Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this debate on behalf of His Majesty’s Official Opposition. It will come as no surprise to noble Lords on the Government Front Bench that we on these Benches broadly support the Bill, because large parts of it are a copy-and-paste job from the previous Conservative Government’s Criminal Justice Bill. From the provisions on anti-social behaviour to the new offence of cuckooing, the duty to report child sexual abuse and the new protest and public order offences, this Government are continuing the work we were doing to strengthen the criminal justice system. This is, of course, very welcome, but it does not mean that all is plain sailing.

The feeling among the British public is that crime has been increasing, even though overall rates of crime have fallen since 2010. The Crime Survey for England and Wales for the year ending March 2025 shows that there were 9.4 million incidents of headline crime. Although this represents a 7% rise from the previous year, the ONS states that this is due entirely to a 31% increase in fraud.

Undoubtedly, a significant factor in this overall feeling of pessimism is the increase in more visible crimes that impact people’s daily lives. Shoplifting, phone theft, graffiti, vandalism, fare evasion and drug use are highly visible crimes that leave people feeling unsafe in their daily lives. Shoplifting, for example, has risen by 20% in the year from 2024 to 2025.

The National Police Chiefs’ Council has pointed to an estimated £1.2 billion shortfall in police funding. The chair of the NPCC has said that the funding settlement in the spending review will “cover little more” than police pay rises. Chief Constable Paul Sanford has warned that the Government will find it “incredibly difficult” to meet their neighbourhood policing pledge with the funding settlement. The Metropolitan Police has already announced that it will have to cut 1,700 staff, scrap its dedicated anti-social behaviour officers and close down half of the front desks in stations across London.

This strikes at the heart of a wider principle. Is this Crime and Policing Bill, which runs to over 200 clauses and over 20 schedules, actually going to reduce crime on the streets of this country? In some ways, it might, but in many others, unless coupled with serious improvements in enforcement and police action, it may very well not.

To turn to the Bill, the Government have committed three crimes of commission and two crimes of omission. I will start with the crimes of omission. The Government’s 2024 election manifesto promised to introduce new respect orders with the aim to

“stamp out issues such as public drinking and drug use”.

The Government come armed with a noble cause, but all it takes is to scratch just below the surface to see that these respect orders are little more than smoke and mirrors.

The Bill inserts a new part before Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, creating respect orders. It then converts what are currently anti-social behaviour injunctions into youth injunctions. Rather than giving the police, local authorities and the courts tough new powers to tackle anti-social behaviour, as the Government claim, they are instead simply renaming the currently existing injunctions and creating new orders that are the same in all but the name.

The anti-social behaviour injunctions were introduced as part of my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead’s efforts to streamline the powers available to authorities to deal with criminal and challenging behaviour. As she noted at that Bill’s Second Reading, under the previous Labour Government, over nine anti-social behaviour laws were passed, creating 19 separate powers. The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 consolidated those into six powers. That had a purpose. I cannot see what this Government’s new respect orders will add to this arsenal.

Secondly, on the repeal of Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, this provision states that shoplifting of goods with a value of less than £200 is to be tried only summarily in a magistrates’ court. There has been much misinformation about this provision, which was brought forward by the last Conservative Government. The Labour manifesto called this an “effective immunity” for some shoplifting—a line that has been parroted by Labour Ministers ever since. However, the Government’s policy paper on the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”, and I think that sums up the bizarre nature of the criticism.

I want to be absolutely clear: anyone claiming that trying low-value shoplifting in a magistrates’ court is granting criminals immunity is wrong and misleading the public. There is absolutely no reason why theft under £200 cannot be tried summarily. I need not remind the House, full of eminent lawyers as it is, that a person can still be sentenced to up to six months’ imprisonment and issued with a fine if found guilty in a summary trial. Six months’ imprisonment is clearly not immunity.

What this does is clear the already clogged-up Crown Court and let the police prosecute more serious cases. That does not mean that thefts under £200 from shops do not impact on shopkeepers, or that they should not be investigated, but there is nothing wrong with having a bit more summary justice in this country. It permits cases to be tried and discharged more quickly and efficiently, rather risking long and drawn-out Crown Court cases that last for months if not years. If the police are not investigating such offences, that is an issue with the operation of policing, not the law.

Clauses 107 and 108 were inserted into the Bill on Report in the other place and, as such, have not had as much scrutiny, perhaps, as they ought to. The 11th report of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has drawn attention to these clauses for the uncertain scope of the new offences and the use of highly subjective terminology.

Clause 107 creates the new offence of using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards an emergency worker that are racially or religiously hostile. Clause 108 creates the offence of using threatening or abusive words or behaviour that are likely to cause an emergency worker harassment, alarm or distress. These offences are very similar to the existing offences under Section 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The key difference is that these new offences can be committed in a private dwelling, whereas those in the Public Order Act cannot. It is understandable why the Government might wish to press ahead with these new offences—we all wish to see our emergency workers protected—but it is far from certain that creating two new speech-related offences will offer emergency workers any greater protection in reality.

Clause 107 involves the criminalisation of insults and Clause 108 uses the term “distress”. Both are highly subjective, thereby leaving people open to prosecution on undefined terms. We already know that this an acute problem in this country. There exists a litany of cases where people have been arrested and prosecuted for speech offences. The continual misuse of non-crime hate incidents, and the probably irresponsible policing of tweets and online comments, have had a chilling effect on free speech. If anything, we should be reviewing and removing barriers to freedom of expression and speech, not expanding those limitations. I therefore echo the comments of the Constitution Committee in relation to Clauses 107 and 108 and call on the Government to heed its advice that these clauses should be drawn far more narrowly.

I am sure much of the debate on the Bill will comprise what noble Lords deem to be omissions and missed opportunities. I have time to mention only a few of those, but I give notice to the Minister that in Committee I will be raising many more. Given that this Bill, in many ways, mirrors the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, it was surprising to see there has been no inclusion—bar two clauses—of the measures to end and replace the Vagancy Act. The previous Government planned to repeal the Act and replace it with a new framework around nuisance begging and rough sleeping. If the Government are to commence the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, but not institute further powers to replace it, there may be a gap in the law. I would appreciate it if the Minister could perhaps comment on why the Government have not included these measures in the Bill.

Furthermore, the Bill does not include the previous Government’s plans to impose tougher penalties on those convicted of shoplifting offences on more than three occasions. Those provisions would require the court to impose a community order, including a curfew, exclusion or electronic whereabouts monitoring condition, or a combination of such conditions. Given the Government’s tough talk on bearing down on retail crime, it is more than a little confusing why they have not included such measures in the Bill.

I will end where I began: criminal justice is not simply about laws this Parliament passes. We can continually create new criminal offences and we can pass as many new laws as we like, but until we get to grips with the enforcement of those laws, we will never tackle the scourge of criminality. The Government have been talking tough on crime, but this must now be met with corresponding action.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks we have heard from around the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the seriousness of anti-social behaviour and the rationale of the Government in bringing forward the measures that they have in this part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, summed it up as the requirement for an effective and functioning system—hear, hear to that.

My concern is aligned with the sentiment, if not the letter, of Amendment 1, which would require the Government to explain why they feel that this set of measures, including respect orders, will work, when previous similar measures—ASBIs and so forth—have not worked to the extent, perhaps, that the Ministers who championed them when they were originally brought in expected. I do not believe that this is the moment for an independent review, but I think the Minister could give the Committee a detailed explanation of the specific circumstances in which he feels that these new respect orders will be deployed, why they are more likely to work than the existing arrangements and, in particular, the degree to which they will really make a difference. The Minister has brought forward these measures for the approval of Parliament, and he must be able to justify the result he expects them to have once they are implemented.

We know that that Governments of all flavours—this is not a specific reflection on the current Government—tend to reach for the statute book to address knotty problems, when in fact the answer may equally lie in better execution of existing powers. That probably is the overall challenge that has been put to the Minister this afternoon. I very much look forward to his answer.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the speakers in this debate so far. This Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. Sorry.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

No problem.

My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly to Amendments 4, 5 and 7 in my name. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very clear case for each one, so I will speak briefly. I put on record my thanks to Justice, which has gathered insights from so many people working in this field and it has been really interesting reading case studies that are backed up by very clear evidence.

These amendments would provide essential safeguards, ensuring the powers contained within respect orders are proportionate. Amendment 4 would require orders to be made only where there is evidence of actual conduct, not speculation about what a person might do in future. Amendment 7 would ensure that an order is imposed with a clear end date, capped at two years. In my opinion, it is wrong that an individual could be subject to potentially serious restrictions in perpetuity as a result of behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. In Amendment 5, we want to change the “just and convenient” threshold generally applied in civil proceedings to “necessary and proportionate”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put a very good case for this—much better than I could ever do, so I will not try.

Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, calling for an independent review of existing anti-social behaviour powers before respect orders are rolled out, would improve the Bill considerably, because precisely what laws are already used, and what works in practice, is critical to their success.

On the subject of likely success, I welcome the fact that respect orders can include positive requirements that people have to, for example, attend rehabilitation—perhaps to deal with addictions to drugs or drink or both. However, such requirements can work only if every region has capacity in drug and alcohol treatment programmes. I am sure the Minister is aware that only 12 of the 43 police forces returned data last year on how many cases were referred for such treatment. Without that information, we cannot know how such rehabilitation can work. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, when he responds, about what efforts are being made to ensure there are places available. Legislation alone is no good without resources.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I did want to hear what she had to say, but my enthusiasm to move on overtook me, unfortunately. I must learn to ignore nods from the Government Bench opposite as well.

As I said, the Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. On these Benches, we are not entirely sure of the need for new anti-social behaviour laws, and the validity of the proposed measure will be touched on more thoroughly in group 3. We feel the focus should be on enforcement first and foremost.

But as this proposal will become law, there are several individual parts of it that would benefit from being amended. I begin with Amendment 2 in my name, which is intended to probe the age at which a person can be given a respect order. The Bill states that this will be 18 and that younger offenders will be subject to a youth injunction. I cannot see why there should be two different powers to deal with the same behaviours. One of the benefits of anti-social behaviour injunctions is that they can apply to any person over the age of 10, rather than having different powers for different age groups.

To set the age minimum at 16 seems like common sense, and I would be surprised if the Minister disagrees with me. It is, after all, his party that believes in treating children of that age as adults. Why should 16 year-olds be allowed to choose the people who create anti-social behaviour laws, but simultaneously be exempt from those laws? Perhaps the Minister can explain the rationale, should he oppose the amendment.

Amendment 6 aims to ensure that an issued respect order does not place excessive restrictions on the recipient. It is similar to Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in seeking to ensure that orders are “necessary and proportionate”. As it stands, respect orders may require the recipient to do anything specified by the court—a power that does not contain any internal safeguards. This could lead to massive judicial overreach. The amendment in my name seeks to ensure that this is not the case. It is fair and proportionate that a recipient may be prohibited from doing anything that may cause a repeat of that which required an order in the first place. Prohibiting those actions is just, but that is where the powers of prohibition should end. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this potential issue with the proposed policy.

Amendment 11 would remove perhaps the most egregious part of this clause: giving the Secretary of State complete discretion not only over which authorities fall under the scope of respect orders, but the definitions that define respect orders themselves. It means that the already strong and limiting orders can be altered and twisted by whichever Home Secretary happens to be in office. I am sure each noble Lord could think of a different set of hands that they would not want this power to reside in. The amendment in my name would prevent that occurring and leave this already forceful power as it is.

Amendments 13 and 14 seek to improve the clarity in the chain of command in issuing orders. In a policy with so many moving parts, efficiency is key. A respect order would currently appoint a supervisor, who would then have the discretion to inform an

“appropriate chief officer of police”

if the offender lives in more than one area. This adds an extra layer of responsibility to a supervisor already charged with monitoring the respect order’s recipient. I can foresee potential mix-ups and miscommunications whereby either no or multiple chief officers believe themselves to be responsible for a recipient. The easy solution would be to specify the relevant chief officer alongside the supervisor, disaggregating the chain of appointments and improving clarity. I hope the Minister considers this point.

Amendment 20 seeks to require that risk assessments are the basis of respect order applications. It seems wrong that, despite being required to carry out a risk assessment, an applicant can apply for a respect order without having to reference it to the court. Respect orders are potentially very freedom-limiting; the court that issues them should be able to reference the risks posed by the recipient as a justification for these sanctions. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on the first day in Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill. I feel like I am at base camp at the start of a climb to Mount Everest—but, as ever, Mount Everest has been conquered, as I am sure the Bill will eventually be as well. It feels like we are at the very start of a long, fruitful and productive process.

I will start by outlining a little about respect orders, because it is important to put them into the general context of why the Government are doing what they are doing. There were over 1 million recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour in the last year for which records exist. That is an awful lot of anti-social behaviour and does not include even the underreporting that may well exist.

There is a government manifesto commitment to take action on respect orders. The new orders will enable courts to both ban offenders from engaging in harmful anti-social behaviour, and/or—as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, noted—impose positive requirements to tackle the root cause of anti-social behaviour. That could be anger management or alcohol or drug awareness courses, which will hopefully tackle the root cause of that anti-social behaviour and stop it occurring.

Unlike existing ASB civil injunctions, breach will be a criminal offence enforceable by arrest and tried in the criminal courts. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. This goes to court only if an individual breaches the order put on them—the purpose of the order is to stop the behaviour taking place. Penalties for breach will include community sentences, unlimited fines and potentially prison time for the most serious breaches, but only on a breach. That is a really important point to recognise in our discussions today.

Because there are so many amendments in this group, although it is a slow process I will take the amendments in turn. Amendment 1, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, my noble friends Lady Whitaker and Lord Hacking, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, would require a Home Secretary within six months of the Bill becoming law to undertake a review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, prior to introducing respect orders.

First, the introduction of respect orders was a manifesto commitment, so the Government have put some thought into it. I also assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to ensuring that the powers to address anti-social behaviour remain effective. As such, they are subject to continuous review. I do not want to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but there will not be a pilot on this, because the Home Office has regularly engaged with front-line practitioners and with the ASB sector to better understand how the powers of the 2014 Act are used and where improvements can be made.

In addition, under the last Government the department launched a public consultation in 2023 to understand how powers could be used more consistently and effectively. That consultation has helped inform the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 7 of the Bill, which, to aid this ongoing evaluation process, provides for new requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government to help us continually improve and review.

Therefore, the provisions in Clause 1 deliver on the manifesto commitment. We need to press ahead with respect orders as soon as possible to ensure that the police, local authorities and others have the effective powers to tackle the 1 million cases per year. Amendment 1 would require us to have a costly and unnecessary review, and it would slow and cause delay in the rollout. Therefore, with respect, I cannot accept it either today or on Report.

Amendments 2 and 3 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, seek to lower the age at which respondents can receive a respect order from 18 to 16, or indeed to 14. Again, I hope the noble Lords understand that the Government do not wish to criminalise young people unless it is absolutely necessary, which is why our manifesto was clear that respect orders were aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour perpetrated by adults. The noble Lord, Lord Bailey, made some very valid points on that in relation to the potential criminalisation of younger people.

That does not mean there is no provision for the relevant agencies to deal with youth-related anti-social behaviour. The respect order, while replacing the civil injunction for adults, will remain in place for those under the age of 18, renamed as the youth injunction. Importantly, this will enable youth courts to impose behaviour requirements on younger offenders without resulting in criminalisation if they breach the injunction. There is still the potential for those orders to be placed, but it does not involve criminalisation.

Amendments 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others would amend the legal test for issuing a respect order. Amendment 4 would mean that a respect order could be issued only in relation to ASB that a respondent had already engaged in, and not where the respondent had threatened to engage in this behaviour, as is the case with existing civil injunctions.

I stress to the House that respect orders are fundamentally preventive in nature. They are designed to stop bad behaviour by putting in place a restraining order that says, in effect, “Don’t do these particular actions”. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. That is an important point for the House to understand and grasp from the Government’s perspective. Anti-social behaviour can be insidious and difficult to prove and it can take many forms. We know that the threat of aggressive or anti-social behaviour can often escalate quickly into more serious, violent and criminal behaviour —a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. That is why it is crucial that we retain the ability to issue an order against those threatening to engage in ASB, in order to prevent that harm before it happens.

Amendment 5, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would change the legal test for issuing a respect order, so that that the court would need to find it “necessary and proportionate” to issue the order to prevent the respondent engaging in anti-social behaviour, rather than using the legal test as currently drafted, in which the court must find it “just and convenient” to do so. The current “just and convenient” language mirrors that of the civil injunction and is therefore familiar to the courts.

Let me be clear—this again goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that the current threshold still requires a judge, with all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails, to be satisfied that the issuing of an order is just, reasonable and fair. Courts will already take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of their duties under the Human Rights Act. Given these considerations, the benefits of amending the legal test in this way are limited.

Moving on to Amendment 6—

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

8: Clause 1, page 2, line 26, after “court” insert “or a magistrate’s court”

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we must ensure that courts can operate within their means. If we issue them with new responsibilities, we have to be sure that they have the capacity to fulfil them. Unfortunately, in restricting respect orders to the High Court and county courts, the Government risk not providing the bandwidth to deal with new orders.

At the end of Labour’s first year in office, the Crown Court backlog suffered an annual increase of 11%. There are over 74,000 cases waiting to be judged. Of course, that burden is not entirely at the door of the Crown Courts, but a considerable number of the outstanding cases will require their use. County courts are in a better—but still not ideal—state. The average time for justice to be delivered is just over 49 weeks. Reflecting on this, it makes sense for the Government to divide the responsibilities for the new respect orders as widely as possible. The logical conclusion is to permit an application for a respect order to be made to a magistrates’ court.

If respect orders were confined to the serious criminality that we expect to be dealt with by the High Court and county courts, I would accept placing additional pressures on to them and excluding magistrates’ courts. It is right that those facing serious harassment or other forms of anti-social behaviour have the ability to make application to these courts, but the scope for respect orders is far wider than that. The definition of anti-social behaviour is to include actions causing alarm and distress. These are two very subjective metrics: they are fundamentally different from harassment and more serious forms of anti-social behaviour. So I see no reason why magistrates’ courts should not be available to deal with these less serious and potentially menial forms of anti-social behaviour. This is the reasoning behind Amendments 8 and 16, tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie.

There is also precedent for this. When the last Labour Government introduced anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, they could be made only by a magistrates’ court. This recognised that anti-social behaviour should be the purview of summary justice. The Minister might argue that the Government are simply replicating the application process for anti-social behaviour injunctions and that they were the action of the previous Government. That may be a fair criticism, but that would not mean that the Government are right. Simply following the case of previous legislation does not automatically mean that the legislation before us today is following the right path; nor does it acknowledge the very different state of the backlog in the High Court and county courts today, as opposed to 2014. It makes far more sense to permit the use of magistrates’ courts for this purpose today, given the historic case burden.

Finally, I can see no downside to this. It will permit burden-sharing between three types of courts. It would not alter the nature of the orders, nor the process by which they are made. But it would make some progress toward reducing the waiting time for the making of a respect order. Surely the Government do not want to see a 49-week wait for a respect order to be made. Would that not hamper the effectiveness of these supposedly tough new respect orders? I hope the Minister will consider these amendments carefully and sensibly.

The other amendments in this group seek to minimise the pressure placed on our courts by the new measures and ensure that our shared principles of justice are upheld. Interim respect orders interact with the principle of innocent until proven guilty. They can be made following a court adjournment up until the final court hearing. They have the same function as a regular respect order and can impose the same restrictions. I am conscious that this may sometimes be necessary. I reiterate the debilitated state of our courts and the fact that adjournment is sometimes out of their hands, even if the defendant is likely to engage in further anti-social behaviour. In these occasional instances, I can understand the need for an interim respect order.

Amendment 15 aims to find a balance, creating a presumption against issuing an interim order, while still leaving the option open. Amendment 19 exists to forward the argument that these orders can be issued to prevent only further harassment, and not the vague concepts of alarm and distress. These amendments aim to ease the administrative burden on the courts. Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against a decision to refuse to issue an interim respect order, the defendant is notified. It is right that a person should know when they might be subjected to a respect order, especially when they have not yet been proven guilty. I beg to move Amendment 8.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I have just a few comments. I am quite concerned that the latest figures show that the magistrates’ courts’ backlog of cases to be heard reached 361,000 as of September 2025, a record high and a significant increase on previous years. In the other place, the Minister said the legal test for respect orders was being kept “broad and flexible” to enable them to be used for a wide range of anti-social behaviours. Again, this suggests significant extra pressure on courts. Jamming up the system further is not going to help victims. Can the Minister say what the Government’s assessment is of the impact on the wider criminal justice system?

Giving evidence in the other place, the Police Federation also pointed to the pressure these orders would put on custody places, saying that infrastructure was needed to make new legislation “effective and believable”. Perhaps the Minister could also address that.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a very wide question, my Lords. Let me say that the purpose of Committee is to provide a significant number of days for Members from all sides of the House—as we have had today, from the government side as well as from the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats—to test Ministers and raise points. If the noble Baroness has points she wishes to raise during the passage of the Bill, as ever, I will try to answer them, either on the Floor of this House or in writing afterwards.

The noble Baroness asks whether things have changed. Even today, there are a number of amendments that the Government have brought forward in the groups of amendments that we are deliberating on today. Things move; the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, was saying with regard to the immigration Bill that a number of things have changed over the course of time, and things move. It is now 16 months since the King’s Speech which introduced this legislation. We continue to monitor and move; where necessary we bring forward amendments, and I am open to testing on all matters at all times. But I would welcome the noble Lord withdrawing his amendment today.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and to those who have contributed. I know we all have the interests of a functioning justice system at heart, and the discussion has reflected that. We must approach this debate with pragmatism as our guiding principle. That means that, when legislating for new crimes, the best outcome is the one that sees offences prosecuted. In a perfect world, perhaps the Crown Courts and the county courts alone would have the capacity to handle these new respect orders. But, as I have outlined, the courts system is incredibly backlogged, and it is therefore necessary to use as many courts as possible to deliver the policy.

Considering the scope of respect orders on top of that, my amendments and the amendments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie are perfectly reasonable. To consider causing alarm as on the same level as causing harassment, as prosecuting them in the same courts effectively does, defies sense. Making use of magistrates’ courts is both the rational and practical solution to this problem.

Similarly, approaching interim respect orders from a more conservative standpoint would be prudent. They are very illiberal measures and should be used only in the most necessary circumstances. Amendments, such as those tabled in my name, to create presumptions against them and to narrow the preview of their power seek to ensure that this is the case.

I hope that the Minister will agree with the important principles behind these amendments and will perhaps take them away and consider them, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

Debate on whether Clause 1 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled and de-grouped this clause stand-part notice because it would be helpful to the Committee to probe the real purpose of respect orders. We have no plans to insist that this part of the Bill be removed on Report.

This Government appear to be making the same errors as those of the previous Labour Administration. The Blair Government seemed to believe that, the more they legislated on crime and anti-social behaviour, the less of that behaviour there would be. We saw Act after Act, many repealing or amending Acts that they had passed merely a few years before. This flurry of lawmaking meant that, by the end of its term in office, Labour had created 14 different powers for police to tackle anti-social behaviour and criminality. My noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead undertook to simplify this system by condensing all these measures into just six powers. However, with this Bill we see that old pattern of the new-Labour years re-emerging. This Bill creates four new powers: respect orders, youth injunctions, housing injunctions and youth diversion orders. I cannot see what real-world impact this will make.

As I said at Second Reading, the concept of respect orders appears to be little more than a gimmick. It is legislative action to make the Government appear to be tough on anti-social behaviour when in fact they are not. Respect orders are no different from the existing anti-social behaviour injunctions. Applications for both are made by the same list of people to the same cause. The requirements that can be placed on the respondent are the same for ASB injunctions and respect orders. Both permit the making of an interim order or injunction. Both permit the exclusion of a person from their home in the case of serious violence or risk of harm. Both permit the variation or discharge of the order or injunction. They are, in almost every aspect, exactly the same.

The only difference is that one is a civil order and the other a criminal order. The Bill creates a criminal offence of breaching a condition of a respect order. A person found guilty of that offence on conviction or indictment is liable to a jail sentence of up to two years. Anti-social behaviour injunctions, however, do not have a specific criminal offence attached to them. A person who breaches a condition of an ASB injunction does not commit an offence of breaching the injunction. The Government have argued that this difference makes their respect orders tougher and therefore justified. However, this overlooks two important facts.

First, the court granting the ASB injunction can attach a power of arrest to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 9 of that Act states that

“a constable may arrest the respondent without warrant”

where they believe that the person has breached a condition of their injunction. The person arrested for a breach of their injunction can then be charged with contempt of court, which carries a punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment. It is entirely understandable that the Government wish to introduce a specific criminal offence of breaching conditions. It is easier to prosecute someone who breaches their respect order than to prosecute someone for contempt of court for breaching their injunction. That is not least because a police officer would have to know that a person had an injunction against them, that they had breached the condition and that their injunction contained a power of arrest. It is also because, even though ASB injunctions are civil orders, the criminal standard of proof is applied when determining whether a person has breached a condition.

I understand this entirely, but it does not explain why the Government are seeking to replace injunctions in their entirety. Surely, given that every other aspect is the same, it would be far easier and more expeditious to retain the injunctions and simply amend them to create an offence of breach of conditions. That would mean that the ASB injunctions remain in place but they have the same power of enforcement. Why did the Government not follow this route? Why did they not simply amend the anti-social behaviour injunctions, as opposed to creating a whole new class of order?

The answer cannot be that one is a civil order and one a criminal order because, as I have demonstrated, the civil order could easily have been upgraded to criminal status by way of legislative amendment. I would hazard a guess and say that the reason is perhaps bluster. Is it not the case that the Government wanted to seem to be tough on crime, so they came up with a rehash of ASBOs with a slightly catchier name? These new respect orders will likely have little effect on reducing anti-social behaviour. What would have a positive impact would be to increase the number of police officers. Unfortunately, the Government have failed on that front. Since they entered office, the total police officer headcount has fallen by 1,316. That record to date stands in stark contrast to the previous Government’s successful recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers during the last Parliament.

If the Government are serious about getting tough on crime, they should stop the gimmicks and start with enforcement. I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have listened to the quite detailed discussion that we have had so far in our attempt at line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill in relation to respect orders. Weighing up the pros and rather more cons, I am very aware that what I am going to say might seem glib about anti-social behaviour. People listening in might think, “This crowd who are raising problems of civil liberties are not aware of the real scourge of anti-social behaviour and the impact and the misery that it can cause on ordinary people’s lives”. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, gave us a taste of what that anti-social activity can feel like in local areas. I recognised the descriptions from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, of young people potentially running amok in local areas. Where I live, that has been known to happen, so I recognise that.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I accept that, but it would be fair to say that I would be making promises or guessing about issues that I could not guarantee. But I can guarantee for the noble Viscount that we will monitor the use of this and that the measures that I have already outlined—those in the Bill, those on police numbers and the focus that we are putting on certain police initiatives through central government discussion with the National Police Chiefs’ Council—will make a difference. They will be judged on that.

Self-evidently, a manifesto commitment to reduce and tackle anti-social behaviour requires this Minister, this Government and this Home Secretary to go back to the electorate, at some point, to say, “That is the difference that we have made”. While I cannot give the noble Viscount an aperitif today, I hope I can give him a full-course meal after the discussions have taken place further down stream.

It is important, as we have just heard, that if perpetrators breach an injunction multiple times, the police cannot take action unless they take them to court. Under this measure, there will be a criminal action so police can take action immediately.

I wish to tell the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that, for a respect order to be issued, two tests must be satisfied. First, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in or threatened to engage in anti-social behaviour as defined. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that issuing the respect order is just and convenient. A further safeguard introduced is that the relevant authorities carry out risk assessments prior to the respect order being put in place.

These clauses, about which the noble Lord has quite rightly asked questions, are important and I wish to see them retained in the Bill. I am grateful for his overall indication that, when it comes to determining that, he will not oppose these clauses, but I will take away his comments and I hope to continue our discussions in the positive way that we have to date.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am grateful for the contributions made and to the Minister for his response. Of course, I have no intention of opposing the passage of respect orders. They were part of the Government’s election manifesto and, as such, shall become the law of the land. This does not prevent my criticising them. Indeed, simply because they were part of the Government’s manifesto does not mean that they are a good idea that would have a positive impact on the streets of Britain.

I have provided substantive justification for why I believe that respect orders are, simply put, an effort to paint a picture of a Government bearing down on crime and anti-social behaviour when, in reality, they are not. The proof will be in the pudding; we will see whether the Prime Minister’s so-called tough new respect orders have any actual impact, in due course. For now, I will leave it there.

Clause 1 agreed.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.

Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Amendment 26 to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which permits a registered social housing provider to issue a closure notice in respect of premises they own or manage, under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As my noble friend and other noble Lords have stated, a closure notice under Section 76 of that Act is a notice which prohibits a person from accessing specific premises. Currently, such a notice can be issued only by the police or the local authority, but Schedule 2 permits an RSH to also issue such notices.

My noble friend’s amendment would ensure that the RSH provider is able to issue a closure notice for an individual flat in the premises it is responsible for. Given that paragraph (2)(b) of Schedule 2 does not specify that fact, I look forward to the Minister’s answer and hope he might clarify that point.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for this short but focused debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing his amendment. As he has explained, it seeks to allow registered social housing providers to issue a closure notice in relation to an individual flat within a housing block that they own or manage.

The closure power is a fast, flexible power that can be used to protect victims and communities by quickly closing premises that are causing nuisance or disorder. Clause 5 and Schedule 2 extend the closure power to registered social housing providers. Currently, only local authorities and police can issue closure notices. This is despite registered social housing providers often being the initial point of contact for tenants suffering from anti-social behaviour. Now, registered social housing providers will be able to issue closure notices and apply for closure orders, to enable them to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned a specific landlord. Without going into the facts of that case, it is clear that registered social housing providers have to meet regulatory standards set by the regulator of social housing. There is statutory guidance in place, and registered social housing providers are expected to meet the same legal tests as set out in the 2014 Act that the noble Lord mentioned. This will ensure that all relevant agencies have the right tools to tackle anti-social behaviour quickly and effectively. In turn, this will save police and local authorities time, as housing providers will be able to make applications directly, rather than having to rely on the police or local authority to do so on their behalf.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised his concerns about risks of abuse. For instance, he was concerned that extending the power to housing providers might risk it being misused to evict tenants, such as those in rent arrears. There are robust safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of misuse. Like other agencies, housing providers will be required to consult with relevant partners prior to the issuing of a closure notice. This requirement is in addition to the legal test having to be met and the fact that the process will go through the courts.

I want to assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and others that premises here means any land or other places, whether enclosed or not, and any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of the premises. This could therefore already include an individual flat within a housing block. Indeed, that would be the expectation: that this targets individual households, rather than whole blocks of flats. We are confident that the current legislative framework and the Bill will cover that and make that clear. On the basis of that clarification—of course, I will reflect on Hansard and the points he specifically raised about the 2014 Act, and I will write to him in more detail if I need to—I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Hampton, for tabling these amendments and all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Ensuring that anti-social behaviour complaints are adequately handled and delivering a just outcome for the complainants and communities affected without being overly burdensome on the relevant authorities are important principles. These amendments are largely in line with that goal.

This group is particularly important, as anti-social behaviour seems to be on the rise in our streets. As such, it is important that we have the right framework not only for dealing with complaints but for self-correcting any potential mistakes made. With an increased volume, local authorities simply do not have the time to be weighed down by bureaucratic procedures.

For that reason, Amendment 27 raises eyebrows. It is important that we provide the necessary support for those who are harmed by criminal behaviour, but it is also true that this clause would require policing bodies to review responses to complaints about anti-social behaviour, in certain instances. It would place an additional level of administration on to these authorities. As it stands, the amendment seems to cast the net too widely on when impact assessments might be necessary; it would therefore add yet more workload to already strained forces. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s opinion on this matter.

Amendments 28 and 31, however, appear to work to the opposite end. It is right that, when we mandate administrative work from our public servants, we should give them clear guidance on where it is necessary. A discretionary threshold has the potential to encourage local authorities to err on the side of caution and thus review cases that do not merit the time required. Adding a statutory threshold for an ASB case review would both streamline the process and create a more regular system across authorities. This is never a bad thing, and I hope the Minister will consider taking it on board.

I am cautious of Amendment 30 for reasons similar to those that I have already discussed. In principle, the amendment is sound, but adding more bureaucracy to the process by publishing the reasons for not reviewing a case has the potential to take time and attention away from cases that do meet the threshold. Additionally, a statutory threshold would be available for all to see and would set out the criteria needed to meet it. This would surely forgo the need to release the reasons why thresholds were not met.

This is a largely sensible set of amendments that have the interests of both complainants and the respective authorities at heart. I hope that the Minister agrees with what I have just said and look forward to what he says in response.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his amendments. I also thank the Victims’ Commissioner, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, both on the amendments and for her work on this issue over many years. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for the comments on this area from the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Clement-Jones, and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, from His Majesty’s Opposition.

Amendment 27 aims to ensure that all victims of repeat anti-social behaviour are subject to an impact assessment, even where the individual has not requested a case review to be undertaken. The Government believe that there is a more effective response to this issue, in that we can ensure that victims are aware of their rights to request a case review. That has been included in updated statutory guidance for front-line staff, which we published in September. The proposals in the amendment would significantly increase the resources required to review anti-social behaviour incidents. The wording of the amendment would mean that even in cases where the victim is satisfied with the response, the police would be required to conduct an impact assessment.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, has approached this by saying he wishes to work with the Government to look at this. I am happy to have further dialogue with him and the responsible policy Minister in the Home Office post Committee. We can return to it then and examine the nuances. I hope that my initial comments give him a flavour of where the Government currently are.

Amendments 28, 29 and 31 look at the anti-social behaviour case review process and mandate the requirement for there to be an independent chair, for victims to be invited to attend their case review, and to reduce the ability for authorities to add additional caveats that reduce the victim’s abilities to request a case review. I am pleased to say—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, will accept this and the way that I put it to him—that we have recently updated the statutory guidance to front-line professionals, which already reflects the proposals he has put to the Committee today. I believe that this will create the impact that his amendments intend to bring while still allowing for greater flexibility for circumstances to be treated on an individual basis. Again, if the noble Lord would like further information on the statutory guidance, I am happy to provide that to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, but we think that it meets the objectives of Amendments 28, 29 and 31.

Amendment 30 seeks to require relevant bodies involved in case reviews to publish details on why they have determined that the statutory threshold for a case review was not met. Under existing legislation, it is already a requirement for the relevant bodies to publish the number of times they decided that the review threshold was not met. I highlight to the noble Lord that, through Clause 7, the Government are introducing further requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government. That is for the purpose of us understanding how local agencies are using the powers and tools provided by the 2014 Act, including the question of case review.

If the noble Lord looks at Clause 6 in particular—it is buried in the depths of the undergrowth of Clause 6 but I assure him that it is there—he will see that there will be a new duty for police and crime commissioners to set up a route for victims to request a further review where dissatisfied with the outcome of their case review. This includes where the relevant bodies determined that the threshold was not met for the initial case review. I will give further explanation of Clause 6 when we reach it, but I hope that it meets the objectives that the noble Lord has set out in Amendment 30.

The recently updated guidance on case reviews address many of the same points as these amendments and I hope that it will have the opportunity to bed in. I am happy to send the noble Lord a copy of the guidance, if I am able to, and I assure him that we will monitor the effectiveness of that guidance in improving good practice. He has my commitment that, if necessary, we will revisit the issues again in the near future. Until then, I submit that it would be premature to legislate further on case reviews beyond the measures in the Bill. I hope that with those assurances, the invitation to further discussion and the offer of further information, the noble Lord would be content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is all too often the case that, when the Government say they are bringing minor and technical amendments to a Bill, those amendments are neither minor nor technical in nature. However, with these amendments, that is genuinely the case. There is, therefore, little for me to say in response to this group of amendments. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 was passed by this House earlier this year and, as far as I am aware, the data protection override in Section 106 of that Act was not queried or opposed by noble Lords during its passage, and no amendment was proposed to that clause. I therefore have no issue with these amendments.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful and all I say in response is that the sooner we get to Clauses 132 and 192, the better.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we support Amendment 55A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She has already highlighted the importance of improved data collection around the use of anti-social behaviour legislation. This is essential because it is impossible to gauge the fairness or effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers without adequate data and transparency.

We also support Clause 7. It is important to have more transparency around how these powers are used by local authorities and housing providers. The evidence is that they already have this information but are failing to share it. As a result, little is known about how these powers are being used in practice.

The charity Crisis wants the Government to go further by making this information publicly available. This would provide full transparency around patterns of anti-social behaviour and the powers used to tackle it. Is this something the Government might consider? Perhaps the Minister could let us know.

The police, too, must improve their recording practices around anti-social behaviour. A report last year by HMICFRS found that some forces’ recording is very poor, while others do not always record the use of statutory powers. We believe that transparency is key to ensuring that future orders are applied reasonably and proportionately, and to prevent discrimination.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra, as ever, raises a serious and pertinent point with his Amendment 35. Clause 7 permits the Secretary of State, by regulations, to require authorities to provide them with information about anti-social behaviour. Unfortunately, Clause 7 contains rather vague requirements on what information the regulations might contain. It would perhaps be helpful for the Minister to provide the Committee with some concrete examples of what might be included. My noble friend is absolutely right that social media posts should not be included in any of the guidance.

With Amendment 55A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my fear is that the police and the Home Office, already overburdened with creating statistics, will yet again be further burdened. Perhaps this is not the way forward.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to both the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for these two amendments.

