Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction and I am grateful to the many organisations that have provided briefings. In too many areas of crime and policing, we are failing the people who most need protection: children and vulnerable adults exposed to predators, shopkeepers bearing the cost of unchecked theft, farmers shouldering the consequences of criminals stealing expensive farm equipment to order, and traumatised women who hesitate to report assaults, fearing that the justice system will only compound their suffering.
Much of this comes down to resources. Although the Minister often states that Labour is investing an extra £1.2 billion in policing this year, the reality is that little of this will reach front-line services. The National Police Chiefs’ Council notes that a quarter of this sum will be returned to the Treasury through increased employer national insurance, with the rest already committed to fund pay awards and service debt. A decade of underfunding has forced police to borrow just to maintain their dilapidated buildings and antiquated IT. Already, gaps in children’s services, mental health and social care force police into roles they are ill-equipped to fill.
In scrutinising this Bill, we have to ensure that we do not set the police up to fail. Take drug testing: the Bill expands the range of triggers for police to be able to test someone for drugs but makes no provision at all for more drug testing centres or forensic resource. That must change because drugs are deeply intertwined with serious violence and linked to more than half of all homicides. Drug-related deaths have doubled since 2012, and about 70% of thefts and cases of domestic violence are driven by addiction. Yet more than 27,000 suspected drug suppliers remain on bail or under investigation, largely because we lack enough trained forensic specialists. If these delays, and the patchy availability of treatment programmes, are not addressed, the measures in the Bill will become irrelevant.
In a similar vein, there are a number of provisions in the Bill that are welcome in principle but need careful scrutiny in practice. Among those are new offences—such as assaulting retail workers and the proposed respect orders—which, while well-intentioned, risk duplicating existing laws and further straining a justice system already operating way beyond capacity.
Liberal Democrats have long argued that neighbourhood policing is the most effective way to address these problems before they take root. The role of local beat officers is crucial: they know where the domestic abusers live, where kids are left home alone, and where the drug dens operate. Effective neighbourhood policing depends on familiarity, consistency and trust—qualities that can only be built over time. We cannot keep parachuting in new officers and expect these relationships to flourish. That is why we have proposed legal minimum resourcing to ensure that neighbourhood policing teams are maintained at the level necessary to sustain long relationships and a sense of safety among communities.
That sense of safety is especially important for young people. At the moment, one in three young people reports that they do not feel safe in their communities. The dangerous and often tragic result is that they carry weapons. We therefore back proposals to tighten the rules around the online sale and delivery of weapons and we will bring forward amendments to give legislative life to even more of the Clayman review’s recommendations.
Turning to police and criminal justice reform, very few people realise that 90%—yes, 90%—of crime is now digitally enabled. That means that chief constables must be given the flexibility to decide the right mix of traditional police officers and specialist staff needed in their forces, because digital skill is very often now more highly valued than physical prowess, and recruitment should reflect that.
Meanwhile, training has to move with the times. One-third of all police officers now have under five years’ experience, but inspection after inspection exposes serious flaws in the training provided. Poor professional development, combined with infrequent updates on new laws and procedures, means that many front-line officers have outdated skills, leading to uneven standards and a workforce that lacks confidence to use its powers. With 94% of reported offences unresolved, new laws mean little if officers are not equipped to enforce them, so we will push for the first national review of police training since 2018.
However, reforming policing alone is like fixing a lock on a door that is completely rotten. It simply beggars belief that at the end of March 2025 there were 310,000 cases outstanding in magistrates’ courts; that serious offences such as rape are taking more than two years to come to trial, with offenders back out on the streets on bail, tormenting their victims; and that perpetrators who are convicted of crimes often pass through prisons without any kind of rehabilitation.
I shall highlight some serious concerns on civil liberties. In Clause 138, the move to give police automatic access to driving licence data for any law enforcement purpose, not just driving offences, marks a major expansion from current practice. The Home Secretary need only consult police, with no full parliamentary oversight, when drafting these regulations. While the Bill does not mention facial recognition, and Ministers say that there are no plans to use DVLA data this way, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, in a written submission to the Home Affairs Committee, stated that police chiefs are seeking access to the DVLA database for facial recognition searches, and proposals by the previous Government would have enabled this. To do this would put more than 50 million innocent people in a perpetual digital line-up, which poses profound risk, particularly for people of colour and minority groups. Big Brother Watch found that in the UK in 2023 89% of police facial recognition alerts wrongly identified members of the public as people of interest. We shall vigorously press the Government to ensure that DVLA access is necessary, proportionate and set out clearly in primary legislation, restricted to tackling serious crime or public safety threats.
It is about not just facial recognition but a whole range of biometrics, some of which are only now in development. I am particularly concerned about the need to future-proof the Bill against tomorrow’s technologies. New digital tools such as remote data extraction, advanced surveillance systems, predictive analytics and wearable sensor technology will soon reach the UK market. The Bill must be capable of evolving this technology, ensuring that protections for citizens remain robust as new digital tools appear.
In conclusion, public confidence in policing is at an all-time low. This may not be fair—I do not think it is—but it is the reality. New duties imposed by Parliament must therefore be matched by new investment. We must deliver policing that keeps people safe without edging towards a surveillance state. The Bill gives us a great opportunity to strike that balance, but more power without resources or safeguards risks serious consequences. Let us ensure that the Bill empowers the police, protects freedom and prepares the service for a fast-moving technological world, because only then will it truly deliver safer communities.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the speakers in this debate so far. This Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. Sorry.
No problem.
My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly to Amendments 4, 5 and 7 in my name. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very clear case for each one, so I will speak briefly. I put on record my thanks to Justice, which has gathered insights from so many people working in this field and it has been really interesting reading case studies that are backed up by very clear evidence.
These amendments would provide essential safeguards, ensuring the powers contained within respect orders are proportionate. Amendment 4 would require orders to be made only where there is evidence of actual conduct, not speculation about what a person might do in future. Amendment 7 would ensure that an order is imposed with a clear end date, capped at two years. In my opinion, it is wrong that an individual could be subject to potentially serious restrictions in perpetuity as a result of behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. In Amendment 5, we want to change the “just and convenient” threshold generally applied in civil proceedings to “necessary and proportionate”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put a very good case for this—much better than I could ever do, so I will not try.
Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, calling for an independent review of existing anti-social behaviour powers before respect orders are rolled out, would improve the Bill considerably, because precisely what laws are already used, and what works in practice, is critical to their success.
On the subject of likely success, I welcome the fact that respect orders can include positive requirements that people have to, for example, attend rehabilitation—perhaps to deal with addictions to drugs or drink or both. However, such requirements can work only if every region has capacity in drug and alcohol treatment programmes. I am sure the Minister is aware that only 12 of the 43 police forces returned data last year on how many cases were referred for such treatment. Without that information, we cannot know how such rehabilitation can work. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, when he responds, about what efforts are being made to ensure there are places available. Legislation alone is no good without resources.
My Lords, we must ensure that courts can operate within their means. If we issue them with new responsibilities, we have to be sure that they have the capacity to fulfil them. Unfortunately, in restricting respect orders to the High Court and county courts, the Government risk not providing the bandwidth to deal with new orders.
At the end of Labour’s first year in office, the Crown Court backlog suffered an annual increase of 11%. There are over 74,000 cases waiting to be judged. Of course, that burden is not entirely at the door of the Crown Courts, but a considerable number of the outstanding cases will require their use. County courts are in a better—but still not ideal—state. The average time for justice to be delivered is just over 49 weeks. Reflecting on this, it makes sense for the Government to divide the responsibilities for the new respect orders as widely as possible. The logical conclusion is to permit an application for a respect order to be made to a magistrates’ court.
If respect orders were confined to the serious criminality that we expect to be dealt with by the High Court and county courts, I would accept placing additional pressures on to them and excluding magistrates’ courts. It is right that those facing serious harassment or other forms of anti-social behaviour have the ability to make application to these courts, but the scope for respect orders is far wider than that. The definition of anti-social behaviour is to include actions causing alarm and distress. These are two very subjective metrics: they are fundamentally different from harassment and more serious forms of anti-social behaviour. So I see no reason why magistrates’ courts should not be available to deal with these less serious and potentially menial forms of anti-social behaviour. This is the reasoning behind Amendments 8 and 16, tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie.
There is also precedent for this. When the last Labour Government introduced anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, they could be made only by a magistrates’ court. This recognised that anti-social behaviour should be the purview of summary justice. The Minister might argue that the Government are simply replicating the application process for anti-social behaviour injunctions and that they were the action of the previous Government. That may be a fair criticism, but that would not mean that the Government are right. Simply following the case of previous legislation does not automatically mean that the legislation before us today is following the right path; nor does it acknowledge the very different state of the backlog in the High Court and county courts today, as opposed to 2014. It makes far more sense to permit the use of magistrates’ courts for this purpose today, given the historic case burden.
Finally, I can see no downside to this. It will permit burden-sharing between three types of courts. It would not alter the nature of the orders, nor the process by which they are made. But it would make some progress toward reducing the waiting time for the making of a respect order. Surely the Government do not want to see a 49-week wait for a respect order to be made. Would that not hamper the effectiveness of these supposedly tough new respect orders? I hope the Minister will consider these amendments carefully and sensibly.
The other amendments in this group seek to minimise the pressure placed on our courts by the new measures and ensure that our shared principles of justice are upheld. Interim respect orders interact with the principle of innocent until proven guilty. They can be made following a court adjournment up until the final court hearing. They have the same function as a regular respect order and can impose the same restrictions. I am conscious that this may sometimes be necessary. I reiterate the debilitated state of our courts and the fact that adjournment is sometimes out of their hands, even if the defendant is likely to engage in further anti-social behaviour. In these occasional instances, I can understand the need for an interim respect order.
Amendment 15 aims to find a balance, creating a presumption against issuing an interim order, while still leaving the option open. Amendment 19 exists to forward the argument that these orders can be issued to prevent only further harassment, and not the vague concepts of alarm and distress. These amendments aim to ease the administrative burden on the courts. Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against a decision to refuse to issue an interim respect order, the defendant is notified. It is right that a person should know when they might be subjected to a respect order, especially when they have not yet been proven guilty. I beg to move Amendment 8.
My Lords, I have just a few comments. I am quite concerned that the latest figures show that the magistrates’ courts’ backlog of cases to be heard reached 361,000 as of September 2025, a record high and a significant increase on previous years. In the other place, the Minister said the legal test for respect orders was being kept “broad and flexible” to enable them to be used for a wide range of anti-social behaviours. Again, this suggests significant extra pressure on courts. Jamming up the system further is not going to help victims. Can the Minister say what the Government’s assessment is of the impact on the wider criminal justice system?
Giving evidence in the other place, the Police Federation also pointed to the pressure these orders would put on custody places, saying that infrastructure was needed to make new legislation “effective and believable”. Perhaps the Minister could also address that.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their comments. I am sorry: I am just getting my pages in order; it came slightly more quickly than I expected. I thought we would have a few more contributions.
The amendments all relate to the role of the courts in the Government’s new respect orders, and it is fair and proper that they do so. These new orders will enable courts to ban offenders from engaging in formal, harmful anti-social behaviour and—again, as we have discussed—tackle the root cause. Amendments 8 and 16 seek to allow magistrates’ courts to issue respect orders. I have been clear that the respect orders are civil behaviour orders intended to prevent further anti-social behaviour occurring. They also aim to encourage rehabilitation through the positive requirements that I discussed in the previous group of amendments. Because they are civil in nature, applications should be heard in the civil courts, which have the appropriate procedures and expertise for handling these types of orders.
Magistrates’ courts deal primarily with criminal matters and summary offences. Hearing civil applications in a magistrates’ court would risk treating preventive orders as punitive measures, when, actually, as I mentioned, they are designed either to try to stop people undertaking negative behaviour or to encourage people to undertake what I will term positive behaviour, such as anger management or alcohol awareness courses.
Amendment 15 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are not issued by the courts unless specifically said otherwise, and where an application has been made without notice. Again, anti-social behaviour can escalate quickly and cause great harm, and an interim respect order enables rapid protection in urgent cases involving immediate risk. Judges can make decisions based on the individual facts of the case and ensure that victims receive immediate relief in cases which they deem to be appropriate. On occasion, these will have to be issued without giving notice to the respondent, and it is important that judges retain the ability to do so on or without request from the relevant agency. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the court would be required to apply itself to the question of whether it was appropriate to make an interim order. There is no question of one being made without an express determination to that effect, but speed is still required.
Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against the decision by the courts to refuse an interim respect order, the respondent is duly notified. I reiterate that interim respect orders are designed to provide urgent temporary relief to protect victims and the public from serious harm before a full hearing. If the respondents were notified of an appeal, it could undermine the immediacy and effectiveness of the interim order, and doing so would likely complicate proceedings, prolonging risk to victims and communities. I come back to the fact that all the measures in the Bill are designed to tackle anti-social behaviour at source and provide either interventions to prevent or interventions to encourage positive behaviour. The law allows appeals without notice to maintain speed and efficiency in safeguarding measures.
Amendment 19 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are made only when the court considers the respondent likely to engage in harassment. Again, I just say to the noble Lord that the definition of anti-social behaviour is broad: it is intended to capture behaviours that may not meet the criminal threshold but which can cause severe harm to victims and communities. As I pointed out, interim respect orders are a necessary thing to provide immediate relief, preventing harmful behaviour from escalating and causing further damage to victims and communities. I would have thought that the noble Lord would have supported that general direction of travel. They are a preventative order, not a punitive order; they are punitive only in the event of a breach. Again, the purpose of the order is not to have that breach in the first place but to send a signal that says, “This behaviour is unacceptable”, or “This support mechanism is required”, and if you do not attend the support mechanism or if you breach the preventive mechanism, you are facing a potential criminal sanction.
Before the Minister sits down —I love that expression—can I just check? I think he said that respect orders were not going to be piloted. Is that correct? Diana Johnson, the Policing Minister in the other place, in the third session in Committee, said:
“We will pilot respect orders to ensure that they are as effective as possible before rolling them out across England and Wales”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 1/4/25; col. 104.]
So, what has changed between then and now that the Government have changed their mind?
The Government have considered the reflections in another place, and we have now determined that we want to get on with this. Remember that the Bill has 12 days in Committee, and then Report, and we have a long way to go before Royal Assent. The Government want to have a manifesto commitment that they made in July 2024 implemented in good time. Even now, that manifesto commitment will take us potentially nearly two years to put in place. That is a reasonable process, we have consulted widely on the respect orders and that is the Government’s position now.
Can the Minister say whether anything else has changed that we would not be aware of because it has not been written down anywhere?
That is a very wide question, my Lords. Let me say that the purpose of Committee is to provide a significant number of days for Members from all sides of the House—as we have had today, from the government side as well as from the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats—to test Ministers and raise points. If the noble Baroness has points she wishes to raise during the passage of the Bill, as ever, I will try to answer them, either on the Floor of this House or in writing afterwards.
The noble Baroness asks whether things have changed. Even today, there are a number of amendments that the Government have brought forward in the groups of amendments that we are deliberating on today. Things move; the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, was saying with regard to the immigration Bill that a number of things have changed over the course of time, and things move. It is now 16 months since the King’s Speech which introduced this legislation. We continue to monitor and move; where necessary we bring forward amendments, and I am open to testing on all matters at all times. But I would welcome the noble Lord withdrawing his amendment today.
My Lords, of course I support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, opposing the increases in these fines, but I think we need to go further and for a variety of reasons abolish these on-the-spot penalties per se, which is why I have tabled this clause stand part notice.
You cannot overestimate how much public space protection orders and community protection notices trivialise what we understand to be dealing with anti-social behaviour. We have just had a long discussion about what anti-social behaviour is. These orders are part of the toolkit to deal with anti-social behaviour and they end up targeting individuals for the most anodyne and mundane activities, and banning everyday freedoms.
The use of fines has, in a way, led us to not take seriously what real anti-social behaviour is, because these fines are given out for such arbitrary, eccentric reasons. PSPOs and CPNs can be issued on a very low threshold, are entirely subject to misuse—there is lots of evidence showing that—and often criminalise, as I said, everyday activities. For example, PSPOs are often used to ban young people gathering in groups—which seems to me to be a dangerous attack on our right to assembly—despite the fact that the statutory guidance states that PSPOs should target only activities that cause a nuisance and should not criminalise
“everyday sociability, such as standing in groups”.
That is what it says, yet they are constantly used in that way and seem to be unaccountably doled out.
There are now over 2,000 PSPOs in England and Wales, and each of them contains up to 35 separate restrictions. That means that tens of thousands of new controls are being issued on public spaces all the time. As we heard earlier, they are imposed in different geographic areas, making prohibitions on different types of activities for different citizens from one place to another. You can be in one town where an activity is legal and then go to the next town and the same activity is illegal. We discussed some of that earlier.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out and as Justice has drawn our attention to, the inconsistent use of PSPOs creates a “postcode lottery” for victims but also for perpetrators. Justice says that this
“undermines the rule of law by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location rather than the circumstances”.
I hope we can send the Minister the research done by Justice and by the Manifesto Club that has already been referred to so that he can see from the freedom of information requests to local authorities just what kind of activities are being issued with PSPOs and CPNs, and therefore what these fines are being used to tackle. I assure the Committee that it is innocuous activities, not anti-social behaviour. There are councils that are banning kite-flying, wild swimming, as we have heard, and using camping stoves.
I thought it was interesting that, recently, the Free Speech Union forced Thanet District Council to scrap its imposition of a sweeping public spaces protection order that would have banned the use of foul or abusive language in a public space in the Thanet area, so you would have been able to swear in one area but not in another. I understand that it might have raised a lot of money, but that is not necessarily the same as dealing with anti-social behaviour.
Actually, the councils themselves do not do the dirty work of enforcement. Instead, they outsource that to private companies, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has explained so well the dangers of using these private firms. We have a geographic breakdown of the national way of dealing with anti-social behaviour, and now we have an almost feudal way of collecting fines from it. These kinds of fines mean that orders might well be issued for all the wrong reasons—for income-generating, commercial purposes to meet targets that are about raising money rather than tackling anti-social behaviour—and increasing the fines will surely only incentivise that practice further.
I urge the Minister to consider that the noble cause that the Government are associated with here is dealing with anti-social behaviour, but using private companies to fine people in such a cavalier way discredits the whole cause. It is damaging the reputation of that noble cause. There is no transparency or oversight mechanism for these companies. There is one ban that I would like to bring in, and that is fining for profit. I hope the Minister will consider at least reviewing this and looking at it closely.
My Lords, I do not intend to rehearse the arguments already put so effectively by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. Suffice to say that we on these Benches fully support Amendment 23, as £500 is an extortionate amount of money for the type of behaviour that fines are designed to address and will simply result in private companies making even greater profits than they do at the moment while pushing those already struggling further into debt. For these reasons, we have serious reservations about the implications of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
The orders create a postcode lottery for victims. Charities warn that, in some parts of the country, orders are handed out like confetti. This undermines public trust by making enforcement dependent on the victim’s location.
Overall, the use of these powers needs to be subject to much stricter safeguards. The Government must ensure that there is proper oversight of their use and that the law is applied equally, openly and proportionately.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this thoughtful debate on Clause 4 and associated amendments. The discussion has reflected the balance that must be struck between proportionate enforcement and ensuring that penalties remain effective and fair. As anti-social behaviour seems to be increasingly present on our streets, it is right that the clause is given careful consideration.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised concerns in Amendment 23 about the overuse or inappropriate issuance of fixed penalty notices. Those are indeed legitimate points for consideration, and I am sure that all noble Lords agree that such powers should be exercised carefully and with a proper sense of proportion. Fixed penalty notices are designed and intended to deal swiftly with low-level offending without recourse to the courts, but they must always be used responsibly and in accordance with proper guidance. However, it seems that Clause 4(3) and (4) will help to act as a proper deterrent to anti-social behaviour, as they will play an important part in ensuring that the penalty levels remain meaningful. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on this matter.
I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We are grateful to my noble friend for his focus on practical enforcement. His Amendments 24 and 25 seek to strengthen the collection of fines by introducing automatic confiscation provisions and modest administrative charges for non-payment. It is right that those who incur penalties should expect to pay them, and that local authorities are not left to have to chase persistent defaulters at the public’s expense. We therefore view my noble friend’s proposals as a constructive contribution to the debate in order to ensure that enforcement is both efficient and fair.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has given notice of her intention to oppose the Question that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill. We respect this view, but we cannot agree to the removal of the clause. Clause 4 contains a number of sensible and proportionate measures that are designed to improve compliance and to strengthen the effectiveness of penalties. Many of these reforms build on the Criminal Justice Bill brought forward by the previous Conservative Government.
This debate has underlined the importance of maintaining confidence in the fixed penalty system, ensuring that it is used appropriately and enforced consistently. The system exists to fulfil the wider aim of upholding law and order in our communities. In these endeavours, we on our Benches will always be supportive.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendment 55A, which is supported by StopWatch, a campaign organisation that is concerned with the use of stop and search. I disagree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
Amendment 55A would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data on the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders and related injunctions. Specifically, it would ensure that these reports include the number of occasions when stop and search has been used by the police prior to the issuing of such orders, and the protected characteristics of those who have been issued with them. These powers can have serious and lasting consequences for those subject to them, particularly young people and those from marginalised communities. Yet at present, the public and Parliament have very limited visibility of how these tools are being applied. This would ensure transparency and accountability about how anti-social behaviour powers are being used across England and Wales.
We know from existing evidence that stop and search disproportionately affects people from black and non-white ethnic backgrounds. The Government’s own figures last year reported that there were nearly 25 stop and searches for every 1,000 black people and yet only around six for every 1,000 white people. There is a real risk that these disparities could be echoed or even compounded in the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders or injunctions. Without clear data, broken down with protected characteristics, we cannot know whether these concerns are justified, nor can we properly evaluate the fairness and effectiveness of the system. By requiring the Home Office to publish quarterly data, this amendment would bring much-needed transparency. It would allow Parliament, bodies with oversight and the public to monitor trends, identify disparities and ensure that anti-social behaviour powers are being used proportionately and appropriately.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is clearly very exercised about the use of resources. He actually said that more information does not reduce crime. I think that is probably completely wrong, because the more information you have, the better you can understand what is happening. So this is about good governance and evidence-based policy. If these powers are being used fairly, the data will confirm that. If not, then we will have the information necessary to take corrective action. Either way, the transparency will strengthen public trust in policing and the rule of law.
This amendment is about shining a light where it is most needed. It would do nothing to restrict police powers. It would simply ensure that their use can be properly scrutinised. I hope the Minister will agree that accountability and transparency are not optional extras in a just society; they are actually the foundations of it.
My Lords, we support Amendment 55A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She has already highlighted the importance of improved data collection around the use of anti-social behaviour legislation. This is essential because it is impossible to gauge the fairness or effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers without adequate data and transparency.
We also support Clause 7. It is important to have more transparency around how these powers are used by local authorities and housing providers. The evidence is that they already have this information but are failing to share it. As a result, little is known about how these powers are being used in practice.
The charity Crisis wants the Government to go further by making this information publicly available. This would provide full transparency around patterns of anti-social behaviour and the powers used to tackle it. Is this something the Government might consider? Perhaps the Minister could let us know.
The police, too, must improve their recording practices around anti-social behaviour. A report last year by HMICFRS found that some forces’ recording is very poor, while others do not always record the use of statutory powers. We believe that transparency is key to ensuring that future orders are applied reasonably and proportionately, and to prevent discrimination.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra, as ever, raises a serious and pertinent point with his Amendment 35. Clause 7 permits the Secretary of State, by regulations, to require authorities to provide them with information about anti-social behaviour. Unfortunately, Clause 7 contains rather vague requirements on what information the regulations might contain. It would perhaps be helpful for the Minister to provide the Committee with some concrete examples of what might be included. My noble friend is absolutely right that social media posts should not be included in any of the guidance.
