be the punishment if criminals do not pay it? Imprisonment is not important. In the words of the great capitalist Del Boy, it is “cushty”, and most criminals, from the smallest to the greatest, regard a term of imprisonment as factored into the crime. What about fines? No problem, they will simply not pay them, and with sufficient sob stories to the court, they will probably get away with a ridiculously low payment plan. Then, when they go outside and drive away in their BMW while texting on their new iPhone, that is great.

Only one thing works as proper punishment—they hate it—and gives the state and victims proper recompense: that is the confiscation of their ill-gotten gains or of any part of their property, which will cover the amount of any unpaid penalty. Of course, there are compensation orders, which can be made for most crimes, but, again, the convict will probably not pay up and nothing more will be done about it.

We must expand confiscation orders to all crimes where a penalty has not been paid, and my amendments are, I would suggest, a tiny but good example. We seem to go out of our way to make compensation orders as difficult as possible to obtain and deliver. Confiscation orders in the UK can be issued for any crime that involves financial gain, not just specific offences. They are used to take away profits from criminal activity, with the court determining the amount of the order based on the defendant’s benefit from their criminal conduct. The common crimes involve fraud, drug trafficking, theft and organised crime, but any offence where a financial element is present can trigger an order.

How do confiscation orders work? First of all, a conviction is required. Even I would agree with that. A confiscation order can be made only after the defendant is convicted of a crime. The Crown Court decides whether to issue an order after gathering information from both the prosecution and defence. The court’s goal is to recover the benefit—they stress “benefit”—the defendant gained from the criminal conduct. The court considers whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, which can be established by their conduct over time. The ultimate aim is to disrupt criminal activity by making the crime unprofitable and preventing future offences.

Why on earth stop with that tight confiscation concept about ill-gotten gains? If someone has committed a crime and gets a financial penalty or a fine and he does not pay up, he has benefited from that crime. He has made a financial gain in that he has saved the money he should have spent on a fine. In those circumstances, it is only just and right that the court’s bailiff can confiscate all and any property of the convict to recover the fine he has refused to pay or says that he cannot pay.

In this case, we are looking at confiscation of his goods and property up to a value of £500 plus a small administration fee. My amendment advocates automaticity, and that is essential. We do not need all the evidence of ill-gotten gains that prosecutors have to go through to prove that the superyacht, Bentleys and five homes all over the world came from drug running or ripping off a pension fund, since we would be collecting only on a known fine imposed by a court.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

26: Schedule 2, page 242, line 22, at end insert—
“(1B) An RSH provider may issue a closure notice in respect of an individual flat within a housing block for which they are responsible.”

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 relates to Clause 5. Clause 5 is very short and is titled “Closure of premises by registered social housing provider”. It says that Schedule 2 amends various parts of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014

“so as to enable registered social housing providers to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder”.

My amendment says:

“An RSH provider may issue a closure notice in respect of an individual flat within a housing block for which they are responsible”.


I apologise to the Committee and to the Minister if my amendment is already included in the definition of “premises”. However, the only definition I can find is in Clause 92 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, and that says

“‘premises’ includes … any land or other place (whether enclosed or not) … any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of premises”.

Thus, it would seem to me, as a non-lawyer, that a person could argue that an individual flat in an RSH housing block was technically not “premises” within the definition of the 2014 Act or Schedule 2 to this Bill.

I tabled this amendment because I am aware of a serious problem in a block of flats next to mine and only about 400 yards away from here. Over a period of about two years, residents complained of blatant drug dealing in a flat owned by the L&Q social landlords. Addicts were threatening other householders to let them in to buy drugs from the flat. Children in other flats were scared to come home from school in case they met violent druggies in the corridor. The police were involved but could not sit there 24/7, waiting to catch drug dealing in practice. The Westminster City Council anti-social behaviour unit and the local MP got involved, demanding action, but L&Q refused to do anything. It even lied that it had applied for an ASBO, and it took two years before that tenant was finally evicted. Of course, the Bill and my amendment cannot force a negligent RSH, such as L&Q, to issue a closure notice, but it might help those who do care about their tenants.

Just for the record, I have named that company because my noble friend Lord Gove, then the Housing Minister, called in the chief executive after writing to him, stating:

“You have failed your residents”.


He did that after a devastating ombudsman’s report uncovered a prolonged period of decline in L&Q’s repairs and complaint handling.

I do not need to say any more. If the Minister tells me that “premises” includes individual flats within the definition and we will be covered with this, I will not come back to this on Report. But if I have a valid point, I hope the Government will make a little tweak and amend the Bill accordingly. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.

Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for this short but focused debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing his amendment. As he has explained, it seeks to allow registered social housing providers to issue a closure notice in relation to an individual flat within a housing block that they own or manage.

The closure power is a fast, flexible power that can be used to protect victims and communities by quickly closing premises that are causing nuisance or disorder. Clause 5 and Schedule 2 extend the closure power to registered social housing providers. Currently, only local authorities and police can issue closure notices. This is despite registered social housing providers often being the initial point of contact for tenants suffering from anti-social behaviour. Now, registered social housing providers will be able to issue closure notices and apply for closure orders, to enable them to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned a specific landlord. Without going into the facts of that case, it is clear that registered social housing providers have to meet regulatory standards set by the regulator of social housing. There is statutory guidance in place, and registered social housing providers are expected to meet the same legal tests as set out in the 2014 Act that the noble Lord mentioned. This will ensure that all relevant agencies have the right tools to tackle anti-social behaviour quickly and effectively. In turn, this will save police and local authorities time, as housing providers will be able to make applications directly, rather than having to rely on the police or local authority to do so on their behalf.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised his concerns about risks of abuse. For instance, he was concerned that extending the power to housing providers might risk it being misused to evict tenants, such as those in rent arrears. There are robust safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of misuse. Like other agencies, housing providers will be required to consult with relevant partners prior to the issuing of a closure notice. This requirement is in addition to the legal test having to be met and the fact that the process will go through the courts.

I want to assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and others that premises here means any land or other places, whether enclosed or not, and any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of the premises. This could therefore already include an individual flat within a housing block. Indeed, that would be the expectation: that this targets individual households, rather than whole blocks of flats. We are confident that the current legislative framework and the Bill will cover that and make that clear. On the basis of that clarification—of course, I will reflect on Hansard and the points he specifically raised about the 2014 Act, and I will write to him in more detail if I need to—I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. I am quite happy with all the standards and powers, and I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones; I know there are robust standards. The only thing I was interested in was whether the word “premises” includes individual flats in a housing block. I have the Minister’s 98% assurance on that. I would be very grateful if he and his officials would reflect on that and, at some point, confirm absolutely to the House that the power exists to close an individual flat or a couple of flats, and not just the whole shooting match of the block. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

35: Clause 7, page 16, line 29, at end insert—
“(6A) Regulations may not require a relevant authority to provide information on social media posts which they may consider to be anti-social or have anti social behaviour messages.”

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 35 standing in my name says:

“Regulations may not require a relevant authority to provide information on social media posts which they may consider to be anti-social or have anti-social behaviour messages”.


I do not need to regurgitate much of what I said earlier on non-crime hate incidents, which could compose a large part of this, because I am looking forward to the Minister’s announcement in due course that he will have solved the problem of so-called non-crime hate incidents.

I was tempted to propose that Clause 7 should not stand part of the Bill, because I wanted to discuss the huge number of requirements in it, but I thought I would do it under the scope of this amendment. Basically, I want to ask the Minister: what will the Government do with all the information demanded by Clause 7? When I was a Home Office Minister—and I am certain the noble Lord has had this experience as well—we got lots of written requests from Members of Parliament, PQs, asking for information on all sorts of law and order issues concerning what the police were up to in England and Wales. We could not provide it, because the police forces were not under an obligation to send it to the Home Office.

Sometimes I would think, “Oh, I’d like to know that as well”, but whenever I asked the police forces if they could provide it, they would quite legitimately say, “What resources do you want us to divert from fighting crime to collating this information to send to the Home Office, and what practical use will you put it to?” Well, I think they had a fair point, but the demands for more and more statistics from the police have continued to increase. I will not suggest that it is in proportion to the rise in crime, but more information has not helped reduce it.

I come back to the point: will the Minister tell the House exactly what use the Home Office will make of all this information, since what is demanded is fairly extensive? If this information was free, it would be okay, but we all know what will happen. All councils will employ at least one, probably more than one, special information-gathering co-ordinator to collect the information required and transmit it to the Home Office. New computer systems will be needed to provide it in “the form and manner”, as per new subsection (4)(b).

This, I suggest, is not a low-grade clerking job, since the information demanded in subsection (2) is not just a collection of numbers or reports, but provision of the reports, plus the authorities’ responses, plus the details of ASB case reviews. Then subsection (3)(d) calls for the information collected to be analysed by the local authorities. As I say, analysis of the plethora of different anti-social behaviour orders and responses to them in sufficient quality to be sent to the Home Office will be regarded as a fairly high-level job, not one for a low-paid junior clerk in the council.

I think we are probably looking at a salary of about £50,000 for the lead person and £30,000 for the assistant, and with national insurance and pensions we are looking at about £100,000 per authority. Multiply that by 317 local authorities and we will have local government costs of £32 million. No doubt many local authorities will love it; there will be more office-bound jobs as they cut dustbin collections and social services work and leave potholes unfilled. Okay, that is a sinister, cynical comment, but that will happen in some local authorities.

I simply ask the Minister to tell the Committee, if that £32 million I calculate will be the cost of every authority supplying all the information requested in Clause 7, will that be money well spent? My little amendment would do my bit to limit some of the costs, since I do not want local authorities wasting time and resources by collecting and analysing so-called anti-social social media posts which have happened in their area, either to the poster or to the complainant. They will be chasing their own tails if they attempt to go down this route. It would be a self-defeating waste of time. That is the purpose of my amendment: to ask the Government to justify what they will do with all the information collected under Clause 7 and to ask whether my calculation of £32 million is roughly right. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 55A, which is supported by StopWatch, a campaign organisation that is concerned with the use of stop and search. I disagree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

Amendment 55A would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data on the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders and related injunctions. Specifically, it would ensure that these reports include the number of occasions when stop and search has been used by the police prior to the issuing of such orders, and the protected characteristics of those who have been issued with them. These powers can have serious and lasting consequences for those subject to them, particularly young people and those from marginalised communities. Yet at present, the public and Parliament have very limited visibility of how these tools are being applied. This would ensure transparency and accountability about how anti-social behaviour powers are being used across England and Wales.

We know from existing evidence that stop and search disproportionately affects people from black and non-white ethnic backgrounds. The Government’s own figures last year reported that there were nearly 25 stop and searches for every 1,000 black people and yet only around six for every 1,000 white people. There is a real risk that these disparities could be echoed or even compounded in the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders or injunctions. Without clear data, broken down with protected characteristics, we cannot know whether these concerns are justified, nor can we properly evaluate the fairness and effectiveness of the system. By requiring the Home Office to publish quarterly data, this amendment would bring much-needed transparency. It would allow Parliament, bodies with oversight and the public to monitor trends, identify disparities and ensure that anti-social behaviour powers are being used proportionately and appropriately.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is clearly very exercised about the use of resources. He actually said that more information does not reduce crime. I think that is probably completely wrong, because the more information you have, the better you can understand what is happening. So this is about good governance and evidence-based policy. If these powers are being used fairly, the data will confirm that. If not, then we will have the information necessary to take corrective action. Either way, the transparency will strengthen public trust in policing and the rule of law.

This amendment is about shining a light where it is most needed. It would do nothing to restrict police powers. It would simply ensure that their use can be properly scrutinised. I hope the Minister will agree that accountability and transparency are not optional extras in a just society; they are actually the foundations of it.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to both the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for these two amendments.

As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 35 relates to the new power in Clause 7 for the Home Secretary to make regulations requiring relevant authorities, including local councils and social housing providers, to report information on anti-social behaviour. The amendment would mean that those regulations would not be able to request information from the relevant authorities about things that are considered anti-social or indeed anti-social messages. We will come on to the non-crime hate incident issues that the noble Lord has a concern about, but currently Clause 7 would allow information to be requested on reports of anti-social behaviour made to an authority, responses of the authority and anti-social behaviour case reviews carried out by the relevant authority. Anti-social behaviour can come in various forms, and it is important that the regulation-making power can address this.

Information held by central government on anti-social behaviour is in some areas limited. This has led to a significant evidence gap in the national picture of anti-social behaviour. I mentioned the 1 million incidents per year, but there is still an evidence gap in that picture of anti-social behaviour. The new clause will change this to ensure stronger and more comprehensive understanding of ASB incidents and interventions, but we want to make sure that Clause 7 creates a regulation-making power only. Regulations will then be made following the passage of the Bill to specify the information that agencies must provide. Going back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, indicated, this may be information they already have but do not necessarily share.

I assure the noble Lord that regulations are being developed in close consultation with the relevant practitioners, including local authorities and social housing providers, to understand what information is held on anti-social behaviour and the impact that this requirement may have upon them, for the very reasons that the noble Lord mentioned. We will of course make sure that any new requirements are reasonable and proportionate but meet the Government’s objective of having a wider understanding of some of the trends and information.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his usual detailed explanation and courtesy. With particular reference to my rather narrow amendment, does he think it right that we should report on so-called anti-social behaviour that occurs in media posts? Leaving aside the non-crime hate incidents, will local authorities be expected to report on instances of anti-social behaviour in their areas when those incidents have been only on social media, not face to face?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

What I can say to the noble Lord is that, again, the Secretary of State has within this clause a regulation-making power and is currently examining—and will do if this power is approved by Parliament—with local councils what information they hold that they can share with the Government. There is a range of issues to go down the road yet, before we get to a stage where we are issuing regulations that demand or require particular types of information, but that will be done in consultation. Of course, it also depends on sharing information that the local authorities or social housing providers hold, not what the Government are asking them to hold, necessarily. We will cross that bridge a little further down the line, if the legislation is passed and receives Royal Assent.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment for the moment; we will return to the issue later. I hope too that the noble Baroness will not in due course push her amendment to a decision, given that we have the information already.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

In view of the Minister’s detailed reply and assurances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 35 withdrawn.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses three separate but related offences: increasing the penalties for littering and dog fouling offences and introducing a specific offence of littering on public transport.

Littering may appear to be a minor problem when juxtaposed with some of the issues discussed in the Bill, but it is one of the most prominent anti-social offences to plague towns and communities. Littering is one of the most visible forms of environmental degradation, affecting not only the appearance of our streets and greenery but degrading our sense of public pride and community. Littering is associated with signs of a neglected area, and it sends a powerful negative message about standards and civic responsibility.

The scale of this problem is undeniable. Keep Britain Tidy estimates that local authorities in England alone spend around £1 billion each year clearing litter and fly-tipped waste. Almost 80% of our streets in England are affected by littering to some degree, with the most common items including food and drink packaging, cigarette ends and sweet wrappers.

The Government’s own figures show that local councils issue fewer than 50,000 fixed penalty notices a year, despite the widespread scale of the problem. This is why my amendments seek to increase the penalties for littering offences. The current fixed penalty levels were last revised in 2018, when the maximum fine was raised to £150. Since then, both inflation and enforcement costs have risen considerably. As time has gone on, therefore, the deterrent effect of the penalty has been eroded. An uplift is thus justified and necessary. A higher penalty would reflect the real cost to communities and to local authorities, and would send a clear message that littering is not a low-level or victimless offence.

The same logic applies to my amendment concerning dog fouling offences. It is true that some progress has been made through awareness campaigns, but the problem persists in many communities. It is unpleasant, unsanitary and requires local authorities to bear the cost of cleaning it up. It is therefore only right that penalties are raised to reflect both the nuisance and costs incurred. I hope the Government agree that more must be done to combat littering and dog fouling offences.

The negative effects of littering are felt most in highly frequented public places. Public transport is one such area of public life where the harm of littering is exacerbated. It is a growing problem on our trains, buses, trams and underground systems. Anyone using public transport on a Saturday or Sunday morning will no doubt have experienced the scale of rubbish left behind from the thoughtless few of the night before. The accumulation of food packaging, coffee cups, bottles and newspapers left behind by passengers is a saddening sight and must be addressed. Littering on public transport causes expensive inconvenience for operators and diminishes the travelling experience for others. Often, passengers would rather stand than sit on dirty seats. A distinct offence of littering on public transport would underline the responsibility of passengers in shared public places and support transport authorities in maintaining standards of cleanliness and safety.

These amendments are not about punishing people for the sake of it; they are about upholding civic standards and ensuring that those who do the right thing are not let down by those who do not. They are about fairness: the costs of litter removal fall on local taxpayers, transport users and businesses, rather than on those responsible for creating the mess. It is time the Government took a firmer stance on the few who ruin the enjoyment of Britain’s streets for the many. Higher penalties and clearer offences would, in my view, provide both the incentive and the clarity needed to improve compliance.

I hope the Government will view these proposals in that spirit—not as punitive but as a practical contribution to cleaner, safer public spaces and to civic pride. I look forward to hearing from the Minister, and from across the Committee, on how the Government intend to continue building on their anti-littering strategy and supporting local authorities in enforcement. I am sure many noble Lords will have received letters and emails from constituents complaining about the state of local streets and the scale of litter they must contend with. They are right to be concerned. The cost to our environment, our economy and our collective morale is far greater than the individual cost of a packet or a coffee cup dropped out of selfish behaviour. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend. My only criticism is that the proposed increase for the penalties is not high enough, but at least it is a very good start. I declare an interest, as on the register: I am a director of the community interest company, Clean Streets, which works with Keep Britain Tidy to try to reduce cigarette litter on the streets, with considerable success.

In about 1995, I was privileged to make an official visit to Commissioner Bratton in New York, who pioneered the broken window theory—I am sure the Minister is aware of it. As he discovered, if there is a street with one broken window and no one does anything about it, very soon there will be more broken windows, then litter and rubbish lying in the street, and then low-life people, as they call them in America, move in. He said that you would start with a street with a broken window and, within a couple of years, end up with garbage and then a drug den. I actually visited one where they were trying to batter down a steel door to get the druggies out.

I am not suggesting that a little litter would cause that here, but there was an experiment cited by the excellent nudge unit, set up by Oliver Letwin, when he was in government. The experiment was carried out in the Netherlands, where, for one week, they looked at a bicycle parking lot. They pressure-washed the whole thing, scrubbed it and kept it clean, and over the course of that week not a single bit of litter was left there and no damage was caused. The following week, they put bits of litter in the parking lot—a bottle here and an empty cigarette box there—and, within days, the whole place got more and more litter, because people thought it was an okay thing to do. If people see one bit of rubbish, they think they can just add their rubbish to it as well.

Littering is not only unsightly but highly dangerous. Cigarette litter, in particular, is dangerous—not from the cigarettes themselves but from the filters, which have microplastics in them. It causes enormous costs to councils to clean up.

A couple of months ago, serving on the Council of Europe, I attended an official meeting in Venice. It was the first time I had been there. It is not very wheelchair friendly, but I did manage to get around. After four or five days in Venice—I paid to stay on for some extra days—I was impressed that there was not a single scrap of litter anywhere on the streets. One could not move for tourists, but there was not a single scrap of litter. There were signs everywhere, saying “Keep Venice Clean”. People, mainly ladies, were going round with their big two-wheeled barrels collecting garbage from people’s homes. It was impressive.

I was even more impressed that everyone seemed to have a dog—the widest variety of dog breeds I have ever seen—but there was only one occasion in five days where I saw dog mess on the pavement. The view was that, if you have a dog, you clean up after it. It is an extraordinary place. When I am on my wheelchair in London or anywhere else—trying to avoid the people on their mobile phones who walk into me—I am looking down all the time as I dare not drive through dog dirt on the pavement because I can never get it off the wheels. I manage to avoid it, but that is what I must to do in my own country. I cannot take the risk in a wheelchair of driving through the dog mess we find on the pavements. To be fair, in Victoria Tower Gardens, where I see people exercising their dogs, they all have the little poop-scoop bag and they pick up the mess and that is very good, but there is too much dog mess on the pavements.

We need tougher sanctions. We need the highest possible penalties, particularly for fouling and leaving mess on the pavement. I know the penalties are there already, but they have not been enforced rigorously enough. My friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, might condemn the private companies that move in and start imposing more fines for the ridiculous dropping of litter, but perhaps they could move in and start imposing them, and catch out the people who are leaving the dog mess on the pavement. I almost tried to do it myself on one occasion, when I came across similar dog mess in the same spot three days in a row. I was tempted to get up at 5 am, sit there with my camera to catch the person doing it and report him or her to Westminster City Council.

We need enforcement on this. Goodness knows how colleagues in this place who are blind and who have guide dogs manage to avoid it—I hope the dogs do—but others may not avoid it and will walk through it. It is filthy and disgusting, and a very serious health hazard. I support the amendments in the names of my noble friends, and I urge the Government to consider all aspects of making tougher penalties for litter and tougher enforcement penalties for dog mess on the pavement.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

I support my noble friends Lord Davies and Lord Blencathra. Litter is important, and while it may sound like a low-level issue, I endorse the sentiments expressed by my noble friends about the broken windows theory that a messy environment leading to more litter and more problems.

I support the increase in fines. In reality, I doubt whether taking £100 or £125 would make the slightest bit of difference. I believe this is all about enforcement. We have heard from my noble friend about the low level of fines being put forward for littering offences. The emphasis is on local authorities to provide adequate water paper bins. That is the other side of it—there must be carrot and stick involved.

I support what my noble friend Lord Blencathra said about dog fouling. I add one thing: human nature is very strange. In the countryside where I live, in Devon, on a number of occasions one comes across people picking up dog mess in little plastic bags and then chucking it into the hedge—they seem to think that is super helpful, but it is littering. We need some sort of public information campaign to say that that is dangerous to livestock as well as to the environment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 17th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

40: After Clause 8, insert the following new Clause—
“Forfeiture of vehicles under the Environmental Protection Act 1990In section 33C of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (section 33 offences: forfeiture of vehicles), omit subsection (7).”Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove some of the issues a court has to consider before granting a forfeiture order for someone convicted of fly tipping controlled waste, and ensures that the innocent landowner must not bear the cost of removal.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for the delay; the lift was delayed, so I just made it.

In moving my Amendment 40, I will also address Amendment 42. Amendment 40 suggests omitting subsection (7), on the forfeiture of vehicles, from the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The first question is: what does subsection (7) say? To start with, this part of the 1990 Act deals with the criminal act of illegally fly-tipping and the massive amounts of rubbish dumped in the countryside, including controlled waste. We saw an example of that at the weekend at Kidlington, where an enormous amount was illegally dumped there. Section 33 deals with a forfeiture of vehicles and rightly gives the appropriate authority, which may be a local authority or the Environment Agency, power to ask the court to take possession of the vehicle used in the commission of the crime and dispose of it—excellent law, in my opinion.

Regarding subsection (7), the point of my amendment is to remove a few hoops which the court has to consider before making the order—in my opinion they are not necessary—and make it more difficult to penalise the organised crime rackets behind most of the worst illegal dumping. Thus, subsection (7) says:

“In considering whether to make an order under this section a court must in particular have regard to … the value of the vehicle … the likely financial and other effects on the offender of the making of the order (taken together with any other order that the court contemplates making) … the offender’s need to use the vehicle for lawful purposes”


and

“whether, in a case where it appears to the court that the offender is engaged in a business which consists wholly or partly in activities which are unlawful by virtue of section 33 above … the making of the order is likely to inhibit the offender from engaging in further such activities”.

I say to these caveats that the value of the vehicle is irrelevant. If the criminal uses it to commit a crime, too bad. Whether it is a 20 year-old clapped-out van or a new Mercedes-Benz Sprinter, if it is used in a crime, he loses it, whatever the value. As for the likely financial effects, what should we care if it has financial effects on the criminal? I would hope it would—that is the point of confiscating the implement he uses to commit the crime.

Then the court has to consider the criminal’s

“need to use the vehicle for lawful purposes”.

I have no doubt that he will tell the court that he needs it to transport meals on wheels or medical supplies and give any number of bogus excuses. If a criminal uses a vehicle for criminal purposes and has made a lot of money by doing so, he should forfeit the vehicle, even if he can no longer use it for the school run.

Let us not be naive. We are not looking here at a householder who drives in his Volvo to the countryside to dump a bag of garbage but at serious and organised criminals, using their three-tonne tipper trucks—or, as we saw recently, their 30-tonne tipper trucks—to dump thousands of tonnes of controlled waste, including asbestos, chemicals and other building rubble. It is estimated, according to our House of Lords Select Committee report of two weeks ago, that the organised gangs make about £1 billion per annum from illegal dumping of controlled waste. As I said in a debate last week, the only thing that hurts these criminals is not a fine, which they might not pay, but depriving them of their property. We should not have any get-outs, as we have in subsection (7); instead, we should confiscate any and all vehicles used in their criminal waste-dumping activities.

I will not speak to Amendment 42, since my noble friends on the Front Bench put down their own amendment before mine and will make a better argument of it than I can. All I say is that I apologise that my explanatory statement is wrong here; I inadvertently attached the same one as for Amendment 40. However, going back to Amendment 40, I beg to move.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly support my noble friend. He has done the Committee a great service by bringing forward these amendments. The Bill is indeed very broad, and the question of fly-tipping falls very squarely within its auspices.

This is a very serious issue indeed, and it is undertaken by a range of criminals, from small one-man bands to large, organised gangs, and everything in between. The fact is that we still have a really serious problem, which is not taken sufficiently seriously by law enforcement. Therefore, we have to bring forward measures that the criminals will be frightened of and will not just consider as a cost of business of being in that field. They must be concerned about the potential loss of their vehicles and the potential removal of—or, at least, adding of points to—their driving licenses. I could not agree with my noble friend any more; he has absolutely hit the nail on the head.

There is another very important measure, on which we will hear from my noble friends on the Official Opposition Front Bench in a few moments, around equity. It is inequitable that the person who is the victim of this crime must be responsible for clearing it up—that is just completely wrong. I have never understood why that should be the case.

I declare an interest of some description in that I have a small farm in Devon. I really feel for landowners and those who have responsibility for land. They go into their fields to tend their stock and then see massive piles of waste that could contain everything from biowaste to asbestos, to building products, and so forth, and then somehow it becomes their problem to find the means to clear it up. This is wrong, so we ought to use the Bill, in a very positive way, to remove that burden on the victims of crime and put it on the perpetrators, with support from local authorities.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am afraid I will have to write to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, with that detail. But I stress that there is no statutory limit on the amount of compensation that may be imposed for an offence committed by an offender aged 18 or over. However, in determining whether to make a compensation order and the amount that should be paid under such an order, the court must take into account the offender’s means. If they are limited, priority must be given to the payment of compensation over a fine, although a court may still impose a fine. I suppose 20% of something is better than 100% of nothing, if I can put it that way.

Having said that, guidance on presenting court cases produced by the National Fly-tipping Prevention Group, which is a group chaired by Defra that includes a wide range of representatives from interested parties—central and local government, enforcement authorities, the waste industry, police and fire services, private landowners, and the devolved Administrations—sets out that prosecutors should consider applying for compensation for the removal of waste. Defra will consider building on this advice in the statutory guidance that will be issued under Clause 9 once the Bill becomes law.

Noble Lords will also be interested, I hope, to hear that local authorities can already issue fixed penalties of up to £1,000 to fly-tippers, the income from which must be spent on clean-up or enforcement. Local authorities issued 63,000 fixed penalty notices in total for fly-tipping during 2023-24, and these were the second most common enforcement action, according to Defra data.

I fully understand the sentiment behind these amendments and entirely accept the principle that the polluter should pay but the Government believe that the sentencing framework, as set out in primary legislation, is the proper place to deal with this issue. I recognise, however, that there may be benefits in providing the court with an alternative disposal relating to penalty points, as proposed in Amendment 46 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Defra remains committed to considering such a move and will provide an update in due course.

I also stress, and in response to Amendment 47, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, noted, that there is an existing power for local councils and the police to seize a vehicle where there is a reasonable belief that it is being used or had been used for fly-tipping, which can lead to the vehicle being sold or crushed if it is not claimed. If the vehicle is claimed, the council can prosecute and a court can order that ownership rights are transferred to the council, under which it can keep, sell or dispose of the vehicle. There were nearly 400 vehicles seized in 2023-24 as an enforcement action.

When such an order is being considered, it is appropriate that the court must consider certain factors that Amendment 40, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to remove. The duty on the courts to consider these factors, such as the financial impacts of the forfeiture or the offender’s need to use the vehicle for lawful purposes, embeds principles of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of—our friend—the European Convention on Human Rights. This entitles a person to a peaceful enjoyment of their possessions but allows the state to enforce laws to control use of that property when it is in the general interest. Any such interference with this right must be lawful for legitimate aim and be proportionate. Amendment 40 would remove these safeguards, and we should always tread lightly when considering long-held rights regarding property, something I am sure I would not have to tell the Benches opposite.

In light of my explanations, I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response and to all those who have spoken in this short but interesting debate. I start with the problem: fly-tipping does not sound as bad as the crime actually is. Many people say, “Oh, fly-tipping, that is just dumping a mattress or a fridge in the countryside”, but as we have seen recently, there are 30,000 tonnes of contaminated garbage in Hoads Wood, with probably around 900 or 1,000 tonnes left at the weekend. It is not fly-tipping: it is rubbish racketeering. I am not going to suggest an amendment to change the title of it, but we really need to take it seriously.

Now, the other point that my noble friend on the Front Bench and I—and, I think, nearly all of us—agree on is that, ideally, the landowner should not have to pay the cost of clearing it up. He or she is the victim by having it dumped on their land in the first place, and then they are the victim the second time around in having to pay for clearing it up. But it should not be the ratepayers who pay for it either.

Ideally, of course, it should be the people who do it, but in many cases, we cannot catch them; we do not know who they are. In those circumstances, it seems grossly unfair that the landowner then has to bear the cost of doing that. We may discuss this in the next group of amendments, but I would hope that on, say, the Kidlington thing, a couple of forensic experts can crawl over that and find something. There must be addresses; there must be some data—that rubbish has not come from 200 miles away. There must be intelligence to pin down who has been doing it and then we should hit them hard.

I do not accept that the European Court of Human Rights would say that we need all those safeguards before taking away the vehicle of someone who has been involved in heavy crime. I challenge the Minister on that. I like the idea of three points on the licence, although I would go slightly further and make it three points for every load the person has dumped, but there are various penalties we can add there as well.

So I think we are all on the same side here—the noble Earl, Lord Russell, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel on the Front Bench, myself and the Minister—and we are all searching for slightly tougher penalties. I hear what the Minister said, but perhaps if all of us on this side of the House could agree some simple, concerted amendment for Report where we can toughen up on this a bit, maybe adding the penalty points thing, maybe finding some way to make sure that the landowner does not pay and some way to penalise the organised crime behind this, it may be worth while coming back on Report. But in the meantime, in view of what the Minister said and his assurances, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 40 withdrawn.

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[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 43, I shall speak also to Amendments 44 and 45, all on serious and organised waste crime. By chance, I found myself involved in this since those from the save Hoads Woods campaign came to me. That resulted in a ministerial direction and resulted in the clean-up of Hoads Wood at a cost of £15 million to the taxpayer, equivalent to the Environment Agency’s annual budget for fighting waste crime. It also led to the Environment and Climate Change Committee conducting a short inquiry into these matters, which has reported in the last couple of weeks. My amendments deal with some of the key findings from that report.

I do not wish to jump the gun, but some of these matters are clear cut; they are urgent, and I want to keep up the pressure. The Bill represents a vital opportunity to make progress, and it is progress that I do not want to be missed. I know that the Government have inherited broken systems and are committed to making reforms, particularly on the broker and dealer regulations, which I welcome and thank them for doing. The work done by the committee clearly shows that all parties recognise that this is a problem and is out of control. The findings paint a picture of fundamentally broken systems, where criminality is endemic in our waste sector. The key is to treat it as an organised crime problem and provide the right tools with which to fight it. We need to fight fire with fire.

While we sit with bits of paper that are easily forged, criminal networks buy land under false ID, using the dark web and secret apps to communicate with each other. I have no wish to blame individuals, but broken systems are creating broken results. This is a £1 billion a year problem. These criminal organised gangs are also involved in drugs, firearms, money laundering and modern slavery. There is the sheer scale: 38 million tonnes—enough to fill Wembley stadium 30 times over—is believed to be illegally managed every year.

We need look no further than the devastating environmental catastrophe that is unfolding in real time in Kidlington, Oxfordshire, as has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which came to light just this weekend. My heart sank when I saw this, because this dump—150 metres long and 6 metres high—threatens to become an environmental disaster, with toxic leachate running into the River Cherwell, which is only metres away. It feels like Hoads Wood has been allowed to happen all over again. I do not understand how, for months and months, lorries were allowed to dump this stuff and nothing has been done. I ask the Minister seriously to consider meeting the costs and to work with local residents and the council to ensure that that clear-up takes place. That is extremely important.

Without swift and decisive action, we will continue to draw ever more sophisticated criminal networks into the UK waste sector. The National Crime Agency warns that this is now a strategic threat. Beyond financial losses, this is not a victimless crime; there are damaging consequences for public health and the natural environment, and we, the taxpayer, are left to pick up the bill.

We welcome the Joint Unit for Waste Crime, but it has only 12 individuals and has no statutory footing or clear strategic direction. There needs to be better co-operation between partners. The committee heard witnesses say that this is the Bermuda triangle of intelligence—information is simply lost between partners and falls between the cracks. Amendment 43 would require the Secretary of State to take serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority threat and to mandate the Joint Unit for Waste Crime to establish a comprehensive national action plan. That would focus on prevention, protection and prosecution, underpinned by effective intelligence sharing. It would place a duty of co-operation on all relative public bodies and enforcement agencies, ensuring that intelligence and expertise flow across the system. The national action plan would create a single point for receiving and disseminating waste crime reports.

Members of the public report this and get rightly frustrated when nothing happens. The need is clear: these issues are falling between organisations and jurisdictions, and all the while it is the criminals who are benefiting. Amendment 44 calls for greater transparency and accountability. Openness and accountability are key to understanding the causes and the scale of organised waste crime. A lack of transparency benefits only the criminal networks.

When the Environment Agency was asked by the Environment and Climate Change Committee how many sites of a similar size to Hoads Wood existed, the answer given was six. However, since then Sky News has reported a site in Wigan and, as we have heard, there is the site in Kidlington which was publicised in the press at the weekend. It is not clear whether those two sites are additional, but time will tell, and we need to know the true scale. We cannot effectively fight that which we do not know. More than numbers, it would require location, sizes, types of waste and what action is being taken to clear up these tremendous, huge waste piles. This amendment is also essential; these matters need to be legislated for as otherwise they will not be properly reported.

Amendment 45 is the linchpin of the committee’s recommendations. It would establish a root-and-branch review of serious and organised waste crime which would be independent of Defra, the Environment Agency and HMRC. The committee found multiple failures by the Environment Agency and criticised the regulators for being slow to respond. Despite receiving over 24,000 reports of waste crime in three years to March 2025, the EA opened only 320 criminal investigations. HMRC has achieved zero criminal convictions for landfill tax fraud, despite the tax gap being estimated at £150 million annually. The independent review scrutinised the egregious events at Hoads Wood, the fact that they were reported for years and that it took until January 2024 for the EA to obtain a restriction order. Clearing up the six sites that are already known about could cost close to £1 billion if the cost is similar to that of clearing Hoads Wood.

These are very important issues. Critically, we want to see a change in the financial rules set by the Treasury that prevent the Environment Agency diverting income derived from environmental permits on legitimate businesses towards dealing with criminal activity. Additional funding provided to the Environment Agency for 2025-26 should be maintained.

To conclude, I recognise that the Minister has not had long to consider the committee’s report, and that a formal response is not due until the start of December. My hope is that there is time for a formal response to the committee’s report prior to the Bill’s Report stage. I hope that the Government are minded at least to take an initial look at the amendments. If it is helpful, I am fully prepared to work and co-operate with the Government in any way I can. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

May God and my noble friends forgive me, but I think our Lib Dem Peers have a good point, particularly with regard to the new clause proposed in Amendment 43. I will not repeat what the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said, but the letter from our chair of the Environment and Climate Change Committee is absolutely spot on. The crime is massive—costing the country £1 billion per annum—and the environmental damage is enormous. I was not aware that our committee had carried out a short investigation, and I had not focused on Amendments 43, 44 and 45 until I saw the horrendous photos and videos last Friday and Saturday of the hundreds, possibly thousands, of tonnes dumped on that back lane in Kidlington, just six yards from the River Cherwell. The local MP and others have called it an environmental catastrophe, and that is no exaggeration.

This criminality is happening all across the country. I was on the board of Natural England when our SSSI at Hoads Wood was destroyed by 30,000 tonnes of illegal waste, dumped over a period of many months before the Environment Agency was aware of it. The agency then issued a notice barring further access to the site and is now spending £15 million to clean it up. The cost of cleaning up the Kidlington dump is estimated to be greater than the local authority budget.

Many have criticised the Environment Agency but I will not slag it off—at least, not too hard. Its main response is to issue a notice stopping further dumping, but inevitably that is weeks or months too late and the criminal gangs will have found new sites by then. This level of mega organised crime is way beyond its capability. It is a licensing organisation. It can do criminal investigations, but not of this complexity. It is easy for it to investigate a leak into a river from a factory, or prosecute a farmer who illegally dredged the River Lugg, but this level of organised crime is way beyond its capacity to investigate.

Conclusion 2 in the letter to the Defra Secretary of State from the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, is so right. She says:

“What we do know, however, is that criminality is endemic in the waste sector. It is widely acknowledged that there is little chance of criminals being brought to justice for committing waste offences—the record of successful prosecutions and other penalties is woeful. Organised crime groups, including those involved in drugs, firearms, money laundering and modern slavery, are well-established in the sector. They are attracted to the low-risk opportunity to make large sums of money and commit crimes from coordinated fly-tipping to illegal exports and landfill tax fraud”.


When I was on the board of the Food Standards Agency until 12 months ago, I had responsibility for the National Food Crime Unit. We found that the gangs involved in recirculating condemned food back into the food chain, usually to the catering sector, were also involved in moving stolen high-value cars, JCBs, drugs, mobile phones, et cetera. They were simply movers and distributors of all high-value stolen property or illegal items. If you have the network to move stolen vehicles then you have the network to dump thousands of tonnes of rubbish also.

How much money do these organised crime teams make from illegal dumping? The cost of legally disposing of mixed waste is up to £150 per tonne, and up to £200 per tonne for hazardous waste. A legal company would have to charge that fee, which includes the landfill tax of £94 per tonne. All these crooks have to do is put in a bid slightly below £150 and they would probably get the contract, including from possibly legitimate companies that did not know that they were dealing with crooks—it is possibly more likely that they would know, but they take the cheaper option and deny responsibility. The crooks who dumped at Hoads Wood probably made away with about £4 million: 30,000 tonnes at a profit of £130 per tonne. At Kidlington, let us say that they dumped 10 loads of 30 tonnes each day for 30 days. That is 900 tonnes, or £120,000 pure profit—dirty profit, to be more exact.

Although Amendments 44 and 45 are okay, they are not the important ones in this group. Of course there is no harm in more data, but we already know how serious the problem is, as our Lords inquiry has shown. Conducting a review to report by 2027 sounds a bit like that wonderful line from Sir Humphrey Appleby in the “Yes Minister” episode “Doing the Honours”, when he said,

“I recommend that we set up an interdepartmental committee with fairly broad terms of reference, so that at the end of the day, we’ll be in the position to think through the various implications and arrive at a decision based on long-term considerations rather than rush prematurely into precipitate and possibly ill-conceived action which might well have unforeseen repercussions”—

to which Hacker says: “You mean ‘no’?”

However, the new clause in Amendment 45 has one good gem in it—namely, proposed new subsection (2), which says that the review must consider

“the extent and effectiveness of integrated working between the Environment Agency, HMRC, the National Crime Agency, local police forces in England and Wales, and local authorities”.

That leads me on to the noble Earl’s Amendment 43, which has a very sensible key suggestion: beefing up the Joint Unit for Waste Crime. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, whom we all respect, said in answer to an Oral Question in this Chamber on 15 October that Defra had increased the budget for the EA to use on the joint unit by 50% and that the number of staff had doubled. I have no real criticism of Defra, but that will still not work because the Environment Agency is the wrong organisation to lead it.

