(4 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Just one week after celebrating the achievement of women around the world on International Women’s Day, I would like to open this debate by once again expressing my sadness at the horrific developments in the Sarah Everard case. My heartfelt thoughts and prayers are with Sarah, her family and friends at this unbearable time. This is also a stark moment to reflect on what more we can do to protect women and girls against crime, and the events of the last few days have rightly ignited anger at the danger posed to women by predatory men—an anger I feel as strongly as anyone.
This Government were elected just over a year ago on a clear manifesto commitment to support the police and to keep our country safe. It is vital that we continue to deliver on that promise to the British people, and our commitment to law and order is having a real impact across the country. There are already over 6,600 more police officers in our communities, thanks to the unprecedented campaign to recruit an additional 20,000 more police officers. Our crackdown on county line drug gangs is delivering results, particularly in London, the west midlands and Merseyside. The police have made more than 3,400 arrests, shut down more than 550 deal lines and safeguarded more than 770 vulnerable people. Last year, we saw the UK’s biggest ever law enforcement operation strike a blow against organised crime, with over 1,000 arrests, £54 million of criminal cash seized, and 77 firearms and over two tonnes of drugs seized. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill will go further still in our mission to back the police, to make our communities safe and to restore confidence in the criminal justice system.
We ask our brave police officers to do the most difficult of jobs—they run towards danger to keep us all safe—and that is why I have worked closely with the Police Federation in developing this Bill. I would like to pay tribute to the chair of the Police Federation, John Apter, for his constructive way of working since I became Home Secretary, admirably fighting for his members every single day. He has voiced his members’ concerns to me directly, and I have acted upon them.
This Bill will enshrine in law a requirement to report annually to Parliament on the police covenant, which sets out our commitment to enhance support and protection for those working within or retired from policing roles, whether paid or as volunteers, and their families. The covenant will initially focus on physical protection and support for families, officers and staff, and their health and wellbeing, with a duty to report in place to ensure parliamentary scrutiny.
Despite all that they do, emergency workers are still subject to violence and abuse. The statistics paint an alarming picture. There were more than 30,000 assaults on police officers in the year to March 2020, and over the past year we have all seen the reports of people deliberately coughing at our emergency workers, claiming to have coronavirus and threatening to infect them. There have been too many disgusting examples of police officers and ambulance drivers being spat at and violently attacked as they go out to work day after day to make sure that the rest of us are safe and cared for.
This Bill doubles the maximum sentence for an assault on emergency workers. Does the Home Secretary therefore share my astonishment at the irony that the Labour party will now be voting against that provision?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Having personally spent much time with our frontline officers, the very people who put themselves in harm’s way to keep us safe, I think that is a really stark point, and a reminder of which party is backing the police and which party simply is not.
I will in just a second.
Having personally spent time with those on the frontline, I have also seen the impact of these incidents on officers and on their families. We cannot tolerate such acts, which is why the punishment must fit the crime, and the Bill will double the maximum penalty for assaults on emergency workers from 12 months’ to two years’ imprisonment.
I urge the Home Secretary not to play party politics with this particular bit. I introduced, as a private Member’s Bill, the legislation that she is acting on, and at the time I argued very strongly in favour of two years being the maximum sentence. I was dissuaded by the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), who is now the Foreign Secretary; by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), the former Home Secretary; and by a lot of Conservative MPs, who did not want to support the legislation at all.
I need to be persuaded that the Government have used the legislation that is on the statute book at present. For instance, the Home Secretary refers, quite rightly, to people spitting at police officers. It is disgusting and it is a form of assault, but unfortunately the sentencing guidelines still have not been updated since the introduction of my legislation to make sure that spitting is an aggravating factor and will be treated as an offence.
There are many important points that I would be happy to debate about the police covenant and giving our police officers—the frontline men and women who keep us safe day in, day out—the protection that they and their family members deserve. The hon. Gentleman is right about the sentencing structure and guidance, but we have had support from the Crown Prosecution Service regarding the assaults that I have referred to, particularly over the last few months in relation to coronavirus, when we have seen spitting and assaults on officers.
This Bill is a criminal justice Bill as much as a policing Bill. It is an end-to-end Bill to ensure that the sentence fits the assault and the crime. The Bill will double the maximum penalty for assaults on emergency workers from 12 months’ to two years’ imprisonment, recognising that our officers and emergency workers should rightly be protected. Having spent much time with those on the frontline and seen the impact and the sheer volume of these incidents, I think it is right that we have that provision in this Bill.
The Government fully recognise the professionalism and skills of our highly trained police officers, and that includes the specialism of police drivers. Too often, they are driving in high-pressure situations pursuing suspects on the road while responding urgently to incidents. Through this Bill, we will introduce a new test to assess a police officer’s standard of driving. Should an officer be involved in a road traffic incident, this new test will allow the courts to judge their standard of driving against that of a competent and careful police constable with the same level of training, rather than that of a member of the public, which is how it stands at present.
The Government back the police and will never allow those with an extreme political agenda, such as those calling for the defunding or abolition of the police, to weaken our resolve when it comes to protecting the police. We back the police and will do everything we possibly can to make our community safer.
I have heard the call of the British public for safer communities, and that means cracking down on violent crime, which has a corrosive impact on towns and cities across the country. That includes gangs peddling drugs, as a result of which law-abiding citizens live in fear and, tragically, teenage children are stabbed to death. This senseless violence has absolutely no place in our society.
I support entirely the need to make sure that sentences fit the crime, but is not the reality that courts have huge backlogs and are reluctant to jail people who should be in jail, because they know that our prisons are overcrowded? Does not this Government’s failure on courts and prisons massively undermine what the right hon. Lady says about sentencing?
Absolutely not. The Government are determined in their resolve—through this legislation, and delivering on our manifesto commitments—to bring in sentences that fit the crime. This is an end-to-end criminal justice Bill. If the hon. Gentleman and hon. Members listen to this afternoon’s debate, they will hear about the measures that are being introduced, and about the Government’s longer-term response. That includes the wider work that the Government are undertaking with the courts and the CPS; the changes that we need to make not just to sentencing, but to our laws; and the support that we are giving to our police.
We do not want to waste police time. Over the years I have formed an unlikely alliance with people such as Peter Tatchell, particularly with the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, to ensure that we enshrine in law your ability, Madam Deputy Speaker, my ability, or anybody’s ability to insult people and cause offence. Thinking particularly of clause 59, will my right hon. Friend assure me that nothing in the Bill will have a chilling effect on the right to debate and, if necessary, cause offence?
When it comes to freedom of expression, my right hon. Friend knows my views and those of this Government. Prior to taking interventions I spoke about the corrosive impact of violent crime across our towns and cities. Tragically, too many young children—teenagers—have been stabbed to death in towns and cities of the UK. Such senseless violence has no place in our society. I have met too many mothers whose children have been murdered on the streets of our city, and I have seen the raw pain and distress of parents grieving for their child, and the utter devastation they are forced to endure.
We are proud that this Government have put more police officers on the beat, but tough law enforcement can be only part of the solution. We must do much more to understand and address the factors that drive serious violence, so that we can prevent it from happening in the first place. Through the Bill, we will introduce a serious violence duty, which will work to bring public bodies, including the police and local authorities, to work together as one, to share data and information across our communities, and work together to save lives. I thank many of my predecessors for their work on that, particularly my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid).
I make no apology for finding new ways to protect our communities and save the lives of our young people. Whenever lives are tragically lost as the result of serious violence, we must do everything we can to learn from what has happened. Homicides involving offensive weapons such as knives make up a large and growing proportion of all homicides, yet no legal requirement is currently placed on local agencies to understand what has happened after each incident. We are therefore introducing the requirement for a formal review to be considered, where a victim was aged 18 or over and the events surrounding their death involved the use of an offensive weapon. The new reviews will ensure that we learn lessons from such cases, and produce recommendations to improve our response to serious violence.
Every time someone carries a blade or a weapon, they risk ruining their own lives and those of others. Every stabbing leaves a trail of misery and devastation in its wake. Our new serious violence reduction orders will help the police to protect our communities better, by giving officers the power to stop and search those already convicted of crimes involving knives and offensive weapons. The orders will help to tackle prolific and higher-risk offenders, and help to protect individuals from exploitation by criminal gangs. That is exactly what I mean when I say that we are making our communities safer.
There will be concerns about disproportionality, but our aim is for these orders to enable the police to take a more targeted approach, specifically in relation to known knife carriers. Unfortunately, data from 2018-19 indicate that the homicide risk for young black people is 24 times higher than that for young white people. That is appalling. As long as young black men are dying and their families are disproportionately suffering, we cannot stand back, and I cannot apologise for backing the police when it comes to stop and search. The Government will work with the police to gather data on the impact of the orders to deliver real and lasting results.
Victims and witnesses must have the full protection of the law while the police conduct their investigations. We will reform the pre-charge bail regime to encourage the police to impose pre-charge bail, with appropriate conditions where it is necessary and proportionate to do so, including where there is a real risk to victims, witnesses and the public. We hope that that will provide reassurance and additional protection for alleged victims, for example in high-harm cases such as domestic abuse.
Since the Home Secretary’s Government first promised a victims Bill, there have been 1 million sexual offences and 350,000 rapes. This Bill is 300 pages long and barely mentions women or children. The explanatory notes do not mention women or girls once. Will she get to her feet and apologise finally for missing this fantastic opportunity to put victims at the heart of our criminal justice system?
I will take no lectures from the hon. Gentleman or the Opposition when it comes to supporting victims. As the former chair of the all-party parliamentary group on victims, I and this Government have absolutely put victims at the heart of all our work, as have my predecessors in all their work.
The hon. Gentleman can yell from the Back Benches, but it is important to remember that when it comes to protecting victims, there are many victims of different offences and different crimes. I think he and all Members of this House should recognise that this Bill will absolutely provide additional protections for victims in high-harm cases such as domestic abuse and many other cases.
These reforms will be named Kay’s law in memory of Kay Richardson, who was tragically killed following the release of her husband under investigation, rather than on pre-charge bail, despite evidence of previous domestic abuse. It is impossible to imagine the impact of such an horrific crime on the victim’s loved ones, and we all have a responsibility to do all we can to prevent more victims and more families from suffering as they have. That is the point and the purpose of this Bill—it is an end-to-end Bill.
Before Opposition Members start to prejudge any aspect of this Bill and this Government’s work on victims, there will be plenty of time to debate this Bill. There will also be plenty of time to debate the role of victims and how the Government are absolutely supporting victims.
An essential responsibility and a duty on us all is protecting our children. I am truly appalled and shocked by each crime and every case of hurt and harm against young people from sexual abuse and exploitation. It is impossible to comprehend the motivation of those who perpetrate offences against children, and we have been reviewing the law in this area carefully to ensure that any changes we make are the right ones. Through this Bill, I intend to extend the scope of the current legislation that criminalises sexual activity with a child under the age of 18 by people who hold defined positions of trust to include faith leaders, sports coaches and others who similarly coach, teach, train, supervise or instruct a sport or religion on a regular basis.
This issue has some brilliant and long-standing champions. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch), who even throughout her recent cancer treatment worked with me to ensure that we address this significant issue. I also thank the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion), who continues to stand by the many victims who were abused as youngsters and who were failed and ignored by those who should have supported them. I also thank Baroness Grey-Thompson for her tireless work on this issue.
Through this Bill, we will also introduce an important measure to help bring closure to families whose loved ones have gone missing. The House will know the horrific case of Keith Bennett and the struggles his family have gone through to find his body since his murder. In 2017, the police believed they had a further lead when it came to light that Ian Brady had committed papers to secure storage before his death, but a gap in the law meant that the police were unable to get a search warrant to seize those papers.
I know this is an important issue—indeed, it has been raised by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and others. I am therefore introducing new powers enabling officers to seize evidence that they believe may help to locate human remains outside of criminal proceedings, such as in missing persons cases, suicides and homicide cases where a suspect is known but cannot be convicted, such as where the suspect themselves has died. As I said to Keith’s brother, Alan, when I met him recently, I am absolutely determined to give the police all the powers they need to access any evidence that could help them to bring some closure in cases such as Keith’s. While I cannot guarantee that a loved one will be found, I can make sure that families are provided with every avenue that our legal system will allow in the pursuit of justice. This is why we emphasise the need to make our communities safer, and that is exactly what the Bill does.
The right to protest peacefully is a cornerstone of our democracy and one that this Government will always defend, but there is, of course, a balance to be struck between the rights of the protester and the rights of individuals to go about their daily lives. The current legislation the police use to manage protests, the Public Order Act 1986, was enacted over 30 years ago. In recent years, we have seen a significant change of protest tactics, with protesters exploiting gaps in the law which have led to disproportionate amounts of disruption. Last year, we saw XR blocking the passage of an ambulance and emergency calls, gluing themselves to a train during rush hour, blocking airport runways, preventing hundreds of hard-working people from going to work. Finally, I would like to gently remind the House that on one day last year many people across the country were prevented from reading their morning newspapers due to the tactics of some groups—a clear attempt to limit a free and fair press, a cornerstone of our democracy and society.
The Bill will give the police the powers to take a more proactive approach in tackling dangerous and disruptive protests. The threshold at which the police can impose conditions on the use of noise at a protest is rightfully high. The majority of protesters will be able to continue to act and make noise as they do now without police intervention, but we are changing it to allow the police to put conditions on noisy protests that cause significant disruption to those in the vicinity. As with all our proposals, the police response will still need to be proportionate. The statutory offence of public nuisance replaces the existing common law offence. Our proposals follow the recommendations made by the Law Commission in 2015. The threshold for committing an offence is high, with any harm needing to affect the public or a cross-section of the public and not just an individual.
We must give the courts the tools to deal effectively with the desecration of war memorials and other statues. Through the Bill, we will toughen the law where there is criminal damage to a memorial by removing the consideration of monetary value of damage. Those changes will allow the court to consider the emotional and sentimental impact, not just financial, so that the sentence can reflect the severity of harm caused. For what it is worth, that does not just mean statues. It will cover a range of memorials with low monetary but high sentimental value, for example gravestones, war memorials, roadside tributes to people killed in car crashes and the memorials to people who have been murdered, such as the Stephen Lawrence memorial. I would like to thank my hon. Friends the Members for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis) and for Bracknell (James Sunderland) for their important work on this issue.
I am also clear that no one should have to put up with disturbances and disruptions on their doorstep. Unauthorised encampments can create significant challenges for local authorities, and cause distress and misery to those who live nearby. As we pledged in our manifesto, we will make it a criminal offence to live in a vehicle on land without permission and we will give the police the power to seize vehicles if necessary. I can assure the House that the new offence has been framed in such a way to ensure that the rights of ramblers and others to enjoy the countryside are not impacted.
What consideration has the right hon. Lady given to the rights of generations of Travellers and Gypsies, who have often been around longer than some of our property laws, who might want to pull up on a roadside for a night? What consideration of their rights has been given in the Bill, which will automatically criminalise them?
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that there was an extensive public consultation on this issue and all those points were considered at the time.
The Home Secretary may remember coming to visit Wolstanton Marsh in my constituency during the election campaign. Residents around Wolstanton have long suffered as a result of the unauthorised encampments on the marsh. Will she join me in welcoming what the Bill will do for them? This is a manifesto pledge delivered.
I recall a visit to my hon. Friend’s constituency, and he is right. Many colleagues, and many members of the public through the public consultation, made the point that unauthorised encampments cause misery and harm to those in the local communities affected by them. There have been many discussions with colleagues across the House on this point, and with local authorities, which more often than not bear the brunt of the costs and consequences, alongside the police.
In September, my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor published a White Paper setting out our vision for a smarter approach to sentencing, and now we are introducing legislation to establish this in law. We need a system that is robust enough to keep the worst offenders behind bars for as long as possible, but agile enough to give offenders a fair start on their road to rehabilitation. Sexual and violent offenders must serve sentences that reflect the severity of their crimes, helping to protect the public and give victims confidence that justice has been served. These offences are committed predominantly against women. Through this Bill, rapists and other serious sexual predators sentenced to a standard determinate sentence of four years or more will henceforth serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody. Rapists sentenced to life imprisonment will similarly serve longer in custody before they are considered for release on licence. The Bill also strengthens the framework for the management of sex offenders. In particular, we are legislating so that courts can attach positive requirements to a sexual harm prevention order or a sexual risk order so that, for example, a perpetrator can be required to attend a behavioural change programme.
The measures in this Bill build on those in the Domestic Abuse Bill, which will return to this House after Easter. Among the changes we have brought forward in the Lords is a new offence of non-fatal strangulation and the criminalising of threats to disclose intimate images. I know that these additions to the Bill will be welcomed by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes). We have had discussions already this afternoon about violence against women and girls and what more we can do; these measures are fundamental to restoring confidence in the criminal justice system.
We also recognise that the reoffending rate for children is high, and that is why we are taking forward measures to provide courts with stronger alternatives to custody. In the Bill, we are providing custodial sentencing options for the most serious crimes, alongside alternatives that will allow youth offenders to be effectively managed and rehabilitated in the community. That will ensure that judges and magistrates are able to make the most appropriate decisions in the best interests of the child and of the public. In recognition of the fact that children now in custody are much more likely to have complex needs, we will introduce measures to enable the trialling of secure schools. They will be schools with security rather than prisons with education, and they will have education, wellbeing and purposeful activity at their heart.
The courts play a fundamental role in our criminal justice system. During the pandemic, we have seen the benefits of enabling participation in proceedings remotely or by live video or audio link. We want to put these temporary provisions on a permanent footing, giving judges better options to support the effective and efficient running of their courts and underpinning the principle of open justice. Our aim is to modernise our courts and tribunals so that there are more opportunities to attend and observe hearings remotely, shorter waiting times and less unnecessary travel. I can assure the House that these advantages will never be taken from the right to a full hearing in court. This will always be available where needed, and where the court considers it to be in the interests of justice. Trials will continue to take place in court. We also want to further improve accessibility to our justice system for people with disabilities.
At the moment, if somebody suffers a sexual assault or rape, they will wait two years before they have their moment in court. Will the Home Secretary agree to amend the Bill so that people who are victims of rape or sexual assault will be fast-tracked straight into the court system and will no longer have to wait two years?
It is absolutely right that we look at every single measure and approach to ensure that victims of rape receive justice. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the rape review is taking place and will soon be published.
We want to improve accessibility to our justice system for people with disabilities. Reasonable adjustments can be made for most people with disabilities to enable them to complete jury service. However, the law has to date prevented deaf people who require the services of a sign language interpreter from having an interpreter in a jury deliberation room with them. We are changing that to ensure that all deaf individuals are able to serve as jurors unless the circumstances of a particular case mean that it would not be in the interests of justice for them to do so.
As I said at the beginning, this Government were elected on a clear manifesto commitment to keep our country safe. That is what the British people rightly expect, and that is what this Bill will deliver, by supporting the police, by preventing and cutting crime and by restoring confidence in the criminal justice system, because giving people the security they need to live their lives as they choose is an essential part of our freedom. As we emerge from the coronavirus pandemic, we will build back safer and increase the safety and security of our citizens. This Bill will enable us to do exactly that, and I commend it to the House.
I should inform Members that we will start with a time limit of five minutes, but it will go down very quickly to three minutes.
Absolutely. The cancellation of that workstream is entirely wrong. I say to the Home Secretary that the offer is open on that. The letter has been sent to the Home Office; reply and engage with us on the Opposition Benches.
I am actually not aware of that workstream being cancelled or the letter, so I would be more than happy to come back to the House and follow up with the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle).
I am grateful for that, and when the Home Secretary returns to the Home Office, I would be grateful if she could dig out the letter and respond. That would be extremely useful—it was sent on 29 January, for reference.
The shadow Home Secretary should well know and should honestly tell the House that the maximum sentence for rape is life.
I asked the Home Secretary earlier in the statement to tell me how many people convicted of rape were actually sentenced to life imprisonment, and she could not answer the question. The answer is hardly any. Ninety-nine per cent. of reported rapes do not even get close to a court, and then we hear the Minister trying to come to the Dispatch Box to boast about the rape statistics—absolutely appalling.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
As the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) said, it is an honour to close this debate and to follow other right hon. and hon. Members. This two-day debate has been an opportunity, first of all, for all of us to pay tribute to the memory of Sarah Everard, her loved ones and the wider community, who have expressed their shock, revulsion and anger at what has happened and at the wider issues, too.
When we talk about safety, each and every one of us has a responsibility. When women all too often feel unsafe, it is the wrong response to say to them, “Stay indoors. Don’t go out alone.” Instead of questioning the victim, we have to deal with the perpetrator. When I think about how far we have come, I sharply remind myself of how far we still have to go. I look around this House and think of colleagues from all parties—some of whom are no longer here—with whom I have had the honour to work on a cross-party basis on issues such as stalking, child abuse and coercive control. I am proud of that work, and I know that they are, too. The Domestic Abuse Bill, which is coming to the end of its progress through both Houses, has in many ways been Parliament at its very best.
The events of last week have no doubt acted as a catalyst. Society is speaking. The response to the reopened call for evidence on the Home Office’s violence against women and girls strategy has now received more than 120,000 submissions in just three days. Society is speaking, and it is for all of us to be up to the level of events.
The Bill, on which I have worked for many months—from well before the sentencing White Paper that I published in September last year—is not just the fulfilment of a manifesto commitment, important though that is; it lies at the very heart of the mission of this Government. It is another milestone along the road to creating a higher degree of public protection for victims of crime—and that very much includes women and girls. I had hoped—in fact, I believed—that we were going to be able to work with Members across this House not on the principle of the Bill but perhaps on the detail. Imagine my disappointment to hear that the Labour party has decided to oppose the Bill on Second Reading.
Let us remind ourselves of what Second Reading is all about: it is not about the detail of the Bill—whether it can be amended, improved, honed, polished or added to, as we have seen with the Domestic Abuse Bill—but about the principle. With the greatest of respect to Opposition Members, what beggars belief is that they think that now is the time to turn unity into bitterness and partnership into strife—[Interruption.] I can tell the right hon. Member for Tottenham that I am afraid that is what I have been hearing across the House. It is as if, somehow, we have descended into two nations once again, speaking past each other and not engaging in the way that we did on the Domestic Abuse Bill. To say that I am perplexed and disappointed is an understatement.
But then I read today’s Order Paper, and sadly all seems to be revealed, because we have not one reasoned amendment—we will vote on the one moved by the right hon. Member for Tottenham—but two from the Labour party. The Front-Bench amendment, which has a few names attached to it, makes a brief reference to the law on protest but, on analysis, does not really offer any solid reasons that are differences in principle in respect of Second Reading. The other reasoned amendment, which has been signed by 42 Labour party Members, offers much more direct resistance. It is clear that in principle those signatories are very much opposed to the Bill. There, frankly, lies the heart of the dilemma for the right hon. Gentleman and the Labour party: they are trapped between parts of their party that oppose, in principle, sensible, reasoned, proportionate measures that develop the law in a mature way, and the vast majority of the public, who want us to work together in the national interest. I am afraid that it looks as if party interests are being put before the national interest. It gives me no pleasure at all to say that, but I am afraid that that is what it looks like—not just to those on the Government side of the House, but to the country.
Let us look at what we did on the Domestic Abuse Bill. By working together, we moved mountains.
No, I will not give way to the right hon. Gentleman. I do not think I can do justice to the number of inaccuracies, generalisations and false assertions—inadvertent assertions, I will concede—that were made by him and, I am afraid, by other Opposition Members. They are concocting—
No, I will not give way.
Opposition Members are concocting synthetic arguments in objection that just do not stand the closest scrutiny. They are inadvertently—I will say “inadvertently”, because I will give them, of course, that courtesy—misstating some of the key provisions of this Bill.
Let us start with the juxtaposition pf sentencing for rape and criminal damage. The starting point for the lowest category of the offence of rape, as set out by the Independent Sentencing Council, is five years. With aggravating factors and different categories of offending, rape offenders will receive, and very often do receive, substantially longer sentences, leading up to those for campaigns of rape, where sentences of in excess of 20 years, or even life sentences, will be imposed, because the maximum penalty for rape is life imprisonment.
No, I will not give way.
In this Bill, we are making sure that those who commit offences such as rape spend more of their time in prison. We are ending Labour’s automatic halfway release provisions for people who receive sentences of over four years for offences such as rape and section 18 grievous bodily harm, and we are making sure that they serve two thirds of their term of imprisonment.
Turning to criminal damage, the relevant Act is now 50 years old, and for those 50 years the statutory maximum has been 10 years where the value of the damage is over £5,000. The changes in relation to criminal damage of memorials simply remove the previous restriction on the mode of trial and allow the full range of those powers to be used up to that maximum. We are simply giving the courts greater discretion as to how they sentence such offenders, taking into account the emotional and community impact of those offences.
We had, I thought, cross-party support on these measures. Indeed, back in the summer, the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) publicly backed our proposals. He said that he would work to support such efforts in Parliament. Now he is opposed. Why? Why the change? What is going on here? I will tell Members what is going on.
No, I will not give way. I will explain what is going on, and then I will let the right hon. Gentleman in.
I would suggest that what has happened here is the result of a conflation with the covid regulations and their interaction with the right to protest, which the Labour party did not oppose—it voted in favour of those on occasions or did not oppose them. They have conflated those arguments with measures in the Bill that long predate what happened on the weekend—those regrettable scenes that we all saw and were upset and appalled by. They are now conflating those issues with the issues relating to this Bill. There is no relation between the two, and I would love to hear an explanation from the right hon. Gentleman.
I am grateful to the Secretary of State for giving way. Last year, the Government spoke about additional protection for war memorials. We all understand the value of war memorials. What we did not agree to, and I have never agreed to, is locking up people for 10 years for damaging all memorials, including those of slave traders. That just sums up everything that is wrong with the Government’s approach. They could have worked with us. They did not. They have created division.
It is a very nice try from the right hon. Gentleman, for whom I have the utmost respect, but it does not cut the ice. We know what has happened here. It is a party in panic that is weaving, twisting and wobbling because its internal management problems are far more important than the public interest. That is the truth. Here we are, at the end of a two-day debate, with the Labour party, which I concede has a proud record in supporting the police and maintaining law and order, now voting against measures to strengthen sentencing for rapists, burglars, drug dealers, sex abusers, killer drivers. All of that is being opposed by the Labour party. Let me tell Labour Members the price of that for their party.
No, I am not going to give way.
Much has been said about the excellent campaigns run by Labour Members. I pay tribute to the hon. Members for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock), for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer) and for Rotherham (Sarah Champion), with whom I have worked very well over the years on issues relating to child abuse. Imagine the impossible position that those doughty campaigners have been put in by their Front Benchers. They are now having to vote against the very measures that they campaigned for so assiduously. That is a terrible predicament for them to be put in. It is a disgrace, and the Labour Front Benchers should hang their heads in shame.
There have been in this debate many constructive and important contributions, and I want to in the minutes that I have left—
They don’t like it when the truth is explained to them. They think that they have the moral high ground on all these issues. Well, I can tell you that there is no monopoly on morality in this place.
Before I deal with the excellent contributions from Members across the House, may I deal with the canard about “annoyance”? Much has been made about the somehow strange use of a word that is seen as a massive infringement on the civil liberties of men and women across this country, yet a brief perusal of the Law Commission’s report of 2015 tells us that the law has developed for centuries with phrases like “annoyance”. It is a part of the common law on public nuisance. The members of the Law Commission—they were all very good members; there was Lord Justice Lloyd Jones as he then was, and Professor David Ormerod, who is well known as an excellent academic in these fields—recommended that the law needed to be codified. The law had been restated with reference to the use of the word “annoyance” by none other than the late and noble Lord Bingham when he was in the House of Lords. He set out the law very clearly. Clause 59 amounts to no more than a reiteration of the excellent work of the Law Commission. To say anything else is, frankly, once again a confection, a concoction and a twisting of the reality.
I want to deal with the question of abuse in a position of trust. I pay particular tribute—I think all hon. Members will agree with me—to the outstanding work of my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch). It has been a pleasure to see her back here. She spoke earlier. I think she has now gone home, but we all wish her well. She has, with great tenacity, campaigned to make sure that we make these provisions a reality.
I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham). He asked a particular question about driving instructors. He will see in the Bill that there will be provision, by way of statutory instrument, to allow an amendment of the law to extend to further categories of occupation. It is important that there is a clear evidence base. We are dealing with young people who are transitioning to adulthood—they are 16 and 17 years of age—and it is quite clear that the evidence on sports coaches and religious leaders, sadly, did point to a need to change the law. I pay tribute to my hon. Friends and to my noble Friend Baroness Grey-Thompson for their excellent work.
On causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) deserves our thanks and praise for pressing her Bill. I know she has welcomed the provisions. In the context of memorials, I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Bracknell (James Sunderland) and for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis) for pressing their case with extreme prejudice and alacrity and for succeeding on the provision.
The Home Office parts of the Bill were outlined very well by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary yesterday. In summary, I would say that important public health duties are being extended in relation to serious violence. I have long held the view that it is only by bringing together the local agencies that we truly get ahead of the trends in serious violence and in prevention, which is of course nine tenths of what we need to be doing.
The Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), made a weighty contribution to the debate, rightly pointing to the extra investment in alternatives to custody. At the heart of the approach I am taking as Lord Chancellor is enhancing and improving community sentencing. It has long been clear to me that we need to make sure that sentencers have a proper choice of robust community alternatives.
I asked whether the Lord Chancellor could explain to my community why someone who was in a position of trust—deputy manager of a care home—who peddled kids to deal drugs across the country got a prison sentence of only four years. What is he going to do about that?
The hon. Gentleman knows that matters dealt with in court are matters for the independent judiciary, but I will look at the case, because it is vital that we make sure that those who are involved in organised crime and abuse—that is what that case sounds like to me—are properly dealt with, and that the wider issues are addressed. I share his concern.
Not at the moment.
I am particularly pleased to thank my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray), who represented the family of Ellie Gould, the murder victim of whose case I think everyone in this House is fully aware. It is important to take on board the points he made about domestic homicide. I have spoken elsewhere about the importance of getting the balance right when it comes to the categories of murder. I committed to a review—I did that last week—and I will bring before the House further information on the content of that important review.
In the minutes left, I am pleased to commend to the House a radical new approach to the way in which we deal with young people—children—who are incarcerated in the secure estate. The days of locking them up and forgetting about them absolutely have to end; we all agree on that. That is why the measures to clarify the legal framework surrounding new secure schools will allow a complete change in the way in which we deal with, support, rehabilitate and educate children in our care. Schools with security will have education, wellbeing and purposeful activity at their very heart. As ever, I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Rob Butler) for his constructive suggestions and his work as a member of the Justice Committee.
Let me outline on the record the important provisions in the Bill relating to unauthorised encampments. Many right hon. and hon. Members have raised the issue. It is a real concern for many of our constituents.
The pages of the Bucks Free Press attest to the sheer scale of the costs to our green spaces and our communities of unauthorised encampments. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that on this issue and on protests, the Opposition are refusing to engage with legitimate limits on both freedoms?
My hon. Friend puts it very well. This is all about balancing the rights of Traveller communities to use authorised encampments and to enjoy the lifestyle that they have chosen, and the rights of householders not to have their local communities despoiled. That is what we are seeking to do. The Bill, in my strong submission, allows that balance to be maintained and enhanced.
The Bill is part of our wider approach to making the criminal justice system smarter, and to keeping our streets safe from the worst criminals, while giving offenders opportunities to turn their life around. We can rebalance the justice system. We can restore faith in it, which has sadly been in decline for too long. The Bill is a welcome step forward, and I commend it to the House.
Order. We require social distancing in the Chamber at all times, please.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. First, let me ask you to switch any electronic devices off or to silent mode. I remind you that Mr Speaker does not allow tea or coffee to be consumed during sittings of this Committee. This is really difficult, but you have to try to observe the social distancing arrangements and sit only in the places that are marked. I ask you to wear a face mask when you are not speaking, unless you are medically exempt. Space is a bit tight in this room, so people just have to observe social distancing and try to make it as easy for people as possible as they are moving around.
Today we will consider, first, the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and then a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions, before the oral evidence session. In view of the time available, I hope that we can take all those matters without debate. Before we hear evidence from our first panel, we will have a short briefing from the Parliamentary Digital Service on cyber-security, which is of particular concern to members of this Committee because we are dealing with matters relating to the police and criminal law. The programme motion was discussed on Monday by the Programming Sub-Committee for this Bill.
I beg to move, Date Time Witness Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 10.30 am The National Police Chiefs’ Council Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 11.25 am The Police Superintendents’ Association; The Police Federation of England and Wales Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 2.45 pm The Centre for Justice Innovation; The Centre for Social Justice Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 3.30 pm Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 4.15 pm Local Government Association; The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 4.45 pm Doughty Street Chambers; Garden Court Chambers Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 5.15 pm Youth Justice Board Tuesday 18 May Until no later than 5.45 pm The Bar Council Thursday 20 May Until no later than 12.15 pm National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders; Unlock Thursday 20 May Until no later than 1 pm The Victims’ Commissioner Thursday 20 May Until no later than 2.45 pm The Children’s Society; Community Justice Scotland Thursday 20 May Until no later than 3.30 pm The Association of Youth Offending Team Managers Thursday 20 May Until no later than 4.15 pm The Law Society Thursday 20 May Until no later than 5 pm Howard League for Penal Reform; Criminal Justice Alliance; Women in Prison; Sentencing Academy Thursday 20 May Until no later than 5.45 pm Professor Colin Clark, University of the West of Scotland; Amnesty International UK; Liberty
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 18 May) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 18 May;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 20 May;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 25 May;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 27 May;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 8 June;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 10 June;
(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 15 June;
(h) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 17 June;
(i) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 22 June;
(j) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 24 June;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 10, Schedule 1, Clause 11, Schedule 2, Clauses 12 to 42, Schedule 3, Clause 43, Schedule 4, Clauses 44 to 47, Schedule 5, Clauses 48 to 51, Schedule 6, Clauses 52 to 66, Schedule 7, Clauses 67 to 73, Schedule 8, Clause 74, Schedule 9, Clauses 75 to 97, Schedule 10, Clauses 98 to 100, Schedule 11, Clauses 101 to 127, Schedule 12, Clause 128, Schedule 13, Clause 129, Schedule 14, Clauses 130 to 134, Schedule 15, Clause 135, Schedule 16, Clauses 136 to 156, Schedule 17, Clauses 157 to 161, Schedule 18, Clauses 162 to 168, Schedule 19, Clauses 169 to 171, Schedule 20, Clauses 172 to 176, new Clauses, new Schedules, remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 24 June.
The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), and I are both delighted to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I welcome to the Committee my hon. Friends, on the Government Benches, and hon. Members across the room. I am sure that we can expect some lively debates in the days and weeks of scrutiny ahead.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Victoria Atkins.)
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be circulated to members by email and made available in the Committee Room.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Victoria Atkins.)
Thank you. I have got to switch to the Minister, Victoria Atkins. If there is time, I will come back to Sarah Jones.
Q
Assistant Commissioner Hewitt: That is right.
Q
Assistant Commissioner Hewitt: Yes, I welcome that very much. In some senses, that was previously there. When you look, in particular, at the work that has been done by violence reduction units in the past year to 18 months—a couple of years, in fact—getting all the relevant agencies in the local area to focus on and prioritise reducing violence, and play their part, is the way to reduce levels successfully. We can never do that purely by enforcement. This is a really important opportunity to bring all those groups together and focus on violence in their local area.
Q
Assistant Commissioner Hewitt: The fact that it is a partnership is really important as well.
Q
Chief Constable Harrington: We did ask for public nuisance to be made statutory. A Law Commission report from 2015 clearly set out more broadly some of the benefits of doing that. The report refers to:
“serious distress, annoyance, inconvenience or loss of amenity; or is put at risk of suffering any of these things”.
The measure would be for more unusual kinds of protest activity that are not a march. Historically, people have hung off gantries of cranes, where there is serious inconvenience and loss of amenity.
Importantly, making it statutory establishes two things. First, the rules are very clear to those who have to use and understand the legislation. The common law is good, but it is steeped in decided cases and judgments that are often difficult to extract for non-lawyers. It allows Parliament to be clear about what the phrases mean, and to give guidance to policing and the public on what is intended. From a policing perspective, where we have intelligence or information, it allows us to act in advance to prevent some of those issues, where proportionate and necessary. That is the difference that it makes. We are working from the Law Commission report in 2015, which states a number of benefits. We see those as very important for those reasons.
Q
Chief Constable Harrington: Yes, that is the Law Commission’s summary of what that should be. That is where that phrase appears. We welcome the clarity; making it part of statute allows for phrases such as that and others to be clearly defined for us and for the public.
Q
Assistant Commissioner Hewitt: As I alluded to, it is critical to have a clear code of practice and framework to ensure the extraction to be proportionate and necessary for that investigation, and to be very clear about timelines, how that will be done and how the victim—or the complainant—will be treated throughout. This has been a very challenging area for us. Having that certainty and clarity of the guidelines will help to ensure that everybody understands the process. As I said, the ability for us to do that as quickly as we can, to deliver the evidence we need, is really important to maintain confidence, as you say, for people to come forward, and to maintain those complainants throughout the process, to reduce the attrition levels.
Q
I have two brief questions. The first relates to the proposed increase in the penalty for assaulting an emergency worker from 12 months to two years. Does the police service welcome that change? Do they think that it will potentially deter people from attempting to assault officers in the discharge of their duties?
Assistant Commissioner Hewitt: Yes, we welcome that change very much. It is sad to report that we have seen a steady increase in assaults on emergency workers, primarily police officers. In the month up to 14 March this year, there was a 19% increase on the previous year in assaults on emergency workers, predominantly police officers.
We have done an enormous amount of work in the service; we did an officer and staff safety review process, which is working to improve the safety of our officers and staff. We have worked closely with the Crown Prosecution Service, which has been supportive in achieving charges where officers or staff are assaulted in the course of their duties. I think the increase in the sentence is positive, provided, of course, that those sentences are handed down when people are found guilty at court. We are supportive of that, because it demonstrates the seriousness and the importance of the fact that, although our officers and staff protect the public and do dangerous things, they should not expect routinely to be assaulted.
We completely agree, thank you. My final question relates to out of court disposals. There are proposals in this Bill to simplify the number of out of court disposals from six to two. That has been trialled, I think, in three forces over the past few years—
Order. Minister, I am very sorry to interrupt you, but we are out of time. We will have to save that question for another witness or another occasion. I am afraid that brings us to the end of the Committee’s allotted time to ask questions. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee. Apologies, Minister, but we are on a pretty tight schedule.
Examination of Witnesses
Chief Superintendent Paul Griffiths and John Apter gave evidence.
Q
John Apter: I think we are pushing on an open door. Policing has changed significantly over the past decade or so, and it is the same with chief constables, who may previously have been reluctant to get certain wellbeing initiatives into place. There is wholesale agreement that the covenant will be a positive thing for policing.
The issue we have at the moment is that although we know the principles of the covenant, we do not really know what exactly will be in it. Chief constables know me very well, and I, on behalf of the organisation, will be holding them to account, but I genuinely think that it will be a partnership. Perhaps that is naive, but if, as expected, the legislation allows the covenant to be enshrined in law, I will be saying to chief constables very clearly, “This is not something you can cherry-pick. This is in legislation. This is to benefit our colleagues, staff, volunteers and so on. It is not a nice-to-have; it is an essential.” So they will be held to account, but in fairness I think it will be a productive partnership.
Q
Chief Superintendent Griffiths: Most of them have probably worked their way through the hierarchy of public order command systems, from right at the frontline, following through to supervisory and management roles, but not necessarily in all cases. There is a detailed training command course for public order leads, which embodies everything that you would expect: to understand the tactics necessary when utilising public order, seeking the appropriate advice and guidance, understanding the law and the community, and all the different aspects of decision making that are so important to understand how best to corral a crowd or deal with a peaceful protest.
They will learn how to deal with everything from small, minor protests with just some shouting, to some of the challenges that, sadly, we have seen in the past 12 months, where they have faced attacks by missiles, etc. The training is detailed. I have absolute confidence in some of the public order commanders. We have to understand that they are called to make really difficult judgment calls, balancing human rights of individuals and the recognition of their own staff and the public. They make difficult decisions in a short space of time. It is a credit to them as individuals and to the training processes that allow them to do that.
Q
Chief Superintendent Griffiths: You are right to clarify that. Unfortunately, we have not been consulted on that particular aspect. If I can provide written evidence, we will explore a response and get back to you.
Q
John Apter: Absolutely, the risk of a custodial sentence would be a meaningful deterrent, as well as everything else. As I said, it is about the training and equipment that officers and staff have. But I go back to my earlier point: the increase in sentencing will mean nothing if the sentencing guidelines do not allow the courts to use those powers effectively. Far too often, my colleagues feel that the wider criminal justice system lets them down. We need to address that, as well as increase sentences. Yes, I believe that it would be a deterrent.
Chief Superintendent Griffiths: It is very much welcome and supported. There is a hope that it will be a deterrent. We recognise that any sort of assault on emergency workers has a complex and dynamic number of factors that may cause that situation to arise. We must do everything in our power to eliminate or minimise every aspect of those factors. Hopefully, it will have a deterrent effect, and will send a very strong message from Parliament to emergency workers to say, “You are valued for what you do. We support you, and you should not have that sort of risk when trying to carry out your duties.” We will review the situation over time, to see what the deterrent effect is, but we are grateful for the support that Parliament proposes.
Thank you. It may be worth you engaging with the Sentencing Council once the legislation passes, to ensure the sentencing guidelines reflect the seriousness of the offence, and that the sentences in practice reflect Parliament’s intention.
Now is a good time to draw this session to a close. I thank the witnesses for their evidence this morning.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I am afraid I have to strike a balance and I have to switch to the Minister, for his questions. I am sorry.
Q
Adrian Crossley: So that I understand the question and I answer it properly, are you asking what merits we would need to see in order for there to be an expansion of minimum tariffs in sentencing? Is that what you mean?
Or the risks. What are your views about the principles of the possibility?
Adrian Crossley: My own view is that judicial discretion should be king. I have not done any huge research into this, but in my view and from my practice, sentencing guidelines have become very prescriptive and they almost railroad judges into decisions. Judges always have parameters to work within, but what is before the court is often something that is necessarily unique. Minimum sentencing can shackle decision makers who are acutely aware of the facts in front of them.
The only benefit I see is in cases where there are overwhelming public interest concerns that mean that a minimum tariff would adequately address a specific mischief and would undo it. If I were to see that, I would regard that as a pro for minimum sentences. I would need to see an evidence base that that would achieve that.
Phil Bowen: I agree with what Adrian says. In general, a lot of the evidence from, for example, the United States on mandatory minimums is not encouraging, but I see an argument for Parliament identifying particular crimes of concern and putting those in place. We should be clear that the deterrent effect of that is likely to be pretty mixed. The evidence is pretty mixed about whether that kind of thing really does deter future crime, but I can see the public need for the Government to be seen to respond to public desires around particular signal crimes. That is why, although I do not reject them out of hand, I agree entirely with Adrian that judicial discretion is extraordinarily important because judges will know the facts of the case much better than the press or the public watching on.
Q
Phil Bowen: I think the emphasis in the Bill and the White Paper on flexibility around the use of electronic monitoring is the strongest part of the proposals. What the Ministry seems to be doing, which I think is right, is to encourage probation officer discretion and the flexible use of electronic monitoring powers, both to control people where there is need for further control, and to loosen up things where they are doing well. Part of the problem with electronic monitoring to date has been far too rigid sets of curfews without the ability for probation officers to vary them while people are on community sentences. I certainly support that.
In terms of providing for longer periods of electronic monitoring, I can see cases where that may well be useful. The only note of caution that I would suggest to the Committee is that the evidence base suggests that for younger people—in particular, young adults who live at home and people assessed as low risk—longer periods of electronic location monitoring can have a backfire effect. In other words, it can lead to increases in reoffending. All that really means is that the Bill provides the powers that it does, and it is then the job of the probation service to use those powers as flexibly as possible and in line with the evidence.
Thank you. I was going to ask about problem-solving courts, but I think that was covered adequately in earlier questions. I think Minister Atkins has some questions.
Q
Adrian Crossley: This policy actually has its origins in the CSJ. We are obviously very supportive of the serious violence reduction order. Just for clarity, and so I can answer that more fully, this is a post-conviction order. We regard it as being part of the wider system. We do not regard it as a stand-alone solution to knife crime in our country.
We see a very significant increase, not just in possession of weapon offences, but of violent offences perpetrated with the use of a weapon. What is clear to us is that we need to do something about that which is robust enough to challenge the mindset of someone leaving their home with a weapon. We draw from the group violence intervention models piloted in Boston in the US under Operation Ceasefire, which create a sort of pull-push effect. We really want to deter people from being able to leave the home feeling that they are safe walking around with a weapon. They should know that they are much more likely to attract police attention if they are on these orders. At the same time, in the sentencing court, we would hope that the order would be able to include other, positive provisions—perhaps even a knife crime behaviour order. Real intervention, engaging young people and pulling them away from that sort of offending can also have a pull effect away from that kind of offence.
I should say that currently, as it is being piloted, it is only for adults. Our view is that knife possession is pervasive across a number of age groups: it is particularly concerning when young people are carrying knives. We would like to see this scheme really being rolled out, so that we can intervene early when people are younger, to see that we do everything we can to take knives off the street and keep people safer.
As it is 2.45 pm, we had better call this session to an end. I thank the witnesses for the evidence they have given to the Committee.
Examination of Witnesses
Jonathan Hall QC and Matt Parr gave evidence.
I am going to have to stop you there. I will switch to the Government side and Victoria Atkins.
Q
Jonathan Hall QC: First of all, it means that anyone who is a risky offender—whatever they were put inside for, whether they were sentenced for a terrorist offence or were sentenced for a non-terrorist one but are in fact a risk—can be managed under MAPPA. The law as it stands states that someone must be a risk based on their offending.
To take the example of a fraudster who went to prison and was then dangerously radicalised and became a terrorist risk, their risk would not in fact flow from their offending. Clause 162 cures that, so that anyone who is identified as a terrorist risk may be manged under MAPPA. That is a good thing, because the authorities found it quite hard to deal with that cohort of people.
The other thing that clause 162 does is to make it very clear that people can provide information to MAPPA without having to do what they used to do when I carried out my review, which was to look for information gateways in, for example, the Children Act 1989 or the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, because they did not feel that there was a clear basis for them to share information with MAPPA. As you will understand, the key thing about managing terrorist risk is that all the right information should be receivable. Clause 162 cures that point as well.
In other words, dealing with the reality presented by a very small number of the most dangerous offenders—dealing with that reality, rather than being constrained by the fact that they committed a fraud offence in the past, rather than a terrorist offence.
Jonathan Hall QC: Exactly.
Q
Matt Parr: There were four tests in the law as it stands, one of which is “serious disruption”. Clause 55, I think, changes that to “significant disruption”, among some others. It is a general lowering of the bar.
Q
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation”,
or,
“serious disruption to the life of the community.”
That is the wording in clause 54 as well. As you will understand, clauses 54 and 55 are about ensuring consistency between moving protest and static protest. We heard from police witnesses this morning that one can flow into the other very easily, and back again.
May I also ask about clause 59? That places the common law offence of public nuisance on the statute book. Does the inspectorate have any views on that, or has it made any recommendations on it previously?
Matt Parr: Not previously, but we did in the report we put out in March. That was one of the five proposals that the Home Secretary asked us to comment on in particular. Our view was that we agreed with what the Law Commission recommended back in 2015, I think. We concluded, for much the same reasons as they did, that that was a sensible thing to do. In summary, we thought that protesters deserve to know where they stand, and that there was no harm in making the rules clearer than they are. It was supporting the Law Commission’s proposal.
Q
Matt Parr: I am really sorry. I have not looked at that. I cannot give you an answer, I am afraid.
Q
Let me turn to Jonathan, if I may, going back to clause 108, which Alex Cunningham was asking about. This is in relation to prisoners sentenced for non-terrorist offences who are deemed to become high risk in the course of their sentence. To clarify, is your understanding of the clause the same as mine—that the Secretary of State does not have the power to unilaterally ask for their prolonged incarceration, but instead the Secretary of State simply has a power to refer the prisoner to the Parole Board, which will then make the assessment of dangerousness? It is the Parole Board that makes the decision, not the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State simply refers. Is that your understanding as well?
Jonathan Hall QC: Yes. I have it in front of me. I think the point that Mr Cunningham was making is that it is the Secretary of State who refers it, but you are right: it is the Secretary of State who refers it, but ultimately it is the Parole Board that decides.
Q
Jonathan Hall QC: Yes, that is right. When the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020—the emergency legislation that came in after the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall—transformed people from automatic release prisoners to people who would have to apply to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point, it had an effect on people who are currently serving. That was challenged in the courts by one of the affected prisoners, and the High Court concluded that it was consistent with article 7.
Q
The final point that Mr Cunningham raised was in relation to the potential for a cliff edge if somebody serves all of their sentence in prison and is not released early. He referred to the possibility of a cliff edge, which exists in various other contexts that you have referred to already. Am I right in saying that if the Government, the security services or the authorities are concerned about the risk that a particular prisoner might pose following release if they were released without licence conditions because they had served all of the sentence, it would be open to the security services, acting through the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to apply for a TPIM if they felt the threshold was met? That would be one option available if they wanted to manage risk, accepting that TPIMs are rarely used.
Jonathan Hall QC: You anticipated what I was going to say. Yes, that is available, but TPIMs are very resource-intensive, and they are very rarely used for that reason.
I misunderstood the line about the role of the Parole Board. I was concerned about what happens beyond the completion of the sentence. As the Minister says, the TPIM is used only in extremely rare circumstances, and it was unclear when that would apply and when it would not apply. Again, my concern is the cliff edge—somebody being released into the community without any licence conditions or further restrictions on their movements.
Q
Q
Alison Hernandez: I want to be really clear what we are all talking about. We are not talking about all Gypsies and Travellers.
Exactly.
Alison Hernandez: We are not talking about the travelling community. We are talking about a minority of people. I have examples in Exeter city where the local authority created a very nice site so that we could admit them quicker from where they were. It had everything that they needed and the facilities that they wanted, and it was in a nice, secluded spot. When the police went in to evict them, they decided not to go to that site that was available to them. They wanted to go to the next game that they wanted to play. Let’s be really clear about this: we are talking about a minority of people who do not want to abide by the law of this country. I believe we need this offence to support our communities and to send a very strong message: you do not do this type of behaviour.
I mentioned the £18,500 metal fencing created at Drumbridges roundabout to stop them accessing that land. They broke into that land. I have communities who will tell me that they have spotters who go ahead to break open the gates, so they will use the excuse that the gates were already open. All these sorts of things are happening. I have asked about CCTV—can we put it on the main sites where we have these things happening? It cannot be done, because of human rights—because it is where someone is living. Every place you turn to as a community to try to solve this problem is not available.
For me, harms are being caused. On Dartmoor alone, when they had an unauthorised encampment, it became absolutely huge. When these things get so huge, no one can move them on, because the amount of resource required to do so is immense. The bailiffs were going to cost £50,000 a day, and they would still need police back-up in order to do it. The cost is absolutely huge. There is something about sending a message through this Bill which tells the public that we are on their side and that we do not support people who do not want to abide by the law.
David Lloyd: I entirely agree with that. In Welwyn Garden City, we have a person who has almost been driven to the verge of bankruptcy because there was an unauthorised encampment which decided, at the same time, to take on industrial-level fly-tipping. It would cost about £150,000 to move those materials. That originally happened 18 months or two years ago. It is still there among all the woodland.
These people are at the end of their tether. The cost is not just monetary. I have people calling me who really are frightened because they have had large numbers of people on their own land and they feel intimidated and personally threatened. We need to do something about it. Much of it is about sending a message.
While I recognise that it is not helped, as I said earlier, by the fact that local authorities do not provide sufficient spots for Travellers to move on to—I recognise that is something we need to do—we also need to send a message that these people can be moved on if they are in an unauthorised place. We need to send that message out again, as Alison has said far more ably than me, so that the public recognise that we are on their side and we are on the side of the underdog.
Councillor Caliskan: All I would add is that I recognise that there are strongly held views, and we have councils who articulate exactly what colleagues on this panel have spoken about. It can be a huge cost to a local authority.
The best way to deal with these issues is through a collaborative approach, not just through agencies in a particular area, but also with the communities themselves who may be occupying the space. Something has got to give at some point, and an obvious solution is trying to identify space. Local authorities absolutely do not want to be encouraging criminality and disruption, not least because it costs a lot of money, but we could be going round and round in circles unless we find a long-term solution. I recognise that the Bill is an attempt to do that. All I would say is that in order for there to be a collaborative approach, alongside that there needs to be an approach that is about dialogue with communities, too. I do not think that contradicts anything that other panel members have said.
Just to assist the Committee, clause 61 focuses on the conditions whereby this offence can be committed. The phrases “significant damage”, “significant disruption” and “significant distress” appear to cover the descriptions given by Commissioner Hernandez and Commissioner Lloyd.
On the serious violence duty, where the Government are requiring local agencies to work together to draw together plans to tackle serious violence in their local areas, I am happy to reassure Commissioner Lloyd that clause 13 very much views police and crime commissioners and mayors with policing powers as having a convening role in that. What value do you think will be gained in your local areas from requiring these organisations—vital as they are, in their many ways, in tackling the serious violence that we hope to prevent—to get around a table and work together with schools and educational establishments, in particular, to ensure that we prevent serious violence?
Very briefly, please, because we are almost out of time.
David Lloyd: Things that are asked for specifically and are required of us get done. This measure strengthens what many of us are already putting into our own police and crime plans. It is always better to place a duty on us, because that ensures that it gets done. We really do need to ensure that the scourge of serious violence is reduced. There are many parts of the country—thankfully not Hertfordshire—where this is out of control, and this measure will help.
Q
Adam Wagner: Yes, of course.
Q
Adam Wagner: I think I would be neutral on that. It is a very wide piece of legislation. Every time I read it, I am pretty surprised at how wide it is already. What I am pretty clear about is that section 12 does not need to be widened.
Q
Adam Wagner: Well, potentially. The proof is often in the pudding. It depends on how the police use it and whether they are using it effectively. I have read the report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services. I speak to a lot of police, and my experience is that they know they have a wide suite of powers when it comes to protest. What they struggle with, if you look at what has happened over the covid regulations, is deciding when to use them and what is proportionate. These are very difficult policing situations, and they are not necessarily solved by imposing widespread conditions that may lead to legal challenges, which may be successful. Successful policing of protests ultimately comes down to working with the protesters and civil society—hearts and minds stuff from the police. You saw that with the Sarah Everard vigil, and you see that with Extinction Rebellion and Black Lives Matter. I do not think you can really enforce your way out of some of the disruption caused by protest. It is really about allowing voices to be heard and being careful.
Q
Adam Wagner: Well, in part. The Public Order Act was used quite extensively over the course of the Extinction Rebellion protests, and Black Lives Matter was under the covid regulations last summer. That was the power that was used, and those are much more extensive. The covid regulations are far too extensive. We saw there the problems when the police are given too much power, because then they have to make what are not really public order decisions but substantive political decisions about which protests they do and do not allow. That is the danger. I do not think it is a right-wing or left-wing issue; any Government should be worried about protests being limited by political decisions, rather than public order decisions.
Q
Adam Wagner: I think the objective test would assist the courts; I do not think it would assist police officers. Anything that limits these powers is better than not, but I just think the powers themselves are too wide for the reasons I have set out. I do not think that helps anything. From a policing perspective, applying all those tests is not going to be easy anyway. Really, this is about the width of the powers overall as a package, rather than the reasonable firmness test or anything like that.
Q
Marc Willers QC: I do not think it would just be related to private lands—
I accept that. There are provisions on common lands as well—you are quite right.
I think we had better let Mr Willers answer as we are going to run completely out of time.
Marc Willers QC: It covers private and public land, and common land, and you are right that the conditions are “significant damage”, “significant disruption” and “significant distress”. My comments earlier were about the fact that significant damage and disruption can be covered by other legislation. The “significant distress” point was one I made in the context of the fact that the occupier may have their own impression of “significant distress”, or may suffer significant distress because of an inherent prejudice towards Gypsies and Travellers.
I am really sorry Minister, but we are going to have to stop there because we are out of time allotted for this session. I thank you both for your evidence.
Examination of witness
Stephanie Roberts-Bibby gave evidence.
Q
Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: We would see the benefits very much related to the skills, experience and expertise that multi-academy trusts could bring into a secure school setting. As you may know, the secure estate is split into three different sections: secure training centres, secure children’s homes and young offenders institutions. The custodial element of those organisations is very strong and probably strongest in the YOIs and the STCs. The introduction of a very different model that accounts for children’s needs will not mean that they will not be secure; it will mean that they have a focus on education, mental health, and a trauma-informed approach to working with children who have complex needs, which is very much needed.
Q
Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: Gosh. We could probably provide you with a significant amount of evidence on that and I would very much welcome the opportunity to do that in writing to the Committee.
We would suggest coming from the perspective of the child first and using the evidence base that has been developed recently, which focuses on children, their personal and social identity and their strengths, rather than being deficit-based. The evidence, which equally applies to adults, is that if you look for good and build on good, much more is achieved than if you tell people that they are no use and no good and cannot contribute to society.
We know that with children, the earlier we intervene, the better—early intervention and prevention, and targeting services upstream. That is a challenge for youth offending teams at the moment. They have statutory caseloads and trying to balance intervening earlier is really difficult. Some local authorities manage to do that better than others. There is a massive evidence base and we can share the evidence after the Committee today.
Q
Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: We have been working really closely with the Ministry of Justice on the remand review. We are very keen to understand the data better and to have a look at the trends across the country. One of the things we would really welcome as, dare I say, an amendment to the Bill is for there to be a decision why bail is and is not granted. There is still a lack of evidence on what needs to change for more children to remain in the community, and we want to avoid perpetuating cycles of evidence.
You asked about what more we could do around the remand review. There is certainly something more we could do around trying to knit the system together better, through our heads of regions constantly having discussions with the sector around remand. We are doing quite a lot of work at the moment on developing alternative models for accommodation. We are working across London. We are investing in a pathfinder project to try to develop a different model for children, to prevent them being taken into the secure estate on remand.
I think that covers everything I wanted to ask. Thank you for the work you are doing.
If you do wish to furnish the Committee with further written evidence to support your comments, that would be most welcome. I think Mr Cunningham had a further question.
Q
Derek Sweeting QC: In the end, it will have to be managed judicially. I am not sure that we need to hem in the exercise of discretion in relation to that. There are already provisions in relation to what the judge must take into account when considering whether there should be remote participation. They are very difficult to apply to juries, by the way, but if they are followed, we will find that they involve a significant number of safeguards for the fair conduct of proceedings.
Q
Derek Sweeting QC: Yes, I think my point was really about the suggestion that the statutory offence—these are the words—is to cover the same conduct as the existing common law offence of public nuisance but, yes, you are right that there is an offence of that sort in there.
Q
Derek Sweeting QC: Two questions. Is it more convenient? Certainly, during the pandemic it has been important to have a method of holding hearings when we have to socially distance. Under the circumstances of the pandemic, it was vital. Remote hearings have enabled the family jurisdiction in particular to keep on working from the word go—it never stopped. Using technology in those circumstances in remote hearings was extremely helpful. It was certainly convenient during the pandemic.
Is it convenient for everyone? During the pandemic itself, we had some opposing views. Counsel certainly found it convenient, but one or two participants in family proceedings publicly said that they felt detachment from the proceeding. We have to recognise that there are reasons for being cautious about making the assumption that if it is convenient for legal professionals and judges, it is also necessarily a good experience for users. Certainly, there are whole categories of users for whom, if they cannot get to court or if they have mobility problems, the ability to have a hearing remotely is going to be valuable. Of course, we have been in a big laboratory, and we have tested a lot of these things in a way that we that we would not have been able to do in the decades before the pandemic. We need to take forward the best of remote and carry on using it.
Are there disadvantages? Yes, I think there are. There are experiences that we have all heard about, which are salutary and should make us be cautious about just assuming that we can always do things as well if we are doing them remotely.
Q
Derek Sweeting QC: I am not sure that is right. The point that I was making is that the proposed amendment is to the mode of trial for a limited class of offences of criminal damage. That is the effect of the amendment. It removes the power for an offence involving a memorial to be tried in the magistrates court, however small the value of any damage. That was the point I was making earlier. I was really being asked whether that is a proportionate measure, and the point I was making is that there are some offences involving memorials where one would have thought that the magistrates’ powers are perfectly adequate, and it is not proportionate to require that matter to go to the Crown court.
Q
Derek Sweeting QC: Well, there might be, but equally there might be cases where it is wholly unnecessary to go to the Crown court. Since the definition of “memorial” extends to moveable items, removing a bunch of flowers from a memorial amounts to the offence. It is difficult to see why that merits a trip to the Crown court. It is well within the magistrate’s existing sentencing.
Q
Derek Sweeting QC: My understanding that a mode of trial change is being contemplated under part 2.
Q
Derek Sweeting QC: There are obviously circumstances in which minimum sentences can be used. It is a matter for Parliament. You have to reflect on public disquiet and the need to make sure there is a sentencing regime that reflects the seriousness of offences. The general position is that if you have minimum mandatory sentences, you inevitably tie the hands of the judge to some extent. If you carry on extending that, you are making potentially significant inroads into judicial discretion. The lesson of sentencing is that cases generally need individual sentences because there are very complex differences between them. You were just making the point about judges having discretion to sentence according to the gravity and nature of the crime.
Does anyone else have any further questions? I cannot see anyone. In that case, Mr Sweeting, thank you very much for your evidence to the Committee. I thank all witnesses who gave evidence today to the Committee. That brings us to the end of our oral evidence session for today. The Committee will meet again on Thursday to take further evidence. We will meet in this room at 11.30 am.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Q
May I start with problem-solving courts? Clearly, as with so many things, it is important that the implementation is right; there are some things that work and some things that do not. Can you give your views on the things that have worked and the things that have not worked in problem-solving courts that we have tried in the past—I think there was one in Merseyside a few years ago—and the lessons that we might learn from problem-solving courts in the US, as we design and implement the pilot?
Helen Berresford: This is not something that we have significant expertise in at Nacro, in terms of learning from previous pilots. With any of these things, we have to understand, as you say, what has worked and what has not worked.
The point that we made earlier about the role of building judicial confidence, which was picked up on, is a really important one, and that confidence has to be central to problem-solving courts as we roll them out. Getting the right people involved and the right support functions is important. One of the important purposes—is it not?—of problem-solving courts is that you bring the right people into the discussions and keep them engaged.
I will just refer, for example, to community sentence treatment requirements. We know from our experience of what we have seen that engaging with the judiciary in that process has a really positive impact. That is one of the things we have seen and that we would like to see much more of in the roll-out of CSTRs, and I would say the same for problem-solving courts.
Sam Doohan: In addition to building interest and engagement in the judiciary, one of the other issues is also building interest and engagement among the local population. The courts need to be credible, both to offenders and to the local population. That is probably the biggest step that needs to be taken. If local people think that someone will effectively get just a slap on the wrist and that the problem-solving court does not solve the problem, they will not bother reporting minor crimes and, to some degree, neither will the police. It is very important that that credibility takes centre stage and that the whole process has some faith that its measures will actually be successful.
Q
First of all, do you share that analysis, particularly where a CSTR might be an alternative to a short sentence? If you do share that analysis, what do you think we can do to encourage the wider use of CSTRs, in addition to the extra money for the actual treatment that is being provided at the moment? I ask that because I would like to see them being used a lot more.
Campbell Robb: Yes, we would too, and I think the evidence suggests that when they are used properly they can have a significant effect, on both the addiction or the mental health issues that people are suffering from, and ultimately—we think in previous studies, but not recently—potentially on reoffending. So we are very supportive of them.
I think that, as you would expect us to say, they need to be part of a wider network that is available, ranging from wider drug treatment services, through the NHS and other public health bodies, to job opportunities. They are part of a holistic approach—part of a whole series of interventions that can help people.
On their use as an alternative to sentencing, we could not agree more. That is the work that Nacro does every day, with hundreds of people across the country. If we can use them to help support people through their mental health issues, or drug and alcohol issues, and keep them out of the criminal justice system, then absolutely; we could not agree more. We are very supportive and would want to work alongside to get more of them up and running as soon as possible.
I agree that having the judiciary, as well as the public, see them as a viable alternative is something we all need to work on once the Bill becomes an Act, so that we really get that buy-in and momentum behind them so that they can be used more widely.
Helen Berresford: We have seen an increase in their usage in the test sites. The only point I would add, without repeating my earlier comment, is that building judicial confidence will be an important part of this. That is a really important thing to learn from. Continually evaluating and learning as we roll these out will be really important, learning where they have worked and where they have not. If we can build that in, I think there is a really positive role for community sentence treatment requirements.
Sam Doohan: There is also an issue with building faith with offenders and the people who will potentially receive treatment. One of the concerns that we hear with these kinds of disposals is that people are worried that their criminal record will show that they have been in drug treatment or mental health treatment. In general, although not in the absolute, that is not a problem, because it will not show up and they will not have to disclose it. But people do not know that and they do not necessarily have a great deal of faith that it will not show up three, four or five years later, when they have turned their life around.
I mention that in particular because a DWP study from 2010, I think, found that the only group who, in employment terms, were discriminated against on a par with people with convictions were alcoholics and drug users. Therefore, ensuring that people understand the full ramifications of co-operating with a drug treatment programme—that it will be private, to a large degree, and that it will give them the opportunity to move on positively afterwards—would go a long way.
Q
Helen Berresford: Our preference—and yours too, I hear—is very much about looking at community sentences, where they are more effective. If there is an option of custody, I think we really need to build that in as an absolute last resort, and it is worth looking at how we can ensure that is the case. Certainly, on a broader point, in the past we have seen increases in recall to prison, and in some cases people have been recalled for very minor breaches of their conditions, and nothing to do with committing a crime. It is really important that we ensure that is not what we are doing. If there is a condition about prison as a last resort, we have to make sure that it is for a very significant reason and that it is truly a last resort.
Q
Sam Doohan: Broadly speaking, statutory minimums cause problems. The reduction of judicial discretion means that cases cease to be individual and start to be set by central Government policy. Although it can be argued either way, depending on your taste, were we to follow an American model, where if you get three strikes and then a very long prison sentence for a relatively minor crime, under the current British criminal records system that would almost certainly be disclosed for life, and it would not just be a fairly stiff sentence for repeat offending; it would become a life sentence immediately. That is something always to be aware of when thinking about where we set not just sentencing guidelines, but sentencing minimums in particular. If the judge thinks that six months is appropriate, we should not be the ones to argue with that.
Campbell Robb: We agree that judicial discretion is paramount. We think that is a very, very important consideration. For any changes, it is important to be aware of that and to have an urgent space to see what impact those minimum sentences are having across the piece, in terms of numbers, time and then rehabilitation.
I thank our three witnesses for a very strong performance and for answering the questions so fully—it is much appreciated.
Examination of witnesses
Dame Vera Baird, QC, gave evidence.
Thank you very much for that. I think you have covered everything that I needed to cover.
Q
On the point about digital divides, do you accept that there is a need to clarify the law on this? At the moment, we have the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and we have the Attorney General’s new guidelines, but presumably you accept that there is a need to set a framework in law in order to help and protect victims, and to protect the right of a free trial under article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Dame Vera Baird: I think national legislation to clarify the law about this is imperative, but it is just not this national legislation.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: Yes, of course we have to do so. I am not sure you will be doing that with this power. I think there is a real human rights challenge here already, and I am pretty satisfied that there will be data protection challenges too. Yes, of course data protection is the law and it is important. I do not think this fulfils all your obligations under that either.
Q
“that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to a purpose within subsection (2)”.
That wording of course comes from the 1996 Act, doesn’t it?
Dame Vera Baird: I do not know which it comes from, but “relevant” is no good, Minister. “Relevant” is not a reasonable line of inquiry. Somebody who comes across the letter from the lady in Northumbria might think that is relevant. I do not think that finding it is a reasonable line of inquiry. A reasonable line of inquiry in the CPIA is the right test, and this is the wrong test.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: There is a test of a reasonable line of inquiry under the CPIA. That is the test, and that is very much a narrower test than the one in the proposed clauses. I have to say, because we narrowed it from relevance down to a reasonable line of inquiry in our amendments, the police were happy to accept that, so I am not sure why the Home Office wants it to be wider than the police want it to be.
Q
“satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate”.
Again, that wording applies across the board in terms of criminal proceedings. Is that correct?
Dame Vera Baird: I have come across the terminology before, but it is highly subjective. Insufficient detail is gone into for it to have the meaning that it is important to have. I think it is a very good thing, if I may say so, Minister, that you have accepted that the backdrop against which we approach these clauses is a very, very undesirable one, where confidence has been lost by over-demands on vulnerable complainants’ personal data. It is hugely important therefore to put into the legislation every protection that can be put in, for fairness. Remember, there is a massive power imbalance in the relationship at the time of the requests—
Q
The codes of practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, for example, are vital codes of practice that are relied on in court. If a police officer does not meet the standards expected by that code when interviewing suspects, for example—if there is a significant breach—the entire prosecution can fall. Do you accept that although we are rightly looking at the wording of the clauses, just focusing on those would not give the full picture? We also need to consider the importance that the code of practice will have. It will deal with some of the practice points that you have raised.
Dame Vera Baird: I do not think it is the right analogy to compare any code of practice. Let me tell you, the code of practice under this is invisible or non-existent. Codes of practice are discussed though they are the answer to it all. The first thing to say is that they do not have the power of statute, and if the legislation goes through as it is now, that is what the police will likely rely on. Of course a statutory code of practice under PACE has the consequences that you described, Minister, but that is because if you break the code of practice under PACE, it impacts on the defendant. The defendant can say, “Oh, that’s been done unfairly and jeopardised my fair trial,” and a breach can even be the end of a prosecution. There is absolutely no power for a rape complainant to have a similar resolution of a breach of any code of practice in this legislation. They can breach the codes of practice until they are blue in the face, and it does not make any difference to the trial.
But you accept—
Dame Vera Baird: That is a difference in power, is it not? That is an important point.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: I am sure you accept the difference, though, Minister—
No—
Dame Vera Baird: There is no possible remedy or solution for the complainant that is analogous to the outright acquittal that can be a consequence of breaching the PACE code of practice, because that is about a defendant. This is about a complainant. What do you suggest would be the solution if the code of practice were breached in my case of rape and too much documentation was taken and disclosed? What is my remedy?
Q
Dame Vera Baird: I would like to answer that, if I can. They are the only thing, because there is no sign of a code of practice. There is no draft code of practice at all. When I ask what my remedy would be as a rape complainant, you say to me that the police will be accountable, but how will they be accountable? It is not a crime and it is not a tort to break this code of practice, so what is the remedy if it is broken? It is not an analogy with the PACE code of practice. Do not over-rely on this code of practice, Minister. You and I share the aim of protecting complainants. Do not over-rely on a code of practice no one has ever seen and that does not have statutory form.
Q
Dame Vera Baird: If those routes really do exist, have they been working, Minister? I do not remember any complainant being able to come to me as a PCC and complain about an individual case. Let’s face it: the dire situation where the public, or at least this sector of them, have lost confidence in the police has occurred at the time when all of those bodies that can call them to account have been in play, and they have not called them to account.
Q
I will move on to unauthorised encampments. You were asked about the impact and you fairly conceded that residents can be victims in the context of unauthorised encampments. Clause 61 sets out the offence. The conditions that are laid down for the alleged commission of an offence include factors such as “significant damage”, “significant disruption” and “significant distress”. With your focus on antisocial behaviour, presumably you welcome the focus on those unauthorised encampments that result in those sorts of distressing conditions?
Dame Vera Baird: I would not want anyone to suffer from any of those, but causing damage—I do not know what that is. If you are on an unauthorised encampment and you have not got a lavatory so you dig a latrine, is that causing damage to the field? I think it depends how it is defined. I really cannot go much further than saying that unless there is proper provision of authorised encampments, you have two sets of victims. I quite agree with you that the people who are distressed, damaged or whatever by an unauthorised encampment are victims of that. There is no doubt of it—you have made your point—but I want you to take into account the difficulty of finding somewhere to camp in a lot of places, which forces people into an unlawful place. Of course, damage is not justifiable, but that is a factor to consider. I was so pleased when the NPCC appreciated that as well.
Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. I thank the witness again for her evidence.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Q
Hazel Williamson: What YOT managers say to me is that the biggest challenge is around funding. Youth offending teams have absolutely reduced first-time entrants; we have reduced children and young people going into custody. We are also reducing the reoffending rates for many of our children and young people. The assumption, therefore, is that youth offending teams do not need to be funded as much as they were previously.
However, youth offending team managers have been saying for some time that just because the numbers have reduced does not mean that we are not working with a complex group of children and young people. For many youth offending teams, the numbers they are working with have not reduced; it is just that the children are in a different space and place. For example, we might not be working with as many children on statutory orders, but we will be offering some kind of prevention and diversion to keep them out of the criminal justice system.
It is not always the case that because first-time entrants are reducing and the numbers of children involved in the criminal justice system are reducing, youth offending teams are not doing the same amount of work they have always done. Funding is really an issue, as is understanding the context and the numbers of children that YOTs are trying to work with across the country.
Q
Hazel Williamson: Absolutely, and we know that, but children and young people who commit those offences as children should still be sentenced as children. We can use the strength in our youth offending teams, because we have seconded probation staff working with us, so we can have quite a balanced report for those children and young people, and support them with the transition from youth offending teams into probation. Age and maturity should absolutely be considered across the whole system, but our children and young people who commit offences when under 18 should be sentenced as children.
Q
Hazel Williamson: What we know about sentencing is that people will make significant changes between the time they committed the offence and where they are at any given point in time. We have been working with children who have been awaiting sentence in the Crown court, and who are now past their 18th birthdays. They will have made significant changes up to the point where they are sentenced, and they were still children at the time they committed that offence.
Q
Secondly, some new youth sentencing options, and sentencing options more widely, are made available in the Bill. Can you give us some commentary on how youth offending services and courts can make a success of those new sentencing options?
Hazel Williamson: I assume you are referring to the intensive supervision and surveillance, intensive fostering, and GPS monitoring?
Yes, for example.
Hazel Williamson: Okay. In terms of ISS, I have already indicated that its extension will require some resourcing. Intensive supervision and surveillance is already in place across the country for youth offending teams, and it is utilised to prevent children from receiving custodial sentences. I think that is already in place. There are concerns that the pilot of an ISS extended to 12 months did not give the results it needed to.
In terms of the intensive foresting arrangements, again, I go back to the fact that it is really resource-intensive and expensive, and it will require very close join-up with our local authority colleagues, who will be required to provide the foster carers to support it. On GPS—some trials have been taking place for GPS monitoring for our children and young people—there is some thought that it will certainly prevent some of our children and young people from being involved in those more violent crimes, and will reduce the risk of them being exploited. That is not the case from what we are seeing with children and young people who are subject to GPS monitoring and tagging. We also know that those children really struggle with the equipment, in terms of practicalities and charging the equipment. We know that GPS does not work for a lot of our children and young people in areas where it has been piloted.
As youth offending teams, we want to look for suitable and robust alternatives to custody for our children and young people. There is no doubt that it has to be done in partnership, but it will require some significant resourcing.
Hazel, thank you for that. When people ask—[Interruption.] Bloody hell, I am wrestling with my wretched mask—my mother-in-law made it and I wear it in honour and tribute to her. Hazel, when people ask me, “How should I prepare to give evidence to a Committee?”—be it a Select Committee or a Bill Committee like this—I shall say, “Watch Hazel Williamson.” That was crisp, concise and informative. It really was a masterclass, and it is appreciated by us all at the start of a very long afternoon. We are trying to find our next witness, who is being asked to appear 25 minutes early. If we cannot find our next witness, colleagues may go and have a cup of tea and stretch their legs. Thank you, Hazel.
Hazel Williamson: Thank you.
Q
Ellie Cumbo: As I said earlier, it has been a story of great success in many ways, enhancing the convenience of all parties, including solicitors, particularly in relation to those types of hearings—administrative hearings— where it is only legal professionals talking to each other. Why on earth should you not use a remote hearing for that?
But it is not just an innate conservativism that prompts those concerns about whether it is working well for all types of hearings and all types of people appearing in those hearings. This is a significant change that is difficult to analyse—in fact, I believe the MOJ itself is still in the process of evaluating its success. We are keen participants in those discussions and are keen that our views are heard. Our views are that where such hearings enhance the interests of justice, we are in favour of them and, where they do not, we are not.
Q
Ellie Cumbo: Obviously we and our members have implicit confidence in the judiciary. We are great believers in the importance of our independent and expert judiciary. That is not to suggest that it is not possible to make their lives a little bit easier than the current provisions do.
There is guidance, as I referred to earlier, about where remote hearings are and are not appropriate, and it differs slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. That is not a comment on the judiciary but it is arguably a reason for further attention to be paid to how clear those messages are and how possible it is, with the best will in the world, for the judiciary to interpret them in a way that promotes the interests of justice.
Q
Ellie Cumbo: No, I think I have had the opportunity to cover most of the things that the Law Society would want to. Perhaps I should have added into the conversation about pre-charge bail that we take the same view in relation to the removal of the presumption against bail: we understand the aim, but do not think this is the best way of achieving it. We would like to retain that presumption on the basis that it is still perfectly possible to use bail, but it can only be used where it is appropriate and proportionate to do so. We think that is an important safeguard.
Q
Dr Bild: Yes.
Q
Dr Bild: Yes, I agree with that. I think the concern is the ability of a Secretary of State to have the power to intervene in the automatic release of a prisoner. That is the question. I agree that the ultimate decision will be made by the Parole Board, which is an independent tribunal, but there should probably be a bit more of a firewall between the Secretary of State and an individual prisoner’s sentence.
Q
Dr Bild: I do not know if it is going to be made by the Home Secretary or the Justice Secretary. Yes, I agree on the final decision for release, but the halting of the automatic release will presumably be done by the Secretary of State.
Q
Dr Bild: I agree with you, but the issue you have here is that somebody who is dangerous could be released into the community under licence. If that person serves their entire sentence in custody, that same person, who may be even more dangerous by the end of their full sentence, will be released into the community with no licence conditions, no supervision and no support. So yes, I agree with you that it is safer for the extra time that someone is kept in custody, but it is less safe once they are released.
Q
Dr Bild: The Parole Board only has discretion in the sense that it has to follow its own rules. Therefore, it can release someone only when it is satisfied that they do not pose a risk to the public. The Parole Board would not be able to decide that now is a nice time to release someone and have a little bit of licence period; I assume that it would have to follow its rules. If it was not fully satisfied that the person is safe to release, I imagine that the Parole Board’s hands would be tied by its own rules.
Q
Dr Bild: I would agree that that was the case last year in relation to the terrorism legislation, as I said earlier. I am not saying that it is not lawful, but I think that a different issue is engaged when a Secretary of State is making a decision on an individual case and not a blanket, “You have committed a certain offence, therefore this is your release arrangement.” That is the issue.
Q
Let me move on. I want to ask a question to all the panellists, so perhaps the answers could be relatively brief, given that I am sure we are under time pressure. We had some debate some time ago in this session about the appropriateness of imposing minimum sentences, whereby Parliament specifies in statute that if someone is convicted of a particular offence, there is a minimum period of time that they must be sentenced to in prison, regardless of the facts of the individual case, and regardless of any discretion that the judge may wish to exercise. Can each panel member give the Committee their views on the appropriateness, generally, of statutory minimum sentences?
We have got three minutes.
Dr Janes: The problem with mandatory minimum sentences is that they do not allow the judge to take into account the specific characteristics, needs and circumstances of the person before them. We have already spoken about why those things are so important. [Interruption.]
Do not all speak at once, but one of you please speak.
Dr Paradine: For us, it is the same as for Laura: minimum sentences, the lack of evidence of a deterrent effect, and the inflation of sentences across the board. We really do not believe that minimum sentences are the way forward, and there is so much evidence that that is not the way to go. It is misleading, and it will not do anything for public confidence. What will do so is sentences that actually work in preventing and reducing offending.
Q
Dr Paradine: Yes, because judges should have the discretion to apply to the case the sentence that is required. That is why we have judges, and that is why our system is as it is. There is no need for constant interference in the way that is proposed in the Bill.
Nina Champion: I agree with both Kate and Laura about the importance of looking at the individual circumstances of the case. I would also like to add that, in terms of racial disparity, we know that black people are more likely than white people to be sent to prison at Crown court. We know that black women are more likely to be given a custodial sentence. We know that these disparities exist. Even taking into account other factors such as the lack of an early guilty plea, we know that black people are disproportionately represented in terms of sentencing and being sent to custody, so this would disproportionately impact those groups.
Q
Nina Champion: Across the board.
Dr Bild, last but not least.
Dr Bild: I agree with the other panellists. If there was any evidence whatsoever that mandatory sentences deterred people, there could be some justification for them, but in the complete absence of any such evidence, I see no reason to have mandatory minimum sentences. To pre-empt the question, that includes every single offence.
Q
Oliver Feeley-Sprague: I think in my answer, I said—if I didn’t, I should have—that it has the potential to criminalise a way of life. Some of the powers around returning to a site and seizing vehicles, when those vehicles might be your home, clearly do raise that prospect. I will repeat what I said about our experience as a human rights monitoring organisation: Gypsy and Traveller communities across this continent, across Europe, possibly even—
Q
Oliver Feeley-Sprague: It depends on how you are defining that threshold of “serious”. I have seen little in the Bill that gives any indication of what threshold you are using to reach those determinations. It is true, as far as I am aware, that the Gypsy and Traveller community is one of the most persecuted groups in the UK, and they are persecuted across Europe.
Q
Gracie Bradley: I just want to echo what Olly said in respect of the fact that the threshold is not clearly defined. These definitions are vague, and they could potentially include a very wide range of issues. I would also add that the way the clause is drafted, it is not simply where significant disruption, damage or distress is caused; it is where there is a likelihood or a perception that it is likely to be caused. The offence can be committed by someone who is said to be likely to cause damage or distress. This is highly subjective, and may invite stereotypes and profiling based on the mere existence of an unauthorised encampment. Again, the issue is really about the breadth of the drafting, the lack of definition, and the fact that the mere threshold of likelihood may invite judgments that are based on stereotyping and profiling. That is what is really concerning about this clause.
Q
Gracie Bradley: That is a difficult question to answer. I do not have a firm answer to that, but I think that if you are taking into account the distress of local residents, you also have to take into account the fundamental right of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people to live a nomadic way of life. It is not an absolute in either direction, and when we are talking about a community that, as Olly has said, is one of the most persecuted in the country, we have to be really careful about introducing these really broad and vaguely defined measures that are likely to invite them to be stereotyped and discriminated against further.
Q
Gracie Bradley: As I have already said, the issue is that we are talking about “likely to cause damage”. That is subjectively determined. There are some people who will be perceived as likely to cause damage; there are some people who, in another person’s mind, will not be. This is very subjective, and I do not think we can abstract it from the history of how people have been treated. I think Colin wants to come in.
Professor Clark: Yes, I can say something about this. In a sense, it is not even local residents; it is actually in the hands of the landowner or the licensee. That is one of the changes between, for example, the regulations in the law as contained in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the current Bill—this is where there is a significant change. In the 1994 Act, it was the police who had that decision to make about when the action should be forthcoming. In this Bill, that right is given over to the landowner or the licensee, and in a sense it is up to the people who—to answer your question, Minister—own the land on which the Travellers are camped. The landowner would make a decision: “I now feel that this is disruptive, damaging and distressing, so therefore I will call the police and then issue the actions.” That is the issue at stake here.
I will just remind the Minister about the lack of movement on a national site strategy, around both permanent and transit sites and around the right number of pitches on those sites. A lot of these issues would go away and it would be far less expensive than a constant cycle of evictions. The economics of this, as well as the human rights aspects, are quite important.
Q
Professor Clark: What is the context? Without context that is an impossible question to answer.
Fly-tipping. A field was taken over by an unauthorised encampment and it cost £50,000 to clear it. Is that acceptable?
Professor Clark: There is legislation in place already to deal with fly-tipping, I believe. I do not think that there needs to be an enhancement of that legislation to the current law as it stands. There is legislation to deal with fly-tipping, whoever may cause it.
When sites come into being in local areas, it is not uncommon for other people to notice that it is Travellers coming in and use that as an excuse to fly-tip their own business-related waste, and then blame it on the Travellers. That comes back to the points that my two colleagues made about the dangers of invoking racialised stereotypes here and apportioning blame, when it is not those individuals who are to blame. Again, this is where we need to be careful about the way in which we use language and how this Bill goes forward.
Q
Oliver Feeley-Sprague: Anybody responsible for causing £50,000-worth of damage to somebody’s property is committing a crime and, absolutely, people should be protected from that. To echo what the other panellists have said, I think you need to be very careful about further minoritising the Gypsy and Traveller communities. To answer your question bluntly, any form of significant damage of that nature is a crime, whoever does it.
Q
Gracie Bradley: I am not sure that I understand what the question is getting at.
Does the Law Commission have a reputation for not understanding human rights law, or for somehow wanting to diminish people’s human rights?
Gracie Bradley: Not that I am aware of. I suppose what you are getting at is that codifying public nuisance in statute was a recommendation of the Law Commission, which is correct. In 2015, it did recommend that codifying public nuisance should be done, but it did not consider the application of public nuisance to protest.
The Law Commission noted that its proposed defence of reasonableness would increase cases where a person was exercising their right under article 10 or article 11 of the convention, but they also noted that it is somewhat difficult to imagine examples in which this point arises in connection with public nuisance. The Law Commission absolutely did not propose a maximum custodial sentence of a decade.
Would any of the other witnesses like to respond to that question?
Oliver Feeley-Sprague: Just to say that I agree 100% with what Gracie said. That is my reading of what the Law Commission concluded in 2015. There are very specific qualifications about article 10 and article 11 rights needing to be protected under any changes of the law. By my reading, this Bill does exactly the opposite of that, so we should be extremely cautious.
Professor Clark: I think the Law Commission is fully cognisant of the rights and responsibilities of a healthy democracy. It understands questions of human rights and citizenship. I would not dare to suggest differently.
Q
One of you can respond to that, if you would like to kick off.
Professor Clark: I can. What was the question?
“Serious annoyance” is a phrase that has caught attention. In the context of public nuisance, that is a phrase that has arisen over centuries—I think I am right in saying that—of legal development and does not necessarily have quite the flippant meaning that it may have in day-to-day life outside of a court of law.
Professor Clark: Okay. I understand now—sorry. I think this comes back to the point that all three of us have made on the issues around terminology and definitions, and the use of them, and the ability to exercise discretion. You would like to hope, and expect, that moving forwards such expressions would take on their proper meanings in a legal context, but applied fairly and applied justly.
Given the overall nature of the Bill and what I said earlier about the impreciseness of the language and terminology, certainly in the case of part 4 with regard to unauthorised encampments, I think that is why a lot of outside bodies and organisations and non-governmental organisations have question marks.
However, I will hand over to Gracie, who might be better informed than I am on this.
Gracie Bradley: I am happy to pick this up. We know the legal genesis of that definition of “serious annoyance”, but of course the provisions in the Bill do not confine themselves to “annoyance”. If we look at clause 54, we see that conditions may be imposed that appear
“necessary to prevent the disorder, damage, disruption, impact or intimidation”—
Q
Gracie Bradley: I was not saying that it was in clause 59; I was picking up on another clause in the Bill, which contains language that is vague and concerning. But I can leave it there, if you want to stick with clause 59; I do not have anything to add on that.
Q
“public safety…the economic well being…the prevention of disorder or crime…or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Of course, unauthorised encampments of this kind do infringe
“the rights and freedoms of others”.
Thereby, I would suggest, article 8 is not engaged. Moreover, the right to enjoy one’s property is made very clear, is it not, in article 1 of protocol 1, which says that people are
“entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of…possessions.”
So, given what I have just said about paragraph 2 of article 8, and about article 1 of protocol 1, would you care to reconsider your article 8 analysis in relation to this clause?