With Amendment 55A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my fear is that the police and the Home Office, already overburdened with creating statistics, will yet again be further burdened. Perhaps this is not the way forward.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendments. Every week, coming from the north of England to this House, I see literally miles and miles of repulsive gang graffiti. On the outskirts of every station, walls and buildings are plastered with it. At Crewe and near Euston, hundreds and hundreds of goods wagons are covered in it, and even the walls of residential buildings. We see it everywhere, so why worry about it? It is unsightly and destroys any beauty that may be left on the approaches to cities by rail, but it is much more insidious than that, as my noble friend on the Front Bench has pointed out.
Gang-related graffiti, which we see in all urban areas, is often seen as both a symptom and a catalyst of criminal activity. I suggest that there is sufficient evidence available to conclude that gang graffiti leads to increased crime in affected neighbourhoods and that it instils fear among local residents. Gang graffiti typically consists of symbols, tags or messages used by criminal gangs to mark their territory, send warnings or communicate with other gangs. It differs from other forms of graffiti, such as street art, due to its association with organised crime and territorial disputes.
Several studies and reports indicate a correlation between the presence of gang graffiti and higher rates of crime, particularly violent offences. Gang graffiti is often used to demarcate territory, which can lead to turf wars and retaliatory violence. Areas marked by gang symbols may experience an increase in robberies, assaults and drug-related crimes as gangs seek to assert dominance. A study published by the Journal of Criminal Justice found that neighbourhoods with visible gang graffiti reported higher levels of gang-related crime and violence, suggesting that graffiti serves as both a warning and an invitation for conflict. Police departments in cities such as London and Manchester have noted that the appearance of new gang graffiti often coincides with spikes in criminal activity, particularly when rival gangs respond by marking over existing tags.
Crime prevention experts argue that gang graffiti is not merely a symptom but a tool used to intimidate, recruit and claim control, thereby fostering an environment conducive to criminal behaviour. Although correlation does not necessarily imply causation, the consistent association between gang graffiti and increased crime rates supports the argument that graffiti can contribute to localised crime.
The visual presence of gang graffiti can have a significant psychological impact on residents and visitors, as my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel said. Research conducted by community safety organisations has shown that people perceive areas with gang graffiti as less safe, which can lead to heightened anxiety, avoidance behaviours and reduced community cohesion. Surveys by our local councils in the UK reveal that residents often cite gang graffiti as a major contributor to their fear of crime, even if they have not personally experienced gang violence.
Our own British Crime Survey found that the visibility of gang markers and threatening messages increases the perceived risk of victimisation, causing some individuals to alter their daily routines or to avoid certain neighbourhoods or streets altogether. Community leaders report that gang graffiti can erode trust in public institutions as residents feel that the authorities are unable to maintain law and order and prevent criminal groups operating openly. In summary, gang graffiti acts as a visual clue that can frighten people, negatively impact mental well-being and discourage positive social interaction within affected communities.
Last year, the Metropolitan Police estimated that there were 102 active gangs in London engaged in violence and robbery, and they were responsible for a significant amount of serious violence, including half of all knife crimes with injury, 60% of shootings and 29% of reported child sexual exploitation. I think those 102 gangs equate to about 4,500 individuals. It is not just London; the same is happening in all our major cities. Let us be clear: gang-related graffiti is not some kids with aerosol cans spray-painting walls for a bit of fun. Gangs are making powerful statements to their allies and enemies that this is their criminal territory. Therefore, the solution has to be the prompt removal of graffiti, expensive though it is, and that has to be part of gang prevention strategies. However, we also need increased penalties, as suggested by my noble friend in his Amendment 51.
I do not need to speak in support of Amendment 52; I think I have just made the point that gangs are highly dangerous organisations and there should be tougher sentences for any crimes that have gang connections.
My Lords, everyone is concerned about gang activity. The dark web means it has never been easier for people to source and buy drugs independently, contributing to the emergence of more loosely organised micro-gangs, as once an individual has a large supply of illicit drugs, they need to recruit others to help distribute them. I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the tabled amendments.
On Amendment 51 on graffiti, I entirely agree with some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that this usually relates to gangs marking territory or expressing group affiliation. It can result in public spaces feeling unsafe, and the fear is that it could fuel turf wars between rival gangs. To many it is also an unsightly nuisance, with the clean-up cost high for home owners, businesses and local authorities. However, we remain unconvinced that this amendment is the way forward.
Graffiti without the property owner’s permission is already a criminal offence, classified as vandalism or criminal damage, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. I am also concerned that measures such as this risk embedding racial bias in law enforcement and disproportionately affecting minority and marginalised communities. The courts have already found that using graffiti as a marker of gang identity can result in the unjust targeting of marginalised groups, especially people of colour.
In 2022 a legal ruling forced the Metropolitan Police to admit that the operation of its gangs matrix was unlawful, breached human rights and had a disproportionate impact on black people. The matrix used factors, including graffiti, to label people as gang members, leading to life-changing consequences for those who had been wrongly included. Over 1,000 individuals assessed as low risk subsequently had to be removed from the database. This demonstrates the danger of conflating graffiti, gangs and criminality. While I understand the intention behind this amendment, the risk of unintended consequences is clear.
The definition of a gang in Amendment 52 feels worryingly broad, so we cannot support it. As drafted, it raises significant concerns that outweigh its intended benefits. Prosecutors are already cautioned not to use the term “gang” without clear evidence because, used inappropriately, it can unfairly broaden liability for an individual’s offending while disproportionately affecting ethnic minorities.
This proposal also feels overly prescriptive. It is important that the courts retain discretion and the law allows for nuanced sentencing; for example, when someone was plainly being coerced, groomed or manipulated into gang activity.
On these Benches, we believe that sentencing must account for individual circumstances and be based on specific individual criminal behaviour. Simply being in with the wrong people is not the same thing.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, for tabling Amendments 51 and 52. These amendments are proposed and supported by three Members of your Lordships’ House who, between them, have considerable experience in what might loosely be called the law and order space. They are, in rugby terms, a formidable front row and, as such, I have considered what they proposed with care.
I reassure the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Blencathra, and indeed your Lordships’ House, that this Government are definitely against gangs and absolutely against graffiti. That said, we do not believe that these proposals are needed, primarily because the activities criminalised in these measures are already covered by existing legislation.
The intended effect of Amendment 51 is to criminalise the kind of graffiti which gangs use to mark what they feel is their territory and/or to threaten rival groups with violence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, this criminal behaviour is already covered by the existing offence contained within Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Section 1 is broad enough to cover graffiti because case law establishes that the damage does not have to be permanent, and it catches behaviour such as using water-soluble paint on a pavement or smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. In addition, Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act has a higher maximum penalty than the proposed new offence, being punishable in the Crown Court by a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Not only is the proposed offence not needed, there are very real problems with the structure of what is proposed; I will mention three, but there are others. First, this amendment creates an offence of strict liability. That means that the prosecution is not required to prove intention, recklessness or even knowledge. The result is a criminal offence which could be committed by accident. The criminal law does not like strict liability offences, and they are very rare in our jurisprudence. The reason is simple: we do not usually criminalise people who are not even aware that they were doing anything wrong.
Secondly, whatever the intention behind the drafting of this proposed criminal offence, in the way it is drafted, the definition of “gang” is so broad that it would capture both the Brownies and the Church of England, as well as football teams, drama societies and many other groups not normally regarded as criminal. I do not think that the noble Lords intend that a Christian cross chalked on a fence could potentially be prosecuted as a criminal offence.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 53A, I will also speak to my Amendment 53B in this group. I completely support the comments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel on the Front Bench, and I support his amendments.
I encounter this every day coming to this House, where beggars lie on the pavement, half blocking it. Possibly they think they are less frightening sitting down than standing up, but the nuisance is the same, as is the chant asking for money. I have not seen them for some months now, but for a couple of years we had different beggars every day; then I realised it was the same dog they had. I presume that the dog got passed around between them, since the public are possibly more sympathetic to the dog than to the beggar— a kind of Dogs R Us.
There was another one who, when I first encountered him, was really scary. He was a beggar, but he was shouting and screaming—not at the public, I realised, but more to himself or to the ether than anything else. Clearly, he had a mental health problem. After I saw him a couple of times, I had no problem; I just did not make eye contact. However, people who had never met him before, such as women coming out of the shops, were terrified of him. It was nuisance begging, but clearly there was a health problem behind it.
My Amendment 53A would merely add a little tweak to my noble friend’s new clause by adding “outside any residential building” to the list in subsection (6). In this Westminster area, I have seen them sitting not on the doorstep but right beside the entrance to a residential block of flats. Frankly, I think that is intimidating, and residents should not have to face that fear, whether misplaced or not, that they may face beggars as they come and go from their own property.
My Amendment 53B would amend my noble friend’s amendment after subsection (7), by inserting:
“The judgement that the begging satisfies the conditions in (a), (b) and (d) is one to be made by the person who is the victim of the begging”.
So what does subsection (7) say? It says:
“This subsection applies if the person begs in a way that has caused, or is likely to cause … (a) harassment, alarm or distress to another person, … (b) a person reasonably to believe that … they, or any other person, may be harmed, or … any property … may be damaged, … (c) disorder, or … (d) a risk to the health or safety of any person except the person begging”.
In other words, the purpose of my amendment is that I do not want a police officer to come along and say, “Oh no, guv, that’s not harassment or causing alarm. What are you worried about? There’s no risk to your health and safety”. I suggest that the judgment be made by the person who is the victim of the nuisance begging. Some people will not be worried or alarmed, as I was not worried after I saw that chap with the mental health problem a few times, but others may be.
I came across this in an accusation about bullying in the Civil Service. If a civil servant believes that someone is bullied, that is taken for granted because one person felt it even though others might have felt differently. I dealt with that in my capacity of serving on an ALB.
In conclusion, I want to make it clear that, if a person feels that begging is causing him or her alarm, distress or harassment, or is a risk to health and safety, then it is the victim’s view that must be considered, not that of anyone else applying their own test for what that alarm might be.
My Lords, there is a genuine problem around aggressive begging and the involvement of organised criminal gangs. That is why we support Clause 11, which rightly focuses not on individuals who are begging but on those who are orchestrating and profiting from this practice.
Lots of things in life are a nuisance, but that does not mean we should criminalise them. Where begging is causing a genuine nuisance, police already have a range of powers to deal with it under anti-social behaviour legislation. We think this amendment is the wrong solution at a time when charities such as Crisis say that the number of vulnerable people on the streets who survive by begging, including women and first-time rough sleepers, is rising. In these circumstances, we should be looking at how we can better reach and support those in such straitened circumstances. By contrast, criminalising begging would push people away from support, and it will not solve the problems of poverty, homelessness, addiction or exploitation.
My Lords, we recognise the legitimate concerns about persistent anti-social behaviour. Repeat offenders represent a significant challenge; within many communities there is a small core of individuals creating a disproportionate amount of misery and distress to victims. However, the Liberal Democrats remain sceptical about the approach taken by Amendment 54. On these Benches, we believe that youth incarceration should be a last resort, not an automatic consequence. Mandatory detention after three breaches not only removes judicial discretion, it risks criminalising young people for behaviour which is below the criminal standard.
The evidence shows that detention is largely ineffective and often counterproductive. In reality, it increases the likelihood of future offending. Indeed, a chief constable I spoke to told me that short-term sentences simply equip people to be better at crime. The aim of these measures may be to help victims, but the risk is that they could ultimately result in the creation of more of them.
We believe that the key to tackling persistent anti-social behaviour is properly funded community policing. There are about 10,000 fewer police and PCSOs and neighbourhood teams now than in 2015. More than 4,500 PCSOs have disappeared, and their loss is continuing. Some forces simply do not have enough personnel in neighbourhood teams to actively address anti-social behaviour. In his response, will the Minister say what is being done to reverse the exodus of community officers?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, the contributions we have heard demonstrate the seriousness of the issue and highlight why communities and victims need reassurance that persistent anti-social behaviour will be confronted robustly and effectively. I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for bringing forward these amendments. They provide a welcome opportunity to examine whether the current response to repeat breaches of injunctions is sufficient.
It goes without saying that ongoing and persistent anti-social behaviour has a profound impact on the lives of ordinary residents, including the feeling of individual safety and a wider sense of cohesion in our neighbourhoods. Amendment 54 seeks to provide that if someone under 18 breaches three injunctions of supervision orders, they must be given a detention order. It seems likely, to me at least, that someone who has broken three such injunctions is plainly on the path to becoming an habitual offender. Repeated breaches should not simply be met with ineffective sanctions—communities have to know that the law has teeth and that those who repeatedly defy court orders will face meaningful consequences. The amendment seeks to reinforce that principle and to signal clearly that a cycle of breach, warning and further breach is unacceptable.
I hope that the Government give the amendment the thought and time that it deserves, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I rise for the final time tonight—the Committee will be pleased to know—to support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. I wish I had put down my own amendment to Clause 27 to draw attention to what I think is the complete disconnect between subsections (1) and (3) in the new section.
The Bill in its current form proposes in subsection (1) of the new section that it shall be an offence for any person to possess an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon with the intent
“to use unlawful violence against another person, … to cause another person to believe that unlawful violence will be used against them”
and others, or
“to cause serious unlawful damage to property”.
That is fairly serious stuff.
However, the penalties in subsection (3) of the proposed new section, with a maximum of 12 months’ imprisonment in a magistrates’ court and up to four years on indictment, are insufficient given the gravity of the offence. I support the argument for a substantial increase in sentencing powers to reflect the seriousness of the conduct involved.
Possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it for violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious criminal act. Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property. It is not a spontaneous or lesser form of criminality but rather a calculated and dangerous escalation. The mere possession of a weapon with such intent poses a direct threat to public safety, undermines community trust and creates an atmosphere of fear and insecurity.
As the Minister will know, offences involving offensive weapons are often precursors to more serious crimes, involving grievous bodily harm right up to homicide. I maintain that actions that create an imminent risk of serious harm should be met with robust deterrence and sentencing. Allowing relatively lenient penalties for those caught with weapons and with criminal intent fails to deter potential offenders and signals a lack of seriousness in addressing violent crime. The psychological impact on victims—those who are threatened or believe they are at risk of violence—can be profound and long-lasting, as many reports say, even if no injury actually occurs.
When compared with other offences of similar seriousness, the proposed penalties appear disproportionately low. For instance, offences such as aggravated burglary or possession of firearms with intent to endanger life attract significantly higher sentences, often exceeding a decade in custody. This clause is about people going out with vicious knives or machetes, intending to use unlawful violence against another person—in other words, to attack them and possibly kill them. Why on earth should there even be a summary trial for that sort of offence? That is why I wish I had put down my own amendment to delete from the new section subsection (3)(a), which provides for trial in a magistrates’ court.
Of course, we must not look at this Bill in isolation; we have the Sentencing Bill coming along, which will aim to ban anyone—if I understand it correctly—going to prison for a sentence of 12 months or less. If one of these cases goes to a magistrates’ court, and the magistrates impose the maximum sentence of 12 months, it will be automatically suspended and the perpetrator will get away with it. What signal does that send? If these criminals were going out with a knife to scratch cars or vandalise property, summary might be appropriate, but they are going out with knives to attack people and possibly kill them. That is why, in my opinion, it has to indictable only and a 14-year maximum sentence—which, as we know, will end up as seven in any case, with automatic release at half-time. I believe the current proposal for a maximum of four years on indictment is markedly out of step with comparable offences and the seriousness of potential offences in subsection (1).
The criminal justice system must not only punish offenders but deter would-be offenders and reassure the public that their safety is paramount. Inadequate penalties such as this one risk undermining public confidence in the legal system. A more severe sentencing framework would send a clear message that society will not tolerate the possession of weapons in the street with intent to commit violent acts or grievous bodily harm to people. It would also be a stronger deterrent to those contemplating such conduct.
In conclusion, I believe the Government are absolute right to introduce this new power, but they have the penalties wrong since they are disconnected from the seriousness of the offence. Given the potential for severe physical and psychological harm, the premeditated nature of the crime and the need for effective deterrence, I also submit that the maximum penalties should be increased. Of course, this is not tying the judge’s discretion; I am suggesting no minimum sentence but a sentence of up to 14 years.
I should add that I have exactly the same view on the suggested penalties in the next massive group of amendments, but I have made my arguments here and I will not repeat them when we come to that group on Wednesday.
My Lords, nearly half the murders in the UK over the last three years are due to knife crime, so we recognise the vital importance of equipping police with the necessary tools to intervene when there is clear evidence of intent to commit serious violence. We give Clause 27 our full backing.
Before I turn to the amendment, I want to make a couple of points around the new offence. Will the Government ensure that robust guidance and oversight are in place to prevent unjustified or discriminatory use of this power? That needs to be accompanied by improved training for police and judiciary. The reality is that young black men are already significantly overrepresented in knife crime prosecutions, and we must be careful not to compound that position. Discrimination and justice are opposites.
I hope this may also help stem the rising number of incidents in which people suffer life-changing injuries after being attacked with acid or other corrosive substances. Reports of such offences increased by 75% in 2023, including 454 physical attacks. Half these victims were women, with attacks often occurring in a domestic abuse context, but only 8% of these cases resulted in a charge or summons, partly due to the victim’s fear of reprisal. The hope is that this new offence may allow prosecutions to be brought before harm is inflicted, since proving intent would not necessarily require the victim to testify. Can the Minister say how the Government intend to use the offence to this end?
On Amendment 56, the Liberal Democrats agree with Jonathan Hall that four years in prison in insufficient when there is clear evidence of the intention to cause mass fatalities. The court must have the full weight of the law behind it in the hopefully rare cases in which a lengthy sentence is thought necessary for public prosecution. I would expect the Sentencing Council to issue guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, and I hope this will guard against sentence inflation. Nevertheless, we are minded to support this amendment and I urge the Government to look again at the maximum penalty.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for his amendment, which, as noble Lords will know, increases the maximum penalty to 14 years for possessing a weapon with intent. I happen to think that sentences should be proportionate to the offence, and that is why the maximum sentence for this offence has been set at four years. This is in line with other weapons offence penalties, such as that for possession of a bladed article. To set the sentence for this offence at 14 years would be disproportionate.
The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and others, including the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, asked legitimate questions about the difference between existing offences and this new proposed offence. It is already an offence to carry a bladed article in public without good reason. It is also an offence to then threaten a person with a bladed article or weapon. Under Section 52 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, it is an offence to intentionally threaten someone with an offensive weapon in public or in private.
The introduction of this new offence bridges a gap, which I believe is there, between being in possession of a knife or other offensive weapon in public or on education premises, and it being used to threaten or harm anyone. This offence will target those who equip themselves with bladed articles with the intention to endanger life, cause serious harm or fear or violence, but are intercepted by the police before they have had the chance to carry out any attack on the intended victim. It will therefore empower the police to bring charges against those individuals, which, in my view, is a differentiation which I hope has been clarified for the noble Viscount. He shakes his head.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will reply quickly to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and also the noble Viscount. I am not against sharp-edged knives. I have a very good knife that cuts through a Savoy cabbage and does a great job with everything I need in the kitchen. It is just rounded at the edge, so I cannot stab my wife with it.
My Lords, the key finding of the Clayman review was the need for better police data recording on knife crime. Officers often fail to note the specific type of knife used, with further gaps around sales and marketing. Amendment 122 recognises that, without understanding the threat, it is difficult to counter it, so the evidence base must be improved.
The amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Clement-Jones, promote a policing approach to reduce opportunities for crime through better design of our buildings, known as designing out crime. I have spoken to a number of chief police officers who have tried this, with great effect. They are very happy about how this can happen and would really like to see it rolled out. This preventive approach aligns with the Liberal Democrat position and I hope the Government will give it serious attention.
We welcome the Government’s proposals on this part of the Bill, but laws work only if they are enforceable. Again, the Clayman review said that police currently lack the training, know-how and resources to police online knife sales effectively.
Can I ask the Minister about the policing of overseas suppliers, since this is where many of these lethal weapons originate? What plans are in place to monitor imports? The Clayman review found that there is often very poor co-ordination between Border Force and police and noted the difficulty in getting data from tech and communication companies based overseas. Can the Minister mention that when he winds up, please?
Clayman also suggested an import licensing scheme to ensure that a licence is required to bring knives into the UK. He proposed revisiting the tax levy on imported knives to ensure that potential weapons brought into the country are easier to track and identify. Do the Government intend to implement either of those recommendations?
My Lords, we on these Benches believe that this group contains sensible and prudent amendments. They require us to review the effectiveness of the Government’s measures and to consider carefully the potential implications of the new regulations around the sale of knives. They also seek to ensure that we have the necessary evidence base to improve legislation where needed. These, in our view, are good principles.
Amendment 122 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, contains both those elements. The first part of the amendment seeks a review within two years of the effectiveness of the measures in preventing the online sale of knives to persons under the age of 18. This would plainly be sensible. There is little point in legislating to prevent something if we find out that in fact that prohibition is not taking effect. We all want to stop the sale of knives to children, but we should want to do so in the most effective and proportionate manner. By reviewing the impact of the Bill, the Government would be able to make the necessary adjustments in response to the evidence. Having said that, we should listen carefully to the observations of my noble friend Lord Hailsham in this respect.
Another aspect of the question of efficacy is our obligation to the law-abiding public. It is right that we should attempt to ban children from purchasing knives. We are all aware of the severity of the knife crime epidemic and that part of the problem is the easy access to knives. But we should not pretend that the entire problem stems from their online availability. Of course, it is a factor, but children and young persons intent on committing knife crime will have plenty of other opportunities, if they are determined enough, to buy knives and to acquire them from other sources. They could use an older friend’s or family member’s identification, or indeed, they could ask them simply to make the purchase. They could steal a knife—given the current rates of shoplifting, I suspect this already happens—or they might simply go no further than their kitchen drawer and take one of the many easily accessible knives there.
By adding restrictions to online sale, the Government are merely stemming one route of access, but doing so adds an extra burden to the great majority of law-abiding citizens and retailers. As I have said, we understand why action is necessary, but, if we are to make it mandatory, we should ensure that it is genuinely effective in practice. Here, we should listen to the wise words of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We must know, therefore, that we are not adding regulation for its own sake and that we are simultaneously taking other meaningful measures to address the wider issue. The Government should continue to explore this further.
Proposed subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) in Amendment 122 address another aspect of the knife problem. While the first part reviews the effect of the Bill on the sale of knives, these subsections turn to the design and legality of the knives themselves.
If the knives which we make harder to purchase are not the ones being used in knife crime, our efforts will be in vain. Collecting data both on knives sold and, separately, on knives used in crimes, as Amendment 194 argues for, could offer a remedy for this. It would provide the Government with the necessary data to identify which types of weapons in particular lie at the root of the problem and to take action accordingly. This principle also underlies Amendment 123—I had already noted the typo, if I can put it that way, and have marked the noble Lord’s homework accordingly. But, taking it seriously, consulting on what knives are used in offending and on the measures to be required to curb their circulation must be sensible and proportionate, and it should complement the Government’s proposals.
This is a moderate group of amendments on a subject that clearly needs further review and refinement. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on the Government’s position. At the same time, I think we need to hear carefully and take heed of what noble Lords have said in their words of caution on this topic.
My Lords, briefly, I associate myself with all the sentiments that have been shared this afternoon on this matter. I think we all know what we want to try and stop with the Bill: zombie knives. There is no excuse or legitimate use at all for a zombie knife. But it is incredibly difficult to define, and legislation has attempted to do so. The points raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham are absolutely right: we do not want to criminalise the use of everyday items or the ownership of swords. They may not be for historical purposes, but they may be of sentimental value, family heirlooms or collector’s items and may have any number of associated uses. My noble friend Lord Blencathra has put his finger on an absolute scourge which we, as parliamentarians and in co-operation with the police, really have to deal with using every tool that we have. But I also share the concern that there will be many unintended consequences if my noble friend’s amendments, as currently drafted, were included in the Bill.