We are talking about massive, organised crime of £1 billion. There is only one organisation capable of leading a multiagency task force on that, and that is the National Crime Agency. I urge the Minister to take this back to the Home Office, discuss it with Defra, the EA and the NCA, and, without changing everything, give the National Crime Agency the lead in tackling this. As I and the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, have pointed out, these same criminals are involved in high-value stolen goods such as mobiles, construction equipment, drugs—all stuff way out of the league of the EA but bang in the bailiwick of the NCA. If the noble Earl, Lord Russell, can come back with a simpler amendment on Report on something like that, then I would be minded to support him.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

47A: Clause 10, page 18, line 19, at end insert “or the gardens and grounds of a private dwelling”
Member’s explanatory statement
Anyone trespassing in the gardens or grounds of a private house must be assumed to be targeting the private residence and should be guilty of the same offence as if the tresspasser had entered the physical building and there should be a minimum penalty as well as the scope to have a larger maximum.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendment 47B.

Amendment 47A is to seek clarification that the definition of “premises” as

“any building, part of a building or enclosed area”

will include gardens and grounds associated with private dwellings. The phrase “enclosed area” is a key part of the statutory definition. Gardens and grounds of private dwellings are typically surrounded by fences, walls or hedges, marking them as distinct and separate from public areas. I hope that the intention behind the word “enclosed” here is to extend the definition beyond the physical structure of the buildings to include spaces that are set apart for private use. Therefore, I suggest that gardens and grounds, by virtue of their possible enclosure and association with the dwelling, fulfil the criteria set out in the definition.

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[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and read the Member’s explanatory statement on these two amendments. I will be brief.

I can remember, as a child, signs indicating the barriers and limits of public access to certain parcels of land. Across the field, there was a substantial area of public allotments with a wide footpath running through the middle to an empty field beyond, which had public access. Nevertheless, there was a large hand-painted black sign at the start of this footpath that read, “Trespassers will be prosecuted”—not that as a child I understood what that meant, except to say that I could not use the footpath to access the field beyond but would have to walk a long way round to access the field, which was public open space.

Trespass is a crime that has been with us for decades but not always understood. At a time when Governments are trying to open up the countryside to those who have previously had limited access, extending trespass to private gardens and grounds needs careful consideration. Of course, if someone enters your property uninvited, even if the front door is temporarily open, they are trespassing, but those who are not intent on committing a crime—stealing the owner’s valuables, or helping themselves to the contents of the fridge—might have strayed there by accident. That is extremely unlikely. Strangers will generally enter a private property uninvited only if they have some nefarious project in mind.

However, that is unlikely to be the case in respect of grounds and gardens. Public footpaths are not always clearly signposted. The map that the walker may be following might be inaccurate or out of date. Some footpaths may have been temporarily diverted due to the lambing season or some other stock grazing in the area. Stiles and bridges may have fallen into disrepair, causing walkers to look for an alternative route to complete their walk. Is the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, suggesting that these unwitting miscreants should be dealt with in the same way as those who have deliberately set out to commit a crime?

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My amendment refers specifically to gardens and grounds of houses, not to farmers’ fields with a footpath wandering through them. Even if a garden has a footpath going through it, people have the right to use that footpath and it would be difficult then to prove that someone had criminal intent, but if someone enters the grounds and gardens of a private residence, we must assume they have the same criminal intent as if they want to enter the person’s house. It has nothing to do with farmers’ fields or footpaths.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s interjection and for that clarification. However, as somebody who lived for 35 years with a footpath running through their garden, I have to say that I do not really agree with him.

We should be very careful about implementing these two amendments. They smack to me of the landed gentry attempting to keep the ordinary man and woman from enjoying the countryside. I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me that it would not be an easy task to prove that deliberate trespass had occurred over land and grounds or gardens with the intent of causing harm or wanton damage to those grounds.

In respect of Amendment 47B, I do not support increasing the fee should an offence be proved. I am nevertheless keen to hear the Minister’s views on the amendment, but at the moment I am not inclined to support the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for tabling the amendments. I hope I can half help him today and, in doing so, assist the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville.

I confirm that the Government will repeal the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824. In Clauses 10 and 11, the Government are legislating to introduce targeted replacement provisions for certain elements of the 1824 Act, to ensure that the police have the powers they need to keep our communities safe. Those targeted replacement measures include a new offence of facilitating begging for gain, which we will come on to shortly, and an offence of trespassing with the intention of committing a crime. Both were previously provided for under the 1824 Act, and the police have told us that it would be useful to retain them.

I hope this helps the noble Baroness, because the new criminal offence of trespassing with intent to commit a criminal offence recreates an offence that is already set out in the 1824 Act. It does not add to it; it recreates it. As is currently the case, it will be an offence for a person to trespass on any premises—meaning any building, part of a building or enclosed area—with the intention to commit an offence, and that is currently in the legislation.

Amendment 47A from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to ensure that trespassing in gardens and grounds of a private dwelling is captured by the replacement offence. This is where I think I can half help him by indicating that gardens and grounds would already be included in the definition of “premises” in the 1824 Act, so, in essence, that is covered already.

His Amendment 47B would introduce a minimum level 2 fine and increase the maximum level fine from level 3 to level 4 for this offence. Again, the measure in the Bill replicates entirely—going back to the noble Baroness—the maximum penalties currently set out in the existing legislation that we are repealing, but replacing in part, through the clauses addressed by these amendments. I agree with the noble Baroness on the proportionality of the current level of the fines. I say to the noble Lord what he anticipated I would say to him: sentencing is a matter for the independent judiciary, and we need to afford it appropriate discretion. Parliament rarely specifies minimum sentences, and this is not an instance where we should depart from that general principle. I know he anticipated that I would say that—as the good old, former Home Office Minister that he is, I knew he would clock that that was the potential line of defence on his amendment.

It is important to say that the penalties set out in the current legislation, which we are replicating, are considered appropriate and proportionate to the nature of the offence. Therefore, with what I hope was helpful half clarification on grounds and gardens, and with my steady defence on the second amendment, which the noble Lord anticipated, I ask him not to press his amendments.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, half a loaf is better than no bread, of course. All I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, is that she has got totally the wrong end of the stick. I will not go into more detail to argue against her, except to say that I too had a footpath right across the middle of my garden in Cumbria, and I had no problem with it at all. However, that is quite separate from the guy who, in 2000, threatened to burn down my house because he did not like my view on hunting. That is quite a different matter. He committed an offence on my driveway, as opposed to the thousands of people who used the footpath, which I built special turnstiles at either end of for them to use.

I accept entirely what the Minister said and am delighted to see that grounds and gardens of public dwellings will be included in the definition—that is the half I am very happy with. I knew he would not accept my amendment on the penalties. He said that it is up to an independent judiciary—I wish we had one, without a Sentencing Council tying its hands, but that is a matter for another debate. With the Minister’s courteous remarks, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 47A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

This is also an opportunity to clarify that this is not a group of amendments seeking to unfairly penalise innocent groups of people. The amendments are specifically targeted at people and symbols that are unquestionably identifiable as gang related. They create separate laws for a specific form of crime and go to the heart of one of the main issues making our cities unattractive and unsafe. Gangs, as I have said, are intimidating; they prey on the weakest in our communities, recruit them for their own ends, encourage violence and increase lawlessness. We believe that these amendments are necessary steps that must be taken to curb the issue. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, and I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendments. Every week, coming from the north of England to this House, I see literally miles and miles of repulsive gang graffiti. On the outskirts of every station, walls and buildings are plastered with it. At Crewe and near Euston, hundreds and hundreds of goods wagons are covered in it, and even the walls of residential buildings. We see it everywhere, so why worry about it? It is unsightly and destroys any beauty that may be left on the approaches to cities by rail, but it is much more insidious than that, as my noble friend on the Front Bench has pointed out.

Gang-related graffiti, which we see in all urban areas, is often seen as both a symptom and a catalyst of criminal activity. I suggest that there is sufficient evidence available to conclude that gang graffiti leads to increased crime in affected neighbourhoods and that it instils fear among local residents. Gang graffiti typically consists of symbols, tags or messages used by criminal gangs to mark their territory, send warnings or communicate with other gangs. It differs from other forms of graffiti, such as street art, due to its association with organised crime and territorial disputes.

Several studies and reports indicate a correlation between the presence of gang graffiti and higher rates of crime, particularly violent offences. Gang graffiti is often used to demarcate territory, which can lead to turf wars and retaliatory violence. Areas marked by gang symbols may experience an increase in robberies, assaults and drug-related crimes as gangs seek to assert dominance. A study published by the Journal of Criminal Justice found that neighbourhoods with visible gang graffiti reported higher levels of gang-related crime and violence, suggesting that graffiti serves as both a warning and an invitation for conflict. Police departments in cities such as London and Manchester have noted that the appearance of new gang graffiti often coincides with spikes in criminal activity, particularly when rival gangs respond by marking over existing tags.

Crime prevention experts argue that gang graffiti is not merely a symptom but a tool used to intimidate, recruit and claim control, thereby fostering an environment conducive to criminal behaviour. Although correlation does not necessarily imply causation, the consistent association between gang graffiti and increased crime rates supports the argument that graffiti can contribute to localised crime.

The visual presence of gang graffiti can have a significant psychological impact on residents and visitors, as my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel said. Research conducted by community safety organisations has shown that people perceive areas with gang graffiti as less safe, which can lead to heightened anxiety, avoidance behaviours and reduced community cohesion. Surveys by our local councils in the UK reveal that residents often cite gang graffiti as a major contributor to their fear of crime, even if they have not personally experienced gang violence.

Our own British Crime Survey found that the visibility of gang markers and threatening messages increases the perceived risk of victimisation, causing some individuals to alter their daily routines or to avoid certain neighbourhoods or streets altogether. Community leaders report that gang graffiti can erode trust in public institutions as residents feel that the authorities are unable to maintain law and order and prevent criminal groups operating openly. In summary, gang graffiti acts as a visual clue that can frighten people, negatively impact mental well-being and discourage positive social interaction within affected communities.

Last year, the Metropolitan Police estimated that there were 102 active gangs in London engaged in violence and robbery, and they were responsible for a significant amount of serious violence, including half of all knife crimes with injury, 60% of shootings and 29% of reported child sexual exploitation. I think those 102 gangs equate to about 4,500 individuals. It is not just London; the same is happening in all our major cities. Let us be clear: gang-related graffiti is not some kids with aerosol cans spray-painting walls for a bit of fun. Gangs are making powerful statements to their allies and enemies that this is their criminal territory. Therefore, the solution has to be the prompt removal of graffiti, expensive though it is, and that has to be part of gang prevention strategies. However, we also need increased penalties, as suggested by my noble friend in his Amendment 51.

I do not need to speak in support of Amendment 52; I think I have just made the point that gangs are highly dangerous organisations and there should be tougher sentences for any crimes that have gang connections.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, everyone is concerned about gang activity. The dark web means it has never been easier for people to source and buy drugs independently, contributing to the emergence of more loosely organised micro-gangs, as once an individual has a large supply of illicit drugs, they need to recruit others to help distribute them. I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the tabled amendments.

On Amendment 51 on graffiti, I entirely agree with some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that this usually relates to gangs marking territory or expressing group affiliation. It can result in public spaces feeling unsafe, and the fear is that it could fuel turf wars between rival gangs. To many it is also an unsightly nuisance, with the clean-up cost high for home owners, businesses and local authorities. However, we remain unconvinced that this amendment is the way forward.

Graffiti without the property owner’s permission is already a criminal offence, classified as vandalism or criminal damage, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. I am also concerned that measures such as this risk embedding racial bias in law enforcement and disproportionately affecting minority and marginalised communities. The courts have already found that using graffiti as a marker of gang identity can result in the unjust targeting of marginalised groups, especially people of colour.

In 2022 a legal ruling forced the Metropolitan Police to admit that the operation of its gangs matrix was unlawful, breached human rights and had a disproportionate impact on black people. The matrix used factors, including graffiti, to label people as gang members, leading to life-changing consequences for those who had been wrongly included. Over 1,000 individuals assessed as low risk subsequently had to be removed from the database. This demonstrates the danger of conflating graffiti, gangs and criminality. While I understand the intention behind this amendment, the risk of unintended consequences is clear.

The definition of a gang in Amendment 52 feels worryingly broad, so we cannot support it. As drafted, it raises significant concerns that outweigh its intended benefits. Prosecutors are already cautioned not to use the term “gang” without clear evidence because, used inappropriately, it can unfairly broaden liability for an individual’s offending while disproportionately affecting ethnic minorities.

This proposal also feels overly prescriptive. It is important that the courts retain discretion and the law allows for nuanced sentencing; for example, when someone was plainly being coerced, groomed or manipulated into gang activity.

On these Benches, we believe that sentencing must account for individual circumstances and be based on specific individual criminal behaviour. Simply being in with the wrong people is not the same thing.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, for tabling Amendments 51 and 52. These amendments are proposed and supported by three Members of your Lordships’ House who, between them, have considerable experience in what might loosely be called the law and order space. They are, in rugby terms, a formidable front row and, as such, I have considered what they proposed with care.

I reassure the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Blencathra, and indeed your Lordships’ House, that this Government are definitely against gangs and absolutely against graffiti. That said, we do not believe that these proposals are needed, primarily because the activities criminalised in these measures are already covered by existing legislation.

The intended effect of Amendment 51 is to criminalise the kind of graffiti which gangs use to mark what they feel is their territory and/or to threaten rival groups with violence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, this criminal behaviour is already covered by the existing offence contained within Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Section 1 is broad enough to cover graffiti because case law establishes that the damage does not have to be permanent, and it catches behaviour such as using water-soluble paint on a pavement or smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. In addition, Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act has a higher maximum penalty than the proposed new offence, being punishable in the Crown Court by a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.

Not only is the proposed offence not needed, there are very real problems with the structure of what is proposed; I will mention three, but there are others. First, this amendment creates an offence of strict liability. That means that the prosecution is not required to prove intention, recklessness or even knowledge. The result is a criminal offence which could be committed by accident. The criminal law does not like strict liability offences, and they are very rare in our jurisprudence. The reason is simple: we do not usually criminalise people who are not even aware that they were doing anything wrong.

Secondly, whatever the intention behind the drafting of this proposed criminal offence, in the way it is drafted, the definition of “gang” is so broad that it would capture both the Brownies and the Church of England, as well as football teams, drama societies and many other groups not normally regarded as criminal. I do not think that the noble Lords intend that a Christian cross chalked on a fence could potentially be prosecuted as a criminal offence.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I apologise for standing up a bit late but I want to go back to an earlier comment that graffiti could happen by accident. How on earth can graffiti artists spray a wall with gang tags by accident?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The difficulty is that if somebody were to put something on a fence, for example, and they were not aware that this was associated with a gang, they would potentially be criminalised by it.

Thirdly, the requirements of the proposed new offence mean that expert evidence would need to be adduced in order that the jury or magistrates could decide whether the prosecution had proved to the criminal standard—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—whether the graffiti is gang-related within the meaning of the section. Most judges, magistrates and juries are unlikely to understand the significance of particular names, symbols or tags—this is not just the Sharks and the Jets that we are talking about, but rather most abstruse versions. Then the requirement that a trial be fair would require that the defence would also have to be able to instruct an expert, usually at public expense. Your Lordships’ House is well aware of the difficulties the criminal courts already have with delay. The idea that these existing challenges should be added to by numerous “battle of the expert” trials about graffiti is as unpalatable as it is unnecessary, given that the conduct is already captured by the Criminal Damage Act.

Amendment 52 seeks to make gang involvement a statutory aggravating factor in the sentencing for any criminal offence; thus, it is very wide indeed. The definition of “gang” is once again so broad that it would capture a number of wholly innocuous groups, and this is not a mere drafting issue. It encapsulates the fundamental problem with this provision, which is the difficulty of defining the conduct which it seeks to condemn with sufficient precision to make it workable. Again, evidence might be needed at the sentencing stage.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

53A: After subsection (6)(j) insert—
“(k) outside any residential building.”

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 53A, I will also speak to my Amendment 53B in this group. I completely support the comments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel on the Front Bench, and I support his amendments.

I encounter this every day coming to this House, where beggars lie on the pavement, half blocking it. Possibly they think they are less frightening sitting down than standing up, but the nuisance is the same, as is the chant asking for money. I have not seen them for some months now, but for a couple of years we had different beggars every day; then I realised it was the same dog they had. I presume that the dog got passed around between them, since the public are possibly more sympathetic to the dog than to the beggar— a kind of Dogs R Us.

There was another one who, when I first encountered him, was really scary. He was a beggar, but he was shouting and screaming—not at the public, I realised, but more to himself or to the ether than anything else. Clearly, he had a mental health problem. After I saw him a couple of times, I had no problem; I just did not make eye contact. However, people who had never met him before, such as women coming out of the shops, were terrified of him. It was nuisance begging, but clearly there was a health problem behind it.

My Amendment 53A would merely add a little tweak to my noble friend’s new clause by adding “outside any residential building” to the list in subsection (6). In this Westminster area, I have seen them sitting not on the doorstep but right beside the entrance to a residential block of flats. Frankly, I think that is intimidating, and residents should not have to face that fear, whether misplaced or not, that they may face beggars as they come and go from their own property.

My Amendment 53B would amend my noble friend’s amendment after subsection (7), by inserting:

“The judgement that the begging satisfies the conditions in (a), (b) and (d) is one to be made by the person who is the victim of the begging”.


So what does subsection (7) say? It says:

“This subsection applies if the person begs in a way that has caused, or is likely to cause … (a) harassment, alarm or distress to another person, … (b) a person reasonably to believe that … they, or any other person, may be harmed, or … any property … may be damaged, … (c) disorder, or … (d) a risk to the health or safety of any person except the person begging”.


In other words, the purpose of my amendment is that I do not want a police officer to come along and say, “Oh no, guv, that’s not harassment or causing alarm. What are you worried about? There’s no risk to your health and safety”. I suggest that the judgment be made by the person who is the victim of the nuisance begging. Some people will not be worried or alarmed, as I was not worried after I saw that chap with the mental health problem a few times, but others may be.

I came across this in an accusation about bullying in the Civil Service. If a civil servant believes that someone is bullied, that is taken for granted because one person felt it even though others might have felt differently. I dealt with that in my capacity of serving on an ALB.

In conclusion, I want to make it clear that, if a person feels that begging is causing him or her alarm, distress or harassment, or is a risk to health and safety, then it is the victim’s view that must be considered, not that of anyone else applying their own test for what that alarm might be.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, there is a genuine problem around aggressive begging and the involvement of organised criminal gangs. That is why we support Clause 11, which rightly focuses not on individuals who are begging but on those who are orchestrating and profiting from this practice.

Lots of things in life are a nuisance, but that does not mean we should criminalise them. Where begging is causing a genuine nuisance, police already have a range of powers to deal with it under anti-social behaviour legislation. We think this amendment is the wrong solution at a time when charities such as Crisis say that the number of vulnerable people on the streets who survive by begging, including women and first-time rough sleepers, is rising. In these circumstances, we should be looking at how we can better reach and support those in such straitened circumstances. By contrast, criminalising begging would push people away from support, and it will not solve the problems of poverty, homelessness, addiction or exploitation.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for his Amendment 53, which, as he explained, would introduce a new offence of nuisance begging and permit a constable to move on a person engaging in this behaviour. Failure to comply with the notice would constitute a criminal offence. I note also Amendments 53A and 53B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which seek to further extend what constitutes nuisance begging under the proposed new offence.

I start by saying to noble Lords that the Government do not wish to target or criminalise individuals who are begging to sustain themselves or rough sleeping because they have nowhere else to go. That is why we are committed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, to repealing the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, and why we will not be introducing measures that target or recriminalise begging and rough sleeping. It is also—for the very reason the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned—why the Government have invested more than £1 billion in homelessness and rough sleeping services this year, which is up £316 million compared to last year. So there is an increase in support to tackle the very issues that the noble Baroness mentioned.

However, we are legislating in the Bill to introduce targeted replacement measures for certain elements of the 1824 Act to ensure—I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, will welcome this—that police retain the powers they need to keep our communities safe. These targeted replacement measures, in Clauses 10 and 11, include a new offence of facilitating begging for gain and an offence of trespassing with the intention of committing a crime, both of which were previously provided for under the 1824 Act.

As noble Lords mentioned, begging is itself a complex issue, it can cause significant harm or distress to communities and local areas need appropriate tools to maintain community safety. But where I come back to in this debate is that there are powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which many police forces use effectively to tackle anti-social behaviour in the context of begging and rough sleeping—for example, the very point the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned, where an individual may be harassing members of the public on a persistent basis, including potentially outside their own home, as in his amendment.

The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 provides for current statutory guidance. I hope that it partly answers the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to say that we will update that anti-social behaviour statutory guidance. This will ensure that it is clear to agencies how ASB powers can be used in the context of harassment and this type of begging, if an individual’s behaviour reaches a threshold that will be set in the ASB statutory guidance.

Existing criminal offences can also be applied where the behaviour crosses the current criminal threshold. I expect the updating of the guidance to take place very shortly after Royal Assent is given to the legislation passing through the House of Lords. In the light of the assurances that we take this issue seriously, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, will not press his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is somewhat mollified that there are powers in place to deal with the issues that he has raised.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful for what the Minister said. I admire his style at the Dispatch Box; he is courteous and thorough in giving his answers. In view of his assurances that this is really covered by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 53A (to Amendment 53) withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

54: After Clause 11, insert the following new Clause—
“Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014: amendment(1) Schedule 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is amended as follows.(2) After paragraph 1(3) insert—“(3A) A detention order must be made in relation to a person between the ages of 14 and 18 who has been in breach of three injunctions.(3B) A person subject to a detention order under sub-paragraph (3A) must be detained in youth detention accommodation as defined by paragraph 14(3).”.(3) After paragraph 2(7) insert—“(8) Any person subject to a supervision order under this paragraph is eligible for an electronic tag.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and another in the name of Lord Blencathra add a power of detention for 14 -18 year olds who have a record of breaching inunctions.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, in moving my Amendment 54, I will also speak to my Amendment 55. Amendment 54 seeks to amend Schedule 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The relevant section says that:

“A youth court, if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person aged under 18 is in breach of a provision of an injunction under section 1 to which he or she is subject, may make in respect of the person—(a) a supervision order or (b) a detention order”.


Dealing with the detention provisions first, the court “may” make a detention order. My amendment seeks that it “must” make such an order, tying the court’s discretion, if a person between the ages of 14 and 18 breaches three or more injunctions.

As the Minister knows—indeed, as we all know—the problem with juvenile crime is habitual offenders. None of us want to lock up little kiddies who make a couple of mistakes or commit minor crime—of course not. However, before any juvenile gets an injunction, the anti-social behaviour has to be reasonably serious. This is what the College of Policing says on the grounds for an injunction:

“A civil injunction is issued on the balance of probabilities. It must be just and convenient to grant the injunction to prevent anti-social behaviour, and the respondent must have engaged in or threatened to engage in either: conduct that has or is likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress … or conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance”.


The College of Policing states that a civil injunction is used for

“drug/alcohol-related ASB … harassment … noise (tenure-neutral)”—

whatever that means—“vandalism” and “aggressive begging”. Therefore, I submit that if a juvenile between the ages of 14 to 18 breaches three of those, we have passed the stage where the court may—I stress “may”—make a detention order. Anyone who has breached three injunctions is rapidly heading to becoming a habitual offender. If he does not get a detention order after all that behaviour, what signal will that send to him and his mates? It will signal that you can get away with it, and nothing will happen but another appearance before the court, a rap on the knuckles and being told to be a good boy. As parliamentarians, we owe it to innocent members of the public to protect them from habitual trouble-makers, and my amendment would do just that.

The court also has a discretion on whether to make a detention order when a juvenile breaches one or two injunctions. I am happy with that. I submit that we only remove that discretion when the offender breaches three or more.

I will move on to supervision orders. The court could order a supervision order instead of detention. Such an order could impose one or more of three requirements: a supervision requirement, an activity requirement or a curfew requirement. We do not need to go into what each of those requirements can do or the obligations they might impose. My amendment simply seeks to add an additional power, so that:

“Any person subject to a supervision order … is eligible for an electronic tag”.


Note my wording: it states that they would be “eligible” for an electronic tag; I am not tying the court’s hands here to make it compulsory.

One of my reasons for attaching electronic tags to juveniles under court-imposed supervision orders is the enhancement of accountability. Electronic monitoring provides a reliable, objective mechanism for tracking the whereabouts of young offenders. This not only helps to ensure compliance with curfews and exclusion zones stipulated by the court but gives our Prison and Probation Service immediate insight into any breaches. The knowledge that their movements are being monitored can act as a significant deterrent against further anti-social or criminal behaviour.

I suggest that electronic tagging offers reassurance to communities affected by persistent anti-social behaviour. Enabling authorities to monitor offenders more closely would reduce the risk of reoffending while under supervision. This is particularly pertinent in cases where the offence involves intimidation, vandalism or harassment in a particular locality. The visible commitment to monitoring can help rebuild public confidence in the justice system’s capacity to protect communities.

I have no doubt that some will argue that tagging for a juvenile is punitive, but I suggest it can also help with rehabilitation. Electronic monitoring allows for greater flexibility compared with secure detention, enabling juveniles to remain in their communities, continue education and maintain family relationships. The structure imposed by tagging can help young people develop routines and take responsibility for their actions, while still being held accountable. For many, this balance of liberty and oversight provides a constructive framework for positive behavioural change.

As we all know—the Minister knows this, and he knew it from his last experience in the Home Office—for many young offenders, early intervention is critical to prevent escalation into more serious criminal behaviour. Electronic tagging, as a clear and immediate consequence, can serve as a wake-up call, highlighting the seriousness of continued non-compliance. This timely intervention can disrupt cycles of offending and encourage reflection, potentially diverting young people from the future of criminality.

I will not speak to my Amendment 55, since I think I have a bit of inadvertent duplication here. I was drafting an amendment to the Act and then one to Schedule 2, and my Amendment 55 is my first draft, which I should not have sent to the Public Bill Office by mistake. Therefore, I beg to move Amendment 54.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for Amendment 54 and for fessing up to Amendment 55, which we will accept as an honest mistake. I welcome his honesty in raising the issue.

There is a recognition that Amendment 54 still wants to provide for minimum sentences for persistent breaches of youth injunctions. I emphasise that the Government do not want to criminalise children unnecessarily, an aspiration we share with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. That is why the new respect order in the Bill will not apply to those under 18. However, we know that in many cases the behaviour of offenders under 18 requires a more formal deterrent and intervention. That is why we have retained the civil injunction as is for those under 18. Practitioners have told us that it is a particularly helpful and useful tool to tackle youth anti-social behaviour and to ensure that their rights and the safety of the community are upheld.

Youth injunctions are civil orders and fundamentally preventive in nature, which again goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. It is more important to intervene to prevent than it is to punish afterwards, particularly when young people are the individuals who are causing those challenges in the first place.

The important point about youth injunctions, which, again, goes to the heart of the noble Lord’s amendment, is that if the respondent abides by the terms of the order, they will not be liable for any penalties but, self-evidently, where a respondent does breach an order there needs to be some action. The noble Lord has suggested one course of action. I say to him that the courts already have a range of responses, including supervision orders, electronic tagging, curfews and, in the most serious cases, detention orders for up to three months for 14 to 17 year-olds.

I hope there is a common theme across the Committee that detention of children should be used only when absolutely necessary, and that courts should consider the child’s welfare and other risks before imposing such a response. This should be on a case-by-case basis, and the prescribing of a mandatory minimum sentence, even for repeat offenders, would both undermine the ability of the independent judiciary to determine the appropriate sentence and potentially be disproportionate. There is a place in our sentencing framework for mandatory minimum sentences, but I submit that this is not it.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, is quite right again that one of the best preventive measures we can have is to have large numbers of boots on the ground in neighbourhood policing. She will know that the Government have a manifesto commitment to put 13,000 extra boots on the ground during this Parliament. In this first year or so, the Government have put an extra 3,000 in place. We intend, where we can, to increase the number of specials, PCSOs and warranted officers to replace those who were lost between 2010 and 2017. When I was Police Minister in 2009-10, we had 20,000 more officers than we had up to around 2017. That is because they were hollowed out and taken out by the two Governments who ran the Home Office between 2010 and 2017.

The noble Baroness is absolutely right that visible neighbourhood policing is critical to tackling anti-social behaviour, but the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to provide minimum sentences, which I do not think will achieve his objective. It does not have my support either. I hope he will withdraw the amendment, having listened to the argument.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I am grateful to the Minister for his courteous and detailed answer. I did not realise that electronic tagging was already an option and it is very important that it is applied in appropriate cases. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I am not creating a new criminal offence here. The power of detention already exists to be used by the court when it thinks fit.

On the general principle of minimum sentences, why do we fetter a judge’s discretion by having a maximum sentence? If we want proper judicial discretion, we should say that the judge can sentence anything he likes, but we do not—and I am glad we do not. We say that Parliament cannot set a minimum. Why is it appropriate, in a democracy, for Parliament to set a maximum sentence but not a minimum? I knew that the Minister, in his courteous way, would say that we would fetter judicial discretion, but I have suggested three breaches of injunctions. When can a court say, “You’ve done six now”, or, “You’ve done 10, Johnny”, and impose a sentence of detention for continued breaches of injunctions? As a democracy, it is perfectly legitimate for us as parliamentarians—and Members in the other House, whose constituents are suffering—to say that judges will have a discretion to impose orders of detention up to a certain level, but once the breaches of injunctions go past a certain threshold, Parliament demands that they impose a level of detention, whatever that level may be.

I have made my point. The Minister will probably hear me make a similar point about minimum sentences at various other points in the Bill but, in view of his remarks, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 54 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

55B: Clause 13, page 20, line 7, at end insert—
“(3) The coordinating officer need not be a constable but must be someone versed in the internet and online sales and purchases.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to ensure that the police and NCA appoint a person as the co-ordinating officer who is the most qualified about the internet and online sales and need not be a person who has qualified as a constable.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The House will be relieved to know I will be mercifully brief on this occasion. Until 1968 the Met and other police forces used CID officers to do SOCO work—that is, collecting forensic evidence at the scenes of crimes. For many it was not their speciality and they often damaged vital evidence. Police forces realised that teams of dedicated civilians who specialise in gathering evidence at crime scenes could do a better job. Naturally, the Police Federation opposed any civilians being brought in to do it. Now, civilians do command and dispatch—which used to be done by serving officers—investigation support, and crime analysis. Over the years the police service has had to recognise, reluctantly in my opinion, that a constable of whatever rank may not be the best-qualified person to undertake increasingly complex tasks. We see credit card fraud going through the roof because there is practically no one in any police force capable of investigating it. Goodness knows who could do it —forensic accountants, perhaps.

All I am seeking here is an assurance from the Minister that this important co-ordinating role will not go to an inspector or a superintendent unless he or she is an absolute expert on the internet and online sales. This requires a switched-on internet geek, and not necessarily a uniformed bobby. Can the Minister assure me that the police will recruit for this role the best-qualified person, from wherever that person comes from, provided that he or she passes all the integrity tests, and that the guidance envisaged in the clause will say so? I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I must say, I admire the range of interventions made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I do not want him to fall back on his seat, but on this occasion, we have some sympathy with the two amendments he has put forward. This group addresses the establishment of the new civil penalty regime for online advertising, a measure which we on these Benches support for its goal of strengthening accountability for online platforms. The introduction of civil penalties in this part of the Bill is intended to tackle the online grey market that facilitates the sale of illegal weapons, enabling earlier intervention and prevention of offensive weapon crimes. We must ensure that the framework we establish is not only robust legally but operationally effective in the digital age.

Amendment 55B tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, concerning Clause 13, focuses specifically on the essential role of the co-ordinating officer. Clause 13 mandates that the Secretary of State designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the co-ordinating officer for this chapter. The amendment proposes that:

“The coordinating officer need not be a constable but must be someone versed in the internet and online sales and purchases”.


We on these Benches recognise that 21st-century crime fighting is no longer solely about boots on the ground. It relies heavily on specialised digital expertise to effectively police online marketplaces and hold search services and user-to-user services accountable. The designated officer must possess deep knowledge of digital platform sales techniques and online advertising mechanisms, as the noble Lord indicated. By explicitly allowing this officer to be a non-constable professional and expert, we would ensure that law enforcement can deploy the most qualified individuals to secure content removal notices and apply civil penalties. In our view, this pragmatic approach would ensure efficiency and maximum efficacy against technologically sophisticated platforms.

Amendment 55F in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relates to Clause 24, which governs the guidance issued by the Secretary of State regarding the operation of this new regime. All new intrusive powers, especially those concerning online services, require clear, precise guidance to avoid unintended consequences and ensure fairness. Proper statutory guidance is the mechanism by which the principles established in the Bill should be translated into proportionate and actionable requirements for online service providers.

In short, in our view these amendments seek to guarantee that the architecture of this new regime is built on technical expertise and clarity, both those pillars being essential in ensuring that our online crime-fighting tools are fit for purpose. As such, we support them.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his amendments to the clauses that implement this Government’s manifesto commitment to hold senior managers of online platforms, be they social media platforms, online marketplaces or search engines, personally liable for the failure to remove illegal online content relating to knives and offensive weapons. His Amendment 55B would require the co-ordinating officer—that is, the person appointed by the Home Secretary to administer these new powers—to have the necessary internet and online sales experience and skills, stating that they need not be a warranted officer. Amendment 55F would make these criteria explicit in the statutory guidance for these measures.

I agree with the sentiment behind the amendments. It is of course important that the co-ordinating officer responsible for the administration of these powers be suitably experienced. I reassure the noble Lord that the Government are providing £1.7 million for a new national police unit to tackle the illegal online sale of knives and weapons, including the issuing of content removal notices. The unit will be dedicated to co-ordinating investigations into all aspects of online unlawful knife and offensive weapon sales, and to bringing those responsible to justice. It will also improve data collection and analysis capability in order to expand police understanding of the knife crime problem and how enforcement activities can best be targeted. The intention is that a senior member of this specialist unit will be appointed as the co-ordinating officer, and they will have the necessary skills and resources to administer the powers.

Whoever is appointed as a content manager must be experienced in both aspects of the problem we are trying to tackle. They should have experience not only of online sales but of the investigation of illegal online sales of knives and weapons—that is, they must be able to understand the investigatory and evidential process as well as having experience of the internet. This will, to paraphrase the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, not be any old bobby with a warrant card but someone highly experienced in internet sales and the investigatory and evidential role. That is why, in short, we feel that the role must be held by a warranted officer. It is a police role. They will be issuing enforcement notices and, as part of the criminal process, they need to have that experience as well as the essential online experience that all noble Lords who spoke in the debate mentioned; we agree that that is necessary.

Given the assurance that we are not neglecting the online side of things, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will be sufficiently reassured and is content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, first let me say that I am almost overcome with deep emotion, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the Lib Dems have supported a Blencathra amendment—I wonder where I have gone wrong.

I say to the Minister that I am not totally reassured. I was not suggesting any old bobby; I was afraid that the police would automatically look for someone of senior rank: inspector, superintendent or chief superintendent. But the absolutely crucial thing is that that person must be fully qualified on internet sales and online stuff. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, set it out with rather elegant detail; I called the person a computer geek. If that superintendent is a senior investigating officer and he or she is a computer geek, then I am satisfied. I do not suggest that I will take this back on Report, but the Minister’s answer did not totally satisfy me that the best person will necessarily be recruited for the job. Yes, of course the person must have an understanding of investigation techniques, but that does not necessarily mean that it has to be a high-ranking police officer. The police already have civilians investigating things that do not require an officer.

As I say, I am slightly equivocal about the Minister’s answer. It is slightly disappointing that the Government will not countenance the possibility that this person may not be a warranted officer. It is quite simple: if you recruited the right computer geek, you make him or her warranted officer—you can do it that way. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 55B withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

55C: Clause 18, page 22, line 24, leave out “an amount not exceeding £60,000” and insert “a minimum of 500% of the value of the illegal goods advertised”
Member’s explanatory statement
A fine is based on a judgement of the seriousness of the crime and is subjective. My amendment ensures that the penalty is based on the actual value of the illegal knives and the profits from their sale.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55C, I will speak also to my Amendments 55D and 55E. My three amendments here are all similar, as I argue that a value-based penalty is more effective than a maximum fixed fine. The issue of illegal knife sales on the internet is a matter of serious public concern. It is big business with big consequences when those knives—machetes and zombie knives—are used to kill and maim, as is increasingly the case.

The proposals in the Bill to fine individuals and businesses up to £60,000 for selling illegal knives online seem hefty at first glance. However, the effectiveness and fairness of such a fixed penalty are questionable. A more effective approach would be to impose a fine equal to 500% of the total value of all the illegal goods advertised. I want to convince the Minister that a proportional penalty is, in some cases, superior to a subjective fixed maximum fine.

First, there is the subjectivity of the fixed maximum fine. Setting a maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives leaves the final penalty to the discretion of the court. This introduces subjectivity into the process, as judges must determine what amount is appropriate in each case. The outcome may vary significantly depending on the judge’s interpretation of the offence’s severity, the defendant’s circumstances and other factors. Consequently, similar offenders could face vastly different penalties, undermining the consistency and predictability of the law. Then, of course, I come back to my favourite organisation, the Sentencing Council, advising that the £60,000 fine should never be imposed—but let us leave that aside for the moment.

Moreover, a fixed cap may not reflect the true scale of the illegal activity. For example, a small-scale individual seller and a large business operation could both face the same maximum penalty, despite the latter potentially profiting far more from illegal sales. This lack of proportionality can result in fines that are either too lenient or excessively harsh, depending on the specifics of the case.

In contrast, my suggestion of a fine set at 500% of the value of all illegal knives advertised is directly linked to the scale of the offence and the profits. This proportional penalty approach ensures that the penalty increases in line with the seriousness of the crime. Large-scale operations, which are likely to profit more and cause greater harm, would face correspondingly larger fines. This not only achieves greater fairness but strengthens the deterrent effect. As we have said on many occasions, criminals are primarily motivated by profit. If the financial penalty reliably exceeds any potential gains—by a factor of five in this case—the risk heavily outweighs the reward. I suggest that that creates a strong disincentive for individuals and businesses to engage in illegal knife sales.

The proportional system also ensures that penalties remain meaningful, even as the market or profitability of legal knives fluctuates over time. The proportional penalty system is more likely to deter criminal behaviour, because it removes ambiguity and subjectivity from sentencing. Offenders know in advance that any profits from illegal activity will be entirely wiped out and replaced by a substantial loss. That clarity and certainty are crucial in discouraging would-be offenders. Furthermore, tying the fine to the value of the legal goods ensures fairness across all cases. Small-time offenders are punished proportionately for their actions, while major players face penalties commensurate with the harm they cause and the profits they make. That upholds the principle that the punishment should fit the crime.

In summary, I submit that a fixed maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives online introduces subjectivity and inconsistency—whereas a penalty of 500% of the value of all illegal goods advertised is fair, more predictable and far more likely to deter criminal activity.

I do not need to speak to my Amendment 55E; it is the same concept but suggests a mere 100% proportional penalty for a lesser offence. I urge the Minister to consider adopting a proportional penalty system to effectively combat the sale of illegal knives over the internet. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has so concisely described—he gets more concise as the evening goes on—this group deals with the sanctions applied under the online weapon advertising regime.

We very much welcome the Government’s commitment to ensuring accountability for businesses and sellers who facilitate the online sale of knives. However, if the penalties imposed are too small, they merely become a tolerable cost of doing business for large, wealthy online service providers. As the noble Lord explained, the Bill proposes maximum civil penalties for service providers of up to £60,000 for failing to comply with content manager requirements or for failing to comply with a content removal notice. His Amendments 55C and 55D directly challenge that maximum limit by proposing that the penalty for a service provider’s non-compliance should instead be a minimum of 500% of the value of the illegal goods advertised.

In our view, that proposal shifts the focus decisively towards financial deterrence—although I hate to agree with the noble Lord twice in one evening. The argument embedded within these amendments is sound: fines should reflect the scale and profitability of the illegal advertising business they enable. By linking the minimum fine directly to five times the value of the illegal goods advertised, we ensure that the penalty scales proportionally with the volume of the illicit trade facilitated by the platform, making it financially unsustainable to turn a blind eye to illegal weapon content.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 55E applies this same principle to the penalties imposed on the service provider’s content manager. Clause 23 currently sets the maximum penalty for the content manager at £10,000. Amendment 55E seeks to replace that cap with a minimum penalty of 100% of the value of the illegal goods advertised. That would ensure that the individual responsible for overseeing compliance within the organisation also faces a penalty that reflects the seriousness of the content they failed to manage or remove, particularly where that content is tied directly to the advertisement of unlawful weapons.