Gracie Bradley: No. I think that what I said was that under article 8 it would likely be an unlawful interference, and I would disagree with your analysis that if it is proportionate, article 8 is not engaged. If the right can still be engaged, and a limitation may or may not be proportionate—
Q
Gracie Bradley: The point is that there is a balance to be struck; that is what happens with qualified rights. And I think the point is that the potential threshold at which these measures may be applied is so low, and the impact on Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people is potentially so distinct, that it would be disproportionate for the measure to be applied to them. What we are talking about, especially when we are talking about the potential seizure of vehicles in the context of nomadic Gypsy and Roma Traveller communities, is people potentially losing their homes entirely. If we are talking about people potentially facing a custodial sentence, that is a really significant interference with their article 8 rights, and it may have further implications—for example, what happens to their children if their caregivers are not available to them? Yes, I recognise that there may be interference in the life of the local community, but the point is that the threshold at which these measures may be invoked, and the impact on people who live in their homes and who have a nomadic way of life, is so significant that the way the Bill is drafted is disproportionate. In Liberty’s view, it also invites discrimination.
I recognise that the Committee is trying to get at the point about the wider community. It goes back to what Colin spoke about at the beginning and what numerous police forces have mentioned—that there is a lack of lawful stopping places, and that there is inadequate provision. I do not think we square this circle by getting into whose rights are more infringed on which side. The point is that what we need to get to is working constructively together to ensure that communities are provided for, and to make sure that there are enough stopping places and pitches. That is the way that we resolve this.
Q
Gracie Bradley: Of course—Liberty is a human rights organisation. As I am aiming to demonstrate, I am not dismissing that this is a qualified right, and that there are other things that hang in the balance on the other side. I have said there is a balance to be struck but, at the same time, the way the Bill is drafted means that it poses a disproportionate and really significant threat to the rights of Gypsy and Roma Traveller communities. They are a persecuted and minoritised community, and I do not think it is defensible for them to be targeted in this way, especially when there is a non-punitive solution, which is to ensure that there are adequate stopping places.
It is not targeting that community expressly; it is targeting people who engage in a particular kind of behaviour, regardless of their identity—but I think I have taken this far enough.
I thank the witnesses on behalf of the Committee. Thank you for coming early and staying longer than your allotted 45 minutes, and I thank you for your evidence.
That brings us to the end of today’s sittings. The Committee will meet again at 9.25 am on Tuesday in Committee Room 14, in order to commence line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Thank you, Sir Charles. It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
First, I thank Opposition Members for the constructive tone of the debate so far. I very much take the point that this covenant meets with the approval of all the parties represented here today and, I am sure, others as well. We are all conscious of the terrible incidents that members of the police force and the wider policing family have to endure on a daily basis, but we are also particularly mindful—reference has been made to this—of what they have had to endure and the services that they have had to provide in the past 12 months. It has been a very difficult time for the whole of society, and it is, I hope, no surprise to anyone that members of our policing family have been at the forefront of that and have been protecting us through these very difficult 12 months. I am therefore really pleased by the constructive tone of the debate thus far.
I am particularly grateful to the hon. Members for Rotherham and for Croydon Central for tabling these amendments and explaining their reasons for doing so. As I hope will become clear, we very much understand the motivations behind the amendments and, indeed, we have great sympathy with what they seek to achieve. We may just have different ideas of how to achieve them.
Let me put the clause in context. I am pleased that parliamentary counsel decided to put this clause at the very start of the Bill, because it is a significant Bill—the largest criminal justice Bill that Parliament has considered for some time—and I think it right that the police covenant is at the very start. It sets the tone for the rest of the legislation.
This clause will enshrine in law a duty on the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the police covenant, which has been introduced with a view to enhancing support for the police workforce and their families—a very significant point. Even in this Committee Room, there are members of the policing family—they are not direct members themselves, but their fathers, mothers and so on have served in the service—and it is right that we include them in our consideration.
I appreciate the Minister giving way. She says, “and their families.” She has just done some exemplary work on the Bill that has become the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and knows that a disproportionately high number of cases of domestic violence and abuse happen within the police world. One would hope that, were we able to tackle the root cause of that by addressing the trauma at the very beginning and putting support in place, the knock-on repercussions would be prevented, which I am sure she and I both really want.
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady. She is right: in the course of proceedings on that Bill, we examined the impact that domestic abuse has on members of the wider policing family. She is absolutely right, and I will come on to that point about the trauma, if I may. I do very much acknowledge it.
I will just explain the thinking behind the clause as currently drafted. The covenant takes the form of a declaration and is not set out in the Bill. In particular, the report must address the health and wellbeing of members and former members of the police workforce in England and Wales, their physical protections and support for their families. Over time, the report may deal with other matters addressed under the banner of the police covenant.
The clause is in the Bill because our police put themselves at risk on a daily basis, dealing with some of the most challenging, toughest and most heartbreaking situations—hon. Members have given examples of that during this debate. I will explain how the covenant came into being. We set out a frontline review, inviting police officers, staff and community support officers to share ideas, in order to change and improve policing. The results of that review identified the fact that more must be done to support the wellbeing of those across the policing community. We have therefore announced plans to establish a police covenant, to recognise the bravery, sacrifices and commitment of those who work, or who have worked, in policing. No member of the police workforce should suffer any disadvantage as a result of their role in policing, and the covenant will support that aim.
The examples that hon. Members have provided show, first, the challenges, difficulties and—actually—terror that officers must face on occasion. However, I also hope—I am grasping for silver linings—that some of the stories show the improvements in our collective understanding of the impact of trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder on mental health.
The example that the hon. Member for Rotherham gave of the officer who—I think she said that they were not even asked if they were okay, which, as the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood quite rightly said, should be only the beginning of the conversation; of course, much more must flow from that first question. However, the officer to whom the hon. Member for Rotherham referred had to leave the force in 1999. I hope that we all, as a society, have gained a better understanding of the impacts of trauma and so on on mental health since then.
Because the Minister has just said that trauma is now recognised, will she go the whole hog and include the word in her wonderful clause 1?
I am developing my argument, if I may. The reason I referred to that particular officer, although other examples were given, is that under the covenant, as it is drafted, that officer—as a former member of the police force—is covered by the covenant, and we very much want it to support not just serving members but those who have served and have since retired, or had to leave.
We now come to the nub of the issue—the inclusion of words in the legal framework, as set out in the Bill. We believe very strongly that the consideration of the impact of working with traumatised survivors on the morale and wellbeing of members and former members of the police force is already within scope of the clause, as currently drafted. It falls within the broad categories of health and wellbeing, as set out in clause 1.
Again, just to give the Committee some comfort and, indeed, I hope confidence in what we intend to do, our initial priorities for year one, which will be overseen and monitored by the police covenant oversight board and the police covenant delivery group, will include working towards ensuring that occupational health standards, including for mental health, are embedded in all forces; holding chiefs to account for providing the right quality and investment in their workforce; further consideration of a new chief medical officer for policing in England and Wales; working on a review to establish what is a good support model for families, drawing on established good practice and research from other sectors and international partners; and once that is agreed forces will be required to implement locally bespoke schemes in their local infrastructure. It will include development training for GPs around the role of the police, similar to the military veterans’ GP training, and development of pre-deployment mental health support provided to the police workforce, particularly in the light of the pandemic and the effect that it will have had on the police workforce.
Rather like the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, whereby in the definition we set out the very broad legal framework, and there were many examples of domestic abuse behaviour in those categories, which were then put into the statutory guidance. The wording, “health and wellbeing”, provides the legal framework. Within that, it is for the board, the delivery group and, ultimately, the Secretary of State, to include those matters in the report.
The Minister’s words are giving me a lot of comfort, but could she clarify a little more? What she is talking about is retrospective support once the incident has happened. Is it her intent that there will be preventive action at the very beginning of police training, so people are aware what the trauma is in advance, rather than just focusing on once it has happened?
I am sure that I will give further clarification in due course if it is needed, but I draw comfort from the fact that the wording I have here is the development of “pre-deployment” mental health support. If that requires further explanation, I am sure that I will provide that explanation in due course.
I would just like to give comfort on this point. We also plan that the board should have its inaugural meeting to set its priorities during scrutiny of the Bill. Parliament will be able to assess the priorities that flow from that meeting within the scrutiny of the Bill. The approach in the clause is very much of openness and transparency. We want the concerns that have been quite properly put forward to be addressed within the legal framework as set out in clause 1, and the practical workings to have meaningful effect for officers, former officers and members of staff on the ground.
The Minister has been very generous in giving way. It sounds as if she is moving towards the suggestion that she might not accept the amendment. Although in broad terms, the word “trauma” can be encompassed in the widest possible definition of health and wellbeing, one of the difficulties faced thus far is that the culture has been that health is about physical health, and wellbeing is just about not being off work. Consequently, were she to accept the change in wording, it would give a very strong steer that Government see the importance of cultural change being at the heart of the issue.
I would go further, because I would not want the Committee to understand that the covenant is the only work being done on mental health and understanding trauma and wellbeing. There is already work going on with some of the people who have been mentioned in the debate to improve local understanding of the impact. Chief constables are very alive to that.
The point of the covenant is to set the framework for recognition in relation to both mental and physical wellbeing, and to set up the structure so that the Secretary of State is accountable through the report to Parliament for those matters. It is drafted as it is because we do not want to fall into the beguiling trap where, in a year or three years’ time perhaps, people look at a list of conditions in a piece of legislation, and take that as exhaustive. We want professional curiosity and intelligence to be used in these matters. Our concern is that differentiating physical and mental health could have unintended consequences years down the line for how the terms of the covenant are deployed at local level.
The Minister will have heard me quoting John Apter earlier. Having talked to the College of Policing, he said that there is a
“lack of ability or willingness to mandate particular aspects of training and support.”—[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 20, Q30.]
Does she not think that it is time they were given that ability so that, were willing, they could alter the training to suit changing circumstances and the needs of police officers?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his question. He touches upon one of those imponderables, in that the police are operationally independent. There is always a balancing act, for Ministers of any Government, of any colour, in persuading, cajoling, directing and working with the police to ensure that their training meets both the expectations of the public and the needs of police staff. That is why the police want to come with us on this journey, because we are working together on this. I cannot be as directional as he is perhaps suggesting.
However, the fact that we are having these debates in Parliament is significant. We plan for the board to have its inaugural meeting during the scrutiny of this Parliament, and very senior people, who take what this House says very seriously, will be around the table. Having this debate will very much help them understand their responsibilities in this regard. I note that Paul Griffiths said in giving evidence last week:
“There is a need for consistency across occupational health standards, but I think that could be achieved through the programme management rather than through legislation.”—[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 20, Q30.]
That is really what we are trying to address in clause 1.
The hon. Member for Croydon Central kindly invited me to meet Sam from the Green Ribbon Policing campaign to discuss some of these issues, and I would be delighted to do so. We are very much in listening mode as to how we can improve our plans for this clause. We have kept the wording deliberately broad to ensure that there is room within the legislation to allow the Secretary of State to consider issues of importance as they arise, and the issues that have been raised here will be included in those considerations.
We have built flexibility into the clause through paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (2), to be addressed if considered appropriate. We very much want to strike the right balance, by directing the substance of the report without being too prescriptive. As the aim of the covenant is to focus on issues directly relevant to members or former members of the police workforce, we will be establishing a police covenant governance structure, along with key policing stakeholders, to feed directly into the police covenant report. This structure will support us in prioritising the most relevant issues to the police year on year, and ensure that the report reflects that.
Amendment 77 seeks to place the police covenant oversight board on a statutory footing. I hope that it is apparent from what I have said already that we do intend to establish such a board, albeit on a non-statutory basis, to drive the strategic direction of the covenant, to set priorities and to monitor progress, which will feed into the Home Secretary’s annual report to Parliament. The board will comprise key representatives from across policing, but we consider it appropriate for the board to be chaired by the Minister for Policing. As part of our plans to establish the board, we will ensure that its important work feeds into the police covenant report.
Does the Minister acknowledge that the reason we want to put the board on a statutory footing is that at the moment it falls to the Home Secretary to provide a report to Parliament only once a year? The power balance of who the covenant is for, who should be driving the improvements and who should be leading what is needed within the police is wrong. We believe that that balance could be put right if the Bill stated that it should be those police organisations, under an independent chair. If the Minister for Policing chairs the board, inevitably he will be marking his own homework. The whole purpose of the covenant is to enable the police to get the support they need in a way that is driven by the police for the police. It is not about the Minister deciding whether what is being done suits him.
I am so pleased that the hon. Lady raises that, because the very first subsection of the Bill sets out the Secretary of State’s accountability. It is the Secretary of State who lays a report before Parliament, so they are accountable to Parliament for the contents of that report. I do not have a crystal ball, but I imagine that when the first report is laid, hon. Members from across the House will ask the Secretary of State searching questions about, for example, its observations and provisions in relation to mental health and trauma. In drafting the covenant, we have tried to keep the Secretary of State’s accountability absolutely on the face of the Bill. Just as the Secretary of State is accountable at the Dispatch Box, so too must the board be chaired by the relevant Minister, so that the flow of accountability to the Dispatch Box is there.
There are other important boards across Government that are not on a statutory footing but that assist and hold Ministers to account when it comes to how particular work is developed. The accountability point is that the Secretary of State must lay this report before Parliament, and then Parliament will hold the Secretary of State to account.
If the board is not on a statutory footing, it does not much matter who is chairing it, because there is no statutory line of accountability. If it is not on the face of the Bill, it does not matter. The Minister could agree to have an independent chair of the board if it is not going to be on a statutory footing. Her argument does not follow, in that sense.
This is very speculative, so forgive me, but let us follow the hon. Lady’s example. If the board has an independent chair, and to everyone’s surprise they make recommendations to the Secretary of State that do not include measures relating to mental health, the Secretary of State is then in a very difficult position, because she is accountable to Parliament for the contents of the report, yet the work of the report, driven by a committee that is not chaired by one of her Ministers, has come to a set of results that she may not agree with and cannot account for. This is about the trail of accountability from the covenant through to the Dispatch Box. That is why—[Interruption.] I am so sorry; I have just been handed a note but cannot read the writing. I think I can get it. We have that chain of accountability through to the Dispatch Box, which is precisely what we are trying to achieve. We do not want the report or the Minister not to be accountable.
For clarity—I am sorry to labour the point, but it is important—will the board be on a formal setting? Is it an actual thing? Is it the same group of organisations that make up the report at present? If the board is an actual thing, my concern is this. To take the Minister’s hypothetical example, a new Home Secretary might not have any interest in mental health and wellbeing, but if the board is on a statutory footing, it still has a duty to push whoever is chairing it in the right direction. Could the Minister clarify whether the board is a formal body?
Of course, and as with other boards, as I have said, the terms are set out and agreed. We want to be open and transparent on that. Its membership will include all the key policing representatives that one would imagine and, what is more, we have tried to go further by giving the Secretary of State the freedom to consult others. If there is a particular charity or organisation that is addressing a particular issue that the board feels is important that year, the Secretary of State has the power to consult that organisation. Again, to provide comfort, we will review the governance arrangements six months after the board is constituted, and we will consider the independence of the board’s chair as part of that.
Amendment 76 is an important amendment. We are exploring how the police covenant, as currently drafted, can apply to police forces and law enforcement organisations that do not fall within the remit of the Home Office, in particular the British Transport police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Ministry of Defence police and the National Crime Agency. We are very much alive to the points made both by organisations and in this debate. With that work ongoing, I trust that the hon. Member for Croydon Central will not press the amendment to a vote.
Finally, new clause 44 would place a duty on specified health service bodies to have due regard to the police covenant principles. I recognise that, in advancing this new clause, the hon. Member for Croydon Central has drawn on the provisions of the Armed Forces Bill 2021 in respect of the armed forces covenant. The difficulty is that the two covenants are at a different stage in their development. The armed forces covenant has been around for some years, and in that context it is right that it should now develop, with the new duty provided for in clause 8 of the Armed Forces Bill. In contrast, we are just getting started with the police covenant. At the moment, we do not think it appropriate to place a requirement on specific public bodies to have due regard to the police covenant. We must gather robust evidence and have careful consideration of the needs and consultation with the relevant health service bodies.
I want to reassure the hon. Lady that, through the reporting requirement that we have set out in the legislation and the governance process, we will be looking at the best way to ensure that our police can access the right care when they need it. In the light of my explanation and my assurance that we are continuing to consider how best to address the report requirement for non-Home Office forces, I hope that the hon. Member for Rotherham will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Nobody wants to press any other amendments to a vote, and new clause 44 will be dealt with later, so we come to the decision on clause 1.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Increase in penalty for assault on emergency worker
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles. Clause 2 increases the maximum penalty for common assault or battery against an emergency worker from 12 months to two years’ imprisonment, thereby delivering our manifesto commitment. Our emergency services place themselves in harm’s way to protect us, and it is therefore right that we treat with particular seriousness any assault committed against an emergency worker, which is why we seek to legislate to increase the maximum sentence for assault against them from 12 months to two years’ imprisonment. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to our emergency services for the work they do on our behalf and on behalf of all our constituents, keeping us safe, looking after us and protecting us. I am sure the whole Committee will be united in expressing that sentiment.
We consulted last year on extending the maximum penalty from one year to two years and found overwhelming support for the move. In evidence last week, we heard representatives of policing and emergency services expressing strong support for the move as well. It will give courts the ability to pass higher sentences, reflecting the seriousness and severity of these offences. The clause does not change the definition of emergency workers. That is set out in section 3(1) of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018 and covers police constables; National Crime Agency officers; prison and custody officers; fire, rescue and search personnel; and those people providing NHS services. The clause simply amends the maximum sentence that appears in that Act from 12 months to two years.
It is worth saying that, where more serious assaults occur against emergency workers, such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or grievous bodily harm with intent, those offences will be charged as those more serious matters, which of course have higher sentences. Actual bodily harm has a maximum sentence of five years; GBH, under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, also has a five-year maximum; and GBH with intent has a maximum sentence of life. We of course expect more serious assaults on our emergency workers to be prosecuted and sentenced accordingly.
It is worth noting that the proportion of defendants in assault cases against emergency workers receiving immediate custody went up last year compared with the year before, from 17% to 25%, and about 10,000 cases were successfully prosecuted and sentenced. This legislation is being used on a fairly wide basis.
No amendments have been tabled to the clause. I believe it commands widespread support across the House and among the public. I do not want to detain the Committee longer than necessary. I think I have covered the key elements of the proposals, and spoken about the importance of the work of our emergency services and the tribute that we pay to them. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
I do not wish to detain the Committee for long; I have just a couple of points. The Minister set out that the consultation has gone on. It was obviously a manifesto commitment of his party, and I generally approve of manifesto commitments being implemented. Even if I might not agree with all the ones that were in his manifesto, I can see the point, but am I not right that the original intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who introduced the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act, was to have a two-year maximum, but it was reduced during the passage of the legislation to one year as a consequence of the Government of the day wanting it to be one year?
I understand that there have been consultations and a manifesto commitment since, but from where does this Damascene conversion come? It seems to me that the Government originally said, “We’ll support the legislation if the maximum is one year,” and within months of it being implemented they were saying, “It’s got to be two years,” which was what my hon. Friend actually wanted. He cut it in order to get Government support. I am interested to find out where that conversion came from. Was there some sudden bit of evidence that convinced the Government that my hon. Friend was correct, in which case I congratulate the Government on being willing to change their mind. I would be interested to hear from the Minister where that change of heart came from.
Secondly, I notice that the British Association of Social Workers and the Social Workers Union have submitted a petition to the Government, which I understand has quite a few thousand signatures, asking them to amend the legislation to include social workers in the definition of emergency workers. No doubt there are arguments for and against that, but I wonder whether the Minister has anything to say about whether the Government have any intention of doing that.
Let me reply briefly to some of the points that have been raised by Opposition Members.
The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood asked about what had prompted the change from one year to two years and if there had been a “Damascene conversion.” The change is evidence that the Government are always willing to listen and to reflect. They have listened to organisations such as the Police Federation and to the results of the consultation. It is no bad thing that a Government are willing to keep things under review and to make changes, where there is public appetite or evidence to support them, rather than simply to remain with a particular position that was taken two or three years ago. It is a sign of maturity and wisdom that we are willing to make changes as appropriate.
Both the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Rotherham asked about other workers, including social workers. The 2018 Act, which passed with widespread cross-party support, drew a particular distinction about frontline emergency workers—the police, firefighters, frontline NHS staff, rescue services and so on—who are putting themselves directly into harm’s way, because what they are doing is unique.
However, as both hon. Members and the shadow Minister said, other workers also have contact with the public, including retail workers and social workers, which is important. That is why the sentencing guidelines we already have rightly recognise that a victim might be working in the public sector or otherwise providing a service to the public, including working in a shop, as an aggravating factor. Because it is recognised as an aggravating factor, it means that if the victim is one of those people, the judge is duty bound to pass a higher sentence than would otherwise be the case, so that is accounted for in the way I just described.
The shadow Minister spoke a little about the sentences passed down and mentioned that in 2019 only 6% of sentences for common assault on an emergency worker were for six months or more. That went up a bit last year. The figures for 2020 came out just a few days ago, and it went up to 15% in 2020. The average sentence has gone up as well. By elevating the maximum sentence today, we in Parliament are sending a clear signal to the judiciary and others that we expect this offence to be taken extremely seriously, and sentenced accordingly and commensurately.
My understanding is that the Sentencing Council guidelines for the offence as it already exists are due to be published in the near future, possibly as soon as later this week. They will provide further clarity to the judiciary, but Parliament’s voice will be heard clearly today in signalling that we expect longer sentences for people who assault our emergency workers. I am sure the judiciary will hear that.
The shadow Minister made some points about ensuring that the police are properly protected. She drew particular attention to the risks of attending lone patrols and the need for resources. We are in the middle of a successful police recruitment campaign, which will eventually target 23,000 extra police. We are about a third of the way through that. The result of that extra recruitment will be to mitigate some of the risks that the shadow Minister mentioned. As a fellow Croydon MP and her constituency neighbour, I am well aware of those risks and was painfully affected by the awful murder of Sergeant Matt Ratana. I take the opportunity to join the shadow Minister in paying tribute to Sergeant Ratana and his family. He died in the course of duty after a long and distinguished career, and I am sure we all want to remember him and his family.
I hope that answers the questions that were raised, and I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Special constables and Police Federations: amendments to the Police Act 1996
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sir Charles, noting that there are no amendments, I do not propose to speak to the clause, which I commend to the Committee.
Thank you, Sir Charles. Clause 3 would allow police specials—volunteer police officers—to become members of the Police Federation, a proposal that we support. I wanted to say a few words because special constables play a vital role in keeping our communities safe. They have been of huge value to communities across the country, particularly through the pandemic. The special constabulary has a long and proud history and has made an immeasurable contribution to policing our communities.
Sir Robert Peel is often quoted:
“The police are the people, and the people are the police.”
That cannot be more applicable than to our special constables who volunteer to make our communities safer while working at other jobs. It is important that special constabulary officers feel valued and that their contribution is recognised. It is imperative that they have the support and opportunities to thrive and feel they have the protections they deserve for doing such an important job. I know this clause is close to the Police Federation’s heart and to that of former special John Apter, who has campaigned for police specials to join the federation.
The number of police specials has significantly declined. There were 9,126 specials in England and Wales in September 2020. That is 10,500 fewer than in 2012, a drop of more than 15%. John Apter argues that including the specials in the Police Federation will help increase numbers, as the representation that the change will bring may encourage more people to volunteer with the police. It would give specials a legal status, like that of police officers who are members of the federation. Putting the change into law will formalise that support for specials. In a survey about federation membership, 94% of respondents who were specials said that they wanted to join the Police Federation.
In Scotland, police specials are already part of the Scottish Police Federation. Scottish specials have the same legal status in the force as their regular officer counterparts. Both are appointed to office by the chief constable of Police Scotland, so there is no legal barrier to specials joining the Scottish Police Federation. The inclusion of specials in the Scottish federation has been uncontroversial, as far as I can see.
The Association of Special Constabulary Officers is supportive of specials being given greater access to the federation’s legal advice and assistance services. It says:
“As frontline volunteer police officers we are exposed to the same risks of complaints and injuries and conduct investigations, and the Federation has an unrivalled local network of capability on those issues already in place, which is required under police regulations and funded by forces. In this respect ASCO is supportive of the ongoing work.”
However, ASCO has voiced concerns about how much it will cost and the risk of specials losing their independent voice. ASCO wants to retain its role as the representative association and professional body for police specials, with the federation being the lead and expert organisation in respect of the elements of formal representation that it is funded to undertake.
The cost will be around £3 million, which is not being covered by the Home Office. If the number of specials increase, as we hope, back to 2012 levels, that would possibly rise to £6 million or £7 million. The chair, workforce lead and “citizens in policing” lead for the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners have agreed in principle to fund membership for specials. They wrote to all current PCCs in June 2020, asking them to indicate their willingness to pay specials’ subscription fees. Although we support the relatively uncontroversial clause, will the Minister confirm that that £3 million cost is accurate? Does she think the cost of membership is proportionate? Is it appropriate for taxpayers to cover that amount out of the police precept, especially if the number of specials rise and the cost goes up to £6 million or £7 million?
I note the time. Our special constables make a vital contribution to keeping communities safe, through their professionalism, dedication and sacrifice, increasingly fulfilling a range of specialised and frontline roles. They often face the same risks as regular officers while on duty and have the same powers as regular officers.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
When we adjourned this morning, I was agreeing with the hon. Member for Croydon Central that special constables make a vital contribution to keeping communities safe, through their professionalism, dedication and sacrifice. Increasingly, as they fulfil a range of specialised and frontline roles, they face the same risks as regular officers while on duty. Given that they share the range of powers that regular officers can deploy, we are very pleased to have included this clause in the Bill.
The hon. Lady asked me about the funding. We understand that the Police Federation is currently exploring funding options for specials’ membership. The Home Office currently provides free access to an insurance policy for all special constables, to cover the costs of legal advice in the event of disciplinary and misconduct proceedings. We have no plans at present to withdraw from that insurance. I commend clause 3 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Meaning of dangerous driving: constables etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
On an almost minute-by-minute basis, highly trained police drivers respond to emergency calls on all our behalf. They rush to incidents of danger when others run away. They are highly trained and they deserve the protection afforded by the Bill, and to be judged by the standard of the training they have received, rather than the standard of a normal driver. This may seem a relatively unimportant feature of the Bill, but it is extremely important to the police officers who undertake these dangerous duties. It is a matter of great interest and concern that they should not be treated as criminals when all they are actually doing is performing their duties to the best of their abilities.
Clauses 4 to 6 provide a new test to assess the standard of driving of a police officer. Should an officer be involved in a road traffic incident, this new test will allow courts to judge their standard of driving against a competent and careful police constable with the same level of training, rather than against a member of the public, as at present. Clause 4 applies the new test to the offence of dangerous driving, while clause 5 makes similar provision in respect of the offence of careless driving.
We believe that police officers need to be able to do their job effectively and keep the public safe. We are aware of concerns among some police officers over the legal position when pursuing suspected offenders or responding to an emergency. The hon. Member for Croydon Central asked about different standards of training. The proposed changes seek to strike the right balance between enabling the police to keep the public safe on the roads and pavements, apprehending criminals around the country who would otherwise pose a threat, and effectively holding to account the minority of officers who drive inappropriately.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council has worked closely with police forces to standardise police driver training across England and Wales. This will ensure that police drivers are trained to a similar standard, depending on their role, and that the legal test for police drivers will have a fairer comparator. This will also include different levels of training to reflect the training and skills that each role requires.
The NPCC made exactly that point: people will have different levels of training. It just wants reassurance about officers who are not trained to do something that they end up having to do in the line of duty. Will they be affected because they have not had a very high level of training when, for example, pursuing somebody?
This will include different levels of training to reflect the training and skills that each will require, so that difference is reflected. We are pleased to introduce these clauses. There is a careful balancing act between the interests of the law-abiding public and police officers while ensuring that standards are maintained on the road. These provisions will also extend, I am happy to say, to police driving instructors when they carry out advanced police driving techniques for the purpose of teaching trainee police driving instructors and trainee police drivers in the territorial police forces and other police forces. We believe that this new test strikes that balance, so I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 5 and 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Duties to collaborate and plan to prevent and reduce serious violence
Before we move on, I remind colleagues that they are meant to address the Chair. I am seeing quite a lot of backs. I do not mind seeing backs occasionally, but it does help Hansard writers and everybody here if we have a little bit of fluidity and motion. I call the Minister.
Sir Charles, I am probably the worst offender for that, so forgive me—I will try to face forward.
Before I turn to the specifics of the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I set out why we feel it necessary to create the duty. Serious violence has a devastating impact on victims and their families. It instils fear in communities and it is extremely costly to society. It is always difficult to talk about economic cost when we are talking about children in harm and grieving families and so on, but there is an economic cost as well.
Incidents of serious violence have increased in England and Wales, and it is for that reason that we have decided to introduce the serious violence duty. The duty is a key part of the Government’s programme of work to prevent and reduce serious violence. It involves taking a multi-agency approach to understand the causes and consequences of serious violence, focusing on prevention and early intervention, informed by evidence. In addition to tough law enforcement, we need to understand and address the factors that cause someone to commit violent crime so that we can prevent it from happening.
Analysis of responses to our 2019 public consultation, which tested options for a public health approach to tackling serious violence, found an overall consensus that a legislative approach was preferred to a voluntary, non-statutory approach. We know that that is already being undertaken in some areas, such as those with a pre-existing violence reduction unit, but there is inconsistency across England and Wales. We envisage that the duty will create the conditions and legal basis to bridge that gap.
At its core, the duty will require specified authorities to work together and share data and intelligence. They will also need to formulate an evidence-based analysis of the problems associated with serious violence in their local area, and subsequently produce and implement a strategy detailing how they will respond to those particular issues. The duty will be placed on specified authorities from the police, justice, fire and rescue, health and local authorities. Education, prison and youth custody authorities will be under a separate duty to co-operate with the specified authorities where required; they can also choose to collaborate voluntarily with the specified authorities, or with each other, should they wish to do so. There will be requirements for authorities to consult all such institutions in their area as they prepare their strategy.
We know how important it is that we get implementation of this new duty right and that we ensure that the authorities understand what will be required of them. That is why we have published draft statutory guidance to support the implementation of the new duty. That guidance, which is available to hon. Members now, explains the requirements of the new duty and provides advice on how they can be met effectively, including examples of good practice. We have done that precisely because we want Parliament, charities and others to examine the document and feed in their thoughts on how it can be improved, ensuring that the guidance is as effective as it can be ahead of implementation of the new duty.
When the national referral mechanism was introduced, I was struck that the responses to my freedom of information requests showed that it was not UK children who were being referred. There was a perception that it was international children, whereas the act of trafficking can mean literally taking a child from one side of the street to the other. Has the situation changed, and will anything in this work make that apparent to local authorities and other safeguarding organisations?
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for her question. Sadly, the situation has changed and now the most common nationality of potential child victims of modern slavery is British. As she knows, the NRM is more than a decade old. The criminal world has moved on and the needs of the children we are trying to help, as well as those of adult victims, have changed.
The transformation programme is looking at whether there are different ways in which we can help victims, depending on the safeguarding arrangements that may already be in place and whether children have any family or parental links with this country. Clearly, the needs of a child from Vietnam who has no family links in this country may be very different from those of a child who has been born and brought up here, with parents looking after them and with brothers and sisters. We are trying to find ways to address the needs of all victims, but particularly child victims in this context.
Local authorities are of course already responsible for safeguarding and promoting the welfare of all children in their area, including child victims of modern slavery. Children’s services must already work in close co-operation with the police and other statutory and non-statutory agencies to offer child victims of modern slavery the support they require. With the background and context that it is already mandatory, we therefore conclude that it is not necessary to include that as a further requirement in the Bill.
I turn to amendment 92 and an early help strategy. The hon. Member for Croydon Central is right to point to the need for a focus on prevention, which is a key part of what the duty seeks to achieve. Early intervention is an important part of prevention work and reducing serious youth violence. The duty already sets out the responsibilities of specified authorities and the work they are to undertake, which includes risk factors that occur before a young person has become involved in serious violence. The specified authorities, including the local authority that has responsibility for children’s social care, will be required to consult education authorities in preparing the strategy. They can also be required to collaborate on the strategy. As such, the provision should already ensure that a strategy to reduce and prevent serious violence would encapsulate early help for this cohort, so we do not believe that an additional strategy is required. Again, I refer to the draft statutory guidance that already has early intervention running throughout it. Indeed, we plan to add case studies before formal consultation, to help explain and guide multi-agency partners.
On amendment 93, children’s social care authorities have a crucial role to play and significant insights to share, particularly for those young people at risk of becoming involved in serious violence, child criminal exploitation or other harms. However, local authorities that are already named as a specified authority under the duty are responsible for children’s social care services. Therefore, for the reasons I have already outlined, we do not believe it necessary for the clause to contain the explicit requirement to consult such services, because they are within the definition of local authority. Again, we will make it clear, as part of our draft statutory guidance on the duty, that social care services, among other vital services for which local authorities hold responsibility, must be included.
We believe that amendment 82 is also unnecessary, given the functions conferred on local policing bodies by clause 13, which are intended to assist specified authorities in the exercise of their functions under the duty and to monitor the effectiveness of local strategies.
I turn to new clause 17 and the important issue of child criminal exploitation. I thank the hon. Member for Rotherham for setting out the case for providing in statute a definition of child criminal exploitation. Child criminal exploitation in all its forms is a heinous crime, with the perpetrators often targeting and exploiting the most vulnerable children in our society. We are determined to tackle it. There is already a formal definition of child criminal exploitation included in statutory guidance for frontline practitioners working with children, including “Keeping children safe in education” and “Working Together to Safeguard Children”. In addition, as the hon. Lady noted, the definition is also included in the serious violence strategy, published in 2018, the Home Office’s “Child exploitation disruption toolkit” for frontline practitioners, and the county lines guidance for prosecutors and youth offending teams.
We have discussed the introduction of a further statutory definition with a range of organisations and heard a range of views. On balance, the Government have concluded that there are risks with a statutory definition. Some partners highlighted the changing nature of child criminal exploitation. Inherent to such exploitation is that it evolves and responds to changes in the criminal landscape and the environment. As such, there are concerns that a statutory definition could prove inflexible as the nature of child criminal exploitation adapts.
In addition, as the hon. Lady has rightly noted, the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, conducted by Frank Field—now Lord Field—and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) and Baroness Butler-Sloss, considered the definition of child criminal exploitation under the Act and concluded that it should not be amended, as the definition currently in place is sufficiently flexible to meet a range of new and emerging forms of modern slavery.
We believe that our focus should be on improving local safeguarding arrangements to identify and support victims of child criminal exploitation, and on working to ensure that the right support is in place locally to protect these very vulnerable children.
I appreciate, foresaw and understand all the objections that the Minister raises. As she is a former barrister and someone who uses the law, does she agree that it would help to have a definition, as our witnesses said?
Well, we do have the definition in the Modern Slavery Act. Modern slavery cases are notoriously difficult to prosecute because, as with other hidden harms, they require the involvement of often very vulnerable people, including adults as well as children. They include people who might not have English as a language at all, let alone as a first language, and people who might be targeted precisely because of their vulnerability. Although we are looking very much at the context of children, we know that vulnerable adults have their homes taken over by county lines gangs to cuckoo and sell their drugs from, with all the horrendous violence and exploitation that vulnerable adults have to endure as part of that.
We will continue to look at this. As evidence develops, we will be open to that, but, on balance, we have concluded that it is preferable at this stage to focus on the local multi-agency safeguarding arrangements, and to work on the serious violence duty to get a level of understanding of all the good practice taking place at the local level, which the hon. Lady and others have talked about.
One should not view the Bill as being the only thing that the Government or safeguarding partners are doing to address concerns. We have increased the dedicated support available to those at risk and involved in county lines exploitation, and have provided funding to provide one-to-one caseworker support from the St Giles Trust to support young people involved in county lines exploitation. We are funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis.
We are also working on a public awareness campaign, #LookCloser, which was rolled out nationally in September and focuses on increasing awareness of the signs and indicators of child exploitation so that the public and frontline services report concerns quickly to the police. As I say, on balance, at this point, we do not believe that a statutory definition is the correct approach, but we are focusing on practical responses to exploitation.
On new clause 47, I have great understanding as to why the hon. Member for Croydon Central tabled it. It would require specified authorities to prepare and implement a strategy to prevent and reduce child criminal exploitation and to safeguard affected children. We have, however, built flexibility into the duty to allow areas to decide which specific crime types are a priority locally. We have done that deliberately so that local areas can react to what is needed in their areas. Indeed, the draft statutory guidance sets that out. Under the duty as drafted, the specified authorities will already be able to include child criminal exploitation in their local serious violence strategies, should that be of particular concern to them. I very much understand the motivation behind the new clause, but we are not convinced that a separate strategy is necessary.
I do not assume that the duty and the draft statutory guidance preclude that consistency of standard; but in this arena and also with other crime types that are hidden and which prey upon vulnerable people, I am very keen that we encourage innovation. We are seeing some really interesting work being conducted through the Youth Endowment Fund. The hon. Gentleman may be familiar with that; it is a fund that stretches over a decade. It is protected money of £200 million that is being invested across the country and is evaluated very carefully in order to build a library of programmes that work—and also programmes that do not work: we need to know both those things, to help local commissioners make good decisions about what they should be funding with taxpayers’ money. I am keen that we enable that sort of innovation.
Of course, consistency of standards is one of the reasons why we want to introduce the duty—precisely because we are aware that those areas that have VRUs may well be a few steps ahead of other parts of the country that do not have them because they do not suffer the same rates of serious violence as London or Manchester, for example. I very much take the point about consistency, but we believe that that can be addressed through the duty itself and the draft statutory guidance.
I am going to come to an end soon, Sir Charles. There is a requirement to include how inter-agency training will be commissioned, delivered and monitored for impact in the published local safeguarding arrangements. That is relevant to the point that the hon. Member for Stockton North just made. Safeguarding partners must also publish an annual report on their safeguarding arrangements, which should include evidence of the impact of the work of the safeguarding partners and relevant agencies, including training.
I am pleased that the Committee has had the opportunity to debate this duty. We have more debates ahead of us, I suspect. We believe that the three safeguarding partners already in place, through the multi-agency safeguarding arrangements that came into being in 2019, are the way to address some of the important issues raised by hon. Members in this part of the debate.
Sir Charles, I am sorry about turning my back previously. It was a very appealing amendment and it is hard not to look.
I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 7, page 8, line 4, at end insert—
“(3A) Specified authorities which are housing authorities must have particular regard to their housing duties when performing their duties under this section.”
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his political jibe. He is correct to say there are examples of bad housing in Croydon, as there are in other parts of the country. It has a massively serious effect on people’s lives. [Interruption.] I can hear the hon. Member for Croydon South muttering about it from a sedentary position.
I will move on to the issue that we are talking about. When an urgent move is required because of gang violence, temporary accommodation is often the only realistic option. The law currently does not prioritise families in this situation, in contrast with the requirement for victims of domestic abuse to be treated as a priority for rehousing. Section 189(1) of the Housing Act 1996 gives victims automatic priority need, so that victims fleeing domestic abuse are moved urgently and thus protected. That is not the case when the threat of violence is external, which means that families are often forced to choose between giving up a secure tenancy and making a homeless application to their local authority, or keeping their secure tenancy and staying somewhere where they are in danger. The child safeguarding practice review published last year notes a case where a family moved back to an area where they were at risk in order to prevent the loss of their right to permanent housing. Within months, their son was killed.
The problems do not stop there. Evidence from practitioners shows how people at risk of violence who approach their local authorities are often not given adequate support due to their not being categorised as priority need under section 189(1) of the Housing Act. Youth workers who work with victims of gang violence often try to identify mental or physical health needs in the family in order to create a workaround. This shows that the system is not responding to the needs of victims of violence because of their status as victims. Support workers at New Horizon Youth Centre in London state that when young people are found in priority need, it is often as a result of any mental health conditions that they have managed to have diagnosed during the centre’s work with them following a serious incident of violence—it is not on the basis of being a victim or being at risk of such violence. In most cases, there is police evidence of risk, but the support workers have found that this is not enough to secure a positive priority need decision.
Kate Bond, the youth outreach project manager at New Horizon Youth Centre, explains: “We have seen so many cases where violence or the threat of violence is rejected as a reason for young people to be seen in priority need under the Housing Act. We have cases where even though there is clear evidence that someone’s life is at risk—not only because of their current injuries, hospital letters and police reports, but also proof from a range of other relevant services—they are not found in priority need. Too often, we end up having to pay for these young people in emergency accommodation and spend a long time gathering proof under other grounds for priority need, keeping the young person in limbo. Traumatised young people are further demotivated by this process and the sense that their lives being at risk is not enough to secure them somewhere safe to live. This continues to put lives and communities at unnecessary risk. However, even that threshold for proof required by local authorities before they will place young people in temporary accommodation can be difficult to reach. Often, for example, young people cannot go to their GP because it is in an area where they feel unsafe, so securing medical proof becomes more challenging and the diagnosis of mental health conditions more difficult.”
Under sections 177(1) and 177(1A) of the Housing Act, a person is legally homeless if violence or the threat of violence means that they cannot be reasonably expected to remain in their current accommodation, but the homelessness code of guidance for local authorities currently provides no guidance for local authorities on how to consider whether an applicant might be in priority need because their current home puts them at risk of gang violence, harassment or grooming. Currently, there is only general advice on the assessment of violence in paragraph 8.36, whereas the assessment of domestic abuse is dealt with in some detail by the statutory guidance. The guidance also says that a shortage of housing could be taken into account when considering whether a family should be moved.
Housing providers such as local authorities or housing associations may also hold critical information that can be used as evidence to support the homelessness application, safeguarding, or police investigations. They may be able to support young people and families to access alternative accommodation. Practitioners are reporting, however, that housing representatives are often not included in relevant case forums and discussions on families at risk of harm. Similarly, when people fleeing violence present at their local authority for rehousing, there is currently no duty on the local authority to seek information from the police to ascertain the level of risk when assessing the housing application.
As I said, amendments 50 to 62, and new clauses 28 and 29, were drafted by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow in collaboration with the co-chairs of the Housing Law Practitioners Association and Garden Court Chambers, and with the backing of many organisations such as Centrepoint, New Horizons Youth Centre, Shelter, Crisis, Barnardo’s, the Big Issue Foundation, St Basils, Catch-22, Redthread, Homeless Link, Nacro, the Revolving Doors Agency, Fair Trials and the St Giles Trust.
New clause 28 would ensure that we learn from best practice of housing support services for victims of domestic violence, and that those who are at risk of violence owing to gang behaviour are prioritised for rehousing away from harm. For children and adults affected by and at risk of serious violence, seeking support to secure a safe place to live can be extremely difficult. Evidence from practitioners shows how young people, care leavers, people with multiple needs, and families facing threats of violence are not given adequate support when approaching their local authorities to seek help moving out of harmful situations because, despite meeting the threshold for vulnerability, given that they have fled violence or threats of violence, they are not seen as in priority need. In many cases, they do not receive the initial duties and assessment to which they are entitled under the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. New clause 28 is designed to remove that hurdle and set outs clearly that anyone at risk of violence is in priority need, whether the violence takes place inside or outside the home.
New clause 29 would ensure that the current homelessness code of guidance is updated to take into account the specific needs of those fleeing gang violence and exploitation. Serious cases reviews have shown that the current guidance is not sufficient and young people are paying the price with their lives. Victims of serious violence are often forced to choose between remaining in an area where they are at risk or making a homeless application and giving up a secure tenancy. In the financial year 2019-20, more than 7,000 households were recognised as being at risk of or experiencing non-domestic violence and abuse and seeking homelessness support. It is right that the departmental guidance provides specific guidance for people in that situation.
Homelessness and housing precarity are significant contributing factors to children and adults becoming vulnerable to violence as they respond to offers of accommodation from those seeking to exploit them. Prevention of that trend and early intervention to reduce the harm they may face requires their housing needs to be met quickly and appropriately. The current homelessness code of guidance highlights certain vulnerabilities faced by groups such as young people, care leavers and victims of trafficking, who should be considered as part of the housing application, but there is little guidance around young people at risk of violence and exploitation. By enhancing the current code of guidance so that local authorities take into account the needs of people at risk from serious violence, the Government would ensure that the needs of that vulnerable group specifically are considered by local housing authorities to protect them from further risk of violence. Amendments 50 to 62 would ensure that registered social landlords are involved and consulted in local efforts to reduce serious violence, and that there is timely co-operation between the police and local housing authorities to prevent serious violence.
Part 2 of the Bill outlines the model for multi-agency working to prevent serious violence. The horrific cases in the serious case reviews tell us that there is no effective multi-agency response to preventing serious violence that does not include housing. These amendments will ensure that registered social landlords are included in the new duty and ensure that there is timely information sharing between the police and RSLs for the purpose of preventing serious violence. By supporting effective multi-agency working between all partners, the Government can ensure that housing is considered as an essential part of a comprehensive public health approach to tackling and preventing the serious use of violence.
As I have said, there is provision in law and in practice for people fleeing domestic violence to have a route out of that violent situation, through their local authority and the definition of priority needs. There is not the same route out for those at risk of gang violence in their area, and I have seen the consequences of that. These amendments would put those at risk of serious violence on the same footing as those at risk of domestic violence. I would be grateful if the Minister could consider these amendments.
We very much recognise the valuable contribution that local authorities and housing associations are able to make as part of local efforts to prevent and reduce serious violence. Local authorities are responsible for the delivery of a range of vital services for people and businesses in a local area, including housing and community safety. It is expected that such responsibilities will be key to the role they play in local partnership arrangements as they contribute to the development and implementation of the duty. As such, they will be best placed to provide a strategic overview of and information about housing and associated issues in the local area.
The statutory guidance for the duty makes clear that such duties are relevant and should be considered as part of the work to meet the requirements of the serious violence duty. We therefore do not consider it necessary to stipulate in legislation that such authorities must have due regard to their housing duties when meeting the requirements of the serious violence duty, as there will be a requirement for them to have due regard to the statutory guidance in any case.
Moreover, existing legislation is already designed to ensure that social housing is prioritised for those who need it most. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will continue to work with the relevant sectors to ensure that the guidance is clear and fit for purpose, in relation to this crucial point, ahead of the duty provisions coming into force. When it comes to recognising and protecting the groups of people most at risk of involvement in serious violence, we are aware that housing and risk of homelessness are factors to be borne in mind, but we remain to be persuaded that an explicit reference to registered providers of social housing within the provisions for the duty is the correct approach to take in this instance.
One of the key requirements of the serious violence duty will be for specified authorities in a local area to work together to identify the causes of serious violence and, in doing so, ascertain which groups of people are most at risk locally. Legislation already dictates that, where a local housing authority requests it, a private registered provider of social housing or registered social landlord shall co-operate to such extent as is reasonable in the circumstances in offering accommodation to people with priority under the authority’s allocation scheme. That includes lettings allocated to those in priority need and those requiring urgent rehousing as a result of violence or threats of violence. Statutory guidance on allocations was issued in 2012, and local authorities must pay due regard to it.
Furthermore, the Regulator of Social Housing’s tenancy standards make clear that private registered providers of social housing must co-operate with local authority strategic housing functions. Those who are at risk of violence should already receive support if they are in need of social housing and/or if they are at risk of homelessness. However, it is important that local authorities are able to respond according to the needs of the specific local area and of the particular person. We are concerned that the amendment, which applies only to the social housing sector and not the private rental sector, may inadvertently single out and potentially stigmatise social tenants as being associated with serious violence, which I am sure nobody wants to flow from that.
It is unusual for housing and the Home Office to be in the same conversation, which is possibly why the Minister was using strange terminology more akin to the MHCLG.
That is something that we need to try and shift over the long term and that is the point of the clauses and amendments.
I understand the Minister’s points. On new clause 28, there is a clear argument that there is provision on domestic abuse but not a provision for violence outside of the home in a similar way. Now is not the time to press the new clauses to a vote, because that comes at the end of the Bill’s time in Committee, and I am happy to leave the amendments. However, I hope the Minister will encourage housing organisations, through the process of the new duty, to be part of the conversation because they are absolutely crucial, as I have seen for myself. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
We very much agree that voluntary and community sector organisations and local businesses are key to working with young people to tackle issues relating to serious violence and crime, and indeed to offering alternative opportunities to young people. One of the non-legislative measures that I am working on at the moment is bringing together the private and public sectors to offer opportunities by way of training, work placements and so on to young people who at the moment may believe that their life chances involve joining a gang and earning their money that way. We have to give young people a range of alternatives, so I very much agree with the motivations behind all these amendments, but particularly those that seek to involve charities and businesses.
I should point out that clause 9—“Power to authorise collaboration etc. with other persons”—is very much intended to include charitable organisations in the serious violence duty. We did not feel that it was right to put a duty on charities, but we did very much want to reference their ability to be included and involved in both the drawing up and the implementation of the strategy.
We are not persuaded that amendment 116 is necessary, because of the way it is drafted. It would potentially create significant new burdens if specified authorities were required to consult all voluntary sector organisations and businesses in the local area, as opposed to those that they considered to be most relevant to the local strategy for preventing and reducing serious violence.
I will shamelessly take this opportunity to mention, by way of example, the wonderful Louth Navigation Trust in my constituency. Wonderful charity though it is, I think it would itself accept that it is probably not able to assist in the drawing together of a serious violence duty in the way that specialist charities, such as St Giles Trust, Redthread and the other organisations that we all know and work with. will be able to do. That was a flippant example—forgive me—at 4 o’clock on a Tuesday afternoon.
Turning to amendments 81 and 87, we very much agree that it is important for serious violence strategies, required by chapter 1 of part 2 of the Bill, to be kept under review to ensure that they remain relevant and address the current issues affecting local areas at the time when they are being implemented. However, we are concerned as to whether an explicit requirement for revised strategies to be prepared and implemented every two years is the correct approach to take.
The duty is a key part of our work to prevent and reduce serious violence, focusing very much on prevention and early intervention, and informed by the evidence. We have been clear that a key focus of the duty, as I have said, should be on early intervention and prevention. That is why we have included a requirement for specified authorities to identify the kinds and causes of serious violence in the local area and the work that flows from that. It is therefore clear that local strategies should include a combination of short-term as well as longer-term initiatives aimed at preventing and reducing serious violence.
The draft statutory guidance for the duty makes it clear that local partnerships should review their strategy on an annual basis. Such reviews should consider how the interventions and solutions have affected serious violence in their area—considering, for example, crime statistics, and accident and emergency data. A review may well highlight the need for a refreshed strategy, for example where new and emerging crime types are identified—there may be the emergence of a new county line in their area—but we do not expect that to be the case every time.
We know that specific initiatives and actions that focus primarily on early intervention may not have a discernible effect on serious violence levels immediately. An assessment of the effectiveness of a local strategy conducted only two years after the strategy is first prepared may not capture the potential long-term impact and, therefore, may render it ineffective and in need of revision. Perhaps there would be a fairer analysis if a little more time were permitted to enable the interventions to take hold.
We want to ensure that local area resources are directed towards delivering on the strategies that they have prepared, instead of being diverted towards the preparation of revised strategies because there is a calendar they must keep to. I am reminded of a phrase about being driven by data and not dates, and wonder whether it is appropriate here.
I believe that specified authorities in local areas will be best placed to determine the necessary frequency of revisions in their own strategies, and that the existing requirement for strategies to be kept under review will ensure that a revision will be necessary and timely, rather than simply a formality. I see a role for hon. Members in that. I hope that they will watch closely what their areas are doing under this duty, and they will be able to highlight any concerns they have about the appropriateness, timeliness and so on of strategies and their revisions.
Finally, new clause 59 would require the creation of a statutory national serious violence oversight board, to be appointed and chaired by the Secretary of State. There will need to be a system in place to monitor progress in relation to the duty. There may be a useful role for the Government to support the process, but we question whether it is necessary to include the detail of such arrangements in the Bill. We will consider non-legislative options, which will in all likelihood feature in our statutory guidance for the duty. That will ensure that specified authorities are able to have a say in the arrangements, through a public consultation, following Royal Assent, including any proposed role for central Government, before they are established.
We expect to detail any role for Government in monitoring progress and activity in relation to the requirements of the serious violence duty to be included in the version of the draft statutory guidance, to be consulted on following Royal Assent. It is worth noting that specified authorities will already be expected to monitor their own progress, through the requirement to keep their strategy under review. Police and crime commissioners and those areas where mayoral offices have responsibility for policing will also have the discretionary power to monitor the performance of the specified authorities against their shared objectives.
Furthermore, community safety partnerships have a statutory requirement to keep the implementation of their strategies under review, for the purposes of monitoring effectiveness and to make any changes to strategies where necessary or expedient, and to publish the outcomes of each review. In the light of the explanations I have given, I ask the hon. Member for Croydon Central to withdraw her amendment.
I heard what the Minister said, in particular about amendments 81 and 87. She said that she did not want to push organisations towards having to prepare revised strategies all the time. She also said that the guidance advises them to review their strategies on an annual basis. We are in the position of having both things at the same time.
I hear what she says and am reassured by the need to look at it on an annual basis. I do think the phrase “from time to time” is slightly too loose to be in the Bill. We have seen the need for both short-term and long-term planning and we need to get that balance right. A lot of the violence reduction units, within PCC areas, say they want to be able to plan and get money beyond a year. At the moment, their money is given annually, which is very prohibitive. That is worth bearing in mind.
I heard the Minister say that there will be systems in place to monitor success and that she will look at what such systems could be. I was reassured by that and hope that she will ensure they have the teeth and resources to analyse what is happening across the country. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I hope that the Committee feels that, in my responses to the amendments, I have dealt with the substance of most of the clauses. I want to emphasise that clause 8 is included to reflect the fact that, particularly in the instance of county lines gangs, criminal gangs do not respect county boundaries, police force areas or local authority areas. They will reach their tentacles across the country, wherever they think there is a market and they can do their harm. The clause encourages and requires authorities to collaborate to address those concerns.
Does the Minister agree that they are keen to look at the legislation to see where it is weakest, and to target accordingly?
Very much so. Criminal gangs are very adept at spotting Government and local priorities and adjusting their behaviours. During the global pandemic, still some county lines were adjusting their methodology to evade detection when they were moving around the country. It is disgraceful, disgusting behaviour, and I hope that this duty and the requirement to collaborate will help to address that.
On the point that the hon. Member for Croydon Central made about housing priority need and the comparison with domestic abuse dealings in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, I will arrange for a letter to be written to her on that point. Unless there are any more interventions, I will sit down.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 8 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 12
Preventing and reducing serious violence
I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 12, page 12, line 34, at end insert—
“(5) In exercising their functions under this Chapter, specified authorities must have particular regard to reducing serious violence against women and girls, including street harassment, and reducing instances of hidden harm resulting from serious violence.”.
I thank my hon. Friend for that point, which is exactly the point I was about to make. She is completely right. This is in some senses an addition. Perhaps the Minister will say it is for local organisations and agencies to decide what to prioritise, but the reality—this is not a criticism—is that this duty was conceived at the height of concerns about street violence, violent crime and knife crime, and we may all be a little bit to blame for not focusing as well on the gendered violence and hidden violence that does not make the headlines in the same way, but is equally important. One feeds the other: if there is violence in the home, there is often more violent behaviour from children because they learn that behaviour. Gendered violence is just as important but is perhaps not as highlighted and talked about as it should be.
Women from all parts of the country, from all backgrounds, young and old, are killed every week. Last year, the number of female homicide victims in England and Wales reached its highest level since 2006, up 10% on the previous year. That is true of not only murder but all kinds of violence against women and girls. For the year ending March 2020, the crime survey for England and Wales estimated that 7.1% of adults aged 16 to 74 years had experienced sexual assault by rape or penetration. Domestic violence, already endemic across Britain, increased significantly during the covid pandemic, with 260,000 domestic abuse offences between March 2020 and June 2020 alone.
Amendment 91 would ensure that specified authorities have particular regard to reducing serious violence against women and girls, including street harassment, and reducing instances of hidden harm resulting from serious violence. I hope that the Minister will consider the amendment in the spirit in which it is presented. This would be a very useful thing for local agencies to do. It is incredibly important and is part of the wider violence picture and should therefore be included in the Bill.
As hon. Members will be aware, tackling violence against women and girls is one of the Government’s key priorities. These abhorrent crimes have no place in our society. This Government are committed to ensuring that more perpetrators feel the force of the law and to improving our support for those who suffer at the hands of abusers.
We have taken action to tackle all forms of violence against women and girls by introducing legislation around forced marriage, female genital mutilation and the disclosing of private sexual photographs. More recently, the landmark Domestic Abuse Act 2021 will bolster our response to domestic abuse at every level. The Act includes placing a duty on local authorities to provide support to victims of domestic abuse and their children in refuges and other safe accommodation, as well as many other things. What I have said about here it does not do justice to the Act, but we recognise also that legislation is not the only answer. Local authorities and others have a role to play in tackling violence against women and girls, which is why we provide funding to support victims of such crimes.
We have refrained from including in the duty set out in the Bill a specific list of crime types that must be included in a serious violence strategy for a local area. We have also refrained from prioritising one type of victim over another. This is to allow local strategies to take account of the most prevalent forms of serious violence in the locality, and the impact on all potential victims. Forms of serious violence will vary between geographical areas and we want to enable partners to adapt and respond to new and emerging forms of serious violence as they develop and are identified. That could include domestic abuse or others forms of violence against women and girls, but the Government believe, as set out in the duty, that it should be for authorities to determine what their specific priorities should be for their area. That is consistent with the model of police and crime commissioners and mayors who have policing responsibilities for setting priorities for policing.
In making any such determinations, they must consider the maximum penalty that could be imposed for any offence involved in the violence, the impact of the violence on any victim, the prevalence of the violence in the area and the impact of the violence on the community in the area. It is anticipated that work to answer these questions would form part of the development of a strategic needs assessment and strategy. The approach of including a specific offence, as is urged in the amendment, is not consistent with the wider approach.
We are committed to going further in our efforts to tackle violence against women and girls, which is why we will be publishing a new cross-Government strategy tackling violence against women and girls, which will be followed by a complementary domestic abuse strategy. I look forward to their publication to set out our approach to tackling all forms of violence against women and girls, including street harassment.
I hope these assurances and our commitments to future work in this area mean that the hon. Lady will be content to withdraw her amendment.
I hear what the Minister is saying and I applaud the work that has been done thus far on violence against women and girls, but I believe that the list in clause 12(4) that she just read out steers the whole process in the direction of serious street violence and youth violence, without a nod to the incredibly point about violence against women and girls, so I would like to test the will of the Committee on amendment 91.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I just wanted to raise a couple of concerns. We have not tabled amendments to the clauses, but I want to bring some issues that have been raised to the attention of the Committee.
Clause 14 would give the Secretary of State powers to make regulations regarding how PCCs or mayors can assist serious violence partnerships. It would allow education, prison and youth custody services to collaborate in order to prevent and reduce serious violence; it would also allow them to collaborate with SVPs. Subsection (5) places a duty on a relevant authority to collaborate with other relevant authorities for the purpose of preventing and reducing violence, if requested to do so by another relevant authority. The example provided in the explanatory notes is that
“a local young offenders’ institution may choose to collaborate with a secure children’s home located in the same area if they are experiencing similar issues with serious violence within their institutions.”
That makes sense, but we believe that there needs to be some nod in that process towards the focus on the safeguarding responsibility for children. It is important that the duty does not just become an intelligence-gathering exercise instead of a proper data-sharing exercise, so we want to ensure that people can be protected and prevented from getting involved in serious violence.
Clause 15 would impose a duty on education, prison and youth custody services to collaborate together and with SVPs when one partner organisation requests it, as long as complying with the request does not infringe on any of their existing legal duties. The explanatory notes call this a “permissive gateway” that
“would permit but would not require the sharing of information.”
The example given is that
“a clinical commissioning group could disclose management information about hospital attendances where serious violence was suspected, which could support the development of a local problem profile/strategic needs assessment.”
Again, that makes sense. However, the notes go on to say that
“any disclosure of information under this clause may be made notwithstanding any obligation of confidence or any other restriction on the disclosure of the information, save that disclosure would not be permitted if it would contravene the data protection legislation or the prohibitions on disclosure provided for in any Parts 1 to 7 or Chapter 1 of Part 9 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.”
We have talked to organisations that are concerned that the need not to uphold any obligation of confidence or any other restriction on the disclosure of information could undermine some of the trust that children, particularly those who are vulnerable or who are being criminally exploited, have with teachers and educators. Will the Minister talk through what any other restriction on the disclosure of information means in this context, particularly when applied to an individual child in a school setting? Will she set out the key difference between the “permissive gateway” of information sharing and the multi-agency structures—for example, referrals to children’s social care—that already exist for information sharing about individual children?
Overall, there is no question but that information sharing between agencies and police forces is vital to achieving a proper understanding of serious violence, particularly involving the county lines drug network and the many vulnerable children who have been swept into it, but it is also important that the objective of information sharing is about the safeguarding of vulnerable people and children, as well as crime prevention and reduction.
I will deal straightaway with the point about information sharing, as it would seem to me that the other clauses are understood.
Clause 15 provides a new permissive information sharing gateway for specified authorities, including local policing bodies and education, prison and youth custody authorities, to disclose information to each other. Sadly, we know that information sharing between agencies is not always as full and as timely as we would like, because of concerns that they are not allowed to share information. We do not want those concerns to get in the way of preventing serious violence.
Of course, we must operate within the law, so the clause ensures that there is a legislative framework in place to enable information to be shared between all authorities exercising functions under chapter 1 of part 2 of the Bill. In doing so, the clause permits but does not mandate authorities to disclose information. I reassure the Committee that, as required by article 36(4) of the UK General Data Protection Regulation, my officials have consulted the Information Commissioner’s Office on the proposed provisions within this clause and clauses 9 and 16, and no concerns were raised.
To be clear, clause 15 does not replace existing data-sharing arrangements or existing protocols that are already working well, including those under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Through the clause we are simply ensuring that all the specified authorities—local policing bodies and education, prison and youth custody authorities—are able to share relevant information with each other for the purposes of the recipient of the information exercising their functions to prevent or reduce serious violence. Such bodies should already have arrangements in place that set out clearly the processes and the principles for sharing information and data internally. Examples of data that could be shared include hospital data on knife injuries, the number of exclusions and truancies in local schools, police recorded crime, local crime data, anonymised prison data, areas of high social services interventions and intelligence on threats such as county lines, including about the activities of serious organised crime gangs and about drugs markets.
An important element of the duty would be to establish the local problem profile, and data sharing between the duty holders would be a crucial part of that process. By virtue of this clause, the authorities I have mentioned would be able to share information freely, providing it does not contravene data protection legislation or the provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I hope that reassures the Committee.
That is reassuring. I wanted to raise the point to ensure that we were all aware of that concern, which was raised to us by several organisations. I am grateful for the Minister’s response.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 90, in clause 16, page 16, line 14, at end insert—
“(8) A local policing body must report annually on the requests made under this section, including information on the bodies the request were made to and the use of information provided.”
This amendment would require local policing bodies to report on requests for information made to specified authorities, educational authorities, prison authorities and youth custody authorities for the purpose of assisting with its functions under section 13.
The amendment would ensure that when information was shared between partners, the local policing bodies reported back to their partners to explain how they were using the information. That would in turn help the partners better to understand the wider context to the issues raised.
The Children’s Society has pointed out that clauses 15 and 16 raise questions as to what information will be collected about individual young people and how that information may be used. It is keen that additional information sharing requirements do not result for some children in a more punitive response instead of a response that balances safeguarding and the prevention of violence escalating.
I will end my comments by asking the Minister further questions on the issue of data collection. Will the information and data collected through the duty be strictly management-level data, or case-level data? Will police forces be able to request information on specific vulnerable young people, and will policing bodies be able to request from specified authorities such as schools case-level information on children at risk of or experiencing serious violence? If so, how will the police use that information?
The hon. Lady asks a specific question—namely, will local policing bodies be able to request case-level information on children at risk and how will they use it? Police and crime commissioners and, in London, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the Common Council of the City of London, will have powers to work with the specified authorities to support multi-agency working. The specified authorities will need to co-operate with a local policing body when required to do so.
However, we will make it clear in guidance that the local policing body should consider the proportionality of additional requests and anticipated costs to specified authorities before making any such requests. That includes specific requests for data, which may be made only in order to fulfil its role of monitoring the effectiveness of local strategies. Such requests for data must relate only to the organisation that has generated it, except where functions are contracted out. Sufficient safeguards must be in place to ensure that information, including that which pertains to individuals, is disclosed in line with relevant data protection legislation.
Arrangements must also be in place to clearly set out the processes and principles for sharing information and data. Such arrangements should cover the sharing of information and data within the local partnership and with external bodies and should include the purpose of sharing the data, what is to happen to the data at relevant points, and clarity on respective roles. I hope that answers the hon. Lady’s questions.
I am pleased that that will be in the guidance. I think that issues flow from things such as the gangs matrix in London. There were concerns that information that was gathered in order to support people actually ended up being used as a way of profiling people—that the data was perhaps not used in the way in which people had thought it would be. That was the basis for the amendment. Given that that will be in the guidance, however, I am reassured that the purposes for which the information should be used should be clear. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Directions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Again, if it will assist the Committee, I am content to hear the hon. Member for Croydon Central set out her stall, as it were, and I will then respond.
I will be brief. I have three questions for the Minister, just to get a bit of clarity. The first is on clause 17, which, according to the Library briefing, gives the Secretary of State
“powers to issue directions to any SVP member, education, prison or youth custody service it thinks is failing to discharge its duties to prevent serious violence.”
It would be helpful if the Minister could provide an example of what that means. What direction will the Secretary of State be issuing? What is envisaged by that clause?
Secondly, the amendments in clause 19 require community safety partnerships to have regard to
“preventing people from becoming involved in serious violence”,
and to
“reducing incidences of serious violence”
when assessing crime and disorder in their area and formulating their strategies. It would be helpful if the Minister explained how that differs from what their strategies are doing already. Will there be a bit of an overlap of strategies there?
My final point is one that has been raised by the Local Government Association and has been drawn to my attention elsewhere. The community safety partnerships have had their funding steadily withdrawn since 2010, which has had an impact on their resources and their capacity to do things. It would be helpful if the Government could review the impact of those funding reductions on community safety partnerships—perhaps with a view to increasing that core funding—and on the ability of councils to address the range of crime issues they are expected to assist other partners in tackling.
Serious violence has a devastating impact on victims and their families, instils fear in communities and is extremely costly to society, as I have already said. I hope the Government’s intention is clear from the discussions we have had today, but it is crucial that there are consequences if some authorities are not focused on what we are trying to achieve through the duty. On the rare occasion when a specified authority or educational, prison or youth custody authority does not fulfil its requirements under the duty, thereby risking the success of the whole partnership, clause 17 provides the Secretary of State with the power to issue a direction to secure compliance.
This power does not apply to probation services provided by the Secretary of State or to publicly managed prisons, young offender institutions, secure training centres or secure colleges. For such authorities, existing mechanisms will be available to ensure they are meeting the requirements of the duty, so we are trying to get consistency across them all.
For any directions relating to a devolved Welsh authority, the Welsh Ministers must be consulted before a direction is issued. We are continuing to engage with the Welsh Government on the operation of the direction, as far as it relates to devolved Welsh authorities, and I will be writing further to Minister Hutt shortly.
I was asked for examples of when we envisage that a direction may be given. It is very much expected that these powers will be used infrequently—I hope never—but we must have this ability to ensure compliance if that situation were to arise. It is very much a matter of last resort when all other attempts to work effectively in partnership with an authority have failed. Where necessary, we must have this backstop mechanism to ensure that all relevant authorities comply with the duty and play their part in reducing and preventing serious violence.
A direction may include requiring authorities to take the necessary steps set out by the Secretary of State in order to comply with the duty. If necessary, to ensure an authority complies, a direction can be enforced by a mandatory order granted on application to the administrative court in England and Wales. We very much hope that this power will be used rarely, if at all, but if, for example, an authority refuses to provide information that it is required to provide under the Bill, it is available as a last resort when all other attempts to work effectively have failed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clauses 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 18 to 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. She speaks with great experience, and she is absolutely right: doing these reviews has wider benefits. Reading the review on Child Q and hearing the stories from the father, mother and family members about him, we can see, hopefully, some form of the beginnings of closure from the review. Therefore we are very much in favour of extending homicide reviews in the way provided for under the Bill. We have some amendments, but they come later, so I will not speak to them now.
To do the victims and their families and friends justice, we need to ensure that the lessons are learned. Part 2, chapter 2 of the Bill will require police, local authorities and clinical commissioning groups to conduct offensive weapon homicide reviews when an adult’s death involves the use of an offensive weapon. Police recorded 625 homicide offences in the year ending December 2020. Of all homicides recorded in the last year—the latest year that we have information for—37% were knife-enabled crimes. A large proportion of homicides involve offensive weapons. In the year ending March 2020, 275 homicides involved a sharp instrument, 49 involved a blunt instrument and 30 were homicides involving shooting. It is therefore absolutely right that the Government look to learn the lessons from those homicides not currently reviewed by multi-agency partners.
In my constituency, there have been incidents in which adults have been killed and an offensive weapon was involved. In one instance, there were incidents in the same area within weeks of each other. Those cases were not linked together, but actually, when people looked into the background and how those murders occurred, it turned out that they were linked.
It is therefore important that the pathways that lead people to be involved in homicides, whether as victims or perpetrators, can be understood and the knowledge can be shared. Offensive weapon homicide reviews will be similar to the domestic homicide reviews that already take place. Domestic homicide reviews are carried out when someone over the age of 16 dies as a result of domestic violence, abuse or neglect. The Government have committed to taking action to address homicide, but have not previously committed to introducing offensive weapon homicide reviews specifically.
Clause 23 will require an offensive weapon homicide review to be carried out when a qualifying homicide has taken place. A qualifying homicide occurs when an adult’s death or the circumstances or history of the person who has died meet conditions set by the Secretary of State in regulations. In accordance with clause 27, the purpose will be to identify lessons to learn from the death and to decide on actions to take in response to those lessons.
Clauses 24 to 35 do a number of things, including giving the Secretary of State the power to specify the relevant review partners in regulations and which of the listed public bodies will need to carry out the review in these circumstances, and to clarify when offensive weapon homicide reviews do not need to be carried out. Importantly, review partners must report on the outcome of their review to the Secretary of State. In addition, there are other key regulations about the obligations of offensive weapon homicide review partners.
Clause 33 is important, as it will require offensive weapon homicide reviews to be piloted before they are brought into force. The Secretary of State will be required to report to Parliament on the pilot. It is vital that offensive weapon homicide reviews are piloted before being rolled out nationally, but the provisions are fairly light on detail. It would be helpful if the Minister could provide any further information on the piloting. Can she clarify how many local authorities or police forces they will work with to pilot the reviews?
Standing Together, a domestic abuse charity, recently reviewed domestic homicide review processes in London boroughs. Its 2019 report identified several areas for improvement, including how domestic homicide reviews are stored and retrieved, how chairs are appointed, and how appropriate funding is secured. It also highlighted that not enough sharing of knowledge is happening.
We are glad that the pilot partners will report on these reviews before they are implemented, but could the Minister explain in a bit more detail what those reports will include? Will there be regular reporting and evaluation of these offensive weapons homicide reviews once they are implemented? Where there is an overlap, and a homicide fits into two different categories—for example, if there is a domestic homicide review and an offensive weapons homicide review—how will the lessons be learned? Will there be two reviews, or just one? I am also keen to hear how the lessons from all existing homicide reviews can be better understood and shared between partners to ultimately make our streets safer and save lives.
The Secretary of State is given the power to make regulations on offensive weapons homicide reviews, to provide information on how to identify which local services are relevant to the review and how local services can negotiate who carries out the review when the circumstances are not clear. This is defined in regulatory powers, not on the face of the Bill; perhaps the Minister could explain why, and also explain what her expected timeframe is for these powers. If the duty to conduct these reviews will not be carried out until the criteria are defined in regulation, will there be a delay? What period of time is the Minister expecting that to be—because those regulations will need to go through Parliament—and what will happen after the regulations are published? Can she provide any data on how many more homicide reviews this change will actually bring; what expected number of reviews will need to be undertaken? Finally, what are the plans for budgets to cover local safeguarding partners’ costs for the delivery of these reviews? That question was raised in evidence from the Local Government Association, so will the Home Office be submitting a case to increase the funding for local authorities? If not, how does it envisage that these reviews will be funded? I will leave it there.
It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Croydon Central for setting out some of the background to these clauses. Through the clauses relating to offensive weapons homicide reviews, we want to tackle the growing proportion of homicides that involve offensive weapons, for all the reasons that one can imagine: for communities, and for the families affected. As the hon. Lady has set out, there is at the moment no legal requirement to review such homicides unless they are already subject to review: if, for example, the victim is a child or a vulnerable adult, or the homicide has happened in a domestic setting. As such, we want to introduce these offensive weapons homicide reviews to ensure that local agencies consider the circumstances of both victims and perpetrators, and identify lessons from these homicides that could help prevent future deaths.
Taking a step back and looking at the Bill as a whole, this work will form part of the local authorities’ work on the serious violence duties. I hope there will be much cross-learning between those duties and the homicide reviews that may occur in local areas, as part of a joined-up approach to tackling such homicides. All persons, bodies and organisations with information relevant to the decision to conduct a review or to identifying lessons, such as schools and probation services, will be legally required to provide information deemed relevant to the review.
The hon. Member for Croydon Central has understandably asked where these reviews fit in with existing homicide reviews: child death and adult safeguarding reviews in England, and their equivalents in Wales, as well as domestic homicide reviews. To avoid duplication of work, the Bill provides that these new offensive weapons homicide reviews will be required only where there is not an existing statutory requirement to review the homicide, which I hope answers her question.
Given that the Minister is determined to learn the lessons of these reviews and given the importance of properly funding local agencies to carry out any such improvements, can she confirm today that additional resource will go along with this additional focus from the Home Office on implementation?
I am very pleased to confirm that the Home Office will provide funding for the relevant review partners to cover the costs of the reviews during the pilot stage, and will meet the cost of the Home Office homicide oversight board. If the policy is rolled out nationally, funding arrangements will be confirmed after the pilot, but in that initial period that is certainly the approach.
I am trying to see whether I have further details about the pilots that I can assist the Committee with. Clause 33 requires that a pilot of the reviews takes place for one or more purpose, or in at least one area. We intend to pilot reviews in at least three areas and are currently in discussions to enable that to happen. We will announce the pilot areas in due course. We want to pilot the reviews in areas that have high levels of homicide and in areas that have low levels, and that represent regions in both England and Wales.
We will also specify in regulations the length of time that the pilot will last. We currently intend to run the pilot for 18 months to ensure that the review process can be tested properly in each of the pilot areas, but clause 23 allows us to extend the length of the pilot for a further period, which may be useful if further test cases are needed. Our approach is to ensure that the pilot provides us with the greatest insight and information as to how the reviews would work if we roll them out across the whole of England and Wales. In the interests of transparency, clause 33 also requires the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report on the operation of the pilot before the reviews can come fully into force across England and Wales.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 24 to 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Extraction of information from electronic devices: investigations of crime etc
I beg to move amendment 94, in clause 36, page 29, line 5, at end insert—
“(c) the user who has given agreement under subsection (1)(b) was offered free independent legal advice on issues relating to their human rights before that agreement was given.”
This amendment would ensure that users of electronic devices were offered free independent legal advice before information on their device could be accessed.
I thank my hon. Friend for all the points she made, which, to be quite honest, are common sense, but would cause a huge shift in victims’ and survivors’ perceptions of their rights. I have questions for the Minister.
On data storage and security, I am sure we were all pretty shocked and disgusted to hear that images relating to Sarah Everard were not secure in the police system. While I have a very high regard for the police, they can be a leaky sieve—let us be honest. Why do we not simply clone phones at the point of taking them? Why is it months, or usually years, before the victim gets their phone back? Would it be possible to put in legislation or guidance a timeframe on how long that phone can be held for? Having spoken to officers, it seems that cloning a phone is complicated and geeky; it tends to be put in a back drawer until they absolutely have to do it. A timeframe would give a lot of comfort to victims and survivors; they would know it was only a week until they got their photos back, for example.
Finally, a myth has been perpetuated that victims and survivors have to hand over their phone or mobile data to the police or their case will not be taken forward. I have heard examples of victims and survivors being told expressly that if they do not hand it over, they are withholding evidence and could be prosecuted. At that point, unfortunately, a number of survivors drop out of the process and withdraw their charges altogether. If the Minister is able to give reassurance on that, that would be hugely appreciated.
I turn to amendment 115, on the list of people who may extract data. The list is pretty extensive, but one group stood out: immigration officers may request a mobile phone. A few months ago, I went to a large asylum hospital in my constituency, where there were 50 to 100 men—I do not know how many—and what concerned them most was that, literally as they entered the country, their mobile devices and indeed clothes were taken off them. There was no debate or explanation; it is just part of the process.
I completely understand the argument that very bad people, such as gangmasters, who come into the country may have a lot of contacts that are relevant to police inquiries. The police and transport police are already on the extensive list of people who may access electronic devices, so if an immigration officer was concerned, they could get a police officer to take the digital device away. That is not a problem. Extracting data is a complex process that requires specialist experience, and it ought to be managed under the law. I am concerned that we are asking immigration officers to be incredibly mindful, and to be trained and resourced, and to have all the skills, to request that device.
The people I met fell into three camps: economic migrants, who have paid to come over here; people who have been trafficked over here; and those brought in specifically for modern slavery. All the men I spoke to wanted to see pictures of their loved ones. They wanted those memories from home, and a mobile phone may be the best way to hold those memories and connections.
I do not know anyone’s telephone number aside from my parents’—it was the one I grew up with. I can call the police, the NHS helpline and my mum, but everything else is stored on my phone. If I lost it, I would not know how to respond—and I have back-ups that I can access, and English as my first language. When I changed phones, I did not download properly and lost five years of photos. That was so painful. Imagine someone being trafficked into this country, and probably horrifically abused on the way in. The one thing they can hold on to is their memories on that digital device, but that is taken away. They have no information about why it was taken, or when it will be returned, and all their contacts have been lost.
All the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central made apply in this case. Immigration officers are one of the groups who may take these devices—this is not a dig against immigration officers, who do a difficult job—but in any other situation a police officer or a court order would be required to take such detailed data. I ask the Minister please to remove immigration officers from the list.
I welcome the discussion about this chapter of the Bill, because the framework we are setting out is a really important step forward in improving the expectations about and management of digital data that victims and complainants may have on their digital devices. Of course, completely understandably, the focus has been on complainants in sexual violence cases—I will go into some detail on that in due course—but the chapter applies across the board. If, for example, in cases that do not relate to sexual violence, a mobile phone is deemed to be relevant and the authorised person is satisfied that the exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate, this chapter will apply.
Thank you. The Minister for Crime and Policing, my hon. Friend Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) answered the urgent question on the timing of the rape review. Colleagues will know that for the last two years, the Government have commissioned intensive research into each stage of the process within the criminal justice system of a rape case or a sexual violence investigation, from the moment of reporting through to the moment when the case finishes, whether by way of a verdict or if a trial does not go ahead for any number of reasons. We had very much hoped to publish that review by the end of last year. However, we were very understanding of the fact that the Victims’ Commissioner and women’s charities wanted to make representations, in particular looking at the shadow report by EVAW—End Violence Against Women. We were mindful that there was a super-complaint under way as well. Therefore, we have paused publication in order to take into account some of those factors.
The Minister for Crime and Policing informed the House this week that we plan to publish the review after the Whitsun recess. It will show the Government’s intentions in relation to this particular category of cases, sexual violence cases, and will of course sit alongside this Bill, but will go much further than the Bill. On some of the situations, scenarios and experiences that were described today and last week in evidence, I just urge caution until the rape review is published, because there may be answers in that document.
In terms of the legal framework, I think it is really important that we have this in the Bill and that the rights of victims and of suspects and defendants are set out and clarified and that we introduce consistency where that has been alleged in the past to be missing.
I note just as an example that one of the other ways in which we are really trying to help victims of sexual violence is through support for independent sexual violence advisers. We already have ISVAs working with victims across the country. This year, we have been able to announce the creation of 700 new posts, with some £27 million of funding. I give that just as an example. This is an important part of our work, but it is not the only piece of work that we are doing to address some of these very genuine concerns.
I am hearing everything that the Minister is saying. Knowing that the review is coming out—I assume it is something that she has been working on or very closely with, because of her intense involvement and support in this area—does she feel that the measures in the Bill are proportionate or are they something that, once the review comes out, she may look at changing, to ensure that the safeguards that she speaks of are embedded in the final Act that we see?
We have been working together on this. We must not not forget that the background to the legal framework has to take into account the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the more general disclosure rules, for example. But this has been very much a piece of work across Government, because we want this framework to give confidence and clarity to victims and to suspects, but also, importantly, to the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, because they are the ones who must administer and work within the legal framework and the code of practice.
If I may, Mr McCabe, I will take a bit of time, because this is such an important measure and I am mindful that there are questions about it, to set out some of the detailed thinking behind the way in which the clauses have been drafted. The current approach to the extraction of information from digital devices has indeed been criticised by some as feeling like a “digital strip-search” where devices have been taken as a matter of course and where, in many cases, all the sensitive personal data belonging to a device user was extracted and processed even where it was not relevant to the offence under investigation. We absolutely understand the concerns that have been raised in relation to that.
I think this is an appropriate point for me to lay the challenge on the Government about the decision to classify children as adults at the age of 16 in clause 36(10). The Minister has just used the expression “digital strip-search”. Is it really appropriate for a 16-year-old girl, or boy for that matter, to have a digital strip-search, giving up all their little secrets and everything else, because the Government think that they should be classified as an adult and that adult factors should be applied directly to them?
I will deal with that in detail in due course. Just so that colleagues understand how that age was settled upon, in the drafting we carefully considered people’s views, including the Information Commissioner, about the freedoms and the feelings of power and authority that users of devices have. We settled on the age of 16 because we understand that a 16-year-old is different from a 12 or 13-year-old, if their parents have allowed them mobile phones, although I am banning my son from having a mobile phone until he is at least 35, but there we go. A moment of lightness, sorry.
I will deal with the point in more detail later, because it is important, but there is a difficult balance to maintain between rights of victims, suspects and defendants but also rights of users, particularly under the European convention, so that has been the Government’s motivation in this. However, we are alive to scrutiny.
I think this involves the focus that I hope the Minister is going to come to. I hear everything she has just said about the justification and I am going along with that, but it is clear in subsection (10):
“In this Chapter—
‘adult’ means a person aged 16 or over”.
Why was that specific wording chosen rather than “the remit of the clause covers people from the age of 16 onwards”, for example?
I will come to that later, but the hon. Lady knows that I am in listening mode on this. The Bill includes requirements to obtain agreement to extract information; to ensure there is reasonable belief that the required information is held on the device; and, before using this information, to consider whether there are less intrusive means of obtaining it. That is an important point that I know hon. Members have focused on. The clauses will ensure that the victim’s right to privacy will be respected and will be at the centre of all investigations where there is a need to extract information from a digital device.
The Bill also includes a new code of practice. This will give clear guidance to all authorities exercising the power. It will address how the information may be obtained using other, less intrusive means; how to ensure that agreement is freely given, and how the device user’s rights are understood. All authorised persons will have a duty to have regard to the code when exercising or deciding whether to exercise the power. The clauses are also clear that the code is admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings and that a failure to act in accordance with it may be taken into account by the court. It will give up-to-date, best practice guidance for selectively extracting data considering existing technological limitations. That will be updated as and when further capabilities are developed and extended to all authorities able to use this power.
The Minister is outlining how important the code of practice is. Is she therefore sympathetic to the view that we have put forward in our new clauses that that code of practice should be pulled together with a list of eminently sensible and professional organisations and people, and that we should define in the Bill some of what that should include because it is so important?
We are going to be even more ambitious than that. We aim to publish a draft on Report, which means the House and the other place will be able to scrutinise the draft code of practice during the scrutiny of the Bill as a whole. Once the Bill receives Royal Assent, we will consult formally on the code of practice, including with the relevant commissioners, to enable a more detailed draft to be laid before the House. Again, we are in listening mode on the ways in which the code of practice should be drafted, because we understand how important it is and how important it is that victims, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, among others, have confidence in the document.
I am so sorry—I have not quite understood the hon. Lady. On the taking of a phone, if I have just been told that we are concerned about the ramifications of cloning it, I do not see why we would clone it despite those reservations in order to provide photographs. I would be very uneasy about having differences in how the police handle digital data depending on the personal circumstances of the person from whom they have taken a phone, including nationality. I would be very cautious about going down that road.
I did not mean to be used in court. I meant for the individual who has lost their one contact with home—that they could get a copy or a print-out of photos, rather than the device just being taken away with no explanation of when they are going to get it back again.
I am very cautious about distinguishing between different victims. Perhaps the hon. Lady is alleging that the person she is talking about is a victim. The framework is about consistency and clarity, and I would be concerned about having caveats here and there in order to fit individual facts. Part of this test is about relevance, necessity and proportionality. Those are the tests that we are asking officers to apply, and we would have to apply them across the board.
There are situations within the framework whereby the power can be used without agreement, such as to locate a missing person where the police reasonably believe that the person’s life is at risk. Under clause 36, the police may have good reason to believe that a device has information that will help to locate the person. In such circumstances, clearly the person is not available to give their consent, so clause 36 ensures that officers can extract data, if it is necessary and proportionate, to protect the privacy of the user. That also applies in relation to children who need to be protected.
New clause 49 raises the bar for the exercise of the power in clause 36(1). The necessity test under new clause 49 is one of strict necessity. I am not persuaded that adopting the phrase, “strictly necessary and proportionate”, instead of “necessary and proportionate”, will make a material difference. This phrase is well used in the Bill. I note that article 8.2 of the European convention on human rights—the very article that people are relying on in relation to the framework—permits interference with the right to respect for private and family life. Such interference is permitted where it is necessary to achieve various specified objectives.
I understand what the Minister is saying. The review in Northumbria showed that about 50% of requests were not strictly necessary and proportionate. That must be wrong, and we are trying to make sure that people know what they are giving over, that they do it voluntarily and that it is absolutely necessary that such information is requested. Apart from trying to be clear about what is proportionate and necessary, what solution can the Minister put in place to make sure we do not have 50% of cases involving asking for information where it is not necessary and proportionate?
On what the hon. Lady has described, I am not sure what difference it would make. I am trying to put myself in the boots of a police officer. Would a police officer ask for data if they read the words, “strictly necessary”, but not if they read the word, “necessary”? Actually, the problem that has been identified by the figure quoted by the hon. Lady is police officers’ understanding of the legislation, which comes back to training. Article 8, on which many rely in this context and in this part of the Bill, refers to “necessary” interference, and I am not clear what “strictly necessary” would add to that.
New clause 49 seeks to provide that information may be extracted only for the purpose of a criminal investigation
“where the information is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry.”
There are safeguards within the clauses to ensure that information is not extracted as a matter of course, and they have been drafted with respect for victims’ privacy in mind. They include a requirement that the authorised person has a reasonable belief that the device contains information that is relevant to a purpose for which they may extract information, and that the exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve that purpose.
I hear everything the Minister is saying and it is very plausible, but I want to challenge her assertions on necessary, proportionate and clear lines of inquiry, based on the answer I received to a written question to the Home Office on 11 November. I asked about the process of extracting mobile phones. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Croydon South replied:
“Immigration Enforcement search all migrants”—
at this point, “all migrants”, so we do not know yet whether they are an asylum seeker, being trafficked or are here for nefarious purposes—
“upon arrival at the Tug Haven at Dover. In the event that a mobile phone is discovered it will be seized as part of an investigation into the organised crime group involved in the facilitation.”
Again, we do not know if they are a criminal or a victim at this point, but the phone will be seized regardless.
“The migrant will be informed verbally that the phone will be kept for evidential purpose for three to six months. They are provided with a receipt and contact details. Attempts will be made to communicate this in their first language, although this can be challenging due to external factors.”
So people arrive here, immediately their phone is taken away from them and they might not even know why. It is great that within “three to six months”, they are meant to have that response—
Sorry, Minister? I do not think that the reality on the ground—the reality that the Home Office acknowledges—backs up what the other Minister is saying about reasonable, proportionate and lines of inquiry, because it is happening to every migrant coming into this country.