As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 35 relates to the new power in Clause 7 for the Home Secretary to make regulations requiring relevant authorities, including local councils and social housing providers, to report information on anti-social behaviour. The amendment would mean that those regulations would not be able to request information from the relevant authorities about things that are considered anti-social or indeed anti-social messages. We will come on to the non-crime hate incident issues that the noble Lord has a concern about, but currently Clause 7 would allow information to be requested on reports of anti-social behaviour made to an authority, responses of the authority and anti-social behaviour case reviews carried out by the relevant authority. Anti-social behaviour can come in various forms, and it is important that the regulation-making power can address this.

Information held by central government on anti-social behaviour is in some areas limited. This has led to a significant evidence gap in the national picture of anti-social behaviour. I mentioned the 1 million incidents per year, but there is still an evidence gap in that picture of anti-social behaviour. The new clause will change this to ensure stronger and more comprehensive understanding of ASB incidents and interventions, but we want to make sure that Clause 7 creates a regulation-making power only. Regulations will then be made following the passage of the Bill to specify the information that agencies must provide. Going back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, indicated, this may be information they already have but do not necessarily share.

I assure the noble Lord that regulations are being developed in close consultation with the relevant practitioners, including local authorities and social housing providers, to understand what information is held on anti-social behaviour and the impact that this requirement may have upon them, for the very reasons that the noble Lord mentioned. We will of course make sure that any new requirements are reasonable and proportionate but meet the Government’s objective of having a wider understanding of some of the trends and information.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

37: After Clause 8, insert the following new Clause—
“Increased penalties for littering offences(1) The Environmental Protection Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 88 (fixed penalty notices for leaving litter)—(a) in subsection (6A)(b)(i), for “£100” substitute “£125”;(b) in subsection (6A)(b)(ii), for “£75” substitute “£94”;(c) in subsection (8C) (England, Wales and Scotland versions), for “level 3” substitute “level 4”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase penalties for littering and related offences. It raises fixed penalties in England and Wales by 25 per cent and moves the maximum fine levels up one tier on the standard scale.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses three separate but related offences: increasing the penalties for littering and dog fouling offences and introducing a specific offence of littering on public transport.

Littering may appear to be a minor problem when juxtaposed with some of the issues discussed in the Bill, but it is one of the most prominent anti-social offences to plague towns and communities. Littering is one of the most visible forms of environmental degradation, affecting not only the appearance of our streets and greenery but degrading our sense of public pride and community. Littering is associated with signs of a neglected area, and it sends a powerful negative message about standards and civic responsibility.

The scale of this problem is undeniable. Keep Britain Tidy estimates that local authorities in England alone spend around £1 billion each year clearing litter and fly-tipped waste. Almost 80% of our streets in England are affected by littering to some degree, with the most common items including food and drink packaging, cigarette ends and sweet wrappers.

The Government’s own figures show that local councils issue fewer than 50,000 fixed penalty notices a year, despite the widespread scale of the problem. This is why my amendments seek to increase the penalties for littering offences. The current fixed penalty levels were last revised in 2018, when the maximum fine was raised to £150. Since then, both inflation and enforcement costs have risen considerably. As time has gone on, therefore, the deterrent effect of the penalty has been eroded. An uplift is thus justified and necessary. A higher penalty would reflect the real cost to communities and to local authorities, and would send a clear message that littering is not a low-level or victimless offence.

The same logic applies to my amendment concerning dog fouling offences. It is true that some progress has been made through awareness campaigns, but the problem persists in many communities. It is unpleasant, unsanitary and requires local authorities to bear the cost of cleaning it up. It is therefore only right that penalties are raised to reflect both the nuisance and costs incurred. I hope the Government agree that more must be done to combat littering and dog fouling offences.

The negative effects of littering are felt most in highly frequented public places. Public transport is one such area of public life where the harm of littering is exacerbated. It is a growing problem on our trains, buses, trams and underground systems. Anyone using public transport on a Saturday or Sunday morning will no doubt have experienced the scale of rubbish left behind from the thoughtless few of the night before. The accumulation of food packaging, coffee cups, bottles and newspapers left behind by passengers is a saddening sight and must be addressed. Littering on public transport causes expensive inconvenience for operators and diminishes the travelling experience for others. Often, passengers would rather stand than sit on dirty seats. A distinct offence of littering on public transport would underline the responsibility of passengers in shared public places and support transport authorities in maintaining standards of cleanliness and safety.

These amendments are not about punishing people for the sake of it; they are about upholding civic standards and ensuring that those who do the right thing are not let down by those who do not. They are about fairness: the costs of litter removal fall on local taxpayers, transport users and businesses, rather than on those responsible for creating the mess. It is time the Government took a firmer stance on the few who ruin the enjoyment of Britain’s streets for the many. Higher penalties and clearer offences would, in my view, provide both the incentive and the clarity needed to improve compliance.

I hope the Government will view these proposals in that spirit—not as punitive but as a practical contribution to cleaner, safer public spaces and to civic pride. I look forward to hearing from the Minister, and from across the Committee, on how the Government intend to continue building on their anti-littering strategy and supporting local authorities in enforcement. I am sure many noble Lords will have received letters and emails from constituents complaining about the state of local streets and the scale of litter they must contend with. They are right to be concerned. The cost to our environment, our economy and our collective morale is far greater than the individual cost of a packet or a coffee cup dropped out of selfish behaviour. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend. My only criticism is that the proposed increase for the penalties is not high enough, but at least it is a very good start. I declare an interest, as on the register: I am a director of the community interest company, Clean Streets, which works with Keep Britain Tidy to try to reduce cigarette litter on the streets, with considerable success.

In about 1995, I was privileged to make an official visit to Commissioner Bratton in New York, who pioneered the broken window theory—I am sure the Minister is aware of it. As he discovered, if there is a street with one broken window and no one does anything about it, very soon there will be more broken windows, then litter and rubbish lying in the street, and then low-life people, as they call them in America, move in. He said that you would start with a street with a broken window and, within a couple of years, end up with garbage and then a drug den. I actually visited one where they were trying to batter down a steel door to get the druggies out.

I am not suggesting that a little litter would cause that here, but there was an experiment cited by the excellent nudge unit, set up by Oliver Letwin, when he was in government. The experiment was carried out in the Netherlands, where, for one week, they looked at a bicycle parking lot. They pressure-washed the whole thing, scrubbed it and kept it clean, and over the course of that week not a single bit of litter was left there and no damage was caused. The following week, they put bits of litter in the parking lot—a bottle here and an empty cigarette box there—and, within days, the whole place got more and more litter, because people thought it was an okay thing to do. If people see one bit of rubbish, they think they can just add their rubbish to it as well.

Littering is not only unsightly but highly dangerous. Cigarette litter, in particular, is dangerous—not from the cigarettes themselves but from the filters, which have microplastics in them. It causes enormous costs to councils to clean up.

A couple of months ago, serving on the Council of Europe, I attended an official meeting in Venice. It was the first time I had been there. It is not very wheelchair friendly, but I did manage to get around. After four or five days in Venice—I paid to stay on for some extra days—I was impressed that there was not a single scrap of litter anywhere on the streets. One could not move for tourists, but there was not a single scrap of litter. There were signs everywhere, saying “Keep Venice Clean”. People, mainly ladies, were going round with their big two-wheeled barrels collecting garbage from people’s homes. It was impressive.

I was even more impressed that everyone seemed to have a dog—the widest variety of dog breeds I have ever seen—but there was only one occasion in five days where I saw dog mess on the pavement. The view was that, if you have a dog, you clean up after it. It is an extraordinary place. When I am on my wheelchair in London or anywhere else—trying to avoid the people on their mobile phones who walk into me—I am looking down all the time as I dare not drive through dog dirt on the pavement because I can never get it off the wheels. I manage to avoid it, but that is what I must to do in my own country. I cannot take the risk in a wheelchair of driving through the dog mess we find on the pavements. To be fair, in Victoria Tower Gardens, where I see people exercising their dogs, they all have the little poop-scoop bag and they pick up the mess and that is very good, but there is too much dog mess on the pavements.

We need tougher sanctions. We need the highest possible penalties, particularly for fouling and leaving mess on the pavement. I know the penalties are there already, but they have not been enforced rigorously enough. My friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, might condemn the private companies that move in and start imposing more fines for the ridiculous dropping of litter, but perhaps they could move in and start imposing them, and catch out the people who are leaving the dog mess on the pavement. I almost tried to do it myself on one occasion, when I came across similar dog mess in the same spot three days in a row. I was tempted to get up at 5 am, sit there with my camera to catch the person doing it and report him or her to Westminster City Council.

We need enforcement on this. Goodness knows how colleagues in this place who are blind and who have guide dogs manage to avoid it—I hope the dogs do—but others may not avoid it and will walk through it. It is filthy and disgusting, and a very serious health hazard. I support the amendments in the names of my noble friends, and I urge the Government to consider all aspects of making tougher penalties for litter and tougher enforcement penalties for dog mess on the pavement.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Sorry, I thought the noble Lord was gearing up to make further comments.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling the amendments. I agree with him and everybody else who has spoken that fly-tipping, littering and dog fouling are not victimless crimes; they blight our communities. I find it very annoying to see not just dog mess in bushes but stuff thrown out of car windows and stuff left on trains that is not picked up. An important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, is that some of this is also about improving behavioural change and encouraging people not to tolerate this. Never mind fines or responsibilities, it is about not tolerating this as a society.

Having said that, the amendments themselves are unnecessary in this case, and I will try to explain why. Local authorities can already issue fixed-penalty notices for littering of up to £500, which is greater than the proposed penalties in the amendment. In addition, local authorities already have the power to issue public space protection orders to tackle persistent anti-social behaviour, including dog fouling. As we have debated, Clause 4 raises the maximum penalty for the breach of PSPOs from £100 to £500, so there is already an upward target in terms of the amount of potential fine. This is not meant as a snide point, but I say to the noble Lord that the Dog (Fouling of Land) Act 1996 has been repealed and replaced; I cannot amend it because it does not exist any more.

The argument I put to the House is that local authorities are best placed to set the level of these penalties in their area, taking into account the characteristics of the community, which might even include ability to pay. Outside of issuing a fixed-penalty notice, those prosecuted for littering can also face, on conviction, a fine of up to £2,500. I do not believe that increasing the fine available to someone who fails to give their name and address to an enforcement officer issuing them a fine is appropriate, with a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale—currently £1,000—being the appropriate level in these circumstances.

Amendment 38 makes a very important point about littering on public transport becoming a specific offence. I pay tribute to the people whom the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned: the people who go up and down trains, collecting rubbish on behalf of the company. They are also the people who helped protect us last week in the LNER attack. They fulfil a very important function as a whole.

However, the British Transport Police and the railway operators already have the power to enforce the railway by-laws and prevent unacceptable behaviour on both heavy and light railway. That includes fines of up to £1,000. On the noble Lord’s late-night train back, in theory, a £1,000 fine for littering could be issued. By-laws are controlled by each individual devolved area, which will have its own by-laws around littering and enforcement.

That takes me to the other point—I do not mean to be cocky in the way I say this—that the amendments, as proposed, seek to amend the law in Scotland and Wales as well as for England, and they deal with matters that are devolved to Scotland and to the Senedd in Wales. As such, it would not be appropriate to include such measures in the Bill without the consent of the legislatures, which at the moment we do not have and have not sought.

Finally, I think it is of benefit to noble Lords if I briefly outline the steps the Government are taking to reduce littering among our communities. There is a Pride in Place Strategy, which sets out how Government will support local action—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned—by bringing forward statutory enforcement guidance on littering, modernising the code of practice that outlines the cleaning standards expected of local authorities and refreshing best practice guidance on powers available to local councils to force land and building owners to clean up their premises.

Having had the opportunity to debate all these issues, I think that the amendments make an extremely important point, and I am not trying to downgrade the points that have been made by noble Lords. Litter is an extremely important issue, but the approach taken in these amendments is not one that I can support—but not because I am not interested in the issue itself. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and not to move the other amendments, but we can still discuss it further at some point, no doubt on Report.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to those who have contributed and spoken in support of this group of amendments and, indeed, for the Minister’s response, although I was a little disappointed by the scepticism of colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches.

These matters go to the heart of civic pride and the everyday quality of life that our constituents rightly expect. The present system of penalties is no longer an adequate deterrent, having not been amended for many years. As has been observed, local authorities spend hundreds of millions of pounds every year clearing up after those who show little regard for the public realm. When the maximum fine for littering has remained unchanged since 2018, its real-term value has fallen sharply. Fines are now too often treated as a minor inconvenience rather than a genuine consequence for selfish behaviour. My amendments seek to address that imbalance and ensure that penalties once again reflect the true cost to our communities. Our buses, trains and underground systems are shared spaces used by millions every day. They should be clean spaces, not repositories for discarded coffee cups and beer bottles.

As I mentioned in my opening speech, although awareness of dog fouling has improved, enforcement remains inconsistent and penalties insufficient. It is only fair that those who allow this behaviour to persist should face meaningful consequences, rather than leaving their neighbours and local councils to deal with the aftermath.

These amendments are modest practical steps towards restoring civic responsibility and pride in our shared environment. They are not intended to be punitive; they are about accountability and respect for the public spaces we all enjoy. I hope that the Government will take note of the strength of feeling by travellers and the public at large and will continue to work with local authorities and communities to tackle the persistent blight of dog fouling and littering, especially on public transport. But for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group essentially encompasses several different groups of amendments; perhaps they should have been separated, but we are where we are. Two of those groups within this very large group are, I would argue, quite uncontroversial. I have absolutely no issue with the Government increasing the maximum penalties for the offence in Clause 28 in Scotland, and for extending the provision in Clauses 31, 32 and 35 to Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have no issue with the government amendments about the bulk sale of knives.

I do, however, take issue with government Amendments 71, 72, 73, 74, 85, 86, 110, 111, 129, 130, 141, 142, 170, 171, 185, 186, 187 and 188. These amend the Bill to permit the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying further forms of identification that can be used for age-verification purposes relating to the online sale and the delivery of knives and crossbows. That might seem innocuous at first, but all it takes is to look at the explanatory statements to realise what these amendments are really about. The explanatory statement for Amendment 71 says that the amendment

“allows the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID)”.

That is the point.

What is happening here is that the Government are attempting perhaps to sneak in provisions permitting digital ID by the backdoor. I say that the Government are sneaking these in, because they have not only tabled amendments to change clauses already in the Bill but included the regulation-making power permitting digital ID in the drafting of the new clauses that extend provisions to Northern Ireland and Scotland. On top of that, they have lumped these amendments together with all the others in this enormous group. I can only assume that the Government hoped that perhaps no one would notice their attempts to take the very first step towards legislating for mandatory digital ID. That is why we cannot support these amendments.

The Government will perhaps attempt to play this off as a small and practical change to allow Ministers to retain flexibility by allowing new age-verification processes, but that is a red herring. Digital ID is an affront to our rights, and the Government have repeatedly stated that it will not be mandatory, that it is no big deal and that it will simply make things easier. Yet here we are with the Government seeking to insert provisions for digital ID into the Crime and Policing Bill. They have not even enacted the policy, yet they are already trying to expand its purpose. Does this not tell us all we need to know? They say that it will not be mandatory, but how can we ever be sure of that?

We notified the Government of our opposition to these amendments in advance to let them know that we would not accept any amendments to this Bill, or for that matter any Bill, that enables digital ID. It is in that spirit that I tabled my Amendments 72A, 72B, 87A and 131A to remove provisions in the Bill that permit the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify other identity documents. My Amendments 75A, 75B, 75C, 76A, 76B, 76C, 190A, 190B, 191A and 191B amend the government amendments for that same purpose. If the Government accept these proposed changes to their amendments—that is, if they accept that there can be no power to specify digital ID for the purposes of these clauses—I have no further concerns with them. However, if they do not want to accept my changes to their amendments to remove the ability to specify digital ID for age-verification purposes here, then we will not be able to support them.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.

As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.

As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.

I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.

There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century —I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.

I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.

I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we on this side of the Committee are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing forward this thoughtful group of amendments relating to the controls on offensive weapons. Each of these amendments raise practical questions about the application of current laws that relate to offensive weapons and seek to ensure that legislation designed to protect the public does not inadvertently criminalise legitimate, historically important or professionally supervised activities.

Amendment 211 proposes a defence where a weapon is of genuine historical importance. The reasoning behind this amendment is eminently sensible and aligns the treatment of such items with existing defences relating to antiques and curated collections. This is a meaningful distinction between dangerous modern weapons intended for misuse and historical artifacts preserved for cultural or heritage purposes. There is an important question here on proportionality and the scope of reasonable excuse. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on whether existing provisions fully address the concerns raised.

Amendments 212 and 213 relate to the traditional straight police truncheon and agricultural tools. I can tell the Committee that in my 32 years as a police officer, I did not use my truncheon on anybody, but it is very useful for silencing alarms in business premises in the middle of the night when you cannot get the keyholder out of bed. Here too, we recognise the practical issues that these amendments seek to resolve. It is not a controversial belief that items with legitimate ceremonial, historical or agricultural uses should not inadvertently fall within criminal restrictions where there is no evidence of misuse. The examples provided in support of these proposals make clear that the law must operate with fairness and precision, and I hope the Government consider them with due regard.

Amendment 214 addresses a wide range of potential exemptions for visiting forces, emergency services, theatrical and film productions, museums and antiques. These are complex areas with operational realities that deserve serious thought. The amendment raises legitimate questions about how the law accommodates professional and historical circumstances without undermining public safety. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on, and response to, this amendment.

These amendments rightly probe the intersection of criminal law with the heritage and cultural sectors. These are sectors that must be protected. We cannot allow well-meaning legislation unintentionally to criminalise legitimate historical and cultural activities. We look forward to the Minister’s response and assurances that these matters will receive the careful consideration that they merit.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I stand to ask for guidance from the Dispatch Box. When I was doing my national service in the Royal Navy in March 1957— I can date it precisely—I became a midshipman. With that ranking, I was awarded a midshipman’s dirk, which I still hold today. I cannot find that dirk falling under any of the exceptions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Do I therefore have to table a special amendment to make it lawful for me to continue to hold my midshipman’s dirk?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.

Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.

Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.

We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for setting out the case for his Amendments 214A and 438. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who attached their names to Amendment 214A. As the noble Lord, Lord Brady, has explained, the aim is to deregulate the devices known as sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I too must out myself as a townie. As with the previous group, it has been a bit of an education finding out about these items and their uses. They are currently subject to control as they are included in the statutory definition of a firearm set out in Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968. This means that firearms licence holders with a legitimate need for these items are required to apply to the police to include them on their existing firearms licence, and this is obviously at a cost to both the police and the licence holder.

As many noble Lords have noted—indeed, every noble Lord who spoke—removing these items from the legal definition of a firearm would alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments. Because these are entirely inert objects containing no moving parts, they do not of themselves create a risk to public safety, as the noble Lord, Lord Brady, and others have said. The Government have already set out our intention to remove these items from the legal definition of a firearm, and I am therefore sympathetic to the intent behind these amendments.

However, I hope that the noble Lord will understand that I cannot give a commitment at the Dispatch Box this afternoon to bring forward the necessary legislative changes to the Firearms Act in this Bill. If he would agree to withdraw his amendment, I will undertake to update the noble Lord ahead of Report. I will say no more.

--- Later in debate ---

In closing, I say that I do not disagree with anything that noble Lords have said, but we must be particularly careful that we do not just choose some people to protect while unintentionally giving the impression that we do not really care about others.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward Amendments 214F and 214G, which address a gap in the protections afforded to retail workers under Clause 37. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate.

The amendments seek to ensure that delivery drivers who are employed as part of the retail and distribution process are fully included in the scope of the proposed offences against retail workers, and that delivery vehicles themselves are recognised as an extension of the retail premises. We understand and support the underlying principle behind these proposals. Delivery drivers in many cases are the face and point of contact between businesses and consumers and they often work alone, sometimes at unsociable hours and in circumstances where they may be exposed to heightened vulnerability and increasing levels of aggression and abuse.

The safety of delivery drivers should not depend on whether they are standing behind a shop counter or stepping out of a branded van. The rise of home delivery as a core component of modern retail means that this work is an integral part of the sector, and it is only right that the law reflects that reality. It is regrettable to read that certain major supermarkets have rolled out bodycams for their delivery drivers in an effort to protect them. I therefore hope the Government will consider carefully how these protections might sensibly be extended to those whose job it is to ensure that goods reach the customer.

Turning to Amendment 351 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, I fully understand the principle and intent behind this amendment. It raises significant questions about whether the current scope of legal protection is sufficiently broad. The question of whether other public-facing workers, such as in transport, hospitality or civic buildings, face similar risks is one worth raising and discussing. Many of those workers play a crucial role in maintaining order, ensuring safety and supporting essential public functions in spaces accessible to the public.

I similarly thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 214FA. This would include premises used by the hospitality industry for the supply of food or drink as part of the definition of retail premises for the purposes of this offence. This is also an important question to pose to the Government, and I hope they consider it with care.

The issues raised by this group of amendments deserve serious consideration. They invite the Government to reflect on whether extra provisions are needed to protect certain public-facing roles and, if so, which roles specifically need to be highlighted. The question that needs to be answered in response to all the amendments in this group is why only retail workers should be afforded a special criminal offence. Does the A&E receptionist not face the threat of violence and intimidation too? What about the bar staff at a nightclub? A wide range of people are at higher risk of assault during the course of their work. If we are to create a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker, it would make sense to expand this. I hope that the Government will give this careful thought and return the clarity in how they intend to address the concerns expressed.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Stowell, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their amendments. I should note—if not declare an interest—that I have been a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers for 46 years now. That is a long time. I think it is worth noting that I have an interest in this matter. Indeed, I spent many years trying to raise this very issue when a Member of Parliament and outside Parliament before coming to this House.

I should also say at the outset that I am meeting the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to discuss this matter, and am very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, as well. I had a request from my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton to meet him and the USDAW general secretary, Joanne Thomas. I am also happy to do that between now and Report; it may not be immediately.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 39 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled this notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill, to correct what has become serious misinformation. By way of background, Clause 39 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That section was inserted into the 1980 Act by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 provides that where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence where the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will only be heard before magistrates’ courts and will not go before the Crown Court. This alteration has become the subject of significant misinformation, largely perpetuated by the party in government. In the 2024 election manifesto, it claimed that this had created

“effective immunity for some shoplifting”

and the Government’s policy paper in the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”. This, of course, is absolutely false. There is no immunity in any form for any shoplifting offences. Allowing an offence to be tried only in a magistrates’ court does not give anyone immunity.

The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for sentencing a person guilty of theft from a shop state that the starting point for low-value shoplifting, with little additional harm to the victim, is a “high-level community order”, with the maximum being a 12-week custodial sentence. For low-value shoplifting, with significant additional harm to the victim, the starting point is 12 weeks’ custody and the maximum is 26 weeks’ custody. It is clear, then, that magistrates’ courts can impose community orders and terms of imprisonment on offenders found guilty of low-value shoplifting. If the Government believe that is immunity, they clearly need to have a serious rethink. I therefore ask the Minister why the Government are making this change, since there is absolutely not immunity for low-value shoplifting. What can they possibly hope that this will achieve?

The reality is that Clause 39 is purely performative. Worse than that, it is performative politics with negative ramifications. Where an offence is triable either way, it is up to the magistrates’ court and the defendant to decide which court finally hears the case. If the magistrates’ court deems itself to have sufficient powers to try the case, a defendant is able to elect the court that their case will be heard by. Are we seriously saying that we will be permitting a person charged with stealing £50-worth of chocolate to be hauled in front of a Crown Court judge and jury? In such a scenario, the most likely sentence would be a community order for a few months’ imprisonment: that sentence would likely be the same whether the case was tried in a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.

Why enable the possibility for a person charged with low-value shoplifting to elect to go to a Crown Court, simply for them to be handed the same sentence they could have been given in the magistrates’ court? There are around 73,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard by the Crown Courts. Many people are waiting years for their case to be heard. The last thing we need now is for more minor offences to be sent to the Crown Courts, adding to their already sizable backlog. This is not a solution to shoplifting. It is simply another way for a defendant to string out their proceedings. Permitting low-value shoplifting to be tried only summarily does not give shoplifters immunity but will serve only to clog up our already stretched Crown Courts.

What does create an effective immunity for shoplifting is the Government’s Sentencing Bill. Noble Lords will know that the Bill creates the presumption that a custodial sentence of less than 12 months be suspended. Even if a person is given a custodial sentence for low-value shoplifting, they will not serve any time in prison. If that does not give would-be shoplifters more incentive to steal, I do not know what does. Clause 39 is pointless and performative, and would be damaging to the swift passage of justice.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the intention of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but we firmly believe that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. There is one thing that we can all agree on: shop theft has risen at any alarming rate in recent years. It is a blight on our society; it causes loss and distress to retailers and it undermines the safety of retail spaces.

This Government are committed to restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, and to protecting businesses from escalating losses. The latest figures from the Office for National Statistics are stark. Shoplifting almost doubled over the past five years, increasing to 530,643 cases in 2025. While multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences, and some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised.

The noble Lord is right that Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act converted theft of goods worth £200 or less from shops to being tried summarily. I completely understand that the argument of the previous Government was that this would increase efficiency by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft and keeping the cases in the magistrates’ court, but it has not worked. Instead, it is not that there is immunity, but there is a perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. My noble friend Lord Hannett referred to this in relation to the previous group of amendments.

Clause 39 will rectify this, and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so; they think it is a waste of time, because they believe that the police will not do anything. The underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable.

We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge, and Clause 39 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously. By removing the financial threshold for so-called low-value shop theft, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime is not going to be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are also making it clear to the retailers that we take this crime seriously, and they should feel encouraged to report it.

I acknowledge the concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that by making shop theft triable either way there is scope for some cases to end up in the Crown Court. However, there are two reasons why the noble Lord does not need to worry about this. The first is that Sir Brian Leveson highlighted in his independent review that the risk is mitigated by the existing sentencing guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate. This means that, in practice, the vast majority of such cases fall well within magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be committed to the Crown Court, for either trial or sentence. We anticipate that the effect on the backlog will be negligible. Secondly, as far as defendants electing trial in the Crown Court is concerned, they already have the ability to do this in relation to the so-called summary only offence. In practice, elections occur only in marginal numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that Clause 39 will change this.

I urge the noble Lord to join us in sending this very clear message—we entirely accept it was always the intention of the previous Government not to decriminalise this—to make it clear to everybody what a serious offence this is. I hope that he is willing to withdraw his opposition to Clause 39 standing part.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am, however, very disappointed by her continued defence of Clause 39. It is absolutely clear that the changes made by the previous Government do not create effective immunity for low-value shoplifting. All shoplifting offences are able to be tried in a magistrates’ court, where the court can impose a custodial sentence if necessary. Drink-driving offences are tried summarily only. I do not see the Government proposing to make that offence triable either way.

The fundamental point is that this change will not help anyone. It will not deter shoplifters. I hardly think a potential shoplifter will suddenly decide to stop because he might be tried in a Crown Court as opposed to a magistrates’ court. It will simply increase the Crown Court backlog without any benefit. This is a matter that I am sure we will return to on Report.

Clause 39 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

215: After Clause 39, insert the following new Clause—
“Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after “subsection (10)” insert “and sections 208A”.(3) After that section insert—“208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”), (b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.(5) In this section—“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.(4) After section 292 insert— “292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 215 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie speaks to a growing and deeply felt concern shared by communities and retailers across the country—that the persistent and habitual shoplifter is too often left to reoffend, with little intervention, limited consequences and insufficient support to break the cycle of offending. There has been a 13% increase in shoplifting offences in the year ending June 2025.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The first thing we want to do is Clause 39, which, of course, was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But in addition, this is about making it clear to everybody that it really does matter, and driving it through to the police that there should be no immunities—that there are no levels below to which this should not apply.

For all these reasons, I do believe these amendments are not required, but I would be very happy to discuss the matters further with both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and I encourage them to speak with me if they feel there are matters that I have not fully taken into account. But, for now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her kind offer.

The amendment of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe focuses on enforcement. If the police do not investigate theft, if they do not take measures to deter and prevent shoplifting, no amount of legislation will change that. Creating a code of practice for low-value shoplifting could be a step in the right direction. Together with my Amendment 215—and I am grateful, I think, for the implied support of the Liberal Democrats—these measures target enforcement and punishment. This is in stark contrast to what the Government are proposing in Clause 39. The effective immunity for shoplifters comes from the inability of the police to catch those who shoplift. It is an issue of enforcement and investigation, which in turn all comes back to police funding and officer numbers—a point made by the noble Baroness Lady Doocey. Better enforcement is what will drive down shoplifting offence rates, not putting those cases before Crown Court judges. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 215 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I fully endorse the important points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. I had great pleasure in working with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the Modern Slavery Bill. I am totally in awe of her experience and her willingness to share that experience, which, as a new Peer, was absolutely wonderful for me—although I could certainly do with it now as well.

The government amendments in this group provide more welcome detail on the definition and operation of child criminal exploitation prevention orders and include provisions necessary to cover the whole of the UK, not just England and Wales. As with other government amendments during the passage of the Bill, we welcome the expansion of detail in the Bill. Could the Minister confirm that each of the three devolved states has approved the relevant amendments in this group? It would be very good to hear that this has already been done. I do not disagree with anything that anyone has said so far—it has been an excellent and very clear unification of the views of everyone here.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, for introducing this large group of amendments. As noble Lords will appreciate, many of the amendments before us today concern matters of clarification or technical improvement to ensure consistency across the Bill and the amendments tabled so far.

We on these Benches are broadly supportive of these changes, particularly when they strengthen child safeguarding protections and improve clarity, which we hope will eventually result in more seamless practical implementation. In this regard, we welcome amendments extending the scope of child criminal exploitation prevention orders to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and those clarifying procedural matters, such as the form of notification requirements when oral notification may not be practicable. These are sensible adjustments that contribute to ensuring that the Bill operates coherently across the four nations and in real-world enforcement scenarios.

I briefly draw attention to Amendment 235ZA in my name, which would remove Clause 43(3)(a). That subsection currently requires that, when a court makes a criminal exploitation prevention order, the terms of the order must avoid

“conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant”.

Although religious beliefs are, of course, an important individual right, the purpose of these orders is to protect children from very serious criminal harm. It is, therefore, my view that safeguarding and public protection must take precedence over all other concerns and that no such exemption should hinder appropriate and proportionate restrictions when a court considers them necessary. I hope the Government consider the matter carefully and take the recommendation on board.

Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for bringing forward Amendment 235A, which would give the courts an explicit ability to impose a prevention order to protect a child from being threatened, intimidated or coerced into criminal exploitation. The intention behind the amendment—to intervene earlier and more effectively to safeguard children at risk—is one that I hope all sides of the Committee can support. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response and clarification of how the Bill will ensure that those protections are fully delivered. These are complex issues, but our shared objective is simple: to ensure that vulnerable children are protected and that those who exploit them face firm consequences. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the points that have been raised here today.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, if the Committee will allow me, I will begin by detailing the government amendments in this group. We know that criminal gangs conducting activity such as county lines drug dealing do not stop at internal UK borders, and children are criminally exploited across the UK. To go to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, this is why—at the request of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice—we are making provision in the Bill for child criminal exploitation prevention orders in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is at their request, and I hope that also answers the point from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Since the Bill covers England and Wales, this means that the offence of child criminal exploitation will now apply UK-wide. These amendments have been tabled because, since the Bill was published, we have had those discussions and this is a way of making sure that we have a UK-wide approach.

These orders will give the police and courts across the whole of the United Kingdom powers to prevent child criminal exploitation happening in the first place, or happening again, by putting prohibitions and requirements on an adult who poses a risk of criminally exploiting a child. As I have mentioned, these provisions have been drafted in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments and consequential amendments are therefore required for England and Wales to ensure that the orders function smoothly across the United Kingdom.

Finally, we have tabled some other amendments to put beyond doubt that assessment of whether an individual has engaged in child criminal exploitation, or associated conduct, in an application for, or imposition of, a child criminal exploitation prevention order is to be determined by the court on the basis of the civil standard of proof; that is, the balance of probabilities. This is appropriate given that there are civil rather than criminal proceedings in this case. The application of the civil standard of proof is well precedented in many similar preventive orders across the statute book and is important to ensure that an order can intervene earlier in the course of a child’s exploitation so that it can be prevented. I hope that I have wide support across the Committee for those measures—I think I do.

Amendment 232B is in the name of my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown. I welcome her moving her first amendment in such a positive way. She has secured the support of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which is a fairly impressive bunch on a first amendment, so I say well done to her on that. Her amendment seeks to create a further definition of child criminal exploitation.

I say to my noble friend—and I think that this was anticipated by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—that “child criminal exploitation” is already defined in Clause 40 by the description of conduct amounting to an offence. It is where an adult

“engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of … causing the child to”

engage in criminality. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised a number of issues for which I am not accountable, but which my noble friend may wish to respond to. That is the Government’s view on the purpose of Clause 40. Clause 40 captures activity online, through the use of technology and whether or not it is seemingly consensual. This definition also operates for the purposes of the child criminal exploitation prevention orders.

My noble friend has made a very strong case, through personal experience as a constituency MP in east London for almost 20 years, on the impact of county lines gangs on young people. I fully accept, understand and appreciate where she is coming from on those issues. That is why the Government introduced Clause 40 in the first place. It is also why the Government are introducing a bespoke stand-alone offence of CCE, along with the CCE prevention orders, to signal unequivocally that using a child to commit crime is against the law and that those children are victims of a crime. I also agree that any apparent consent of the child to involvement is irrelevant to whether they have been criminally exploited, and that criminal exploitation can occur online and through the use of technology. I understand my noble friend’s amendment, but these points are captured by the definition of CCE in Clause 40, which does not include a child’s consent and captures adults’ conduct by means of any method or control.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we welcome this amendment, which would provide a valuable additional tool to protect children who are criminally exploited while at the same time committing criminal acts that victimise others. The amendment seeks to address these behaviours proportionately, managing the child’s risk to others without inflicting the potentially life-changing damage of having a criminal label attached, while ensuring the child is protected from further exploitation.

A criminal exploitation protection order would be an important step towards providing an end-to-end response for children in this situation. Unlike a youth rehabilitation order, it would directly target behaviours linked to child criminal exploitation, addressing the unique power imbalances and coercion involved in those often-complex situations. I urge the Government to look closely at the proposed order, which would be an extremely worthwhile addition to the Bill and which has the full support of these Benches.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, for bringing forward this important amendment. It speaks to an issue that has been much discussed during the Bill’s passage: the urgent need to protect children who are coerced or manipulated into criminal activity by those who exploit them for profit and control.

Amendment 247 proposes a new clause to establish a criminal exploitation protection order. This would be aimed directly at safeguarding children who have already been subjected to criminal exploitation, preventing further harm. As the noble Baroness has eloquently explained, these children deserve support and a clear pathway out of exploitation. Undoubtedly, there is merit in exploring whether a new bespoke order focused on the safety and welfare of the exploited child could complement the existing prevention orders in the Bill which target the adult perpetrators. We recognise the intention behind ensuring that prohibitions and requirements are carefully balanced so as not to interfere unnecessarily with education, family life or existing legal orders. From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives of the amendment.

We recognise that introducing new regimes raises practical considerations that must be considered. I therefore look forward to hearing the Government’s response and to further discussion as the Bill progresses. Protecting children from exploitation must be central to this legislation. I thank the noble Baroness for her continued leadership on this issue.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Armstrong for Amendment 247. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their support for the amendment, and for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am sorry to have elevated the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool—obviously, I was transfixed by the “Liverpool” part of his title. I appreciate his gentle chiding of me for that rookie error, which I still occasionally make after 15 months in this place. I apologise for that.

I hope I can reassure the Committee that the Government are committed to tackling the criminal exploitation of children and to supporting children who are victims of criminal exploitation. There are a number of comprehensive provisions in the Bill. In early December, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is meeting the Policing Minister in the Home Office to discuss these issues. I am grateful for her expertise and for the discussions that my noble friend Lady Armstrong has had with Action for Children and colleagues outside of the House.

I fully understand and agree with the desire to safeguard children from the horrific consequences of criminal exploitation. That is why the Government are delivering on the manifesto commitment to bring forward this order, under the clauses that we have discussed, and go after the gangs that are luring young people into violence and crime. Additionally, as the Committee will know, through Clauses 42 to 55 and Schedule 5 to the Bill, the Government’s criminal exploitation prevention orders will place prohibitions and requirements on adults who pose a risk of exploiting children into criminality.

This brings me to the central point of the amendment before us. The Government have considered the position but feel that the most effective way to manage the behaviour of those who have criminally exploited children, or who are at risk of doing so, and to protect children from being criminally exploited are the measures in the Bill. We should be restricting the conduct of the adult perpetrator rather than of the child victim.

I simply say to my noble friend—this is an important point—that for legislation to be effective, there needs to be a consequence for non-compliance. If the measure that she has brought forward was put into legislation, we would be focusing on the child victim and their behaviour. In the event of non-compliance, unless there is a consequence to that—and I am not quite sure what that consequence would be—the proposal would have no legal effect. If a child breaches the prohibition or requirements in an order, the first response could be a further narrowing of the prohibitions or requirements, or varying them. Ultimately, a breach of the order would require a consequence, and I am not sure that we have considered that matter in full.

The Government believe that the measures we are introducing in the Bill will create greater awareness of child criminal exploitation and increase identification of victims, and will ensure that we assist victims in receiving appropriate support. When victims are identified, practitioners will be encouraged to recognise vulnerability, first and foremost, and, I hope, to clearly signal that the children who are used by adults to commit crime are victims of abuse.