These amendments force us to consider how we can make our laws genuinely tough on organised online crime. In our view, legislation must be proportionate; and proportionality, in the face of corporate digital crime, means that penalties should meaningfully exceed the profits derived from facilitating criminal activity. The amendments rightly push us to consider the financial consequences that would truly deter platforms from risking public safety for private gain.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Well, that is a very good segue into the words that are just following—I was about to get there.

Many knives and weapons that are sold illegally are sold relatively cheaply, in the order of tens of pounds. Some sellers who sell knives and weapons over social media tend to hold and advertise small stock numbers. Therefore, we contend that the suggested minimum penalties are simply too low to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content. The independent review of online safety of knives shows a case study as an example where an individual bought 30 knives to sell illegally over social media for under £50 each. Should the social media company not take the illegal content down, the proposed minimum fine under these amendments would be £1,500 for the executive and £7,500 for the companies. Those penalties, as I am sure noble Lords would agree, would be too low for large tech companies and executives to be worried about at all. Not having a minimum penalty will leave full discretion to the police, who specialise in investigating illegal knife sales online. This will allow them to use their judgment to issue fines that are commensurate in each case.

The penalties for failing to comply with these are, as already noted, issued in the form of civil penalty notices by the police. They can be up to £60,000 for companies and £10,000 for individuals. I remind noble Lords that these penalties are for single violations and will add up if companies and executives repeatedly fail to comply with removal notices. The measure is intended not just to punish companies but to facilitate behaviour change. I trust that the police administering these measures will issue fines of an appropriate level to incentivise the prompt removal of illegal content.

I note the experience, which I found instructive, of the independent review of the online sale of knives, that a lot of the activity is undertaken through very small stocks that are cheaply sold. If we used the regime of a proportionate measure, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we simply would not generate enough. Noble Lords may not think that £60,000 is worth much, but we certainly would not generate anywhere near £60,000 in those examples.

It is worth bearing in mind that a lot of the grey market sellers do so over social media websites. The recipient of the fine is the tech company that does not take down the illegal material, rather than the person selling the knives or the weapons. We understand the intended recipient of the punishment—the fines—which is why we think that having the £60,000 or £10,000 level is appropriate, because that is for single offences. Any time a company fails to remove the content for which they have received a notice, the fines will add up and accumulate, which will make an impact—and we would all agree that that needs to be done.

In response to another point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, we feel that the Sentencing Council is unlikely to comment on the level of a civil penalty. That may be a little speculative from my perspective, but I think that it is probably what the experience bears out.

Given this explanation and the clarification of our view of how the environment—I should not have used the word “market” earlier—in which these sales take place, I hope that the noble Lord is sufficiently assured that these penalties will have an impact in the way they are set out in the Bill and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I almost had palpitations for the second time tonight when the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported my amendment.

I hear what the Minister has to say. I had not intended for the 500% penalty to apply to just two or three individuals selling a few knives; I intended that it would apply to the supply of the whole shooting match. The individuals who are selling a few knives have got them from somewhere: there is a supplier or a big source making these by the thousand. For someone at the centre who has a warehouse with £100,000 worth of knives, a penalty of £500,000 would clean them out completely, whereas a penalty of £60,000 would still leave them with £40,000 profit. However, I accept the point that, if the case involves small-scale individuals, the 500% penalty might not be as great as the penalty in the Act. I wonder whether it is worth looking at the possibility of offering “either/or” as an option—I think that is a possibility for the future.

I will make another general point. I woke up about a week ago at 2 am and thought of this proportional system. It may not be perfect for knives, but I think there is some merit in this concept of proportionate fines for certain offences, whereby rather than having a maximum penalty imposed by law, the penalty is a percentage—100%, 200%, 300% or 1,000%—of the value of the goods being advertised or sold.

Bearing in mind what the Minister said, we would like to look again at the possibility of offering a fine and some proportional penalty. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 55C withdrawn.

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[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, very briefly, I align myself with my noble friend on his remarks and the question he put to the Minister. I do not understand the situation, so I would very much appreciate an explanation from the Minister. What is the logic of having the same maximum penalty for both the existing offence of carrying an offensive weapon and the new offence of carrying an offensive weapon with intent to commit harm or violence, and so forth?

My mild concern, which I am sure the Minister with his usual skill can allay, is that if we have the four years maximum penalty for the new aggravated offence of having intent to commit harm, is there not a danger that that could diminish the seriousness of the existing offence if it is not possible or likely to prove the intent to commit violence or the other provisions of the new section? I absolutely support what the Government are trying to do here; we are all on completely the same side. It would be very helpful for the Minister to explain how these two offences would differ in their application in practice and therefore the implications for the maximum sentences.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise for the final time tonight—the Committee will be pleased to know—to support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. I wish I had put down my own amendment to Clause 27 to draw attention to what I think is the complete disconnect between subsections (1) and (3) in the new section.

The Bill in its current form proposes in subsection (1) of the new section that it shall be an offence for any person to possess an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon with the intent

“to use unlawful violence against another person, … to cause another person to believe that unlawful violence will be used against them”

and others, or

“to cause serious unlawful damage to property”.

That is fairly serious stuff.

However, the penalties in subsection (3) of the proposed new section, with a maximum of 12 months’ imprisonment in a magistrates’ court and up to four years on indictment, are insufficient given the gravity of the offence. I support the argument for a substantial increase in sentencing powers to reflect the seriousness of the conduct involved.

Possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it for violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious criminal act. Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property. It is not a spontaneous or lesser form of criminality but rather a calculated and dangerous escalation. The mere possession of a weapon with such intent poses a direct threat to public safety, undermines community trust and creates an atmosphere of fear and insecurity.

As the Minister will know, offences involving offensive weapons are often precursors to more serious crimes, involving grievous bodily harm right up to homicide. I maintain that actions that create an imminent risk of serious harm should be met with robust deterrence and sentencing. Allowing relatively lenient penalties for those caught with weapons and with criminal intent fails to deter potential offenders and signals a lack of seriousness in addressing violent crime. The psychological impact on victims—those who are threatened or believe they are at risk of violence—can be profound and long-lasting, as many reports say, even if no injury actually occurs.

When compared with other offences of similar seriousness, the proposed penalties appear disproportionately low. For instance, offences such as aggravated burglary or possession of firearms with intent to endanger life attract significantly higher sentences, often exceeding a decade in custody. This clause is about people going out with vicious knives or machetes, intending to use unlawful violence against another person—in other words, to attack them and possibly kill them. Why on earth should there even be a summary trial for that sort of offence? That is why I wish I had put down my own amendment to delete from the new section subsection (3)(a), which provides for trial in a magistrates’ court.

Of course, we must not look at this Bill in isolation; we have the Sentencing Bill coming along, which will aim to ban anyone—if I understand it correctly—going to prison for a sentence of 12 months or less. If one of these cases goes to a magistrates’ court, and the magistrates impose the maximum sentence of 12 months, it will be automatically suspended and the perpetrator will get away with it. What signal does that send? If these criminals were going out with a knife to scratch cars or vandalise property, summary might be appropriate, but they are going out with knives to attack people and possibly kill them. That is why, in my opinion, it has to indictable only and a 14-year maximum sentence—which, as we know, will end up as seven in any case, with automatic release at half-time. I believe the current proposal for a maximum of four years on indictment is markedly out of step with comparable offences and the seriousness of potential offences in subsection (1).

The criminal justice system must not only punish offenders but deter would-be offenders and reassure the public that their safety is paramount. Inadequate penalties such as this one risk undermining public confidence in the legal system. A more severe sentencing framework would send a clear message that society will not tolerate the possession of weapons in the street with intent to commit violent acts or grievous bodily harm to people. It would also be a stronger deterrent to those contemplating such conduct.

In conclusion, I believe the Government are absolute right to introduce this new power, but they have the penalties wrong since they are disconnected from the seriousness of the offence. Given the potential for severe physical and psychological harm, the premeditated nature of the crime and the need for effective deterrence, I also submit that the maximum penalties should be increased. Of course, this is not tying the judge’s discretion; I am suggesting no minimum sentence but a sentence of up to 14 years.

I should add that I have exactly the same view on the suggested penalties in the next massive group of amendments, but I have made my arguments here and I will not repeat them when we come to that group on Wednesday.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, nearly half the murders in the UK over the last three years are due to knife crime, so we recognise the vital importance of equipping police with the necessary tools to intervene when there is clear evidence of intent to commit serious violence. We give Clause 27 our full backing.

Before I turn to the amendment, I want to make a couple of points around the new offence. Will the Government ensure that robust guidance and oversight are in place to prevent unjustified or discriminatory use of this power? That needs to be accompanied by improved training for police and judiciary. The reality is that young black men are already significantly overrepresented in knife crime prosecutions, and we must be careful not to compound that position. Discrimination and justice are opposites.

I hope this may also help stem the rising number of incidents in which people suffer life-changing injuries after being attacked with acid or other corrosive substances. Reports of such offences increased by 75% in 2023, including 454 physical attacks. Half these victims were women, with attacks often occurring in a domestic abuse context, but only 8% of these cases resulted in a charge or summons, partly due to the victim’s fear of reprisal. The hope is that this new offence may allow prosecutions to be brought before harm is inflicted, since proving intent would not necessarily require the victim to testify. Can the Minister say how the Government intend to use the offence to this end?

On Amendment 56, the Liberal Democrats agree with Jonathan Hall that four years in prison in insufficient when there is clear evidence of the intention to cause mass fatalities. The court must have the full weight of the law behind it in the hopefully rare cases in which a lengthy sentence is thought necessary for public prosecution. I would expect the Sentencing Council to issue guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, and I hope this will guard against sentence inflation. Nevertheless, we are minded to support this amendment and I urge the Government to look again at the maximum penalty.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to make observations about Amendments 122 and 123. I am not against a review or a consultation, but I make the point that these are not cost-free. Reviews and consultations take up a lot of time within departments and are expensive, and we need to keep that in mind when this House authorises them.

My point is very narrow and applies to both the review and the consultation. It is perfectly true that the sharp-bladed knife is a matter of very great concern to the public, and rightly so. It is important to keep in mind, however, that sharp-bladed knives also have legitimate purposes. My point is that when we authorise the review or consultation, we need to be sure that the scope of the review or consultation is sufficiently wide to address the balance between banning, or further banning, sharp-bladed knives and the impact on those who use them for proper purposes. In other words, the scope of the review or consultation must consider the issue of proportionality when we come to any further proposed changes. That is the only point that I want to make, but it goes to both the review and the consultation.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I find myself in the rather scary position of seeing some considerable merit in the suggestion of a Lib Dem Peer, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I will also comment on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, who also advocated for controls on knives.

There is merit in having a review, or otherwise, of the measures in the Bill. However, I would go further and say that we probably need a wide-ranging review of all the measures successive Governments have taken to try to crack down on knife crime as, despite all our efforts, we cannot manage to do it. I was the Home Office Minister who took through the Offensive Weapons Act 1996, followed up the next year by the Knives Act 1997. That was building on Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998.

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I stand to ask for guidance from the Dispatch Box. When I was doing my national service in the Royal Navy in March 1957— I can date it precisely—I became a midshipman. With that ranking, I was awarded a midshipman’s dirk, which I still hold today. I cannot find that dirk falling under any of the exceptions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Do I therefore have to table a special amendment to make it lawful for me to continue to hold my midshipman’s dirk?

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Before the Minister replies, I will briefly respond to the very kind remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington. To continue the love-in, I say that he was not only an excellent commissioner but a superb chief constable. He was a hands-on bobby as chief constable.

One night, he decided to go out in a squad car in plain clothes. He was sitting in the back, and a call came in for the officers about an incident around the corner. The officers said, “You just sit there, sir, we’ll go and have a look at it”. No sooner had the officers disappeared than the back door of the car was wrenched open, and a Geordie stuck his head in and said, “It’s okay, mate, you can scarper now—the rozzers have gone”. The noble Lord did not scarper.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

Maybe this should be called the “afternoon of the long knives”.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate and thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and, in his absence, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for bringing these amendments. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining the intention behind them.

We can see the merit in Amendments 211, 212 and 214, but making changes like this would first require thorough consultation with the police and officers. Obviously, we are very privileged to have the testimony and experience of—I am not sure whether “brace” is the right collective noun for two former commissioners—the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, remarked on how you learn something new every day: indeed, I had no idea that truncheons have so many uses or non-uses. I am grateful also to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, opposite for explaining the ingenious uses that he put his truncheon to from time to time.

While I am referring to comments from noble Lords, I say to my noble friend Lord Hacking that his issue depends on the question, “How long is your dirk?” I am not sure whether that is something I would want to say at any point in time, let alone at the Dispatch Box, but there we are.

More seriously, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the rest of the Committee that the Government will consider further the issues raised in the discussion that we have had on this group of amendments. In doing so, we will ensure that any changes to the existing defences and exemptions are made after thorough consideration of the impacts. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, they all deserve serious thought and thorough consultation. Although I am not suggesting for a minute that anything said by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggested otherwise, we must place the safety of the public in a paramount position. As such, I cannot undertake to bring forward any proposals in time for later stages of the Bill. However, I stress that, in any event, it would be possible to give effect to the sort of proposals that the amendments intend through existing regulation-making powers. Any such regulations would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure and, therefore, would need to be debated in and approved by both the House of Lords and the other place.

Amendment 213, on items used for agriculture, gardening or similar purposes, was tabled by noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and discussed by the noble Viscounts, Lord Hailsham and Lord Goschen. We believe the legislation is clear that it targets curved swords, and, if that is contested, it is ultimately for the courts to decide. We will work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to ensure that police officers have access to appropriate guidance. I am sympathetic to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and other noble Lords, and the proposed amendments require further consideration and consultation.

Regarding Amendment 214—indeed, all the amendments—I stress that it is at the discretion of the police, the CPS and ultimately the courts to decide to take action against those holding weapons or items on the Schedule’s list for legitimate historical reasons, or indeed those using them for legitimate cultural sets of reasons. It is at the discretion of the police and the courts in taking a case forward. But I equally stress that we have existing powers to change the relevant law through secondary legislation. Given that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

214B: After Clause 36, insert the following new Clause—
“Knives on educational premisesIn section 139A(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (offence of having article with blade or point (or offensive weapon) on educational premises), omit paragraphs (b) to (d).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that the only justification for anyone to have a knife at school would be for “use at work” and that would apply to teachers only. It would remove any other defence for having a knife on educational premises.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak also to my other amendments in this group. Amendment 214B is rather small; the others propose three large new clauses which I hope to sell to the Government.

On Amendment 214B, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to have an offensive weapon on any school premises, with the exception that

“it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) or (2) above to prove that he had the article or weapon in question with him … for use at work … for educational purposes … for religious reasons, or … as part of any national costume”.

My amendment suggests deleting

“for educational purposes … for religious reasons, or … as part of any national costume”.

I see no justification whatever to permit schoolchildren to have knives. What is their educational purpose? Perhaps it is to learn that they have sharp edges.

The religious exemption, I understand, is for the Sikh men and women who are under a religious obligation to wear a knife called a kirpan when they are old enough to understand its meaning. There is no specific age for that, and I stress that it is a religious artefact and is not worn as a weapon. I also stress that Sikhs using the kirpan as a weapon are extremely rare and the only documented case that I can find was of a man drawing it in self-defence when he was attacked, and he was rightly exonerated for it.

Nevertheless, we are awash with knife crime in schools. I think it sends completely the wrong signal that some young men and girls can attend school carrying or wearing a knife. It gives all the ignorant others a chance to say, “If they can carry one, why can’t I?” I stress again that Sikhs do not have a track record of using their kirpans as offensive weapons. I also say that, in my view, no religious belief can trump public safety, no matter what the religion.

Similarly, the exception for national costume must also go, as far as schoolchildren are concerned. In full dress uniform, which I wore very exceptionally, I had a sword on my left side and a dirk on my right—one drew them with contrary arms, so you were fully armed on both sides. We of course also had a sgian-dubh down our hose—our sock, for English speakers. In a civilian kilt, I would also have that black knife—the translation of sgian-dubh—down my right hose. It is a black knife not because of the colour but because it was sneaky and underhanded and you could stab your opponent with a hidden weapon he did not know about—although every single person in Scotland knew you were carrying a secret, hidden weapon down your sock. I am not sure how my dirk differed from the dirk of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and I am not sure what purpose his was supposed to be put to as a midshipman: we had better not go there. But I say that there is no justification whatever for permitting any schoolchildren to wear a sgian-dubh or any other knife as part of a national costume. Those exemptions should be rescinded.

Turning now to my principal amendments in this group, and they are related, I think the new clauses I have suggested here are terribly important. Amendment 214 lists some of the categories of offensive weapons that are so dangerous and so evil that they should have separate mention from all other offensive weapons in legislation. Amendment 214D suggests measures to stop their manufacture or importation, with some tough penalties for breaches, and the new clause proposed in Amendment 215 would create tough penalties for possession, carrying and use. The first thing the Minister and other noble Lords will say, quite rightly, is that we do not need a special category for these weapons, since they are all caught already in various laws on offensive weapons. That is entirely correct, but I shall argue that we now have such an epidemic of the use of these appalling weapons, especially machetes, that we need exemplary action to crack down on them.

The first known machete attack in this country was the barbaric murder of PC Blakelock in Broadwater Farm in 1985, where reports say that he was on the ground, curled up in a ball, screaming in agony as a machete and knife-wielding mob hacked him to death with 43 vicious wounds. No one has ever been convicted of that crime. The next big machete attack was in Wolverhampton in 1996, but it is in the last 10 years that machete attacks have really taken off. On Monday, two days ago, an 18 year-old was sentenced to 24 years for the machete murder of a man in Leeds. Also last Monday, a man was sentenced in Croydon for the murder of a 16 year-old with a machete. In Woolwich in October, two teenagers were sentenced for the machete murder of another 15 year-old kid. In September, two youths were sentenced to life imprisonment for the machete murder of a 14 year-old on a London bus. In Lincolnshire, two men were sentenced for the manslaughter with a machete of another man. In October, we all saw videos of a group of men fighting in the street with machetes, and two weeks ago similar videos were shown of a gang outside a Starbucks in east London, fighting with machetes. This did not look like the United Kingdom but downtown Kinshasa, where I see they are almost re-enacting another Rwanda massacre.

I say this carefully. Who is doing nearly all the machete killings? Why, black youths. Who are nearly all the victims who are dying? Again, black youths. This is not the time or the place to go into it, but we seem to have imported an African attitude to the use of machetes, either through some of the people coming into this country or British-born youths adopting a machete culture. Leaving aside the individual historic cases I mentioned, the generality is that police figures recently released from police forces in England and Wales following an FoI show that machetes are used in almost 700 cases every month. That is a machete attack almost every hour on average, but the true total is even higher, as the nation’s largest force, the Metropolitan Police, failed to provide statistics, saying it would take too long for staff to compile them. I am certain that the two noble Lords the former commissioners who are with us here today would have found the time to compile those statistics, especially if I had asked for them. Six other police forces failed to respond. A survey of police forces found that machetes were involved in 1,335 crime incidents in two months at the end of last year.

I have focused on heavily on machetes, since they are the new preferred weapon of choice for gangs and individuals wanting to terrorise and kill those they see as their opponents. Why take a seven-inch knife or a nine-inch carving knife from the kitchen drawer when you can get a 21-inch machete and have a much more offensive weapon? I used to have a machete myself, a handle and a blade about 21 inches long, which I would sharpen to an absolute razor’s edge. I used it for clearing brambles and brush in an overgrown orchard I had. It was a superb implement which could slash through anything. The mind boggles to think of that used on any human being.

The other particularly dangerous weapons I list in this new clause are zombie knives, obviously, and cleavers. Why cleavers? Do we have butchers on the rampage? Well, no, but the scum who murdered drummer Lee Rigby outside Woolwich Barracks used a standard meat cleaver. That is why I say in proposed new subsection (3) that the Secretary of State must be able to add new particularly dangerous weapons if the fad suddenly changes. For example, in rural farming supply shops, noble Lords will find an implement called a bill-hook. It is rather like a shorter version of a machete, but with a curved, pointed end. It is used for hedge laying, but it is not beyond the wit of thugs to buy these if we clamp down so much on machetes or other things that they cannot get them. There is no recorded incidence of a cutlass being used, but they are very similar to machetes and the bad guys will switch to them if we clamp down on everything else.

Finally, in this proposed new clause, I suggest that the Secretary of State be given a rather unusual power—which I do not think we do anywhere else in regulations—to put pictures or photos in the regulations. Look how many words it takes to define a zombie knife. Let us make it simpler by publishing representations of them as well.

I do not need to spend long on Amendment 214D, which provides for the offence of selling, manufacturing and importing of these particularly dangerous weapons. I have already made the case why they are evil, and I suggest that anyone convicted of an offence under this new clause should get up to 10 years’ imprisonment and an unlimited fine. I am not tying the judges’ hands; I can assure the Minister of total discretion to sentence up to 10 years. It must also apply to the directors and officers of a company, who should not be allowed to hide behind limited company status.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am glad that the noble Lord is relieved about that.

The serious point here is that getting the defences and exemptions under which weapons may be legal to own, import or sell under certain limited circumstances right also requires consultation—I think the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, acknowledged that. In the absence of such consultation, I suggest that the Bill is not the right place to legislate on a specific category of knives and weapons, and we risk not taking account of some important matters if we have not consulted first.

In any event, it would be possible to give effect to these proposals for further restrictions through existing regulation-making powers provided for since the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Any such regulations would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, so, again, they would be subject to debate in and approval by both Houses of Parliament.

We have debated the provisions in Chapter 1 of Part 2 which introduce new measures to provide the police with the power to require social media marketplaces and search services to take down online illegal content. I understand the honest, genuine motivation of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in tabling these amendments, but just a casual listen to the debate today shows that there are a number of issues that we need to consider, and I believe that the existing powers that we have, the actions that we have taken and the measures under the Bill will be sufficient. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, some mildly in support of my amendments and others liking the concept but pointing out the serious drafting flaws in them. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hailsham; he is right that the drafting is flawed. Any future amendments I make would need to include “legitimate and lawful use”. He pointed out that he would need to go on to the high street or to another public place to use his machete. I would have to do the same myself, with a buddleia overgrowing the road. If I had a machete, I would have to go on to the pavement to use it. Instead, I have an electric trimmer, which my wife can use. There are legitimate flaws in my drafting.

I suspect that many of my noble friends from a hereditary background have houses stuffed full of dangerous, sharp weapons—from pikes to swords—as well as armour and all the other accoutrements acquired over centuries in this great and noble land of ours, where tremendous battles have been fought to secure our freedoms since 1066. Of course they are not for public display; I accept that this too is an error in my drafting. They are there because they are owned by the family, who should not be penalised for having them.

My concept is right. There is a problem here, and I hope that if we come back to some elements of this amendment on Report, my noble friend Lord Hailsham will help me in the drafting. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, that a dirk is not included in my definition. My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier hit the nail on the head: tough sentences are required, though that may not require some of the amendments that I have suggested. I am so grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for pointing out that with the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, it was tough sentences that cracked down in Scotland. I do not want to put words into his mouth, but he said that there was then full judicial discretion. We did not have the Sentencing Council, which to me ties the hands of our judges—judges who should have full discretion to sentence as they see fit.

In some of those cases in the last few months which I quoted, people got a minimum term of 24 years or 30 years for an appalling murder, but hundreds of others who attacked people who did not die received much lesser sentences. Machete attacks have now become endemic. It is the weapon of choice for bad guys, for youths who want to commit crimes or terrorise their opponents in other gangs. We need unique and specialised exemplary action.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I am not calling for children to be criminalised. I referred to three instances, and I was wrong in suggesting removing educational uses. But I can see no justification for maintaining a religious exception and a national dress exception allowing kids to bring such knives to school. The Government are wrong to stick to that.

Introducing this has been worth while. I do not mind that my noble friend Lord Hailsham called some of it “bizarre”. What is happening on the streets of London and elsewhere in England today is bizarre. If, 20 years ago, we had said that we would see these gangs fighting on the streets outside Starbucks with machetes, we would have said, “Don’t be fanciful; it’s barking mad; it’s never going to happen”. It is happening day in, day out on our streets. It is not only bizarre; it is obscene and dangerous. Therefore, we need to take special action, exemplary action, to deal with this problem. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 214B.

Amendment 214B withdrawn.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 214F and 214G, in my name, as we move away from the regulation of weapons to retail crime and shoplifting. I will try to be brief.

In my 15 or so years as an executive at Tesco and as vice-chair of the British Retail Consortium, I spent many hours investigating and studying shoplifting and what could be done to reduce it. We used staff training, the latest waves of technology and generous business investment to combat it. I was always very worried by the wider social impact, as stolen goods were sold on to fuel drug habits and innocent shop workers were sometimes hurt in the process of trying to stop it. The truth is that these risks and their devastating effect on individuals have become much greater as society has changed and become more divided and less moral, and hence violent crime has become more of a day-to-day occurrence. As with so much else, the long Covid lockdown has made things worse, and the police have prioritised other things.

However, this Bill is full of amendments requiring the police to do more. That will put yet further pressure on the police contribution to tackling neighbourhood crimes such as shoplifting and assaults on retail workers, which frighten retail workers, especially in the smallest shops, and lead, sadly, to more shop closures on the high street. For some years I strongly supported USDAW’s campaign for a stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker. As the Minister knows, I am delighted that the Bill puts that into law. It is a good day for the Minister, given his USDAW links, and for the noble Lord, Lord Hannett of Everton, smiling over there, who represented USDAW so intelligently when I was at Tesco.

However, the Bill as drafted does not quite do the trick as it does not cover retail delivery drivers, who have also been the subject of growing aggression. This is a particular problem if the driver has to ask for ID because a juvenile under 18 is taking delivery—a flashpoint, according to a recent British Retail Consortium survey—or if there is a disagreement about what is being paid for and delivered. Last week, Tesco even announced that it was piloting giving body cameras to delivery drivers. Another point of significance is that such drivers are already covered by parallel legislation in Scotland. That is not always a recommendation, but given the national character of much of retail, I hope the Minister will agree that this alignment makes sense and accept my Amendments 214 F and 214 G. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will be very brief this time. My Amendment 214FA seeks to add hospitality venues. This is an important clause which has my full support; I simply want clarification that cafes, restaurants, pubs and bars are included in the definition of retail premises.

In UK law, “retail premises” typically refers to premises where goods are sold directly to consumers for personal use. This includes shops, supermarkets and other establishments where tangible products are offered for sale. Hospitality venues such as cafes, restaurants, pubs and bars primarily provide services: the preparation and serving of food and drink for consumption on the premises. While these venues may sell some items to take away, their main business activity is the provision of hospitality services rather than retailing goods.

UK planning law differentiates between retail and hospitality venues through the use of “use classes”, which categorise buildings and their permitted activities. Class E—commercial, business and service—includes shops, restaurants, cafés, financial services and other commercial uses. While both retail shops and hospitality venues are covered under class E, they are distinct subcategories within this class. Class E(a) refers to shops selling goods, while class E(b) refers to the

“sale of food and drink principally to visiting members of the public where consumption is mostly undertaken on the premises”,

which covers cafés, pubs and restaurants. Therefore, while cafés and restaurants fall under the same broad planning class as retail shops, they are not regarded as retail outlets in the strict sense, but rather as hospitality or food service venues.

Legislation relating to employment, health and safety, licensing and business rates may further distinguish between retail and hospitality businesses. For example, food hygiene regulations specifically address food service establishments, while retail regulations focus on the sale of goods. Under UK law, cafés and restaurants are not generally regarded as retail outlets; they are classified as hospitality venues or food service establishments. The key distinction lies in the primary activity. Selling goods is retail whereas providing food and drink services is hospitality. From what I understand, the core hospitality operations—serving meals and drinks, and providing accommodation—are not generally covered under the definition of a retail outlet. If I am wrong and Clause 37 includes cafés, bars and restaurants, then I am content that there is no problem. However, if it does not, we have a gaping hole in the law and my amendment is essential to plug it. If I am right that those are not covered, I hope the Minister will bring forward a little amendment to ensure that those workers get the same protection as workers in retail shops.

[Lord Hannett of Everton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to contribute to this debate. In fact, some months ago, I introduced a debate on retail crime. I think it is fair to say that there was support across the House—why would there not be? The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, made the point that, to some extent, this was never an adversarial debate between employers and the trade union. It is a good example of where we come together for a common cause.

In historical terms, I should say that, in 2003, USDAW, which has been referred to, introduced its Freedom From Fear campaign. It sounds very dramatic, but it was born out of necessity. Too many retail workers were being verbally and physically abused. In some ways it had become normalised. It was an acknowledgement that, on too many occasions, people working in retail were abused. This campaign has run since 2003 and has resulted in this stand-alone offence being accepted.

I congratulate the Minister, not just because he had the enlightened view to become a member of USDAW, which I should acknowledge, but because of his commitment to retail workers and to understanding the implications of being verbally and physically abused. We often see the retail store as an environment that, quite rightly, encourages people to come in, and the vast majority of the public do so. In truth, however, over the years, the trend of coming into a store and believing that you can abuse somebody has become normalised. It is not condoned by employers, and certainly not by the trade unions, but the £200 threshold, to some extent, gave licence. Even some of the perpetrators would say, “Don’t worry, if it’s less than £200 there’ll be no action taken”.

Retail workers, of whom there are just under 3 million, do an exceptional job; reference was made to the pandemic. Abuse can never be a part of the job. It is a fundamental right to be able to go to work safe and come home safe. That is why I congratulate the Government and the Minister on their commitment to this matter. I could read out lots of statistics about the effects of retail crime; I will not do so. However, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the USDAW campaign, to retail crime and to its impact. Everyone has stores within their area. If you talk to shopworkers, you will see that this is very much an evidence-based campaign.

When I talk about statistics, I am not talking about thefts from a store; I am talking about the fact that behind every statistic, there is an individual. Some of those individuals who were physically abused never went back to the workplace. Having been abused two or three times, they did not have the confidence to return. That is a shame. Maybe it reflects the way society has gone, as we have referred to.

I welcome this stand-alone offence, and I do not want to detract from it. It is 22 years, at least, in the making. A lot of effort has gone in. I am proud of the fact that this Government have understood it and have done it, although I have to say to the Minister that the question of where the Act will stop has been referred to in respect of this offence. I am proud that this offence has been accepted, because it matters. I say to my noble friend the Minister that USDAW wants me to send a big thanks for the effort that has gone in to achieve this outcome.

However, I want to make a request of the Minister; I hope that he will consider it favourably. I would like to meet him to consider some of the implications of the further reach of retail offences. I would like that meeting to be with my general secretary, Joanne Thomas, and maybe people from the Home Office. I make that request on a without prejudice basis, but it would give me the opportunity to express some further considerations and concerns that have been raised in this House.

I will leave it at that but express my support for the work that has been done on this Bill. Hopefully, when this Bill takes effect with the stand-alone offence, USDAW members will feel now that it has been accepted.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I agree entirely with the noble Lord. This is slightly extraneous to the amendment but, wearing his USDAW hat, will he please campaign against automatic tills, which we helpless disabled people find absolutely appalling? Will he commend shops such as Booths in the north of England, which has absolutely refused to have automatic tills and insist on having tellers at every one? It is a wonderful way to shop.

[Lord Hannett of Everton (Lab)]

We can have a conversation about that at some stage. I thank the noble Lord.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We will reflect on that. It is a helpful suggestion, if colleagues are happy to have a joint meeting. I would also like to involve the Policing Minister, who has an interest in this matter as a whole.

I want to place on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton. They have campaigned very strongly as representatives of the supermarkets, in this case Tesco, and the workforce. My noble friend has campaigned for many years on this issue. Freedom from Fear is a campaign that Paddy Lillis, the previous general secretary, Joanne Thomas, the current general secretary, and my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton, the general secretary before Paddy Lillis, worked on for a long time. It has been brought to them by members of the union as an important issue. It is worth putting that on record, and we can examine how we organise the discussion and consultation in due course.

Assault on anyone, including delivery drivers and transport staff, is wholly unacceptable. Everyone should be protected from assault. Under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, common assault has a maximum sentence of six months in prison and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 covers serious violence, grievous bodily harm and actual bodily harm.

I come back to the reason why I have campaigned on this issue for many years. Retail workers have been at the forefront of upholding much of the legislation. They uphold legislation on solvent abuse sales, tobacco sales, knife sales, drink sales and a range of other issues. They are also very much the first port of call on shop theft and the issues that the noble Baroness mentioned. USDAW figures show that 10% of staff have reported a physical attack on them in the last year alone; that seems to me to be a very strong reason why the Government have brought forward this amendment. There is a wealth of evidence to back the position that there is a significant problem specific to retail workers because of the nature of that work.

Clauses 37 and 38 provide for the bespoke offence of assaulting a retail worker. They also place a duty on the courts when sentencing an offender to make a criminal behaviour order; shop theft may often be linked to drug and alcohol abuse issues as a whole. Our definition of a retail worker is intentionally narrow, given the vital need to provide legal clarity and ensure there is no ambiguity for courts in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker when impacted by their job.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned the hospitality sector. This sector is specifically excluded, but if he looks at the definition of retail premises in Clause 37(3), he can see that it would be open to a judge to determine what might be included. For example, cafes might have stalls inside the shop, so that could be potentially defined as a retail premise as well. There is no specific offence, and I would not wish to extend it to the hospitality sector, but a judge could potentially interpret some aspects of hospitality being within the retail sector under Clause 37(3).

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I think the Minister’s remarks make quite a telling case. In particular, I was struck by the point that retail workers, because of the things they sell—cigarettes and tobacco—are more on the front line than people serving chicken nuggets, or whatever. I accept that there is a very good point that the retail sector needs to be guarded specifically, possibly differently from the hospitality sector. I shall look carefully at what he said.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Delivery drivers cover a wide range of sectors and roles and therefore including them could potentially cause an issue with definition and therefore with the courts using the legislation. Again, my noble friend and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell of Beeston and Lady Neville-Rolfe, have put that case. I am happy to meet them, and we can examine and discuss and hear what they have to say outside the Committee.

With regard to public-facing workers, which the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also mentioned, the previous Government—again to their credit—introduced a statutory aggravating factor for assault against any public-facing worker via Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. I am advised that that would include, for example, train staff, and the aggravating factor would apply in assault cases when an offence is committed against those providing a public service, performing a public duty, or providing a service to the public. There may be areas of definition, but I hope that the issue that the noble Baroness has raised ensures that the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence and will send a clear message that violence and abuse towards any public-facing worker will not be tolerated.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendments 215 and 216 respectively. I have great respect for both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. The noble Baroness’s background means that she knows more than most about the corrosive experience of shoplifting and the effect it can have on those working in the retail industry. The noble Lord’s distinguished career as a police officer gives him great authority to speak about the challenges to police forces and their obligations to society that they should be fulfilling. I reassure both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that we are all on the same side on this. This is one of these situations where I am very keen to work with Members from all sides of your Lordships’ Committee to ensure that we deal with this social and economic menace efficiently and effectively.

On Amendment 215, I will repeat what I said a few moments ago: this Government take repeat and prolific offending extremely seriously. However, sentencing in individual cases must be a matter for our independent judiciary, and it must take into account all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the statutory purposes of sentencing. Your Lordships will, of course, be aware that the courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders.

As some of your Lordships may be aware, until relatively recently I was a judge in the Crown Court, and I sentenced my fair share of shoplifters. There was a complete spectrum of those offenders, from the destitute, homeless young mother stealing nappies for her baby at one end to the shameless, organised shoplifting gangs who terrify and terrorise shop workers. As the sentencing judge, there was a toolbox of disposals of increasing seriousness available to me, so that I could match the appropriate sentence to the offender on a case-by-case basis. These included discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences with requirements and custodial sentences where appropriate.

Previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor, with the sentencing guidelines making it clear that, when determining the sentence, sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions and the time elapsed since the previous conviction. But that repeats what is, in fact, common sense and what every sentencer knows. From my own experience, I can tell the Committee that the more frequently a defendant appears before the court, having gone out and done exactly the same thing that he or she had just been sentenced for, the more exasperated the judge becomes, who then starts imposing tougher and tougher sentences.

Despite the popular caricatures, judges do live in the real world. While sentencing a shoplifter to prison as a standard proposition will seem harsh, it can and does happen if the court concludes that there is no other way of stopping them. Importantly, this Government will introduce a whole range of options that will ramp up the community and suspended sentence powers for judges. In other words, the toolbox is getting fancier and more extensive.

As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, sentencers are already able to impose a robust range of electronic monitoring requirements on anyone serving their sentence in the community. Where the court imposes curfews, exclusion zones and/or an alcohol ban, offenders must be electronically monitored, subject to individual suitability. I note the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the effect on police resources. However, quite a lot of the monitoring is done by the Probation Service. As the noble Baroness is probably aware, the Government are putting a lot of additional resources back into the Probation Service to enable it to do this.

Soon judges will be able to add driving bans and bans on offenders attending pubs, bars, clubs and desirable social activities like sports and concerts, as well as some tough new geographical restriction zones, to the existing tools.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I love that the Minister said that judges will be able to do that. Will she use the new powers, which I think the Attorney-General is taking, to overrule the Sentencing Council if it tries to dilute those powers?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

This is probably not the moment for me to embark on that one. This, of course, is simply about agreeing with the Sentencing Council’s guidelines in individual cases, not overriding them. I am confident that agreement will be reached, but, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, perhaps that is one I will deal with another day.

We are also about to expand the intensive supervision courts to deal with the root causes of these crimes by making repeat offenders come back in front of the same judge on regular occasions to see how they are doing. That is what is going to be available to judges.

Let us look at the other side of the coin for a moment. Many shoplifters have complicated backgrounds and complex needs, and sometimes electronic monitoring may not be an appropriate requirement to add to an offender’s sentence, even if this is their third or more offence. Many prolific offenders are homeless and lead chaotic lives. Even getting them to turn up to court on time can be a significant challenge. Imposing an electronic monitoring requirement in some of these cases would be setting the defendant up to fail instead of helping to improve the outcome for the perpetrators and victims of crime and the public at large. It is all entirely case specific, and the judge is the right person to make that decision.

I am proud of our judiciary, which is working hard under very difficult circumstances at the moment, and I am asking noble Lords to trust our magnificent judges, because they do understand the problems that repeat shoplifting can cause and they understand the powers available to them to sentence individual offenders appropriately. This measure would put unnecessary constraints on them and make an already difficult job harder. I can also assure noble Lords that we are continuing to work with cross-government partners and police forces to consider new ways of targeting and tackling persistent and prolific offenders.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for having given my Amendment 235A a positive acclamation. However, I did not move it because it struck me that the amendment we are now debating is actually better than the one I tabled. Therefore, there seemed no point in having a double debate. I listened very carefully to the excellent exposition of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, which is really important.

I came to this having looked after three children’s homes when I was a GP. I became suspicious that there was something funny going on in one of them but could never put a finger on it or get social services to recognise it. However, I am sure there was, because one Christmas the children in that home set fire to it and burnt it down—but I really do not know what was happening, and I never found out.

It is terrifying the layers with which children can be enticed, encouraged and supported into criminal activity and then become quite expert at it. They are terribly intimidated and frightened for their lives. The intimidation may not be overt but covert. They have threats made against them, their families, for their lives, or of mutilation. They get beaten up and all kinds of terrible things happen. That locks them further into a world of criminality.

It therefore seemed that this would be the third side of the triangle, if you like. We talk about prosecuting the exploiter, and we talk about prosecuting the child for whatever crimes they have committed. Let us be honest: these are sometimes very difficult children. They are severely emotionally damaged, very difficult to get close to, and will not disclose to people in authority what is really happening to them, because they are so terrified. Therefore, they may be unwilling to disclose information to the police. Then, we have this gap which still leaves them liable and open to exploitation.