I know this is important detail, but I remind the hon. Lady that interventions should not be too long.
I cannot hope to do justice to a parliamentary question answered by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South, the Immigration Minister, because I know the care and attention he gives to answering such PQs. However, over lunch, I will attempt to extract an answer that will do justice to his response. I make the point that the hon. Member for Rotherham is referring to practice at the moment. Again, the point of this legal framework is to ensure that we have consistency and clarity of approach. I will try to do my hon. Friend justice when we return at 2 o’clock.
I will now move on to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and its code of practice, because those provisions on “reasonable lines of inquiry” will continue to apply to the investigation of criminal offences in England and Wales. We cannot—must not—view the extraction of digital data in a vacuum, apart from the rest of the powers of, and duties on, police officers and the CPS when it comes to a criminal trial.
In the context of mobile phones, iPads and so on, police forces will continue to use the digital processing notice developed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council for this purpose. It explains in lay language how the police extract the information, which information might be extracted, how long the device might be retained for and what happens to irrelevant material found on the device or devices. The notice makes it clear that investigators must respect an individual’s right to privacy and must not go beyond the reasonable lines of inquiry. That is the golden thread that runs throughout the Act.
It is imperative that the existing procedures for investigations set out in the 1996 Act are followed. Although the clauses in the Bill concern a broader range of activity than just criminal investigation, helping as they do in investigations for missing persons or to protect children, we do not want to introduce any ambiguity. I will therefore reflect on that, but we are clear that the CPIA provisions must continue in the context of criminal investigations.
I note that new clause 49 would omit subsection (7)(b) of clause 36. We are clear that police officers and others using the extraction power should always seek to obtain the information required in the least intrusive way possible. There are situations in which it may not be reasonably practicable to utilise the least intrusive means of obtaining information, and this clause ensures that authorised persons may make that judgment. That could be because the time it would take to gather the information might affect the investigation or increase the risk of harm to an individual, or because those methods would mean intruding on the privacy of a wider number of people.
I will give one example and then I will sit down. When searching for a missing person, information such as an image on a witness’s device might also be captured on CCTV. Identifying all cameras, and downloading and reviewing many hours of CCTV footage is a time-consuming process. The authorised person may decide that it is more appropriate to extract the information from the device in order to speed up the inquiry and to try to locate the missing person before they come to harm.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
As the Committee will remember, I gave a very quick example of circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the authorised person to use information extracted from a digital device: when a person is missing, it would be appropriate to do that rather than wait for a review of many hours of closed circuit television footage. I hope that has dealt with that part of new clause 49.
New clause 49 also incorporates a definition of “agreement”. In order for authorised persons to exercise the power to extract information from digital devices, device users other than children or adults without capacity must voluntarily hand over their device and agree to the extraction of information. Authorised persons must explicitly ask device users for their agreement. The code of practice will provide guidance on: how agreement is to be obtained by the authorised person; ensuring it is freely given; and how the device user is made of aware of their right to refuse. The code will set out the best practice that authorised persons should follow when obtaining agreement, such as providing a copy of the digital processing notice for the device user to read and sign.
The final change made by new clause 49 is that it would define an adult as a person aged 18 or over, rather than 16 or over, as set out in chapter 3 of part 2. I understand this was not raised by the Victims’ Commissioner, but we have listened, and have thought very carefully about the imposition of that age in the Bill. In setting the age at 16, we were keen to ensure that those aged 16 to 17 were given appropriate control over their personal devices. That is not dissimilar from the position in other legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which recognises the rights of young people aged 16 and 17. However, we note the concerns raised in the debate, and we will reflect on them.
May I say how grateful I am that the Minister is clearly in listening mode on this issue? The difference with the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is that it does not define 16 and 17-year-olds as adults. It is that particular word, not the inclusion of that age bracket, that we are concerned about.
I thank the hon. Lady. As I say, we will reflect on the issue.
New clause 50 would provide that, where the user of a device was a child or adult without capacity, their views were sought and taken into account when someone else was making a decision on their behalf regarding the extraction of information from their device. We agree on the point about children. Indeed, clause 37(4) makes an equivalent provision, so we are not sure there is much between us on this point. We rely on clause 37(4) to ensure that the views of the child are taken into account.
We do not, however, agree that it is appropriate to include equivalent provision for adults without capacity. With such people, it is the capacity of the individual user that is relevant, and that is determined on the basis of a case-specific assessment. It is only if, as a result of that assessment, the person is deemed not capable of making the decisions that someone else is asked to make it. Authorised persons using that power will still have to comply with their existing responsibilities under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the associated code of practice or equivalent provisions in Scotland and Northern Ireland. We will, however, include guidance and direct authorised persons to the relevant statutory responsibilities in the code of practice.
New clause 52 seeks to expand the list of statutory consultees in respect of the code of practice to include the Victims’ Commissioner, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and representatives of victims and witnesses, but clause 40 already places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult
“(a) the Information Commissioner,
(b) the Scottish Ministers,
(c) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and
(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
We believe this last line affords sufficient flexibility to capture those other persons listed in new clause 52. I can assure the Committee that we will work closely with the Victims’ and Domestic Abuse Commissioners, and other relevant groups, as we develop the code.
The new clause also lists matters to be addressed in the code of practice. We do not dispute the relevance of many of the matters listed in new clause 52(5), but putting such a list in the Bill is unnecessary. The code needs to be comprehensive and fit for purpose, and it will be prepared in consultation with interested parties and subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Amendment 94 seeks to provide for independent legal advice for device users. Ensuring that victims are properly supported is a priority for this Government. The code of practice will make it clear that investigators should inform people about the use of the power, and ensure that they are fully aware of their rights. This information will include: why they are asking for agreement, what will happen to the individual’s device, what information will be extracted from the device, how long it may be retained for, and what will happen to any irrelevant material found on the device.
We are aware of the impact that requests for personal information can have on victims of sexual violence, and we believe that individuals should be supported in the process. We are fully committed to giving support to victims of crime, including access to independent sexual violence advisers, who we believe have a role in helping to explain the power to victims; as I have said, we are investing in 700 more of these posts this year.
We are exploring the findings of the sexual violence complainants’ advocate scheme, piloted in Northumbria, as part of the rape review, which will be published shortly. We do not think that chapter 3 of part 2 of this Bill is the right place to address this broader issue about the provision of legal advice to victims and witnesses, given the wider impact across the criminal justice system.
Amendment 115 to schedule 3 seeks to exclude immigration officers from the list of persons authorised to carry out a digital extraction. Immigration officers play a vital role in protecting vulnerable people, particularly those who may be victims of trafficking, and it is important that they are able to obtain information that may be vital in those and other investigations. The power in schedule 3 ensures that all authorities extract information in a consistent way, and put the needs and privacy of the user at the forefront of any request. Any person being asked to provide a device will be made aware of their rights, including their right to refuse.
The hon. Member for Rotherham asked about a parliamentary question that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Croydon South, answered. I am told that mobile phones are seized under statutory powers where there is a reasonable belief that evidence of a criminal offence will be found. The subsequent examination of the device will be conducted in forensic conditions, and in such a way as to target only the relevant material. The handset will be retained for as long as is required to support any criminal proceedings before being returned to the owner.
Finally, there is also a Government amendment in this group: amendment 63, which ensures that the definition of the common council of the City of London is used consistently throughout the Bill. The City of London Corporation has both public and private functions, and it is therefore appropriate that public legislation applies to the corporation only in respect of its public functions. Government amendment 63 provides that the reference to the common council relates to
“its capacity as a local authority”,
which brings clause 37 into line with other provisions in the Bill referencing the common council.
To sum up, this is the first time that a clear and consistent approach to the extraction of information from digital devices with the device user’s agreement has been written into primary legislation. The provisions remove legal ambiguity around the practice and, for the first time, enshrine the protections and safeguards that authorised persons must adhere to when exercising that power. It is a significant step forward in driving a consistent approach across the Union for the law enforcement authorities that exercise these powers, and for victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system. Of course, there is more to do outside the Bill in a range of areas, but we are committed to working with victims and survivors and with charities and commissioners to ensure that when implemented, the provisions command the trust and confidence of victims and witnesses. Many of the issues raised in the new clauses can and will be addressed through the code of practice, so I hope that the hon. Member for Croydon Central will feel able to withdraw her amendments and support Government amendment 63 and clauses 36 to 42 standing part of the Bill.
We all agree on the problems here; we have suggested some solutions and the Minister has explained why she is not convinced. I think it would be hard for the Minister not to agree with quite a lot of what Vera Baird said when giving evidence. We will have to come back to some of those new clauses and decide how we vote at an another time.
Given what the Minister said on three points—first, that she would look at the age issue and the definition of an adult; secondly, that there would be a draft code of practice by Report, and that she would incorporate some of the measures we discussed into that; and thirdly, that the rape review will be published soon, and that in it, the Government are looking at work such as that done in Northumbria, and at police training—I am content not to push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Application of section 36 to children and adults without capacity
Amendment made: 63, in clause 37, page 31, line 35, after “London” insert
“in its capacity as a local authority”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
This amendment clarifies that the reference in clause 37(11) to the Common Council of the City of London is to the Common Council in its capacity as a local authority.
Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 38 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clause 43
Pre-charge bail
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I am in the unusual position of having found out that things were going wrong with pre-charge bail at the same time that the Minister did. We were both in Rotherham with the National Crime Agency, to learn more about how it was investigating past cases of child sexual exploitation. There was a throwaway line by the officer about how things had got a lot more complicated since pre-charge bail was brought in through the Police and Crime Act 2017, and I have to say that I did not know anything about it.
Pre-charge bail does exactly what it says. Before 2017, the police were able to put in place restrictions on a person before they were charged, such as “You cannot leave the country” or “You cannot go within 100 yards of the victim.” This is really important in a place such as Rotherham, because the victims—the survivors—and the perpetrators are sometimes both still living on the same street, or their children may still be going to the same school, but also because a number of the perpetrators are dual nationality and there is a flight risk. The problem the police had was that there was a window of 28 days during which they had to make the charge, and with child abuse cases, particularly past child abuse cases, it can take months if not years to gather all of the evidence they need to make that charge. We found in Rotherham that the police were having to sit on their hands and hope that the perpetrator did not either flee or—as unfortunately happened in a number of well-documented cases—engage in intimidation. There was a lot of intimidation of victims and witnesses because the police were not, for example, able to put distance restrictions on the then alleged perpetrators.
I really welcome that these restrictions are back. I do not want to reflect on the omission in the intervening years—the fact that they were not in place. I am grateful that the police were creative and used release under investigation, because that was really all that they had, but it was not good enough, and it is not good enough. I am proud to support my hon. Friend’s amendments on this topic, which I think strengthen the Bill and make it even more victim-centred. However, I thank the Minister for listening to the women of Rotherham, the National Crime Agency, and all the other forces up and down the country. These events demonstrate to me that we make legislation with the best of intentions, but sometimes the unintended consequences are severe, so I am grateful that the Government have recognised that mistake and redressed it through this Bill.
What I would say, though—I have to say something, Minister—is that child abuse cases and many sexual offence cases are, by necessity, resource-heavy. If she can do more to put resources within the reach of officers so that they can speed up these cases as much as possible in order to eliminate the ongoing trauma that survivors go through, that would be deeply appreciated.
Before I explain the clauses, we should remind ourselves why the 2017 Act was passed. Colleagues may remember that in the first half of the past decade, there were several very high-profile investigations into very serious allegations of child sexual abuse and exploitation. There was an understanding that in some cases—not all—we had to look at bail conditions and so on to ensure that these complex investigations were carried out as efficiently and quickly as possible. That was the driving sentiment behind the 2017 legislation. We have listened to the police and to victims and survivors and charities that work with them. We want to improve the efficiency of the pre-charge bail system and encourage the use of bail where necessary and proportionate.
The hon. Member for Croydon Central explained the background to this clause and schedule and its reference to Kay Richardson, whose murder has already been described. When we scrutinised the Domestic Abuse Bill, I said that the experiences of individual victims and their families were behind many of the measures introduced to improve court processes, for example, and to help with services and refuges. This is such an example. Colleagues will understand that we wanted to take time to work through the measures in this Bill and this schedule in order to ensure they were as effective as possible in helping victims. It could not be included in the Domestic Abuse Bill, but I am pleased it is in this Bill.
The motivation behind Kay’s law is to provide better protection for victims through the anticipated increased use of pre-charge bail and to refocus the system, with victims at its heart. The hon. Lady’s amendments and new clause allow us to discuss two significant elements of this reform package: the duty to seek views from alleged victims on pre-charge bail conditions and the consequences for a suspect who breaches those conditions.
As with other measures in the Bill, our reforms to pre-charge bail put victims at the centre of the changes we are making, to help ensure that they are better protected and involved in decisions that affect them. The views of victims on bail conditions and how these can best safeguard them are vital to enable the police to build a full picture of all the relevant circumstances.
I hope we can all agree that this must be balanced against the need for operational flexibility within policing and the need to balance victims’ rights against those of the suspect. While I would expect officers to seek the views of victims in the vast majority of pre-charge bail cases, that may not always be practicable. For a variety of reasons, a victim may be uncontactable by the police. The duties imposed by the legislation must be proportionate within the investigation. It would not be right, and could be disproportionate, to require officers to hold a suspect in custody longer than appropriate until that contact is made. The current wording goes far enough to ensure that the duty is followed in all cases where it is practical to contact the victim.
We are not of the view that the Bill should be amended to require that officers discharge this duty in every case, unless there are exceptional circumstances. We need this change to work in practice for the benefit of victims and the wider public. I make it very clear that this is the expectation within this legislation, but we have to reflect operational practicalities and the balancing act of ensuring the rights of both victims and suspects.
Amendments 96 and 97 seek to provide that the personal circumstances of the victim are taken into account where bail conditions are varied. I agree with this view but believe that the drafting of the Bill as is, coupled with the current legislation in this area, already provides for this. When imposing or varying conditions, custody officers must take into account a number of considerations, including the need to ensure that the suspect does not interfere with witnesses or obstruct the course of justice, and that will include consideration of the victim’s circumstances and needs. The duty set out in the Bill also requires further consideration by the investigating officer to determine which of the bail conditions are relevant conditions—conditions that relate to safeguarding the victim. I anticipate that that will also require consideration of the victim’s personal circumstances and needs as part of this overall assessment.
Finally in this group, new clause 54 aims to create a criminal offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions. I understand that there is a long-held concern about the sanctions available when a suspect on pre-charge bail breaches their bail conditions. We should remember that officers will, in the first instance, consider whether the behaviour or actions that breached the conditions amount to a separate offence, such as harassment or intimidation. Equally, there are civil orders that can be put in place, breaches of which constitute an offence. I am thinking of a sexual risk order, a stalking protection order and when in due course they are piloted, the new domestic abuse protection orders. I also have concerns around creating an offence without an understanding of the number of people that it would be likely to affect. I am pleased to say that data collection in this area is being improved, but we do not yet have a full picture of what the effects of such an offence are likely to be on suspects, victims and the wider criminal justice system.
To support the increased data collection around breaches, the Bill includes provision for a pause on the detention clock following arrest for breach of conditions to encourage the police to arrest in those instances. The issues raised by the amendments are all ones that we would expect the College of Policing to address in the statutory guidance provided for in the new section 50(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. In the longer term, across the board of Home Office policy, we will keep under review the case for any additional sanction where pre-charge bail conditions are breached as the reforms provided for in the Bill settle in and we have better data on which to make a decision. For now, however, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43, accordingly, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. The Opposition have an opportunity to respond to the Minister about whether to withdraw the new clause.
My hon. Friend knows that I have the great privilege of knowing and working with Ian. He is a remarkable survivor, who does everything he can both to prevent and to seek justice for child abuse. The problem in a lot of these cases is that the abuse happened in the past. As technology has moved forward—in the use of DNA, for example—the evidence available now will be so comprehensively different from that available to those brave enough and successful enough to try to get a case to court in, say, the ’70s or ’80s, that not to allow double jeopardy in the case of child abuse seems a really poor and morally reprehensible decision. We have the opportunity to change that now for these specific cases.
As I said, the last review into double jeopardy was conducted 20 years ago by the Law Commission. Since then, the disclosure in 2017 of abuse by Jimmy Savile and in 2016 of abuse within football, and disclosures in other parts of society have changed the societal landscape so radically that I ask the Minister to consider at the very least initiating such a review.
I will end with a question that I put to the Victims’ Commissioner:
“Non-penetrative child abuse offences are not seen as serious crime; therefore, they do not fall under the double jeopardy rule. Should they be?”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 20 May 2021; c. 113, Q178.]
Her answer, in a word, was yes. I urge the Minister, if she will not accept the new clause, to consider a review into this important topic, which is widely supported by the public and a number of bodies.
I will now speak to new clauses 39, 40 and 41 together, while giving a little bit more detail on each one. They all relate to online sexual abuse of children. It might seem silly to say, but people seem to see online abuse as not as severe as abuse in a room, which is nonsense, because online abuse is a child being abused; they are just not in the same room as the abuser. I have to put a health warning on some of the examples that I will give, but I need to give them to explain. Hopefully no one in this room has any knowledge about what is going on out there on the internet, but unfortunately some of us work in this field and so do know. It is pretty chilling, hence my earlier attempt to put “trauma” into the police covenant.
I have worked really closely on these new clauses with the International Justice Mission, which is a fantastic organisation.
The Minister is nodding. The IJM is leading the way in working collaboratively with international justice departments, police departments and local voluntary organisations around the world. It gave me one example from its recent work in the Philippines, where it has been spending a lot of time. Recently, Philippines police rescued a three-month-old baby in an operation to free children from online sexual exploitation, and weeks later they brought a two-year-old to safety. This is what we are talking about when we talk about online abuse.
The International Justice Mission reports that children it has helped to rescue have been abused by family members. It has been supporting children who have, for example, contracted sexually transmitted diseases as a result of their abuse. Online sexual exploitation includes creating, possessing or distributing child sexual exploitation material such as photos or videos. Traffickers livestream the exploitation to satisfy the online demand of child sex offenders paying to direct the abuse in real time. That crime has been growing internationally, particularly during the covid pandemic, as online offenders have been at home with greater access to the internet and with fewer eyes on them, while victims have been locked into the same environment as their traffickers.
The National Crime Agency has stated its belief that the UK is the world’s third largest consumer of livestreamed abuse. That means that people here are sat in their homes directing the abuse of a child in another country. We must strengthen our criminal legal framework for apprehending those offenders in the UK. They may not physically not carry out the act, but they are directing it, and as far as I am concerned, that is as good as.
The International Justice Mission research shows a trend of relatively lenient sentencing for sex offenders in the UK convicted of abusing children in the Philippines, for example. Offenders serve on average only two years and four months in prison, even though they spent several years and thousands of pounds directing the sexual abuse of children. Those sentences do not represent justice for the survivors and, probably just as important, they do not deter the perpetrators. Prevention is vital, but a framework must be in place to give law enforcement the tools they need to act effectively.
I welcome some of the changes in the Bill, which will really help to deal with the problem, including clause 44 and the positive shifts on sentencing for those convicted of arranging or facilitating sexual abuse. We could go further simply by including online offences.
No need for apologies, Mr Cunningham. It is important that the Bill is properly scrutinised and that the parliamentary procedure is complied with. I call Minister Philp.
It is a great pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I join the hon. Member for Stockton North in paying tribute to the hon. Member for Rotherham for the work that she has been doing in this area for so many years. I am sure the entire Committee, and anyone listening, will have been deeply moved by her speech a few minutes ago, in which she described the most appalling abuse that I know all of us, as a House, can come together to combat and fight. I know she has been tirelessly working in this area for many years, and the whole House is grateful to her for the work and leadership she has shown.
The provisions in the Bill that we are discussing form only a small part of what the Government are doing to combat these terrible crimes, and I pay particular tribute to the Minister for Safeguarding, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle, who leads the Government’s work. Before talking about the provisions in the Bill, I want to draw attention to some non-legislative work that is going on, particularly the work that is being done internationally, including through the “Tackling Child Sexual Abuse Strategy”, which I think was published earlier this year. The hon. Member for Rotherham talked a few moments ago about a separate piece of legislation—the forthcoming online safety Bill, which aims to tackle many of the issues that we have been discussing. We are of course also working internationally with other states and with international organisations and charities, such as the International Justice Alliance and the International Watch Foundation, to make sure that we protect children overseas. Legislation is important, but so is action. The Minister for Safeguarding and others in Government are committed to taking that action, and we welcome the support from Members of different parties in doing that.
Let me pick up some of the points that the hon. Members for Rotherham and for Stockton North raised in their comments. A question was posed by the hon. Member for Stockton North in his excellent speech: he asked whether we were content with some of the sentences being handed down to people in the United Kingdom who go online and cause a deeply traumatising offence to be committed in another country, such as the Philippines or elsewhere. The answer is no, we are not.
Clause 44 aims to address the lacuna that currently exists in this area and that we think needs to be closed. Clause 44 is a critical part of doing that.
The Minister’s speech is incredibly reassuring, and I am glad that it will now be in black and white in the transcript, because it gives the comfort that we need. However, hearing everything that he is saying, is there any objection to putting the words “online” or “international” in the Bill, just for clarity and just because there is a change? The likelihood of people reading through all the guidance when they are making a decision is slender, whereas they will go to the Act and it would be there in black and white, which would give a lot of comfort.
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. My clear understanding is that the police already prosecute for these offences. I will go away and double-check with colleagues to make sure that there is no scope for misunderstanding by law enforcement authorities: the police; the National Crime Agency; and the Crown Prosecution Service. Having investigated that question further, I will write to her with the reply to her question. The law permits it, and the law is being used. However, I will just seek that assurance that there is no misunderstanding by practitioners. My understanding, as I say, is that they are prosecuting and getting some convictions, but I will double-check her point and get back to her in writing.
I think that speaks to the issues raised in new clauses 40 and 41. In relation to new clause 39, I think that the essence of what the hon. Lady is seeking to achieve is delivered by clause 44, as it is drafted, by making the maximum penalty the maximum sentence for the underlying act that is committed. To take the most extreme and distressing example, if someone is being raped and that has been incited, facilitated or arranged online, that facilitation will now—if we pass this clause—lead to that maximum sentence applying. It will be the underlying offence that triggers the maximum sentence, which I think addresses the point that she is quite rightly making in new clause 39. I believe that clause 44 addresses that issue.
Finally, there is the question of new clause 37, which is concerned with double jeopardy. I completely accept, and I think the Government accept, that this is an incredibly difficult area, where a very difficult balance has to be struck, because on the one hand we have long-standing interests of natural justice, which say that someone can only be tried for a given offence once for reasons of fairness, natural justice and finality, but on the other hand there are the points that the hon. Lady has very powerfully made concerning these very distressing offences.
As the hon. Lady said, this issue was looked at by the Law Commission in the early 2000s and then legislated for via the 2003 Act. In fact, the Law Commission initially only recommended that the exemption to double jeopardy should apply to murder. However, when Parliament debated this question, it decided to expand the range of exemptions, which were covered in schedule 5 to the 2003 Act, to cover, in addition to homicide, other offences, as she said, such as rape, penetrative sexual offences, kidnapping and war crimes. Such offences are generally punishable by a term of life imprisonment, or in one or two cases by the exceptionally high standard determinate sentence of 30 years.
A line has to be drawn as these things are balanced, which is an extremely difficult line to draw, because there will always be offences that are just over the non- exception side of that schedule 5 line, which are very grave offences. The hon. Lady very powerfully described why those offences are so appalling, offensive and terrible. She is right—they are—but we have to try to strike a balance in deciding where that line is drawn. Clearly, offences of rape and sexual assault involving penetration are exempted—they can be tried again—but those that do not involve penetration are not in schedule 5, so the rules on double jeopardy apply.
The Bill does not change that, and there are no plans to change where the line is drawn. As the hon. Lady raised the question in such powerful terms, I will raise it with more senior colleagues in Government to test their opinion—I can make no stronger undertaking than that—to ensure that her point, which she articulated so powerfully, gets voiced. I will let her know the response. I do understand her point, but there is a balance to be struck and considerations of natural justice that need to be weighed as well.
I appreciate what the Minister is saying. In that discussion, will he throw in the potential of another review? In relation to this crime, things have moved on so much, not in the last 20 years, but in the last five years, so it would be good to hear his colleagues’ thoughts on that as well.
I have been listening carefully to the Minister’s response. Will he undertake to get back to Opposition Members and indeed the whole Committee before Report?
I almost said that without being prompted, but, since I have now been prompted, yes, I will.
I hope that the commentary I have given on the operation of the clause addresses the many points quite rightly and properly raised by the hon. Member for Rotherham and the shadow Minister. I have undertaken further to investigate two points, and I hope that on that basis the Committee is content to see the clause stand part of the Bill.
I know that members of the public get a little confused by this, so I remind them that the new clauses were debated as part of our discussion on clause 44 because that is where they sit most logically, but we will vote on them at the end of our consideration.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Positions of trust
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way and for sharing those figures. Does he have, or was he provided with, a breakdown of them? On the 19%—I think that was the figure he gave—of males reporting contact abuse perpetrated by someone in a position of trust, does he have a breakdown of what proportion of those offences were committed by people who either met the current definition or who meet the definition as expanded by clause 45, as opposed to people who do not meet either of those definitions? That would be interesting information if he has it to hand.
Indeed it would be good information to have to hand, but I do not know the answer to the question. Perhaps we can discuss the issue in a future debate.
If data on those instances of abuse is collected, even in the Crime Survey for England and Wales, why do the Government not think that the law should recognise the activity as criminal?
I thank the hon. Member for Rotherham for introducing her amendment and the hon. Member for Stockton North for his thoughtful speech. I think we are all united in our horror and disgust at people who abuse positions of authority or trust to do the sorts of thing that we have been discussing—there is agreement on that. The debate is really about how we can best implement the solutions that we would like to see.
This is obviously a complicated and delicate area. As Parliament has legislated that the age of consent is 16, when we deviate from that by defining circumstances where the age of consent is effectively raised to 18, we need to be careful and ensure that we are doing it in a thoughtful and well-considered way. As the hon. Member for Rotherham said, the existing legislation—sections 16 to 19 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—defines some very specific roles, such as teacher and social worker. That is the law as it has stood for the last 18 years.
The Government have listened to the campaigns of the hon. Lady, of my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford, and of many others, and we have decided to change the law in response to the very powerful case that has been made. However, in doing so, we have tried to be thoughtful, careful and proportionate. As Members will see from the drafting of clause 45, the Government propose to extend the current “positions of trust” legislation to cover where a person is coaching, teaching, training, supervising or instructing someone on a regular basis in either sport or religion, as then subsequently defined. To answer the shadow Minister’s question, the definition of sport in this context would certainly cover things like gymnastics, swimming and so on. Therefore, the case that he powerfully made out—the awful case of Hannah that he mentioned—would of course be covered by this legislation as drafted, because it was in the context of swimming, which is a sport. I hope that reassures the shadow Minister that that awful case would be addressed by this legislation.
It does reassure me on that point, but I wanted the Minister to reassure me about the individual music teacher as well.
I think that was the constituency case raised by the hon. Member for York Central. In that case, the victim alleged rape—she was saying that there was no consent—and in cases where there is no consent, it is obviously appropriate that it is investigated as rape and prosecution is sought for rape. The legislation we are discussing today deals with cases where there is consent. I do not know the particulars of the case—the shadow Minister said that it was not subsequently proceeded with—but that is a non-consent case. We are discussing cases where, even with consent, it is still held that an offence has been committed.
I think we are agreed about the need for reform. We have listened carefully to the cases that have been made, and have made these proposals. The shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Rotherham have raised a number of questions through their amendments and in their speeches, the first of which is, “Why shouldn’t this be much broader? Rather than specifying sports and religion, why not—as amendment 7 does—have a very broad clause that says
‘if A is regularly involved in caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of B’?”
That is an extremely broad set of definitions, and it is not completely clear from that very broad drafting who might or might not be included in them. The shadow Minister asked, “Why be specific? Why not be general?” The first reason for wanting to be specific rather than general—specifying these two roles, religion and sport, to start with—is so that people have certainty about which side of the line they are on. If the clause is drafted very broadly—“caring, training, supervising”—supervising is an extraordinarily broad term, so it would not be immediately obvious who is included and who is not included. One of the features of good law is that the people who might be subject to it have some pretty good degree of certainty about whether they are going to be affected or not. The Government’s concern about terms as broad as “supervising” is the question of what is covered by them. What is included, and what is excluded? There are a lot of things that could be covered by the term “supervising”.
As I am sure the Minister is aware, amendment 7 is a direct lift from the Sexual Offences Act 2003, so the definition that he is pulling apart now is already law. The bit that we are challenging is adding the specific job titles to the legislation, which I think is already fit for purpose.
I understand the hon. Lady’s point. However, the point about providing some degree of certainty for someone in a particular role in this context, which is at the edge of the law—where the law is evolving—none the less has some validity.
Having said that we want to be specific rather than general for the reason just outlined, the question that then arises—which the shadow Minister and the hon. Lady have asked—is, “Why these two roles? Why sports and religion to start with?” I stress the words “start with”. The reason is twofold: first, those particular roles carry an unusual degree of influence.
Religion is a powerful force. Ministers of religion or people who lead religious congregations often wield very extreme and high levels of influence over their congregations and their followers. It therefore seems appropriate to recognise the high degree of influence that flows from that particular religious context.
In the case of sports coaches, there is clearly a degree of physical proximity. In fact, the shadow Minister, powerfully and eloquently illustrated in describing the case of Hannah—the case of the swimming coach—how it is that sports settings are so easily abused. That is why sport was selected as one of the two specific areas. It also flows from the data. In fact, the shadow Minister referred to the January 2020 report of the all-party parliamentary group on safeguarding in faith settings, chaired by the hon. Member for Rotherham. It analysed the 653 complaints mentioned by the shadow Minister and, in 495 of those, the type of role that the person was discharging was identified. The figures I have are slightly different from the shadow Minister’s—they are broadly similar, though—and the top two categories were sport, at 31%, and faith, at 14%. Therefore, the two roles here are the two top roles revealed by that survey. Of course, there were other roles with smaller percentages.
The frustration of wearing a mask is that the Minister cannot see that I am smiling. He is quoting back all the arguments I have been making for the last five years—I am grateful that they have sunk in. He is right that we went for the most obvious and biggest offenders, but that is now. As I said in my speech, I am concerned that in five years it may be counsellors, whom we have not mentioned today but have a huge influence over the people they support, or an online form that turns online grooming into real abuse. I completely agree with him, but this measure needs to be future-proofed so that we do not keep having the same arguments as the professions and influences change.
I pay tribute again to the work done by the hon. Member in this area over many years and the work done by her all-party parliamentary group. I am glad that we agree on the starting point, because she has called for it and the data of her all-party parliamentary group points to it as well. The question is how it is best future-proofed and whether one tries to do so with the general provisions in amendment 7, which would run the risk of giving us a lack of clarity and potentially inadvertently criminalising some situations that hon. Members may not feel appropriate, or with the other approach of starting with these two specifics—I think we agree they are the right starting point, because the evidence points there—and adding further positions as the evidence base develops. That is what proposed new section 22A(4) of the 2003 Act will do: it will give the Secretary of State power to add other specific roles as that evidence base develops.
I will say a word on that because the shadow Minister asked about it. But, before I do, I give way to him.
There is considerable evidence to cover some of the other categories of people in a position of trust. The Minister said that we may have a different interpretation of some of the statistics, but, even if I agree with his numbers, the Bill’s provisions cover only half the children, and half would still be at risk. Should I start drafting amendments for Report that say, “Let’s include people who provide home facilities for overseas students or, perhaps, cadet force leaders”? If anyone has a strong influence over a young person, it is a cadet force leader. Should we start coming up with a list based on evidence that he might accept on Report?
There may well be evidence in those areas, but the shadow Minister does not need to draft amendments for Report, because, if the Bill in its current form is passed, it will not require primary legislation to add those other categories; it will simply require a statutory instrument. Therefore, once passed—if passed in this form—the Secretary of State will of course keep this under constant review.
It will then be open to anyone, including organisations such as the APPG or people such as the shadow Minister or anyone else, to make representations to the Department—the Department will also keep it under review—that there is evidence that group X, Y or Z should be added. The case might be that they have an unusual degree of influence, capable of being abused, and that an evidence base supports that, so they should be added to the list. By virtue of a statutory instrument under subsection (4), that can be done.
Those reassurances are helpful, but will the Minister tell us what criteria we should apply if we are to bring forward suggestions of other groupings to be included in the legislation?
The criteria are not specified in subsection (4), which simply says:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations amend subsections (1) and (2) to add or remove an activity in which a person may be coached, taught, trained, supervised or instructed.”
However, providing the profession or category of person being added is involved in coaching, teaching, training, supervision or instruction—provided they do one of those things—they are capable of being added.
On the criteria that might be applied, that would be for the Secretary of State and a Delegated Legislation Committee to determine. I suggest that what would make sense is for the criteria to consider two or three things: first, the degree of influence that the person has—that case has been met in the case of sports’ coaches and religious ministers or practitioners—and, secondly, that there is an evidence base to demonstrate that abuse of that position of authority is occurring. Again, that case has been made for sports and ministers or practitioners of religion, because the data that the APPG received shows that.
I suggest to the Committee—this is not in the legislation—that if those two criteria are met, it might be appropriate to make further additions, but that would be for the Secretary of State and a Delegated Legislation Committee to decide, case by case. I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Rotherham, the APPG and others will make that case. The mechanism is there to add things pretty quickly from month to month, or year to year, as the cases get laid out.
In conclusion, it strikes the Government that the provision is the best way of protecting vulnerable people—we have started with sports and religion—but we have also created the facility to expand the list quickly and easily by delegated legislation, as the case gets made by campaigners over time. On that basis, I hope that the Committee will be content to see clause 45 stand part of the Bill. I hope that the provisions that I have been explaining mean that amendment 7 does not need to be pressed to a vote.
I have heard everything that the Minister said. I 100% put on the record my gratitude that our work to research and prove the case around faith leaders was heard and listened to. However, my concern is the clarity. No legislation is effective unless it is out in the public domain, whether that is for the professionals who need to use it or, for example, the victims or families who need to know it is there.
As the Bill stands, my concern is that, were we to go to for the
“regularly involved in caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of”
persons as the definition that means it is a crime, any parent or individual would know what that meant. I do not want to press the amendment to a vote now, but I will reserve the right to later, because 21 MPs spoke on this in the Chamber, so I think it needs to be heard by the Minister. We need that clarity so that any parent or child knows what their rights are. Just having certain professions defined muddies the waters further rather than a blanket definition based on role and responsibility. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
We have had a fairly thorough debate, so I am not sure there is any need for a clause stand part debate.
Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Criminal damage to memorials: mode of trial
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will briefly introduce the clause. At present, when someone commits an act of criminal damage, where the value of that damage is less than £5,000, the matter is triable summarily only, with a maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment or a fine of up to £2,500. The clause makes a change and says that where the item being damaged is a memorial, where it commemorates someone, the offence of criminal damage is triable as an either-way offence and potentially, although not necessarily, can be heard in the Crown court with a higher sanction.
The reason for that is that there are some occasions when criminal damage is committed against, for example, a war memorial and although the financial value of the damage may be less than £5,000, the symbolic damage to society is far higher. We have particularly in mind acts that desecrate war memories; memorials to people who have sacrificed their lives for our freedom—the ultimate sacrifice. We and, I think, most of the public take the view that where their memory is desecrated in that way, it is appropriate that the courts have open to them a higher criminal sanction. It does not mean the judge has to use it. We still have judicial discretion so the judge can make a determination based on the facts of the case, but we believe that things such as desecrating war memorials and dishonouring those who have sacrificed so much should, in some circumstances, be punishable by more than just a fine and three months in prison.
I am absolutely gobsmacked that after the Government made such a tremendous fuss in the media, with announcements in Parliament and all manner of things, that the Minister has just dismissed his clause in a matter of a couple of minutes.
The Minister did not dismiss it, but he addressed it for two minutes after everything that went before.
A point is no less powerful for brevity. In fact, some of the most powerful points are brief.
I will not reply to the Minister by applying brevity to my speech, because we need seek reassurances from the Government on several things. It is fair to say that clause 46 generated much discussion on Second Reading, and I am glad that we are now able to discuss it a lot more fully in this focused forum. I am sure it is no surprise to the Minister to hear that we have some serious reservations about the clause.
First, we do not believe that it in any way helpfully adds to the existing law on criminal damage. Much has been made by the Government about how those who vandalise statues will feel a greater force of law in relation to their actions and could face up to 10 years in prison. Speaking in support of the proposed changes, the Home Secretary said:
“My message today is simple: actions have consequences. I want vicious individuals held to account for the violence and criminality that they perpetrate.”—[Official Report, 15 June 2020; Vol. 677, c. 542.]
That sounds very serious indeed. However, the Government’s impact assessment states:
“No additional prison capacity needs to be built because the expected prison caseload increases are less than 1 place per annum. Prison construction costs are thus treated as negligible.”
If the legislation will result in less than one prison place a year, why bother changing the mode of trial at all?
The impact assessment goes on to say:
“The number of cases that will be sentenced for this offence every year range from 10 to 60, with a best estimate of 35…These figures are based on a mixture of published research and internal projections.”
Let us say that we do get 35 cases a year. We then need to know how many would be for damage worth less than £5,000. Then, within that even smaller subsection of cases, we need to work out how many cases it would really be appropriate to send to the Crown court for sentencing. Perhaps the Minister can tell us, but my guess is that it would probably be none at all.
Then there is the issue of the utter randomness of increasing penalties for some vandalism offences in this wide-ranging crime Bill—a Bill that completely omits to make changes in the criminal law to offer more protection to victims of other types of offences, victims who are actual living breathing people, whom we believe the public at large, and Members of the House, think pose a more pressing concern to legislators. Child criminal exploitation and sexual offences are just a couple of examples that spring to mind. As the Secret Barrister has noted:
“While in practice the maximum of 10 years would rarely, if ever, be imposed, the new cross-party consensus appears to be that displaying disrespect—not even quantifiable damage—to an inanimate object is worthy of a higher maximum sentence than inflicting grievous bodily harm, violent disorder, affray, theft, carrying knives, acid or offensive weapons, voyeurism, upskirting and causing death by careless driving, to name but a few offences that cause tangible harm to real people. It would inject criminal sentencing, which already suffers from wild incoherence and inconsistency between offence types, with another dose of gratuitous disproportionality.”
I agree with the Secret Barrister on all but one part of that: there is no cross-party consensus.
The Government have done much good work to simplify the vexed and confusing world of criminal sentencing by overseeing the implementation of the sentencing code last year. Yet in clause 46—and in so many other parts of the Bill—the Government seem enthusiastic to trample across the good progress that has been made.
I would particularly welcome some information from the Minister on what guidance will be used to quantify the level of sentimental and emotional impact necessary for the case to be sent to the Crown court. Whose emotions will be measured, and how? Surely clear guidance would provide at least some protection against the “gratuitous disproportionality” about which the Secret Barrister warns.
The Sentencing Council has already helpfully provided detailed sentencing guidance on that very topic. In fact, for the offences of
“Criminal damage (other than by fire) value exceeding £5,000”
and of
“Criminal damage (other than by fire) value not exceeding £5,000”,
the guidance refers to damage to
“heritage and/or cultural assets”.
It is, therefore, already covered in law. I am no lawyer, but I strongly presume that that includes war memorials and that the sentencing court should treat that as an aggravating factor when passing sentence.
I ask again: how does clause 46 helpfully add to the law? The Opposition’s position is that it does not. It goes way beyond the anticipated proposals to address protection for war memorials. Instead of working with us to address the concerns of their Back Benchers, the Government have tried to make this a wedge issue across the political divide, to the detriment of the law. We would have been happy to engage on provisions in relation to war memorials and protections for our communal symbols of such great national sacrifice and pride, but we are certainly not happy to do so on the wide scope covered by the clause.
The clause defines a memorial as
“a building or other structure, or any other thing, erected or installed on land (or in or on any building or other structure on land)”.
That is weird: “any other thing”. Why have the Government drafted the clause so widely? I would be grateful for guidance from the Minister on what type of serious offending the Government hope to catch with that capacious definition.
Proposed new section 2(11B) reads:
“For the purposes of that paragraph, any moveable thing (such as a bunch of flowers)”.
The Bar Council notes:
“This raises the prospect that the removal of a bunch of flowers could result in proceedings in the Crown Court.”
It goes on to say:
“Putting aside questions of whether one would need to get permission to remove old bunches of flowers, such an allegation could be sent to the Crown Court if either a magistrates’ court considered the offence to be particularly serious”—
I do not think that it would—
“and beyond their maximum sentencing powers of six months’ imprisonment, or if the defendant”
opted for trial by jury. That means that somebody who has removed a bunch of flowers from a graveside could opt for a trial at the Crown court.
I know that the following example is from Scotland, but it comes from my childhood. Let us imagine that an old bunch of flowers left for commemorative purposes at the memorial for a dog such as Greyfriars Bobby—a delightful memorial that is well loved in its community—is picked up and put in the bin. Does the Minister think that the person who put the flowers in the bin should end up answering a case in the Crown court? I am sure he does not. I am sure that the intention behind the clause is not to cover that type of incident, but the fact that we could even ask the question strikes me as absurd.
Let me start by answering some of the points the shadow Minister has just made. First, he questions why the measures are necessary when the Sentencing Council guidelines already have, as aggravating factors, things such as “emotional importance”. In reading out those guidelines, he acknowledged their title:
“Criminal damage (other than by fire) value exceeding £5,000”.
The whole point of this new clause is that it addresses circumstances where the value is less than £5,000. That is precisely its purpose. There may be cases where the monetary value of the damage may be less than £5,000 and therefore not subject to the Sentencing Council guidelines that he read out, but the damage to our national discourse—our national state—is significant, because war memorials represent all of those hundreds of thousands of people who gave their lives for our freedom. Even if the value of the damage is less than £5,000, the disrespect and dishonour done to those who sacrificed and secured our freedom is a matter that this Government take seriously. I am disappointed to hear that that is not something that interests him.
The Minister is relying on these war memorials again. He is talking about them, but this is an extremely wide provision, covering all manner of memorials and of places, from individual gravestones all the way through to the Cenotaph. How on earth will a prosecutor determine the emotional value of one crime against that of another? Is the emotional value of a small grave desecrated the same as the Cenotaph?
First, it is not the prosecutor who makes that determination; it is the judge. Secondly, the judge makes such determinations the whole time. Indeed, judges already make those determinations under existing sentencing guidelines for the more serious either-way offences. It will be for the judge to decide whether the nature of the damage merits a higher sentence or a lower one. That is why we have judicial discretion. I have confidence in our country’s judiciary to be able to draw the distinction between desecrating the Cenotaph, which honours the memory of hundreds of thousands of servicemen and women, versus something else.
The point is that, at present, the judiciary do not have that discretion open to them, because where the value of the damage falls under £5,000, the matter is triable summarily only, with a very low maximum penalty. The clause gives the judiciary the discretion to take into account such considerations and to sentence as appropriate. The Government’s view, clearly, is that desecrating the memory of brave servicemen and women who have given their lives in defence of our freedom is something we should stand up against. This Government are standing up against it; I do not know why the Opposition are not.
The Minister is being unkind. In no way are we against some of the things in the Bill. We do not want to be in a position in which we are not supportive, respectful and everything else. I think he should withdraw that remark.
I will be happy to withdraw my remark when the shadow Minister joins us in supporting the clause. If he does so, of course I will withdraw it.
Surely when something is stolen, damaged or desecrated, it is about not just its monetary value but the effect on the victim. In this case, the victim could be the children or grandchildren of the person commemorated on that war memorial. A stolen photograph album has no monetary value, but the actual value to the family is very strong.
My right hon. Friend makes a powerful point. That is exactly the purpose of the clause. The monetary value, the £5,000, does not reflect the profound emotional damage that can be caused when something like a war memorial is desecrated.
The shadow Minister asked how it will be decided whether a matter is heard in the Crown court or in the magistrates court. As he rightly said, the defendant always has the right of election for an either-way offence but, generally, the allocation decision is set out in the allocation guidelines of 2016. A decision is based on whether the anticipated sentence will exceed the magistrates’ sentencing powers—if the magistrates think that it might exceed their sentencing power, they will send up to the Crown court—or if the case is of unusual legal or factual complexity.
There is therefore a flexible system for deciding where a case is heard. Some of the cases might be heard in the Crown court and some in the magistrates court, depending on the facts of the case, so by no means does it follow that everything will end up in the Crown court. It is true that the number of anticipated offences is low— between 10 and 60 a year—but we are talking about acts that desecrate the memory of servicemen and women. I hope that that the Committee can agree on that in supporting the clause.
Will the Minister confirm that all the offences captured in those statistics were against war memorials?
The impact assessment covered all offences that might be caught by the clause, clearly many of which might well be war memorials. We have seen examples of war memorials being desecrated and the Cenotaph was attacked last July. A war memorial in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Corby was desecrated—indeed, it was possibly even destroyed—and he led a campaign to get it replaced. Sadly, such things happen, and it is important that we as a House send out a message that we stand with our servicemen and women when their memory is attacked in that way.
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 51 stand part.
That schedule 6 be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 52 stand part.
Very quickly, I just want to put on the record a point about clauses 50, 51 and 52, and schedule 6. Their background is, as my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said on Second Reading, the horrific case of Keith Bennett and the Moors murderers, which brought to light the need for new powers to search for material that may relate to the location of human remains.
In 2017, the police believed that they had a further lead to assist Keith’s family in finding his body, when it was discovered that Ian Brady had committed papers to secure storage before his death. However, the existing law would not allow the police to obtain a search warrant to seize the papers, because there was no prospect of them being used in criminal proceedings, as Brady was dead.
These new powers will build on the existing law and enable officers to seize material that may help them to locate human remains outside criminal proceedings. As well as cases such as Keith’s, where a homicide suspect has been identified but cannot be prosecuted, these powers could be useful for the police in missing persons cases, or suicides where there is no indication that criminal behaviour has taken place.
These are terrible circumstances that lead to the need for this law, but we very much hope that passing these measures will bring a small crumb of closure and comfort to the Bennett family and others.
The Opposition support these clauses, for exactly the reasons the Minister has outlined. The case of Keith Bennett was incredibly awful. Today we saw the news about the ongoing search for remains in a Gloucester café. Mary Bastholm was 15 when she went missing in 1968. She is a suspected victim of Fred West. That search, for various legal reasons, was able to go ahead. Unfortunately, the police have today said that they have not found any human remains, so for Mary’s family the ordeal goes on, to try and get some kind of closure. However, for that family at least we were able to look for remains, but in the case of Keith Bennett the law did not allow the police to look. Therefore, it is absolutely right that we correct the law.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Functions of prisoner custody officers in relation to live link hearings
I beg to move amendment 64, in clause 53, page 44, line 33, leave out “and (4)” and insert “to (4A)”.
This amendment and Amendments 65 to 67 ensure that the references to live audio links and live video links in clause 53(3) are consistent with the provisions made about live links in clause 168 of, and Part 3 of Schedule 19 to, the Bill.
Clause 53 seeks to extend to prison escort and custody service officers the right to accompany prisoners in police stations, such as for the purpose of conducting video remand hearings. Owing to an historical anomaly, they are unable to discharge that function at the moment. It became clear during the coronavirus, where video remand hearings were used quite widely to avoid having to take a prisoner to court, that PECS officers did not have those powers, so we had to ask police officers to do that instead, which took up a lot of police time. The police did that, and I pay tribute to them for doing so, but that took up police officer time that could have been spent out on patrol arresting criminals.
The clause amends the Criminal Justice Act 1991 to provide PECS officers with those powers to have custody over prisoners in police stations, for the purpose of overseeing preliminary sentencing enforcement hearings by way of live links. It is a good operational improvement that I hope will make things more efficient where it is appropriate to use it.
Amendments 64 to 67 make some small technical amendments to the clause, because there were some references to a piece of legislation that is being repealed. They simply replace those reference with the correct ones.
We understand what the Government are trying to achieve in this clause, but we have a number of concerns about what it will lead to in the longer term. I would welcome some ministerial assurances that those concerns will be considered.
Before that, I thank Transform Justice for its energetic scrutiny of the amendment, which I am sure will add much value to the debate. The Government’s fact sheet describes clause 53 as
“enabling legislation to ensure that any future VRH rollout is not reliant on police resource, which would be an ineffective and inefficient use of their training and skills”.
It also notes that the implementation plan for rolling out video remand hearings across police stations
“is being developed and not yet finalised”,
and that
“A solution to the long-term structural and resourcing issues is required”
to facilitate the roll-out. In that case, it does not seem necessary to include it in the Bill.
If there is so much work to be done to have proper functioning video remand hearings, why are the Government bringing that forward at this time? We take a similar position to that of the Law Society, which says that although it supports the use of prisoner custody officers to facilitate video remand hearings during the pandemic, it does not believe it should be a permanent feature of the justice system.
The rationale for legislating to increase the use of audio and video live links across the Bill seems somewhat confused. On the one hand, the need for covid-19 protection is mentioned; on the other, the measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and modernisation. The covid-19 motivation is particularly confusing, given that the Bill will not be enacted for some time, when the covid safety of courts will, we hope, no longer be an issue. Can the Minister tell the Committee the motivation for video remand hearings beyond the pandemic?
Even more problematic is the lack of evidence to back up the functioning of the proposals. Even now that we have been living with the pandemic measures for a year, we still have no evidence beyond the anecdotal about the extremely significant changes to how we run hearings. This is one of a number of remand changes made during the pandemic for which we are seriously lacking detail. The other, more concerning, one is that in September 2020 the Government increased the length of time they are legally allowed to hold people on remand from six to eight months, a provision in place until 28 June 2021. While I am on the topic, I would welcome an assurance from the Minister that the custody time limit extension will lapse, and he will stick to his word in the SI Committee some months ago and it will not be extended again.
To go back to clause 53, before the pandemic very few police forces ran video remand courts. Where they did, defendants detained by the police post charge would not be taken to court for their first appearance, but would appear from police custody by video link, with their lawyer, the judge, the prosecutor and so on in the physical courtroom. When the pandemic hit, PECS contractors, who usually transport these remanded defendants to the court, said that courts and court cells were not covid-safe enough and refused to transport all the prisoners who needed to go to court, so police forces in almost every area agreed to set up makeshift courtrooms in police custody suites that would be video linked to the magistrates court. The police agreed to run these courts purely on an emergency basis and were not paid to do so by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. As the first wave eased and the courts implemented their own covid-19 safety procedures, police stopped running video remand courts and most areas reverted to the traditional arrangement.
We are not aware of any significant concerns with the traditional arrangement, so again I ask: why do we need this clause, which lays the groundwork for even more video remand courts in the future? There are significant cost implications to running the hearings in this way. The Government have published an economic impact assessment for the use of PECS staff in police custody. This shows a positive cost-benefit, but the assumptions need some further scrutiny.
To quote from the material provided by Transform Justice:
“PECS staff would only be used in custody if the police agreed to run video remand courts permanently. Despite the government stating ‘VRHs will indeed be rolled out at some point in the future’…no such agreement has been reached—police forces have given no commitment to running and hosting video remand courts. Given that most police forces are not running video remand courts currently, the installation of video remand courts nationwide would incur considerable costs for the police, including premises costs, IT infrastructure costs, costs of keeping defendants in cells for longer, and staff costs. During the first months of the pandemic the costs incurred by police in running emergency video remand courts were considerable—the Met had to use 45 staff to manage the process and estimated the operation cost the equivalent of £2 million a year. Though some police costs would be offset through the support of PECS, it would still cost police staff time to liaise with PECS staff and would incur the other costs. The ‘Do nothing’ option in the economic assessment assumes that the police costs of running video remand hearings have already been budgeted for by local forces—but this is not the case.”
I know it is a very long quote, Mr McCabe, but it continues:
“The economic impact assessment suggests that the PECS staff in police custody are in addition to existing PECS staff. PECS staff will still need to transport defendants from police custody to court and to supervise prisoners at court. Therefore, if PECS staff allocated to police custody for video remand hearings are additional, PECS costs will be greater, police will incur significant costs and the courts will still need to be able to accommodate some of those who have been detained by the police in court cells. We therefore suggest that the economic impact assessment does not encompass any of the costs associated with having PECS staff in police custody, so the cost-benefit cannot be judged.”
I would welcome the Minister’s comments on Transform Justice’s analysis because, as far as I can see, the economic justification for the measure goes to the root of why it is being proposed. Furthermore, will the Minister accept that the implementation of the PECS staff in police custody proposal should be contingent on a full cost-benefit analysis of video remand hearings versus the physical equivalents? If he is not prepared to do that, why not?
We have reservations about the impact that this change would have on justice. It is vital that changes to our justice system that would impact on the very principles that underlie it, such as the right to a fair trial, are properly tested before they are introduced. The stakes are too high for us to get it wrong, so will the Minister consider safeguards to make sure we get this right? These include that every defendant who may be assigned a video remand hearing should be subject to full health and mental health screening, and if necessary an assessment, by a health professional before the case is listed; that this screening information and needs assessments from police custody are made available to the bench or judge before that day’s court hearings start; that a simple system is set up to bring those defendants immediately to court whom the bench or judge deems need face-to-face hearings; and that all those who are deemed vulnerable—vulnerable adults and all children—should automatically be assigned a physical hearing.
We do not really see the need for the provisions in the clause, but I stand open to hear the Minister’s justification for it. If need can be demonstrated for it, we would welcome the Government’s commitment to the safeguards to access to justice that I have just raised, alongside the further cost-benefit analysis.
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech, and for the thoughtful questions that he has posed in it. As he says, this is enabling legislation to create the option of using PECS officers this way in the future. We were rather caught by surprise during the pandemic when it transpired that these powers did not exist at a time when we wanted to use lots of video remand hearings for obvious, covid-related reasons. As the shadow Minister said, this Bill will hopefully receive Royal Assent some time after coronavirus has become a memory and is behind us. None the less, these enabling powers are worth taking, because it is conceivable that in future, even after coronavirus, we may want to use video remand hearings more than was done previously, which was essentially not at all.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Many of the rights we have today are hard won and came about through protest. If it were not for those protests, we would not be here today—certainly, there would not be any female MPs if those rights had not been won.
Forgive me. I do please want to place on the record the enormous contribution that the suffragists made. Indeed, some would argue that while the suffragettes did powerful work in raising awareness, it was the suffragists who worked with male Members of Parliament to pass the very laws that were needed to enable women to sit in this place.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. The term “serious unease” is vague. As MPs, we get, as the Minister has said, death threats and abuse, which we should not get, but “serious unease” is a very low threshold.
Let me make a genuine effort to help Her Majesty’s official Opposition. They are surely not saying that death threats are an acceptable form of protest. Death threats are terrifying for those who are victims. Indeed, I would say they impede democracy in this country precisely because people worry about the threats to their personal safety. I just want to clarify.
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. I think the Minister has misinterpreted what I said. I had protests against me that were rallying the crowds, which led to the exact same phraseology that went into death threats. I am saying that that was incredibly chilling and uncomfortable. Of course I wanted it to stop, but I do not try to deny people’s right to protest.
It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. It is a pleasure to appear opposite the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate. He did a fine job in the temporary absence of the hon. Member for Croydon Central.
I welcome this debate because it is only in a Public Bill Committee that we get the chance to scrutinise a piece of legislation line by line, word by word, as has been amply demonstrated this morning. Second Reading is important, of course, but it simply does not provide the time for this sort of back and forth about the Government’s intentions behind each line of legislation, and indeed the intended consequences, so I genuinely welcome this approach..
I also very much welcome the constructive views that have been put forward by Opposition Members in relation to this part of the Bill, because it goes without saying, of course, that it is our job as a Public Bill Committee to do this. It also demonstrates the important role that this place plays in scrutinising legislation and holding the Executive to account.
I note that there are some misunderstandings about what the Bill entails, and I very much welcome the opportunity to correct some of those, in a way that I hope and expect will reassure Committee members. Hon. Members have made very fair points about the right to peaceful protest being part of living in a democracy, and part of the social contract between the state and citizens. As part of that social contract, there are constraints both on citizens—we are expected, as members of this society, to observe and abide by the rule of law—and on the state.
That is why, for example, we have this process in Parliament, and not just in relation to this piece of legislation; it is for every single piece of legislation introduced by any Government of any colour. We have measures such as the European convention on human rights, an incredibly important document whose influence runs throughout this part of the Bill and other relevant parts. I say this because I very much want to approach this discussion with a constructive tone, to try to clear up some of the misunderstandings that have emerged about what the Bill encompasses.
I have enjoyed hearing some of the recollections of hon. Members about attending protests, particularly that of the hon. Member for Stockton, North, who I think is claiming credit for a Prime Minister standing down because he went out protesting—perhaps I am being mischievous. In a mischievous tone, I also note that nobody has yet mentioned the Iraq protests and how those massive protests did not change the course set by the Government who were then in power.
The first misunderstanding that I want to clear up—first and foremost—is that this Bill is not about banning peaceful protest, and nor can the measures within it enable the police, or indeed the Home Secretary, to ban peaceful protest. Nothing in the Bill does that. I state that clearly and proudly on the record, so that people listening to this debate from outside this Committee Room understand that that is simply not the case. That is a misunderstanding and I am very keen to clarify it.
We have probably all received emails suggesting that the Bill will ban protest. Indeed, we have not just seen emails but violence, and protests that have led to violence and attacks on the police. I think that it is incumbent on all of us to ensure that we use language in such a way that, while we are challenging the provisions of the Bill and talking about churches and noises and having all those debates, we make it absolutely clear that we are not stopping protests with this legislation.
My hon. Friend makes a very important point. There is a responsibility on all of us in the language we use. I know that in the heat of debate and the joy of advocacy, one can sometimes get a little bit carried away. But I am really keen that in this Committee we understand that the Bill is not about banning peaceful protest, particularly because of the unrest that we have seen in some parts of the country, which I will come on to in a moment.
Another perhaps colourful piece of advocacy that seems to have crept into the debate this morning is that the Bill is somehow about imprisoning more people. That is simply not correct. Indeed, anyone making such allegations should be mindful of the fact that, of course, as with any other criminal offence, the standard and burden of proof remains the same: namely, that it is for the Crown to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Those fundamentals of our criminal justice system remain throughout this process.
I am not saying that clause 56 will send more people to prison, but the Minister will accept that it increases the maximum penalties.
It does. I will come to that, if I may, but there is a difference between increasing the maximum and doing this, as some have claimed—I accept that it is in the heat of debate—in order to put more people in prison. That is not the intention.
But the Minister will accept that the provisions in the Bill will criminalise more people who participate in protests.
Again—forgive me; I am tackling this as if I were prosecuting. The hon. Gentleman is making several leaps of assumptions before he arrives at that destination. I will go through the clause in great detail and lead him through it so that he understands the checks and balances in the legislation. There is an extraordinary leap in his assertion, which I hope to answer in due course.
Peaceful protest is absolutely fundamental to a free society. The right to peaceful protest will not be, and will never be, in question by this Government. The measures in part 3 of the Bill will not suppress the right to protest. To refer again to the European convention on human rights, the Lord Chancellor—as any Secretary of State must—has signed a statement to the effect that, in his view, all the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the rights under the convention. The Bill is about updating the Public Order Act 1986, which is some 35 years old, by enabling the police to impose conditions in careful sets of circumstances as set out in the Bill, which we are scrutinising.
We all stand up and share the value of free speech and freedom of assembly. However, under articles 10 and 11 of the convention, those are not absolute rights, as the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood fairly agreed. There is a balancing act between the rights and freedoms of protestors and of those who are not joining in the protest. We know, sadly, that in recent years some of the tactics used in the course of protests have chipped away at that balance. For example, some protestors delayed an ambulance reaching an A&E ward, putting lives at risk. Some protestors disrupted the transport system during rush hour, delaying hundreds of hard-working people.
Interestingly—this is where we see the real tension between competing rights—some protestors have blockaded printing presses, thereby disrupting the freedom of the press, which I am sure we all acknowledge is a fundamental right. We have been talking about protests with which we may not agree, and I am sure we are all familiar with newspaper articles or depictions in the media with which we may not agree, but it is the right of the free media in our country to report in accordance with that freedom and independence. In fairness to the Opposition, I know that they agree with that, because in the wake of the blockade of printing presses last year, the Leader of the Opposition said:
“The tactics and action of Extinction Rebellion, particularly blockading newspapers, was just wrong in my view and counterproductive.”
As the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood eloquently described, there is this grey, messy area in which we try to address that balance of competing rights between protestors and people who are not joining in the protests but may be affected by them. We know, however, sadly, that not every protest is peaceful. I would like to take a moment to reflect on the danger in which police officers can find themselves when they are policing a protest that goes wrong.
In recent months, we have seen protests outside London. The hon. Member for Rotherham rightly challenged me about this being London-centric, and a smile came to my lips because I was thinking, “We can never assume that the sorts of protests we see in central London will not happen elsewhere in the country.” Indeed, the great city of Bristol has in recent months seen for itself, through the so-called “Kill the Bill” protests, which apparently aim to bring this piece of legislation to a halt, the impact that protest can have on police officers, who are trying to do their job in balancing the rights of protestors and safeguarding the social contract to which I have referred.
Would those actions not already be criminal activity under existing legislation?
They would. The hon. Lady may remember that I questioned Mr Wagner about his interpretation of the Public Order Act. We acknowledge, and I think the police have said, how dynamic a public protest can be; it changes very quickly and they have to make decisions very quickly, on the ground. I asked Mr Wagner, because I was slightly concerned about some of the evidence he had given earlier:
“Do you accept that the Public Order Act 1986 is a piece of legislation that has stood the test of time and should remain in law?”
He said:
“I think I would be neutral on that. It is a very wide piece of legislation. Every time I read it, I am pretty surprised at how wide it is already. What I am pretty clear about is that section 12 does not need to be widened.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 76, Q109.]
Then I asked whether that meant the Public Order Act went too far for his liking. He replied:
“Well, potentially. The proof is often in the pudding. It depends on how the police use it and whether they are using it effectively.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 76, Q110.]
I agree wholeheartedly with his summation that it is about how the police employ the powers, but we need to just have in mind the range of views that have been expressed by witnesses giving evidence to the Bill Committee, whether in writing or orally. It would appear that there are some for whom the current legislation goes too far, yet we hear of instances such as the “Kill the Bill” protests where very significant harm has been done to police officers. Hon. Members will be able to draw on their own memories of other protests that have resulted in police officers being very badly injured and hurt by the protests of a minority. It shows, again, the need for a balance.
Is what the Minister says not an argument for banning all protest? It is not at all clear, at the beginning of a protest, which protests are going to go wrong in that way. She said herself that things can change very quickly. It cannot be predicted.
The hon. Lady has summarised the very great responsibilities borne by senior officers in charge of protests. Of course protest should not be banned—I said at the beginning that that is not what the Bill is about—but the point does show the very fine judgments that senior police officers have to make in the moment of the protest. Where there are organisers, they will have been able to have discussions beforehand, but where protests spring up on social media and it is not clear who the organisers are, police officers are having to make decisions on the ground very quickly.
I am asked what has changed in the 35 years since the Public Order Act came into force. The role of social media in getting the message out, and protests being organised at very short notice, means that it can be difficult for police officers to identify to whom they should be speaking when it comes to how these protests or gatherings are policed and managed.
The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate mentioned Pride. I would not call Pride a protest, although it may have had its roots in protest. I hope we now see it as a glorious celebration enjoyed, from the photographs I have seen in newspapers, by the police as much as by other people in attendance. That is an example of a gathering where the organisers are very clear, and they work extremely well with the police to ensure that the procession, the celebration, is enjoyed by all and is safe for all.
First, people all around the world are being murdered for being gay, so there is the element of protest. Secondly, can the Minister confirm that the measures she is putting in the Bill would address the fire-starting protests that come up? If that is the nub of what she is trying to address, it seems to me that the clauses go a lot further than that.
That is one of the things addressed by the Bill’s clauses. If I may, I will go methodically through the examination of the clauses.
There is a reason why we are trying to draw consistency between processions and assemblies. In 1986, the distinction between the two might have been very clear, but we heard evidence from the police that nowadays a protest can become an assembly and an assembly can become a protest. They change, so we are trying to bring consistency between the two forms of gathering, irrespective of the mobility of the participants, so that we have clarity of law as to what applies to participants when they gather together.
At this stage in my submission, I am going to introduce some context. Again, the misunderstanding might have arisen that the measures will apply to every single protest that ever takes place, which is not the case. In his oral evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on 28 April this year, Chief Constable Harrington said that between 21 January and 21 April this year, more than 2,500 protests were reported to the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and of those 2,500 protests, conditions were imposed on 12.
As I develop my argument and talk about these powers being used very carefully by the police, and about the checks and balances within the legislation, I point to how rarely the conditions are imposed in the range of protests that go ahead. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby might have wished that conditions were imposed in other protests, but we foresee the legislation being deployed rarely and very carefully.
Does the Minister believe that, were the provision to be enacted and the thresholds reduced, as some of us have argued, more protests would have conditions imposed? Does she have a view on how many more or fewer protests would have conditions imposed?
Again, this comes to the checks and balances in the clauses that I will go through in detail. It will be for the officer to make decisions, either on the ground or ahead of the procession, but there have been instances where the police do not have the confidence under the current legislation to impose conditions in relation to noise specifically. When one hears about the problems that residents and others in the vicinity of the noise experience, one can see why they would wish that conditions were imposed. As I say, I will go into more detail in a moment.
To set the context, the recent report on the policing of protests, produced by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services, found that the balance between protesters’ rights and the rights of local residents and businesses, and those who hold opposing views, leans in favour of the protesters and that a modest reset of the scales is needed. Again, this is the messy, grey area that the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood referred to. As with all existing public order legislation, we are making use of the new powers. The police will continue to be required to demonstrate that their use is necessary and proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Clause 55 stand part.
Clause 56 stand part.
Clause 60 stand part.
I now turn to the detail of clauses 54, 55, 56 and 60, which all relate to the conditions that the police can place on public processions, public assemblies and, by virtue of clause 60, single-person protests.
The police are able to place conditions on planned or ongoing protests to prevent serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community. Conditions may also be imposed on a protest if the purpose of the person organising it is the intimidation of others in order to compel them to do or not to do an act that they have the right to do or not to do. The four clauses will ensure that the police are better placed to prevent protests that cause those harms. They will achieve that in the following ways.
Clause 55 will widen the range of conditions that the police can impose on public assemblies, to match existing powers to impose conditions on public processions. Clause 56 will prevent protesters from exploiting a loophole to evade conviction should they breach conditions at a protest and will increase sentences for such offences. Clauses 54, 55 and 60 will enable the police to impose conditions on a public procession, public assembly or single-person protest where noise may have a significant impact on those in the vicinity or may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation. These same clauses will also confer on the Home Secretary the power, through secondary legislation, to define the meaning of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
and
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried out in the vicinity of a public procession”,
assembly or single-person protest.
It appears that some of the Bill’s provisions intersect with the Welsh Government’s responsibilities. For example, the responsibility for public order is reserved to the UK Parliament, while the provisions relating to noise generated by persons taking part in a procession look set to overlap with the devolved Government’s responsibilities for environmental health. How have the Government addressed those particular concerns, and have they been resolved?
I am so sorry; I do not understand the hon. Gentleman’s concerns. Are they that this matter is reserved?
I will explain again. As Dr Robert Jones of the University of South Wales points out, the Welsh Government have responsibilities that seem to overlap with provisions in the Bill; their environmental health responsibility on noise is a particular case in point. The Bill says that demonstrations should not be noisy if they cause alarm and so on, but the Welsh Government have those sorts of responsibilities as well. How have those overlapping responsibilities been addressed and how have they been resolved?
I am told that all the provisions relate to reserved matters, so they fall within that framework.
I will not pursue this matter further, but is it not clear that the Welsh Government have responsibilities on an environmental basis for noise reduction?
I cannot add to what I said earlier. These are all reserved matters.
I move on to public assemblies. I will explain why it is necessary for the police to be able to place the same conditions on public assemblies as they can on public processions. The case for the changes in clause 55 was made by Her Majesty’s inspector Matt Parr in his report on policing protest, published in March. The report included the following observation:
“there have been some conspicuously disruptive protests in recent years, both static (assemblies) and moving (processions). Protests are fluid, and it is not always possible to make this distinction. Some begin as assemblies and become processions, and vice versa. The practical challenges of safely policing a protest are not necessarily greater in the case of processions than in the case of assemblies, so this would not justify making a wider range of conditions available for processions than for assemblies.”
It is clear that the challenges of safely policing a protest are not necessarily greater for processions than they are for assemblies. The clause will therefore enable the police to impose conditions such as start times on public assemblies, and prevent excessive noise levels.
Does the Minister agree that, contrary to what the Opposition say, the measures are about facilitating peaceful protest, not stopping protest? Obviously, if a protest breaches other people’s right to carry out their normal lives, that is different, but this is about making sure that protests can take place.
Very much so. This is about ensuring that the rights that we have spoken about so far are protected, and that the integral balance of the social contract is maintained. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right.
The police already have the power to impose any necessary conditions on marches. If it is acceptable for the police to impose any such conditions on processions, as they have been able to do since the 1930s, it is difficult to see the basis for the Opposition’s objection to affording equivalent powers to impose conditions on an assembly when it presents an equivalent public order risk.
In his evidence, Chief Constable Harrington said words to this effect—my apologies to Hansard: “We asked for consistency between processions and assembly, which this Bill does.” The police will impose those conditions only where they are necessary and proportionate, complying with their obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998. In fairness, Chief Constable Harrington set out the care and training that the police receive to ensure that they can carry out their obligations carefully.
Clause 56 closes the loophole in the offence of failing to comply with a condition attached to a procession or assembly. When the police impose conditions on a protest to prevent serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, they ensure that protesters are made aware of those conditions through various means. Those can include communicating with protesters via loudspeakers or handing out written leaflets.
Some protesters take active measures, such as covering their ears and tearing up leaflets without reading them, to ensure that they are not aware—or to complain that they were not aware—of the conditions being placed. Should they go on to breach the conditions, they will avoid conviction as, under current law, an offence is committed only if a protester knowingly fails to comply with the condition.
Clause 56 will change the threshold for the offence to include where a protester ought to have known of the conditions imposed, closing the loophole in the current law. That is a commonly used fault element in criminal law—indeed, I note that the hon. Members for Stockton North and for Rotherham use it in new clause 23, which provides for a new street harassment offence. The police will continue to ensure that protesters are made aware of the conditions, as they currently do. The onus on the prosecution would change from having to show that an individual was fully aware of conditions, to showing that the police took all reasonable steps to notify them. As I said earlier, the standards and burdens of proof apply, as they do in any other criminal case: it is for the Crown to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
This particular proposal was examined by the policing inspectorate and it is again worth quoting from its report in March. It said:
“Our view is that the fault element in sections 12(4) and (5) and sections 14(4) and (5) of the Public Order Act 1986 is currently set too high. The loophole in the current law could be closed with a slight shift in the legal test that is applied to whether protesters should have known about the conditions imposed on them. On balance, we see no good reason not to close this loophole.”
The clause will also increase the maximum penalties for offences under sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986.
Due to the increasingly disruptive tactics used by protesters, existing sentences are no longer proportionate to the harm that can be caused. Organisers of public processions and assemblies who go on to breach conditions placed by the police, as well as individuals who incite others to breach conditions, will see maximum custodial sentences increase from three to six months. Others who breach conditions will see maximum penalties increase from level 3 to level 4 on the standard scale, which are respectively set at £1,000 and £2,500.
Can the Minister give an example of an occasion when the current sentence has not been proportionate, in her opinion? Is she looking at custodial sentences and considering the impact they would have on the courts and on the Prison Service?
The custodial aspect has been increased from three months to six months in relation to organisers of public processions and assemblies who go on to breach conditions, as well as those who incite others to breach conditions. The sentence in relation to the fine is for those who breach conditions. They go in a different category from organisers and those who incite others to breach conditions.
I do not have any examples to hand immediately, but I imagine some will find themselves in my file in due course. We are looking at maximum sentences, but it is still for the independent judiciary to impose sentences in court on the facts of the case that they have before them. That is another safeguard and another check and balance within this legislation. It will be for the judiciary to impose individual sentences, but it is right that Parliament look at the maximum term.
What evidence does the Minister have for the need for tougher sentences in this area? Are the judiciary saying that they are ill equipped to sentence people appropriately when they have been convicted of this type of activity?
Again, I point to the disruption and to the tactics that have been developing over recent years, which have grown not just more disruptive but, in some cases, more distressing. There are examples of an ambulance being blocked from an A&E department and of commuters being prevented from getting on the train to go to work in the morning by people who had attempted to climb on to the train carriage. We are seeing more and more of these instances, so it is right that the maximum sentence is commensurate.
If protesters feel that such measures are disproportionate, they will presumably put that defence forward in court. It will be for the Crown to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and for their counsel to mitigate on their behalf. We are trying to show the seriousness with which we take these small instances, where the balance between the rights of protesters and the rights of the community that is not protesting is disproportionate within the checks and balances that we have already discussed in the course of this debate.
I turn now to the measures relating to noise. The provisions will broaden the range of circumstances in which the police may impose conditions on a public procession or a public assembly to include circumstances where noise may have a significant impact on those in the vicinity, or may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation. These circumstances will also apply to single-person protests.
The hon. Member for Rotherham asked whether the noise provision was London-centric, with the biggest protests happening in London. As I said earlier, one would not want to assume that some of the protests that we have seen on the news could not happen outside London, as with the “Kill the Bill” protests in Bristol. It is right that we have clarity and consistency in law across the country so that if a group of protesters behaved in the way people appear to have behaved in the Bristol protests—injuring many, many police officers who were just acting in the line of duty—one would expect the law to apply as clearly in Rotherham as in central London.
I thank the Minister for her clarity on that. I completely support her point when violence is being done or emergency services are being blocked and the disruption is in no way proportionate to the nature of the protest, but I would like her to give some clarity on the issue of noise. Is it a decibel thing? Is it an irritation thing? Who decides what the irritation is? What is and is not acceptable? Would the threshold be lower in a small village because noise would not normally be heard, whereas in a big city with lots of industrial sites it would be a lot higher? It is that subjectivity that I put to the Minister.
That is precisely why we are introducing an objective test in clause 54(3). The hon. Lady will see the wording:
“For the purposes of subsection (1)(ab)(i), the noise generated by persons taking part in a public procession may have a relevant impact on persons in the vicinity of the procession if—
(a) it may result in the intimidation or harassment of persons of reasonable firmness with the characteristics of persons likely to be in the vicinity.”
That is consistent with other parts of the criminal law. The wording continues:
“or (b) it may cause such persons”––
that is, persons of reasonable firmness––
“to suffer serious unease, alarm or distress.”
We have been very mindful of trying to help the police because it would be a matter for the police to weigh up during a procession, assembly or one-person protest or before one starts. It would be for the senior officer to make that assessment, but it is an objective test.
I hope that the hon. Lady will not mind my raising it, but the example she gave of the impact that hearing a drill had on her personally was her personal, subjective experience; we are saying that this would have to be an objective test—the reasonable firmness of people in the vicinity of that noise.
Let me give an example that I am sure everyone in this room will have experience of, as I have. An MP might be speaking at a demo or rally and a group of people feel the need to say, “See you next Tuesday” during the speech. That distresses the church group being addressed. Would that reach the threshold? Is it more of a decibel thing rather than it being directed to the MP? For example, in Rotherham the community came together to hold peaceful vigils but the far right held counter-protests in which they felt the need to call us paedophiles.
I appreciate that I am being annoying on this, but I just do not get it. These particular cases feel subjective and that is why I would like to get the clarity bedded down.
First and foremost, the hon. Lady is certainly not being annoying; she is doing her job and her duty on the Committee. I am feeling my way here carefully because obviously Ministers should not comment on individual cases, but, on her example, in a scenario where someone is being at shouted at or spoken to as she described, there is a very good argument for saying that the person doing the shouting is committing a public order offence under the 1986 Act—that could be a section 5 offence of causing harassment, alarm or distress at the moment.
Again, I read across to other parts of public order legislation. That is why the objective test is an important one. We want first to be consistent with other public order measures. However, we recognise that there may be some instances in which an individual, for whatever reason—medical or otherwise—may have a particular sensitivity. In the criminal law, we say, “Look, we have got to deal with this on an objective basis, because it is the criminal law and the consequences of being convicted of a criminal offence are as serious as they are.” I have some hypothetical examples to give a bit of colour in due course, but, if I may, I want to complete outlining the checks and balances as written in the Bill so that everyone has a clear picture of the steps that a senior officer will have to go through to satisfy herself or himself that a condition can be imposed on the grounds of noise.
The senior officer must decide whether the impact is significant. In doing so, they must have regard to the likely number of people who may be affected, the likely duration and the likely intensity of that impact. The threshold at which police officers will be able to impose conditions on the use of noise is rightly very high. The examples I have been provided with—I am sure the Committee will understand that I am not citing any particular protest or assembly—are that a noisy protest in a town centre may not meet the threshold, but a protest creating the same amount of noise outside a school might, given the age of those likely to be affected and how those in the school are trying to sit down to learn on an average day. A noisy protest outside an office with double glazing may not meet the threshold, but a protest creating the same amount of noise outside a care home for elderly people, a GP surgery or small, street-level businesses might, given the level of disruption likely to be caused. Again, that refers to the conditions in clause 54(3) about the likely number of people, the likely duration and the likely intensity of that impact on such persons.
We have heard an awful lot about the police having to apply judgment and make decisions quickly, but, given the examples that the Minister has just read out, does she agree that there is a good dollop of common sense in much of what we need to apply with this legislation?
Indeed. Of course, we are rightly sitting here scrutinising every single word of the Bill carefully, but a senior police officer on the ground will have had a great deal of training and years of experience as an officer working in their local communities. They will also have the knowledge of their local communities. I imagine that policing a quiet village and policing the centre of Westminster are two very different experiences, and the officers making such decisions will be well versed in the needs of their local areas. None the less, officers across the country will be bound by the terms of subsection (3)—those checks and balances I have referred to throughout—and the European convention on human rights.
I thank the Minister for being generous; it is appreciated. On the examples I supplied, her response was that the existing legislation ought to be covering the point. She mentioned a case study in which a protest could reach the threshold if there was no double-glazing. What concerns me is the organiser who could now face up to six months in jail. Are they meant to know whether properties do or do not have double-glazing, and therefore instruct the march to be silent for a specific 100 yards, as they could otherwise fall foul of the earlier clause? I say to the Minister that I just do not like subjectivity when it comes to the law.
The organiser in those circumstances would, of course, be liable to having a committed an offence only if they breached the order. Indeed, this is the important point. It is for the police to make that assessment. If the police have a conversation with an organiser and say, “We believe that using your very high-level amplification system in this residential street meets the criteria under subsection (3) such that we are going to impose a condition asking you to turn it down,” the organiser, or the person deemed to be the organiser, will have had that conversation with an officer, and I very much hope that they will abide by the condition. If they do not, that is where the offence comes in, and that is a choice for the organiser.
As is already the case with processions, those conversations will happen and it will be a matter for the organiser as to what course of action they choose to take. One hopes that they will take the advice and guidance of the police, adapt and therefore be able to continue with their protest in a way that meets the expectations of the local community or local businesses. I appreciate that the detail is incredibly technical, and I am trying to work through every set of factual circumstances. I understand absolutely why people want to work through those, but there are checks and balances that run throughout the Bill.
First, does the Minister agree that we must therefore have specific training for the police? She has referred many times to senior officers making decisions, but senior officers might not be available in Stockton-on-Tees or Rotherham, and certainly not in the local village, when there is some form of demonstration. The local PC may well be the person who has to turn up and make some form of decision in this situation. Secondly, on the issue of noise itself, how can a police officer be fair and objective where there are different groups of people who will be suffering differently as a direct result of a demonstration? A bunch of teenagers standing on Whitehall might find the noise and the robustness of the conversation tremendously exciting, but the pensioners group that has gone for tea at the local café might be very distressed. How on earth does the police officer make a balanced decision in that sort of situation?
I can help the hon. Gentleman on the officer point. Pre-procession—in other words, in respect of processions that are yet to happen—the conditions must be assessed, and if ordered, ordered by a chief officer. That is a chief constable outside London, and in London an assistant commissioner. That is the highest rank in a police force. Mid-procession, conditions are imposed by a senior officer, which is an inspector or above, at the scene. So I do not think that the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman describes will arise. It is another example of the checks and balances that we have tried to put in place throughout this part of the Bill to ensure that these decisions are taken by very experienced and specialised officers.
I have been given another example to help demonstrate the point. A noisy protest that lasts only a short time may not meet the threshold, so the 90 seconds of—I forget the piece of music—
Thank you, Holst. But a protest creating the same amount of noise over several days might meet it, given the extended duration of the protest.
For clarification, is the senior officer expected to know the area and the types of buildings where the protest will be, as well as the nature of the demonstration—whether it will have lots of sound systems, or involve lots of whistles and chants? Is it expected that that will be known beforehand, or is there scope to act if that were to occur during a demonstration?
That serves to demonstrate the dynamic nature of different forms of protest. If a decision is to be made during the course of a protest, it will be made by a senior officer of inspector rank or above, on the ground and assessing the situation. Let me try to provide a practical example. The inspector may assess the situation in Hyde Park, then walk through to an area where there is lots of high-density housing and consider that the circumstances there are different. It is about being able to react to circumstances as they change and evolve in the course of a protest. That is why we are trying to bring consistency between processions and assemblies—because of the dynamic nature of protests—but it will be for the senior officer, working of course with his or her colleagues, to assess the factors laid out in subsection (3).
The police will impose conditions on the use of noise only in the exceptional circumstances where noise causes unjustifiable disruption or impact. I emphasise that in doing so they will have to have regard to the number of people affected and the intensity and duration of the noise, and act compatibly with the rights of freedom of expression and so on within the convention.
The shadow Minister prayed in aid the non-legislative recommendations from HMIC. I want to place on the record that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has established a programme board to consider and implement those. I hope that helps.
Does the Minister agree that not only is it a judgment or decision for the police to make in this situation, but that if a prosecution were to follow, the Director of Public Prosecutions and ultimately a jury would decide whether, on balance, they thought a breach of these provisions had occurred?
Exactly right. The police will first have to satisfy themselves and the CPS that a charge should be brought, and from that all the usual safeguards and standards that we expect in the criminal justice system will apply. For example, the CPS will have to apply the code for Crown prosecutors in relation to the public interest and evidential tests. We will then have the mechanisms in the trial process—perhaps a submission at half-time by defence counsel if they feel the evidence is not there. There are many mechanisms that apply in criminal trials up and down the country every single day, and those mechanisms will be available for offences under the Bill as they are for any other criminal offence.
I have been asked for clarification of the terms: annoyance, alarm, distress and unease. Many of those terms are already used in the Public Order Act 1986 and in common law. They are well understood by the judiciary, and the Law Commission—this is particularly in reference to the public nuisance point, which we will come on to in a moment—recommends retaining the word “annoyance”, as it provides continuity with previous legal cases and is well understood in this context. We understand the concerns about this, but as I say, through the introduction of these words, we are trying to be consistent with the approach that has long applied in the Public Order Act.
It is necessary to apply the measure in relation to noise to single-person protests because they can, of course, create just as much noise through the use of amplification equipment as a large protest using such equipment. Again, the police will be able to impose conditions on a single-person protest for reasons relating only to noise, not for any other reason.
Forgive me: I have just been corrected regarding the briefing I received about the rank of the officer at the scene. It is the most senior officer at the scene, so there is no minimum rank, but it is anticipated in the use of the word that it will be an officer of great seniority. Any protest on which it may be necessary to impose conditions is likely to have an officer present of at least the rank of inspector.
I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that point, but it does mean that the local sergeant or PC in a village or a town centre is going to have to make decisions about these matters. My point was that surely, this means that there needs to be some very specific training on how police should react to demonstrations or other activities of that nature.
I would give the police some credit. First, if it is a protest of any serious size, or the organisers have contacted the police or the other way around, this can and should be dealt with ahead of the protest. In the event of a protest taking people by surprise in a quieter area than a huge metropolis, the police will react as they are very used to reacting in circumstances that need them to be flexible and move quickly, and I am sure they will have people on the scene very quickly who can assist with this. We want to ensure that the expectation is that a senior officer, and certainly the most senior officer at the scene, will be the one imposing these conditions.
I now turn to the parts of the clauses that set out that the Home Secretary will have the power, through secondary legislation, to define the meaning of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
and
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the procession”,
or assembly or single-person protest. Again, to clear up any misunderstandings, this is not about the Home Secretary of the day banning protests. Opposition Members have understandably called for clearer definitions wherever possible, which is what this delegated power is intended to achieve. Any definition created through this power will need to fall within what can reasonably be understood as “serious disruption”. The threshold will be clarified, not changed: such definitions will be used to clarify the threshold beyond which the police can impose conditions on protests, should they believe them necessary to avoid serious disruption. This is about putting the framework in place to help the police on the ground.
The regulations will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, which means that they must be scrutinised, debated, and approved by both Houses before they can be made. It will, of course, be for the police in an individual case to apply that definition operationally. They can apply that definition only if the criteria in the Bill are met. This is not about the Home Secretary outlawing particular protests or individual demonstrations; it is about setting a framework for a definition, to help the police operation on the ground to understand the criteria in the Bill. To assist in scrutiny of the Bill, we aim to publish further details of the content of the regulation before consideration on Report.
The clauses relating to protest, public assemblies, marches, processions and demonstrations, as well as other terms that have been used to describe this, represent a modest updating of legislation that is more than 35 years old. They do not enable the police or, for that matter, the Home Secretary of the day to ban any protest. Interestingly, we will come to debates in Committee on new clause 43, which relates to interference with access to or the provision of abortion services. That provision does, in fact, seek to ban such protests, so, again, there is a balancing act, or the grey area that has been referred to in this very debate.
I am interested in what the Minister has to say about new clause 43. Is she indicating Government support for the measures that we are trying to introduce?
No, I am drawing out an apparent contradiction. I do not say that in a pejorative sense. The hon. Member and others have expressed strong reservations and complaints about the Bill. I understand that they will vote against the measures, but it seems that discussions about freedom of speech and expression—that balancing act—will be part of the consideration of the Opposition’s new clause. I am not laying out a position either way; I am observing the difficulty in achieving that balancing act and an apparent contradiction. It is for individual Members to decide matters of scrutiny.
These clauses provide for a sensible alignment of police powers to attach conditions to an assembly or a public procession, and extend those powers to deal with particularly egregious cases of disruption due to unacceptable levels of noise. The measures are supported by the police, who will, as now, have to exercise the powers within the framework of the Human Rights Act. On that basis, and with that detailed analysis, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause is designed to protect vehicular access to Parliament, and it will amend the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. That will ensure that preventing access to the parliamentary estate is prohibited, but it will not give the police powers to arrest those who contravene it.
Clause 58 requires a new controlled area around the temporary locations of Parliament, and the central rules around protests may be imposed around the temporary home of Parliament during restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster, whenever that may occur.
Clause 59 replaces the common law offence of public nuisance with the statutory offence of intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance. The new statutory offence of intentionally or recklessly causing a nuisance includes the term “serious annoyance”, and it is unclear what will constitute a serious annoyance or serious inconvenience. A person does not have to actually suffer any of the above consequences, but only be at risk of suffering them.
The Minister said in the evidence sessions that the term “annoyance” was not dreamed up on the back of an envelope, but follows many centuries of legal development, culminating in the 2015 Law Commission report. However, that does not help to explain or to guide the police as to how to enforce conditions on a protest that puts someone at risk of suffering “serious annoyance”. During the evidence session, Chief Constable Harrington, the public order and public safety portfolio lead for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, said:
“On serious annoyance, we need to see what Parliament’s decision on the definition of that is and to interpret that accordingly… We will have to see what Parliament decides and whether it is able to give us some clarity about what that means”.––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 10, Q8.]
Can the Minister reassure us today by providing some clarity on what “serious annoyance” might mean and what is the threshold for “serious annoyance”?