I hear what noble Lords have said. Everybody who has spoken has broadly supported the direction of travel. We want to draw on that wealth of experience and insight, which is why my colleagues, the Policing Minister and the Safeguarding Minister in the Home Office, are hosting a round table with experts before Christmas to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and look at how we can better support children who are victims of crime and potentially perpetrators of crime.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Lord, Lord Randall, on Amendment 247A. I had the fortune of meeting Claire Wright over a year ago, and she explained to me what Hope and Homes for Children was doing as a charity. I too was bowled over by it, because it was an area that I did not have much knowledge of. She and the organisation have done amazing work. While this may be out of scope of the Bill, the one suggestion I make to the Minister is that he could bring together a round table of Ministers from relevant government departments to listen to Claire Wright and Hope and Homes for Children, so that their good work can be shared and built on.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge for bringing forward this important amendment. It would ensure that this House does not overlook emerging and deeply troubling patterns of abuse that fall outside traditional definitions.

The amendment seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who are recruited into residential care institutions overseas for the purpose of financial gain, commonly referred to as orphanage trafficking. As my noble friend highlighted, this is a practice that too often disguises itself as humanitarian intervention, while in fact it enables systematic exploitation and harm. Many so-called orphanages operate as profit-making enterprises, intentionally separating children from families and communities to attract funding and donations. The children involved may be subject to physical and emotional abuse, forced labour or trafficking into other forms of exploitation.

It is right that we recognise the growing international call to confront this practice and that we consider whether our legislative framework needs strengthening to support that effort. Ensuring that the Modern Slavery Act accurately reflects contemporary forms of exploitation is a legitimate objective, and I commend my noble friend for shining a spotlight on an issue that has far too long remained in the shadows.

We are sympathetic to the intention of the amendment and welcome the opportunity it provides to examine how the UK can play a stronger role in protecting vulnerable children globally. At the same time, we look forward to hearing from the Minister about the practical implications of such a change and how it might interact with existing powers and international co-operation mechanisms. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the concerns he has raised, and I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who contributed to this short but vital debate on an issue, which, speaking personally, I was not tremendously well aware of before looking at the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Randall. Many noble Lords have commented that it is the hard work of people such as Claire Wright and others that has brought to light this pernicious activity or—to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—this evil trade.

As the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, has explained, Amendment 247A seeks to include so-called orphanage trafficking within the meaning of exploitation under Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act. I know the noble Lord has concerns about modern slavery and trafficking in his wider work. I pay tribute to his work as chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation and the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery for highlighting this evil activity and the wider concerns around modern slavery.

As the noble Lord described, in our case, concerns about orphanage tourism would be about volunteers from the UK visiting orphanages overseas, fuelling this activity and contributing to a cycle of harm and exploitation of children. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester made a very relevant point: a lot of it is done in good faith. However, it can be undermined and exploited by those who are acting in bad faith.

I make it very clear to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate—the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Randall, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the Opposition Front Bench—that the Government share the same concerns. That is why the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office provides travel advice warning British nationals of the risk of volunteering with children and highlighting how volunteer visitors may unknowingly contribute to child exploitation and trafficking. The advice that the FCDO gives signposts travellers to the global standard for volunteering, which helps organisations provide responsible volunteering. By adopting the global standard, organisations commit to promoting child-safe volunteering in all environments, which includes not facilitating visits to orphanages or other institutional care facilities.

Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 already recognises the specific vulnerabilities of children and encompasses the exploitation of children for the provision of services of any kind and to enable someone to acquire benefits of any kind, including financial gain. Therefore, orphanage trafficking is already captured by the broad terms of the existing legislation. It is fair to say that the noble Lord, Lord Randall, anticipated that that may be the tenor of my contribution.

I point out to noble Lords that on 16 July this year, the Home Office launched a public call for evidence on how the Government can improve the process of identifying victims of modern slavery, human trafficking and exploitation. The call for evidence closed on 8 October, and the Home Office is now analysing responses received. A report summarising the key findings and themes from the call for evidence responses will be published in due course. Of course, the Home Office will consider the evidence gathered to explore any further changes that can be made to improve the identification of victims.

We are seeking to introduce new modern slavery legislation as part of our efforts to review and improve the modern slavery system. This new legislation will enable us to clearly articulate the UK’s responsibilities under international law regarding modern slavery, allowing us to reduce opportunities for misuse while ensuring the right protection for those who need it.

I make no commitments here to your Lordships’ Committee, but that may well be to an opportunity to revisit some of the issues raised in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Polak, floated the suggestion of a wider round table; I will certainly take that back to colleagues and discuss it.

For the reasons I have outlined about Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act already capturing orphanage trafficking in the broad terms, we do not believe it is necessary to amend Section 3 any further, as the conduct in question is already captured. In light of this explanation, and hoping that it does not disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and other noble Lords too much, I hope he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly perhaps to defend the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. Quite often in your Lordships’ House, we end up with amendments that are remarkably similar, and it appears to be a trait among some of your Lordships to consider working in co-operation with others systematically a somewhat eccentric behaviour. I personally feel that it should be encouraged.

What I wanted to say is the obvious: data is king. The situation that we have allowed to evolve over the last 20 or 30 years has been allowed to happen because of a dearth of reliable and systematic collection and utilisation of data. We have allowed what has been happening—largely to these young girls, in plain sight—because we have lacked the detail and the nitty-gritty information required to nail it. In a long career in business, the thing one disliked most was awaydays when you talked about strategy, when a large number of people would devote an enormous amount of hot air to talking about this, that or the other, usually in a slightly vague way. The thing that nails that sort of debate is reliable and accurate data. It deflates the rather pompous balloon who is spouting out, apparently knowledgeably but actually probably repeating what somebody else has said—it deflates that remarkably quickly.

Very simply, we need to follow the fourth recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in her report. It is in bold and it is very brief, but it is extremely clear:

“The government should make mandatory the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases and work with the police to improve the collection of ethnicity data for victims”.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it has been five months since the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, undertaken by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was published. I once again extend my thanks to her for her incredible work on this. The audit laid bare the systemic failures of local government, police leadership and safeguarding structures that allowed organised grooming gangs to operate in plain sight. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found a culture of denial, a fear of being labelled racist, an unwillingness to confront uncomfortable truths and a catastrophic failure to treat vulnerable young girls as victims. Her review documented how institutions minimised, dismissed or actively ignored evidence of horrific abuse. Perhaps the most sobering lesson from this is that these were not isolated failings; they were structural, cultural and tragically repeated in town after town across the country.

The national audit produced 12 recommendations. To their credit, the Government have accepted all 12, some of which have found their way into the Bill. However, unfortunately, the first and second recommendations of the audit have so far been left behind. The first recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was to change the law so that any adult who intentionally has sexual intercourse with a child under 16 receives a mandatory charge of rape. In their response to the audit, the Government said:

“Our laws must never provide protection for the adult abusers rather than the child victims of these despicable crimes. We share Baroness Casey’s view … and we accept the recommendation to change the law in this area”.


If the Government agreed with this recommendation and said that they will implement it, why have they not done so? The Bill provides the perfect opportunity for this change in the law. That is why my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and I tabled Amendment 271B. It would provide for a new, distinct offence of child rape. This would operate alongside the current offence of the rape of a child under 13 in Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

In her audit, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, laid bare the loophole in the law. Currently, an adult who has sex with a child under the age of 13 is automatically guilty of rape, and this operates with strict liability. But, despite the age of consent being 16, when an adult has had sex with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, the decision to charge and which offence to charge with is left open to the Crown Prosecution Service. This has led to many cases of child sexual exploitation having the charges downgraded from rape to lesser charges, such as sexual activity with a child under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act. Not only is that offence not a charge of rape but it carries a maximum sentence of 14 years—not life, as in the case of an offence under Section 5. Our amendment would provide that, where a person over the age of 18 has penetrative sexual relations with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, they will be charged with the rape of a child in all cases and face a sentence of life imprisonment.

We have not included a so-called Romeo and Juliet provision in this amendment, because it applies only to those who are over 18. Children who are close in age and have consenting sexual relations would not be criminalised under the amendment. I want to make sure that that is clear.

Fundamentally, the law must be unambiguous on this matter. The penetration of a child is rape. It is not sexual activity; it is not exploitation; and it is not an unfortunate incident. It is rape. The Casey report describes girls as young as 13 being passed between adult men, yet institutional language frequently minimised the seriousness of what had occurred. Creating a specific offence would reinforce the fundamental point: children cannot consent to sex with adults—full stop. Given that the Government have accepted that this needs to happen, I hope that they will be able to accept my amendment.

The second recommendation from the national audit that the Government have failed to deliver is the national inquiry. Amendment 247B from my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch seeks to press the Government on what has become a chaotic process. I know we have discussed this on many occasions in this House, but the fact is that the inquiry is in disarray. Survivors have already resigned from the panel because they do not trust the Government. Those most impacted by the grooming gangs scandal have lost faith in the process that was meant to bring them long-overdue justice. Months on from the announcement, the Government were U-turning. The chair has not been appointed, the terms of reference have not been published and the inquiry has not begun. How much longer must the victims and survivors wait? My noble friend’s amendment would give the Government a timeline of three months, and there is no reason why they cannot live up to that.

My noble friend Lady Cash is a stalwart defender of the rights of children and young girls. She proposes two crucial amendments, which also link into the national audit on grooming gangs. Amendment 288A would complement the duty to report in Clause 72 of the Bill. It would establish a duty on professionals with safeguarding responsibilities to report where they know or reasonably believe that a child is being sexually abused or exploited. That would fill a long-identified and long-criticised gap. If this scandal has showed us anything, it is that vulnerable young girls were let down by the very people who were supposed to protect them. Institutions sometimes waited for absolute proof before acting, and children paid the price for that inaction.

Amendment 288B creates a new offence targeted at public officials who obstruct or frustrate investigations into child sexual abuse. This is not hypothetical. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found that public officials failed to record offences, failed to transmit intelligence and, in some cases, deliberately closed down avenues of inquiry. There must be consequences for such conduct. The noble Baroness was explicit that the fear of being accused of racism contributed to the reluctance of authorities to confront organised grooming gangs. More importantly, she also acknowledged that it remains impossible to provide a definitive assessment of the ethnic profile of the perpetrators, because the data collected by police forces has been woeful. That poor-quality data is one of the factors that permitted officials and authorities to claim they could not conclude any link between ethnicity or nationality and the prevalence of grooming gangs.

The large number of perpetrators whose ethnicity was recorded as “unknown” in the statistics creates a highly distorting picture. Inclusion of the “unknowns” shows 28% of group-based offenders as white, but exclusion of the “unknowns” shows 88% being white. This is obviously not the way to create datasets that could be used for accurate police intelligence and rigorous policy-making. Even today, we still have people trying to deny the fact that the vast majority of perpetrators in these grooming gangs were Pakistani, despite the evidence; they are able to continue this route because of the poor-quality data.

Because of this completely and shockingly inadequate collection of data, I strongly support this amendment from my noble friend Lady Cash. Her Amendments 288C and 288D compel the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all child sexual offenders and victims. Consistent nationwide data gives us truth, and truth is the basis of action. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his series of amendments. They probe the definitions of child sexual assault and rape, and also impose a statutory duty to investigate historic instances of child sexual abuse where the lawful authority has been negligent. I hope that the Government will consider these amendments with the seriousness they deserve.

These amendments together form a coherent, serious and necessary set of reforms that respond directly to the failures highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and some of her solutions. The victims of grooming gangs were failed by the state. They were failed by those whose duty was to protect them, and they were failed by institutions that put political sensitivities above child safety.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

Before my noble friend rises to reply, I want to emphasise, as someone who has practised at the Bar over many decades, like the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, the importance of our recognising in the course of these discussions that, while we are dealing here with a spate of offences clearly committed by gangs of Pakistani men, this is not confined to Pakistani men. The Epstein case has told us quite clearly that upper-class white men with power can abuse and groom and commit these crimes. I have seen it since my early years at the Bar. I see the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, sitting there, and we acted in cases involving East End gangs who passed around girls who were part and parcel of that world. Nowadays, in the drugs world, pass-around girls, who are often underage, are part and parcel of that world. So we must not become fixated on the idea that this happens only in certain communities. I just want that to be emphasised.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, very briefly, the government amendments set out the devolution arrangements to ensure that criminals cannot exploit differences between the four nations, and we are very happy to support them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is an important issue that I know there is cross-party support for, and I am largely supportive of the intentions behind the amendments in this group.

The first of the Minister’s amendments acts largely to tidy up the drafting of the Bill and ensure its thoroughness. I agree with this. Expanding the scope for technology testing regarding child sexual abuse materials is welcome.

Similarly, extending provisions to ensure that they are the same in all parts of the union is a minor but important amendment. Consistency across our internal borders is the best way to ensure that children are protected equally everywhere. It should help with cross-border co-ordination between authorities, and I therefore welcome it.

I see the logic behind government Amendments 295A and 295B. It is the right approach that, if the Government want to crack down on technology, they should first do so at the source. That means discovering which technologies are being used to create unlawful content, which requires people to test them. This would also, I hope, have the additional effect of not blanket banning content for people without nuance, instead targeting the specific pieces of software responsible. So long as the individuals able to use this as a defence remain strictly authorised by the Secretary of State, I appreciate the amendment’s aim.

This should go hand in hand with an initiative similar to the one suggested by my noble friend Lord Nash. If the Government can identify the technology used, they should attempt to shut it down. Unfortunately, this is often outside the Government’s jurisdiction and therefore some form of software to prevent the distribution of child sexual abuse material might be the next best approach. I hope that the Minister can confirm that they are perhaps looking at this.

As I said, this is a non-partisan issue. We all want to reduce child sexual abuse, online or offline, and these amendments should work to help the Bill achieve the former. I hope that the Minister can, in due course—perhaps at a later stage—fully outline how this new technology will be implemented and applied consistently, and will consider my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, but I broadly support the approach.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will reflect on what he said and give him a fuller briefing on the detail of how we are approaching the AI issue. Obviously, we will come on to further amendments in the next group, which I will respond to once they have been moved.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this extremely important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Nash for their continued efforts on the protection of children online.

This group should unite the whole Committee. We can be in no doubt about the need to safeguard children in an environment where technology is evolving at unprecedented speed and where the risk of harm, including the creation and dissemination of child sexual abuse material, is escalating. It is a sad truth that, historically, Governments have been unable to keep pace with evolving technology. As a consequence, this can mean legislation coming far too late.

Amendment 266, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require providers of online services, including generative AI systems, to conduct risk assessments on the potential use of their platforms to create child sexual abuse images. The Committee has heard compelling arguments about the need for meaningful responsibilities to be placed on platforms and developers, particularly where systems are capable of misuse at scale. We recognise the seriousness of the challenge that she has outlined, and I very much look forward to what the Government have to say in response.

On my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, we are particularly sympathetic to the concerns that underpin his proposal. His amendment would mandate the installation of tamper-proof software on relevant devices to prevent the creation, viewing and sharing of child sexual abuse material. My noble friend has made a powerful case that prevention at source must form part of the comprehensive strategy to protect children. While there are practical questions that will require careful examination, his amendment adds real value to the discussion. I am grateful for his determined focus on this issue, and I hope the Government also take this amendment very seriously.

Similarly, Amendments 479 and 480, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, speak to the responsibilities of AI search tools and AI chatbots. The risk of such technologies being co-opted for abusive purposes is not theoretical; these threats are emerging rapidly and require a response proportionate to the harm.

From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives across this group of amendments and look forward to the Government’s detailed response and continuing cross-party work to ensure the strongest protections for children in an online world. As has been said several times throughout Committee, protecting children must remain our highest priority. I hope the Government take these amendments very seriously.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for the way she introduced this group of amendments and for her tireless work to protect children online. I say on behalf of all noble Lords that the support she has received today across the Committee shows that her work is vital, especially in the face of emerging technologies, such as generative AI, which present opportunities but, sadly, also have a darker side with new risks for criminal misuse.

She has received the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes, Lady Boycott, Lady Bertin and Lady Doocey, my noble friends Lady Berger, Lady Royall of Blaisdon and Lord Hacking, the noble Lords, Lord Bethell, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Hampton and Lord Davies of Gower, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and others to whom I will refer later. That is quite an array of colleagues in this House. It is my job to respond to this on behalf of the Government, and I will try to be as helpful as I can to the noble Baroness.

The Government share her desire to protect the public, especially children, online, and are committed to protecting all users from illegal online content. We will continue to act to keep citizens safe. Amendment 266 seeks to create a new duty on online service providers—including those already regulated under the Online Safety Act—to assess and report to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency on the risk that their services could be used to create or facilitate the generation of AI child sexual abuse material. The amendment would also require online service providers to implement measures to mitigate and manage the risks identified.

I say to the noble Baroness that UK law is already clear: creating, possessing or distributing child sexual abuse images, including those generated by AI, is already illegal, regardless of whether they depict a real child or not. Child sexual abuse material offences are priority offences under the Online Safety Act. The Act requires in-scope services to take proactive steps to prevent such material from appearing on their services and to remove it swiftly if it does.

As she will know, the Government have gone even further to tackle these appalling crimes through the measures in the Bill. I very much welcome her support for Clause 63. We are introducing a world-leading offence criminalising the possession, adaptation and supply of, or offer to supply, an AI model that has been fine-tuned by offenders to create child sexual abuse material. As I mentioned earlier, we are also extending the existing paedophile manual offence to cover advice on how to abuse AI to create child sexual abuse material.

We have also introduced measures that reflect the critical role that AI developers play in ensuring their systems are not misused. To support the crucial work of the Government’s AI Security Institute, we have just debated and agreed a series of amendments in the previous group to provide authorised bodies with the powers to legally test commercial AI models for extreme pornography and other child sexual abuse material. That is essential to allow experts to safely test measures, and I am pleased that we received the Committee’s support earlier.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

289: Clause 82, page 98, leave out lines 3 to 11
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the ability of the court to dismiss an action in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse on the grounds that the defendant would suffer substantial prejudice.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 289 is a probing amendment through which I am seeking the Government’s justification for the substantial prejudice provision in Clause 82. By way of background, Clause 82 removes the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims in cases relating to child sexual abuse. As such, it implements recommendation 15 of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse chaired by Professor Jay. The inquiry found that most personal inquiry claims relating to child sexual abuse are not only modest in value, but in many cases do not result in compensation being paid. The reason for the high rate of failure is that a significant number of those claims are prevented from proceeding as a result of the limitation period on bringing forward a claim under the Limitation Act 1980. That Act permits the three-year period for claims resulting from sexual abuse as a child to begin from age 18, therefore expiring at 21, but many survivors do not feel comfortable with coming forward and telling people what happened until much later, never mind gathering the courage to bring a lawsuit against their abuser. The result is a lack of justice for those who have been abused as a child, and it is welcome, therefore, that the Government have decided to bring this forward.

However, there is possibly an issue with the drafting of Section 11ZB, which is inserted by this clause. It establishes the situations in which the court must dismiss an action for injury arising from child sexual abuse. It states that for all cases brought after the commencement of this clause, the court must dismiss the action if the defendant can prove that a fair hearing cannot take place. However, for any case that started before this new clause comes into force, the test for dismissal is set considerably lower because in this instance, the court must dismiss the claim if the defendant can prove that they would suffer substantial prejudice, and thus the proceedings are inequitable.

This goes further than was recommended by the Jay inquiry. Its report referred to

“the express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show that a fair trial is not possible”.

The only test the independent inquiry wanted was that the test of whether a fair trial can take place applied to all past and future cases. I know there is concern that the ability of the court to dismiss actions due to substantial prejudice placed on the defendant will create uncertainty for survivors of child sexual abuse and delay access to justice. This has the potential to undermine the purpose of the recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and might not provide the certainty and support survivors deserve.

I reiterate that this is simply a probing amendment, and I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on why the Government have gone further than recommended by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group. I repeat a declaration of interest I made at Second Reading: that I have appeared as a barrister in a number of the leading cases about limitation of the law of tort. The purpose of limitation periods is to give a claimant a fair chance to decide whether to bring a claim, but also to place some sort of time limit on claims. Limitation periods vary according to the cause of action—for example, defamation claims have to be brought within one year. Personal injury claims have always been in a special category. The normal limit is three years or, in the case of a young person, three years after attaining the age of majority. But because some personal injuries manifest themselves only some time after they have been caused, particularly those relating to disease claims, the law has responded by postponing the starting date to reflect something called the “date of knowledge”.

What constituted knowledge was difficult to encapsulate in statute and gave rise to a lot of litigation, particularly in the context of what are generally known as historic claims for child sexual abuse. But these difficulties were largely overcome by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court a complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. Although the section gave various sensible guidelines as to matters to be taken into consideration, the discretion was expressed to be entirely unfettered.

One difficulty of the law remained. In claims for deliberate acts of assault, there was a finite six-year limitation period, rather than a three-year extendable limit for claims in negligence, so some claimants did not have the advantage of Section 33. This problem was overcome by the decision of A v Hoare in 2008— I was one of the unsuccessful defendants in that case—when the House of Lords decided that, whether the claim was in negligence or in assault, there was still a discretion to disapply the limitation period.

The only question that remained was whether it would ever be too late to bring a claim in the light of Section 33. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, a much-missed Member of your Lordships’ House, made this observation:

“If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations …) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible”.


That passage was in fact referred to in the conclusions of IICSA, which decided that the three-year period should be removed, but that there should be

“express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show a fair trial is not possible”.

The Government responded to IICSA’s report and did not support getting rid of limitations. The Government acknowledged the importance of Section 33 and made this point:

“A limitation period also encourages disputes to be resolved timeously thus promoting finality and certainty. Both are key cornerstones of the legal system. As such, the Government’s opening position, ahead of consultation, is that it does not support this option”.


Nor did they support a special limit for claims arising from sexual abuse. I remind the Committee that, in 2017, in the case of Carroll v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the Court of Appeal emphasised the unfettered nature of the Section 33 discretion.

My question to the Government at Second Reading was essentially this: what cases do they envisage would now be allowed to proceed which would not have done under the current law? I do not expect an immediate answer, but the Government have now had plenty of time to consider their response. There was a consultation following the Government’s response that I referred to, but it was not particularly large and did not contain consistent answers.

Changing the law of limitation is best an exercise following the careful balancing of respective interests, perhaps by the Law Commission. What appears to have happened here is that the Government, notwithstanding the initial view that I referred to, have decided to come up with some sort of compromise. In doing so, I fear they have produced in Clause 82 a real dog’s dinner of a provision.

Clause 82 is headed:

“Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases”,


but it does not do that. It specifically provides that sexual abuse is in a separate category from, for example, physical abuse, although this was precisely what the Government did not want when they responded to the original recommendations. It contains a rather unclear provision that, when a dispute has been settled, it will no longer be subject to these new provisions. It probably does not include discontinued claims or claims settled otherwise than by way of a formal agreement.

New Section 11ZB contains some very unclear provisions as to the circumstances in which the court can dismiss an action, while at the same time containing in new subsection (2) the provision:

“The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place”.


The interrelationship of new subsections (2) and (3) is incoherent and will inevitably result in litigation. The lack of clarity on what is and is not sexual abuse, and what is and is not settlement, will, I fear, also give rise to litigation.

I agree with the Opposition Front Bench’s probing amendment that we should get rid of new Section 11ZB(3), but that would leave a repetition of what the law is anyway and would not deal with the points about what constitutes sexual abuse or settlement via agreement. My conclusion is that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the law as it is. This rather messy compromise will give rise to unnecessary litigation and I am unsure it will provide remedies where remedies are not already available.

Sexual abuse, particularly of children, is abhorrent, and we now know there has been far more of it than was originally perceived. It is, however, important to point out that claims are not usually made against individual perpetrators; one can understand why there would not be much sympathy for a claim being brought, however late, against such a perpetrator. The usual defendant is, for example, a school, religious organisation, local authority or even central government. They may or may not have any knowledge of what happened but, because of the expanded doctrine of vicarious liability, will be deemed in law to be responsible for what occurred. They may or may not be covered by insurance.

As Lord Brown pointed out, there will come a time when it is quite simply inappropriate, many years later, for claims to be brought before the court. However sympathetic one is to the victims of sexual abuse, the law currently caters adequately for the balance between the interests of claimants and defendants. If we include Clause 82 in the Bill, I fear we will make bad law. The clause should not stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is no answer to say that another Government considered it carefully: different Governments have different priorities. I am not sure that that is going to come as a great surprise to the noble Lord. As for Section 33, this Government are satisfied that it does not provide sufficient protection.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief in my response. As I say, this was a probing amendment, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. I thank the Minister for her clarification. I am content with the Government’s assurances, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 289 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, this debate has underlined that stalking is not an occasional nuisance but a pattern of behaviour that our systems still struggle to recognise and act on early enough. The debate shows a familiar picture: warning signs are missed, threats are minimised and tools that Parliament has already provided are used patchily, if at all.

These amendments point towards a more joined-up and confident response, in which the police, prosecutors and other agencies share information, understand the particular dynamics of stalking and intervene at a much earlier stage, including online, before behaviour escalates into something far more dangerous. Looking ahead, there is now a real opportunity to embed that approach in the forthcoming review and in the VAWG strategy. Many of the ideas we have discussed—stronger use of stalking protection orders and notices, better guidance and training, and clearer expectations of consistency across forces—could and should be reflected on here.

The underlying purpose of these amendments is surely uncontroversial: to ensure that the law and practice keep pace with the reality of stalking and to give victims a response that matches the seriousness of the threat they face, so that this debate becomes a turning point rather than a missed opportunity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, stalking is an offence which constitutes severe harassment and can instil grave fear into victims, as we have just heard. It is absolutely right that the law bears down on perpetrators of stalking. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 gave magistrates’ courts the power to impose stalking protection orders on application by the chief officer of police. Clause 97 extends this power so that a Crown Court can impose such an order where a person has been acquitted of any other offence.

The Government will no doubt argue that they are taking the necessary action to further prevent cases of stalking through this part of the Bill, but let us not forget another Bill they are currently taking through your Lordships’ House. The Sentencing Bill will suspend sentences for anyone charged with the offence of stalking. Section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 states that a person found guilty of stalking is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—less than the 12-month time limit for the presumption of a suspended sentence order.

Furthermore, the offence of breaking a stalking protection order is also likely to lead to a suspended sentence under the Sentencing Bill. Although a custodial sentence of up to five years can theoretically be imposed on conviction on indictment, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines state that in most cases of culpability and severity the starting point will be one year’s custody, and the ranges can go down to 12 weeks in custody and even a community order. This may very well be proportionate for low-level stalking offences, but the fact is that a person with a high degree of culpability and a medium to high level of harm will fall into the range that will mean their sentence is highly likely to be suspended.

If the Government are serious about bearing down on stalking, I suggest that letting anyone convicted of that offence walk free is not a good move for the safety of the victim. The Minister might try to rebut this argument by talking about the stalking protection orders, but I gently say to him that there is no good in letting a stalker roam the streets just because they have an order slapped on them. Given the falling police numbers, what is the likelihood of a person who violates their order actually being arrested? I also suggest that victims of stalking will not feel safer simply because their stalker has been given a court order.

What makes this even worse is that there is a very real possibility that a person who breaks the terms of their suspended sentence order will still not receive a custodial sentence. Although the automatic presumption will not apply in that case, the Government have opposed Conservative amendments to explicitly exempt people with a history of non-compliance from suspended sentences. They have also resisted our amendments to exempt repeat offenders from being handed suspended sentences.

Under this Government’s legislation, there is a very real possibility that a stalker could continually stalk their victim, break their stalking protection order and their suspended sentence order and never face jail time. That is not protecting victims. Against this backdrop, I suggest that it does not matter what we do in this place regarding stalking; we can table all the amendments we like to toughen up the protection orders, but they will not protect victims or prevent stalkers if the Government let than walk free. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, did not have much to say about what is in this Bill. He has opportunities to talk about another Bill; let him do that at another time. I am talking about this Bill. He never mentioned what was going on in this Bill, the measures within it or, indeed, the amendments before us in his opening contribution—not a single word. Maybe he should reflect on that, because he has not endeared himself to me in these discussions.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Do I ever?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord asks, “Do I ever?”—he does occasionally, and I will give him the benefit of the doubt, but I was not really impressed that he did not say one single word about what is currently before the Committee. Let us have a discussion about the Sentencing Bill with my noble friends Lady Levitt and Lord Timpson another time. That is being completed. Anyway, let us leave that to one side.

I hope to be helpful in part to the noble Baronesses and others who have spoken. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing their experience, their views and their passion for this subject to this debate. A number of amendments are before the Committee. As I said, I hope to be helpful in part on some of them.

Amendments 330A, 330AZA, 330AA, 330AB, 330B and 330C all relate to stalking protection orders, which, as Members know, are civil orders introduced in 2020 to protect victims of stalking. Amendment 330A in the name of my noble friend Lady Royall seeks to reference explicitly the required civil burden of proof—that is, on the balance of probabilities—for determining whether the behaviour of a person to be made subject to a stalking protection order amounts to acts associated with stalking. Currently, statutory guidance for the police published by the Home Office references that it is likely the courts will apply the civil burden of proof when considering stalking protection orders, but I agree with my noble friend that there could be a case for making this clearer. I therefore undertake to consider her proposals in Amendment 330A ahead of the next stage on the Bill. I hope that helps the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who also spoke on this matter and my noble friend.

I am grateful for Amendment 330AA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am particularly grateful to her for drawing her personal experience to the attention of the Committee. I had not realised the traumas that she had had in the run up to the 2010 election, but I had a quick chance to google those matters while she was speaking. It looks like it was an appalling experience. I am grateful to her for bringing it to the attention of the Committee.

The noble Baroness’s proposal in Amendment 330AA would remove the requirement for the restrictions in SPOs to avoid, where possible, conflict with the defendant’s religious beliefs and interference with their attendance at work or at an educational establishment. On this occasion, I understand the noble Baroness’s view that this could be brought out in statutory guidance, but it is our view in the Home Office that it is important to retain this within primary legislation, particularly regarding an individual’s rights through the European Convention on Human Rights, especially Article 9 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, so I am afraid I cannot help her on that one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Doocey in this small but perfectly formed group of amendments. My Amendment 335 would mandate a statutory consultation on the guidance to accompany the new encouraging or assisting serious self-harm offences contained in Clauses 102 and 103.

On these Benches we welcome the underlying intention of Clauses 102 and 103 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations for a broader offence covering encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm, expanding beyond digital communication to include direct assistance. However, offences that involve encouraging self-harm must be handled with the utmost care, given the vulnerabilities inherent in such cases. The critical issue here is the risk of inadvertently criminalising legitimate support services, which has been raised with us by a number of support organisations.

The offence requires a specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm. This is intended to ensure that charitable organisations and mental health professionals who advise sufferers on how to moderate or manage self-harming behaviour are not criminalised. My amendment addresses this directly by requiring the Secretary of State to produce guidance and consult extensively with representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations; mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care; and legal experts—prosecutors and defence practitioners—regarding the application of the specific intent requirement. This mandatory consultation is essential, in our view, to ensure that the statutory guidance clearly differentiates between criminal encouragement and legitimate therapeutic activity. Without ensuring that this guidance is informed by experts and laid before Parliament, we risk confusion among front-line practitioners and the inadvertent penalisation of those working hardest to help vulnerable people. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to this amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.

Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).

I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.

I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.

I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.

On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.

I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.

I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.

The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.

In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.

I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, having heard a number of cogent arguments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I cannot remain silent. I was certainly persuaded on the noble Baroness’s Amendment 335A, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister has similarly been persuaded.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group concerning the important issue of child abduction. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions this evening. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward Amendments 335A and 335B, which raise important questions about the interaction between Clause 104 and the lived reality of victims of domestic abuse. The amendments probe how the new offence will operate where a parent has acted out of fear for their own safety or that of their child, and they touch on the wider issue of how the criminal law recognises coercive, controlling and violent relationships.

We very much support the principle behind the noble Baroness’s amendments and the safeguarding concerns that they highlight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about how the Government intend to ensure that the operation of Clause 104 does not inadvertently criminalise vulnerable parents acting in desperation to protect themselves or their children.

Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, create and support a parallel offence in Northern Ireland relating to the detention of a child overseas without consent. I recognise the importance of maintaining consistency across jurisdictions and ensuring that children in Northern Ireland benefit from equivalent protections. I would be grateful if the Minister can set out how the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland intends to exercise the new regulation-making and commencement powers. What discussions have taken place with relevant agencies to ensure that the offence can operate effectively in practice? I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendments 335A and 335B. Her amendments have been grouped with the modest collection of government amendments—336, 496, 521 and 549—tabled in my name, which extend the provisions contained in Clause 104 to Northern Ireland.

I note the concern raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that Clause 104 will criminalise parents who are fleeing domestic abuse where the detention of the child is primarily motivated by the intention of keeping themselves and/or the child safe. I reassure your Lordships that this absolutely is not the intention of the existing Clause 104. Indeed, in developing the provisions, very careful consideration was given to the implications of potentially criminalising a parent who has detained their child abroad.

Before I turn to the reasons why the Government will not be supporting these amendments today, I want to explain a little more about the purpose of Clause 104’s inclusion in the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her clear and even-handed explanation of her understanding of the reason why the Government included it in the first place. The clause seeks to implement the Law Commission’s 2014 recommendation that the Government should close a small gap in the law by making it a criminal offence for a parent, or person with similar responsibility to a parent, to detain a child abroad without appropriate consent, once the original consent has expired.

I am sure that I do not need to explain to anyone that the abduction of a child by a parent is an extremely distressing experience for everyone involved. For any Government, the aim is to safeguard children from abduction by preventing the unlawful removal of a child, ensuring their swift and safe return when they have been taken and upholding custody rights through international co-operation and legal enforcement. The new measure is intended to be consistent with the existing criminal framework, to stand as a deterrent and a backstop where we know that a gap in the law is being exploited, even if by very few people. Some of those who have not returned a child are themselves abusers; they are abusive parents seeking to evade the law. We cannot leave that gap unclosed.

However, I have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by your Lordships this evening, and to some sent to me by organisations with an interest in this area. I remain satisfied that there is no risk of vulnerable parents who have been victims of domestic abuse being criminalised. I hope I shall be forgiven for setting out my reasons in a little more detail; I alluded to them earlier in relation to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but that was in a slightly different context, and I think I need to give more detail.

Many of your Lordships will be aware that there is a two-stage test for the Crown Prosecution Service to apply when deciding whether a prosecution should be brought. The first is an “evidential sufficiency” test but, even if that stage is passed and it is felt that there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, that is not the end of the matter. The second stage is the “public interest” test, which asks whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be brought. It is this stage of the test that is often applied in, for example, assisted dying cases. This is important, including in a domestic abuse context, because it means that prosecutors must consider the background, including whether the alleged offender was acting from benign motives or was themselves a victim of domestic abuse, before deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. Additionally, and importantly, a third test applies for the new offence in Clause 104 which adds an additional safeguard: that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required for a case to proceed.

Prosecutorial discretion remains a key safeguard, and evidence of domestic abuse would be a highly relevant factor in any decision to prosecute, or in whether the Director of Public Prosecutions would give his consent in addition. Factors that are relevant to the public interest do not require proof to the criminal standard. It is a much more “in the round” assessment than would be required if bringing some kind of criminal proceedings.

To be clear, in answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the Government continue to believe that the civil courts remain best placed to deal with child abduction cases. That is why we support international co-operation and recourse to the 1980 Hague convention as a civil mechanism for facilitating the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other state parties and the Hague Conference, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, to ensure that the convention operates effectively. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in effect agreed, that this prosecution should be the act of last resort. We agree. We are conscious, however, that criminal proceedings may be needed in some cases. It has been suggested that some parents see detaining a child abroad following any earlier consent as an easier route to keeping their child permanently outside the UK with no criminal charges or police involvement. That clearly circumvents the law. This change to the criminal law is intended to sit alongside and supplement existing civil remedies, rather than filling the courts with people who have retained their child abroad.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asks whether the Government would be prepared to add a domestic abuse defence, in effect. The law on defences, including those relevant to domestic abuse, is highly complex. It requires definitions and decisions about where the burden of proof lies and what the standard of proof will be. It is precisely because of this complexity that the Law Commission is currently reviewing defences in domestic abuse cases as part of its wider project on homicide and sentencing. While the primary focus of its review is on homicide, the findings are likely to have broader implications for how defences operate in domestic abuse contexts and could be relevant across a broader range of offences. A bespoke defence of domestic abuse in the offence created by Clause 104 could have implications far beyond the child abduction framework.

I hope that the noble Baroness will accept from me that the Law Commission’s findings will be carefully reviewed before any changes to the law are considered, in order to ensure that any legislative changes are informed by evidence. In the meantime, we are exploring ways to strengthen our understanding of how defences operate in non-homicide cases by gathering more robust data. For these reasons, it would be premature to legislate before the Law Commission has completed its work, but I take the point about the equality impact assessment and the gendered nature of some of these offences. I will, if I may, write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and, obviously, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well.