It was with that thought that this amendment, this concept, came forward, to try to close that gap a little bit. I hope when the Minister sums up—and perhaps criticises this clause, because I anticipate we might be told it is not necessary—that he explains what harm such an order would do. I cannot see how it would make anything worse, but it may certainly make things better, and that was the sentiment behind the support of the Opposition Front Bench for this concept.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, when I first saw this new clause, I did not pay too much attention, but having looked at it in more detail, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, since I think they are on to something here. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, has confirmed that. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who has a long track record of fighting for the rights of children, from trying to save the children’s playground in Victoria Tower Gardens from the Holocaust Memorial Bill to his track record of tabling amendments to this Bill and others.

Researching the Casey review recently with regard to my amendments on grooming gangs prompted me to look at this again. Then, I realised that a CEPO would be valid in dealing with some of the problems caused by those grooming gangs. The criminal exploitation of children is a real, growing concern across the UK, with increasing numbers of young people being coerced, manipulated or forced into criminal activity by adults or older peers.

As the Committee knows, these vulnerable children suffer significant harm, both physically and psychologically, and often find themselves trapped in cycles of offending, unable to escape the influence of exploiters. In response to this issue, the concept of a criminal exploitation protection order is possibly a very sensible idea to offer targeted legal protection for children who have been victims of criminal exploitation.

Existing legal frameworks, while robust in certain areas, do not sufficiently address the unique vulnerabilities of children subject to criminal exploitation. Traditional criminal justice responses may inadvertently criminalise victims—as we have seen all too frequently with the grooming gangs cases—or fail to disrupt the exploitative relationships at the heart of their offending.

A CEPO could fill this gap by prioritising the welfare and protection of exploited children, recognising them as victims rather than solely perpetrators. The order would empower authorities to intervene proactively, preventing further harm and breaking the cycle of exploitation.

The details are not in the Bill, and the regulations will set out the details, but I would expect and hope that the regulations may do the following. On prohibitions, the CEPO could prohibit children from engaging in specified activities that are linked to their exploitation, such as associating with certain individuals, visiting particular locations or possessing items used in criminal activity.

On the positive requirements for the children, the order may require them to take positive steps such as attending counselling, engaging with support services or participating in educational programmes designed to build resilience and reduce vulnerability. Those are just a few examples, but I hope that the regulations would detail a whole range of things that children could be stopped from doing and encourage them to do good things.

Importantly, this is a holistic approach: by combining restrictions on the one hand and supportive measures on the other, the CEPO could address both the immediate risks and underlying factors that contribute to continued exploitation. CEPOs could prevent further harm, as the order would be seen as a protective barrier, reducing the likelihood of children being drawn back into criminal activity and shielding them from exploiters.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

I think I know what the Minister may say, not only because I have seen these things before but because I have heard what Dame Diana Johnson, the Minister in the other place, had to say. The answer will be that the Government are sympathetic to the issue but feel that that this is not the right place to deal with it, or that it is already covered; however, there is something to be said for including something in the Bill. A lot of the issues dealt with in the Modern Slavery Act were already covered, but we put it all together into that Act. This is a good example of that approach. The Government made, not a commitment but a vague suggestion that they might bring something forward during the passage of the Bill, and there will be people both in Parliament and outside who will continue to campaign on this issue. If we could somehow get something on to the statute book, it would be to the benefit of everybody. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lord, I focused on this new clause when I saw my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge’s name on it. When I was Opposition Chief Whip, among the many fixtures and fittings I inherited in the office was the MP for Uxbridge, John Randall. Although I was Chief Whip, I became his understudy, and to this day I follow his lead on many of the amendments he tables, particularly on biodiversity and so on. So when I saw his name, I thought, “There is something in this and I had better look at it”. My noble friend has tabled a very important amendment and put his finger on the appalling abuse of children in the world. It is a significant and widespread issue which serves as a pipeline to modern slavery and other forms of exploitation globally.

My noble friend’s proposal seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include orphanage trafficking—specifically, the recruitment of children into overseas residential care institutions purely for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation. As he said, orphanage trafficking is a form of child exploitation whereby children are deliberately separated from their families and recruited into residential care institutions, not for their welfare but to generate profit. This hidden practice is driven by greed and the profit motive, with children being used as commodities to attract charitable donations and international funding or to facilitate voluntourism. In many instances, children are not without parents but are falsely labelled as orphans to increase the institution’s appeal. The problem is as extensive as my noble friend has said.

There are an estimated 5.4 million children worldwide living in orphanages and other residential care institutions. Research consistently shows that over 80% of these children have at least one living parent. Orphanages, particularly in developing countries, are often set up and run as businesses, with the children as the “product”. Orphanage directors and “child-finders” often target poor, low-education families in rural areas, making false promises of education and a better life in exchange for the children.

The exact scale of orphanage trafficking is difficult to quantify due to a lack of data, poor government oversight of many unregistered facilities and the clandestine nature of the crime. Children in these institutions are often untracked, making them more susceptible to exploitation. The links between institutions and child trafficking have been formally recognised in recent years by the United Nations General Assembly and the US Government’s Trafficking in Persons Report, which highlights the growing international concern.

Children in these institutions face various forms of modern slavery and abuse, including financial exploitation, with the children being used to elicit donations from well-intentioned tourists and volunteers. This can involve forcing them to pose as orphans or perform for visitors, or keeping them in deliberately poor conditions to evoke sympathy. Then there is sexual exploitation—children are vulnerable to sexual abuse by staff, volunteers and organised criminal groups targeting these facilities. Then there is forced labour: children being forced to perform labour such as working on a director’s land, doing excessive domestic chores, or begging on the streets. Then there is illicit adoption: in some cases, children are recruited for the purpose of illicit, fraudulent adoption, with documentation falsified to facilitate the process and generate profit.

This is an evil trade, and it is well organised. These so-called child-finders lure families into giving up their children through deception, coercion or payment. Gatekeeping procedures are bypassed or manipulated, often by falsely declaring children as abandoned or creating fraudulent documents. The child’s identity is altered—the child’s name is changed to establish an orphan identity and make them untraceable by their biological family. The child is maintained in the institution long term for ongoing exploitation and profit generation through donations and sex tourism. My noble friend’s amendment deserves Government support.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support this amendment. As the Minister might notice, it is not intended to be dealt with under the Crime and Policing Bill but under the Modern Slavery Act. That means, in a sense, it is probably simpler for the Government to accept it, because it is an improvement to an Act of 10 years ago. I am not quite sure why, oddly enough, the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and I did not think about it in those days, but it was not raised.

When I was a judge, I had the specific example of a child being put into an orphanage by their father, with the intention of a large amount of money being paid eventually for that child to be adopted. The child was in the process of being adopted in England by an American family who came to England. The whole set-up was so unsatisfactory that the child was removed and went into care. The question then was whether the child should go back to the natural parent—the father—but the problem was that he had put the child into the orphanage.

This is a very serious issue that is seriously underestimated and not well known. The very least the Government could do is to amend the Modern Slavery Act.

--- Later in debate ---

While I am on my feet, I will add my support to all the amendments in this group. I highlight in particular those tabled by my noble friend Lady Cash. They are necessary to address the deficiencies in the criminal justice system and the other bodies that have been highlighted in the Casey review, when it comes to safeguarding victims and potential victims of child sexual abuse, whether it is rape-gang connected or a different pattern of activity. I also support Amendment 271B in the names of my noble friends on the Front Bench, dealing with the rape of a child. Again, this was something that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, argued for: she said the law should be changed to close the loophole whereby penetrative sex with a child is not always classed as rape. I think most people in the country will think it is absolute insanity that this is not called rape. A child cannot consent to sex. It should be rape. It should be called rape. We should prosecute those rapists as rapists, and we should treat children as children. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the proposed new clauses in my Amendments 271C, 271D and 271E. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Maclean on her excellent amendments. She also has the advantage of that wonderful name of the great Highland clan the Macleans of Duart, which I used to have myself.

I was inspired to table my amendments when I read properly the brilliant but frightening report from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock. I had skim-read the media reports and the government comments on it when it was published, but it was not until recently, when I read the report properly, that I had confirmed to me the full horror of the conspiracy by those in lawful authority who had covered up child rape for the last 30 years. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said in blunt terms what we all knew was the case but were afraid to say in case we were accused of racism or Islamophobia. We could all see from the various court convictions that 90% of the perpetrators were Pakistani Muslim males and the victims were almost exclusively young white girls.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, pointed out that around 500,000 children a year are likely to experience sexual abuse of some kind. The police recorded data shows just over 100,000 offences of child sexual abuse and exploitation recorded in 2024, with around 60% of these being contact offences. We know that the sex crimes reported to the police are just the tip of the iceberg. The national police data confirms that the majority of victims of child sexual exploitation are girls—78% in 2023. The most common age for victims is between 10 and 15 years-old—57% are between 10 and 15 years old, for God’s sake. Putting that together suggests that, of just those reported to the police, we have at least 60,000 little children every year being victims of contact sexual abuse—and what an intriguing term that is. Let us start calling it out for what it really is.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:

“That term ‘group-based child sexual exploitation’ is actually a sanitised version of what it is. I want to set it out in unsanitised terms: we are talking about multiple sexual assaults committed against children by multiple men on multiple occasions; beatings and gang rapes. Girls having to have abortions, contracting sexually transmitted infections, having children removed from them at birth”.


These children were not abused by these Pakistani rape gangs. They were raped, raped and raped again by people who believed that the girls who were not Muslim were just prostitutes, deserving to be raped. Therefore, I say that “child abuse” is far too mild a term to describe the evil of what is happening. Abuse can expand over a wide range. It can be heavy smacking, not feeding a child property or failing to give love, care and attention. These things are bad in themselves, but we must make sure that we use the right terminology when talking about rape and sexual assault.

That is why I have tabled the proposed new clause in my Amendment 271C. The important words in it are “investigating authority”. Of course, after investigation, if the police find evidence of rape or sexual assault, the accused will be charged with those specific offences. The CPS will also use those correct terms. However, we have seen, time and time again, that the police, in their initial statements, say they are investigating “child abuse” and have a person or persons in custody with regard to “child abuse”. That is what the media are told and that is the message we get on our screens and in the press. By the time the police eventually say the person or persons have been charged with rape, the damage has been done. We all relax somewhat: just a bit of abuse, nothing to worry about.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:

“That is why I want the legislation on rape tightened up so that an adult having penetrative sex with a child under 16 is rape, no excuses, no defence. I believe many jaws across the country would drop if it was widely known that doing so is called anything but that”.


I am pleased to see that my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower have tabled Amendment 271B, which does exactly that. My proposed new clause is complementary, in a way: if a person is under investigation for child rape, let the police say that at the outset and not give the impression that it is something lesser.

The new clause proposed in my Amendment 271D sets out details on the full and proper investigation of historical child sexual abuse. I have used the commonly used term “historical”, but I do not like it either: it gives the impression that it is something way in the distant past, like the Battle of Waterloo. The proper terminology would be, “investigation of past child sexual abuse cases which were not properly investigated at the time”, since that is what we are talking about. It is not a very sexy title, but that is the reality.

I know that the National Crime Agency is looking at some of these past cases, and nearly 1,300 previously closed investigations involving allegations of group-based child sexual abuse and exploitation are currently being reviewed in Operation Beaconport, but my proposed new clause gives them wider authority.

We have all heard about Rochdale, Rotherham, Aylesbury and Telford, but there are at least 30 local authorities where child rape by gangs took place. Apparently, 23 police forces have submitted cases to the NCA, and the Met itself is looking at 9,000 cases. However, it seems that the NCA is looking only at police forces, when the conspiracy to not investigate and to cover up was led in many cases by elected councillors, local authorities and children’s homes.

I quote the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, again:

“I met many victims of child sexual exploitation when I conducted the inspection of Rotherham Council in 2016. I was outraged, shocked and appalled at their treatment—not only at the hands of their vile abusers, but at the treatment afforded them by those who were supposedly there to help, and to be accountable, such as their police force and their council. Those responsible in Rotherham denied any wrongdoing and tried to shirk accountability”.


She went on to say that

“I assumed we would all wake up to the fact that these were abused children and it would mean that the police, councils, health and other agencies would do their damnedest to make sure these victims were given as much care, respect and chance at justice as possible”.

Note her words: she thought that not just the police but

“councils, health and other agencies would do their damnedest”

to stop it, but they did not. In fact, we have seen from many cases that councils, councillors and their staff did their damnedest to conspire with some police forces to turn a blind eye, reduce and drop charges and cover up. The excuse was not to offend community relations and prosecute the mainly Pakistani men doing the raping.

So it is essential that the NCA, since there is no one better qualified to do it, has the powers in my proposed new clause to investigate all persons in lawful authority in the organisations I list in proposed new subsections (1) and (5), not just the police. These are

“staff of local authorities of whatever rank … elected council members of local authorities … police officers of all ranks … any police support staff … owners or managers of homes for children in care”.

Of course, the proposed new clause gives the NCA powers to get all papers and emails and sets penalties for any person trying to obstruct its inquiries.

Finally, the new clause proposed in my Amendment 271E is on offences and penalties. I need not go through them all, but I have listed eight different offences, ranging from failure to investigate and dismissing charges improperly up to and including bribes or sexual favours and the conspiracy to cover everything up.

I did not conjure these up from thin air: all these suggested offences are based on reports of crime cases and convictions, and these were allegations made in court and accepted as truthful—but then nothing was done about them. The persons were convicted of child rape or sexual assault, but then no one investigated the police or the council officers who failed to investigate or covered it up, and we have tens of thousands of cases which never got to court because of failures of investigation and good cover-ups.

Where any of these people were acting alone, I suggest a sentence of up to 10 years. However, where there was a conspiracy, with any of these people acting in concert to commit any of the offences in my list, the only penalty, in my opinion, can be up to life imprisonment. This has to be separate from the offence of perverting the course of justice, where the maximum penalty is generally seven years. I think that the heaviest sentence ever given for perverting the course of justice was 12 years for someone who planted incriminating evidence on an innocent person.

There is already a power to remove all or part of a police officer’s pension if the officer has been sentenced for a crime. Then the Home Secretary can initiate a procedure. We need to make it clear that that power can be used against any police officers and local authority employees who may be convicted of any of the crimes I have listed.

Some, perhaps many, noble Lords and the Minister will say that these penalties are far too draconian. Of course, they are draconian, and they need to be. What we are looking at are some of the vilest crimes committed against children short of murder.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:

“When those same girls get older, they face long-term physical and mental health impacts. Sometimes they have criminal convictions for actions they took while under coercion. They have to live with fear and the constant shadow over them of an injustice which has never been righted—the shame of not being believed. And, with a criminal justice system that can re-traumatise them all over again, often over many years. With an overall system that compounds and exacerbates the damage; rarely acknowledges its failures to victims. They never get to see those people who were in positions of power and let them down be held accountable … What makes child sexual exploitation particularly reprehensible, is that is consists of both formal and informal groups of men preying on girls, coercing, manipulating and deceiving them in pursuit of sexual gratification and power”.


News reports and inquests have detailed specific instances, such as the case of Charlotte Tetley, a survivor of the Rochdale grooming scandal who, after years of mental health struggles and self-harm, took her own life as an adult. Another victim, an anonymous woman, described having

“a lot of problems in the past, suicide attempts and drinking”

due to the abuse she suffered as a vulnerable teenager. Major studies and reports consistently find that survivors of child sexual abuse are at a significantly higher risk of suicide attempts than the general population. All those abusers have escaped any investigation or sanction and are in the same vile box as the rapists who raped all those children. They need to be investigated and prosecuted and to get exemplary sentences.

I am conscious that I am exceeding the 10-minute limit, but I hope the Committee will bear with me because there a couple more minutes to go. I promise that in the next debate I will speak for less than 30 seconds.

Over the past 30 years, 60,000 girls have been raped every year. We are appalled at Ukraine, where Putin has kidnapped 20,000 people and soldiers have raped about 4,000 over the past three years.

Finally, I look forward to hearing the wise words of my noble friend Lady Cash. It was two or three years before she qualified as a barrister that we created a precedent for prosecuting and bringing to justice those who committed crimes in the past. We passed, by the Parliament Act, the War Crimes Act 1991, after this House blocked it for many good reasons. We prosecuted one person under it, a 78 year-old Belarusian SS man called Anthony Sawoniuk. He murdered 18 Jews—well, he murdered a lot more than 18 Jews, but those are the ones we got names for—and we punished him. He was convicted and given a life sentence in grade C Norwich Prison, with three meals a day and his healthcare needs taken care of, and he died peacefully at age 84. Of course, the only appropriate punishment for him would have been if he appeared at Nuremburg and was hanged with all the others. We have a precedent for going back 50 years to bring to justice a war criminal who was not even British at the time it was done, so I hope that we will accept my noble friend’s view that we need to look back at historical cases and bring them forward.

Penultimately, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, talked about taxis. I am afraid we have not got an amendment on taxis, but I want to get one. Let me conclude with these words from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey,

“one thing is abundantly clear; we as a society owe these women a debt. They should never have been allowed to have suffered the appalling abuse and violence they went through as children. This is especially so for those who were in the ‘care’ of local authorities, where the duty to protect them was left in the hands of professionals on the state’s behalf”.

These women are now in our care. It is our duty in this Parliament to ensure that they get justice for the appalling crimes they suffered.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, and I shall speak to the four amendments in my name. Those are in two parts. Amendments 288A and 288B are directed to the reporting of child sexual abuse and child criminal exploitation. The purpose of the amendments is to act. We have to actually do something since we have had so many reviews and inquiries.

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With respect, I have even greater concerns about Amendment 271E. The noble Lord prayed in aid Nuremberg, but I say to him that his amendment is fundamentally at odds with the rule of law and the long-established principle, enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that no one can face punishment for acts which were not criminal at the time they were committed. Just days after the Constitution Committee of this House published an important and timely report on the rule of law, I hope that the noble Lord will reflect on that and reconsider his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Why, then, was it legitimate to pass the War Crimes Act, bringing to justice someone who committed crimes, not even in this country, 50 years ago?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has made his case. I have put my view. If he wishes to examine it further, we can do so in due course. I understand that he wants to bring people to justice. So do I, but the approach we want to take is different from his, and we will have to accept that.

Amendment 271B, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and Amendment 271C, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would give effect to recommendation 1 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, that the law should be changed so that adults penetrating a child aged under 16 are charged with rape. As I have said, the Government have accepted this recommendation and have committed to changing the law. I reassure noble Lords that we are working fast to consider how that law change should be made. We are discussing this. I met the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as part of that work and I will update Parliament soon about our proposed approach but, at the moment, I hope that the noble and learned Lord accepts that we are committed to that legislation and will table it as soon as time allows.

Amendment 271C, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would mean that someone suspected of or charged with a sexual offence against a child that involved penetration would be described as having committed rape, whether the penetration was penile or non-penile, and regardless of what the offence is actually called in legislation. It would also mean that a wide range of other non-penetrative offending behaviour would be referred to simply as sexual assault. I do not think that that meets the intention of the recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as it would not substantially change criminal law. Additionally, the difference in how offences are labelled in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and mandating how enforcement agencies then refer to those offences could lead to operational confusion, which I hope the noble Lord would seek to avoid.

Amendment 271B, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, which I have already mentioned, would create a new offence of rape which would apply when an adult penetrates with their penis the vagina, anus or mouth of a child aged 13 to 15. The offence would not require proof of an absence of consent or reasonable belief. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who spoke to it on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that the Government are committed to making this change in law. We have accepted the recommendations of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and we strongly agree with the sentiment behind the amendment. However, we are also aware of the need to ensure a robust framework of sexual offences, which must work effectively across all types of child sexual abuse. This will be a significant change to the framework and, as such, if the noble Lord will allow me, we need to discuss it with the police and prosecutors to make sure that they have the tools needed to bring abusers to justice. When we have done that and taken those considerations into account, we will change the law, and we will update Parliament when we do that. I hope he can accept that intention.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her Amendments 288A and 288B. These overlap with the provisions in Chapter 2 of Part 5, which provide for a duty to report, which we will come on to later; she noted and accepted that. We believe, after extensive consultation with the relevant sectors, that the model in that chapter is the appropriate one to adopt. Again, we can debate that later, and I am sure we will, but that is the Government’s view at the moment.

Amendment 288B seeks to create a criminal offence specifically in respect of concealment by public officials. I am mindful that the type of offence proposed by this amendment may overlap with existing statutory provision, including obstruction of justice offences. Later, we will come on to consider the offence of preventing or deterring a reporter from carrying out their duty in Clause 79, and it will be part of the appropriate way forward at that stage.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, also tabled Amendments 288C and 288D, which are about the collection of the ethnicity and nationality data of child sexual abuse offenders and victims. I note what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said. The recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, is to work alongside the police to establish improvements which are required to assist the collection and publication of this data. We have accepted that recommendation. This includes reviewing and improving the existing data that the police collect, as well as considering future legislative measures if required. The objective the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, has set is one that we have accepted. We are working through that at the moment and, although it may not be satisfactory today, it is an objective to which she and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, can hold us to account.

This is an important debate. I think we are at one on these things, but it is the Government’s firm view that most of the amendments are not the way forward or need further refinement along the lines that I have already outlined to the Committee. As I have said, the Government are committed to changing the law in relation to rape. We will take away amendments and consider this further for Report.

Given these caveats, let us go back to where we started on this wide-ranging group, which is whether we should have a statutory timescale for the inquiry. Going back to the lead amendment in this group, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, will withdraw her amendment because we are trying to do this as speedily as possible. The converse impact of her amendment may well be to create a further delay to a process that the Government are determined to get down as quickly as possible, as the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, said, to land the inquiry and get further recommendations to tighten up areas in which we need to reduce—and, we hope, stop—the number of further victims of these awful crimes.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

258A: Clause 56, page 71, line 1, leave out paragraph (a)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to remove the possibility of offences under this section being tried in a magistrate’s court.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, before speaking to my Amendment 258A, I say in the nicest possible way to the Government Whip, the noble Lord, Lord Katz, that he must not get overexcited about a 10-minute advisory timescale. My noble friend Lady Cash had three major new clauses tabled; I had three major new clauses tabled. I decided not to degroup any of them, out of decency to the House, but I was limited to 10 minutes.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think I have ever given an indication the noble Lord could not speak, but there was a 13-minute contribution on a 10-minute latitude.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson; I was not referring to him. It was the Government Whip who was getting very agitated about my comments. I could have spoken for a lot longer if I had degrouped my amendments, but I am not going to do that.

Quite simply, Clause 56 lists all the crimes in Part 1 of Schedule 6 that are relevant to convicting someone of controlling another person’s home for criminal purposes. Schedule 6 is about two pages of big issues—very large crimes—which are completely inappropriate for a summary trial. This is about hijacking someone else’s home, where the homeowner is kept prisoner. That is such big stuff that it should not be triable by summary but only in a Crown Court.

I beg to move—after one minute and 21 seconds.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we welcome government Amendment 262, which recognises that cases of cuckooing often involve a complex web of coercive control. The person who seems to be in charge may actually be being manipulated or exploited by somebody else, and this addresses that complexity. However, while I understand the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and recognise all too well the potential life-changing harm caused by cuckooing, we are not minded to support restricting the trial venue in that way.

Magistrates’ courts provide quicker access to justice for victims and less delay than Crown Courts, particularly given the current backlogs. This is particularly important as cuckooing is linked to ongoing exploitation, with offenders often moving on to repeat the offence elsewhere, so fast action to stop the creation of more victims may in some cases be the more sensible option. Magistrates’ courts can also be less intimidating for vulnerable victims, supporting them to testify. Many other exploitation and safeguarding offences can be tried either way, allowing the specific facts of each case to determine the appropriate court. Imposing a blanket restriction on trial venue risks delaying justice, undermines established practice, and limits judicial discretion.

The pattern of coercion and control is at the heart of all these issues, whether we are talking about the exploitation of vulnerable children or adults. The evidence shows that women—as well as children—who are coerced into offending, often by traffickers or abusive partners, are in practice more often punished than protected. Too many victims of coercive control are still unfairly prosecuted for offences linked to their own abuse. Many female victims do not report to the police for fear of being criminalised, and that concern is well-founded. If, for example, drugs are being stored or grown in their flat, it is all too often the woman who is prosecuted. The statistics bear this out: around 70% of women in prison are victims of coercion or domestic violence.

Turning to the issue of coerced internal concealment, Amendment 259 links the new offences of causing internal concealment and cuckooing, making it clearer and easier to prosecute these serious and often related behaviours. Coerced internal concealment, whereby a person hides items such as drugs inside their bodies, is a particularly stark illustration of the abuse of power. Anyone who puts another person’s life at risk in this way should be subject to the harshest of penalties, so we support the introduction of this new offence.

I take this opportunity to raise an issue which, regrettably and surprisingly, remains absent from the Bill. In the past five years in England and Wales, a child has been subjected to an intimate police search every 14 hours on average. Black children are four times more likely to be strip-searched compared to their proportion of the population. Half these searches lead to no further action.

In opposition, the Government promised stronger regulation, including a statutory duty to notify parents, which should be the bare minimum. Although a consultation began in April 2024, there have been no firm proposals since, which is disappointing given an earlier commitment from the former Home Secretary to new mandatory rules and safeguards being

“put in place as a matter of urgency”.

That pledge followed a series of recommendations from the IOPC, including a call to amend the law so that police forces are required to make a safeguarding referral for any child subjected to a search involving the exposure of intimate parts. It also called for clearer guidance, enhanced training, greater consistency across police forces and, again, for these reforms to be implemented “quickly”.

Some 18 months later, some forces have improved practice and made more safeguarding referrals, but there is still no legal requirement. The Children’s Commissioner confirms that poor strip search practice is widespread and is not limited to any one force or region; failures include not having an appropriate adult present. Can the Minister confirm that a timescale is in place for the implementation of these recommendations? If not, will the Government consider amending the Bill to reflect the need for urgent action?

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I hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord will therefore be content to withdraw his amendment and support the Government’s amendments.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, that was a good little 16-minute debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that I rather admire his style in this House—I hope that does not damage his future career. There are many Ministers who are able, but in addition he brings a style of being decent, nice, pleasant in the way he deals with debates, thorough and meticulous, patient and even long-suffering. I rather admire the way he actually replies in detail to our amendments; his initial reaction might be to say, “What a load of rubbish!”, but he does not do that and is kind and courteous. I appeal to him: could he please have a word with his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and teach him how to be as nice and decent as he is? Turning to the reply from the noble Lord, Lord Katz, I still think that he was wrong and I was right, but, nevertheless, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 258A withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

New Section 11ZB(3) to be inserted by Clause 82 provides the perfect escape clause for such a defendant and is unworthy of the Bill. We support the proposals in Amendment 289. I am mindful of the argument from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for why Clause 82 should not stand part and keen to see something that will work in law.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I think we all welcome the concept of Clause 82, because it provides a significant step forward towards justice for survivors of child sexual abuse. By removing the limitation period, the provision acknowledges the unique barriers facing victims in coming forward after many years of abuse.

Let us be clear: we all agree that child sexual abuse is a crime marked by profound trauma, secrecy and manipulation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, pointed out, survivors often require years, possibly decades, to process their experience and feel able to seek justice. The limitation periods, while serving certain legal purposes, have historically denied victims their day in court. The removal of this barrier is a recognition of the lasting impact of abuse and the difficulty in disclosing it. I therefore cannot understand this “get out of jail free” card to permit a defendant to avoid liability on the grounds of substantial prejudice. In my inexpert, non-legal opinion, it risks undermining the legislative intent and perpetuating injustice, and it would send a message contrary to the spirit of the clause.

While the possibility of prejudice to defendants—such as faded memories, lost evidence or deceased witnesses—is real, it must be weighed against the injustice suffered by survivors who have been unable to seek redress due to the limitation period. I think all noble Lords here of a legal bent would say that our courts are perfectly well equipped to assess evidence, account for gaps and determine credibility, even in historic cases. The link of prejudice can be mitigated through fair trial procedures and should not override the fundamental right of survivors to have their claims heard.

We as legislators must ensure that perpetrators of child abuse are held to account, regardless of the time elapsed. Dismissing claims on the basis of substantial prejudices would not only deny justice to individuals but would undermine public confidence in the legal system’s ability to deal with some of the most serious wrongs to our children that we have witnessed over the last 30 years. It would risk protecting abusers from scrutiny, contrary to the principles of transparency and accountability.

To conclude, courts must prioritise the rights of survivors and the public interest in accountability, ensuring that the defence does not become a loophole that perpetuates injustice. Therefore, I support the probing amendment in the name of my noble friends and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we recognise the purpose of time limits and we recognise the right to fair trial, but survivors of child sexual abuse should not be barred from justice simply by the passage of time. The difficulty lies, of course, in striking that balance. At the moment, too many claims with merit are rejected at the outset or, more often, not brought at all. Clause 82 is therefore welcome in principle, yet new Section 11ZB(3) then proceeds to undermine it, mandating dismissal if defendants can show “substantial prejudice”—a vague term undefined in the Bill, which, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, may be appealing to defence lawyers. A court already has the power to dismiss a case if it believes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial, so we find it difficult to understand the justification for this extra layer of protection. The inclusion of this provision risks effectively undoing all the good work of the clause. Amendment 289 would close that escape hatch, ensuring that it brings meaningful change. I urge the Government to reconsider in the light of this amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

316ZA: In subsection (2), in the heading of the inserted section, leave out “sexual abuse” and insert “bestiality”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to alter the wording of Amendment 316 to refer to “animal bestiality” rather than “animal sexual abuse”.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood on introducing his proposed new clause and on running through the sordid details, which we did not want to hear and do not want to think about, but had to hear if we are to have better legislation, which I believe his proposed new clause will introduce. His proposed new clause is far superior to Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, since it describes the abuse of the animal and not just the perversion of the offender. It links to all the other online offences we have in the Bill—where people are publishing dangerous and pornographic pictures of abuse, strangulation, et cetera—and animal sexual abuse needs to be included there too. Therefore, I strongly support his amendment, which has also been signed by other noble Lords and my noble friend Lady Coffey.

When I first saw his amendment, I was motivated to use the term “bestiality”, since I was brought up in Scots law, which had very robust words to describe illegal sexual activity—at least illegal a few years ago. Bestiality is still the term used in Scotland. I initially thought that the term “abuse” was milder than bestiality and that bestiality conveyed a more condemnatory stance of the filthy perverts who were doing this. However, after a discussion with my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood, I now agree that bestiality is a more restrictive legal term focusing on the perverted behaviour of the man rather than the abuse of the animal. Abuse is the key word here. I accept that the terminology “animal sexual abuse” is a more contemporary term emphasising the act as cruel and exploitative rather than just a taboo behaviour.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I want first to pick up on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, and both her comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and ask the Minister a question. Am I right in thinking that given that the Prison Service—and I think also the Probation Service—must do a full assessment of risk on any transgender prisoner, the protections they seek are already there?

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for raising the case of Karen White. The Scottish Prison Service apologised because it did not do what it should have done: a full risk assessment. Had it done that, she would not have been placed on a women’s wing. I therefore hope the Minister can confirm that the protections for the public, particularly for victims, remain, because now, following the Karen White case in particular, real care is taken to make sure the law is followed. I would find it extraordinary if crimes were just dropped off the list because somebody had a transgender recognition certificate—so could the Minister confirm that this is not the case?

Turning now to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones’s amendment, we on these Benches also welcome Clause 87, but it needs strengthening. My noble friend’s amendment is very clear: we have to be able to stop offenders changing their names without the knowledge of the police. That also plays into the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean. Research from the Safeguarding Alliance has shown that key legislation is being made redundant because of a loophole that people can use to get through the cracks. This is not just about transgender issues; it is about people just changing their name regardless of their gender. Frankly, this makes Sarah’s law and Clare’s law utterly useless. I hope the Minister is prepared to consider this.

The remaining amendments in this group, from the Government, look as though they are sensible adjustments to the arrangements regarding sex offenders obtaining driving licences in Northern Ireland. We look forward to hearing from the Minister in more detail on those.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I was not going to participate in this debate until I heard about the Scottish case and the Scottish Prison Service admitting that it got it wrong and that it did not carry out what they should have done.

I recall Julia Hartley-Brewer interviewing the SNP Scottish Justice Secretary. The Justice Secretary was saying that it was terribly difficult to reach an assessment, make a judgment and try to get it right. Julia Hartley-Brewer said, I believe, “What is the problem? Just look down his trousers and you will find the answer”. I commend that as the best answer I have ever heard.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, beginning with the amendments that regulate the name changes of sex offenders, I am glad that Members across your Lordships’ House agree on the necessity of regulations. Clause 87 is a sensible measure from the Government, and the amendments that build on its principle are similarly prudent. An individual who commits a crime as intrusive and offensive as a sexual offence demonstrates that they are a threat to public order and safety. After all, that is the reason why we have a sex offender register. Criminals who have proven that they pose a risk should be monitored by the authorities, and the authorities should have the necessary details to monitor and manage them.

Amendment 317 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would ensure that those who change their name by deed poll are legally required to alert the police of this change. The amendments in the name of the Minister extend the provision restricting the granting of driving licences in a new name to Northern Ireland. All these amendments seek to consolidate the existing legislation to ensure that there are no gaps there or in the Government’s new law, and we support the principle behind them.

The most consequential of the amendments in this group is that tabled by my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch. It would serve to bar those who commit sexual offences from obtaining a gender recognition certificate. This is a very necessary measure. I am glad that the Government have not yet granted an exemption for sex-offending transgender criminals, which would allow them to attend a prison different from their biological sex. Hailing from north of the border—where, as others have commented, there have been several incidents of that happening—I believe that it is a very worrying scenario indeed.

The Government have still not implemented the Supreme Court’s judgment in the For Women Scotland case, neither in statute nor in guidance. There is still the chance that those who commit sexual offences can end up in the wrong prison through obtaining a gender recognition certificate. I am not remotely suggesting that the Government would wilfully do this, but I hope that, given their record on prisoner administration, the Minister can understand our concerns.

No safeguards currently exist outside of ministerial discretion. A way to guarantee that this does not happen would be to bar sex offenders from obtaining a certificate in the first place; it is a bare minimum. In sending such people to prison, we are admitting that they are not trustworthy among the public; why, then, should we risk the safety of prisoners of the opposite sex? For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendment, and I hope the Minister can too.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

330: After Schedule 10, insert the following new Schedule—
“ScheduleDisqualification for riding a cycle: minor and consequential amendments1 The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 has effect in relation to a person disqualified for riding a cycle as if it was amended as follows.2 In section 26 (interim disqualification)—(a) omit subsection (7) to (11);(b) in subsection (12), for “section 34 or 35” substitute “section 34”.3 Omit sections 34A to 37A (provisions relevant only to a person disqualified for driving a mechanically propelled vehicle).4 In section 38(1) (appeal against disqualification), for “section 34 or 35” substitute “section 34”.5 In section 39 (suspension of disqualification pending appeal) omit subsections (3) and (4).6 In subsection 40 (power of appellate courts in England and Wales to suspend disqualification) omit subsections (7) and (8).7 In section 41 (power of appellate courts in Scotland to suspend disqualification) omit subsections (3) and (4).8 Omit section 41A (suspension of disqualification pending determination of applications under section 34B).9 In section 42 (removal of disqualification)—(a) in subsection (3) omit “(disregarding any extension period)” wherever those words appear, and(b) omit subsection (3A)(b), (3B) and (5)(a).10 Omit sections 44, 44A and 45A (endorsement of licence and driving record).11 In section 46 (combination of disqualification with orders for discharge)—(a) in subsection (1), for “sections 34, 35, 36, 44 or 44A” substitute “section 34”;(b) in subsection (2)—(i) omit “or” at the end of paragraph (a), and(ii) omit paragraph (b);(c) in subsection (3), for “sections 34, 35, 36, 44 and 45A” substitute “section 34”.12 In section 47 (supplementary provisions as to disqualifications and endorsements)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) for “section 34, 35 or 44” substitute “section 34”, and(ii) omit “or endorsement”;(b) omit subsections (2) to (4).13 Omit sections 48 to 50 (exemption from disqualification and endorsement for offences against construction and use regulations, etc).”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to amend the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 as it applies to persons disqualified for riding a cycle.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Lucas is making a good recovery from an operation and has asked me to move or speak to his amendments for him. I suspect that he is watching on parliamentlive.tv to see if I get it right, so I hope the Committee will forgive this awful breach of protocol when I say, “Ralph, switch off the TV; just rest up and recover”. I shall move his Amendment 330, speak to his other amendments in the group and speak to my own amendments at the end, if I have time.

The purpose of this amendment is to fine-tune Part II of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 as it applies to persons disqualified from riding a cycle. The proposed new schedule would omit Sections 34A to 37A, 41A and the other odd section on the ground that they are relevant only to disqualified drivers of mechanically propelled vehicles. For example, Sections 34A to 34C cater for reduced disqualification on successful attendance on a course and apply only to persons convicted of a specified motoring offence. Section 35 relates to persons convicted of an offence in which fixed penalty points are to be taken into account, but fixed penalty points do not apply to cyclists. Sections 35A to 35D, which relate to custodial sentences, do not sit well with the proposed new cycling offences. Sections 36 to 37A all relate to motor vehicles, whether it be by disqualification until a driving test is passed, the revocation of a driving licence or the surrender of a revoked driving licence to the Secretary of State. Accordingly, all those sections would be omitted.

Noble Lords may well ask which of the disqualification provisions in Part II would therefore remain, as they apply subject to those minor and consequential amendments set out in the schedule. My noble friend has listed them: Section 26, interim disqualification; Section 38, appeal against disqualification; Section 39, suspension of disqualification pending an appeal; Sections 40 and 41, power of appellate courts to suspend disqualification; Section 42, removal of disqualification; Section 43, the rule for determining the end of a period of disqualification; Section 46, combination of disqualification and orders for discharge; and Section 47, supplementary provisions as to disqualification. That concludes Amendment 330.

On Amendment 338, my noble friend says that new Clause 29A(7) introduces new subsections (8) to (12). This amendment would extend the clause to new subsection (12A), forming part of another amendment that I propose to speak to later.

On Amendment 339, the thrust of Clause 106 is to bring cycling offences pretty much into line with those that apply to motor vehicles. However, at present, provision for obligatory disqualification is omitted for the most serious offences, so it may be said that there will be a lacuna in the law—disqualification, with motor vehicles being, inter alia, an added deterrent to offending. Accordingly, the amendment now before the Committee would amend Section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 by prescribing that the period of disqualification for the two most serious offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling will not be less than five years and two years respectively. The other two offences of causing death or serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling, where the culpability is less, will be subject to obligatory disqualification for not less than 12 months. No additional amendment of Section 34 would be required.

The only alteration that would be made by Amendment 340, in respect to the penalties for certain serious cycling offences, is the insertion of references to “obligatory” in column 5 of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The expression relates to disqualification. Without it, certain provision in the amendment of Section 34 would be of no effect.

Amendment 342 is my noble friend’s last amendment in this group. He says that it would insert three subsections. He proposes a substitute for new Section 29A(12) to extend the penalties for certain serious cycling offences set out there. The proposed new subsection (12A) would amplify the definition of “disqualified”, and subsection (12B) would introduce proposed new Schedule 11A.

The only amendment that would be made by proposed new subsection (12) is with respect to the penalties for certain other serious cycling offences not catered for in new subsection (11), again with the insertion of the word “obligatory” in column 5 of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. As before, the expression relates to a disqualification. It too is necessary if Section 34 is to bite.

Proposed new subsection (12A) addresses the fact that “disqualified”, as currently defined, is couched in terms that at present can apply only to disqualified drivers of “mechanically propelled” vehicles. In other words, “disqualified” is for holding or obtaining a driving licence. That formulation is retained in paragraph (a).

As for the riders of cycles, I am sure noble Lords are well aware that a driving licence is not required for them. Therefore paragraph (b), in relation to them, inserts a different formulation. It redefines “disqualified” as disqualified for riding a cycle

“on a road or other public place”,

the latter expression being in conformity with the same wording in the new cycling offences created by this provision.

Finally, proposed new subsection (12B) would introduce a new Clause 106(11)(a), containing as it does

“minor and consequential amendments of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988”.

That concludes my noble friend’s amendments. If one thought that the debate on the last amendment was highly technical, this one is even more technical. I shall set a test at the end by asking questions to see whether all noble Lords have got it.

I turn now to my own Amendments 337B to 337F. I am certain that the Minister will see that in the Marshalled List there are four groups of amendments tabled by many more Peers than just me who are deeply concerned at the scourge of dangerous cycling inflicting serious damage on pedestrians and aiding criminality. I am sure the Minister saw the news item last week on the Met finally cracking down on the big, heavy, illegal bikes capable of 70 mph that are used for snatching phones. Many of them are driven by food delivery couriers—mainly Deliveroo. I encounter them every night on my way home on the pavements outside Millbank.