I will finish on this point: the designated area for Parliament includes Parliament Square, where can be found a number of statues of celebrated pioneers of struggle and protest, including Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Gandhi and the suffragist Millicent Fawcett. I wonder what they would think about the state limiting people’s rights of protest in this way. I think we can all guess.
If I may, Mr McCabe, I shall confine my remarks to clause 57, which deals with “Obstruction of vehicular access to Parliament”. I will take up the challenge on annoyance when it comes to clause 59.
Clause 57 delivers a clear recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, chaired by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman). Its 2019 report, “Democracy, freedom of expression and freedom of association: Threats to MPs”, refers to
“unimpeded access to the Palace of Westminster for all who have business in either House, or wish to meet their representatives”,
and to how vital that is. The report continues:
“Even though there is a special legal regime for the area around Parliament, it is clear that those responsible for policing and controlling that area have not always given the need for access without impediment or harassment the importance it requires. This must change.”
We are acting on the recommendations of the Joint Committee and, through clause 57, strengthening and extending the Palace of Westminster controlled area in relation to section 142A of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.
Would my hon. Friend be interested to know that, more than a century ago, precedent was set by the grandfather of the current Lord Montagu? He arrived in a motorcar and the police tried to prevent it from entering the precincts of the Palace, but he insisted that it came in. Precedent was therefore set well over a century ago at the dawn of the age of the motorcar, and I hope that that precedent will be followed.
That is a wonderful example to explain how that fundamental right of our democracy was introduced. I note, of course, that my right hon. Friend has great knowledge and expertise in all matters vehicular, to which I defer.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause provides the Secretary of State with a regulation-making power to designate new “controlled areas” for the purposes of part 3 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, should Parliament relocate due to restoration and renewal works, or for any other reason. That would include, for example––I am sure we all hope that it does not happen––the House needing to relocate because of a fire or other emergency. We hope fervently that this will not be required for those reasons, but it is the will of the Government, working with the parliamentary authorities, to ensure that the measures relating to controlled areas can be extended to wherever Parliament relocates to ensure the security and safety of parliamentarians in the event of a temporary relocation.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:
The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate has made his remarks on the clause, for which I am grateful.
The clause enshrines in statute the long-standing common law offence of public nuisance. As we heard from a number of our policing and other witnesses, codifying the criminal law in this area will provide clarity to the public, the police, prosecutors and others as to the scope of the offence, giving clear notice of what conduct is covered.
The new offence of intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance has been drafted in line with the recommendations of the 2015 Law Commission report “Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency”. The Law Commission held a public consultation, which informed the recommendations of its report. It found that it is necessary to keep this offence, as
“human inventiveness being so great, it is desirable to have a general offence for culpable acts that injure the public but do not fall within any specialised offences.”
The intention of the clause is to codify an existing offence, not to create a new one. That is in keeping with the intention of the Law Commission. As such, it is appropriate to mirror the language from the common law offence as much as possible. For that reason, we have retained the use of the terms “annoyance” and “inconvenience” while adding the caveat of “serious”, so raising the bar for securing a conviction.
It is clear from case law relating to the existing common law offence that those terms connote something more than merely feeling annoyed or inconvenienced. The term “annoyance” has been applied to acts such as allowing a field to be used for holding an all-night rave or conspiring to switch off the floodlights at a football match so as to cause it to be abandoned––certain colleagues will prick up their ears at my mention of that—and to noise, dirt, fumes, noxious smells and vibrations.
The Law Commission provides the further example of vexatious calls to the emergency services’ 999 number or to Childline. Repeated vexatious calls can affect the ability of a local force to respond to genuine emergencies. That gives a flavour of the examples that have long been understood under the common law offence as annoying or inconvenient.
Many of the terms used are well established in law, including criminal law. Indeed, the term “inconvenienced” appears in the Metropolitan Streets Act 1867, “loss of amenity” is used in the Railway Fires Act 1905, and “annoyance” features in the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 —statutes with which I am sure we are all very familiar. These are not vague, untried or untested terms, and I note that the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood is happy to put her name to new clause 2, which concerns kerb-crawling and uses the term “annoyance”.
As I have said, there are powers in place to deal with fly-tipping. Where people feel the need to secure certain sites, it is down to the local authority to deal with those issues. I am certainly not encouraging people to take the law into their own hands and deal with things in the ways they see fit. That would be the road to chaos. I have heard what the hon. Gentleman said, but I am not going to comment on individual situations. The law is there, it is available and it can be used. It has been used quite successfully by many local authorities and the police.
There are other solutions for managing unauthorised encampments such as negotiated stopping whereby arrangements are made on agreed permitted times of stopping and to ensure the provision of basic needs such as water, sanitation and refuse collection. The manifesto commitment and the Government response referred to littering as a problem, but then why do the Government not consider providing more authorised camping sites with proper refuse facilities? Why do the Government think that confiscating someone’s home, putting them in prison and fining them is the answer? Why do the Government not instead consider the proposals of my hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr Perkins), whose private Member’s Bill would make it an offence to demand money to vacate an unauthorised encampment? That, along with a significant increase in permanent site provision, could prevent Gypsy and Traveller communities from being forced to make unauthorised encampments, having nowhere to go, and prevent the small minority of Travellers who demand money to leave sites where they are not entitled to be.
I acknowledge the difficulty that people or businesses can face with unauthorised encampments on their land. The Victims’ Commissioner put it well when she said that
“unless there is proper provision of authorised encampments, you have two sets of victims. I quite agree with you that the people who are distressed, damaged or whatever by an unauthorised encampment are victims of that. There is no doubt of it…but I want you to take into account the difficulty of finding somewhere to camp in a lot of places, which forces people into an unlawful place.” ––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 21 May 2021; c. 120, Q193.]
The Policing Minister also claimed that money for sites was available in the £150 million affordable homes programme pot, but the last shared ownership affordable homes programme in 2016 to 2021, with a budget of £4.7 billion, awarded grants for just two Traveller sites across the whole country in the scheme’s entire period. They were both just transit sites in Birmingham and Cornwall. That was revealed by Friends, Families & Travellers, which FOI-ed Homes England to find that information. Funding for Traveller sites must be more than warm words.
The Minister also claimed that there has been an increase in the number of caravans on sites from 14,000 in 2010 to 20,000 in 2019, but she failed to point out that the number of caravans counted on sites is different from the actual number of pitches. The 14,000 and 20,000 figures are the total number of caravans counted that are listed as on authorised sites in the caravan count. While there has indeed been a rise from 14,730 in January 2010 to 19,967 in January 2020, the number of caravans on socially rented sites fell by 364.
Small-scale, family-run sites are great for those who have the resources to pull this off, but they are incredibly problematic and inaccessible for those who live in areas where land is at a premium and who have limited finances. It is the number of permanent pitches that can really improve things for Travellers, residents, local authorities and the police. Although there has been a 39.9% increase in transit pitches alone, it amounts to an increase of only 101 pitches—the equivalent of 10 per year over 10 years—with an overall decrease of 11.1% in permanent pitches on local authority and registered social landlord sites. In fact, the Government’s published figures show that there has been an overall 8.4% decrease of pitches on local authority Traveller sites. Nesil Caliskan, the chair of the Local Government Association, told us in the evidence sessions:
“There has to be a commitment from local authorities that those sites are allocated. The statutory legislation that already exists for these protected characteristics needs to be taken seriously. We should be meeting the obligations that are already set in statute, which says that we should have adequate sites for these communities, but we just do not.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 68, Q99.]
The Government should focus on ensuring that local authorities have the resources they need to provide more space for Traveller communities to legally reside. By taking an enforcement approach to address the number of unauthorised encampments, the Government are overlooking the issue of the lack of site provision.
Part 4 of the Bill would cause harm to Gypsy and Traveller communities for generations. Gypsies and Travellers are already the most disproportionally represented group in the criminal justice system. Part 4 would compound the inequalities already experienced by Gypsies and Travellers and further push them into the criminal justice system, just for existing nomadically. I urge the Government to rethink these harmful proposals.
I am very grateful to Opposition Members for debating this matter, because it gives me the opportunity to clear up some of the misunderstandings that appear to have arisen during the course of the Bill being debated and scrutinised by Parliament, and indeed by organisations outside Parliament.
We know that the vast majority of Travellers are law-abiding citizens, but when damage, disruption or distress is caused where a person resides on land without consent, it can affect local communities as well as landowners. Residents often feel helpless as their land or local amenities are damaged or disrupted, and councils are left with huge clean-up bills in some cases. In 2016, Birmingham City Council incurred costs of £700,000 due to evictions and clean-up costs resulting from harmful unauthorised encampments—that is £700,000 of taxpayers’ money. It is only right that the Government seek to protect citizens who are adversely affected by harmful unauthorised encampments, and to deter them from being set up in the first instance.
We have held consultations on this issue. In the 2018 Government consultation on enforcement powers for unauthorised encampments, it was made clear that people want to see greater protection for local communities, and for the police to be given greater powers to crack down on unauthorised encampments. In 2019, we ran a further consultation in which we asked how we should extend those powers. Some 66% of the people responding on behalf of local authorities were in favour of a new criminal offence for intentional trespass. At the start of our proceedings in oral evidence, we heard powerful accounts from PCC Alison Hernandez about the impact of unauthorised encampments in her area of Devon and Cornwall. Only today we have heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby, and from my hon. Friends the Members for Ashfield and for Blyth Valley, about the impact that unauthorised encampments and harmful behaviour within those encampments have had on their constituencies.
It is that caveat that is critical when we are looking at these clauses. Clause 61 introduces a new criminal offence for people residing on private or public land with vehicles who refuse to leave, without a reasonable excuse, when asked to do so, but only when they have caused, or are likely to cause, significant damage, disruption or distress. That is the key: that is what I kept asking those who spoke against these provisions during the evidence sessions. It is clear that for this offence to be committed, the conditions set out in subsection (4) of the proposed new section must be met: in other words, in a case where the person is residing on the land, significant damage or disruption has been caused or is likely to be caused as a result of P’s residence.
Would the Minister clear a point up for me, just so I can get straight in my head what this Bill is setting out to do? A few years ago, we had the tall ships regatta in Blyth, and all the caravan sites were full, the bed and breakfasts were full, the hotels were full—it was a fantastic time. We had a massive influx of people coming to Blyth Valley. My cousin is a landowner, and he was asked by a group of people who were coming down whether he could turn over part of a field so that people could put their caravans there. About 50 caravans turned up in total. They stayed, they enjoyed the weekend, and they cleared up after themselves—they had a litter pick when they left, putting all the rubbish to one side. My cousin did not charge the group, but they brought toys for the kids and flowers for his wife. The Bill is not setting out to stop tourism, is it? It is not setting out to stop that guy in his caravan or that man with his camper van. It is to stop the unlawful things that go on: litter, breaking into houses, and anything like that. If the Minister could clear that up for me, that would be fantastic.
I thank my hon. Friend for his contribution, and I am really happy to clarify this. I understand the concerns that have been voiced, but there is clearly a great deal of misunderstanding as to how these provisions are intended to act. They are intended to address the criminal, damaging, disrupting or distressing behaviour that arises from some unauthorised encampments—certainly not all; we are caveating this very carefully. Where there are unauthorised encampments in which people are behaving in a way that is causing, or is likely to cause, significant disruption, damage or distress, that is the behaviour we are trying to target.
I have listened very carefully to the arguments from the Opposition, particularly those regarding the provision of authorised encampments, and I am going to come on to the details of the Government’s plans for that in due course. However, to say that the answer to this behaviour is to provide authorised encampments is to miss the intention and, indeed, the very drafting of this clause. People can go on to a piece of land without agreement, but this offence will not be committed unless the conditions in subsection (4) are met. That is why I asked some of the witnesses, “What is an acceptable level of distress?” We as constituency MPs need to be able to look our constituents in the eye when we are voting on this legislation and say, “We have weighed up what may be significant disruption, what may be significant damage and what may be significant distress, and have tried to ensure that we are representing your views when we are opining on this piece of legislation.”
The Minister will be aware that quite often, this land is agricultural land, which is needed for farmers and landowners to graze their stock. In a dry season, as it was earlier in this season, the last thing that farmers want is land that they can use for their own livestock being taken over and possibly used for the grazing of the horses of people who have come on to their land.
Of course, it will not just be a question of horses. My farmers have the pleasure of farming some of the greatest, highest-quality agricultural land in the country, and they go to great efforts to ensure that their arable fields are ploughed, sowed, and treated to ensure optimum production of crop yields in each and every field that they farm. The use of a large vehicle—or, indeed, many large vehicles—which is not farm machinery and therefore not driven by the person who tends to a field going on to that field can cause damage. At this time of year, when driving around agricultural areas, one will see entrances to fields blockaded with all sorts of large items to try to ensure that they are not trespassed upon in the way that we are trying to tackle in the Bill.
The Minister places a lot of stock in the word “significant”. To play devil’s advocate—perhaps against myself—she may be holding out a false promise to some of the communities we have heard described today. If a gang of Travellers turn up with 10 caravans, move on to someone’s land illegally—or it would be illegal under the Bill—take their rubbish away and do the work they want to do in the area, they will not be caught by the provision because they will not have caused “significant damage”. Communities across the country think that the Conservative Government are about to deliver all-encompassing, “we can move the Travellers on” legislation, but it is simply not the case.
In that scenario, the hon. Gentleman is right, in that we are addressing the behaviour that is set out in proposed new section 60C(4). In the event of a travelling community behaving as he describes, all the existing civil measures that a landowner can rely upon are there to move them on. We are trying to deal with behaviour that causes significant damage, distress and disruption where encampments are unauthorised. We are balancing things carefully because we want to address the serious scenarios that my hon. Friends have described in their constituencies.
As we have touched on in other contexts, the word “significant” is widely used in legislation, for example in section 14A of the Public Order Act 1986 on “Prohibiting trespassory assemblies”, which refers to “significant damage”. The criminal offence is committed only when a person resides or intends to reside on the land without consent with a vehicle. That avoids criminalising other forms of trespass, for example, the offence does not apply to a hiker, someone who is homeless or someone who inadvertently strays on to private land. I know that many colleagues of all parties have received communications from clubs, associations and people who have taken the time to write to their Member of Parliament or the Home Office on the issue and we very much hope that this will provide them with welcome reassurance. We all have the right to enjoy the beautiful national parks and green spaces that this great country has to offer and we will be able to continue to exercise that right.
The types of harms caught by the offence are defined in clause 61 and cover many of the problems we have been told that residents and landowners face through some unauthorised encampments. These include significant damage to land, property and the environment, as well as threatening behaviour to residents and landowners. Regarding distress, an offence is committed only if significant distress has been caused or is likely to be caused as a result of offensive conduct, which is then defined within the Bill. It is therefore not possible for an offence to be caught if a person is distressed by the mere presence of an unauthorised encampment on the land. That is where the civil measures I referred to earlier will come into play.
I was challenged with an example where a landowner is distressed and demands the police arrest someone. As with every other criminal offence, the police will only arrest someone if they are doing so in the course of their duties under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. They cannot and must not arrest someone just because a landowner or anyone else happens to demand it. It is important as we are discussing the Bill that we bear in mind the wider checks and balances within the criminal justice system and the wider principles that apply across all criminal offences.
If someone has met the previously mentioned conditions, to be guilty of the offence, they must fail to comply with the request to leave as soon as reasonably practicable and without reasonable excuse. The duties of the police in relation to safeguarding the vulnerable when taking enforcement decisions will continue to apply, as with any other criminal investigation.
The penalties are consistent with squatting legislation and existing powers to tackle unauthorised encampments. The offence is also accompanied by a power for the police to seize the vehicle and other property of the person committing the offence, which ensures that enforcement action is effective and could also have a deterrent effect. Seizure powers are already conferred on the police in relation to failure to comply with a police direction under the 1994 Act. It is right that the police should have equivalent powers in the context of the new criminal offence.
The seizure power is proportionate. Where possible, police decisions to arrest and seize vehicles should continue to be taken in consultation with the local authority which, where possible, would need to offer assurance that it has relevant measures in place to meet any welfare and safeguarding needs of those affected by the loss of their accommodation. The police will continue to undertake any enforcement action in compliance with their equality and human rights obligations.
The shadow Minister set out the police evidence on these new powers. The responses to the 2018 consultation showed a clear desire from the public for the police to be given more powers to tackle unauthorised encampments, but unauthorised Traveller sites require a locally driven, multi-agency response, led by local authorities and supported by the police. There are incentives in place for local authorities to encourage the provision of authorised Traveller pitches. Local planning authorities should continue to assess the need for Traveller accommodation and identify land for sites.
It is only right that the police are given the powers to tackle instances of unauthorised encampments that meet the conditions of proposed new subsection (4). We are very pleased that the Opposition are adopting the position that we should legislate for changes to police powers when requested by the police, because that gives us hope that they will support the measures in part 3, which we have just debated and which have been requested by the police.
This new offence is not targeted at any particular group. Rather, anyone who causes significant damage, disruption or distress in the specified conditions and who refuses to leave without reasonable excuse when asked to do so will be caught by the offence.
Section 61 of the 1994 Act is currently exercisable where any of the trespassers has caused damage to the land or to property on the land or used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the occupier, Under the amendments in clause 62, the relevant harms comprise damage, disruption or distress, including environmental damage, such as excessive noise and litter. The harms do not need to be significant for police to be able to direct trespassers away in the first instance. That will make it easier for the police to direct trespassers away where encampments are causing problems for landowners, communities or businesses.
We have also increased the period in which trespassers directed away from the land must not return, from three months to 12 months. That is designed to strengthen enforcement powers, acting as a greater deterrent in the first place, and to protect more proportionately the rights of landowners and local communities. We are also enabling the police to direct trespassers away from land that forms part of a highway, to ensure that directions can be given to trespassers on roads.
Our overarching aim is to ensure fair and equal treatment for Travellers in a way that facilitates their traditional nomadic way of life while respecting the interests of local residents and the settled community. We recognise that the vast majority of Travellers are law-abiding citizens, but unauthorised sites can often give an unfair negative image of nomadic communities, and cause distress and misery to residents who live nearby. We are equally clear that we will not tolerate law breaking.
Statutory guidance will be issued, as provided for in clause 63, and will outline examples of what might constitute a reasonable excuse for not complying with the request to leave. That guidance will be vital to support the police in discharging those functions and will help to ensure a consistent application of the powers across England and Wales. The police must have regard to the guidance when exercising the relevant functions. We envisage that the guidance will set out, for example, what might constitute significant damage, disruption and distress, and what might constitute a reasonable excuse, where someone fails to comply with a request to leave the land. It will be up to the police and courts to decide whether someone has a reasonable excuse for not complying, depending on the specific facts of that case.
We recognise the rights of Travellers to follow a nomadic way of life, in line with their cultural heritage. Our aim is for settled and Traveller communities to be able to live side by side harmoniously, and we hope that the clear rules and boundaries that we are putting in place will facilitate that. We remain committed to delivering a cross-Government strategy to tackle the inequalities faced by Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. The planning policy for Traveller sites is clear that local planning authorities should assess the need for Traveller accommodation and identify land for sites. Local housing authorities are required to assess their housing and accommodation needs under the Housing Act 1985, including for those who reside in caravans. There is wider Government support for the provision of Traveller sites via the new homes bonus, which provides an incentive for local authorities to encourage housing growth in their areas, and rewards net increases in effective housing stock, including the provision of authorised Traveller pitches.
Does the Minister have an idea what the Government’s plans are in terms of the number of sites that are likely to be created over the next three to five years?
That is a matter for local authorities. We have the planning policy for Traveller sites, which is down to the local planning authority. In the hon. Gentleman’s area, I know not whether his local council agrees with him that there should be more sites, but it would be a matter for the local authority to address with local residents.
We remain committed to delivering the strategy to tackle the inequalities faced by the communities that we have discussed. There is the additional affordable homes programme for local authorities to deliver a wide range of affordable homes to meet the housing needs of people in different circumstances and different housing markets, including funding for new Traveller pitches.
We believe that we have struck the right balance between the rights of those who live a nomadic way of life and the rights of local communities to go about their lives without the significant damage, disruption and distress outlined in proposed new section 60C(4), which, regrettably, some unauthorised encampments cause. I therefore commend clauses 61 to 63 to the Committee.
It is, as always, a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. The clause fulfils the Government’s long-standing commitment to increase the maximum penalty for the offences of, first, causing death by dangerous driving and, secondly, causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from, in both cases, the current maximum sentence of 14 years to life imprisonment.
As members of the Committee will know, in response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties some time ago, the Government proposed to take forward various changes in the law, including these, and all of them received overwhelming public support and support from other consultees. By enacting this clause we are delivering on the result of that consultation and on a long-standing commitment. That means that when sentencing people for these very serious offences, the courts can sentence up to life imprisonment if the judge sees fit.
Many hon. Members will have constituency cases where families have suffered the terrible trauma of a loved one being killed by a dangerous or careless driver who was driving when drunk. I have certainly encountered a number of such cases in the last six years as a constituency MP, as I am sure each and every Member here has. The criminal justice system can never adequately compensate for the grief caused by the loss of a loved one in such terrible circumstances, but these changes will mean that courts now have the power to make sure that the punishment truly fits the crime.
It is appropriate that the maximum sentences for causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence are increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. I commend these measures to the Committee.
I am pleased to offer the Opposition’s enthusiastic support for clauses 64 to 66, and particularly for clause 64, which will increase the maximum penalties for the offences of causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years’ imprisonment to imprisonment for life.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock) and for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for their committed work to increase the penalty for those guilty of causing death by dangerous driving to life imprisonment and for the Bill they have promoted and supported. My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East has worked alongside the family of Jaqueline Wileman, from Grimethorpe, who was 58 when she was struck and tragically killed by a stolen heavy goods vehicle in September 2018. I offer my sincerest thanks to the Wileman family for their tireless campaign for change, which they are now able to see become a reality.
Other families of victims of these awful crimes have also long campaigned to see these changes, such as the family of Violet-Grace, who died from injuries inflicted as a result of a car crash caused by individuals driving dangerously in March 2017. I hope that this change in the law, which they have fought to bring forward, will provide some small solace that dangerous drivers who kill will, in future, feel the full force of the law.
Work to address this important issue has been energetic on both sides of the House, and it was the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) who introduced the Death by Dangerous Driving (Sentencing) Bill in July 2020, as a private Member’s Bill co-sponsored by my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East and for Barnsley Central. We are therefore fully supportive of the Government’s proposal to provide the court with a wider range of penalties to ensure that sentences are proportionate and reflect the seriousness of the offending.
The urgent need for this change is illustrated by the fact that, in 2019, over 150 people were sentenced for causing death by dangerous driving. Of those offenders, around 95% received an immediate custodial sentence, of which over 15 received a sentence of more than 10 years. If 10% of offenders are already being sentenced near the maximum threshold, it seems the time is ripe to provide the court with wider sentencing powers for these offences so that offenders are dealt with consistently and fairly.
Although we are fully supportive of these changes, I note that there has been some delay in introducing them. The Government committed to changing the law on causing death by dangerous driving following a review in 2014—seven years ago. As the Minster said, it has been a long-standing commitment. There was also a consultation in 2016, which the Government responded to in 2017, committing to the legislative changes that are now in the Bill. The private Member’s Bill brought forward by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead last year was a real nudge along to the Government, following a perceived dropping of the ball. I would normally say, “Better late than never,” but for a measure as serious as this, and with hundreds of families losing loved ones to dangerous drivers in the intervening years, I wonder what held the Government up for so long.
Speaking of delays, Cycling UK said that, although it cautiously supports these proposals, it fears they will do very little to address the many serious problems with the framework of road traffic offences and penalties. I understand that the Government promised a full review of the framework back in 2014, but it has never happened. I would welcome an update from the Minister on the wider review, which could look at the utilisation of driving bans.
We fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment at two years’ imprisonment.
In that case, I will sit down and address that point later.
I have nothing further to add to my earlier answers. We keep these matters under continual review. There are no plans to make changes just at the moment, but we do of course keep an eye on these matters.
A review was promised in 2014. Is that review likely to be held soon?
I am afraid that I have no specific information on that, other than to say that we keep an eye on these matters on an ongoing basis.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 64 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving
This clause has a very similar intention to the previous clause, in that it introduces a new section 2C offence into the Road Traffic Act 1988 to fill a lacuna in the existing legislation. It does that by introducing a new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. There is currently no offence that covers this, so we are filling a gap that exists in the current legislation.
The new offence created by the clause is committed if a person causes serious injury by driving a car or another mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or public place without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other road users and, while doing so, causes serious injury.
The maximum custodial penalty for the offence on indictment will be two years’ imprisonment or a fine. The maximum custodial penalty on summary conviction will be 12 months or a fine. Until such time as section 224 of the sentencing code is commenced, the maximum penalty on summary conviction in England and Wales will be read as six months.
This is an important clause, which fills a gap in the current law and ensures that, where serious injury is caused by someone who is driving carelessly or inconsiderately, there will be an offence that can be prosecuted with an appropriate penalty—in this case, a maximum of two years if tried on indictment. I hope the Committee will agree that this is a sensible measure and will support the clause.
As I prematurely said some minutes ago, we fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment, as the Minister said, at two years’ imprisonment.
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 made provision for new offences for dangerous and disqualified driving, but left the gap the Minister referred to in the law, relating to careless driving that results in serious injury. As I said before, we welcome the sensible proposal in clause 65, which fills that gap and will allow for a penalty that recognises the high level of harm caused by these incidents. As a result, the Opposition support clause 66 and schedule 7, which make minor consequential amendments as a result of clauses 64 and 65.
Debates about conditions in prisons are probably somewhat outside the scope of our discussion, save to say that the Prisons Minister works on a daily basis to ensure that our prisons provide the right sort of environment, including for rehabilitative purposes.
The shadow Minister asked about the prison population and drew attention to the overall impact assessment for the Bill. As he said, the impact assessment, in which these measures are listed as measures A to C for driving offences, estimates that 1,300 offenders may be affected. The impact on prison places obviously depends on how judges sentence the new offence—measure C in the impact assessment—and how sentences vary under clause 64, which we discussed previously, given that the maximum is being increased from 14 years to life. However, that is all included in the overall figure of 700 places that covers the entire Bill.
The shadow Minister asked about the availability of prison places in the light of the pandemic. That again is more a matter for the Prisons Minister, but the overall prison population today is materially lower than prior to the pandemic—I speak from memory, but I think it is 5,000 or 6,000 lower—for a variety of reasons that I am sure the shadow Minister is aware of. Therefore, the pressures on the prison population coming out of the pandemic may be a little less severe than one might have feared.
I repeat my support for the clause, which fills an important gap in the law.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 66
Road traffic offences: minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Clause 66 and schedule 7 introduce a number of minor consequential amendments to be made to other Acts as a result of the offence we discussed in the previous clause. The consequential amendments to proposed new section 2C to the Road Traffic Act 1988 —causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving—are among those. It inserts a new section 3ZB and 3ZC into that Act, and tidies up various other anomalies. In essence, they are minor, inconsequential amendments that follow the previous clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 67
Courses offered as alternative to prosecution: fees etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 67 provides a specific statutory power for the current charging arrangements for education courses offered for minor driving offences as an alternative to a fixed penalty or prosecution. Those courses help to improve road safety and reduce the burden on the criminal justice system. The provisions in this clause will not change the way in which courses are offered, administered or run, but will provide greater transparency over the way that fees are set. A local policing body may charge a fee to cover the cost of the approved course, but also include an uplift as a contribution towards the cost of promoting road safety, including road safety partnerships and speed cameras.
The clause will also allow the Home Secretary to prescribe in secondary legislation the types of courses in which motorists may be charged, the maximum amount that may be charged and the way that the charge can be used. It will allow provision to be made to prevent courses from being offered to repeat offenders. That means that any potential repeat offenders will face the deterrent of fixed penalty fines and penalty points on their licence. Equivalent provisions are made for Northern Ireland, and there are allowances for corresponding or similar provision for Scotland, following consultation with the Lord Advocate.
We support clause 67 and welcome that the charging regime for courses offered as an alternative to prosecution will be placed on a statutory footing. It makes a lot of sense that a course cannot be offered to repeat offenders, but I would like to ask the Minister a question about proposed new part 4B, section 91G, which states:
“A fee may be set at a level that exceeds the cost of an approved course and related administrative expenses, but any excess must be used for the purpose of promoting road safety.”
Can the Minister provide an example of why a fee would be set at a level that exceeds the cost, and how much that could be? How much do the fees vary across police forces? Police forces can decide which courses to offer, so not all courses will be available in all areas. The same offence committed in different force areas may be dealt with in different ways.
What will the clause do to ensure that there is a consistent application of diversionary courses across the country? If the courses are to be effective methods of deterrence and rehabilitation of offenders, it is important that their use be consistent. In its 2016 report, the Transport Committee said of diversionary courses:
“There are clearly concerns about the transparency of the operation and funding of diversionary courses, reinforced by the variations in fees between force areas and the profits earned by providers.”
It also recommended that:
“the costs for diversionary courses should be standardised nationwide unless there is a clear and convincing reason not to do so…so that the public can be confident in the transparency of these courses.”
Although clause 67 allows the Secretary of State to specify in regulations the level of fees, use of fee income and how fees are to be calculated, can the Minister tell us whether a standardised cost may be considered in secondary regulations?
As I said, the clause permits charges to be laid in excess of the cost of the approved course, but will also permit a contribution towards the cost of promoting road safety, including road safety partnerships and speed cameras. In principle, that seems to be a good approach; if one falls foul of driving legislation, a contribution to the costs of keeping our streets safe locally seems to be a proportionate response.
The current course fee is approximately £100, but that can vary according to local course arrangements. The types of course offered and course costs can be found on the national driver offender retraining scheme, which is available online at www.ukroed.org.uk. The type of course offered and the costs can vary by police force and supplier, but we want to ensure that there is greater transparency in the way that fees are set, enabling the setting of maximum amounts that can be charged to provide, run and administer such courses. There is no immediate intention to introduce standard fees unless it is considered appropriate after consultation with relevant stakeholders.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 68
Charges for removal, storage and disposal of vehicles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The police have the power to remove vehicles that are illegally, dangerously or obstructively parked, broken down or abandoned, including after theft or a road traffic collision. The cost of the recovery, storage and disposal of such vehicles should not fall to the police or the taxpayer.
Clause 68 will clarify the legal basis for the police’s charging for vehicle recovery under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. That will ensure that the police can continue to recover the cost of removing, storing and disposing of vehicles, including those causing an obstruction or danger—for example, vehicles damaged in a road traffic collision. The clause will also ensure that all appropriate authorities covered under the 1984 Act can continue to recover such costs, which includes the Secretary of State and Highways England.
Clause 68 is described in the explanatory notes as being intended
“to return to a statutory footing”
the legal basis for charging for removing or impounding vehicles. However, in an article in the Daily Mail, it has been described as fixing an “incredible legal gaffe”.
The powers to charge for vehicle removal, storage and disposal were actually introduced in 1984, but the explanatory notes explain that
“the police’s power to charge for the removal, storage and disposal of vehicles within the meaning of ‘civil enforcement areas for parking contraventions’”
seems to have been inadvertently removed due to a drafting error. At the same time, the power of local authorities, the Secretary of State and strategic highways companies to charge for the removal, storage and disposal of vehicles were also inadvertently removed.
I want to ask the Minister about the implications of the error, and what changes or problems the passing of clause 68 might bring. Will the many drivers who for the past 30 years have been charged when the legal basis for that charge did not actually exist be able to take legal action? Will the Government review what has happened?
Howard Cox, of the motoring pressure group FairFuelUK, has said:
“Drivers who in the last 30 years have been charged illegally should demand their vehicle confiscation costs be repaid in full. They should be checking that they have the historic paperwork to mount a legal challenge. This is not a question of their offences being right or wrong—it is down to the government’s incompetence that is off the scale. The authorities and those responsible must pay for this idiocy.”
Jeanette Miller, of the Association of Motor Offence Lawyers, told the Daily Mail that it was
“a major error in the legislation that has resulted in goodness knows how many millions being charged to motorists without any lawful basis”.
She added:
“Where this leaves motorists in terms of seeking refunds is difficult to say. There is a limitation period of six years in pursuing civil claims, but this can start from the date of the breach or, crucially, the date of knowledge.”
The fees for storage and release of vehicles can be hundreds of pounds. The police and other bodies can charge £150 to tow a vehicle, and car-owners can also be charged up to £20 a day for storage of a car and up to £75 to dispose of it. The Government’s impact assessment says:
“There are no impacts associated with this measure. The new provision returns to a statutory footing the position as it applied before the inadvertent removal of these powers due to a drafting error. There will be no additional impact beyond that.”
It is hard to believe that there will be no impact if potentially millions of people have been charged for the storage and release of vehicles when there was no legal basis for that charge.
There is not simple data collection on the number of impounded vehicles, so could the Minister provide us with some figures for how many people she estimates have been affected by this error since 1991?
I also ask the Minister what this will mean for our cash-strapped police forces, local authorities and highways agencies. They could face huge bills if they are forced to compensate drivers for their legal costs, so this error could have serious, wide-ranging consequences. I hope the Minister can reassure the Committee that the Government will be taking swift action to come up with a solution, so that this mistake does not become a national scandal.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for setting out the history of the regulation and its drafting. The police have other powers to charge for the removal of vehicles used in a manner that is causing alarm, distress or annoyance, or being driven without a driving licence or insurance. The only power affected was the power to charge for the removal of vehicles that were abandoned or broken down.
This provision clarifies the statutory basis of the ability of the police, Secretary of State or strategic highways companies to charge for vehicle recovery. Local authorities were not affected, as the amendment to the 1984 Act focused on the powers of local authorities and inadvertently removed other powers to charge. We believe it has been right for the police to continue to charge for vehicle recovery: that has avoided costs being borne by the taxpayer, and has allowed the police to continue removing abandoned vehicles to keep roads safe for other drivers and pedestrians. If the police were unable to deal with vehicle removal, significant inconvenience would be caused to the travelling public and commerce by the obstruction of highways by vehicles.
The hon. Gentleman stated some of the fees that can be charged. It is important to explain the thinking behind those: police contracts require operators to deal with a range of different vehicles, provide a guaranteed speedy response, and to have specialist equipment and secure storage facilities. Vehicles are often accident-damaged, do not free-wheel and are difficult to access—or they may require forensic examination, and must therefore be removed and stored with the highest standards of professionalism. I believe that is all I can do to assist the hon. Gentleman with his queries.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 68 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 69
Production of licence to the court
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 70 to 73 stand part.
That schedule 8 be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 74 stand part.
That schedule 9 be the Ninth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 75 stand part.
Clauses 69 to 74 and schedules 8 and 9 update the law in relation to the production and surrender of driving licences, so as to streamline the processes for the electronic endorsement of driving licences by removing the need for the physical licence to be produced. They also strengthen the rules for the surrender of driving licences where a driver faces disqualification.
The current legal requirement to produce and surrender the driving licence as part of the endorsement process is now outdated. In 2015, the paper driving licence counterpart, which previously recorded the endorsement, was abolished, and the information is now only recorded on Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency electronic drivers’ records. There is therefore no need for a physical driving licence to be produced and surrendered for an endorsement to be recorded on an individual’s driving record. The only need for a licence to be produced and surrendered is when the driver may be sentenced to disqualification or is actually disqualified. The clauses and schedules bring the law up to date, removing any need for individuals to deliver or post their licence before a hearing, and leaving only a duty to take their licence to court if there is a hearing and if they attend.
Clause 70 provides the Secretary of State—in practice, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency—with the power to require the surrender of a driving licence to the agency where a court has ordered disqualification. Failure to do so would be a summary offence, carrying a maximum penalty of a level 3 fine—currently £1,000. Where an individual is disqualified, the court will notify the DVLA and forward the licence to it when it has been surrendered at court. When it has not been surrendered at court, the DVLA will follow up production of the licence with the disqualified driver using the new power.
The clauses also remove the need for the production and surrender of the driving licence and allow police constables and vehicle examiners to issue a fixed penalty notice without checking and retaining a physical driving licence.
Clause 75 is included at the request of the Scottish Government. Its objective is to make better use of police and judicial resources in Scotland. Currently, the police throughout Great Britain have the power to issue a conditional offer of a fixed penalty notice under sections 75 to 77A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The scheme was introduced in 1989 as an alternative to prosecution for certain low-level road traffic offences. Once a conditional offer of a fixed penalty is issued, an individual has 28 days to accept the offer and make payment. In Scotland, if the offer is not accepted or the recipient fails to take any action, the police will submit a standard prosecution report to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service for consideration of whether a prosecution should take place.
Clause 75 grants the power to issue fixed penalty notices on the spot in Scotland for minor road traffic offences. That power is already available in England and Wales. In contrast to the position with conditional offers of fixed penalty notices, when the recipient of a fixed penalty notice fails to respond it simply becomes a registered fine at one and a half times the original penalty. That approach is attractive to the Scottish Government as a means of reducing the burden on the police, prosecutors and courts while preserving the recipient’s right to challenge a fixed penalty notice, should they wish to do so.
The clause will apply in the first instance to the police, but the Scottish Government want to be able to consider its potential extension to traffic wardens and vehicle examiners at their own pace and following further consideration.
I commend the clauses and schedules to the Committee.
The Opposition also support the remaining clauses in part 5. They are sensible, helpful and well evidenced, and we are glad to offer our support for them. Currently, when a fixed penalty notice has been issued, a driver must surrender their licence to the relevant authority, but since the paper counterpart licence was abolished in 2015, there is no need for a driving licence to be produced for an endorsement to be recorded against a driver’s driving record.
Clauses 69 to 74 will finally remove the redundant requirement for a physical driving licence to be produced when a fixed penalty notice has been issued and they will also strengthen the rules for the surrender of driving licences when a driver faces disqualification.
Clause 69 will amend section 27(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 to provide that courts are no longer required to oblige licence production. Instead, the courts will be provided with powers that they may exercise at their discretion. This power will apply both where the court proposes to disqualify and where it disqualifies a licence.
Clauses 70 and 71 make further amendments to the 1988 Act, the effect of which, when taken together with clause 69, is to remove the need to produce a driving licence from the fixed penalty process. This streamlining is welcome and hopefully will in some small way reduce the administrative burden on our under-resourced and overstretched courts system, as it will no longer need to handle the physical licence where a driver faces endorsement, but not disqualification.
In recent years, attempts have been made to update the law in this area through private Members’ Bills, which have had Government support. The attempt made by the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Michael Tomlinson) fell after its Committee stage because of the 2017 general election. The attempt made in the 2017-to-2019 Session by the right hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Mr Jack) did not even manage to progress past its First Reading. I am glad that the Government are at last introducing the measure in a Government Bill in Government time.
We are also content with clause 75, which extends the police power that the police in England and Wales currently have to issue on-the-spot fines for certain moving traffic offences to police in Scotland. I am aware of the Department for Transport’s joint consultation with the Scottish Government on this topic from 2018. Doesn’t it take a long time for things to happen in law? The majority of the responses to the consultation supported the proposed changes and seemed to indicate the need for fixed penalty notice reform in Scotland for suspected road traffic offences, which the Government are sensibly introducing here.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Do any other Members wish to speak before the Minister rises to his feet? I do not see you all jumping up and down, so I call the Minister.
It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles, and it is a pleasure, as always, to respond to the shadow Minister. Let me start by saying how glad I am to hear that he and the Opposition generally welcome the principles that lie behind the changes in these clauses. We intend to reduce the number of cautions from the current six to the two contemplated in the Bill, following, as he rightly said, the initial pilot with three police forces, which has now expanded to 14 or 15 police forces. The feedback that we received from those police forces is that they find the simpler structure of cautions much easier to follow and much more helpful. Broadly speaking, it sounds as though we are all on the same page—both sides of the House, and the police as well. I am glad that we are starting from a very similar place.
The shadow Minister asked a number of questions about the involvement of victims in the administration of cautions. Of course, victims should be at the heart of the criminal justice system—we all believe very strongly in that. On victims, I draw the Committee’s attention to paragraph 6.7 of the victims’ code, which says:
“Where the police or the Crown Prosecution Service are considering an out of court disposal you”—
the victim—
“have the Right to be asked for your views and to have these views taken into account when a decision is made.”
The police and CPS must make reasonable efforts to obtain the views of victims, and they must communicate with victims on the topic. As the shadow Minister rightly said, it is clear that victims need to be part of this endeavour, and paragraph 6.7 of the victims’ code ensures that.
The shadow Minister asked a second series of questions about the fact that both levels of caution—the diversionary caution and the community caution—have a requirement for conditions to be attached. He expressed some concern that that might impose additional bureaucracy on police forces. He also asked about the cost of the whole scheme more generally and mentioned the estimate that the whole of the criminal justice system cost might be in the order of £15 million a year.
On the conditions, it is important that the cautions have some effect. It is important that where someone has committed an offence and admitted guilt—I will come to the point about admission of guilt in a moment—there should be some sort of follow-up action to ensure remedial activity and that an appropriate step is taken. If we simply let someone go with no follow-up step, it undermines and diminishes the seriousness of the fact that they have committed an offence and admitted to it. It perhaps misses an opportunity to take a step that will reduce reoffending in future. In general, taking steps to stop people reoffending is a good thing. There are some opportunities that we are very keen to embrace via these conditions and sentences passed by the court. For example, if someone has a drug addiction, an alcohol addiction or a mental health problem, we want that to get treated. These cautions are an opportunity to impose a condition—seeking treatment, for example. Of course, in a court setting, there are community sentence treatment requirements, alternative dispute resolutions, mental health treatment requirements and so on. These cautions have an important role to play in ensuring that the underlying causes of offending get addressed.
I will just finish the point, and then I will take the intervention in a moment.
There are opportunities to take a more calibrated approach if police officers or the Crown Prosecution Service think it is appropriate. First, in the code of practice that we will be tabling to accompany these new diversionary and community cautions, there will be significant latitude and quite a lot of flexibility for police officers and the CPS to set appropriate conditions. They could be quite low level. For a low-level offender, where it is not appropriate to impose an onerous condition, or where the police feel it would impose an unreasonable burden on police officers themselves, a much lower, light-touch condition could be applied. That would address the concern that the shadow Minister raised.
There is also the option of a community resolution, which the NPCC says it will retain. There will be the two cautions set out in statute, and there will be the community resolution option too. Although the community resolution comes with conditions, there is not an obligation for them to be followed up, so the administrative burden would not apply.
On the cost point, of course we should be aware that the police are generally receiving a great deal of extra funding as part of the recent police settlements in order to support the police uplift programme—the extra 23,000 police officers. It would be a good use of a bit of that time if it were spent on following up the conditions that have been imposed to try to prevent reoffending. We all agree that reoffending is too high; that is bad for the individual and society as a whole. That is a good use of a bit of the additional police resources.
Perhaps I should give way to the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate first, and then I will give way to the shadow Minister.
I am grateful to the Minister. On the issue of addressing the root of the offending in the first place, I am chair of the all-party parliamentary group on attention deficit hyperactive disorder, and people with ADHD are disproportionally represented in the prison population. That is partly because of screening—they are not screened early enough and are sometimes not aware that they have ADHD. Has the Minister given any thought to whether some of the conditions could involve screening for people with ADHD if that is one of the roots of the offending?
That is an extremely good point. That is the sort of issue that we should take up in the code of practice that accompanies the statutory framework. That is exactly the kind of thing that should be picked up. Where someone has a need for treatment of some kind, whether for drugs, mental health—ADHD in that example—or alcohol addiction, we need to try to get the underlying cause of the offending sorted out. That is something that we can and should pick up in the accompanying code of practice, and I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising it.
The Minister is talking a lot of good sense, and I take issue with very little of what he has to say. I am keen to understand whether he is content that we are seeing lower numbers of out-of-court disposals. He talks about reoffending, which we all want to see reduced, but there is no evidence that this measure will contribute to that. Would he suggest otherwise?
Clearly recent data, over the past 15 months or so, has been significantly distorted because of the effect of the pandemic on the criminal justice system, policing and everything else, so we need to be careful about post-dating data from February or March 2020.
The reoffending point links to the comments of the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate. We need to ensure that, in the code of practice, we are guiding police forces and the CPS to the follow-up activities and conditions that are most likely to deliver a reduction in reoffending. The shadow Minister is right that, although the police preferred the new system that we are introducing, there was not evidence of a reduction of reoffending in the pilots areas. We have an opportunity via the code of practice to ensure that the conditions are proposed and designed, like the one that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate just proposed, with the purpose of reducing reoffending. This is an opportunity that we should seize, along the lines just suggested.
Does the Minister agree that the regulatory framework of diversionary and community cautions will prevent many young people from entering the formal criminal justice system—including having their fingerprints and photographs taken—which could affect their life chances and employment chances in later years for a mistake that they made at a very young age; that these measures will be welcomed by the parents who see their children perhaps having a second opportunity to live a crime-free life; and that this will allow rehabilitation within the family and the community?
I do agree. Of course, I know that the hon. Gentleman had a long and distinguished career with, I think, the Metropolitan police.
Therefore the hon. Gentleman’s comments are based on that long experience of public service in the police force. It is clearly better if we can get people to stop their offending by way of early intervention such as this, rather than having them end up in a young offenders institution or somewhere similar, which often leads to a pretty bad outcome. We should take this opportunity to stop that pattern of behaviour developing and worsening. That is why these conditions are important —to ensure that that prevention and rehabilitation take place. I fear that otherwise we are missing an opportunity —an opportunity that the shadow Minister is poised to grasp.
I am really interested in what the Minister said about working with ethnic minority and BME communities. We have seen a tremendous cut in services over the last 10 or 11 years, so does he see the potential of legislation such as this to increase even further the need for the Government to think again and invest more in organisations that can help people to understand what the Government are about and how young men in particular—it is young black men who tend to be affected most—can avoid the criminal justice system and move on with their lives?
Exactly—avoid the criminal justice system by desisting from criminal behaviour.
Obviously, a lot of initiatives are under way, particularly via the funding for serious violence reduction units, which has increased a great deal in the last couple of years. The work of serious violence reduction units with those communities, talking about issues exactly like this, is the right way to do that. I will make sure that my colleague the Minister for Policing is appraised of our discussions this morning—this afternoon, now—so that he can ensure that that is reflected as he works with SVRUs and the police on issues such as this.
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I am sure that he will excuse me for being parochial about this. In Cleveland, we have the third-highest rate of serious violent crime in the country, but the Cleveland Police force has been passed over in the past when it has come to funding for the initiatives he is talking about. Will he remind the Policing Minister of the particular issues that we face in Cleveland, and perhaps secure us some more funding?
It sounds like I have been engaged to act as a lobbyist on behalf of Cleveland, but I will pass that on, and while I am at it, I will mention the needs of Croydon, my own borough.
And Lincolnshire!
I will not forget the fine county of Lincolnshire, represented by the Minister for Safeguarding.
Well, I am afraid that in the case of Croydon, there is quite a lot of crime. I will add Cleveland to my communication.
I turn to the large group of amendments starting with amendment 11, which the shadow Minister moved. He proposes replacing the word “diversionary” with the word “conditional”. I understand entirely what he is trying to do with that amendment, but unfortunately there are technical and legal reasons why that does not work. Essentially, the reason—as he touched on when moving the amendment—is that the concept of a conditional caution already exists in the current form of statutory out-of-court disposals for adults, which were enshrined in part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
We cannot change the name because there would be transitional provisions when the old cautions may still apply, and that may lead to confusion about which type of caution is being referred to, whether that be the old conditional caution, which may still apply in some cases—depending on the time of the offence—or the new conditional caution, which would be called a “conditional caution” if we adopted the amendment. It would lead to confusion about which caution was in force. As the new diversionary caution is different from the old conditional caution, we think that, both for legal reasons and for reasons of general confusion and clarity, the use of a different word—“diversionary”, in this case—is the right thing to do.
Amendments 46 and 48 are in the shadow Minister’s name but I do not think that he moved them. Should I defer replying to them?
In that case, I will not speak to those now—I will hold back for a subsequent opportunity—and I trust that I have answered the shadow Minister’s excellent questions.
I appreciate the Minister’s response. As far as the amendment is concerned, I accept that we are perhaps all looking at different levels of confusion within the system. It is just a shame that we have to have any confusion at all. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I repeat to the Minster what I said before: we need to address disproportionality across the whole justice system. There is no doubt that these particular measures will add to that, and it is important that the Government take measures to ensure that young people—and even older people—coming into the system have a full understanding of what they are getting into as a result of the Government’s proposed changes to the law. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Smiling as always, Sir Charles. I thank the shadow Minister for his speech. I made a number of the points that I would make in response in my comments a few minutes ago, so I do not want to re-elaborate on them at too much length, lest I wear thin the patience of colleagues. I will just reiterate briefly the two or three key points in response to the shadow Minister.
First, the Government think that having some level of conditions is an inherently good thing because it means there is a mechanism by which follow-up can take place, and it provides an opportunity for rehabilitation. Secondly, in the code of practice, which we have discussed already, there will be considerable latitude over how the conditions are calibrated. It could therefore be possible to have quite light-touch conditions. What we will take away is that, in the code of practice that gets drafted, and subsequently tabled and approved by Parliament, there is a wide range of conditions, including some at the lower end that are not unduly onerous on the police to monitor and follow up. Thirdly, the community resolution is still an option available to the police, and although it has conditions, it does not require follow-up.
A combination of those three considerations makes the approach being taken the right one. The key point is that the code of practice is very important. We will no doubt debate it when it gets tabled and voted on in a Delegated Legislation Committee. I hear the shadow Minister’s point, and the code of practice will reflect that.
On the final point, about disproportionality, which the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate raised, we will certainly be mindful of disproportionality considerations. As the hon. Member for—help me out—
There we go. Mr Dorans, are you happy with that description of your constituency?
As the hon. Gentleman said in his intervention, this is an opportunity to divert people from a path towards more serious crime and into a regular life. That is important for everyone, including some of these communities, which get themselves into more trouble than we would like. That point is well made.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 76, page 71, line 21, at end insert—
“(8) The Secretary of State must, within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, and every 12 months thereafter, lay before Parliament a report on the use of cautions in accordance with this Part.”
I will not keep the Committee long on this simple amendment, which would compel the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the use of cautions, as established under this clause. As I said earlier, in 2019 only about 192,000 out-of-court disposals were issued in England and Wales, which is the lowest number in a year since 1984. I bear in mind what the Minister said but, of course, those figures refer to 2019, not the time covered by the pandemic.
The use of out-of-court disposals has been in decline since 2008, after it peaked at 670,000 disposals in 2007. Their use has fallen nearly three quarters since then. In 2008, community resolutions were introduced, and they remain the only type of out-of-court disposal that has been used at a similar rate in each of the past five years. That has happened while recorded crime has increased by more than 1 million offences, from about 4.3 million in 2010 to about 6 million last year. I mentioned earlier that we have concerns that the new restrictions on using out-of-court disposals for certain offences are likely to have some impact on out-of-court disposal volumes, driving down their use further. I again ask the Minister to clarify whether he thinks there will be more or fewer out-of-court disposals in the future.
It is all the more important that we monitor the new system to ensure that the use of out-of-court disposals does not continue to decline significantly. Although I appreciate that there has been a pilot and evaluation done of a two-tier framework, this is the one that is already in use. There has not been such an assessment of this new proposed two-tier framework. I have already mentioned the reservations that we have about attaching conditions to all cautions and the potential impact that that will have on disproportionality. Again, these changes need to be monitored to ensure that they do not have unwanted, perverse consequences. We are all keen to see the use of effective out-of-court disposals increase, not decrease. They can allow police to deal quickly and proportionately with low-level, often first-time offending and help to keep people out of the formal criminal justice system, which in many cases is preferable for their communities and for the Government in the long run.
An annual report to Parliament would allow for the necessary scrutiny of the new system and help to stem the decline in the use of out-of-court disposals. I hope that the Minister agrees that that would be a useful exercise. It will be good to hear more generally from him about Government plans to monitor and scrutinise the new system.
On the review of how out-of-court disposals are used and are going, they are, as the shadow Minister said, already recorded by all forces in England and Wales and reported to the Home Office and the MOJ for statistical purposes. The figures appear in criminal justice statistics, published quarterly, which include performance data tables for each individual police force, as well as trends in use—figures from which the shadow Minister was likely quoting a few minutes ago.
There is therefore already complete transparency on the numbers, which enable Parliament, the Opposition and the Departments—the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office—to look at them, take action, call parliamentary debates and so on. Those figures are all in the public domain.
In addition to that, however, all police forces are already required to have an out-of-court disposal scrutiny panel, led by an independent chairperson. Those panels are extremely important in holding the police to account and ensuring that disposals are being used appropriately, to provide assurances that difficult decisions are being made properly and to provide effective feedback to police officers and their forces.
Already, therefore, we have two levels of scrutiny: the data being reported, aggregated by police force and reported nationally to the Home Office and the MOJ, so we can debate it in Parliament; and, for each individual force area, a scrutiny panel. In addition, a standard review of legislation takes place after a Bill receives Royal Assent. I suggest to the Committee that those three mechanisms between them are sufficient.
The shadow Minister, however, is right to point to the figures. We in Parliament should be vigilant about them. If we, the Opposition or any Member of Parliament are concerned about how those quarterly figures look, there are a lot of ways to express those concerns in Parliament—by way of a Westminster Hall debate, an Opposition day debate or any of the usual mechanisms. I suggest that the existing mechanisms are adequate. I invite everyone in Government and in Parliament to use them.
On this occasion, we are in a different place. I appreciate what the Minister said about the various methods through which information is available and about the opportunities to debate the issues, but I cannot understand why the Government are reluctant to have a formal report on the new system. We have discussed at some length the considerable reduction in the number of cautions used over the past 10 or 15 years. That decline is continuing. There is no evidence that the new system will result in any increase in the use of the cautions. For that matter, it is important for us to hold the Government particularly to account, so I will press for a vote on the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clauses 77 to 85 essentially provide for the statutory basis on which the diversionary caution—the higher of the two new cautions—will be introduced. We have already discussed at some length the principles that underpin the diversionary caution, and clauses 77 to 85 simply provide for the details necessary to facilitate their introduction. Given that we have already had a fairly extensive discussion on the principles, I will go through the clauses relatively quickly.
Clause 77 specifies the criteria for giving a diversionary caution, as introduced in clause 76, which we have just agreed. An authorised person may give a diversionary caution to a person over 18 years of age, subject to the specified conditions being met. The clause specifies key safeguards whereby an authorised person or prosecuting agency can authorise the use of this caution. They must establish that there is sufficient evidence to charge, that the recipient admits the offence and that the recipient signs and accepts the caution, along with understanding the effect of non-compliance. Those requirements mirror the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that apply to existing conditional cautions. The requirements are important safeguards, given the consequences that can flow from the breach of a condition attached to a diversionary caution, as we have discussed.
Clause 78 establishes the types of conditions that may be attached to a diversionary caution. We will expand on that in the code of practice that we discussed. The provision is similar to the existing conditional caution. Again, as we have already discussed, it requires reasonable efforts to be made to ensure that the victim’s views are sought before the conditions are set out. We have talked about the importance of taking victims’ views into account.
Clause 79 provides for the rehabilitation and reparation conditions that may be attached to a diversionary caution. Further to the point made by the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock, we talked about the importance of rehabilitation as well as reparation. The clause specifies the sort of activities that may be undertaken.
Clause 80 introduces a financial penalty condition. Clause 81 deals particularly with conditions that might attach when the offender is a foreign national. Clause 82 introduces a method whereby an authorised person or prosecution authority may, with the offender’s consent—should that be necessary subsequently—vary the conditions attached to a diversionary caution.
Clause 83 deals with the effect of failure to comply with a condition attached to a diversionary caution. As I said earlier, criminal proceedings can be instituted against the offender for the index offence in the event of any breach. That is why a formal admission of guilt is so important.
Clause 84 grants a constable power to arrest the offender without a warrant where the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the offender has failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any condition attached to a diversionary caution. Clause 85 clarifies how the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will be applied in the event that an offender is arrested under clause 84 if a breach has occurred.
The clauses essentially implement the principles that we discussed when we considered clause 76 a few moments ago.
I am sure it is the Minister’s intention to be helpful. Does he want to respond to the shadow Minister in winding up this part of the debate?
I have already made the points that I wanted to make, but I will respond to one or two of the shadow Minister’s questions.
Indictable-only offences are by definition extremely serious. They are the most serious offences, so there would be an expectation of proper prosecution in such cases.
The shadow Minister asked what the exceptional circumstances might comprise. I cannot give him speculative examples, but the meaning of the term “exceptional circumstances” is well understood in law, and it is a very high bar. It is not a test that would be met readily or easily.
On the fact that the limit on the fine may be specified by a statutory instrument, there is a desire to retain a certain measure of flexibility. I understand the shadow Minister’s concern that the fine may end up escalating to an unreasonably high level, but as he acknowledged in his questions, it is subject to a vote in Parliament. If Parliament feels that the level of fine is inappropriately high, it is open to Parliament to simply vote it down. Then the Government would have to think again and come back to the House with a fine at a more reasonable level. On that basis, I recommend that the clauses stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 77 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 78 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Giving a community caution
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Rather like the previous group of clauses, which implemented the diversionary cautions, clauses 86 to 93 lay out the details of the proposed scheme for community cautions, implementing the principles that we have already debated pursuant to clause 76. As I did a few minutes ago, I will go through each clause quickly.
Clause 86 specifies the criteria for giving a community caution. It must be given by an authorised person to someone over the age of 18. The clause specifies the key safeguards whereby an authorised person or prosecuting authority can authorise the use of the caution: establishing sufficient evidence to charge, and an admission of guilt from the offender, who signs and accepts the caution and understands the effect of non-compliance. That mirrors precisely the provisions of clause 77, which we discussed a few minutes ago.
Clause 87 establishes the type of conditions that can be attached, specifying that they should be rehabilitative or reparative—that is very important for the reasons that we have already discussed. It requires that reasonable efforts are made to ascertain victims’ views.
Clause 88 introduces the permissible rehabilitation and reparation conditions, which must have the objective of facilitating rehabilitation in those cases. The clause provides that such conditions may be restricted in some cases and contain unpaid work conditions or attendance conditions.
Clause 89—again, mirroring the previous group—introduces the financial penalty condition. Clause 90 provides the framework for registering and enforcing financial penalties as part of this regime.
Clause 91 provides a framework for court proceedings arising from the enforcement of the financial penalty, essentially to ensure that it gets paid if someone does not pay it. Clause 92 introduces a method for an authorised person or prosecuting authority to vary the conditions, which, again, mirrors the previous group of clauses.
Clause 93 deals with the effect of community cautions where criminal proceedings may not be instituted against the offender for the offence. In particular, if the offender fails to comply with the condition under community caution without a reasonable excuse, the condition may be rescinded and a financial penalty order may be imposed instead, so the consequence of breach here is financial penalty rather than prosecution.
I hope that gives the Committee adequate oversight of the effect of clauses 86 to 93.
Although we were on relatively familiar ground with the new diversionary cautions, the community cautions, on which clauses 86 to 93 set out the detail, are very different from the lower-tier out-of-court disposals currently in use. In fact, they are much more similar to the existing conditional cautions that the diversionary cautions are already designed to replace. There are lots of cautions here—cautions and cautions and cautions.
I spoke earlier about our concerns about the necessity of attaching conditions to the community cautions, so I will not tread the same ground again, but that is an important point. We very much support the simplification of the out-of-court disposal system and the introduction of the two-tier framework, but why are the Government introducing two tiers that are so similar? We should be able to get rid of the confusion of the current system of six out-of-court disposals without so severely restricting the choices of police officers who deal with such a wide range of low-level offending for which a range of penalties may be appropriate.
I understand that the community caution is intended to replace the community resolution. There are two major differences between the two. A community caution will be formally administered by the police, like other cautions, so it will appear on an offender’s criminal record in the same way that other cautions do. There will be a clear statutory rule about the conditions that can be attached to it. That is quite a jump from the community resolution. Community resolutions are voluntary agreements between the police and an accused person. They do not appear on an offender’s criminal record, and the actions agreed to are not legally enforceable.
My colleague is right to raise the issue of disproportionality in the system. Anything that increases that is not good for us as a country and is certainly not good for the young people involved. It is important that the Government bear that in mind as they bring the measure forward. More importantly, as I said, the Government can get into a situation where they recognise that communities—ethnic minority communities, call them what we will—need to have an understanding of the changes that the Government are proposing, so that we do not find more young people, young black men in particular, with criminal records when that is not necessary.
Secondly, the community cautions will now involve financial penalties. Officers will be able to attach a fine to a community caution as a punitive condition. Failure to meet any of the conditions, including a financial penalty condition, could result in a police-issued fine. Again, that would be quite a departure from the community resolution. Offenders might be asked to pay damages to their victims as part of a resolution, but community resolutions are not used to fine individuals.
Will the Minister tell me, therefore, whether the intention is to replace the community resolution entirely with community cautions? I ask, because Transform Justice has rightly called for some clarity in this area:
“The status of community resolutions under the proposed legislation is not clear. Clause 96 ‘Abolition of other cautions and out-of-court disposals’ states that ‘No caution other than a diversionary or community caution may be given to a person aged 18 or over who admits to having committed an offence’. We are unsure what this means for community resolutions, although we understand the intention is that they will remain available to police if they wish to use them.
Given the value of community resolutions, as an out of court disposal that does not require a formal admission of guilt, the legislation and accompanying regulation should make clear in Clause 96 that use of community resolutions will not be prohibited under the new framework.”
I have already discussed our concerns about the need for a formal admission of guilt for the community caution and the potential that has to deepen disproportionality in our criminal justice system. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate just raised that issue. We all know that there are benefits to having a light-touch disposal to deal with low-level offending in some cases where appropriate. Keeping people out of the formal justice system at this level can help keep them out of it for good and so I wonder whether the Minister thinks that we might be losing a helpful method of disposal here. Finally, how does he anticipate that the low-level offences that benefited from community resolutions before will now be handled?
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and his questions. For clarity, in answer to his principal question, the community resolution will still be available to use. It will not be removed by the Bill. As he said, community resolutions have conditions attached to them, but they do not require the admission of guilt— they simply require someone to take responsibility—and, should the conditions not be adhered to, there is in essence no consequence to follow that.
That low-level entry provision will therefore still exist and be available to police officers to use. Because that will still exist, it is appropriate to pitch the community cautions—the ones we are debating—somewhere in between the community resolution, which will remain, and the diversionary caution that we just debated. That is why it is pitched where it is.
There are three principal differences between the diversionary caution and the community caution. The first is on disclosure. We will talk about this when we consider an amendment later, but the community caution is not disclosable in a criminal record check and so on from the moment that the condition ceases, whereas for the diversionary caution a spending period goes beyond that.
The second difference is that, as the shadow Minister said, the consequence of breaching the community caution is the imposition of a fine, whereas for the diversionary caution it can lead to substantive prosecution. Thirdly, the range of offences is somewhat different.
I hope that reassures the shadow Minister that the community resolution will remain—it is not being abolished—and therefore we have a sensible hierarchy of provisions available for the police to choose from. I hope that provides him with the reassurance that he was asking for.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 87 to 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94
Code of practice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clauses in this group apply to both types of caution and provide an overarching framework in which the new cautions will sit. Each clause has a particular function, and I will address them in turn.
Clause 94 introduces a general code of practice and requires the Secretary of State to prepare it—we have talked about that already. It specifies the kind of matters that such a code will include, such as the circumstances within the clauses, the procedure, the conditions that may be imposed and the period of time. We talked about that earlier. It is very important that we get that right for the rehabilitative purposes that we have discussed and to cover issues such as the one that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate mentioned. That includes who may give the cautions, the manner in which they may be given, the places where they will be given, how the financial penalty should be paid, how we monitor compliance, the circumstances in which a power of arrest may arise, and so on. I should add that the code cannot be published or amended without the prior consent of the Attorney General. We need this clause to ensure the code can exist.
Clause 95 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations placing restrictions on the multiple use of diversionary and community cautions. They should have reference to the number of times a particular individual has received cautions previously. The regulations made under this clause will be laid in draft form before Parliament for scrutiny and will be subject to an approval resolution of both Houses. That provides a key safeguard and ensures that the out-of-court disposal framework is being used as intended and is not being used inappropriately—for example, where there is repeat offending that should be handled through more serious means, such as prosecution.
Clause 96 abolishes the previous caution regime, as the shadow Minister said, but does not abolish community resolutions. That obviously follows the widespread consultation that we had previously and lays the groundwork for the new system that we debated in the previous two groups.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 94 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 95 and 96 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 97
Consequential amendments relating to Part 6
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 97 introduces schedule 10, which makes various consequential amendments to existing legislation to ensure the proper operation of the new two-tier system, which we have just discussed, and the removal of the existing out-of-court disposals. Clause 97 and schedule 10 make those technical changes.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10
Cautions: consequential amendments
I beg to move amendment 117, page 228, line 15, in schedule 10, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) and insert—
‘(2) In paragraph 1(1)—
(a) for “—“ substitute “at the time the caution is given.”, and
(b) omit sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).”
This amendment would remove the spending period for cautions.
We have discussed a number of important matters over the course of the morning, all of which impact on the lives of young people and older people. They have all been extremely important issues, but for me this amendment is particularly important, because it would make life a lot easier for a lot of people, and probably contribute more than some of the other things that we have discussed to keeping them out of the criminal justice system.
Amendment 117 would remove the spending period for cautions. It would revise the text of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to the following:
“For the purposes of this Schedule a caution shall be regarded as a spent caution at the time the caution is given.”
Currently the upper-tier disposal of a conditional caution has a spending period that is the earlier of three months or the completion of the caution, and the Bill will maintain that spending period for the diversionary caution. We believe that the spending period associated with diversionary cautions should be removed so that those who receive one are not forced to disclose this record to potential employers. The effect of the spending period attached to cautions is to increase the barriers to employment for those who are diverted from court.
Given the Government’s commitment to reform of rehabilitation periods elsewhere in the Bill—at part 11—we believe that this is a good opportunity to continue the direction of travel that the Government are on, make another positive change in this area and remove the rehabilitation period for cautions as well. The Government may believe that a three-month spending period is required for a diversionary caution in order to support public protection. However, there is strong evidence, of which I am sure the Minister is aware, that employment is one of the most important factors, if not the most important, in enabling people to cease offending. Research has also found that employers discriminate against people with criminal records and that many do not differentiate between a caution and a conviction.
A three-month rehabilitation period is short enough to have little impact on public protection, but its existence requires people in employment to declare the caution and so risk losing their job. It acts as a barrier to those seeking work, education, insurance and volunteering opportunities. It is also important to remember that criminal record disclosure in itself is not really a public protection measure: the general public cannot check a person’s record or require them to disclose it. In any event, under present guidance, if the police or CPS believe that someone is a legitimate risk to others, they would never meet the public interest test for caution instead of charge.
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I trust that everyone has returned from lunch re-energised and refreshed. I want to respond to one or two of the points made prior to lunch by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North. In moving the amendment, he argued that the diversionary caution should not have a rehabilitation period of three months from the date of the caution being given or, if earlier, the date on which the caution ceases to have effect because the conditions have been met.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but none the less I respectfully disagree with him, for the following reasons. First, the offences for which a diversionary caution might be given include offences of a certain degree of gravity. They are offences where there was sufficient evidence available to prosecute, and had that prosecution proceeded, a far more serious penalty, including a longer spending period, would have been applicable. There is a balance to strike between a desire to let the offender move on with their lives and public protection, and the relatively short spending period—only three months, which is not very long—aims to strike that balance.
Secondly, it is important that we distinguish between the diversionary caution and the community caution. One of the ways in which we do so is the fact that the diversionary caution has a three-month spending period until rehabilitation, whereas the community caution does not. Were we to remove that, it would diminish the difference between those two forms of caution. That sort of hierarchy, as I put it before lunch, is important, and we should seek to preserve it, reflecting the fact that diversionary cautions are more serious that community cautions.
There is also a third reason, which occurred to me during the shadow Minister’s speech. Given that the caution can be extinguished, in terms of the need to disclose it, the offender has an incentive to meet the conditions early within the three months. The conditions might include the need to attend a particular training course or to commence a treatment programme if they have a drug or alcohol problem. Saying that the offender has been rehabilitated at the point at which they meet the condition creates an incentive for them to meet it sooner rather than later. We should bear that in mind. Although I understand where the shadow Minister is coming from, for all those reasons I urge the Opposition to withdraw the amendment.
I am a little saddened and disappointed that, for all he has said, the Minister does not recognise the real impact that disclosure can have on people, perhaps preventing them from getting a job or even resulting in them losing their job. That is a great sadness. He says that three months is not a very long time, but a person has to report a caution to their employer on the day they receive it, and it could result in their dismissal. Similarly, anyone applying for a job would have to disclose it to the employer, which may well result in them losing that employment opportunity and the chance to turn their life around. Moreover, if an officer is content that a caution is appropriate, why on earth is the additional punishment of a disclosure period being sought? I intend to press the amendment to a Division, simply because I think it is in people’s best interests and represents for the individual given a caution the best chance to change for the better.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
These clauses essentially assist with the implementation of the measures we have debated. Clause 98 sets out that regulations under part 6 are to be made by statutory instrument and the parliamentary procedure applicable. It also provides that regulations may make different provisions for purposes and consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional and transitory provisions and savings. It would not be possible, or indeed appropriate, for all the detail to be set out in the Bill; there is simply too much, and doing so would entail a certain lack of flexibility, as we often discuss. The clause provides the appropriate parliamentary procedure to fill in those details as appropriate, which we will of course debate as they arise. However, the key principles are clearly set out in the Bill, as we have debated.
Clause 99 sets out certain definitions that are relevant for part 6 of the Bill—the out-of-court disposal provisions. The clause is essential to provide clarity in making sure that the new framework, which we spent this morning debating, is properly, accurately and precisely interpreted.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 100
Minimum sentences for particular offences
Clause 100 amends the criteria applied for when a court may depart from imposing a minimum sentence. Minimum sentences are rare in this jurisdiction, and generally speaking, but not always, they apply to repeat offences. These minimum sentences are not, technically or legally speaking, mandatory or completely binding on the court, but it is mandatory that the court must consider passing that minimum sentence. The court may depart from imposing that minimum sentence only by having regard to the particular circumstances of the offender and the nature of the case, so an element of judicial discretion is retained.
However, given that Parliament has legislated to set out these minimum sentences, we think it right that the court should depart from the minimum sentences specified by Parliament not by having regard to the particular circumstances of the case but only in exceptional circumstances. In effect, the clause raises the bar for when a judge can depart from these minimum sentences; it tells the judge that circumstances must be exceptional before the minimum sentence is disregarded, to make sure that Parliament’s will in this area is better reflected by the sentences the court hands down.
Clause 100 will cover four offences: threatening a person with a weapon or bladed article, which carries a minimum sentence of four years; a third offence in relation to trafficking a class A drug, which carries a minimum sentence of seven years; a third domestic burglary offence, which carries a minimum sentence of three years; and a repeat offence—a second or higher offence—involving a weapon or bladed article. The clause strengthens the minimum sentences in those cases and makes it harder for the judge to depart from the minimum, or reduces the range of circumstances in which such a departure might occur. Three of the four offences are repeat offences; the fourth is a first-time offence. They are fairly clearly defined offences for drug trafficking or domestic burglary, where Parliament clearly decided in the past that there was less necessity for judicial discretion.
Schedule 11 makes consequential amendments to existing legislation as a result of clause 11, to give effect to what we have just discussed. The amendments are to section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and to the Armed Forces Act 2006.
These offences are serious. In the past, Parliament has taken a view that a minimum sentence is appropriate, particularly for repeat offences. It is therefore appropriate that we today make sure that the courts follow Parliament’s view as often as possible.
I asked for figures on how often judges depart from the minimum sentences. For the burglary offence, the data is a couple of years old, but it looks like the court departed from the minimum sentence in that year in about 37% of cases, so in quite a wide range of cases. It is on that basis—to tighten up the strength of minimum sentences—that we are introducing clause 100 and schedule 11 today.
As the Minister said, clause 100 would change the law so that for certain offences a court is required to impose a custodial sentence of at least the statutory minimum term unless there are “exceptional” reasons not to. This is a change from allowing the court to impose a custodial sentence of at least the minimum unless there are “particular” reasons not to.
The offences and their statutory minimums are: a third-strike importation of class A drugs, with a seven-year minimum sentence; a third-strike domestic burglary, with a three-year minimum sentence; a second-strike possession of a knife or offensive weapon, with a six-month minimum; and threatening a person with a blade or offensive weapon in public, with a six-month minimum.
As the Minister has pointed out, the effect of clause 100 is relatively simple, although the Opposition are concerned that it will also be profound. The law currently allows for minimum custodial sentences to be handed down to those who repeatedly offend. As things stand, judges can depart from the minimum sentences when they are of the opinion that there are particular circumstances that would make it unjust not to do so.
Despite what the Minister says about judicial discretion, the proposition put forward by the Government seems to be that the Government are concerned that the judiciary has been too lenient when imposing minimum sentences, and therefore the law needs to be strengthened in this area. The Government’s solution is to change the law so that for certain repeat offences, a court is required to impose a minimum term unless there are exceptional circumstances not to. In a nutshell, clause 100 seeks to make it harder for judges to exercise their discretion and moves away from the statutory minimum sentence for a small number of offences.
I certainly agree with the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby, and I have given his constituency its full title—how on earth could I ever forget Whitby, when it is one of my favourite destinations for a day out? I am sure he will understand why that is the case. For me, this issue is about how we tackle the guys with the briefcases and not just the young men on the streets? How do we make sure that we deal with organised crime? We have seen some great results recently in my own constituency and across the Cleveland police area, where there have been raids on individual houses and the police found large amounts of drugs. However, those drugs are finding their way in through Teesport and through the Tyneside ports as well. We are failing to get to the people who are driving the entire trade and we need to do much, much more to do so.
With the National Crime Agency currently prioritising cyber-crime, child sexual exploitation and terrorism, and the Serious Violence Taskforce having been disbanded recently, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how anything in clause 100 will tackle serious organised criminality.
To conclude, the Opposition have deep concerns about the introduction of the power in clause 100. We worry that it has been introduced without an evidential basis, without consultation with impacted groups, and without a full equalities impact assessment. Even more importantly, we worry that it will further entrench the already shameful levels of racial disparity in our criminal justice system while failing to tackle the underlying causes of the crimes that we have been discussing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, which I hope will address the issues that I have raised.
Let me respond to some of the questions and points that the shadow Minister raised in his speech. First, I should be clear that in forming the proposals the Government have considered carefully, in accordance with the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, the impact that these changes in the law might have on people with protected characteristics, including race. The full equality impact assessment was published alongside the draft legislation, and I can confirm that it is publicly available should anybody want to scrutinise it.
Does the Minister accept that despite the Government’s intentions, good as they may be, to reduce disparity, the reality is that it is not reducing and has not reduced since the report was published? Does he therefore accept that the Government need to do more?
I have not seen the up-to-date data for the past year, but I accept that we need to pay continuous attention to these issues. We need to make sure that the justice system always behaves in a fair and even-handed manner. Clearly, we accept that we need to be eternally vigilant on that front.
To return to the topic of this clause, it is simply about making sure that the decisions taken by previous Parliaments are reflected in the way in which judges take their decisions. We also need to ensure that departing from what Parliament has specified happens only in exceptional cases. Believing as I do in parliamentary sovereignty, that seems reasonable to me.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The shadow Minister has given a comprehensive and thorough introduction to the topic of whole-life orders, which I had intended to give the Committee myself. As he has laid out the background, I do not propose to repeat it. He accurately described how they operate and the categories of offender to which they apply. As he said, a whole-life order is the most severe punishment that a court can hand down, ensuring that the person so sentenced never leaves prison under any circumstances.
The shadow Minister illustrated the gravity and seriousness of such sentences by listing some of the terrible cases from the past 30 or 40 years, or indeed the past 50 years, in which whole-life orders have been imposed. The clause proposes to add to the small list of offences that qualify for a whole-life order as a starting point the heinous case of premeditated child murder—a crime so awful and appalling that I think all hon. Members agree it should be added to the list.
The murder of a child is particularly appalling, and whether we are parents or not, we all feel deeply, particularly when there is a degree of premeditation—when it is not just in the moment, but planned and intended for some time—that the crime is truly terrible and enormous. That is why the Government propose to expand the whole-life order. I think there is unanimity on that point.
The shadow Minister raised the important question of violence against women and girls, both in general terms and in the context of a particular case, which Sir Charles has asked us to be careful about because it is subject to live legal proceedings. The matter is not concluded before the courts, so of course we should be a little careful. Let me start with the wider issue of violence against women and girls.
For many years, the Government have had an unshakable commitment to protecting women and girls from the completely unacceptable violence and harassment that they all too often suffer at the hands of men. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle, the safeguarding Minister, has been at the forefront in recent years—introducing the Domestic Abuse Bill, which reached the statute book as the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 a short time ago, and leading and taking forward our work in this area. In the relatively near future—certainly in the next few months—we will publish a refreshed violence against women and girls strategy and a domestic abuse strategy, both of which will take further our work in this area.
A great deal of work has been done in the last five or 10 years, almost always with cross-party support. For example, banning upskirting started off as a private Member’s Bill and the measure was then passed by the Government. There are also recent measures on non-fatal strangulation, which are critical to protecting women, and work on the rough sex defence, which is part of the Domestic Abuse Act. We have introduced additional stalking offences over the last few years and increased sentences for such offences. A huge amount of work has been done, is being done and will be done to protect women and girls from attack. As the shadow Minister rightly said, women and girls have the right to walk the streets any time of day or night without fear. That is not the case at the moment, and we all need to make sure that changes.
In relation to the terrible crime of rape, it is worth mentioning, by way of context, that sentences have been increasing over the past few years. The average adult rape sentence rose from 79 months in 2010 to 109 months in 2020, an increase of approximately two and a half years—and quite right, too. However, it is not just the sentence that matters, but how long the offender spends in prison.
Via a statutory instrument that we introduced last year, and a clause that we will come to later in the Bill, we are ensuring that rapists spend longer in prison. Those sentenced to a standard determinate sentence of over seven years will now, for the first time, serve two thirds of their sentence in prison, not half, as was previously the case. It was wrong that rapists, when given a standard determinate sentence, served only half of it in prison. It is right that that is now two thirds, when the sentence is over seven years. The Bill goes further, moving the release back to two thirds of the sentence for those convicted of rape and given a standard determinate sentence of over four years, ensuring that rapists spend longer in prison.
I hope that gives the Committee a high level of assurance about the work that has been done already, is being done through the Bill and will be done in future in this critical area. We discussed that extensively in yesterday’s Opposition day debate, which the Lord Chancellor opened and I closed. Labour’s Front-Bench spokesman made the point, fairly and rightly, that rape conviction rates are too low and must get higher. The rape review, which I am told will be published in days not weeks, will propose decisive action to address that serious problem.
I hope that lays out the Government’s firm commitment on the issue and our track record historically—
It sounds as though the Minister is about to wind up without addressing my specific points.
No, I certainly was not planning to ignore the hon. Gentleman’s amendment. I was simply setting out the wider context and the work that the Government have done, are doing and will do.
I have a couple of things to say about the amendment. First, the offence it describes is obviously horrendous and very serious. It currently carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Where the murder involves sexual or sadistic conduct, the starting point for the tariff—the minimum term to be served in prison—is 30 years, so a very long time. It is important to note, however, that judges have the discretion to depart from that tariff where they see fit and, if necessary, increase it, including by giving a whole-life order. It is important to be clear that the law already allows for such an offence to receive a whole-life order where the judge thinks that appropriate.
Secondly, the amendment refers in particular to strangers. It would essentially move the tariff’s starting point from 30 years to a whole-life order, the maximum sentence being life in both cases—it would not change the maximum sentence—but it aims that change in minimum sentence only at cases where a stranger has perpetrated the abduction, sexual assault and murder. It strikes the Government as surprising that that distinction is drawn, because the crime described—abduction, sexual assault and murder—is as egregious and horrendous whether committed by a stranger or by someone known to the victim.
Minister, do you wish to come back? I saw you in discussions with another Minister, so I will give you the option. It is not normal to do this, but is there anything further that you would like to add in response?
I will just say that we are always happy to talk to the Opposition about a matter of this sensitivity, but I remain of the view that we should not single out murders involving a stranger and exclude domestic cases from the Bill, because that would diminish those equally appalling offences in which the victim is known to the offender. It may even be a partner; it may even have happened in her house—yet that is not in the amendment. I ask that we think again about putting it to a vote. I am happy to sit down with the shadow Minister to talk about the issue and about the whole life order question, but I repeat the point that I made earlier.
I appreciate that, but I still intend to divide the Committee on the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 102 relates to whole life orders, which we discussed fairly extensively a few moments ago. It will give judges the opportunity, in rare and exceptional cases, to use a whole life order on people who are convicted when they are aged between 18 and 20. At the moment, whole life orders can be imposed only on offenders aged 21 or over, but occasionally there are some very unusual cases in which offenders aged 18, 19 or 20 commit heinous offences and a whole life order might be appropriate. For example, an offence of murder, rape and abduction such as the shadow Minister described might be committed by someone aged 20. We think, as I hope the Opposition do, that the judge should be free to impose a whole life order; in fact, the shadow Minister himself made that case very compellingly a short while ago.
I will give an example in which a judge called for precisely that: the notorious, infamous case of Hashem Abedi, the brother of the Manchester Arena bomber. In sentencing him, the presiding judge, Mr Justice Baker, described the actions of the two bombers as
“atrocious crimes: large in their scale, deadly in their intent and appalling in their consequences.”
The judge said that he was satisfied that they had appeared to deliberately target the young audience in attendance at the arena’s Ariana Grande concert in order to heighten the risk of injury and death. He said in his sentencing remarks that
“If the defendant…had been aged 21 or over”
and if a whole life order had been available,
“the appropriate starting point…would have been a whole life order”,
given the seriousness of the crime.
I am sure that every member of the Committee, and indeed every Member of the House, will agree that for crimes as abhorrent as Hashem Abedi’s—murdering so many people in cold blood, many of them young—or in cases of the kind that the shadow Minister spoke about in our debate on clause 101, involving the murder, rape and abduction of a woman, where the offender is 19 or 20 years old, the whole life order should be available to the judge in those exceptional and thankfully rare circumstances.
I think that this extension to the whole life order regime is appropriate. On that basis, I urge that clause 102 stand part of the Bill.
I am getting a little confused now with some of the things that the Minister has said in relation to the last debate and the imposition of whole life orders. I assume that he was referring to the fact that judges have that flexibility rather than being compelled to impose such a sentence.
The shadow Minister is right. I was saying that, for the kind of offences that he described in the last debate, judges have the ability to impose a whole life order. For murders involving sexual assault and abduction, the starting point currently is a tariff of 30 years. However, the judge has the freedom to go up to a whole life order. But at the moment, the judge cannot do that if the offender is aged 18, 19 or 20. The clause will give judges that freedom.
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification. As he said, clause 102 will allow judges to impose, in exceptional circumstances, a whole life order on offenders who were aged 18 to 20 when the offence was committed. Currently, a whole life order can be imposed only on offenders who were aged 21 or over when they committed the offence; we both recognise that. The court will be able to impose a whole life order
“only if it considers that the seriousness of the offence, or combination of offences, is exceptionally high even by the standard of offences”
that would normally attract a whole life order for an offender aged 21 or over.
I start by paying tribute to those who lost their lives on 22 May 2017 at the Manchester Arena. That evening was supposed to be one of fun. Instead, a truly wicked act claimed 22 innocent young lives and left many more lives shattered. As the Minister said, it is only right that Hashem Abedi received the longest sentence in history for his part in the atrocity that night. It is also right that he will spend the rest of his life in jail. Neither of those points has ever been in doubt.
Labour’s overarching commitment is to keeping the British public safe and to ensuring that horrific terrorist attacks such as the one at Manchester Arena cannot be repeated. For that reason, Labour will support the introduction of clause 102. We do, however, seek assurances that the Government will think carefully about their approach to young adults when making sentencing changes in the future.
As the Minister explained, since 2003 the law has provided that whole life orders can be handed down only to offenders who were aged 21 or over at the time of their offence. Clause 102 will make an exception to that rule, so that in exceptional circumstances whole life orders can be given to those who were aged 18 or over but under 21 at the time they committed their offence.
In its briefing on the Bill, the Sentencing Academy indicated that the inclusion of clause 102 seemed to be a response triggered by the trial of Hashem Abedi for his involvement in the Manchester Arena bombing. As many people will know, Hashem Abedi was the brother of Salman Ramadan Abedi and was found guilty of assisting his brother to order, stockpile and transport the deadly materials needed for the attack. In total, he was found guilty of 22 counts of murder, attempted murder and conspiring to cause explosions.
In his sentencing remarks, Mr Justice Jeremy Baker indicated that Hashem Abedi’s actions were so grave that if he had been aged 21 or over, he would have sentenced him to a whole life order. Given that Hashem was under the age of 21 at the time of his offences, the judge was precluded from sentencing him to a whole life order. Instead, he was sentenced to at least 55 years—the longest determinate sentence in British criminal history. Mr Justice Baker made it clear that Abedi would leave prison only if the Parole Board was convinced that he was no longer a risk to society. Even then, he would spend the remainder of his life on licence, with the risk of being recalled to prison. In all likelihood, he concluded, Abedi could expect to spend the rest of his life in prison.
This, to a certain extent, represents the first concern that the Opposition have about clause 102. If the current sentencing regime already allows courts to sentence someone to almost certainly spend the rest of their natural life behind bars, what does clause 102 actually add to the law? As Mr Justice Baker pointed out, the only way Hashem Abedi could conceivably be released from prison is if the Parole Board deemed him no longer to be a risk to society. I am sure that the Minister will agree that after committing such a heinous and fanatical crime, and while refusing to show any remorse for his actions, the chances of his being deemed safe to be released are close to zero. Moreover, given that he will be at least 78 years old before his minimum sentence comes to an end, the chances that he will die before appearing before the Parole Board are considerable.
The other reason why we have concerns in this area was neatly summed up by the Sentencing Academy, which pointed out that, since the current sentencing regime for murder came into force in 2003, the issue of a sentencing judge being prohibited from imposing a whole life order on someone aged 18 to 20 arose for the first time only in 2020. For the avoidance of any doubt, the event referred to in 2020 is that trial of Hashem Abedi.
I will be brief in my reply. On the need for the sentence, we have already discussed the Abedi case. We have seen that, in his case, it is conceivable that the whole-life order might have made a difference. He would be eligible for Parole Board consideration at the age of 78. In that circumstance, a whole-life order would make a difference because, under one, such a consideration would not take place.
The shadow Minister said that such cases are very rare because, by definition, people who are 18, 19 or 20 have many years of life ahead of them. None the less, they occasionally occur, and it is important that we give judges the ability to deal with that. The fact that we have whole-life orders illustrates that there are limited circumstances in which they are appropriate.
I thought that there was a slight inconsistency in the shadow Minister’s arguments. On the previous clause, he argued for the expansion of whole-life orders, and on this clause—I know he will support it, so I do not want to push this too hard—he raised doubts about the appropriateness of the expansion of whole-life orders. It struck me that there was a slight tension in those arguments.
The Minister must not misunderstand or misinterpret what I was saying. We are fully supportive of what he is trying to achieve here, but we want to make sure the Government recognise that such orders should be used only in the most extreme cases, and maturity has to be an issue.
We do recognise that. The orders are intended to be used in exceptional circumstances. The phrase “exceptional circumstances” is well established and well known by judges and in law.
On the shadow Minister’s point about accounting for maturity more generally, of course judges take it into account at the point of sentencing. At about this time last year, during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, we discussed extensively the use of pre-sentence reports when someone who is just over the age of maturity but still maturing is sentenced. The fact is that pre-sentence reports can comment on maturity, and judges can take that into account.
I can give the shadow Minister the assurance he asked for. First, the Government are mindful of the issue generally, and, secondly, we expect this to be rare and exceptional. I have a great deal of confidence that the judiciary will apply the flexibility that we are providing in a way that reflects that. As the shadow Minister said, I would not expect the power to be used in very many circumstances, but where terrible cases arise, such as the appalling Abedi case, or a case in which a 19 or 20-year-old abducts, rapes and murders a woman, the whole-life order might be appropriate. It is right that judges have them available to use. I am glad to have the shadow Minister’s support on this clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 103
Starting points for murder committed when under 18
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We come now to the sentencing regime for children who commit murder. Thankfully, that is a very rare occurrence, but it does sadly happen. Clause 103 amends the sentencing code to replace the current 12-year tariff point for all children who commit murder, with a sliding scale of starting points. The sliding scale takes into account the age of the child and the seriousness of the offence. It means that the older the child and the more serious the murder, the higher the starting point.
Detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure is the mandatory life sentence for children who commit murder. Starting points are used by the judge to determine the minimum amount of time to be served in custody before the offender can be considered for release by the Parole Board. Judges can set a minimum term that is higher or lower than the starting point by taking into account aggravating or mitigating factors. Rather than having a flat 12-year starting point, as we have at the moment, which does not account for the age of the child—it could be 12 or 17—or the relative seriousness of the offence, instead we will have a sliding scale based on a more nuanced system.
The new starting points represent the approximate percentages of the equivalent sentence for an adult, which of course reflects the seriousness of the particular offence. If the child who has been convicted of murder is aged between 10 and 14, the tariff—the minimum amount to be served—will be set at half the adult equivalent. If they are 15 or 16 years old, it will be set at 66%, and if they are 17 years old—almost an adult but not quite—it will be set at 90%.
The introduction of this sliding scale recognises that children go through different stages of development and that a child of 17 is manifestly different from a child of 10. It seeks to reduce the gap in starting points between someone who is 17 versus someone who is 18, say, but increase it when the person is a lot younger. By linking it to the equivalent sentence for the same offence committed by an adult, it also seeks to reflect the different levels of seriousness that might apply.
This is a sensible and proportionate measure that reflects both age and seriousness. That is not currently reflected in the starting point, and we have to rely wholly on judicial discretion to correct that. This measure makes the provision a little more predictable and transparent, so that everyone can see how the system works.
On 3 May 2019, Ellie Gould was murdered by her former boyfriend in the kitchen of her family home. She was strangled, and stabbed 13 times, in a brutal and frenzied attack. She was only 17 years old and was looking forward to university. Her whole life should have been ahead of her, but it was snatched away in the most horrendous way imaginable.
When Ellie’s former boyfriend was sentenced for his appalling crime, he received only 12 and a half years in prison, meaning he could be eligible for parole before his 30th birthday. If he had committed his crime a year later, after he had turned 18, he could have received a much longer sentence. As a dad and a grandad, I can only imagine the enormous life-changing pain of having a child taken away in such appalling circumstances, while knowing that the perpetrator will be released within a relatively short period.
On behalf of the Opposition and, I am sure, of the whole Committee, I praise the enormous fortitude and dignity that Carole Gould has shown amid such horrendous loss. It is thanks to her tireless campaigning for Ellie’s law that we are discussing the clause. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham made clear in the Chamber some time ago, there is no doubt that Thomas Griffiths received too short a sentence for the crime he committed, and Labour stands firmly behind the Gould family.
As the Minister pointed out, under the current sentencing framework, if a child commits murder before they turn 18, they are sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure, with a starting point of 12 years, as opposed to the starting point of life imprisonment for an adult found guilty of the same offence. As such, the way that starting points are currently calculated means that a 17-year-old who, like Thomas Griffiths, commits murder, can receive a much shorter tariff than someone who has just turned 18, even if the crime is more serious.
Clause 103 would rectify that by replacing the 12-year starting point with a sliding scale of different starting points based on the age of the child, as the Minister outlined. The aim is to ensure that sentences given to children who commit murder are closely aligned to the sentences handed down to adults who commit the same offence.
As I set out at some length during the debate on clause 102, the Opposition are naturally cautious when it comes to the age of maturity and increasing the sentencing regime that applies to children. As I have said, that concern is held not only by the Opposition, but by the Justice Committee, which set out unequivocally that:
“Both age and maturity should be taken into significantly greater account within the criminal justice system.”
None the less, as I have said in the past, the Opposition are also pragmatic and recognise that on some occasions, such as the death of Ellie Gould, the sentences that are currently available do not properly reflect the severity of the offence committed.
As Carole Gould has described so movingly, the families of victims of these atrocious crimes often feel that they have faced two gross injustices: first, when the act is carried out, and secondly, when the sentence is delivered. Labour agrees with the Government that in the darkest days of grief, it is deeply unfair that the families of victims feel that they have been cheated of justice when a perpetrator receives a far shorter sentence because of an age difference of a matter of weeks or months.
That is why we, along with the Gould family, were quite appalled when the sentencing White Paper was published with proposals that would have seen Thomas Griffiths receive an even lighter sentence of only 10 years. I am glad that the Government have now seen sense and corrected that point, but not before Labour brought the anomaly to the Government’s attention back in October last year. Labour will support the Government on clause 103 today, but we feel that much more could be done in this area.
As Carole Gould has pointed out, clause 103 deals with the issue of older children being sentenced in a way that is closer to young adults. Another important issue, however, remains to be resolved: the sentencing gap which exists between those who murder within the domestic home and those who murder a stranger in the street. The point made by Carole is a poignant one:
“Why should a life taken in the home by someone you know be valued less than a life taken by a stranger in the streets?”
I understand exactly what my hon. Friend is saying. However, I know from discussions with the Lord Chancellor that he is very shy about addressing the issue of people receiving an adult sentence for crimes committed under the age of 18 because their case did not get to court until after they had turned 18. He does not appear to have any sympathy for that. I hope that over time we can work with the Government on what happens to children who commit crimes. They should not be disadvantaged by not having their case heard until they become an adult.
The concept of basing minimum term reviews on age at sentencing, rather than on age at the time the crime was committed, has also been rejected by the courts as contrary to the purpose and rationale of the sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As the great Lord Bingham set out in the case of Smith:
“The requirement to impose a sentence of HMP detention is based not on the age of the offender when sentenced but on the age of the offender when the murder was committed, and it reflects the humane principle that an offender deemed by statute to be not fully mature when committing his crime should not be punished as if he were. As he grows into maturity a more reliable judgment may be made, perhaps of what punishment he deserves and certainly of what period of detention will best promote his rehabilitation.”
With that in mind, what guarantees can the Minister provide that no child will be put at a disadvantage because of court delays caused by the huge backlog that has accrued on the Conservative Government’s watch? Similarly, does he agree that it would be hugely unfair for children to be worse off because of something completely out of their control?
The Opposition’s second concern with clause 104 is the cliff edge created by the offender turning 18. As I set out at some length during our discussion of clause 102, the Opposition are very mindful of the significant advances made during the past 20 years relating to the age of maturity. As the Minister is all too aware, it is now widely recognised that young adults are still developing their decision making and impulse control skills well into their mid-20s. As I have said before, that is acknowledged not just by the Opposition but by the Justice Committee, neuroscientists, criminologists and, until recently, this very Government. It is somewhat disappointing, then, that the Government have chosen to create a cliff edge whereby anyone who turns 18 suddenly loses the right to have the High Court review their sentence.
That concern is shared by the Sentencing Academy, which points out:
“The accompanying ‘factsheet’ justifies removing reviews from those aged 18 by the time of sentencing on the grounds that: ‘This is because their age and maturity will have been taken into account at their sentencing’. However, it is an accepted feature of sentencing law that the passing of an offender’s 18th birthday is not a cliff edge in terms of their emotional and developmental maturity.”
I must therefore ask the Minister why, when the Government have previously accepted that
“the system…should presume that up to the age of 25 young adults are typically still maturing”,
they have chosen to create this cliff edge at the age of 18. Not only does this seem unfair; it also seems counterproductive. By removing an offender’s right to a review of their sentence based on good behaviour, the Government are also removing any incentive for that offender to behave well in prison. As the Howard League points out, minimum term reviews are infrequent but important, as they
“offer a rare source of hope and can powerfully motivate young people to make and maintain positive change.”
The Sentencing Academy points out that since 2010 fewer than 10% of offenders serving detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure applied for a second review of their sentence. It says of the proposed change:
“this restriction will merely remove the opportunity of review from a small handful of cases in which exceptional progress has been achieved after the halfway point in the sentence”.
Is the Minister not worried that by removing the right to these reviews, he could be putting overworked prison staff at increased risk of harm?
Although we sympathise with the stated goal that the Government are seeking to achieve through clause 104—to prevent unnecessary distress to the families of victims of crime—in its present form we are unable to support it. Instead, we have tabled amendment 131, which we believe balances the need to protect the families of victims of crime from distress with preserving the rehabilitative benefits of being able to request a sentence review. The mechanics of the amendment are simple. Instead of ending the right to a sentence review at the age of 18, the amendment would make provision for minimum term reviews up to the age of 26, reflecting the widely held view that young adults are still developing in maturity well into their twenties, while also providing a powerful incentive to motivate young offenders to reform and rehabilitate while in custody.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Once again, the shadow Minister has helpfully laid out the context and the background to the clause. I will not irritate or detain the Committee—or perhaps both—by repeating the information that he has given.
These reviews provide an opportunity to look again at the minimum term handed down, but it is important to remember that we are talking about a cohort of people who have committed a very serious offence: murder. As the shadow Minister said, when sentence is first passed on a child, the judge passing the sentence will include in their consideration the maturity of the person at that point. There is an acceptance that further maturing may occur subsequently, which is why the review mechanism exists. Even with the reform proposed in clause 104 there can still be a single review once the individual is over 18; it is only subsequent reviews—a second, third or fourth review—that the clause would preclude. Given the likely length of sentences or of minimum terms, as well as the fact that most people receiving a first sentence will probably be in their mid or late teens, it is very likely that in almost all cases there will be one review after the age of 18. We are simply precluding those further reviews.
The shadow Minister says the clause might affect incentives. Once the minimum term has been reached, whether it has been reduced or not reduced, the Parole Board still has to consider whether release is appropriate, so even if the minimum term is not reduced, there is still an incentive to behave in prison and to engage in rehabilitation and so on, in the hope of getting the Parole Board release once the minimum term has been reached. So I do not accept the argument that the clause changes the incentives to behave well in prison.
On the point about people maturing beyond the age of 18, for first sentences, that is reflected in the sentence passed by the judge, informed by pre-sentencing reports. As I have said previously, the law as we propose to amend it will still allow—most likely in almost every case, or very many cases—a single review after the age of 18. That is analogous to the judge, when sentencing someone for the first time at the age of 20, 21 or 22, or even slightly older, taking into account maturity at the point of sentencing.
The clause will increase the amount of time that an offender sentenced to a discretionary life sentence will be required to serve in custody before they can be considered for release. A discretionary life sentence can be imposed for any offence that has a maximum period of life where the court believes that the high seriousness of the offending is such that a life sentence should be imposed, rather than a lesser determinate sentence. Such offences include manslaughter, rape, and grievous bodily harm with intent.
When imposing such a sentence, the court must set a minimum term, or tariff, that must be served in full in custody before the prisoner can be considered for release by the Parole Board. At present, when setting a discretionary life tariff, the sentencing judge will identify a notional determinate sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offence as well as time spent in custody on remand and the early release provisions that apply to that notional determinate sentence in order to calculate the tariff. In practice, the standard approach applied by the court is to decide what the notional determinate sentence would be for the offence committed and then calculate the tariff based on half that notional determinate sentence, reflecting the release provision requiring automatic release at the halfway point for prisoners sentenced to a standard determinate sentence.
That is no longer fit for purpose, because the Government have legislated to remove automatic halfway release for serious sexual and violent offenders serving a standard determinate sentence of seven years or more. In fact the next clause, 106, will extend that principle further to many standard determinate sentences of four years or more. That means—anomalously—that the most serious offenders given a standard determinate sentence will serve longer in prison and be released only after serving two thirds of their sentence, but the people I have just described with a discretionary life sentence will not. The Government’s proposal will align the automatic release point for serious offenders serving standard determinate sentences with the earliest possible point at which the Parole Board may direct release for those serving sentences of particular concern or extended determinate sentences, namely two thirds of the custodial term of such sentences.
For the most serious terrorist offences, through the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 we brought in new provisions meaning that offenders must serve their custodial term in full. The clause will ensure that the approach to release for those serving determinate sentences for serious offences is reflected in the way in which minimum terms for those serving discretionary life sentences are calculated. They will be brought into alignment, avoiding any anomalies. Judges will, of course, retain discretion to depart from the starting point as they consider appropriate in the cases before them.
The clause will bring discretionary life sentences into line with the broader approach for dangerous offenders, so that the most serious offenders will serve longer in prison before they become eligible to be considered for release by the Parole Board, thereby ensuring that the punishment better reflects the severity of the crime. In effect, it introduces consistency between the discretionary life sentences release provisions and those we introduced in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act this year, which we are expanding in the Bill. It is a measure that brings consistency and keeps serious offenders in prison for longer. I therefore hope that the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.
As the Minister said, the clause will change the way in which the minimum terms of discretionary life sentences are calculated. As the law currently stands, and has stood for quite some time, discretionary life sentences are calculated at one half of what the equivalent determinate sentence would be. The clause enacts a proposal in the sentencing White Paper to change the way in which life sentences are calculated, so that they are based on two thirds of the equivalent determinate sentence rather than one half.
The Government’s rationale is set out in the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill, which say:
“This change is necessary because most serious violent and sexual offenders who receive determinate sentences—including those who may receive an extended determinate sentence—are required to serve two-thirds of their custodial term before they may be released.”
That refers, of course, to other recent changes to release arrangements that mean that certain categories of offender must now serve two thirds of their sentence, rather than half, before they can be released.
Like the previous sentencing changes, the clause will make an already complicated sentencing regime even more complex by changing the way in which sentences have long been calculated. It is somewhat ironic that the Government on the one hand claim to want to make sentencing simpler, and on the other hand make a series of reforms that do the exact opposite. I will develop that point in more detail when we come to clause 106, but let me give a broad overview of what I mean.
In advance of the publication of the sentencing White Paper in September 2020, the Lord Chancellor set out in a column for The Times—sorry, for the The Sun on Sunday, which is quite a different paper—that
“Sentences are too complicated and often confusing to the public—the very people they are supposed to protect.”
The Lord Chancellor returns to this point in his foreword to the White Paper, stating that
“The system we have today can be complex and is too often ineffectual. Victims and the public often find it difficult to understand, and have little faith that sentences are imposed with their safety sufficiently in mind. The courts can find it cumbersome and difficult to navigate, with judges’ hands too often tied in passing sentences that seem to make little sense. The new Sentencing Code is a good start in tidying up the system, however we must be mindful not just of how sentences are handed down, but also how they are put into effect.”
The Opposition agree wholeheartedly with the Lord Chancellor’s sentiment, which is why we welcome the new sentencing code with open arms and why we are a bit puzzled by some of the measures in the Bill.
I am not from a legal background, so perhaps I am missing something here. Can the Minister explain in simple terms how the myriad changes to release arrangements for certain offences will make sentencing simpler, rather than more complicated? If the Government’s objective is to keep dangerous offenders in prison for longer, why do they not simply legislate for longer custodial sentences, rather than moving the date at which prisoners are either automatically released or released by the Parole Board? Not only would it be a simpler approach, but it would ensure that offenders still serve 50% of their sentence in the community, which we know will significantly reduce their risk of reoffending. Again, this a point that I will draw on further when discussing the next clause.
The other concern we have about clause 105 is that it fails to recognise the fundamental difference between discretionary life sentences and determinate sentences. As the Howard League sets out in its briefing:
“In contrast with the determinate serious sentences, a person serving a discretionary life sentence will be liable to detention until the day he or she dies and there is no automatic release date. The blanket increase in the punitive period therefore cannot be grounded in protecting the public as that is covered by the jurisdiction of the Parole Board: it is simply a hike in the punitiveness and there is no evidence to justify this in terms of reducing long-term harm or increasing public safety.”
In other words, the Government cannot rely on the rationale that clause 105 and the extension in the way discretionary life sentences are calculated is for the purposes of public protection.
When discretionary life sentences are handed down, the offender knows that he or she will be released from prison only if the Parole Board considers it safe to do so. This is a decision made by the Parole Board, regardless of whether it is taken at the halfway point or two-thirds point of a sentence. Instead, we are inclined to agree with the Sentencing Academy, which suggests the clause is all about
“solving a problem of the Government’s own making”
as a result of previous changes to the point of automatic early release.
To wrap up, the Opposition are concerned that the clause will make an already overcomplicated sentencing regime even more complicated, contrary to the Government’s desire for simpler system. It will also have no impact at all on the decisions made by the Parole Board, which remains the ultimate decision maker as to when somebody on a discretionary life sentence is safe to be released. For those reasons, we cannot support the clause.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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That was a very generous and lovely apology.
Clause 106
Increase in requisite custodial period for certain violent or sexual offenders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Good morning, Sir Charles. It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. Clause 106 is an extremely important clause of the Bill, because it forms a critical part of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the most serious offenders spend more time in prison, properly reflecting the gravity of their offences, protecting the public and building confidence in our sentencing regime. It does that by abolishing the automatic halfway release point for certain serious violent or sexual offenders and instead requiring them to serve two thirds of their sentence in prison.
This builds on changes made throughout 2020. First, in February of last year, we changed the release provisions for terrorists and terrorist-connected offenders receiving a standard determinate sentence in order to ensure that they serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody and thereafter are released only when the Parole Board is satisfied that it is safe to release them. Colleagues will recall the Bill that became the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which we passed in a day in February of last year to prevent repeats of the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham attacks. In fact, the first terrorist who might otherwise have been released early was kept in prison just a few weeks after we passed that Bill. The measure was tested in the High Court last summer and found to be lawful when measured against the European convention on human rights. I thought that the Committee might appreciate an update on that.
Then, in April of last year, we laid before the House a statutory instrument—the Release of Prisoners (Alteration of Relevant Proportion of Sentence) Order 2020. I will explain what that did. For the most serious sexual or violent offenders with a standard determinate sentence of more than seven years, the automatic release point was moved from half to two thirds, ensuring that those serious offenders spend longer in prison. This clause puts the provisions of that order—a statutory instrument—into primary legislation. Critically, however, it goes further and says that serious sexual offenders and certain violent offenders receiving a standard determinate sentence not just of more than seven years but of between four and seven years will also automatically spend two thirds of their sentence in custody, rather than being automatically released at the halfway point; the release at the two-thirds point will still be automatic. It applies to any sexual offence carrying a maximum life sentence, including rape. I know that rape and related sexual offences are rightly of concern to the Committee, so it is worth stressing that this clause will ensure that rapists spend longer in prison.
What assessment has the Minister made of the effect on the prison population, particularly in Wales, which already has the highest rate of imprisonment in western Europe with 154 prisoners per 100,000 of the population of Wales, compared with 141 per 100,000 in England? Given the possible effects of inflation on the length of sentences, what provision will he make specifically for Welsh prisons to cope with that?
We have indeed made such an assessment. We have done it for the whole jurisdiction, and the steady-state impact on the prison population is 255 prisoners. I do not have a breakdown for Wales, but I estimate—this is simply my off-the-cuff estimate—that the portion of that 255 that applies to Wales might be in the range of 10 to 20 prisoners in Wales. That is just my off-the-cuff estimate, not an official figure, so it carries quite an important health warning.
On the prison population impact and prison capacity more generally, the hon. Gentleman will be aware that the Government are committed to building an extra 10,000 prison places to make sure we can cater to increased demands in the Prison Service as we make sure dangerous criminals spend longer incarcerated.
Building an extra 10,000 prison cells is very costly. Does the Minister agree that investing more in rehabilitation and preventive programmes might be a better use of the money?
Of course, we do believe in rehabilitation and prevention, and a lot of work is going on in that area, but we are talking about people who have been convicted of offences such as rape and murder. On Second Reading, Members made the point about making sure that particularly sexual offenders, including rapists, spend longer in prison. There were different views on how that could be achieved, but there seemed to be broad unanimity across the House that such offenders should spend longer in prison, and the clause does exactly that. However, it in no way detracts from the importance of prevention and rehabilitation that the hon. Lady mentioned a second ago.
I should say that caught in this clause are not just sexual offenders who commit offences, including rape, with a life sentence, but also the most serious violent offenders, which includes those who commit manslaughter, attempted murder, soliciting murder, and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, so I think our constituents up and down the country will welcome the fact that these serious offenders will spend two thirds of their sentence in prison and not just a half.
Provision is also made in this clause for the two-thirds release requirement to apply to those under the age of 18 who were given a youth standard determinate sentence of seven years or more for a sexual offence with a maximum penalty of life, and for the other very serious violent offences just referred to. The changes are made by inserting new section 244ZA into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to make the necessary provisions. The measures will ensure that the proportion of the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence committed, and are intended to address long-held concerns, both in Parliament and among the public, about the automatic halfway release for serious offenders.
The two-thirds point also aligns with the release point for offenders found to be dangerous and therefore serving an extended determinate sentence, whose eligibility for release by the Parole Board commences from the two-thirds point, so it introduces consistency and coherence into the sentencing regime as well. On that basis, I commend this very important clause to the Committee.
Clause 106, as we have heard, follows the Release of Prisoners (Alteration of Relevant Proportion of Sentence) Order 2020, which altered the automatic release point for offenders who have committed a specific sexual or violent offence. As the Minister said, the effect of the release of prisoners order was to move the automatic release point from halfway to two thirds of an eligible prisoner’s sentence, and would apply to those found guilty of specific sexual or violent offences for which the penalty is life, and who were sentenced to seven years or more in prison.
Clause 106 implements the proposal in the “A Smarter Approach to Sentencing” White Paper to extend these changes to include sentences of between four and seven years for any of the sexual offences already specified, but only to some of the specified violent offences. That raises a point of concern for the Opposition. Why does the clause apply to all the sexual offences covered by the release of prisoners order, but only some of the violent offences?
Clause 106 will apply only to manslaughter, soliciting murder, attempted murder, and wounding causing grievous bodily harm with intent. This is precisely the point that the Opposition are trying to make. First, the release of prisoners order fundamentally changed the sentencing and release regime. Now the Government propose to extend the regime, but only to some of the original offences, with the other offences remaining the same. How on earth can that do anything but confuse an already notoriously confused system? I have asked before, what is the point of the remarkable work of the Law Commission on producing a much simplified sentencing code if the Government continue to tinker with sentencing and release provisions?
It is not only the Opposition who are concerned by the direction of travel the Government are taking on sentencing complexity. After considering clause 106, the Sentencing Academy agreed that its inclusion,
“unquestionably makes sentencing more complex and less intelligible to the public. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the judiciary are already struggling in discharging their statutory duty to explain the effect of the sentence as a result of the SI 2020/158 change. This proposal will make this task more difficult and result in a greater number of errors.”
The academy goes on to express its concerns in full:
“We expressed concerns about the reforms last year and this provision exacerbates our concern. Proportionate sentencing is not well-served by a system in which identical sentence lengths have a significantly diverging impact in practice: two nine year sentences should carry the same penal weight; it should not mean six years in custody for one offence and four-and-a-half years in custody for another. The decision to exclude some violent offences from this proposal makes the system yet more perplexing: how can a seven year sentence for kidnapping justify four years and eight months in prison when a six year sentence for the same offence merits three years?”
I wonder if the Minister could explain that point to the Committee.
Let me be clear: Labour supports moves to ensure that the most serious and violent criminals receive longer sentences when there is evidence that their sentences do not match the severity of their crimes. That is why the Opposition supported the Government’s moves to introduce clause 101 to extend whole-life orders for the premeditated murder of a child; clause 102 to extend whole-life orders to those who are 18 to 20 and have committed particularly heinous crimes; and clause 103 to increase the starting points for murder committed as a child. However, we cannot support a series of yet more changes to sentencing and release, which will only further confuse the system and make the task of members of the judiciary even more difficult, resulting in a greater number of sentencing errors.
The Prison Reform Trust makes a good point on the Government’s proposed changes to sentencing and release when it says,
“that only serves to demonstrate the complexity of sentencing law in this area, and the extent to which the government adds to that complexity every time it responds to an individual crime by promising a change in sentencing law.”
If the Government want to ensure that serious violent and sex offenders spend longer in prison, they can easily do so simply by increasing the maximum sentence length for the relevant offences. Taking that route rather than what the Sentencing Academy describes as,
“sentence inflation via the back door”
would not lead to judges being confused and making sentencing errors. Moreover, it would not lead to the public being confused and losing faith in our sentencing system. Taking that route would also mean that prisoners spend longer in jail without having to lose out on the rehabilitative properties of spending half their sentence in the community.
That brings me to another fundamental concern that the Opposition have with clause 106. By requiring an offender to spend additional time in prison, the amount of time that they would spend in the community under supervision would decrease significantly. As the Howard League notes, we know that reducing
“the amount of time which people who have committed serious offences spend under the supervision of probation services in the community…is likely to undermine public safety rather than helping to keep victims and the public safe. Though there is no single model of probation supervision, a rapid evidence review across jurisdictions and models suggests that community supervision in itself reduces reoffending—unlike time in prison, which increases reoffending rates.”
To sum up, the Opposition agree with the Government that where evidence exists that sentences do not properly reflect the severity of the crimes committed, sentencing reform should absolutely be an option. None the less, sentencing reform should be properly considered and guided by the principles set out by the Lord Chancellor in his foreword to the White Paper. Sentences should make sense to victims, members of the judiciary and legal practitioners. More importantly, sentences should make sense to the general public. Only when the general public and victims of crime understand our sentencing regime will they have full faith in it. We believe clause 106 goes against those principles, and for that reason we cannot support it.
Are there any colleagues who would like to participate before I call the Minister? If not, I call the Minister.
I feel bound to reply to some of the points that the shadow Minister has just made. First, he said that the provisions make sentencing more complicated and that it will be harder for the judiciary to understand. I will pass over the implied slight on the judiciary’s ability to absorb complicated sentencing, but the measures relate exclusively to release provisions; they make no changes to the way that sentencing works. As such, this does not change anything a judge will do in passing sentence. The release decisions, and the administration of that, are obviously done by the Prison Service and the National Probation Service down the track. The release provisions have nothing at all to do with sentencing, so let me assure the shadow Minister on that point.
Secondly, the shadow Minister said that if we want people to spend longer in prison, we should increase the maximum sentence. By definition, the way that the provisions are constructed mean that they relate only to offences where the maximum sentence is life. It is not possible to increase a sentence beyond life—life already is the maximum. The only way to increase the sentencing is for the Sentencing Council to change its guidelines, and as the shadow Minister knows, the Sentencing Council is independent of Government and is chaired by Lord Justice Holroyde. However, I note in passing that average sentence lengths passed down by judges for serious offences have been increasing. Since 2010—a date that I choose arbitrarily—the average sentence for rape has gone up by about two and a half years, so judges have chosen to increase sentence lengths in the past 10 years.
The shadow Minister asked why the selection of violent offences with sentences between four and seven years is narrower than those above seven years. To be completely clear, the list of sexual offences is the same: between four and seven years, and seven-plus. I think the shadow Minister did say that, but I repeat it for clarity. The reason is that we are trying to calibrate the provisions in order to target the most serious offences, which include all serious violent and sexual offences where the sentence is more than seven years, and all serious sexual offences where the sentence is between four and seven years, but just that smaller selection of violent offences, such as manslaughter and so on, which we talked about earlier. We are attempting to calibrate this to the most serious offences.
Finally, the shadow Minister asked about public perception. Over the past 10 or 20 years, the public have been both confused and angered that a court hands down a sentence to a very serious offender—we are talking about sentences that carry a maximum of life, such as manslaughter and rape—and the offender then walks out halfway through a sentence, or less than halfway when time on remand in taken into account. The public are angered by that. In fact, as a Minister in the Ministry of Justice, I get quite a lot of correspondence from members of the public who are angry about serious offenders getting released inappropriately early, as they see it. I agree, which is why we will ensure that the most serious offenders spend longer in prison. If the Opposition vote against this measure, as it would appear they are about to do, they are voting to say that they do not think those serious offenders should spend longer in prison. They are voting for people who have committed manslaughter or rape to be released from prison earlier than would be the case if the clause were passed. I think the public expect us to do something different, and I ask the Opposition to think again—particularly given that, on Second Reading, both sides of the House seemed to be arguing that people who commit very serious offences, including rape, should spend longer in prison. The clause does exactly that. On that basis, I commend it to the Committee.
Clause 107 makes some changes to SOPC—sentences for offenders of particular concern—essentially to tidy up an anomaly that arose from the changes made last year. As Members will recall, under the changes we made last year to terrorism sentencing, when a terrorist offender had a SOPC sentence the release point was moved to two thirds, at which point they became eligible for consideration for release by the Parole Board. However, two child sexual offences also carry a mandatory SOPC sentence where there are different release provisions.
In this clause, we are simply making a change to make the release provisions for those two child sex offences in relation to the SOPC sentence the same as those for the terrorist sentence—that is to say, they will serve two thirds, following which they will be eligible for consideration for release by the Parole Board. That makes the sentence the same as for the other terrorism SOPC offences and the same as the extended determinate sentences. In his last speech, the shadow Minister spoke in a spirit of simplification and consistency, and this change is consistent with that principle. I commend the clause to the Committee.
The Minister likes to have his little digs; I think he quite enjoys them. I assure the Committee and everybody else that I have full confidence in the judiciary. If the Minister had as much confidence as I do, perhaps he would not be mucking about so much with the system and would leave the judiciary to sentence within the regime that exists.
As we have heard, as with clause 106 the purpose of clause 107 is to increase the proportion of the time certain offenders spend their sentence in jail. In this case, we are talking about offenders of particular concern, meaning those who have been convicted of one or two child sexual offences or certain terrorist offences. As set out by the Minister, as things currently stand different release arrangements apply to offenders of particular concern convicted of terror offences and those convicted of child sexual offences.
Clause 107 would change that by ensuring that all offenders of particular concern would serve two thirds rather than one half of their sentence in prison, before applying to the Parole Board to be released. Given that I have spoken extensively on the same matter, or very similar matters, in clauses 105 and 106, this speech will be very short. For the reasons I set out in relation to those clauses, we cannot support clause 107. Although the Opposition agree that those who have committed the most serious violent and sexual offences should spend longer in prison, we do not believe that the method set out in clauses 105 to 107 is the best vehicle to meet this policy objective.
The Opposition cannot support more changes to the sentencing and release regimes. Contrary to what the Minister says, that will further complicate our sentencing system and risk victims of crime and members of the public losing faith in it. If the Government want to ensure that offenders spend longer in prison, where the evidence base suggests they should, we believe there are better ways of achieving that goal.
I have nothing to add, except one point that I should have made in my earlier speech. If someone with a SOPC serves their entire sentence in custody, they get a year on licence after release. That is an important point to add to my previous remarks, but I have nothing further to add to my speech on clause 106: the same points apply.
-Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sorry, Sir Charles; I was momentarily moved to speechlessness by the fact that the Opposition have just voted to let child rapists out of jail earlier than the clause proposes.
Let us move on to clause 108, which relates to a new power for the Secretary of State to prevent the automatic release of offenders serving a standard determinate sentence, where release is ordinarily automatic, and instead refer them to the Parole Board in certain, very limited circumstances.
With a standard determinate sentence at the moment, there is automatic release at either the halfway point or, for more serious offences, at the two-thirds point, as per clauses 105 and 106. Clause 108 creates a new power to allow the Secretary of State to refer a prisoner who is in custody and assessed as dangerous to the Parole Board, to decide whether or not they are safe to release. Prisoners who are serving a standard determinate sentence, for any offence, who have become dangerous or who are identified as being dangerous while they are in prison get this referral.
To be clear, we are not creating a new kind of indeterminate sentence like the old imprisonment for public protection sentences, created in 2003, in which the sentence could carry on forever if someone were considered to be dangerous. The maximum sentence originally passed by the court on conviction and sentencing still applies.
We are not overriding the sentence of the court, but we are saying that if an offender is identified as dangerous they may continue to serve their determinate sentence until its end, unless and until the Parole Board, after the release point, decides that they are safe to release. It means that if someone becomes dangerous, they do not automatically get released early.
The Minister will see from an upcoming amendment that I am interested in this clause. Can he give some clarification? Will he define “dangerous”? I assume that is within the prison context, as opposed to the crime being served for.
Will the Minister give some details on when and why the Secretary of State might intervene? At the moment, depending on the Parole Board’s decision, the Secretary of State already has 21 days to intervene. Will he explain what the clause will bring to the table?
I am happy to answer all those questions, which are good questions. The 21-days provision that allows the Parole Board to think again has nothing to do with this; it is completely separate. It is a live issue in the terrible Pitchfork case, which Members will be aware of.
The provision in which the Parole Board takes a decision to release and the Secretary of State may ask it to think again, within 21 days, applies to any Parole Board release and is a matter currently being considered. That is wholly separate from this provision. It relates to any Parole Board release decision and was prompted by the awful Worboys case two or three years ago.
Here we are talking about where a prisoner is serving a standard determinate sentence and would ordinarily be released automatically without any Parole Board involvement at all, and the Secretary of State says, “Well, I think actually they are now dangerous”—I will come on to what that means in a minute—“and instead of automatic release, can the Parole Board look at the case and decide whether they are suitable for release, once their release point is passed?” That is different from the 21-days reconsideration.
The hon. Member for Rotherham asked for the definition of becoming dangerous and whether it means dangerous in a prison context. The answer is no. It does not mean dangerous in a prison context; it means dangerous to the public. One might ask what “dangerous to the public” means. The definition of “dangerous” in this context has a high threshold—we anticipate this provision will be used extremely rarely; it is not going to be a commonly used provision. It is that an offender is at “significant risk” of causing “serious harm” to the public by committing murder or one of the serious offences listed in schedule 18 of the Sentencing Act 2020, such as manslaughter, rape or terrorist offences, and that the risk cannot be sufficiently managed through the use of licence conditions.
If a referral is made, the Parole Board will consider it. It may say, “We will release them anyway” or, “We think there is a danger; we are going to keep them inside.” It can only keep them inside prison until the end of the original sentence that the court handed down.
I will give an example not caught by our new provisions. To take the example the shadow Minister used, let us say there is a six-year sentence for kidnapping. Currently, there would ordinarily be automatic release after three years. If for some reason there is evidence that the person who has been committed for kidnap might commit a terrorist offence or might kill someone, the Secretary of State can refer and the Parole Board will then consider, “Are they dangerous? Can we release them?” If it decides to keep them in prison, they can be kept in prison up to the six years of the original sentence, but no later. During the final three-year period in my example, the Parole Board will look at the case periodically.
If, after reference to the Parole Board, the prisoner thinks there has been an unreasonable delay—“I should have been released after three years, but it is now three years and six months and no one has looked at it; this is unreasonable”—they can refer the matter to the High Court to get it sorted out. There is a safety mechanism so that there cannot be an unreasonable delay.
Will the Minister confirm something? In the event of a dangerous person—a radicalised person—being required to serve their full sentence, will they be released into the community without any supervision or licence conditions when they get to the end of the sentence?
That already happens, of course, with extended determinate sentences, where it is possible that the person will spend all their sentence in prison. If the Parole Board does that, there is no subsequent period on licence—unlike the SOPC that we just talked about, where there is a minimum of one year on licence afterwards.
Of course, when the Parole Board makes decisions about whether to release in the final half or third of a sentence, it will be aware of the point that the shadow Minister made. If it thinks that public safety is best served by releasing a little bit before the end of the sentence to allow that one year, or whatever it may be, on licence at the end, it is within its power to consider and do that—so instead of the individual serving all the sentence inside, there would be a bit of release on licence at the end. The Parole Board can think about that at the end if it chooses to.
But surely the point remains that this person, who is said to be a danger to the public although there may not be sufficient evidence to convict him of another charge, will be released into the community at the end of their sentence—after six years, 10 years or whatever—and will still be the same dangerous person he was thought to be by the Lord Chancellor, through the Parole Board, when he was in prison.
Under ECHR and common-law provisions, we cannot extend a sentence beyond what was handed down by the court. Of course, that was the big problem with the old IPP sentences, where people could stay in prison forever; indeed, there are still people in prison under IPP sentences.
We have to work within the envelope—within the maximum sentence handed down by the court originally for the offence originally committed. The judgment is essentially to be exercised by the Parole Board on how best to protect the public, by striking a balance. Do we leave people in prison for the whole time or do we release them a bit early with a period on licence? That is a judgment that the Parole Board has to make to best protect the public. In some cases, if it thinks that the risk is very high, it may consider that the whole term in prison is the best way.
Take the example of the six years. The Parole Board may say, “Well, six years in prison is better than five years in prison followed by one year on licence”. It is a judgment that the Parole Board must make. We cannot reasonably go beyond that six years, because that would be potentially unjust: we would be punishing someone and imposing a sentence that was longer than that originally handed down by the court for the offence of which they were convicted. That would be contrary to natural justice, common law and ECHR provisions.
That is why the measure is designed as it is, and I hope that makes sense.
The old IPP sentences had their problems; they were much too widely used and were not originally intended to be that widely used. There was an issue about them, certainly. However, would not that kind of sentence—one that was indeterminate but able to be cut short when the individual concerned could demonstrate that they were no longer dangerous—be the answer in some of the kinds of tangents that the Minister is talking about?
The Minister seems to be tying himself in knots, to say, “Well, it’s going to be either three years or six years, but we all know that the person is coming out at the end”. Originally, IPP sentences were legislated for to deal with this very issue, but of course they ended up being too widely used. Is there not a better way of reintroducing some kind of IPP sentences that would enable greater safety but be much more narrowly used?
Can I clarify whether the hon. Member is talking about potentially indeterminate sentences?
She is. Okay.
We debated this issue internally, when we were designing the clause. Clearly, one of the options considered was reintroducing some form of IPP sentence, which is, as the hon. Lady said, indeterminate, meaning that it could go on forever. That was not done because there is potentially an inherent injustice. We have been using the example of kidnap, so let us keep using it. If someone commits that offence and the judge decides that six years is the right sentence, to then say that that person, having been given a fixed sentence, could spend the rest of their life in prison because of a risk that they might offend later—they had not committed a more serious offence; it is just that they might—struck us as being inherently unjust.
Do hon. Members remember the film “Minority Report”, where people were incarcerated because it was judged that they might commit an offence in the future? If we get into the territory of imposing a penalty, which could be imprisonment forever, because someone might commit an offence rather than because they actually have committed an offence, we are straying into potentially slightly dangerous territory.
I was not suggesting that; I was not suggesting that people who have been given determinate sentences should then arbitrarily suddenly find themselves with an indeterminate sentence. What I was suggesting was that perhaps there are a small number of cases for which it would be appropriate to reintroduce the possibility for judges to give indeterminate sentences again. The problem with the IPP was that it was much too widely used; I think the wording was too broad and it was much too widely used by sentencers. But the purpose of it was to deal with just these cases that the Minister is talking about.
I am not suggesting that somebody who has been given a determinate sentence should then arbitrarily be given an indeterminate sentence. However, if an indeterminate sentence for public protection was available in very narrow circumstances to judges, would that not fill this gap in a more coherent way than the way in which the Minister is trying to do it?
Clearly, if the original offence for which the offender is sentenced is one of the more serious ones that we have been talking about—for example, even offences that we consider to be moderately serious, such as committing grievous bodily harm with intent, have life sentences—the judge can, if he or she chooses, impose a life sentence and set a tariff for consideration for release, so there is flexibility. We are talking about cases where the original offence is not one of those very serious ones that has a life sentence, but one that has a fixed determinate sentence. I think the hon. Member is asking if we can give the judge the power to say that, even though the original offence has a fixed maximum sentence of, for example, only five years, they will override that and say, “Actually, for some reason that is not to do with the original offence, but is just to do with some other assessment of public risk, I will give you an indeterminate sentence.” I think that is the question.
Not quite. I was suggesting that perhaps the Minister should legislate for indeterminate sentences in particular circumstances and give the judge that discretion, but in a much narrower band of offences than those that ended up getting indeterminate sentences in the past. Indeterminate sentences have all been abolished now—they cannot be used. If I might say so, it seems that the Minister is trying to deal with the very issue that they were introduced to deal with in a very convoluted manner.
No, we are trying to do deal with the issue of prisoners who become dangerous, or who clearly pose a danger to the public, while they are in prison, but without doing what IPPs did. IPPs were abolished for a reason in 2012: people who committed a particular offence with a fixed sentence of, say, five years could end up in prison forever. As I have said, for more serious offenders the judge has the option of a life sentence, but we do not think it is right that someone could commit an offence with a fixed sentence, such as five years, and end up in prison for life, not for an offence they have committed, but for one that they might commit in the future.
This is the best way of balancing that public protection consideration against natural justice—that the punishment should fit the crime—and avoid a “Minority report”-type situation where someone is incarcerated for a crime that they may commit in the future, but have not yet committed. This strikes the right balance. We stay within the envelope of the sentence handed down by the judge. The judge has the option in serious cases to hand down a life sentence already, but we have just changed the release provisions.
We have debated the clause relatively extensively, Sir Charles. It strikes the right balance between natural justice and protecting the public. On that basis, I commend it to the Committee.
As we have heard, clause 108 would create a new power to allow the Lord Chancellor to refer a prisoner to the Parole Board who would otherwise be eligible for automatic release, if he believes that they have become a significant danger to the public while in prison. Rather than being freed at the halfway or two-thirds point of a sentence, they would be released only if the Parole Board thought it was safe. If the Parole Board did not believe it was safe, they would continue to serve the rest of their sentence in prison, unless the Parole Board consequently changed its mind. As the Minister has confirmed, if they served the whole of their sentence in prison, they would then be released into the community without any licence conditions or supervision.
It is safe to say that the Opposition have several serious concerns with clause 108, and largely agree with the Prison Reform Trust in believing that
“this clause creates a constitutional and legal mess”.
Let us start with the basics. As is set out in the explanatory notes to the Bill, this is a brand new power, the beneficiary of whom is the Lord Chancellor.
I say with great respect to the shadow Minister that the beneficiary of this clause is not the Lord Chancellor, but the general public, who might be protected from dangerous offenders who would otherwise be released.
The Lord Chancellor is the beneficiary, because he is given a new power to change things and refer.
The effect of the clause is that, for the first time for these types of prisoners, the Lord Chancellor will have the power effectively to refer a prisoner to have their sentence conditions varied, should the Parole Board agree. We all understand that. For example, if a prisoner is sentenced to five years for shoplifting, under current legislation they would become eligible to be automatically released on licence at the halfway point of their sentence. Under the new provision, if the Lord Chancellor believes that the shoplifter had become radicalised in prison, he could refer the prisoner to the Parole Board, which could prevent his automatic release. That would, of course, be without the prisoner ever having been charged or found guilty of any further offence while in prison.
That raises two fundamental questions. First, is it right or proper for the Lord Chancellor to be involved in the management of individual prisoners? How will he make the decision to refer somebody to the Parole Board? What criteria will be used for the Lord Chancellor to make such a referral decision? Secondly, is this not a case of punishment without due process, and therefore unlawful?
On the first point, I note the remarks of the Sentencing Academy on clause 108:
“giving the Secretary of State for Justice the power to intervene in the management of an individual offender’s sentence gives rise to concern about undue political interference in the sentences of individual offenders.”
I accept that the final decision rests with the Parole Board. That raises the all-important question of whether the Secretary of State for Justice, who is after all a member of the Government, is really the right person to decide who should be referred to the Parole Board in a prison that could be hundreds of miles away.
That is by no means the only question provoked by clause 108, as currently drafted. The questions go on and on. Perhaps the Minister will be good enough to provide clarity on at least the following points today. What evidential tests will have to be satisfied for the Secretary of State to make a referral to the Parole Board, and who will be responsible for collecting that evidence? What standard of proof will the Secretary of State use when deciding to make a referral or not? Will he have to be satisfied that someone has become a significant danger on the balance of probabilities, or beyond reasonable doubt? If the Secretary of State is so concerned that someone has become radicalised or poses a serious threat, why not simply take that person to court and allow a judge to consider the evidence? Are the Government simply trying to avoid the inconvenience of having to provide evidence and have it tested in open court? Is it not a dangerous precedent for the Secretary of State to become involved in determinations made about individual cases?
That brings me to my next concern. What happens to a prisoner who, after being referred by the Secretary of State to the Parole Board, is refused their automatic release? As I understand it, if the offender is denied automatic release, he or she could spend the rest of their custodial sentence in prison, rather than some of it on licence in the community. Those prisoners will be released before the end of their sentence only if and when the Parole Board authorises it.
That raises two further concerns. First, it would create what Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has described as a “cliff-edge effect”, which is where an offender who has specifically been identified as being a significant danger to the public while in prison spends their entire sentence in custody and is released into the community without any licence or monitoring conditions. Let us think about a possible scenario. A prisoner has been convicted for non-terrorist or non-violent crime and is sentenced in court to, say, five years. They are specifically told by the court that they can expect to be automatically released from prison at the halfway point of their sentence—in that case, two and a half years. Instead, they receive the news that the Secretary of State has reason to believe that they have become a danger to society while in prison. The Parole Board agrees, and their sentence is retrospectively changed so that they can spend the whole sentence in prison.
I am sure the Minister will agree that that offender would have some right to be angry with the criminal justice system and society at large. They would then be released, harbouring that anger, without any licence conditions or supervision. Does the Minister not see what the consequences of that could be? Would it not be better simply to collect any evidence and allow a court to come to a determination? Surely, if the evidence of what is effectively an offence exists, the person should be charged and sentenced for that offence.
During the evidence session on 18 May, the Minister tried to convince the Committee that clause 108 would not create that cliff-edge effect by indicating that if the authorities were particularly concerned about an individual offender, the Home Secretary could impose a terrorism prevention and investigation measure on them. However, that excuse simply does not stack up. As Jonathan Hall, QC, pointed out, TPIMs are extremely resource-intensive and very rarely used, especially in these circumstances. As the Minister will be aware, for each of the three-month periods between 1 December 2018 and 30 November 2019, only three to five TPIMs were in place nationally.
I want to raise one particular point. Is the Minister aware of the Welsh Government’s recently published race equality action plan, which states its commitment to developing a race equality delivery plan that will address the over-representation of black, Asian and minority ethnic people in the criminal justice system? Indeed, in Wales, more black and minority ethnic people are in prison than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Does he share my concern that this and other clauses might militate against the policy of the Senedd in Cardiff, a legislative public body that has been democratically elected?
I will try briefly to respond to some of the points raised by Opposition Members in relation to clause 108.
First, on whether the clause somehow infringes natural justice or the ECHR, or imposes a penalty without due process, as the shadow Minister put it, I can categorically say that it does not, because under no circumstances can anyone spend a longer period in prison than the original sentence handed down by the judge. The clause relates to the administration of the release provisions. It is a long-established legal principle that the administration of a sentence—whether it is spent inside or outside prison, for example—is a matter that can be varied in the course of the sentence being served.
This matter was tested in the courts relatively recently when we passed the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020. The very first person who was effectively kept in prison longer than they ordinarily would have been, because their release point was basically moved by that Act, went to the High Court and tried to make the case that that was an infringement of their rights because they thought they were going to get released automatically at two thirds, but were instead referred to the Parole Board, which did not let them out. Because of TORA, that has been tested in the High Court and found to be lawful—that is to say, the administration of the sentence can be varied.
The reason we have gone no further than that and have said that someone cannot be kept in prison for longer than the original sentence—the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood was probing on this in her interventions—was that we think that would infringe the principle of natural justice. The shadow Minister questions whether we have gone too far and the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood thinks we have not gone far enough, which might suggest that we have landed in around the right place.
There was then the question from the shadow Minister on the cliff edge issue: if someone serves all of their sentence in prison, they then spend no time on licence, by definition. That does, of course, apply to any of the existing extended determinate sentences if the Parole Board decide to keep the prisoner inside prison for the whole of their sentence. The potential for the cliff edge does exist, but when deciding whether to release early the Parole Board can, of course, take into account whether the public are better served by the whole sentence being spent in prison, or most of it in prison and a bit of licence at the end. In no sense are the public any less safe if the prisoner spends all of the sentence in prison, given that the sentence is a maximum. The prisoner is in prison, clearly, and cannot commit an offence during that period.
On rehabilitation, it can of course take place, it does take place, and it should take place in prison as much as in the community. Significant resources are being invested in that rehabilitation process in prison, led by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk).
On the matter of the propriety of the Lord Chancellor making the referral, as raised by the shadow Minister and by the hon. Member for Rotherham, the power is the power of referral. The Secretary of State for Justice, the Lord Chancellor, is not making any final decision himself or herself about release, and is simply referring a prisoner to the Parole Board to make that determination and that decision. That does not constitute undue political interference in the process.
I am anxious to make progress, but I will take an intervention.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. For me, the issue is the basis on which the Lord Chancellor makes the decision to refer. What evidence test is used and who gathers that particular evidence?
Most likely, as a matter of practice, that would be the prison governor or prison authorities who see behaviour of concern, and might draw the matter to the attention of the Ministry of Justice and the Secretary of State.
The shadow minister asked what test was applied. The test is whether there is a significant risk of serious harm to the public by the offender potentially committing a serious offence, such as murder, in the future, as listed in section 18 of the Sentencing Act 2020, and that the risk cannot be sufficiently managed through the use of licence conditions. That is the test that will be applied by those making decisions, but ultimately the decision is for the Parole Board.
The concept of the Parole Board making a discretionary decision about whether to release already exists, and has done for years. Currently it exists in the contest of extended determinate sentences, and in the past it existed—in theory at least—for every single sentence passed. It already happens for thousands and thousands of extended determinate sentences, so what is proposed here is not a radical departure from current practice for extended determinate sentences, nor indeed for people on a life sentence with a tariff. The referral process can add to the criteria taken into account for those offenders. We would expect that to involve small numbers.
In answer to the issue relating to Wales raised by the hon. Member for Arfon, we are expecting the numbers to be extremely low. It will not have a significant impact on overall numbers. It is, mercifully, pretty rare for that sort of evidence to come to light. If the evidence is at the level that it merits prosecution—planning, preparing or inciting an offence, which was asked about—obviously prosecution is the first option. Prosecution for the offence will always be the first option, but if we cannot establish that an offence has been committed to the required criminal standard, a Parole Board referral is the next best thing up to the maximum sentence, but no further. I hope that address the questions—
I asked the Minister to address the issue of the number of TPIMs likely to be applied in the event of somebody considered to be dangerous when leaving prison.
I cannot speculate on what may happen in the future. The shadow Minister pointed out that the number of TPIMs in use is pretty small and that is most certainly true. Equally, the number of people likely to be referred in that way will be small, albeit likely to be larger than the number of TPIMs. As I said, there is the option for the Parole Board not to have the person serve the full sentence but to have a little bit at the end served on licence. There is that option, as well as the TPIM, plus the option for the police and security services to keep people under observation more generally, if they are concerned. I hope that answers the point.
The Minister has given a full response to some of the issues I raised but not a sufficient one. I am worried about the evidential test in relation to this matter. The Minister said if there is sufficient evidence for a prosecution while the person remains in prison, there will be a prosecution, but if that evidence does not meet a criminal test, there can be no prosecution and this legislation will be relied on to retain the person in prison following a referral to the Parole Board. We remain very concerned about that and about the standard of proof, which we also talked about.
Ultimately, this issue is about how prisoners are managed in the longer term and their rehabilitation. The fact remains that someone who is considered dangerous, though not dangerous enough to be prosecuted, can be released into the community at the end of their sentence without any supervision or conditions. I accept that the Minister says the security services or police might keep an eye on them. That is insufficient if somebody is considered to be so dangerous. On that basis, we still oppose the clause.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I thank the hon. Member for Rotherham for moving her amendment and for her remarks, the spirit of which I certainly completely agree with. Amendment 145 covers only moves to open prisons rather than Parole Board release decisions more generally. I think it is worth making it clear to the Committee that the victim’s rights to participate in the parole process are clearly enshrined already in the victims’ code, published again recently. Under the Parole Board’s existing rules, there is a requirement for the Secretary of State to provide the board with a current victim personal statement if one has been prepared, and that must be taken into account by the panel considering the case. The statement sets out the impact that the offence has had on the victim and their family and any concerns that the victim and their family may have about the potential release. Victims are, as part of that, entitled to request that specific licence conditions, including exclusion zones and non-contact requirements, be imposed on the offender. The victims’ code enshrines a number of entitlements relating to parole, including the right to present a victim personal statement in the way that has just been described. A root-and-branch review of the parole system is going on to try to improve these different things further.
As I said, this amendment relates only and specifically to open prison transfers. But I think that the general point that the hon. Member for Rotherham has raised is important. It is important that we do more to ensure that the victim’s voice is heard in these Parole Board decisions, for all the reasons that the hon. Member eloquently laid out. I will suggest that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, who has the responsibility for this area, meet with the hon. Member for Rotherham to discuss these important issues. The matter is obviously in the rules already: it is in the victims’ code; it is in the Parole Board rules. But clearly, what is written down needs then to translate into action, and the hon. Member has raised a couple of cases in which that did not seem to happen in the way it ought to have done. She has clearly had correspondence with the previous Minister with responsibility for prisons and probation. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham took over that portfolio only three or four months ago. I know he will want to meet her to discuss these important issues and make sure that it is happening in practice as it should do, so I make that commitment on his behalf.
Government amendment 132 to clause 109 makes some simple provisions and creates a mechanism for the Parole Board to change a decision where there has manifestly been an error. This follows a recent court case.
You have been very generous, so do not regard that as an admonishment. Just temper your keenness to canter on.
I will take that as a check on the reins. I have nothing further to say on amendment 145, Sir Charles.
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. I have worked extensively with the Government’s victims team and it is fantastic. The victims code is great, but only if it is implemented. The problem we find is that people are not notified when the offender is coming up for parole consideration, so their rights are not activated because they do not know that that situation is occurring.
I accept his generous offer of meeting the hon. Member for Cheltenham, which I will take up. With that reassurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 132, in clause 109, page 99, line 11, leave out
“resulted from a clear mistake”
and insert
“it would not have given or made but for an error”.
This amendment ensures that the language used in the new provision about when the Parole Board can set aside decisions aligns with a recent High Court judgment which ruled on the circumstances when a Parole Board decision can be revisited and makes a drafting clarification.
I am sorry to have spoiled the anticipation by jumping early. May I speak to clause 109 as well?
Very briefly, clause 109 makes provision for manifest errors in Parole Board release decisions to be corrected. Government amendment 132 implements a recent court judgment where the language was changed and says that reconsideration will happen where there has been
“a clear mistake of law or fact”.
It makes that change following the High Court judgment in the case of Dickins, with which I am sure the Committee is familiar.
I have relatively little to say on these clauses, which are technical in nature. Clause 110 covers responsibility for setting licence conditions for fixed-term prisoners. Clause 111 repeals some uncommenced provisions dating back many years that have never been used, and simply removes them from the statute book because they have never been commenced. Clause 112 covers the release at the direction of the Parole Board after recall for fixed-term prisoners. Clause 113 is about changing the release test for the release of fixed-term prisoners following recall. Clause 114 covers release at the direction of the Parole Board in relation to timing.
They are technical changes, and I do not propose to add anything beyond these brief remarks, Sir Charles.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 110 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 111 to 114 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 115
Extension of driving disqualification where custodial sentence imposed: England and Wales
I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 115, page 104, line 21, at end insert—
“(2A) The amendments made by subsection (2)(a)(i) do not have effect in relation to an offender who—
(a) is sentenced before the coming into force of section 107 (increase in requisite custodial period for certain offenders of particular concern), and
(b) on being sentenced, will be a prisoner to whom section 244A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release on licence of prisoners serving sentence under 278 of the Sentencing Code etc) applies.”.
This amendment ensures that the amendments made by clause 115(2)(a)(i) do not apply to a person who is sentenced between the passing of the Bill (when clause 115 comes into force) and the coming into force of clause 107 two months later and who will be a person to whom section 244A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 applies.
Amendment 68 is a technical amendment that introduces a transitional provision that has been identified as necessary to address a short two-month gap before different, but inter-connected, provisions in the Bill come into force. Sir Charles, will I briefly speak to clauses 115 to 118?
Okay. I will not refer to them again, so I will do so.
Clause 115 relates to England and Wales and makes some changes to the driving disqualification provisions where we have changed the automatic release points. Colleagues will recall that we have moved the release point from a half to two thirds for certain offences, including in changes made last year. We want to make sure that, where a driving disqualification is imposed, it takes account of the change in release point. The clause makes simple consequential amendments to those release points.
Clauses 116 and 117 do similar things to make sure that driving disqualifications properly intermesh with the changes to release provisions. Clause 118 does similar things in relation to Scotland.
The House briefing paper on the Bill explains that when a driver receives a driving disqualification alongside a custodial sentence, the court must also impose an extension period to ensure that the disqualification period is not entirely spent during the time the offender is in prison. The explanatory notes explain that clause 115 would change the law so that the length of the extension period reflects a succession of other changes made by the Government to the release points for certain offenders.
The notes refer to changes made by the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, the Release of Prisoners (Alteration of Relevant Proportion of Sentence) Order 2020, changes in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 and further changes proposed by this Bill. These pieces of legislation all change the point at which an offender is automatically released or becomes eligible to be released if the Parole Board agrees they are no longer a danger to the public. Rather than being at the halfway point of the sentence, that release point will now move to the two-thirds point.
As I explained at some length in the debate on clause 106, the Opposition cannot wholeheartedly support changes to the release point of certain offenders. Not only do the changes make a notoriously complicated sentencing regime even more complicated but they also substantially limit the amount of time an offender spends on licence in the community, significantly increasing their chances of reoffending.
The Opposition do not support the Government’s logic in adapting other pieces of legislation, in this case driving offences, to reflect those changes. For that reason, we are opposed to clauses 115 to 118 and urge the Government to use caution before committing to any further changes that would further complicate an already overcomplicated sentencing system. That said, I do not intend to press the clauses to a vote, but let the record show that we are opposed to the provisions.
No.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause 115, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 116 to 118 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 119
Calculation of period before release or parole board referral where multiple sentences being served
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will speak extremely briefly to clauses 119 to 123. They simply set out minor amendments to existing legislation that part 7, chapter 1 of the Bill makes. In brief, clause 119 provides clarification on when a prisoner must be automatically released and when referral to the Parole Board is required in cases where concurrent or consecutive sentences are being served, so it provides clarification around how those sentences interact with one another.
Clause 120 addresses the application of release provisions to repatriated prisoners, reflecting some recent alterations that have been made domestically, which we have talked about already—making sure that works with repatriated prisoners.
Let me start with clause 124, which would give responsible officers the power to compel offenders to attend an appointment at any point in a community order or during the supervision period of a suspended sentence, in exceptional circumstances.
The responsible officer is the statutory term for the probation practitioner who is overseeing the order. Section 198 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires the responsible officer to make any arrangements that are necessary in connection with the requirements imposed by the order, and to promote the offender’s compliance with those requirements.
In some cases, the responsible officer might be delivering those requirements directly. In other cases, they might be working with the offender to develop a sentence plan and monitor their progress against it, but referring them to colleagues or to other organisations to deliver particular requirements, for example, educational or treatment requirements.
The current legislation lacks clarity on the extent of a responsible officer’s power to compel an offender, who is subject to a community or suspended sentence order, to attend supervision appointments—meetings, essentially. Offenders serving community sentences have a duty to keep in touch with their responsible officer, and responsible officers also have the power to make any arrangements that are necessary in connection with the requirements imposed by the Order. But it is not currently clear what powers probation officers have if they are concerned about a new or escalated risk that an offender presents, which is not necessarily related to the delivery of what the court has ordered. Hence this measure, which enables the responsible officer to require the offender to participate in a meeting. It simply clarifies that that can happen. I think we all agree that contact between the responsible officer, for example, the probation officer, and the offender is a good thing to make sure that that relationship is being properly managed.
Clause 125 is one of a number of measures in the Bill that seek to strengthen community sentences. In the Sentencing White Paper last September, we set out a new vision for community supervision combining robust punishment and management of risk with a new focus on addressing rehabilitation needs to break the cycle of reoffending. Clause 125 therefore increases the maximum length of time a curfew can be imposed to make it potentially more effective and increases the maximum number of hours that a curfew could be imposed in any given 24-hour period. At the moment, a curfew can be imposed for a maximum of 12 months and we will increase this to up to two years, to give the court a little more flexibility and, we hope, encourage the use of community sentences more often.
The clause will also increase the potential of a curfew to support rehabilitation by providing a longer period during which some of the positive effects of the curfew can be established. It can, for example, reduce interaction with criminal associates. Again, that will hopefully enable the courts to use those sentences more as an alternative to short custodial sentences, which we are all keen to avoid where possible.
At the moment, a community order or suspended sentence order may specify a maximum of 16 hours of curfew per day, which provides in practice a weekly maximum of 112 hours. The clause will increase the daily maximum to 20 hours, but we will not move the seven-day maximum of 112. The number of curfew hours per day can be moved around if, for example, somebody gets a job, or something like that, and that needs to be taken into account, but the weekly maximum does not change. It is important to make the point that we are not altering that.
Clause 126 will give greater powers to the responsible officer to vary electronically monitored curfews on community sentences. Again, we think that will be helpful. To be clear, the responsible officer will not be able to change the number of curfew hours. That is an important point to emphasise.
Clause 127 removes senior attendance centres from the menu of options available. They are not very widely used, and in fact in some parts of the country they are not used at all. These days, there are various other means that are used to provide rehabilitation and so on, rather than senior attendance centres. Schedule 12 contains further amendments relating to the removal of the attendance centre requirements, as I have just described.
Clause 128 simply introduces schedule 13, which makes provision for courts to have powers to review community and suspended sentence orders and commit an offender to custody for breach. Without this clause, schedule 13 would not form part of the Bill. Part 1 of schedule 13 contains provisions relating to the review, which is a crucial element of the problem-solving court approach. As Members know, we are keen to run pilots of problem-solving courts. We think they have an important role to play where offenders have a drug, alcohol or mental health problem, and where the judge can have repeated interaction with the person concerned. We think that could hopefully contribute to the addiction or mental health problem being dealt with. They were piloted in the past—I think they were piloted in Liverpool a few years ago—and they were perhaps not as effective as we had hoped. This pilot is therefore important to try to get the model right. If we can get the model right, we will obviously look to roll it out.
Clause 129 introduces schedule 14. Schedule 14 itself provides the legislative changes required for the problem-solving court pilot that I have just described. We think that problem-solving courts are really important, so the pilots will be important as we have to get the model right. There are lots of different ways of running problem-solving courts. The Americans and the Australians do them differently. We want to get this right. As I say, if we can find a way of tackling the root cause of offending behaviour, whether it is drug addiction, alcohol addiction or mental health, that will help everybody—the community, society and the offender—so I am really pleased that these schedules are in this Bill, laying the groundwork for the things that I have described. I commend these clauses and schedules to the Committee.
As the Minister set out, clause 124 provides legal clarity about what a probation officer or responsible officer can instruct an offender who has been released from custody to do. Specifically, it will give probation officers the legal power to compel offenders serving a community or suspended sentence order to attend supervision appointments. Those appointments can be either for the purpose of ensuring the offender complies with rehabilitative requirements or where there are public protection concerns. If an offender refuses to comply with directions made under clause 124, they can be found to be in breach of their licence conditions and punished accordingly.
On the whole, this is a clause that the Opposition can support. If there is legislative uncertainty about what a probation officer can and cannot do, it is important, for the benefit of probation officers and offenders themselves, that it is ironed out. We accept that. The Opposition also accept the importance of offenders attending the appointments they need to rehabilitate and reform in the community. I have spoken at length about how Labour fully appreciates the importance of time spent in the community when it comes to reforming an offender and reducing the risk of reoffending. We are also keen to support amendments that will make the life of probation officers easier by providing legislative clarity.
However, although we are supportive of clause 124, we have some concerns, which I hope the Minister can respond to today. First, given that failing to attend appointments under the clause could result in an offender being found to be in breach of their licence and possibly recalled to prison, can the Minister set out the procedure that offenders can use to challenge orders made under clause 124?
Secondly, we must also consider the impact that the powers in clause 124 could have on offenders who have learning disabilities or are neurodivergent. As the Prison Reform Trust explains:
“People with learning disabilities can find it particularly difficult to comply with measures such as additional appointments or reporting requirements, and so special attention will need to be given to ensuring they are not unfairly disadvantaged by these provisions.”
In addition to addressing the system for offenders to challenge orders under the clause, will Minister set out what safeguards will exist to ensure that no offender is unfairly disadvantaged by clause 124 due to circumstances beyond their control?
I now turn to clause 125, the effect of which is similar to 124. Clause 124 gives probation officers greater powers to compel offenders to attend appointments in the community, and clause 125 gives probation officers greater powers with regard to curfews. Under current legislation, offenders subject to a community order or suspended sentence order can be subject to a curfew for up to 16 hours a day for a maximum of 12 months. Clause 125 would increase the daily curfew to 20 hours and increase the total period over which curfews can be imposed from one year to two years.
The Government set out in the explanatory notes that this change will increase the punitive weight of a curfew requirement, but also has the potential to support rehabilitation by providing a longer period during which some of the positive effects of curfew could be established. As with clause 124, the Opposition are keen to give our hard-working probation officers the tools, powers and legal clarity they need to do their job properly. We are satisfied that clause 125 is a proportionate means of achieving that goal, particularly as the Government have chosen to retain the maximum number of curfew hours that can be imposed per week.
None the less, as with clause 124, we seek some assurances from the Minister about how these extended powers will be used in practice. As with clause 124, our main concern is about the potential of clause 125 to increase the number of offenders found to be in breach of their licence due to circumstances they cannot control, or because of technical breaches. I will discuss one aspect of this in more detail when we come to amendment 122, but we know that offenders are wrongly accused of breaching their licence conditions, including those relating to curfews, due to electronic tags malfunctioning. What assurances can the Minister give that extending the powers of probation officers in this area will not lead to more offenders accused of being in breach due to malfunctioning tags?
I also repeat my concern in relation to clause 124 about how this power could impact offenders who suffer from learning difficulties or are neurodivergent. What steps will the Minister take to ensure that these offenders are not unfairly disadvantaged by clause 125? Will probation officers be given additional discretionary powers to ensure that these offenders are not punished for a breach that they did not intend to make?
Finally, how does the Minister respond to concerns expressed by the Howard League that allowing probation officers to place strict restrictions on leisure days could prevent people on licence from building the positive social relationships that would help them to desist from crime?
Let us move to clause 126, which, like clause 125, extends the power of probation officers in relation to curfews. As the Government explanatory notes point out, currently, changes to a curfew cannot take place unless they have been authorised by a court. Clause 126 would amend the sentencing code by enabling probation officers to vary a curfew requirement made on a community order or suspended sentence order. Specifically, the clause would allow the probation officer or responsible person to change the curfew requirement in one of two ways: changing the time a curfew starts or ends over the course of 24 hours, or changing the residence of the offender as set out in the order.
The explanatory notes suggest that these additional changes will be beneficial not only for probation officers but for Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and offenders:
“This legislative change seeks to reduce the burden on the courts, freeing up time for other matters and saving probation resource by reducing the volumes of papers prepared for court and court visits. There will also be advantages for offenders, allowing for variations where typically there are alterations to work hours or location that make compliance impossible, or where an offender’s curfew residence address needs to be changed in a timely way.”
While the Opposition stand firmly behind any proposal to reduce the horrendous burden currently on our courts, I am somewhat perplexed that the Government’s first thought in this area is to give probation officers the power to vary curfew requirements.
As the Minister will no doubt be aware, the backlog in the Crown court is at record levels, sitting at almost 40,000 cases before the pandemic even began. As we said before, victims of rape and other serious offences face a wait of up to four years for their day in court. While it is true that the backlog has been exacerbated by the pandemic, it was created by the Conservatives closing half of all courts in England and Wales between 2010 and 2019, and allowing 27,000 fewer sitting days than in 2016. If the Government were serious about reducing the burden on our courts, they would have adopted Labour’s package of emergency measures during the pandemic, including mass testing in courts, the extension of Nightingale courts and reduced juries until restrictions are lifted, but they did not, and the result is the catastrophe we see today.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I remind the Committee that with this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 125 to 127 stand part.
That schedule 12 be the Twelfth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 128 stand part.
That schedule 13 be the Thirteenth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 129 stand part.
That schedule 14 be the Fourteenth schedule to the Bill.
Before we adjourned, the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Stockton North, gave a lengthy speech, which we were all grateful to hear. We paused to allow the Minister to prepare himself. I believe he is now prepared, so I call the Minister.
Thank you, Sir Charles. I trust everyone has had a refreshing and congenial break for lunch. Prior to the break, the shadow Minister raised a number of questions relating to clauses 124 to 128 and to schedules 12 to 14. I will endeavour to answer as many of those questions as I can. He asked what procedure offenders could use to challenge orders made under clauses 124 and 125, particularly to ensure that they were not unduly penalised if they then breached the conditions that had been imposed. If a breach does occur and some serious consequence follows, it is always open to the offender to make a representation when attending their hearing at court to either make the case that the breach was technical or minor in nature, or that the condition itself was not varied in a reasonable way. A significant penalty can never be imposed without the intervention of the court.
Questions were asked about circumstances beyond the control of the offender. We heard about the possibility of a device malfunctioning and about particular circumstances relating to disability that might disadvantage certain people. We envisage the power laid out in section 124 being used only in rare circumstances, certainly not routinely.
I confirm that it is the intention to provide clear advice to probation staff, setting out the rare circumstances in which additional supervision may be warranted, to ensure, for example, that disabled offenders are not unfairly or unduly disadvantaged, and to avoid the purpose of these supervision appointments going beyond the very specific purposes that the order has been imposed by the sentencing court.
The same applies to people with learning difficulties. Courts sentence on a case-by-case basis and, where electronic monitoring has been imposed as one element of that sentence, the officer supervising the offender is already able to review notifications of apparent violations and take a reasonable view, on a case-by-case basis. If someone has been genuinely unable to understand how to operate the equipment or had a genuine technical problem, we would expect probation officers to exercise reasonable discretion.
As I said at the very beginning, if a breach did follow and the court was invited to impose some penalty, it would be open to the offender to make a representation at that point to explain the mitigating circumstances. My expectation is that it would never get that far, because I would expect the supervising officer to be reasonable in the meantime.
I recognise what the Minister is saying. I raised the point that people should be able to make representations after their hearings, but some of the people we are talking about have particular challenges in life and special needs. How will the Minister ensure that their problem—their malfunctioning equipment or otherwise—is properly communicated to a court to ensure that they are not penalised?
Clearly, in the first instance we would expect the responsible officer to exercise these powers in a reasonable way and to exercise discretion. Hopefully, as I said a few minutes ago, these cases would not get as far as court because the probation officer would act in a reasonable and proportionate way in the first place. The guidance will reflect that. If someone does get to court, there is the possibility of their being represented in proceedings. However, I also would expect the judge to ask a reasonable question of the person appearing before the court, such as whether there were any mitigating circumstances or technical problems or whether they had failed to understand how to operate the equipment. If there is a vulnerability, the pre-sentence report written prior to the original sentencing would be expected to pick up those issues.
The shadow Minister asked whether the powers in clause 126 were too wide and gave the responsible officer excessive latitude and leeway to vary curfew requirements that a court had previously imposed—to dispense summary justice without proper reference to the courts. To be clear, clause 126 is very limited in the powers that it provides probation officers, and they will be able to amend the requirement in only two limited ways, and only if those changes do not undermine the weight or purpose of the requirement imposed by the court. The power in clause 126 is restricted to two areas: a shift in the start and/or end times of the curfew periods—but no change to the total number of hours imposed—and a change to the offender’s curfew address, where the address was not part of the order in the first place. So they are very limited powers to vary, which I hope provides the reassurance asked for.
The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, who unfortunately is not in her place, referred to the problem-solving courts in Liverpool. I understand that the results from that have been a little mixed, but we are committed on both sides of the House to the principle of problem-solving courts, and I noted the shadow Minister’s recitation of the history of these going back as far as 1999. Both sides recognise the important role that problem-solving courts can play. Other jurisdictions have used them, with the United States being an obvious example. We are starting on a pilot basis rather than a big-bang roll-out because the details of how the model operates is important. The details make a big difference, and the design of the way it works—when the reviews takes place, what they are reviewing and what actions are taken—make a difference to whether the thing is successful or not.
While across the House we are committed to the principle of problem-solving courts to tackle the underlying causes of offending, we have to make sure that they work in practice and the details are right before rolling them out. To answer another of the shadow Minister’s questions, I am sure we will be coming back to Parliament and reporting on the progress of these problem-solving courts. My hope is that we find a way quickly to make these work in practice and can then roll them out. I am committed to community sentence treatment requirements, which are a form of disposal that provides for mental health, alcohol and drug addiction treatment. Quite a lot of money has gone into that recently—£80 million for drug addiction earlier this year. Problem-solving courts are a critical way of supporting the delivery of treatment under community sentence treatment requirements. It is something I want to push, and I am glad that there is agreement across the House on that.
The final question that the shadow Minister asked was whether a guilty plea was needed to qualify for an appearance before a problem-solving court. Problem-solving courts do not require a guilty plea, and this Bill does not stipulate that as a prerequisite, but a willingness to engage with the court and comply with the community interventions will be an important factor. The problem-solving courts working group in 2016 considered making a guilty plea a key factor in creating the engagement necessary, but we recognised the number of complexities across the cohorts targeted, and did not think it was necessarily required. People who plead not guilty, and are then convicted, would be eligible for the problem-solving court, and I hope they can be helped as much as anyone else. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 124 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 125 to 127 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 128 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 13 agreed to.
Clause 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 14 agreed to.
Clause 130
Duty to consult on unpaid work requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will follow your direction, Sir Charles, by saying just a few words on this clause, which is relatively straightforward and, I think, pretty inoffensive.
Clause 130 simply creates a requirement for probation officials to consult key local and regional stakeholders on the delivery of unpaid work. Unpaid work—or community payback, as it is sometimes known—combines the sentencing purposes of punishment with reparation to communities. We believe that, where possible, unpaid work requirements should benefit the local communities in which they are carried out. Nominated local projects are already popular with sentencers and the public, but there is currently no requirement for probation officials to consult stakeholders on the design or delivery of unpaid work, so members of communities and organisations within particular local areas that are best placed to understand the impact of crime and what might be useful in the local area do not necessarily have their say.
Clause 130 simply seeks to address the gap by ensuring that key local stakeholders are consulted, so that they can suggest to the probation service what kind of unpaid work might be useful in their local area. We hope that local community groups and stakeholders come up with some good ideas that the probation service can then respond to. That seems to be a pretty sensible idea. The probation service in some areas may do it already. This clause simply creates a proper duty, or a requirement, for the probation service to do it. Of course, if we understand the needs of local communities and their thoughts, we can improve the way unpaid work placements operate to support rehabilitation and also help the local community. If the local community can visibly see offenders doing unpaid work in their local area, whether it is cleaning off graffiti, cleaning the place up or whatever else it may be, that will, we hope, demonstrate that the programme is giving back to and improving the local community, but delivering a punitive element as well.
I was about to conclude, but of course I will take the intervention.
When I used to run a children’s hospice, we had offenders under probation supervision come in. They were meant to be doing gardening at the children’s hospice, but instead they sat around smoking cigarettes. We kept on raising that with the probation worker, because we had invited the offenders there to give them a second chance, to help with their rehabilitation, to enable them to contribute to the community and so on. But the probation officer said, “What do you want me to do? I can’t beat them; I can’t make them work, but they have to come on these schemes.” Could the Minister give some examples of how the probation service will have the resources and the influence to ensure that people who are out in their local community are actually—
The hon. Lady makes a very good point. First, I am extremely disappointed and somewhat shocked to hear that people who were supposed to be doing work at a hospice in Rotherham in fact sat around smoking cigarettes. That is obviously shocking and not what the orders are supposed to be about. The hon. Lady says that the probation officer shrugged their shoulders and said, “Well, what can I do about it?” Of course, if the person, the offender, was not doing the work that they were supposed to be doing, that would amount to a breach of the unpaid work requirement, and they could be taken back to court to account for their breach, so I am extremely disappointed by the attitude of the probation officer that the hon. Lady just described.
The hon. Lady asked about resources. Extra resources are going into the probation service for it to supervise exactly these kinds of activities, and I would expect them to be supervised and policed properly. I will certainly pass on her concern to the relevant Minister. I have already made contact about fixing a meeting for the hon. Lady and the Prisons Minister that we talked about in this morning’s session, in relation to victims being consulted about probable decisions. The same Minister, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, is responsible for the probation service as well—I am just adding to his workload. I will raise it with him, but I would certainly urge the hon. Member for Rotherham to raise this issue in the same meeting, because I know that the account she just gave will concern my hon. Friend as much as it concerns me.
I echo the points made by the hon. Member for Rotherham in that there is a variation in the enthusiasm that some of those who conduct this work display, on both sides. I was told, for example, that a lad who came from a farming family had thrown his back into it very strongly and was encouraging others to join him. I would add that we do consult with the local community, and many of the jobs that are done in my constituency are at the behest of either a local authority or other local groups.
Wonderful. We would like to see the kind of consultation that already takes place in Scarborough and Whitby take place across the country as a whole, and that is precisely the intention behind clause 130. Where Scarborough has led, the rest of the nation, thanks to this clause, will follow.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 131
Youth Remand
I beg to move amendment 128, in clause 131, page 122, line 12, at end insert—
“(ba) after subsection (5) insert—
(5A) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6) “recent” is defined as having occurred in the previous six weeks.””
I am pleased to speak to amendments 128, 129 and 130 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham and myself. However, before I do that, if the Minister could give me a list of where he has influence, perhaps he could fix a few meetings with Ministers for me as well.
I thank the Minister very much for that—it will, of course, be on the record, which I am very pleased to note. Before I get into my speech, I would like to thank Transform Justice and the Alliance for Youth Justice for the extremely helpful work they have done on this part of the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hove (Peter Kyle), the former shadow Justice Minister, who worked extremely hard on these particular issues. I am grateful to him.
Clause 131 amends the legislative threshold for remanding a child to custody. It will mean that remand to youth detention accommodation can be imposed only in the most serious cases, where a custodial sentence is the only option and the risk posed by the child cannot be safely managed within the community. It will introduce a statutory duty which states that courts must consider the interests and welfare of the child before deciding whether to remand them to youth detention. It also imposes a statutory requirement for the courts to record the reasons for the decision.
First, let me say that we are pleased with the direction of travel that this clause indicates, and we are keen for the Government’s work in this area to succeed. We are in complete agreement with the Government that custodial remand should be used only as a last resort for children. However, we do think that there is scope for these proposals to go further in tightening the threshold for remanding a child into custody. I will speak more on that when we discuss our amendments.
The current youth remand provisions were introduced in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and I well remember the Public Bill Committee, where I had the privilege of serving as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sadiq Khan, now our excellent Mayor of London, and also my good friend. By 2019, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse noted a significant increase in the use of custodial remand for children. The Opposition warmly welcomes measures which aim to reduce the number of children remanded into custody, especially in light of the fact that in 2018/19 only a third of children remanded to custody or local authority accommodation later received a custodial sentence.
Our concerns about the use of custodial remands for children are compounded by the extreme racial disproportionality on remand, and the record proportion of children in custody who have not yet been tried in court.
Against the backdrop of the record court backlog and the waiting times for trial, there could not be a more opportune moment to address these issues. We particularly welcome the introduction of the statutory duty to consider the welfare and best interests of the child. We believe that, while these proposals can go further—I know that the Minister will listen carefully to our proposals shortly—these changes will help to reduce the number of children who are unnecessarily remanded to custody, so we are pleased to support them.
However, there are a couple of points on which I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts. Has he any further information to share with the Committee on his Department’s considerations of the impact that police remand has on custodial remand? Are there any plans to address that? Research by Transform Justice shows that police remand, where the child is detained by the police until court either in a police cell or in a local authority PACE bed—under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—is a driver of custodial remand. Transform Justice explains that point:
“This is because any child remanded by the police has to be presented in court within 24 hours, meaning Youth Offending Team staff often don’t have enough time to develop a bail package that will satisfy the court. Children who appear from police custody also usually appear in the secure dock, which can bias courts to view the child as more ‘dangerous’ and therefore more suitable for custodial remand.”
The criteria for police remand are spelled out in section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and are very different from those used by the court for remand. In fact, the criteria for police remand of children are almost identical to those for adults, unlike the child-first approach taken in so many other areas of the justice system.
We know that the police remand more children than the courts. Of the 4,500 children who appeared in court from police custody in 2019, only 12% went on to be remanded by the court. Some 31% of those remanded by the police went on to be discharged, dismissed or have their case withdrawn, while 37% went on to get a fine or community sentence. The figures illustrate that police use of remand is seriously out of synch with the courts already. This clause may further widen that gap.
Is the Minister not concerned that the police may continue to overuse post-charge detention, undermining the positive efforts of the clause to reduce unnecessary custodial remand for children? Will the Government consider updating the police remand criteria, so they are in line with the new court remand criteria, to ensure consistent decision making across the whole criminal justice system?
I am greatly supportive of the provision in the clause that requires courts to record their reasons for remanding a child, not least because it will provide valuable data on the use of remand, which will enable us to continue to make improvements in this area. For that to be most effective in informing future policy decisions, we would need to have some sort of centralised monitoring system. Will we have such a system? It would mean that the need to record reasons would not only focus the mind of the court in a specific case; it would also benefit the system as a whole, as each case can inform our ongoing learning process about the use of remand and its effectiveness. Has the Minister considered the possibility of such a centralised monitoring system?
It has been suggested that the obligation on the court to record reasons would be most effective if courts had to specify why non-custodial alternatives were deemed unsuitable and how each of the custodial remand conditions has been met. Is that the kind of detail that the Minister envisages the obligation should entail? I am sure we all agree that it would be helpful for that level of information to be provided, so I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.
Turning to the amendments, as I said earlier, the reforms to the threshold for remanding a child in custody are welcome, but there are a couple of areas where we believe they should go further. The Opposition amendments, if adopted, would get us closer to the goal of custodial remand being used only as a truly last resort.
Amendment 128 seeks to tighten the history test by defining a recent history of breaching bail or offending while on bail as having been committed within the last six weeks. The clause currently makes provision to amend the history condition so that the previous instances of breach or offending while on bail must be “significant”, “relevant” and “recent”. In order to reduce the number of children held unnecessarily on remand, it would be helpful to amend the clause so that there is a clear definition of “recent”.
In defining recent, we have to be mindful of what that means to a child. As the Alliance for Youth Justice notes:
“If we are to take a child-centred approach, we must consider how children experience time, and recognise the well-established principle that children change and develop in a shorter time than adults.”
The Youth Justice Board for England and Wales has recommended that “recent” be no longer than within a six-week period. I hope that the Minister will agree that clarity on that point would be of great assistance to the courts. I would be interested to hear from him what discussions his Ministry of Justice colleagues have had regarding defining a time limit for this condition.
Amendment 129 is a straightforward amendment to the necessity condition that would again help achieve the aim of using custodial remand for children only as a last resort. Although we welcome the strengthened wording of the necessity condition included in the Bill, which would require remand to be used only when the risk posed by a child cannot be safely managed in the community, we share the concerns of the sector that the benefits arising from this change may be undermined by its drafting. The amendment would therefore tighten and strengthen the wording. Transform Justice says that these benefits of the current proposed change to the necessity condition
“will be undermined by the loose wording of one of the other necessity conditions: that remand to YDA is necessary to prevent further imprisonable offences. This condition is highly subjective and casts a wide net, which may be widened further by youth sentencing provisions elsewhere in the bill.”
We share the concern expressed by the Alliance for Youth Justice that
“the latter part of the condition (to prevent the commission of an imprisonable offence) sets such a low threshold for meeting the Condition as to render the first threshold (to protect the public from death or serious personal injury) somewhat redundant.”
The amendment would tighten the latter part of the condition by ensuring that it applies only to serious imprisonable offences, which we think better reflects the intention of the clause.
Finally, amendment 130 would compel the court to record the age, gender and ethnicity of a child remanded in custody in order to provide better data on remand, particularly on disproportionality. We believe that this could be a helpful tool in addressing the deeply concerning and increasing levels of disproportionality at this point in our justice system. The numbers beggar belief. Nine out of 10 London children who are remanded are from black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. A deeply comprehensive report that was published by the Youth Justice Board in January shows that race alone is a factor in remand outcomes for children. The researchers gathered data on thousands of English and Welsh cases, and information provided in practitioner assessments. Even when other related factors were controlled for mixed ethnicity black children, they were, as the Youth Justice Board notes,
“still more likely to be remanded in custody and, if not remanded, more likely to be subject to restrictions on bail.”
This is a serious injustice in our system that needs to be urgently addressed. More needs to be done than this amendment makes provision for, but it would be a helpful tool in breaking down the disproportionate outcomes that we are seeing. The amendment would at the very least provide accurate data to help understand this disparity, in line with the “explain or reform” principle outlined in the Lammy review, which I think is an eminently sensible step in the right direction. I hope that the Minister agrees and look forward to hearing his thoughts. I would also be grateful if he could share with the Committee any other initiatives his Department is working on to address this flagrant disproportionality in youth remand.
As the shadow Minister said, clause 131 aims to ensure that children are remanded into youth detention accommodation only where absolutely necessary and as a last resort. As the hon. Member for Rotherham and the shadow Minister said, that is something that we can all agree on. We do not want to remand children into custody prior to conviction unless it is absolutely necessary.
The hon. Member for Rotherham said that prevention was important, and of course we agree, although it is outside the scope of these clauses. Money is being invested, significantly, in serious violence reduction units that aim to prevent, but also to divert young people who might otherwise get into serious crime on to a better path.
We are mindful that over a third of children in custody are on remand and that, of those, only around a third go on to receive a custodial sentence. While custodial remand is perfectly justified in some cases, the threshold for confining an unconvicted child to a secure environment must, rightly, be set very high indeed. It sounds like we broadly agree on these principles, and that is why we are amending the provisions of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which sets out the test that the courts must satisfy when deciding whether to remand a child into custody. I think everyone agrees with the aim of the clause, which is to make sure that remand custody for a child is an absolute last resort. The shadow Minister welcomed this direction of travel and the steps that are being taken.
The clause introduces a statutory duty for the court to consider the welfare and best interests of the child when making remand decisions and a statutory requirement for the court to record its reasons for imposing custodial remand to ensure that the welfare of the child is at the forefront of the court’s mind and promote a child-first approach to decision making. We are also strengthening the sentencing condition to ensure that the mere possibility of a custodial sentence would not on its own necessarily warrant custodial remand. Similarly, a relatively minor or fairly recent breach should not, on its own, justify remand. We are reinforcing the history condition so that only a recent, significant and relevant history of breaching while on bail should be taken into account to justify custodial remand. The current tests already require the court to satisfy itself that a child can be remanded to custody only where it is necessary to protect the public from death or serious harm. We are reinforcing that necessity condition by making it clear that it means when the risk posed by the child cannot be managed safely in the community. These measures, taken together, significantly elevate and strengthen the test for child remand to custody.
Will the Minister confirm whether there is likely to be some form of time limit relating to the recent history of the child?
The shadow Minister leads me to his amendment 128, to which I was going to speak in a moment, but I shall address it now as he has raised it. There will not be a hard or specific time limit in the way that his amendment specifies six weeks. We think that a hard-edged limit of six weeks specified so precisely would unduly fetter judicial discretion. The judge should be able to make a judgment in the round, taking into account all the considerations. A hard cut-off of six weeks is too binary. It is made clear that the judge needs only to look at circumstances where there is a history of breach or offending while on bail that is recent, significant and relevant. That is quite a high test, but we do not propose to go as far as amendment 128 does in specifying six weeks. We do not support the amendment for that reason, although, in spirit, our clause as drafted is pushing in a very similar direction. We just think that six weeks is too precise and that the judge should have some residual discretion.
Before moving to amendments 129 and 130, I would like to touch on a question that the shadow Minister raised about whether police remand almost inevitably and inappropriately leads to custodial remand. He said that could be because there is not enough time to consider bail arrangements and that it could create a sense of bias because, if the judge sees the person in the dock, it may lead them to believe that they are a more serious offender. I do not accept either argument. The statistics that he himself gave a minute or two later support that. He said that only 12% of children going into police remand end up in custodial remand. That demonstrates that 88% of children on police remand do not go into custodial remand, which suggests that there is not a strong linkage in the way that he feared there might be.