I turn very briefly to government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549. Until now, the provisions in Clause 104 extended to England and Wales only. However, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive, these provisions will now also apply to Northern Ireland. I note the concerns raised by the two amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment at this stage. I hope your Lordships will join me in supporting the government amendments in this group.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, I have been a community worker for over 35 years now and I have dealt with many communities where one parent has found someone to do tuition, and that has acted as a bit of a kitemark. Other parents have felt they were safe because of the relationship they have with that particular parent. This very strong common-sense proposal would protect entire communities in one fell swoop. I really support this very important amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to this group of amendments tabled by the Government and to Amendment 337A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton. Amendment 337 provides Northern Ireland with provisions equivalent to those in Clause 105. As with similar amendments earlier in the Bill, we recognise the need for aligned protections across jurisdictions, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline the engagement with Northern Ireland departments and confirm that operational partners are prepared for implementation. Similarly, Amendments 520 and 550 ensure appropriate territorial extent and commencement powers for Northern Ireland. These are direct drafting and procedural changes that appear entirely sensible.

Turning to Amendment 337A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, we are supportive of the principle it raises. Closing a loophole that allows barred individuals to tutor children through so-called private arrangements seems an important and proportionate step, while the amendment sensibly preserves the long-standing exemptions for family and friends. I recognise, however, that extended regulated activity in this way may raise practical questions about enforcement and the potential impact on legitimate private tutoring arrangements, and it would be helpful to understand how these concerns would be managed in practice. I hope the Minister will respond constructively to the issues highlighted here.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, for setting out the case for his Amendment 337A. I pay tribute to his advocacy on this issue and on many other related issues as a teacher and—I did not realise this until tonight—as a cricket coach as well. I hope he is doing good work churning out a better set for the next encounter we have with the Australians, because I am afraid I have fears for the third Ashes Test, which is due to begin.

I also pay tribute to other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, to demonstrate the cross-party nature of the issue that we are talking about and the consensus, we must make sure that there is protection for families and young people in every scenario and every setting. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for bringing the specific issue of music tutoring to the Committee’s attention, and the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, for sharing his experience from his years as a youth worker.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has explained, this amendment seeks to prevent individuals who are barred from working in regulated activity with children from working as private tutors when hired directly by a parent. It does this by specifying that private tutoring is a regulated activity, even when provided under a private arrangement. I can assure the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary because the existing legal framework already achieves this outcome. Under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, teaching, including private tutoring, that meets the statutory frequency criteria—for example, on more than three days in a 30-day period—is already a regulated activity. It is already an offence for a person on the children’s barred list to undertake such activity.

It is certainly the case, as the noble Lord pointed out, that parents are currently unable to check whether a private tutor is barred from working with children. This is because, under the current legislation, self-employed individuals cannot access higher-level DBS checks, which may include information on spent convictions, cautions and barred list status. However, I am pleased to inform your Lordships that on 20 November, the Government laid a statutory instrument, which was debated in the other place this very evening and is due to come into force on 21 January. It is an affirmative statutory instrument, so your Lordships’ House will be discussing it early in the new year.

This SI will allow individuals who are self-employed or employed directly by an individual or family where they are engaged in regulated activity with children and adults to access enhanced DBS checks, including checks of the relevant barred lists. As a result, private tutors who meet the statutory frequency criteria for regulated activity with children will be able to obtain an enhanced DBS certificate, including a check against the children’s barred list. Parents will be able to see this check before deciding whether to engage the tutor and will not become regulated activity providers by doing so.

This statutory instrument delivers the core safeguarding purpose of the amendment, enabling parents to check whether a prospective tutor is barred by the DBS from working with children and giving them the information that they need to make confident and informed decisions. I have already spoken about the government amendments, but in response to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, around engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive, they approached us to ensure that there was UK-wide coverage of the enhanced scheme. We have been working very much hand-in-glove with them to develop the regime that the government amendments put in place.

I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord will not move his amendment but will support the government amendments.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering for her clause stand part notice. On behalf of the Opposition Front Bench, we support Clause 106. As was set out in response to one of the earlier groups on cycling, we on this side strongly support the creation of the new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling.

It is often said, and too rarely challenged, that cyclists are harmless; that their contribution to road danger is negligible. But the facts tell another story. As was said earlier, there were 82 pedal cycle fatalities in 2024 and many more serious injuries. Yet in the same period, the number of prosecutions for careless or dangerous cycling remained vanishingly small. In 2023, only 44 pedal cyclists were convicted for careless cycling and only five convicted for dangerous cycling. That discrepancy between actual harms and enforcement cannot stand.

Contrast that with motor vehicle driving—serious collisions involving cars or motorbikes routinely lead to formal investigations, charges, licence points, disqualifications and even long prison terms. The law, and indeed the public, treat death or serious injury caused by a motor vehicle as a major crime, but there is no comparable public or legal response when a cyclist injures or kills a pedestrian. That double standard undermines justice and safety and sends the wrong message.

Furthermore, with the rise of e-bikes and e-scooters, a dangerous tool is emerging that should not go unaddressed. As noted in the impact assessment for the Bill, prosecutions for existing offences are minimal and the penalties are insufficiently dissuasive. That suggests not only a failure to protect law-abiding cyclists and citizens but a broader pattern of underpolicing of cycle-related crime.

If we are serious about public safety and fair and equal enforcement, we cannot continue to treat dangerous cycling as a lesser category of offence. For that reason, I support Clause 106.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

The noble Lord did not mention cars running over pedestrians and killing them—does that not matter?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Of course it matters. It is quite a serious matter, in my opinion.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree: it does matter. I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for Clause 106.

I will bring the debate back to what Clause 106 is about, which is ensuring that every road user complies with road traffic law in the interests of their safety and that of other road users. This includes cyclists, which is clear in the Highway Code. Clause 106 should stand part of the Bill. We put the clause in so that there is parity between cars and cyclists in the event of death and serious injury. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for that. If I accepted the recommendation that the clause should not stand part, we would not have that provision before the Committee today.

It is important that we agree to the clause for several reasons, not least of which is the fact that over the past 10 years an average of three pedestrians have been killed by cyclists per year. In total, there were 603 pedestrian injuries following a collision with a pedal cycle in Great Britain in 2023, which was a quite considerable rise on 2014.

In the earlier debate, we heard concern around cyclists riding on pavements and going through red lights and zebra crossings. This is not about putting cyclists in prison for serious offences; it is about trying to change behaviour. It is about ensuring that people recognise that there is a penalty for poor behaviour. If somebody is killed or seriously injured as a result of someone cycling badly, it is absolutely right that we take action with Clause 106.

The Government do not believe that the current offences for cyclists who exhibit dangerous or careless behaviour have appropriate penalties, particularly when it results in death or serious injury. That is why we are introducing the new dangerous cycling offences here in Clause 106. That will bring equality before the law. It will make sure that there is parity with motoring offences. If somebody is killed because of the poor performance of a road user, that road user should ultimately face a penalty whether they are on a bike or in a car.

I say again: this should be about trying to make cyclists aware that their vehicle is dangerous, even though it is a bike, and that it can lead to death or to serious injury. At the same time, we want to ensure, as we are doing, that we get the huge health and environmental benefits of cycling. The Government have committed £600 million in the spending review for new cycling and walking infrastructure, and that is the right thing to do.

I welcome the support of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, on these matters. She has asked two specific questions, about insurance and about defining the type of vehicle involved. They are both amendments to the clause, in effect, but I accept the discussion. The question is about the clause and its implementation, but the clause is not about insurance or about defining. Any change to insurance requirements would require some very careful consideration, as it could put people off cycling and have adverse effects on health and congestion. It might well stop people cycling; they would use cars for short journeys instead. It might involve an enforcement regime, which we have talked about earlier, being examined again. Some cyclists have third-party insurance and that is good.

This is predominantly a Department for Transport matter. I will examine both the issues, on insurance and on definition, that the noble Baroness raised and discuss them with the Department for Transport. Ultimately, Clause 106 is about prevention of death or serious injury by cycling. It should stay part of the Bill and should not be deleted. That is why I hope the noble Baroness will not take that option at an appropriate moment, if not today. I hope she reflects on what I said, and I will certainly reflect on what she said.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments looks at illegal vehicles on our streets, enforcement and guidance. Amendment 345 from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, seeks guidance on enforcement in respect of illegal vehicles. However, having looked into this, my understanding is that a range of powers exists to enable the police to deal with these offences. The College of Policing already produces authorised professional practice on roads policing that sets out the existing powers and their operational application in detail. We therefore do not think the amendment is needed.

Amendments 350 and 356G, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, on drink-driving, are very important. The first, as we heard, seeks to reduce the drink-driving limit so that it is in line with most other countries. The second is about alcohol ignition interlocks, which are in use in many jurisdictions.

As we have heard, drink-driving remains a major but preventable cause of death and serious injury on our streets. Reducing the drink-drive limit is one step in trying to tackle that, but it would need to go hand in hand with a publicity and enforcement campaign for maximum effect. When I was younger and learning to drive, it was absolutely drummed into us that we never went out and drank and drove. One person would be the designated driver, or we would use public transport or a taxi, or we would persuade someone’s parents to come and pick us up. This message needs to be amplified—as well as for drug-driving, which I have raised in this Chamber before, and which seems to be a growing trend. This needs to come as a package.

Alcolocks, which we have discussed, are an important development in trying to reduce drink-driving and people reoffending. It is a simple breathalyser linked to your ignition, which means that, if you are over the limit, you simply cannot start your vehicle. There was a drop-in, only a couple of weeks ago, in Portcullis House in which this was all demonstrated to us, and I thought it was a fantastic invention. As we have heard, it is already used in many EU countries, New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Given that around 260 people are killed in drink-driving collisions every year, and that drink-driving accounts for around 16% of all UK road deaths, this is an important yet simple development that has been shown to work successfully and to reduce repeat offending internationally. Why would we not want to bring it in here? We fully support this amendment and hope that the Government will respond positively. I note that a Minister from the other place also came to the drop-in, so I hope that the Government might be moving in that area.

On the amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that, without suspicion, having random breath tests is not proportionate. Therefore, we on these Benches do not support it.

Amendment 416C, from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, highlights a potential loophole, which he outlined; it is interesting to consider given that technology has moved forward. Amendment 416B, from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, makes a strong point about uninsured vehicles. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response to these and the other issues raised in this group.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group consider a highly important issue that requires the utmost consideration, so I thank noble Lords who have contributed thus far.

We support the idea behind my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 345 that guidance, and a pilot based on that guidance, is a viable approach to stemming the proliferation of illegal vehicles and criminal offences by the drivers of those vehicles on our roads. A measure such as this is all the more urgent following the report published this week by the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Transport Safety, which laid bare the scale of criminality plaguing our roads. As many as one in 15 vehicles may carry modified and ghost number plates to evade ANPR detection. These modified vehicles, guilty of a crime in and of themselves, are then being used to bypass surveillance and undertake activities such as black market trading, drug dealing and organised crime.

Over 34,000 suppliers are registered with the DVLA to produce UK number plates, many of which are private and unregulated. A consultation and pilot should be the bare minimum. The APPG report has issued recommendations, but a more general consultation would be able to cover different types of road crime. Can the Minister confirm that the Government have acknowledged this report and are considering wider measures to deal with illegal vehicles and criminal activity on our roads?

I take much the same approach to Amendment 416B, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and my noble friend Lord Ashcombe, and Amendment 416C, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington. Both measures aim to reduce crime on our roads by increasing police powers. I am not sure whether there is a power already under Section 165 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 for police to take possession of uninsured vehicles on the road; I stand to be corrected on that.

I support the principle behind the two amendments, particularly Amendment 416C, which closes an obvious gap in the law that has emerged as technology has developed. That said, simply increasing the powers of our police is meaningless if there is not the manpower to use those powers. New powers are welcome, but they should come with effective enforcement.

I am not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 350, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town and Lady Finlay of Llandaff. Both Houses, when legislating on matters concerning public safety, as the amendment does, should err on the side of safety. It is the same reason why we are not opposed in principle to the Government’s announcement of their intention to reduce the drink-driving limit per 100 millilitres of breath.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to the group of amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin in what I might say was rather a poignant way.

The amendments probe the liability of courier companies, specifically for the actions of their employees who use cycling as their method of transportation. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin spoke of the threat posed by these cyclists to a disabled person, for example. Amendment 346C, tabled by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin, asks for a review looking at how the law could be changed to ensure that bicycle courier companies are held accountable for their riders.

Noble Lords will be aware of the explosive growth of bicycle delivery and courier services, and many of those courier companies are not held responsible for the dangerous manner in which their riders behave. Many of the most dangerous incidents are caused by delivery riders under pressure to meet tight deadlines and often operating fast, heavy e-bikes. Holding companies responsible, or at least requiring a public review of their practices, would help deter irresponsible riding and shift the burden back on to the companies that profit from high-speed delivery models. A review of this kind would also allow us to examine the employment models used by these companies, the incentives placed on riders and the adequacy of training, supervision and enforcement mechanisms. It would provide a valuable evidence base for any future legislative change, rather than relying on piecemeal responses to individual incidents.

I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for Amendment 416K and the passion with which he spoke in support of it. It would give the police power to issue fines of an unlimited amount to delivery companies for dangerous cycling offences

“under sections 27A (causing death by dangerous cycling), 27B (causing serious injury by dangerous cycling), 28B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) or 28C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling) of the Road Traffic Act 1988”.

We support the intention behind the amendment, whose aim is to hold companies that hire large numbers of delivery drivers to account for the actions of their hired staff. This is an important principle and touches on the important points of what frameworks and policies companies have in place to ensure that their own staff are abiding by the laws of the road. While questions would clearly need to be addressed around proportionality, enforcement and evidential thresholds, the amendment raises legitimate concerns about the status quo. I hope the amendment has made the Government reflect on whether current penalties fall too heavily on individual riders, while the companies that benefit financially from the delivery model escape meaningful consequences. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendment 481, tabled by my noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich, proposes a review into bicycle and motorcycle delivery services and their potential links to criminal activity. We are broadly supportive of the principle behind the amendment. It seeks to shine a light on a range of issues that are often raised by residents and local authorities, including concerns about organised crime, exploitation, immigration compliance and the impact of delivery riders on community safety.

Taken together, these amendments raise serious and timely questions about accountability, public safety and the responsibility of large delivery platforms. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is absolutely right that the Government must acknowledge the argument and come up with answers. The words of my noble friend Lord Goschen summed it up perfectly: this is an opportunity to do something positive about a very real problem, and to do it now in this Bill. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the issues raised and set out how they intend to ensure that the rapid growth of this sector does not come at the expense of safety and public confidence.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments, in their different ways, seek to extend liability for the unlawful actions of cyclists to their employers or contractors. Amendment 346C, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, proposes a review of the new cycling offences provided for in Clause 106 one year after the clause comes into force. He set out its provisions with clarity, his customary humility and his personal perspective, and we are all grateful for him doing so. As I understand the noble Lord, the intention of such a review is to assess whether the new offences have impacted the standard of cycling by delivery riders, and whether further changes in the law are required to ensure that their employers or contractors take greater responsibility for the cycling standards of their workers.

To be clear, these offences apply to all cyclists regardless of the purpose of their journey or whether they are paid to do it. I, of course, recognise the very real concerns around the behaviour of delivery riders that we have discussed in this group of amendments, but I completely reject the idea from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that we are somehow being complacent and ignoring the issue. The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, talked about the importance of using the opportunity to do something positive, and I will come on to that in a second. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for sharing her experience from City Hall of the Greater London Authority, the mayor’s office and TfL.

We of course recognise the concerns about the behaviour of delivery riders, but it is harder to find firm evidence to suggest that their behaviour is so demonstrably worse than that of other groups that it is necessary to single them out for review—hard evidence, I would say, looking at the faces of some noble Lords opposite. Furthermore, it is not clear what such a review would achieve. The Health and Safety Executive’s guidance already makes it clear that those who drive or ride for work should have the skills and expertise required to be safe on the road. The key thing here is that the Department for Transport—we discussed this on Monday in Committee; certainly, I spoke to it on one of the later groups—is also developing a new road safety strategy, and we will set out more details shortly. That will be a holistic strategy around all elements of road safety including pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists, road users and public transport drivers—the whole gamut. I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that is the opportunity for us to do something positive and take a holistic approach to improving road safety. We are not playing down these issues but just trying to find the best way of approaching them in a sense that is complete and wholescale rather than piecemeal.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, as we discussed earlier, we have seen a huge rise in fast food and other deliveries by e-bikes and e-scooters across our cities, and of course internationally too. The whole model for these deliveries is based on time— carrying out as many deliveries as possible in as short a time as possible. This constant pressure can lead to riders taking risks that endanger not only themselves but other road users and pedestrians. These risks include installing bigger batteries.

This group of amendments is timely and of the moment, given the rise in these bikes and scooters. However, kits are increasingly being bought online that are used to adapt regular cycles into e-cycles. These are causing not only serious safety issues on our streets but fire safety issues, as we have already heard. Therefore, the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, look to tackle both the fire and road safety issues associated with non-compliant lithium-ion batteries. It does feel like there is a loophole in the law whereby unsafe batteries are being sold in the UK and are having a devastating effect. These are important issues, and I hope we hear some clear progress in this area from the Government.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as was mentioned earlier in Committee when speaking to Amendment 346, we take the issue of bike alterations very seriously. My noble friend Lord Blencathra raises a similar issue with these amendments, and, in placing the onus on suppliers, a two-pronged approach to tackling the issue is welcome.

We know that many of the most dangerous e-bikes on our roads are not the result of amateur tinkering alone. They are enabled by a market that supplies batteries far in excess of the 250-watt limit set out in law, or batteries that fail to meet even the most basic safety standards for lithium-ion technology. These batteries transform what should be a pedal-assisted cycle into something much closer to an unregistered electric motorcycle, which is often capable of significant speed and acceleration, and frequently used in dense urban areas, on pavements and in shared spaces.

There is also a wider public safety dimension. Unsafe lithium-ion batteries are not merely a road safety issue; they are a growing fire risk in homes, flats and shared accommodation. The London Fire Brigade and other services have repeatedly warned about fires caused by substandard e-bike batteries, often supplied online with little oversight and no meaningful accountability. This amendment would reinforce the message that safety standards are not optional, and that those who profit from ignoring them may—indeed, should—face consequences.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am grateful to the nobleLord, Lord Blencathra, for his amendments on the regulation of e-bike batteries. Your Lordships’ House may recall the recent passage through this House of the Product Regulation and Metrology Act, which received Royal Assent in July and underlines the Government’s determination to take action on this point. Amendment 346D would provide for the prosecution of any person who had supplied an unsafe battery to an individual who was subsequently convicted of any of the offences in Clause 106 of the Bill.

While an unsafe battery—and by this I mean one that does not comply with existing product safety standards—could put the e-bike at risk of catching fire, particularly while placed on charge, as we have heard from many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, this would not directly lead to a person riding their cycle carelessly or dangerously. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, anticipated my argument and posited it more eloquently than I might have done. The battery is simply that which powers the e-bike: it cannot, on its own, enable the rider to overcome speed or power restrictions provided for in regulations. This would come from a broader set of modifications concerning the electric motor and other component parts, and I will come on to that in a bit. As the battery would not play a direct role in any incident leading to a prosecution of the kind provided for at Clause 106, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will see that this amendment is not required.

In moving his amendment, the noble Lord also talked about the chips that allow bikes to be driven at frankly hair-raising speeds that make them unsafe for the user, let alone others. To be clear, those modifications are already illegal: e-bikes with those chips do not comply with the electrically assisted pedal cycle regulations. Therefore, there is already a law in place to cover this.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in opposing the proposition that Clause 107 should stand part of the Bill, I will speak also to my opposition to Clauses 108 and 109. These clauses were added by the Government without any debate on Report in the other place; therefore, they have not been subjected to the detailed scrutiny that they deserve. It is only right that, as the revising Chamber, we should fulfil our duty in that respect.

I will be clear from the outset that we on these Benches do not doubt for a moment the courage, dedication and indispensable role of our emergency workers. Indeed, the previous Conservative Government legislated to bring forward the specific offence of assaulting an emergency worker through the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018. However, we must also ensure that the criminal law remains proportionate, coherent and workable, and in our view these clauses fail that test. Clauses 107, 108 and 109 introduce a series of new offences on the racial or religiously aggravated abuse of emergency workers. The Government present these measures as necessary enhancements to the law to protect emergency workers from abuse motivated by racial or religious hostility. No one disputes the seriousness of such conduct. But these clauses do not simply strengthen existing protections; they create overlapping, confusing and potentially sweeping new offences that go beyond what is necessary or desirable in a free society.

The provisions duplicate offences that are already well established in our law. Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour motivated by racial or religious hostility is already an offence under Sections 18 and 29B of the Public Order Act 1986. I completely understand that those offences cannot be committed inside a dwelling, while the new offences in Clauses 107 and 108 can be committed inside a person’s house. That is a key difference between these offences.

Both clauses also require the conduct to be racially or religiously hostile, but, again, that aggravation is already captured by the criminal law. Section 66 of the Sentencing Code creates a statutory aggravating factor for any offence based on racial and religious hostility. Furthermore, Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 creates a specific offence of using words or behaviour that cause “harassment, alarm or distress” and are religiously or racially aggravated. That offence can be committed inside a dwelling, so a person who racially abuses an emergency worker inside their home can already be prosecuted under the Crime and Disorder Act 1988. It is abundantly clear that there is absolutely no need for these new offences.

Clause 107 in particular casts an extraordinarily wide net. It includes not only threatening but insulting behaviour. This is a highly subjective term that will not create clarity or certainty—but do not take my word for it. The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has criticised these clauses for this precise reason. Its 11th report states:

“Clause 107 criminalises ‘insults’ and clause 108 introduces the term ‘distress’. This potentially leaves people open to criminal sanction on a subjective basis. In addition, clause 108 includes a defence for ‘reasonable conduct’, which is not defined. As a result, the precise scope of these clauses, and the criminal offences contained within them, is uncertain”.


In Clause 108, matters become even more troubling. The clause would criminalise conduct merely likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, again with the addition of racial or religious hostility, but with penalties that do not align with the broader public order framework. Here we see threatening or abusive behaviour that is already covered elsewhere reframed in a way that risks catching behaviour far removed from the core of criminal wrongdoing. While a defendant may raise a defence, the burden-shifting mechanism in subsection (7) is unusual and risks being applied inconsistently.

It is a long-standing principle that the criminal law should be carefully calibrated, limited to what is necessary and drafted so that ordinary citizens can understand the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. The law must be strong where it matters, not sprawling and duplicative. When Parliament repeatedly layers offence upon offence, we risk incoherence, overcriminalisation and legal uncertainty, none of which helps emergency workers or the public. If the Government believe that the existing framework is insufficient, they should amend those statutes directly and not create parallel criminal regimes that overlap and contradict one another.

In conclusion, Clauses 107 and 108 are unnecessary and duplicative and risk expanding the criminal law in ways that Parliament has previously rejected. They confuse rather than clarify. They undermine coherence rather than strengthen protection. We owe emergency workers the best possible statutory safeguards, but they must be safeguards that work. These clauses do not. For that reason, and in the interests of principled and proportionate criminal law, I urge the Committee to oppose Clauses 107 and 108.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly because we have very important business in future amendments. I heartily endorse the comments of my noble friend on the Front Bench. Why were these proposals—which, after all, attract cross- party support, as indeed the 2018 legislation did—not brought forward for pre-legislative scrutiny or debate and discussion at an earlier stage in the other place? They were introduced only at a later stage. For all the reasons my noble friend gave, there would have been a proper debate about whether it is right to bring forward legislation that includes potential incarceration for up to two years for an offence. In fact, it is quite incongruent because it does not look at sexual orientation and disability, for instance, only racially biased hate crime in private dwellings. Why was it not brought forward at an earlier stage, when I think all sides of the House would have been predisposed to support it and debate it properly?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think I am being illiberal, although I accept that the noble Baroness may have a different view on that. Later in the consideration of amendments, we will come to those of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that seek to further define some of the aspects of Clause 109. I am happy to look at the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but the judgment we have made is that these clauses should remain part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has asked that they be removed. That is a clear difference between us. I have explained why they should be included; he has explained why he believes they should not. If he wishes to take that stance on Report, we can have a discussion about that.

For ease of recall, I have just been passed a copy of a long letter about the Bill and these clauses, which I have been reminded that I sent to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, on 12 November. The letter answers some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised. I do not know whether this four-page letter has been made public, but I am happy to place a copy of it in the Library for the noble Lord and anybody else to examine.

Obviously, there will be the opportunity on Report for the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to again table his clause stand part notices and/or for any Member of the House, once they have had an opportunity to look at the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to table amendments to meet the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has mentioned. We support these clauses, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will reflect on that and not seek to remove them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for responding to this debate. I spent 32 years as a police officer and an emergency worker, and I am still not persuaded by these clauses. As I established in my opening speech, all scenarios for criminalising racially or religiously aggravated abuse of emergency workers are already covered by the criminal law, and this is mere repetition. There exists a raft of legislation which permits the prosecution of a person who commits such conduct. The Sentencing Code already provides for any offence to be aggravated by racial or religious hostility. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a specific criminal offence for using racially or religiously hostile language. The Public Order Act 1986 also contains such provisions. It is absolutely not correct to claim that emergency workers need further protection under the law when it comes to abusive language.

The Bill therefore creates duplicate offences with different thresholds and different maximum penalties, all while leaving the existing offences untouched. How is this meant to improve enforcement? How are police officers supposed to choose which offence fits which circumstance? The Government have not offered an answer, I am afraid. By creating new stand-alone offences that replicate existing ones, the Government risk producing confusion rather than clarity. Police officers, paramedics and other emergency workers deserve a legal framework that is simple, enforceable and unambiguous.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have said this already in my responses to the noble Lord in Committee, but I think it is important that I comment on what I said in the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to re-emphasises the point. The offences under the Public Order Act 1986 have been interpreted by the law over the years, but, essentially, they do not relate to private dwellings. The clauses in the Bill are about private dwellings and give greater clarification. That is the point I put to the noble Lord. In the four-page letter to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, which I will happily put in the Library, that is one of the key points that I make, as I have in this debate. I re-emphasise that in response to the noble Lord’s closing remarks.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am grateful for that. Perhaps it would be easier to amend the original law on this, rather than introduce it in these clauses.

As I said, police officers, paramedics and other emergency workers deserve a legal framework that is simple, enforceable and unambiguous, and what is before us is none of those things. Given the poor defence offered by the Government, I think this may be an issue that we have to return to on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 107 agreed.

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[Baroness Gohir (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, have inspired me to speak. I support the amendment and would add another set of people who do exactly the same: spiritual faith healers. They do coercive and controlling behaviour and target the most vulnerable. They do all the things mentioned. In certain minority ethnic communities, they will target vulnerable women, for example, and take large amounts of cash from them. I do not expect noble Lords to amend this proposed new clause to add those sets of people, because they obviously want to maximise their chances of getting their clause through, but they have inspired me to think about replicating their amendment and perhaps proposing it for future legislation. So the Minister can expect a letter from me to discuss this further—which also amounts to spiritual abuse.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for tabling this considered amendment. Controlling or coercive behaviour is currently legislated against if the offender is or has been

“in an intimate or family relationship”

with the victim. This amendment uses the framework of Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and applies it to offenders providing psychotherapeutic or counselling services.

I understand the reasoning behind the noble Lord’s amendment. The original offence is in place because being in an intimate or familial relationship puts both parties in a unique position of proximity. These positions of trust carry a heightened risk of becoming exploitative, and thus legislation exists to recognize this. Psychotherapy and counselling services carry a similar risk; they put patients in extremely open and often vulnerable positions as they entrust the provider with their confidence. Controlling or coercive behaviour becomes more likely given the power dynamics in these relationships and I see no reason why, in principle, the law should not extend past protecting familial or intimate relationships to encompass certain intimate services.

This conclusion is backed up by recent research into mental health services. Earlier this year, the University of Hertfordshire found more than 750 incidents of violence and coercion by staff. These include instances of verbal abuse, intentional neglect and even cases of physical violence. I do not intend to extrapolate from that study and make it seem as if it represents the entirety of our mental health services—I hope it does not. This is an under-investigated area and we do not yet know the scale of neglect in our services, but the most serious conclusion that can be drawn from it is the fact that, of these 750 offences, only four official complaints were made and, of those four complaints, a single one was upheld. Whether the reason for that was ignorance of reporting mechanisms, intimidation by staff or the inexistence of the legal means, it represents a failure of the system.

The least we should do as legislators is promise to further examine the reasons behind those failings: something I hope the Minister can assure us the Government will do. If the Government conclude there is a gap in the law, and that vulnerable people attending psychotherapy or counselling services are being controlled or coerced without the legal means to get justice, I hope that they will consider the amendment in question.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for returning to this issue. I give him credit for his persistence. I welcome the support for these measures from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for sharing his personal experiences and to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath for reminding us that this issue was raised even back as far as 2001. I am also grateful for my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark making a guest appearance in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Marks; it is always helpful to see that, as I am speaking for the Government on this occasion. I am also grateful for the constructive comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, with regard to these issues.

Amendment 347, as we are clear, seeks to create an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour for psychotherapists and counsellors providing services to clients, by replicating the coercive or controlling behaviour offence under Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has previously shared concerns—he has repeated them today—about unscrupulous therapists taking advantage of their clients’ vulnerabilities by supplanting parents and families in the affections and minds of their clients, for the purposes of turning them against their friends and family through the process called transference. I entirely agree with him that this is a serious issue that deserves careful consideration. Again, I reflect on what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said in that regard. However, the question for the Committee is whether there is an argument to legislate at this time or whether there are other means to examine the outcomes that the noble Lord seeks. I suggest that for the moment that, for reasons I will explain, legislation would not necessarily be the way forward in this case.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting short debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this group of amendments, each of which addresses the issue of safety on our public transport networks, whether of passengers, workers or those tasked with policing them. The amendments before us reflect genuine concern about how effectively our current frameworks protect people from violence, intimidation and abuse in transport settings, and they deserve careful consideration from the Minister.

I begin with Amendment 356A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Morgan, which would place a duty on the British Transport Police to

“take all reasonable steps to prevent violence against women and girls on trains”.

Violence against women and girls remains an appalling and persistent problem. Just yesterday, the Government and Liberal Democrats joined together to defeat a Conservative amendment to the Sentencing Bill that would have exempted sexual offenders and domestic abusers from the automatic presumption of a suspended sentence. For victims of sexual assault or domestic abuse, the distinction between a custodial sentence and a suspended sentence is not an abstract policy question; it is the difference between knowing that their abuser has been removed from the community, and knowing that they remain at liberty.

That point is reinforced by the Government’s recent recognition of the scale of the problem. Violence against women and girls has been described by the Home Secretary as a “national emergency”. The Government have trialled domestic abuse protection orders to track domestic abusers. But the most effective way to protect victims is to ensure that offenders face custodial sentences for their crimes. A Government who oppose that principle are not a Government who can claim to hold violence against women and girls as a priority.

In the year ending 2024, police recorded more than 106,000 sexual offences in England and Wales—an increase of around 10% on the previous year. Women continue to report feeling unsafe on public transport, particularly during off-peak hours and at night. This amendment recognises that prevention must go beyond enforcement alone. Its emphasis on data sharing and engagement with train design reflects the reality that safety is shaped by visibility and co-ordination. These are practical, forward-looking measures that deserve serious engagement from the Government. I hope the Minister considers them carefully.

Amendment 356F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, proposes a new offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Abuse and violence directed at front-line transport staff has increased markedly in recent years, with British Transport Police data showing a significant rise in assaults on railway employees. Public transport workers perform an essential public service, often in challenging circumstances, and they should be able to do so without fear of violence or intimidation.

Amendment 399, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, addresses a long-standing operational problem: inconsistent and delayed access to railway CCTV footage. Timely access to high-quality CCTV is often critical to identifying suspects, supporting victims and securing prosecutions. Establishing clear legal requirements for accessibility and technical standards would help to remove the barriers that currently frustrate investigations and undermine confidence.

Taken together, these amendments highlight a broader concern. Although the Government have articulated ambitions around tackling violence against women and girls and improving safety on public transport, there remains a gap between aspiration and implementation. Too often, victims, police and front-line workers encounter fragmented responsibilities, inconsistent standards and slow operational responses. What is needed is clear leadership, stronger co-ordination between agencies and a willingness to embed prevention into the everyday operation of our transport networks.

We on these Benches are clear that public transport must be safe and accessible for all, and that violence, whether against women passengers or workers, must be actively prevented, not merely responded to after the fact. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that the objectives reflected in these amendments are delivered in practice and how they will translate stated commitments into real-world safety improvements.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for Amendment 356A, and I am glad we have reached it today. We hoped to reach it prior to Christmas, but time did not permit. I know that she has championed this issue in the House before, and I welcome her contribution pressing the Government today. I also welcome the slight widening of the debate by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester to look at metro services.

I note the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and the terrible case of Claudia Lawrence. She has written to me separately on that. I have already instigated with my colleagues in the Home Office a response to the issues that she has raised. I hope she will forgive me if I concentrate on other matters today, but that is not off my agenda.

I know the whole Committee will support the fact that the Government have taken action on violence against women and girls, which is intolerable anywhere, including on the railway. The noble Baroness referenced the Government’s strategy on halving violence against women and girls, which was published in the House of Commons on the last day before Christmas. The Statement repeat has not happened in this House because the Opposition did not want it. That is fine—I understand that—but the commitment from the Government is very clear, and the recently published strategy to halve violence against women and girls is vital.

I also take the points on behaviour made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which is an encouraging comment as part of that because the points he made are valid, and I accept them. The British Transport Police is essential in helping us to deliver that objective of halving violence against women and girls, alongside police counterparts in Home Office forces. It may be helpful to the Committee to say that the British Transport Police, as the police force for the railway, is already required to prevent crime, and that includes the offences set out in the amendment. The British Transport Police undertakes activities across the railway to encourage victims and bystanders to report offences, and indeed poor behaviour, and will relentlessly pursue offenders. In BTP Policing Plan 2025-27, it has given specific commitments to prevent violence against women and girls through:

“Effective and sensitive investigation and robust offender management”,


and:

“Targeted activity to identify and apprehend those intent on offending”.


If it helps the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, I am very happy to provide, through my colleagues in the Department for Transport, a further meeting for her to look at that work and understand it at first hand.

The noble Baroness also mentioned rolling stock companies and the manufacture and leasing of trains to train operating companies. The design of trains is defined not by the rolling stock company but by the train operating company. Therefore, the proposal that the British Transport Police shares data on violence against women and girls with rolling stock companies would not lead to improvements in the design of train carriages, but I take her point. The British Transport Police already shares crime data with train operating companies, which can feed into the British Transport Police policing plans.

The noble Baroness will also, I hope, be aware that the Rail Safety and Standards Board already publishes key train requirement guidance that is used by train operating companies when ordering new trains. This helps detail the features that are to be included in the specification. The content of the document is prepared by a group of rolling stock experts representing train operating companies, manufacturers, leasing companies, industry bodies and the Department for Transport. Following input from security experts in the Department for Transport and BTP, new content has recently been prepared that includes additional measures to do exactly what the noble Baroness wishes, to enhance personal security, including those that seek to reduce violence against women and girls. The content has been included in a draft of the document that will be submitted for consultation with the rail industry. The intention— I hope this is helpful for the noble Baroness—is that it will be published in spring 2026. While it is not the legislative back-up that she is seeking in the amendment, I hope it meets the objective of the very valid points she has made today.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned sentencing. We had a full debate yesterday on the Sentencing Bill and the House made its decisions on it. There is a difference between us on that, but I want to see offenders brought to justice and people caught. That is an important part of our proposals regarding the prevention measures and the performance of the British Transport Police on these issues.

Amendment 356F in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy includes the introduction of a stand-alone offence of assaulting a public transport worker. Before I refer to what he has said, I will address the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. First, I confirm that we are having a meeting. It is in the plan; it will be sorted and is coming down the line very quickly. She referred to Clause 37 and the stand-alone offence on retail workers. We have taken the view that there should be a stand-alone offence because retail workers are upholding the law for the state on sales of alcohol, drugs, knives, cigarettes and a range of other matters. But I agree with her that it is essential that transport workers feel safe going about their job. There is no place for abuse and assault of any worker, and I know we will all agree with that.

The attack in Huntingdon in early November shocked and horrified us all. Tributes were paid at the time to the railway staff who stood in the way of alleged attackers and did their duty, and those matters will come to court in due course. But I must stress the important point—this goes to the heart of what my noble friend said—that if a public transport worker suffers violence or abuse at work, it is essential that they report it to the police so it can be investigated. We take that seriously in the police, the transport police and the railway, and elsewhere in the Home Office. As the dedicated police service for the railway, the British Transport Police is able to provide further reassurance to rail staff that it is there to protect them and will arrest offenders quickly.

The key point I want to make to my noble friend is that transport workers are already protected in legislation, as the noble Baroness touched on. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 makes offences against public-facing workers, in which transport workers would be included, an aggravating factor that the courts must consider in sentencing. As I said earlier in Committee, everybody is protected from assault. It is criminalised under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and that long-standing piece of legislation, the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The key point in this case is that transport workers are covered by that legislation, whereas—to return to Clause 37—retail workers were not covered in the way that public-facing workers are in relation to police and others. They are still covered by the main offences of the Criminal Justice Act, but the aggravating factor that we are introducing under Clause 37 deals with retail workers specifically. I am happy to discuss Clause 37 with the noble Baroness when we have the opportunity to meet very shortly regarding her concerns about the legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

356H: Clause 110, page 141, line 31, at end insert—
“(2A) It is an offence for a person—(a) to have in their possession with intent to supply, or(b) be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply,an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would include a person concerned in the supplying of an electric device for use in vehicle offences within the scope of the offence in clause 110.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 356H is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It seeks to strengthen Clause 110 by ensuring that those who are concerned in the supplying of electronic devices used in vehicle theft are brought within the scope of the new offence.