My Lords, I will speak about Amendment 214B on knives in schools. It will come as no surprise to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that we on these Benches take a different view. We strongly believe that criminalising children is just not the way forward. Last year, an authoritative joint police and Ofsted report warned that serious youth violence has spread its tentacles further than many adults realise and that 11 year-olds now carry knives for protection, so there is no doubt that there is a major problem. However, the same report does not call for more punitive sanctions to deter young people from offending. Instead, it recommends a preventative, public health approach, focused on early intervention, safeguarding and partnership working. It warned that, without better co-ordination and sustained investment in prevention, efforts to tackle youth violence will fall short and the cycle of harm will continue. These warnings must be heeded.
Yet, budget pressures mean police forces are cutting safer school programmes. The Met, for example, is moving 371 officers out of schools due to funding shortfalls. Prevention has to be taken seriously and resourced properly. Public health funding per capita has fallen by 28% since 2015. That results in reactive rather than preventative policing, and nowhere is this more important than with children and knife crime.
I agree that there is no justification for a child to bring a knife into school, but we cannot support the approach of Amendment 214B. Instead, we should concentrate on the success of interventions such as Operation Divan, which involves a single, voluntary face-to-face meeting between a young person at risk and a police officer or a youth justice worker. This prioritises prevention, education and safeguarding. Early results show a 60% reduction in knife and weapon offences at a cost of only £30 to £65 per person.
I turn briefly to the noble Lord’s remaining amendments and the proposal for a special category of particularly dangerous weapons. As the noble Lord recognises, these weapons are already prohibited. In our view, creating another category risks unnecessary overlap without adding any real benefit.
I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his series of interesting amendments regarding knife crime. As we have already heard, my noble friend comes to this debate with the experience of some time in the Home Office—a real experience at the sharp end. Although the rates of knife crime have fallen a little over recent years, any victim of a crime, particularly one caused by knives, is a victim too many. Just recently, we heard of the terrible incident on fireworks night a year or so ago and the trial, which finished in the Old Bailey earlier this autumn; 16 year- olds were involved, and one of them died, and it all happened very quickly. So, knives are a real problem. The Government pledged in their manifesto to halve knife crime by 2030. If they wish to make good on that premise, it is imperative that they really do something to reduce it.
My noble friend’s amendments are a welcome practical measure in that direction but are subject to a number of reservations. I begin with schools. Amendment 214B introduces an important clarification to the law in respect of defences for carrying a knife in school premises. It makes plain that the only justification for someone having a knife at school can be in relation to educational services. It is also right that, in turn, this justification should apply only to teachers or those holding a position of authority. There is no plausible reason why a student should come on to the school premises carrying a knife. We welcome the amendment as an important step to ensure that both pupils and teachers are safe from knives at school, and we hope that the Government look at this and consider the amendment seriously.
We also thank my noble friend for his Amendments 214C to 214E. As we have heard, these seek to create a special category of particularly dangerous weapons: machetes, zombie knives, cleavers, swords and cutlasses. The merit is in identifying particular weapons by name. That will strike a chord with the public and with those who might otherwise carry them. They will know that, if they carry one of these weapons, just having it in their possession risks a very heavy prison sentence. Just having existing powers of sentencing does not, it seems, carry that resonance with those who most need to hear it, so we have got to do something.
Given the substantial increase in the use of machetes in recent years—we heard from my noble friend about the increase in their use in particular—something has to be done which identifies them, singles them out and curbs their circulation and use. In 2024, there were 18 machete homicides, an increase from 14 in 2023. Amendments 214D and 214E similarly ensure that manufacturing, selling, ownership and possession of these dangerous weapons will be regarded as a specific new offence.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham was right to point out that the drafting causes problems, and there are people, in the countryside in particular, who may have a legitimate use for machetes. But we are not in the jungle of Belize; we are in the United Kingdom. Sickles and scythes can be used, of course, but if there is going to be a use for something such as a machete, there should be specific clarity to make sure that we do not allow it to be put forward as a specious defence.
To call these amendments bizarre would, in my submission, go too far. If we take this matter seriously, as we all should, we will know full well that this really is an important mischief which has to be addressed, named and called out. My noble friend has raised an important issue, and the Government, if they are serious about cutting knife crime—and not just knife crime but the use of these appalling tools and weapons—must work to bridge the drafting gap so that the sorts of things which we have seen and heard about in the last few years are heavily reduced and people can walk and live in safety, particularly in our big cities.
My Lords, if I may, I will come back to the topic of this group. I too have an amendment in this group, Amendment 351. I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, and indeed my noble friends. I endorse a lot of what they have said and argued.
As I said at Second Reading, I have huge sympathy for those in public-facing jobs who have been subject to abuse and violent threats at work. Aside from such threats being unacceptable, I, like the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, understand the fear that they generate. Anyone at work on the receiving end of such a threat should at least be confident that the police will respond swiftly when they are in danger, or when an actual crime starts to be committed.
My instincts have always been to support Clauses 37 and 38, as I said at Second Reading. However, I find myself somewhat conflicted. Several noble Lords argued at Second Reading that existing provisions on assault are an adequate protection in law and that a special law for assault against retail workers was not needed. I thought these arguments were somewhat convincing. Having said that, to be absolutely clear, I have no desire to remove Clauses 37 or 38 from the Bill. I will continue before everybody thinks that I am going to do something radical, which will cause all sorts of upset.
The amendments tabled by my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Blencathra to extend the protection to delivery drivers and some hospitality workers in some establishments highlight that, having started down the path of singling out just the retail sector, it is difficult to draw a clear boundary line. The noble Lord, Lord Hannett, has already said that he now wants to push it yet further.
As we know, the aggravated crime of assault against public-facing workers, which we added to the crime and courts Bill, included all industries and sectors. That was not focused only on the retail industry. I worry that the aggravated offence of assault, which covers everybody in public-facing work, together with this new offence of assault on retail workers, will create a somewhat confusing picture for people who are employed in public-facing roles but are not in the retail sector. I think here of people working in public transport, or in banks or post offices; there are all sorts of different categories.
This potentially confusing picture brings me back to my underlying concerns. First, we cannot afford to lose good people who are doing a good job, whether that is in shops, on public transport, or in banks or post offices, as I said. We think of the recent horrific incident on LNER the other Saturday and the railway worker who was heroic in intervening. We are very conscious now that a lot of people are in places of work where they are subject to real threats and abuse.
So I ask the Minister: what work have he and the department done to satisfy himself that any perception of two-tier protection for people in different public-facing roles will not have a detrimental effect on employees who may fear they are no longer as covered as some other people in other public-facing roles? If there has been any work on that, that would be helpful to know and understand.
Secondly, and in my view just as importantly, if not more so, noble Lords who were in the Chamber at Second Reading may have heard me argue then that one of the things that I feel are needed is for workers who are in charge of public spaces or places, whether they be commercial or public sector spaces, to be encouraged to be more active in upholding common standards of conduct that we should all have a right to expect of each other in public, the breakdown of which is adding to people’s despair. The sorts of things I am talking about here are litter dropping, feet on seats, watching videos or listening to music on phones without headphones, and queue jumping. That is the kind of activity that comes before we get to actual offences that sometimes are happening now, such as fare dodging, smoking or drinking alcohol on public transport where they are not meant to be, or even defecating in public. We need workers to have delegated authority, from their employer or their union, and from all of us in leadership positions, and have confidence that, along with them, we will do the same in upholding these important standards in public places. We need a collective effort to tackle what I see as a broken windows type of activity. If we keep allowing this kind of activity to be ignored, we are allowing the risk of escalated bad behaviour to continue, which could then lead to actual serious crimes.
While the various trade bodies are coming at this from their perspectives with a desire to protect their staff, and rightly so, we need to look at this through a much wider lens and see the bigger picture. As a consequence of that, it might be that the price we need to pay is expanding what some believe is an unnecessary new crime in the Bill, to include other workers and to match the terms of the aggravated offence in the Crime and Courts Bill.
As I say, this was a probing amendment—this is not me trying to introduce a new law—but I would like it if the Minister agreed to meet me, perhaps with my noble friend Lord Davies, to talk about this some more. I genuinely think there are potential unintended consequences to this that we need at least to be alive to. We should consider what more is needed to ensure that everyone who is in a public-facing role feels sufficiently protected, but also, if we are to tackle the behaviour that is leading some to feel that they can do things with impunity, and that then gives them the courage and confidence to go on to commit more serious offences, we need to be thinking about this in a very different and more innovative way.
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy with many of the points made. First, we welcome the new protections introduced by Clauses 37 and 38. As legislators, we cannot stand by while so many people turn up to work every day expecting to face potentially terrifying abuse, threats and physical violence. This was brought home to me recently when a friend of mine went into our local Boots the chemist earlier this week in order to buy some headache tablets, only to find that practically every shelf in the shop was completely empty. When she spoke to the staff, they said, “Oh, it happens on a daily basis”, and they are so terrified that they just stand by and do nothing, because they are petrified that if they do anything or say anything they could be knifed. That is not in an area that is known for, to use the noble Baroness’s expression, “baddies”. It is in an area of London that is very safe. So that is really worrying.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 216 in my name. I look forward very much to hearing the Minister’s response to the proposal from my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower for tougher community treatment of repeat offenders. As it is focused on the community and on suspended sentence orders, it seems to fit in very well with the spirit of the Sentencing Bill, which we will no doubt be debating on a number of further days.
As the Minister the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, has already acknowledged, and as the recent Crime Survey shows, shoplifting has risen very significantly in recent years, especially since Covid. Indeed, we heard on the “Today” programme this morning that the average number of days it takes to deal with shoplifting cases has increased by 80% in the last decade.
My own experience has taught me something else: the biggest problem with shoplifting is not so much the law as the patchy and sometimes non-existent nature of police enforcement in relation to shoplifting and associated misdemeanours. The general acceptance that thefts worth less than £200—the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, was the first to mention that minimum—do not matter to the authorities is a particular bugbear of mine and of others who care about decency and limiting neighbourhood crime and its distressing effects.
That issue lies behind my Amendment 216, which would reverse that deplorable trend. My amendment would require the College of Policing to issue a code of practice to ensure that police forces also investigate shoplifting where the value of goods is less than £200. Letting people walk into shops, steal things and get away scot free eats at the heart of a civilised society, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, explained earlier. You only need to visit San Francisco in recent years to see the awful effects on its once golden streets. However, there is hope there: a Democratic mayor is at last seeing good sense. I hope the Government will follow that lead and consider my amendment this evening.
My Lords, on the noble Lord’s Amendment 215, I have great sympathy for its suggestions. Electronic monitoring can certainly play a useful role, although there is mixed evidence of its ability to reduce reoffending. However, there are multiple challenges in implementation, including inconsistent use by probation services, delays in procuring new GPS tags and gaps in responding promptly to breaches. However, my main problem is that, from a policing perspective, I worry there is no slack available in police time to monitor curfews, exclusion orders or electronic tagging. I fear it may be counterproductive to give the police yet more work when they are having great difficulty coping with what they already have.
I have a similar reservation about Amendment 216, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. In principle, I would support a code of practice to improve enforcement. However, in the absence of more police resources, the danger is that this would only exacerbate the current situation, where chief constables are faced with having to rob Peter to pay Paul in other areas of policing, and victims of other crimes would likely suffer as a consequence.
I would stress prevention over cure. I draw the Committee’s and the Minister’s attention to a West Midlands Police programme that diverts repeat low-level shoplifters into services like drug rehabilitation. Since its pilot in 2018, it has been credited with saving local businesses an estimated £2.3 million through reduced shoplifting. Surely this is something we ought at least to investigate.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendments 215 and 216 respectively. I have great respect for both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. The noble Baroness’s background means that she knows more than most about the corrosive experience of shoplifting and the effect it can have on those working in the retail industry. The noble Lord’s distinguished career as a police officer gives him great authority to speak about the challenges to police forces and their obligations to society that they should be fulfilling. I reassure both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that we are all on the same side on this. This is one of these situations where I am very keen to work with Members from all sides of your Lordships’ Committee to ensure that we deal with this social and economic menace efficiently and effectively.
On Amendment 215, I will repeat what I said a few moments ago: this Government take repeat and prolific offending extremely seriously. However, sentencing in individual cases must be a matter for our independent judiciary, and it must take into account all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the statutory purposes of sentencing. Your Lordships will, of course, be aware that the courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders.
As some of your Lordships may be aware, until relatively recently I was a judge in the Crown Court, and I sentenced my fair share of shoplifters. There was a complete spectrum of those offenders, from the destitute, homeless young mother stealing nappies for her baby at one end to the shameless, organised shoplifting gangs who terrify and terrorise shop workers. As the sentencing judge, there was a toolbox of disposals of increasing seriousness available to me, so that I could match the appropriate sentence to the offender on a case-by-case basis. These included discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences with requirements and custodial sentences where appropriate.
Previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor, with the sentencing guidelines making it clear that, when determining the sentence, sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions and the time elapsed since the previous conviction. But that repeats what is, in fact, common sense and what every sentencer knows. From my own experience, I can tell the Committee that the more frequently a defendant appears before the court, having gone out and done exactly the same thing that he or she had just been sentenced for, the more exasperated the judge becomes, who then starts imposing tougher and tougher sentences.
Despite the popular caricatures, judges do live in the real world. While sentencing a shoplifter to prison as a standard proposition will seem harsh, it can and does happen if the court concludes that there is no other way of stopping them. Importantly, this Government will introduce a whole range of options that will ramp up the community and suspended sentence powers for judges. In other words, the toolbox is getting fancier and more extensive.
As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, sentencers are already able to impose a robust range of electronic monitoring requirements on anyone serving their sentence in the community. Where the court imposes curfews, exclusion zones and/or an alcohol ban, offenders must be electronically monitored, subject to individual suitability. I note the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the effect on police resources. However, quite a lot of the monitoring is done by the Probation Service. As the noble Baroness is probably aware, the Government are putting a lot of additional resources back into the Probation Service to enable it to do this.
Soon judges will be able to add driving bans and bans on offenders attending pubs, bars, clubs and desirable social activities like sports and concerts, as well as some tough new geographical restriction zones, to the existing tools.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I fully endorse the important points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. I had great pleasure in working with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the Modern Slavery Bill. I am totally in awe of her experience and her willingness to share that experience, which, as a new Peer, was absolutely wonderful for me—although I could certainly do with it now as well.
The government amendments in this group provide more welcome detail on the definition and operation of child criminal exploitation prevention orders and include provisions necessary to cover the whole of the UK, not just England and Wales. As with other government amendments during the passage of the Bill, we welcome the expansion of detail in the Bill. Could the Minister confirm that each of the three devolved states has approved the relevant amendments in this group? It would be very good to hear that this has already been done. I do not disagree with anything that anyone has said so far—it has been an excellent and very clear unification of the views of everyone here.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, for introducing this large group of amendments. As noble Lords will appreciate, many of the amendments before us today concern matters of clarification or technical improvement to ensure consistency across the Bill and the amendments tabled so far.
We on these Benches are broadly supportive of these changes, particularly when they strengthen child safeguarding protections and improve clarity, which we hope will eventually result in more seamless practical implementation. In this regard, we welcome amendments extending the scope of child criminal exploitation prevention orders to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and those clarifying procedural matters, such as the form of notification requirements when oral notification may not be practicable. These are sensible adjustments that contribute to ensuring that the Bill operates coherently across the four nations and in real-world enforcement scenarios.
I briefly draw attention to Amendment 235ZA in my name, which would remove Clause 43(3)(a). That subsection currently requires that, when a court makes a criminal exploitation prevention order, the terms of the order must avoid
“conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant”.
Although religious beliefs are, of course, an important individual right, the purpose of these orders is to protect children from very serious criminal harm. It is, therefore, my view that safeguarding and public protection must take precedence over all other concerns and that no such exemption should hinder appropriate and proportionate restrictions when a court considers them necessary. I hope the Government consider the matter carefully and take the recommendation on board.
Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for bringing forward Amendment 235A, which would give the courts an explicit ability to impose a prevention order to protect a child from being threatened, intimidated or coerced into criminal exploitation. The intention behind the amendment—to intervene earlier and more effectively to safeguard children at risk—is one that I hope all sides of the Committee can support. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response and clarification of how the Bill will ensure that those protections are fully delivered. These are complex issues, but our shared objective is simple: to ensure that vulnerable children are protected and that those who exploit them face firm consequences. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the points that have been raised here today.
That is a valid point. I have considered with officials how we ensure enforcement of the guidance. I simply put it to the noble Earl—and we can debate this outside the Bill—that the statutory guidance is issued to chief constables of police forces under Clause 60 and they have a legal duty to ensure that statutory guidance is implemented, and officers have a legal duty to support and interpret that at a local level when they are faced with incidents of child exploitation as defined by the Bill. That requires a whole shift of culture and of training—I understand that. I will take from this comment and from the Committee generally that my colleagues in the Home Office need to look not just at the guidance but at its implementation. Ultimately, it has a statutory footing, and that is the key point for the Committee.
Will the Minister take on board the fact that countless inspections of police training, including by HMICFRS, have said that there has not been an independent assessment of police training since 2018, despite the fact that so many of the policing bodies themselves have asked for it? Taking the point, will he now say that there will be an independent assessment, so that police training can be much more appropriate and police will know exactly what they are supposed to be doing when we sit in this House and make legislation?
I will sound like I am repeating myself from Question Time, but, very shortly, we anticipate bringing forward a policing White Paper looking at a whole range of mechanisms to improve police performance. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will wait for further detail on the policing White Paper, which I have already said to the House will be published before Christmas, to allow for further discussion on a range of efficiency and improvement matters for policing. The point she makes is worthy of consideration, but I will park it until a later date in the parliamentary calendar.
My Lords, I chair a commission on forced marriage. One of the most useful things that the Labour Government did in 2007 was create a forced marriage protection order. That was intended to deal with the perpetrators rather than the victims. However, having listened to the speeches so far, I realised that I had not thought of protection orders being for the victim rather than to prevent the victim being dealt with.
It is an admirable scheme. I was much touched by the story that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, gave to us. One thing that would make it most useful is to deal with parents. My experience is not so much in this area, but when I was a family judge, one of the problems, particularly in care cases, was the inability of the parents to manage their children. Very often, the children were very well meaning, but they absolutely would not do what their parents said. Is anybody who is a parent surprised? As a grandparent, I am even less surprised by the fact that children, if they are told to do something by a parent, will not do it—just out of bloody-mindedness, apart from anything else.
This would offer a genuine ability to look after a child who is being exploited and is extremely vulnerable, but whose parents, trying as hard as they can, cannot manage him or her. This would give them the power, apart from the authorities, to do something useful—and useful not just for the child but for the state.
My Lords, we welcome this amendment, which would provide a valuable additional tool to protect children who are criminally exploited while at the same time committing criminal acts that victimise others. The amendment seeks to address these behaviours proportionately, managing the child’s risk to others without inflicting the potentially life-changing damage of having a criminal label attached, while ensuring the child is protected from further exploitation.
A criminal exploitation protection order would be an important step towards providing an end-to-end response for children in this situation. Unlike a youth rehabilitation order, it would directly target behaviours linked to child criminal exploitation, addressing the unique power imbalances and coercion involved in those often-complex situations. I urge the Government to look closely at the proposed order, which would be an extremely worthwhile addition to the Bill and which has the full support of these Benches.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, for bringing forward this important amendment. It speaks to an issue that has been much discussed during the Bill’s passage: the urgent need to protect children who are coerced or manipulated into criminal activity by those who exploit them for profit and control.
Amendment 247 proposes a new clause to establish a criminal exploitation protection order. This would be aimed directly at safeguarding children who have already been subjected to criminal exploitation, preventing further harm. As the noble Baroness has eloquently explained, these children deserve support and a clear pathway out of exploitation. Undoubtedly, there is merit in exploring whether a new bespoke order focused on the safety and welfare of the exploited child could complement the existing prevention orders in the Bill which target the adult perpetrators. We recognise the intention behind ensuring that prohibitions and requirements are carefully balanced so as not to interfere unnecessarily with education, family life or existing legal orders. From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives of the amendment.
We recognise that introducing new regimes raises practical considerations that must be considered. I therefore look forward to hearing the Government’s response and to further discussion as the Bill progresses. Protecting children from exploitation must be central to this legislation. I thank the noble Baroness for her continued leadership on this issue.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson; I was not referring to him. It was the Government Whip who was getting very agitated about my comments. I could have spoken for a lot longer if I had degrouped my amendments, but I am not going to do that.
Quite simply, Clause 56 lists all the crimes in Part 1 of Schedule 6 that are relevant to convicting someone of controlling another person’s home for criminal purposes. Schedule 6 is about two pages of big issues—very large crimes—which are completely inappropriate for a summary trial. This is about hijacking someone else’s home, where the homeowner is kept prisoner. That is such big stuff that it should not be triable by summary but only in a Crown Court.
I beg to move—after one minute and 21 seconds.
My Lords, we welcome government Amendment 262, which recognises that cases of cuckooing often involve a complex web of coercive control. The person who seems to be in charge may actually be being manipulated or exploited by somebody else, and this addresses that complexity. However, while I understand the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and recognise all too well the potential life-changing harm caused by cuckooing, we are not minded to support restricting the trial venue in that way.
Magistrates’ courts provide quicker access to justice for victims and less delay than Crown Courts, particularly given the current backlogs. This is particularly important as cuckooing is linked to ongoing exploitation, with offenders often moving on to repeat the offence elsewhere, so fast action to stop the creation of more victims may in some cases be the more sensible option. Magistrates’ courts can also be less intimidating for vulnerable victims, supporting them to testify. Many other exploitation and safeguarding offences can be tried either way, allowing the specific facts of each case to determine the appropriate court. Imposing a blanket restriction on trial venue risks delaying justice, undermines established practice, and limits judicial discretion.
The pattern of coercion and control is at the heart of all these issues, whether we are talking about the exploitation of vulnerable children or adults. The evidence shows that women—as well as children—who are coerced into offending, often by traffickers or abusive partners, are in practice more often punished than protected. Too many victims of coercive control are still unfairly prosecuted for offences linked to their own abuse. Many female victims do not report to the police for fear of being criminalised, and that concern is well-founded. If, for example, drugs are being stored or grown in their flat, it is all too often the woman who is prosecuted. The statistics bear this out: around 70% of women in prison are victims of coercion or domestic violence.
Turning to the issue of coerced internal concealment, Amendment 259 links the new offences of causing internal concealment and cuckooing, making it clearer and easier to prosecute these serious and often related behaviours. Coerced internal concealment, whereby a person hides items such as drugs inside their bodies, is a particularly stark illustration of the abuse of power. Anyone who puts another person’s life at risk in this way should be subject to the harshest of penalties, so we support the introduction of this new offence.
I take this opportunity to raise an issue which, regrettably and surprisingly, remains absent from the Bill. In the past five years in England and Wales, a child has been subjected to an intimate police search every 14 hours on average. Black children are four times more likely to be strip-searched compared to their proportion of the population. Half these searches lead to no further action.
In opposition, the Government promised stronger regulation, including a statutory duty to notify parents, which should be the bare minimum. Although a consultation began in April 2024, there have been no firm proposals since, which is disappointing given an earlier commitment from the former Home Secretary to new mandatory rules and safeguards being
“put in place as a matter of urgency”.
That pledge followed a series of recommendations from the IOPC, including a call to amend the law so that police forces are required to make a safeguarding referral for any child subjected to a search involving the exposure of intimate parts. It also called for clearer guidance, enhanced training, greater consistency across police forces and, again, for these reforms to be implemented “quickly”.
Some 18 months later, some forces have improved practice and made more safeguarding referrals, but there is still no legal requirement. The Children’s Commissioner confirms that poor strip search practice is widespread and is not limited to any one force or region; failures include not having an appropriate adult present. Can the Minister confirm that a timescale is in place for the implementation of these recommendations? If not, will the Government consider amending the Bill to reflect the need for urgent action?