We need some clarity around the 12% and the 88%. My point is that the police are remanding into custody a very high proportion of children who do not then go on to receive a custodial sentence. That is the problem, not the other way round.
I think that the shadow Minister also pointed out to the Committee that there is a 24-hour time limit on police remand for children, so it is an extremely short period of time. For that very short window before the court appearance, it ensures that the police do not lose control of the person in their care. Clearly, if that was going on for days or weeks, it would be a matter of concern, but it is a very short time window, as he said.
The shadow Minister’s amendment 129, on the necessity condition, proposes the insertion of the single word “serious”. I contend that any imprisonable offence is in itself serious but, more broadly, we are again relying on judicial discretion. We do not want to unduly fetter the judge’s discretion. The provisions in clause 131 as drafted will send a fairly clear signal to the judiciary that this is something that should be taken very seriously in making these decisions and that Parliament does not want children remanded to custody lightly or inappropriately. The clause as drafted makes that pretty clear. It also makes it clear that not only do the conditions that we have talked about have to be met but, in the opinion of the court, the risk posed cannot be managed safely in the community. Clause 131 as drafted sends a very clear message that custodial remand should indeed be a last resort.
Amendment 130, proposed by the shadow Minister, would require the court to state in open court the age, sex and ethnicity of a child remanded to custody. In all honesty, we believe that the amendment is unnecessary because the data is already collected and published, so the information is there already. The important point about the new record being created is that the reasons for custodial remand have to be spelt out expressly to ensure that the court is properly considering those things. We can then be absolutely assured that the court has to consider those matters and record them so that they are there to look at subsequently and be reviewed, not forgotten in the rush of a court appearance. The substance is captured already by the requirements in clause 131. It seems that both sides of the Committee broadly agree on this, so I do not think that amendments 128 to 130 are particularly necessary, although I do understand the spirit in which they are moved.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I am prepared to withdraw amendment 128, given his explanation, but I ask that he look seriously at time limits, whether in some form of guidance from the Department or otherwise.
On police remand, I am still very concerned that the police are far, far more likely to remand a child in custody than a court is. I ask that the Minister think again and review the advice given to police officers to try to reduce the number of children who are automatically remanded to custody. I am content with the Minister’s explanation on amendment 129 and I will not press it.
When it comes to data, as the Minister will know because I assume that he signs them all off, I get lots of answers to written parliamentary questions saying that the information cannot be provided because it is not available or it can be provided only at disproportionate cost. If we do not gather the data, I will get more of those answers from the Minister, so I intend to press amendment 130. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 130, in clause 131, page 123, line 3, at end insert—
“(aa) after subsection (4)(b) insert—
“(c) state in open court the age, gender and ethnicity of the child.””––[Alex Cunningham.]
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I have a suspicion, but I could be wrong, that we had quite a broad canter round the principles of clause 131. Does anybody want to debate it again, or are we happy to dispose of it? Excellent.
Clause 131 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 132
Discretion as to Length of Term
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We want a youth justice system that recognises the unique needs of children, tackles the underlying reasons why children offend and intervenes early to provide support and divert them where possible. There is a distinct and separate sentencing framework for children aged 10 to 17, which recognises that children have their own specific needs that require a different and tailored approach.
The clauses and schedule amend existing legislation to enable us to make the necessary changes to the most common youth custodial sentence, the detention and training order, or DTO. The changes are to make the DTO more flexible, fairer and more in line with other youth custodial sentences.
In that spirit, clause 132 amends the sentencing code to remove the fixed lengths of the DTO, meaning that any length of DTO between four months and 12 months can be given. The court can pass the right sentence instead of being constrained to give only sentences of DTOs of four, six, eight, 10, 12, 18 or 24 months. Removing those very fixed lengths does not change the maximum or minimum sentence but just means that any length of sentence can be given between the limits of four and 24 months. Removing the fixed lengths also means that the reductions made for time spent on remand that we have just been talking about, or bail, which is subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition, and for a guilty plea, will be more accurate. At the moment, there is not always a DTO length that directly fits once remand, bail or guilty pleas have been considered, and the court must instead refer the sentence to one of the fixed lengths of four, six, eight, 10, 12, 18 or 24 months. With the proposed changes, the court may go between those sentence lengths, if it needs to, to fit in with the reductions for time spent on remand and so on. It is a fairly straightforward change, which makes a great deal of sense.
Clause 133 amends the sentencing code and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to fix a current inconsistency in relation to early release. That inconsistency means that different lengths of early release are available for offenders sentenced consecutively to a DTO and another sentence, depending on the order in which they receive those sentences. The change means that where an offender is serving a DTO and another sentence consecutively, the offender may benefit from the same amount of early release, regardless of the order in which sentences are given. I think that is a fairly innocuous and sensible technical change to the 2003 Act.
Clause 134 introduces schedule 15, and that schedule amends the 2003 Act and the sentencing code, so that time spent on remand and bail, where that bail is subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition—a tag—is counted as time served and credited accurately against the custodial part of the DTO. That is a change to the current approach, where time on remand or bail is taken into account when determining the length of the DTO, rather than being credited as time served. The schedule also makes further amendments where an offender is given two or more sentences, of which one is a DTO. Those sentences are treated as being a single term for the purposes of crediting the days spent on remand or bail. The schedule also makes changes to the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make sure that there is consistency.
Those are relatively technical and, I hope, relatively straightforward changes.
We all recognise that DTOs are the most common custodial sentence for children. Between 2010 and 2019, 20,000 offenders under the age of 18 were sentenced to a DTO. It is important that we get this right. We are tentatively supportive of the proposals in the clauses, and I look forward to the Minister’s response, which will I hope will be able to allay some of our concerns.
As the Minister has outlined, DTOs currently have to be of a fixed length. I have some sympathy with the Government’s view that having such fixed periods restricts the courts in deciding the most appropriate length of sentences. Clause 132 will address that by removing the fixed length and providing that a DTO must be for at least four months and no longer than 24 months. We agree with the Government that is important that the minimum period for a DTO is retained to ensure that extremely short, unhelpful and, indeed, counterproductive custodial terms are not given out.
I do wonder, however, whether four months is still too short, and I question the real benefits of such a short sentence. Clause 133 provides that where an offender is given two or more sentences, one of which is a DTO, those sentences are to be treated as a single term for the purposes of crediting days spent in custody, or in qualifying for bail. The explanatory notes state that this clause is intended to
“fix an existing discrepancy in relation to early release which meant that different lengths of early release were available for offenders sentenced to a DTO and another sentence consecutively, depending on the order in which they received those sentences.”
The clause aims to ensure that
“where an offender is serving a DTO and another sentence consecutively, the offender is able to benefit from the same amount of early release regardless of the order in which the sentences are given.”
Clause 134 and schedule 15 provide that time spent on remand or bail subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition is counted as time served and credited against the custodial part of the DTO.
Taken together, the clauses increase the flexibility in the system for sentencers and should mean that the sentence length can accurately account for remand episodes already served, electronically monitored bail or a guilty plea, rather than nearest permissible length based on the fixed tariffs that currently exist.
I note that the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales broadly welcomes these proposals as well. It notes that the changes may help to solve the issue whereby the fixed lengths of the DTO sentences held the potential to create a barrier to resettlement—for example, where a fixed sentence length would mean that a child would be released just after September and therefore miss out on the intake of a new school or college year. In this instance, the fixed terms would push children out of education for longer than necessary. The more flexible approach proposed here by the Government can help to address such issues.
On the face of it, these reforms seem sensible, and like something we would support. However, the impact assessment contains some concerning projections, on which I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts. The impact assessment notes an unfortunate adverse impact of removing the fixed-term nature of DTOs, in that individuals who receive early guilty plea discounts under the current system may receive longer sentences than they currently do. While there will be no additional children sentenced to DTOs under this option, the Youth Justice Board has said that it anticipates that the increase in average sentence length may lead to a steady-state increase in the youth custody population of around 30 to 50 places, costing around £5.3 million to £8.5 million per year. It has said that there would also be an equivalent uplift in the number of children supervised in the community at any one time at a cost of around £0.4 million to £0.6 million a year.
The Government’s impact assessment predicts that the proposals will increase the steady-state number of children in custody by up to 50 children by 2023-24, costing the youth custody service between £38.6 million and £61.4 million. That is of very serious concern to the Opposition. We share the Government’s stated vision of reducing the number of children in custody, and there has been great progress in that area over the past decade. The number of children in custody has decreased by about 75%, for which the Government ought to be applauded. It would be a terrible shame if we were to roll back any of the progress that has been made in this area, especially as I know how proud the Justice Secretary is of the work that has been done.
I would be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on how these proposals can be introduced without increasing the number of children in custody. Let us remember that it is the Youth Justice Board that is saying this will happen. Does the Department intend to introduce any safeguards in this area? The Opposition would like safeguards to be put in place to help to avoid the possibility of children spending longer than necessary in custody, which could also mean an increase in the number of children in a secure establishment at any one time.
I would also welcome a reassurance from the Minister on a further point raised by the Youth Justice Board in its briefing. It notes that the impact assessment states:
“Time spent on remand will be taken away from time to serve in custody as opposed to from the overall sentence length. There will be some individuals that spend longer on supervision in the community under this option, which would incur additional YOT costs. It has not proved possible to quantify these additional costs.”
We recognise that it might be beneficial for children to spend longer with the support of the youth offending team as opposed to being in custody, but there is of course an attendant impact on youth offending team budgets, which are already stretched. The Youth Justice Board says:
“Some children may spend longer on the community part of the order which gives youth offending teams more time to work with them but there is no evidence to support this as a benefit.”
The Youth Justice Board also notes that a cost-benefit analysis of these proposals, in terms of the additional spend for youth offending teams, would be helpful. Will the Minister provide such a cost-benefit analysis? Will he also confirm whether youth offending teams will be provided with appropriate further resource to handle any increased workload as a result of these proposals?
I am glad that the shadow Minister welcomes the broad thrust of these changes. That is very welcome indeed. In response to his questions about the impact assessment, it is important to say that it makes it clear on the second page that
“there will be no additional children sentenced to DTOs”.
The question therefore arises: why, then, will there be this very slight increase in the population, of between 30 and 50 places? The reason, as far as I can see, is that where the DTO sentence length falls between the two fixed points, at the moment it gets rounded down to the lower of the two, whereas under these proposals it can be calculated precisely. No additional people will be subject to a DTO; however, we will no longer have this rounding-down effect. In a sense, when we account for the time served and so on, and particularly the early plea discount, at the moment there is an inappropriate rounding down, because of the fixed points, which will now be eliminated. The time served will therefore better reflect the law and the court’s intention, and that will lead to a very slight increase in the number of people subject to these orders at any given point. However, the total number receiving the order will not change.
I accept that the total number receiving the orders will not change, but does the Minister not accept, and regret, that these proposals will lead to some children—it might only be a handful—being subjected to more time in custody than they would be under the current system? If he does accept that, what will he do to try to change it?
It is more that, owing to an anomaly in the current system that is a consequence of the fixed points, people are being let out slightly early. This change really means, among other things, that the law as written can be fully implemented, rather than this little rounding anomaly occurring. However, I stress that the effect is very slight.
By the way, I should take this opportunity to thank the shadow Minister for his earlier commendation of the Government’s record on reducing unnecessary child imprisonment.
In answer to the shadow Minister’s last question, which was about youth offending teams and longer time potentially being spent under their care, clearly it is our hope and expectation that youth offending teams will be effective—indeed, they are effective—in helping to divert young people on to a better path in life. We are generally increasing resources in this area, and I hope that that will have precisely that effect.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 132 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 133 and 134 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 15 agreed to.
Clause 135
Youth rehabilitation orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 122, in schedule 16, page 255, line 26, at end insert—
“(2A)After sub-paragraph 4(1) (Duty to give warning or lay information relating to breach of order), insert—
“4 (1A) For the purposes of this paragraph, a reasonable excuse for breach of an electronic compliance monitoring requirement shall include design faults in any necessary electronic apparatus, including (but not limited to) poor battery life; but shall not include intentional failure by the offender to charge necessary electronic apparatus.””
This amendment would introduce a safeguard to prevent children from being criminalised due to design faults, including poor battery life, on electronic monitoring devices.
Amendment 120, in schedule 16, page 258, line 34, at end insert—
“24(1) Paragraph 35 of Schedule 1 (Further provisions about youth rehabilitation orders) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1), for “The Secretary of State may by order” substitute “The Secretary of State must by order”.
(3) In sub-sub-paragraph (1)(a), omit “enable or”.”
This amendment would make panel reviews of youth rehabilitation orders routine by amending Paragraph 35, Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
Amendment 121, in schedule 16, page 258, line 34, at end insert—
“24(1) Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 (Further provisions about youth rehabilitation orders) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.
(2) At end insert—
“(6) The Secretary of State shall take steps to ensure that there are sufficient resources in place to allow for a court to make a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance in all appropriate cases.””
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that intensive supervision and surveillance is available in all youth offending areas.
That schedule 16 be the Sixteenth schedule to the Bill.
I call the Minister.
As we have said previously, and as I think the Opposition would agree, we believe that, wherever possible, children who offend should be managed in the community, as it is better for their rehabilitation and therefore wider society, as it is less likely that they will reoffend. In that spirit, clause 135 introduces and refers to schedule 16, which makes amendments to YRO provisions set out in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and in the sentencing code, which we believe will give the courts and the public confidence in YROs as an alternative to custody. The amendments are listed in schedule 16 and include the introduction of a new electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement and changes to the YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance, ISS, a high-intensity alternative to custody, with mandatory extended activities, supervision and curfew requirements.
Before we move on, it has come to my attention, courtesy of the Whips, that there will be a vote in the House at 4.30 pm. I am sure that none of you want to come back afterwards. It is up to you if you do, but I thought I would bring the Whips’ discussion to a wider audience, so we know what their ambition is for the Committee.
Clause 136
Abolition of reparation orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Given your suggestion, Sir Charles, I will place a premium on brevity. Clause 136 is straightforward. We believe that restorative justice is an important part of the justice system. However, the reparation order itself has been made redundant, having been overtaken by the evolution of the wider youth justice sentencing framework. Instead, referral orders and youth rehabilitation orders now provide a wider range of interventions, including elements of restorative justice, and are more flexible than a reparation order. They have essentially replaced reparation orders.
Also, reparation orders cannot be given in conjunction with a referral order or a youth rehabilitation order, which significantly reduces the circumstances in which they can be used. As a consequence, reparation orders have dropped out of usage—they dropped by 98% over the last decade because the other disposals have taken up the slack. Only 51 have been handed down in the year to March 2020. It is by far the least-used non-custodial disposal. Therefore, in the interests of clarity and simplicity, the clause abolishes the reparation order to enable those other forms of disposal to be used, as they are used anyway.
As the Minister explained, the clause would abolish reparation orders, which require the child to make practical amends to the victim or other affected party. The Government White Paper noted that the orders are little used, probably as they have been replaced by some of the more widely used sentencing options, and so have become redundant.
Reparation orders are the least used orders in the children’s sentencing regime, too. Between 2010 and 2019, around 5,000 offenders under the age of 18 were sentenced to reparation orders. The number of reparation orders handed down fell in each year during that period. In 2019, 66 of those sentences were passed, compared with 2,400 in 2010. In the year ending March 2020, there were just under 16,900 occasions where children were sentenced at court; only 51 of these were reparation orders.
While it is not clear why the use of the order has fallen so sharply, it has been suggested that it is as a result of changes in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which removed restrictions on the use of cautions and conditional cautions, which means that children who may have proceeded to court are possibly now receiving out-of-court disposals, which is a good thing. Do the Government plan to do any research to confirm this suggestion? I think it could be helpful if they did so, since this is quite a significant change in sentencing patterns, and it would be helpful to better understand how restorative justice processes are now manifesting themselves, given that usage is low and that reparation can also be included in other sentences, such as the referral order and youth rehabilitation order.
We support the removal of reparation orders and support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 136 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 137
Temporary release from secure children’s homes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The vote might come at quarter past 4, although the Whips will be better informed of that than me, and the Whip cannot move the adjournment while someone is speaking, I just remind him of that.
With that thought in mind, I will try to deal with the important points raised as quickly as I can.
We recognise that young people in detained accommodation or in custodial settings need a lot of support. Secure schools are being developed to do precisely this.
To support this, we think it is important that secure schools are provided by people who have a certain level of autonomy. Many charities have the necessary skills to do this. That is why, starting with clause 138, we are ensuring that providing a secure 16-to-19 academy can be counted as a charitable activity, enabling charitable secure school providers to improve outcomes in youth custody.
We always take changes to charities law seriously. We have to ensure that charities are properly regulated. The Ministry of Justice has worked closely with the Charity Commission and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to make sure that is done in a way that preserves the integrity of charity law.
Clause 137 ensures that there is a clear statutory power to enable providers to allow for temporary release where someone is sentenced to custody, which applies to secure schools as well. It is important that these children can be released into the community as part of the rehabilitation that we want to do with them. This clause puts that release provision on a statutory footing. We think that temporary release provisions are an essential tool in the rehabilitation journey, and this makes sure that can happen.
The Youth Custody Service and secure children’s homes that make temporary release decisions always do so subject to proper risk assessments. The YCS will develop formal guidance for SCH managers, outlining the necessary steps to be taken when making a balanced temporary release decision. Both these measures are helpful in ensuring that charities are able to come into this space to provide these services and that temporary release can be facilitated as part of the rehabilitation package, all of which is important.
Amendments 123 and 133 speak to the inspection regime. Like other academies and children’s homes, secure schools will be jointly inspected by Ofsted and the Care Quality Commission. They will also be inspected monthly, not annually, by independent visitors. As co-commissioners for secure schools, the Youth Custody Service and NHS England will be responsible for ensuring high standards of performance. The minimum frequency of inspection is also set out in the regulations.
As secure 16-to-19 academies will fall under the definition of a children’s home in the Care Standards Act 2000, they will be inspected on an annual basis in any case. The definition of children’s home in the Children’s Home (England) Regulations 2015 makes it clear that they will fall under the frequency of inspections regulations, so they will be annually inspected in any case, making amendment 123 unnecessary.
We have consulted HMCIP on the question of inviting it into the inspection regime, and it agrees with the Government’s position. Although secure schools are a secure environment, they are essentially schools and children’s homes, and so should be inspected by Ofsted and the CQC. Involving the prisons inspectorate in these institutions would run counter to the ethos we are trying to develop.
In speaking to amendment 146, the hon. Member for Rotherham made a compelling contribution on some of the failings that have occurred in the past, which we all agree we want to avoid. We are clearly talking about the new secure 16-to-19 academies. I want to speak to the concern about the profit motive, which amendment 146 addresses. As part of the existing academies legislation, an academy trust is, by definition, a not-for-profit charitable company, so I can confirm to the hon. Member and other members of the Committee that because academy trusts have to be not-for-profit by their nature, this new provision does not open up the possibility of introducing the profit motive into the provision of these secure schools.
I hope that my remarks achieve the twin objectives of giving commitment and assurance on these clauses, as well as avoiding a clashing with a vote that may be imminent.
Excellent.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 137 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Amendment proposed: 123, in clause 138, page 126, line 40, at end insert—
“(8) A secure 16 to 19 Academy will be subject to annual inspection by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This amendment would make secure 16 to 19 academies subject to annual inspection by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Good morning. Before we begin, let me remind you of the preliminaries. I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent; that Mr Speaker does not permit food or drink during the Committee; to observe social distancing and only sit in the appropriate seats; and to wear face coverings in Committee unless you are speaking, obviously, or are exempt. If you could pass any speaking notes to Hansard, they would be very grateful.
The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. I remind Members wishing to press a grouped amendment or a new clause to a Division to indicate their intention when speaking to their amendment.
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. Colleagues will recall that I made the point on Tuesday that the cliff edge for an extended determinate sentence, referred to by the hon. Member for Stockton North, can occur where an EDS prisoner is recalled and then serves the remainder of their custodial sentence and licence period in prison. I am sure Committee members knew that, but for absolute clarity I thought I would put it on the record.
It is a pleasure, again, to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe.
Before I respond to the amendments and observations of the hon. Member for Croydon Central, I wonder whether it might assist the Committee for me to set out why we are introducing the orders. I understand very much the points that she has made on behalf of organisations and others. I think it would help to set the orders in the context of the thinking behind their introduction.
We know that there is a serious problem with knife crime in many parts of our country. That is why over the past two years we have committed more than £176.5 million through a serious violence fund to address the drivers of serious violence locally, and to bolster the police response to it in those areas. That includes £70 million to support violence reduction units in the 18 areas of the country that are most affected by serious violence. That has been calculated through a variety of datasets, including admissions to hospitals for injuries caused by knives or bladed articles. There has been a great deal of thinking about how we target those parts of the country that have greatest experiences of knife crime and serious violence. We have also committed a further £130 million to tackle serious violence and homicide in the current financial year.
There is much more to do, however. Every time a person carries a blade or weapon, they risk ruining their own lives and other people’s lives, so we must do our utmost to send a clear message that if people are vulnerable and want to move away from crime, we will support them.
Unfortunately, in the last few days in South Derbyshire, a young lad has been murdered with a knife, and another young lad has been severely injured in a revenge attack melee. This legislation is incredibly important. My message to all parents in South Derbyshire is, “Please talk to your children about not carrying a knife.” This legislation will make a major impact, and I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for bringing it forward.
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend. May I say how sorry I am to hear of the experience in her constituency? It serves to highlight that knife crime does not just happen in great big cities, but can happen in picture-perfect rural areas as well. When I come to the pilots, I will explain why the four pilot areas have been chosen. We want to ensure that the orders work across the country, helping different types of communities and residential areas to safeguard people’s lives.
We as a Committee are concentrating on these clauses, but under the serious violence duty that we have already debated, local areas must, as a matter of law, get around a table and address the serious violence issues in their area. I very much want these orders to be seen in the context of the whole package of measures that the Government and the police are using to tackle serious violence. I very much hope that that duty will help in my hon. Friend’s area.
I apologise for asking the Minister to reply again. May I also put on the record how grateful I am for the superb work that Derbyshire police have undertaken on this case? They really have wrapped it up very quickly, and I want to ensure that—
Again, I am very happy to thank not just my hon. Friend’s local police force, but police forces across the country for all the work that they do day in, day out to keep our constituents safe.
Does the Minister acknowledge the success of the Scottish violence reduction unit that was established in 2005? It has reduced the number of homicides from 135 in that year to 64 last year. It works on the principle that violence is preventable, not inevitable, and that the best approach is multi-agency working and partnership. The detail contained in the Bill will set up such committees across the country.
Very much so. I am shameless in plagiarising good ideas to protect people across the country. We have worked very closely with the Scottish authorities to learn from them, and from their work in Glasgow in particular, how they have brought down violent crime in Glasgow. The hon. Gentleman rightly identifies that the serious violence duty very much builds on that work, so that we require every single local authority area to look very carefully at what is happening and at how they can identify and address those problems.
Will the Minister address the points that I raised with the Opposition Front Bench about pilots being held in Wales? Was any consideration given to holding pilots in Wales in the light of the distinct situation there?
If I may, I will keep that point back for a little later, but I will develop it. I promise the hon. Gentleman that every single constabulary area was considered carefully and we arrived at the result in a data-driven way. I hope to answer that point in due course.
We know that the police see stop-and-search as a vital tool to crack down on violent crime and we have already made it easier for forces to use existing powers, but too many criminals who carry knives and weapons go on to offend time and again, and serious violence reduction orders are part of our work to help to end that cycle.
The orders will give the police powers to take a more proactive approach and make it easier to target those already convicted of offences involving knifes and offensive weapons, giving the police the automatic right to search those offenders. SVROs are intended to tackle prolific, high-risk offenders, by making it easier for the police to search them for weapons.
SVROs are also intended to help protect vulnerable first-time offenders from being drawn into further exploitation by criminal gangs, by acting as a deterrent to any further weapon carrying and providing a credible reason for those young people to resist pressure to carry weapons.
I am interested in the point the Minister is making about first-time offenders. A lot of children and young adults carry knives because they are scared and because they are aware of the crime going on in their area and they want to protect themselves—they feel vulnerable without a knife. What guidance will be in place for police officers to make the distinction?
First and foremost, this will be piloted and there will be lessons learned during the careful piloting of the orders. Also, the orders are only available to convicted knife carriers above the age of 18.
I compare and contrast with knife crime prevention orders, which form part of the overall context of the orders. The hon. Member for Croydon Central will recall that KCPOs were introduced in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 and are intended to be rehabilitative in nature. We have both positive and negative requirements that can be attached to them. They are available for people under the age of 18, from the age of 12 upwards. That is the difference between the two orders.
The hon. Member for Croydon Central asked me about the piloting of KCPOs. Sadly, because of the pressures of covid, we were not able to start the pilot when we had wanted to, but I am pleased to say that the Metropolitan police will start the pilot of KCPOs from 5 July. We will be able to gather the evidence from that type of order alongside the work on SVROs, which will obviously start a little later than July, given the Bill will not yet have Royal Assent. That will run alongside. It will run for about 14 months and we will be able to evaluate and see how the orders are working.
I want to lay the same challenge to the Minister as I did to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Croydon South. The Minister talks about the fear of young people, feeling they must carry knives and being pressured into carrying knives. Does she accept that much more needs to be done to deal with the organised criminal gangs—indeed, organised crime as a whole—which drive young people to carry knives? The Government need to do so much more.
The hon. Gentleman and I agree that the young people we are understandably focusing on in today’s debate are the victims of the criminal networks and the organised crime gangs that, for example, run county line networks across the country, in urban and rural areas. They are out and about selling drugs for these sinister, cruel organised crime gangs. The many ways in which children and young people are exploited by these gangs are well known to members of the Committee. Going along with what my hon. Friend the Member for South Derbyshire said earlier, we want to get the message out that it is not normal to carry a knife. There can be a feeling within certain parts of our communities that that is what everybody does. Actually, the overwhelming majority of people do not carry knives, but it is that fear or that worry that people need to carry a knife to protect themselves that we are trying to address.
I certainly take the Minister’s point that these things are decided on objective measures. County lines extend into Wales from large conurbations in the midlands and from London. There is one specific point that might be captured were Wales included. It is a comparatively minor and specific point in that in the sentencing code in proposed new section 342A(9) it says that
“the court must in ordinary language explain to the offender”.
I draw the Minister’s attention to the point that in Wales “ordinary language” might mean in Welsh or English.
The Welsh Language Act 1967 says that Welsh and English should be treated on the basis of equality and more recent legislation establishes Welsh as an official language. That free choice of language is pretty subtle and not just a matter of law. Guidance should be given to court officers so that they understand how subtle that might be.
The hon. Gentleman raises a good point. I remember visiting Welsh courts and feeling at a great disadvantage that I did not speak Welsh. He raises a serious point. I cannot give confirmation here and now, but I know that we will take that factor into account in due course once the evaluations have been conducted. He makes a fair point and he makes it well.
When Martin Hewitt from the National Police Chiefs’ Council gave evidence to the Committee, he welcomed the piloting of the orders and made the following point, of which we are all aware:
“There is no doubt that there are people who are more violent and have a history of violence, and we do a range of things to try to reduce the number of violent crimes. Our concern is to make sure that there is no disproportionality in the way these orders are used, so we are really keen to work very closely with the pilot site to assess how this can be another tool—and it is just one further tool—in dealing with street violence and violence among younger people.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 13, Q16.]
I thought Mr Hewitt put that extremely well. This is another tool that we want to put forward to help the police deal with violence on the streets around the country.
The pilot will also test the deterrence effect of SVROs. It will trial how we ensure that vulnerable offenders are directed to local intervention teams, test community responses to the orders and examine the potential impact on disproportionality, as well as building evidence on the outcomes for offenders who are subject to an SVRO.
On the point of deterrence, the available evidence suggests that a criminal conviction can prevent reoffending through the deterrent effect, particularly in changing behaviour in more vulnerable offenders, as it could equip them with a credible basis for resisting gang or other peer pressure to carry knives. A recent academic study has shown that individual searches can produce useful results, such as the discovery of contraband materials. It could also be effective if focused on prolific offenders. One of the many reasons for running pilots on the orders very carefully is to gather evidence on their deterrent effect before they are rolled out nationally. We also understand the importance of scrutiny and oversight and stress the importance of being completely transparent about how SVROs are being used, to reassure communities that the orders are being used appropriately. During the pilot, we will work with partners to address those challenges and ensure that the orders are used appropriately and effectively.
We expect all forces to allow stop-and-search records to be scrutinised by community representatives and to explain the use of their powers locally, as the statutory guidance requires them to do. At our request, the College of Policing has updated its stop-and-search guidance to include better examples of best practice for community engagement and scrutiny, and it is available now for all forces to follow.
As required by clause 140, we will lay before Parliament a report on the operation and outcome of the pilot. That brings me to amendment 98, which would prescribe in the Bill the matters to be addressed in the report on the outcome of the pilot. The amendment lists no fewer than 14 matters that would have to be addressed as part of the evaluation. I will deal with some of the specific points, but before doing so, I again wish to reassure the Committee that we want the SVRO pilots to be robust and their evaluation to be thorough. We are still in the early design phase, and although I may not agree with all 14 points listed in amendment 98, many have merit and I can assure Opposition Members that we will take them into consideration as we progress the design work and agree the terms of the evaluation. I will make the general point that it is not necessary to include such a list in the Bill. Indeed, the approach adopted in clause 140 is consistent with, for example, the piloting provisions in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 in respect of knife crime prevention orders.
We are talking about those matters listed in amendment 98. As part of the pilot, we plan to evaluate the impact of the orders on black and ethnic minority people. When we considered police forces for the pilot, we took into account the demographics of each force, and it is a key reason why we are piloting SVROs in four forces rather than just one—to ensure that we capture sufficient data, including the ethnicity of those given an SVRO, to properly examine the impact on disproportionality. No one should be unfairly targeted by stop-and-search, and safeguards—including statutory codes of practice, use of body-worn video to increase accountability, and community scrutiny panels—already exist to ensure that that does not happen.
SVROs will be subject to the same scrutiny as current stop-and-search powers. As I said, we expect all forces to allow stop-and-search records, including those for SVROs, to be scrutinised by community representatives and to explain the use of their powers locally, as the current statutory guidance on police use of stop-and-search requires them to do. We are also exploring with the four pilot forces how they can make best use of body-worn video—that is absolutely critical, I think, in opening up transparency—and how they can use community scrutiny panels during the pilot.
What is more, during the Committee’s consideration we have contacted all the pilot areas to ask them what plans they have to contact and engage with local charities and people who work with young people to ensure that the community as a whole has an influence on how the pilots are rolled out, and all four forces have confirmed that they are already in contact with them, or are planning to be, ahead of the pilot. Again, I very much hope that that gives reassurance about the direction of travel that we expect from the four pilot forces, and indeed thereafter, when it comes to the use of these orders.
I understand that there are also concerns about mistaken identity and possible methods, such as using stop-and-account, to identify those who are subject to an SVRO. We very much expect police officers to take steps to confirm somebody’s identity on the street when exercising their powers and to be sure that the person they are stopping is in fact subject to an SVRO. It is also important to note that an officer would be acting unlawfully if they exercised the SVRO powers in relation to a person who is not subject to an SVRO. Again, as part of the pilot, we will monitor use to identify any disparities or concerns that may arise about cases of mistaken identity.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 142 and 143 stand part.
New clause 65—Registered sex offenders: change of name or identity—
“(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review of how registered sex offenders are able to change their name or other aspects of their identity without the knowledge of the police with the intention of subverting the purpose of their registration.
(2) The review must consult persons with expertise in this issue, including—
(a) representatives of police officers responsible for sex offender management,
(b) Her Majesty’s Passport Office, and
(c) the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.
(3) The scope of the review must include consideration of resources necessary for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.
(4) The review must make recommendations for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.
(5) The Secretary of State must report the findings of this review to Parliament within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.”
This new clause would ensure that the Secretary of State must publish a review into how registered sex offenders are changing their names or other aspects of their identity and propose solutions for how the government aims to tackle this issue.
I remind the Committee that if the Whip is seeking to adjourn at 1 o’clock, he will not be able to interrupt a speaker, so if we are going to proceed with that, we will need whoever is speaking to finish just before 1 pm so the Whip can do what he might wish to do.
I wonder whether it would be convenient for the hon. Member for Rotherham to speak?
It would be convenient—thank you. It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr McCabe.
I found a very real problem that I did not know existed. I have spoken to a number of Ministers in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice about it, and they all recognise that it is a real problem. I am seeking, through new clause 65, to get a review into how registered sex offenders are changing their names, and in doing so, are slipping under the radar with some absolutely devastating consequences.
Currently, all registered sex offenders are legally required to notify the police of any changes in their personal details, including names and addresses. Those notification requirements are incredibly weak, however, and place the onus entirely on the sex offender to report changes in their personal information. I would like to say that, by their very nature, sex offenders tend to be incredibly sneaky and used to subterfuge, so the likelihood of them actively notifying their police officer is quite slender.
At this point, I would like to mention the crucial work that has been carried out by those at the Safeguarding Alliance, who identified this issue four years ago and alerted me to it. They have an upcoming report, from which I will use just one case as an example. It is the case of a woman called Della Wright, the ambassador for the Safeguarding Alliance, who is a survivor of child sexual abuse. She has bravely chosen to speak out and to tell her story, which is symptomatic of that of so many other survivors who have been impacted by the serious safeguarding loophole.
When Della was between six and seven years old, a man came to live in her home and became one of her primary carers. He went on to commit the most heinous of crimes, and was free to sexually abuse Della at will. Years later, Della reported the abuse in 2007 and again in 2015. Then it quickly become apparent that the person in question was already known to the police. He had gone on to commit many further sexual offences against an undisclosed number of victims. During this time, Della was made aware that his name had changed. It has since been identified that he has changed his name at least five times, enabling him to relocate under the radar and evade justice. When Della’s case was finally brought to court, he was once again allowed to change his name, this time between being charged and appearing in court for the planned hearing. That slowed down the whole court process, adding additional stress to Della, and made a complete mockery, I may say, of the justice system.
While the loophole exists, Della’s abuser is free to change his name as often as he likes, including from prison.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Clause 142 and 143 stand part.
New clause 65—Registered sex offenders: change of name or identity—
“(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review of how registered sex offenders are able to change their name or other aspects of their identity without the knowledge of the police with the intention of subverting the purpose of their registration.
(2) The review must consult persons with expertise in this issue, including—
(a) representatives of police officers responsible for sex offender management,
(b) Her Majesty’s Passport Office, and
(c) the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.
(3) The scope of the review must include consideration of resources necessary for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.
(4) The review must make recommendations for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.
(5) The Secretary of State must report the findings of this review to Parliament within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.”
This new clause would ensure that the Secretary of State must publish a review into how registered sex offenders are changing their names or other aspects of their identity and propose solutions for how the government aims to tackle this issue.
I think the Minister was just about to respond.
I was, Mr McCabe—thank you very much. I understand that the Opposition do not oppose clauses 141 to 143, but I will obviously respond to new clause 65, tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham and signed by more than 30 other Members. I understand the message of how seriously Members across the House take the issue. We are very alive to the ability of sex offenders to manipulate systems, build trust, groom, and use many evil, awful methods in order to commit their crimes.
I am not naive to the risks that the hon. Lady put forward in her very well argued speech about the motivations of sex offenders in changing their name. As she said, there are very strict rules: sex offenders are required to notify the police within three days of changing their name—indeed, failure to do so is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of five years. I note her concerns, and those of others, about what can be done, if a sex offender does not so notify, to ensure that there are not consequences further down the line.
In fairness, parliamentarians have been having this debate for some time. I have received a great deal of correspondence on this matter, particularly in conjunction with the campaign run by the Safeguarding Alliance. As a result, I have commissioned officials to look into the matter very carefully. I have written to the Master of the Rolls requesting that a judicial working group set up by the Ministry of Justice should consider how the deed poll process can be exploited for criminal ends.
The work of that group includes considering whether amendments to the Enrolment of Deeds (Change of Name) Regulations 1994 are required. I raise that because the regulations for changing name by deed poll are made by the Master of the Rolls, not a Minister, and I must of course respect and honour that; it is not as straightforward as me signing my name and changes happening. The ball has already started rolling with the Master of the Rolls, and indeed the Ministry of Justice, to try to find ways of addressing the concerns that the hon. Lady and many other Members have voiced in recent months.
I hope the Minister recognises my concerns around enrolment, and the fact that the data then gets published. The enrolled deed poll does not include the question whether someone has a criminal past. I am still concerned that that could be a loophole.
Interestingly, the point that the hon. Lady has highlighted about, for example, victims of domestic abuse having to publish their addresses is one of the factors that we are very much having to bear in mind as we look at this. I have also received a great deal of correspondence from hon. Members concerned about the safety of transgender people, for example, and victims of domestic abuse. We can think of other examples of where people have changed their name and there are security issues therein as well as the fact of the name being changed. It is a very complicated area.
I have also listened to the concerns about the Disclosure and Barring Service system. As colleagues will know, the DBS conducts criminal records checks and maintains lists of people who are barred, by virtue of their previous convictions, from working with either children or vulnerable adults—sometimes both. That is an incredibly important process. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid) has done a great deal of work on the issue as well.
I have asked my officials to work with the Disclosure and Barring Service, employers and others, including the General Register Office, to examine whether, for example, requiring birth certificates would help assure employers such as schools of a person’s history and previous names. The work is very complicated, not least because we have to bear in mind, for example, that 20% to 25% of records checks involve applicants born overseas. Although one would hope that it is easy in this country to obtain a copy of a birth certificate if one has lost it, that may not be the case elsewhere in the world.
The Minister has been going through the same process that I have been going through. Rather than putting a blanket demand for birth certificates on everybody, is there the potential to flag all sex offenders? I am not sure about the Minister’s view, but mine is that when someone carries out a sexual offence, they lose some of their rights. If all sex offenders had a flag on them that automatically triggered the check, either with the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency or the Passport Office, that would seem a more manageable way forward administratively.
The Passport Office can already refuse to change the names on a passport under the existing regulations, but this whole area is incredibly complicated; it involves not just regulations but the common law as well. There is a great tradition in common law of people being able to change their names, and we would not want to trespass upon that. What we are trying to do is target sex offenders who are not doing what they should be—namely, notifying the police of any changes to their names.
I have gone through some of the work that we are conducting, albeit quietly; we have not gone to the lengths of describing it as a review. Given the wording of her new clause, I hope that the hon. Member for Rotherham takes comfort from the fact that we are looking at the issue seriously. We are working across the MOJ, the Home Office and other agencies relevant and important to the issue to try to find answers that are proportionate and protect the rights of the very people we are not trying to target.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby gave the example of someone who changes their name on getting married. I am sensitive to the resource implications of having blanket orders. We will continue with this work. I am happy, as always, to involve the hon. Member for Rotherham because I know of her great interest and expertise on these matters, but I hope I can persuade her not to push her new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 141 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 142 to 144 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 145
List of countries
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 145, page 143, line 16, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment would place a requirement on the Secretary of State to prepare (or direct someone to prepare) a list of countries and territories considered to be at high risk of child sexual exploitation or abuse by UK nationals and residents, rather than leaving at the Secretary of State’s discretion to produce such a list.
I previously spoke about the horrific nature of online exploitation and the need for an urgent and robust response from the UK to disrupt the cycle of supply and demand fuelling that abuse. As I previously argued, the Bill is an important opportunity for the Government to take action in this area, and clause 145 is no different. I very much welcome the measures set out in the Bill and particularly in clause 145, which provide for the establishment and maintenance of a list of countries and territories in which children are considered to be at high risk of sexual exploitation or abuse by UK nationals or residents. Tied to this, clause 146 would require applicants—for example, the police—for a sexual harm prevention order or sexual risk order to have regard to that list. These important measures should be welcomed. They give effect to a recommendation made by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.
It is vital that we do all we can to tackle contact offending overseas, but we must also take into consideration online offending against children overseas. My amendments 4 and 5, to clause 145, would require the Secretary of State to produce a list of high-risk countries for both in-person and online abuse. As currently drafted, the Bill grants the Secretary of State the ability to publish a list of countries and territories in which UK nationals pose a high risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. Through my amendments, I am seeking to clarify that that relates to both in-person and online abuse. Through amendment 6, I would make it a requirement that the Secretary of State do this; currently, it is a matter of discretion.
It is hoped that, through consultation with law enforcement and civil society, we will enable an accurate list of high-risk areas to be gathered together. That would be an immeasurably useful resource for targeting resources in the future. This process will also help us to better understand the nature of exploitation and abuse by UK nationals, enabling us to ensure that interventions are effective in achieving prevention.
As with my other amendments on online sexual exploitation of children, these amendments are supported by the International Justice Mission. I am very grateful for its support on this matter, but also for all the work that it does around the world to protect children. It knows only too well the horrific nature of online abuse carried out by UK offenders against children overseas. I really hope that the Minister is minded to add a provision about online abuse to the Bill or is able to give reassurance that the online proliferation of abuse will be included in the list.
Again, I am mindful that the clauses are not opposed by the Opposition, so I hope that I can move straight to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham. However, I should just say, for those who are not familiar with why we are putting together a list of countries, that it was a recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that we as a country must look very carefully and seriously at how sexual offenders within the UK travel abroad to rape and sexually assault children overseas. That is an incredibly important matter and one that we take very, very seriously.
The inquiry recommended that we bring forward legislation providing for the establishment of a list of countries where children are considered to be at high risk of sexual abuse and exploitation from overseas offenders—I underline that. This is a list to help people regarding offenders from the United Kingdom, not a commentary on offenders within the countries that are so listed.
The purpose of the list is to help the police and courts identify whether a civil order with a travel restriction should be made. The list has been created. We commissioned the National Crime Agency to develop the list of countries, and it brought together insights from sensitive law enforcement data, open-source intelligence analysis and the expertise of those who work with the victims of child sexual exploitation, in drawing it together.
I understand the logic of the argument that the Minister is putting forward, but what I hear anecdotally from the police is that there is that escalation. I would have thought that knowing, for example, that they are able to watch children being abused in the Philippines would be a draw for UK abusers who want that escalation to go to the Philippines. Having the word “online” there would make the police recognise the very severe damage that happens, whether it is done in person or is being directed by a UK national. It is about the recognition of how this escalates.
Yes, I do understand that point, but there has been very careful consideration of the effects of an order to prohibit a person from travelling overseas. I am told that adding “online” to the clause would undermine the appropriateness of such orders.
I also draw the Committee’s attention to the Online Safety Bill, which will help more generally in the online world. It will place a duty of care on tech companies to target grooming and the proliferation of child sexual abuse material. Of course, Members will in due course scrutinise the draft Bill that has been put before the House for its consideration.
On amendment 6, the effectiveness of the list is dependent on its reflecting the current global intelligence picture. The Secretary of State must retain the right to withdraw the list in the unforeseen event that the intelligence picture changes rapidly or that the list becomes no longer of practical use. I stress, however, that our intention is to maintain the list, and any decision to withdraw it would be taken on an exceptional basis.
I welcome the hon. Lady’s, and indeed the Opposition’s broad support for the clauses, and invite her to withdraw the amendment.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 145 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 146 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 147
Standard of proof
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Amendments 162 to 164 were tabled in not only my name but that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson). They amend clauses 148 and 149, which relate to sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders. The Government are introducing the clauses to expand the role of those orders so that positive requirements can be placed on individuals, and we welcome that. Currently, the law allows only for individuals to be ordered to stop things.
Given that the Government are introducing changes to the orders, I believe that the law could be strengthened even further, which is why I am speaking to the amendments in the name of my right hon. Friend. The amendments would impose a positive duty to refer to a treatment programme all individuals who are subject to a sexual harm prevention order where they have been convicted, or a sexual risk order when a conviction has not yet been obtained. For example, that could be prior to a court hearing when there is sufficient concern for an order to be made before a conviction is obtained.
Under the amendments, a mandatory referral to treatment services would be required for all those engaged in criminal sexual behaviour and where a SHPO or SRO is to be put in place. That is an attempt to intervene at the earliest opportunity, and in particular to stop non-contact sexual offending behaviour escalating. Starting with non-contact sexual offending, such as indecent exposure or voyeurism, is necessary as it is often a gateway to more serious offending. There is a great deal of evidence that those who commit low-level or non-contact sexual offences will often escalate their behaviour and take more risks, with the potential for increasingly violent sexual crimes.
That pattern of behaviour is encapsulated by the case of a University of Hull student, Libby Squire, who was out in Hull one night when she was picked up by a man who went on to rape and murder her and then dumped her body in the River Hull. She was not found for many weeks. It was later revealed that the man who murdered Libby had been prowling the streets of Hull for many months committing low-level sexual offences such as voyeurism and burglary of women’s underwear and sex toys. Those crimes took place between 2017 and January 2019.
The last known non-contact sexual offence that the man committed happened just 11 days prior to the murder of Libby Squire. Unfortunately, very few of his crimes were reported to the police before Libby went missing. Even if the offender had been charged or convicted of those non-contact sexual crimes, the police believe that little would have been done to address his offending behaviour, as his actions did not meet the high threshold for referral to specialist treatment.
The amendments would address that issue and make referrals mandatory for all sexual offending, including lower-level or non-contact sexual offending. That would effectively interrupt a pattern of behaviour at the earliest possible point and help to prevent an escalation of sexual offending, thus helping to reduce the risk of sexual harm to women and girls and the wider public. I look forward to hearing what the Minister says about this group of amendments, as I know that she too is very concerned about these matters.
Again, I am not going to address the clauses, because I understand they are not opposed. If I may, I will deal with the amendments. I am extremely grateful to the hon. Member for Rotherham and the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North, who has rightly brought to the fore the case of Libby Squire. Although I am not a Hull Member of Parliament, I have some knowledge of it because it is in my part of the country, and everyone in our region watched the facts of that case unfold with growing dismay, gloom and horror when it was eventually clear what had happened to poor Libby, so I very much appreciate the chance to put on the record our condolences to her family. I also completely understand why the right hon. Lady has tabled the amendments.
We are not able to agree to the amendments because we are concerned that for each offender, even of so-called low-level offences, one has to be very, very careful to make it clear that those offences are still by their very nature serious. Sadly, the depravity and gravity of sexual offences is such that there is a range, and the lower-level offences are ones that are particularly troubling to the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North in the context of this clause.
It is important to make an individual assessment of the value of a treatment programme in each case, using risk assessment and risk management plans to inform the decision. Sadly, not all offenders will respond appropriately to a treatment programme. Indeed there are fears that, in some cases, it could exacerbate their offending behaviours. At the moment and for the foreseeable future, we intend that treatment programmes should be directed towards offenders who would benefit most. When I say “benefit”, it is for the wider benefit of the community that these perpetrators are stopped, but it is for those offenders who will respond best to the programmes. That means that a case-by-case assessment must occur, rather than the universal approach proposed by the right hon. Lady.
I have spoken to the right hon. Lady and received a letter from her setting out her concerns. I know that her principal concern is how we manage effectively the risk presented by sex offenders whose offending behaviour starts with non-contact sexual offences such as indecent exposure, but which then escalates. There is a growing understanding that there is a range of behaviours that can escalate, and we very much want to address that escalation in behaviour.
However, one of the challenges is that, as the right hon. Lady acknowledges, the lower-level non-contact sexual offences might not be reported. If they are not reported, the police cannot deal with an offender if they do not know about that offender. They cannot manage the risk presented by such offenders if the behaviour is not reported and prosecuted as appropriate. So, from this afternoon, let us all encourage people who see the voyeurism or indecent exposure that concerns us in this particular area to please report that to the police. If it is reported, it begins to build a picture of that offender so that appropriate and necessary action can be taken.
Where such offences are reported and lead to convictions, the offender will be made subject to the notification requirements under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and risk-assessed and managed under a multi-agency public protection arrangement. That plan will be implemented with support from other relevant agencies within the MAPPA framework.
I join the hon. Lady in paying tribute to Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt, whose lives were tragically cut short in a horrific manner in Fishmongers’ Hall. I am really pleased that these clauses meet with the approval of both the Government and the Opposition parties, so that we are able to make some very substantial changes, as recommended by Jonathan Hall, QC. He examined the legislation with great care and attention following the commission from the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor.
The hon. Lady asked me a few questions. If I may, I will write to her on the point about the statistics; I do not have the statistics to hand, I am afraid, but I will write to her with them. She asked about the ability under clause 159 for officers to apply for a multiple entry ability warrant. The reason for that ability is that we anticipate that there will be a very small number of cases in which counter-terrorism police officers believe that a warrant permitting multiple entry is required. An application by the police will only be made following cross-agency work, including discussion with probation services on the justification for a warrant and its appropriate scope. Ultimately, of course, it would be for the court to decide, and clause 159 is clear that the court should issue the warrant only if it is satisfied that such authorisation is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.
To reassure colleagues, Parliament has previously agreed to the creation of premises search powers that permit multiple entries. For example, the search power under section 56A of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 provides for that, and it was inserted by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. I hope that as we felt able to do that in that legislation, we will feel able to do the same in the Bill, given all the safeguards.
The hon. Lady asked about the purpose of a search. The personal search will provide the police with the means of conducting assurance checks. We envisage that in the majority of cases, they will be checks on whether a relevant terrorist offender is in possession of something that could be used to harm or threaten a person—a weapon or a fake suicide belt, for example—but there may be other limited scenarios in which a personal search for something that appears innocuous may be necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism. An example would be a personal search to check whether the offender was in possession of a mobile phone in violation of their licence conditions.
This provision gives a better means of monitoring risk, because a contraband phone would be unlikely to meet any definition of something that could be used to threaten or harm, but depending on the offender’s background, it might embolden them to make contact with their previous terrorist network, enable them to access materials useful in preparing an act of terrorism, or provide a route for them to radicalise others. I hope that I have addressed the hon. Lady’s concerns.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 157 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 158 to 161 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 18 agreed to.
Clause 162 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 163
Rehabilitation of offenders
I beg to move amendment 134, in clause 163, page 180, line 23, at end insert—
“(A1) The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, as it forms part of the law of England and Wales, is amended as follows.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 143.
It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, and an equal pleasure to follow the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle.
Amendment 142 relates to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, which sets out a rehabilitation period for orders on conviction that impose prohibitions and other penalties. The rehabilitation period is equal to the duration of the period for which the order is specified to have effect. The amendment seeks to put beyond doubt that where the court imposes any provisions in an order, that attracts a rehabilitation period and requires disclosure in a way that is similar to when orders impose prohibitions and penalties. A provision may say, for example, that a person should, or should not, engage in a particular activity. Any provision, of whatever nature, triggers the disclosure requirement until such time as the provision ends. Amendment 142 makes that clear.
Amendment 138 is in a somewhat similar spirit. It relates to orders that set out that they have effect until the occurrence of a specified event. The court may make provision for some orders to have effect indefinitely, or until a further order is made in respect of the subject. Those orders might include disqualifications, restraining orders, sexual harm prevention orders and criminal behaviour orders. The amendment is intended to put beyond doubt that where such provision is made in the order, the rehabilitation period and the accompanying disclosure requirement end only when the order ceases to have effect, so once again, it is clarifying. The rest of the amendments in this group—134 to 137, 139 to 141, and 143—are technical amendments that make corrects to various cross-references.
No, I think it would be better to stick to the sequence on the selection list.
Given your direction, Mr McCabe, I will not speak to clause 163 substantively just yet—or, indeed, to amendment 165—but will speak narrowly and specifically to amendment 9.
I understand the spirit of the shadow Minister’s amendment, but I observe that it is not often that the Opposition propose conferring on Government regulation-making powers that they have not asked for. It is usually the other way around, is it not?
The Government take the view that schedule 18 of the sentencing code sets out the list of most serious offences. They are the same offences used to assess dangerousness. Using schedule 18 ensures simplicity and consistency between assessing dangerousness and requiring longer disclosure. We think it is more straightforward and transparent for those people subject to disclosure requirements to know that that is not a moving target; they know the list is fixed and will not change.
The power that the shadow Minister generously proposes conferring on the Government might lead to unpredictable changes for the people affected. For those two reasons—predictability and consistency—we prefer to set things out in statute, as is currently proposed, via schedule 18 of the sentencing code.
I will briefly answer one question that the shadow Minister posed—I might address some other questions later—on research on whether these are the right lengths of time, or whether more can be done in future. Yes, I confirm that we will continue to look at this, and to conduct research as appropriate to ensure that the balance is struck between rehabilitation and protecting the public.
The fact that the Government have missed the point about the narrow application of the measure and how very few people will be caught by it is lamentable. I will not press the amendment to a vote at this stage, but we may well revisit the matter in future. It is great to have such provisions, but they affect only a minority of people in the criminal justice system, when they could benefit so many more. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 137, in clause 163, page 181, line 27, at end insert—
“(3A) In subsection (2) (rehabilitation periods), in the words before paragraph (a), for ‘(3) and’ substitute ‘(2A) to’.”
This amendment and Amendments 138 to 140 make provision about the rehabilitation period that applies to a person who is subject to a relevant order where the last day on which the order is to have effect is not provided for by or under the order.
Amendment 138, in clause 163, page 182, line 8, at end insert—
“(4A) After subsection (2) (and after the table in subsection (2)(b)) insert—
‘(2A) Subsection (2B) applies where provision is made by or under a relevant order for the order to have effect—
(a) until further order,
(b) until the occurrence of a specified event, or
(c) otherwise for an indefinite period.
(2B) The rehabilitation period for the order is the period—
(a) beginning with the date of the conviction in respect of which the order is imposed, and
(b) ending when the order ceases to have effect.’”
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 137.
Amendment 139, in clause 163, page 182, line 9, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) For subsection (3) (rehabilitation period for community etc order which does not provide for the last day on which the order has effect) substitute—
‘(3) The rehabilitation period for a relevant order which is not otherwise dealt with in the Table or under subsections (2A) and (2B) is the period of 24 months beginning with the date of conviction.’”
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 137.
Amendment 140, in clause 163, page 182, line 11, at end insert—
“(5A) In subsection (4)(b) (rehabilitation period for other sentences), for ‘subsection (3)’ substitute ‘any of subsections (2A) to (3)’.”
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 137.
Amendment 141, in clause 163, page 182, line 29, after “order” insert “—(a)”.
This amendment and Amendment 142 make provision about the rehabilitation period that applies to a person who is subject to an order which imposes requirements or restrictions on the person or is otherwise intended to regulate the person’s behaviour.
Amendment 142, in clause 163, page 182, line 31, at end insert “, and
(b) for paragraph (g) substitute—
‘(g) any order which—
(i) imposes a disqualification, disability, prohibition, penalty, requirement or restriction, or
(ii) is otherwise intended to regulate the behaviour of the person convicted,
and is not otherwise dealt with in the Table,’.”
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 141.
Amendment 143, in clause 163, page 182, line 31, at end insert—
“(8A) In section 6(5) (the rehabilitation period applicable to a conviction), for the words from ‘by virtue of’ to ‘or other penalty’ substitute ‘to an order within paragraph (g) of the definition of “relevant order” in section 5(8) above’.
(8B) In section 7(1)(d) (limitations on rehabilitation under the Act), for ‘or other penalty’ substitute ‘, penalty, requirement, restriction or other regulation of the person’s behaviour’.
(8C) In paragraph 5(b) of Schedule 2 (protection for spent cautions), after ‘prohibition’ insert ‘, requirement’.”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment makes amendments to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 that are consequential on or otherwise related to the amendments to that Act made by Amendment 142.
As the shadow Minister said, the amendment would change the current rehabilitation period for endorsements that are imposed in respect of motoring convictions from five years to nil. Unless another disposal is given for the same motoring conviction that attracts a separate rehabilitation period, the amendment would result in some motoring convictions being spent immediately and having no rehabilitation period.
It is worth saying that the Department for Transport leads on the rehabilitation periods for motoring penalties. It is a complex area with a combination of fines, driving bans and penalty points, as well as community and prison sentences, which are an important part of the system to reduce dangerous and careless behaviour on our roads. That includes the way in which the provisions interact with the insurance system, as the shadow Minister said.
Clearly, if someone gets speeding points and that has consequences for their insurance premium for some time, it is a disincentive to drive dangerously. There is also a reasonable link between someone who drives carelessly or dangerously and the risk they pose, which leads to higher insurance premiums. There is therefore a certain justice to that link.
The range of penalties and the current penalty points system has been developed to prevent low standards of driving behaviour, which have the potential to cause serious harm to other road users and, in the worst cases, death. That approach has been successful over the past few decades, under Governments of both colours, because road deaths have, mercifully, been decreasing.
Given the complexity of the subject, we do not propose to make the change that the shadow Minister suggests just now, but I can commit to conducting further research and investigation into the matter. The shadow Minister made the point about a longer disclosure period for driving causing other matters to be disclosed for a longer period than would otherwise be the case, with the consequent impact on employability. We will conduct further research into this area to ensure that we get the balance right and continue the positive direction of travel on safer roads, while at the same time ensuring that we facilitate rehabilitation.
That is a helpful response from the Minister and I welcome the things that he had to say, particularly in relation to reviewing the issue in future. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. I understand that there is considerable cross-party support elsewhere for this approach to ironing out the anomaly, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The shadow Minister has already touched on the substance of the clause, so I do not want to repeat what he so eloquently laid out for the Committee a little earlier. In substance, the clause amends the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to enable an individual’s conviction to be spent earlier than would otherwise be the case. The reason for doing that is to enable people to rehabilitate and get back into work sooner than would otherwise be the case. However, we recognise that for the most serious offences, we want the conviction never to be spent—hence the exclusion defined by offences covered by schedule 18 of the sentencing code, which we discussed a couple of minute ago. For other offences, both for adults and for people under 18, the spending periods are reduced.
The shadow Minister asked earlier how we arrived at those particular times. We have looked at the data on reoffending, engaged widely with stakeholders and various groups in the sector that have an interest in this issue, and we have arrived at the reductions that we have. We think the reductions strike a balance between providing an earlier opportunity for rehabilitation on the one hand, and providing additional public protection and protection for employers on the other.
Of course, no Government or Ministers have a monopoly on wisdom—except, of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle—but we think this is a good starting point and a step in the right direction, as the shadow Minister has said already. However, we will continue to research in this area and will keep it under scrutiny, to ensure that the balance struck is the right one. I am pleased that stakeholders generally, and the shadow Minister, welcome this move.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 163, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 164
British Sign Language interpreters for deaf jurors
I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 164, page 183, line 10, after “interpreter” insert
“or language and communication service professional”.
This amendment would expand the provision of the clause to include other language and communication service professionals such as interpreters for Deafblind People, lipspeakers, notetakers, Sign Language interpreters, Sign Language Translators, and Speech to Text Reporters.
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech. Interestingly, it pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, he quoted the Bar Council’s concerns about whether the jury principle might be undermined, but then he moved a series of amendments that would considerably increase the scope of the clause. Those two points clearly pull in opposite directions, perhaps suggesting that the clause as drafted is about in the right place.
As the shadow Minister eloquently laid out, once again, clause 164 permits a stranger—a so-called 13th member—to enter the jury room where that person is a British sign language interpreter, to assist a deaf juror in participating in the proceedings. Both sides of the House have agreed that that is a good idea. The shadow Minister read out a quote from the Bar Council that raised some concerns about the sanctity of the jury room being infringed. That is of course an important principle in law. I sat as a juror at Croydon Crown court during the summer recess a couple of years ago, so I know that that is something that the system protects fiercely, and rightly so.
I assure the shadow Minister and the Bar Council that several safeguards are in place to ensure the BSL interpreter cannot unduly influence proceedings. They have to sign an agreement that includes confidentiality and other provisions, and undertake not to engage in any behaviour that might be of concern. They swear an oath to the same effect, and breaking it would be a criminal offence. Only BSL interpreters on the proper register can be used, so someone cannot be picked off the street and wander in; it has to be somebody who is on the approved register to start with.
The shadow Minister asked about the possibility of error. I believe that the intention is to have two BSL interpreters present just in case one makes a mistake or loses attention for a moment, so there is a safeguard there. Of course, if any member of the jury witnesses behaviour that concerns them, it is always open to them to report the matter to the trial judge. I hope that the safeguards that I have just outlined address the points that the shadow Minister and the Bar Council raised.
If jurors break their oaths and say things outside or reveal things that they should not, there can be contempt proceedings and punishments. Will the same punishments apply to the interpreters? The Minister has set out a number of contractual arrangements, which are all well and good, but will the same obligations lie upon the interpreters as lie upon jurors?
Yes, I believe—in fact, I know, because it is written down in front of me; that is not quite the same thing, but let us assume it is for these purposes—that the provisions create a new offence where a BSL interpreter intentionally interferes in or influences the deliberations of the jury in the proceedings before a court. Yes, there are now criminal provisions being introduced by the clause.
I understand the spirit in which amendments 147 to 161were moved by the shadow Minister, and he mentioned that the hon. Member for Nottingham South assisted in their development. I understand that widening the type of people who might be able to assist could help a wider range of jurors, but there are some concerns about going too far, too quickly.
As the shadow Minister pointed out, this is a significant step. It is a significant departure from centuries of established practice. Allowing a 13th person into the jury room has never been done before. There is a feeling among the stakeholders we consulted—the judiciary, the Bar and so on—that we should take this one step at a time. Let us start with British sign language interpreters and see how that goes. If it is made to work successfully, as we hope it will be, we can look in due course at widening the range of people who might be accommodated.
There are also, I should add, potential capacity constraints. For example, I am told that there are 150 registered BSL interpreters, but only 32 speech-to-text reporters, so one might have issues with the number of available people. This is an important step. Let us take this one step first and then review it on an ongoing basis to see whether we need to go further.
I accept the Minister’s explanation as far as the sanctity of the jury room is concerned, so I can leave that to one side. However, in his last few sentences he illustrated why there should be wider provision in this area: so few people are available to provide the services for the particular way he wants to take this clause forward and serve deaf people. I think there is a real opportunity to involve far more deaf people in the system. For that reason, I will press the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
This is a quick and simple clause. The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, which has been drafting this Bill, spotted a stray reference in an old piece of legislation to offences punishable by death in the context of jury sizes. It goes back to the concept of small war-time juries being unable to try certain offences where the penalty was death. We no longer have the death penalty, so the OPC thought it was a good idea to tidy up the statute book by removing the reference.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 165 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 166
Remote observation and recording of court and tribunal proceedings
I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 166, page 185, line 41, at end insert—
“(8A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (8) unless the advice of the Senior Data Governance Panel (or similar committee established for this purpose) has first been sought on the provision which they would make.”
This amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to seek the advice of the Senior Data Governance Panel before making regulations governing the broadcast of court hearings.
Clauses 166 and 167 put on to a permanent and sounder footing many of the measures that have been used during the coronavirus pandemic to, first, enable remote hearings to take place and, secondly, where proper, to allow transmission of those hearings. It is important to stress that at all times the judge retains control of the proceedings and it is ultimately for the judge in any particular hearing or trial to decide what is appropriate. Nothing in the provisions fetters that important judicial discretion and safeguard over the management of any individual hearing or proceeding.
On clause 166, over the past year, our courts and tribunals have successfully and rapidly moved the bulk of their proceedings online during the pandemic. Such hearings have been vital in our court recovery.
It should be noted that in the civil and family jurisdictions, and in tribunals, the ability to hold proceedings using audio and video technology is not governed by legislation, but is permissible under the court or tribunal’s inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, no legislation is needed to enable remote hearings for those jurisdictions, in contrast to the criminal jurisdiction, for which clause 168, which we will consider shortly, makes provision.
Legislation is required to make sure that suitable safeguards are in place to protect those taking part in a hearing and ensure the proper administration of justice. Clause 166 replicates some of the temporary powers introduced during the coronavirus pandemic for that purpose, future-proofs them and brings several new jurisdictions into the regulatory framework. The clause also allows courts and tribunals to provide transmissions of proceedings either to individuals who have identified themselves and requested access, or to specifically designated locations.
As I have already pointed out, judges, magistrates and anyone presiding over a tribunal panel retain the ultimate discretion. Regulations made by the Lord Chancellor, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, will govern much of this area and will enable the regulations to be refined for particular circumstances or applications.
Clause 167 makes several further safeguards in relation to this matter permanent, with a few minor refinements. For example, the clause prohibits the recording or transmission of anyone remotely attending proceedings in a list of major courts and tribunals, unless authorised by the court or tribunal or the Lord Chancellor. It also provides clarity by defining this offence as summary-only as well as contempt, while making new provisions to preclude double jeopardy. It enshrines some of those important safeguards.
On amendment 72, which was moved by the shadow Minister and would compel the Lord Chancellor to seek the advice of the Senior Data Governance Panel, we say that that is not necessary in legislation as set out here. Of course the Government do not make the relevant regulations in isolation. That is why secondary legislation can be brought forward only with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor—a member of the Government—and of the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice’s concurrence is a very important safeguard.
Of course, in the formulation of regulations of this nature, informal consultation will take place with a number of bodies, including the SDGP, the judiciary, court practitioners, Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and other interested parties. The SDGP does of course advise, but it is worth pointing out that the SDGP itself is not on a statutory footing and therefore perhaps it is not appropriate to give it the sort of status that the amendment proposes. That might also risk interfering with the notion of judicial independence. Therefore, although informal consultation with various stakeholders and experts is of course important, we think that the statutory obligation contemplated by amendment 72 goes a little too far.
I am content with the Minister’s explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 166 and 167 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 168
Expansion of use of video and audio links in criminal proceedings
We have heard extensively from the shadow Minister on the clause, so I do not think I need to repeat too much of what he said about its purpose, save to say in summary that it enshrines the expansion of the use of, or enables the use of, video and audio links in criminal proceedings beyond that introduced last year in the Coronavirus Act 2020, which, as we have already discussed, has enabled a great deal of court recovery.
Clause 168 builds on that progress by moving the barriers, restrictions and inconsistencies in the current legislation, which limits the potential use of live links in criminal proceedings. It is vital to stress that nothing in the clause makes remote technology in any way compulsory or inevitable. It is always a matter for choice by the court, which may choose it for reasons of health, as we have during the pandemic, or have some other reason for thinking it is a good idea. The point is, we are creating a discretion and a power for the court to use. Indeed, some participants, including defendants, may want to exercise their own choice and say to the court—for a particular reason, perhaps the inconvenience of travelling—that they want to participate remotely. It might be easier for a witness to participate remotely, for example, rather than travel all the way to a court that might be a great distance away.
The flexibility that the clause enshrines could be useful in a wide range of circumstances. Those principles have been widely debated in previous clauses and are, broadly speaking, agreed.
The proposed amendments to the clause in essence seek to introduce a range of very specific safeguards to circumscribe or control the way in which the measures may be used by a judge. The Government view, however, is that the safeguards already built into clause 168 and its associated provisions do that already. Let me enumerate what those safeguards are, which I hope will assure the shadow Minister and anyone else listening.
First, the court—the judge—must decide whether it is in the interests of justice for a live link to be used. That is a critical test. In doing that, the court is required to consider
“any guidance given by the Lord Chief Justice, and…all the circumstances of the case”—
I stress, “all the circumstances”.
The amendments have tried to pick out various different, specific circumstances. Inevitably, that list will not be exhaustive—they might forget something—so by saying “all the circumstances”, we give the judge a wide range of discretion. Those circumstances expressly include “the views” of the person who might be invited to attend by live link, so if someone has a particular problem or objection, they may table it and say to the judge why they think it is not right for them to appear remotely, if they are invited to do so. Equally, of course, they might say to a judge, “I would rather participate remotely”, for some reason of logistics or something else.
I am conscious of time and the shadow Minister made a long speech, but on this one occasion, I will give way.
I am keen for the Minister to understand that not all defendants who are offered the facility would be legally represented. They might not have appropriate advice about the benefits of appearing in person.
Where someone appears without representation, obviously a whole number of issues are raised, of which this is just one small one. In those circumstances, the judge himself or herself will—and does—carefully talk the defendant through the implications. When someone is unrepresented, the issues are to do not only with live hearings, but all kinds of elements of the proceedings where ordinarily a barrister or solicitor would assist the defendant. In the absence of that, the judge has to lead them, ask them questions and ensure that their interests are properly accounted for by the court in a manner that is impartial and fair.
Another question under clause 168 and its associated provisions that the judge must consider is whether the person concerned could participate effectively in the proceedings. A number of the amendments talk about disability and so on. It is therefore worth enumerating again in more detail the circumstances that must be considered: the nature of the proceedings; whether the person can participate effectively by live link; the suitability of the live-link facilities; and the arrangements that could be put in place for the public to observe the proceedings. There are a lot of things there that the judge is already obliged to take into account to ensure that the interests of justice are served—that the defendant gets a fair trial, or that the witness or victim may participate properly.
On children, the courts already have a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of children. It is important to acknowledge that there may be situations in which it is beneficial for a child, whether as a witness or a defendant, to appear by live link. It is important that the court can take a balanced judgment, rather than a presumption one way or the other. Critically, however, there is already a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of the child.
I hope that I have demonstrated, or illustrated, with that long list of considerations that the matters of concern that the shadow Minister has properly raised already have to be taken into account. Ultimately, however, I do not think that it is appropriate for us to seek to legislate for everything in detail, as some of the amendments seek to do. Instead, I have set out the principles to rely on—the good offices and the sober judgment of the judge presiding over the case—to make sure that justice has been done. I have a great deal of confidence in our judiciary to ensure that the right balance is struck, as has been done throughout the pandemic. No one has suggested that, during the pandemic, any particular defendant or witness has been especially badly served. I have confidence in the judiciary to get these balances right, and I believe that the statutory basis of clause 168 is the right one.
Briefly, this schedule is consequential to the previous clauses. Part 1 of the schedule enables non-parties to observe proceedings remotely; part 2 prohibits unauthorised recordings; and part 3 sets out various supplementary procedural matters around the giving, variation and rescinding of live-link directions in criminal proceedings, as provided for in clause 168.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 19 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 169
Repeal of temporary provision
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Very simply, clause 169 essentially repeals some of the temporary measures in the Coronavirus Act 2020, which are superseded by the clauses and schedule that we have just debated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 169 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 170
Financial provision
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: clause 171 stand part.
That schedule 20 be the Twentieth schedule to the Bill.
Clauses 172 to 174 stand part.
We are entering the final straight of the main section of the Bill and cantering towards the finish line.
In brief, clause 170 contains standard provisions around financial authority. Clause 171 introduces schedule 20, making a number of technical amendments to the Sentencing Act 2020. Clause 172 is a standard clause conferring powers on the Secretary of State to make any consequential amendments. Clause 173 gives the Secretary of State power to amend the sentencing code to incorporate changes to its provisions that are made by this Bill—nothing untoward there—and clause 174 is a standard clause setting out the territorial extent of the provisions in this Bill that we have debated for the last few weeks.
Over the days of our debate, Opposition Members have pointed out areas where the Government’s resource assessments seem to be well out of step with the Government’s expectations of the Bill’s impact.
One particular area of concern is the impact on prison places. The Government’s impact assessment has come up with a total increase in the adult prison population of around 700 offenders in steady state by 2028-29. After the hours of debate that we have had on changes to provisions that will extend the custodial period for many sentences and increase sentences for some road traffic offences, I find that number completely implausible. To put my mind at ease, perhaps the Minister could share with the Committee the arithmetic that conjured that number up.
Incarceration is extremely expensive, so if the Government have underestimated the impact, I worry that prison budgets will be stretched even further when they are already at breaking point. If rehabilitation and support for the cycle of offending are to work, they must be properly resourced.
There are areas of the Bill where the Government have not even been able to make an assessment of the cost impact. For instance, in the impact assessment for the changes to detention and training orders, the Government say:
“There will be some individuals that spend longer on supervision in the community under this option, which would incur additional youth offending team costs. It has not proved possible to quantify these additional costs.”
Youth offending teams are so stretched that we have even had to table an amendment to ensure that the current provision of intensive surveillance and supervision is adequately funded across the country; otherwise, the range of appropriate sentencing options for children will be limited. I hope that the Minister can commit to ensuring that additional costs will be robustly monitored so that these services, which save the justice system in the long run by turning people away from offending, are provided with sufficient resource to do their jobs properly.
I simply draw attention to the calculation set out in the extremely extensive impact assessment, which I am holding in my hand, and to the additional 10,000 prison places that are being constructed and the extra probation service personnel who are being recruited.
I think you had me cantering with you, Mr Philp, because I almost missed out Mr Cunningham altogether.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 170 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 171 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 20 agreed to.
Clauses 172 to 174 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 175
Commencement
I beg to move amendment 144, in clause 175, page 193, line 21, at end insert—
“(ea) section [Proceeds of crime: account freezing orders].”
This amendment provides for NC74 to commence two months after Royal Assent.
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 74—Proceeds of crime: account freezing orders.
Amendment 144 and new clause 74 are an administrative amendment and new clause to ensure that the provisions available under the Financial Services Act 2021 in relation to account freezing and forfeiture powers are available in Northern Ireland. It was not possible to get a legislative consent motion when that Act was passed. That clearly needs to be corrected to protect the good people of Northern Ireland, and we propose to do so through this clause.
Amendment 144 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
I am sure you will rule me out of order if I am, Mr McCabe, but I just want to make a quick remark here. In some areas, the Government have been very receptive to the Opposition’s concerns—they have committed to carrying out a cost-benefit analysis and other assessments—but the Bill was rushed through to Second Reading after the White Paper, and it was only because of an unexpected delay that we were given sufficient time to prepare for Committee stage, especially considering the size of the Bill and the complexity of some of its provisions.
I hear Ministers are keen to get this Bill through Report and Third Reading before the summer recess, which starts in four weeks’ time. I would like reassurance from the Ministers that the work they have committed to undertake will be done in a timely fashion as the Bill progresses. Perhaps they will need a little more than four weeks to get the job done. It is no good having a cost-benefit analysis that shows that a provision is too expensive to be worth it if it is already in law and has come into force.
I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman thinks that we have rushed into this. There was a period of some nine months, I think, between the White Paper and the introduction of the Bill and Second Reading. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South, and I have been very careful throughout the scrutiny of this Bill to make it clear where there is extra work to be done. The timeframes, as far as we are able to do so, have been provided.
We very much look forward to continuing to scrutinise the Bill, as the processes of this place and the other place continue in the time-honoured fashion. I am told that we have published impact assessments. Indeed, a great deal of work has gone into the Bill, and into the preparation of documents associated with it. I hope we will be able to continue the positive trends that have emerged during parts of the scrutiny of this Bill into next week. These are important measures and the Government want to pass them as quickly as possible to continue protecting the people we have been so keen to discuss in this Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 175, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 176
Short title
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I was going to talk for hours on this, but I see that my hon. Friend wants to beat me to it. This is the short title of the Bill, and we ask that it be cited as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 176 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles, as always.
I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) for tabling her amendment. I know it will not be pressed formally, but I put on the record my thanks to her for bringing the issue before the House and, indeed, to the hon. Member for Stockton North for giving us the opportunity to debate this important issue in Committee. The Government are absolutely committed to tackling all forms of abuse against women and girls, including sexual harassment. No one should feel unsafe while going about their daily life, and it is completely unacceptable for anyone to make a woman or girl feel objectified or scared.
Following tragic events earlier this year, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary reopened the first ever public call for evidence for the new tackling violence against women and girls strategy, to capture the many stories that women and girls shared with their friends and their family and on social media. We want to capture those stories as part of our work to shape the new strategy that is coming forward later this year. More than 160,000 responses were received in just two weeks, bringing the total of public responses to more than 180,000—an extraordinary figure for a Government consultation. It says so much about the determination of women and girls to stop those sorts of behaviours.
We are equally determined to respond to the sharing of those experiences. The new strategy will include work to tackle sexual harassment and to recognise the disproportionate impact it has on women and girls.
I thank the Minister for giving way—we are so intuitive now that we do not need to ask to intervene on each other.
This sort of behaviour starts at a very young age, which is why the Government were right to accept my amendment to the Bill that became the Children and Social Work Act 2017, to make relationships education for all primary school children mandatory. That should have started last September; we are now told it will start this September. Will she comment about that early intervention and the importance of it?
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for her previous work and for making this important point. I want to give the Committee an impression of the work that we are undertaking as part of the strategy. Legislation is of course an option, but we need to do so much more. We need boys and young men to understand that some of the things that they might have seen on the internet are not real life and not appropriate ways to behave towards women and girls in the street, the home or the school, as we have seen in the Everyone’s Invited work. Education is critical and, I promise her, flows throughout our work on the strategy.
I wish to correct some impressions that might exist. While there is not an offence of street harassment—or, indeed, of sexual harassment—a number of existing laws make harassment illegal, including where such behaviour occurs in a public place. That can include, depending on the circumstances of the case, offences under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Public Order Act 1986 and the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
However—this is a big “however”—I assure hon. Members that we are looking closely at the existing legislation on street harassment and we are committed to ensuring that the law is fit for purpose. We remain very much in listening mode on the issue. We will continue to examine the case for a bespoke offence and will listen closely to the debate as it develops through this House and the other place.
It is important to stress that a law is of limited use unless people know it is there and have the confidence to make a report in accordance with it. Equally—this relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Rotherham about education—it is important that police officers and law enforcement know how to respond properly to such allegations.
I am glad about what the Minister has just said, that she remains in listening mode and that she will continue to examine the case. Does she have more detail on what form that listening mode takes? Are people in the Home Office looking at this? Is there any possibility of it? Is there a timeline, a review, that we are waiting for before a decision or any kind of structure around that?
I hope the Committee will understand that it is taking us time to work through the 180,000 responses that we received—an extraordinary number for any Government survey. We have a team of officials who are working through each and every response, and we have taken each and every response very seriously. It is taking a bit of time. Once that exercise, the results of the survey, has been fully understood—fully collated and absorbed—from that, the strategy will be shaped. Later this year, we hope to be able to publish.
The strategy will deal not just with the sorts of topics that have been discussed in the course of the Committee, along with many other forms of crimes that disproportionately affect women and girls, including, for example, female genital mutilation, so-called honour-based abuse and such like. We want this to be an ambitious strategy that meets the demands of the 2020s, including the emergence of online crimes. We know from our discussions of this Bill and the scrutiny of what became the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 that perpetrators of crime can find ample opportunity online to continue their abuse. We are being mindful of all those aspects when drawing up the strategy.
The Minister is indicating a willingness to look carefully at this. Does she expect the strategy to which she is referring to end up creating new legislation? Does she expect new legislation to come out of it?
The hon. Lady is asking a question I cannot properly answer at this stage. She will know from her previous experience that drafting strategies of such depth and breadth requires cross-Government work. I am not at a stage at the moment of being able to comment directly on that. Our wider work, such as commissioning the Law Commission to look at the use of the internet and image-based abuse, which I suspect we will be talking about later this morning, and the online safety Bill, is all part of ensuring that there is lots of work across Government knitting together to provide a safer environment for women and girls, both on and offline.
We are aware that the issue is not just about the public knowing and understanding what the law is, but helping the police in knowing how to respond. I am pleased that the College of Policing has agreed to develop advice for forces in England and Wales to assist them in using existing offences in the most effective way. The Crown Prosecution Service, similarly, will revise its legal guidance on public order offences to include additional material on public sexual harassment.
Hon. Members across the Committee will agree that legislation alone cannot be expected to tackle sexual harassment. We are clear that we need to continue to drive a cultural change in attitudes and help boys and girls grow up to understand what a healthy relationship looks like and what sort of behaviour is healthy, respectful and civil in public places, and we must ensure that the sorts of episodes that girls in particular referenced in the Everyone’s Invited work are no longer experienced. I acknowledge and appreciate the debate that the amendments have induced and understand what hon. Members are seeking to achieve through the new clauses. However, I hope that, given our assurance that the Government continue to explore the issues, the hon. Member for Stockton North will feel able not to press the new clause today.
It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles. I am fully supportive of new clause 3, because I think it addresses a rather patriarchal approach that is going on and needs flushing out. The all-party parliamentary group on women in the penal system recently released its third briefing report, “Arresting the entry of women into the criminal justice system”, and its key finding was that 40% of women arrested resulted in no further action. That figure is even higher for women who are arrested for alleged violence.
That shows to me that women are being arrested and put into custody disproportionately, without the necessary due process in terms of what the outcome is likely to be. This creates a drain on police resources and, to be quite honest, is a waste of time, as arrest is not an appropriate response to women showing challenging behaviour. We need a more nuanced approach. Many officers arrested women for fear of criticism from more senior officers if they did not, and black women are two and a half times more likely to be arrested than white women, which raises concerns. Officers need to realise that turning up in a uniform can actually make a situation much more tense, and many women are arrested due to their response to the police turning up, not necessarily because of what the police were called in for. Frances Crook of the Howard League put it very well when she said that these women are annoying, but not necessarily dangerous.
I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on Lancashire police, who have started a pilot through which they bring independent domestic violence advisers to the scene where domestic altercations are going on. Officers are reporting that they have found that incredibly useful in de-escalating the situation, rather than just going straight to charging or bringing the woman in for their own protection. The new clause raises the points that first, there is a problem with the system, and secondly, more creative approaches can be used, so I am very interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on it.
As always, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles. New clause 3 seeks to remove the provision in the Bail Act 1976 for a defendant to be refused bail where the court feels it is necessary for their protection—or, in the case of children, their own welfare—that they are remanded in custody. It is extremely important to make clear to the Committee that this provision is used very rarely. It is considered to be a last resort, and it is only used when there are no alternatives, so we should be in no doubt that this is an unusual provision to use.
“Rare” is a relative concept. Would the Minister like to tell us how many people were remanded in this way during, say, the last year for which he has figures?
I am afraid that I do not have that precise figure to hand: I was relaying reports I have received from people who are active in this area. I can certainly see if that figure exists, and if it does, I would obviously be happy to share it.
The intent behind this amendment is clearly to ensure that prison is used only when strictly necessary. Of course, when somebody has a mental health crisis, for example, prison is not ultimately the best place for them to be, but there may be limited circumstances in which it is necessary to use remand for someone’s own protection—as a last resort, as I say. There is a risk that if we abolish this power without being absolutely clear what the alternatives are, vulnerable people could be left exposed. The Government agree with the sentiment behind this amendment, but we want to be certain that there will be no unintended consequences and no gaps created as a result.
The Minister made the point that the use of this provision is very rare and that prison should be used only as a last resort. I accept that, but surely for such people we should ensure that there are facilities across the country, so that it is not necessary to remand a person, in any circumstances, to prison for the good of their own health.
Clearly, the provision of alternative accommodation in those circumstances is the most desirable outcome. We need to think carefully and make sure we have covered the full range of circumstances that may arise. That is why the Government have committed to a review of this issue. We have already written to the all-party parliamentary group on women in the penal system to set out our plan for this, so that is in the public domain. I know the Howard League for Penal Reform has been campaigning in this area and it will be consulted as part of that review.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I welcome the fact that he is going to conduct a review. In doing that, could he see whether any research already exists or do some research on what the outcomes are for the small number of people who are remanded in this way? I can certainly see circumstances in which they might end up in a worse state than they would have done had they not been remanded in such a way. That is important if the Minister is considering whether to get rid of these provisions.
Yes, that is exactly the type of question the review should consider, along with the counterfactual question of what would happen if this measure is not used. Both alternatives need to be considered to reach an informed decision.
When that review takes place, can the Minister ensure that there is particular consideration of alternatives in very rural areas? Currently, women in Wales are generally held outside Wales, for example at HMP Oakwood, as there is no local provision.
Yes, consideration of the available provision needs to form part of the review to ensure that, if the option were to be withdrawn, rarely used though it is, appropriate provision across the jurisdiction of England and Wales would be available.
As this is a complicated issue, and we do not want to accidently cause a gap in provision, and because a review has already been commissioned to look at the issue, I respectfully ask that the new clause is not pressed.
I accept what the Minister says about unintended consequences. It is important that the individual is always protected. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood has welcomed the review into this, and I do too. I also welcome the fact that the Minister responded positively to my hon. Friend when she talked about an outcome study about the people who are actually involved.
I look forward to hearing from the Minister at some time in the future about how that would work, to ensure that we work in the best interests of the people who are affected by this situation. We may well want to return to the matter in future, but for now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 4
Video recorded cross-examination or re-examination of complainants in respect of sexual offences and modern slavery offences
“(1) Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 comes into force in relation to proceedings to which subsection (2) applies on the day on which this Act is passed.
(2) This subsection applies where a witness is eligible for assistance by virtue of section 17(4) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (complainants in respect of a sexual offence or modern slavery offence who are witnesses in proceedings relating to that offence, or that offence and any other offences).
(3) This section has effect notwithstanding section 68(3) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause would bring section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which provides for the cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses to be recorded rather than undertaken in court, fully into force for victims of sexual offences and modern slavery offences.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I fully support new clause 4. It links very tightly to my new clause 20, which I would like to speak to. New clause 20 would mean that once a witness was determined to be eligible for special measures, they would be informed of all provisions and able to decide which option suited them best, rather than the onus being on the court to decide which ones they were allowed. Special measures are an absolute lifeline for many victims giving evidence in court against their abuser. Navigating the criminal justice system can be incredibly challenging, and the idea of giving evidence as a witness against your own perpetrator is extremely distressing. Cross-examination causes re-traumatisation for victims and special measures are vital for reducing the impact on their mental wellbeing. Special measures include screening the witnesses from the accused, giving evidence by a live link and in private, and video- recorded evidence. Currently, victims of child sexual abuse are eligible for special measures in court when giving evidence as a witness. However, delivery of the provisions remains inconsistent and victims often have trouble accessing the measures to which they are entitled.
The onus is currently on the court to offer the provisions to the victim if it believes it will
“improve the quality of evidence”
by witnesses—so is not about the survivor’s mental wellbeing and abilities. An APPG on adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse survey found that 44% of victims were not offered the opportunity to give evidence remotely or behind a screen.
This new clause would amend the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act to ensure that once a witness was determined as eligible for special measures by the court, they would be informed of all options and could decide which measure or measures suited them best. It is worth saying that some survivors I work with actually want to be in court and face their abuser—but it is up to them to make that choice.
This amendment will provide what is best for the witness’s wellbeing, rather than if the judge thinks it will improve the quality of evidence. There was support for this proposal in the Bill Committee’s evidence sessions. Phil Bowen, Director of the Centre for Justice Innovation, said:
“Yes, I think a presumption would be useful, but I think it also requires attention to implementation and delivery issues. Special measures should already be used in specialist domestic abuse courts across our magistrates court estate and, in many cases, domestic abuse victims are without access to those measures, for want of anyone who asked.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 43.]
Adrian Crossley, Head of the Criminal Justice Policy Unit at the Centre for Social Justice, said of special measures:
“I think it makes a massive difference to the view of the complainant and, unfortunately, it would also make a massive difference to the view of some defendants, who may face the reality of the evidence against them earlier. It may encourage pleas that should have happened earlier.”
“Sometimes the implementation of special measures and, certainly, the pragmatics of what happens in court are not there and the stress that that puts witnesses through is absolutely huge.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 46.]
As we have seen too vividly with the rape review findings, lack of support for witnesses and victims in court proceedings has a genuine impact on the justice process. More than a quarter of child sexual abuse cases did not proceed through the criminal justice system last year because the victim and survivor did not support further action. One of the main reasons was that the victim worried they would find the legal process too upsetting.
The Minister may say that we should keep the law so that it is the quality of evidence that remains, because that matters the most. I say to the Government that it is obvious that when we prioritise the wellbeing of victims and survivors—the people giving the evidence—the conviction is more likely to be secured because they feel more able to speak. If the victim assumes that they will be re-traumatised in the court proceedings, why on earth would they even try to secure justice? If that is the assumption, more offenders will walk free.
Dame Vera Baird, the Victims’ Commissioner, also agreed with this proposal. In her view, the problem begins
“with the fact that the needs assessment is not done clearly by a single agency.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 20 May 2021; c. 113.]
It needs to be carried out as part of the witness care unit, rather than across the Crown Prosecution Service and police, as it currently does. Dame Vera Baird also said that the measures that may best suit the victim are not always available. Special measures are not consistently available across the country.