We also have the problem of thousands of e-bikes—mainly Lime—lying scattered over our pavements; of companies deliberately selling massive off-road bikes, which people then use on our streets; of some e-bikes being so heavy that they are breaking the legs of users; and of thousands of people riding on our pavements, with grossly inadequate enforcement to stop it.

The penalties under Clause 106 are inadequate and I have suggested increased penalties for anyone convicted, as has my noble friend Lord Lucas. However, I submit that no one will ever be convicted under its subsections, because a conviction depends on someone, presumably a police officer, concluding that the cycling

“falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist”,

and that a competent cyclist would conclude that it was dangerous. Will the Minister tell me how many times the Home Office expects to find a police officer present to witness this behaviour and come to the subjective conclusions in subsections (4) and (6)? We need a simple objective test, as is in my Amendment 337E, which would mean that anyone

“who rides a cycle on any pavement … is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention”.

I challenge any noble Lord to dispute that. It seems to me pretty obvious that that has to be the case.

My Amendment 337C introduces

“a presumption that it is automatically dangerous cycling if the person is riding a bicycle capable of exceeding the legal 15.5 mph speed limit and weighs more than 30 kilograms”.

Thirty kilograms is a new concept, but it is now essential. A non-electric bike weighs between 8 kilograms and 15 kilograms, and most electric bikes now weigh about 25 kilograms. However, the company Lime has increased the weight of its bikes to 35 kilograms, leading to a phenomenon known as “Lime bike leg”. In August, the Telegraph reported the following, which the BBC also covered:

“I’m a trauma surgeon and treat patients with ‘Lime bike leg’ weekly … It’s a really common cause of leg injuries today”.


Lime bikes are 25kg heavier than normal pedestrian bikes. The report continued:

“Doctors have observed an increase in lower leg injuries caused by heavy e-bike frames falling on their riders”


and breaking their legs.

I fed into a road safety algorithm, “What would be the effect of a 35-kilogram bike with a 70-kilogram man sitting on it hitting a pedestrian at 25 mph?” and the answer was, “Almost certainly in every case: fatal with pretty horrific, catastrophic injuries”. Even at 15.5 mph, the injuries would be life-threatening, and totally fatal in the case of a child. Therefore, we must introduce a weight restriction, as well as strictly enforcing the 15.5 mph speed limit.

Would a “competent and careful cyclist” ever ride a bike on a pavement, or ride a 35-kilogram bike faster than 15.5 mph? Of course not. If someone is riding one of these massive, heavy, fast bikes, we do not need a subjective judgment on the quality of the riding; the criterion for dangerous cycling has been met per se.

My Amendment 337D would add an aggravating factor. It simply makes the point that if an innocent pedestrian is killed by a person using an illegal e-bike capable of going faster than 15.5 miles per hour and weighing more than 30 kilograms, an additional penalty should be applied. I apologise for my typo in the amendment; it says 25 kilograms, but it should be 30 kilograms. I suggest an additional five years, and a minimum of 15 years where a life sentence has been given. This is not for the ordinary cyclist who is reckless but for someone deliberately using a big, heavy, fast, killer bike.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, it seems an awful long time since my cycling proficiency test. We can debate whether standards have slipped in the 50-plus years since I took my test, but I think it is a common experience of all noble Lords who have spoken that a small minority of cyclists’ reckless actions potentially put people at risk. As a temporary resident of London during the week, I regularly see cyclists on pavements and going through red lights. I can report that, on crossing a zebra crossing one evening, I myself was almost hit by a cyclist, who was then pulled over by a police car not 100 metres later, much to my satisfaction. So it is possible for enforcement to happen.

I want to start with enforcement, because it is a thread that has run through a number of noble Lords’ contributions. It is right that strict legislation is already in place for cyclists, and the police do have the power to prosecute if these laws are broken. Cyclists have a duty to behave in a safe and responsible way that is reflected in the highway code. The Road Traffic Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, mentioned, imposes a fine of £2,500 for dangerous cycling and of £1,000 for careless cycling. The Road Traffic Act 1988 also makes it an offence to ride a bike if a person is unfit to do so due to drink or drugs. A considerable amount of activity is undertaken by the police to enforce these potential breaches of legislation. In fact, the Government themselves have pledged £2.7 million for each of the next three years to support police enforcement action on road traffic offences in the form of Operation Topaz, which is a strategic partnership between the Department for Transport, the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council.

I was pleased also to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about the City of London Police, who I know have taken this matter extremely seriously. They have cycling police officers who can catch offenders who have gone off-road into areas where vehicles or police officers on foot could not catch them, so it is important we recognise that. We have had contributions today from the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Hogan-Howe, and Lord Blencathra, who introduced amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. We have also heard from the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell of Beeston, Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lady Pidgeon and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. All have touched on the issues of enforcement and whether the legislation is significant enough.

I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Clause 106, which is where these amendments are coming from. Clause 106 underlines the Government’s determination that cyclists who cause death or serious injury should face the full force of the law, as if that were done by a motor vehicle. The criminal justice system should not fail fully to hold to account the small minority of cyclists whose reckless actions lead to tragic consequences. A number of contributors to the debate have mentioned their personal experiences and have also witnessed incidents. There is a whole cohort of cyclists who obey the law and who perform well, and as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would anticipate me saying, there is a health benefit to cycling that should be recognised and encouraged. However, there is certainly a holding to account of death and serious injury, and that is where the Government are coming from as a starting point to the debate today.

A wide group of amendments has been put forward, and I will try to touch on each amendment in turn. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, spoke on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I spoke to him before he went on his short, I hope, leave of absence from the House and discussed these amendments with him briefly. I wish him well for his speedy recovery and thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing the amendments on his behalf.

Amendments 330, 338, 339, 340 and 342 would allow persons to be disqualified from cycling upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Again, let us not forget that Clause 106 contains the penalty of significant jail time, and potentially a life sentence with significant jail time added to it. I agree that dangerous or careless cyclists are a serious risk to others, but disqualification would pose significant challenges. This may touch on other, later amendments, but self-evidently, cyclists are not currently required to have licences, and the only obvious way to address this would be to introduce a licensing system. However, such a system would be complicated, costly and, I would argue, potentially disproportionate, in that it would be created solely to enforce offences perpetrated by a small minority of people. Again, I do not think the noble Lord intended his amendment to serve as a barrier to cycling, but my concern is that it would risk implementation of this and would not really be workable.

In his own right, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, introduced Amendments 337B and 337F. Again, these would introduce greater criminal penalties for cyclists riding heavier, faster e-bikes. I do understand that, as has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords, it is e-bikes that have been illegally modified for greater speed that represent an inherently greater risk to other road users. There is no longer any weight limit, following enactment of the Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycle Regulations 1983, but they do specify that the electrically assisted speed for e-bikes is limited to 15.5 miles per hour. E-bikes that can achieve greater speeds would not be compliant with these regulations and therefore would be classed as motor vehicles. Because they are motor vehicles, a person using such could already be prosecuted under the existing offences in the Road Traffic Act 1988 of causing death or serious injury, which carry the same penalties as proposed in the new cycling offences: a life sentence with a 14-year potential sentence.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Just for clarification, the Minister said that they will be classed as motor vehicles. Does that mean they are still motor vehicles, even though they might not be registered or insured?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

They are classed as motor vehicles for the purposes of the legislation if they can travel above 15.5 miles per hour; but they are not, self-evidently, for the reasons I have already outlined, subject to the licensing arrangements that we have to date.

Mandatory uplifts based on specific vehicle type would be a novel but also an inconsistent approach to sentencing. Sentencing should always reflect the facts of the case and the level of culpability. Introducing rigid statutory additions could undermine the principle of proportionality, create inconsistency and risk setting an undesirable precedent. On the noble Lord’s amendments on changing the “careless and inconsiderate” cycling definition, I understand his desire to put beyond doubt that cycling on a pavement or in an area intended only for pedestrians should be considered as cycling without due care and attention. However, cycling on pavements is already an offence in its own right, as set out in Section 72 of the Highways Act 1835, which is an awfully long time ago and has stood the test of time. It is also an offence under Section 129 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Given that these offences are still in place, I would suggest that, along with those in the Bill for serious offences, that provides a sufficient deterrent.

Amendment 337F would insert the definition of a cycle. Again, I come back to Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which already defines cycles, and this definition includes compliant electrically assisted pedal cycles. As I said earlier, an e-bike that does not comply with the relevant legislation is a motor vehicle for the purposes of the legislation, not a cycle.

I turn to a series of amendments—341A to 341D, 342A to 342F, 346A, 346B and 498A—in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which propose that a person could receive up to 12 points on their driving licence upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Reaching 12 points on their driving licence would, of course, disqualify them from driving a motor vehicle.

As I have mentioned already, cyclists do not require any form of licence to cycle, therefore the noble Lord proposes points on a driving licence as an alternative penalty. In the Sentencing Bill, which is currently before your Lordships’ House, there is already a new driving prohibition requirement that the court can impose when giving a community or suspended sentence order. This prohibition will allow a court to take a more flexible and tailored approach to punishment than a driving disqualification, and it will be available irrespective of the offence that has been committed. I hope that the noble Lord agrees that the provision in the Sentencing Bill goes some way towards meeting his objective.

The noble Lord’s Amendments 346A and 498A seek to create a registration scheme for the purposes of enforcing the new offences in Clause 106—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful. This Minister would not have gone over time had he not given way, but he now has gone over time and so will sit down. I commend the course of action that I suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his decency in replying as fully as he possibly could. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that there are many more groups to go on cycling, and I think he will have a chance of input there.

The general thrust that the Minister detected is one thing, but, if I may say so, my forecast was right. I said at the beginning that the general thrust I would detect was that Peers from all sides would be highly critical that not enough is being done. Clause 106 is okay as far as it goes, but there is a much wider problem out there, as articulated by nine other Peers from all sides, in addition to me. My noble friends LadyMcIntosh of Pickering and Lady Stowell asked why this never-ending consultation is taking place. Someone said that, as this is a Home Office Bill, why does it not just get on with it? It may be a Home Office Bill, but it is the Department for Transport’s policy, and that is where the rot lies.

Those who criticised the last Government were absolutely right to do so. I condemn in no uncertain terms the Department for Transport under the leadership from 2019 to 2022 of Mr Grant Shapps, who was obsessed with getting more and more e-bikes and e-scooters on the road. The reason the consultations were extended was, in my view, and in what was tipped off to me, that he wanted to get so many more e-bikes out there that it would be impossible to pull back on them. It is like the police saying that everybody is shoplifting and so there is nothing they can do about it. Mr Shapps wanted to say, “Everyone has got e-bikes now, so we cannot put in a registration system and we cannot control them”.

If noble Lords want further evidence of the Department for Transport’s attitude, in February 2024 it went out to consultation again. The consultation was to double the size of the electric motor from 250 watts to 500 watts and to introduce an additional speeding system. There were 2,100 responses; the vast majority of professionals—police forces and others—totally condemned it, and the Department for Transport had to pull that back, and rightly so. But mark my words, it will try it on again and again.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a very good point: why should cyclists have a right to a healthy life but not the pedestrians who are getting mowed down? He tabled some good amendments that would be excellent. He made the point that although everyone has called for more enforcement, you cannot have more enforcement if you do not know the bike and the identity of the person riding it.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe made the point that the amendments just do not go far enough. She used the term Wild West. I assume she was quoting the press release—I have it here—from the Mayor of London, Mr Sadiq Khan, who said that very thing last month: London is now a Wild West for e-bikes.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, made an absolutely excellent speech, and I commend him for it. He is right to say that we have boosted cycling, which is a good thing, but have not boosted the safety protocols. He is right about cyclists jumping red lights. You do not have to go far to see that; go to our prison gates at the Peers’ entrance and stand there and look at the pedestrian crossing and the lights. Last week, when the lights changed to red for the cars, I was halfway across when a cyclist tried to come through. I stopped and said: “Get back! Get back!” He did actually stop and move back a bit. That happens all the time. They use the red lights as an excuse; when cars stop, the cyclists belt through.

My noble friend Lord Goschen made the point that there is no enforcement at all. He wondered why anyone would bother to buy a moped or a small motorbike, when you have to have an MOT and insurance and pass a test, when they can buy an e-bike which goes 70 miles an hour and does everything you want, and you do not have to do anything to register or insure it, and no one will stop you when you break the law.

My noble friend Lord Shinkwin made the comment, rightly so, that there is a threat to disabled people. I am glad the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, welcomed my definition of cycles. It is possible that that was the only thing she agreed with me on, but I will take any little crumbs of comfort. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel supported most of my amendments, as I fully support his. I did ask for tougher penalties, but I am now content that the penalties are okay.

The Minister, in his speech, which was as courteous as usual, said that only a small minority break the law. He is right, I think, when that applies to the conventional cyclists and not e-bikes. In the past, it was my experience that it was a tiny minority of Lycra louts—the ones with their heads down between the handlebars and their backsides up in the air, belting through lights. I submit that I am certain that the majority of e-bike riders are breaking the law one way or another, either by excessive speed or by riding through lights or on the pavement. I can say with absolute certainty that 100% of the food delivery drivers are breaking the law, but more of that in another group. I disagree with the Minister that we cannot have a simple presumption that if people are riding a bike on the pavement then it is automatically, per se, and without any other judgment needed, seen as driving without due care and attention.

I simply say this again. I always come in with slightly more trenchant views than many other colleagues in the House, but we have had support today from colleagues with much more moderate amendments than mine. I am fairly certain we will see that when we come to the other groups. The Minister has to go back to the Department for Transport and tell it to get off its high horse and on to its bike. We must have proper amendments to toughen up the law and deal with all the other abuses of e-bikes, particularly in London. In those circumstances, on the assumption that we will be doing more work on this, I beg leave to withdraw my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 330.

Amendment 330 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

345: After Clause 106, insert the following new Clause—
“Police guidance and pilot: enforcement of criminal offences for illegal vehicles on roads(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue guidance to the college of policing and the National Police Chief’s Council on enforcement of criminal offences committed by drivers of vehicles illegally being driven on public roads.(2) The guidance under subsection (1) must include guidance on enforcement of criminal offences committed by drivers of vehicles which—(a) do not have a valid MOT;(b) are not registered with the DVLA;(c) are driven without a registration plate or one that is non-complaint or not associated to that vehicle;(d) are driven by drivers without a valid driving license;(e) are not insured;(f) are persistent evaders of toll, congestion or parking offences;(g) are displaying a stolen, ceased or fraudulent Blue Badge;(h) are vehicles registered overseas which have been in the UK for more than six months.(3) In conjunction with the guidance published under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must by Regulations make arrangements for an enforcement pilot, within the area of one or more police forces and for a period of not more than two years working with other public bodies that may lead to improving enforcement of the criminal offences in subsection (2).(4) In the context of the pilot under subsection (3), the Secretary of State may provide by regulations that—(a) outsource the operation (but not the oversight) of the pilot to another public body, or to a firm accredited by the Enforcement Conduct Board; (b) permit information sharing between relevant public bodies who hold information which will assist enforcement of those criminal offences in (2) and the operators of the pilot;(c) provide the operators of the pilot the powers that they need to detain vehicles where the owners have not responded to requests to regularise any of the offences in subsection (2).”

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Amendments 345 and 398 stand in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas. As I said earlier, my noble friend is making a good recovery from an operation. Amendment 345 is straightforward. It asks the Secretary of State to give clear national guidance to policing bodies on how to enforce criminal offences committed by drivers of illegally operated vehicles and to run a short, tightly defined pilot to test practical improvements in enforcement. Across the country, too many dangerous and unlawful vehicles remain on our roads. We have vehicles without MOTs and without insurance, driven by drivers who are unlicensed or who are using stolen or fraudulent plates. These are not just paperwork problems; they are real risks to road users and communities. At the same time, persistent evasion of tolls, congestion charges and parking rules blights town centres and funds organised offending. The current responsibilities are fragmented between the DVLA, local authorities and the police, and that fragmentation creates gaps that offenders exploit.

My noble friend’s amendment would do three things. First, it would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council so that enforcement is consistent, proportionate and focused on the highest harms. Secondly, it would mandate a time-limited enforcement period so that we can test new operational models and information-sharing arrangements in a controlled way. Thirdly, it would allow a pilot to be run with accredited partners under strict oversight so that we can learn what works without rushing into permanent untested powers.

Why is a pilot the right approach? A pilot is the responsible way to proceed. It would let us trial better use of data, test targeted interventions against repeat and organised offenders, and measure the impact on road safety and community harm before any national rollout. It would also allow Parliament to see independent evidence about proportionality, costs and safeguards, which is exactly what the public expect. Let me be clear: this amendment is not a blank cheque. Any information-sharing would have to comply with data protection law, any detention powers would be narrowly defined and subject to review, and any outsourced delivery would operate under ministerial oversight and public reporting. The Secretary of State would have to build those safeguards into the regulations and the pilot design so that civil liberties and accountability are front and centre.

This would be a practical, evidence-led new clause. It would build on existing enforcement work and give police the tools to tackle the most dangerous and persistent offenders while protecting the public and taxpayers. I ask noble Lords to support this amendment so that we can make our roads safer, reduce organised and repeat offending and ensure that enforcement is effective and accountable.

I conclude by saying that I like the other amendments in this group, and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and other Peers who have signed them. I look forward to hearing what she has to say. However, I am mystified as to why this amendment is in a group of amendments all about drunk-driving. Having said that, I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

I shall speak to Amendment 356G in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, who has spoken so forcefully on the subject.

Drink-driving remains one of the most preventable causes of death on UK roads. The latest Department for Transport figures show that an estimated 260 people were killed in crashes on Britain’s roads involving at least one driver over the legal alcohol limit in 2023, and approximately 1,600 people were seriously injured.

Alcohol interlock technology, or alcolocks, can reduce reoffending and save lives. Alcolocks prevent a vehicle from starting if alcohol is detected on the driver’s breath. The driver has to breathe into a tube, and the levels of alcohol are instantly detected before the engine is able to be turned on. According to the RAC Report on Motoring 2025, 82% of UK drivers support the introduction of alcolocks, so—stops, looks meaningfully at Ministers—it is very popular with voters. Research for the RAC report also found rates of admitted drink-driving near pre-pandemic levels, with more than one in 10 respondents, 12%, saying they had driven when they thought they were over the limit, either directly after drinking or on the morning after. The figures for younger drivers were even more pronounced, with 14% of those aged 25 to 44 admitting to drink-driving, and as many as 18% of those under 25.

The good news is that alcolocks are already in the Road Safety Act 2006, but the experimental wording in its Section 16 effectively turned the interlock provisions into a contingent pilot that ended in 2010. That pilot was never fully taken forward and the powers never came into effect. As a result, alcohol interlocks are not part of the UK courts’ sentencing toolkit. This has left the interlock scheme in limbo, despite years of persistent drink-driving offending and the accompanying road deaths and injuries. However, removing this experimental wording will mean that the interlock scheme under Section 15 of the Road Safety Act can be brought into force, restoring the original purpose of the Act to give courts a rehabilitative, safety-oriented sentencing tool for drink-drive offenders.

Section 16 meant that courts could impose an alcohol ignition interlock programme order only in designated pilots or trial court areas—that is, only in areas specifically chosen by the Secretary of State. This was a purposefully cautious approach for any scheme to be selective and closely monitored to build an evidence base. However, the evidence base is now robust and expansive, and the UK is behind the curve, with all 50 US states, most EU countries, New Zealand and more all introducing a form of alcohol interlock programme, with substantial research available that supports their effectiveness.

This provision is already there in legislation; it just needs a tweak. These international programmes show that alcolocks can reduce reoffending by up to 70% and are as effective as airbags in reducing road deaths. All the Government have to do is accept this amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

May I ask for one point of clarification? These alcolocks sound fantastic. Do they have to be fitted by the manufacturers when the car is made, or can they be attached as a gadget afterwards?

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

I hear that they can be fitted in an hour for under £200.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an eye-opener of a debate, not just for me but, I think, for many noble Peers; we have all learned something that we did not know before.

I feel a bit of a fraud doing this little wind up at the end. It really should be the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, after her superb speech and the amendments she spoke to. Let me just rattle through a few comments. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Attlee did not like my noble friend’s amendment. Mind you, I did not like his amendment on random stops much either.

My noble friend Lady Coffey was right. The police should have good reason for stopping someone. I remember a few years ago that my constituents, way up in the wilds of Cumbria, used to complain that when they left the local pub late at night, they would drive a few yards and a police officer hiding in a car around the corner would stop them and say, “We have reason to think you have been drinking, sir”. Was that a random stop or was it done with good reason? The noble Lord himself said that the police do not need a reason to stop someone, so we do not need random stopping.

The points made by my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington were absolutely right. We read those horrible stories about policemen being dragged along, and I hope the gap there can be plugged.

I really liked what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, said about interlock schemes. I think I first heard of those on “Tomorrow’s World” 20 years ago and they still have not been implemented. I simply do not understand what the problem is with doing a pilot. If the noble Lord brought that back on Report and it was in order, many of us would be tempted to support him.

I come now to the two big crunch amendments, which were the eye-opener for me. The noble Baroness was so right to talk about uninsured vehicles, and so was my noble friend Lord Ashcombe. I had no idea that the fine was less than half the insurance—that just cannot be right. Although we cannot put increased fines in the Bill, I like the idea of confiscation. Everyone says, “The police have the power to confiscate”, but are they actually doing it? I get the impression that very few vehicles are being confiscated.

We have automatic number plate recognition all over the country. If it is working, why are there tens of thousands of uninsured cars on the road? I say to the police, and perhaps to the Home Office to advise them: get out there and start grabbing those vehicles, getting the people and confiscating their cars. When they get them back, it will be not a £50 administrative fine but a £500 admin fine added to the current penalty to get their vehicle back. That might act as a disincentive for them until the government strategy comes along.

I conclude with the amendment from my noble friend Lord Lucas. The Minister seemed to make a very good case as to why his amendment was not necessary, and he did it in a courteous and nice way. I thank him for agreeing that my noble friend may come to the Home Office and meet the officials there and be briefed on it. With those words, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 345 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shinkwin (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 346C, I welcome the other amendments in this group in the names of my noble friends, Lord Blencathra and Lord McColl of Dulwich.

Amendment 346C is a modest and reasonable amendment, which would do exactly what it says on the tin. It would require the Home Secretary to institute

“a review assessing the effectiveness with which operators of bicycle courier services ensure that their employees and contractors conduct themselves on the roads in such a way as to avoid committing the offences in section 106”.

The review, which must be published within a year of that section coming into force, would recommend any changes to the law which the review determines may be necessary. The rationale for this amendment is similarly simple: it seeks to probe how the law could be changed to ensure that companies which contract for the services of delivery cyclists bear some responsibility for the conduct of those cyclists on the road.

Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I approach this issue from the perspective of a severely disabled person, whose condition makes me extremely vulnerable to the impact—and I use the term advisedly to mean the actual physical impact—of being hit by an individual riding one of these e-bikes in, to use the legislative terminology, a “dangerous, careless or inconsiderate” way. To put it bluntly, the impact would be catastrophic; I would not expect to survive. So I completely agree with my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who said on day six of Committee that you take your life in your hands when you cross some roads in central London. I do so, quite literally, every day, on my way to and from your Lordships’ House.

Now I entirely appreciate that whether I live or die is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things. It would be a shame if I were killed, but the earth would continue to turn. I know that. Equally, I know that I am just one person. I think of all those people with visual impairments, for example, who literally risk life and limb just stepping outside their front door. So the review should consider the impact on them as well, and not just in terms of their independence, mental health and well-being, all of which will of course bring associated costs for the NHS and social care services, but of their employment prospects. For why would anyone want to risk going to work, given they could end up in hospital before they have even got to the office as a result of being hit by a courier cyclist on an e-bike while they were walking along the pavement or trying to board a bus from one of those so-called floating bus stops?

I cite this group as just one example—and of course there are people with mobility impairments like mine, or simply older people whose reflexes are not as sharp as they once were—to highlight how the dangers presented by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling on e-bikes, particularly by courier and delivery cyclists, are having a far greater impact on our society than we perhaps realise. I would go so far as to say that the effect has been to airbrush out of the bigger social picture whole swathes of society. So while I am not suggesting that an assessment of impact should be disability-exclusive, I would argue that such an impact alone merits a review.

I say to the Minister that I am not laying the blame at the door of Government per se. The Member’s explanatory statement accompanying the amendment refers to the companies which contract the services of delivery cyclists bearing

“some responsibility for the conduct of these cyclists”—

the point being that the responsibility is shared. But none of us, either in Parliament or the Government, can deny that we also share responsibility for addressing the problem; in our case, by providing the most effective legislative framework to facilitate the change we all want to see—safer streets.

I am reminded of what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said on day six in Committee, about us having made a “huge strategic mistake” by not factoring in the need for safety from the outset when these e-bikes were introduced. I agree with him. Sadly, some people, especially those in the Department for Transport, appear not to. They—and I dare say they are non-disabled and a bit slow on the uptake, bless them, so we need to make allowances—still do not seem to have woken up to the fact that this experiment has gone badly wrong.

That needs to be the starting point of the review. There must be a recognition—a fact which I sense the Minister implicitly acknowledges—that there is a significant and growing problem, which cannot simply be dismissed by officialdom’s obtuse obfuscation of, “Well, we are where we are”, because if we do not recognise that where we are is bad then we cannot move on.

Lime, the other e-bike hiring companies and companies such as Just Eat deserve to be in the dock and not in the saddle when it comes to this review. Yes, they will be part of the solution, but right now they are doing very nicely thank you very much from being a big part of the problem. They cannot be allowed to set or influence the review’s terms of reference or to sit on the review panel. That should be done by those most affected by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling, not by those whose irresponsible indifference means they are profiting from putting people’s lives at risk.

In conclusion, I believe that the case for a review is compelling. As my noble friend Lady Stowell said on day six in Committee, courier delivery service e-bike users are “the worst perpetrators”. It is time we reviewed the situation. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 416K supports a targeted, enforceable measure that holds delivery platforms to account where their operational model and oversight failures contribute to dangerous cycling on our streets. This is not about blame for individual riders alone; it is about closing a regulatory gap so that companies that profit from rapid, app-driven deliveries also carry responsibility for foreseeable harms linked to their business models and practices.

If noble Lords want a bit more excitement in their lives than the excitement of participating in this debate then I invite them to accompany me, when we rise tonight, to walk along Millbank, Horseferry Road and Marsham Street, past the Home Office. The excitement will come from them dodging out of the way of dozens of Deliveroo couriers belting along the pavements delivering to the thousands of flats in this area.

Even more excitement may come when I manage to confront one of these riders and we have an exchange of views, but not usually a meeting of minds. When I see them belting along the pavement, I drive straight for them. My chair is heavier than theirs, so they are the ones who are forced to dodge out of the way. When I manage to stop one on those massive, fat tyre, illegal bikes and speak to them, I can say with all honesty that every single one I have seen is a recent arrival to this country. Half do not speak English and do not know the law on riding killer bikes on the pavement. The other half do know and tell me to go away sexually, that they will do what they like, and who will stop them.

If I had said that a month ago, I might have been accused of racist comments, but on 4 December this year, the Home Office issued a press release to say that, in targeted action, it and the police had arrested 171 food delivery couriers for criminal activity, and 60 of them were illegal migrants facing deportation. The Home Office press release said:

“It comes as Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood has been targeting people working unlawfully in the ‘gig economy’. Border Security Minister Alex Norris has also met representatives from food-delivery firms to encourage them to do more to tackle the issue—such as using facial recognition checks to prevent riders sharing their identities with people who do not have permission to take up work in the UK. Norris said that November’s action ought to ‘send a clear message: if you are working illegally in this country, you will be arrested and removed’. He added: ‘We are tightening the law to clamp down on illegal working in the delivery sector to root out this criminality from our communities’”.


Good on you, Minister, and good on the Home Office—they have provided proof of what I have encountered every night for the past two years on the streets of Westminster, within hundreds of yards of this building. Good luck to you in trying to send them back to Eritrea, Somalia or wherever, because there is bound to be some immigration judge who will block you and cite bogus human rights reasons for why they cannot be deported. But that is your problem and not for today.

My amendment supplements what Minister Norris was doing. He exhorted the food delivery companies to do more to tackle the issue. My proposed new clause would give the police the power to penalise the food delivery companies financially, since money is the only thing that will make them change.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

To be clear, I was talking about evidence of causality rather than necessarily data on incidents. Let me make some progress, and maybe the noble Lord will be a little mollified by the time I get to the end of my contribution—or maybe not.

The fundamental purpose of the new offence is to—

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am sorry, but I am afraid that saying that there is no evidence of causality is just what the Department for Transport wants the Home Office to believe. The evidence is quite clear; there are no better words than from the Mayor of London himself, Sadiq Khan, who said it is a Wild West out there. Many other councils in London are now trying to ban bikes from their areas because of the danger they cause, and those heavy, gigantic food delivery couriers are the worst offenders of all.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Again, I say to the noble Lord that I will make some progress and then he may come back at me again before I finally sit down.

The fundamental purpose of the new offences is to appropriately punish offenders and deter dangerous cycling behaviours. There is no carve-out or special provision for delivery riders. To be clear, all road users will face equal treatment before the law under these provisions. I can also assure the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, that, like all new government enactments, the Crime and Policing Act will be subject to post-legislative review three to five years after Royal Assent, so there is the opportunity to review the action.

Amendment 416K from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would allow for food delivery companies to receive an unlimited fine should any of their riders be convicted of any offences under Clause 106. A complicating factor around this, as many noble Lords recognised, is that many such riders operate in the gig economy—the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, set that out particularly well. We are not always talking about the relationship between an employer and an employee, so using what we would consider normal working relationship incentives and rule structures is not always the easiest thing to do.

It is worth stating, particularly as the Employment Rights Bill finally finished its passage through Parliament yesterday, that as part of that wider package of employment reforms, there will be a major consultation on employment status which will help to clarify these grey areas. Again, I cite the contribution that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, made. I say in response to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that is probably the best place to have a review of the grey areas around contractors and employers working in the gig economy. A problem has clearly been identified in the delivery driving sector, but there are many other sectors— I remember from my time spent in Committee on the Employment Rights Bill that there are lots of areas where the lack of clarity on employment status is causing all sorts of consequences.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am so grateful to the noble Lord for giving way again; I hope this will be the last time. If he and my noble friend Lord Hailsham are correct that the current law on vicarious liability might mean that Deliveroo and Uber Eats are not liable for the agents they are using, does he accept my noble friend Lord Goschen’s point that we are Parliament and, if the current law does not cover it, we can amend the law as we suggest to make sure that those companies are liable for the people who deliver food in their name, with a great big bag on their back advertising that?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not disagree with the proposition that the noble Lord makes. Of course, we are Parliament, but I suggest that we should legislate in a slightly more deliberative way than simply shooting at ducks ad hoc as they come up in the stall.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

346D: After Clause 106, insert the following new Clause—
“Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling offences: supply of batteries for modification of cycles(1) Where an offence under sections 27A (causing death by dangerous cycling), 27B (causing serious injury by dangerous cycling), 28B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) or 28C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is committed on a cycle which has been modified since purchase with a battery, a person who supplied the battery for the modification may be charged with an offence if the battery—(a) has a maximum continuous rated power which exceeds 250 watts, or(b) does not comply with statutory guidelines on lithium-ion battery safety for e-bikes issued by the Office for Product Safety and Standards.(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to put a penalty on the suppliers and sellers of batteries used for the modification of cycles used in the committing of offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I neglected to say at the start of my previous remarks that although it may be the case, as my noble friend Lord Shinkwin said, that the world would not stop turning if he was killed by an e-bike on the streets, my orbit would certainly be destroyed, as would that of many of us, if that were to happen to him. One possible solution might be that, when I fit a bulldozer blade to my chair, I can precede him and he can ride safely behind me.

My Amendment 346D states that if anyone is convicted of causing death or injury by dangerous or careless cycling, and if the e-bike has an illegal battery with a power rating greater than 250 watts or does not meet the approved standard, then the supplier of the battery should receive an unlimited fine imposed by the court, not the police. I think we would all agree that the concept I am trying to get at here is right. We must get at the suppliers of the batteries that do not conform to UL 2849, the US standard, or EN 15194, the European standard.

I admit that the problem here will be enforcement. Just like all the other illegal stuff we have wrestled with in this Bill—from knives to pornography—if it is sold online, it is very difficult to stop. Furthermore, illegal sellers will say that they thought the battery was for an off-road bike, which would be perfectly legal.

However, this is where the proposed new clause in my Amendment 416J might work. It would give the police a power that could be delegated to a local authority or other agents to perform. The proposed new clause says:

“If a retailer supplies batteries which do not comply with statutory guidelines on lithium-ion battery safety for e-bikes … the police may issue notices requiring the retailer to … recall relevant batteries from consumers … suspend the sale of relevant batteries, and … warn consumers about the risks of relevant batteries”.


Again, it is not perfect, and in some ways it is not nearly strong enough to cut off the illegal supply of batteries that are not compliant with either US or European construction standards.

My proposed new clause and the Bill are concerned with dangerous cycling. Recent figures show that there were 11,266 incidents involving e-bikes and e-scooters in 2023-24, and this figure is rising rapidly. Therefore, for the purposes of this Bill, we have to get at the supply of illegally doctored and excessively overpowered batteries. These are the same batteries that cause the most fires, including fatal ones. That is because the number of dangerous and non-compliant batteries in circulation is a significant and fast-growing problem.

Authorities rely on data regarding fires and product recalls to gauge the scale of the issue. The Office for Product Safety and Standards has issued 21 product recalls and published 29 product safety reports for unsafe e-bikes, e-scooters and batteries since 2022. Specific enforcement action was taken against the brand Unit Pack Power’s e-bike batteries, which were linked to several fires across England, with withdrawal notices issued to four online marketplaces, 20 sellers and the manufacturer.

The number of fires caused by lithium-ion batteries is surging rapidly. London Fire Brigade data shows that it responded to 88 e-bike fires in 2022; that figure rose to 134 in 2025, as of late September. In 2023, almost 200 fires involving e-bikes or e-scooters were reported across the UK, resulting in 10 fatalities. The rise in fires is primarily linked to unregulated conversion kits and low-cost batteries, often purchased from online marketplaces—but fires are not our concern today.

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So I am grateful for the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for raising the issues, but, for the reasons I have outlined, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I think that noble Lords and Ministers are getting the message from nearly all sides of the Committee—apart from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that there is a real problem here that the Government are not addressing.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I entirely accept that there is mischief here. My comments were addressed at the specifics of the amendment—but I accept that there is a problem that needs to be addressed.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful for the clarification from the noble Lord; I did not wish to misquote him. Following his comments, I note that, of the thousands of batteries for sale, none of them specifically say, “Buy this battery and illegally break the law. Add it to your legal bike and break the law by going on the pavement”—they are more subtle than that. The closest I came was in the example I cited in the debate on the previous group, where one company said that its bike—capable of speeds of 64 kilometres per hour—was suitable for “off-road and commuting”. The advertising is much more subtle, but everyone knows what is going on. These batteries are being sold for illegal purposes.

The problem I had with these amendments was that, to get them in scope of the Bill, I had to pull my punches and narrowly tweak them in some ways. Therefore, of course the amendments are technically flawed. I would have liked to put down an amendment on the chips, but that, I think, was not in order. To try to get at the concept of the problem, which all noble Lords support, I had to put down amendments that I accept are flawed. However, what the amendments seek to achieve is consistent with the rest of the Bill: we have had problems with knife crime, so, in addition to penalties for the carriers and users, the Bill has clauses trying to cut off and penalise the online suppliers—and the same goes for crossbows. Then we have all the sexual offences in Part 5 of the Bill, again with attempts to tackle the online supply of illegal photos, as well as lots more clauses on the online supply of illegal material.

I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. He pointed out that it is easy to pick out flaws—I can pick all the flaws myself—and the technical faults in these amendments. However, what we are getting at here is that every noble Lord who has spoken feels that the Government are not doing enough on this issue. I believe that we can do a lot more. Of course, I want the police to grab every massive, overweight and overfast illegal bike out there and destroy it, but they will never keep up with the supply. We have to cut off the supply, and my amendments, in their inadequate way, were seeking to do that.

I am grateful to the Minister, because I think we have had a bit of movement over the past two days, with the Home Office now offering to discuss with colleagues how we can get this a lot better. I hope that we can, with noble Lords around the Committee, agree something on Report that tackles the specific problem, without causing great new problems of enforcement. Something needs to be done. I do not think we are prepared to wait for the Department for Transport’s strategy on safer cycling or road use, which we may never see. I suspect that, when we do see it, it will be grossly inadequate in tackling the scourge of huge, heavy, illegal e-bikes mowing down pedestrians on the pavement. Since both Ministers have been kind enough to agree to meet us before Report, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 346D withdrawn.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we take a very different view and strongly support Clauses 107 and 108, which recognise a simple reality. Emergency workers can face racially or religiously aggravated abuse whenever and wherever they are carrying out their duties, including in private homes. They cannot choose their environment or walk away from hostility. Their professional duty is to step into what are at times chaotic, volatile situations, and to stay there until the job is done. The law should follow them into those settings and make clear that such targeted hostility is no more acceptable in a hallway or a living room than it is on a street corner. This debate has shown that the issue is not about policing opinion or curtailing lawful expression but about drawing a firm line between free speech and deliberate acts of intimidation directed at those who protect the public.

These clauses are drafted to catch only behaviour that crosses that line in aggravated circumstances, and they sit alongside, rather than in place of, the wider framework of public order and hate crime. In our view, striking them out would send the wrong message, undermining our commitment to those who protect us. Looking ahead, it will of course be vital that their use is monitored and that guidance for police and prosecutors is kept under review, so that the balance struck here remains both proportionate and effective in practice.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister rises, could I ask a simple question? It would seem to me that, under the definition of emergency workers in Section 3(1)(j) of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, an emergency worker is

“a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide ... NHS health services, or … services in the support of the provision of NHS health services”.

I think we all support the words of the Secretary of State for Health, but is he in danger of falling into the trap of criticising the BMJ for the action it has taken?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I will come back to that point in a moment. I think the noble Lord is trying to inject a slight bit of topicality into a different argument, but I respect his opportunities in trying to raise those issues.

I say at the outset that I am with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on this, which is why we brought this forward. I am grateful to her for standing up and supporting the objectives of the Government in her contribution. I have to say to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I cannot and will not support their approach to delete these clauses from the Bill.

Emergency workers, as the noble Baroness has said, risk their safety every day to protect the public. They deserve robust protection through legislation, especially against abuse directed towards them because of their protected characteristics, which is not only harmful but erodes the principle of respect and public service, which are core values of this democracy.

As the noble Baroness rightly said, when emergency workers walk through a door of a private dwelling, they are faced with the circumstances in that private dwelling; they cannot walk away. They are there because of an emergency—perhaps medical, police or fire—and, if they face abuse in that private dwelling, then they deserve our support, just as they have our support if they face abuse on the street for a racially aggravated reason. If somebody does something at the end of their path on a street in Acacia Avenue and abuses them, they will find themselves under the course of the law on those matters.

I believe—and this is what these clauses are about—that, if the emergency worker is racially abused in the property, then they deserve that protection. It is critical for sectors such as health, fire and policing to have that legal support. We cannot leave them, as the noble Baroness rightly said, to be abused. The law must recognise this and make sure we have proper protection.

Currently, as has been mentioned, the Public Order Act 1986 and Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provide important safeguards in public spaces. It is not acceptable to call somebody a racially abusive name in a public space, so why is it to call them that name in a place of a private dwelling? It is not acceptable, so we are going to bring those clauses into play.

The noble Lord asks why we do this. We do this because Sergeant Candice Gill of Surrey Police, supported by the deputy chief constable—and, may I just say, by the Conservative police and crime commissioner for Surrey—has campaigned for this change in the law, having personally experienced racial abuse in a private home. It is not a sort of technical matter that the noble Baroness or the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, have mentioned; it is a real issue of racial abuse in a private dwelling to a police officer—who is doing her job, serving and trying to protect and support the public, and is being racially abused with no consequence whatsoever. Sergeant Candice Gill, after whom I would be proud to call this legislation Candice’s law, is campaigning and has campaigned to make this an amendment to the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, asked why we brought it forward in the House of Commons as an amendment. I will tell him why: it was brought to our attention, it is an action we do not support, and it is an area where we think action needs to be taken. That is why we have brought it. I do not think it is fair that people are racially abused in homes. Sergeant Candice Gill has campaigned on this and has brought it to the attention of the Government; we brought an amendment forward in the House of Commons which is now before this House, and I believe it should have support.