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for introducing his amendment. This is an opportunity to consider cuckooing more broadly.
We on these Benches recognise the need for a cuckooing offence, and we did so last year before the general election. I am glad to see that the Government are now following our lead. Data suggests that cuckooing offences have quadrupled in recent years; given that it is a crime largely associated with child exploitation, it is all the more pertinent that we tackle it head on now.
Children are used to conceal and traffic illegal drugs in order to fund the activities of criminal drug gangs. Some 22% of people involved in county lines drug trades are children—that is almost 3,000 vulnerable people under the age of 18 being made to do the dirty work for criminals. These county lines trades are often run out of the dilapidated homes of vulnerable people. Criminals appropriate and transform them to use them for their own ends. Children are ferried in and out; they are sent to similar locations all over the country. It is a very specific crime that requires a very specific law. We see force in my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s amendment, but we would not wish to tie the prosecutor’s hands.
Amendment 259, which addresses the offence of causing internal concealment, would prohibit cuckooed houses being used to house people who hide and then transport drugs. These people, as I have pointed out, are often children. Amendments 260 and 261 address that more broadly. Cuckooing—using children for criminal purposes—is a heinous and exploitative crime and it is right that it be given its own offence. However, while we welcome the Government agreeing to come with us on cuckooing, it is a shame that they have failed to address another root cause of the issue. As we have said, cuckooing is a crime primarily committed by gangs who co-opt homes to run their criminal operations. If you could break up those gangs, you would reduce cuckooing; the two feed off each other.
On the previous day of Committee, His Majesty’s Opposition had two amendments that would have done this. The first amendment would have created a statutory aggravating factor for gang-related offences. The second would have created an offence for specific gang-related graffiti. We appreciate the Government following our lead to create the offence of cuckooing, but if they are serious about this, they should do the same with gangs. Our measures would not, as some noble Lords suggested, criminalise fence-painting or church symbols. Neither is a gang sign. They would, however, deter gangs from their activities and lock up members who partake. This would be just as effective as this new offence.
The Committee has considered that amendment. If the noble Lord wishes to write to me on any details, I will certainly write back to him, but, in the interests of progress, it would be better if that was dealt with outside the Chamber, given that we have debated those matters already.
My Lords, very briefly, the government amendments set out the devolution arrangements to ensure that criminals cannot exploit differences between the four nations, and we are very happy to support them.
My Lords, this is an important issue that I know there is cross-party support for, and I am largely supportive of the intentions behind the amendments in this group.
The first of the Minister’s amendments acts largely to tidy up the drafting of the Bill and ensure its thoroughness. I agree with this. Expanding the scope for technology testing regarding child sexual abuse materials is welcome.
Similarly, extending provisions to ensure that they are the same in all parts of the union is a minor but important amendment. Consistency across our internal borders is the best way to ensure that children are protected equally everywhere. It should help with cross-border co-ordination between authorities, and I therefore welcome it.
I see the logic behind government Amendments 295A and 295B. It is the right approach that, if the Government want to crack down on technology, they should first do so at the source. That means discovering which technologies are being used to create unlawful content, which requires people to test them. This would also, I hope, have the additional effect of not blanket banning content for people without nuance, instead targeting the specific pieces of software responsible. So long as the individuals able to use this as a defence remain strictly authorised by the Secretary of State, I appreciate the amendment’s aim.
This should go hand in hand with an initiative similar to the one suggested by my noble friend Lord Nash. If the Government can identify the technology used, they should attempt to shut it down. Unfortunately, this is often outside the Government’s jurisdiction and therefore some form of software to prevent the distribution of child sexual abuse material might be the next best approach. I hope that the Minister can confirm that they are perhaps looking at this.
As I said, this is a non-partisan issue. We all want to reduce child sexual abuse, online or offline, and these amendments should work to help the Bill achieve the former. I hope that the Minister can, in due course—perhaps at a later stage—fully outline how this new technology will be implemented and applied consistently, and will consider my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, but I broadly support the approach.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, having arrived in this House a very long time ago—53 years ago—I know this House works best if it treats legislation as an evolutionary process. The Online Safety Act seemed to be a very good Act when we passed it two years ago, but now we have further, drastic evidence, which we have heard in this debate. I am confident my noble friend the Minister will treat the speeches made in this debate as part of the evolutionary process which, I emphasise again, this House does best.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for bringing forward these amendments and for explaining them so clearly. The understanding of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, is that AI chatbots do not trigger the illegal content duties since these tools are not considered to show mental intent. As a result, chatbots can generate prompts that are not classified as illegal, even though the exact same content would be illegal and subject to regulation if produced by a human. I find that quite extraordinary.
By accepting these amendments, the Government would be acting decisively to address the fast-evolving threat which this year saw abusive material of sexual content for children rise by 380%. In April 2024, the Internet Watch Foundation reported that a manual circulating on the dark web, which the Minister referred to earlier, instructed paedophiles to use AI to create nude images of children, then use these to extort or coerce money or extreme material from the young victims. The charity warned that AI was generating astoundingly realistic abusive content.
Text-to-image generative AI tools and AI companion apps have proliferated, enabling abusers to create AI chatbot companions specifically to enable realistic and abusive roleplay with child avatars. Not only do they normalise child sexual abuse, but evidence shows that those who abuse virtual children are much more likely to go on to abuse real ones. Real children are also increasingly subjected to virtual rape and sexual abuse online. It is wrong to dismiss this as less traumatic simply because it happens in a digital space.
The measures in the Bill are welcome but, given the speed at which technology is moving, how easy or otherwise will it be to future-proof it in order to keep pace with technology once the Bill is enacted?
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I think we all welcome the concept of Clause 82, because it provides a significant step forward towards justice for survivors of child sexual abuse. By removing the limitation period, the provision acknowledges the unique barriers facing victims in coming forward after many years of abuse.
Let us be clear: we all agree that child sexual abuse is a crime marked by profound trauma, secrecy and manipulation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, pointed out, survivors often require years, possibly decades, to process their experience and feel able to seek justice. The limitation periods, while serving certain legal purposes, have historically denied victims their day in court. The removal of this barrier is a recognition of the lasting impact of abuse and the difficulty in disclosing it. I therefore cannot understand this “get out of jail free” card to permit a defendant to avoid liability on the grounds of substantial prejudice. In my inexpert, non-legal opinion, it risks undermining the legislative intent and perpetuating injustice, and it would send a message contrary to the spirit of the clause.
While the possibility of prejudice to defendants—such as faded memories, lost evidence or deceased witnesses—is real, it must be weighed against the injustice suffered by survivors who have been unable to seek redress due to the limitation period. I think all noble Lords here of a legal bent would say that our courts are perfectly well equipped to assess evidence, account for gaps and determine credibility, even in historic cases. The link of prejudice can be mitigated through fair trial procedures and should not override the fundamental right of survivors to have their claims heard.
We as legislators must ensure that perpetrators of child abuse are held to account, regardless of the time elapsed. Dismissing claims on the basis of substantial prejudices would not only deny justice to individuals but would undermine public confidence in the legal system’s ability to deal with some of the most serious wrongs to our children that we have witnessed over the last 30 years. It would risk protecting abusers from scrutiny, contrary to the principles of transparency and accountability.
To conclude, courts must prioritise the rights of survivors and the public interest in accountability, ensuring that the defence does not become a loophole that perpetuates injustice. Therefore, I support the probing amendment in the name of my noble friends and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.
My Lords, on these Benches we recognise the purpose of time limits and we recognise the right to fair trial, but survivors of child sexual abuse should not be barred from justice simply by the passage of time. The difficulty lies, of course, in striking that balance. At the moment, too many claims with merit are rejected at the outset or, more often, not brought at all. Clause 82 is therefore welcome in principle, yet new Section 11ZB(3) then proceeds to undermine it, mandating dismissal if defendants can show “substantial prejudice”—a vague term undefined in the Bill, which, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, may be appealing to defence lawyers. A court already has the power to dismiss a case if it believes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial, so we find it difficult to understand the justification for this extra layer of protection. The inclusion of this provision risks effectively undoing all the good work of the clause. Amendment 289 would close that escape hatch, ensuring that it brings meaningful change. I urge the Government to reconsider in the light of this amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I add my voice to what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The fundamental principle is set out in new Section 11ZB(2): if the defendant cannot have a fair trial, the hearing cannot proceed. The gravity of the allegations and the public interest demand that there be no hearing, notwithstanding the damage that this causes to the unfortunate alleged victim. I entirely agree that new Section 11ZB(3) confuses the position; it introduces uncertain concepts and will inevitably lead to unhelpful litigation.
My Lords, I speak in strong support of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I do not know whether it is necessary. I declare an interest as a victim. My concern about the historic sex offences is the prison population. We have large numbers of historic sex offenders in prison. It creates great problems for the Prison Service. However, a custodial sentence is the only sensible disposal. We need to work out what to do with historic sex offenders within the prison system.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Brinton has made a powerful case for removing the limitation period. The Government have already signalled a willingness to act, so objections are likely about timing rather than policy—at least, I hope that is the case.
The amendment would align the law with what Parliament has already accepted, which is that child sexual abuse is distinct from other offences. This is a crime defined by secrecy, grooming and a stark power imbalance. We know that victims often take decades to come forward, so allowing offenders to shelter behind time would reward fear and coercion.
Amendment 293 provides clarity for all parties—victims, police, prosecutors and, indeed, defendants. It removes the scope for technical argument about whether a particular course of conduct falls outside time and instead focuses everyone on the core question, which is whether the evidence available can support a fair trial. It also brings coherence. Across the system, we are rightly moving away from arbitrary cut-offs that prevent past abuse ever being heard in court. The amendment is a modest step in the same direction in accordance with the recommendations of inquiries and the expectations of survivors.
There must be no time bar on prosecuting sexual activity with a child. If we are serious about saying that such conduct is never acceptable, surely we should also be serious about saying that it is never too late to pursue justice for it. The amendment achieves that and warrants the support of the Committee and the Government.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward the amendment. Obviously, victims of child sexual offences should always be able to seek justice, no matter how long it takes them to come forward.
We absolutely understand and respect the intention behind this proposal. Many survivors of abuse do not feel able to disclose until years—sometimes decades—after the offence, and there is a very real sense of injustice when the law appears to stand in the way of accountability.
However—and on this point I side with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier—I think there exists no limitation period for offences that would occur under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act. The Limitation Act 1980 applies only to civil cases, and indictable criminal cases do not have general limitation periods in England and Wales. As offences under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act are indictable only, we do not think the amendment is strictly necessary, despite the fact that it pursues a very noble aim. While sympathetic, therefore, to the principle—
I too would like to thank the Government for these amendments, because helplines have seen a rise in non-fatal strangulation offences, and not everything gets reported to the police. We have seen a rise at the charity that I run, the Muslim Women’s Network helpline. Research shows that if a victim is subject to a non-fatal strangulation, they are seven times more likely to be a victim of domestic homicide. Analysis of the domestic homicide data shows that strangulation is one of the two main methods of killing women. I hope that the long-term trend, once these amendments are introduced, will be a decline in these types of offences being reported on helplines. I commend the Government.
My Lords, these dangerous practices of strangulation and suffocation are often used to control, intimidate and silence in domestic abuse situations. The growing normalisation of strangulation during sex risks giving abusers a veneer of acceptability and a false sense of impunity. Strangulation was the cause of death of over a quarter of the women killed between 2014 and 2025—about 550 in total. In that context, the case for criminalising such images is compelling. Mainstream platforms must be put under a duty to remove this material or face sanction.
The related amendments in this group are welcome, in order to ensure that the new offences operate coherently across England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. We on these Benches very much support this group of amendments, which sends a clear signal that such material is totally unacceptable.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank the Minister for tabling this group of amendments, and I am happy to offer the support of these Benches. The criminalisation of strangulation in pornography is part of a wider initiative that has been championed across the House and discussed today, particularly on this side by my noble friend Lady Bertin, but by many others as well.
The prevalence of strangulation in pornography and the harm it causes are very clear. Distributing such material is already illegal offline; the fact that its online equivalent is not is a gap in the law, and these amendments correct that. They close that gap and prohibit the distribution of a practice that is both dangerous and extreme. I know that there are reports from some GPs of an exponential rise in incidents of non-fatal strangulation and suffocation among younger generations, which they largely attribute to pornography; the least we can do is to provide restrictions on dangerous content that should not be normalised. As has been said, distributing non-fatal strangulation images is unlawful offline; it makes little sense that that is not replicated in our online legislation. This group aims to correct that, and I willingly offer the support of these Benches.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness’s amendment for the reasons she gives and for a further reason, which is that I deprecate the practice of Ministers of all Governments of not bringing into force legislation which has been enacted by Parliament. Parliament intends legislation to come into effect; otherwise, we are wasting our time debating and approving it. Parliament enacts legislation to address a mischief, as, in this case, the mischief that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has identified. Of course, I understand that sometimes time is needed to prepare for the effects of legislation, perhaps because implementing regulations are needed, but after two years, it is high time for this legislation to come into force.
My Lords, this amendment exposes the indefensible gap between Parliament’s clear intent and women’s lived reality. The new offence was deliberately framed to capture deliberate, targeted and deeply damaging conduct, with a suitably serious maximum penalty, but without commencement, there are no consequences for offenders and no visible progress for the public. The Government’s delay sits uneasily alongside their stated ambition to halve violence against women and girls, particularly given previous assurances that implementation would follow swiftly as part of their wider strategy.
From these Benches, the message is simple: Parliament has already done the hard work in legislating; what is now required is immediate commencement, not further consultation or prevarication, so that this cross-party achievement can finally begin to offer real protection on the streets and in public spaces.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for moving this amendment, which, as she says, seeks to accelerate the commencement of the 2023 Act. The intention behind the amendment is clear and wholly understandable: to ensure that victims of sex-based harassment benefit from protections that Parliament has already approved, and to do so without further delay.
Without doubt, there is a shared desire across this House to see individuals, particularly women and girls, better protected from harassment in public spaces, and while I entirely understand that commencement provisions often involve important practical and operational considerations, including the readiness of policing and guidance frameworks, and that there has to be an explanation of the implications of altering the timetable set out in the original Act, we on these Benches recognise the motivation behind the amendment and the concerns that it seeks to address.
If the Government do not agree with the amendment, we look forward to hearing from the Minister what progress there has been towards commencement and whether the approach proposed here would assist the effective implementation of the Act’s provisions.
My Lords, I support Amendment 316 from the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just taken my entire speech away from me, so I will not quote Coke’s. I thank him for what he has said. He is a lawyer and he has tried to help with this.
On the point of this amendment—I declare an interest as a vice-chair of the APPG on Cats—the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, has our support on animal welfare, and indeed he has been driving this for a number of years via a number of APPGs. So the essence of what he is trying to do is right. The comments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made are helpful: perhaps when we get to another place, we will have a better-worded amendment that carries more support.
For me, the reason I am supporting this is because of the animal side, but there is evidence that the abuse of animals leads to abuse of children. That link is clear, and there is evidence from everywhere that that is where it starts, but it ends with children and young people.
That is why this amendment, difficult as it is to speak about, is vital. When the evidence is there of a cause leading to a different cause that is worse, the amendment should get the support of this House and the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is right; he is trying to right a wrong and he understands the points of law. His principle is right: this does need resolving, and it is an important issue to animal lovers. Lots of animal lovers in this country have no idea that this is going on around them. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, may be right, in that some of the people in question are poor people who are not part of society; but there are also those who kill animals for videos and live feeds, to be watched for money. That is going on all around the world; it is not just an English problem.
There is a bigger picture. This is not just about an unfortunate person abusing an animal; like everything else in today’s debate, it is a wider society problem. I hope that people approach this with the gravitas it deserves. Animal abuse is one thing; but transferring that to children and young people is equally important. That is why I support the amendment.
My Lords, this group of amendments reflects the realities that the police, the NCA and child protection agencies now face, with children being coerced online into self-abuse, harming siblings or even abusing their family pets under pressure to provide images or live streams as proof. The overlap between child sexual abuse—as the noble Lord, Lord Black, has so clearly demonstrated—offline offending and animal cruelty is now recognised in safeguarding and law enforcement practice. It comes alongside a wider surge in online animal abuse content, in which abuse is staged, filmed and shared for attention or gratification. Strengthening the law on animal sexual abuse so that it reflects how this behaviour is perpetrated and disseminated online is therefore necessary and overdue.
Two points are critical. First, terminology matters. Animal sexual abuse is now used in policing and safeguarding precisely because it captures a wide range of exploitative conduct that is formed, traded and used to control and terrorise victims, including children. Narrowing the language risks opening loopholes that offenders will exploit. Secondly, these reforms need to go hand in hand with better investigation, data sharing and sentencing so that the growing volume of image-based offending against children and animals results in real accountability rather than just statistics.
The sexual abuse of animals and the use of such material within wider abusive networks, which is reprehensible, must now be treated with the seriousness the evidence demands.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Black for his contribution this evening and for his amendments. I welcome the moving of Amendment 316.
As others have said, animal sexual abuse is one of the cruellest acts imaginable. It sees the taking advantage of defenceless creatures, often by those who are expected to be caring for them, and shows complete disregard for living, conscious, feeling creatures who frequently become damaged, traumatised and often die as a result of ASA. I wholeheartedly agree with all noble Lords that it is an offence that deserves to be dealt with using the full force of modern law. The amendment would ensure that the law reflects the severity of the crime. As has been outlined by other noble Lords, applicable legislation is currently fragmented and often parochial. At present, too many offences fall outside the scope of prosecution and the legislative framework is not reflective of the current reality.
I will not repeat all the statistics presented in my noble friend’s excellent opening speech, but it is worth emphasising a couple of his points. The first is the connection of ASA with child sexual abuse offences, general sexual offences, domestic abuse and coercive and exploitative behaviour. As was demonstrated, there exists empirical evidence that proves this correlation. In the United States of America, for example, nearly one-third of ASA offenders have also sexually offended against children and adults. In the UK, 71% of domestic abuse victims have reported that the abuser also targeted pets. There is clear evidence that certain offenders commit similarly related crimes.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was very happy to add my name to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I arrived slightly later to the party than the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, because I was not around when they nobly started tackling this difficult subject. However, once I arrived, I was happy to try to help in whatever way I could.
The amendments in this group are interwoven with an awful lot of other legislation that we have passed in recent years and are discussing today because many of the same traits, particularly behavioural traits, are still there, together with some of the challenges that the different authorities have in trying both to understand this behaviour and to do something about it. The parallel drawn in Amendment 330A between the DAPO, to which domestic abuse perpetrators are subject, and the stalking protection order, which has nothing like the same power or speed, is a good analogy. I ask the Government to look at and consider that very carefully. If the Government were to talk with the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, they would find, I suspect, that Dame Nicole Jacobs—a dame as of last week—would be very interested in discussing it further with them and would argue the case for that.
Amendments 330AZA and 356E, which deal with the ingenuity, frankly, of perpetrators in using online means to find different ways to get at their victims, has many parallels with what we look at in many areas that deal with online abuse. I appeal to the Government that we be joined up, in terms of the experience that different departments and specialist teams are gaining through the different pieces of legislation and guidance that we are enacting, so that we are learning from one another and not operating in silos, which, I fear, we sometimes do.
Amendment 330AA, which would remove the excuse of one’s religion or the need to be in an educational establishment—again, another ingenious excuse for finding a way to get to the perpetrator—is a loophole that I hope the Government will look at very carefully.
A stalking protection notice to accelerate and streamline the process would be extremely valuable. I am sure that, if the Minister and his team were to talk about this with some of the most advanced areas of the country and police forces—in particular, the county of Cheshire, which has five gold stars for doing this really well—and to ask whether they would find a stalking protection notice useful in order to move quickly, the answer would, I suspect, be a resounding yes. Going to talk to the people who are on the front line in dealing with this day in, day out would be a very useful use of time.
On Amendment 330C, of course the Secretary of State should have the power to issue stalking guidance, not least because, as stalkers get more and more ingenious and devious in some of the ways they find to make their victims’ lives horrible, it is important that the guidance keeps up. It is often two steps behind. The people who suffer because of that are the victims and the people who gain are the perpetrators, because it gives them the breathing room to do what they do and the law is quite slow to catch up.
I am broadly in sympathy with all these amendments. Stalking is one of the main causes of distress to victims in this country, alongside domestic abuse and anti-social behaviour. They are the unholy trinity and the largest volume affecting people, predominantly women. The ways perpetrators pursue their victims are often quite complex. These are quite devious and often quite intelligent individuals. We need an intelligent response in order to do something about it.
My Lords, this debate has underlined that stalking is not an occasional nuisance but a pattern of behaviour that our systems still struggle to recognise and act on early enough. The debate shows a familiar picture: warning signs are missed, threats are minimised and tools that Parliament has already provided are used patchily, if at all.
These amendments point towards a more joined-up and confident response, in which the police, prosecutors and other agencies share information, understand the particular dynamics of stalking and intervene at a much earlier stage, including online, before behaviour escalates into something far more dangerous. Looking ahead, there is now a real opportunity to embed that approach in the forthcoming review and in the VAWG strategy. Many of the ideas we have discussed—stronger use of stalking protection orders and notices, better guidance and training, and clearer expectations of consistency across forces—could and should be reflected on here.
The underlying purpose of these amendments is surely uncontroversial: to ensure that the law and practice keep pace with the reality of stalking and to give victims a response that matches the seriousness of the threat they face, so that this debate becomes a turning point rather than a missed opportunity.
My Lords, stalking is an offence which constitutes severe harassment and can instil grave fear into victims, as we have just heard. It is absolutely right that the law bears down on perpetrators of stalking. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 gave magistrates’ courts the power to impose stalking protection orders on application by the chief officer of police. Clause 97 extends this power so that a Crown Court can impose such an order where a person has been acquitted of any other offence.
The Government will no doubt argue that they are taking the necessary action to further prevent cases of stalking through this part of the Bill, but let us not forget another Bill they are currently taking through your Lordships’ House. The Sentencing Bill will suspend sentences for anyone charged with the offence of stalking. Section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 states that a person found guilty of stalking is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—less than the 12-month time limit for the presumption of a suspended sentence order.
Furthermore, the offence of breaking a stalking protection order is also likely to lead to a suspended sentence under the Sentencing Bill. Although a custodial sentence of up to five years can theoretically be imposed on conviction on indictment, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines state that in most cases of culpability and severity the starting point will be one year’s custody, and the ranges can go down to 12 weeks in custody and even a community order. This may very well be proportionate for low-level stalking offences, but the fact is that a person with a high degree of culpability and a medium to high level of harm will fall into the range that will mean their sentence is highly likely to be suspended.
If the Government are serious about bearing down on stalking, I suggest that letting anyone convicted of that offence walk free is not a good move for the safety of the victim. The Minister might try to rebut this argument by talking about the stalking protection orders, but I gently say to him that there is no good in letting a stalker roam the streets just because they have an order slapped on them. Given the falling police numbers, what is the likelihood of a person who violates their order actually being arrested? I also suggest that victims of stalking will not feel safer simply because their stalker has been given a court order.
What makes this even worse is that there is a very real possibility that a person who breaks the terms of their suspended sentence order will still not receive a custodial sentence. Although the automatic presumption will not apply in that case, the Government have opposed Conservative amendments to explicitly exempt people with a history of non-compliance from suspended sentences. They have also resisted our amendments to exempt repeat offenders from being handed suspended sentences.
Under this Government’s legislation, there is a very real possibility that a stalker could continually stalk their victim, break their stalking protection order and their suspended sentence order and never face jail time. That is not protecting victims. Against this backdrop, I suggest that it does not matter what we do in this place regarding stalking; we can table all the amendments we like to toughen up the protection orders, but they will not protect victims or prevent stalkers if the Government let than walk free. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.