Vehicle crime remains a persistent and evolving challenge. Organised criminal networks are increasingly turning to sophisticated electronic devices—such as signal jammers, key programmers, and relay attack tools—to bypass modern vehicle security systems. These devices are not sold in back alleys alone: they are traded online, often under the guise of legitimate diagnostic equipment, and then misused to facilitate theft. The law must keep pace with this reality. Clause 110 rightly takes some steps towards addressing this growing problem, and I welcome the new provisions.

However, I have one particular question for the Minister. What is the difference between this new offence and the offence of going equipped for stealing under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968? I note the different maximum penalties, being three years’ imprisonment for the Section 25 offence and five years’ imprisonment for the new offence in Clause 110, but is that the only difference? I ask this not to be overly critical but simply to understand the rationale behind the inclusion of this new offence.

I recognise that electronic devices for stealing vehicles are a new and evolving problem, and, as such, the new offence must be watertight. That is why I have tabled my amendment. I am sure the Minister will have a sense of déjà vu when speaking to this amendment. It is similar in nature to the amendment we tabled in Committee to Clause 13 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill last year. In that Bill, our amendment sought to add possession with the intent to supply to the new criminal offence of supplying an article for use in immigration crime. The Government listened to us and tabled their own amendment on Report to widen the scope of that offence to include being concerned in the supply of a relevant article. Amendment 356H is intended to close the same possible loophole in Clause 110 as existed in the original drafting of Clause 13 of the border security Bill.

Clause 110 contains two separate offences. Subsection (1) states:

“It is an offence to possess an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with a relevant offence”.


Subsection (2) states:

“It is an offence to import, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply”


such a device. That captures quite a wide range of activities, but what is missing from this aspect of the offence is possession with intent to supply such a device, or any other activity relating to the supply of these devices.

My amendment would address this gap by including two further offences. It explicitly includes possession with intent to supply an electronic device in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the device would be used in connection with the theft offence. It contains the same language that the Government brought forward for the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill. Proposed new paragraph (b) in the amendment therefore states that a person commits an offence if they are

“concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply”

such an electronic device. This would, I believe, capture those who are knowingly involved in the chain of supply: those who broker deals, advertise devices or otherwise facilitate their distribution.

Without this amendment, there is a risk that individuals who play a crucial role in enabling vehicle theft will escape liability simply because they are not the final supplier. That is a loophole we cannot afford to leave open. Given that the Government accepted that this was a gap in what is now the Section 13 offence in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, I hope the Minister will agree that it is a loophole in this offence that should be closed. I beg to move.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, we support the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. He has hit the nail on the head with this amendment about the intent to supply electronic devices for car theft, which has become an epidemic in this country. Data assessed by colleagues in the other House revealed that, in 2024, 75% of vehicle thefts were unsolved and only 2% resulted in a suspect being charged or summonsed, with 95,000 cases being unsolved. In November 2025, a BBC report showed that keyless car theft devices used by criminals can be found online and retail for around £20,000. According to that report, video guides and devices can be easily found online, allowing access to high-end cars such as Jaguars and Range Rovers and upwards. The Bill provides an offence for owning such a device. This amendment would address the potential loophole for those supplying the device.

I wait with interest to hear the Minister’s response. Motorists are taxed to the hilt, and pay road charges and congestion charges. I do not think it is unreasonable that the Government try to do something to protect motorists’ vehicles. All the money goes in—we pay our road taxes and our insurance. The numbers are staggering, with 95,000 cases last year unsolved. If you own a reasonably priced car, after working hard, there should be something to protect you from the people supplying the equipment rather just than the person using the equipment. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for explaining the purpose of this amendment. He is right to highlight the importance of the issue that it raises. The Met estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle theft, so I am glad that we have the opportunity to debate Clause 110 and the important measures it takes in relation to vehicle theft.

I certainly understand the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to make the offence in Clause 110 as tight as possible, but I hope to persuade him, and your Lordships’ Committee, that the amendment is unnecessary. In particular, I do not believe that there is a gap in the offences provided for in Clause 110. Further, the amendment would require the police and prosecution to prove intent, rather than the burden being on the defendant to do so. This would have the effect of weakening the offence, as it would place a higher bar on the prosecution to secure a conviction.

By way of background, Clause 110 provides for two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply these devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or the theft of anything in a vehicle.

This amendment seeks to extend those offences to include a person concerned in the supplying of an electronic device for use in vehicle offences. However, Clause 110 already makes provision for it to be an offence to possess a device where it appears that there could be an intention to supply. It outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it was on the premises at the same time as the accused, or on the premises of which the accused was the occupier or a habitual user other than as a member of the public. I point out that the amendment would require the prosecution to prove intent to use the device to commit theft. As I have already said, this is a higher bar than the clause as drafted.

Clause 110 outlines:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence … to show that the person did not intend or suspect that the device would be used in connection”


with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. A court can therefore infer that the articles in question are intended for use in vehicle theft. This reflects the fact that there are likely to be few legitimate uses for those specified articles. It is appropriate to expect that those who are involved with such articles should be alert to the possible use of the articles for criminal purposes. The amendment states that it would be

“an offence for a person to … be concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, an electronic device”.

I am not sure that such wording materially expands the scope of the offence. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine who may be captured by such wording who will not already be captured by the existing wording in the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked a specific question around whether offenders could be charged with going equipped to commit theft under Section 25 of the Theft Act 1968. These existing offences put the burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s intention to steal a vehicle or something from inside the vehicle. This new offence places the burden on the defendant to prove that they were not intending to steal a vehicle, or that the device would not be used to steal a vehicle or commit vehicle crime.

I note that, in his contribution, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, asked about the online sale of devices. Under the Online Safety Act 2023, there is a new duty placed on social media and tech companies to prevent the advertisement of stolen goods and devices that facilitate crime. Online sales platforms will block adverts and listings for items that are illegal to sell; sales platforms already do this for other illegal items.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, with respect to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, it is fair to say the offence deals with a different set of circumstances from the offences in that Act. However, we will take away the comments and ensure that there are no gaps in the offence. I appreciate him raising the point.

For all these reasons, I am not persuaded that the amendment is required, and I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw it.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Goschen and to the Liberal Democrats for their support for this amendment. The purpose of the amendment is not to widen the offence indiscriminately but to ensure that Clause 110 operates as Parliament clearly intends. Without explicitly including those who are concerned in supplying these devices, the offence risks capturing only the least sophisticated actors, while leaving untouched those who organise, promote and enable the trade from behind the scenes.

The reality of modern vehicle crime is that it is technologically advanced and often commercially organised, and those involved in supply chains are frequently well aware of the criminal end use of the devices they help distribute. Yet they structure their involvement precisely to avoid possession, and that is a gap that criminals will exploit if we allow it to remain. I hope that the Minister will reflect on the constructive nature of this proposal, given that the Government are aware of and have acknowledged the potential gap in the legislation. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 356H withdrawn.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.

The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.

Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.

Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses an issue that will be immediately recognisable to many people across the country: the theft of essential equipment from those who rely on it for their living. Turning first to Amendment 357, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, we broadly support the intention behind extending the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023. This was an Act brought in by the Conservative Government to protect businessmen and tradespeople, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would ensure that it explicitly includes GPS equipment. Technology becomes ever more central to commercial activity, particularly in agriculture, construction and logistics. It is therefore right that the law keeps pace with the evolving nature of equipment theft. GPS units are high-value, easily resold and frequently targeted. Bringing them clearly within scope of the Act is a sensible and proportionate step to help disrupt illicit resale markets.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 358 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, who have made the case extremely well today. I pay tribute to the Fraud Act committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and I shall quote from it extensively in the next group.

This amendment would rightly ensure that the definition of a specified article included devices capable of using virtual subscriber identity modules, not just physical SIM cards. As we have heard, the criminal landscape evolves rapidly. If we legislate only for plastic SIMs, criminals will simply pivot to readily available virtual SIM technology. By incorporating virtual SIMs into the definition now, we will help to future-proof these provisions and make them genuinely effective against highly scalable, technology-enabled fraud.

Clauses 112 to 117 quite rightly seek to address the serious and growing problem of SIM farms being used at scale to perpetrate fraud and other abuses—it was very interesting to hear the quotes of the noble Lord, Lord Young, from the Select Committee’s report, which demonstrates that the problem has been with us for several years now—but, as drafted, Clause 114 risks being a technological step behind the criminals. As we have heard, it refers to devices capable of using physical SIM cards, but the market is already rapidly moving towards virtual or embedded SIMs. Indeed, I have an iPad in my hand that has a virtual SIM inside it—no physical SIM card at all. If the Bill focuses only on the plastic card and not the underlying functionality, it will leave an obvious loophole that organised criminals will quickly exploit.

The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke of “entrepreneurial” but not in a good way. We know that fraudsters are highly adaptive. As mobile operators deploy more robust controls on physical SIMs—I suspect not enough for the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—and as handsets and routers increasingly use eSIMs or other virtual identities, those intent on running industrial-scale smishing and scam operations will migrate to those platforms. If we legislate today for yesterday’s technology, we will simply displace the problem from one category of device to another and be back here in a few years’ time having the same debate. I hope the Minister will be able either to accept the amendment or to confirm that the Government will bring forward their own wording—there is always a bit of “not invented here” with these things. Without that assurance, there is a real risk that this part of the Bill will be lacking in force from the day it comes into effect.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for speaking to this group. On his Amendment 358, I agree that the Government should look to make provisions that account for all forms of SIM cards used in SIM farms. As the noble Lord stated, the current drafting of Clause 114 does not encompass eSIM cards in the devices used for SIM farming. Given the number of mobile phones that now use eSIMs, this really should be amended.

This speaks to the larger issue of defining provisions ahead of legislation coming into force. When changes are being made to the legality of certain products, suppliers and consumers should be made aware well in advance; behaviours will have to change with reform. This is a case of not just courtesy but constitutional propriety. That is the reasoning behind my Amendments 358A and 538A.

Legislating for the criminalisation of specific devices and software related to fraud should not be done on a whim. Individuals should not wake up one day and possess an illegal device or software that was considered legal a day before, with no warning of the coming change. Some notice must be given. Currently, the Bill simply permits Ministers to specify a device whenever they wish. There is no requirement for those regulations to come into force before the new offences of possession and supply come into force. My amendments would ensure, in the interests of fairness and the rule of law, that the new offences could not come into force until at least three months had passed from the making of the regulations defining the articles.

I believe that a period of three months before the possession and supply of certain articles becomes illegal is sufficient for people to change their habits and businesses to change their models. We in this House would be doing the public a disservice if we did not provide them with the necessary time to adapt. I hope the Minister agrees with this reasoning. I hope he will consider the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and, as always, I look forward very much to hearing his reply.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I first give my appreciation to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Vaux of Harrowden, in producing their report on this matter. It was during my enforced sabbatical from Parliament, so I was not party to the discussions at that stage. It is useful to have that continuum of discussion, and the previous Government’s initial intentions have been carried forward by this Government as a whole.

Amendment 358, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, mentioned, would expand the definition of SIM cards. To be clear, the Government’s consultation and evidence gathering as part of the preparation for this Bill focused on physical SIM cards, which are where the current and most significant threats arise and what these clauses seek to address. The provisions in the Bill are designed to tackle the misuse of physical SIM farms, which are widely used for criminal purposes such as fraud and spam. We are all aware of how that manifests on our phones and those of people we know and work with.

Virtual SIM technology is developing, but it is not currently presenting the same scale of risk, and the evidence we have from the consultation does not support extending the ban at this time. Physical SIM farms pose a significant and immediate threat because they enable large-scale criminal activity. Unlike virtual SIMs, physical SIM cards are harder to trace, as they are not inherently linked to a specific handset or verified identity. Their anonymity makes them ideal for fraud, phishing and mass spam campaigns.

Furthermore, the trade in physical SIM cards creates a black market where thousands of cards can be bought and sold with minimal or no oversight. This flow of unregistered SIMs fuels organised crime, facilitates money laundering and undermines law enforcement efforts. Virtual SIM technology, by contrast, is generally more secure and traceable because it requires integration with the device software and often involves stronger identity checks. At present, I say again, there is no evidence of virtual SIMs being exploited at scale for criminal purposes. Our focus therefore remains on the tangible and proven harm caused by physical SIM cards.

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[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support strongly the comments of my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the principle of the amendment laid by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This is a timely amendment, possibly timelier than the noble Lord anticipated, because today the Government have announced the promotion of a Minister to promulgate digital IDs among the population.

Digital IDs are going to have a huge vista and connection, not just in linking to personal data but in other areas of life: in the relationship between the state and the individual; and in the payment of parking tickets, road tolls, stamp duty and fishing licences—a different sort of fishing, as it begins with an “f”, not a “p”. So I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the thrust of the amendment, although I accept that some polishing is required.

If the Government are to promote digital IDs, the population at large need to have confidence not just that they will be correctly introduced but that there are safeguards against such impersonation. I strongly support the principle of this amendment and say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that if the Government resist it in principle, what confidence can the man in the street have that the Government are sincere about the safeguards they intend to introduce, alongside their intention for digital IDs—to get that balance right between the state and the individual, coupled together against the criminal?

We need to bring this back on Report. I hope the Minister is prepared to meet the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others to address this principle, so that the Government get off on the right foot, if they intend to promote digital IDs, and not resist this, because there is a world of pain if they do.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling this amendment. I know that the creation of a specific identity offence has been a long-standing concern of his, so I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this debate. I tentatively support the principle behind his amendment, although this issue is deserving of more scrutiny and thought than we are perhaps able to give it as an amendment in Committee.

I recognise the impetus for this amendment. Identity theft has long been the primary means by which criminals commit fraud; and, with a booming online world exacerbated by the introduction of artificial intelligence, digital identity theft is fast becoming a serious issue. CIFAS, the leading non-profit fraud prevention service, has documented the rise in identity theft. Last year, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, over 420,000 fraud cases were filed to the national fraud database, a 13% increase on the previous year. The main driver of this increase was identity fraud, with 250,000 filings, representing a 5% annual increase.

CIFAS cites online fraud as a primary cause of this increase; AI and generative technologies enable criminals to exploit people at speed and scale. Documents and identity cards are being forged at a more sophisticated level than before, with many now able to pass verification checks. Targets are often the elderly, as criminals target the least technologically capable and therefore most vulnerable victims.

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[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, especially Amendments 360 and 362, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes.

Like others, I welcome that the Government appear to have seen value in the introduction of a statutory defence for cyber security researchers. I hope that this will result in the updating of the Computer Misuse Act, for which, like others, I have been campaigning for about a decade. When it was passed, that Act was perfectly valid, but the market conditions, which have been described by colleagues, were extraordinarily different. As my noble friend Lord Holmes has rightly said, the Act is now not just neutral in the scene but actively doing damage to our national security.

The Act prevents or discourages those professionals whose work lies in researching things such as vulnerabilities in the system or threat intelligence from doing that work, because of the possibility of finding themselves in trouble with the law. It is therefore very important that we organise ourselves so that such challenges, if they exist, can be defended against as they come forward, and that the activities of our professionals can be both supported and encouraged.

I hope that, in drafting the legislation, the Government will ensure that they cover all aspects of this particular difficulty—not just vulnerabilities in the system but particularly threat intelligence, which, if we think about it for a moment, is becoming increasingly important. We need to know what is wrong with the system, and we need to know it early and before it is capable of doing real damage in each case.

This is an important amendment. When he replies, can the Minister give an assurance that the amendments that the Government will bring forward, I hope, will cover both the question of vulnerabilities and the issue of threat intelligence?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for tabling the amendments in this group.

To start with Amendment 360, I welcome the noble Lord’s aims. When a crime is detected or prevented, it is a sensible principle that the individual responsible for detection or prevention should not be punished. That said, the amendment is perhaps too wide in its scope. It mentions nothing of proportionality, which leads me to worry that it could end up being used as a defence for an individual who has committed a far greater crime than that which they claim to have been preventing. Similarly, “public interest” is broad and undefined, and I would appreciate it if the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, could clarify what would fall under this defence.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

365: After Clause 117, insert the following new Clause—
“Increased penalties for fare dodging(1) Section 5 of the Regulations of Railways Act 1889 (penalty for avoiding payment of fare) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), for “level 2” substitute “level 4”.(3) In subsection (3)—(a) for “level 3”, in each place in which it appears, substitute “level 5”, and(b) for “three months” substitute “six months”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase the penalties for passengers who fail or refuse to pay railway fares and those who travel or attempt to travel without having paid for previous fares.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group addresses two of the most significant criminal challenges facing our railways: fare dodging and freight crime. First, my Amendment 365 seeks to increase the penalties for fare dodging on the railways. It was reported towards the end of last year that one in 20 London Underground passengers was dodging fares. Transport for London has estimated its losses at around £130 million over the last year, with losses across the whole railway network potentially reaching £330 million. This is not a victimless crime. Those losses do not simply disappear into the ether. Every penny not paid in rail fare means less money for improvements to services, less money for infrastructure upgrades and higher fares for the vast majority of law-abiding passengers who do pay their fares.

Often, fare evasion is a crime committed in conjunction with other more serious offences. Some of those who have been stopped and searched by police for fare evasion have been found with knives and drugs. This amendment would increase the maximum fine that can be issued by officers of the railway operators for fare evasion from level 2 to level 4 on the standard scale, therefore bringing the maximum penalty from £500 to £2,500. Furthermore, it would increase the maximum penalties that can be handed out on summary conviction to a level 5 fine or a term of imprisonment of up to six months.

The existing penalties were fixed at the current levels through the Criminal Justice Act 1982, meaning they were set a number of decades ago. Given the scale of the problem, it is clear that these penalties do not reflect either the seriousness of persistent fare evasion or the reality that some offenders treat the current regime as a calculated risk. This amendment would also increase the maximum penalties available to the courts, particularly for repeat or aggravated offenders, while leaving full discretion with magistrates to distinguish between genuine error and deliberate fraud.

This is about not just punishment but enforcement. Railway staff, especially at Transport for London, need to be trained to confront those bumping barriers and take action. It is an all too common occurrence to see staff simply watching as people jump the barriers.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this short but important debate, and raising these important issues. As we are discussing rail issues, I should first draw noble Lords’ attention to my interests, as declared in the register. I am former employee and current shareholder of a transport operator, FirstGroup, and a former employee and current member of a rail union, the Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association. So I am both staff side and management: it balances out.

I turn first to Amendment 365, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seeks to increase the fines for fare dodging. The Government are committed to ensuring that everyone who travels on the railway pays the correct fare for their journey, and train operating companies have multiple mechanisms in place to prevent passengers travelling without the correct ticket. This includes the provisions set out in the Railways Act, but also use of the civil enforcement regime for penalty fares. In 2022, the penalty was raised from £20 to £100, and this has had a positive impact on reducing fare evasion and preventing fraud on the railway, which of course we all want to see.

Issuing penalty fares is one way of tackling fare dodging, but other measures can be taken. I am pleased to say that we had quite an extensive debate on these. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, acknowledged, the Office of Rail and Road has been asked to consider improvements to the industry’s revenue protection practices. Last year, it published its review setting out five recommendations, which my colleague the Secretary of State for Transport accepted in full.

It is probably worth very quickly going through the recommendations, which were: make buying the right ticket simpler and easier, strengthen consistency in how passengers are treated when ticket issues arise, introduce greater consistency and fairness in the use of prosecutions, make information and revenue protection easy to access and understand, and provide greater co-ordination, oversight and transparency of revenue protection activity. I hope, to an extent, those address the very valid concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, expressed about complexity, which were shared by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. We all want to encourage rail travel; we do not want to discourage it by making the system too complex, and we do not want to penalise those who are truly acting in good faith. At the same time, it is important that we prevent fare dodging and make sure that there is a proper regime to prevent it.

Fare simplification is at the heart of this, as many noble Lords said in the debate on these amendments. I can confirm that this is very much part of the Government’s plans for rail reforms as part of the creation of Great British Railways. It is probably up to individual train operators and other public transport operators to promote their own campaigns on fare dodging but, to pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is the case that whether you are travelling on the Tube or national rail, you cannot go far without seeing posters and public information about fare dodging. This is about the balance between promoting responsible behaviour and a penalising and enforcement regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and others talked about enforcement. On TfL, I share his experience. Maybe I use the Tube a little more than he does, but multiple times I have seen plainclothes crews both on Tube trains and at ticket barriers. I saw one at King’s Cross Tube station ticket barrier just last week. There was a large gang of enforcement officers waiting to catch people trying to get in by tailgating those who were paying fares through the automatic gates. So transport operators are very much aware of their responsibilities.

To be clear on the ORR review, a number of contributions focused not on national rail but on the Tube, and obviously that is operated by Transport for London, a devolved body that is overseen ultimately by the Mayor of London. I want to inform noble Lords that the ORR spoke to TfL as part of its review and it is of course up to TfL whether it takes on its recommendations. When it comes to national rail operators, the ORR has a full purview.

On Amendment 368A, the Government are very aware of the rising frequency of freight crime and the significant and damaging impact it can have on businesses and drivers. We are determined to crack down on it. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, talked very much in the context of rail freight, but of course this is a problem for road freight as well. The incidence of cargo theft, where criminals are ripping the sides of lorries and taking the goods inside, is frightening for dedicated HGV drivers across the UK, and the perception that this crime is low-risk and high-reward is unacceptable and one that we want to change. Whether it is on the rail or the road, we share the noble Lord’s determination to do something about it.

Working with the police, the Home Office has agreed to create a freight crime flag which will be attached to any applicable crime, whether it is on the road or on rail. It will apply across all police forces, including the British Transport Police, which of course polices the railways. The data will be collected as part of the annual data return to the Home Office. The flag is currently being piloted in a small number of forces and, following this, the intention is to roll it out across all forces. The benefit of using a flag, as opposed to creating new crime classifications, is that in a case where, for instance, a driver has their vehicle or load stolen and violence is used or threatened against them, the crime that would be recorded would be robbery, as opposed to vehicle crime. The flag, however, would identify the robbery as a freight crime.

However, we will monitor the implementation of the flag. We are about half way through the six-month pilot, so we will keep a close eye on how this is panning out and consider whether further steps are required in the future. We know that having a code or a flag would not of itself solve the problem. Victims should always report crime to the police, and we expect police to investigate. However, as noble Lords would expect me to say, it is for chief constables to allocate resources for such investigations in line with local policing priorities.

I also acknowledge the worrying involvement of serious and organised criminals in committing freight crime. These individuals are damaging this country’s global reputation and are costing us billions each year. The Government are committed to tackling serious and organised crime in all its forms and are working with policing to that end. We are working closely with the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service and with Opal, the police’s national intelligence unit focused on serious organised acquisitive crime, including a vehicle crime intelligence desk which covers freight crime.

I hope in my response I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord, Davies, that we accept the spirit of his Amendment 368A and are working to address the issues he has raised in tabling the amendment. I hope too that the noble Lord will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 365 to be necessary. For all of these reasons, I invite him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions: my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Goschen, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, for his very interesting examples.

I hope we have been able to impress on the Government the importance of tackling railway crime. I have travelled for over 50 years now on the London Underground, and things have improved immensely with the new security gates, et cetera, but still we see people avoiding payment by tailgating, which is something we have to challenge and stop. I hope the Government will look at addressing these issues, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 365 withdrawn.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Jackson on the quality of the amendment he drafted. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe on the superb speech she made setting out why this amendment is necessary. As we know, it addresses one of the fastest-growing forms of organised crime in the UK: the theft and rapid export of mobile phones—thousands and thousands of them. These are no longer opportunistic street offences. As noble Lords have said, they are part of a highly profitable, highly mobile criminal market that depends on one thing above all else: the ability to reactivate and resell the stolen devices abroad.

A couple of years ago, I was outside Victoria station, at the end of Victoria Street, waiting to cross the road. I saw a woman waiting for the pedestrian lights to change, holding her mobile phone out—I think she was trying to read the map—almost like a Geiger counter. Then I saw two guys on a motor scooter coming around the corner and I tried to shout to her to put her phone away, but too late—it was snatched in seconds.

That was a couple of years ago, when I think there were motor scooter gangs doing it. Now, as we have seen—we were talking about the e-bike problem in our debates on the Bill before Christmas—there are lots of videos of these guys on their very fast bikes, snatching phones, and I believe the Met now has a response squad on those high-powered bikes chasing the phone thieves. So it is a big problem, particularly in London.

At present, our defences are simply not keeping pace. IMEI blocking helps, but criminals now routinely bypass it by altering identifiers or moving devices to jurisdictions where UK blacklists are ignored. What they cannot bypass is the cloud. As noble Lords have said, modern smartphones are useless without access to the cloud-based services that power authentication, updates, storage and app ecosystems.

The amendment therefore introduces a very simple, proportionate requirement. When a user reports their phone lost or stolen, cloud service providers must take reasonable steps to block that specific device from accessing their services. If a stolen phone cannot be reactivated, it cannot be resold. If it cannot be resold, it is not worth stealing. It is as simple as that.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe hinted that the phone companies may possibly have a financial benefit from not co-operating here. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, was more blatant. I will be more blatant still. I am absolutely certain that they are conspiring not to co-operate so that they can sell more phones. We were discussing all-terrain vehicles a couple of hours ago. When the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Bill was going through, the police officers who were advising us said that they had heard from some of the big manufacturers of ATVs—the ones which make motorbikes with locks you cannot penetrate—that they were deliberately putting rubbish locks on the ATVs because when the £8,000 quad bike was stolen, the farmer immediately replaced it. They saw a market in goods being stolen. I think the big phone companies see exactly the same thing: there is a market in replacement phones.

The noble Lord asked: why do the British Government not do something about it? I suspect it is mega US-UK politics. If we said we were going to restrict the ability of Apple, Google and others to sell their phones here, I think we would have Mr Trump seeking to invade us next week, so I suspect there are geopolitical problems there.

The amendment also ensures proper safeguards: verification before blocking, a clear appeals process, and a role for the Secretary of State in setting technical standards. It strengthens law enforcement by requiring timely notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, giving them valuable intelligence on organised theft. This is not about burdening industry. It is about ensuring that all providers meet a consistent baseline of responsible behaviour—one that many already follow voluntarily, but which criminals exploit when it is not universal.

I conclude by saying that we have an opportunity here to collapse the economic incentive that drives mobile phone theft. Cloud-based blocking is practical, proportionate and overdue, and I commend the amendment to the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling these excellent amendments, and to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving Amendment 366 on his behalf.

This amendment is driven by a simple proposition: if we are to bear down on the scourge of phone theft, we must remove the profit motive, because it is precisely this incentive to profit that drives the vast industry behind phone theft. Too often, the criminal justice system is left trying to deal with the consequences of crime after the event, rather than addressing the incentives that fuel it in the first place. Phone theft is now a high-volume, high-impact crime, particularly in our cities, and it causes not only financial loss but real fear and disruption to victims’ lives.

What this amendment seeks to do is eminently practical. It asks cloud service providers, which already control the digital lifeline that makes a smartphone valuable, to take responsible and timely steps to deny access to those services once a device is verified as lost or stolen. A phone that cannot access cloud backups, app stores, authentication, service or updates rapidly becomes worthless on the secondary market, whether at home or abroad.

This is not a novel idea nor an untested one. As many noble Lords will know, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has examined this issue in detail. In its recent correspondence with Ministers and technology companies, the committee highlighted both the scale of the problem and the frustrating gap between what is technically possible and what is currently being done. The committee made it clear that voluntary action has been uneven, that existing measures are inconsistently applied across platforms, and that stronger co-ordination, potentially underpinned by legislation, may be required if we are serious about prevention. This amendment directly reflects that evidence-based work and gives effect to its central recommendations.

Importantly, the amendment builds in safeguards for users to appeal or reverse a block where a mistake has been made or a device is recovered. It leaves the detailed technical standards, timelines and sanctions to secondary legislation, allowing flexibility and proper consultation with industry, and it recognises the importance of law enforcement by requiring prompt notification to the National Crime Agency and local police, strengthening intelligence and disruption efforts. Fundamentally, if we can force cloud service providers to implement this provision, we can break the cycle of phone theft. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for taking up the cudgels on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I thought I had got away with it when I did not see him in the Chamber, but the noble Baroness turned up at the last minute, like the cavalry, and charged in to raise this very important issue, which I appreciate her doing. She is right to do so because, self-evidently, mobile phone theft is unacceptable. It is a significant criminal operation—as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it involves overseas criminal gangs—and a great inconvenience, cost and discomfort to many people. We need collectively to take action to support the reduction of mobile phone theft.

Amendment 366, moved by the noble Baroness on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, would require technology companies which offer cloud-based services to use technical measures, such as cloud-based blocking, to prevent access to cloud-based services after a device by a registered user has been lost or stolen. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Blencathra—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench of His Majesty’s Opposition—expressed support for that principle and indicated that it is one method of tackling the scourge of mobile phone theft.

I share the noble Baroness’s concern about the theft of mobile phones and other devices that host cloud-based services. The number of thefts is too high and we are determined to get it down. I agree that urgent action is required to make sure that the companies which design these devices—to take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—play their part and do absolutely everything they can to ensure that a stolen mobile phone is not a valuable commodity and therefore not worth stealing.

I share the intent to reduce mobile phone theft, but I suggest to the noble Baroness that there are a number of potential practical challenges in the proposed approach that I am uncertain whether we would currently be able to overcome. Many apps on mobile phone devices have some element of cloud access, so the range of companies in scope of the provision would appear to be extremely broad. In addition, disabling all cloud services could, for example, stop tracking and recovery of mobile phones, especially if the tracking function relies on cloud connectivity. That would impede law enforcement’s ability to identify locations to which stolen devices are taken.

As noble Lords will note, there is a measure in the Bill to ensure that tracking of mobile phones is dealt with in a much speedier and more effective way without the need for warrants. The Government are working with industry and law enforcement partners on the delivery of practical and effective measures. As the noble Baroness said, there was a very productive round table in February which brought together police, technology companies and others to look at how we can do what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, recommended: break the business model of mobile phone theft.

The summit resulted in clear commitments from attendees, including data sharing on mobile phone theft to get a comprehensive picture. There was also a range of other measures, including the police stepping up their operational response. Members will have seen this particularly in London, where the Metropolitan Police—I also pay tribute to the City of London Police—has targeted high areas of that activity as an operational response to catching criminals responsible for these crimes. As I have mentioned, the Bill gives police powers to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items, which would be negated if the tracking element was not allowed. That will help in seriously tackling this issue by enabling the tracking down of stolen mobile phones to particular properties.

As a result of the summit, technology companies and policing partners have continued to work together and there have been a number of working groups looking collectively at tech, operational issues of street action by police forces and other issues, although the main committee has not been reconvened. We have had a change of Home Secretary since the summit took place, so I will go back to the Home Secretary’s office about the potential for reconvening the major group, because it is important that that is done and seen through.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

If the Government are serious about the work of the Select Committee on fraud and about doing something about this, the least they can do is accept the recommendation and the amendment; publish a report indicating how the telecommunications companies might be brought within the embrace of the penalty regime; and consult on it so that we can take it to the next stage. I hope that there will be a positive response to this amendment from the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for bringing forward this amendment, which addresses a very important issue. According to UK Finance, authorised push payment fraud accounted for almost 41% of fraud losses in the first half of last year, while unauthorised fraud decreased by 3% on the year. APP increased by 12%. It is clearly a pressing issue, and I am grateful that we have the opportunity to debate it.

The proposition in question would require technology and telecommunications companies, first, to owe a duty of care to their customers to prevent fraud occurring on their platforms and services in general. I do not see an issue with this in principle. Companies should attempt to protect their customers from fraud by implementing general safeguarding measures that prevent against common tactics such as impersonation. I would rather that this did not come from government intervention but was instead the product of a competitive industry, but I recognise that there is only so much that the market can achieve in the short term. I look forward to hearing the Government’s position on this.

I am a little more hesitant to offer support to the second condition of the noble Lord’s amendment, which would require technology and telecommunications companies to contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims of APP fraud that has occurred on their platforms or services. While I acknowledge that there is already an existing framework for company reimbursement in the form of the PSR’s mandatory reimbursement measures of October 2024, I am not certain that the policy is transferable to technology and communications companies.

The PSR requires banks and payment firms to split reimbursement costs evenly between the sending and receiving institutions, and it is very easy to discern which companies are responsible and therefore liable for payment. Adding technology and communication companies into that framework is not so straightforward. These companies are essentially a third party in the actual fraud occurring: they are neither the sender nor the recipient of the defrauded money; they are the medium through which fraud is made possible but not through which it actually occurs. Responsibility for the fraud and subsequent reimbursement does not seem to me to be as clear cut with technology companies as it is with banks and payment firms.

Secondly, the second measure in the noble Lord’s amendment is not thorough enough to support, even if my worries were addressed. The PSR mandatory reimbursement policy, enacted a year and a half ago, was the product of almost seven years of deliberation and policy-making; extending this measure to a whole new industry should face more scrutiny than that which can be achieved for a single amendment. The amendment itself raises questions as to which companies will qualify, what will their contributions be, and how these will fit within the existing requirements placed upon banks and payment firms. These are just a few questions, but there are many more that will need answering if we are seriously to consider this measure as a law.

That is not to say that APP reimbursement has not proved an effective tool in mitigating the harmful effects of fraud. According to the 12 months of available data since the PSR introduced mandatory reimbursement for APP fraud victims by banks and payment firms, 88% of lost money in scope has been returned to victims. Nor is it to say that technology and communication companies will not in future be the vehicle by which APP is committed—ever-popular social media and the ever-increasing AI industry will make sure of that. It is simply to say that we do not know enough about the implementation of this measure to support it. I appreciate its aim, and I agree that something must be done to tackle this specific type of APP, but at the moment I am not sure that the amendment adequately achieves that, so I look forward to hearing what the noble Lord has to say in closing.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Government are deeply concerned by the devastating impact online fraud can have on individual victims, both financially and emotionally. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for tabling this amendment, to the noble Lord, Lord Young, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for helping us to understand and acknowledge the importance of this issue. The Government recognise the importance of preserving trust in digital communications and online spaces in order that all our hard-working businesses operating in the UK can grow and prosper. We recognise that incentives are important for accountability for all stakeholders.

The Government have seen a significant contribution from the banking sector in preventing fraud and supporting victims in response to the Payment Systems Regulator’s new authorised push payment scams reimbursement requirement. In the first nine months of the APP reimbursement scheme, 88% of eligible losses were reimbursed, with £112 million returned to victims. These figures reflect a strong and sustained commitment to protecting consumers—a positive trajectory that deserves recognition. While we are on the PSR scheme, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked about the transition of PSR into the FCA. It is worth noting that we consulted on that planned merger of PSR into the FCA in September and October last year. We are currently considering the responses to that consultation and will bring forward further proposals in due course. He would expect me to say that we want to manage this process in a way that very much does not undermine the work that the Payment Systems Regulator is already doing to ensure that this system works well.

However, every part of an ecosystem must play a meaningful role in fraud prevention, including the telecommunications and tech sector. The Government have already taken steps to ensure that the tech and telecommunications sectors are rightly incentivised to proactively tackle fraud on their networks. The Online Safety Act requires in-scope companies to take proactive steps to stop fraudulent content appearing on the platform and to remove fraudulent material quickly when they become aware of it. If they do not, they risk facing the full regulatory costs of failing to comply, which can extend to 10% of their global revenue.

Ofcom’s duties on user-generated content are now in force in relation to several online harms, including fraud, and the regulator is already assessing platforms’ compliance. Further duties concerning action against fraudulent advertising will be consulted on this year and are likely to come into effect in 2027.

The telecoms sector is subject to regulation that requires providers to block calls that appear to be from scammers and to prevent scammers from using telephone numbers. It is fair to point out that there has been a fair amount of success already in that effort. Voluntary action has proved effective, and under the first telecoms charter operators have introduced firewalls that have stopped more than 1 billion scam text messages since January 2022, so that indicates the scale of both the problem and the progress that has been made.

We are also working with the sector and Ofcom on a number of innovative further actions to tackle the criminal abuse of telecoms networks. The Government launched the second Telecoms Fraud Charter in November 2025. This is an ambitious charter that covers 50 actions the telecoms industry will implement to tackle fraud within the sector. It includes developing new AI systems to detect and prevent fraud, building a new call-tracing system to track down fraudulent communications and upgrading the UK’s networks to enable new features to protect customers from spoof calls. This is a voluntary commitment from the telecoms sector that aims to strengthen efforts to further identify, block and disrupt telecoms fraud through enhanced industry collaboration and robust duty of care towards UK consumers and smaller telecoms businesses that have themselves been victims of fraud. The previous Telecoms Fraud Charter helped UK mobile network operators to block over 1 billion scam messages through the implementation of firewalls. We want to go further than that, which is what the new telecoms charter seeks to achieve.

In addition, Ofcom launched a consultation in October, outlining new rules on how mobile providers must stop scammers sending mobile messages. These proposals draw on existing best practice in the mobile sector and are intended to both prevent scammers accessing mobile messaging services and stop their activities where they have gained access. Last July, Ofcom also published a consultation on new rules to stop scammers outside the UK reaching people and businesses with calls that imitate UK mobile numbers, and these are likely to be introduced this year. We expect these measures to address gaps in the industry’s existing counterscam measures, and to significantly reduce the risk of individuals and businesses receiving scam messages.

Furthermore, in the upcoming fraud strategy, which we discussed earlier in Committee, and which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the Government will explore options to make it harder for criminals to exploit UK telecoms networks to commit fraud. The noble Lord tempted me to stray off the primrose path of prudence when it comes to timing; I am afraid I cannot do any better than repeat what my noble friend the Minister said: it will be coming in due course. Obviously, we have some time left even in Committee, let alone further stages of this Bill, so I am afraid I can make no commitments there.