Clauses 107 to 109 will close that legislative loophole. The removal of the dwelling exception will make racially or religiously aggravated abuse of an emergency worker in a private dwelling an offence. The change will ensure that offenders prosecuted under Clause 107 face a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The offence in Clause 108 will be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4. As I have said, Lisa Townsend, the Conservative police and crime commissioner for Surrey, said:

“This long-overdue change to the law would never have happened without Sgt Gill’s courage and determination”.


I think we owe this to Sergeant Gill and any other officer, health worker, fire service worker or police officer who has been racially abused in a home where they have gone to help support individuals. They deserve our support.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and to support the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, not least because my noble friend Lord Hendy—who is, sadly, not able to be in the country this evening—co-signed her amendment.

If anyone imagines or suggests that the job of the Health and Safety Executive should be limited to the inspection of heavy machinery or physical infrastructure, as opposed to social infrastructure, then they are not just living in the last century but arguably the one before that. For the Health and Safety Executive to look at its role in such a limited way is also incredibly gendered.

I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on the intention of these amendments, because they sit so comfortably with other measures that the Government are attempting. The noble Baroness put it very well when she said that this is essential for the credible functioning of the violence against women and girls strategy. Last night, during the course of the Second Reading debate on the Victims and Courts Bill, it was wonderful to hear another Minister, my noble friend Lady Levitt, talk about further work and an expanded regime on allowing whistleblowing and the busting open of non-disclosure agreements that cover up illegal activity—which often means violence against women at work. What the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is proposing sits so comfortably with that.

I cannot believe that my noble friend the Minister will think anything different not least because, just a few minutes ago, he spoke so passionately about protecting emergency workers when they have to go into difficult and dangerous settings and how they should be protected even from abuse, let alone from violence and more serious criminality. It would be odd if there was no duty on the employers of emergency workers to look at risk, adequate training and culture in the workplace and at what measures might be taken within teams and with training for those same emergency workers. As was suggested by the noble Baroness, this is about joined-up thinking and coming up with a violence against women and girls strategy that the whole Committee and all parties can get behind. I am feeling optimistic about my noble friend the Minister’s reply.

To Committee colleagues on the opposition Front Bench, I would say that there are inevitable concerns about any additional burden on employers. I am seeing nods that suggest that my suspicions are correct. But these duties can be as appropriate. If noble Lords and Committee members have concerns about the precise drafting of the amendments, those can be dealt with before Report. The duties would be to prepare and revise assessments that are appropriate for a particular business—and businesses and workplace settings are so different; they include very vulnerable and secluded settings, with visits and travel, including to people’s homes. This only need be about strategies and training as appropriate; the duties need not be an undue burden on good employers of good faith who have many women workers in particular, although I would like to see all protected.

I hope that the entire Committee can get behind the noble Baroness. I am delighted to see the first ever woman general secretary of the TUC looking as if she might be due to speak after me.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I first seek clarification from the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, on his sums. I do not do sums either but, if I heard him correctly, he said that a worker spends 50% of his life at work. If that is what I heard correctly, that is 84 hours a week.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

What I said was that a person fortunate enough to be employed spends on average 52% of one year in and around the workplace.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I shall need to go back later and do my own sums, but that still seems to me a little bit excessive.

I am not opposed to the proposed new clauses, and I agree with the thrust of them; this is an important issue. But my concern is with turning a broad legal duty, which these two proposed clauses suggest, into concrete and repeatable workplace practice. There are some practical difficulties. First, you get hidden and underreported incidents. We all know that victims often do not report harassment or stalking—and then there are no incident logs, which may underrate the risk. The risk can come from colleagues, managers, contractors, clients, customers or the public, including online, making responsibility and control much harder to map. That might put a simply impossible obligation on employers and impose a very heavy burden on small employers, which would probably not have an HR or personnel department or the security expertise to assess all the potential risk.

Designing “gender-responsive” measures into practical and proportionate steps seems to me to be a very difficult thing to do; a lot of careful tailoring would be required to deal with different people and roles. That may be beyond the capability of many employers, particularly small ones. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has looked at the HSE advice, already published, which I think includes detailed guidance on managing work-related stress and preventing work-related violence. That includes information on creating policies to address unacceptable behaviour. Perhaps the voluntary advice it gives could be expanded to deal with the elements at the core of these new clauses.

I also look to what ACAS does. This is what it says on its website:

“‘Vicarious liability’ is when an employer could be held responsible if one of their workers discriminates against someone … The law (Equality Act 2010) says a worker and an employer could both be held responsible if the discrimination happens ‘in the course of employment’. This means something that’s linked to work … This could be at work or outside the workplace, for example at a work party or through social media that’s linked to work”.


That is what ACAS says about discrimination, but I simply wonder whether the better course of action might be not to pass this proposed new clause into law but to get HSE and ACAS to take the thrust of the suggestions and design new guidance that delivers what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, want.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, has just left the Chamber, but when I saw him here, I assumed that he was going to speak on this matter. Had he spoken, he would probably have said, “Please do not give any more powers to the Health and Safety Executive”. He was a victim of one of the excessive criminal trials. When he was commissioner of the Met, one of his officers was pursuing a burglar. The burglar ran on to the roof of a factory, and the police officer chased him, fell through the skylight and was seriously injured. The Health and Safety Executive took the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to court for failing to provide a safe working environment for the officer. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said: “I stood in No. 1 court of the Old Bailey—the court that had the trials of murderers, serious criminals and traitors—accused by the Health and Safety Executive of not taking enough care of my workers. When my lawyer asked the chap from the Health and Safety Executive, ‘What should the officer have done?’, he said, ‘Well, he should have stopped; he should have sent for a cherry-picker and scaffolding to make sure it was safe’”. The noble Lord said, “I looked at the jury, and the jury looked at the face of this idiot, and within minutes I was cleared, because a sensible jury knew that that was a ridiculous thing to say”.

That is the only danger of giving these powers to an organisation like the Health and Safety Executive. It may use the bulk of them safely most of the time, but on occasions you will get silly decisions. I should say in conclusion that that case of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, is a very good reason why we should keep juries, rather than having a single judge.

I perceive difficulties in putting this proposal into law, but I hope that a solution can be found whereby the Health and Safety Executive, ACAS or others can pursue the contents of new clauses without recourse to legislation.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have some serious reservations about Amendment 348 and the related Amendment 349. I spoke at length against them when a similar amendment was tabled to the Employment Rights Bill, and I shall not repeat everything that I said then.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked about looking at the drafting. That was interesting, because one of my problems is with the wording of this repeated amendment. It is all over the place, quite dangerous and very broad, and it could get us into all sorts of unintended trouble. Let me illustrate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, spoke passionately and excellently about some the real live problems of sexual harassment at work, and many of us will recognise that. As I say, I have concerns about the language of this amendment. It refers to having a legal mandate for employers to introduce

“proactive and preventative measures to protect all persons working in their workplace from … psychological and emotional abuse”.

We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that “psychological and emotional abuse” is a very broad term. The nature of “proactive and preventative measures” might involve stopping something that is very hard to define and could result in real overreach. It could be quite coercive and manipulative.

However, I am particularly nervous about the use of the “gender-responsive” approach that is advocated, particularly in relation to training. We are told in the amendment that

“a ‘gender-responsive approach’ means taking into account the various needs, interests, and experiences of people of different gender identities, including women and girls”.

Women and girls are not a subset of “gender identities”—whatever they are. That is insulting, and gender identities are at the very least contentious. This language confusion, for me, drags the amendment into a potential political minefield. I am familiar with the way in which gender-responsive approaches are being used in the workplace at the present time to undermine women and girls.

I was fortunate enough today to have a meeting here in Parliament with the Darlington Nurses Union. The Darlington nurses are in dispute with their NHS employer because they felt sexually unsafe in their single-sex nurses’ changing room—which, by the way, was fought for as part of health and safety at work in the past. They had a place where they could get changed and they felt unsafe when a gender-inclusive policy allowed a male who identifies as a woman to use their space. This has led to all sorts of problems in relation to what safety at work is. They felt as though there was a degree of sexual harassment going on, and so forth. I am just pointing out that this is a difficult area, so can we at least acknowledge it?

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interest of CEO of the Muslim Women’s Network UK. We have a helpline and we deal with honour-based abuse cases.

While I support in principle the introduction of a statutory definition of honour-based abuse, it is essential that the Home Office concludes its work on the definition. I am part of the advisory group on this, alongside many other stakeholders. We must ensure that a final version is workable and fair, and includes statutory guidance, as recommended in Amendment 355.

However, I oppose the definition that has been put forward, although I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, has suggested it to create debate and discussion. I have a number of concerns. While I appreciate that a number of organisations have put their names to the proposed definition, I suspect that many have not gone through it line by line, as we do in here, and probably just accepted it at face value without thinking about whether it is applicable in law.

First, the definition lists types of abuse that could be motivated by shame. However, I note that stalking and harassment, which are specific offences under the law, are not mentioned and could be motivated by honour, particularly when a victim has escaped from the family or partner and attempts are made to track down, contact and bring back the person. Also, non-fatal strangulation and suffocation are not included in the list, and I would like to see them included.

Secondly, what does the wording actually mean when it refers to

“the perceived norms of the community’s accepted behaviours”

and the community being “shamed”? What do we mean by “the community”, “perceived norms” and “accepted behaviours”? This has to be legally clear for it to be applied. What community are we referring to? The use of this word has not been challenged for decades; we just blindly accept that terminology.

Let us take Birmingham, the city where I live. It has a population of more than 1 million. More than 500,000 are from a minority ethnic background; let us delve deeper into this population. Around 190,000 are from a Pakistani background, 20,000 are Arab, 66,000 are of Indian heritage and 17,000 are of Somali heritage —I could go on with that breakdown. If somebody commits an honour-based abuse crime in Birmingham, are we then suggesting that all those communities—for example, the 190,000 Pakistani community, including myself—are shamed by that crime? Well, that is not true: we would be stereotyping the whole community, and the communities are so diverse.

Even if we amended the wording to “the perpetrator and/or their family feeling they have been shamed or will lose honour and respect within their community”, tens or hundreds of thousands of people will not know who they are. A more accurate description, in my opinion, would be to cite “perpetrators’ perception of being dishonoured among their family and their social circle and their kinship group”.

By using this description, the honour-based abuse definition could even have a wider application. While this type of abuse is mostly associated with minority ethnic communities, honour-based abuse can occur in other contexts, even if to a much lesser extent. For example, it can happen in white, non-minority contexts too, particularly with the rise of toxic masculinity and the manosphere. Violence could be justified as “She embarrassed me”, and “She shamed me”. Then, abuse is committed for that reason. It could also be applied to gang-related contexts where violence is sometimes used to restore and protect honour.

I now turn to “accepted behaviours”. How will this be interpreted in law? This wording opens up the definition to subjective interpretation, risking inconsistent application. Legal risks could include prosecutors struggling to prove a motive beyond reasonable doubt. The defence could argue alternative motivations such as control, jealousy and anger. We must also ensure that those applying a legal definition are provided with clear guidance when any form of abuse is motivated by honour and shame: otherwise, automatic assumptions cannot be made that abuse is motivated by shame and honour just because the perpetrator is from a particular background, for example from a south Asian background. Evidence will be needed to justify why that motivation is linked to honour. As accepted behaviours may vary, it would be wise to list some key ones if it is not possible to provide an exhaustive list.

The very last part of the definition talks about the perception of shame preventing a victim accessing support and help. If honour-based abuse is going to be used as an aggravating factor to increase sentencing, this part needs to be strengthened further. This section needs to be linked to the behaviour of the perpetrator. Instead, it should be framed as where the perpetrator exploits concepts of shame and honour through threats, intimidation, coercion or blackmail, to prevent or deter the victim from seeking support, protection or assistance. An example of this is using intimate images to prevent a victim from speaking out by threatening to share those images.

Putting all of that together, I propose the following definition, some of which could be put in guidance. Honour-based abuse is an incident or pattern of abuse where the perpetrator is motivated by their belief that the victim has caused or may cause them and/or their family to lose honour or respect within their social circle or kinship group because of behaviours that are perceived to bring shame to them that may include: choosing one’s own partner; refusing a forced marriage, female genital mutilation or other harmful practices; having premarital sex, a relationship or pregnancy outside marriage; having interfaith, interethnic, intercaste relationships; ending a marriage or seeking divorce; having LGBTQ+ identity or relationships; seeking education or employment against family wishes; not dressing or having an appearance according to family expectations; having friends of the opposite sex; refusing family control over decisions; disclosing abuse and seeking help; and acts of betrayal within gang-related relationships.

Types of abuse may include: physical or sexual abuse; violent or threatening behaviour; stalking and harassment; non-fatal strangulation or suffocation; controlling or coercive behaviour; economic abuse; spiritual or faith-related abuse; psychological and emotional abuse; isolation; harmful cultural practices such as forced marriage; and intimate image abuse, especially in relation to silencing victims. The definition is long, some of it could be in guidance, and it would need tweaking.

I turn to Amendment 354, which proposes making honour-based abuse an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. I would support the amendment once we have defined honour-based abuse. I too acknowledge the long-standing campaign called Banaz’s law to get this very law passed. Banaz Mahmod was murdered by her family in an honour killing in 2006. Her sister, Bekhal Mahmod, has been campaigning to have honour-based abuse become a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. She is supported by Southall Black Sisters in her campaign, and I hope the Government will join us in acknowledging its campaign and hard work. I look forward to hearing from the Minister whether the Government are committed to adding a definition of honour-based abuse to this Bill.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I completely agree with all these proposed new clauses, which are long overdue. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Sugg on her excellent exposition and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on her strong support.

I want first to criticise the term “honour-based abuse”, since there is nothing honourable about it. The term was invented by the perpetrators to make their actions seem more honourable than they were. In reality, these acts are abusive and destructive, involve the horrible murders of girls and women, and are morally wrong and thoroughly evil. I understand that, in an ideal world, we would have different terminology; however, as we are not, we probably cannot change the name now, since it is widely used and understood, including in law. Still, calling it what it is helps us refute the false framing that protects abusers as if they were doing something decent instead of evil.

What is the extent of the problem in the United Kingdom? It is estimated that at least 12 so-called honour killings occur in the UK each year, which averages out to at least one woman or girl murdered per month. The exact number is not known, as these crimes are often hidden and underreported. The figures provided by excellent charities such as Karma Nirvana are expert estimations; I congratulate them on the superb work they do, and I wish Karma Nirvana well in developing its national e-learning modules. The actual number of cases is widely believed to be much higher, because, as I said, many go unreported or are misidentified by authorities. Some police forces simply do not want to add that label, for the same misguided reasons that they covered up the rape of children in certain communities.

This is not a cultural problem to be tolerated or explained away. Since at least one girl or woman is murdered every month in this country, we can imagine that many thousands of other abuses, less than murder, are occurring. They can include physical assault, emotional and psychological control, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and sexual violence—up to murder itself. Victims are often isolated and silenced by those closest to them. The abuse can be carried out, as we have heard from noble Baronesses, by multiple family members or by members of the wider community. The honour-based abuse includes violence, murder, threats, intimidation, coercion and other forms of abuse carried out to protect or defend the perceived honour of a family or community.

Honour-based abuse is not a private family dispute; it is a serious human rights violation. It strips people of their autonomy, their choice and their safety. As it is hidden, many victims never reach out for help. When they do, they need responses that are informed, compassionate and co-ordinated, and they need to be taken seriously by the police, education authorities and the health service.

Despite some excellent initiatives being taken by the charities and the Home Office, I feel we are still talking about it sotto voce. We all need to denounce aspects of honour-based abuse for the evil that it is and not tolerate excuses—that it is mandated by some people with a perverted misinterpretation of religion and practised by ignorant people.

I turn to my Amendment 355A. The College of Policing already provides extensive guidance on how to identify honour-based abuse. Officers are advised to look for a wide range of indicators: control of movement, restrictions on communication, coercive family behaviour, fear, anxiety, unexplained absences, threats of being taken abroad and the collective involvement of extended family members. I have just read out a small selection; I believe that the college has about 15 different indicators that tell police officers, “These are things you can look for that might add up collectively to honour-based abuse”. If one wants a definition, one can look at the College of Policing indicators and the suggestions from the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir—and there you have a definition of all the factors that could encompass honour-based abuse. The college’s guidance is detailed, thoughtful and clearly written; it recognises that honour-based abuse is not a single incident but a pattern that is often hidden, often escalating and often involving multiple perpetrators acting together.

However, after setting out all these excellent warning signs, the guidance stops short of the critical next step. It tells the professionals what to look for but gives them no instruction on how to record what they have found. There is no requirement to flag up an incident as honour-based abuse. There is no standardised data field, no multi-agency reporting framework and no clarity on whether a case should be logged as domestic abuse, forced marriage, coercive control, child safeguarding or all the above. In short, the system trains police officers to recognise honour-based abuse but then leaves them with no mechanism to ensure the system itself recognises it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 399 in the names of my noble friend Lady Pidgeon, who cannot attend today, and my noble friend Lady Doocey. This amendment would enable CCTV systems on the railways to be quickly available to the police and continuously for 30 days, alongside defining the technical standards to support this access. It is about ensuring that investigations on the railways can be carried out efficiently.

The amendment was first tabled by our colleague Daisy Cooper following a spate of bike thefts at St Albans station. In trying to resolve this issue, the correspondence from the British Transport Police was quite revealing. The CCTV system at St Albans station is operated by Govia Thameslink Railway—GTR—as part of a commercial franchise agreement. GTR manages CCTV across 238 stations, with over 6,000 cameras. Although British Transport Police and other forces have established information-sharing agreements with GTR and similar operators, these agreements are designed to govern data management, including storage and access protocols. They do not constitute contracts with commitments to supply CCTV footage within specific timeframes or of specific volumes.

Currently, there are no provisions for rail franchise agreements that mandate specific service levels for supplying CCTV footage—it is not established in law yet. While this may change over coming years, as the franchises may be nationalised, this remains an issue. Unlike council-owned CCTV systems, which often feature integrated platforms allowing direct access, many rail CCTV systems are standalone, not remotely connected. Retrieval often requires physical visits to stations, which can delay access, and sometimes operators impose limits on the duration and length of footage they can supply.

While I acknowledge that these are challenges resulting from the current franchise arrangements, which will gradually be resolved, other constraints are rooted in the operational systems. I am aware that in September, the Government announced that they will be providing funding of almost £70 million so that Network Rail can make some improvements to CCTV. Although this is welcome, Amendment 399 would ensure that a legal obligation exists, and I hope the Minister will look carefully at the issues we are raising today.

Amendment 356A from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, would put a duty on British Transport Police to take steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains. This is a national emergency: one in four women have experienced domestic abuse, and a woman is killed by a man once every three days. Given that fewer than one in six victims of rape or attempted rape report their assault to the police—the reasons cited including that the police would not believe them or could not help them, or that they would not be understood—and given that only 2.6% of rape offences result in a charge or summons, it is crucial we do everything we can to assist in this process.

We fully support specialised teams tackling violence against women and girls in every police station, including British Transport Police stations, and we welcome the Government’s overall work in this important area.

The amendment also raises the issue of rolling stock design. As the railway comes under public ownership, there is a real opportunity for the Government to lead on the right design of the interior of their new fleets of trains; procedures to cut out crime and ensure safety and accessibility for everybody should be the heart of that design. However, it should be noted that the rolling stock would not be publicly owned; rather, it would continue to be leased, as now. That issue may need to be looked at again.

Amendment 356F from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, would create the offence of assaulting a public transport worker, which is similar to the offences of assaulting retail workers and emergency workers. We are sympathetic to this amendment but as the noble Lord himself indicated, the wording may need refining. However, the principle behind it is clear, and it is obvious that protection is needed.

This is an important group of amendments that addresses the safety of our railway networks, systems and travelling public. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the many serious points that have been raised.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

In rising to support Amendment 356A in the name of my noble friend, I recognise that the problem will probably be enforcement, and the answer may have to be a lot more British Transport Police routinely patrolling certain trains.

I also want to raise another issue which affects women. The amendment deals with the big crimes—rape and other sexual offences, stalking, upskirting and domestic abuse—but women and girls also suffer bad behaviour on trains. For example, if a woman or girl gets on to a train and the only seat left has some yob’s rucksack on it, how many would say, “Could you move your rucksack, please?” They would probably stay silent, afraid that if they did speak up, they would be attacked.

The same things happen late at night, when groups of youths have been drinking and are making a noise or playing their music loudly, causing a complete disturbance. A few weeks ago, I had the guts to tell someone to take his feet off the seats, and he did. But I wonder how many women and girls would actually take that action, asking people to turn the music down, behave themselves, stop the swearing and loutish behaviour, and stop throwing their empty beer cans about. Women will not do that sort of thing—they will not take action—and are therefore suffering.

I do not have an answer to this problem, but it has to involve improving behaviour on trains generally. Perhaps, like the US Transportation Secretary, who told people to dress properly on planes and not like scruffs just off the beach, we should say similar about Great British Railways: when you are on trains in future, behave yourselves, because women and girls are suffering.

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I hope that I have been able to give some comfort to the noble Lords and noble Baronesses who put forward these amendments—

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Will the Minister take this idea to the British Transport Police? By the time one has done a three-hour journey, one is heartily sick of hearing, for the 20th time, “See it. Say it. Sorted”. Could it possibly intersperse between those announcements something like: “This coach has video recording. We will take action against any passengers who harass or cause trouble for others”? That may not be the right wording, but something warning about that might be helpful.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will give consideration to that with my colleagues in the Department for Transport. As somebody who travels every week on the train to this House, “See it. Say it. Sorted” appears on my journey on a number of occasions—in my case, in both English and Welsh. The noble Lord makes a valid point: there should be an acceptance and acknowledgment that the type of antisocial behaviour which he has referred to, at a low level, can be intimidating for individuals. The ability to undertake physical violence in the extreme form that allegedly took place in Huntingdon—I have to use the word “allegedly”—and the low-level abuse that might occur are significant issues. Transport staff on railways, from whichever railway company, and the teams that are operating require the support of the state to give them that back-up.

Under the current legislation, I believe that my noble friend’s amendment is not necessary. However, the general principle that we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and other speakers, including my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, via the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, is absolutely valid and was well worth raising. I hope that I have been able to give assurances on that and that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, will withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 357, first tabled by my party in the other place last year, would extend the operation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act by making explicit reference to GPS equipment or, as the industry now prefers, global navigation satellite systems.

For several years, Liberal Democrats have highlighted the sharp rise in rural crime, with organised gangs systematically targeting farms and rural businesses. Their focus has been on stealing high-value GPS drones, receivers and in-cab screens from tractors and harvesters. This equipment is worth thousands of pounds and is essential for modern precision farming. The loss of these units leaves farmers facing costly delays and crop losses at critical times of the year. These thefts have formed part of a well-organised international trade whereby equipment is stripped, containerised and shipped overseas, often beyond recovery. Crucially, offences spiked as rural policing came under ever-increasing strain. Local stations were closed and experienced neighbourhood teams hollowed out, taking with them the deep local knowledge that underpins effective intelligence gathering.

Organised gangs stepped into that vacuum, criss-crossing county boundaries with little deterrence. We recognise that real progress has been made over the last year, with insurance claims for GPS theft now starting to fall, thanks to greater collaboration between farmers, insurers, police and the National Rural Crime Network, whose invaluable work is now rightly benefiting from strengthened national funding and support. The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act should build on that work, offering a strong framework for prevention, giving the Secretary of State powers to require immobilisers and the marking and registration of agricultural machinery, and to extend these measures to other equipment by regulation.

Amendment 357 would strengthen that framework by naming GPS units explicitly in the primary legislation. This would give a clear signal of intent, ensure momentum and guard against any further delay in bringing the provisions into effect. We welcome the Government’s recent commitment to include removable GPS units in future regulations and I am pleased that Ministers have listened to evidence presented from these Benches and others. The reality, however, is that the key provisions of the Act have not yet been brought into force and the secondary legislation required to implement them is still pending. Our amendment would ensure timely and decisive action, so that farmers and rural businesses see the benefits on the ground sooner rather than later. This is a simple, practical step that would support the Government’s aims and help stop the theft and resale of vital agricultural technology. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.

The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.

Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.

Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses an issue that will be immediately recognisable to many people across the country: the theft of essential equipment from those who rely on it for their living. Turning first to Amendment 357, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, we broadly support the intention behind extending the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023. This was an Act brought in by the Conservative Government to protect businessmen and tradespeople, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would ensure that it explicitly includes GPS equipment. Technology becomes ever more central to commercial activity, particularly in agriculture, construction and logistics. It is therefore right that the law keeps pace with the evolving nature of equipment theft. GPS units are high-value, easily resold and frequently targeted. Bringing them clearly within scope of the Act is a sensible and proportionate step to help disrupt illicit resale markets.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this debate and raising these important issues. Turning first to Amendment 357, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I can confirm that the Government remain committed to the implementation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 and fully support the intentions behind its introduction. Informed by responses to the call for evidence and direct consultation with industry, the Act will cover the forensic marking and registration on a database of new all-terrain vehicles, quad bikes and, I am pleased to say, removable GPS systems.

The NFU Mutual Rural Crime Report 2025 highlights that GPS theft cost an estimated £1.2 million in 2024. GPS units are particularly vulnerable to theft and their theft massively disrupts day-to-day farming operations, which is exactly why we have included them in the legislation. I am pleased to echo the acknowledgement by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, of the progress that has been made in this important area, with, as she said, falling insurance claims thanks to the concerted efforts of the police and other parties.

The Act requires secondary legislation before it can come into effect and we intend to bring this forward as soon as possible. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, the Government’s response to the call for evidence was published quite recently, in October 2025. We are very grateful to all those who took the time to respond, and we carefully considered the views and evidence provided in those responses. Significant technical concerns were raised and we needed to assess the impact before we committed to introducing secondary legislation. We did not want to introduce regulations that were not fit for purpose or, more importantly, that would adversely impact vehicle safety.

The noble Lord talked about the comparison between smaller vehicles and larger, more expensive farming machinery, such as tractors. We have carefully considered the benefits and implications of including other agricultural equipment in the regulations. The installation of immobilisers into other large pieces of machinery post manufacture poses a similar risk to ATVs, so there is a delicate balance to be struck between the costs to businesses and the achievability of the ends of the regulations.

Should the Act become more effective in tackling rural theft, the legislation would be widened in the future by introducing other large agricultural machinery in a further tranche of regulations. We are looking at the situation and the way the regulations operate, and will see whether we can apply them further.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Can the Minister give a rough timescale for a consultation on extending this to include heavy agricultural machinery or contracting equipment?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not want to commit to any particular timescale. It probably ill behoves me to do so, but I will point out that, having published our response to the call for evidence a couple of months before Christmas, we are obviously trying to motor ahead with it, if noble Lords will forgive the pun.

I turn now to Amendment 368, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which proposes two changes: first, to expand enforcement provisions under the 2023 Act and, secondly, to introduce a statutory aggravating factor for theft of tools from tradesmen under the Sentencing Act 2020. The Government recognise the distress caused by tool theft and its impact on tradespeople and small businesses, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke to. As he said, these tools are essential to livelihoods, and their loss can cause real financial and emotional harm. That is why we are already taking action through the National Vehicle Crime Working Group, which brings together specialists from every police force to share intelligence and tackle emerging trends in vehicle-related crime, including tool theft.

On sentencing, the current framework is sufficient and robust. Courts must follow guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, which already require consideration of harm, culpability and aggravating factors such as financial loss, business impact and emotional distress. Courts also have powers to impose compensation orders to ensure that victims receive financial compensation. Introducing a statutory aggravating factor, as this amendment calls for, would duplicate existing provisions unnecessarily and have limited impact on outcomes. Indeed, I am reminded that a wise man once said,

“I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors”.—[Official Report, 15/12/25; col. 585.]

That was of course the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, speaking just three weeks ago, on 15 December, in response to an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to Clause 102 on self-harm. I could not have put it better myself.

I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we accept the spirit of her Amendment 357 and we are working to give effect to this issue. I hope too that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 368 to be necessary, and forgive my light ribbing a moment ago. For all these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in this Committee and to follow my friend the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who perfectly and proportionately set out the principles in this amendment, which I support to every last sentence. We are now discussing a number of amendments on areas where the existing law, and this Bill as drafted, are clearly out of date and full of gaps—not least when we consider how our nation, our economy and the state itself are seeking to move to digitisation, which has such benefits for citizens and communities, our cities and our entire country. But one key element which enables, empowers and underpins almost every element of that digital transformation is effective digital ID.

There are a number of arguments that could be made at another time about the correct approach to digital ID. I would suggest that the principles around self-sovereign ID should strongly be considered. Mandation is clearly problematic, while the reasons for introducing a digital ID should be clearly made and the benefits set out. But the specifics of this amendment are clear, proportionate and timely, because a digital ID is critical and essential to availing oneself of the opportunities—and, indeed, to protecting oneself against many of the harms. To not have a digital ID protected by the criminal law would be a huge, inexplicable and indefensible gap.

If the Government want digital ID to be the means of accessing government services and to see greater digital inclusion—and, through that, the attendant and very necessary financial inclusion—action to protect our digital ID is critical. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones effectively set out his amendment, which is proportionate, valid, timely and necessary. I very much look forward to the Minister accepting the principle as set out.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, identity theft, as my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond said, is no longer a niche crime; it is the dominant fraud type in the UK and getting worse. In 2024, over 421,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database and almost 250,000 were identity fraud filings, making identity theft the single largest category recorded by industry partners. CIFAS, the credit industry fraud avoidance system, recorded a record number of cases on the national fraud database in 2024. The organisations themselves prevented more than £2.1 billion of attempted loss, yet criminals are shifting tactics. Account takeovers rose by 76% and unauthorised SIM swaps surged, driven by the rapid adoption of AI and generative tools that let fraudsters create convincing fake documents and synthetic identities at scale.

We have all read of some of the high-profile examples: celebrity impersonation via deepfakes and cloned voices has been widely reported; manipulated videos and voice clones purporting to show public figures from Elon Musk to Martin Lewis, Holly Willoughby and others, have been used to generate investment scams and phishing campaigns. Documented victim losses include large individual losses linked to celebrity impersonation scams. One NatWest customer is reported to have lost £150,000 after responding to a scam impersonating Martin Lewis.

However, I think we are all more concerned with the tens of thousands of ordinary people who are not celebrities and who lose all their savings to these crooks. They are the victims who suffer real financial loss and damage, with long and costly recovery processes, while businesses face rising prevention costs and operational strain. I therefore strongly support the concept of the draft clause and the need for it. While it is well intentioned, I fear that it has some technical difficulties. It is a bit broad and vague about what “obtains” and “impersonate” mean. It also risks overlap with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act and the Data Protection Act, and lacks some clear defences for legitimate security research and lawful investigations. It also needs to address AI and the deepfake-specific methods, and set out what we can do about extraterritorial reach, for example, or aggravating factors for organised, large-scale operations.

We all know that my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond is, as we have just heard, an absolute expert on AI; he recently addressed a top-level group of the Council of Europe on this subject. May I suggest that he and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, get together with the Home Office or other government digital experts and bring back on Report a more tightly drafted amendment? Among other things, it should tighten the definitions of “obtain”, “impersonate” and “sensitive”; ensure that the mens rea is tied to dishonesty or intent to cause loss or gain; include recklessness in enabling others; limit the scope to unlawfully obtained data or use that bypasses authentication; and explicitly include AI/deepfake methods when used to bypass checks or cause reliance. It should also have clear defences for lawful authority and make sure that duplication is avoided, whether it be with the Fraud Act, the Computer Misuse Act or the Data Protection Act. Finally—I know this is an impossible ask, and that Governments find it almost impossible to do—something should be done about extraterritorial reach, because that is terribly important.

I say to the Minister: there is a gap in the legislation here. We should plug it, and we may have time to bring back on Report a more tightly drawn amendment that would deal with all the concerns of noble Lords and the possible problems I have just raised.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support strongly the comments of my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the principle of the amendment laid by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This is a timely amendment, possibly timelier than the noble Lord anticipated, because today the Government have announced the promotion of a Minister to promulgate digital IDs among the population.

Digital IDs are going to have a huge vista and connection, not just in linking to personal data but in other areas of life: in the relationship between the state and the individual; and in the payment of parking tickets, road tolls, stamp duty and fishing licences—a different sort of fishing, as it begins with an “f”, not a “p”. So I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the thrust of the amendment, although I accept that some polishing is required.

If the Government are to promote digital IDs, the population at large need to have confidence not just that they will be correctly introduced but that there are safeguards against such impersonation. I strongly support the principle of this amendment and say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that if the Government resist it in principle, what confidence can the man in the street have that the Government are sincere about the safeguards they intend to introduce, alongside their intention for digital IDs—to get that balance right between the state and the individual, coupled together against the criminal?

We need to bring this back on Report. I hope the Minister is prepared to meet the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others to address this principle, so that the Government get off on the right foot, if they intend to promote digital IDs, and not resist this, because there is a world of pain if they do.

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Tackling this is hampered by the lack of a consistent national framework for recording or investigating freight crime, leaving major gaps in data and enforcement. This is all against the backdrop of the Government’s target to increase rail freight by 75% by 2050, a target set by my noble friend Lord Harper when he was Secretary of State for Transport, to which this Government remain committed. But that growth in the rail freight sector cannot materialise if the sector faces such high levels of theft. My amendment does not seek any new offences but would require the Home Secretary to establish a new freight crime code. The aim is to ensure that incidents of freight crime are properly recorded and investigated across the country. Among the issues with current data collection is the fact that freight theft is currently recorded as theft from a vehicle. This does not reflect the seriousness or the specific nature of freight crime. I look forward very much to what the Minister has to say in relation to this.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 365 after Clause 117, which would increase penalties for those who deliberately avoid paying rail fares. Deliberate fare evasion undermines the integrity of our railway and costs taxpayers and passengers hundreds of millions each year. We must be firm in protecting revenue that funds services and investment.

However, there is another side to this issue that we cannot ignore. Recent reviews and watchdog recommendations show a system that is complex, inconsistent and at times unfair to passengers who make genuine mistakes. The passenger watchdog has called for a national yellow card warning for first-time errors and a central railcard database to prevent innocent people being prosecuted for technical or administrative errors. I always book advance tickets on the train; they are slightly cheaper than the full-fare ones. A few weeks ago, business here finished early, so I got to Euston early and caught an earlier train than I had booked. When I produced my ticket, I said to the manager, “I’m on an earlier train. Is that all right?” He said, “I’ll let you off on this occasion”. I think what he meant was that he would let me off paying the full fare because I was on an earlier train. But I have heard of people, with a ticket that they have paid for, being accused of fare evasion for being on the train at the wrong time. That is a perfect example of where the yellow card system should be used.

The Office of Rail and Road was asked to review revenue protection practices precisely because enforcement has been uneven and opaque. We have seen the consequences of those failures. Thousands of prosecutions were quashed after courts found that operators had used inappropriate fast-track procedures and many passengers faced the threat of criminal records for minor errors. These are not abstract concerns; they are real harms to livelihoods and trust in the system.

I support the principle of tougher penalties for deliberate evasion, but only if there are clear safeguards. Those safeguards should be: a statutory first-warning step; a consistent published test before any prosecution; improved point-of-sale information and standardised enforcement guidance for all the different train operators; and mandatory staff training and data sharing to identify repeat offenders rather than punishing honest mistakes. I understand that the Government have accepted the ORR’s recommendations and must now legislate to ensure that enforcement is proportionate and transparent.

In short, tough penalties and fairness are not mutually exclusive. We can deter deliberate evasion while protecting innocent travellers, but only if this amendment is paired with the reforms that the ORR and passenger bodies have recommended. I urge the Minister to support the amendment on that basis and to press the Government to enshrine these other safeguards in law.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra has made a very pragmatic speech on the difficulties of fare evasion and the extraordinary complexities of the ticketing and fares system in the UK. Of course, I note that the Government are legislating in this area as part of the broader GB Railways Bill that is coming down the tracks, as it were. I really do not believe that there is a single individual in the United Kingdom who could answer 20 questions about the cheapest fare from A to B crossing C and get it right. It is an extraordinary system, and I quite agree that many people are making inadvertent errors, which should absolutely be taken into consideration.

Equally, the Minister will have heard me talking about enforcement on many occasions throughout the passage of the Bill. The law is brought very quickly into disrepute if the laws that law-abiding people see as absolutely necessary are avoided by a determined criminal element. We have all seen it. We have all seen it on the Tube, with people barging through, tailgating and hopping over the barriers. I have seen two officials of London Underground at Green Park station late in the evening, chatting to one another—someone comes barging past and they do absolutely nothing. If that continues, then I suggest we get ourselves into a very difficult situation indeed. So, when the Minister comes to respond, I ask that he talks about enforcement and about the attitude of the police to combat this serious issue which robs the railways and London Underground of hundreds of millions of pounds and is unsustainable.

I think that, on the ticketing issue and the fare issues, the answer really lies in technology. I think that apps have made this much more straightforward. It is absolutely a task for computers to find the best ticket from A to B, but there are plenty of people who do not use those, who are not particularly computer literate and who prefer a paper ticket. So, it is perhaps more complex than it seems from the outside, but I really think we have to put more effort on enforcement in this difficult area.

--- Later in debate ---

To be clear, this amendment does not change the law. It would not create a new offence. It would require the Home Secretary to establish a freight crime code and ensure that incidents are properly identified, recorded and investigated across all police forces. Recording these high-value crimes differently from a standard theft from a vehicle better reflects the seriousness and economic consequences of freight crime, which creates the groundwork for building a stronger deterrent to the organised and occasional criminals who are taking a huge amount of money out of our economy, threatening drivers and destabilising the logistics industry. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say, considering he is not looking to bring in a new Bill but is seeking to create a code. Surely, it is not beyond the wit of the Government to create a code to record and investigate, and ensure that people understand that these are high-value crimes and not just thefts from vehicles.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I want to comment on something the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said and endorse it. I regularly travel to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and I use the marvellous level-access tram system. There are no barriers or gates, but periodically four people come on in a team with their little electronic machines, go between one station and another, and check we all have our little “aller simple” travelcard. If someone does not have it, they are hauled off. It is only one team of about four people in all of Strasbourg, but everyone is terrified of not having a valid ticket. That may be the solution: check people on the trains rather than at the barriers.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, I cannot understand why Governments in the past have not called these people to account when they have had them in for meetings and they have said they are going to go away and do something about it. Why have they not? The answer is that nobody is asking them to do it and there is no financial incentive to do it either. That is what Governments are for, it seems to me. This is a real opportunity to do something about it. I support it 100% and I hope the Government will take action on it.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Jackson on the quality of the amendment he drafted. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe on the superb speech she made setting out why this amendment is necessary. As we know, it addresses one of the fastest-growing forms of organised crime in the UK: the theft and rapid export of mobile phones—thousands and thousands of them. These are no longer opportunistic street offences. As noble Lords have said, they are part of a highly profitable, highly mobile criminal market that depends on one thing above all else: the ability to reactivate and resell the stolen devices abroad.

A couple of years ago, I was outside Victoria station, at the end of Victoria Street, waiting to cross the road. I saw a woman waiting for the pedestrian lights to change, holding her mobile phone out—I think she was trying to read the map—almost like a Geiger counter. Then I saw two guys on a motor scooter coming around the corner and I tried to shout to her to put her phone away, but too late—it was snatched in seconds.

That was a couple of years ago, when I think there were motor scooter gangs doing it. Now, as we have seen—we were talking about the e-bike problem in our debates on the Bill before Christmas—there are lots of videos of these guys on their very fast bikes, snatching phones, and I believe the Met now has a response squad on those high-powered bikes chasing the phone thieves. So it is a big problem, particularly in London.

At present, our defences are simply not keeping pace. IMEI blocking helps, but criminals now routinely bypass it by altering identifiers or moving devices to jurisdictions where UK blacklists are ignored. What they cannot bypass is the cloud. As noble Lords have said, modern smartphones are useless without access to the cloud-based services that power authentication, updates, storage and app ecosystems.