My Lords, Amendment 334A is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower. I am grateful to Southall Black Sisters for the detailed evidence it has provided. On Wednesday we are going to cover broader issues around codes of honour and the deployment of these as a motivation and an excuse for horrendous crimes against the person. Amendment 334A deals with, in some ways, an even more insidious and hidden issue. It recognises the growing number of suicides and self-harm cases linked to domestic and so-called honour-based abuse.
I remember meeting a group of young women when I was a member of the London Assembly and hearing with horror the widespread acceptance that a murder could be justified by codes of honour in their community. It most certainly cannot. Culture does not transcend or trump the law, and nor should it. We are all familiar with the concept of death by a thousand cuts. Prolonged abuse and prolonged encouragement of self-harm can have devastating consequences beyond the physical and the immediate.
Last month, an inquest into the death of Michelle Sparman, a Caribbean woman who died by suicide in August 2021, reached a landmark verdict at Inner West London Coroner’s Court. The assistant coroner concluded that Michelle’s state of mind was “contributed to by neglect”, and that her prior relationship was marked by “toxicity”, highlighting an abusive pattern of relentless coercive messaging from her ex-partner that undermined her confidence and mental well-being. Crucially, the coroner identified this abusive conduct as the key causative factor in her death—a rare explicit recognition of prolonged domestic abuse that had contributed to her suicide. But there is a serious gap in the law. Michelle’s family were told by police that suicides were outside their remit and there was no case because Michelle had not reported domestic abuse when she was alive.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. I am not a lawyer and certainly do not understand the law, even vaguely, but I really do not understand this. If what I am asking for is not necessary—I totally accept what the Minister has said—how come we have three cases of suicide a week, which is suspected to be an underestimate, and only one conviction since 2017? Those numbers do not seem to add up to me.
I take the point the Minister made about the Law Commission’s review. Reviews are helpful, but a recent report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner exposed ongoing failures by government to act on the lessons from domestic homicide reviews. Only a quarter of national recommendations were fully implemented between 2019 and 2021, and this extends to domestic abuse suicides. It is very sad that victims have waited years for concrete changes and it now seems that there is not a huge amount, according to what the Minister said in her response, that will make the difference. There needs to be something, so I will think carefully about everything she has said. I certainly plan to come back at the next stage with something that perhaps will not have so many holes in it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for now.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 337A, which is about consistency and common sense. The same standard of protection should apply wherever a child is taught, whether in a classroom, online or in their own home. Parents assume that safeguards already exist, and they are shocked when they learn that someone barred from working with children can still legally offer tuition. In my experience, the vast majority of parents do not know this. As the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has said, this is a huge loophole, and something needs to be done about it as a matter of urgency.
The targeted change would simply ensure that the law reflects modern patterns of learning and closes an indefensible gap without adding either bureaucracy or cost. It would strengthen public confidence in the DBS system and in the integrity of child protection as a whole. Tutoring is now a central part of many children’s education, especially those who are already vulnerable or struggling, and the law really does need to keep pace with this reality. By backing the amendment, the Government can demonstrate that safeguarding principles are applied consistently across all settings, formal and informal alike, and that known risks will never again be allowed to fall between the cracks of overlapping regulations. It is a modest step, but one entirely consistent with our shared commitment to protect every child from exploitation and harm. In the end, it is simply a test of resolve. If we know where the danger lies, we have a duty to act before another child is placed at risk.
My Lords, just to demonstrate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, this is a cross-party matter and he has my support. I would be interested—he may or may not know—in the number of children affected by the failure of the regime to make sure that these tutors and so forth are properly registered. In any case, I wholeheartedly agree that this is a common-sense measure and needs to be brought in as soon as possible.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The important change that we are making is that it enables parents to access checks at the higher level, so they will be able to decide on whether to engage somebody. The parent will be able to access the check, see their history and, based on what the DBS check throws up, decide whether they will be engaged without necessarily becoming classified as a provider as in the current regime. That is an important distinction. It does not pull them into a different sphere of activity but allows them to ask a crucial question: is this person fit to be a tutor for my child?
My Lords, I am still not clear. There are 90,000 names on the DBS barred list. I understand the Minister to have said that parents will now be able to access the enhanced barred list, therefore things that would not be picked up in a lower-level DBS check will be picked up with the enhanced one. However, if somebody asks, “Is Fred Bloggs okay?”, can they just ask for his enhanced records or will it say that “Fred Bloggs is one of the 90,000 people that are on the DBS barred list”?
Lord Katz (Lab)
To be clear, they will have the same rights and access as a school has at the moment. We are equalising the scheme, so yes, they would be able to see that he is on the barred list and have access to the record. I hope that clarifies it for the noble Baroness.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has explained all my reservations about these clauses very articulately, so I will not repeat them. They add an unnecessary implication that the public are a threat to emergency workers. Why are religiously and racially aggravated offences being highlighted here, as though members of the general public were somehow prone to that kind of behaviour? It is an unhelpful signposting because, as has been rightly pointed out, if emergency workers are dealt with aggressively or harassed in any way, we have laws to deal with it. To highlight this implies that there is something extra to be added, that there is a problem out there of the public going around racially abusing workers, and that there are particular offences in mind. Duplication of law ends up being virtue signalling. I am not sure that virtue is being signalled, but none the less it seems to be a box-ticking exercise rather than an effective piece of lawmaking.
I am also very worried about the notion of “insulting behaviour”. I am probably guilty of it; one does get frustrated sometimes. What on earth does it mean? It is entirely subjective. What is insulting behaviour? It would be helpful for the Minister to give us illustrations and examples of what constitutes insulting behaviour. How will people be charged with this? It immediately makes people fearful of raising complaints or of being frustrated in public. If the ambulance has not turned up for a long time and your husband is dying of a heart attack, you might be a bit fraught. Somebody might interpret that as insulting behaviour. It might be perfectly rational, reasonable behaviour and not criminal. I am worried that this is creating a toxic atmosphere where none need be there. I cannot understand why it is there.
The words “likely to cause” feel far too much like pre-crime. What is “likely to cause”? These are criminal offences. If you are charged with them, you will be seen potentially as a hate criminal. Therefore, the Government have to give us a very detailed explanation as to why they feel these clauses are needed, so that we can scrutinise it. As they are presently given, I am not happy at all. I will support any move to have them removed from the Bill.
My Lords, on these Benches we take a very different view and strongly support Clauses 107 and 108, which recognise a simple reality. Emergency workers can face racially or religiously aggravated abuse whenever and wherever they are carrying out their duties, including in private homes. They cannot choose their environment or walk away from hostility. Their professional duty is to step into what are at times chaotic, volatile situations, and to stay there until the job is done. The law should follow them into those settings and make clear that such targeted hostility is no more acceptable in a hallway or a living room than it is on a street corner. This debate has shown that the issue is not about policing opinion or curtailing lawful expression but about drawing a firm line between free speech and deliberate acts of intimidation directed at those who protect the public.
These clauses are drafted to catch only behaviour that crosses that line in aggravated circumstances, and they sit alongside, rather than in place of, the wider framework of public order and hate crime. In our view, striking them out would send the wrong message, undermining our commitment to those who protect us. Looking ahead, it will of course be vital that their use is monitored and that guidance for police and prosecutors is kept under review, so that the balance struck here remains both proportionate and effective in practice.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, before the Minister rises, could I ask a simple question? It would seem to me that, under the definition of emergency workers in Section 3(1)(j) of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, an emergency worker is
“a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide ... NHS health services, or … services in the support of the provision of NHS health services”.
I think we all support the words of the Secretary of State for Health, but is he in danger of falling into the trap of criticising the BMJ for the action it has taken?
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I too support the objective of Amendment 348—who would not support the objective of preventing illegal violence and harassment in the workplace? I suspect that the main argument against Amendment 348 will be the burden that it would impose on employers, particularly small ones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made that point very eloquently.
I will briefly identify one reason why it is very much in the interests of the employer to have these duties. It is because if there is illegal violence and harassment in the workplace which causes, as it will, damage to the victim, she—and it normally will be she—will be looking for remedies, and the person against whom she is most likely to be advised to sue is not the rogue other employee but the employer. The employer is particularly vulnerable to such a civil claim if they have not, as required by Amendment 348—which no doubt can be improved in its drafting—conducted any sort of assessment to identify potential risks, have not implemented policies and procedures to eliminate those risks, and, in particular, have not provided at least basic training to all employees on the importance of these matters. So, yes, this will impose a burden on employers, particularly small ones, but it is very much in their interests to protect themselves against legal liability and to deter such action taking place.
My Lords, these amendments ask employers not only to react when something goes wrong but to look ahead, identify the risks and take sensible steps to prevent harm before it happens. That is especially important for women and those in insecure or public-facing roles, who we know are more likely to be targeted and less likely to feel safe reporting what has happened to them.
The statistics are damning. There were nearly 700,000 incidents last year alone, with attacks on lone workers surging by 132% over three years. We strongly support the aim of these amendments; however, as we did previously, we have questions around how a duty to eliminate risks, so far as reasonably practicable, would work in small businesses on tight margins. Layering new mandates on top of existing duties under the Equality Act and employment law risks confusion, which could dilute accountability. This is not an argument against doing more, but a practical issue which needs to be addressed.
There is also a wider cultural point. Legislation can set clear expectations, but workers will be safer only if staff feel confident to report incidents and these reports lead to action, not to victims being sidelined or blamed. Training, confidential reporting routes and proper follow-up, all mentioned in the amendments, are not extras; they are essential if any new duty is to change what has sadly become everyday reality for many people just trying to do their jobs.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her thoughtful amendments, which seek to place prevention of illegal violence and harassment in the workplace on a clear statutory footing and to expand the duties of the Health and Safety Executive accordingly.
It is clear from the debate that, across your Lordships’ House, we take violence against women and girls extremely seriously, whether that violence occurs at home, on the street, online or in the workplace. We know that gender-based violence remains alarmingly prevalent. Data for the year ending March 2024 shows that 6% of women aged 16 and over experienced domestic abuse, 4% experienced sexual assault and 4% experienced stalking.
These amendments focus on violence at work, in the employment context. Sexual harassment at work is far from uncommon. A recent study by UCL found that nearly one in seven UK workers encountered workplace abuse in the past year, with women reporting significantly higher levels of harassment and assault. Those figures remind us that work must of course be a place of safety, dignity and respect for all employees.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for raising a point that really had not occurred to me in years of gazing at Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act. I also thank the noble Lord for his reference to the Handyside case, quite correctly observing that freedom of speech means nothing if it does not include the freedom to offend, shock and disturb. But, of course, Handyside was about ideas that offend, shock and disturb. Sections 4A and 5 are not talking about ideas; as the noble Lord said, they refer to threats, abuse and insult.
Outside the rarefied walls of academe, the cases in which Sections 4A and 5 are applied are to the objectionable drunk, on a train or in a doorway, who yells at somebody and can cause, in the words of the statute, distress or alarm. I agree with the noble Lord that they are not very different. In fact, he said it would be otiose to have both “distress” and “alarm” in the sections, but surely there is a shade of difference between the two. If there is some lasting upset, we could call that distress, but if it is a question of frightening or unsettling somebody by yelling an insult in their ear, that is probably closer to alarm. Although I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness about the evils of overzealous prosecutors, I suggest that there is some purpose to these two very similar words both appearing in these two sections.
My Lords, I have listened to this rather short debate against the particular backdrop of the Government’s increasingly unsettling approach to public order—a direction of travel that raises real concerns on these Benches. The current stance seems to involve simply doubling down on the pattern set by the previous Administration, which, in our view, risks overpolicing protest, overburdening an already stretched justice system, diverting resources from serious crime and threatening legitimate speech.
In that context, we have sympathy with this proposal. However, I have some concerns about changing a standard legal formula in public order and anti-social behaviour law. It is widely embedded in guidance and operational policy; in removing it, there is a risk of creating uncertainty and confusion within the police, local authorities and the courts. At the same time, it is equally clear that the concepts of alarm and distress have, in practice, been stretched far beyond what Parliament ever intended. Some people are very easily alarmed or distressed by noisy but peaceful demonstrations, or simply by views with which they profoundly disagree. These cannot be a sound basis for criminal liability.
There is a real risk that an overbroad test inhibits free expression, penalises vulnerability and hands too much discretion to those who are most intolerant of difference. If the Government will not support this amendment, will the Minister explain how they intend to ensure that public order powers are not used to criminalise mere annoyance, eccentricity or disagreement, but are focused on genuinely threatening, abusive and harassing behaviour?
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling Amendment 352. It is welcome to see such a cross-party collection of noble Lords supporting it: the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, are not names always seen together on an amendment.
The amendment proposes to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act, as we have heard. As others have said, alarm is a word that denotes impression, mood and temperament. It is a word that allows the criminal law to stray beyond the prevention of genuine disorder and into the policing of irritation, discomfort or unease. Several legal cases have shown where this can lead. In a case called DPP v Orum in 1989, a conviction was upheld under Section 5 for shouting abuse at police officers. The court accepted that even trained officers, accustomed as they might be to a degree of verbal abuse, could none the less be persons likely to be caused “harassment, alarm or distress”. Although that may be understandable up to a point, it demonstrates how low the threshold has been set. If professionals whose job it is to face confrontation can be alarmed by rude language, one begins to wonder who cannot be.
Another case is called Norwood v DPP in 2003, in which a man was convicted for displaying a poster saying “Islam out of Britain” in his window. The reasoning again rested partly on the likelihood of causing alarm. Whatever one thinks of the views expressed—many of us would deplore them—the case illustrates how “alarm” can operate as a gateway through which deeply subjective reactions become the basis for criminal liability. It seems that these cases represent symptoms of a statutory provision that has no clear boundary. “Alarm” does not mean “fear of violence”—it does not require intimidation; it does not even require serious upset. It has been stretched to cover being offended, unsettled or merely uncomfortable. I suggest that is not a sound basis for criminal liability.
As others have said, the law retains and contains safeguards where genuine harm arises: “harassment” would remain in the wording of the statute, “distress” would remain in the wording of the provision, and Section 4 remains available for
“Fear or provocation of violence”.
Other statutes address stalking, threats and coercive conduct. My noble friend’s amendment would remove nothing that is truly necessary to protect the public. It would restore a measure of seriousness to public order law. Criminal offences should address conduct that is objectively wrongful, not speech or behaviour that happens to alarm someone whose threshold for alarm may be very low. This amendment has our wholehearted support, and I hope that it has the support of the Minister too.
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group. Amendments 353 and 355, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, relate to a statutory definition of honour-based abuse and a duty to issue multi-agency statutory guidance.
Honour-based abuse is a form of domestic abuse motivated by an abuser’s perception that a person has brought, or may bring, dishonour or shame to themselves, their family or their community. It can take many forms and is often complex to identify, but it centres on controlling individuals to compel them to behave in certain ways or subscribe to certain beliefs. For some, the concept of honour is prized above the safety and well-being of individuals, and to compromise a family’s honour is to bring dishonour and shame. In extreme cases, this is used to justify abuse, disownment or physical harm. Honour-based abuse is not a cultural tradition or religious practice. It is a form of abuse that can occur within any community, regardless of faith or background.
Despite increased reporting to the national honour-based abuse helpline, commissioned by the Home Office, it remains the least prosecuted form of violence against women and girls. Across agencies, it is inconsistently recognised, poorly understood and inadequately responded to. Without clarity, front-line professionals are unsure how to spot the signs, and victims can slip through the cracks.
The need for change is starkly illustrated by the story of Fawziyah Javed. Fawziyah was a lawyer; she understood the importance of evidence and tried to protect herself and her unborn child. She repeatedly sought help, reporting to health professionals, contacting the police and gathering evidence against her abusers, but her situation was not taken seriously. Her case exposes a persistent and systemic failure to recognise honour-based abuse within statutory systems. Multiple perpetrators were involved, but they were overlooked because investigations often focused on a single individual, reflecting approaches designed for intimate-partner domestic abuse rather than the extended, collective and coercive nature of honour-based abuse.
In late August 2021, when Fawziyah made a second report to the police, the risks she faced had still not been recognised. On 2 September 2021, Fawziyah, aged 31, and 17 weeks pregnant with a baby boy, was tragically murdered when her husband pushed her from Arthur’s Seat in Edinburgh. Immediately after this, as was shown in the Channel 4 documentary “The Push: Murder on the Cliff”, he did not call 999; the first call he made was to his own father. This illustrates the family-involved dynamics of honour-based abuse, which are too often overlooked by statutory systems.
Fawziyah’s mother, Yasmin Javed, has led the campaign to ensure that her daughter’s legacy drives meaningful change, and has permitted me to share Fawziyah’s story. Yasmin’s courage and advocacy ensures that survivors’ voices are heard and their experiences are recognised. She believes strongly that the lack of understanding of honour-based abuse and the absence of a universal statutory definition meant that Fawziyah’s experience and the perpetrators were missed.
Fawziyah’s story demonstrates why we urgently need a statutory definition and accompanying guidance, not just for the police and prosecutors but for teachers, social workers, healthcare professionals and everyone who has an opportunity to identify abuse early before it escalates. It will help professionals understand its complex dynamics and act decisively to protect victims.
In August, the Government announced six new measures to tackle honour-based abuse, including legislating, at the earliest opportunity, to introduce a statutory definition and multi-agency guidance. I am very pleased that we are on the same page on that.
Turning to the definition itself, Amendment 353 puts forward a suggested definition that has been developed over a number of years. It is not my definition but the product of sustained work by the sector, legal experts and, most importantly, survivors with lived experience. From 2022, survivors worked with the University of Nottingham to develop a survivor-informed definition. This work identified serious limitations in existing non-statutory definitions and provided a framework that captures the collective and coercive nature of this abuse. Building on this survivor-informed foundation, barrister Naomi Wiseman, drawing on extensive experience in this field, led further work with violence against women and girls sector partners to draft a statutory definition. Through multiple iterations, consensus was reached upon a definition that reflects the complexity of honour-based abuse.
To date, this work has engaged survivors, over 60 organisations and specialist legal expertise. It combines lived experience with professional knowledge to bring clarity, consistency and stronger protections. This process has been truly sector-wide and survivor-led. Survivors’ voices have shaped every iteration, ensuring that the definition reflects the realities of honour-based abuse. I wish to put on the record my sincere thanks to all those involved, particularly the survivors. Their dedication and insight, born from personal experience and gaps in professional responses, has ensured that future victims can be recognised, protected and believed in the ways that they were not.
This survivor-led process has required significant time, expertise and emotional labour, often carried out amid ongoing abuse, ostracism and bereavement. Every consultation involves survivors and bereaved families retelling painful and traumatic experiences. They do this out of a sense of duty, so that their survival can mean something for the many who are not able to speak out. Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, has welcomed this work. She said: “I recognise the significant progress that has been made to date and emphasise the importance of grounding any definition in survivor experience. I support the ongoing work led by survivors, the specialist sector and Karma Nirvana to ensure the definition is effective”.
Of course, we all want a definition that works, and I therefore welcome the debate to come, so we can agree a definition that is fit for purpose—one that respects survivors’ lived experience and treats their contribution with the seriousness that it deserves. I am grateful to the noble Baroness the Minister and Home Office officials for their engagement to date. I know that work is ongoing on a revised definition, and I hope that we can work together, with survivors, experts and the sector, to return on Report with a workable, legally sound definition that reflects survivors’ experiences, strengthens protection and supports effective multi-agency working.
Timing matters here. For years, survivors, the sector and front-line professionals have called for a statutory definition, and this Bill is the vehicle through which change must be delivered—it really cannot wait any longer. The CPS and police are revising their guidance, which is due mid-next year, and they need a statutory definition in place to do so effectively. The success of this reform will also depend on the rollout of clear, comprehensive communication and training, a commitment that I am pleased to say that the Government have already made for next year. We need the definition to make that effective. For too long, perpetrators have escaped accountability, while victims have been failed. The time to act is now.
I turn to Amendment 354 in my name, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws; the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has tabled a similar amendment in this group. Amendment 354 would recognise honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing. It would ensure earlier identification of honour-based abuse in investigations and prosecutions, and that sentences properly reflect the gravity of the offending. Safeguarding would be strengthened for victims facing risk from multiple perpetrators, and it would also act as a stronger deterrent.
The murder of Somaiya Begum, a 20-year-old biomedical student, exposed a critical gap in the criminal justice system. Despite an active forced marriage protection order, Somaiya was murdered by a family member. Evidence at trial demonstrated the role of family pressures and honour dynamics, yet the court concluded:
“It is not possible to identify a motive for this dreadful attack”.
In his defence statement, the defendant explicitly relied on notions of honour to shift blame on to other family members. Despite this, the judge did not recognise honour in sentencing. This demonstrates how the absence of formal recognition allows key motivations to be overlooked, weakening justice and accountability.
Somaiya’s case and other cases such as the terrible murder of Banaz Mahmod, to which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will refer, illustrate several wider systemic failures. Yesterday would have been Banaz’s 40th birthday—and I pay tribute to Banaz’s sister, Payzee Mahmod, who has been a tireless advocate for changes to the law in Banaz’s memory, and whom I have worked closely with on this campaign. I also want to acknowledge Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who is calling for change in this area too.
When we do not recognise the aggravation of honour in the perpetration of these crimes, there are multiple consequences. First, there is the erasure of victims; when honour motivations are not named, survivors and families feel unseen and invalidated, deepening mistrust in the justice system and perpetuating silence. Secondly, there is unreliable data: judgments rarely reference honour, creating the false impression that such cases are infrequent or absent, despite evidence to the contrary. Thirdly, there are low prosecution rates: between April 2024 and March 2025, only 95 honour-based prosecutions were brought, with fewer than half resulting in conviction. Supporting this amendment would address these failures, improve data, strengthen accountability and ensure that courts formally acknowledge honour-based motivations, giving survivors and families the recognition and justice that they deserve.
Given that we are a little later than planned, many noble Lords who were going to speak in favour of these amendments are sadly no longer in their place. That includes the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who, given her long experience, fully supports these amendments, in particular making honour-based abuse an aggravating feature, to send a clear message to communities and sentencing judges.
I pass on my sincere thanks to the Minister for the meeting to discuss this issue with not just her but three Ministers and officials across both departments. I am also very grateful for her own suggestion that she speak to the sector and survivor representatives ahead of this debate to hear from them directly. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, earlier in response to the Urgent Question on the VAWG strategy, and I look forward to reading that strategy tomorrow, given his reference a number of times to honour-based abuse.
I appreciate that the Government are clearly working to make progress on this, and I have two questions for the Minister. Will she commit to continuing to work with the sector to bring forward amendments on an agreed definition and guidance for Report? Secondly, while I heard the Minister’s explanation on Monday on existing aggravating factors and sentencing practice, we know from reviewing sentencing remarks in cases of clear honour-based abuse that, in practice, these factors are inconsistently applied and often fail to capture the collective, coercive and family or community-driven nature of the abuse. In that context, could the Minister set out the Government’s position on formally recognising honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing?
In conclusion, I pay tribute again to the tireless work and bravery of survivors. Without them the progress on this work to date would not be possible. I would also like to thank Karma Nirvana, whose incredible work supports victims and survivors, brings the sector together collaboratively and campaigns for these life-saving changes alongside over 60 leading organisations. I am deeply grateful to the survivors and sector representatives who attended a briefing for noble Lords here last month. They reminded us plainly that honour-based abuse remains an invisible crime, with invisible perpetrators and, tragically, invisible victims. They told us that making progress on these amendments will save lives, prevent immeasurable harm and deliver recognition and justice for those who deserve it. Fawziyah, Somaiya, Banaz and so many others cannot speak for themselves, but through the courage of their families and advocates, we have the opportunity to act. In their names, I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for moving her amendment. This group also includes Amendment 356 in my name and in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Blower, whose support I greatly appreciate. I also thank Southall Black Sisters for their tireless campaigning in this vital area.