The Government will continue monitoring developments in this area to ensure the telecommunications and tech industries remain accountable for delivering on their commitments to tackle fraud and the criminal abuse of their services, in line with the plan we will set out in our soon-to-be-published fraud strategy. However, where insufficient progress is being made in reducing abuse of telecoms networks or tech platforms for the purposes of fraud, the Government, and regulators, will not hesitate to take necessary measures to compel further action. I am on common ground with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who critiqued the amendment, describing the concern it shows for the intermediary nature of the liability some telecoms platforms would be under. It is a fact that a tech sector reimbursement scheme would undermine the UK’s long-standing intermediary liability regime, which means that platforms are not liable for illegal content posted by users provided they are unaware of the unlawful activity, and which underpins the interactive internet and is a cornerstone of digital innovation. I share his concern that a departure from intermediary liability would leave the UK out of sync with our international partners and potentially threaten growth of the UK’s digital economy.

Therefore, in view of the clear plan we are putting in place to tackle fraud, it is the Government’s assessment that the measures set out in this amendment are not necessary at this time, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly commend the report of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, which I have read. My purpose in speaking, very briefly, is to interrogate Amendment 369, in the light of what we already have.

What we already have was very well put in a report by David Spencer of Policy Exchange, the director of which is my noble friend Lord Godson. David Spencer put the current balance very well, I think in his report A Long, Long Way to Go. He wrote:

“The Human Rights Act 1998 does not refer to a ‘Right to Protest’ – the relevant rights are the ‘Right to freedom of expression’ (Article 10) and ‘Right to freedom of peaceful assembly’ (Article 11). However, the sense that many of the recent wave of protests have been ‘peaceful’ by any ordinary understanding of the word – particularly when filled with antisemitic chanting through mobile sound amplifiers, calls for ‘jihad’ on the streets of London, or the use of criminal damage as a tactic – is clearly false. Further, Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights”—


and this is the point about balance that other noble Lords have made—

“in that they can be restricted where it is necessary and proportionate to protect public safety, prevent crime and protect the rights and freedoms of others”.

I myself think that the balance in the Human Rights Act really puts the matter rather well when it refers to this right of peaceful assembly. Peaceful assembly surely does not mean that the protest must be meek and mild. One must expect protests to be noisy, turbulent, robust and, up to a point, disruptive. But the right of protests to be disruptive, as the noble Lord, Lord Walney, said a few moments ago, must be balanced against the right of others not to have their lives disrupted. That is the balance of the thing.

Furthermore, just in closing, there is a very difficult issue here that David Spencer raises very profoundly about some of the language that has been used in demonstrations that is very close to—trembling on the verge of—incitement. In a country where we have seen what happened in the synagogue in Manchester, and where attacks are carried out on other institutions, we have to bear that in mind.

In short, it seems to me this amendment is either reproducing what is already in the Human Rights Act, in which case it is unnecessary, or it is complicating it, in which case it should not really be there. My own sense is that it is complicating it, and that it makes no sense at all to scatter different rights willy-nilly in different pieces of legislation, rather than—if one is going to set positive rights out in statute—putting them in one place in the Human Rights Act, which is what has been done. So I think that the balance we have got is satisfactory and that the amendment does not really stand up to robust interrogation.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for bringing forward these amendments. The importance of peaceful protest in a free and democratic society is of course a principle supported by all noble Lords. I want to be clear at the outset that no one on the Benches on this side questions either the legitimacy or the constitutional right to protest.

I first turn to Amendment 369, which seeks to place an express statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986. This amendment risks solving a problem that does not exist. That is our belief. The right to protest is already deeply embedded in our constitutional and legal framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has so carefully explained. It is recognised in common law, it long predates our membership of the European Convention on Human Rights and it has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts as a fundamental freedom in our democratic tradition. Crucially, this right has never been absolute. Historically, it has always existed alongside the equally important duties of the state to maintain public order, protect public safety and safeguard the rights and freedoms of others. That careful balance has evolved over centuries through common law and legislation. It is not at all clear that reinstating the right to protest in statutory form would add meaningful protection beyond what already exists.

There is a real risk that codifying such a broad and long-standing right in statue could have unintended consequences. By setting out open-ended duties on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate protest, the amendment would inevitably invite further litigation and judicial interpretation. Decisions about the proper balance between protest rights and competing public interests, such as disruption to essential services or public safety, could increasingly be determined in the courts rather than by Parliament or accountable Ministers. That risks further frustrating the will of the Executive and of Parliament. I do not believe that placing an express right to protest into statute is either necessary or desirable. Our system has functioned for generations without such a provision and it is not evident that this long-standing settlement is now deficient.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require an independent review of the existing legislative framework governing protest. We on these Benches are unconvinced of the case for such a review. The Acts listed have been subject to extensive parliamentary scrutiny and their compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights has been debated at length in both Houses. We do not support proposed new subsection (5) in this amendment, which would require the review to have regard to the impacts of legislation on the exercise of rights under the ECHR. The ECHR is already subject to unwelcome litigation which brings about perverse outcomes that were never intended at its commencement: there are plenty of examples of that. An additional independent review would be unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative, consuming time and public resources without a clear or compelling purpose. For these reasons, we on these Benches do not support either amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and to further discussion of how best to uphold both the right to protest and the rule of law in a balanced and proportionate way.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope it does not surprise noble Lords if I confess that I have been on the odd protest in my time. I have quite enjoyed the freedom to have a protest. I have protested against the apartheid Government, against the National Front and, if the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will bear with me, against his Government when he served as a Minister.

The right to peaceful protest is an important part of our democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and demonstrate their views, provided they do so within the law. This Government are committed to protecting and preserving that right. I hope that that gives some succour to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and indeed others who have spoken in favour.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his case for the two amendments on public order. Amendment 369 seeks to introduce a statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986, along with a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate that right. I understand the concerns that he has put and I accept and appreciate those concerns, but, as has been said, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, these protections are already firmly established in UK law. Public authorities are required under the Human Rights Act 1998, passed by a previous Government in which I was pleased to serve, to act in accordance with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly set out in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, as has been said by a number of noble Lords today, including the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies of Gower, and as set out in the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, these rights are qualified. This point is illustrated by Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. On that qualification, I am not going to get into the argument between the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Blencathra, but for the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others who have argued for the amendment today, the key point is that that right, as has been said, can be restricted only where restriction is lawful, proportionate and justified. The right to peaceful protest is also recognised under the common law and creating a separate statutory provision risks duplicating existing protections, which could lead to confusion in how the law is interpreted and applied. It might also complicate operational policing without offering any additional legal safeguards.

I have to say that I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that there is a fundamental right to protest. But I respectfully submit, as I think he argued in his contribution, that the amendment would not strengthen that commitments and might indeed introduce uncertainty into the law. That is a very valid and important point, because existing legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 10 and 11, qualified rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, set out the issues that again were ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the right to protest exists: it is one that I cherish and have exercised myself and may even exercise myself again in the future, who knows? It is an important right, but his amendment would cause confusion and water down the ability to provide that security of protest under the existing legislation. Therefore, I ask him ultimately to not press it further.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require the Government to commission an independent review of the existing protest legislation within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said that the Government called the review post the tabling of this amendment. We proposed the review on 5 October last year. The Home Secretary announced an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation on 5 October last year and I suggest that Amendment 371, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would essentially be what the Government have already ordered and would, if agreed today, negate the purpose of what the Government have already ordered and extend the review that we have already ordered still further by establishing that review in law.

We announced the review on 5 October because of the very issues that all noble Lords have mentioned about balancing the right to peaceful protest and the right to enjoy non-harassment, the right to potentially go to a synagogue, or the right to go about your daily business. Those issues are extremely important, which is why the Home Secretary has appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, as one of the people to undertake the review. His independence and expertise will ensure a rigorous, impartial review. He will have the help and support of former assistant chief constable Owen Weatherill, who brings operational experience from his role with the National Police Chiefs’ Council as lead for civil contingencies and national mobilisation. That independent review reaffirms this Government’s ongoing commitment to keep public order legislation under review.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I too support the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that Clauses 118 to 120 should be removed altogether from the Bill.

My reasons are twofold. First, I regard it as wrong and unjustified to prohibit people from concealing their identities at demonstrations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said, let alone prohibiting anyone in a designated locality concealing their identity if they so wish. That is what the Bill does, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out. My second point is that the purpose of the clause can only be to enable the use of live facial recognition technology to monitor demonstrations, to enable the authorities to determine who is attending them and, frankly, to take action against them subsequently. I regard that as an offensive justification, certainly given the present state of the technology and the present lack of regulation of live facial recognition.

On the first reason, overall, the prohibition of individuals concealing their identity involves introducing a Big Brother role for the state that is unwelcome and foreign to our notions of democratic freedom. The power may not be Orwellian in scale, but it has nasty totalitarian echoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four. We should remember that the catchphrase of the dictatorship in that novel is, “Big Brother is watching you”, the justified implication being that state observation of individuals is a principal instrument in the toolkit of dictatorship.

No doubt that is the reason why the power to prohibit such concealment is hedged around in the Bill by the complicated regime of designated localities, exempted purposes and limited durations. Those limits on the prohibition of concealing identity are intended to act as a brake on the power, but, in fact, all the weaknesses—mentioned by my noble friend Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others—emphasise how far the power is a fetter on individual freedom.

I fully appreciate that the power to designate a locality under Clause 119 would arise only if a senior police officer reasonably believed that a protest was likely to involve, or has involved, the commission of offences, and that it would be expedient to exercise the power to prevent or limit the commission of offences. However, that must be measured against not only the seriousness of the offences to be avoided, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out, but the right of individuals to wear a disguise, which may be, as others have pointed out, a perfectly reasonable thing to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke of protesters against the Iranian regime. What about journalists, of whatever political persuasion, who wish to report on a protest but do not want to be recognised by the protesters or the public? What about employees, who would rather not be recognised attending a protest by their employers? The employers may have a political objection to the cause that the protesters are pursuing. Any figure who may be publicly recognisable who wishes to take part in, or even just attend, a protest, and wishes not to be recognised, may legitimately have that right to conceal their identity. What about parents who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their children, or adult children who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their parents?

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relied on the public protests of Emmeline Pankhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly objected to that comparison. There were countless other suffragettes who did not want friends or family to know of their support for, or activity as, suffragettes in protests because they might disagree with their family, parents, husbands, wives or friends, or simply out of concern for their own safety. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, expressed the position of ordinary citizens who wish to keep their identities private. I go further: in peacetime, it is the right of people to keep their identities private. The state would have to justify any limit on that power, and it has not done that.

We all agree that everyone has a right to protest but we must all acknowledge that protests can, and often do, involve the commission of offences by some. But the fact that protest may involve, or be likely to involve, the commission of offences by some people does not justify the police or the state in denying everybody in the designated locality the right to conceal their identities. This prohibition says to people that if you take part in or attend the protest, or are in the locality covered by the designation, you must be recognisable. I say to the Minister that that is an unjustifiable arrogation of power by the state. It must be justified by the Government if they wish to legislate for it, and they have not gone anywhere near justifying that arrogation of power.

My second reason for opposing this clause is that the prohibition on concealment of a citizen’s identity can have only the one purpose of enabling them to be monitored on camera, with a view to being identified later. Let us examine that. At its most benign, the power may be directed only against those who commit offences. Where it is for that limited purpose, it can be argued that preventing offences by the persons identified on camera may be a legitimate exercise of the power of the state, but I will repeat the points made by my noble friend Lord Strasburger on that. Just as police officers justify surveillance, so this power, if it were sufficiently defined and limited, might be justifiable, but the purposes of surveillance in the Bill go much further and unacceptably so. A dictatorial state may regard it as permissible to identify supporters of a particular view, political party or cause for the purpose of keeping them under further surveillance; worse still, branding them as trouble-makers for the future; or, at the extreme, taking action against them, ranging from pulling them in for questioning to arrest and unlawful imprisonment.

We have seen abuse of powers such as that in countries all over the world; the country that is currently under consideration is Iran, but it has happened in many others. We prevent abuse of power only by being astute to limit police powers and state infringement of individual liberties in the first place. This is not just an argument about live facial recognition technology, which my noble friend considered—we will discuss that more later—but an important argument about the legitimate limits on state power. Clauses 118 to 120 come nowhere near falling within those limits, even had they been tightly drawn—which they are not, as my noble friend and others have pointed out. For that reason, these clauses really ought to go.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these stand part notices. However, we on these Benches are unable to support her as we have general support for Clauses 118 to 120.

The clauses address a very real and increasingly familiar problem in modern protest policing: the deliberate concealment of identity to frustrate lawful policing and avoid accountability for criminal acts. I am sure that all noble Lords have seen videos circulating on the news and online of protests where large groups of people arrive masked or disguising their identity. Often, the only reason for that is to embolden themselves and each other to commit offences, knowing that their identification and subsequent prosecution will be next to impossible. This undermines both public confidence and the rule of law.

Clause 118 creates a relatively tightly drawn offence that would apply only where a locality has been designated by the police because there is a reasonable belief that a protest is likely to involve, or has involved, criminality. It is not a blanket ban on face coverings. Rather, the clause provides clear statutory defences for those wearing items for health reasons, religious observance or work-related purposes. I do not have concerns that these defences may be abused, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some assurances as to how he intends that this will not be the practical reality.

Clauses 119 and 120 provide for necessary safeguards and structures relating to the powers of Clause 118. They stipulate that designation must be time limited, based on a reasonable belief and authorised at an appropriate level. There are explicit requirements to notify the public of the designation, the nature of the offence and the period for which it applies. These safeguards are consistent with other provisions of the Public Order Act that relate to police powers to impose conditions on assemblies and processions.

Removing these clauses would make policing protests even more difficult, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. Offenders who attend protests with the primary intent to commit crimes, whether related to the protest topic or not, will be able to evade justice more easily. The vast majority of peaceful protesters are unfairly associated with disorder that they did not cause. Effective policing protects the right to protest by isolating and deterring criminal behaviour within it. For those reasons, we cannot support the stand part notices in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling her intention to remove Clauses 118 to 120. The Committee is aware of the purpose of those clauses. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, for the broad principle of the clauses.

I start by referring the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to the front page of the Bill. She will see that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint—which is me—has made the statement that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, which answers the first point that she put to me.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

369A: Clause 121, page 149, line 32, at end insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of the defence in subsection (3), a person does not have a reasonable excuse by way of an honestly or sincerely held political belief, irrespective of the nature of the belief.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that a person cannot claim a reasonable excuse for the possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest because of a sincerely held political belief.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, ever since the Supreme Court ruled in the DPP v Ziegler in 2021, the state of public order and protest law in this country has been nothing less than a confused mess. As Policy Exchange noted in its report, ‘Might is Right?’, we have entered an era of increasingly disruptive protests. We have seen severe disruption from the likes of Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion and pro-Palestinian groups. My amendments together seek to restore clarity and proportionality to our public order law following the deeply troubling consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziegler.

The starting point must be an uncomfortable truth: the law as it now stands has tilted too far in favour of those who seek to justify criminality and serious disruption on the basis of contentious political beliefs. That tilt did not arise from legislation passed by Parliament but from judicial interpretation. It has been Parliament’s clear intention to prevent such actions occurring in the name of protest—that is evident in the legislation that has been passed in recent years—but the will of Parliament has been, to at least some degree, undermined by the judiciary, most notably in the Ziegler ruling, which has elevated protest-related rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights above the practical ability of the state to prevent intimidation, obstruction and damage. I argue that the proportionality analysis mandated by the Human Rights Act 1998 has migrated from being a safeguard of last resort to being a routine defence for conduct that Parliament has plainly intended to criminalise.

In effect, the courts are being invited to weigh the importance of a cause against the harm done to the public. That is not the rule of law; it is moral relativism dressed up as jurisprudence. These amendments offer a direct and refreshingly simple response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord did not take my comments in that vein. It is completely unacceptable for individuals to have their lives disrupted by that level of protest, but it is for the police on site to determine. I was not there on the night; I did not witness the protest. I read about the concerns prior to today, and during the course of this debate I have examined again the reports that have occurred. But it is for a police officer on site to determine. Under existing legislation, there are offences of harassment, of inciting violence and other offences and, as the noble Lord knows, because we have debated this at Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill to ensure that people can, with the police, determine a protest route and the regularity of a protest as part of the proposals in this legislation. I am not ducking the question; it is important that people have the right to live their lives in freedom, and to enjoy a restaurant meal. But I cannot be the police on the night, determining whether the offences that are potentially covered currently by law are exercised by the police. I hope the noble Lord will accept the comments that I have made. With that, I invite the noble Lord not to press the proposed amendments, and to revisit them should he so wish.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to those who have supported my amendments and even to noble Lords who disagreed with them, because this discussion has laid down the real issue before us: who decides where the limits of protest lie —Parliament or the courts?

Much of the criticism rests on the claim that removing reasonable excuse defences is somehow draconian. I profoundly disagree. I say to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that peaceful protest remains fully protected. These amendments address not expression but coercion, not persuasion but disruption, not dissent but deliberate law-breaking carried out in the expectation that the courts will excuse it after the fact.

That expectation is not hypothetical. It is precisely what flowed from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ziegler. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his interpretation of the law as it stands, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, for his further clarification. The Ziegler decision has encouraged protesters to view arrest as a tactical step, confident that they can later invoke proportionality, sincerity of belief and human rights arguments to defeat prosecution. We saw this with a recent case, whereby Just Stop Oil protesters threw powder paint at the historic Stonehenge. They were acquitted, of course, on all counts. The result is uncertainty for the police, frustration for the public and an erosion of respect for the law.

Noble Lords may agree that the answer lies in better guidance or more nuanced drafting, but we have been down that road. The debates on the Public Order Act 2023, particularly those led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, were an earnest attempt to clarify the law while retaining reasonable excuse defences, but Labour denied the opportunity to do so. The outcome has been complexity layered upon complexity, and still the courts are left to decide case by case whether obstruction, damage, or intimidation was worth it, given the cause advanced.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

370: After Clause 122, insert the following new Clause—
“Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructureAfter section 8 of the Public Order Act 2023 (key national infrastructure) insert—“8A Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructure(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) they do an act which causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to—(i) two or more individuals, or(ii) an organisation,in their use or operation of road transport infrastructure, and(b) they intend that act to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (a).(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).(4) In this section—“the maximum term for summary offences” has the meaning given by section 6(4); “road transport infrastructure” has the meaning given by section 8(2);“trade dispute” has the meaning given by section 7(10).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause creates a new offence of creating serious disruption to road transport infrastructure.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 370 would create an offence of intentionally causing disruption to road traffic infrastructure where the action in question affects multiple individuals or organisations. The amendment originates from the growth, in recent years, of protests designed to cause maximum public disruption to further narrow ideological ends. Activist groups comprising self-aggrandizing ideologues began to realise that, by taking part in large-scale obstructions that affected the law-abiding public, they could get their causes into newspaper headlines and Twitter feeds. The consequence was that groups such as Just Stop Oil became household names through their disruptive tactics. They targeted the lives of everyday people, disrupting people’s livelihoods and hampering the functioning of society.

The most damaging of these protests has become the disruption to road traffic. Protesters sit on busy roads and grind traffic to a halt. People are late for jobs, emergency services are delayed and police time is wasted, and it is the public who, ultimately, must pay the price. In 2022, Just Stop Oil shut down the M25 for four successive days, causing more than 50,000 hours of vehicle delay to over 700,000 vehicles. This cost the public over £700,000, and the cost to the Metropolitan Police was over £1.1 million. Despite 45 people engaging in the protest, only five organisers were arrested and held in custody. If we do not punish those who cause such obscene disruption, we leave the public vulnerable to further disorder.

The Government have taken forward several measures from our previous Criminal Justice Bill, including the provisions to ban possession of pyrotechnics at protests, the new offence of concealing one’s identity at a protest and the prohibition on climbing on specified memorials. However, it is a shame they have neglected to carry forward this particular measure to prevent serious disruption on roads. Avoiding prosecuting disruptive individuals ultimately comes at the expense of the public. I hope the Government can recognise this and will reconsider the amendment.

My further two amendments in this group respond to a stark reality. We have seen successive waves of disruptive protests that have strained our communities, stretched the capacity of our police forces, and left the public questioning whether the law was operating as intended. It is abundantly clear that undue weight has too often been placed on the rights of disruptive activists at the expense of the rights, well-being and interests of the wider public.

Take, for example, the recent Palestine-related demonstrations. The Metropolitan Police has stated that the costs of policing these protests in London between October 2023 and June 2024 were £42.9 million. Some 51,799 Metropolitan Police officers’ shifts and 9,639 police officer shifts from officers usually based outside the Metropolitan Police area were required. Further, 6,339 police officers have had rest days cancelled between October 2023 and April 2024, all of which will eventually have to be repaid to those officers. Such demands on police capacity inevitably divert resources away from policing crime and protecting vulnerable communities.

It is against this backdrop that Amendment 382A seeks to empower chief officers to act decisively. By way of background, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 currently permits the chief officer of a police force to apply to the local council for an order to prohibit the holding of all demonstrations in a particular area for a period of up to three months. The threshold, as it currently stands, is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers in Section 12 of the Act—that is, the power to impose conditions on protests—are insufficient to prevent serious public disorder.

However, this threshold of “serious public disorder” overlooks a number of further factors. It does not consider the potential for property damage, the impact on the rights of others not involved in those protests, or the demands placed on police resources. My amendment would replace Section 13(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 to introduce the ability for the relevant chief officer to consider the risk of

“serious public disorder … serious damage to property … serious disruption to the life of the community”

and

“undue demands on the police”.

There is precedent for this. Section 11 of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 permits the police to prohibit processions if they believe that the protest would place undue demands on the police or military forces. Although I recognise the unique historical context of public processions and assemblies in Northern Ireland, there is no reason why, with modern protest tactics, police forces in England and Wales should not also be able to consider the cost and burden on the police imposed by the policing of the protest.

On Amendment 382C, the existing six-day notice period for marches under Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 simply is not fit for modern policing needs. When tens of thousands of officers must be mobilised at short notice to manage demonstrations that may span multiple days and locations, six days’ advance notice does not provide sufficient time for intelligence assessment, resourcing and engagement with organisers. Extending this to 28 days would acknowledge the complexity and scale of contemporary protest events. It is a proportionate adjustment that gives police forces the lead-in they need without unduly restricting peaceful protest.

I emphasise that these amendments support peaceful, lawful expression, which is a cornerstone of our democracy. They do not, and are not intended to, curtail genuine dissent. They do, however, ensure that, in protecting the ability to protest, we do not trample the rights of those affected by serious destruction.

We are often reminded that the right to protest must be balanced with the rights of others. I put it to noble Lords that these amendments deliver that balance. I beg to move.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend on the Front Bench. I think we grossly underestimate how much damage to the UK economy is caused by stopping motorways, particularly the M25. I have not seen authoritative figures for how much it costs to block a motorway, which happens with road traffic accidents. Years ago, I saw a figure of £0.75 million per hour. I do not know whether the Minister has a figure for how much it costs when the M25 or another important motorway is closed. It is not just the effect on motorists; it is the effect on industry, transport and supply chains, and the need to build in extra float in the transport system to allow for that. So, I strongly support my noble friend in everything he said.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper. I add that into the mix of the debate today, but I still come to the conclusion that existing legislation, however it is interpreted, covers this. Therefore—for the last time, I hope—I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate, but I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed and to my noble friend Lord Attlee for supporting my amendments.

The police are charged not only with facilitating lawful protest but with protecting the safety and liberties of all citizens, yet the current legal framework, I suggest, often leaves officers with insufficient tools to intervene meaningfully before disruption becomes entrenched. Amendment 382A strikes at the core of this problem by allowing chief officers to seek prohibition in defined circumstances, including where marches are likely to cause serious disorder, damage or disruption or to place undue demand on limited policing resources. We align the law with operational reality and public expectations.

What do the public expect? Polling shows that large majorities support police intervention in protest scenarios that go beyond peaceful lawful conduct. They reveal a public who very much distinguish between legitimate expression and conduct that crosses into intimidation and disorder. Similarly, extending the notice period to 28 days is a common-sense enhancement that gives police and local authorities the time needed to prepare for large and potentially complex processions. This is about ensuring the responsible ordering of protest in a way that protects public safety, minimises disruption and allows ordinary citizens to go about their lives.

These amendments are a measured, evidence-based response to the challenge of protest policing in the 21st century. I hear what the Minister says, but I hope the Government can give them some serious consideration. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 370 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

That amendment should, of course, be supported in the light of the tragedies at Manchester Synagogue, Bondi Beach and elsewhere, but I say further that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, is absolutely right. He and others have spoken in strong terms about the dangers of antisemitism. It is a danger of extreme wickedness, and I agree with him and others who have spoken about it. The Government need to be very careful in that regard. I take pleasure in agreeing, perhaps unusually, with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, on this amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a very large grouping, and I shall be as brief as I possibly can, but there is quite a bit to cover. I support the principle behind Amendment 370A by the noble Lord, Lord Walney. We have seen a growth in the number of protest groups who engage in severe criminal activity to further their ends and yet, as organisations, are shielded from the full force of the law. There is a spectrum on which protest groups sit, from peaceful and non-violent to those proscribed as terrorist organisations. Inevitably, there will be groups that sit towards the more extreme end of the spectrum and yet do not meet the criterion to be designated as terrorists.

Bash Back is a transgender activist group which has used vandalism and intimidation to attack those who might disagree with its views. We have heard first-hand from my noble friend Lord Young of Acton as to their criminal activities. Whether this group’s behaviour qualifies a group as a terrorist organisation is a matter for the Government’s lawyers. But when Bash Back’s action guide, now taken offline, provides a step-by-step manual on how to commit extreme criminal offences and evade prosecution, there must be legal recourse that goes beyond targeting the individuals responsible and attacks the structure of the group. The noble Lord’s amendment provides a good framework for this, and I hope that the Government take it away and consider it further.

Similarly, I support the principle behind Amendment 370AA in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn, Lord Austin of Dudley and Lord Polak. For far too long have our cities been occupied on a weekly basis by angry and unruly marches that go well past their stated aims. Too often are innocent members of the public intimidated by calls for an intifada or for jihad. We have been too lax, I am afraid, in reining this in.

I broadly support the amendments tabled by noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and my noble friend Lord Leigh to Clause 124. Regardless of the merits of the clause in question, the measures would greatly clarify the legislation and remove the inevitable conflicts of interpretation that will currently result from it. I hope that the Government consider these improvements before Report, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendment 486B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, raises the important issue of public funding. We support the principle that organisations that promote, support or condone criminal conduct, or seek to undermine our democratic institutions through violent or illegal means, should not be eligible for public funds. Public money should never be used.

Amendment 486C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, speaks to the deeply troubling rise in antisemitic offences. I am sure noble Lords are united in complete condemnation of the events at Bondi Beach last year. The proposal for a dedicated CPS unit reflects serious concern to ensure that such crimes are prosecuted effectively and consistently.

I turn to the two government amendments. Amendment 381 creates a new criminal offence of making representation outside a public officeholder’s home. The offence contains two elements. First, it criminalises a person being present outside a public officeholder’s dwelling for the purpose of representing to or persuading that public officeholder to do or not to do something in connection with their official duties. The second element is that a person will be committing an offence if they are present outside public officeholder’s dwelling for the purpose of representing or persuading them in relation to something

“otherwise than in connection with their role as a public officeholder”.

In other words, the amendment criminalises representations in relation to their public capacity and in a personal capacity.

I completely understand that the Government are seeking to take action against the intimidation or harassment of public officeholders, but serious concerns arise from this amendment. First, proposed new Section 42B(2) and (3) state that a person is to be considered as making representations

“by the person’s presence or otherwise”.

This implies that a person simply standing or holding a sign without saying anything could be criminalised. Can the Minister confirm that this is true?

Secondly, there is a distinct possibility that these provisions might capture political campaigners within its scope. As I have understood it, the second prohibited purpose in the offence captures making representation in relation to a public officeholder’s capacity as a private citizen, meaning that attempting to convince them to vote for another political party by campaigning could in theory be captured by the offence. For instance, say I am a party activist canvassing on the doorsteps, and I knock on the door of councillor of an opposing party. Would that, by my presence or otherwise, not be sufficient to constitute an offence? Let us say I post a leaflet for my party through the letterbox of the PCC of an opposing party. Would I be liable to arrest? Are the Government now saying that people should not be able to canvass or campaign? Again, I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether this would be the case.

Thirdly, it is the case that the law already provides significant protections for people in their own home. Section 42 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 permits a police officer to force a person to leave the vicinity of another person’s home if the officer believes the person is likely to cause alarm or distress to the resident. It is a criminal offence to breach such a direction, and that covers both members of the public and officeholders. Does the Minister agree that this already provides quite a substantial protection for public officeholders from intimidation, harassment and abuse outside their own homes? On the basis that we do not need duplication, as the Minister said earlier, I suggest that this may well be the case here.

I have today posed a number of questions to the Minister regarding the amendment, and I look forward to what he has to say in answering them, but I must add that we do not think that this amendment should be made to the Bill today. The proposed change is a serious legal issue with profound questions about the nature of democracy and the relationship between public officeholders and those we serve. It has been introduced in your Lordships’ House in Committee and debated among 24 other amendments. It has not been considered by the other place, and it certainly has not received sufficiently detailed scrutiny in this place. I therefore do not believe it is appropriate simply to wave this through after so little consideration, and I hope the Minister will be willing to withdraw the amendment for now and bring it back on Report, when we can have a full and proper debate.

Finally, Amendment 372 would ensure that the police take into account the cumulative impact of protests when deciding whether to impose conditions on demonstrations and assemblies. We completely support this, but I am surprised that the Government now support this too. During the passage of the Public Order Act 2023, this exact same proposal was brought forward by the then Conservative Government. My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, who was the Minister at the time, moved Amendment 48 on the first day of Report on that Bill. While not identical in wording to Amendment 372, the government amendment to the 2023 Act would have permitted the police to consider the cumulative disruption to the life of the community.

The Labour Party opposed that amendment, and 133 of its Peers voted it down. Now the Minister comes back to the House and asks us to support the very thing that his party was previously opposed to. It would be eminently helpful if the Minister could explain to the Committee why his party has suddenly had a damascene conversion and now supports these measures.

The amendments in my name to government Amendment 372 are simply probing amendments. The text of the government amendment as it stands permits the police to consider only the cumulative impact of protests in the same geographic location. It does not permit them to consider the cumulative impact on communities arising from the content of the protest, nor the cumulative impact of protests organised by that same organisation in the past. The potential impact of permitting the police to consider only geographical location is that protests organised by completely different groups on entirely different matters, but held in the same place, could see conditions imposed on them that have no bearing on their own behaviour.

We see many protests down Whitehall by different groups protesting about completely different issues. Would it be right for the police to be able to restrict a protest by farmers in Whitehall simply because there has been a pro-Palestinian protest there the day before? We must also remember that certain groups are far more disruptive and prone to disorder and violence than others. If only geographical location was considered, the police would be forced to treat all protests the same regardless of the conduct of the protest group in question.

It is clear from polling conducted by Policy Exchange that a significant proportion of the British public believes that police should consider the cumulative impact of particular groups protesting for the same cause. Yet this is not what is proposed by the Government’s amendment.

In conclusion, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the Government’s thinking as to why they have included only geographical location and not the subject matter, the context or the content of the protest in this amendment.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a long and wide-ranging debate, and rightly so. The issues that we are discussing in this rather large group of amendments go to the heart of who we are as a nation. I will try to do justice to the sincerely held, if somewhat, at times, diametrically opposed views expressed across the Committee.

Let me deal first with the two government amendments in the group. First, government Amendment 372 places a duty on a senior police officer to take cumulative disruption into account when assessing whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold is met and, in turn, whether conditions should be applied to a public prosecution or public assembly.

This Government are committed to upholding the democratic right to peaceful protest. However, this must not come at the expense of the right of others to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the last few years, we have seen the impact of repeat protests on the life of some of our communities. We saw this in the wake of the antisemitic terror attack on the Heaton Park synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025, which resulted in the tragic murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz, as mentioned already by the noble Lord, Lord Polak.

As the noble Lord pointed out, protests continued in Manchester over the subsequent days, highlighting concerns around the need to protect specific communities and others impacted by the cumulative impact of protest. At this point I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for praising not just Rabbi Walker of Heaton Park Shul—who I had the pleasure and privilege of meeting during Hanukkah; he is an amazing individual and the way that he has held his community together is truly inspiring—but the CST, which continues to protect our Jewish community and lead the fight against antisemitism in our country.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention and her questions. I say, with great courtesy to the Government Whip, that her first question does not relate to the amendment because it is not about an offence. She was talking about the pre-banning of people and asking whether harm is so broad. However, that is a debate we need to have as society.

That leads into the noble Baroness’s second question about whether young people can distinguish. I think young people can distinguish. Part of the issue is that we as an older generation do not understand that a lot of them take a great deal of care about their colleagues because they have been brought up in a society with the rules, as opposed to having to introduce them, and they have seen exactly the concerns that I was raising. We need to continue to debate this but, bringing it back to this amendment, the point is that none of those issues is about offences.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for this interesting debate. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for moving Amendment 382F, which I support. Although it ranges across several statutes, it is in truth a coherent proposal with a clear constitutional purpose: to restore the proper limits of the criminal law so that freedom of speech is protected, while of course ensuring that genuinely threatening conduct remains criminal.

At the outset, I recognise the political sensitivity of this area. Any proposal to amend or repeal so-called hate speech provisions risks being misrepresented as indifference to racism, misogyny, homophobia or other forms of discrimination. Let me be absolutely clear: that is not the motivation behind this amendment. As my noble friend said, we on this side of the House oppose racism and discrimination in all their forms. The case for this amendment is not moral indifference but legal realism. The current framework has proved incoherent, ineffective and, in some respects, actively counterproductive.

As my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea most ably set out, the current legislative framework dealing with offensive language, hate speech and the like is a messy, tangled web of patchwork offences. We have the Malicious Communications Act 1988, Sections 4A and 5 and Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. These provisions criminalise speech not because it threatens direct harm but because it is deemed “abusive” or “insulting” or said to cause a person “needless anxiety”.

I am not ignorant to the fact that we have had laws in this country prohibiting the usage of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour for almost a century. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, now repealed, stated:

“Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence”.


But there are two crucial differences between that legislation and this. The 1936 Act was set against the background of rising fascist paramilitaries, first in Italy and then in Germany and, indeed, in Britain. Secondly, use of the language

“with intent to provoke a breach of the peace”

is very different from outlawing insulting language likely to cause a person “needless anxiety”. I think even a child could understand the difference between inciting a riot and causing a person mild offence.

Yet this is where we are. A person can claim to have been caused “annoyance” or even “inconvenience”, complain to the police and have another individual investigated and potentially arrested. That is not hyperbole; it is the truth. There is a litany of recent examples that we could trawl through, but many have been mentioned by noble Lords today so I will mention only a few, as briefly as I can.

As we have heard, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 was used to arrest Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the two parents who have been referred to. The same Act was used to arrest a 17 year-old boy for comments he posted on Tom Daley’s Twitter account:

“You let your dad down i hope you know that”.


While this is obviously poor behaviour, to claim it should be a matter for the law and constitutes criminality is deeply concerning. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 was used to prosecute a person who posted a picture online with a phallus drawn on it; Jordan Barrack was ordered to pay £400 in compensation for a post that did not cause any harm to anyone. Again, how this case ended up as a matter for the authorities is beyond me.

Of fundamental importance is the fact that the terms we are dealing with here are not precise legal concepts. They are elastic, subjective and dependent on perception rather than consequence. The result is uncertainty for the public, inconsistency in enforcement and an unhealthy transfer of quasi-judicial discretion to individual police officers who have recently taken to very liberal and, indeed, unequal enforcement of these laws.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The noble Lord said that he did not rely on Lucy Connolly in his earlier argument; he is now trying to rely on that case here. I am trying to make the point that it is more complex than he made out in his earlier contribution. I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The previous Government’s LGBT survey in 2018 showed that fewer than one in 10 LGBT people reported hate crimes or incidents. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, has explained one of the reasons for that. The other reason, I know from friends who have also experienced this sort of hate crime, is they do not believe that the police will do anything. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young, that that is one of the reasons why there is concern about the police: too often, people who are targeted in this way feel that they do not get the help that they need.

As has been described, there is no single piece of hate crime legislation. It includes aggravated assault, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, was particularly concerned about. The point about hate crime is that it is not just the individual; the protected characteristic means that they and their community are also affected by it. We have spent many hours on previous groups on this Bill discussing the absolute abhorrence of antisemitism. If actions in Israel can cause people in the UK to start attacking members of our Jewish community, either verbally or against a person or their property, then that is absolutely unacceptable. That is one of the reasons why I would never want hate crimes to be removed.

Research by Professor Mark Walters of Sussex University shows that hate crimes do not affect just those individuals targeted; he describes them as having a “ripple effect” through their wider communities. Some people will avoid certain routes and places, and others will not leave home at all, particularly in our Jewish communities at the moment, but the same is true in certain areas for our Muslim communities. If laws about hate crime are weakened or repealed, it would send an appalling message to these communities of faith, as well as to LGBT and disabled people. Do the supporters of the amendment really no longer regard it as important that the state recognises the communities that have protected characteristics—their vulnerability—as warranting distinct legal recognition and criminalisation?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this has been a very interesting debate and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for tabling Amendment 382G. This amendment contains a line of argument that the Committee began to consider in the previous group: namely, whether the criminal law should concern itself with what people do or whether it should also punish what people are thought to feel or believe.