What will the Minister do to ensure that resources and funding are sufficient to support victims giving evidence? Some witnesses who gave evidence have claimed that special measures should remain available at the discretion of the judge. The Minister may use that argument in the Government’s response to my new clause. However, we know that the current system is letting victims down, and something needs to be done so that it is legally required that they have these options available to them. The majority of court proceedings have taken place via a live link since the pandemic began. What reason is there to refuse the same provision to vulnerable witnesses? Let us be frank: the court is not always functioning with the victim’s best interests at the centre of its decisions. This change would grant vulnerable witnesses much more autonomy over their experience in court, rather than the courts relying on who and how they are able to give evidence—the same courts that have let so many down.
If it were better for special measures to be left to the flexibility of the court rules, we would not have a situation where victims wait years to give evidence, and often then face their abuser in court. Additionally, under this new clause, the court would still be included in the decisions. It would still have to ensure that the measures or measures provided
“do not inhibit the evidence of the witnesses being effectively tested by a party to the proceedings.”
As the Victims’ Commissioner said, it should be the default position that victims, if they choose, can pre-record their video evidence weeks, months or years before the trial takes place. Not only would that be less traumatic for them, but it means the recollections are more current and therefore more reliable.
Cross-examination can also take place on video under section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act. This is particularly useful to reduce the huge backlog that the courts currently face, and these measures already exist. We just need to make sure that victims can access them as they should. The Government need to ensure that implementation is effective, and that the courts are fully resourced for it. More funding must be given to courts to provide places for vulnerable witnesses to give evidence securely, and ISVAs must also be available and dramatically expanded, so I am glad that the Minister has said that as part of the review she will actively look to employ more ISVAs.
I hope the Government listen to this argument and address the issue urgently, so that no more victims have to suffer the traumatising process of giving evidence without access to special measures.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, and the hon. Member for Rotherham for raising this important issue. Clearly, all hon. Members from across the House would want victims of these terrible crimes to be supported at what are often traumatic court hearings, and the Government have certainly been working hard on it.
Reference was made to the rape review published last week. As the hon. Member for Rotherham suggested, it contains a range of measures designed to help support victims of these terrible crimes, not least a provision for more ISVAs, as she said in her remarks. It also asks the police to take a better, more proactive, faster, more comprehensive approach to the investigation of rape. No victim is to be left without their phone for 24 hours; digital material will be requested only where strictly necessary and proportionate to the line of inquiry; and there will be better joint working between the police and the CPS and so on. So numerous measures were announced last week, all designed to help improve the situation in the area that we are discussing. In all frankness, it certainly does need to be improved.
Specifically, the clauses mention pre-recorded evidence permitted under section 28, as we have heard. It is worth saying that for vulnerable witnesses we have already fully rolled out the availability of section 28 pre-recorded evidence; that was completed in November last year. Vulnerable witnesses include all child witnesses, and also witnesses whose quality of evidence is likely to be affected because of a mental health disorder or some form of physical disability. The measure has already been implemented in every single Crown court across the country.
On intimidated witnesses, as the shadow Minister said we are already piloting the use of section 28 evidence for intimidated witnesses in three early adopter Crown courts—Leeds, Kingston upon Thames and Liverpool. That means that victims of those crimes have access to this measure and are able to pre-record their evidence, cross-examination and possibly re-examination via video early in the process, outside of the courtroom environment. That, for reasons we have discussed, is often of significant benefit to the victim.
I am very heartened by what the Minister is saying. One problem that keeps getting raised with me is that if victims choose to go down the live link route there must be authorised sites, but there are so few in the country, and they have backlogs and so on. There is a resourcing issue. However, it is my understanding that a lot more live evidence has been given by video link during the pandemic. Surely we have had a year of piloting this, as well as the specific pilots that the Minister is doing, so is he now looking at rolling back the opportunity to give evidence via live link, in order to wait for the pilot?
Giving evidence by live link in proceedings is obviously different from section 28, which applies to pre-recorded evidence and cross-examination. In answer to the question about live links, no, there is no intention to try to influence the judiciary to use live video links less than they have been doing so. Generally speaking, it has worked very successfully. Each week there are 20,000 court sessions across all jurisdictions—criminal, civil, family and tribunals—using video technology, and there is no desire on the part of the Government to see that reduced, should the judge and other participants want to continue with it. That option is available. All Crown court rooms have the cloud video platform installed in them, which will remain the case.
A new system is coming in that will improve things further, but there will be no removal of remote capability from Crown court rooms. They will have the ability to take live evidence by video link. Every cloud has a silver lining, and one of the silver linings has been the fact that every Crown court room now has that capability.
My new clause shifts the choice to the victim rather than the judge. What the Minister is saying is great, but will he support my new clause, so that the victim is able to choose whether to give evidence by live link?
Having spoken to new clause 4, let me turn now to new clause 20. As the hon. Lady says, it moves the discretion away from a judge and makes it the witness’s choice whether the section 28 recording is conducted. We want to encourage as many eligible people as possible to make use of the special measures that are available, and we have taken a number of steps to ensure that objective. For example, the revised victims code, which came into force just a few weeks ago, on 1 April, focuses on victims’ rights and sets out the level of service that victims can expect to receive from criminal justice agencies. The code also enshrines victims’ rights to have their needs assessed by the police or a witness care unit in order to determine whether they are eligible to give evidence using special measures and would benefit from doing so, to help relieve some of the stress involved in giving evidence. We want to ensure that every single eligible witness is identified, and that the matter is actively considered.
Does the Minister accept that many of these offences leave the victims feeling powerless? Powerlessness, and having things done to them, is part of the horror that arises from such offences. To give victims agency—to allow them to decide for themselves in those proceedings what would work for them—would be a powerful fillip to their psychological wellbeing, so that the court system is not then doing to them, after they have had the perpetrator doing things to them, and all the while they are feeling powerless. The Minister could do a lot of good by accepting the provision.
Clearly the victims code, published a few weeks ago, is designed to help victims in many of the ways that the hon. Lady described. I will come on to the specific question of who makes the decision in a moment. In addition to the victims code, however, we are doing more work with important agencies such as the police and the CPS, drafting guidance to share with victim care units and making sure that the understanding of the special measures, such as section 28, is as high as it possibly can be. We are also looking to maximise the use of section 24 and to improve the use of remote link sites—the point that the hon. Member for Rotherham made a moment ago—again to help victims.
On the question of empowerment, which the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood just asked about, there is clearly a balance to strike. Obviously we want to ensure that victims are protected and looked after, and that we minimise the trauma that may follow from reliving the experience. We should also be aware, however, that these are court proceedings, designed to determine guilt or innocence. The consequence of a conviction in such cases is, most likely, a long time in prison—rightly so. We therefore need to ensure that the interests of justice are considered, as well as the interests of the victim, which are also extremely important; they are both important.
Ultimately, the judge decides whether a live link may be used or the other special measures may be activated for someone who is eligible. The reason for that is that it is for a judge to make a determination in an individual case on how that case is managed and conducted, having regard to all the particular facts in the case—the circumstances, the victim and the nature of the victim, the nature of the questioning or cross-examination that might need to take place.
The concern of the Government is that if we simply legislate to remove that judicial discretion, saying that the judge cannot decide and what happens is automatic, it means that the judge will in some sense lose control of how the proceedings are conducted. There may be circumstances in which that undermines the delivery of justice.
We hope that judges listen to our proceedings—I am sure they do—and hear the very strong emphasis that we in this House give to victims. The judges are aware of the victims code and the strengthened rights that it gives victims, and they will keep that at the front of their minds when they make such decisions. I hope that they will make them—they normally make them and I hope will continue to do so—in a way that is sympathetic and sensitive. To wholly extinguish judicial discretion, however, would go a long way.
I appreciate the Minister’s giving way. I am not entirely convinced that his civil servants have read my amendment. After proposed new paragraph (b) in subsection (2), the new clause states:
“so far as possible ensure that the measure or measures provided for do not inhibit the evidence of the witness being effectively tested by a party to the proceedings.”
It explicitly gives the ultimate call to the judge. We would be giving the victim the right to have a choice, but if the judge believes that it in any way discredits the evidence that they are able to give, the judge has the right not to allow it.
The drafting is:
“Provided that a direction under paragraph (b) shall so far as possible ensure that the…measures provided for do not inhibit the evidence”.
As far as I read it, it does not give the judge the power not to make the order; it simply states that they must make the order in such a way as not to inhibit the evidence being given
“so far as possible”.
My understanding of the words on the page is not that the judge has an ultimate veto; they must simply exercise a direction in that way.
Furthermore,
“so far as possible”
is not a high test when it comes to justice being done and ensuring that evidence is given fairly. When we are potentially convicting someone and sending them to prison for a long time, ensuring that justice is done
“so far as possible”,
intuitively, does not feel like the standard is quite high enough.
I am happy to work with the Minister to get the wording exactly right, so that it does exactly what I think we both want.
The Government’s position, in conclusion, is that it is very hard to sit in Parliament and legislate definitively and bindingly—
Let me finish the sentence—for all the circumstances that may arise in an individual case. Therefore, although we have guidelines, procedures and so on, ultimately, the management of any particular case, including things such as the use of live links and proceedings in the courtroom, are a matter for the very experienced judge who is looking at the case, the defendant and the witnesses in front of him or her, the judge.
That is why, ultimately, judicial discretion is required. However, we agree with the direction of travel. I have already mentioned some of the things that we are doing to push things further. I am certain that judges looking at our proceedings will respond accordingly and will take a positive, constructive and accommodating view where the issues arise. In fact, they already have a duty under section 19 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to take into account the views of the witnesses in making their decisions. We feel that that strikes the right balance.
I do not know whether the Minister accepted the kind offer of my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham to assist him in developing new clause 20 to make it fit for purpose. He has indicated with a nod of the head that he is pleased to work with her—is that the case?
I am grateful for that clarification.
I am also heartened by the Minister’s response to new clause 4. I will not take anything away from the Government for the tremendous progress that they have made in this area. However, there have been many pilots and I believe that those have already proved that the system is working. I suspect that if it were not working, he would be looking to do something else, rather than extending the pilot. I hope that we can make some more progress sooner rather than later.
The Minister talked about the various recommendations in the rape review. I do not think that we need to wait for the Government to roll out their actions from the rape review. We could take some action now. I see the new clause as another opportunity to take another small step, but it is a significant step, to protect victims and even to improve the quality of evidence that is given in court. Who knows, that, too, might improve some of those abysmal conviction rates that we suffer as a country—suffered by victims who do not receive justice.
I completely agree with the hon. Member. Yes, of course, we need robust data to be able to do that. We are in a chicken-and-egg situation because, as the hon. Member highlights, different police forces record different things, so it is hard to grasp the problem. The thing that I am most mindful of is that the opportunity to make changes to the legislation are slight in Parliament, but the Minister has an opportunity now, so I urge him to grasp it.
Does the Minister agree that the punishment should outweigh the potential rewards for stealing pets? At the moment, people receive tens of thousands of pounds for stealing dogs, but they are not given a sentence if they are convicted. I completely understand the work of the taskforce, but we need a positive response, which campaigners and pet owners have called for. There have been some really disturbing cases, with increasing violence used in dog thefts. That is another reason why I want the Government to send a strong message that that is not acceptable and is punishable.
A dog owner was knocked to the ground and punched in a terrifying attack by two men trying to steal her pet. Allie Knight, 22, was attacked near Mutley Plain, Plymouth, as she walked her pug, Paddy. Mike Jasper was walking his dog Ted—this was awful—a sprocker spaniel, in south London in December after visiting his allotment when he was brutally attacked by two men wearing face masks and Ted was taken. “BBC Breakfast” raised this case, and it highlighted the depth of the loss that someone feels when their pet is taken. A 50-year-old woman was attacked and had her dog stolen while she was out walking in Moira Road in Woodville, Derbyshire. One man pushed her to the floor, and grabbed her two-year-old dachshund called Minnie, while the other held his fist to her face.
Police forces need sufficient resources and training to be able to deal with pet theft in a sensitive manner and highlight resources where owners can turn for support. Blue Cross strongly supported the recent decision of Nottinghamshire police to appoint Chief Inspector Amy Styles-Jones as the first specialist dog-theft lead in the country. Having a dedicated dog-theft specialist in each police force would make a huge difference, and would address the point made by the hon. Member for Stroud about the disparities across the country.
Once again, I am grateful to the shadow Minister and his colleagues for raising an extremely important issue: criminals seeking to profit from the theft of a pet. Sadly, it is a growing trend. Dog owners do not feel safe or comfortable very often, and it can be heartbreaking when a much-loved family pet is taken. Recognising that, the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs have recently created a new taskforce to investigate the problem end to end and find solutions—not just in relation to the criminal offence, which we will come on to in a moment but in relation to prevention, reporting, enforcement and prosecution of the offences. It will make clear recommendations on how the problem can be tackled. We have seen in other contexts—for example, there was a problem a few years ago with scrap-metal thefts from church roofs—how an end-to-end approach can have an effect. We should not look simply at one element of the problem but at the whole thing end to end, and that is what the task force is urgently doing, as well as taking evidence from experts. The Minister for Crime and Policing is also involved, to make sure that police investigation is what it should be.
As we have heard, the theft of a pet is currently a criminal offence under the Theft Act 1968, so the question arises of why we need a new offence. The first thing I would say is that the maximum sentence for the new offence proposed by the new clause is only two years, whereas the maximum sentence under the Theft Act is seven years. The new clause, if adopted, would reduce the maximum penalty available for stealing a pet from seven years to two years, which strikes me as incongruous, given the purported objectives of the new clause.
The shadow Minister made some points about whether the emotional value of the pet was recognised and accounted for. I draw his attention, and the Committee’s attention, to the Sentencing Council guidelines on theft, which are used by judges when passing sentence for theft up to the seven-year maximum. Under the guidance, which judges are bound to use, harm includes the emotional distress caused by the theft. The guidance also talks about the value to the person who suffered the loss, regardless of monetary worth, so the emotional distress and the non-monetary value are baked in already, in black and white, in those Sentencing Council guidelines. Indeed, the table specifying the level of harm sets out that emotional damage and harm to the victim cause an escalation in the sentence, over and above what would be the case based simply on monetary value.
Characteristically, the Minister is absolutely correct in everything he is saying, but we cannot get away from the fact that even though legislation provides for sentences of up to seven years, such sentences are not being passed. It is important to recognise that. One of the reasons that I would not back the proposal is that the Minister is right about the two years. We already have a greater sentencing option in the legislation, but that is not being taken, which is why the taskforce is key to looking at the range of options. That includes the judiciary and the Sentencing Council.
My hon. Friend makes a good point, and those topics are precisely the ones the taskforce is addressing to make sure the appropriate statutory powers exist. The maximum sentence of seven years is there. The ability to take account of emotional distress and non-monetary value is there in black and white, in the Sentencing Council guidelines. I talked through a couple of examples in which instances of high harm and high culpability can lead to substantial periods in custody. Even if the level of harm was 3, there would still be level A culpability and the possibility of between six months and several years in custody. The powers are there in statute. The question is more practical, as my hon. Friend says, and that is exactly what the taskforce will address.
The Minister is outlining how people who steal pets could get up to seven years in jail, but there is no evidence at all, anywhere in the country, to suggest that those cases go beyond magistrates court. The sentence is normally a fine; there is no evidence of custodial sentences. I do not know what the Minister proposes to do to improve guidance to the courts on how they deal with that, but perhaps it is something he needs to consider.
That is exactly the kind of question the taskforce will be considering. Under the 1968 Act, theft is a triable either-way offence, which means it can be tried in the Crown court or the magistrates court. One matter the taskforce might consider is where the more serious of those offences are prosecuted. The option of the CPS seeking to have more of the cases tried in the Crown rather than the magistrates court could be explored, and that is a topic the taskforce most certainly may consider.
It is also worth mentioning that, in addition to the work of the taskforce and the existing powers relating to a maximum sentence of seven years, there is a lot more the Government are doing. For example, in the area of animal welfare, we are introducing legislation to recognise animals as sentient beings and putting animal welfare at the heart of Government policy decision making. We have also supported calls for increasing the penalty for animal cruelty from six months to five years under the Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Act 2021, which received Royal Assent in April.
The Minister is making an interesting point about classifying animals in law as sentient, which is overdue. Does he foresee such a change leading to changes in this legislation? Theft of a sentient being appears to be a somewhat different offence from theft of what is currently seen as an object with monetary value.
On monetary or emotional value, the Sentencing Council guidelines recognise emotional value and non-monetary worth. The hon. Lady asks about the interaction between the 2021 Act and sentience, on which we are looking to legislate. That is the kind of topic that the taskforce will have in mind. It is an interesting point, and I will ensure that it features in the taskforce’s deliberations.
Given the work that the taskforce is doing across a far wider area than the criminal offence, and given that the criminal offence already has a maximum of seven years and that emotional value is recognised, I feel that the taskforce is doing the necessary work to step up action in this area. We recognise that there is a problem. More needs to be done, and the taskforce is doing it.
Pet owners across the country will be delighted that we have had the debate. We listened to what Members have said and listened the Minister’s response, and we look forward to the taskforce reporting. I do not know when the report is due, but pet owners across the country still want the Government to take action. We do not want any more dilly-dallying; we need the Government to act. We hope that they will press the taskforce to report quickly and to make recommendations that will deliver what the public want: more severe sentences for people who would steal their pets. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Rental of high performance vehicles
“(1) It is an offence to offer for rental a motor car of more than 300 brake horsepower, unless the motor car is fitted with a black box.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a black box is a telematic device which records information about the way a motor car is driven.
(3) The Secretary of State must by regulations determine the information which a black box must record for the purposes of this section.
(4) Regulations under subsection (3) must provide, at a minimum, for the following information relating to the motor car to which it is fitted to be collected throughout the period of rental—
(a) its location;
(b) its speed; and
(c) its rate of acceleration or deceleration.
(5) The information recorded by the black box must be disclosed to a constable on request, and the failure to disclose such information is an offence.
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
(7) The Secretary of State must by regulations determine how the brake horsepower of a motor car is to be calculated for the purposes of this section.
(8) For the purposes of this section, “motor car” has the meaning given by section 185 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.” —(Sarah Jones.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
My hon. Friend is right, as always. The purpose of the new clause would be of no concern to people who drive safely and competently.
The new clause would also make it a requirement for companies to hand over that black box data to the police should they request it. As Members of the House have communicated to me, this problem is repeatedly raised on the doorstep in some communities and in constituency surgeries, and getting a grip of it would not only make people safer, but push back on the costs picked up by responsible road users who are penalised through their own insurance to cover the risk presented by a minority of reckless road users who drive vehicles without insurance that become involved in crashes.
The Motor Insurers Bureau has shared with me some troubling examples of questionable insurance policies being used by some companies in this rental sector. Agencies agree that costs are passed on to law-abiding road users by those abusers of system. A black box would help to provide an evidence base for determining whether road traffic offences had been committed and, ultimately, for securing prosecutions if necessary. That would protect law-abiding road users from risk and cost to them.
Over the years, I have seen the police and various partnerships deploy several attempts to address the issue, with varying success. The new clause would make a start by using legislation to address reckless driving facilitated by the irresponsible use of hired supercars.
I have listened very carefully to the arguments made by the hon. Lady, and it seems to me that the issue comes down to the driving habits of the small group of people in West Yorkshire and elsewhere that she described.
I fear, Sir Charles, that two non-car-experts are talking about cars, which is probably uncomfortable for car experts across the country. Many of the cars the Minister has mentioned are fitted with black boxes. Police cars are fitted with black boxes. A lot of companies offer much cheaper insurance if someone has a black box fitted to their car. Indeed, there are insurance companies with the words “black box” in their name. The provision is not extreme, and this is becoming normal anyway. Given the Minister’s argument about the breadth of models of car that might be affected by the new clause, perhaps she will commit herself to considering a better definition so as to tackle this particular, extreme problem, which is very concerning for a lot of people.
There are other concerns about the new clause, which come back to the proportionality argument. I fully accept, of course, for those communities that are affected by the sort of antisocial—indeed dangerous—driving that hon. Lady has described, that their feelings as to proportionality will differ from those in a quiet rural area, for example, where there is no such behaviour, but this is where the powers that I have already outlined come in. They include public spaces protection orders, which can be particularly powerful, because they allow a local area to address the concerns in a particular part of the area as appropriate.
The concern that we have for the wider hire market is that the requirement to fit devices to these vehicles—the Honda Civic, the Volvo V60 and suchlike—could restrict choice and availability of vehicles. The low threshold may defeat the objective of stopping higher-performance vehicles being driven at speed. Consumers may in fact switch to lower-powered vehicles so as not to be monitored by black boxes, and continue to break the law.
As I understand it, given the problems that have been described to me, people specifically want to hire these high-glamour cars—Lamborghinis and so on—because they want to show off and race each other. Getting a lower-performance car is not what they are aiming for; the point is to hire these big, high-powered, high-glamour cars and show off in front of their friends.
This is difficult, in terms of defining the type of car. But I also fall back on the proportionality argument, because in requiring devices to be fitted to every single car as a matter of law, we would be affecting the overwhelming majority of law-abiding citizens, who do not race Lamborghinis and so on—although I do note, having watched Jeremy Clarkson’s farming programme, that he has a Lamborghini, albeit a Lamborghini tractor, which I suspect would not fall into this category.
We would have further concerns about the privacy consequences of fitting these devices, because to ensure that we were acting in the way that the new clause sets out, it would have to affect responsible road users as well as irresponsible ones. Telematic data is normally used to assess individual road safety risk, which can be an inexact science. As the hon. Lady said, this is currently voluntary, not mandatory. Forcing those using even medium-sized rental cars to have these devices fitted could understandably lead to privacy concerns on the part of all rental vehicle users and not just the irresponsible racers, on which the new clause is understandably focused.
For those reasons—for reasons of proportionality but also because there are existing powers to deal with this irresponsible, dangerous behaviour—we do not believe that the new clause is proportionate and therefore we hope that the hon. Lady feels able to withdraw the motion.
I have heard from several MPs about the problem that this behaviour is causing in their constituencies. The argument of proportionality is always a strong one, but in this case the problem is such that people are concerned for their safety and for the lives of the people hiring these vehicles, and therefore I would like to press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles—probably for the last time in this Committee, as I believe you may be going fishing on Thursday. That might be just a rumour.
New clause 42 is yet another attempt by the Opposition to improve the provisions of special measures for victims of sexual offences. I hope the Government are more open-minded to this proposal. The new clause would make the use of professional advocates mandatory when complainants of sexual offences undergo video-recorded interviews. I thank the Society of Labour Lawyers for its extremely valuable input in the formation of this new clause.
A number of special measures are available to vulnerable and intimidated witnesses giving evidence at trial, under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. They include the use of screens, the use of a live TV link, giving evidence in private, the removal of wigs and gowns and the use of video-recorded cross examination where a video-recorded interview is admitted as evidence in chief—under section 28, which we discussed earlier.
The new clause deals with the special measure provided for under section 27—the use of video-recorded interviews as evidence in chief. Where the witness concerned is the complainant of a sexual offence, a video-recorded interview is presumed to be admissible in a Crown Court trial as evidence in chief. The Opposition seek to amend section 27 of the Act so that, where a victim of a sexual offence undergoes a video-recorded interview that is intended to stand as their evidence in chief at trial, the interview is conducted by a professional advocate as opposed to a police officer. We believe that is a relatively small but extremely effective proposal that could strengthen the evidence collected under section 27, and as a result strengthen a number of sexual offence cases from the outset.
Currently, video-recorded interviews are conducted by police officers rather than professional advocates. That is a rather significant extension of the role of the police in investigating crime, which includes the production of witness statements and interviewing of suspects, because a section 27 video-recorded interview is intended to be played to the jury and to stand in place of the live evidence on oath that would normally be elicited from the witness by the barrister for the prosecution.
Although it is true that police officers are trained to plan for and ask appropriate questions when conducting a video-recorded interview, it cannot be said that they have the same level of training or experience in witness handling as professional advocates such as barristers. An experienced practitioner explained to me that, in their experience, the interviews conducted by police can sometimes be repetitive, confusing and unclear. As a result, they may risk undermining the prosecution’s case.
I stress that I am not criticising the police, who we know are committed to a full and thorough investigation of crimes. Rather, we believe that this is not covered by the police’s usual remit of expertise, so it stands out as an anomaly in the range of police duties. The police should not be asked to carry out such duties, which fall outside the ordinary range of criminal investigation—especially in cases involving vulnerable or intimidated witnesses, which is what section 27 makes provision for.
We are also concerned that the use of police officers to conduct examination under section 27 may risk creating an imbalance in the equality of arms between the prosecution and defence. That is because the cross-examination of the same victims, whether conducted live during a trial or pre-recorded under section 28, will be conducted by a professional advocate, namely the defendant’s barrister. The provisions of section 27 are intended to help a witness give their best evidence, but under the current system they may be prevented from doing so.
As things stand, with police officers undertaking interviews under section 27, the key witness in a sexual offence case—they will often be the only one in such cases—is denied the benefit of having their evidence for the prosecution elicited by a professional advocate. New clause 42 would redress that imbalance so that victims who receive the special measure of a section 27 video-recorded interview are not denied the chance to have their evidence elicited by a professional advocate.
The Government should adopt this eminently sensible proposal as soon as possible as one of their planned measures to improve the criminal justice system’s response to rape and sexual offence cases. It would improve both the strength of the victim’s evidence, and their experience of being questioned. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts; I could not see anything on section 27 in the end-to-end rape review. Has his Department looked at the issue? Could it do some more work on it?
Before I turn to new clause 68, I pay tribute to the Mother of the House, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), for the time and energy she has devoted to this Bill. She has been a fierce and tireless advocate for improving the lives of women and girls, and her reputation as one of the most powerful voices in the House is well deserved. My hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham has made powerful points while speaking on amendments relating to section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. As she has already spoken at length about what section 41 does, or at least is intended to do, I will spare the Committee’s time by not repeating what has been said.
I move on to new clause 68. The Opposition are deeply concerned by the issues raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham. If section 41 is not functioning as was intended it is only right that the law be reviewed and, if necessary, amended. The last thing we want is for alleged victims of rape to face the ordeal of their sexual history being discussed in court—unless it can be shown to be absolutely necessary and only when strict criteria are met.
The Opposition’s whole approach to this Bill has been to try to protect women and girls from violence and abuse and to ensure that all victims of violence are supported and protected through the criminal justice system. On section 41, we have sought to achieve this through new clause 68. The clause would compel the Government to ask the Law Commission to review section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, with the specific purpose of identifying whether it provides the safeguards intended when it was enacted—and if not, to advise the Government on avenues of reform.
As I am sure Committee members will agree, the question of what evidence should be admitted during trial is contentious and difficult; any reforms must carefully balance protecting complainants with respect for fair trial rights. Allowing the Law Commission to conduct a thorough review of section 41 would be the best course of action to determine the way forward.
Our thinking is twofold. First, we can have full confidence that the Law Commission will be able to evaluate this type of issue. It includes some of the most pre-eminent legal minds in the UK, so there is no doubt that it would review section 41 with the utmost care and detail. Secondly, if the Law Commission were allowed to undertake a root-and-branch approach to section 41, it might make recommendations for reform that went beyond those covered by the new clauses tabled to the Bill. For example, even the most experienced of legal practitioners sometimes struggle with the complexity of section 41, leading to avoidable errors made during trial. We hope that new clause 68 would allow the Law Commission to recommend changes that might be beneficial in this area, as well as others.
It seems that the Opposition are not alone in believing that pursing a Law Commission review is the best way to approach section 41; over the weekend, I was pleased to hear that the Government also concur with that view. Page 17 of the Government’s end-to-end rape review report sets out that one of the actions that the Government will implement within the first six months will be to ask the Law Commission
“to review the way rape myths are tackled as part of the court process and the way in which evidence about the victim is used.”
Yet that strikes me as somewhat strange. When answering a question from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham on this very topic in the Chamber yesterday, the Lord Chancellor seemed somewhat reluctant to confirm that that was the case. Furthermore, paragraph 114 of the Government’s response to the rape review sets out that the Government have already asked the Law Commission to review section 41. I ask the Minister: which is it? Have the Government already asked the Law Commission to review section 41? If not, will he show his unequivocal support for that course of action by voting for new clause 68?
I hope that this is not the last time I serve under your chairmanship on this or any other Committee, Sir Charles.
There is a lot to speak to in this group of new clauses, all of which cover the extremely serious question of the evidence given by rape complainants and other victims of sexual violence before the court and the need to make sure that they are properly looked after and that no one is deterred from coming forward with their claim. It would be terrible if people had an allegation and did not feel able to make it because they were concerned about the issues that we have talked about this afternoon.
I will take each new clause in order. New clause 57 talks about the rules around the disclosure of counselling or therapy sessions in some circumstances. It is important to set out how the law currently stands. There are already significant safeguards, and it is worth going through them. First, the police may request advice from prosecutors on whether something might be a reasonable line of inquiry. If they believe that medical notes might be a reasonable line of inquiry, they are allowed to approach the counsellor. They are not allowed to approach the counsellor simply because they believe such notes exist; that is allowed only if they believe the notes would support a reasonable line of inquiry.
If the notes do exist and if there is a reasonable line of inquiry, the police may approach the therapist to ascertain the situation, and the therapist may confirm or not confirm that there is a reasonable line of inquiry to pursue whether the notes do or do not exist. If they do exist, and if there is a reasonable line of inquiry, the therapist or counsellor does not disclose the relevant notes unless the victim gives their consent. The victim can withhold their consent and say, for whatever reason—understandably, in many cases—“I am not comfortable having that disclosed.” Unless there is a court order compelling disclosure, which is a significant process that involves going to the court to get an order, the notes are not disclosed.
If the victim agrees that the notes can be disclosed, that does not mean they will necessarily be produced in evidence or disclosed to the defence. That will happen only if there is material capable of undermining the prosecution or, conversely, capable of assisting the case for the defence. So there are several steps to go through before very sensitive, private and personal information gets disclosed, one of which is the victim’s own consent. That can be overridden only by an order of the court.
I appreciate how sensitively and proactively the Minister is responding. The problem seems to be the perception as opposed to the reality on the part of the victim and also on the part of the police who, from my constituents’ experience, were routinely saying, “Unless you give us that information, we cannot proceed with the case.” That has a chilling effect, which is why I am pushing for clarity and also a change in the law so that the guidance that should be there now would necessarily flow from that change in the law.
I accept the point that there are instances, such as those that the hon. Lady referred to in her speech and I am sure exist more widely, where victims have had things said to them that are basically not appropriate and that either misrepresent the law as it currently stands or have the effect of deterring someone who would otherwise want to proceed with a case. That is probably one of the things that contributes to the unacceptably low level of rape prosecutions at the moment.
Paragraph 20 of the rape review report explicitly includes working with the police and getting them to take a different approach, frankly, to the one that the hon. Lady described in her speech and intervention. That will avoid the chilling effect. A moment ago, I laid out the law as it stands: it provides significant safeguards, including the victim’s own consent. The issue is not the law, but how the law is being described to victims. That is why this issue is not so much for legislation but for the police and others to communicate more appropriately with victims. I assure the Committee that that is absolutely at the heart of the Government’s agenda for the rape review and other work.
Will the Minister confirm that the particular issues that I raised on new clause 68 are covered by the review? Can he totally clarify that?
Yes. The Law Commission has been commissioned already and the remit, to which it has agreed—it has not been debated—is to examine the law, guidance and practice relating to the use of evidence in prosecutions of serious sexual offences and to consider the need for reform in order to increase the understanding of consent and sexual harm, and improve the treatment of victims. It covers all the areas that we have discussed.
Section 41 relates to the disclosure of a victim’s personal sexual history—obviously a very private, personal matter. We are all concerned that that provision may in some cases discourage, or deter, people from making complaints. Under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, there is a general prohibition on the admission of evidence or questions in cross-examination relating to the sexual history of the complainant apart from four very specific exceptions listed in subsections (3) and (5). Those exceptions are narrow and limited, and the judge’s consent—permission —is required in advance; the defence cannot just bring out that history in court.
Besides having one of those conditions met, further criteria must be met: first, the evidence cannot be designed simply to impugn the credibility of the complainant; secondly, it must relate to specific and relevant instances of behaviour; and thirdly, the refusal of permission might render the verdict of the jury unsafe. That second set of criteria are applied after the court has examined whether one of the four very specific circumstances are met. That is why in 92% of cases no such evidence is adduced—a good thing, frankly. That practice will be considered by the Law Commission, however, as per the request in new clause 68.
The review has been commissioned and will examine the matters that we all agree are important and sensitive and where a delicate balance has to be struck. Rather than legislating in haste now, albeit absolutely for the right intentions, I think we should let the Law Commission’s work unfold and proceed. That will not happen in time for the Bill because we will be on Report and Third Reading in just a few weeks’ time. However, there are other Bills—I will not be specific, but if Members look at the Queen’s Speech they can probably work out which ones—in which measures such as this might be made. I suggest to the Committee that that is the best way to proceed.
I call Sarah Champion if she would like to respond before I call the shadow Minister.
Broadly speaking, the Government are keen to see alternatives to short custodial sentences. That is why we have been forward in promoting alternatives, such as community sentence treatment requirements to ensure that people get mental health, drug or alcohol addiction treatment as an alternative to short custodial sentences. As the Lord Chancellor has said, however—the shadow Minister also quoted him—in some cases, as a last resort, short sentences are required where the offender is not complying with community alternatives. I think we are agreed that short sentences should be available as an option.
I hope that the shadow Minister is reassured to know that the proportion of our prison population serving a short sentence of less than one year, say, is small. I do not have the precise figure at my fingertips, but I am pretty sure that less than 5% of our total prison population is serving a sentence of less than a year. Already, therefore, the principle that community alternatives are better than a short sentence is being applied in practice.
The new clause in some areas simply repeats the existing law, but in other areas I disagree with its principles. In fact, four principles are laid out in the new clause, the first and second of which—that custody should not be imposed where a community sentence would suffice, and that the community sentencing range should not escalate on each occasion—are already included in the Sentencing Council’s “Imposition of community and custodial sentences” guidelines, which set out the approach that courts should take when deciding whether to impose a community or custodial sentence. The law is clear that custody should only be imposed where an offence or combination of offences is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified. Therefore, the first two of the four principles in the new clause are already enshrined in law.
The third principle of the new clause we disagree with on principle. It states that a relevant previous convictions should not push an offence over the custody threshold, where the current offence would not justify custody on its own. In effect, that element of the new clause says, no matter how many previous offences someone might have committed, “Don’t look at that when deciding how long to sentence someone for.” I disagree with that. When someone is before the court having committed a large number of previous offences, that is rightly treated as an aggravating factor, which makes custody and longer custody more likely. It is right that repeat offenders are sentenced more seriously than people who have, for example, committed a first offence. So that element of the new clause I disagree with on its own terms.
The final of the four principles in the new clause refers to not giving custody to an offender where they are a primary carer, except for reasons of public safety. A legal principle is already established in the case of Petherick that where an offender is on the cusp of custody, imprisonment should not be imposed where there would be an impact on dependents, which would make a custodial sentence disproportionate. The principle about primary carers is also reflected in the imposition guideline, and further to that the sentencing guidelines already say that where someone is a
“sole or primary carer for dependent relatives”
that is taken to be a mitigating factor.
The law as it stands gives some protection to primary carers. It does not go quite as far as the new clause, which I think goes too far; I do not think that someone being a primary carer should literally be a get out of jail free card. That person should be accountable and answerable for their crimes, if they have committed them, but their role as a care giver should be taken as a mitigating factor. That consideration is in law already, so for all those reasons, I do not support the new clause.
I welcome the clarification around carers and sentencing, but it is still a fact that carers often find themselves in prison for short sentences when that could have been avoided.
I appreciate that the Government are making a commitment to look at short sentences and how they are set in the future. I hope that that work is done quite quickly, because I think it could drive tremendous change not just for defendants, or offenders, but for their families, and drive the rehabilitation to which my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham referred earlier.
I do not intend to press the new clause. The Minister spoke about previous offences always being taken into consideration. I think that adds to the roundabout of people entering prison, leaving prison, entering prison, leaving prison, when the Government should ensure that such people have proper rehabilitative support rather than just their sentences being extended each time they appear in court for a similar offence. We need a much greater emphasis on rehabilitation in this country, and I hope that the Government recognise that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 18
Release of prisoners on Fridays or the day before Bank Holiday periods
“Section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 is amended by the insertion of the following subsection after subsection (3)—
‘(3A) Where a prisoner is to be discharged on a Friday or the day before a bank holiday, at the discretion of the governor of the prison they may be discharged on a day within the previous five working days that is earlier than the day on which the prisoner would otherwise fall to be discharged.’”—(Alex Cunningham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
We do recognise that there are challenges in making sure that offenders leaving prison are given access to the services they need, so that they can get their lives back on track. However, Friday is a working day, and we would prefer to focus our efforts on making sure that those services are available on Friday, rather than on excluding Friday as a release day and therefore concentrating all the releases on just four days—Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday—which, by definition, would mean that release numbers on those days were 25% higher than would otherwise be the case.
I hear what the Minister says, but the new clause would mean that we could address any issues on a Friday and before the weekend, when no staff are available.
In terms of ensuring that people have access to the necessary services—we recognise that that needs to be done—significantly increased investment is being made to address the concerns that the hon. Lady has just raised. For example, in January this year—just a few months ago—the Government announced a £50 million investment to reduce crime and tackle the drivers of reoffending. That included work to help develop the Department’s approved premises—those are obviously important when somebody is coming out of prison—to provide temporary accommodation to prison leavers at risk of homelessness in five key probation areas. In addition, earlier this year—again, I think it was in January or February—an additional £80 million was announced, which was aimed at expanding substance misuse programmes. Those two initiatives, funded this calendar year with £50 million and £80 million, are aimed at tackling prisoner homelessness issues and, separately, drug addiction problems, so there is a real commitment to do more in this area.
I would like to turn to the question of Scotland—the shadow Minister’s native home. As he said, it legislated in 2015 to allow release not five days earlier, but up to two days earlier. A Freedom of Information Act request made just a few months ago uncovered the fact that over the six years that Scotland has had this provision, only 20 people have been released early under it, so it has not had an enormous effect in Scotland.
We would like to focus our efforts on making sure that when people are released on a Friday they are properly looked after, instead of increasing the numbers on Monday to Thursday—
I was about to sit down, but I can see that the member of the Committee from a Scottish seat wants to intervene, and it would be churlish not to accept.
I thank the Minister for giving way. Does he accept that a significant number of people are imprisoned hundreds of miles from their homes, and being released on a Friday would prevent them from getting the necessary services locally? Does he also accept that the prison governor, having known the prisoner’s history in prison, is best placed to decide whether releasing him a few days early would benefit him and his opportunity to reintegrate into the community, thereby reducing his reoffending?
I do understand the point, but public transport clearly does operate on a Friday and, indeed, on a Saturday and a Sunday for the most part.
It is instructive that, over the last six years, only an average of three people per year have been released early from Scottish prisons, suggesting that prison governors in Scotland, for whatever reason, have not chosen to use this power very widely. For that reason, it is right to concentrate our efforts on investing in rehabilitation services, as we are doing.
I am hoping that the Minister is allowing me to intervene at the end of his remarks. He is concerned about increasing the number of people released from Monday to Thursday, but—I am sure he was listening attentively to my speech earlier—a third of all prisoners are currently released on a Friday. Some 33% or 34% of all prisoners are released on a Friday, and some of them could be spread over the previous four days, which would help services in trying to come to their aid.
I am concerned about what the Government might want to do. The question I pose to the Minister is: what are the Government going to do about the fact that such a high proportion of prisoners are released on Friday, to level it out a bit? I do not intend to press for a vote, but it is important that the Government consider what they are going to do about the huge spike on a Friday and, more importantly, about the lack of access to services. The Minister talked about investment in services, but if those services close down at half-past 4 on a Friday afternoon, they are no use to anybody being released from prison in those circumstances.
I thank the shadow Minister for drawing attention to the statistic. As I said earlier, the focus is on investing to make sure that services are available—the £50 million and the £80 million. An additional consideration would be encouraging governors to make the release early in the day to avoid encountering services closing for the weekend.
Yes, although I will probably sit down now. We are obviously looking at a very bespoke set of circumstances concerning female prisoners in Wales released on a Friday. I hear the concern about distances travelled in Wales, and I will undertake to raise that with my colleague the Prisons Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk).
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his speech. He does not need to implore this Government to listen to the girls he has quoted. Not only are we listening, not only have we listened, but we are following through with a tackling violence against women and girls strategy that is truly ambitious and, I believe, an unprecedented effort to tackle the issues that the girls he quoted have to contend with.
As I said, we conducted the first ever call for evidence on tackling violence against women and girls. No other Government have gone out to the public as we have to ask girls and women for their experiences of what they face day in, day out in their lives. We opened the conversation to the whole of society, so men and boys were very welcome to contribute as well.
I set my officials the challenge of reaching a young woman in her 20s, getting the bus home from work at night, who would not normally respond to surveys. We would somehow try to find ways of reaching her. Not only did we try that in December, but following the awful events of earlier this year—I deliberately do not name anyone, because I am respectful of the family, but I suspect we know the events of which I speak—we reopened the survey, precisely because we understood that women and girls want to talk and to share their experiences.
That is when we received 160,000 further responses. Each and every one is being read and considered carefully in drawing up our tackling violence against women and girls strategy. However, because the Government place so much focus on crimes that disproportionately affect women and girls, we have also decided to focus not one, but two national strategies on such crimes. For the first time, therefore, we have split out domestic abuse from the catch-all phrase “violence against women and girls”, not because we are trying to de-gender it or to deny that the crime disproportionately affects women and girls, but because it is such a high-volume, high-harm crime that it deserves its own national strategy. Thus, we are giving it the focus it deserves in the domestic abuse strategy, which will be published later this year, after the VAWG strategy.
If nothing else has come out of recent events, it is that the range of offences that VAWG covers is significant, so we cannot pretend that a one-size-fits-all approach will suit all those crimes. We do not try to do that, and we are certainly not working towards that. We want to have tailored strategies fit for the 2020s, looking at both offline and online behaviour.
I hope the Minister is aware of how grateful I am for all the work she has done on this cause. She has really been a champion for it. Is she able to share with the Committee her thoughts about whether the crime is increasing or our awareness is increasing? Does she have any thoughts she can share about the root causes of this, and therefore how early prevention will stop it happening?
It is a complicated answer to a complicated question. We know, for example, that some forms of crime are increasing, and there is ongoing academic research into some of those, but we have reason to believe that more women are reporting facing violent acts within sexual relationships. That encompasses a range of relationships, from intimate, long-term relationships to first dates. That is precisely why, on the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, we worked across the House with colleagues to clarify the law on the so-called rough sex defence, because we knew that women in intimate, long-term relationships and in shorter relationships were experiencing that. Through that Act, we also brought in the prohibition on non-fatal strangulation, and again we worked on a cross-party basis. There is emerging evidence, particularly on the latter, that more and more victims of domestic abuse, but also those in other types of relationships, are facing these acts within—to use shorthand—the bedroom. We very much wanted to put a marker in the sand to say, “This sort of behaviour is not healthy, and it is now not lawful.”
The thinking is that those sorts of behaviours have increased over recent years. The thinking behind that is that online pornography has had an impact. However, I refer the hon. Lady to the research that I commissioned when I was Minister for Women and Equalities on the impact of online pornography and attitudes towards women and girls. The Government published that a few months ago. It is fair to say that there are not quite the clear lines that some would expect, but there are common themes there, if I can put it as broadly as that. Online pornography is a factor with some crimes, but sadly violence against women and girls is—dare I say it?—as old as time. The ways in which a minority of men—I make that absolutely clear—see fit to behave towards women and girls is part of the Gordian knot that we must try to untie. It will be a longer-term process than this Bill or the next Bill that comes along when legislation is appropriate. It will require a cultural education journey, as well as shorter-term fixes.
I am very pleased that the hon. Member for Stockton North raised the Law Commission research. As part of our work on ensuring that the law is keeping up to date with modern practices, we have commissioned a lot of work from the Law Commission recently. I do not apologise for that. In fact, it gives me the opportunity to thank the Law Commission for the work it conducts, often looking into very complex areas of law and trying to find ways through in order to assist this place and the other place in updating the law.
The current investigation into hate crime illustrates that point very well. In 2018, we asked the Law Commission to consider the current range of offences and aggravating factors in sentencing and to make recommendations on the most appropriate models to ensure that the criminal law provides consistent and effective protection from conduct motivated by hatred towards protected groups or characteristics. The Law Commission published its consultation document in September. It was an enormous document—more than 500 pages and 62 separate questions. The Law Commission has been very clear that the consultation document was exactly that; it was not a report or a set of conclusions. It does not represent the Law Commission’s final position on any of the issues raised.
I make that point because the new clause invites Parliament to adopt those recommendations wholesale, and I think we are all duty bound to acknowledge that what we have had so far from the Law Commission is a consultation document. It is not its final report. Indeed, the Law Commission hopes to report in October, and of course the Government will give that report very, very careful consideration. I do not believe, however, that it would be appropriate for this Government, or indeed any Government, or any Parliament, to sign what is effectively a blank piece of legislation without seeing what the Law Commission is going to recommend.
We do not know what the consequences may be of the recommendations, nor what would be required to enact and enable them. It may be, for example, that changes to primary legislation would be required. I have to say that I feel uncomfortable at the prospect of the Bill permitting other parts of primary legislation to be overwritten—overruled—by virtue of the super-affirmative procedure. We must surely ensure that significant changes to the law should be properly debated by both Houses of Parliament in the normal way, with any Bill going through all the normal processes and stages.
I gently suggest to the Opposition that perhaps they should be careful what they wish for, because in this very Bill clause 59 gives effect to the Law Commission’s recommendation relating to the common law offence of public nuisance. It made that recommendation in 2015 and recommended that it be put into statute. If I recall our deliberations correctly, the Opposition opposed that very clause. I cannot imagine what the reaction would have been had we attempted to have this super-affirmative procedure imposed in relation to clause 59.
The Minister points to the risks of legislation being passed that defines something that is as yet undefined, and that being a blank cheque. Does she agree that our concerns about the protest element of the Bill, which gives the Home Secretary the right to define vast sections of the Bill after the legislation has been passed, relate to the same principle?
No, no, no, on the very contrary. I do not want to get into very technical discussions about the ways in which hate crime legislation is drawn up, but the hon. Lady will know that there are reams of statute setting out various elements of hate crime and aggravating factors in sentencing. The proposed new subsection to which the hon. Lady refers in clause 54 relates to the definitions of
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried out in the vicinity of a public procession, or…serious disruption to the life of the community.”
It is not a proper comparison in any way, shape or form, because that is a definition of two terms, whereas—who knows?—the Law Commission may be very radical in its reform and recommend that we change many parts of primary legislation that has been passed over several years by various Governments.
On new clause 25, we have already taken significant action, not least with the passing of the Domestic Abuse Act, but we must go further. That is why we will publish the tackling violence against women and girls strategy and a complementary domestic abuse strategy to focus all our attention on those crimes that disproportionately affect women and girls. I have already spoken about the importance of education and challenging some cultural attitudes that exist in corners of society. That will be very much part of the work of both of those complementary strategies, so I invite the Committee to await the Law Commission’s publication of its conclusions, and publication of the Government’s VAWG and domestic abuse strategies. I hope that the hon. Member for Stockton North will be content to withdraw his new clause.
There are sufficient protections for Parliament in the secondary legislation process. Given what the Law Commission has done in the past, “radical” does not strike me as a word that would be applied too often.
Will the Opposition then change their mind and support clause 59, which is a Law Commission recommendation to put public nuisance on the statute book?
Indeed we will not.
The important thing here is to think about what we are trying to achieve. We are actually trying to achieve better protection for women and girls out there in society, day after day, week in, week out.
The Minister managed to talk about commissioned reports, two strategies and one survey. We have so much information in the system already that we know now that we need to act to deal with this. The evidence that I quoted from Emily and Cassidy bears that out. They are 15 or 16 and they were making it very clear that this is a major problem in society. I praise their school for facilitating discussions across the school. I hope that other schools will follow on, because that might build awareness and do away with us punishing people as, hopefully, society changes to the extent that women and girls are much more valued and not subject to the abuse that they suffer now, which may start as verbal but ends up very physical.
I am mindful that the Whips want to finish at 5 pm. We need to make progress if that is to be achieved.
New Clause 21
Minimum sentence for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) an individual is convicted of an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
(b) the offence was committed after the commencement of this section and at a time when the individual was aged 18 or over.
(2) The court shall impose an appropriate custodial sentence (or order for detention) for a term of at least the required minimum term (with or without a fine) unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justify its not doing so.
(3) In this section “appropriate custodial sentence (or order for detention)” means—
(a) in the case of an offender who is aged 18 or over when convicted, a sentence of imprisonment, and
(b) in the case of an offender who is aged under 18 at that time, a sentence of detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.
(4) In this section “the required minimum term” means seven years.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause creates a statutory minimum sentence for rape of 7 years. A court must impose at least the statutory minimum unless it is of the opinion there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justify not doing so.
Brought up, and read the First time.
It is impossible for anyone who has not been through it to imagine the trauma of being raped. That is why I will start with the anonymous voice of a rape victim who was attacked on 29 February last year. The attack happened after a night out in Marlborough. The victim awoke to find 20-year-old Killian Hutchinson assaulting her before raping her. She told police officers that she felt unable to move, either out of fear or because she was intoxicated. She told the Swindon Advertiser:
“I felt immense shame, I felt like nobody would believe me, I felt like it would go nowhere and I’d…done all of this for nothing. But know that none of this is true, those who love you will believe you, the shame you may feel is misplaced. And it won’t all be for nothing.”
It is a scandal that her attacker was sentenced to imprisonment of just five years and three months after pleading guilty to rape.
For the benefit of the Committee, I point out that although the maximum sentence for rape is life imprisonment, there is not currently a minimum sentence set out in statute. Instead, the sentencing guidelines set a starting point for rape of five years, which can be reduced to only four years if certain mitigating circumstances exist. The Opposition simply do not believe that four years is a proportionate sentencing option for one of the most horrendous crimes that it is possible to commit.
There are two options available to us. One would be to ask the Sentencing Council to review the current sentencing guidelines as they apply to rape, but that would take time and there is no guarantee that it would recommend any changes. The second is to create a statutory minimum sentence for rape—a provision along the lines of section 51A of the Firearms Act 1968, which compels a court to hand down a minimum sentence unless there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence, or the offender, that justify not doing so. In other words, this method creates a minimum sentence that can be set by Parliament, but still gives judges the power to depart from that sentence in exceptional circumstances.
New clause 21 uses this method to create a minimum statutory sentence for rape of seven years, which we believe is more proportionate to the devastating consequences of this crime. The new clause would not only ensure that the punishment better represented the crime; it would also bring our sentencing regime closer to that in other common-law jurisdictions around the world.
I thank the House of Commons Library for the extremely helpful briefing that it put together on this point. When I asked what the sentencing ranges for rape were in other common-law countries, its research showed the following. The minimum sentence for rape in India was increased in 2018 and now stands at 10 years. In Australia, the Australian Law Reform Commission said in 2020 that the penalty range for rape was 12 years to life imprisonment. In the state of Victoria, rape carried a standard sentence of 10 years; and in New South Wales, the standard sentence was seven years.
That prompts the question of why is the sentencing minimum for rape comparatively low in this country? Can the Minister honestly say that a four or five-year sentence can ever truly reflect the enormous damage caused by rape? I must be clear about this: we are not talking about the maximum sentence available to courts, nor the average sentence; we are talking about the minimum sentence that a rapist could conceivably receive, as the sentencing regime stands.
I have a suspicion that the Minister will argue that setting minimum statutory sentences undermines the law by removing the discretion afforded to judges by way of the sentencing guidelines. He was previously at pains to talk about average sentences handed down being somewhat higher than the minimum, but it is still the case that many rapists receive much lower sentences. Surely toughening the law around minimum sentences cannot be so disagreeable, as clause 100 of this very Bill ensures that repeat offenders in relation to certain crimes receive a statutory minimum sentence. As the Library briefing sets out:
“Clause 100 and Schedule 11 of the Bill would change the law so that for these offences a court is required to impose a custodial sentence of at least the statutory minimum term unless there are exceptional circumstances that relate to any of the offences or to the offender”.
If members of the Committee have suddenly had a feeling of déjà vu, they are correct in thinking that they have heard that phrase before. That is because new clause 21 would create a statutory minimum sentence for rape of seven years, unless exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or the offender would make it unjust to do so. In other words, new clause 21 is much the same as clause 100 of the Government’s Bill, which sets a minimum sentence for those convicted of repeated drug offences and burglaries.
That raises an important point. If the Minister says, as I suspect he will, that the Government cannot support new clause 21 because he does not agree with statutory minimum sentences, why does he support clause 100? What is it about the crimes under clause 100 that the Government feel deserve minimum sentences that rape does not? Why does it seem that the Government’s thinking is different when it comes to crimes that affect predominantly women and girls? Why is he happy to have minimum sentences for repeat drug offences, which, as I set out earlier in Committee, will greatly increase racial disparity in the justice system, but not for rape?
As an Opposition, we accept that increasing the minimum sentence for rape will not in isolation solve the greater issues at play, but it would ensure that the punishment is proportionate to the crime. Fundamentally, it would send out a clear message that the Government are serious about tackling the epidemic of violence against women and girls in society. The question for the Minister is simple. Does he feel that four to five years in prison can ever be a proportionate sentence for rape? If not, does he support longer sentences for rapists? He has indicated in the past that he does; now is the time for him to ensure that they are imposed.
Like new clause 21, new clause 22 would use the model of the Firearms Act to create a statutory minimum sentence for those who commit the most serious type of stalking offences. When researching the law in relation to stalking, I came across a very useful and persuasive report written by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Cheltenham. The report was part of a campaign by someone who is now the Minister responsible for prisons to recognise the immense harm stalking causes and to increase the maximum sentence that applies to the more serious forms of stalking—stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress. The report makes a compelling case and it is little wonder that it led to the maximum sentence being doubled from five years to 10. However, it did nothing at all to ensure that the minimum sentence for this horrendous crime reflects the impact on victims’ lives.
As with rape, there is currently no minimum statutory sentence for those who stalk with the intention of invoking fear of violence or serious alarm or distress. Instead, judges follow the sentencing guidelines. As the law currently stands, someone convicted under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 can receive anything from 10 years in prison to a category C fine. Not only do we not agree with that, but it misrepresents the gravity of the offence. We also believe that the current system provides no deterrence to perpetrators of this terrible crime. Moreover, it is deeply troubling how few perpetrators of serious acts of stalking ever receive custodial sentences. One report notes that despite record numbers of convictions for stalking, 58% per cent of stalkers received only community or suspended sentences. How can it be right that more than half of stalkers never spend a day in prison? What sort of message does that send to the victims of this horrendous crime?
The purpose of new clause 22 is to end that undue leniency and ensure those convicted of the most serious form of stalking can expect to receive a custodial sentence as default, rather than as an exception. The question for the Minister is one of policy. Is it right for someone who stalks with the intention of causing fear of violence to receive a simple fine or a suspended sentence?
As the shadow Minister made clear in his opening remarks, these are incredibly serious offences that leave victims traumatised and distressed, and the psychological scars are often borne for many years, if not decades, after the offences are committed. They are among the gravest offences that can be committed, and it is right this House takes them seriously. We have discussed the Government’s commitment to improving prosecutions in this area, and that was laid out by the Lord Chancellor in his statement yesterday following the publication of the rape review on Friday last week. More needs to be done, and the Government commitment in this area is clear.
I am listening intently to everything the Minister and his colleague are saying, which is great, but does the Minister understand that we have been promised all this for a long time? Although we are hearing his promises, we are awaiting the outcomes of reviews for which we are not given dates. Women are being murdered and abused.
My colleague, the safeguarding Minister, tells me that the refreshed VAWG strategy will be published this year, in less than six months. I hope that gives some reassurance to the hon. Lady. If she is asking for action, I would point to the extra £25 million VAWG-specific funding, the new offences created in 2012 and the doubling of sentences in 2017. Those are not promises for the future, but actions that have been taken. She should also note that three quarters of those convicted of the offence get immediate custody, and that immediate custody of 16.9 months is more than three times longer than the minimum proposed in the new clause.
We want to make sure that those found guilty of those bad offences, which are terrible in themselves and can lead to escalation, are getting appropriately punished. But we are trying to strike a balance between that and the need to give the judge the ability to consider the individual case on its merits. That might include, for example, the perpetrator having mental health issues, where treatment might be more appropriate than custody. We need to tread carefully in striking that balance.
Given the action that has been taken and that three quarters of the offenders get immediate custody for a term much longer than the minimum proposed in the new clause, we are trying to strike a balance, which is not easy. There are good arguments on both sides of the issue, but we feel that the current sentencing laws make sense in this context. We have made a commitment to keep this under ongoing review and there are other legislative vehicles that could reconsider the issue. I am sure that the VAWG strategy, which my hon. Friend the safeguarding Minister is overseeing, will consider all the issues in the round, when it reports a little later this year.
These are difficult issues and difficult balances to strike, but I hope that I have explained why I believe the Government’s approach strikes that balance.
On new clause 22 and stalking, it was interesting to listen to the level of sentencing imposed, and that is quite encouraging. But I think the Government recognise that more still needs to be done, and I hope that they will continue to consider the matter.
I also think that it would be helpful to have more publicity about what happens to stalkers who commit that crime, because women are still not confident about coming forward. If they learn that they will be taken seriously and that the people who are making their lives a misery may receive the sort of sentence the Minister outlined, more women may come forward and use the law. I hope that the Government will consider that suggestion.
I am disappointed that the Government are prepared to vote against increasing the sentence for rapists. I never thought that I would stand in Committee and believe that Conservative Members would think that it was okay to vote against a minimum sentence of seven years for rapists. I have spoken to rape victims—it was some time ago, not recently—and they tell me that the people convicted went to prison for four years, five years, seven years, but they, the victims, got a life sentence. They continued to live that ordeal. Then, of course, when they learned that the person was due to be released, they lived their lives in more fear because they were afraid that something dreadful might happen to them again.
On a point of order, Sir Charles. In my speech, I said that 74% of people convicted of a stalking offence with serious alarm faced immediate custody. I should have been clear that that was all custody, not just immediate custody.
Thank you for that point of order, Mr Philp; I am sure it was much appreciated by the Committee.
New Clause 23
Street sexual harassment
“(1) A person must not engage in any conduct in a public place—
(a) which amounts to sexual harassment of another, and
(b) which they know or ought to know amounts to sexual harassment of the other.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the person whose conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to sexual harassment of another if a reasonable person would think the conduct amounted to sexual harassment of the other.
(3) The conduct referred to in subsection (1) is known as street sexual harassment.
(4) A person (A) engages in conduct which amounts to street sexual harassment, or which they know or ought to know amounts to street sexual harassment, of another (B) if—
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, and
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of—
(i) violating B’s dignity, or
(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.
(5) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (4)(b), each of the following must be taken into account—
(a) the perception of B;
(b) the other circumstances of the case; and
(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.
(6) For the purposes of this section, “conduct” includes speech, non-verbal attitudes such as gestures imitating or suggesting a sexual act, and obscene sound effects.
(7) A person who engages in any conduct in breach of subsection (1) is guilty of an offence.
(8) Where on any occasion an authorised officer finds a person who he has reason to believe has on that occasion committed an offence under section 1 above, he must give that person a notice offering him the opportunity of discharging any liability to conviction for that offence by payment of a fixed penalty, unless subsection (9) applies.
(9) This subsection applies (and subsection (8) does not apply) if a person has previously—
(a) been found guilty of an offence under subsection (1), or
(b) made payment of a fixed penalty issued under subsection (8).
(10) Where a person is given a notice under this section in respect of an offence—
(a) no proceedings shall be instituted for that offence before the expiration of fourteen days following the date of the notice; and
(b) he shall not be convicted of that offence if he pays the fixed penalty before the expiration of that period.
(11) A notice under this section shall give such particulars of the circumstances alleged to constitute the offence as are necessary for giving reasonable information of the offence and shall state—
(a) the period during which, by virtue of subsection (2) above, proceedings will not be taken for the offence;
(b) the amount of the fixed penalty; and
(c) the person to whom and the address at which the fixed penalty may be paid; and, without prejudice to payment by any other method, payment of the fixed penalty may be made by pre-paying and posting to that person at that address a letter containing the amount of the penalty (in cash or otherwise).
(12) Where a letter is sent in accordance with subsection (11)(c) above payment shall be regarded as having been made at the time at which that letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.
(13) The form of notices under this section shall be such as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe.
(14) The amount of a fixed penalty payable in pursuance of a notice under this section is £500.
(15) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause creates an offence of engaging in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature in public. Those found to have committed an offence would be given an on the spot fine of £500. Those who commit the offence on further occasions would liable to receive a fine of up to £1000.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 24 seeks to establish a review into sentencing in cases of domestic homicide, following many tragic cases, including those of Ellie Gould and Poppy Devey Waterhouse, among others, where there remain concerns about the sentences handed down by courts. The Government recognise those concerns, which is why my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor has already announced a review of sentencing in domestic homicide cases.
We are carrying out a targeted review of how such cases, focused on those that involve fatal attacks on intimate partners or ex-partners, are dealt with in our justice system, including how such cases are sentenced. It is the Lord Chancellor’s intention to make quick progress on this and to conduct the review while the Bill is making its way through the legislative process. The first phase of the review is under way to gather data and relevant information, following which the Lord Chancellor will consider the best form for the next phase of the review.
As for a review of domestic abuse legislation more generally, Parliament has just finished scrutinising, at length and in depth, the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The Act contains many important reforms and proposals for the future, and our focus must be on implementing those reforms before reviewing their impact.
Turning to new clauses 48 and 55, clause 27(7) requires the Secretary of State to publish or make arrangements to publish the report of an offensive weapons homicide review, unless publication is considered inappropriate, in which case the Secretary of State must publish as much of the report as is considered appropriate for publication. Beyond that statutory requirement, we want to ensure that the recommendations from offensive weapons homicide reviews are shared, considered, debated and, where appropriate, implemented locally and nationally in England and Wales. We will therefore set up a new Home Office homicide oversight board to oversee the introduction of offensive weapons homicide reviews to monitor implementation of any findings and to support dissemination of learnings locally and nationally. We will set out further details about the board and how it will operate in due course.
We have already undertaken to create a central repository to hold all reports from DHRs. Once introduced, all historical reports will be collected to ensure that there is a central database on domestic homicides. That is a significant move forward. We are working closely with the domestic abuse commissioner on the detailed arrangements for that central repository so that it can be effective in helping all relevant agencies to access and apply the lessons learned from DHRs.
Finally, in relation to child death reviews, the “Working together to safeguard children” guidance sets out the statutory requirements regarding child death reviews. Established processes are already in place to collate and share learning from such reviews, and it is a statutory requirement that child death review partners make arrangements for the analysis of information from all deaths reviewed and that learnings should be shared with the national child mortality database. The database analyses the patterns, causes and associated risk factors for child mortality in England and disseminates data and learning from the reviews via its annual and thematic reports.
We are not persuaded that new clause 55 is necessary. The statutory guidance for DHRs makes it clear that where the criteria for a review are met a review should be conducted. The power in section 9(2) of the 2004 Act to direct that a review be undertaken is a backstop and, in practice, is rarely needed. However, when it is needed, it is exercised. Indeed, the Home Secretary exercised it recently in the case of the death of Ruth Williams, because Torfaen Council had refused to progress a DHR. Furthermore, we have introduced a process whereby the DHR quality assurance panel reviews all cases where a decision has been made not to conduct a review. The quality assurance panel is made up of members representing statutory bodies and expert organisations, and they are well placed to consider whether a DHR is necessary and to offer appropriate feedback. That process ensures that DHRs can commence as soon as practicable, without needing the Home Secretary to intervene in every case.
In summary, we agree that the lessons for all the homicide reviews must be learned and applied locally and nationally. Mechanisms are already in place, or are indeed being put in place, to ensure that that happens, so we are not persuaded that the two new clauses are necessary at this stage.
I am interested in the homicide board to which the Minister referred. We would appreciate more details about how that would work, and it would be nice if we could get them before Report. I am reassured about the number of databases that there are, because we know that violence breeds violence, and I suspect that there are themes across all these areas from which we could learn more. I ask the Minister to keep pushing the issue.
The right hon. Gentleman makes a very valid point. There are some cases where a lone male parent is the principal carer who may find himself in the dock facing a prison sentence. Naturally, the provisions apply to both men and women.
Dr Paradine puts it very compellingly: these are things that are already meant to happen in the court, yet in many cases they still do not. The Government clearly intend these things to happen, so I hope they can support the new clauses backed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights today and tighten provision in this area.
New clause 35 would impose a requirement for the judge to consider the impact of not granting bail on a child when determining in criminal proceedings whether to grant bail to a primary carer of a dependent child. This is an important measure because we know that even short bouts in custody can have very destabilising effects on families. The Government’s own figures show that a significant proportion of women remanded into custody do not go on to receive a custodial sentence. In 2019, 66% of women remanded by the magistrates court and 39% remanded by the Crown court did not go on to receive one. Again, under the current provisions, consideration should be made of child dependants but in practice it is not, and so again we ask the Government to support the amendment backed by the JCHR and tighten practice in this area.
Finally, I turn to the data provisions in new clauses 26 and 36. New clause 26 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the number of offenders who receive a custodial sentence and who are parents of children or are pregnant at the time of their sentencing. New clause 36 would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the number of prisoners who are the primary carers of a child and on the number of children who have a primary carer in custody. Both clauses speak to the same issue: there is an absence of data on this topic that needs to be addressed.
As the JCHR stated in its legislative scrutiny report for the Bill:
“The Government still does not know how many mothers of dependent children are in prison. It also does not know how many children are separated from their mother by her imprisonment. Despite this Committee’s repeated recommendations that it should collect this data, the Government’s approach continues to keep a group of children invisible to policy makers, the courts, the Prison Service and other support services.”
The Committee continued:
“A lack of data inhibits the ability of the Government, prisons and local authorities to design and evaluate services for children whose mothers are in prison. It prevents children whose primary carer has been separated from them, through no fault of their own, from accessing the support that will help them during and after their mothers’ sentence, and ultimately shows a blatant disregard for the rights of the child, as well as their parents’ right to family life.”
The absence of data is impacting service provision and ultimately preventing the Government from being able to improve measures to support primary carers and their children who are affected in this way, and means that we cannot measure progress in this area. These simple and straightforward duties on the Government are the next necessary step in improving the criminal justice system’s response to these cases, and I hope that the Government can support them today.
As Women in Prison recognises, this is a timely opportunity for the Government to
“make progress on their ambitions to radically reduce the number of women in prison included in their strategy and National Concordat on women in the criminal justice system, as well as the recommendations of the Farmer Review on women.”
Given that three in five women in prison have children under the age of 18, the proposed changes are needed now, as the Bill ushers in sentencing reforms.
The new clauses have cross-party support and will safeguard the welfare of the thousands of children who experience the profound impact of maternal imprisonment by ensuring that it is at least at the forefront of sentencers’ minds. All we ask is for the Government to ensure that what should happen does happen. Often, it simply does not.
The inclusion of the new clauses in the Bill will ensure that the data on the welfare of children is captured and adequately reported, so that those children can access the services and support that they need and deserve.
I am conscious that we are perhaps not progressing as quickly as we had hoped, so I will try to be concise, while answering the questions properly.
The Government accept that we should avoid imprisoning a primary carer unless it is absolutely necessary, but we should also be clear that when someone commits a serious criminal offence, the fact that they are a primary carer should not confer immunity from imprisonment on them. There is clearly a legitimate criminal justice objective in imprisoning some people in some circumstances. We should not get into a position whereby simply having a dependant renders the offender immune from custody—that is not a reasonable proposition. However, we should ensure that custody is used as a last resort and sparingly. I will answer the questions in that spirit.
New clause 26 concerns data collection. The Government fully support the intention behind it, but we do not believe that it is necessary. We already take steps to obtain details of dependent children or pregnancy both at court, as part of the pre-sentence report, and again on reception into custody. However, it is true that the information is not collected centrally, or in a standard format. The Government intend to enable that information to be collated better and to improve its availability. The underlying data exists; it is simply a question of collation and we intend to respond positively to the various JCHR recommendations on that.
Again, we support the principle behind new clause 32, but do not believe that it is necessary. The sentencing code is already clear that
“the court must obtain and consider a pre-sentence report before forming the opinion unless, in the circumstances of the case, it considers that it is unnecessary to obtain a pre-sentence report.”
Existing legislation already asks the court to obtain that PSR. In addition, further guidance was introduced in 2019 for probation practitioners. It sets out that for those who are primary carers with responsibilities for children, a request to the court for an adjournment to prepare the PSR is considered mandatory. That is to ensure that the impact of a custodial sentence on dependants is considered.
As we set out in the sentencing White Paper last September, we are currently running a pilot in 15 magistrates courts. It includes targeting female offenders, who, among other cohorts, have been identified as having particular needs, for fuller written PSRs.
I hope that it is clear from the sentencing code, the guidance issued to probation practitioners and the pilot work that the matter is already being addressed through existing measures. That is probably one reason why so few women are in prison.
Again, the Government are sympathetic to the sentiment behind new clauses 33 and 34, but, by law, a court is already required to state its reasons for deciding on a sentence, and courts are required to take into account the impact on dependants at various points in the sentencing process. We have already discussed the Petherick case, which established that, on the cusp of custody, cases where there is a dependant should be treated in a way that takes that into account. That can tip the scales so that a custodial sentence that might otherwise have been considered proportionate becomes disproportionate.
As we have discussed, courts are also required by law to follow relevant sentencing guidelines issued by the independent Sentencing Council, unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so. Reflecting the principles in the Petherick case, which we have spoken about, the guideline on the imposition of community and custodial sentences is clear that
“on the cusp of custody, imprisonment should not be imposed where there would be an impact on dependants which would make a custodial sentence disproportionate to achieving the aims of sentencing.”
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Good morning, Mr McCabe. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for perhaps the last time on this Committee. New clause 27 would ban taking photos or film footage of someone who is breastfeeding, without their consent. I, for one, was extremely surprised when I found out that our criminal law does not make sufficient provision for that. I am tremendously grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Withington (Jeff Smith), who brought this to my attention following an awful incident in his constituency, for his invaluable work campaigning on the issue since then. I am also grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), who has taken up the matter with characteristic enthusiasm and tenacity. The House is extremely fortunate to have MPs of such calibre campaigning on such vital issues.
I also put on the record our sincere thanks to Julia Cooper, the Manchester, Withington constituent whose case I just referred to, for beginning the campaign to let women breastfeed in peace. Julia has led an impressive campaign, and I hope the Committee will answer with unequivocal support. As of this morning, her campaign petition has more than 26,500 signatures. To illustrate the issue, I will share some of Julia’s testimony about the distressing incident that she was subjected to. She said:
“I visited a park…with my baby for a walk with another mum. At the end of the walk we sat on a bench outside a café and fed our babies.
As I was breastfeeding, I noticed a man staring. He then attached a long-range zoom lens to his camera and began taking photos of me. I quickly turned with my baby to face away from him.
After the feed, I asked the man if he had taken my photograph, which he confirmed…I asked him to delete the photos and he refused, saying it was his right to take photos of people in a public space.
I am absolutely disgusted that this man has gone home with images of me and my baby on his camera, and it’s completely legal. As I said, I feel violated and discouraged from feeding my baby outside the house again.
I reported the incident to Greater Manchester Police, but the man I spoke to at the control room informed me, after having to come off the phone and check with colleagues, that indeed there is no law protecting breastfeeding women from unwanted photography in public.
I understand that women who breastfeed are protected by the Equality Act 2010 in public places like parks, as well as private businesses such as shops and restaurants. But only against discrimination.”
It is clear to me that there is a massive void in the rights and protections of breastfeeding women in public spaces. I find Julia’s case disturbing and upsetting, and I am sure that the Ministers share my feelings. Pregnant Then Screwed also took evidence about this issue from their supporters, and I will share one more case study that shows that the law is simply not strong enough to provide breastfeeding women with the protection they need. The woman I quote says that
“this happened to me with my second when she was a month or so old. Took her for a walk in the carrier…but she wouldn’t calm down. I stopped at a park bench to see if a bit of breastfeeding would work.
I never felt fearful of doing this with my first. A guy walked up to the bench, less than a metre away (during the pandemic) and just started taking photographs of me.
I told him to stop, to which he said he was a ‘photographer from Italy’. I then said I didn’t care if he was a photographer, he can’t take photos without asking permission and asked him to delete them. He then walked off.
I finished feeding my baby and then started to walk home…This is what I reported to the police and unfortunately it isn’t a crime. They were sympathetic and just sorry they couldn’t do much else.”
Both women had gone to the police, who were sympathetic and wanted to help but could not do so because of the current limits in the law. The new clause builds on the Voyeurism (Offences) Act 2019, which this House passed three years ago in response to concerns about upskirting. The Act created the criminal offence of upskirting, and offenders now face up to two years in jail and being placed on the sex offenders register for taking a picture of a person’s clothing without their knowing, with the intention of viewing their genitals or buttocks.
The law was supported by Parliament on the basis that it banned a degrading practice, with the intention of deterring perpetrators, better protecting victims and bringing more offenders to justice. As the law specifies, the location of the body where the Act applies is below the waist, which means that taking a photograph or video footage of a woman breastfeeding without her consent is not currently illegal. By amending the list of prohibited acts under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to include breastfeeding, we can send the same message that taking photographs or videos of this nature without a person’s consent is wrong.
There are many issues at play here, including the protection of women from harassment in public spaces, but there is another reason why this is so important. Breastfeeding has short and long-term health benefits for both mother and child. It is estimated that if all UK infants were exclusively breastfed, the number hospitalised with diarrhoea would be halved, and the number hospitalised with a respiratory infection would drop by a quarter. Mothers who do not breastfeed have an increased risk of breast and ovarian cancers. It is because of those benefits to mothers and babies that the current UK policy is to promote exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of an infant’s life, yet the UK has one of the lowest breastfeeding rates in Europe.
An analysis of global breastfeeding prevalence found that in the UK only 34% of babies receive some breast milk at six months compared with 49% in the US and 71% in Norway. In 2017, Public Health Research carried out research into why the UK’s breastfeeding rates are so low. It found that breastfeeding in public is something that mums are concerned about. The mothers polled are most likely to say that they would feel embarrassed breastfeeding in the presence of people they do not know. Indeed, 63% responded as such; 59% feel the same about their partner’s family; and 49% felt that way about siblings and wider family members.
A poll carried out by “Woman’s Hour” in 2019 found that three in 10 women who formula-fed their baby said that they would like to have breastfed, but felt embarrassed to do so in public. New mothers have more than enough on their plate as it is. They should not have to feel anxious about feeding their child in a public space. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health recommended back in 2017 that the Department of Health and Social Care introduce legislation to support and protect breastfeeding infants and their mothers in public places.
The public are in favour of the measure, too. A YouGov survey of more than 5,000 UK adults conducted last month found that 75% of respondents agreed that taking photos of women breastfeeding without their consent should be made illegal. The amendment has wide support across all groups who support new and breastfeeding mothers, including the National Childbirth Trust, Pregnant Then Screwed, the Breastfeeding Support Network, and Mumsnet. I hope that today the Government can show their support as well so that we can protect breastfeeding women from such disturbing and intrusive acts, and together we can finally put an end to it.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I welcome the opportunity to debate this unacceptable, creepy and disgusting behaviour in Committee. I pay tribute to Ms Cooper and to the hon. Member for Manchester, Withington, who asked me a question on this very subject in the last Government Equalities Office oral questions. I also pay tribute to the many women who have shared their stories in recent months, including those who have responded to our survey to shape the violence against women and girls strategy and to tell us about their experiences.
All the facts that the hon. Gentleman has cited about the health reasons for breastfeeding are very apparent and obvious. The reasons why mums and babies benefit from breastfeeding are well established. In what can often feel like a very busy, hectic and sometimes even—dare I say it?—harried time with a newborn, breastfeeding provides a moment of tenderness, of love, and of innocence. To have a stranger defile that moment by trying to take photographs or video it—that is not something that would occur to most decent, right-thinking people. I very much understand why this new clause has been tabled, and I want to support the mothers and the women who are facing this.
There might well be offences that could cover this behaviour, but I fully accept that from the descriptions the hon. Gentleman has given, those offences are not clear to either to the public or the police. The Government do not shy away from tackling the use of the internet and imagery as forms of criminal behaviour. We already introduced the offence of revenge pornography in 2015, and during proceedings on the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, we listened to victims of threats to use revenge porn and we acted in that legislation to extend the offence to include threats to disclose private sexual images with an intent to cause distress. Of course, the upcoming Online Safety Bill will set the framework for companies and the duty of care on tech companies in relation to members of the public.
However, we absolutely agree that it is right to ask whether the law has kept up to date with the emergence of the internet. That is why we have asked the Law Commission to review the law around the taking, making and sharing of intimate images without consent, to see where there are gaps, and to get the Commission’s advice on how people can be protected from such behaviour. That review looks at the question of voyeurism offences and non-consensual photography in public places, including the issue of images taken of breastfeeding. On 27 February this year, the Commission published a consultation paper on its review, which ended in May, and I understand that it is due to publish its final set of recommendations in the spring of next year.
We await the results of the Law Commission’s report. We want to wait for the results of that report, because it is foreseeable that the Commission’s work will include a body of recommendations knitting together the various types of offending behaviour that it has identified, and suggesting how the law should be redrafted or improved to tackle such offences. As such, I am in the position of asking the Committee—and, I suspect, later on, the House —to bear with us while we await the results of that report.
I understand the anger and frustration, and the fear that some women feel about breastfeeding in public in these circumstances. Given the Committee’s approval of the Law Commission’s work, however, it would be inconsistent, to put it mildly, of me not to say that it is best for us to wait for that work, so we can get a programme of recommendations from it about the overall use of such intimate images on the internet, and how the criminal law should address the issue.
My hon. Friend is, of course, correct: technology is moving so quickly, and so many different things happen in so many different ways. People can even get pictures on their watches these days and talk to their family back home. The fact that that sort of technology exists can be exploited for all the wrong reasons as well. It is important that we act in this space.
During Justice questions last month, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) raised the case of Phillip Leece to illustrate just how horrific a crime this can be. For members of the Committee who may not have heard the question asked by the shadow Secretary of State for Justice in the Chamber, I will quote what he said:
“In 2019…Leece viciously raped a woman on her way home from a night out; she was 26 and soon to be married. Adding insult to injury, he published the name of his victim online”
and made disparaging remarks about her appearance, claiming that she was
“too fat and disgusting to rape.”—[Official Report, 18 May 2021; Vol. 695, c. 522.]
For naming and humiliating his victim online, he received a pathetic and insulting fine of only £120. That in no way reflects the enormous trauma that his action caused the young girl he raped.
During Leece’s trial, his victim read out her impact statement to the court and spoke of the devastating impact that the attack and her subsequent naming had on her. She was once a happy young woman looking forward to getting married, but those events caused her to suffer severe psychological harm, which led to suicide attempts and incidents of self-harm. In her own words, she explained how her naming online changed the way she lived:
“The post made me feel incredibly insecure and sad for the days and weeks afterwards.
It increased my anxiety about leaving the house and it got to the point that I wouldn’t even go into the back garden whilst letting the dog out. I imagined that he would know where I lived and would be able to find me.
The post also led to me eating more and gaining even more weight…with the thought that the bigger I am, the less likely this will happen to me again.”
I am sure that all members of the Committee, regardless of political affiliation, will share my view that a fine in no way reflects the severity of Leece’s actions. I appreciate the Lord Chancellor’s sharing this view. In response to the shadow Justice Secretary’s question about Leece, the Lord Chancellor indicated that he was going to act in this area. Specifically, he said that the Government were
“already making preparations to see what can be done to improve and strengthen the law in this area, because, make no mistake, the naming of victims of sexual abuse—and other types of offending as well where anonymity is an essential part of the process—is not just wrong, it is criminal and we will do whatever it takes to help stamp it out.”—[Official Report, 18 May 2021; Vol. 695, c. 523.]
That view is shared wholeheartedly by the Opposition, and that is why we tabled new clause 31. It is another of those small but significant steps that we are asking the Government to take now, rather than waiting. It is clear to us that the current provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 are simply no longer fit for purpose in the modern world. It is perhaps telling that the last time Parliament reviewed that Act was more than two decades ago, in 1999. I am sure that all of us would accept that since 1999 the world has changed a great deal—that was illustrated by my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham. Online publishing and social media mean that things written on the internet attract an audience far greater than they would have in 1999. Furthermore, things published on the internet have much greater longevity and potential exposure. For those reasons, we need an urgent review of how the Act is functioning.
New clause 31 is a simple amendment: it would give judges the power to sentence offenders who name complainants of sexual offences to a custodial sentence of up to two years. That would bring this sentence in line with the sentence for contempt of court. Given that the Lord Chancellor has previously expressed sympathy for reforming this area, we look forward to the Minister’s support for the new clause.
It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe.
I thank the shadow Minister for raising this extremely important issue. The case he mentioned of Phillip Leece and his victim was truly terrible, and the impact on the victim was clearly appalling. As the shadow Minister said, the Lord Chancellor, in answering an oral question a short while ago, expressed the Government’s support for the principles enshrined in the new clause. We think that more needs to be done—we agree with the shadow Minister on that.
However, we would like to make sure that we do this in a thoughtful way, covering all the potentially related offences. The new clause, as drafted, covers the particular offences under the auspices of the 1992 Act. We take the view that some other prohibitions on naming victims and other restrictions would benefit from similarly enhanced penalties. Specifically, the new clause would not cover anonymity for victims of female genital mutilation, nor victims of forced marriage, who we think are equally deserving of protection and support, as I am sure Opposition Members would agree. In addition, other automatic protections apply to participants in youth court proceedings—defendants as well as victims—and discretionary protections can be imposed or handed down by the court to protect the identity of witnesses.
Besides the cases covered by the new clause, there are these other examples—female genital mutilation, forced marriage, youth proceedings and witness protection—that require action. This is an area, as the Lord Chancellor signalled, where the Government want to act in the near future by coming up with proposals that cover all these things. I know there is frustration: we have a Bill before Parliament, so why not do something now? However, other Bills are coming forward in the remainder of this Session that could be used as vehicles to legislate on this. It may be that the Lord Chancellor will say more about that before Report, because it is being worked on actively at the moment.
Is the Minister giving a commitment that this particular offence will be covered by some form of legislation from the Government in this Session?
I am coming close to saying that. I am saying that this is something that the Government are currently looking at. The Government accept the need to act on this, as the Lord Chancellor said, and on those other offences as well. I do not want to say too much before we are in a position to do so properly, but there are intentions to put in place a process to properly review these offences, on an expedited basis, with the intention of legislation then following. That is where the Government are coming from on this. I hope that it will be possible to say more on Report.
Does my hon. Friend agree that he is probably coming as close as he can—within his pay grade—to making that commitment?
I thank my right hon. Friend for reminding the Committee and me exactly where I sit in the hierarchy of Government. As a former senior Minister himself, he will know that my authority is limited in these circumstances, and indeed in all circumstances. I hope I have given a pretty clear indication, so far as I am able to, of where the Government will come out on this. We essentially accept the point, but change needs to be done properly, and we need to catch the other offences as well. I hope that gives the Committee a clear sense of where we are on this.
I do not know what my pay grade is. I do not think I get paid, do I? The Minister talked about the principle of all this, but we get to a point where we have to leave principles behind and take some action. I assure him that I am also approaching the matter in a thoughtful way, with the support of my hon. Friends and of victims. We would not have tabled the new clause if we did not feel so very strongly about it.
I appreciate the shadow Minister’s point, but the truth is we will not have had the chance to deal properly with all the other offences by Report, which is in just a week and a half, on 5 July. I wish I could, as he puts it, strike a deal, but as my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby rather cruelly pointed out, I do not have the authority to commit the Government here. I hope I have given a very clear indication of our intention. We will not get all these details worked out in the next week and a half, but we will get this sorted out together.
I am sorry to make the Minister uncomfortable about his pay grade, but we need to move forward with this and there is an opportunity to do so. The Minister says that it is only a week and a half until Report, but this new clause has been on the amendment paper for many weeks, and we have been planning for this Committee for many months. I think there has been sufficient time for the Government to do the right thing here, and I intend to push the matter to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause places a requirement on the Secretary of State to collect and publish annual data on child sex offences, child exploitation offences and modern slavery offences. Data collection is vital to ensure appropriate policy responses, and that is even more important when it comes to crime. Publishing transparent crime statistics is key to understanding how the criminal justice system is working and whether victims are getting the justice they deserve.
New clause 38 asks the Government to collect and publish, by police force area, annual data on the number of child sexual offences, child sexual exploitation offences and modern slavery offences committed against children aged under 18 in England and Wales. There is a data blind spot when it comes to tracking a reported crime through to sentencing. Because of the way data is collected, this proves especially difficult for 16 and 17-year-olds against whom sexual offences are committed. I know that the Government are committed to tackling child abuse and exploitation in all its forms. The new clause would help in that fight, by filling in the blanks and allowing us to have an informed discussion on what needs to improve to ensure that victims get their day in court and criminals are brought to justice.
Despite older teenagers in particular being at high risk of sexual offences, due to the way that the data is collected they are often not included in the reported numbers on child sexual abuse. The tackling child sexual abuse strategy states:
“Over 83,000 child sexual abuse offences…were recorded by police in the year ending March 2020, an increase of approximately 267% since 2013… Due to the way this data is collected, and different sexual offences defined, these figures do not capture certain sexual offences committed against 16 and 17-year-olds, such as rape, as well as sexual assault committed against children over the age of 13.”
The Children’s Society’s analysis of the data shows that those two categories are the biggest groups of sexual offences reported to the police, which therefore indicates that the true scale of recorded sexual offences against children is very likely to be much higher. Collecting information is key to showing the true scale of sexual offences and to showing where the cliff edges are in the victim’s journey through the criminal justice system.
The Children’s Society previously found that
“54,000 sexual offences against children under the age of 18 were recorded by 43 police forces in England and Wales between 1 October 2015 and 31 September 2016.”
However, it stated that
“Only around 16% of offences reported where the investigation was completed resulted in charges, summons, community resolution or cautions against the perpetrator… For offences that did not result in action against the perpetrator the most common reason was evidential difficulties”.
Let us take the example of Margaret, aged 16. Throughout her life, Margaret had many interventions from children’s services. Margaret disclosed to family that she was raped and was a witness to another person being sexually assaulted. She disclosed that she was scared of reporting the offence, but did so with her family’s support. Long delays, a change of police staff and her mobile phone being taken for 10 months meant that Margaret eventually stopped supporting the police investigation. The case did not progress to prosecution and the young person remains at risk of sexual abuse.
We need to learn from these cases. New clause 38 would give us a clearer understanding of how many reported crimes against children drop out before a defendant is charged. That would enable us to make improvements in criminal justice. What we know is that a shockingly low number of crimes reported result in a successful conviction.
The Office for National Statistics reported in 2020 that there were more than 12,000 crimes flagged as sexual exploitation, but fewer than 2,000 child sexual exploitation charges were brought against perpetrators. There are several different crime datasets published each year, but none follows a reported crime right through to sentencing. The police and the Crown Prosecution Service must have the right tools to prosecute perpetrators, and that is where robust and transparent data collection comes in. Proper data collection will also enable local areas to plan appropriate safeguarding responses for all children under the age of 18 who are at risk of sexual offences or modern slavery offences in their area.
Figures from the ONS have shown that children are more likely than the general population to be victims of sexual offences, with young people aged between 15 and 19 accounting for nearly a quarter—23%—of all rape offences. I hope the Government will acknowledge the importance of better data collection in their response and will commit to providing the information on an annual basis, so that we can review the effectiveness of the current disruption tools, criminal offences and attrition rates for child sexual abuse and exploitation. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Government recognise the importance of collecting data to inform policy and operational decisions and to see the effect of those decisions. I want to take this opportunity to reassure the Committee that there are already robust mechanisms in place across Government, the police and the criminal justice system for gathering, recording and publishing data. Through the Office for National Statistics, the Government routinely publish data for child sexual abuse crimes committed against children aged under 16 years old. Data for children aged between 16 and 18 is recorded differently, as there are no specific crime codes for this age group. In 2019, however, the ONS carried out analysis of sexual offences perpetrated against 16 and 17-year-olds and published its findings as part of the England and Wales crime survey. Offences relating to child sexual exploitation will be recorded using a variety of crime codes, including those for child sexual abuse and those relating to trafficking. As such, there are no specific crime codes for CSE, and police forces are required to flag child sexual exploitation offences when providing data to the Home Office.