I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in paying tribute to Banaz Mahmod and to the extraordinary courage of her sisters, Bekhal and Payzee, whose tireless campaigning has kept the spotlight on honour-based abuse in the hope that Banaz’s legacy will drive real and lasting change. Banaz was just 20 when she was murdered by her father, uncle and five male cousins. Her crime? Leaving her abusive husband and having a boyfriend she wished to marry. Her family convened a council of war to plan her killing, claiming that her wish for divorce and choice of partner brought shame on the family and the wider community. She did everything that we tell victims to do. On five separate occasions, she reported rape, violence and threats to kill—even an attempt on her life by her own father. She named those who would later murder her, yet she was not believed or protected. Her murder is not an isolated tragedy but emblematic of wider patterns of institutional failure to identify and respond to honour-based abuse.
That is why I have I have also added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, calling for a statutory definition to be brought forward as quickly as possible, alongside guidance, so that the thousands of incidents of such abuse reported in the UK each year are treated with the gravity they deserve. I too urge the Government not to miss the opportunity presented by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will provide that reassurance.
Amendment 356 would make honour a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. A similar amendment in the other place limited this to murder, but here it is deliberately broader. This would ensure that any offence committed in the name of honour is explicitly treated as aggravated in sentencing. It shares the aim of Amendment 354 but, in the absence of an existing statutory definition, it defines the aggravating factor independently, focusing instead on the perpetrator’s conduct and mirroring existing language from racial and religious aggravation laws. This approach would allow the aggravating factor to take effect immediately, while consultations on the definition take place between the Government and the sector.
Critically, Amendment 356 also recognises the frequent involvement of multiple perpetrators and colluders. In Banaz’s case, police estimated that around 50 men were involved, either in the killing or in shielding those responsible. This recognition is vital for improving how agencies identify and respond to such abuse.
I have reflected on the comments made during Monday’s Committee about the concept of honour already being adequately covered in legislation. I do not want to anticipate the Minister’s response, but I imagine she will say that judges are already familiar with the concept of honour and that evidence of its presence will already result in a stiffer sentence.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 357, first tabled by my party in the other place last year, would extend the operation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act by making explicit reference to GPS equipment or, as the industry now prefers, global navigation satellite systems.
For several years, Liberal Democrats have highlighted the sharp rise in rural crime, with organised gangs systematically targeting farms and rural businesses. Their focus has been on stealing high-value GPS drones, receivers and in-cab screens from tractors and harvesters. This equipment is worth thousands of pounds and is essential for modern precision farming. The loss of these units leaves farmers facing costly delays and crop losses at critical times of the year. These thefts have formed part of a well-organised international trade whereby equipment is stripped, containerised and shipped overseas, often beyond recovery. Crucially, offences spiked as rural policing came under ever-increasing strain. Local stations were closed and experienced neighbourhood teams hollowed out, taking with them the deep local knowledge that underpins effective intelligence gathering.
Organised gangs stepped into that vacuum, criss-crossing county boundaries with little deterrence. We recognise that real progress has been made over the last year, with insurance claims for GPS theft now starting to fall, thanks to greater collaboration between farmers, insurers, police and the National Rural Crime Network, whose invaluable work is now rightly benefiting from strengthened national funding and support. The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act should build on that work, offering a strong framework for prevention, giving the Secretary of State powers to require immobilisers and the marking and registration of agricultural machinery, and to extend these measures to other equipment by regulation.
Amendment 357 would strengthen that framework by naming GPS units explicitly in the primary legislation. This would give a clear signal of intent, ensure momentum and guard against any further delay in bringing the provisions into effect. We welcome the Government’s recent commitment to include removable GPS units in future regulations and I am pleased that Ministers have listened to evidence presented from these Benches and others. The reality, however, is that the key provisions of the Act have not yet been brought into force and the secondary legislation required to implement them is still pending. Our amendment would ensure timely and decisive action, so that farmers and rural businesses see the benefits on the ground sooner rather than later. This is a simple, practical step that would support the Government’s aims and help stop the theft and resale of vital agricultural technology. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.
The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.
Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.
Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not want to commit to any particular timescale. It probably ill behoves me to do so, but I will point out that, having published our response to the call for evidence a couple of months before Christmas, we are obviously trying to motor ahead with it, if noble Lords will forgive the pun.
I turn now to Amendment 368, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which proposes two changes: first, to expand enforcement provisions under the 2023 Act and, secondly, to introduce a statutory aggravating factor for theft of tools from tradesmen under the Sentencing Act 2020. The Government recognise the distress caused by tool theft and its impact on tradespeople and small businesses, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke to. As he said, these tools are essential to livelihoods, and their loss can cause real financial and emotional harm. That is why we are already taking action through the National Vehicle Crime Working Group, which brings together specialists from every police force to share intelligence and tackle emerging trends in vehicle-related crime, including tool theft.
On sentencing, the current framework is sufficient and robust. Courts must follow guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, which already require consideration of harm, culpability and aggravating factors such as financial loss, business impact and emotional distress. Courts also have powers to impose compensation orders to ensure that victims receive financial compensation. Introducing a statutory aggravating factor, as this amendment calls for, would duplicate existing provisions unnecessarily and have limited impact on outcomes. Indeed, I am reminded that a wise man once said,
“I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors”.—[Official Report, 15/12/25; col. 585.]
That was of course the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, speaking just three weeks ago, on 15 December, in response to an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to Clause 102 on self-harm. I could not have put it better myself.
I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we accept the spirit of her Amendment 357 and we are working to give effect to this issue. I hope too that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 368 to be necessary, and forgive my light ribbing a moment ago. For all these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and to the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Davies of Gower, for their support. We all want this legislation to be effective, but we want swift implementation of the Act, not in the fullness of time, and stronger rural crime prevention, including forensic marking, to deter the theft and resale of tradespeople’s tools.
GPS theft cost farmers over £1 million last year. Frankly, this just cannot be allowed to continue. There is legislation ready to go—there is an Act of Parliament—and it needs to be implemented now. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we come back to fraud. As the Minister will be well aware, this is not the first time I have raised the issue of ensuring that the technology and telecoms companies take their share of responsibility for the use of their services or platforms by fraudsters and are made to contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for their support on this amendment.
On a previous group I mentioned the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, on which I was privileged to sit. Our report, Fighting Fraud: Breaking the Chain, which was published in November 2022, made the very clear conclusion:
“Until all fraud-enabling industries fear significant financial, legal and reputational risk for their failure to prevent fraud, they will not act”.
That has been borne out over the three years since. There has been no significant improvement, despite the voluntary charters that have been agreed. Only the banks are on the hook for the costs of fraud under the mandatory APP reimbursement rules that were brought in by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. The banks must now pick up 100% of the reimbursement liability, and there is evidence to suggest that this is having a positive impact on the efforts that the banks are making to identify and prevent fraud.
Similarly, the Payment Systems Regulator’s six-monthly reports on the performance of the banks has provided welcome transparency as to which banks and payment services are doing most, and least, to combat fraud. As an aside, it would be good to have confirmation from the Minister that the subsuming of the PSR into the FCA will not reduce the important reporting and oversight of APP fraud that the PSR has been providing.
The banks are picking up the liability, but they are not where the fraud originates. According to UK Finance statistics, around 70% by volume and 30% by value arises from online platforms, and 16% by volume and 36% by value arises from telecoms—calls and texts. Let us name names. According to the PSR, over half of APP scams originate on Meta platforms—Facebook and so on.
Nothing has changed that would change the conclusion of the committee that these industries will not take the issue seriously until they face liability for what they allow to happen on their platforms or services. The banks have sharpened up their acts, in part because of the mandatory reimbursement requirement that we have imposed on them. The banks face real liabilities for the fraud that goes through their accounts.
The Online Safety Act includes some important measures to prevent fraudulent content and scam advertising, but it does not make the companies liable for the losses. We have mandated that the banks should reimburse victims of APP scams after we decided that the voluntary code was not working, and it is now time that those who enable the frauds should pick up their share on a compulsory, not voluntary, basis. There are many possible ways to achieve this, so I have not been prescriptive in the amendment. It could be as simple as bringing the telcos and tech companies into the reimbursement requirements, or we could look at extending the new failure to prevent fraud offence so that it covers the use by third parties of services provided by a company. The failure to prevent offence currently covers only actions by employees or associates, so it would not cover scams in this situation.
Amendment 67 would simply require the Government to bring forward proposals for how to do this within six months of this Bill passing. It is not enough to keep publishing more fraud strategies. The one that is due to be published shortly, which I am sure the Minister will refer to, will be the third fraud strategy since I have been a Member of this House. The Minister said earlier that the fraud strategy would be published soon—I think he said, “in very short order”. I know that he cannot give a date, but it would be helpful to know whether that will be before Report. The content of the strategy might make this amendment unnecessary, so it would be very helpful if we could see it before Report.
Fraud and scam figures are not falling; they still make up around 40% of all crime in the UK. It really is time that we make those who allow their services to be used by the fraudsters, and those who enable the fraud, liable for their actions—or, rather, lack of action. It is the only way to make them take the issue seriously. I beg to move.
We are very happy on these Benches to support this amendment. We all know the grim scale of fraud, now our most common crime. Authorised push payment scams are driven by online platforms, adverts on social media fuelling shopping and investment frauds, and hacked accounts enabling ticket scams. Yet, as has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, platforms such as Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, can still take six weeks to remove illegal content, allowing scammers to resurface again and again—so-called “life-boating”.
This amendment is designed to cut through that inertia. It would provide a clear statutory duty of care on tech and telecom firms to prevent scams at source, using their own AI and tools. It would also require them to share the financial burden with payment providers, which must already imburse many victims of authorised push payment fraud. That seems a fair step, given that the platforms host most of the scams and profit from the engagement that keeps users scrolling. Weak voluntary charters, non-binding Ofcom guidance and even the Online Safety Act’s proportionate measures have let these firms do the bare minimum—reacting to reports rather than proactively detecting fraud through verification, AI-driven scans and systematic audits. Big tech has unparalleled know-how—the AI, software and manpower to spot fraudster patterns and take them down. Banks cannot fight this alone and nor can the police. This amendment would compel these companies to protect their users, stopping scams upstream.
We hope that the Government’s fraud strategy follows the example of this amendment and goes even further with a failure to prevent fraud offence, backed by strong fines and tougher binding Ofcom standards. Meanwhile, Amendment 367 would provide some timely backbone, giving tech and telecom firms a real incentive to act swiftly before yet more victims lose potentially everything.
My Lords, I put my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I want to add a brief footnote to the speech that he made in support. In an earlier debate, the Minister was very complimentary about the work of the fraud committee on which we both served, and he can convert that praise into action by accepting one of the recommendations which we made in our report.
It is worth quoting the relevant sections of the report that led up to that recommendation. On page 162, paragraph 57 states:
“However, banks are the last link in the fraud chain and cannot be expected to foot the fraud bill alone”.
Then we come on to our recommendation:
“To incentivise companies to act on fraud and more accurately reflect the balance of responsibility for fraud, the Government must establish a mechanism by which fraud-enabling sectors—in addition to the outgoing and recipient PSP—are required to contribute to the costs of reimbursement in cases where their platforms and services helped to facilitate the fraud”.
That is a very clear recommendation. We came to that conclusion after taking evidence from, for example, TSB and academics. They all made the point that there was absolutely no incentive on the part of the telecommunications companies to do anything, because their business case rested on generating revenue and they faced no penalties. That was our recommendation.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 379, I will speak also to Amendment 471. When used responsibly, live facial recognition can help to protect the public. The real question before us is not whether it is used but how, under what safeguards, with what scrutiny and by what authority from Parliament? At present, the answer is deeply unsatisfactory.
Police forces are rolling out live facial recognition at speed, without a clear legal framework, consistent oversight or meaningful public consultation. Its operational use has more than doubled in a year. Millions of pounds are being spent on new systems and mobile vans, yet there is still no reference to facial recognition in any Act of Parliament. Instead, the police rely on a patchwork of data protection law, the Human Rights Act and non-binding guidance. Parliament must now act urgently to put its use on a clear statutory footing. The police themselves say that this is vital to maintain public trust.
Recent Home Office testing of the police national database’s retrospective facial recognition tool found significantly higher error rates for black and Asian people than for white people. For black women, the false positive rate was almost one in 10 when the system was run on lower settings. It also performs less reliably with children and young people. The human consequences are already here: schoolchildren in uniform wrongly flagged and told to prove their identity, and a black anti-knife campaigner stopped on his way home from volunteering and asked for his fingerprints because the system got it wrong. These are not theoretical risks; they are happening now.
When this became public, Ministers ordered a review and testing of a new algorithm, which is welcome. But questions remain. Why was the bias not disclosed earlier? Why on earth was the regulator not informed? Why are biased algorithms still in use today? A false match rate of nearly one in 10 for black women is not a technical glitch; it is a civil rights issue. Running thousands of searches every month before strengthening statutory oversight only deepens public mistrust. That is why the measures in Amendment 471 deserve very serious consideration.
Amendment 379 is modest and practical. It focuses on one of the most sensitive uses of live facial recognition: protests and public assemblies. It would require the police to pause its use at such events until a new statutory code of practice, approved by Parliament, is in place. That code would set out clearly when surveillance is justified, how watch lists are compiled, what safeguards apply and, crucially, what redress is available when things go wrong.
This Committee has already heard concerns about the gradual narrowing of protest rights. Each new restriction may seem small in isolation, but together they add up. Elsewhere in the Bill, as we heard on Monday, the Government seek to criminalise those who wish to remain anonymous at protests. Combined with expanding facial recognition, that places even greater pressure on protest rights. Taken together, these measures risk discouraging peaceful dissent and undermining freedom of expression.
I do not normally disagree with the Minister, although we might be on different sides of an argument, but I found that last comment very bad. We are all on the same side—we all want to catch criminals and prevent crime. That needs to go on the record. From what he just said, it was almost as though he was suggesting that he is on the side of that but we are not. To make it clear, we are not sitting here for the sake of it; we are here because we genuinely believe in this and we want to catch criminals and prevent crime.
Let us put out the hand of friendship and make common cause on those issues.
To respond to the noble Baroness’s amendment, I simply say that the consultation is there. Amendment 471 would go quite a long way beyond even that which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, brought forward. I believe this to be a potential future crime-fighting tool. It needs regulation around it and that is what the Government are intending to do. We are very clear about that on page 5 of the consultation. How it is regulated and what is regulated, and how this is approached, is what the consultation is about, but I agree with the basic principle of the noble Baroness’s amendment. Therefore, I ask her to withdraw it.
I would like that in writing.
I thank the Minister for his response and thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The Minister mentioned the consultation, and I am pleased that the Government will legislate, but I hope Parliament will be very much involved, because, like anything, the devil will be in the detail. Whatever comes out of that will be very important.
Can the Minister tell me what happens if, in response to the consultation, the public say that they do not want the police to access particular databases? Will the Government then take those clauses out of the Bill? Perhaps he could just clarify that.
I have a concern that, even before the consultation began, the Home Office was saying that it hoped the process would pave the way for wider rollout. That does not really inspire confidence that Ministers are keeping an open mind. A consultation should not be used as a rubber stamp; it should be the start of a genuine national conversation about the limits that a free society wants to place on mass biometric data surveillance. For that conversation to mean anything, the public need to know the full picture, how accurate the systems are, and where and when they are being used. Right now, that transparency is not there.
We have heard that the Home Office thinks that:
“Any new laws informed by the consultation would take about two years to be passed by Parliament”.
That is far too slow, given the pace of technological change, and that comment was made in December 2025. All we are asking is that Parliament sets the rules before the technology sets them for us. I hope Parliament will be involved in setting those rules. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 396 in my name raises fundamental issues about this part of the Bill. My concern is about Clause 138 and its clear potential to enable facial recognition searches of the DVLA’s vast image database. That would be a dramatic change. At present, drivers’ data can be accessed only for road traffic purposes.
Amendment 396 would place a safeguard in the Bill to prevent authorised persons using information obtained under these powers for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It would ensure that the private images of millions of citizens cannot be repurposed to feed live or retrospective facial recognition systems without full parliamentary debate and explicit consent. Around 55 million facial images are held by the DVLA; they are collected in good faith and with a clear expectation of privacy, alongside names, addresses and medical records, for the routine purposes of getting a driving licence. Turning that repository into a police biometric pool would mark a profound shift in the relationship between the state and the citizen. Combined with live facial recognition on our streets, it would create the infrastructure for real-time, population-scale surveillance, scanning the faces of tens of millions of law-abiding people as they go about their daily lives.
In effect, most of us would find ourselves on a perpetual digital watch list, our faces repeatedly checked for potential wrongdoing. That is troubling not only because of the bias and misidentification in these systems but because it is simply not proportionate policing. The public broadly support the use of technology to catch criminals, but they also want limits and safeguards. A 2024 survey by the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute found that only one in five people—just 19%—trusted police forces to use biometric tools responsibly.
That anxiety is particularly strong among women. Barely three years ago, the Casey review exposed appalling misogyny and a serious abuse of data access within policing. Against that backdrop, granting digital access to millions of female drivers’ personal details and photographs is hardly reassuring, especially when previous safeguards have failed so spectacularly. Last year alone, 229 serving police officers and staff were arrested for domestic abuse-related offences, and a further 1,200 were on restricted duties linked to such allegations. The fear is real that combining facial recognition with DVLA access could allow abusers within policing to misuse these powers to trace survivors, to remove their freedom to hide and to undermine public trust still further. We also know that this technology misidentifies members of ethnic-minority communities far more frequently, compounding injustice and eroding confidence in policing by consent.
I share the ambition for policing to use data more intelligently. Forces need joined-up intelligence systems across the entire criminal justice network, but there is a world of difference between targeted access to high-risk offender data and a blank cheque to harvest the personal information of millions of people.
Clause 138 is far too wide. It allows the Secretary of State to authorise digital access for policing or law enforcement purposes, which frankly could mean anything. What information may be accessed, and for what purpose, would later be set by regulation made under the negative procedure, giving Parliament only the most cursory scrutiny of measures, with huge implications for privacy and liberty. Such sweeping powers should not be slipped through in secondary legislation. The public did not give their driving licence photographs to become part of a national face search system. There has been no debate, no consent and no assessment of the risk to those who have good reason to remain hidden. Once civic freedoms are eroded, they are very rarely rebuilt.
When the Minister replies, I hope we will hear what the Government’s policy intention is. If their intention is to keep open the possibility of using DVLA data for surveillance, they should say so and try to justify it. We know that the police have specifically asked for this. It is not good enough to say, “This is our intention”; my amendment would ensure it cannot happen. That is the safeguard the public expect and the least this Committee should demand.
My Lords, I rise to speak in favour of Amendment 396, to which I have added my name—my notes are only two pages long. It would ensure that the DVLA drivers database was not used for a purpose for which it was never intended; namely, to search drivers’ photos for a match with images collected by live facial recognition.
Facial recognition technology could be a useful tool in fighting serious crime if it was properly regulated and supervised, which is the case with other biometric technologies such as fingerprint and DNA, but currently it is open season on facial recognition, with no statutory constraints on its use or misuse. That means that this deeply invasive, mass surveillance tool poses a serious threat to the civil liberties and human rights of UK citizens. If used in combination with the DVLA drivers database, it would be a disproportionate expansion of police powers to identify and track innocent citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs. It would give the authorities access to the biometric data of tens of millions of our fellow citizens. It is vital that safeguards are introduced in law to prevent this happening. This is precisely what Amendment 396 would do.
In Committee in the other place, the Policing Minister said that
“police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 29/4/25; col. 442.]
But Clause 138 allows regulations to be made at a later date setting out how driver licensing information will be made accessible to law enforcement. All that Amendment 396 does is create safeguards to ensure that the regulations made under Clause 138 cannot provide for facial recognition searches of the DVLA database. I commend it to the Committee.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but I return to my central point, which is, as he pointed out in his intervention, that the normal law of the land is for stop and search on reasonable suspicion that the individual in question is a cause for concern: “I have reasonable suspicion that that person may be carrying a knife, et cetera, or otherwise involved in criminality”. These are special powers given to a relatively junior police officer; this is not a chief constable, let alone a magistrate or a judge. It allows a police officer to change the law of the land for a time-limited period for that area, to change what the stop and search regime is in that area. It is quite right that a power of that kind be tightly circumscribed because of the problems that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, spoke about and because citizens do have rights to go about their business without fear of arbitrary stop and search.
This brings me back to my question about the relationship between Amendment 411, which is in this group on its own, and Amendment 415, which noble Lords opposite have in a separate group, and the apparent dichotomy between them. Amendment 415 says that, where there is a stop and search, an officer should not be allowed to require the presentation of digital ID; it does not even say “compulsory digital ID”. So if, as I think the Government now propose, digital ID becomes available to people to partake of, if they want, as a more convenient method of ID, we are going to have circumstances where noble Lords opposite will have more routine stop and search, but when a stop and search happens, an officer would not be able to ask the person searched to identify themselves if all they have with them is digital ID. That seems like a contradiction to me. I, for one, have always been very concerned and opposed to compulsory single identifiers, not least for the reason that they will lead to routine stop and search with people required to identify themselves to the police when they have done nothing wrong. I should be very interested if noble Lords opposite could square the relationship between this amendment and the one that follows.
My Lords, there is now considerable evidence about how stop and search powers are used in practice, their impact and long-term consequences, not least in building trust, which is so vital for effective community policing. Stop and search powers, especially under Section 60—suspicionless powers —already fall disproportionately on marginalised communities, particularly black and minority ethnic young men. Lowering the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” can only increase the frequency and breadth of those powers and with it the disproportionality. This is not an abstract civil liberties concern but goes directly to trust and confidence.
It is also just 18 months since the Home Office accepted the findings of a police inspectorate report that identified serious shortcomings in the use of Section 60 powers, including low arrest and seizure rates for weapons, inadequate training and failures to adhere to statutory duties, such as PACE Code A or voluntary frameworks such as College of Policing APP guidance.
From a Liberal Democrat perspective, the test for expanding intrusive powers is a simple one. Is there a clear and compelling operational case, supported by evidence, that the existing powers are inadequate and that widening them will improve outcomes without unacceptable collateral damage to rights and community relations? We do not believe that the case has been made here. What is on offer is a lower legal bar for the most intrusive stop and search powers we have, imposed on communities that already experience it acutely, with no serious account taken of the long-term impact on policing by consent. On that basis, we cannot support the amendment.
My Lords, this has been a very interesting short debate, and I thank my noble friends—
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving her amendment. Noble Lords will recall my work on a particular police force and abnormal loads. I am confused that it was the chief inspector who informed the Home Secretary that there was a big problem. I am grateful to her for dealing with it, but I thought that the IOPC was responsible for dealing with misconduct and that the chief inspector was looking more at efficiency and the proper use of resources. It would be extremely useful to the Committee if the Minister could explain where the dividing line is between the activities of the IOPC, which I see as being concerned with conduct and discipline, and of the chief inspector, who is concerned more about efficiency.
My Lords, the amendment rightly exposes a serious weakness in our current system. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, points out, HMICFRS can diagnose deep-seated problems within police forces but it does not have the power to make sure these problems are fixed. There are simply too few national levers to deal with police underperformance. Labour’s manifesto included a clear commitment to give HMICFRS new powers to intervene in failing forces, and Ministers have signalled that they want to legislate to do this. We welcome that, but the Bill contains no such clause. I appreciate that a White Paper might be imminent. Even so, I urge the Government not to miss this golden opportunity to legislate now for clear, time-bound duties and proper escalation mechanisms, so that police forces are required to act on inspectorate findings.