The provisions targeted by this amendment fall broadly into two categories. First, there are ordinary criminal offences—assault, criminal damage, harassment and public order offences—where existing penalties are increased if the court concludes that the offender was motivated by hostility towards a protected characteristic. Secondly, there are freestanding offences, particularly under the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which criminalised the stirring up of hatred, even where no violence or other recognised criminal harm has occurred.

The crux of the debate comes down to this: two identical acts can result in radically different sentences depending not on the harm caused but on an inferred state of mind. That inference might be drawn from sparse or ambiguous evidence, yet it carries profound consequences for liberty. This could make prosecutions more complex, investigations longer and outcomes less predictable—hardly a recipe for clarity or fairness. These laws have grown incrementally and unevenly; they overlap, diverge, and sometimes contradict one another. The result is a body of legislation that is difficult to understand, inconsistently applied and increasingly divorced from public confidence.

This amendment offers the Committee an opportunity to step back and ask whether this approach has genuinely improved justice or whether it has instead distracted our criminal justice system from its core task of tackling real and harmful crime. This is a point that I would particularly like to emphasise. As a former police officer myself, I understand the difficulties in enforcing laws that are passed by a well-meaning Parliament but are incoherent and ill thought through. Part of this problem does indeed lie with us, the lawmakers. Successive Governments and Parliaments have not taken a coherent approach to public order and speech legislation. They have passed statute after statute, simply adding to the already long list of different defences, not thinking to consolidate or repeal existing laws.

When the Public Order Act 1986 passed, it contained seven offences of this nature. The previous Labour Government passed the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sections 28 to 33 of which created racially aggravated offences. They then passed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which added a new Part 3A to the 1986 Act, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 added hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation to the list of hate crimes. The Sentencing Act 2020 also permits for any offence to be aggravated by hostility expressed towards any of five characteristics.

This Government are going down the same path, as we have already discussed in Committee. Clauses 107 and 108 of this very Bill contain further provisions criminalising the use of offensive language based on racial hatred aimed towards an emergency worker. If the Government think it is coherent to simply bolt new offences on to the already vast array of legislation, then I respectfully suggest that they are somewhat misguided.

Furthermore, far from promoting cohesion, these provisions have too often deepened division. They have encouraged grievance politics and fostered public mistrust. They have also placed the police in an impossible position, asking them to arbitrate not just behaviour but belief and expression.

There is a further concern about effectiveness. These laws, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea mentioned, are clogging the justice system with cases that pose no real threat to public safety, while doing little to address genuine hatred or violence. At the same time, they have fed a broader culture in which accusations of hate are used to silence debate, discourage inquiry and deter people—artists, teachers, academics and ordinary citizens—from speaking openly.

Freedom of speech is not an abstract luxury; it is a defining feature of our national character and a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy. I thank my noble friend for enabling this fruitful debate and hope that the Government will consider it carefully.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Before my noble friend the Minister stands up, I will briefly intervene to say that at Second Reading, I counted 44 previous statutes that were being amended by the Bill. I just counted five in Amendment 382G. I do not know whether they join the 44 statutes in the Bill itself or whether they stand alone, but the Bill is extremely complex. In the word I used at Second Reading, it is, in this sense, a “monster” of a Bill, not because of the many provisions in it and the other provisions that noble Lords have brought out in it: that is not my point. My point is just on the complexity of the Bill. I beg that there may be a change of mind by Governments and parliamentary draftsmen and that they do not inflict Bills like this on the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

383: Clause 128, page 154, line 12, leave out “Electronically tracked”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the requirement for an officer to have electronically tracked information to enter and search a premises.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we now come to a group of amendments that seeks to improve the Government’s legislation as it currently stands. We broadly agree with the need to expand the police’s search powers, given the rise in shoplifting—that is not a term I particularly like, as it is really Section 1 theft, but I will refer to it as shoplifting for the purposes of this debate—and theft of personal property. Our only divergence is the extent to which we should extend these new powers.

The measures in the Bill are extremely necessary. We are facing an epidemic of petty theft, with phone theft and shoplifting reaching highs. One-third of adults were victims of phone theft last year, with the United Kingdom accounting for roughly 40% of all such thefts in Europe. These phones are then dismantled, deactivated and often sent abroad, with little chance of their owners getting them back.

Shoplifting gangs are terrorising high streets. Theft from shops reached over £2.2 billion last year, narrowing the margins of small independent stores and pushing up costs for the law-abiding public. Electronic stores are often targeted, with owners left helpless by the lack of power bestowed on security guards and the high costs of surveillance. The police must have the means to tackle this crime past their current capabilities. The fact that, once a criminal enters a premises, he can store the stolen goods until a search warrant is issued is not justice—it is an affront to the victim. It is not good enough to hope that officers arrive in time to arrest criminals in public for individuals to have a chance of retrieving their stolen goods. Officers must be able to enter premises without a warrant if the situation requires it.

That is why the Government’s measure is a welcome step. However, they have watered down the measures that we proposed in the Criminal Justice Bill in 2023. Where our measures would have allowed specified officers to search for stolen goods without a warrant if it is not practicable to obtain one, the Government have limited this to goods with obtainable electronic tracking data. The amendments in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie attempt to revert this measure back to its original intent so that it does not solely pertain to electronically tracked goods.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I give thanks to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will reiterate my opening speech by saying that I know we all have the same end goal of arresting criminals and preventing thefts. We may have different roads that we believe to be the best way of arriving at that goal, but I am confident that this debate has taken place in a productive and open-minded manner.

At the risk of repeating myself, phone theft and shoplifting, frequently targeted at electronic stores, are not just epidemics but growing ones. Crime is thriving, businesses are closing, and the public are becoming increasingly anxious. A phone is stolen every seven and a half minutes in our capital city. We cannot simply look on at the situation with the hope that it gets better.

The Government must resolve to adopt the framework from our 2023 Bill, and they must now go further. Amendments 383, 384 and 385 in my name would achieve this. They would remove the requirement that a stolen good be electronically traceable and would permit senior officers to use discretion to search premises without a warrant. These amendments answer a problem that requires immediate action. The Government must get a grip on the theft epidemic. Our measures provide them with one of many necessary solutions, and I hope the Minister takes them away for consideration.

Moving on to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I largely agree with his principle that the new clause that introduces new powers should be accompanied by checks and balances. Establishing a code of practice, having an independent mechanism for investigating complaints, providing mandatory training for senior officers and requiring an annual report on the use of the powers in question would act to safeguard the heightened powers officers will gain. This especially holds should the Government incorporate our amendments. We trust the judgment of our officers and believe that they will always make the judgment they think best, but I am conscious that we are entrusting them with more intrusive powers. Mechanisms must exist that counteract any tendencies for this power to be misused, and I believe that the noble Lord’s amendments would achieve that. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 383 withdrawn.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.

These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.

I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.

Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.

We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.

It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.

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[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I am absolutely astonished. Until 10 minutes ago, I had no idea that these provisions existed—that a constable without suspicion could seize a person’s devices, interrogate their data and hold on to them more or less indefinitely. Could somebody, perhaps a Minister, tell me in what circumstances suspicionless search like this is justified?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing forward the amendments in question. Amendments 390 and 391 have been well reasoned, and I am particularly happy to offer my support to the principle behind them. Objectivity should be the aim of every piece of legislation, and I welcome any measures towards that end. That is particularly the case when we are dealing with laws that provide the police with powers that can be used at the expense of people’s privacy. Clause 135 does this, allowing constables to extract online information from defendants’ devices should they need to determine whether the person has been involved in an act of terrorism.

I understand the Government’s intention behind this clause, and that it may have implications for national security. However, because of the importance, we should leave as little of its interpretation to human discretion as possible. We are all aware that, while we continue to support our forces, there are occasional instances of bad faith actors and, more generally, mistakes are a natural product of human enterprise. Allowing a constable’s belief to determine whether it is necessary to retain held information is an unnecessary risk that the Government do not need to take.

Similarly, we are not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 390. Individuals who are subjected to these new powers should not have the anxiety of an indefinite investigation hanging over their heads if the authorities do not have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. For that reason, introducing a limit on the amount of time that information can be held without reasonable suspicion is sensible. That said, I am unsure whether three months is long enough for police forces to determine whether retention is necessary. This is especially the case given the heightened stress that a decrease in officer numbers will put forces under. Despite this, I hope the Minister can agree that a limit is a sensible suggestion and update the Committee on the Government’s position.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.

This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.

If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.

There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.

Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.

Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.

I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, covering the safe, proportionate and fair oversight of abnormal loads, raise an important issue. It was one that I was not particularly aware of until looking into this group of amendments. Clearly, I had not appreciated that this area had been such a social media hit since Second Reading.

We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, about the heritage rail industry and its use of abnormal loads. I have received correspondence via Helen Morgan MP outlining the real challenges for those in the heavy transport sector working with specialist contractors who operate abnormal loads across the UK highways infrastructure. As this correspondence rightly points out, no infrastructure or major engineering project is possible without the heavy transport industry. A number of the amendments seek to address the inconsistencies in how police forces handle heavy transport, abnormal loads and mobile crane movements—issues that directly impact these businesses.

As I understand the situation, there is no national framework regulating when or how police forces charge for escorting or authorising these essential movements. This is leading to, as we have heard, arbitrary and excessive fees in some areas while others provide the service at no cost, creating uncertainty, delays and financial burdens that undermine operational efficiency and investment confidence. One example I have seen is a project to transfer a piling rig through the West Midlands, which we have heard a lot about today. It was delayed due to the unexpected police escort charges and the availability of those escort services.

These amendments, among other things, are looking for the Home Secretary to introduce clear regulations on police charging for escorts and the authorisations, ensuring that we have transparency, proportionality and national consistency. I understand that these amendments have strong industry backing from organisations, including the HTA, the Construction Plant-hire Association and the Road Haulage Association, among others.

I completely understand the thinking behind some of the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on the charging for special police services for abnormal loads. I also agree that there is a concern about different charging regimes and practices. I understand that this may have already been partly addressed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council guidance and a legal framework, but I would like assurance from the Minister that this is the case.

I am sure the Government will not want to change the road vehicles order 2003 without a full consultation and impact assessment, given that this is about the safe movement of abnormal loads on our highways infrastructure. However, there is clearly a need for a consistent national approach across all police forces. Given that many of these abnormal loads are supporting infrastructure and the growth agenda, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his long-standing commitment to this very important issue. I would venture to say that there is not another noble Lord in the Committee who cares as deeply as my noble friend does about the topic of abnormal loads.

Amendment 403 seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order to negotiate the chosen route for the load. Amendment 404 seeks to repeal the power of the police to grant certain police powers to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems that the original intention of Schedule 5 to the Police Reform Act 2002 was that the police have the powers to direct traffic and permit regulations to be broken where necessary. However, few accreditations have made it, as it would effectively allow a self-escorter not to comply with the rules of the road.

Amendment 403 and 404, taken together, would repeal this problem and offer a more flexible solution. Instead of accreditation, Amendment 403 enables the chief constable to grant a traffic regulation dispensation order to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems common sense to provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility needed to decide which regulations should be dispensed with. Moreover, the chief constable would have the authority to outline any conditions they consider necessary, such as the number of escort vehicles to be allowed. These amendments are well thought out, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions. This amendment has industry support. A regulatory framework will ensure that the fees charged by police forces are consistent among forces across the country. I know that my noble friend has spent much time engaging with industry stakeholders, so I hope the Minister takes his remarks and amendments seriously. I look forward to the Government’s response.

On Amendment 414, I declare myself as an owner of a shotgun. I associate myself completely with the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. I will leave it there.

I support the principle behind my noble friend’s Amendments 416D and 416M. They are, in essence, clarifying amendments that ensure that the scope of the original measure in question is not used for the abuse of police services for personal gain. The provision of special services is a helpful law that chief officers should be able to draw on with discretion, but the compensation for the use of those services should not come at the expense of the police force’s integrity.

Compensation should ideally be monetary, with, if necessary, the short-term loan of items for specific use, as my noble friend’s amendment lays out, but it should not be equipment for personal use. Similarly, as my noble friend said, it should not be the officers making the decision on the use of special police services who gain financially from overtime payments; it should be those actually working overtime. My noble friend has laid out cases where both these incidents have happened and, once again, we hear of malpractice in the West Midlands Police.

My noble friend is infinitely wiser in his knowledge on this subject than I am, so I will defer to him, but I hope the Minister can address his undoubtedly well-informed points in depth, especially given the questions certain police forces currently face. I once again thank my noble friend for bringing these amendments forward, and I look forward to hearing both his and the Minister’s closing remarks.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and his engagement with me and officials from the Home Office and the Department for Transport on abnormal loads. He brings huge—abnormally large, perhaps I should say—expertise to your Lordships’ House on these matters, and certainly expertise that is unique for this House. I thank him for raising his concerns.

It is good to hear from my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester on this, bringing his experience, particularly as it pertains to the operation of heritage railways. Committee on a Bill is not complete, as far as I am concerned, if I have not talked to my noble friend Lord Faulkner about heritage railways. I have done so a few times—at least on the Employment Rights Act, I remember. Obviously, I note with added respect the new status of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, as a social media influencer, so we should freight his words with even greater import.

On the broader issues raised by these amendments, I am aware that the noble Earl has previously written to the DfT with a report that highlighted specific concerns about the interactions between the West Midlands Police and the heavy haulage industry. He made comments about the chief constable, which are obviously relevant and topical. I think we know what he is talking about, and I will just leave it there; it does not really pertain to the issues in these amendments. That report was appreciated, but it will come as no surprise to the noble Earl—although it may sadden him—that I remind noble Lords that the police are operationally independent from government. Therefore, individual police forces are responsible for making decisions on vehicle escorts based on an assessment of risks to infrastructure and the safety of all road users.

As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, acknowledged, the majority of police forces are making those decisions using their operational independence in a way that he is very satisfied with. The final decision in each case is for the relevant chief officer in discussion with interested local parties. That is set out in public guidance produced by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, National Highways and the College of Policing. However, I fully recognise the importance of constructive dialogue on these operational matters. In that spirit, the policing Minister and I are pleased to have arranged a further meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, which I believe is going to happen next week, as he said, along with the national policing lead for abnormal loads, so that these concerns can be discussed in more detail. This would provide an opportunity to ensure that the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council is being applied consistently and that any unintended consequences for the heavy haulage industry are perfectly understood.

As a further general observation on these amendments, I reassure the noble Earl that the Government keep the special types general order 2003 under regular review to ensure that it remains fit for purpose and reflects operational needs and legal requirements. Where improvements are necessary, these can be made via an amending order, using existing powers under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. This approach ensures that any changes are subject to the established processes for regulatory scrutiny, including impact assessments and public consultation. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, sought in her remarks.

In addition, I acknowledge the representations made by the Heavy Transport Association on this matter in support of the noble Earl’s amendments. The Government recognise the importance of the abnormal load and heavy haulage industry to the UK economy and its critical role in delivering major infrastructure projects across the country, be they in transport, civil engineering or housebuilding. We as a Government are committed to growth, and this is an important part of delivering that commitment. In recognition of this, the Government have supported the efforts made by the NPCC to standardise policing practices for abnormal loads. We strongly encourage police forces across the country to make full use of the new guidance on abnormal loads that was published by the NPCC in May 2025, to ensure that abnormal load hauliers receive a consistent service from the police, no matter where they are operating from. Given this ongoing work to support the industry by the NPCC, I contend that we should allow sufficient time for the new guidance to bed in before considering whether changes to the 2003 order are needed. The guidance is due to be reviewed in May 2027.

As to the specifics of these amendments, as the noble Earl explained, Amendment 403 seeks to confer on the police a power to make traffic regulation dispensation orders. This would allow abnormal load drivers to break normal traffic rules to negotiate their chosen route. While I understand the intention behind this proposal, the Government are not persuaded that it is necessary. Traffic authorities already have the power to make traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and these can provide for precisely the situations described. The Government’s view is that traffic management should remain the responsibility of traffic authorities, which are best placed to consider the wider implications for road safety and network efficiency. Giving this power to the police would blur responsibilities and could lead to inconsistent decision-making.

The Government are also unpersuaded of the case for repealing the provision in the Police Reform Act 2002 that allows the police to accredit certain persons with limited powers to control traffic for the purpose of escorting abnormal loads. Removing this power would mean that only police officers could direct traffic during these movements. The noble Earl has suggested that few accreditations have been made by chief officers utilising these powers. That may be the case, but where such designations have been made, it is inevitably the case that the repeal of these provisions would shift the burden back on to warranted police officers, reduce flexibility in managing abnormal load movements, and lead to delays and higher costs for the haulage industry. These movements often support major infrastructure projects and time-sensitive logistics, so any additional delays could have serious economic consequences. The current system strikes a sensible balance by allowing accredited persons to assist under police oversight, ensuring safety while avoiding unnecessary demands on police time.

I turn to the amendments relating to charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads. Amendments 413 and 502 seek to require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework for fees charged by police forces, while Amendment 416D details how payments should be made and received, and Amendment 416M seeks to prevent individuals who could be financially impacted by a decision concerning escorting an abnormal load from being involved in that decision. While I recognise that the aim of these amendments is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe such a statutory framework is necessary.

Further, a national framework for charging for escorting these loads also already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the costs of policing that has been requested by an individual or organisation. Fee levels are set out in NPCC guidance on special police services and updated annually. Introducing a standardised regulatory framework as envisaged in Amendment 413 would also risk undermining the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country, influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic conditions and the availability of police resources.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

411: After Clause 144, insert the following new Clause—
“Stop and searchIn section 60(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of, or after, violence)— (a) in paragraph (a) omit “serious”, and(b) in paragraph (aa)(i) omit “serious”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would lower the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence”.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 411 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. The amendment was championed by my honourable friend Matt Vickers in Committee in the other place.

The amendment alters the statutory threshold for the exercise of the powers under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. That section permits a police officer of at least the rank of inspector to authorise stop and search powers within a defined locality for a period of 24 hours. Where such an authorisation has been given, a police officer may stop any member of the public to search them for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments without suspicion of the commission of an offence—so, essentially, it allows for a temporary adjustment to standard stop and search powers.

The current test that must be met is for the officer of sufficient rank to reasonably believe that incidents involving serious violence may take place in any locality in his police area. Our amendment would lower the threshold so that the police would be able to use Section 60 powers where there is a reasonable likelihood of violence, not serious violence. The fundamental principle behind this amendment is that the police should be able to act where there is a threat of violence—any form of violence—without being required to weigh the seriousness of that violence. This would remove the more subjective element of the test.

We know that stop and search powers are highly effective in combating crime and preventing violent offences. In the year ending March 2025, there were a total of 528,582 stops and searches conducted by officers in England and Wales. This represented a slight decrease of 1.4% from the previous year. Of those, 5,572 were conducted under Section 60 powers, which actually represented an increase of 5.4%. This is welcome; I am pleased to see the police making good use of their powers. But, given that there were 1.1 million incidents of violence with or without injury recorded by the police in the year ending June 2025, that the figure that the ONS has given shows no statistically significant change compared with the previous year, and that there were still 51,527 knife offences, there is more work that needs to be done. Lowering the threshold for the use of Section 60 is another tool that the Government could utilise in their efforts to crack down on the use of offensive weapons and the incidence of violence. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend on the Front Bench. At this juncture, I also thank the Committee for its forbearance when I was not able to move my previous amendment on mobile phone theft. I put on record my warmest thanks to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for moving it so eloquently on that occasion.

This is an issue about the difference between “serious violence” and “violence”, but the wider context is the fact that the UK has a knife crime problem. In London, the number of incidents up to June 2025 was 15,639, which was an increase of nearly 72% from the data recorded in 2015-16. Unfortunately, it has to be said that the number of stop and search encounters peaked at the end of the last Labour Government and dramatically decreased under the two previous Governments. Between 2003 and 2011, stop and search numbers increased, peaking at 1.2 million, but by 2018 this had fallen by 77%. The number of arrests resulting from stop and search encounters had fallen from 120,000 to 48,000.

The fact is that there is significant evidence that stop and search does demonstrably have an impact on the incidence of knife crime, and therefore reduces crime. In a study released in 2025, the two criminologists Alexis Piquero and Lawrence Sherman analysed data between 2008 and 2023, and found that stop and search encounters were successful in reducing deaths and injuries related to weapons. The conclusion of the study was that

“increased stop and search encounters can significantly reduce knife-related injuries and homicides in public places”.

Evidence from a number of bodies and think tanks, including Policy Exchange, suggests that, while there may be a range of causal factors, a link between rates of knife crime and rates of stop and search exists. As the rate of stop and search decreases, the amount of knife crime increases. As stop and search rises, the amount of knife crime falls. The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, Sir Stephen Watson, said last year:

“If you don’t back your officers to do stop and search, they will stop doing stop and search. And if you stop doing stop and search, you’ll see street robberies going up”.


The issue is the difference between “serious violence” and “violence” within that context. My simple point to the Committee is that, if we want to take weapons off the street and prevent incidents of knife crime and other crime, we have to increase stop and search. Therefore, you have to give warranted officers the legal underpinning and the authority to make the appropriate decisions for stop and search. In 2023, there were 5,014 occasions when a police officer found a weapon or firearm when looking for a different prohibited item. In 3,221 of those cases, they were looking for drugs. This is a case of effective policing and not just getting lucky. So, if they could stop for “violence”, they might find weapons that could have led to a more serious situation. If not, there is a potential for people to just walk away.

On that basis, it is wise for the Government to consider this amendment, because it allows flexibility in operational policing. Fundamentally, it will prevent crime and may even in the long run prevent serious injury or death. Therefore, I invite Ministers and the Committee to give this amendment their strong support.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, there is now considerable evidence about how stop and search powers are used in practice, their impact and long-term consequences, not least in building trust, which is so vital for effective community policing. Stop and search powers, especially under Section 60—suspicionless powers —already fall disproportionately on marginalised communities, particularly black and minority ethnic young men. Lowering the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” can only increase the frequency and breadth of those powers and with it the disproportionality. This is not an abstract civil liberties concern but goes directly to trust and confidence.

It is also just 18 months since the Home Office accepted the findings of a police inspectorate report that identified serious shortcomings in the use of Section 60 powers, including low arrest and seizure rates for weapons, inadequate training and failures to adhere to statutory duties, such as PACE Code A or voluntary frameworks such as College of Policing APP guidance.

From a Liberal Democrat perspective, the test for expanding intrusive powers is a simple one. Is there a clear and compelling operational case, supported by evidence, that the existing powers are inadequate and that widening them will improve outcomes without unacceptable collateral damage to rights and community relations? We do not believe that the case has been made here. What is on offer is a lower legal bar for the most intrusive stop and search powers we have, imposed on communities that already experience it acutely, with no serious account taken of the long-term impact on policing by consent. On that basis, we cannot support the amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting short debate, and I thank my noble friends—

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I did indicate that minor scuffles would not be seen as serious violence. I am not trying to determine from this Dispatch Box the use of a Section 60 power by a police officer on the ground because of the level of violence the police have witnessed and wish to act upon. If we look at the figure 16 years ago, it was significantly higher than in the 12 months prior to now, at just over 5,000. The law has not changed but, going back to the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, police practice and police assessments have meant that they do not need to use that power. In parallel with that, the Government believe that if we wish to make an impact on knife crime, stop and search is a tool in extremis but better education, youth futures programmes and policing hot spots are more effective ways of reducing the problem overall. With that, I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has become an even more interesting debate, and I thank noble Lords for their contributions, particularly my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lord Blencathra.

I say to the Minister and to noble Lords that this amendment is intended to help the Government. Regardless of our politics, everyone would like to see a reduction in violent offences, and increasing police use of stop and search is an incredibly powerful tool to do just that. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Sentamu, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that there is nothing wrong with stop and search. Stop and search is one of the most useful tools in the box. Having spent 32 years on front-line policing in London, I know that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, it is an issue of training and adherence to the codes of practice. There is no question about that in my mind. That is what police need to be concentrating on when it comes to the issues around stop and search.

Lowering the threshold to the likelihood of violence would enable officers to intervene earlier to prevent harm, protect the public and de-escalate potentially dangerous situations before they result in injury or worse, and before becoming serious violence cases. I know full well that officers often face rapidly evolving situations in which it is difficult to draw a clear line between violence and serious violence. I hope that the Government take this away and reflect, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 411 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

415: After Clause 144, insert the following new Clause—
“Prohibition on police use of digital ID(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.(2) After section 6 insert—“6A Police not to require digital identity document(1) If, at any time, His Majesty’s Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, a constable may not—(a) require a person to produce a digital identity card on request,(b) ask a person to produce a digital identity document for inspection, or(c) use any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence.(2) In this section a “digital identity document” means a document which—(a) is issued to an individual by a relevant authority,(b) is available only digitally, and(c) contains or records information which could be used to identify the person.”.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it has become a cliché to say that a week is a long time in politics, but it is an idiom that forever rings true. We began a couple of weeks ago with the Government still firmly wed to the idea that digital ID cards were going to save us all, and we ended the week with the policy relegated to a footnote in future history books. As with everything the Government touch these days, the digital ID policy had become completely toxic and incredibly unpopular, forcing them into the U-turn. It is a U-turn I am supportive of, and I am pleased that the Government have finally seen sense and ditched this policy.

I suppose I should be grateful to the Minister for somewhat negating the need for this amendment. It is quite easy being in opposition when the Government do your job for you.

The amendment is intended as a safeguard to prevent the police being able to require a person to show them a digital identity card when—or should I say if—such a scheme is ever introduced. Fundamentally, this whole debate comes down to who we are as a nation. Britain has never been a country where, in peacetime, one must have an identity card simply because the state mandates it.

I heard much Newspeak about the policy from Government Ministers soon after the announcement. Following the immediate backlash, many started claiming that it was not going to be mandatory after all, and that it was simply mandatory if you wanted to work. The Prime Minister said at the announcement of the policy:

“Let me spell that out: you will not be able to work in the United Kingdom if you do not have digital ID. It’s as simple as that”.


But requiring everyone who wants a job to have digital ID does make it mandatory—we all need to go to work to earn a living. We heard the justification change more times than we could count. First, it was needed to stop illegal migration and illegal working. That argument was soon blown out of the water by the fact that employers are already required to undertake right-to-work checks, and those who violate the law already were never going to suddenly start conducting such checks simply because of the existence of digital ID. Then we heard that it was necessary for efficiency and joined-up services. I can only wonder what the next justification would have been.

That is why I tabled this amendment. It was always a probing amendment, but we must make these arguments to stand up for the principle. The Government might have U-turned on this now, but what is to say that we do not see this pernicious policy creep back towards becoming mandatory in the future? In such a scenario, having such a legislative guardrail against potential police use of digital ID would make sense.

Fundamentally, the principle is that Britain is not a country where police officers require the presentation of mandatory ID cards. A person should be able, if they so wish, to go about their lives with as minimal interference by the state as possible. Digital ID cards were a wrong-headed and poorly thought-through policy, costing large sums of money that we do not have and coming at the expense of fundamental British values. I am glad to see the back of the mandatory element, but we must guard against any future expansions of this scheme. I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am, of course, also delighted that this amendment is now unnecessary and irrelevant, but it fits into some broader concerns that have been expressed in Committee, such as the planned nationwide rollout of police-operated live facial recognition cameras and a whole range of technology used to introduce a surveillance state. The use of digital ID would have not only created that very unpleasant checking of one’s papers by the police but introduced an element of technology which, without being anti-technology, could be seen as problematic.

I noted and would like the Minister’s response to an interview that the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, did with Sir Tony Blair last week, in which she talked about AI and technology having a transformative impact on

“the whole of the law and order space”,

which would therefore mean that digital ID was not totally off the table. The Home Secretary said

“my ultimate vision for that part of the criminal justice system was to achieve, by means of AI and technology, what Jeremy Bentham tried to do with his Panopticon. That is that the eyes of the state can be on you at all times”—

a rather chilling declaration, I must say. At this stage, as we are not going to have to discuss digital ID, that broad use of technology and surveillance might be something that the Minister could reassure us on specifically. It is good to see the back of digital ID, but I am not keen on the eyes of the state being on us at all times as a justification for tackling crime and disorder.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am going to try to stay roughly on the topic of the amendment, rather than turn this into a wider debate on the introduction of digital ID, because I am not entirely sure that my briefing will cover all the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, has addressed.

To be absolutely clear, we are not stepping back from the idea of introducing a digital ID. On 15 January, there was an Urgent Question on the issue in the other place that was repeated here. We have been very clear that we are introducing a digital ID programme. There are two core objectives: first, to make accessing public services easier and to make the state work better for ordinary people, and, secondly, to aid with right-to-work checks and catching those who are working illegally. To be clear, that is still happening. As I say, there is a public consultation coming that will set out the scope of the scheme, and those who wish to respond will be able to respond in those terms.

To respond directly to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, around the use of ID by policing and enforcement agencies, there are already safeguards in place to ensure that the use of any such measures is balanced against the need to protect individual privacy rights. That will be the same for digital ID as it is for existing police access to information contained within the passport and immigration databases, for example, which is done in specific circumstances where that is lawful, necessary and proportionate. An example of a legal safeguard already in place is contained in the UK Borders Act 2007, which makes it clear that holders of e-visas cannot be required to carry them at all times.

I think I have already touched on the issue of stop and search, but I cannot quite remember because of the flow of the interventions. To be clear, the digital ID will not be used as part of stop and search, and police officers will never demand to see it as part of stop and search. However, consistent with current powers where immigration enforcement are carrying out an enforcement visit or warrant, they have powers to ensure that all those who are employed have the right to work in the UK. These powers include the ability to demand ID, take biometrics, and detain, search and seize property to assist their investigation. I hope that provides some clarity on that point.

Given the considerations that I have set out, particularly the fact that the introduction of the digital ID scheme will require its own legislation in future, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have contributed to this short debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley.

At the time when this amendment was tabled, the Government were pressing ahead with plans that would have fundamentally altered the relationship between the citizen and the state. The prospect of compulsory digital ID, coupled with the possibility of routine police access to digital identity data, raised serious concerns about privacy and subsequent state overreach. It was precisely because of those concerns and the lack of apparent or clear safeguards that the amendment was necessary. Indeed, I am still not clear from what the Minister said in his response as to whether it will be introduced in future or whether it will be compulsory.

Since then, as we have heard, the Government have performed a U-turn, announcing that digital ID will no longer be mandatory. The amendment before us was therefore not speculative or hypothetical; it was a direct response to a live and deeply unpopular government policy. We can only hope that this sudden enthusiasm for reversing course is not confined to digital ID alone. While the U-turn means that the immediate threat that prompted it has receded, the wider issue remains unresolved. The Government’s approach to digital identity remains unclear and may change again before Report. For the time being, I will withdraw the amendment, but it is something that we will continue to consider. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 415 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, said, this is Groundhog Day, and I fear we are rehearsing many of the points raised on earlier groups. We on these Benches do not support Amendment 416 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. As we have heard, there are many reasons why someone might choose to wear a face covering while cycling or scooting, ranging from the practical to the health related. As we have heard, if it is cold weather, of course you are going to wear a scarf or a face covering to keep yourself warm and prevent wind burn. Quite frankly, in the recent cold weather, that might even prevent you getting frostbite while you are cycling along.

In urban areas, there are specific masks that people wear to tackle the pollution that we still have in many of our cities, to deal with and filter out pollutants, dust and exhaust fumes. How is that wrong? Why would we want to prevent people doing that? Likewise, if we have extreme heat, people sometimes wear masks because they want to block out pollen and other allergens, and also to protect themselves from UV rays. While in this Chamber we have heard often, in my experience so far, quite negative debate about cyclists, there are many cyclists here, and they will know that covering your face prevents bugs, dirt and small debris hitting their mouth or nose while they are riding. I am an occasional cyclist, and I wear sunglasses and wrap up warm when I am out cycling to protect myself from the glare and debris. It is practical. How would we make that a problem? Why is it a cause for concern? It is practical clothing for people who choose to cycle or scoot. Why are we treating those people as criminals?

There is a separate need for management of micromobility, which has come out in all these discussions. It would be good to hear from the Minister when we might expect some legislation around managing micromobility, the explosion of e-bikes and e-scooters on our streets, and the extension of trial after trial by the previous Government. But this amendment treats all cyclists and those riding scooters as criminals, rather than as individuals dressing for their mode of transport. I hope that the Government will agree with me and these Benches that it is disproportionate and not needed in the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling Amendment 416, which I entirely support. I also thank noble Lords who have contributed, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution.

The amendment, as my noble friend ably set out, would give constables the power to stop individuals cycling while wearing a face covering. Failing to do so would constitute an offence liable to a month’s imprisonment or a fine of up to £1,000. While I know that opposition to this amendment has claimed that this means police powers encroaching into an entirely innocuous activity, it is unfortunately now a necessary measure. What previously would have been a harmless and inoffensive act has been perverted by criminals into a means by which to commit crime and escape justice. We are facing a theft epidemic in this country, largely concentrated in our cities, where youths, often in gangs, shoplift and snatch phones.

Our capital city is now the phone theft capital of Europe, where a phone is snatched every seven and a half minutes. The United Kingdom accounts for almost 40% of all phone thefts on the continent. I task any Member of the Committee to watch footage of these phone thefts and deny that there is a problem with face coverings and bikes. Face coverings mean that they are not detected by CCTV, while electric bikes, often modified, mean that the victim has no chance of chasing and retrieving the stolen property. The same is true for shoplifting. CCTV footage consistently shows offenders using face coverings to evade detection, then using bikes and scooters to flee the scene. The cost to retailers of this shoplifting inevitably is passed on to consumers, and last year amounted to £2 billion.

The police must have the power to stop these criminals, and this amendment provides the grounds for it. It is often impossible to see where a thief has a stolen item on their possession, so we must look for other pointers as to who is committing these crimes. Allowing the police to intervene when they are in public on a bike or scooter is the next necessary step. It would dramatically increase the chances of victims being returned their stolen property and allow the police to begin to tackle the epidemic that we find ourselves in.

I once again thank my noble friend for her amendment, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendment 416. I recognise the concerns that she set out, and those set out very clearly by the many noble Lords who contributed to the debate, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, about the use of bicycles and scooters in facilitating crime and anti-social behaviour.

The Government have committed to the winter of action initiative, which is running from 1 December 2025 to the end of January. This initiative is intended to focus on making town centres across England and Wales safer by building on the safer streets summer initiative and continuing efforts to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour, while addressing retail crime and night-time economy offences, particularly during the darker evenings that we have in winter, when there are higher risks to public safety.

I say directly to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that we are setting a framework. We always say, and I think all sides of the Committee agree, that it is for good reasons of operational independence that the police decide their priorities and how they deploy their resources, which will always be scarce however much we want to give them—there will never be enough. These initiatives give us confidence that the police are treating these sorts of offences as a priority and understand the concerns not only of this Committee but across wider society about the sorts of offences that the noble Viscount and other noble Lords set out.

The police do have powers to act here, and we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about police powers to stop any vehicles, which is a good point. However, the powers to which I am going to refer are different, and this goes to the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 requires individuals to remove face coverings in designated areas where they are being used for the purposes of concealing their identity and gives police the power to seize the face covering. Areas can be designated when an officer of the rank of at least inspector reasonably believes that crime is likely to take place there. We encourage police forces to make full use of these powers in areas they know to be crime hotspots. This includes any road users or cyclists, including those working for food delivery companies, as my noble friend Lord Shamash set out, when the police have due course, and irrespective of the type of vehicle being used, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, went to some lengths to describe.

In addition, local authorities have powers to make public spaces protection orders, which can prohibit specified acts in designated areas. I understand that a number of local authorities already have in place PSPOs that ban the wearing of face coverings in the area covered by the order, to deal with exactly this kind of anti-social behaviour by Balaclava-wearing cyclists.

This is probably as good a point as any to mention that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, mentioned live facial recognition. I am not sure that either was in their place for the debate we had in Committee last Thursday, but I reiterate that there is a live consultation on live facial recognition, so I once again encourage noble Lords, if interested, to contribute to that and set out their views on live facial recognition.

There are of course legitimate reasons why cyclists may wear a face covering, as we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, including health reasons or just to keep out the cold. That is often, but not always, seasonal. Notwithstanding the Stakhanovite efforts made, at least in London by the mayor, to tackle air quality through ULEZ and other measures, it is sometimes about protecting cyclists from inhaling particulates and the like. It would be disproportionate to introduce a blanket prohibition of the kind envisaged by Amendment 416 or, for that matter, to extend the Section 60AA powers, to which I have already referred, to situations where there are no grounds to reasonably believe that criminal activity may take place in a particular location. Given these considerations, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

We are saying here that the requirement to remove this would be accompanied by some sort of reasonable suspicion that that person had been committing a crime, so it is not just a person who has a cough or a cold.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the amendment rightly exposes a serious weakness in our current system. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, points out, HMICFRS can diagnose deep-seated problems within police forces but it does not have the power to make sure these problems are fixed. There are simply too few national levers to deal with police underperformance. Labour’s manifesto included a clear commitment to give HMICFRS new powers to intervene in failing forces, and Ministers have signalled that they want to legislate to do this. We welcome that, but the Bill contains no such clause. I appreciate that a White Paper might be imminent. Even so, I urge the Government not to miss this golden opportunity to legislate now for clear, time-bound duties and proper escalation mechanisms, so that police forces are required to act on inspectorate findings.