The amendment therefore introduces a very simple, proportionate requirement. When a user reports their phone lost or stolen, cloud service providers must take reasonable steps to block that specific device from accessing their services. If a stolen phone cannot be reactivated, it cannot be resold. If it cannot be resold, it is not worth stealing. It is as simple as that.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe hinted that the phone companies may possibly have a financial benefit from not co-operating here. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, was more blatant. I will be more blatant still. I am absolutely certain that they are conspiring not to co-operate so that they can sell more phones. We were discussing all-terrain vehicles a couple of hours ago. When the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Bill was going through, the police officers who were advising us said that they had heard from some of the big manufacturers of ATVs—the ones which make motorbikes with locks you cannot penetrate—that they were deliberately putting rubbish locks on the ATVs because when the £8,000 quad bike was stolen, the farmer immediately replaced it. They saw a market in goods being stolen. I think the big phone companies see exactly the same thing: there is a market in replacement phones.

The noble Lord asked: why do the British Government not do something about it? I suspect it is mega US-UK politics. If we said we were going to restrict the ability of Apple, Google and others to sell their phones here, I think we would have Mr Trump seeking to invade us next week, so I suspect there are geopolitical problems there.

The amendment also ensures proper safeguards: verification before blocking, a clear appeals process, and a role for the Secretary of State in setting technical standards. It strengthens law enforcement by requiring timely notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, giving them valuable intelligence on organised theft. This is not about burdening industry. It is about ensuring that all providers meet a consistent baseline of responsible behaviour—one that many already follow voluntarily, but which criminals exploit when it is not universal.

I conclude by saying that we have an opportunity here to collapse the economic incentive that drives mobile phone theft. Cloud-based blocking is practical, proportionate and overdue, and I commend the amendment to the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these excellent amendments, and to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving Amendment 366 on his behalf.

This amendment is driven by a simple proposition: if we are to bear down on the scourge of phone theft, we must remove the profit motive, because it is precisely this incentive to profit that drives the vast industry behind phone theft. Too often, the criminal justice system is left trying to deal with the consequences of crime after the event, rather than addressing the incentives that fuel it in the first place. Phone theft is now a high-volume, high-impact crime, particularly in our cities, and it causes not only financial loss but real fear and disruption to victims’ lives.

What this amendment seeks to do is eminently practical. It asks cloud service providers, which already control the digital lifeline that makes a smartphone valuable, to take responsible and timely steps to deny access to those services once a device is verified as lost or stolen. A phone that cannot access cloud backups, app stores, authentication, service or updates rapidly becomes worthless on the secondary market, whether at home or abroad.

This is not a novel idea nor an untested one. As many noble Lords will know, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has examined this issue in detail. In its recent correspondence with Ministers and technology companies, the committee highlighted both the scale of the problem and the frustrating gap between what is technically possible and what is currently being done. The committee made it clear that voluntary action has been uneven, that existing measures are inconsistently applied across platforms, and that stronger co-ordination, potentially underpinned by legislation, may be required if we are serious about prevention. This amendment directly reflects that evidence-based work and gives effect to its central recommendations.

Importantly, the amendment builds in safeguards for users to appeal or reverse a block where a mistake has been made or a device is recovered. It leaves the detailed technical standards, timelines and sanctions to secondary legislation, allowing flexibility and proper consultation with industry, and it recognises the importance of law enforcement by requiring prompt notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, strengthening intelligence and disruption efforts. Fundamentally, if we can force cloud service providers to implement this provision, we can break the cycle of phone theft. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

369ZA: After inserted subsection (2)(c), insert—
“(d) ensure that all other members of the public who are not protesting are not hindered in any way from going about their daily business.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment to Amendment 369 seeks to ensure that members of the public who are not protesting are able to go about their daily business.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support the proposed new clause establishing an express statutory right to protest and will speak to my amendments which, I believe, would make that right workable, balanced and fair to all members of the public. I begin by saying that the right to protest is a cornerstone of any free society. It is a mark of confidence, not weakness, when a nation allows its citizens to gather, speak, dissent and challenge those in authority.

I support that principle wholeheartedly, but rights do not exist in isolation. They exist in a framework of mutual respect, where the rights of one group cannot simply extinguish the rights of another. That is why I have tabled these amendments: to ensure that alongside the duty to respect, protect and facilitate protest, public authorities must also ensure that those who are not protesting are not hindered in going about their daily business.

My amendment proposes a new subsection (2)(d), which makes that duty explicit. I have proposed two further subsections in Amendment 369ZB, (3)(d) and (3)(e), to make it clear that preventing inconvenience to any member of the public and permitting people to go about their daily lives are legitimate grounds for proportionate restrictions on protest.

This is not an attempt to water down the right to protest; it is an attempt to anchor it in the real world. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, in the words of the convention, it is to protect the rights and freedoms of others as well. In the real world, “the public” is not an abstract; the public are individuals: it is a nurse trying to reach her shift on time; it is a carer who must get to an elderly relative; it is a parent taking their child to school; it is a worker who risks losing wages, even a job, because the road has been blocked; it is a small business owner whose customers cannot reach them; it is the disabled Peer in this wheelchair who could not get across Westminster Bridge three years ago because Just Stop Oil were blocking me getting across—I should have borrowed one of their banners and then the police would have helped me across.

All these people matter every bit as much as those who are protesting. Their rights are not secondary. Their needs are not trivial, and their lives should not be treated as collateral damage in someone else’s political campaign.

Some argue—I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said so—that inconvenience is a part of protest, but inconvenience is not a theoretical concept. Inconvenience has consequences—missed medical appointments, missed exams, missed care visits, missed wages, missed opportunities. For many people, what is dismissed as mere inconvenience is in fact material harm.

I want to be absolutely clear that a legitimate public interest does not need to be a crowd of thousands. It does not need to be a major national event. It does not need to be a threat to infrastructure. Sometimes a legitimate public interest is one person, one individual, who simply needs to get to work or go to school or go to hospital. A democracy protects minorities, and sometimes the minority is a minority of one.

My amendments recognise that reality. They would ensure that the right to protest was balanced with the right of everyone else to live their lives. They would give public authorities clarity rather than ambiguity, because at present the police are often placed in an impossible position. If they intervene, they are accused of supporting protests. If they do not intervene, they are accused of failing to protect the public. My amendments would give them a clear statutory duty: protect protests, yes, but protect the public and ensure that daily life can continue.

This is not about silencing anyone; it is about ensuring that protest remains peaceful, proportionate and legitimate. If protests routinely prevent ordinary people going about their lives, public support for them will erode. When public support erodes, the right itself becomes more fragile. I think we all saw on television recently motorists getting out of their cars and dragging people off the road. That should not happen. They had to become vigilantes to clear the road. That was because they felt the authorities were not doing their duty in keeping the roads clear.

My amendments would strengthen the right to protest by ensuring that it was exercised responsibly, in a way that commands public respect rather than public resentment. The proposed new clause before them is well intentioned, but without my amendments it risks creating a one-sided right that elevates the interests of protesters above the interests of everyone else. That is not balance, that is not fairness, and it is not how rights should operate in a democratic society. My amendments would restore that balance. They recognise that the right to protest is vital but not absolute. They recognise that the rights of protesters must coexist with the rights of those who are not protesting. They recognise that sometimes the legitimate public interest is not a grand principle but a simple human need—the need to get to work, to keep an appointment, to reach a hospital or simply to go about one’s daily business without obstruction. I commend my amendments to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it was quite difficult to sit here and listen to that, but I will come to that. I very strongly support Amendment 369, and I do so with a real sense of fury that we are in this position, that we actually have to do this, and that it is not obvious to any Government that in a democracy we need the right to protest to be protected. To engage in peaceful protest means irritating other people. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but, unfortunately, what he said just now was complete and utter nonsense.

Over recent years, we have seen a real erosion of protest rights through one Bill after another. I sat here and watched it all and protested at every single move. Each was justified on a narrow, technical or operational point but, taken together, they amounted to a clear political direction—making protests harder, riskier and much easier to shut down.

Amendment 369 does not invent new rights. It states in clear and accessible language that peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right and that public authorities have a duty to respect, protect and facilitate that right.

Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB seek to qualify that right by reference to whether members of the public are “hindered”, experience “inconvenience” or are able to go about “their daily business”. These amendments fundamentally misunderstand the nature of protest. Almost all meaningful protest causes some degree of hindrance or inconvenience. If it does not, it is very easy to ignore. From the suffragettes to trade unionists to civil rights campaigners, protest has always disrupted business as usual, precisely because that is how attention is drawn to injustice. For example, proscribing Palestine Action was such a stupid move by the Government and has caused more problems for them and the police than if they had just left it alone and arrested its members for criminal damage and similar.

I come back to these embarrassing amendments. It is not just the problem of their intent, which I disagree very strongly with, but their vagueness. Terms such as “hindered” and “inconvenience” are entirely undefined. Being delayed by five minutes could be an inconvenience. Noise could be an inconvenience. Simply being reminded of a cause that one disagrees with could, for some, be considered an inconvenience. If those concepts become legal thresholds for restricting protest, the right itself becomes meaningless.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, used the phrase “in the real world”. I live in the real world, and I understand what protest does and why it is needed. Under these amendments, any protest that is visible, noisy or effective could be banned on the basis that someone somewhere was inconvenienced. Democracy is by its nature sometimes noisy, disruptive and inconvenient. It is very inconvenient being here at night debating these issues, quite honestly, in a moderately cold Chamber.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is slightly premature. Technically, we are debating Amendment 369ZA, to which the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is entitled to reply.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Yes, my Lords, procedurally I have to be the tail-end Charlie here and seek leave to withdraw the amendment. However, I am so pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, was able to get in and do a summing up of his amendment.

As soon as I saw Amendment 369, I thought, “This is too extreme; it is unbalanced, and I’ve got to rebalance it”. But I could not rebalance it by tweaking it, so I adopted the maximalist approach of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and that approach, which I agree is also slightly unbalanced, managed to provoke an important debate on the balance of rights and the right to protest. Of course, it provoked the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but if one is to be beaten up in this House, there is no one better to beat me up than the noble Baroness, because she does it with a smile on her face. I know that, deep down, she does not mean it.

I was delighted to be defended by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He was right: we already have all the law we need here—we do not need a new statute. I was interested in one of the points the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made, which I have seen too. Protests have changed. She said that they have become more violent and toxic and that she was screamed at by nasty protesters. That is not very good. I like what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said: that disruption does not often work but persuasion does. He said that disruption is a mechanism for change, but people have rights as well, and that the criminal law is not the place to put in a new law on rights.

I am also grateful for the wise contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Walney. You cannot ignore the public’s views on the disruption protesters cause, and if the protesters go too far, the public will take their own action and will rebel. I mentioned seeing motorists getting out of their cars and dragging protesters off the roads. The noble Lord also mentioned the damage to the economy, and I agree with him on that.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Goodman, who gave an excellent exposition of the balance of rights and duties. I thank my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. I agree with him and welcome his view that the amendments are not essential.

Finally, I say again to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that I profoundly disagree with his amendment and what he said, but he had a very powerful and persuasive case, and I congratulate him on the way he set it out.

In his usual courteous way, the Minister took all our points of view into account, and he agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we already have all the rights we need and do not need a new law. So with that, and at this wonderful hour of the night, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 369ZA (to Amendment 369) withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

How nice it is to be back here again. I oppose Clauses 118, 119 and 120 standing part of the Bill. These clauses introduce a pre-emptive targeting of people based on location rather than behaviour. That should concern anyone who cares about the right to peaceful protest. Under these clauses, a senior police officer may designate an area in anticipation of a protest, based on a belief that an offence is likely to occur. Once that designation is in place, simply wearing an item said to conceal identity becomes a criminal offence. This applies to everyone in a designated area. Criminal liability comes not from conduct but from being in a certain place and from what a person is wearing. That is a profound shift in approach and one that I cannot support.

It is also a massively broad discretion. An inspector can designate a locality for up to 24 hours, extendable, on the basis of a prediction or guess, rather than evidence, of immediate serious violence. The result is a huge power to ban everyday protective coverings across a place at a time based only on an estimate of what might happen. That is exactly the kind of power that leads to overenforcement and a chilling effect on protest, particularly for those who already face risks from being identified.

The Government may say that defences to these provisions exist for health, religion or work, but those protections operate after arrest and charge, not at the point where the person decides whether it is safe for them to attend a protest at all. That is the key issue here. Liberty’s supporters have been clear about the real-world impact. One disabled person wrote:

“I am clinically vulnerable … Forcing disabled people like me to unmask is surely disability discrimination”.


Another said:

“As a single woman, I do not want to be identified”.


Women who have experienced domestic abuse may cover their faces for the same reason.

For others, including diaspora activists and those with credible fears of transnational repression, anonymity is not a political statement but a basic safeguard. We have already seen reporting on how mask restrictions at solidarity protests in the UK, including those linked to Hong Kong, have deterred participation because surveillance and reprisals are real concerns. This then becomes about who feels safe enough to exercise their democratic rights.

I must also ask: are these clauses really necessary? The police already have a targeted power, under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, to require the removal of certain items where this is justified. That power has been used in recent protest policing, including at protests outside a migrant hotel in Epping. Can the Minister say what evidence the Government have of a gap in existing targeted powers that they cannot meet, rather than simply a desire for broader, pre-emptive control? The Government have not demonstrated an operational gap so far. What we appear to have instead is a preference for wider, pre-emptive control rather than targeted, evidence-based policing.

That matters because Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights are absolutely clear: any restriction on protest must be necessary and proportionate, and the Strasbourg court has repeatedly warned against measures that deter peaceful participation through fear of sanction. A clause that criminalises ordinary behaviour across a designated area, without reference to a person’s actual behaviour, is precisely the kind of measure that risks crossing that line.

Will the Government consider narrowing the trigger to “imminent and serious violence or disorder” and introducing a clear front-end reasonable excuse protection, rather than relying on defences only after arrest? If the Government’s concern is intimidation or disorder, then the answer is the better use of existing targeted powers, not a blanket approach that sweeps up disabled people, women concerned about safety and minority communities, along with everybody else. For all those reasons, I support removing Clauses 118, 119 and 120 from the Bill.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.

History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.

The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:

“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.


That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:

“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.


These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:

“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.


That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.

I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.

She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.

The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.

I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.

I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The amendments in this group are motivated by understandable concern about the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ziegler case, which is [2021] UKSC 23. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Faulks, made powerful submissions relating to that case.

The Committee may wish to be reminded that the Supreme Court reconsidered the statements made in Ziegler in the abortion services case, which was [2022] UKSC 32. Further guidance on the issues in Ziegler was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, as the Lord Chief Justice in the Cuciurean case, which is [2022] 3 WLR 446. The Supreme Court said, in the abortion services case, that it is not for the jury or the magistrates in each individual case to assess whether the conduct of the defendant is protected by human rights law. That was the concern, as I understand it, of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that that is highly desirable, but that is not the law.

In the abortion services case, in paragraphs 63 to 66, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, who is the President of the Supreme Court, spoke for a seven person Supreme Court. It was an enlarged court because of the importance of the issue. He addressed the principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, said at paragraph 63:

“The first question was whether, in a case where the exercise of rights under articles 9 to 11 of the Convention is raised by the defendant to a criminal prosecution, there must always be an assessment of the proportionality of any interference with those rights on the facts of the individual case. The answer is no”.


In paragraph 64, he said:

“The second question was whether, where an offence is liable to give rise to an interference with the exercise of rights under articles 9, 10 or 11 of the Convention, it is necessary for the ingredients of the offence to include (or be interpreted as including) the absence of reasonable or lawful excuse in order for a conviction to be compatible with the Convention rights. The answer is no”.


Paragraph 65, says:

“The third question was whether it is possible for the ingredients of an offence in themselves to ensure the compatibility of a conviction with the Convention rights under articles 9, 10 and 11. The answer is yes”.


The position under the law is that the prosecution will say that Parliament has enacted a specific offence; that is the law of the land, and it is simply not open to the defendant to say that they are entitled to seek to overturn the ingredients of the offence by reference to convention rights. The law of the land is set out in the criminal offence. Therefore, respectfully, much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law—notwithstanding Articles 9 to 11 of the convention.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in this group. First, I say to the right reverend Prelate that the peaceful religious processions that he had in mind, such as those at Easter, were not the sort of processions that the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police had in mind when he recently said something to the effect of him having seen an appalling increase in aggro and violence in demonstrations, and that:

“The intolerable has become normalised”.


That is quite different from the peaceful processions that the right reverend Prelate had in mind.

Before I turn to my amendments, I want to say how much I enjoyed the Minister’s winding-up speech in the previous debate. He was in absolutely top form, especially in his demolition of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I suspect that most of the best bits in his speech were not written by his officials; I shall treasure them. I hope that I do not become a victim of such a wonderful oration against me.

I have two amendments in this group. The first is quite small, simple and titchy, and the second is slightly more complicated.

Clause 122(2) says:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they—


(a) had a good reason for climbing on the specified memorial,


(b) were the owner or occupier of the specified memorial, or


(c) had the consent of the owner or occupier”


to do so. My first amendment would delete the general excuse of having a “good reason”. The only defences left for a person charged with an offence under Clause 122 would be that they were the owner or occupier of the memorial or had the consent of the owner or occupier to climb on it. I wonder about “occupier”; I presume that that is to cover memorials that are not just statues but buildings, such as the Hall of Memory in Birmingham. I would be grateful for a slight elucidation on what is meant by the occupier of a memorial.

I turn to the proposed new clause in my Amendment 378B. It is simple in principle but looks a bit complicated. It simply reproduces the operative test, as well as the definition of “community”, in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 and would put them in the Bill, giving them primary law status. This would improve legal certainty and parliamentary scrutiny.

Many clauses in the Bill, and many of the amendments, speak of

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

We may conclude from this that the disruption must be pretty serious indeed to qualify as “serious”. However, that is not the case since the previous Government passed the 2023 regulations, which defined and, some commentators would say, diluted the concept of serious disruption.

In plain terms, my proposed new clause would place in the Bill all the illustrative examples and interpretive tests introduced in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations. As I suggested, those regulations make amendments to provisions in the Public Order Act 1986 concerning the meaning of the expression

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Section 12 of the Act gives the police the power to impose conditions on people organising and taking part in public processions. A senior police officer can exercise this power if they reasonably believe that a procession may result in

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Serious disruption to the life of the community is not defined in the Act itself, but Section 12(2A) sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute serious disruption.

The 2023 regulations refine that list. The amendments to Section 12(2A) and (2B) of the Act also provide that, when considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption, a senior police officer must take into account the disruption that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held, as well as the disruption that may result from the procession, and may take into account the cumulative disruption that may be caused by more than one public procession or public assembly in the same area. The amendments also provide that the term “community” extends to anyone who may be affected by the public procession regardless of whether they live or work in the vicinity of the procession. They state that “disruption” is anything

“that is more than minor”,

in particular to

“the making of a journey”

or access to goods and services. The regulations define this as

“access to any essential goods or any essential service”,

including access to

“the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a place of worship … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service relating to health”.

That is what the regulations say in redefining

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

in the Act. Although my amendment looks complicated, it simply suggests that those regulations should be incorporated into the Bill as primary legislation. Transferring the regulations into the Bill would bring legal clarity—the police, courts and organisers would read the statutory test directly from the Act rather than a separate statutory instrument, reducing uncertainty about where the operative tests are located. It would mirror the stated purposes of the 2023 regulations to provide greater clarity. It would bring consistency of application—putting the tests in primary legislation would reduce the risk of interpretive divergence between different SIs or guidance and make the threshold for imposing conditions more visible to Parliament and the public. The cumulative effects would be preserved—the clause could, and should, reproduce the regulations’ treatment of cumulative effects so that multiple impacts are properly captured, as the regulations already contemplate cumulative assessment.

Of course, the Minister will say that embedding illustrative examples in primary law makes future policy adjustments harder and might require primary legislation and time to respond to unforeseen operational guidance. However, I suggest that retaining my proposed new clause, to secure clarity and parliamentary oversight but add a short delegated powers safeguard—a power to change it in future by regulations—would be perfectly okay.

I support Amendment 369A on pyrotechnics at protests tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower on the Front Bench, but it does not go far enough. I cannot think of any lawful excuse for possessing pyrotechnic articles while taking part in a protest. Protests are a vital part of our democratic life. They are a place for voices to be heard, grievances to be aired and change to be sought. But they are not a place for devices that can cause panic, injury or irreversible escalation. Pyrotechnics are designed to startle, burn, explode and smoke; they are not tools of peaceful persuasion. To allow a defence based on an honestly held political belief risks turning lawful protest into a dangerous theatre of risk and fear. Public safety must be paramount.

There are a few other things I could say about pyrotechnics at protests, but I will cut short my remarks in the interests of time. I see no justification whatever for anyone to have pyrotechnics at any protest or for there to be a lawful defence for it.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support and have added my name to Amendment 382H. I also support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. My support is based on the concerns over and consequences of the Ziegler case. Noble Lords have said today that it was wrong in law, but that is not for me to say. The policy consequences for policing the streets of this country have been profound and negative, particularly in the area of public protest and disorder policing.

The Ziegler case was one of the simplest offences to prove in the criminal law. It was an offence of wilful obstruction of the highway. There were only three parts to prove; it was wilful, it was obstruction and they were on a highway. That was the offence, and it is one of the simplest we have policed over the years. It became complex only when people alleged that there was a reasonable excuse—for which read “a political purpose”—for their obstruction of the highway.

In the past, all the police needed to prove was that it was a highway—which is well established in law—that it had been obstructed and, usually, that they had asked someone to move on and they had either returned or not moved. That was about as complicated as it was. But as soon as you have to import intent, recklessness or reasonable excuse, the offence starts to become more complex and the police have to think carefully before intervening. I know that in this House people sometimes talk about the police being careless with the law, reactive and reactionary—I am not talking about any individual; I am just saying, as a general comment, that it has been said—but my experience is that, on the whole, they try to get it right and to balance everybody’s rights, often in very difficult circumstances.

My reading of Ziegler is that the Supreme Court seemed to say that dealing with obstruction of the highway is far too simple when dealing with protesters—that it is okay for everybody else but for protesters it gets a little more complicated. The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the convention rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association, sometimes grouped together as the right to protest, constituted a lawful excuse, which means that before a person can be convicted for obstructing the highway, the prosecution must prove that a conviction would be a proportionate, and thus justified, interference with that person’s convention rights. The Ziegler judgment has caused very real difficulties for police in dealing with environmental and many other protests and, I argue, for judges in attempting to run trials fairly and efficiently and instruct juries about what must be proved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

I raise a point on Amendment 378B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. Unless I have missed something in that lengthy amendment, the effect of it might well be to interfere with the exercise of the right to picket in an industrial dispute. The right to picket is protected by Section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act and, in a lawful industrial dispute, by Section 219. I doubt that that was the intention of the mover of the amendment. Is it possible to have some clarity on that point?

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is my intention, and I believe it is the case—possibly the Minister will confirm—that my amendment would not change one iota. It would simply incorporate all the current regulations from the 2023 regulations and move them verbatim into the Bill, making it a primary case. It would not change any of the provisions at all. If there are technical drafting issues then they can be corrected later, but there is no intention to change any of the concept.

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments and will speak to a point that comes up in Amendment 378B. Because it arises in 378B, I am raising it now, but it affects the subsequent amendments in the next few groupings, particularly my amendments. It all flows from Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986.

Essentially, there is some concern that so much discretion will be left to the police. It is clear that, for one reason or another, the police have not been effective in controlling protesters to date. Noble Lords may have seen the video clip on social media showing Gideon Falter, CEO of the Campaign Against Antisemitism, being told by police he was “quite openly Jewish”, and therefore causing a breach of the peace.

We are in the middle of assessing the appalling decisions by the West Midlands police, who consulted a large number of mosques, including some very radical ones that housed an imam who stated that women should not leave their home without their husband’s permission. These people were consulted on whether or not Israeli tourists should be allowed to visit the West Midlands. The police claimed they had consulted the Jewish community in the area: that was not true. It is clear they realised that the Israeli tourists would be in danger, but they decided to ban them from coming on the false excuse that they would be the aggressors. So they turned the victims into the guilty ones.

Your Lordships may have seen another video clip— on Friday or Sunday night—outside an Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill called Miznon. There were some very aggressive and intimidating protesters and the police simply stood there. There may have been one arrest, but that was it. So innocent employees, eaters, diners and members of the public faced a very unpleasant situation.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I have just one large amendment in this group but I thought I would wait until the end—or what might be close to the end, with a bit of luck—before speaking to it, because it is different from others in the group. I had considered degrouping it, and now wish that I had, to deal with it at lunchtime on Thursday.

Before dealing with that, what a privilege it was to sit here and listen to the very powerful speech by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, who is not currently in his place, the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and those of my noble friend Lord Polak. What struck me was something that my noble friend said: when we hear the chants of “Support the intifada” and “From the river to the sea”, those are not just catchy phrases for protest marches. What they mean is kill the Jews, destroy the State of Israel and wipe out 8 million people. You cannot get more evil a hate crime than that.

However, my amendment is different and it is a terribly important one, if I may say so, because it would impose a duty on the Metropolitan Police to ensure access to Parliament. There have been disturbing incidents in recent years where the Met has failed to do so, and MPs and Peers could not access our home of democracy or had to run the gauntlet of a mob.

I need to take noble Lords through the recent history of this problem to let the Committee see how we have got to the current state and what I think we can do about it. The minutes of our State Opening on 17 July of the 2024-2026 Session state, under the heading “Stoppages in the Streets”:

“It was ordered that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis do take care that the passages through the streets leading to this House be kept free and open and that no obstruction be permitted to hinder the passage of Lords to and from this House during the sitting of Parliament; or to hinder Lords in the pursuit of their parliamentary duties on the Parliamentary Estate; and that the Lady Usher of the Black Rod attending this House do communicate this Order to the Commissioner”.


That is our sessional order, which the Metropolitan Police Commissioner enforces, primarily through Section 52 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. It allows the police to issue directions to prevent street obstruction near Parliament during sittings.

The Commons used to pass the same Motion until 2005, but in 2003 the House of Commons Procedure Committee concluded that passing the sessional order did

“not confer any extra legal powers on the police”,

and the only way to ensure the police had the adequate powers to achieve the result intended by the sessional order was through legislation. The committee recommended that, until such legislation came into force, the House should continue with the sessional order in a modified form

“to reflect the House’s concerns and to act as a marker that it expects Members’ access to Parliament to be maintained as far as the existing law allows”.

The Government implemented that and included provisions in the Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 intended to meet the requirement identified by the committee. The House of Commons then dropped the sessional order in 2005.

In 2013, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege recommended that the practice of passing sessional orders in the House of Commons be restored. In response, the Government said that they were

“not convinced that their revival would serve any legal or practical purpose”.

The Government are legally right. The sessional orders are not statute law and have no legal effect, but they had a massive symbolic effect, and the Met used to keep access free for all Members of both Houses.

Restrictions on protests around Parliament were introduced under Sections 132 to 138 of SOCPA 2005. In those sections, it says:

“The Commissioner must give authorisation for the demonstration to which the notice relates”,


and that in giving that authorisation, the commissioner should try to ensure, as far as possible, that people were free to enter Parliament. We moved from an instruction that no hindrance must be permitted, to one where the commissioner can decide on a case by case basis to grant protest.

Sections 132 to 138 were abolished by Section 141 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and replaced with restrictions that applied only to the controlled area of Parliament Square, which was delineated for the first time. That was, and is, very sensible. Under Section 143 of the 2011 Act, it is no longer an offence for demonstrations to be held without the authorisation of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. However, a constable or authorised officer who has reasonable grounds for believing that a person is doing, or is about to do, a prohibited activity may direct the person to cease doing that activity or not to start doing it. Noble Lords should note the term prohibited activity.

Much of the emphasis of the sections in that Act is on tents and equipment in Parliament Square, the controlled use of Whitehall and loudspeakers. Why was that? Older Members of the Committee will recall that, for 10 years, a Mr Brian Haw had an anti-war tent on the grass opposite the MPs’ entrance at Carriage Gates, and the Government and MPs were very vexed that there seemed to be nothing they could do about it and no law to remove him. That is the thrust of the parliamentary provisions in the 2011 Act, to deal with that one man and his tent. I believe he died just as the Act come into force. By accident, the need to secure access to Parliament became downgraded once again. The emphasis was on prohibiting tents, accoutrements and loudspeakers outside the Commons.

Technically, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and his officers have full legal powers to ensure that MPs, Peers, officers and staff have free and unfettered access at all times, but the reality is that the duty to do so has been subliminally watered down over the years. We have moved from a position that protests outside Parliament had to have permission to one where they did not need permission but the Met could stop them if they thought it necessary. There is no duty for free and unfettered access. That is why my amendment is necessary, without disturbing 99% of the current controls, powers and responsibilities.

Why is it necessary? In November 2021, Insulate Britain, with more than 60 activists, blocked two main roads leading to the Parliamentary Estate, including Bridge Street and Peers’ Entrance. In April 2019, Extinction Rebellion blocked access in Parliament Square, and the police had to take action to maintain a clear route for access for MPs and Peers reaching the estate. In October 2022, Just Stop Oil activists, as part of a month-long occupation of Westminster, sat in the road surrounding Parliament Square, specifically aiming to disrupt access to the seat of government.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 added an offence of blocking vehicular access to the Parliamentary Estate, but it said nothing about pedestrians. The current laws are therefore slightly inadequate.

The first thing in my proposed new clause that the Metropolitan Police commissioner would see are the words:

“Duty of the Metropolitan Police to ensure access to Parliament”.


It begins:

“It is the duty of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis to secure that members of either House of Parliament, all parliamentary officers and staff have free and unfettered access to the Palace of Westminster controlled area on any day on which either House is sitting”.


That puts access to Parliament front and centre of the legislation, sending a very strong signal that democracy trumps protest—you can still protest if you want to, but do not block access to Parliament.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, that, under ECHR laws, there is no right to protest. The Human Rights Act 1998 does not refer to a right to protest. The relevant rights are the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in Article 11. Moreover, Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights, in that they can be restricted where it is necessary and proportionate to protect public safety, prevent crime and protect the rights and freedoms of others. I submit that the rights and freedoms of others include Members and staff of both Houses. We should also be protected to do our job, because we are the “others”. We have allowed a myth to grow that there is a right to block access to Parliament as part of a non-existent right to protest.

I have a few other small amendments. The 2011 Act designates the controlled area around Parliament but does not stretch as far as 1 Millbank, which did not open until after the 2011 Act passed. I have included it, as well as the road from Downing Street to Parliament, since, although the current law states that Parliament Street is part of the controlled area, Downing Street may be on that no man’s land between Whitehall and Parliament.

The 2022 Act added an offence of blocking vehicular access. I have added that pedestrian access for Members and staff must be maintained, and a requirement that any protesters must be kept back at least 10 metres from pavements used by Members to access Parliament. That would not stop protests; it would just let Peers and Members get in.

Apart from these small changes, I have retained the whole structure of the existing legislation, but with a new duty requirement on the Met. Putting at the beginning of the legislation a sentence that it is the duty of the Metropolitan Police to secure access to Parliament is more than just tokenistic or symbolic. We have allowed our freedoms to access and egress Parliament without hindrance to be eroded over the past 20 years. We have permitted a belief that people protesting outside our gates have more rights and are more important than the legislators working inside.

It cannot be acceptable that the very people entrusted with the responsibility to ensure our legal rights and freedoms under the law cannot get into the building to do it. My proposed new clause would restore that balance. It would make it clear to the commissioner where his primary duty lies, and it should make it safer for all of us, as parliamentarians and staff, to carry out all our duties. I commend my proposed new clause to the Committee.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, this huge group was always going be pivotal for us to discuss, and it is full of moral dilemmas. I am genuinely torn on many of the amendments; I do not know where I stand on some of them. I therefore appreciate the debates that we have had so far. It has been very worth while to hear the different sides of the argument.

When the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, spoke earlier, he stirred me up. Every time I say “stirred up” I think of stirring up hatred; it was not that, but his contribution was very important. He emphasised that a lot is at stake, which it is. On the first day in Committee, I said that I knew that simply reiterating the formal importance of the right to protest is not sufficient for the period that we are living in, because we face new types of protest. We face some vicious and abusive gatherings that call themselves protests. That leaves somebody like me in a difficult dilemma. I am a free-speecher, but I have witnessed the visceral rise of Jew hatred in public and on our streets, so I am torn.

I have a lot of sympathy with the intentions of the noble Lords, Lord Walney, Lord Polak, Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lord Pannick, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, to name just some noble Lords, and I understand where they are coming from. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, himself admitted, there are a lot of existing powers that are not used. That strikes me as the problem.

We have a policing crisis and powers that are not being used, for cultural or deeper political reasons, so we try to compensate by making more laws. That will not solve the problem of the culture of normalisation of antisemitism—if anything, those new laws, which might also not be enforced, could be a distraction. Despite my reservations, my fear is that the deeper problem will lead to bad lawmaking and abandoning key principles that stand up for western civilisation, democracy and so on, because we are so desperate to do something.

--- Later in debate ---

I worry also about contracting out this decision-making to Historic England in the way that the Bill seems to do. That places an unfair burden on that arm’s-length body. It may also have the effect of deterring it from recommending some of our most important memorials for grade 1 listing, since that will now be accompanied, through this Bill, by new restrictions on the protesting public. I will be grateful for the Minister’s response as to the Government’s thinking on this matter, and I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 370B and 370C—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

We agreed that we would finish at about 11 pm, which we have come to. I suggest that we adjourn further debate on this group of amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

I am conscious that we agreed 11 pm with the House staff. If it is going to be quick, then that is fine. But we do not want to be sitting here later, because it is not fair on the House staff. We agreed 11 pm.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I have about four minutes, if that is acceptable. I do not think there are many other speakers in this crowded House tonight who wish to speak on it. I am in complete agreement with the list of memorials to be added to Schedule 12. They should be protected. All we are seeking to do here is add that there are some important ones missing. It is not a technicality; it is a matter of national memory, public safety and simple consistency in the law.

These additions matter because memorials named in the amendments are at the heart of our civic life. They stand in Whitehall, Trafalgar Square, Victoria Embankment and Parliament Square. That is where the nation gathers. That is where tourists and schoolchildren come to learn. That is where the machinery of Government operates. They are not just isolated pieces of stone and bronze; they are focal points for our national life and public ritual. They commemorate the service, sacrifice and leadership of men and women whose actions shaped our history and whose memory we owe to future generations.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose Amendment 379 and support most of Amendment 471, inadequate though it is. My views may not be the same as those of my noble friends on the Front Bench, of course. We all value the right to protest, but rights are not a shield for criminality. The Government and Policing Ministers have been very clear that live facial recognition is being developed and deployed as a targeted, intelligence-led tool to identify known or wanted individuals or criminals on watch lists. It is not a blanket surveillance tool of the public. The Home Office has opened a consultation and asked for stronger statutory rules and oversight precisely to ensure proportionate lawful use.

Amendment 379 would in effect tie the hands of senior officers at the very moment when targeted identification can prevent or stop serious crime. If a protest contains people who are wanted for violent offences, sexual offences or other serious crimes, the ability to identify them quickly and safely is not an abstract technicality; it is how we protect victims and uphold the rule of law. To say that demonstrations are somehow sacrosanct and must be free from tools that help catch criminals is to place form above substance. That is not to dismiss legitimate concerns about privacy and bias. We should legislate a clear statutory framework, independent oversight and robust safeguards, and I know that the Government are consulting on exactly that path.

I will want to see strong action to correct mistakes and address suggestions that it cannot tell the difference in some ethnic groups. That has to be remedied if that allegation is true. But the right response is to legislate proportionate limits and accountability, not to pre-emptively ban a narrowly targeted operational capability at protests and thereby risk letting wanted suspects slip away. For those reasons, I urge the Committee to reject Amendment 379 and instead press the Government to bring forward the statutory code and independent oversight that the public rightly expect.

Amendment 471 is a different kettle of fish—and possibly “off” fish as well. The amendment is far too liberal and fails to protect the public from out-of-control public authorities. I will explain why. As a person relieved of ministerial duties in 1997, I found myself a rather bored Back-Bencher on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—the famous RIPA. The Minister at the time—I think it was Alun Michael—was waxing lyrical about how it would tackle serious crime, terrorism and paedophiles. He mentioned how it would help the police, the National Crime Agency—or whatever it was called then—MI5, MI6, HMRC and a couple of other big national government departments.

We were all in agreement that it was a jolly good thing for these agencies to have that power. Then something the Minister said prompted me to table a Question on what other public bodies could use RIPA powers, and we were shocked to discover that there were actually 32, including at that time something called the egg inspectorate of MAFF, responsible for enforcing the little lion mark on eggs. Schedule 1, listing the public authorities with phone-tapping powers, has expanded a bit since those days, and it now numbers 79. However, that is not the correct number because one of the 79 entries says “every local authority”, so we can add another 317 principal local authorities to that list. I think “every government department” covers all the agencies and arm’s-length bodies under their command, so they also have access to RIPA. In other words, a worthy proposal to let some key government agencies have power to snoop on our mobile phones to detect serious crime, terrorism or paedophilia has now become available, to some extent, to hundreds and possibly thousands of public bodies.

The relevance of this is that if we agree that facial recognition technology can be extended beyond the police, immigration, the National Crime Agency, the security services and possibly a few other big government departments that are concerned with organised crime, people trafficking and immigration, I believe our civil liberties will be at stake if local authorities and some others get to use it as well. If local authorities get the power of facial recognition, I am certain that they will abuse it. A Scottish council uses RIPA to monitor dog barking. Allerdale district council, next to me in Cumbria, used it to catch someone feeding pigeons. Of course it would be brilliant, in my opinion, to catch all those carrying out anti-social behaviour, such as riding dangerously on the pavement with their bikes, not picking up dog mess or generally causing a disturbance. But that is why I think this amendment does not go far enough.

We do not need codes of practice and safeguards—we need a complete ban on all other public authorities using it until it has been tried and tested by the police and we are satisfied that it does not cause false positives and is operationally secure. Then, if it is ever extended to other public authorities, it must be solely, as proposed new subsection (1)(a) says,

“used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007”.

If we do not have these protections, local councils will end up checking our recycling, what library books we take out and what shops and pubs we use, and will justify it by saying it will help them deliver a better spatial strategy or design services to user patterns.

I look forward to the Liberals going back to their original roots as real liberals and bringing forward a better amendment that will protect our liberties.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 379, to which I have added my name, and to very strongly support it. But before I do, I hope the Committee will forgive me if I digress very briefly to tidy up a matter that arose in Committee on Tuesday. I made the point that the police have the duty to facilitate protest rather than prevent it, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, intervened to ask me where he might find a justification for that statement. Well, I have good news. I have here the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest operational advice document, and on page 10, under the heading “Role of the police”, it says that authorised professional practice

“identifies two duties associated with the policing of protest. Broadly these require that the police must … not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly … in certain circumstances, take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. Taken together, these duties (the first a negative duty, the second a positive one) are often described as an obligation to facilitate the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and expression”.

I also have here a very handy flow chart entitled “Facilitating Peaceful Protest”, and I will make it available to the noble Lord following this debate.

To return to this group, it is now eight years since South Wales Police started deploying early versions of live facial recognition technology. When it did so, the technology was extremely inaccurate and there was absolutely no legislation in place to regulate or oversee the use of this mass surveillance technology—and that is what it is.

For those noble Lords who have not had the opportunity to experience facial recognition technology, I will give a quick overview of how it is used. It currently involves a large van full of electronics being parked in a location, such as a busy shopping street, where large numbers of ordinary people will walk past going about their daily business. On the top of the van are cameras pointing in all directions; they are scanning and recording the faces of all the passers-by. The technology tries to match them to a pre-prepared watch-list, which is a set of images of people the police want to find for some reason. Throughout the many hours of the deployment, something like 20 police officers will be standing around chatting and waiting for the system to decide, rightly or wrongly, that somebody whose face matches a person on the watch-list has just walked past. Several of the otherwise unoccupied police officers then detain the target and try to determine whether it is a true match.

Big Brother Watch, which I chair, has observed many deployments of facial recognition by the Metropolitan Police, and has seen many false matches happen. As well as false positives, the system is also susceptible to false negatives, where it fails to recognise somebody who is on the watch-list, and anyone who the police would like to speak to but was not put on the watch-list can wander by undetected. The Committee can form its own view on whether this is a productive use of scarce police time and money, but one thing is clear: this is a highly intrusive mass surveillance of thousands of citizens, almost all of whom are completely innocent and should be of no interest to the police.