Amendment 416A seeks to take the Government further by building this question into a wider statutory review of policing oversight. We support that intention, but we part company with the noble Baroness on the mechanism she proposes. Setting up yet another independent commission, with the terms of reference to be devised by the Secretary of State, approved by the Commons and then followed by nine months of deliberation, risks delaying change for at least another year. The evidence base is already substantial. What is missing is not diagnosis but the authority to enforce it. The noble Baroness is quite right that enforcement is a wider problem, one that extends beyond HMICFRS to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where lessons are not always learned, to put it mildly. I agree with the spirit of co-ordination, but we must remember that the IOPC’s role is distinct—to oversee complaints and investigate the most serious misconduct. It is not, and should not become, a general performance regulator for police forces. That role properly lies with HMICFRS and, ultimately, with Ministers.
From these Benches, our preference is clear: do not commission another review and, instead, move directly and decisively to give the inspectorate the power it so clearly needs. For too long, we have had excellent reports, full of well-reasoned recommendations, almost all accepted by the police and the Government, but nothing happens. That inaction is rarely followed up. Measures that ensure that we no longer see the same failures repeated again and again would be very welcome.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for bringing forward Amendment 416A. While I recognise the intention to ensure that policing is subject to effective scrutiny and that regulatory bodies have the tools they need to drive improvement, I do not believe this amendment is necessary, nor do I think it would represent a proportionate or effective use of time and resources. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services already plays a well-established role in ensuring accountability. It has extensive powers to inspect, report and make recommendations, and these reports are published and robust. They are laid before Parliament and used by the Home Office and policing bodies to drive reform. Where forces fall short, the existing framework already enables escalation, follow-up inspections and external pressure.
I was also worried that this amendment risks duplicating work already being carried out within existing structures. The policing oversight landscape includes His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, police and crime commissioners and parliamentary scrutiny through Select Committees. Co-ordination between these bodies is important, and I suggest it would be more constructive to ensure the better use of these mechanisms rather than create a new independent commission.
It is also worth noting the practical burden imposed by this amendment. It would require the Government to establish a commission, set detailed terms of reference, run a comparative review across multiple regulators, and timetable parliamentary debates in both Houses within a very tight timeframe. That is a significant undertaking that may not be justified, given the absence of clear evidence that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services lacks the necessary authority to fulfil its core function. For those reasons, while I very much respect the motivation behind the amendment, I do not believe it necessary or proportionate and therefore cannot support it.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 421 is now a hot topic. The West Midlands Police chief constable has resigned, and the Government are pledging to restore the Home Secretary’s power to dismiss chiefs who “fail their communities”. Last week’s events bring the motivation behind this amendment into sharp focus, underlining the need to shield operational policing from political interference.
Contrary to some recent reporting, police and crime commissioners are not required by law to consult the police inspectorate before sacking a chief constable. Although they are expected to seek its advice, it is not a statutory duty. Amendment 421 would put that safeguard clearly into primary legislation, requiring HMICFRS to be consulted before a chief constable is removed.
When PCCs were created, they were given the power to hire and fire the chief officer, but concentrating that power in one pair of hands has had damaging consequences. Across England and Wales, around a quarter of forces now lose their chief constable every year—an astonishing level of churn for such a senior role. That is both wasteful of talent and destabilising for forces. Too often, these departures are driven not by incompetence or misconduct but by political disagreement, with some PCCs permanently in election mode and prioritising their own political agenda rather than responding impartially to the real policing challenges on the ground.
We must never reach a point where a chief constable fears upsetting the Home Secretary, or where any politician can bully a police leader to serve their own political ends. That would take us dangerously close to the American model of political control over policing. In the British tradition, officers swear allegiance to the Crown, not to any politician, and they are expected to act independently without fear or favour. It is a model that has stood the test of time, commands public confidence and deserves to be preserved. Although PCCs have used the formal Section 38 removal process only twice, several more have threatened to invoke proceedings, usually starting with suspension. In all these cases, this has resulted in the chief constable choosing to retire or resign rather than fight a public battle they are unlikely to win.
The Government now propose to move responsibility from PCCs to elected mayors, with council leaders taking the lead elsewhere through new policing and crime boards. On these Benches, we fear that this simply repeats the same mistakes in a different guise. The mayoral route in particular concentrates even more power in a single individual, often elected on a low turnout and with limited day-to-day scrutiny. What replaces PCCs must be better, not just different, and for the Liberal Democrats that means local police boards drawn from councillors and community representatives. Moving powers from one underscrutinised politician to another is not a solution.
Amendment 438EC would allow the Home Secretary to instruct a PCC to begin the dismissal process, effectively giving central government the power to fire chief constables. No individual, whether a PCC, mayor, council leader or Home Secretary, should hold unilateral power to dismiss a chief constable. Dismissal must remain possible where justified, but only through a fair and transparent process, with mandatory independent scrutiny.
That is the role of HMICFRS—to provide an external check, ensuring that decisions are based on competence, conduct and the public interest, not political convenience. I welcome the fact that the Home Secretary sought the inspectorate’s view in the West Midlands case, but that essential safeguard is missing from Amendment 438EC, which allows appointment of a person outside government or policing with too much scope for political influence, and only after the Home Secretary has already decided, making the process look uncomfortably like a rubber stamp. That is what Amendment 421 is designed to prevent.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment, which concerns the process by which police and crime commissioners may call on a chief constable to resign or retire. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has mentioned, the Government’s intention is to replace police and crime commissioners with a mayoral model or, in some cases in which the mayoral model is inappropriate, with a policing board made up of local councillors, and that will be brought forward in due course. Further details will be set out again in the policing White Paper. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, asked me when that would be produced. I say again to him the time-honoured phrase of “shortly”, but by shortly I do mean shortly; I hope he will not have too long to wait for the report be published as a White Paper. Self-evidently, it is a very complex document with lots of discussion items in it. Again, any legislative proposals in it will be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. I am not trying to short-change him, but we will give that detail in the near future.
As the noble Baroness has explained, the purpose of her amendment is to ensure that, before taking steps to dismiss a chief constable, a police and crime commissioner must first seek the views of HMICFRS. I agree that this is a desirable approach, and I am pleased to tell your Lordships that this is already in place as a requirement. The noble Baroness should know, and I hope that it is helpful to her, that under Section 38(3) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs may call upon the relevant chief constable to resign or retire. Before exercising this power, and under regulation 11A of the Police Regulations 2003, police and crime commissioners are required to seek the views of HM inspectorate in writing and provide them to the chief constable and the relevant police and crime panel, alongside their rationale for why the PCC is proposing to call for retirement or resignation. I appreciate that it is a confusing landscape to have regulations under the Act and under police regulations. However, the position currently is there in black and white, and what her amendment seeks to do is already enshrined in law.
The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place so I will not say too much now, if anything, about Amendment 438EC. However, because it was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, I want to place on record for the Committee the fact that the Home Secretary has already announced the Government’s intention to reintroduce the Home Secretary’s power to remove chief constables. It has been a difficult few weeks in the West Midlands and, following the changes that were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, it has highlighted the absence of such a power allowing the Home Secretary to act. We believe that action is needed, and I can assure your Lordships that this is high on the Government’s agenda. The White Paper is due in very short order. It will set out exactly the Government’s intentions in this regard and will be followed by legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows, because we need to make changes on a range of matters, not least the abolition of PCCs. I look forward to debating this with noble Lords across the House. However, if the noble Baroness accepts that, difficult though they are to find, the regulations and the requirement are there, I hope she will be able to withdraw her amendment for the moment. I look forward to further discussion when the other matters come before the House at some future point.
In view of what the Minister has just said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, forgive me, if I can beg your indulgence. In order for there not to be any confusion, I neglected to advise the Committee that my brother is a serving Metropolitan Police officer. I should have mentioned that earlier.
My Lords, these three amendments raise a difficult but important question: how should the law treat the use of lethal force by authorised firearms officers so as to protect both the public and those officers who act in good faith in dangerous situations?
Amendment 422 would make it clear in the Police (Conduct) Regulations that when an officer uses force based on a mistaken belief, that belief must be both honestly held and objectively reasonable. This reflects the Supreme Court’s decision in W80 and would give bereaved families, and communities that often feel over-policed, greater clarity and confidence in the system.
Amendment 423A would update Section 76 of the 2008 Act so that force used by an authorised firearms officer could never be treated as reasonable if it was grossly disproportionate to the situation as they saw it. That would set a clear upper limit on what can count as lawful force, drawing a boundary beyond which self-defence cannot reach, however real the threat appears.
From these Benches, we understand the intentions behind both amendments: the first writes the W80 test into disciplinary rules; the second provides clearer statutory guidance in firearms cases.
Amendment 423 goes further. It proposes that if an authorised firearms officer kills someone while acting under an honest but mistaken belief that the force used was necessary and reasonable, the conviction should be manslaughter rather than murder. We are concerned that this would, in effect, create a special route from murder to manslaughter for authorised firearms officers, one not available to others who also face life-and-death decisions.
When police use potentially unlawful lethal force, there must be full investigation, prosecution where appropriate, and robust disciplinary proceedings. The central question, then, is whether these amendments strike the right balance between public accountability and fair protection for officers who must make split-second decisions in life-threatening situations.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 422 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has had a detailed introduction, and I would like to abbreviate my remarks as a result.
The issue under consideration in that case was whether, in police disciplinary proceedings, a police officer could have a finding of misconduct against them if their use of force was found to be honest and mistaken but unreasonable. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate test was the civil law test and that an honest but mistaken belief that the use of force is necessary is justification for that use of force only if the belief is objectively reasonable.
Amendment 422 would place that judgment into statute. Regardless of the merits or otherwise of the Supreme Court’s ruling on whether the criminal or civil test should be applicable, I am not convinced that it needs to be codified into statute, because there now exists relevant case law at the highest level which can be applied by the IOPC and the courts in the future. It is not clear to me what benefit there would be in placing this into the regulations.
I would like to concentrate my remarks on Amendment 423 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, because I want to express my strong support for it. I believe firmly that we must support our armed police officers who regularly put themselves in danger. This amendment presents an opportunity to do that. It would create a defence to a charge of murder for authorised firearms officers who used lethal force in the honest but mistaken belief that such force was necessary and reasonable and convert a conviction for murder into manslaughter.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.
I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.
On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.
Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.
Some of the problems are to do with the sequential nature of the decision-making in these cases. Officers are often under jeopardy, first from the IOPC and then from the CPS. Then obviously it could go to court and there may be a finding of not guilty, but then—for firearms officers in cases where someone has died—the case can go back to a coroner’s inquest, which can find an unlawful killing verdict, at which point it goes back through the cycle again. That is one of the reasons why some of these problems are arising.
First, deadlines would be a good idea as either an advisory or a mandatory limit. Secondly, I do not understand why some of the people involved in the decision-making that I have described have to do it sequentially, not in parallel. For example, why can the CPS and the IOPC not decide together whether something is a crime or misconduct?
At the moment, not only are there many links in the chain that sometimes come to contradictory conclusions but, more importantly, it is taking too long. I argue that in all this there are two groups of people who suffer: one is firearms officers, the group whose case I am arguing, but the other is the families waiting to hear what is happening. If people have lost someone, they deserve to hear whether or not this is a crime or misconduct, but at the moment that is not happening.
This amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, is a sensible suggestion and I support it. If the Government do not, perhaps they would like to make some indication of how they intend to improve the misconduct system, particularly as it affects firearms officers in the circumstances I have described.
My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.
Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.
There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.
There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.
Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington for tabling his Amendment 422A and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for ably stepping into the breach to allow it to be debated. It is a very important matter and I am glad we have had a chance to debate it.
I am very sympathetic to the amendment’s goals. It aims to set a 12-month time limit for misconduct and gross misconduct investigations within police forces. As others have said, timely legal restitution is the only way that justice is effectively served. That applies both to those in the police who are under investigation and, obviously, to victims who are let down by delays that are needlessly, but often, the result of administrative workload. Applying a strict deadline for remedies, excepted under only extraordinary circumstances, is an easy way by which institutions can be encouraged to proceed with investigations in a timely fashion.
That said, I am a little wary of fully endorsing a blanket time limit on police forces for investigations. Although in some cases, perhaps even most, misconduct investigations can and should be sped up, it would be heedless to assume that all forces are simply being inefficient in the time that investigations take. There is a vast disparity between forces’ capacity to deal with their primary function of investigating crime, let alone with administrative internal matters, such as misconduct matters. Certain forces’ ability to spare the resources to source, for instance, legally qualified adjudicators should not, therefore, be assumed. Officer numbers are down, crime is up, and we should be careful about placing additional requirements on police forces that expedited conduct investigations might entail.
Of course, we support the aim of increasing efficiency and ensuring justice is delivered. I thank my noble friend for his amendment and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
My Lords, from these Benches we support a carefully framed presumption of anonymity for firearms officers facing criminal charges, but we believe that it should be tightly drawn and subject to clear judicial safeguards.
Giving automatic anonymity to firearms officers who face criminal charges would mark a major and highly sensitive change. It deserves careful and measured consideration and scrutiny to strike the right balance. The public must have confidence that wrongdoing by officers will be dealt with fairly and transparently. But equally—and I think this is very important—officers must feel assured that if they act in good faith and follow their training, the system will protect and not punish them.
We welcome the wider provisions of the Bill to strengthen police accountability, particularly those speeding up investigations by the IOPC, but we understand why firearms officers seek reassurance. These are exceptionally difficult and high-risk roles, where hesitation can have tragic consequences. With fewer than 6,000 operational firearms officers across England and Wales, those concerns cannot be lightly dismissed.
At the same time, we recognise the force of the arguments made by those noble Lords who support the stand part notices proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and accept that a broad, inflexible anonymity system sits uneasily with the principle of open justice. The public have a legitimate right to know when those entrusted with legal powers are alleged to have acted unlawfully. Our preference is for a statutory presumption in favour of anonymity in firearms cases, rebuttable when the court is satisfied that identification is necessary in the interests of justice or public confidence.
We should trust our judges to apply a clear statutory test, protecting officers where necessary, while safeguarding the principles of open justice on which confidence in policing depends. A narrowly tailored presumption, coupled with robust judicial oversight, can provide the reassurance that firearms officers need without creating the perception of a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else. Of course, rebuilding trust in policing must be our shared priority, and ultimately that rests not on secrecy but on transparency, fairness and confidence that accountability will apply equally to all.
Thankfully, fatal police shootings are rare, and it is even rarer still for such cases to reach the courts. In these exceptional, highly charged cases, a carefully limited presumption of anonymity is a reasonable and proportionate step to keep skilled officers in these vital roles, while upholding open justice.
My Lords, as I think we all agree, this is a profoundly important issue, and one in which there is realistically no perfectly right answer. But let us start with the position that it remains one of the greatest triumphs of British policing that to this day we do not routinely have armed police officers. The image envisaged by Sir Robert Peel when he established the Metropolitan Police—that of policing by consent and the avoidance of a militarised police force, when he had the example of what he saw on continental Europe at the time—has endured. I have listened anxiously to the speeches today, which have been thoughtful and balanced. But we start, on this side, in His Majesty’s Opposition, with the view that on balance the approach of Clauses 152 to 155 is the right one. I shall say more about that in a moment.
While the vast majority of police officers in this country are unarmed, we know that, in order to protect the public, a few thousand brave officers volunteer to put themselves in harm’s way and become authorised firearms officers. The latest figures show that, as of 31 March 2025, there were 6,367 firearms officers in England and Wales. Of those, 5,753 were operationally deployable. That represented a decrease of 108—or 2%—from the previous year. There is a downward trend in the number of armed police officers, which should be a matter of concern to us all. It has to be arrested.
It is not hard to see why fewer and fewer officers are willing to take on this role. The recent prosecution of, and events surrounding, Martyn Blake demonstrate what can go wrong. Throughout, Martyn Blake was public property. He was left in limbo for two years while awaiting an IOPC investigation, a CPS decision and then a murder trial. As we have heard, he was eventually acquitted in October 2024. Despite that acquittal, the IOPC then announced that it was launching a further investigation for gross misconduct. This remains unresolved. Through all of that, he has been publicly known to everyone.
Matt Cane, the general secretary of the Metropolitan Police Federation, has criticised that in the strongest terms—with which we, on this side, broadly agree. The concern and criticisms which he raised have real-world consequences. Police officers feel that their reasonable use of force may be treated disproportionately or unreasonably after the event in a manner which does not recognise the pressures they face when they make split-second decisions.
During the trial of Martyn Blake, dozens of officers handed in their weapons. There was a serious concern that, in the event of a guilty verdict, police forces across the country would be faced with real, severe shortages of armed officers. The publicity given to all that must have been an aggravating factor for Mr Blake. We have to protect these police officers.
We have heard powerful speeches, from the proposer, my noble friend Lord Black, my noble friend Lady Cash and others, not least the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Garnier, either in full support of these stand part notices or asking us to look very carefully at them with a view to doing something along those lines.
There are important issues to consider: open justice; whether or not there should be special treatment for police officers; and concerns about unintended consequences. I remind the Committee of the provisions in Clause 152(3), which says that the court must, first,
“cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”;
then come the identification details. The court must also
“give a reporting direction … in respect of D”—
the defendant—
“(if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.
This is putting in place a presumption which can be rebutted.
I feel that this is rather broad. In practice, it would be helpful for the courts and for those who have to deal with applications to act on that presumption and to lift that bar, if this was put rather more clearly, with some examples. I do not have any to put before the Committee today, but I came to that view when listening to the debate. I invite the Government to think very carefully about whether something should be done about the terms in the clause. This might go quite a way to addressing the concerns of those who are legitimately concerned about the wrong sort of special treatment being given to police officers, and about open justice more generally.
I thank the noble Baroness very much.
At the moment the rule of law is not for us all, as exemplified by the way we treat police in some cases. On pensions, why do the Government prefer decisions about pension forfeiture to be taken later behind closed doors rather than in open court, where reasons are given and can be tested on appeal? If a judge has heard all the evidence in a criminal case involving a police officer, and has seen the harm done and the abuse of trust, why do the Government think that a judge should have no say at all over a publicly funded police pension?
I ask this out of long experience. We have been told for decades now that existing systems are enough or that reforms are coming, and clearly that is not happening. I personally would like to see, instead of these little baby steps, a bold, straightforward move towards the kind of accountability that people can see and understand. Time and again, in cases of serious police misconduct, the consequences remain unclear and invisible to the public.
From the public’s point of view, the current system makes very little sense. Some serious criminal convictions of police officers fall outside the pensions rule altogether, simply because they do not meet a narrow legal definition. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why judges who hear the evidence are excluded and why transparency in court is still seen as a step too far.
When this Labour Government got elected, I really hoped for some changes in the way that we apply a sense of fairness to the whole of our legal system. Quite honestly, they have disappointed me very badly. They are no better than this side of the Chamber. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, we have been waiting a long time for this, and a Labour Government should really put it right.
My Lords, both these amendments seek to sharpen the consequences for police officers, serving or retired, who commit criminal offences. High-profile cases and damning reports have exposed toxic elements of policing culture, eroding public trust. Yet the vast majority of police officers do an excellent job and are let down by a small minority. Recent cases highlight public expectations that the law should rightly demand higher standards of personal integrity from police officers and, at the very least, adherence to the law of the land.
There is also no question but that public confidence in policing’s ability to police its own is fragile. While the latest figures from the Independent Office for Police Conduct show record high complaints, over a quarter of the public lack confidence in the organisation itself, most cannot even describe what it does, and nearly half distrust the police complaints system. That should give us pause for thought, because it is really quite serious.
When officers are seen to evade scrutiny or punishment, trust erodes further. This has major repercussions for those doing the job properly, because many members of the public then say, “Well, they’re all the same, aren’t they?” I fully accept the noble Baroness’s argument that more can and should be done.
Amendment 425 would create a rebuttable presumption that police service can be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing. This rightly recognises the unique betrayal of public trust when those entrusted to uphold the law instead break it. However, I have a concern that in marginal cases, being a police officer could flip from helping to reduce the sentence, as somebody who has served the public, to becoming an automatic burden.
Amendment 426 goes further, granting courts the power to forfeit a sizeable chunk of an offender’s police pension. This could serve as a highly effective deterrent. However, I worry on two counts. First, it could discourage quality recruits, who fear that one mistake could destroy their and their family’s lifetime financial security. Secondly, it could entail taking away pension benefits that the officer has already earned fairly during what were presumably good years of service.
These amendments definitely merit serious consideration, but they also focus on symptoms rather than causes. From these Benches, we want to see the Government go further to strengthen the front line of police misconduct systems, with vetting that catches risks early and misconduct processes that are swift, transparent and trusted. Only then will sentencing reforms such as this land with any amount of force.
My Lords, Amendment 427 concerns one of the most vital levers for improving the performance and professionalism of our police service: the training of front-line officers. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review of the training that officers receive once deployed by their forces. At present, the College of Policing sets national standards and issues codes and regulations, but it cannot force them to comply. Implementation depends on the forces themselves, the Home Office and inspectorates to give those standards real force. The result is uneven training and a postcode lottery for the public.
It is important to do that, but I also say to the noble Baroness that the police are not mental health experts, nor should we expect them to be. At the end of the day, they will be the first responders who have to identify and support people. The work on the Right Care, Right Person project over the last two years by police and health partners, to ensure that people who are in mental health crisis get the right response from the right person with the right training and skills at the right time, is important. That work has shown a decrease in unwarranted police intervention in mental health pathways. We want people with a mental health challenge to have support. The police are dealing with the crisis in the moment, and perhaps the consequential behaviour of the crisis, rather than the underlying long-term trends.
There will always be a role for police in dealing with mental health calls where there is a risk of serious harm. It is important that police have access to relevant health information and use their police powers to do that.
Importantly, as I have mentioned already, there is an important set of training material available, which goes to points that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, mentioned. The College of Police’s mental health training is for all new officers to go through. There is an additional suite of training material I have referred to that provide, I hope, the approach to the culture change that the noble Baroness is seeking. This training provides officers with knowledge to recognise what mental health challenges there are and to communicate with and support people exhibiting such indicators.
I think this is a worthwhile discussion, but I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that it would be helpful to withdraw the amendment now, and we will reflect on the outcome of the White Paper in due course.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and my noble friend Lady Brinton for her summing up, which I thought was excellent. I just want to make a couple of quick points.
I am very much aware that the College of Policing determines what training should be provided for police officers. However, the point I was making—perhaps not strongly enough—is that the training does not work. The training is inappropriate; every police chief will tell you that. HMICFRS, which is the inspectorate, has said on multiple occasions and in multiple reports that the training is inadequate and there need to be changes, and nothing has happened. I honestly think that, whatever happens, there has to be an independent national audit of police training because there has not been one since 2012. The last one was a PEEL inspection, which examined individual forces but not the national picture.
I am so looking forward to the Minister’s White Paper. I cannot even begin to describe how excited I am about it. I think I am correct in saying that the Minister has referred to it—that it will solve all our problems—in almost every topic we have ever discussed. My only concern is that, if it contains as many subjects and if it is going to solve as many problems as the Minister suggests, it will probably be more like an encyclopaedia than a White Paper. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 429 and 430, in my name. An effective, responsive and trusted police service must be built from the ground up, not imposed from the top down. I hope the forthcoming White Paper will start from that premise and reflect the Government’s stated commitment to community policing.
The Minister will no doubt highlight the neighbourhood policing guarantee and the promise of named officers in every community, and much of the Bill is described as strengthening neighbourhood officers’ ability to tackle the priorities of most concern to local communities—respect orders, tighter shoplifting laws and new vehicle seizure powers. However, none of this addresses the central challenge for chief constables: how to deliver on these promises amid rising demand, high turnover and chronic funding shortfalls. Front-line delivery depends on forces retaining officers in visible community roles rather than constantly redeploying them to plug shortages elsewhere.
Despite the new neighbourhood policing grant, the early signs are troubling. Last month, Cheshire police announced a 70% cut in PCSO numbers, from 87 to 27, despite public opposition, citing the need to save £13 million. Nationally too, PCSO numbers fell by 3.3% in the year to March 2025—a loss equivalent to 253 full-time officers—while front counters continue to close, and more and more school liaison programmes disappear.