Amendment 416A seeks to take the Government further by building this question into a wider statutory review of policing oversight. We support that intention, but we part company with the noble Baroness on the mechanism she proposes. Setting up yet another independent commission, with the terms of reference to be devised by the Secretary of State, approved by the Commons and then followed by nine months of deliberation, risks delaying change for at least another year. The evidence base is already substantial. What is missing is not diagnosis but the authority to enforce it. The noble Baroness is quite right that enforcement is a wider problem, one that extends beyond HMICFRS to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where lessons are not always learned, to put it mildly. I agree with the spirit of co-ordination, but we must remember that the IOPC’s role is distinct—to oversee complaints and investigate the most serious misconduct. It is not, and should not become, a general performance regulator for police forces. That role properly lies with HMICFRS and, ultimately, with Ministers.

From these Benches, our preference is clear: do not commission another review and, instead, move directly and decisively to give the inspectorate the power it so clearly needs. For too long, we have had excellent reports, full of well-reasoned recommendations, almost all accepted by the police and the Government, but nothing happens. That inaction is rarely followed up. Measures that ensure that we no longer see the same failures repeated again and again would be very welcome.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for bringing forward Amendment 416A. While I recognise the intention to ensure that policing is subject to effective scrutiny and that regulatory bodies have the tools they need to drive improvement, I do not believe this amendment is necessary, nor do I think it would represent a proportionate or effective use of time and resources. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services already plays a well-established role in ensuring accountability. It has extensive powers to inspect, report and make recommendations, and these reports are published and robust. They are laid before Parliament and used by the Home Office and policing bodies to drive reform. Where forces fall short, the existing framework already enables escalation, follow-up inspections and external pressure.

I was also worried that this amendment risks duplicating work already being carried out within existing structures. The policing oversight landscape includes His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, police and crime commissioners and parliamentary scrutiny through Select Committees. Co-ordination between these bodies is important, and I suggest it would be more constructive to ensure the better use of these mechanisms rather than create a new independent commission.

It is also worth noting the practical burden imposed by this amendment. It would require the Government to establish a commission, set detailed terms of reference, run a comparative review across multiple regulators, and timetable parliamentary debates in both Houses within a very tight timeframe. That is a significant undertaking that may not be justified, given the absence of clear evidence that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services lacks the necessary authority to fulfil its core function. For those reasons, while I very much respect the motivation behind the amendment, I do not believe it necessary or proportionate and therefore cannot support it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for Amendment 416A. It gives me an opportunity, if nothing else, to pay tribute to His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services for the work it does; she was right to point out its professionalism. Moreover, I want to pay tribute to the current chief inspector, Sir Andy Cooke, who has announced his intention to retire in March. He has served as chief inspector with distinction, has 40 years of service to policing and was Chief Constable of Merseyside. I hope that your Lordships’ House will join me in thanking Sir Andy for his dedicated service.

The Police Act 1996 requires His Majesty’s inspectorate to publish an inspection programme and an inspection framework which, following consultation, are laid before Parliament. The latest versions of these were put before the House on 4 March 2025. As part of its work, HMICFRS inspects every police force as part of its Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy programme, and gives the force a grading on a series of indicators. All these findings are published and are available to chief constables, local policing bodies, the PCC, the public and, importantly, Ministers. HMICFRS also publishes a number of thematic reports covering every aspect of policing, and these form a useful tool for the policing sector to drive performance.

I agree with the noble Baroness that it is important that recommendations made by HMICFRS do not just sit on the shelf, are taken seriously and are implemented, and that those affected make sure that the public are receiving the best possible service as a whole. It is important that the three points she mentioned are examined: inspection findings, closer co-operation, and lessons learned. She quoted to the Committee the manifesto, in which we did say we would give HMICFRS new powers to intervene with failing forces. She is right to point to the fact that there is a police White Paper, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, also mentioned, which is expected to be published shortly. By shortly—I know this is always a topic of interest to the Committee— I do mean shortly in this case. I encourage your Lordships to study that document carefully when it is published, because it contains a wide-ranging set of proposals for improving policing in England and Wales. I hope it will go some way toward shining a light, at least, on the three questions the noble Baroness has put to the Committee today.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this very important amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Young. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs.

The status quo is untenable. It undermines free speech, diverts police resources from real crime and risks criminalising people for behaviour that is lawful and should remain outside the criminal justice system. We on these Benches firmly support the abolition of non-crime hate incidents. Non-crime hate incidents in essence are reports of conduct perceived by someone to be motivated by hostility or prejudice against a protected characteristic which do not meet the threshold of a criminal offence. Under current law, police forces record and retain personal data about those incidents, even though no crime has occurred and no legal breach has been established. That alone is problematic but, in practice, the effects are far worse. Current figures estimate that around 13,000 non-crime hate incidents are logged annually, consuming an estimated 60,000-plus hours of police time that could be better directed to tackling burglary, serious violence, organised crime and other priority areas.

Recording an incident and retaining personal data about motives that are merely perceived rather than proven also has a detrimental and unwelcome effect on free speech. People who express lawful opinions, engage in robust debate or even make clumsy social media posts can find themselves on a police database, not because they have committed a crime but because someone has taken offence to those remarks.

This is not a hypothetical shortcoming of policy: there have been cases where almost trivial or schoolyard remarks became the subject of police records. In one high-profile instance, the arrest of a public figure over a social media post was initially associated with a non-crime hate incident, sparking national debate about policing speech and proportionality. It is no surprise, then, that police leaders and independent watchdogs are reassessing the value of non-crime hate incidents. The Chief Inspector of Constabulary has publicly stated that non-crime hate incidents should not be recorded by police because they risk conflating the offensive with the criminal, diminishing public trust and harming legitimate free expression.

Similarly, the Metropolitan Police recently announced that it will no longer investigate non-crime hate incidents, recognising the difficulty that officers face when drawn into matters that are not criminal by definition. The Government’s response to date has been to commission yet another review, with the suggestion that policy decisions should wait until later in the year. But on an issue that so directly impacts both civil liberties and police effectiveness, delay is not a defensible option.

Amendment 416E would go further than reviews. It would abolish the concept of non-crime hate incidents entirely, prohibit any police authority from recording or processing related personal data and require the deletion of existing records. In doing so, it draws a clear distinction between criminal behaviour, which it is right that the police investigate, and lawful expression or debate that should not be subject to police recording or sanction.

We cannot allow a system that treats controversial yet lawful speech as if it were a matter for the criminal justice system. This amendment is a sensible and necessary step to realign policing with its once core mission of protecting people from crime and harm, not policing speech or perceptions. Therefore, we on these Benches very much support this amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for tabling this amendment. This has been a useful debate, and I hope that we can at least look at the common direction of travel on this matter: the need for reform.

I have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, through the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I have also heard from the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Kempsell, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Herbert of South Downs, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler- Sloss. They have raised a range of issues that, in essence, point to the need for change in this system.

I think it is fair to say, and I hope that the Committee will accept, that the current Government have held office since July 2024. There has been a lot of discussion on the issues caused by, and effect of, non-crime hate incidents since the guidance was published in 2014. I do not want to lose the principle, which was mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Herbert of South Downs, that the non-crime hate incident regime had its genesis in the Macpherson report, and in trying to anticipate and examine where crimes were being committed, potentially in the future, and monitor a range of abuses that were present.

However, I say to the Committee—and I think this was recognised by Members in their contributions today —that how the police should respond to hate incidents that fall below the criminal threshold is a complex and sensitive issue. That is precisely why the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Normanton, and the current Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Shabana Mahmood, the Member for Ladywood, have asked the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to conduct a thorough review into non-crime hate incidents.

The review is examining whether the current approach is proportionate, consistent and compatible with the fundamental right to free expression—which goes to very point that was made. As the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said, the review is being led by policing experts and is expected to conclude, in his words, “shortly”. The publication date is one for the College of Policing. We have had the interim report, which has said that there are significant concerns in the way non-crime hate incidents are operating.

Given the points that have been made today, and given that the Government have commissioned a review, seen the interim report and, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, expect to receive the final report shortly, I would again ask the Committee to bear with us—I know that I have asked for this on a number of occasions—to examine what professional police officers and the College of Policing are recommending on non-crime hate incidents.

The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, rightly asked some significant questions. What is happening to database logging of anti-social behaviour incidents? What is happening to people who have previously had non-crime hate incidents put against their name? What is happening with regard to non-disclosure? What is happening in terms of the publication of the report and the Government’s response? Those are all fair and legitimate questions.

However, I say to the noble Lord and the Committee that the current Government have come in, recognised that there is an issue, commissioned the College of Policing to look at that issue and have received an independent report, and we expect a full report on how we can deal with those issues and tweak the regime so that we do not lose the very good things that have sometimes been brought out of non-crime hate incidents and we do not throw everything out immediately. I do not know what the final report is going to say.

At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, said:

“The review has found that the current approach and use of non-crime hate incidents is not fit for purpose, and there is a need for broad reform to ensure that policing can focus on genuine harm and risk within communities. The recording of hurt feelings and differing views should not continue”.—[Official Report, 16/10/25; col. 406.]


That is a very clear statement. However, in moving from that in the interim report to whatever the new regime might be, it is incumbent on the Government to reflect on what the final report says. I am not ducking the amendment that the noble Lord has brought forward, nor his challenge that we need to make some changes. As he says, there is an open door. If we did not want this to be reviewed, we would not have asked the College of Policing and the Police Chiefs’ Council to review the incidence of non-crime hate incidents. Self-evidently, some of the examples given today are not what the original purpose of that legislation and approach was meant to be.

Going back to the Macpherson report, there was a serious element as to how assessments have been made. In Committee today, Members have talked about anti- semitism, racism and a range of incidents where the collection of information might give a bigger intelligence picture that requires a policing response, but which may or may not be a policing response that requires individuals to have their names put against them.

The concerns of everybody, from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, through to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, are legitimate, and the Government want to look at and address them. I hope that this can be examined. However, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment and await the outcome of the police review, so that any reforms are grounded in both robust evidence and a consensus.

Ultimately, the Government must and will take some decisions, and we will be held to account in the House of Commons and in this House as well. In the absence of that detailed response, I am not sure that I can come to this Committee and say, “This is what we will do”, because we need to examine that in detail.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches there is strong support for Amendments 435 and 438A, which would finally shine a light on one of the most sensitive and least discussed aspects of police welfare: suicide and attempted suicide among officers and staff. This is not about apportioning blame; it is about creating conditions in which people can seek help early and leaders cannot look away. Nearly two years ago I sought this very information and was assured that work was happening to collate it. Yet no figures have emerged, leaving families, colleagues and policymakers in the dark, still awaiting clarity and transparency. These amendments would ensure that bereaved families do not feel that their loss has been silently absorbed and they would confront the lingering stigma around mental ill health in policing.

Policing demands a particular duty of care that transcends the ordinary employer-employee relationship, as the state requires officers to face repeated trauma that is unparalleled in any other walk of life. We are now operating in what many describe as a crisis policing model, where officers spend most of their time dealing with the darkest parts of human experience with far fewer opportunities to balance that with visible neighbourhood-based work. In the past, time spent on community policing would lift them out of the dark place. Today, that release valve is much weaker. Much of the informal support that once existed has disappeared. Officers used to have shared spaces where they could decompress together at the end of a shift, but those communal areas have largely gone. From staff sifting through distressing online material every day to front-line officers facing the increasing likelihood of physical assault, the psychological strain is relentless. This feeds a siege mentality in a service that still struggles to recognise emotion and is not naturally open.

Policing remains an environment where taking paternity leave can invite mockery and where the burden can fall especially heavily on women and minority officers amid unreported discrimination. In too many forces, officers still fear that admitting vulnerability will derail their career progression. If Parliament seeks people to shoulder that burden on our behalf, it must insist on collecting basic information. Tracking suicides and attempted suicides would pinpoint hotspots and high-risk groups, enabling proactive measures such as resilience training, peer support and routine psychological screening. I urge the Minister to take these amendments back to the Home Office and consider bringing forward concrete proposals on Report.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing this matter to the attention of the Committee. The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, and I know all too well the stresses and strains of policing. It is vital that more is done to support our officers. I approach these amendments from the fact that it is impossible to address what we do not measure and, at this moment, policing has almost no reliable national mechanism for measuring accurately the total number of police suicides.

Data from the Police Federation of England and Wales shows that more than 100 police officers and staff have died by suicide between 2022 and 2025, with at least 70 officer deaths and over 200 attempted suicides in that period. Those figures are likely undercounts because there is no statutory requirement for forces to record such events. The federation has also revealed troubling trends in how these incidents are linked with organisational stresses—notably, that 47 of 70 suicides and 173 of 236 attempted suicides that it has identified between 2022 and 2025 involved officers under investigation for misconduct or criminal allegations. That is not simply a statistic; it is a human tragedy that echoes through families, colleagues and communities.

As has been said, police forces are not required to record suicide or attempted suicide, meaning that the true scale of the problem is hidden from view and national suicide statistics do not treat policing as a risk occupation, as they should. Without a statutory duty to record and report, we are asking police leaders to act in good faith alone, with widely inconsistent results. Two of the largest police forces in England and Wales reportedly could not provide their own figures when the federation asked. The amendments would end that inconsistency by placing responsibility for data collection and publication on a statutory footing.

The amendments are not a step taken in isolation from policing leadership. The National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing are already committed to suicide prevention across the service. They have jointly endorsed a national consensus statement on working together to prevent suicide in the police service in England and Wales, acknowledging the importance of reducing stigma and improving well-being. The College of Policing also leads on national suicide prevention guidance and professional practice, emphasising the duty of forces to recognise inherent risk factors associated with police work and to promote supportive interventions. However, guidance and consensus alone cannot ensure consistent national reporting or create the accountability that comes from an annual report, laid before Parliament, which analyses trends, contributory factors and the effectiveness of support mechanisms under the police covenant.

Requiring chief constables to certify compliance and linking non-compliance to inspection through HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services will ensure that this is not simply a bureaucratic exercise but a real driver for change. However, without consistent mandatory data, these efforts lack the firm foundation needed to evaluate progress and target interventions where they are most needed. We on these Benches fully support the amendments.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for highlighting the amendments that he has put before the Committee today and to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, although he is not in his place, who tabled two of the amendments.

The importance of collecting accurate and consistent data for police officer and staff suicide is certainly relevant. I note particularly that the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Bach have a significant senior level of experience in these areas. I am grateful also for the comments of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and I recognise and note the strong support from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Opposition Benches for the proposals in the amendments.

Every life lost to suicide is a tremendous tragedy and, when that person is part of our police workforce, that loss is even deeper because those officers, as has been said, walk towards danger and see things that everyday citizens do not see. It is only fair that we support them with the same care and commitment that they show to us.

It may help the Committee to know that last year I met the Police Federation chair, Tiff Lynch, when she raised these matters with me. I have to say that this is an issue. We must do our utmost to protect and support police officers and this Government agree that understanding the scale and nature of the problem is essential. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is important that we understand whether any levels of suicide are linked specifically to a policing role or linked to factors outside of policing that policing may or may not exacerbate, as well as what measures can be taken, as in any walk of life, to help to support and encourage individuals who have mental health challenges or experiences that drive them to suicide. That is why we as a Government are actively considering the best options for achieving that, both in legislation and via non-legislative routes, so that we can deliver meaningful and sustainable improvements without creating unnecessary burdens.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I thank the Minister for such a constructive response and of course I thank everyone for their support. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a point that I had not made in my speech but that I want to amplify: in collecting the data, we should consider people for at least 12 months after retirement. He mentioned one particular case, but we can all perhaps imagine others and, if there is a link, that would be interesting to look at.

I hope we do not have to end up with legislation, because, in a way, that would be an admission of failure. There are far better ways of achieving it without that, or the bureaucracy that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, mentioned. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, for his usual powerful support for this and for saying it is common sense that this needs sorting out—there was no challenge on that from the Minister. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for their wholehearted support.

A couple of important things have through in the debate. First, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned the potential link to misconduct processes. If that is an issue, we need to understand why. We had an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, on a previous Committee day about potential deadlines or timelines for how long these things take; that cannot be unconnected. Whatever it is, we need to understand what it is about.

There is a second very important HR issue: are we recruiting people who understand the nature of the job they are about to embark on? Are we sharing the nature of the challenges? Are we supporting them at the beginning if they have things that they are not sure about? It is important, for the reasons we have all talked about, to make sure that this happens. I am really reassured about the round table. It would be really helpful if, by Report, we had a definite route forward, because I can see there are various routes.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Can I raise one point with the noble Lord? It seems to me—certainly from reflecting on my own police service—that one of the issues regarding suicide simply was the fact that police managers were unable to identify the issues when they arose. I wonder whether he, as a former commissioner and part of the inspectorate, has a view on that.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, makes a really good point: are we training our managers and supervisors to recognise the signs? For good reasons, occupational health units keep all this data together privately. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, mentioned a referral to the medical officer to see whether there was a problem; I wonder how many referrals are coming back the other way to let the manager know that this person might have an issue, not necessary to talk about suicide but to say there is a stress issue and they may need some support. Has it become a one-way valve that protects their privacy but reduces their safety? There are many facets to it that I hope the round table might address. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and thank the Government for their response.

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On Amendment 436, we agree that while the public are acutely aware of the prevalence of these offences, too often they have no sense of whether such offences are investigated, still less prosecuted in their local area. Better information on enforcement of everyday offences would support accountability and make it much harder for forces to hide behind national averages. In doing so, we must be careful to avoid imposing yet more rigid reporting duties on already overstretched officers.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling her two amendments. I begin with Amendment 436, co-signed by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. I strongly support my noble friend’s efforts to ensure that release statistics are as rigorous and useful as possible. These releases are pivotal to both the police and the public—the police so that they are aware of the types of crimes they are likely to encounter, and the public so that they can judge the performance of police forces for themselves.

As it stands, there is not a standard, reliable measurement of crime rates and statistics. The current accredited metric used by the Office for National Statistics is the Crime Survey for England and Wales, which is helpful in giving an indication of certain crime rates but cannot be described as a foolproof operational tool. It uses an interviewer-administered face-to-face survey, which immediately makes the recounting of crime a choice on behalf of the victim, who may, for whatever reason, decide not to disclose it. It reports only crimes committed against over-16s and excludes crimes against the general public, the state, tourists and residents of institutions.

I understand that this is done so that the survey is unaffected by police reporting or recording changes, but it also creates a crime reporting system deeply affected by human discretion that can similarly not serve as a trustworthy basis. The least we can do is ask that the police are required to record data on the enforcement of offences simultaneously to the Crime Survey for England and Wales releases. It would provide a metric to judge police performance, as it would demonstrate the estimated number of crimes committed compared with those investigated by police forces.

This leads me to my noble friend’s second amendment, also signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. Investigations into committed crimes must lead to prosecutions, or else there is little point in maintaining a justice system. Between 2020 and 2024, more than 30,000 prosecutions collapsed. A large proportion of these came from the mishandling or loss of evidence by police. The storage and retention of evidence is an area in desperate need of modernising. It has been described as overwhelming by serving officers and has too often resulted in injustice for victims. The first step in solving this issue is a thorough review of the system as it currently exists before setting out a blueprint of reform. The amendment in question would provide for this, so I wholly support it and I hope the Minister does too. I look forward to his reply.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for her continued interest in improving transparency and accountability in policing. She will know that I am outcome-focused myself, and that I try to ensure that we get outcomes. I note the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Davies of Gower, for Amendment 436.

The Government have taken significant steps to improve the visibility of police performance. I draw noble Baroness’s attention to the newly established police performance framework. That framework, supported by the Home Office’s police performance unit, provides a robust mechanism for monitoring enforcement activities across all 43 current police forces in England and Wales. This includes the priority offences that the noble Baroness mentioned, such as shoplifting, knife crime and theft.

The noble Baroness mentioned the White Paper; I will respond by trailing some of the announcements that were made in the White Paper yesterday. A key one was that the Home Office will this year introduce an initial sector-facing police performance dashboard that will enable chief constables and local policing bodies to analyse the transparent, high quality and operationally significant data that all three Back-Bench speakers sought. This will empower forces to deliver improvements through strengthening their understanding of where they are performing well and where they can learn from practice in other forces to improve. The framework has been designed to be flexible, and there will be a midpoint review in middle of 2027-28 to allow for the inclusion of any new priorities that might be brought forward. The Government believe that this is an appropriate mechanism for considering additional offence categories, rather than—with due respect to the noble Baroness— mandating them in primary legislation.

I took to heart the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that requiring police forces to publish enforcement data on a fixed list of offences might add burdens and administrative duplication, particularly when many of these offences are already captured through a range of other mechanisms, and contradict the later amendments to reduce police bureaucracy. That is an important factor to bear in mind when we consider this proposal.

Furthermore, the police and the CPS are required to comply with the Director of Public Prosecutions guidance on charging, which applies to all offences where a criminal charge may be instituted. This guidance ensures that investigations meet evidential and public interest tests before prosecution. Compliance for that is monitored through an internal assessment framework between the police and the CPS that is crime agnostic and used only for management purposes. A statutory duty to publish enforcement data for selected offences might duplicate those arrangements and divert resources from front-line policing.

In summary on Amendment 436, yes, we need to improve, but we have put in place some mechanisms. We will monitor those mechanisms and, I hope, return to them in due course, without the legislative requirement proposed by the noble Baroness.

The noble Baroness’s Amendment 437 goes to the heart of the core issue of productive use of police time. I again note the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for this amendment. The 2023 Police Activity Survey, provided by the Home Office, gave us significant insights into how police time is used. We are planning to repeat that survey this year, and I hope it will again help us to understand a bit more about the policing landscape.

The 2023 productivity review, sponsored by the College of Policing’s Centre for Police Productivity, prioritised the rollout of productivity-enhancing capabilities, such as the use of AI and robotic process automation, to reduce the time spent on administration. I know that there are concerns about AI, and I have heard them raised today in Committee. However, when properly used, AI can reduce bureaucracy. In Autumn 2024, we launched the Police Efficiency and Collaboration Programme to explore how we can improve productivity and efficiency savings.

Yesterday, the Government published the policing White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing—I have a copy to hand for ease of reference. In that White Paper is a comprehensive package of reforms that address the issues in the noble Baroness’s amendment. I refer her to paragraph 91, which says:

“Another area of extensive paperwork in policing comes from the requirements of the criminal justice system. In the months ahead we will work with the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Prosecution Service (alongside the Attorney General’s Office) to examine changes that could reduce the burden on policing. As part of this work, we will look at a number of areas including the disclosure regime and redaction, the use of out of court resolutions, charging and joint police-prosecution performance metrics. We will do this alongside consideration of any new or emerging evidence, such as the implications of the Independent Review of Disclosure and Sir Brian Leveson’s recommendations for criminal court reform”.


We therefore recognise that that is an important issue.

I also refer the noble Baroness to paragraph 293, which says:

“It is expected that in its first year Police.AI will focus on some of the biggest administrative burdens facing policing – including disclosure, analysis of CCTV footage, production of case files, crime recording and classification and translating and transcribing documents. This will free up 6 million policing hours each year”.


The Government are therefore focused on those issues, so I am not convinced that we need a legislative solution to deal with them. With this having been put in the White Paper—it is a brand-new document, and Members will want to have a chance to reflect upon it—the direction of travel is self-evidently there. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand that the core issues on which she is calling for a review are addressed in the document that I have just referred to the Committee.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Cash both for bringing forward this amendment and for the clarity with which she set out the problem that it seeks to address. I speak in support of the amendment. It is fundamental to our safety and justice system that police data is accurate and fit for purpose.

I am grateful for the warm words that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, spoke about me. I hope that I will not disappoint her too much when I say that sex is not an incidental characteristic in policing or criminal justice: it is a foundational variable. Patterns of offending, particularly in relation to serious violence, sexual offences, domestic abuse and repeat high-harm crime are profoundly sex-disaggregated.

I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, that police forces depend on this data to analyse trends, assess risk, deploy safeguarding interventions and evaluate whether strategies, including those endorsed by your Lordships’ House, are actually working. If police records cannot reliably distinguish males from females, risk assessment collapses, trend analysis becomes unreliable and the very legislation that we pass to make the public safer is frustrated.

We have already seen what happens when biological sex is replaced with self-declared gender identity. As has already been mentioned, in Scotland, Police Scotland permitted suspects’ sex to be recorded on the basis of self-identification, including in serious sexual offences. The consequences were predictable and serious: incoherent statistics, loss of public confidence and an inability to analyse male violence accurately. After sustained scrutiny, Police Scotland reversed that policy in October 2025 and confirmed that biological sex would be recorded, with transgender status noted separately where relevant. That reversal was driven by operational reality, not ideology, and it offers a clear lesson for England and Wales.

Independent expert evidence reinforces this point. The Government-commissioned review led by Professor Alice Sullivan was unequivocal: sex should mean biological sex and, where gender identity is relevant, it should be recorded separately, not substituted. Similar conclusions have been reached by independent analysis examining the consequences of degraded data across public bodies. Once sex data is compromised, statistics become contested, safeguarding weakens and public trust is eroded.

There are also real-world safeguarding implications. Ministry of Justice analysis shows that trans-identified male offenders exhibit offending patterns aligned with the male population, including for violent and sexual crimes. Recording such individuals as female underestimates male violence, artificially inflates female offending and distorts risk analysis.

We have already seen the downstream consequences in the prison estate, where serious safeguarding failures led the Government to tighten allocation rules. Biological sex is a material risk factor; police data is upstream of all this and, if it is wrong at the point of arrest or charge, the entire system is compromised.

There is a theme running through many of our debates today: good policing is inextricably linked to good data. The Government have acknowledged this. Biological sex is just one of the data variables that must be recorded for accurate policing, so I wholeheartedly support my noble friend’s amendment and I hope the Minister will, too.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

From these Benches we look forward to the new law enforcement data service when it is introduced, and to the police, like other public bodies, ensuring that the data they collect comes from the individuals self-identifying.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Cash for tabling this important amendment, allowing for a debate on this matter. The link between ethnicity and crime has, for far too long, been a taboo subject, but the fact is that it always has been and remains to be a significant factor in explaining certain trends.

When ethnicity is ignored and underreported, observers are reduced to relying on conjecture based upon unverified connections. It does an injustice to the victims of crimes that go either unresolved or underreported because their causal factors are refused to be acknowledged. When the facts are obscured, it opens the door for accusations from both sides in bad faith. People are derided as racist, and uninvolved communities are implicated. The result, again, is that the focus is directed away from the victims.

Grooming gangs have been the case study most often referenced when discussing this topic, and I apologise for repeating the same argument, but we do so because they offer the best example of the consequences of ignoring this link. For decades, tens of thousands of white working-class girls were systematically groomed, trafficked and raped by gangs of predominantly Pakistani men. This is a fact that has only recently been accepted by mainstream politicians and media, despite years of campaigning and research conducted outside of Westminster.

We should not have arrived at this point where, after more than 30 years, Westminster is only just waking up to the scale of the tragedy. We should not have had to wait for the review from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, which was commissioned only after the Government faced significant pressure, both in Parliament and online, for politicians to act on an overtly racialised crime. I understand that the failings surrounding the inability to bring these gangs to justice have been many, but a consistent factor is authorities overlooking the crimes for fear of being racist. In turn, the police have done nothing to allay their fears by providing accurate ethnicity figures.

The words of Denis MacShane, the former MP for Rochdale, a grooming hotspot, aptly demonstrate this. By his own words in 2014, he avoided the industrial-scale rape of working-class girls in his constituency out of fear of “rocking the multicultural boat” and offending his own sensibilities as a

“true Guardian reader and liberal Leftie”.

Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends than that good men should look on and do nothing. Good men, in the narrow sense that they were not the ones committing evil crimes, were permitted to adopt Denis MacShane’s acquiescent attitude for decades, because there was no official empirical pushback for campaigners to draw from. If ethnicity data had been collected and released, the fact that these crimes were disproportionately committed by the Pakistani community —as we know from the fragmented picture that we now possess—would have been transformed from a racist trope derided as an inconvenience into a proven fact to be used by police forces for action.

We must learn from our failings. It is not enough simply to commission a review into grooming gangs and hope that acknowledging past crimes will put a stop to future crimes being committed. Crimes are still happening, and they are still happening along ethnic lines. Mandating the recording of ethnicity is a necessity for any Government claiming to want to reduce violence against women and girls.

Past the recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and past grooming gangs, there is a great practical reason to introduce a requirement to record ethnicity. Crime trends differ from community to community, and identifying exactly what these are will help the police direct resources more effectively. This data—and I hope that many noble Lords opposite will support me here—would even reduce officers’ unconscious biases, as decisions would be based upon empirical evidence and not assumptions drawn from shaky data.

The administrative burden that would come with this change would be negligible. It is an extra tick in the box in an arrest report. The benefits, as explained, are numerous. If we are serious about organising a victim-orientated system that is empirically based, this amendment is absolutely necessary. I hope that the Minister will agree, and I very much look forward to hearing from him.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her amendment, which seeks to mandate the collection of ethnicity data in respect of the perpetrators of crime. I also thank all those who contributed to this debate: my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and, for the Opposition, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.

I will not repeat the point that I made in the last group—admittedly, this is a bit further away than I thought we were going to be—but I stress that the content of the annual data requirement on police is reviewed annually. We have also announced plans in the police White Paper, which we have already discussed in a previous group, to bring forward legislation, when parliamentary time allows, on mandating the collection of suspect ethnicity data.

There has been a lot of discussion and debate on this amendment around the recent National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. For the avoidance of any doubt, I want to be absolutely clear that these abhorrent crimes must be pursued wherever they are found, without cultural or political sensitivities getting in the way.

I will just pause to correct the record. While I am not at all defending his comments, I believe that I am right in saying that Denis MacShane used to be MP for Rotherham rather than Rochdale—I am referring to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said—which is obviously where one of the gangs that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, looked into operated. I just want to put that out there. However, as I said, that does not undermine the abhorrence of these crimes; they must be pursued, irrespective of any cultural or political sensitivities getting in the way.

The previous Home Secretary wrote to all chief constables to make it clear that we expect that ethnicity data will be collected from all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases. As previously set out by the Home Secretary, we will be legislating to mandate the collection of ethnicity data in such cases. To be very clear, I quote directly from the police White Paper, which was published yesterday:

“we will work with policing to create a framework for mandating clear national data standards in a timely way, to improve how data is collected, recorded and used across England and Wales, and make sure these standards are applied across all forces and the systems they use. This will further support existing legal and ethical frameworks, ensuring data is managed responsibly and proportionately, and maintaining public confidence”.

The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, referred to the importance of self-defined ethnicity, and this is how the ONS recommends that ethnicity be recorded in line with the census, which does ultimately provide the benchmark versus which all public service data should be collected. In light of this and our commitment to bring forward legislation in the context of our wider reforms to policing, I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, withdraw her amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

438D: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“Exception of the police from the public sector equality dutyIn Schedule 18 (public sector equality duty: exceptions) of the Equality Act 2010, after paragraph 3 insert—“The police
3A (1) Section 149 does not apply to any police force when exercising policing or law enforcement functions.(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, “police force” includes—(a) a police force maintained by a local policing body,(b) the British Transport Police,(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, and(d) the Ministry of Defence Police.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, so as to ensure they are solely committed to effectively carrying out their policing functions.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 438D, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, seeks to exempt the police from the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when they are exercising core policing and law enforcement functions. The public sector equality duty requires public authorities, in the exercise of their functions, to

“have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation … advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it … foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.

The purpose of the amendment is simple, and it comes from what should be a fundamental truism: the police should focus unambiguously on preventing crime, protecting the public and upholding the law.

Police forces already operate within one of the most extensive frameworks of legal accountability in public life. Their powers are constrained by statutes such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, regulations, ethics codes, common law and detailed operational safeguards. Despite this, operational decisions of police officers are being second-guessed not through the lens of legality or effectiveness but through compliance with equality impact assessments, diversity metrics and institutional diversity, equality, and inclusion priorities that were never designed for split-second operational judgments.

There is a practical application here. The police are often hampered in their ability to stop and search people because of their duties under the Equality Act. For example, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Code A, which governs the operation of police powers to stop and search, states that

“when police officers are carrying out their functions, they also have a duty to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation, to advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and people who do not share it, and to take steps to foster good relations between those persons”.

I think it would be quite widely accepted by the public that it is not the police’s role to advance equality of opportunity. They are not activists.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If the noble Baroness looks at aspects of the Bill before us today and earlier in Committee, and at what we said in the policing White Paper yesterday, she will know that the Government do not accept that standards do not need to be raised. We want raised standards, better vetting of police officers, better performance and speedy dismissal if police officers have done wrong. We want to improve those standards. However, the Equality Act is about basic principles underpinning how public services interact with people in our community. In the policing sense, I argue, as I did a moment ago, that those Equality Act provisions underpin what the police want to do, which is to police with the consent of the community. I cannot agree with her; that is an honest disagreement between us. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate; it has been short but stimulating. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for their support.

When considering this matter, there is a question that I would like all noble Lords to keep in mind: what do we want the police to prioritise? Surely the answer is public safety, crime prevention, and the fair and firm enforcement of the law. As I have said, and as the legal framework makes clear, policing is already tightly regulated. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, codes of practice, judicial review, the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the courts all ensure that police powers are exercised lawfully and proportionately. None of those protections would be removed by this amendment. The entire purpose of the amendment is to remove a layer of bureaucratic obligation that is ill suited to operational policing and increasingly counterproductive. It would allow officers to make decisions based on intelligence, behaviour and risk, rather than the fear of breaching abstract equality issues—but perhaps I am guilty of looking at this from an operational perspective.

If we want the police to be active on our streets rather than passive observers and to intervene early rather than apologise later, and if we want public confidence rebuilt through effectiveness rather than process then we must give them the clarity and confidence to do their job. We must recognise that effective policing is itself a public good and that the most equal outcome of all is a society in which the law is enforced without fear or favour. With that, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 438D withdrawn.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Goodman of Wycombe for his recent group of amendments. Extremism in its worst form of course becomes terrorism. This is often, if not always, the product of idle inaction or, at worst, encouragement from surrounding communities and influencers. The propounding of extremist views, even if not necessarily violent, has slowly seated itself in public discourse and is gaining influence in local communities throughout the country. It is clearly something that needs to be addressed, so I welcome the chance to hear from the Government.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 438EB is inspired by the 999 Injured and Forgotten campaign, led by Tom Curry, a detective forced to retire after suffering a life-changing injury on duty, weeks before reaching 22 years of service. In 2023, Tom launched a petition calling for a new medal for police injured on duty and discharged from the service, and it has since expanded to include all public servants.

Every day, emergency responders put their lives on the line to protect the public. Tragically, within policing alone, more than 16,000 officers have suffered catastrophic injuries in the course of their service and have had to give up their careers as a result. Yet there is currently no formal means of recognising their sacrifice. Like Tom, many injured officers miss out on long service and good conduct medals, which now require 20 years of sustained service. Gallantry awards elude most assault victims, who are typically ambushed from behind, depriving them of the opportunity to show valour.

The Elizabeth Emblem was created in 2024 to rightly honour public servants killed in the line of duty. On these Benches, we believe it is wrong that those whose lives have been changed irrevocably through injury are overlooked. This is a modest amendment. It simply asks the Government to consider the merits of such an award and to lay a report on it before Parliament. Although the Bill’s scope does not allow me to include all those we believe should be eligible, this would be an important step towards formal recognition of injured survivors and to honour the brave work of our emergency services. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for this amendment and the case she put forward. It is absolutely axiomatic that we must honour and recognise those brave police officers who put their safety at risk to protect the public. During my police service, I saw many acts whereby officers placed themselves in the most dangerous of situations with little recognition. If I had time, I would be keen to relate some of those instances to noble Lords; some of them, of course, had consequences. There is certainly some merit in the proposal. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what the Home Office might suggest on this.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we owe our emergency service workers a massive debt of thanks for the work they do to keep us safe and for always answering the call when we need help. When dedicated public servants suffer serious injuries in the course of their duties, it is incumbent on us, as a state and as a society, to wrap our arms around them, so to speak, and ensure that they are given all the support they need.

I am sure we all agree that the list of public servants who risk and suffer injuries during the course of their duties is not limited to police officers; this was reflected in the noble Baroness’s comments. Other emergency services, such as our brave firefighters, ambulance workers and other emergency service workers, also face great risk of injury on duty. Any consideration will have to include them alongside police staff—I think the whole Chamber would agree on that—though I note that the text of the amendment refers to police officers alone. I hope the noble Baroness takes that in the spirit in which it is intended.

Noble Lords will be aware that the police are already eligible for a number of medals, including for long or exemplary service, for specific celebrations such as a Coronation or jubilee, and for gallantry. Individuals who suffer injury as a result of their efforts to prevent loss of life can and have been successfully put forward for formal gallantry awards. This includes Sergeant Timothy Ansell of Greater Manchester Police, who was injured coming to the aid of a colleague and received a King’s Commendation for Bravery in October.

Although I recognise that the threshold for these awards is high, and rightly so, there are many incidents which can and should be put forward but which currently fall below the radar. The Home Office has been driving work to increase the number of gallantry nominations for the police, and I encourage any noble Lords who have cases to put forward to do so via the Cabinet Office website.

Work to identify whether a medal is the best method of recognising emergency service workers who are injured as a result of their duties and whether it is viable is ongoing. However, I point out that in this country, all medals are a gift from the Government on behalf of the monarch. They are instituted by royal warrant and sit firmly under royal prerogative powers. It would therefore be inappropriate to legislate for such a medal, potentially cutting across the powers that rightly rest with His Majesty the King. On the understanding that this is a matter that is actively under consideration, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.