The UK already has one of the highest densities of CCTV cameras in the world. Facial recognition technology will in time be added to those fixed cameras in public spaces. The police, your local authority, supermarkets or whoever will be able to keep tabs on who you are and what you are doing. This technology is far more intrusive than fingerprints or DNA. Live facial recognition can capture your face and location from a distance without you having any idea it has happened. It is as if you have a barcode on your forehead that can be read without your knowledge.

The collection and retention of fingerprints is tightly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Crime and Security Act 2010. Similarly, the use of DNA is strictly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. But what regulation is there for facial recognition, the most intrusive technology of the lot? Since the first deployment in 2017, absolutely no legislation, none at all, has been introduced to control this serious threat to our privacy. As we have already heard, the phrase “facial recognition” is not mentioned once in UK legislation.

Police forces, including the Met, have had a go at writing their own rules and marking their own homework, but that is obviously not their skill set; it is the job of legislators. The police’s homemade rules vary from force to force, and nobody is monitoring what is actually happening on the ground. For example, they assure us that all images they collect that do not match someone on the watch-list are instantly and permanently destroyed to preserve the privacy of innocent passers-by, but whether that always happens cannot be verified because there is no scrutiny, as there would be with, for example, DNA. This serious legislative vacuum is not the fault of the police; it is the fault of all the Governments since 2017, who were asleep at the wheel and did nothing to control the use of this highly intrusive technology.

You might ask: “Why does it matter to me? Why should I care if the state knows where I am and what I am doing? I am an honest, law-abiding, clean-living citizen. There is nothing in my life that I need to conceal from the police, my boss or my spouse”. You might be told by advocates of mass surveillance, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear”. Well, that claim is first attributed to the great democrat Joseph Goebbels. The Chinese state, where much of the technology for facial recognition comes from, uses it to monitor the behaviour of its citizens. It is used not just to keep track of where they are, but to assess whether they are being good citizens in accordance with the state’s definition of what a “good citizen” is.

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[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

Shifty is a great description—the noble Baroness could have said far worse than that.

I was given a hard time and then let go. We have to accept that there will be errors, but we have to understand where this is going. We can less and less afford to have police on the streets—we have seen that problem—and technology has to take over. Look at the super-spotters, a very successful crime-fighting group in New York. They would go to an area where there was a lot of crime—noble Lords will know that there was a process in New York where they directed people to crime hotspots—where they looked at the gait of individuals to see whether they were carrying guns or knives. Soon, people in those areas discovered that they had better not carry guns because they would be stopped by these super-spotters and arrested. If you are not carrying a gun, which they had all stopped doing, you cannot kill somebody because you do not have a gun to kill them with. It was a tremendously successful operation in lowering crime.

State-of-the-art facial recognition, at least before I stopped looking at it a couple of years ago, was more in gait than in face. We have to understand that you can start training technology to be much more effective than even these super-spotters at spotting people who are carrying, using their gait to recognise an individual rather than their face. There are all sorts of ways in which this software will be used to recognise people. It will get better and better, and fewer mistakes will be made; mistakes will always be made none the less, but that is the way of policing. They were mistaken when they stopped me—I was this tremendously law-abiding good chap, but they stopped me, and so will the facial recognition.

I loved the description from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, of the 20 police hanging around, which I am sure resonated with noble Lords around the entire Chamber as the sort of thing that happens, but over time we will have to depend on technology such as this. We will have to be extremely careful about civil liberties, but we cannot blanket get rid of this technology, because it will be very important to policing.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I had sought to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, before he sat down, but the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, beat me to it. I want to ask him a simple question but, first, I am sorry that we are on different sides of this—when we served together on the snoopers’ charter Bill, we were totally united that it was a bad Bill and we worked hand in glove to amend it. Can he tell me the substantive difference between a camera and a computer watching everyone in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers and those 20 policemen he talked about looking at everybody in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers from their briefing or their memory? What is the real difference between them?

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.

As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.

Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.

Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.

The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is

“complicated and difficult to understand”.

Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require

“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”

and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:

“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”


Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.

The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.

Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. It seems that he and his noble friends keep talking about the police and the restrictions which will be imposed on the police. But Amendment 471 seems to extend facial recognition to hundreds and hundreds of public authorities, provided they adhere to a code or comply with certain practices. Does he still stand by the idea that facial recognition should be extended to hundreds of public authorities, in addition to the police?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

If the noble Lord accepts the fact that controls are required, which he did not in his earlier comments, I think he would be greatly reassured if you had to have judicial oversight of the use of live facial recognition, which is useful in circumstances other than purely policing. What we are talking about is a greater level of control over the deployment of live facial recognition. We can argue perfectly satisfactorily about whether or not it should be extended beyond the police, but we are suggesting that, alongside that greater deployment, or possible greater deployment, there should be a much greater degree of oversight. I think that effectively answers the noble Lord.

The Metropolitan Police’s own data from recent LFR operations shows a false alert rate requiring officers to make numerous stops of innocent people. Even with claimed accuracy improvements, when a system processes thousands of faces, even a small error translates to significant numbers of misidentifications affecting law-abiding citizens.

More concerning is the evidence on differential performance, and that is where I fundamentally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The National Physical Laboratory’s 2020 testing of facial recognition systems found significant variation in performance across demographic groups. While contemporary LFR systems used by UK police show better performance than earlier algorithms, independent research continues to identify measurable differences in accuracy rates across ethnicity and gender. The Court of Appeal in Bridges ruled that South Wales Police breached the public sector equality duty by failing to satisfy itself that the software was free from racial or gender bias, yet current deployment practices suggest insufficient progress in addressing these equality obligations.

We should also address the secrecy surrounding police watch-lists. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House recommended that these lists be subject to compulsory statutory criteria and standardised training. There is no independent review of watch-list inclusion, no notification to those placed on lists and no clear route for challenge or removal.

I also very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, had to say about the problems with software. But the chilling sentence he delivered was “Technology has to take over”. That is precisely the problem that we are living with. If technology is to take over, we need a legal framework to govern it. The current patchwork of overlapping laws addressing human rights, data protection and criminal justice is not fit for purpose.

These amendments provide the democratic and judicial guard-rails needed to contain this technology, and we cannot allow the convenience of new tools to erode our established civil liberties. Only Parliament should determine the framework for how LFR is used in our society, and only the courts should authorise its deployment in individual cases.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 382F, an amendment that, carefully and proportionately, takes on tackling the problems of the ever-growing number of overlapping Acts and statutes that are used to limit free speech. If public order laws on protest are, to quote the Liberal Democrat Benches from the other day, a confused mess, the labyrinthine patchwork affecting free speech is an impenetrable quagmire. The noble Lord has done a real public service here by carefully going through how, inadvertently and often by mission creep, censorious laws undermine democratic speech rights and are actually damaging the UK’s reputation internationally.

I am not just talking about JD Vance or Elon Musk, who I have heard commented on in this House and dismissed sneeringly by many in Westminster as spreading just Trumpist misinformation or hyperbole. We need to recognise that even the bible of globalist liberalism, the Economist, no less, featured a cover last May proclaiming “Europe’s free-speech problem”, identified the UK as one of the most censorious on the continent and provided a lot of evidence. There has been lots of discussion all over the political spectrum in relation to the idea of 12,000 arrests a year, 30 a day, for speech offences that spring from laws that the amendment seeks to rein in, and for which this House is responsible. We are talking here about crime and policing, and the police are expected to treat speech offences as criminal acts and to police them.

Since the introduction of hate crime laws, which I remind the Committee is a relatively recent concept popularised from the mid-1980s, the legislative and regulatory implications of restricting hate and words that are said to have caused distress have proliferated, and it has grown into a real tangle of tripwires. In that tangle, many people in the police and the CPS, and even politicians, seem confused about what one can say legally and what is verboten.

I am sure that noble Lords will remember the extraordinary story of the Times Radio producer, Maxie Allen, and his partner, Rosalind Levine. They were the couple who were arrested by six uniformed officers, in front of their young children, for posting disparaging messages about their daughter’s school in a private WhatsApp group. It received a lot of publicity, and they have just been paid £20,000 for wrongful arrest, although they have not received an apology. What stood out for me about that story was that when the police officers went into her house, Ms Levine asked what malicious communication offence they were being accused of. The detective did not know, had to Google it and then read out what Google said. That strikes me as not healthy. We as legislators have a responsibility to tackle this. Too often, we just pass more and more laws, with more restrictions on freedom, and never stop to look at whether anything on the statute book can be repealed, streamlined or rolled back.

I commend the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for his detailed, well-thought out and proportionate attempt at tackling the way the law has grown and the negative impact that is having on democratic free speech. I also want to commend him for his courage in taking on this issue. As we know, and he referred to this, if anyone takes on hate speech laws, you just think, “Oh, my goodness, he’s going to be accused of all sorts of things. He’s going to be accused of being a bigot. It’s a risk”, so when he told me he was doing this, I gulped. It is horrible to be accused of being a racist, a misogynist, homophobic, a hatemonger, or whatever, but that is the very point. Being accused of being pro-hate speech, if you oppose hate speech legislation, is itself silencing of a democratic discussion on laws and we as legislators should not be bullied or silenced in that way. Ironically, the best tool for any cultural shift in relation to prejudice, in my view, is free speech. To be able to take on bigotry, we need to be able to expose it, argue against it and use the disinfectant of free speech to get rid of the hate, whereas censorship via hate speech laws does not eliminate or defeat regressive ideas; it just drives them underground to fester unchallenged.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has laid out the key legal problems in his approach to this, especially in relation to the lack of precision in terminology used across speech-restricting laws. He has raised a lot of real food for thought. Perhaps I can add a concern from a slightly different perspective, to avoid repeating the points he has made. For me, there is another cost when law fails to clearly define concepts such as abusive or insulting words, grossly offensive speech, and what causes annoyance, inconvenience and needless anxiety—these things are littered all over the law. It is that the dangerously elastic framing of what speech constitutes harm or hate has been deeply regressive in its impact on our cultural norms. There has been a sort of cultural mission creep which has especially undermined the resilience of new generations of young people. The language of hate speech legislation now trips off the tongues of sixth-formers in schools and university campus activists. When they complain that they disagree with or are made to feel uncomfortable by a speaker or a lecturer and say that they should be banned for their views, they will cite things straight out of the law such as, “That lecturer has caused me harassment, alarm and distress”. Where did they get that from? They will say that those words are perceived as harmful and that if they heard them, it would trigger anxiety—even claiming post-traumatic stress disorder is fashionable. It is because we have socialised the young into the world of believing that speech is a danger to their mental well-being, which has cultivated a grievance victimhood. It is a sort of circular firing squad, because the young, who feel frightened by words which they have picked up and been imbued with from the way the law operates, then demand even more lawfare to protect themselves and their feelings from further distress. They are even encouraged to go round taking screenshots of private messages, which they take to the police, or they scroll through the social media of people they do not like to see whether there is anything they can use in the law.

The law has enabled the emergence of a thin-skinned approach to speech, and this has been institutionalised via our statute book. The police do not seem immune to such interpretations of harmful words, either, and I am afraid that this can cause them to weaponise the power they have through this muddle. It wastes police resources and energy, an issue very pertinent to this Bill.

I will finish with an example. In August 2023, an autistic 16 year-old girl was arrested for reportedly telling a female police officer that she looked like her lesbian nana. The teenager’s mother explained that this was a literal observation, in that the police officer looked like her grandmother, who is a lesbian. The officer understood it as homophobic abuse, so a Section 5 public order offence kicked in on the basis of causing “alarm or distress” by using abusive language. If you witness the film of the incident, seven police officers entered the teenage girl’s home, where she was hiding in the closet, screaming in fear and punching herself in the face. You may ask who was distressed in that instance. The girl was held in custody for 20 hours and ultimately no charges were brought. But we must ask whether the statute book has created such confused laws and encouraged police overreach, and whether it encouraged that young police officer, who heard someone say the words “lesbian nana”, to immediately think, “arrest her, hold her for 20 hours and say that she is causing distress”. What has happened to the instincts of a police officer when they think that this would be the answer?

Many people to whom I speak about the problem addressed by this amendment suggest that it has been overstated. They say that, yes, the police are a bit too promiscuous in arresting people, but the numbers charged and convicted are fairly stable. In fact, a journalist recently told me that in some instances they are going down. But as legislators, should we not query whether this implies that the laws are giving too much leeway to the police to follow up malicious, trivial and politicised complaints? This creates the chilling consequence of the notion of process as punishment: you might not be charged, but you are arrested, and law-abiding citizens are humiliated and embarrassed with the cops at the door. We must take this amendment very seriously, and I hope that the Minister will give us a positive response.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, it is a delight to listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who hit the nail on the head: in fact, she hit many nails on the head, and I agree with everything she said.

I support Amendment 382F because it restores the proper boundary between criminal law and free expression. Criminal sanctions must be reserved for conduct that poses a real risk of harm, threats, menaces and conduct intended to intimidate, not for speech that merely offends or causes hurt feelings. Section 127 of the Communications Act and related provisions currently include abusive and insulting material, and even communication that causes “anxiety”—a formulation that has produced inconsistent enforcement and a chilling effect on legitimate debate.

Should I have reported my MS consultant when he told me the good news and the bad news? The good news was that he knew what it was, and the bad news was that it was MS. He wanted to check how spastic I was. That word, “spastic”, can sound like a terribly insulting term, but it was a medical reference to my condition. This morning, I got a text message reminder: “Your UCLH appointment with the spasticity walk-in clinic at Queen Square will take place early tomorrow morning”. We must make sure that we do not treat all words which may seem insulting as actually being so. The law should be precise and proportionate. Vague criminal offences that hinge on subjective reactions invite over-policing in online life and risk criminalising satire, political argument and robust journalism. Recent parliamentary analysis shows that arrests under communications offences have increased, while convictions have not kept pace, suggesting that resources are being spent on low-value prosecutions rather than on genuine threats to safety. Legal commentary also suggests the difficulties courts face in applying terms like “grossly offensive” and “insulting”, and that undermines predictability and fairness.

This amendment would not leave victims without recourse. Civil remedies, harassment injunctions, platform moderation and targeted civil criminal offences for stalking, doxing and credible threats remain available and should be strengthened. That combination protects vulnerable people while ensuring that criminal law is not used as a blunt instrument against free expression.

Of course, there are trade-offs. Decriminalising insults means some distress will no longer attract criminal penalties, but the correct response is not to expand criminal law; it is to improve support for civil remedies and focus policing on genuine threats. That approach better protects both free speech and personal safety.

For these reasons, I urge the Minister to support Amendment 382F in order to defend free expression, sharpen the law so that it targets real harm, and ensure that our criminal justice system focuses on threats that endanger people rather than on words that merely offend them.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend on the Front Bench. At this juncture, I also thank the Committee for its forbearance when I was not able to move my previous amendment on mobile phone theft. I put on record my warmest thanks to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving it so eloquently on that occasion.

This is an issue about the difference between “serious violence” and “violence”, but the wider context is the fact that the UK has a knife crime problem. In London, the number of incidents up to June 2025 was 15,639, which was an increase of nearly 72% from the data recorded in 2015-16. Unfortunately, it has to be said that the number of stop and search encounters peaked at the end of the last Labour Government and dramatically decreased under the two previous Governments. Between 2003 and 2011, stop and search numbers increased, peaking at 1.2 million, but by 2018 this had fallen by 77%. The number of arrests resulting from stop and search encounters had fallen from 120,000 to 48,000.

The fact is that there is significant evidence that stop and search does demonstrably have an impact on the incidence of knife crime, and therefore reduces crime. In a study released in 2025, the two criminologists Alexis Piquero and Lawrence Sherman analysed data between 2008 and 2023, and found that stop and search encounters were successful in reducing deaths and injuries related to weapons. The conclusion of the study was that

“increased stop and search encounters can significantly reduce knife-related injuries and homicides in public places”.

Evidence from a number of bodies and think tanks, including Policy Exchange, suggests that, while there may be a range of causal factors, a link between rates of knife crime and rates of stop and search exists. As the rate of stop and search decreases, the amount of knife crime increases. As stop and search rises, the amount of knife crime falls. The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, Sir Stephen Watson, said last year:

“If you don’t back your officers to do stop and search, they will stop doing stop and search. And if you stop doing stop and search, you’ll see street robberies going up”.


The issue is the difference between “serious violence” and “violence” within that context. My simple point to the Committee is that, if we want to take weapons off the street and prevent incidents of knife crime and other crime, we have to increase stop and search. Therefore, you have to give warranted officers the legal underpinning and the authority to make the appropriate decisions for stop and search. In 2023, there were 5,014 occasions when a police officer found a weapon or firearm when looking for a different prohibited item. In 3,221 of those cases, they were looking for drugs. This is a case of effective policing and not just getting lucky. So, if they could stop for “violence”, they might find weapons that could have led to a more serious situation. If not, there is a potential for people to just walk away.

On that basis, it is wise for the Government to consider this amendment, because it allows flexibility in operational policing. Fundamentally, it will prevent crime and may even in the long run prevent serious injury or death. Therefore, I invite Ministers and the Committee to give this amendment their strong support.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 411, because it brings clarity and accountability to the exceptional power in Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This is not a call to strengthen police powers; it is a call to describe them accurately, so the public understand their narrow scope and the safeguards that constrain them.

Section 60 is triggered only when

“a police officer of or above the rank of inspector reasonably believes”

one of a small number of factors: that incidents of violence may take place in a locality; that a weapon used in a recent incident is being carried locally; or that people are carrying weapons without good reason; and that there has already been an incident of serious violence. The statute requires the authorisation to be for

“any place within that locality for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours”.

These are tight operational limits.

Changing the definition from “serious violence” to “violence” keeps all the safeguards that make this power exceptional rather than just routine: the inspector-level threshold; the written and recorded authorisation; the geographic and temporal limits; the ability to seize weapons; and the requirement to provide records to those stopped. Those are not peripheral details; they are the legal guardrails that protect civil liberties while enabling targeted public safety action.

I simply ask: where is the dividing line between violence and serious violence? If someone gets stabbed multiple times and it is life-threatening, we would all agree that is serious violence, but what about the person who gets stabbed once and suffers a non-life-threatening cut? Is that merely violence and so does not count? That is why we have to change this definition to any violence, no matter how serious it may be called. This is not a wide-ranging opening of the stop and search powers applying everywhere for all time. Using “violence” in operational documents with an explicit cross-reference to the Section 60 triggers reduces confusion with broader strategic programmes labelled “serious violence”. It prevents the normalisation of suspicionless searches and makes it easier for Parliament, oversight bodies and the public to scrutinise each authorisation against the statutory test.

This amendment is modest, practical and proportionate. It highlights the statutory safeguards and does not remove any of them, but it gives the police a sensible power to save lives and prevent injury where they think that there may be more violence. I urge the Committee and the Minister to support Amendment 411.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with the wording as it is in the Bill. The word “serious” is quite important. Stop and search, particularly in the London area, has been abused. You are supposed to stop somebody because of “reasonable” grounds to suspect, but as somebody who was stopped and searched six times, and every time I did not have anything they thought I would have, I see it as a sort of overpolicing.

It is a pity that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is not here, because when he became the chief police officer in this place, he realised that some of this was not working and was antagonising communities, not delivering the result that was expected. The Bill is worded in terms of “serious”; the amendment tries to lower the threshold. As the intention of the Bill is to stop serious crime, “serious” to me is quite important. I do not support the amendment and would like to retain the wording in the Bill.

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[Lord Shamash (Lab)]

My Lords, in my experience, the fastest and most dangerous group of cyclists are Deliveroo and Uber Eats riders. That would be the case because they have to get as many deliveries in as they can. In my experience, an awful lot of them wear face masks. I would be interested to hear from the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe—we have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, had to say—what you would begin to do about that. They have great big things on their backs saying Deliveroo or Uber Eats, but they drive fast and wear masks. Will the police stop them?

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and her Amendment 416, because it addresses a very real and rapidly accelerating problem on our streets: the use of face coverings by criminals on e-bikes and e-scooters to hide their identity while committing thefts, robberies and drug-related offences. I did not know that the Mayor of London had stolen my noble friend’s “Wild West” quote; I have lots of pages of newspaper reports on the “Wild West”. We should make sure that it is properly attributed to her; she was the inventor of the slogan.

We are not dealing with petty opportunism here, but with organised, masked offenders using high-powered electric bikes capable of 50, 60 or even 70 miles per hour, weaving through pedestrians and traffic with impunity. That may partly be the answer to the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I agree that the amendment may need to be tweaked on Report. We are not talking here about an ordinary man or woman on an ordinary bike pedalling along and wearing a mask to keep out the cold; we are talking about people on big electric bikes, often fat-tyre bikes, belting along at phenomenal speed, wearing balaclavas rather than masks. There is certainly an element of criminality; it is not just ordinary cyclists trying to protect themselves from catching flies while they are riding.

Police forces across the country report that these vehicles are now central to a surge in mobile phone snatching and associated criminality. The scale is stark. Mobile phone thefts have almost doubled to 83,000 a year, with London at the epicentre, recording 65,000 thefts in the last reporting period. The crimes are not only fast; they are deliberately anonymous. Officers and victims consistently describe offenders wearing balaclava masks and full facial coverings. Schools in London have issued warnings about males in balaclavas targeting children for their phones on the way to school. In Newcastle, residents report masked riders armed with crowbars and knives terrorising neighbourhoods, snatching phones and intimidating women walking home.

This is not a marginal issue; it is a pattern. The police are clear: illegal e-bikes and e-scooters are being used for “all sorts of criminality”, including drug dealing, robbery and organised theft. The City of London Police states explicitly that illegal e-bikes are frequently used to commit crimes such as phone snatching, and its targeted operations have reduced such offences by 40% in the square mile. But officers say that identification is the greatest barrier to enforcement. When a rider is masked, unregistered and travelling at 50 miles an hour, the chances of apprehension are vanishingly small. As we discussed the other day, I commend the Met unit using its own fast electric e-bikes to chase these guys on bikes.

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I emphasise finally that these are matters for the Government, ultimately, in my view, to decide. I therefore look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to rise to support my noble friend Lord Young of Acton’s excellent Amendment 416E, which seeks to abolish the non-crime hate incident regime, which is long overdue. The principle at stake is quite simple and fundamental. The state must not brand people as potential wrongdoers when no criminal offence has been committed. So I congratulate my noble friend on moving the amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, whose masterful speech made an absolutely compelling case for the immediate abolition of this obnoxious regime.

I am delighted to hear the wise words of my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs, in his role as chair of the College of Policing. If it looks like, as the noble Lord said, the regime is not fit for purpose, and if that report gets to the Home Office before Report, we want amendments on Report to abolish it, rather than putting it out to consultation for another three months to decide whether to do it in some future criminal justice Bill. If it is not fit for purpose now, it should not be fit for purpose a moment longer than necessary.

For far too long, under all Governments, this gross abuse of our fundamental freedoms has been tolerated. I cannot count the number of times I have heard police and Ministers justify it on the basis that it is an essential intelligence-gathering tool which would be helpful in heading off future crimes. I strongly believe in intelligence-led policing and recording secretly any information on potential criminal activity. But it is not intelligence if you record it on a database and give it to prospective employers with, in the immortal words of Monty Python, a “nudge nudge, wink wink, say no more” sort of thing.

Recent reporting makes this danger painfully clear. As my noble friend said, we now have the documented cases of a nine year-old boy logged for calling another pupil a retard; two schoolgirls accused of saying someone else smelled like fish; and the extraordinary case of Harry Miller, a former police officer, who was visited at work by Humberside Police because he tweeted this joke:

“I was assigned Mammal at Birth, but my orientation is Fish”—


it is not a very funny joke, but nevertheless—which the force recorded as a non-crime hate incident until the High Court ruled its actions a “disproportionate interference” with his freedom of expression, and rightly so.

The case of Allison Pearson was mentioned by my noble friend: the national newspaper columnist had police officers knock on her door on Remembrance Sunday to accuse her of “stirring up racial hatred” over a tweet she had already deleted. It was never told what she was being investigated for, because no offence had been committed. A person who has committed no crime can be questioned, placed on a police record and left with a stain that follows them into job applications, community life and future interactions with the state.

This is not a harmless administrative note. A police record, even where no offence has been committed, can surface in enhanced checks, damage careers and stigmatise people in their communities. It creates a two-tier system of reputational punishment: one for those convicted of crimes and another, less visible but no less damaging, for those who have merely expressed opinions or made mistakes. That is a grave injustice. The state must not be in the business of branding citizens as potential wrongdoers when no criminality has been established. Recording non-criminal speech as a hate incident treats lawful expression as if it were a criminal matter.

This practice chills debate, deters whistleblowers and journalists, and discourages civic participation. It stops harmless jokes and humour. If this system had existed 30 years ago in the British Army, hundreds of thousands of sergeant-majors would have had millions of records against them, because the wonderful terms of abuse and insults they had for us when we got our marching wrong and made mistakes were absolutely astronomical. I do not think we suffered any harm because of those jokes and humour at our expense.

Amendment 416E restores the proper boundary between policing and free expression. It does not prevent the police investigating genuine criminal offences or using intelligence proportionately where there is a real threat to safety. What it does is prevent the indefinite administrative stigmatisation of people who have committed no crime. It protects employment prospects, reputations and the right to speak without fear of being treated as a suspect.

To me, the key subsection is not on stopping them doing it in future but on purging current records, as proposed new subsection (5) says:

“Within three months of the coming into force of this section, any police authority which has retained any record of a non-crime hate incident, save in accordance with the provisions of subsection (4), must delete such record”.


I agree entirely, but I warn noble Lords that the police, in many cases, will try not to do it. They will find every excuse to hang on to that database and not delete it immediately.

I have tremendous respect for the police and the brave work they do on our behalf, and I pay tribute to the 4,000 officers killed in the last 200 years, since the first salaried officers went on duty. All the police I have ever met have wanted to save lives, crack down on crime and keep the King’s peace—but if you gave them a completely free hand, they would want to collect from every person over the age of five their fingerprints, DNA and biometric data and use them to stop crime. They would succeed—it would make a tremendous difference—but I think that is not the sort of society we want to allow. Therefore, we should not permit the retention of data on individuals who have not committed any crime.

I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, said about recording. When I heard the Metropolitan Police commissioner say a few weeks ago that it was not going to investigate non-crime hate incidents and was just going to record them, I thought, “Hang on”. That means that if someone accuses someone else of being racist, the police will not investigate to see whether it is right or wrong but will still record it as a crime. If keeping it recorded means in the call centre, on the record, that is okay, but it should not be recorded on any other database if it is not actually a crime.

I conclude by saying that this reform is practical. As my noble friend said, police resources are finite. Recording and managing non-crime entries diverts police officers from investigating real criminality and protecting victims. If the state wants to monitor tensions, it can do so through proportionate, anonymised intelligence and community safety work, not by placing individuals on quasi-criminal registers for conduct that is lawful. I support my noble friend’s amendment, and I support what my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs said about the College of Policing saying it is not fit for purpose. I therefore look forward to a commitment from the Minister that we will have an amendment on Report that implements what my noble friend Lord Young has said in Amendment 416E.

[Lord Kempsell (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a freelance journalist and, therefore, somebody who has a very great care for freedom of speech. What a pleasure it is to follow the speech of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, which so brilliantly summarised all the reasons there are to support Amendment 416E in the name of my noble friend Lord Young and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for tabling this amendment. This has been a useful debate, and I hope that we can at least look at the common direction of travel on this matter: the need for reform.

I have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, through the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I have also heard from the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Kempsell, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Herbert of South Downs, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler- Sloss. They have raised a range of issues that, in essence, point to the need for change in this system.

I think it is fair to say, and I hope that the Committee will accept, that the current Government have held office since July 2024. There has been a lot of discussion on the issues caused by, and effect of, non-crime hate incidents since the guidance was published in 2014. I do not want to lose the principle, which was mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Herbert of South Downs, that the non-crime hate incident regime had its genesis in the Macpherson report, and in trying to anticipate and examine where crimes were being committed, potentially in the future, and monitor a range of abuses that were present.

However, I say to the Committee—and I think this was recognised by Members in their contributions today —that how the police should respond to hate incidents that fall below the criminal threshold is a complex and sensitive issue. That is precisely why the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Normanton, and the current Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Shabana Mahmood, the Member for Ladywood, have asked the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to conduct a thorough review into non-crime hate incidents.

The review is examining whether the current approach is proportionate, consistent and compatible with the fundamental right to free expression—which goes to very point that was made. As the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said, the review is being led by policing experts and is expected to conclude, in his words, “shortly”. The publication date is one for the College of Policing. We have had the interim report, which has said that there are significant concerns in the way non-crime hate incidents are operating.

Given the points that have been made today, and given that the Government have commissioned a review, seen the interim report and, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, expect to receive the final report shortly, I would again ask the Committee to bear with us—I know that I have asked for this on a number of occasions—to examine what professional police officers and the College of Policing are recommending on non-crime hate incidents.

The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, rightly asked some significant questions. What is happening to database logging of anti-social behaviour incidents? What is happening to people who have previously had non-crime hate incidents put against their name? What is happening with regard to non-disclosure? What is happening in terms of the publication of the report and the Government’s response? Those are all fair and legitimate questions.

However, I say to the noble Lord and the Committee that the current Government have come in, recognised that there is an issue, commissioned the College of Policing to look at that issue and have received an independent report, and we expect a full report on how we can deal with those issues and tweak the regime so that we do not lose the very good things that have sometimes been brought out of non-crime hate incidents and we do not throw everything out immediately. I do not know what the final report is going to say.

At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said:

“The review has found that the current approach and use of non-crime hate incidents is not fit for purpose, and there is a need for broad reform to ensure that policing can focus on genuine harm and risk within communities. The recording of hurt feelings and differing views should not continue”.—[Official Report, 16/10/25; col. 406.]


That is a very clear statement. However, in moving from that in the interim report to whatever the new regime might be, it is incumbent on the Government to reflect on what the final report says. I am not ducking the amendment that the noble Lord has brought forward, nor his challenge that we need to make some changes. As he says, there is an open door. If we did not want this to be reviewed, we would not have asked the College of Policing and the Police Chiefs’ Council to review the incidence of non-crime hate incidents. Self-evidently, some of the examples given today are not what the original purpose of that legislation and approach was meant to be.

Going back to the Macpherson report, there was a serious element as to how assessments have been made. In Committee today, Members have talked about anti- semitism, racism and a range of incidents where the collection of information might give a bigger intelligence picture that requires a policing response, but which may or may not be a policing response that requires individuals to have their names put against them.

The concerns of everybody, from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, through to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, are legitimate, and the Government want to look at and address them. I hope that this can be examined. However, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment and await the outcome of the police review, so that any reforms are grounded in both robust evidence and a consensus.

Ultimately, the Government must and will take some decisions, and we will be held to account in the House of Commons and in this House as well. In the absence of that detailed response, I am not sure that I can come to this Committee and say, “This is what we will do”, because we need to examine that in detail.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his customary courtesy. I can accept his point that, since the Home Office has not yet received the final report, and Report may start in two or three-weeks’ time, it may not be possible to bring forward detailed primary legislation on Report. However, it seems to me—and perhaps my noble friend Lord Herbert can confirm this—that many of the changes may be administrative matters for the police and may not require legislation. What may require legislation may therefore be quite small. This Government, like the last one, love Henry VIII clauses. So would it not be possible for the Government to accept a simple Henry VIII clause so that, where legislation is required on this, a proper regulation can be brought in in the future, once the Government have consulted on what is required, to implement any of the legal changes necessary to give effect to my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in the nicest possible way, that my noble and learned friend Lord Hermer has given strict instructions to Government Ministers on Henry VIII clauses, and the various statutory instrument committees in this House and in the House of Commons have also expressed a grave view on them.

I put it to the Committee—and I hope that the Committee will accept this in good faith, as I am trying to do it in good faith—that the Government have recognised that there is a problem, and the Government have asked the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to examine that problem. The Government have received an interim report, which the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, referred to at Second Reading. The Government are awaiting the final report, which the noble Lord has said is coming shortly. I have not seen the final report. There may be things in it that maintain, change or revoke altogether the issues that have, quite rightly, been raised. But, if the Government had not realised that there was a problem, we would not have asked for solutions to be brought forward.

I know that I occasionally say, “Something will be happening very shortly”, but I say, in genuine help and support for the Committee, that we know that there is a problem. We want to change that problem, but we are trying to make sure that we get sufficiently robust professional advice to be able to make some political decisions based on the advice that we receive. With that, I have tried to help the noble Lord and I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

416H: After Clause 144, insert the following new Clause—
“Police power to confiscate undocked electric cycles and scooters for hire(1) The police may confiscate any undocked electric cycle or scooter for hire which has been left on—(a) a public pavement,(b) a public highway,(c) any other public place, including pedestrian precincts, or(d) any other place where the owners have not given consent for electric cycles or scooters to be collected.(2) The police must take reasonable steps to notify the hire company responsible for the electric cycle or scooter confiscated under subsection (1).(3) The police may charge the hire company with responsibility for the electric cycle or scooter confiscated under this section a fee of up to £1,000 for the release of the electric cycle or scooter.(4) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, delegate local authorities or authorised agents to exercise powers on behalf of the police under this section.(5) If the Secretary of State delegates powers under subsection (4), they must publish a code of practice for local authorities and authorised agents on the implementation of confiscation powers and the charging of fees under this section.(6) For the purposes of this section—“local authority” means any council, unitary authority, district or other body with statutory responsibility for highways, public order, or refuse disposal, and“authorised agent” means any person or organisation appointed in writing by a local authority.”

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, the Committee will be pleased to know that this is my last batch of amendments on the scourge of illegal bikes scattering our pavements and those big bikes the size of motorbikes mowing us down on the pavement. The Committee will also be pleased to know that, as I am attending the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, this is probably the last speech I will be making on the Bill for a short time.

The problem we face is plain and immediate. Thousands of dockless e-bikes and e-scooters have been dumped across our pavements and public spaces, creating a chaotic, inconsistent and dangerous environment for pedestrians. It is not often that I can agree with the Mayor of London, who described the rollout of these services as having become something of a “Wild West”, a term I understand that he took from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. There has been a rapid commercial expansion of cycling without the regulatory framework or parking infrastructure needed to protect the public and preserve access to our streets.

This is not an abstract nuisance but a daily reality for people trying to get to work, for parents with pushchairs, for older people, and for blind and visually impaired citizens, who rely on clear and unobstructed tactile routes. It is a public safety and accessibility crisis that has been documented repeatedly by local authorities, clinicians and charities, and it demands a statutory response. Amendments 416H and 416I would provide that response. One would create a targeted operator charge to fund enforcement and drive better operational systems; the other would give clear and proportionate powers to remove and permanently dispose of manifestly illegal high-powered machines that pose acute safety and criminal use risks.

The evidence from the ground is clear. Local authorities are already acting because the problem is real and costly. Local enforcement teams in Kensington and Chelsea have seized over 1,000 dangerously parked rental e-bikes this year and recovered more than £81,000 in release and storage fees to fund further enforcement action. They did that after repeated complaints about pavement obstruction and trip hazards. Councils have recovered significant sums in seizure and storage fees and have reinvested that money to expand enforcement activities. These are not isolated seizures but the tip of a systemic problem.

Clinicians are seeing new patterns of injury directly attributed to heavy hire bikes. Trauma and orthopaedic surgeons report a rise in lower leg injuries caused when heavy e-bike frames fall on riders or pedestrians, a phenomenon that has been labelled in clinical and medical circles as “Lime bike leg”. These are not minor bruises: the weight and construction of modern e-bikes, particularly the overheavy Lime ones, mean that even low-speed falls can produce fractures and soft tissue damage requiring hospital treatment.

Charities representing blind and visually impaired people have described how dumped e-bikes block tactile paving and prevent safe access to crossings, forcing people to alter or abandon journeys. One campaigner described repeatedly walking into e-bikes and being “put off” visiting central areas because of the unpredictability and danger of obstructed pavements. Residents and local councillors are vocal. Councils report that residents are “sick” of e-bikes blocking footpaths and that the current situation is undermining confidence in local streets. These are not rhetorical flourishes; they reflect sustained public pressure and the failure of voluntary operator-led measures to deliver consistent outcomes.

So who is responsible, and why have voluntary measures failed? The nuisance is concentrated among a small number of large operators that have scaled fleets rapidly: Lime, Forest, Voi and newer entrants such as Bolt. These companies operate dockless models that rely on users to park responsibly. Where that expectation is not met, the public realm becomes cluttered and dangerous.

Operators have taken some steps—funding parking bays, running in-app messages and offering incentives for correct parking—but these voluntary measures have not been sufficient to prevent widespread obstruction or to ensure rapid removal of dangerous or blocking bikes. The result is a patchwork of local rules and inconsistent enforcement that leaves vulnerable people exposed and councils bearing the cost of removal.

Councils are not standing idly by, but the tools they currently have are reactive and costly. Seizure and storage operations require staff time, secure storage facilities and administrative processing. Councils are forced into an expensive cycle of removal and storage because operators do not consistently prevent or properly remedy dangerous parking. I go further and submit that they simply do not care. They are making big money from e-bike hire, so why should they bother about safe parking when there is no penalty on them for letting their users dump them anywhere they like?

I turn to my Amendment 416H, on the operator charge, its justification and its effect. The proposed operator charge is a proportionate “polluter pays” mechanism that would ensure that those who profit from dockless fleets meet the real costs their services impose on the public realm. Operators make big profits from large fleets and dense urban coverage. Where voluntary agreements fail, statutes should set clear duties to ensure safe parking and fund the use of designated bays, to remove and relocate dangerously parked bikes within a short enforceable timeframe, and to be accountable for repeat non-compliance.

Where operators’ business models externalise the costs of pavement obstruction and enforcement, it is fair and efficient to require them to internalise those costs and pay for them themselves. Revenues from the charge could be used by local authorities to fund enforcement teams and rapid removal to secure storage; invest in parking infrastructure, such as a designated parking spaces, where required; and fund data-sharing and monitoring systems, which would enable councils to identify repeat non-compliance and target enforcement.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

They are, but we always leave it to chief officers to direct their police forces to use the full waterfront of different powers and regulations under their purview. We can always encourage them. I am sure that a number of chief officers will be looking intently at the debates in all the days of Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill and will understand the priorities the Committee voices. Certainly, with no little thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and others, we have had plenty of debate on this issue and they will have heard that it is one of extreme concern.

Clause 8 will allow the police to act immediately to stop offending behaviour and confiscate vehicles without delay. In addition, the Government have consulted on changes to secondary legislation to enable quicker disposal of seized vehicles, and our response will be published in due course. These measures demonstrate the Government’s commitment to effectively tackling the illegal and anti-social use of micro-mobility devices such as e-bikes and e-scooters without duplicating powers that are already in place.

I want to stress that riding a privately owned electric scooter on public roads is illegal, and the police have powers to take enforcement action against offenders, including seizure of the e-scooter for the offence of driving without insurance or a licence. The enforcement of road traffic law remains an operational matter for chief officers, who are best placed to allocate resources according to local needs, threats, risks and priorities. The Government will continue to support the police with the tools and powers they need, but this amendment would add unnecessary complexity without improving public safety. With that in mind, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to noble Lords and the Minister for speaking in this short but important little debate on cycling. I am particularly grateful to my noble friends Lord Goschen and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—and, for the first time, a Lib Dem spokesperson has supported, in concept, one of my cycling amendments. I am either on the right side, maybe, or I am doing something terribly wrong if the Lib Dems are backing me.

Over the past few weeks, as we debated various amendments that I put down on bikes of all sorts, and looked at delivery couriers cycling on pavements on these big, fast, heavy, illegal bikes, and the scooters and bikes dumped on the pavements, the general mood was, “Well, your amendments are not perfect, Lord Blencathra, but there’s a problem here and something needs to be done about it”. I hear what the Minister has said, as far as these big, illegal bikes like motorbikes are concerned: they are already illegal and the police have power to do something about them. He suggested that the powers in the devolution Bill will deal with all these cycling problems. Between now and Report, I shall look more carefully at the Bill to see if it does cover all the gaps, but it may be that on Report we will still want to bring back some little amendment on one of these issues—possibly on the precarious criminal liability of delivery couriers, which we discussed last time. A lot of colleagues thought this was terribly wrong and that something needed to be done about it. However, if the Government do something about it, I will not need to, but if they do not do what we think we need to do, I will do something on Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 416H withdrawn.