This simply is not good enough. Public confidence rests on local responsiveness, yet neighbourhood policing teams today have about 10,000 fewer officers and PCSOs than in 2015. The police inspectorate has warned that some forces lack sufficient neighbourhood officers to deal effectively with anti-social behaviour, with huge variations of service across the country. Between 2019 and 2023, over 4 million anti-social behaviour incidents were not attended by an officer in person. Some forces responded to every report; others to very few. Of course, trusted neighbourhood officers are critical to tackling not only anti-social behaviour but knife crime, domestic abuse and retail theft, to name just a few.
Amendment 429 therefore seeks to guarantee for every local authority area a dedicated neighbourhood policing team protected from being routinely diverted to fill response gaps, and to require an annual Home Office report on the state of community policing.
Amendment 430 would make it a statutory duty for forces to maintain neighbourhood teams at effective staffing levels, the level to be determined by forces, councils, communities and ward panels to ensure that resources meet local demand. To support this, we propose ring-fencing 20% of future police grants, supplemented by a share of recovered proceeds of crime. This approach preserves operational flexibility. Forces could, of course, choose to exceed the minimum level if they so wished. I urge the Government to work with these Benches towards our shared goal—restoring visible, trusted and effective neighbourhood policing. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling Amendments 429 and 430. Neighbourhood policing is one of the most important facets of the job, and we support any approach that intends to increase the presence of officers within neighbourhood communities. It is all consistent and very much part of the approach of that great Conservative Sir Robert Peel. Visible police presence on the streets of local communities is an incredibly important role. There is the obvious consequence that more officers out on patrol results in more crime being deterred and prevented, but the latent impact is that more noticeable, familiar and engaged officers contribute to an atmosphere of order and civility within local neighbourhoods—in other words, generally better behaviour.
The Government work closely with the Police Federation and will always listen and gauge the situation with them. I have met the chair of the Police Federation on a number of occasions, and other Ministers in government do the same. We will engage with that body. Like other federations or any form of trade union—although it is not a trade union—there will on occasion be differences between the organisation, the police chiefs and the Government, as is perfectly natural. I believe that we are investing in supporting police officers on the ground to do a better job in what they are trying to do and ensuring that the Government undertake a focus on neighbourhood policing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks. On that basis, I urge her to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for his response. I do not think that we are miles and miles apart. To be clear, I would never do anything that I thought chief constables would not be very much in favour of. They do a fantastic and astonishing job, and I would never do anything that I thought would be operationally wrong for them.
Our amendments are designed to complement what the Government are trying to do, but our aim is to ensure that all communities receive a guaranteed minimum level of visible local policing attached to the funding that makes that happen. I look forward to discussing in further detail with the Minister how that can happen. We are not miles apart and I am sure that when we see this mythical White Paper it will give us all the answers that we require. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, powerful AI tools are transforming policing and reshaping how forces investigate, patrol and make decisions, often with profound implications. This amendment would make it a legal requirement for forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in this way that might affect a person’s rights or freedoms.
The Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, ATRS, provides a consistent way for public bodies to explain how their algorithmic tools work, what data they use and how human oversight is maintained. Its goal is a public, searchable record of these systems. Use of the ATRS is mandatory for arm’s-length bodies delivering public services, though the previous Government did not extend that to the police, despite calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life and from the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.
The College of Policing has now integrated the ATRS into its authorised professional practice. Forces are expected to complete an ATRS report for all relevant tools. That is welcome progress. The hope is that forces will increasingly comply to build public trust and meet their equality and data protection duties. However, while compliance is now expected, failure to record a tool is still not a legal requirement. A force could still choose not to use the ATRS, citing operational necessity, and it would not be breaking any law.
Transparency is vital across public services but nowhere more so than in policing, where these systems have the power to alter lives and restrict liberty. That is why Justice and civil liberties groups such as the Ada Lovelace and Alan Turing institutes want police use of these tools to be publicly declared and for this to be placed on a statutory footing. What is ultimately needed is a national register with real legal force—something the NPCC’s own AI lead has called for.
Government work on such a register is under way. I welcome that project but it will take time, while AI capabilities advance very rapidly indeed. The ATRS is the mechanism we have for now. This amendment would immediately strengthen it, requiring every operational AI tool from facial recognition to predictive mapping to be publicly declared.
Why does this matter? Take gait analysis, identifying people by how they move. No UK force has declared that it uses it, but its potential is recognised. Ireland is already legislating for its use in serious crime. Without a legal duty here, a UK force could deploy gait analysis tomorrow, with no public knowledge or oversight, just as facial recognition pilots proceed today with limited transparency.
This year, forces will spend nearly £2 billion on digital technology and analytics. With growing demand and limited resources, it is no surprise at all that forces turn to AI for efficiency. Yet, without total transparency, this technological shift risks further eroding public trust. Recognition of that need is growing. No one wants to return to the Met’s unlawful gangs matrix, quietly risk-scoring individuals on dubious grounds. For that reason, I urge the Government to accept this vital safeguard. It is a foundation for accountability in a field that will only grow in power and in consequence. I beg to move.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Doocey explained, Amendment 431 seeks to place a statutory duty on every police force in England and Wales to disclose its use of algorithmic tools where they affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals.
We are witnessing a rapid proliferation of algorithmic decision-making in policing, from predictive mapping to risk assessment tools used in custody suites. Algorithms are increasingly informing how the state interacts with the citizen, yet too often these tools operate in a black box, hidden from public view and democratic scrutiny. As we have discussed in relation to other technologies such as facial recognition, the deployment of advanced technology without a clear framework undermines public trust.
This amendment requires police forces, as my noble friend explained, to complete entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard. The ATRS is the Government’s own standard for algorithmic transparency, developed to ensure public sector accountability. My Private Member’s Bill on public authority algorithmic and automated decision-making allows for a more advanced form of reporting. In my view, the ATRS is the bare minimum required for accountability for AI use in the public sector.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Yesterday, I looked at the public ATRS repository that is meant to record what AI tools police forces are deploying. It contained only two entries for police AI tools, even though we know that many are already being used, including systems such as live facial recognition, which is not listed at all. A great deal of AI development takes place within individual police forces, rather than through national programmes, and there are several reasons why these tools may not be appearing in the central record. Some forces believe that putting information on their own website is sufficient to meet transparency requirements. Others may avoid reporting tools by categorising them simply as standard software rather than as algorithms or AI systems. There may also be worries about publishing full information which could make it easier for defence lawyers to challenge decisions in court.
I think, therefore, that both the Government and we are clear—as well as the Official Opposition—that there absolutely is a problem that needs to be addressed, because it is not being addressed at the moment. AI is moving at such a rapid pace that this is not something that can be kicked into the long grass; it really needs to be addressed now. I therefore look forward to seeing the proposals that the Government are going to come forward with—I will not mention the war or the White Paper—but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 432 seeks to press the Government on their plans to address long-standing problems of fragmented police and criminal justice data systems. I must tell noble Lords that I was working on this very subject when I was a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, which I left more than 16 years ago, and the system has neither changed nor got any better. The recent national audit on group-based child sexual exploitation produced by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, described policing’s data intelligence infrastructure as antiquated and identified systemic failures that continue to put children at serious risk. The audit also highlighted the wider paucity of technology underpinning policing.
These concerns echo what has been said for many years, and when I served on the Metropolitan Police Authority, the same warnings had already been voiced about creaking systems that did not keep pace with the demands placed on them. Yet despite endless reviews, there is still no fully integrated digital system linking the police with the rest of the criminal justice system.
Fragmented, outdated IT undermines public protection more broadly. Officers’ time is wasted on manual workarounds; investigative opportunities are missed; prosecutions are delayed, and known risks are not always identified, let alone shared. As digital evidence proliferates and crime becomes more cross-border and complex, the lack of seamless data sharing between forces and agencies becomes even more damaging.
Concerns about poor IT integration between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service were being formally raised as far back as the late 1990s. A major joint inspection published in July 2025 reiterated that the CPS case management system was never designed to interface properly with the 43 different police IT systems, contributing to delays, low charge rates and victim frustration. In other words, the same structural problems persist nearly three decades on.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will certainly defer to the noble Baroness’s knowledge of the Procurement Bill because I think it went through the House before I was in the House. I am happy to share what detail that we can under the details of that Act. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness.
I will also go away and look at the issue of capital funding. I am afraid I do not have the figures in front of me, but of course it is important that we fund all these systems adequately. We would contend that, unfortunately, for the past 14 years some of the investment in policing that we would have liked to see has been lacking, and we have been very clear about our wider approach as a Government to investing, particularly in neighbourhood policing but in policing at all levels. We want to improve on recent experience.
I thank the Minister for his response, but I am, frankly, gobsmacked at his suggestion that my amendment was not needed because the Home Office had a role in deciding what IT the police had and making sure that they had what they needed. For more than two decades, report after report has documented the same weaknesses: fragmented systems, wasted effort, and vital intelligence lost between agencies. People who did not understand would find it almost impossible to believe that vital intelligence can be lost between agencies, but it has been happening for years and years. We cannot keep treating this as a series of isolated IT upgrades that are needed when what is needed is a national strategy, with clear responsibility and sustained investment. There is no way past that; that is what is needed and it is what must be provided. This amendment does not prescribe the solution. It simply asks for leadership and for a timetable to deliver what everyone thinks is now essential.
The Minister mentioned talking to different people and finding out what was needed. All you have to do is talk to 43 chief constables and they will tell you exactly what is needed, for free. We do not have to go out to thousands of people and run various inquiries, taking days and months trying to work out what is needed. Everyone knows what is needed: the money, the will and the leadership. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI, too, support the shortest of all the amendments. My noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe’s Amendment 438A gets to what needs to happen without a lot of description. I have always felt that brevity is the best answer to a problem, because you know what is being asked for. I want to congratulate him on putting in this amendment. Every organisation will face this question of suicide and, if there is a way of collecting the data and working out why, that is necessary. I believe that the duty of candour is not simply about the way the police treat citizens; it is also about the way the organisation treats the police service. There must be a duty of candour from the chief officer and, of course, the Home Office has a part to play. I support this wonderful short amendment, because that is what needs to happen. With a much longer amendment, I am afraid that what is simple will be lost in quite a lot of detail, which is not what we want.
My Lords, from these Benches there is strong support for Amendments 435 and 438A, which would finally shine a light on one of the most sensitive and least discussed aspects of police welfare: suicide and attempted suicide among officers and staff. This is not about apportioning blame; it is about creating conditions in which people can seek help early and leaders cannot look away. Nearly two years ago I sought this very information and was assured that work was happening to collate it. Yet no figures have emerged, leaving families, colleagues and policymakers in the dark, still awaiting clarity and transparency. These amendments would ensure that bereaved families do not feel that their loss has been silently absorbed and they would confront the lingering stigma around mental ill health in policing.
Policing demands a particular duty of care that transcends the ordinary employer-employee relationship, as the state requires officers to face repeated trauma that is unparalleled in any other walk of life. We are now operating in what many describe as a crisis policing model, where officers spend most of their time dealing with the darkest parts of human experience with far fewer opportunities to balance that with visible neighbourhood-based work. In the past, time spent on community policing would lift them out of the dark place. Today, that release valve is much weaker. Much of the informal support that once existed has disappeared. Officers used to have shared spaces where they could decompress together at the end of a shift, but those communal areas have largely gone. From staff sifting through distressing online material every day to front-line officers facing the increasing likelihood of physical assault, the psychological strain is relentless. This feeds a siege mentality in a service that still struggles to recognise emotion and is not naturally open.
Policing remains an environment where taking paternity leave can invite mockery and where the burden can fall especially heavily on women and minority officers amid unreported discrimination. In too many forces, officers still fear that admitting vulnerability will derail their career progression. If Parliament seeks people to shoulder that burden on our behalf, it must insist on collecting basic information. Tracking suicides and attempted suicides would pinpoint hotspots and high-risk groups, enabling proactive measures such as resilience training, peer support and routine psychological screening. I urge the Minister to take these amendments back to the Home Office and consider bringing forward concrete proposals on Report.
My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing this matter to the attention of the Committee. The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, and I know all too well the stresses and strains of policing. It is vital that more is done to support our officers. I approach these amendments from the fact that it is impossible to address what we do not measure and, at this moment, policing has almost no reliable national mechanism for measuring accurately the total number of police suicides.
Data from the Police Federation of England and Wales shows that more than 100 police officers and staff have died by suicide between 2022 and 2025, with at least 70 officer deaths and over 200 attempted suicides in that period. Those figures are likely undercounts because there is no statutory requirement for forces to record such events. The federation has also revealed troubling trends in how these incidents are linked with organisational stresses—notably, that 47 of 70 suicides and 173 of 236 attempted suicides that it has identified between 2022 and 2025 involved officers under investigation for misconduct or criminal allegations. That is not simply a statistic; it is a human tragedy that echoes through families, colleagues and communities.
As has been said, police forces are not required to record suicide or attempted suicide, meaning that the true scale of the problem is hidden from view and national suicide statistics do not treat policing as a risk occupation, as they should. Without a statutory duty to record and report, we are asking police leaders to act in good faith alone, with widely inconsistent results. Two of the largest police forces in England and Wales reportedly could not provide their own figures when the federation asked. The amendments would end that inconsistency by placing responsibility for data collection and publication on a statutory footing.
The amendments are not a step taken in isolation from policing leadership. The National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing are already committed to suicide prevention across the service. They have jointly endorsed a national consensus statement on working together to prevent suicide in the police service in England and Wales, acknowledging the importance of reducing stigma and improving well-being. The College of Policing also leads on national suicide prevention guidance and professional practice, emphasising the duty of forces to recognise inherent risk factors associated with police work and to promote supportive interventions. However, guidance and consensus alone cannot ensure consistent national reporting or create the accountability that comes from an annual report, laid before Parliament, which analyses trends, contributory factors and the effectiveness of support mechanisms under the police covenant.
Requiring chief constables to certify compliance and linking non-compliance to inspection through HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services will ensure that this is not simply a bureaucratic exercise but a real driver for change. However, without consistent mandatory data, these efforts lack the firm foundation needed to evaluate progress and target interventions where they are most needed. We on these Benches fully support the amendments.
My Lords, I totally support Amendment 436 on the collection of enforcement data; the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, have explained well why I do. But I am rising to speak to Amendment 437 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, calling for a review of police paperwork. I will just explain why. I have put my name on a number of amendments that require more data collection, which might sound contradictory. But we need more granular and accurate data, while ensuring that data is streamlined and necessary, rather than collected just for the sake of it. In that sense, there is no contradiction.
The review of paperwork is necessary to identify and cut out all the endless and needless form-filling that police officers are forced to do. Whenever you talk to rank and file police officers, one of the most voluble frustrations that they voice is the ever-growing regime of paperwork and bureaucracy. They complain that they did not sign up to become pen-pushers and this is hardly what they envisaged when they joined the force.
More seriously, we have just heard a very moving debate on the mental health challenges faced by some police officers. I do not want to be glib, but when you talk to police officers, they will often say that they are tearing their hair out and completely demoralised because of the amount of bureaucracy that they face—so it is worth bearing that in mind.
The impressive multiplication of the number of forms the police have to fill out could be interpreted as indicative of the scientification or the professionalisation of police work, as the bureaucratic regime’s apologists would have us believe. I think the duplication of information, which is often banal, indicates a stifling bureaucratisation of policing and a trend that is reiterated by officers as impeding their ability to respond to crime or engage in proactive crime solving.
I want to use an example from some years ago. I was a victim of a very nasty, unpleasant mugging. I reported it to the police, as one does, and they were hyperactive in their response. I got a very nice letter reassuring me that they were there for me as a victim. got a form to fill in, asking whether I had had the right kind of support as a victim. I even had a follow-up phone call to find out why I had not filled out my form and to make sure I was okay. The problem was that at no point did anyone visit me in the sense of attempting to apprehend the person who had committed the mugging. That never came up. It was all about my feelings about being a victim of crime, rather than solving the crime. Imagine how much paperwork went into that. I was bemused, but infuriated as well.
We would like this review to ask how paperwork has proliferated. Certain people argue that the process-driven approach to policing is created by risk aversion—the police covering their own backs, potentially. It might be that it is an obsession with communication. There is certainly a lot of press releasing done, tweets put out and so on. The main thing is that we have to get to the bottom of what is creating it. I think—there will be a discussion on this on a later group—that a lot of the work generated does not have anything to do with core policing. When I talk to police officers I know, they say they are engaged in a wide range of activity related to equality, diversity and inclusion initiatives, which are also bureaucratic in terms of the kind of things that they have to do. We heard about non-crime hate incidents on a previous group. How many hours are spent investigating those? There is also a great deal of paperwork being generated by that, and hopefully we have seen the back of them.
Perhaps this amendment is kicking at an open door. I am hoping for a positive response from the Minister because the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, has made similar points. It seems that cutting red tape is a part of what the Home Office is trying to do, so I am delighted about that.
I have a couple of reservations. I am slightly worried that the solution for cutting red tape that has been put forward is a greater use of AI. I am all for sensible use of technology, but I note that West Midlands Police recently took a shortcut and cut back on a lot of hours of paperwork that would have been wasted in a proper investigation in relation to the Maccabi Tel Aviv football game with Aston Villa. The problem with that shortcut and paper-saving exercise was that as a consequence it came up with a non-existent football match to justify the banning of the Israeli fans, as we know. Recent research by businesses has shown that for every 10 hours apparently saved by the use of AI, four hours are used checking errors and fact-checking AI output. They have had to bring in extra staff to do that particular type of work.
Finally, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville- Rolfe, on her reservations about the licensing of police officers. I am afraid that fills me with horror. Credentialism is notorious for being more bureaucratisation. If you want any evidence, just look at the university sector and what is happening on that in certain sectors.
My Lords, Amendment 437 calls for a review of the volume of paperwork that police officers must complete in the course of their duties. This is one of the most persistent frustrations voiced by front-line officers. Despite the introduction of a new digital case file system, the use of automatic redaction tools and simplified disclosure guidance, the core problem remains: a combination of the pre-charge full file requirement and an onerous disclosure regime. We share the noble Baroness’s concerns, but we do not believe a review is the answer. The evidence is already on the table, as are the solutions.
Baroness Doocey
Main Page: Baroness Doocey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Doocey's debates with the Home Office
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 438EB is inspired by the 999 Injured and Forgotten campaign, led by Tom Curry, a detective forced to retire after suffering a life-changing injury on duty, weeks before reaching 22 years of service. In 2023, Tom launched a petition calling for a new medal for police injured on duty and discharged from the service, and it has since expanded to include all public servants.
Every day, emergency responders put their lives on the line to protect the public. Tragically, within policing alone, more than 16,000 officers have suffered catastrophic injuries in the course of their service and have had to give up their careers as a result. Yet there is currently no formal means of recognising their sacrifice. Like Tom, many injured officers miss out on long service and good conduct medals, which now require 20 years of sustained service. Gallantry awards elude most assault victims, who are typically ambushed from behind, depriving them of the opportunity to show valour.
The Elizabeth Emblem was created in 2024 to rightly honour public servants killed in the line of duty. On these Benches, we believe it is wrong that those whose lives have been changed irrevocably through injury are overlooked. This is a modest amendment. It simply asks the Government to consider the merits of such an award and to lay a report on it before Parliament. Although the Bill’s scope does not allow me to include all those we believe should be eligible, this would be an important step towards formal recognition of injured survivors and to honour the brave work of our emergency services. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for this amendment and the case she put forward. It is absolutely axiomatic that we must honour and recognise those brave police officers who put their safety at risk to protect the public. During my police service, I saw many acts whereby officers placed themselves in the most dangerous of situations with little recognition. If I had time, I would be keen to relate some of those instances to noble Lords; some of them, of course, had consequences. There is certainly some merit in the proposal. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what the Home Office might suggest on this.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we owe our emergency service workers a massive debt of thanks for the work they do to keep us safe and for always answering the call when we need help. When dedicated public servants suffer serious injuries in the course of their duties, it is incumbent on us, as a state and as a society, to wrap our arms around them, so to speak, and ensure that they are given all the support they need.
I am sure we all agree that the list of public servants who risk and suffer injuries during the course of their duties is not limited to police officers; this was reflected in the noble Baroness’s comments. Other emergency services, such as our brave firefighters, ambulance workers and other emergency service workers, also face great risk of injury on duty. Any consideration will have to include them alongside police staff—I think the whole Chamber would agree on that—though I note that the text of the amendment refers to police officers alone. I hope the noble Baroness takes that in the spirit in which it is intended.
Noble Lords will be aware that the police are already eligible for a number of medals, including for long or exemplary service, for specific celebrations such as a Coronation or jubilee, and for gallantry. Individuals who suffer injury as a result of their efforts to prevent loss of life can and have been successfully put forward for formal gallantry awards. This includes Sergeant Timothy Ansell of Greater Manchester Police, who was injured coming to the aid of a colleague and received a King’s Commendation for Bravery in October.
Although I recognise that the threshold for these awards is high, and rightly so, there are many incidents which can and should be put forward but which currently fall below the radar. The Home Office has been driving work to increase the number of gallantry nominations for the police, and I encourage any noble Lords who have cases to put forward to do so via the Cabinet Office website.
Work to identify whether a medal is the best method of recognising emergency service workers who are injured as a result of their duties and whether it is viable is ongoing. However, I point out that in this country, all medals are a gift from the Government on behalf of the monarch. They are instituted by royal warrant and sit firmly under royal prerogative powers. It would therefore be inappropriate to legislate for such a medal, potentially cutting across the powers that rightly rest with His Majesty the King. On the understanding that this is a matter that is actively under consideration, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his support. I also pay tribute to Tom Morrison MP, who previously highlighted this campaign in the other place. Those people who put themselves on the line for us in the course of duty really ought to be honoured. I take the Minister’s point that it is not in the gift of the Government to do this and that we should not legislate, but I hope that whoever has the power will be persuaded to do something like this. It does not have to be a medal, but it needs to recognise that people who put themselves on the line need to be appropriately rewarded—I do not mean monetarily; I mean a proper reward. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I want to come in on the remarks of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and his support of Amendment 445. I have a great deal of sympathy, and I have spoken in other debates that he has had about these matters in the past. I am completely convinced that he is right in his exhortation to us as a country to define some fundamental values to which we should all subscribe.
My only reservation about this amendment is about listing values prior to a national conversation and resolution and some premeditative thought about what a list of British values should contain, being very clear that we are not rubbing up against other parts of legislation covered elsewhere. I can see the attractiveness of this kind of list in general, but it would worry me a great deal.
The example I give is proposed new subsection (2)(e), “respect for the environment”. I see what the attempted definition of the environment is, but I respectfully say that that would apply to any country and is not necessarily British in terms of its value, as is the case with several of the other items on the list. I advocate bringing it back on Report with more generalised language rather than being so specific, or perhaps leaving this for another piece of legislation that is more directly concerned with it.
My Lords, I fully endorse the comments made by my noble friend Lady Brinton, and I want to raise a couple of other issues. I am particularly disappointed to see no reference in Part 14 to safeguarding, risk assessments or multi-agency consultation beyond youth offending teams. This fails to heed the lessons of the Southport inquiry, which highlighted serious failures in information sharing, in part because the perpetrator was under 18, alongside failures to conduct forensic risk or mental health assessments. Without mandatory input from local organisations such as schools, social services and mental health teams, there is a real risk that youth diversion orders will repeat Southport’s tragic oversights.
On Amendment 445, which would require those subject to a youth diversion order to receive citizenship education in British values, we understand and have no problem with the intent. Helping young people develop a positive sense of civic life and shared values is a worthwhile aim. But we believe that if such education is to be offered, it should sit within mainstream or voluntary youth provision as support, not as a condition of a terrorism-labelled civic order. Linking values education to a coercive measure risks blurring the line between welfare and enforcement and could undermine both the legitimacy of the order and the educational goal itself. While we support early diversion, we need stronger safeguards to protect both the wider public and vulnerable children.