Modern slavery offences committed against children are recorded and published by the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Ministry of Justice. The Crown Prosecution Service maintains a central record of the number of offences for which a prosecution commenced, including offences charged under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. All modern slavery offences committed against children are identified through the child abuse monitoring flag, and the Crown Prosecution Service definition of child abuse covers any case where the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offence. Through the ONS, the Home Office already publishes both the number of recorded crimes and the number of persons charged under part 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Alongside that, the Ministry of Justice already facilitates the collection and publication of data on the number of persons prosecuted, the number of persons sentenced and the length of sentences.
The Minister will not be surprised that I investigate the data quite routinely, and there are two problems that she might be able to address. First, when the ONS data come out, they tend to be a big lump —the data are not broken down into specifics. Secondly, she is talking about the data collected on charging, prosecuting and outcomes, but what we are arguing for is the need to look at the number of reported crimes.
I will take those points away, because it is incredibly complicated, as the hon. Lady’s speech and, I suspect, my speech have demonstrated. We do not routinely publish data on the number of child victims by age, as the police record the data on offences rather than on the victims who have experienced them. I suspect that this is the nub of the hon. Lady’s point. I am told that the reason for that is that an offence may come to the attention of the police, but there might not be a specific intended or identifiable victim attached to it. Additionally, the same child may be the victim of multiple offences—indeed, we know that to be the case with gang exploitation—so we have used data gathered through the crime survey in order to try to inform our understanding of the number of victims and their ages.
The Home Office also publishes data on potential child victims of modern slavery who have been referred through the national referral mechanism, which is the framework for identifying and supporting victims of modern slavery. Of course, that stands apart from the criminal justice system. Someone may be referred to the NRM but might not participate or have a part to play in the criminal justice system. There are a great many data sets, but I take the hon. Lady’s point about the identification of child victims. We will see what more we can do.
I am grateful to the Minister for that reassurance, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 43
Offence of interference with access to or provision of abortion services
“(1) A person who is within a buffer zone and who interferes with any person’s decision to access, provide, or facilitate the provision of abortion services in that buffer zone is guilty of an offence.
(2) A ‘buffer zone’ means an area with a boundary which is 150 metres from any part of an abortion clinic or any access point to any building that contains an abortion clinic.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)—
‘interferes with’ means—
(a) seeks to influence; or
(b) persistently, continuously or repeatedly occupies; or
(c) impedes or threatens; or
(d) intimidates or harasses; or
(e) advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade, or otherwise expresses opinion; or
(f) informs or attempts to inform about abortion services by any means, including, without limitation, graphic, physical, verbal or written means; or
(g) sketches, photographs, records, stores, broadcasts, or transmits images, audio, likenesses or personal data of any person without express consent.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) in the first instance—
(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or
(ii) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or
(iii) to both; and
(b) on further instances—
(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or to both; or
(ii) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.”.—(Sarah Champion.)
This new clause would introduce areas around abortion clinics and hospitals (buffer zones) where interference with, and intimidation or harassment of, women accessing or people providing abortion services would be an offence.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am proud to speak to this clause, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq) and supported by more than 35 MPs from across the House.
As we come to the end of Committee stage, a significant portion of our debate has focused on the safety of women in public spaces, and I am grateful for that. We can all recognise, to a greater or lesser degree, that existing public order legislation does not provide the necessary framework to address women’s fear and concerns in public spaces.
This new clause raises a discrete problem—harassment outside abortion clinics. The issue has been raised in the House by my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton for several years, with great support from other Members on both sides of the House. As hon. Members will see on the amendment paper, the new clause has cross -party support from Members from five different parties.
Although my hon. Friend was driven to raise this issue by harassment in her own constituency, this is not a local issue. Figures from the Department of Health and Social Care and abortion providers indicate that in 2019 more than 100,000 women—or more than half of everyone who has an abortion—had to attend a hospital or abortion clinic that had been targeted by anti-abortion groups.
I want to make it clear that this new clause is not about abortion. A woman’s legal right to end a pregnancy is supported by the House and by the public and has been in statute since 1967. It is, however, about the ability of a woman to exercise this legal right without the fear of harassment or intimidation. Therefore, this new clause has a narrow purpose to introduce buffer zones 150 metres around abortion clinics, where certain activities designated as pressuring women about their decision to access abortion are banned.
Currently, around the country, anti-abortion groups engage in activity at the clinic gate seeking to deter or prevent women from accessing abortion care. This takes many forms, including the display of graphic images of dismembered foetuses, large marches that gather outside the clinic, filming women and staff members, following women down the street, sprinkling sites with holy water and handing out leaflets that tell women, falsely, that abortion causes breast cancer, suicidal intentions and can lead to child abuse. Recently, groups have been handing out advertisements for dangerous and unproven medication to reverse an abortion. This activity has been an almost permanent fixture outside several clinics for years. Abortion providers such as the British Pregnancy Advisory Service have collected thousands of accounts from women they have treated about the activities outside clinics and the impact it has had on them. In the past year alone, even during lockdown, this harassment has continued.
One woman, in Liverpool, reported in February:
“She told me that I should let God decide—that it will torture me for the rest of my life and don’t let them do it. She told me her daughter couldn’t have kids and I’m wrong for killing a baby…that I’ll have no luck in the future if I kill a baby.”
Another woman, in Bournemouth, said in December 2020:
“My partner was waiting in the car and he had one woman staring at him and walking around his car whilst showing him a cross. Both my children (both under 4) were in the car waiting with my partner…I felt uncomfortable walking out of the clinic knowing they were there.”
The mother of a patient in Bournemouth just last week said:
“The protester was stood by the entrance with a banner. My daughter is autistic and this procedure is stressful and traumatic—and when she realised they were outside it caused her to have a panic attack”.
Doctors and nurses are not immune to harassment, either. In Brighton in October 2020, one reported:
“There was a man in the entrance lobby—my colleague didn’t know what to do. He wouldn’t leave. He asked us if this was a place where ‘you kill babies’, if I ‘agreed with murdering babies’, and whether I was ‘happy to murder foetuses’.”
This is not a protest—the groups involved in this activity are very clear that they are not seeking to change lawmakers’ minds or amend the abortion legislation. Instead, they seek direct access to individual women who have no choice but to approach them as they access legal and essential healthcare. It is, quite simply, targeted harassment.
The solution is simple and has been used successfully across Canada, Australia and parts of the USA. We need to protect women seeking confidential medical care by making it clear that it is unacceptable to accost a woman at a clinic gate, harass her and lie to her about medical procedures.
We must also recognise that much of the legislation has been thoroughly inadequate at addressing the problem. I am sure the Minister will wish to mention that. The only law that has ever been successful in solving the problem at clinic levels is public space protection orders, which enable a council to create its own local buffer zone, but only three counties across the country have them in place, leaving more than 90% of affected clinics with nothing to protect them. That creates a postcode lottery of protection from harassment, and that is just not good enough. We need a national solution to this national problem. I hope the Minister will consider the impact of this activity on women, and I hope she will recognise that, despite the existing law, it has continued unabated for years.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for setting out the case for this new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton. As she rightly identifies, it is supported by parliamentarians from across the House. I approach this issue with the respect that such a widespread array of support deserves.
We have looked into this issue and kept it under very close review over the past few years, and I will set out in a moment some of the steps we have taken. I want to be very clear that I have sympathy for what the new clause seeks to achieve, in that harassment and intimidation of women who are seeking medical care is completely unacceptable.
The hon. Member for Rotherham is right to emphasise that this new clause is confined to a very narrow basis. We are not debating the provision of abortion services; we are talking about the public order element surrounding clinics and hospitals. For the benefit of colleagues and others who may be watching this debate closely, given that we are looking purely at a public order issue, on a very narrow basis, my Whips have concluded that this is not a matter of conscience, so the matter is whipped. It is in a different category from the wider issue of abortion, about which Members have many varied and strongly held opinions. We confine ourselves to the public order element of what the new clause is trying to achieve.
We keep this matter under very close review. As the hon. Lady knows, it is an offence under the Public Order Act 1986 to display images or words that may cause harassment, alarm or distress. The police have certain powers under that Act if the purpose of the assembly is to intimidate others into doing or not doing an act. Clause 55 of this Bill strengthens those powers and enables the police to place any necessary conditions on such assemblies.
The power that has found resonance with local authorities and has been upheld by the Court of Appeal recently is the power under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to implement public space protection orders to create buffer zones around abortion clinics or hospitals, when they are satisfied on reasonable grounds that protests are having an unreasonable and persistent detrimental effect on the quality of life of people in the area. Three local authorities have imposed such orders around particular clinics. Indeed, I am led to believe that Ealing, which imposed the first such order, very recently renewed it following its expiration.
I thank the Minister for recognising that this is harassment rather than protest. Does she share my frustration that more councils are not using public detention orders?
I will come to the figures in a moment because they will, I hope, help the Committee understand the approach that the Government are taking.
In the protests, or demonstrations—or however one wants to describe them—there can be a range of activities, and the hon. Lady has, understandably, focused on some of the most upsetting forms of activity. There are more peaceful ways of protesting, however, and I do not think it would be right for me to pretend that every single protest has the ability to harass and alarm in the way in which she has said some protests do. The advantage of PSPOs is that they are very local. They are brought by local authorities in the circumstances of their area, and the conditions imposed will reflect the conditions of the protests faced outside service providers.
I was going to make a similar point to that made by the hon. Member for Rotherham. Is it not the case that many local authorities find the process complex and expensive? Will the Minister consider providing a toolbox or other assistance to local authorities to enable them to do this in a way that does not put them outside their comfort zones in the areas in which they have been working?
Very much so. Indeed, that has been part of our work with the review. We conducted the first review in 2018 and, to put this in context—I will read the figures out because I want to make sure they are correct—of the 406 clinics and hospitals identified as providing those services, providers told us that only 36 had stated that they experience any protest activity.
I am grateful for the opportunity to state publicly that I very much support the new clause. On the point that the Minister has just made, in my local area abortion services can be accessed in the large hospital. There is no protest there because it is a large hospital with loads of people coming and going for other things, but in areas with stand-alone abortion clinics, we all know where they are, and people are known to stand outside. Although I understand the point about things being different in different areas, when people are standing outside, holding something and not saying anything, it is still enormously judgmental, scary and upsetting, even though what those people are doing perhaps does not look to the police to be as intimidating as it is. I am sure that some turn away because they cannot face going past that.
I accept that, and of course, women can be in a distressed state when they are approaching clinics. They may be in turmoil and may have questions about what they are about to do—they may well have doubts. I am sympathetic to the idea that not every protest has to display the sorts of posters that the hon. Member for Rotherham has described to unsettle or upset women accessing those services.
I have a second set of figures. The figures are important because we as a Government have to look at proportionate responses. The first set of figures came out of the 2018 review. Since then, to come to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby, we have again asked service providers for their views and whether there has been an increase or decrease in activity. The figure I have been provided with is that 35 out of the 142 registered clinics are currently or have recently been affected by protest activities. Five hospitals have been affected. That compares with 32 clinics and four hospitals being affected in 2018.
I am told, incidentally, that one of the clinics that had been reviewed in 2018 has since closed down, so that may explain that difference. I give the figures because that is why we are concerned that a blanket ban across all of the service providers may not be proportionate, given that the majority of clinics and the overwhelming majority of hospitals that provide these services do not appear to have been affected by protest activity thus far. That is why we believe that a localised approach of PSPOs, with councils using the orders, is the way forward.
We have also looked very carefully at whether there is work we can do to help councils understand the powers that they have under the orders. Again, we believe that the law is in a good place at the moment, but we very much keep this under review.
I thank the Minister for those assurances. Would it also be the case that where an abortion clinic is in a general hospital, the measure could unintentionally prevent people from protesting against the closure of a ward or a service, or trade unionists protesting about a particular aspect of their employment rights?
My right hon. Friend raises an important point. That is why we have looked so carefully at the universality of the measures put forward by the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton and why we believe that PSPOs, which are targeted and have been upheld by the Court of Appeal, seem to be the most effective way of managing these very difficult circumstances outside particular service providers.
I appreciate that this may be corrected before Report, but we are also concerned that proposed subsection (3) of the new clause potentially includes medical practitioners and others providing advice on abortion services within the confines of the buffer zone—in other words, within the clinic. Nobody—but nobody—would want that to be an unintended consequence of the new clause. My right hon. Friend has alighted on another unintended consequence—that other forms of protest may be caught by the new clause.
We very much understand the motivations behind the new clause and the work that parliamentarians have been conducting over recent years in order to shed light on this issue, but the Government do not feel able to support new clause 43.
I hear what the Minister says. I am still very concerned that, by the Minister’s own figures, we are looking at a quarter of clinics being targeted. I am very concerned about the postcode lottery. Would the Minister be open to my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton working with her civil servants to try to come back with a more appropriate wording for Report?
In fairness—I am sure the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton will back me up on this—we have been working. I do listen. I have meetings with colleagues from across the House—both those who support the intentions of the new clause and those who do not. We must acknowledge that there are colleagues and members of the public who want to defend their right to make their feelings and their views known in front of these service providers. I am very happy to meet colleagues representing the range of opinions on this issue. I have met the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton several times and am very happy to meet other colleagues, whichever side of the debate they may stand on.
With those reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank the shadow Minister, my constituency neighbour, for introducing these new clauses. I join her in paying tribute to the retail workers and others who have kept our country going over the past 12 to 18 months, often in difficult circumstances. I know that we are all very grateful for what they and others have done. I have a great deal of sympathy for retail workers. My first regular paid job was in Sainsbury’s at West Wickham, which the shadow Minister will know is a short distance from the boundary of her constituency.
We take the issue seriously and, as the shadow Minister said, we had a Westminster Hall debate on this topic three or four weeks ago, when a number of Members described various forms of abuse and assault that their constituents had suffered. Most of the assaults given as examples would have been charged not as common assault with a maximum sentence of six months, but as a more serious form of assault—for example, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, which carries a maximum sentence not of a year, as per the new clause, but of five years. Indeed, in more serious cases involving knives and so on where people are convicted of grievous bodily harm with intent to commit grievous bodily harm, the maximum sentence is not a year, as per the new clause, but life.
There are a number of criminal offences on the statute book that cater for the serious offences described graphically in that Westminster Hall debate. In such cases, a charge should be laid and a higher sentence—higher even than that contemplated by the new clause—could and should be given.
There is also the question of whether current law adequately recognises retail workers and other public workers when a sentence is being passed. The law already recognises that such people are to be treated somewhat differently if the victim is, for example, working in a shop, and the sentencing guidelines, which the shadow Minister mentioned and which were updated a few weeks ago, make it clear that if there are aggravating factors the sentence passed will be longer than it otherwise would be. The fourth aggravating factor on the list is an
“offence committed against those working in the public sector or providing a service to the public”.
That would obviously include retail workers, transport workers and others.
Not only do we have offences on the statute book already—many of which have much longer maximum sentences than the maximum called for by the new clause, such as five years for actual bodily harm—but the fact that the victim was providing a service to the public already represents an aggravating factor that leads to a longer sentence.
On particular things that have happened during covid, the case of Belly Mujinga, which the shadow Minister mentioned, occurred at Victoria station. I think Belly Mujinga worked for Southern Railway, which is the company that serves our two constituencies. The new Sentencing Council guidelines published a few weeks ago incorporated some revisions, which I think help. There is a new aggravating factor of deliberate spitting or coughing. A new factor—
“Intention to cause fear of serious harm, including disease transmission”—
increases culpability, which increases the sentence.
Therefore, if that person’s action—this would apply to a case such as that of Belly Mujinga—included such an intention, that is taken to increase the culpability of the offender. Those changes were made to the sentencing guidelines a few weeks ago, so we have offences on the statute book with long maximums such as five years, or life for GBH with intent. We have aggravating factors that apply in respect of retail workers, and indeed other people serving the public. We have new sentencing guidelines, which speak to things such as spitting and causing fear of serious harm in relation to transmissible diseases.
Is there a problem? Yes, there is, but I do not think that it is with the sentences; it is with the reporting and the prosecutions. Shockingly, in a survey prepared for the Home Affairs Committee that I think the shadow Minister has seen—I referred to it in our Westminster Hall debate—of the 8,742 shop workers responding who had been victims of this sort of crime, only 53% reported the offence to the police. Half the victims did not even report it, so we need to do a lot more to make sure that victims report this crime.
The Minister is making the arguments that I thought he would. They are perfectly reasonable, but I come back to him on the point that one of the problems is the tiny proportion of prosecutions and another is the huge increase in assaults against all these groups of people. He makes the point that a lot of people do not report these crimes, but Parliament and the Government could send a strong message, as the Government did with war memorials: they said that they were not necessarily expecting lots of prosecutions, but they wanted to send a strong message to the public about the importance of memorials.
For Parliament to send a strong message would be a really powerful way of encouraging shop workers to report these crimes. Although sentencing guidance is important, I do not think that the public know about it or would be able to tell us that it was changed a few weeks ago, whereas making it clear that this is something we want to set out in law would send a message to all those people who do not report these crimes. It might help.
I think the sentencing guidelines are important. Addressing coughing, spitting and causing fear of infectious disease transmission is important, as is the recognition that public sector workers and people providing a service to the public get in the sentencing guidelines. The shadow Minister says that they are not important; I think they are, because they are what the judge looks at, day in, day out, when deciding what sentence to hand down.
When it comes to getting more incidents reported, investigated and then prosecuted, we first need to look at why people are not reporting them. Again, the survey sheds light—3,444 people replied to this question. The top reason for not reporting the offence, cited by more than a third of respondents, was
“I did not believe the employer would do anything about it”.
Shockingly, the second was
“I believed it was just part of the job”,
which of course it is not; the third was
“I considered the incident too minor”;
and the fourth was
“I did not believe the police would do anything about it”.
Clearly there is a perception issue around this crime that we need to sort out. The Minister for Crime and Policing is leading a taskforce designed, first, to get employers to better support their employees when it happens. Although 87% of people—almost all—tell their employer, only 53% report it to the police. I infer by subtracting one number from the other that in 34% of cases, employers who know about the crime are not supporting their employees to report it to the police. Employers need to do more. To be honest, I think that the police will be doing more in this area as well, guided and encouraged by the taskforce that the Minister for Crime and Policing is running. We have the laws and we have the aggravating factors, but we need more reporting and more investigation, and there is a taskforce dedicated to doing that.
Let me make a couple of specific comments on new clause 45—the retail worker clause—and new clause 46, which would add health and social care workers and transport workers, who of course are very important but are also protected under the Sentencing Council guidelines because they are both in the public sector and providing a service to the public. Even taken together, the two new clauses arguably have some omissions. For example, teachers—who I would say deserve no less protection than the other groups—are not mentioned at all; nor are people who serve their communities doing refuse collection or work in parks. All kinds of other workers who serve the public or work in the public sector, and who are equally deserving of protection, are not mentioned in the new clauses, but all those people are rightly covered by the Sentencing Council guidelines.
There is more work to do, which the taskforce is doing. We need retail employers to support their staff much more, and we need the taskforce to do its work of increasing reporting and prosecutions, but the offences are on the statute book already, with maximum sentences of five years —or even life, for GBH with intent. The aggravating factors are there, so let us get these crimes reported and get them prosecuted. That is how we will protect retail workers.
I thank the hon. Member for Stroud for moving the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling. The hon. Member for Stroud has done the legal bit, and I am going to do the emotional, child abuse bit.
I think all hon. Members know who Tony is, because he is on BBC Breakfast a lot. He is a little lad. I do not know how old he is now—probably about eight. His legs are amputated, but he has been doing a walk around his local park every day to raise money for the NHS. I did not realise until very recently that he was the Tony this law is named after. It was only when I saw him and his adoptive parents on BBC Breakfast making the argument for this that I thought, “This is an obvious legal change that clearly needs to be made.”
Under current law, 10 years is the maximum sentence that judges can impose when someone has been convicted of child cruelty, causing harm or allowing a child to die or suffer serious physical harm. It is just madness! Someone who is guilty of intentionally causing grievous bodily harm to an adult can face a life sentence in the most severe cases, so I do not know why this cap of 10 years is in place. Surely, for offences that result in severe physical harm to children and lifelong harm, which will be much longer than lifelong harm to an adult, courts ought to be able to impose the sentence that they think is most fitting.
The proposed change to the law follows the tireless campaigning by the adoptive parents of Tony Hudgell. As the hon. Lady said about the injuries inflicted on Tony, it is truly unimaginable that someone could consciously do that. A change in the law would give the judges the discretion they need to pass longer sentences, including in the most horrific cases such as Tony’s. We are thankfully talking about a relatively small number of cases. In the past five years, there were an average of 68 child deaths a year caused by assault or undetermined intent. Child homicides are most commonly caused by a parent or step-parent. Children under the age of one are the most likely group to be killed by another person.
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children analysis of police data from across the UK shows that there were 23,529 child cruelty or neglect offences recorded by the police in 2019-20. Although there are significant variations among regions and nations, it is extremely concerning that the police-recorded child cruelty and neglect offences have risen by 53% in the past three years. I am perversely curious to see the data that comes out of this past year, because anecdotally I understand, from my police force and from what we are reading, that the levels of child abuse have escalated under lockdown. That should not come as a surprise, but it is deeply chilling to all of us.
The latest ONS figures available for England and Wales are from 2018: 500 offenders were sentenced for offences of cruelty and neglect of a child; 114 of those offenders received an intermediate custodial sentence; and 220 received a suspended sentence.
Over the past year, the NSPCC has seen the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on physical abuse, as I mentioned. Calls to its helpline surged through the pandemic to record numbers. Tony’s case represents the most severe form of physical abuse. However, while extreme, it is not an isolated example. There have been a number of court cases and serious case reviews containing disturbing details of how children have been severely physically abused, often over a prolonged period. Alongside that, it is important that we see wider changes, including greater public awareness, so that adults can spot the signs of abuse and reach out if they have concerns about a child, and additional resources for local authorities, so that early intervention services and children’s social care can respond effectively when they think a child is at risk.
Cuts to funding and the rising demand for support has meant that local authorities are allocating greater proportions of their spending to late intervention services, while investment in early intervention is in many cases just not there. Early intervention is my personal crusade because, surely, prevention at the earliest possible time is what we all ought to strive for. We need to see a child-focused justice system that does not exacerbate the trauma that young victims and witnesses have already experienced. Positive experience of the justice system can help them move forward, but negative experience can be damaging and, for some children, retraumatising.
We need increased capacity and investment in the criminal justice system, so that policy and procedures may progress cases efficiently and delays may be reduced. Children need to have access to specialist assistance measures in court, such as assistance from a registered intermediary who can support a young victim or witness in giving evidence. Therapeutic support for children who have been experiencing abuse and neglect needs to be universal and easily accessible. That is vital to enable children to process the trauma that they have experienced, to begin to heal and to move forward.
I understand and know that the ability to impose a stronger sentence is not the panacea, but it is really important that at the very least, child abuse is on a parity with adult abuse in terms of sentencing. I hope that the Ministers will support the new clause and, by doing so, show their dedication to tackling child abuse and to proportionate sentencing for that horrendous crime.
The case of Tony Hudgell is truly heart-breaking. The abuse that he suffered at the hands of his birth parents is shocking beyond expression. In fact, I met his adopted mother, Paula, only a few months ago. We discussed the case and what happened at some length. It is something that I have become personally acquainted with not so long ago.
It is worth making it clear that where it is possible to prove who specifically inflicted the abuse, these offences do not need to be charged and instead the more usual offences can be charged, such as grievous bodily harm with intent, which carries a maximum sentence of life. The problem that arises in cases like Tony Hudgell’s is where it is not possible to prove specifically who it was who carried out the offence. He had two birth parents and it could have been either of them.
As I understand it from that case, there was no way that the court, the prosecution or the police could prove which of the two birth parents it was. That means they could not be charged with the regular offence—such as GBH with intent—that would have carried a life sentence. Instead, therefore, they fell back on the other offence, which we are debating now: causing or allowing, in which it cannot be proved that someone actually did it, but we can say they allowed it. If people cause or allow the death of a child or vulnerable adult, the maximum penalty is 14 years or, in the case of causing or allowing serious physical harm to a child or vulnerable person, a maximum of 10 years. That was the offence charged in the Hudgell case.
I have been informed that we have conducted a review of charges under the clause, and my understanding is that the only instance where the judge went all the way up to the maximum of 10 years was in that case. It is clear from the sentencing remarks that the judge would have gone further, but I think it is the only case where the judge has gone to the maximum.
Even though the case is the only one, it is so appalling, and I have discussed it with the Lord Chancellor, who will look at it again. It is a delicate area of law to pick through because it cannot be proved that it was the particular person who has been convicted—it could have been one of two—and it therefore requires a bit of thought.
I am not Lord Chancellor, though.
We might separate the “cause” part from the “allow” part because “cause” and “allow” are somewhat different.
If we separated “cause” and “allow”, would we not be in the same position of not being able to prove which of the parents did the deed?
The “allow” part could conceivably apply to both where there are two parents. It can probably be established that they must have been aware of the abuse because they must have noticed the kind of abuse we are talking about, but it cannot necessarily be proved that they did it or even that they caused it. Currently, it is “cause or allow” in the same offence, with the same maximum penalty. One could make a case that the “cause” bit is more serious than the “allow” bit, so they might have different maximum sentences. I have a commitment from the Lord Chancellor that I can relay to the Committee.
I am going to be pedantic now, but if the offences are separated yet the cause cannot be proved, the charge will have to be on the “allow” bit, which is the lower level of offence.
Yes. We could have different maximum penalties for each of those, and even the lower one could be higher than the current penalty, so we could still make progress from where we are today.
I have a commitment from the Lord Chancellor that he will look at this in broadly the way that I described, also looking at the 1933 Act.
I am listening intently to the Minister. Is it his assumption that the Lord Chancellor will look at this before Report?
Honestly, I would not have thought so. That is only a week and a half away, but I will pass that representation on. I know hon. Members want to hear at an early stage, such as Report.
It is only so that we do not lose the legislative opportunity.
I understand. I will convey the hon. Lady’s point. As I have said two or three times previously, there are several other Bills in this Session that might be suitable for reform. This is not a “one chance and it is gone” situation. My main purpose in speaking today was, first, to pay tribute to Tony’s adoptive parents and to Tony for his bravery, having suffered such appalling abuse, but also to tell the Committee that the Lord Chancellor is actively and seriously considering this important area.
We will follow the matter through, but in view of the Minister’s comments and the Lord Chancellor’s commitment, I shall not press this to a vote today. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New clauses 60 and 61 were tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), whom I commend for her considered and forensic work on this issue. Our consideration of the matter is particularly timely, as the national lockdowns of the past year have seen an associated increase in domestic abuse. The crime survey for England and Wales showed that 1.6 million women and 757,000 men had experienced domestic abuse between March 2019 and March 2020, with a 7% growth in police-recorded domestic abuse crimes. The national domestic abuse hotline saw a 65% increase in calls during the first lockdown last year. Research by Women’s Aid discovered that one in seven victims currently enduring abuse at the hands of their partners said that it had got worse in the wake of the pandemic. It has been called an epidemic within the pandemic, and the time is ripe to improve the criminal justice response to these awful offences.
Women experiencing domestic abuse often delay reporting incidents of common assault to the police. Sometimes that is because they feel traumatised or unsafe immediately after the incident. Sometimes it may be because they have an ongoing relationship with the perpetrator. Sometimes it might just be because they are dealing with the traumatic and logistical challenges of fleeing the abuse. Because of the six-month time limit on charging summary common assault offences, by the time that many women have the courage to come forward and are ready to speak to the police, they are told that the charging time limit has passed and that there are no further opportunities for them to seek justice against their perpetrator.
Even when women do report within the six-month time limit—say, three or four months after the incident—their cases can be timed out because the police, for whatever reason, do not complete their investigation within the time remaining. As a result, many victims are left feeling unsafe and unprotected from their perpetrators, who might continue to harass, stalk and terrorise these women for a long time to come.
New clause 60 would address this issue by changing the time limit for common assault prosecutions in domestic abuse cases, so that it was six months from the time of reporting rather than six months from the time of the offence. It would provide that charges still needed to be brought within two years of the offence. That would give survivors of domestic abuse longer to report to the police, but it would also retain a time limit to ensure that there was a safeguard against cases being dragged out.
New clause 61 would address the same issue, but take a different approach by introducing discretion for magistrates to extend the six-month time limit in cases in which someone has not come forward to report an assault, because of domestic abuse. Taken together, the new clauses would extend the window in which victims can access justice safely, while ensuring that the police conducted common assault investigations expeditiously. Both new clauses have the support of Refuge, Women’s Aid, the Centre for Women’s Justice and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. I look forward to the Minister’s considered remarks on both approaches later in our debate.
To illustrate the importance of reform in this area, I will share some testimony from a victim of these deplorable crimes that has been shared by Women’s Aid, because it is important that we listen to the voices of women who are calling for this change. This woman said:
“I am a victim of domestic abuse. I was in a violent relationship that ended late last year when I decided to leave. I have 4 accounts of physical assault which were sent to the CPS with evidence by the police.
I had a phone call from my police officer explaining that the CPS have come back and said that they are charging my abuser with only 2 counts of assault, as the other 2 accounts of assault are outside of the 6-month prosecution limit…It took strength and courage for me to come forward and now I’m being dismissed.”
I will finish with a quote from my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford, who puts it so well:
“Too many domestic abuse cases are currently not prosecuted because they are timed out by a six-month limit on common assault prosecutions. But unlike with other crimes, in domestic abuse cases, there are obvious and serious reasons why victims may take more time to report the abuse to the police, especially where there is an ongoing abusive relationship. This means many women who do find the courage to come forward and report these incidents are being badly let down because time has run out and the perpetrator is never charged. That can leave victims feeling more vulnerable than ever, while the perpetrators go on to commit more crimes.”
My right hon. Friend says that if the Government are serious about tackling violence against women and girls, they have to tackle this injustice. She is exactly right. We have heard much from the Government, throughout these Bill Committee proceedings, about how seriously they take tackling violence against women and girls, so I hope that they listen seriously to these calls for change and accept these new clauses.
I can be brief in responding. I have met the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford to discuss a particular case in her constituency that appeared, on the face of it, to fall within the circumstances that she is trying to address through these new clauses. I take very seriously the concerns of the right hon. Member and, indeed, those of Refuge and Women’s Aid, and I am pleased to tell the Committee that we are looking into this issue very carefully.
The Committee will appreciate that we need to measure the problem and understand the scale of it before we can put measures before the House, or indeed in our domestic abuse strategy. On the basis that we are looking into this issue seriously and gathering the data—on the understanding that this is an active piece of work by the Government—I understand that the hon. Gentleman might be minded not to push the new clause to a vote on this occasion.
The Minister is correct: I do not intend to push this new clause to a vote at this stage. However, my right hon. Friend might well choose to push it to a vote later in the process. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 63
Offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation
“(1) It is an offence for a person (A) to require or accept from a person (B) sexual relations as a condition of access to or retention of accommodation or related services or transactions.
(2) For the purposes of this section, A is—
(a) a provider of accommodation,
(b) an employee of a provider of accommodation,
(c) an agent of a provider of accommodation, or
(d) a contractor of a provider of accommodation.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a maximum of 7 years.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause would create an offence of requiring or accepting sexual relations as a condition of accommodation, sometimes known as “sex for rent”. This would be punishable on indictment with a prison term of a maximum of 7 years.
Brought up, and read the First time.
No one should ever be placed in that situation. My hon. Friend and I were both members of the shadow housing team when we discussed the housing crisis that faces many people, especially young people. No one should ever be in that situation. Perhaps a whole-society approach is required. If we did not have a problem with housing, perhaps young people such as my hon. Friend’s constituent would not find themselves in that sort of situation.
This offence would also extend to those who facilitate sex for rent directly—for example, by driving so-called tenants to and from their accommodation or by disguising sex for rent arrangements. Put simply, if it were not for those who actively promote or facilitate acts of sex for rent, the problem would not be a fraction of the size it is today. I hope the Minister will support new clause 64 and act today.
I think that everyone who has heard about the work of the campaign of the hon. Member for Hove, as set out by the shadow Minister, will have deep worries and concerns about this appalling practice, and we welcome the work that the hon. Member is doing to raise awareness of it.
We are unequivocal that so-called sex for rent has no place in our society. We know that it often involves the exploitation of vulnerable people. Rape, sexual violence and sexual exploitation are devastating crimes, and we are determined to bring offenders to justice. There are existing offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that may be used to prosecute this practice, including the section 52 offence of causing or inciting prostitution for gain and the section 53 offence of controlling prostitution for gain. Both offences carry a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment.
The Minister cites a prostitution law, but these people are not prostitutes. Surely she accepts that.
I understand that point. I am carefully examining the wording, and the section 52 offence applies when an identified victim has been caused to engage in prostitution or has been incited to do so, regardless of whether prostitution takes place. I understand the concerns of the victims, who we are so worried about, and that the wording of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 can cause a further layer of distress in someone who is seeking help or who wants to report an offence, but there is a very fine distinction. I appreciate that I am probably indulging in the law of semantics, but it is a very delicate balance. Of course, we must emphasise that if someone finds the courage to report such a crime to the police, they will benefit from the anonymity provisions under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. We must support victims in the court process when they are following through with such difficult allegations, in order to bring them to the attention of the police and to investigate and prosecute.
I understand the point that the Minister is making, but there is so much stigma around the word “prostitution” that I cannot see a situation where many young women would willingly come through, knowing that that would be associated with them for the rest of their lives. That is why the new clause is so powerful, because it clearly puts the onus on the man—it is almost always a man—as an exploiter, whereas the woman is the victim. That is why the new clause is so important.
I understand that. Indeed, I seem to recall a Westminster Hall debate a couple of years ago in which the hon. Lady admonished me for my use of the phrase “sex work”, when in fairness I had been using both “prostitution” and “sex work” throughout the debate. It is very important to be sensitive to the terminology used and what it can mean to different people, and I understand that.
Under section 52, it would be illegal to advertise a product or service that incited prostitution for gain, and the promise of provision of accommodation in return for sexual services may be covered by this offence, depending on the specific services.
If it is acceptable, I want to put on record my thanks to the Minister, because from that point forward, when I raised the issue in that debate, she has always used the terms “sex worker” and “prostitute”, as have her civil servants. Although the two are sometimes interconnected, they are two very separate things. I know that has been of huge benefit to the sector, so I thank the Minister.
I am sure the Minister will be aware that, in many cases, this is not a deal that the tenant would have at the outset. It is when they fall behind with the rent that a proposition is made to them, so it is a choice between eviction or succumbing to this situation. In that case, the woman is in a very pressurised situation.
Very much so. Of course, there can be additional pressures, even to those my right hon. Friend has described—for example, if the victim is worrying about housing themselves and their children. We understand, and have great sympathy with, the motivation behind the new clauses.
In 2019, the Crown Prosecution Service amended its guidance on prostitution and the exploitation of prostitution to include specific reference to the potential availability of charges under the section 52 and section 53 offences where there is evidence to support the existence of sex for rent arrangements. I am advised that there is a case in the criminal justice system at the moment in which sex for rent allegations are being prosecuted under those sections. Of course, I will not comment further, because it is sub judice, but the outcome of that case will help to improve our understanding of the effectiveness or otherwise of the legislation as it is at the moment.
We are looking at understanding the barriers to pursuing such cases. We have heard evidence that this practice may be widespread; the hon. Member for Stockton North referred to the Shelter survey, which extrapolated that there may be up to 30,000 victims of this type of coercion. However, the problem is that those numbers are not reflected in reports to the police. As with so many hidden crimes, domestic abuse being but one example, cases are often not reported to the police, so there is a bit of a chicken and egg situation: if the crimes are not reported, the police of course cannot investigate them, and prosecutions cannot be brought. Again, like many other hidden crimes, there is an element of raising awareness and enabling people to seek advice and help and to report crimes to the police so that they can then be protected through the criminal justice system and the offenders can be brought to justice.
We are conscious of the role of online services as well. Under our new legislation that is coming forward—the Online Safety Bill—tech companies will for the first time have a legal duty to prevent criminal activity on their services. The new legislation will apply to services that host user-generated content or enable users to interact online. This will cover a broad range of services that could be used to facilitate sex for rent, including online marketplaces, classified ads sites and social media services. Services in the scope of the new legislation will have to put in place systems and processes to limit the spread of illegal content and to swiftly remove any illegal content that may harm individuals when those services become aware of it. We also need to make sure that online advertising regulation is fit for purpose. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is considering tougher regulation on online advertising and will consult on this issue later this year.
We await the result of the case that is in the criminal justice system at the moment. I encourage anyone who is able, and who has the wherewithal, to report instances such as this to the police so that they can be investigated. I assure the Committee that we will examine this issue as part of our work on the violence against women and girls strategy. We are very aware of the vulnerabilities that people may find themselves in, as set out so eloquently by hon. Members, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby. If constituents write to hon. Members, please encourage them to report their cases to the police if they are able to, so that those cases can be investigated and brought to justice.
I therefore very much hope that the hon. Member for Stockton North feels able to withdraw his new clause.
To clarify, looking at section 52 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in particular, I would not want a victim who is going into a police station to report this offence to be under the impression—this is what I was trying to address—that she has to sit there and declare, “I am a prostitute.” That is absolutely not what is required. Section 52 states:
“A person commits an offence if… he intentionally causes or incites another person to become a prostitute”.
As I say, it is semantics, and there is a wafer-thin cigarette paper between us, but I would not want vulnerable people to think that they have to go into a police station and declare themselves to be that, because, of course, they are victims of a crime.
I appreciate that clarification, but the fact remains that the prosecution requires that word to be used in the system. For me, that means that we need a newly defined clause in this area, so I am going to press new clause 63 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am conscious of time, so I will try to respond concisely. On new clause 67, when the offender has crossed a significant age threshold such as the age of 18 between committing the offence and being convicted and sentenced, the sentencing guidelines already say that the sentence that should be adopted as a starting point is that which would have applied at the time of the offence—that is to say, when the offender was younger.
Courts already have a duty under section 59 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to have regard to sentencing guidelines in those cases unless that would be clearly contrary to the interests of justice. The new clause would not make any material difference to the way the system operates because of the sentencing guidelines currently in force.
On the more general points about maturity and how people take until the age of 25 to mature, as the shadow Minister said, we have debated the issue many times—in particular, almost exactly a year ago during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. Pre-sentencing reports, which are prepared, take into account, and judges then take into account on sentencing, the maturity of the defendant when they are being sentenced.
The shadow Minister made some points about court backlogs, which I am going to address only briefly. Obviously, court backlogs have developed as a consequence of coronavirus, which is the case across the world. Huge extra resources—more than half a billion pounds—have been put into reducing those outstanding case loads, which in the magistrates court are falling consistently, as they have been for quite some time. Of the excess case load caused by coronavirus, about half has been eliminated already. Every week that goes by, the outstanding case load drops by—the last time I checked—about 2,000 cases.
On the Crown court, we have nightingale courts. There are no limitations on sitting days, and I believe the corner has been turned. Looking forward to a time when social distancing is eased in the very near future, I expect the courts will be running even more cases.
As the shadow Minister generously recognised, the Bill significantly reduces rehabilitation periods for children and for adults, which I think we welcome across the Committee. On the starting point, or the rehabilitation point, the regime that applies is calculated from the point of conviction, rather than the point of offence.
Regardless of the duty on the court to which the Minister refers, it remains a fact that children are receiving sentences under the adult regime. There is no two ways about that. What concerns me most is the rehabilitation period. A child who commits an offence as a 17-year-old who does not appear in court until he is 18 can end up with a rehabilitation period of four years, which takes him to his early 20s. All that time, if he is applying for a job or with respect to other activities, he must declare that. That is a real concern for me.
I am not going to push the new clauses to the vote at this time, but the Government need to do much more thinking in this area and start treating children as children. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 69
Poaching of game
“(1) The Game Laws (Amendment) Act 1960 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 2(1), after “committing” insert “or has committed”.
(3) In section 4(1)—
(a) after “section thirty” insert “or section thirty two”, and
(b) at end insert “or any animal, vehicle, or other article belonging to him, or in his possession or under his control at the relevant time.”
(4) In section 4(2), after “gun” in lines 2 and 4 insert “, animal,”.
(5) In section 4, at end insert—
“(6) The court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under either the Night Poaching Act 1828 or the Game Act 1831 may order the offender to reimburse any expenses incurred by the police in connection with the keeping of any animal seized in connection with the offence.”
(6) In section 4A(1)—
(a) in line 1, after “under” insert “section one or section 9 of the Night Poaching Act 1828 or”,
(b) after “thirty” insert “or section thirty two”, and
(c) omit “as one of five or more persons liable under that section.””.—(Mr Goodwill.)
This new clause is intended to broaden the powers available to the police and the courts for dealing with illegal hare coursers, measures include providing for forfeiture of animals on conviction and permitting the recovery of expenses incurred by the police in housing a seized animal.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I fully support everything the right hon. Gentleman has said. This is not sport, but chasing down a wild animal to rip it apart for money. I am opposed to that, as I am to other blood sports. It is not done by local people, but people who come from all over the country in an organised manner. They do enormous damage to the land, and threaten and intimidate local people who expose their actions.
I agree that the fines for this brutish behaviour are far too small. These new clauses would put much better protections and sanctions in place. I also agree that if the police had the resources to take the dogs, that would be a much better threat to those people, because without the dogs they are unable to keep going with this so-called sport. Also, the dog is worth much more to them than the threat of the fine.
I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby for bringing these new clauses before the Committee. I address the Committee as a Minister, but if hon. Members would indulge me for a moment, I will speak as a constituency MP. My right hon. Friend mentioned Chief Inspector Phil Vickers, who is my chief inspector. I am a Lincolnshire MP and my constituency suffers terribly from the crime of hare coursing.
These can be terrifying crimes for the farmers and landowners on whose land they are committed, because if a farmer or someone working on the farm dares to challenge those people, they can, in most cases, find out where they live. I have had instances where farmers have been worried about their family’s safety and their own safety at home, because of the fear that, in going out in the middle of the night and challenging the hare coursers, they will alert the criminals to where they live or the vicinity of where they live.
These are serious crimes that can have a huge impact on the landscape, and hares within our constituencies as well. They are the most beautiful creatures. Watching one gambolling along across a field as dawn is rising can be a very beautiful view in our countryside, yet these people come fully equipped with huge lights and, often, stolen vehicles. Money is bet on the ways in which the hare will turn, or which dog will prevail, which is truly unpleasant.
Child criminal exploitation—the grooming and forcing of children to commit criminal acts by adults—is an emerging and fast-growing phenomenon. I have terrible problems saying the word “phenomenon”. Maybe I should have a drink—I assure you it is water, Mr McCabe.
Child criminal exploitation is often present in, but is not limited to, county lines activity. According to analysis by Labour of national referral mechanism statistics, up to 3,000 children are known to be criminally exploited every year, yet the real number is likely to be significantly higher, given that these figures are based only on the children known to services. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham said in her speech on new clause 17, the Children’s Commissioner estimates that at least 27,000 children are at high risk of gang exploitation. That is a truly horrifying figure.
Under the law as it currently stands, the only way to prosecute child criminal exploitation is through subsidiary offences—for example, possession with intent to supply—or under modern slavery legislation. The problem is that modern slavery legislation is poorly suited to the specific nature of child criminal exploitation. As written answers to parliamentary questions submitted by my hon. Friend the Member for Hove show, only a handful of modern slavery orders are handed out each year. We also know that between 2019 and 2020 only 30 charges were flagged as child abuse under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. We need a specific, singular offence of child criminal exploitation with a maximum tariff that acts as a real deterrent to those who exploit vulnerable children in this way. That is what new clause 71 seeks to do.
Under the new clause, an adult would commit an offence if he or she intentionally took advantage of an imbalance of power over a child in order to coerce, control, manipulate or deceive the child into committing a criminal offence. Any person found guilty of this offence would be liable to imprisonment for up to 14 years, in keeping with the maximum sentences applicable for causing or inciting the sexual exploitation of a child. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham said during our sixth Committee sitting, all too frequently it is the children who have been exploited who end up taking the rap, rather than being recognised for what they are—victims.
It is hardly surprising that in 2019-20 1,400 children were first-time entrants in the youth justice system due to drug offences and around 2,000 were first-time entrants due to weapons offences. Both crimes are heavily associated with child criminal exploitation, which raises the question: how many children are currently in custody as a direct consequence of being exploited by an adult? It would be interesting to know just how many children are in custody, so does the Minister have any information on that? As my hon. Friend has said, they are not criminals, but victims—in other words, children who have been exploited by adults to commit crime. And we can repeat that sentence time and again.
While the child victims of this horrendous crime languish in jail, their future prospects almost certainly ruined, the failings of the criminal justice system mean that the real criminals go untouched. We have raised this issue in previous speeches, particularly in relation to young people carrying knives or drugs, the latter on behalf of a controlling adult who is part of an organised criminal gang.
By creating a new specific offence of child criminal exploitation, we would allow for direct action to crack down on the gang leaders who are currently committing their crimes with total impunity. The Minister must recognise that the current law is not working. It is letting down child victims of horrendous crimes, while letting gang members off the hook.
The Government must take far more radical action to combat this crime. Creating a legal framework specific to child criminal exploitation is key to that. The Government say they take child criminal exploitation seriously, but now it is time for them to show it, so I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on new clause 71.
I will now speak, relatively briefly, about new clause 72. Once more, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hove for tabling new clause 72, and I wish him well in his new post as shadow Schools Minister—a job I would have quite fancied myself. New clause 72 would create a new criminal offence of plugging, or the placing of banned substances into the body of another person, or coercing another to insert banned substances into their own body, for the purpose of transporting and concealing them.
As we heard from Iryna Pona of the Children’s Society during our evidence session on 23 May:
“Plugging is when young people are exploited by criminal groups to deliver drugs across the country and—sometimes—they are delivering those drugs inserted in cavities in their bodies.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 23 May 2021; c. 127.]
Plugging has been specifically recognised by the National Crime Agency as a particularly malicious form of child criminal exploitation perpetrated across county lines. For the children who are exploited to carry drugs in this way, the experience they suffer is simply horrendous. Naturally, it is also a great risk to their health and could even cause their death.
As is the case with child criminal exploitation, there is currently no specific area of law that criminalises those who exploit children to carry drugs in this way. Likewise, they cannot be prosecuted under existing sexual offences legislation, due to a lack of sexual intent. Again, we are left with a gap in legislation, which categorically fails victims of this horrendous crime, many of whom will be children, while letting the real criminals—dangerous criminals—off the hook.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central asked the witness from the Children’s Society whether they thought there would be a benefit in trying to define plugging in terms of a specific criminal offence, the answer was instantaneous: yes.
Once again, as with child criminal exploitation, the Opposition are pleased to give the Government a chance to come up with the goods. New clause 72 would create a new and specific offence to criminalise the act of placing drugs into a person’s body for the purposes of trafficking them or coercing a person to do it themselves. Those found guilty of this new offence could expect to serve a custodial sentence of up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
By creating a specific offence, we could introduce a significant deterrent to gang leaders and extend the time spent in prison by those convicted of child criminal exploitation. I look forward to receiving the Minister’s support.
I am conscious that we have already touched on some of these issues in the debate on new clause 17, which I will try not to repeat. Child criminal exploitation is a heinous form of abuse, and the Government are determined to tackle it. The exploitation, degradation and assault of a young person to conceal drugs internally for transportation, known as plugging, is immoral and unlawful and, again, the Government condemn it.
We are taking action to target those who seek to exploit vulnerable children through county lines operations. Earlier this year, we announced £148 million of investment to tackle drugs misuse and supply, along with county lines activity. That includes £40 million of investment dedicated to tackling drugs supply and county lines activities, and represents a surge in our activity against those ruthless gangs. That will allow us to expand and build on the results of our existing county lines programme, through which we have set up the National County Lines Co-ordination Centre to improve the intelligence picture and co-ordinate the national law-enforcement response, which includes protecting those young people who are abused and exploited.
Turning to the question of creating a specific offence of child criminal exploitation, we have discussed this issue carefully with law enforcement and others and, on balance, we are of the view that existing legislation is sufficient to address the exploitation of young people for criminal purposes. In particular, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides for the offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour, as well as human trafficking for all types exploitation. For child victims, it is sufficient to show that they have been chosen for exploitation because of their youth. There is no requirement to prove force, threats or deception, which may, in particular circumstances, be difficult to prove. A range of civil orders are available to law enforcement partners to respond to county lines and child criminal exploitation, including modern slavery and trafficking prevention orders, and modern slavery and trafficking risk orders.
To promote good use of those orders, the NCLCC has established a dedicated orders team to identify children and the perpetrators who exploit them, and to help forces with the application of such orders; to disseminate guidance and deliver training to local forces to upskill local force understanding; and to work with regional leads to improve best practice in gathering data on the use of orders in a county lines context. We are also committed to improving local safeguarding arrangements.
With the Department for Education, we commissioned Liverpool John Moores University to examine the effectiveness of multi-agency safeguarding partnerships in dealing with young people who are at risk or who are involved in serious violence and county lines. It has reported, and we are considering its recommendations. In addition, we have funded dedicated support for those who are at risk and who are involved in county lines. Between June 2020 and June this year, that work was carried out by the St Giles Trust, which worked with 170 young people to help them leave exploitation and exit gangs and other forms of coercion.
We continue to fund the Missing People SafeCall service, which is a national confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation, and we are funding the Children’s Society Prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation as well as other forms of abuse and exploitation. We are therefore committed to tackling child criminal exploitation and bringing the perpetrators to justice, but we do not, on balance, believe that a specific offence would change the way in which young people are supported. Our efforts focus on improving the practical response to such criminality. We keep the legislative framework in connection with child criminal exploitation under review, and of course we will consider any additional evidence that supports the view that additional legislation is required as it arises.
I agree with the Minister that a lot of work has to be done with support, safeguarding and everything else, but the income of local authorities has been devastated in recent years and the ability to provide the range of services required is somewhat compromised. That makes such situations all the more difficult for young people.
The Minister talked about the Modern Slavery Act, and so did I. Although it is a relatively young piece of legislation, it has rarely been used. I am not aware of any prosecutions whatever to do with the issues I have raised today—
I will not cite cases, but I believe the first prosecution was in Cardiff Crown court, involving a county lines gang who originated in the south-east. I do not recall the details, but I would not want the Committee to think that it had not been used. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman said that he was “not aware” that it had been.
I was referring specifically to the child exploitation element and the plugging offence. I am aware of no specific prosecution on those things. For me, it is a matter of child protection—of adult protection as well, in some cases—and we feel strongly about both the new clauses. We intend to press both new clauses to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
During previous consideration, I raised with the Minister the effects in Wales of some provisions in the Bill. She assured me that those matters are reserved, and that is indeed correct. However, the justice system is just that—a system—and the consequential effects of some of these provisions inevitably extend to matters that are the responsibility of the Senedd in Cardiff and the Labour Government. What those detailed effects might be, one can only surmise at present, but given the substantial interweaving between the implementation of the provisions in the Bill and those matters under the Senedd’s authority, one can only suspect that they will be substantial and significant. Hence we have tabled this new clause, which would require the Secretary of State to issue an assessment of the impact of the Bill on devolved policy and services in Wales within six months of its passing and to issue such an assessment for any further changes in relation to regulations under the Bill within one month of making them.
For the benefit of Committee members who may not be wholly conversant with the intricacies of Welsh devolution, let me explain that the Senedd has policy responsibility, and the power to legislate, in respect of large parts of public provision relevant to this Bill—for instance, health and, importantly for us here today, mental health; local government including, significantly, social services and housing; education up to and including higher education; equalities; the Welsh language; and economic policy in respect of training and employment. The Senedd also funds about half the costs of policing in Wales.
Then there are the policy implications. Wales has a higher rate of imprisonment than England—in fact, we have the highest rate of imprisonment in western Europe. The Welsh Labour Government have a framework to reduce that number. This Bill will lead to higher numbers in jail, one supposes. Wales has a higher rate of imprisoning black and minority ethnic people than England, and the Senedd has a race equality plan. The provisions of this Bill, particularly in relation to stop and search and on bladed weapons, are likely to lead to an increase in the imprisonment of young black men, which will be at odds with the Senedd plan. The Assembly, as it was then, has taken a “wellbeing approach” to many aspects of social provision. The Bill obviously has a more forthright law-and-order stance and thereby is inconsistent with Welsh public policy.
Furthermore, implementing policy requires human resources and costs money. For example, an increase in the number of people in prison would most likely lead to an increased demand for mental health services inside Welsh prisons from without—the local health board. HMP Berwyn at Wrecsam springs to mind. It is the largest prison in the UK and the second largest in Europe. It accommodates many prisoners from outside the health board area and, indeed, from England—people who would not normally use its services. The health board might well be reimbursed for the monetary cost of providing those services, but we all know of course that mental health services are chronically short not just of money but of staff. This could be a substantial burden on the local health board, but we will not know beforehand; there is to be no impact assessment.
An increase in the number subsequently released would have implications for the demand for housing, education, training and jobs. I could go on, but I think the Committee will have already seen how the system in its entirety might be affected. After all, it is a system.
The consequences for the implementation of Senedd policy is not my only concern. The Senedd is a legislature—it passes law—so the question of the effect of the Bill, if enacted, when there is a divergence between the law at either end of the M4 also arises. For example, will the Secretary of State then seek to direct devolved services or at least to influence them, perhaps without the consent of Welsh Ministers? I have to say that this would be entirely unacceptable. Indeed, it would be directly contrary to the clear will of the people of Wales, as expressed in the referenda on the powers of the Assembly, as it was then, most recently in 2011 under the former Conservative Government.
The Minister might say that there are agreements in place between the Ministry of Justice and the Welsh Government to account for divergence, such as the memorandum of understanding in 2013, upon which a concordat in 2018 was produced to establish a framework for co-operation, and that might be sufficient. When I asked the Minister about the memorandum in the context of the development of this Bill, it was unclear, to me at least, whether the concordat processes were followed—not least, whether they were followed effectively—because her response was that she would write further to the relevant Welsh Minister, Jane Hutt, following my question. Clearly, there was a process in place that perhaps has not been completed.
The Committee may not be aware of the work of the recent commission on justice in Wales, under the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. The report concluded that
“the concordat does not really address the problems or provide a sustainable or long-term solution to the effect of separating justice from other devolved fields.”
That was Lord Thomas’s conclusion. Although justice is not devolved to Wales at present, this apparently clear split is, I think, an oversimplification, for both the Senedd and the Welsh Government, as I said earlier, have introduced legislation and policies leading to a divergence in law and practice in Wales as compared with England.
This is, in fact, recognised in the Welsh law-making processes. Section 110A of the Government of Wales Act 2006, as inserted by section 11 of the Wales Act 2017, requires that new devolved Welsh legislation must be accompanied by a “justice impact assessment” to explain how it impacts on the reserved justice system in Wales. Therefore, what happens in Wales is subject to an impact assessment. However, there is no reciprocal requirement on the UK Government or Parliament to report on the impact that changes to the reserved England and Wales justice system will have on devolved services in Wales, and, as I said earlier, those might be quite profound.
For all these reasons, I believe that the proposals in my new clause are required, and I am glad to have this opportunity to propose it, with the valued support of Labour and SNP colleagues. For me, the long-term practical solution is to devolve justice. Northern Ireland and Scotland now have their own jurisdictions, as I believe will Wales, eventually, but that is perhaps in the long term. In the meantime, quite frankly, it is just not good enough to say that matters in the Bill are reserved, and leave it at that.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving us an insight into the complexities and the balances that are a part of the devolution settlement for Wales. I imagine that the Committee’s SNP Member, the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock, if he were here, would say the same about the Scottish devolution arrangements.
It may assist the Committee if I set out the provisions of the Bill that, in the view of the UK Government, relate in part to devolved matters in Wales and, as such, engage the legislative consent process. There are three such provisions. The first are those in chapter 1 of part 2 relating to the serious violence duty, so far as those provisions confer reserved functions on devolved Welsh authorities. The hon. Member for Arfon posed a question about the memorandum in that regard. I am able to help the Committee with the news that we are continuing to discuss with the Welsh Government the direction-making power in clause 17 relating to the duty.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising this issue. The Government do support the principle behind the amendment. New parents, including those breastfeeding or women who are pregnant, should be able to serve on a jury at a time that is suitable for them. As the shadow Minister has said, we are aware of some of these cases that we have corresponded about in recent months and, as a consequence, have already updated the guidance that Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service uses to ask that a more accommodating and sympathetic approach is taken to somebody who responds to a jury summons by saying that they are pregnant, breastfeeding, or have very significant caring responsibilities in the way that he has described. Where that happens, a deferral is always considered in the first instance.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the application process. Clearly, the summoning bureau will not necessarily know who is pregnant or who is looking after a child, so it is inevitable that there will always be some kind of application process; that cannot be avoided. The thing is that it is done in a way that is sympathetic. As I have said, that guidance has been changed already. We have also updated www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk to make it clear that these are all legitimate reasons for requesting a deferral. I hope that a combination of that publicity on www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk and the work on updating the internal guidance in response to some of the cases that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues have raised addresses the underlying issue. We still think that a case-by-case consideration is appropriate rather than a blanket provision such as this, which perhaps does not capture all of the circumstances that may arise. Allowing discretion to continue is the best way of handling this, but the sentiment—the direction of travel—is exactly the same as that of the hon. Gentleman.
There are, in the way in which this new clause is drafted, some idiosyncrasies. For example, on a technical point, the hon. Gentleman refers to parental leave, but there are other forms of leave that do not count as parental leave. Maternity leave and adoption leave, for example, are considered as a different form of leave. I am sure that this was inadvertent, but, as drafted, some of those groups that one would wish to include have been unfortunately omitted. We are on the same page as the Opposition on this, but the change in the guidance and the publications on www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk'>www.gov.uk address the issues that have been raised.
The Minister had an over-complicated response to what I thought was a relatively simple and straightforward matter. He talked about supporting the principle and he talked about sentiment. Surely, we could save the time, expense and, of course, the anguish around this process. Of course, there will have to be some communication between the person called for jury service and the court, but that could be very simple: “Dear court usher, or whoever you are, I am currently pregnant, or currently breastfeeding, please may I have the exception that is granted under Labour’s excellent amendment to this particular Bill.” It is very straightforward, and I cannot understand for the life of me why the Government cannot just say that if somebody in such a situation does not want to do jury service, they should not have to do it. For that reason, I shall press the matter to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for putting the case for new clauses 76 to 82 on behalf of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North, who in the last Parliament had a ten-minute rule Bill on the issue.
The Government’s long-standing policy towards sex work and prostitution has been focused on tackling the harm and exploitation that can be associated with prostitution, as well as ensuring that those wishing to exit sex work are appropriately supported. These six new clauses seek to make significant changes to the legislative regime governing prostitution and sex work. In summary, they would impose what is known as the sex buyer law, or Nordic model, which would criminalise the buying but not the selling of sexual services, the profiting by third parties from sexual services and the advertising of sexual services.
Under English and Welsh law currently, the buying and selling of sexual services are not necessarily unlawful in themselves. In other jurisdictions where the buying of sex has been criminalised, such as France, Northern Ireland and Sweden, there has been no conclusive evidence to show that the criminalisation of the demand for sex has either led to a significant decrease in the demand for sexual services or improved the conditions in which sex workers operate. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that criminalising the purchasing of sexual services worsens the conditions in which prostitutes and sex workers operate. It may change the profile of buyers of sexual services, distilling the demand down only to those willing to break the law to purchase such acts and forcing prostitutes and sex workers to engage in forms of prostitution associated with higher levels of harm. In the absence of unequivocal evidence, the Government have therefore maintained their line that we are focusing on trying to exit people and trying to reduce the harm and exploitation that they face.
The argument that the Minister makes assumes the ability to give informed consent by the people in prostitution. I have no problem whatsoever with people who are choosing to prostitute themselves. What I have an issue with is sex trafficking and the number of people—and I know that the Minister is very aware of this—who are forced into this situation. I see no better approach than to remove the financial reward for these people, to enable those who actually want to prostitute themselves to go ahead.
I very much accept the hon. Lady’s point about the coercive aspect of trafficking—forcing people into prostitution and sex work. It is a huge part of our work to tackle modern slavery and sex trafficking. We have covered this ground already, albeit on a slightly different subject. Section 52 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 makes it an offence to cause or incite another person to engage in prostitution for one’s personal gain or the gain of a third party. Section 53 also creates an offence relating to one’s personal gain or the gain of a third party, and under section 53A it is a strict liability offence to pay for the services of a prostitute subjected to force, coercion, deception or exploitation. All of those offences are captured by the definition of exploitation in section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, by virtue of which human trafficking with a view to committing the aforementioned offences carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
The other new clauses in the group stand or fall with new clauses 76 and 77. I will not address them, because I know an important matter is to be debated after this and I am mindful of time. We are taking action to tackle harmful activity online—that is a very important point in this subject area. With the Online Safety Bill, which I have already addressed several times in Committee, the imposition of a legal duty on certain online services providers to tackle criminal activity on their services will apply to a range of instances covered by this topic. The tech companies and services that are in scope will have to put in place systems and processes to limit the spread of illegal content and to remove it swiftly.
On the wider work of the violence against women and girls strategy, prostitution and sex work have been raised in many of the responses that we have received, and we very much intend to address actions on that to reduce the risks for women working in prostitution and sex work. As always, I would very much welcome the hon. Lady’s ideas and suggestions on these aims, and I am very happy to work with her and the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North on addressing some of those harms, which we are all determined the prevent.
I am happy to withdraw the clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and for introducing this new clause so eloquently. He mentioned the tragic case of Helen McCourt, which I am sure is on our minds as we debate this new clause. Along with the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn), I have met her mother Marie McCourt, who has campaigned tirelessly on this issue for many years, which led ultimately to the passage, as the shadow Minister said, of Helen’s law a few months ago. It was a privilege to take it through the House of Commons as the Bill Minister.
The Government once again are very sympathetic to the sentiments and the intention behind these new clauses, and I would like to look briefly at new clauses 83 and 84, which combined seek to repeal and replace two common law offences, as the shadow Minister has said. New clause 83 would repeal the common law offence of obstructing a coroner, replacing it with a statutory offence, while new clause 84 seeks to repeal the common law offence of preventing lawful burial.
It is worth just saying that, as with many common law offences, they are quite wide-ranging measures in their scope and cover potentially quite a wide range of behaviour. One of the risks we run when we seek to codify the common law—as we sometimes, or indeed often, do—is that we may inadvertently narrow the scope of the existing common law provisions. Of course, we will also be reducing the maximum sentence, because as common law offences these offences currently have a maximum sentence of life whereas by creating a statutory offence, as these new clauses seek to do, there would be a specified much lower maximum sentence.
It is worth saying that the common law—as, too, the non-common law—does cover the question of concealing a body in various ways. In circumstances where an offender is responsible for a homicide, the fact that they concealed or mutilated the body is already taken, not as a point of common law but as a point of sentencing guidelines, as a clear aggravating factor at sentencing. Therefore, on conviction the sentence will be increased, reflecting the fact that the sort of behaviour the shadow Minister has described has occurred. Where the concealment of a body is part of a course of action that includes the killing, the sentence for murder would again include that as an aggravating factor in deciding the starting point for the sentence. If we have a separate offence, the danger, of course, is that the offences may be served concurrently, so we may not have someone in prison for any longer, whereas if it is an aggravating factor for the main offence, we may well get a longer sentence. We need to be mindful of those technical reasons that might inadvertently have the opposite effect to that intended.
It is also the case, of course, that once someone is convicted of an offence of this kind—this includes refusing to disclose the location of the body—we have legislated via Helen’s law, as the shadow Minister said, that the Parole Board is now obliged as a question of statute to consider the non-disclosure of the whereabouts of the body when making release decisions. That was previously in parole guidelines but is now statutory, which also sends a message to the Parole Board about how strongly Parliament feels about this. Non-disclosure could also lead to a later release point. All those points are important to bear in mind.
On new clause 84, which seeks to deal with the desecration of a body, the meaning of acting with severe disrespect to a corpse could, under the new clause as drafted, include several circumstances such as mutilation, hiding or concealment, unlawful burial or cremation, or otherwise preventing the lawful burial of a body. It could also mean taking photographs of bodies where it is inappropriate or unnecessary to do so. The Government completely understand the thinking behind the new clause, because, of course, the bodies of those who have passed away should be treated with dignity and respect.
A number of existing criminal offences can already be used, such as preventing lawful burial and decent burial, as well as perverting the course of justice if the activities are designed to prevent justice from being done. Those are common law offences with a maximum penalty of life, as I said. There are also statutory offences such as disposing of a child’s body to conceal a pregnancy or burning a body other than in a crematorium, as well as offences that can apply in some circumstances, such as misconduct in public office if such a person—that could even include a police officer—is in public office.
The desecration of a body is likely to be connected to another offence. Therefore, as with the previous new clause, an act of desecration is likely to be an aggravating factor in sentencing the other offence, which might be murder or manslaughter, resulting in a more severe penalty. Again, we come to the question of concurrency: if a separate offence is created, the two sentences might run concurrently, whereas if instead the act aggravates the main offence, there may be a longer sentence. Those points are worth making.
The intention of the new clauses may be to ensure that people who commit such acts would spend longer in prison, and we obviously sympathise with that, but it is possible that, for the reasons I have mentioned, they would not achieve that effect. Such matters can be reflected either through the existing common law offence or as an aggravation to the principal offence. We now have Helen’s law regulating release from custody where that happens.
The Government recognise the campaigning done by Marie McCourt, and I know that the Lord Chancellor has met her as well as the hon. Member for St Helens North. The Lord Chancellor has met her a number of times and I have met her as well. We want to continue discussing these issues with Marie and her family and to think about whether there is anything else we can do to ensure that the awful circumstances we are discussing are fully reflected beyond even what I have already described. We are receptive to ideas in this area and are happy to talk about them and think about what else can be done, but, for the reasons about the precise way in which the new clauses are crafted, we do not think they would take the law as it stands any further forward. However, we are happy to work with Marie, the hon. Member for St Helens North, shadow Ministers and others to see if there are other things that we can do.
On the basis of what the Minister has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
I do not know how hon. Members have managed it, but new clause 84 has already been debated, so we come to the final question.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
It is customary at this stage to mark the end our deliberations in Committee by reflecting on the ups and downs, the agreements and disagreements and the range of subjects on which we have deliberated. Our debate on the police covenant at the beginning of the Committee’s deliberations feels like a long time ago. I am pleased that the Bill and no fewer than 84 new clauses have had the benefit of rigorous scrutiny by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee over the past few weeks.
I thank in particular you, Mr McCabe, for your stylish chairmanship of the Committee as well as your co-Chair, Sir Charles, who was equally stylish and equally good at keeping us all in good order. I thank the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South, for sharing the privilege, the pleasure and the workload of our Committee with me. I thank the Opposition Front Benchers—the hon. Members for Croydon Central, for Stockton North and for Enfield, Southgate—for their constructive and at times lively approach to the matters that we have debated, but that is all absolutely in the role of this Committee and what this process is supposed to do in this place.
I would, of course, get into lots of trouble if I did not thank the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby. If Chairs keep us in order, Whips whip us in to make sure that we remain in good order. I give my sincere thanks to him because it is a very difficult job at times and one that does not get much praise.
I thank the Clerks for herding us in the right direction when we needed to be so herded, and the Hansard writers, whose ability to keep note of what we are saying never fails to amaze me. I thank the officials and the lawyers from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Transport. A huge amount of work goes on behind the scenes to help Ministers to prepare for a Bill Committee, and it is very much thanks to them that we are able to do so.
That flows inevitably to my very sincere thanks to the Bill manager for the Home Office, Charles Goldie, and the Bill manager for the MOJ, Katie Dougal—I hope I pronounced that correctly. They help Ministers to swim serenely above the water while they are working terribly hard underneath, so I thank them very much for their hard work and effort.
Thanks also to our private offices, who help Ministers to turn up at Committee on time. Finally, of course, thanks to the members of the Committee. I know that, for some Members, this was their first Bill Committee—I hope that we have not put them off for life—but they have all contributed in their own way and have played a vital role in scrutinising this important piece of legislation so that it is ready for the House’s wider scrutiny on Report in a week and a half’s time. Thank you all.
The very fact that we are within three minutes of the reporting time for this Bill justifies my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate fighting for all the time that the Committee has had to deliberate. I thank you, Mr McCabe, and Sir Charles for chairing our weeks of deliberations with skill and good humour.
I thank the Government Members who made a contribution and even those who were able just to crack on with their correspondence, and Ministers for listening and making us some promises that I am sure they will keep. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle, recognised very early on that a 16-year-old is not an adult in any circumstances whatsoever, and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Croydon South, very kindly said that he would act as an advocate for Opposition Members who might be having problems engaging with other Government Ministers.
My thanks also go to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central for sharing the Front-Bench role with me and for championing our position on shopworkers and protests. I thank all the other Opposition Members who did a grand job holding the Government to account on everything else—from violence against women and girls, to pet theft. I thank the many organisations, too numerous to mention, that championed their causes and helped us to champion ours, too. Without them the challenge to the Government would have been all the poorer. I thank the Committee Clerks for their professionalism and their patience and, of course, our friends in the Hansard service.
Finally, I thank our Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate, who will now hang up his whip and get into his new role on a full-time basis, as I understand it. I thank him especially because I really did need him daily to tell me, “It’s okay, Alex, we will get through the business. We will get to the end. We will get all the new clauses dealt with—rest assured.” So, thank you to him.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. I will try to lead by example in that regard.
Part 1 of the Bill increases the penalty for assault on an emergency worker from 12 months to two years. Many other key workers are on the frontline, too. Indeed, shopworkers have borne the brunt of much of the abuse about mask wearing and social distancing in stores, on top of the existing problems associated with age verification for the purpose of alcoholic drinks purchases, drunken abusive behaviour, and of course shoplifting. Late-night shops are often run single-handedly, so the distress and trauma associated with assaults or threatening behaviour should not be underestimated. I am due to meet shortly with in-store workers from my local Tesco to see at first hand how this problem has affected staff in that setting. I hope the Minister can reassure me—either now or when she sums up at the end—that she is aware of the issue’s importance and that amendments may not be necessary to deliver the action we all believe is needed.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his scrutiny and service not just on Report but in Committee. I can reassure him; I know how strongly he and other Members across the House, including my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton South (Matt Vickers), feel about the matter. I reassure the House that we are not complacent about ensuring that the criminal law is fit for purpose. We are actively considering an amendment in the Lords if appropriate.
I rise to speak to new clause 91 and amendment 117.
Amendment 117 simply says that the Scottish Government reserve the right to amend the code of conduct governing data extraction if the UK code of conduct is not suitable for our distinct policing service. I cannot imagine why the Government would not just accept that amendment, so I look forward to hearing that they have.
New clause 91 will instruct the Secretary of State to conduct a review of the criminal offences set out in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Let us face it: after 50 years, it is high time. That argument is gaining traction across party and with good reason. One of my colleagues will be saying more about that later in the debate, so I will simply say that my support for it is wholehearted. Our approach to drug misuse and addiction should be a public health approach, because that is what saves lives.
Mr Speaker, I understand that I have unlimited time, but I can reassure you that I will talk as briefly as I can to allow other speakers to make their contribution. I will look at three areas of the Bill.
I have said before that the curbs on the right to protest are draconian and contrary to international law—it is not just me saying that, of course—and I know colleagues will say more on that shortly, but people out there need to be aware of how the provisions will impact on them. I always use the example of the WASPI women, the Women Against State Pension Inequality. I do that because, whether it is anti-war protesters, the Black Lives Matter movement or those who are desperately worried about the environment, there is always a cohort in here ready to tell us what is wrong with those protesters: how “dangerous” they are and how we need to clamp down on them.
Now, nobody is going to tell me that the Women Against State Pension Inequality are a threat to any of us. The opposite is true. These are older women who should be retired by now, but they have had their retirement stolen from them by the UK Government. So many times we have all gone across the road to join thousands of WASPI women and their supporters from all across the UK, but because of the exclusion zone to be thrown up around Parliament they will be prevented from ever doing that again. We are to hear and see nobody unless they agree with us. That is just one tiny part of the curbs on the right to protest. It is not what we expect from the so-called bastion of democracy.
I want to turn briefly to serious violence reduction orders. Members might ask why, given that they apply only to England and Wales, but here is why. I was quite shocked to hear the Home Office attempt to make a comparison between serious violence reduction orders and the work of the hugely successful Scottish Government-backed Scottish Violence Reduction Unit. The Scottish VRU adopts a public health approach to violence. I urge hon. Members not to be fooled by attempted comparisons. The underlying principle—
I know that Mr Speaker is trying to create time for other people, but I will give way briefly.
I just want to correct the hon. Lady. In the Bill Committee I was drawing a comparison not with the orders but with the serious violence duty, which I imagine she welcomes because we have looked carefully at the Glasgow model. We would argue that we are going further than the Scottish Government, because we are making the provision a legal duty. I hope she would support that in principle.
The underlying principle of the Violence Reduction Unit is that the causes of violence are deep-rooted and that we need a public health approach. These orders do not take a public health approach. In order to make a lasting improvement, numerous agencies have a role to play, including education, social services, health, justice and the third sector. Rather than creating barriers to education, housing and employment, the multiagency approach in Scotland actively removes them. The focus in Scotland has been on listening to the community, not dividing it. SVROs conform to outdated reactive practices. By the time one is issued, the damage has been done. The Government say they represent a public health approach, but a public health approach emphasises prevention. It is glaringly obvious when we think about it: fewer crimes create fewer victims, and that reduces demand on public services. Crime prevention is the public health model in action and that is not what these orders represent.
Finally, I support the amendments to delete part 4 of the Bill, on Travelling communities. That part of the Bill sickens me to my core. The Conservative hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson) has been allowed by his party to get away with claiming that Travellers today are
“more likely to be seen leaving your garden shed at 3 o’clock in the morning…with your lawnmower”.––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 8 June 2021; c. 410.]
In other words, he is saying they are thieves. There can be no hiding from the fact that this is anything other than a full-on attack on the way of life of Gypsy Travellers. The Travelling community in Scotland are deeply concerned, as are all others across the UK.
The Home Affairs Committee has considered many different aspects of this Bill and these amendments at different times and in different ways, but given the time I will focus on just a small number of areas.
I particularly want to address new clause 69, in my name. Its purpose is to get justice for victims of domestic abuse who are being timed out and take action against perpetrators who are being let off the hook. Many domestic abuse cases are prosecuted as common assault in a magistrates court where police and prosecutors may say that the threshold for the Crown court is not met. In these cases, there is a time limit on justice—most victims are not aware of this—of six months from the offence, even though in domestic abuse cases it may take many months, for good reason, for victims to feel able to go to the police. They may still be in an abusive relationship. They may be afraid. They may not be safe. They may have children and be worried about how to leave or where they will go. It may take them time to get the support that they feel they need to be able to talk to the police. There are so many reasons that are, in themselves, the essence of continuing crimes of domestic abuse. That is why the new clause increases the time limit so that there can be six months for the police to deal with the case from the point of reporting, rather than from the point of the offence itself.
Somebody I have talked to told me her story. She was assaulted while she was pregnant. She went to A&E but did not, at that stage, want to talk about what had happened. However, when the abuse continued after the baby was born, she left and gathered her courage to talk to the police, who started an investigation but before long told her that she had passed a time limit she never even knew existed and her ex would not be charged. There are many more such victims of domestic abuse who, for serious and obvious reasons, do not report it immediately, and the perpetrators go on to be free to commit more crimes.
I thank the right hon. Lady for having raised her constituent’s case with me in previous meetings. We take this issue very seriously, and I can assure the House that we will return with a proposal at a later stage. I certainly do not rule out an amendment, if appropriate, in the Lords. This must be looked into and I am extremely grateful to her for raising it.
I welcome the Minister’s statement. I am keen to pursue this and to work with her on it, as we have cross-party support. I really do want to see progress and I hope we can achieve that in the House of Lords.
This is, once again, about the blind spot where the legal system does not recognise the reality of violence against women and girls. There may be many reasons why a six-month time limit is appropriate for summary offences about altercations between acquaintances in the pub or tussles in the street, but it is not appropriate for domestic abuse—for the experience of violence against women and girls that is, too often, being missed out in the criminal justice system, where thousands of cases a year may be affected in this way. We have support for changes in this area from the domestic abuse commissioner of Refuge, Women’s Aid, the Centre for Women’s Justice, and West Yorkshire police.
On new clause 31, the Select Committee has conducted a detailed inquiry into violent abuse against shop workers. We have recommended a stand-alone offence because we need to strengthen the focus on this escalating offence and to have the police take it much more seriously. It is simply unacceptable that shop workers should face this escalating abuse over very many years. The new offence of assault against emergency workers has made a difference and increased prosecutions, and we need to increase prosecutions in other areas as well.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
That the Bill be now read a second time.
Relevant documents: 1st, 2nd and 4th Reports from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 6th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee, 7th Report from the Constitution Committee
My Lords, the first duty of any Government is to keep the country safe. This means working together to prevent and reduce crime, backing the police—ensuring that they have the powers and tools they need—and a fair justice system which ensures that the punishment fits the crime but allows offenders who have paid their debt to society to make a fresh start.
We have already recruited nearly half of the promised 20,000 additional police officers and overall police funding has grown in real terms for the fifth consecutive year. We have also already ended the automatic early release of the most serious offenders sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment or more, we are implementing our landmark Domestic Abuse Act and we have published our new strategy to tackle violence against women and girls. However, we need to do more to protect our communities, and the measures in this Bill are directed to that end.
The police undertake a uniquely challenging role in helping to keep communities safe. They make enormous sacrifices to protect the public and, in turn, we should protect them. The police covenant will demonstrate our commitment to back police officers and staff and ensure that the police workforce do not suffer any disadvantage as a result of their role. The Bill will require the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on key issues that we want to prioritise, particularly the health and well-being of the workforce, their physical protection and supporting their families.
Our police and other emergency workers are committed to serving their communities. The overwhelming majority of the public applaud and salute that service but, shockingly, the latest figures show that assaults on police officers increased by 14% compared with the previous year. Obviously, that is unacceptable. The Bill therefore doubles the maximum penalty for assaulting an emergency worker to two years’ imprisonment, ensuring that those who carry out these attacks receive a punishment that is commensurate with the crime that they have committed.
Sorry, some of my speech is missing, but I will carry on. Moving on swiftly, the end-to-end rape review acknowledged that the invasive nature of the process around disclosure has long been an issue for victims. We need to do more to assure victims that information will be extracted from their mobile phone only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so in pursuit of reasonable lines of inquiry. To that end, the Bill establishes a statutory framework, backed up by a code of practice, for the extraction of information from electronic devices. Our focus is on protecting privacy and supporting victims of crime and others who voluntarily provide information to the police. In the Commons debates we heard concerns, including from the Victims’ Commissioner, that these provisions do not yet provide sufficient safeguards. We owe it to vulnerable victims and witnesses to get these provisions right and we are continuing to explore how they might be strengthened.
I return to the issue of serious violence. It blights our communities and we cannot look to the police alone to solve it; that has to be a shared endeavour, with all relevant agencies working together. Part 2 of the Bill will require local authorities, specified health authorities and fire and rescue authorities, along with the police and other specified criminal justice agencies, to come together to prevent and reduce serious violence in their area. They will be required to formulate an evidence-based analysis of the problems associated with serious violence in their locality and then produce and implement a strategy detailing how they will respond, including through early interventions. To support such collaborative working, the Bill introduces new powers to share data and information for that purpose.
One way to prevent serious violence is to ensure that we learn the lessons from the far too many deaths involving knives that we see on our streets. Each of these is an individual tragedy, with the most devastating consequences for victims and their families. We will therefore introduce offensive weapons homicide reviews—to be undertaken jointly by the relevant police force, local authority and clinical commissioning group or health board—which will examine the circumstances surrounding a death and identify lessons to prevent such tragedies in future. These homicide reviews will first be piloted to ensure that we design a review process that is as effective as possible before we roll them out across England and Wales.
Part 2 of the Bill also reforms pre-charge bail. As noble Lords will recall, changes made in 2017 sought to address legitimate concerns that individuals who had not been charged or convicted of any offence were subjected to bail conditions restricting their liberty for months or, in some cases, years while the police pursued their investigation. Noble Lords will recall that the experience of the last four years has shown that the pendulum has swung far too far in the other direction, leading to concerns that bail is not being used in appropriate cases to protect vulnerable victims and witnesses.
To address those concerns, the Bill will remove the current statutory presumption against pre-charge bail, instead adopting a neutral position. This is designed to encourage its use when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, based on each case’s individual circumstances and the list of risk factors now set out in the Bill. These changes will be reinforced by statutory guidance issued by the College of Policing to help establish a consistent approach across all forces.
Lastly, in relation to Part 2, we are extending the positions of trust offences in the Sexual Offences Act to protect 16 and 17 year-olds in a wider range of circumstances—namely, in a sporting or religious context—where adults hold a position of particular influence or power. I know this change will be particularly welcomed by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson.
There has been much comment about the public order provisions in Part 3. The right to peaceful protest is a fundamental part of our democracy. This is not about stifling freedom of speech and assembly but about balancing those rights with the rights of others, including protecting the free press and ensuring that people can get to their work and that ambulances can quickly transport patients to hospital.
We have listened to policing professionals who have told us that the distinction made in the Public Order Act between processions and assemblies is out of date and does not reflect the operational reality. We have listened to the independent Law Commission, which recommended that the common-law offence of public nuisance be put on a statutory footing. We have listened to the cross-party Joint Committee on Human Rights, which recommended strengthening powers to ensure unhindered access—including for noble Lords—to the Parliamentary Estate. We have listened to the independent policing inspectorate, which concluded that the measures we have proposed in Part 3 would improve police effectiveness without eroding the right to protest.
Part 4 of the Bill delivers on an express manifesto commitment to tackle unauthorised encampments. These measures are not about restricting the nomadic lifestyle of Travellers but about protecting all communities from the distress and loss of amenity caused by unauthorised encampments. In particular, the Bill provides for a new criminal offence of residing in a vehicle on land without permission. It is important to stress that the offence applies only where a person fails to leave the land or remove their property without reasonable excuse when asked to do so and they have caused or are likely to cause significant damage, significant disruption or significant distress. I do not think any noble Lord would want to condone such behaviour.
The sentencing measures in the Bill will target the most serious violent and sexual offenders and those who pose the greatest threat to the public. That includes those who commit the premeditated murder of a child, those who kill through dangerous driving or careless driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, and those who become more dangerous while in prison. However, we are aware that delivering public protection and building confidence in the criminal justice system is not just about making better use of custody. In many cases, particularly for low-level offending, effective early interventions and community supervision keep the public safer by preventing further offending. To that end, we are simplifying the adult out-of-court disposals framework, making provision to pilot adult problem-solving courts and increasing the curfew options that are available to sentencers. In addition, we will aid offender rehabilitation by reducing the time periods after which some sentences become spent so that they do not have to be disclosed to employers for non-sensitive jobs or activities.
The Bill includes measures on sentencing and remand for children. We intend these measures to increase confidence in community sentences as a robust alternative to custody and to ensure that custodial remand is used only as a last resort. They also ensure that sentences for the most serious crimes provide justice for victims and reflect the seriousness of those offences. The Bill also includes measures to enable the trialling of secure schools in order to fulfil our vision of secure environments centred on individualised education and care.
I turn now to Part 10, which includes the provision for serious violence reduction orders. These deliver on another manifesto commitment to introduce a new court order to target known knife carriers, making it easier for the police to stop and search those convicted of knife crime. These new orders are intended to help tackle high-risk offenders, by making it easier for the police to search them for weapons, and to help protect more vulnerable offenders from being drawn into further exploitation by criminal gangs. The targeted use of stop and search, as part of a wider approach to intervening and supporting offenders, will help safeguard those communities most at risk.
In Part 10 we are also strengthening the powers to manage sex offenders—one of a number of measures in the Bill which will help tackle violence against women and girls. In particular, the Bill will help positive requirements to be attached to sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders; for example, by requiring perpetrators to attend a treatment programme.
Finally, the Bill includes a number of measures to improve the efficiency of the Courts & Tribunals Service. Our aim is to modernise the delivery of justice, including through the greater use of technology, but only where it is appropriate to do so. We are facilitating the ongoing use of audio and video technology in our courts and tribunals, building on its successful use during the pandemic. This will ensure shorter waiting times and less unnecessary travel for court participants. However, a full hearing in court will always be available when needed and where the court considers it to be in the interests of justice. The decision as to how a hearing is conducted will remain a matter for the judiciary—the judge, magistrates or tribunal panel—who will determine how best to protect the interests of justice on a case-by-case basis.
This is a multifaceted Bill, but there is one overarching objective: to keep the public safe. It promotes multiagency working to prevent and reduce crime; it gives the police the powers they need to fight crime and prevent disorder; it introduces tougher punishments for violent and sexual offenders; it helps end the cycle of reoffending; and it enhances the efficiency of the courts to help deliver justice for all. I commend the Bill to the House.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in today’s debate. I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his kind words about the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson; I am sure that I echo the words of the whole House in sending him our good wishes. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Sandhurst for the very interesting maiden speech he made during this important debate—there were times when I wondered whether he might just pop down to the Front Bench and help me on some of the Ministry of Justice issues. I very much look forward to working with him in the future.
A couple of noble Lords, including Front-Bench speeches from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, talked about the size of the Bill. I agree, and I know that the noble Lords will lead by example and not add to its size. I welcome the support for many of the measures in the Bill, including those in relation to the police covenant, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others. I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about other parts of the covenant that he would like to explore: doubling the maximum penalty for assaults on emergency workers, the amendments to the Sexual Offences Act in respect of positions of trust, and the provisions relating to the rehabilitation of offenders.
It is fair to say, however, that some of the other measures have not been quite so well received by your Lordships’ House. Many points have been raised, and my noble friend Lord Wolfson and I will need to consider some of these further. I will take this opportunity to touch on some of the main themes in today’s debate, but I know your Lordships will understand that I will not get through every single point made by every noble Lord—or else we will be here until tomorrow morning.
I will first address the concerns of a number of noble Lords regarding the public order provisions in Part 3 of the Bill. I had some very thoughtful, although contrary, contributions from my noble friends Lady Stowell and Lord Moylan, and the noble Lords, Lord Blunkett and Lord Walney. In particular, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, spoke about the fragility of democracy, which I thought was a very interesting point. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, gave several examples of how, historically, our right to protest might have been curtailed. I have to say that I disagree with him. I think the right to protest peacefully is as fundamental to our democracy now as it has ever been. To be a bit mischievous, I add as a postscript that the Labour Party boycotted the Jarrow marches.
That said, we must respect the rights of others who might be affected by the increasingly disruptive tactics used by some groups. We saw further examples of such disruption during the recent protests by Extinction Rebellion, with protesters stopping emergency workers from attending to members of the public—as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said—as well as gluing themselves to trains to stop ordinary working people from going to work.
The policing inspectorate found earlier this year that the balance between protesters’ rights and the rights of local residents, businesses and those who hold opposing views leans in favour of the protesters and called for a modest reset. The Bill does just that, by enabling police to better manage highly disruptive protests. These new measures will balance the rights of protesters with those of others to go about their business and their day unhindered.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Oates, Lord Beith and Lord Dubs, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to the powers conferred on the police to attach conditions relating to the generation of noise. We accept that many protests are, by their very nature, noisy—they would not be protests otherwise—and the overwhelming majority of protests will be unaffected by these provisions. But in recent years we have seen some protesters use egregious noise, not as a method of legitimately expressing themselves but to antagonise and disrupt others from the enjoyment of their own liberties and rights. This power can be used only when the police reasonably believe that the noise from a protest may cause serious disruption to the activities of an organisation or cause a significant impact on people in the vicinity of the protest.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, talked about the lack of a definition of serious disruption and annoyance. Part 3 of the Bill uses many terms that are already used in the Public Order Act 1986 and other legislation and that are familiar to the police and the courts. The police are very well versed in applying the tests set out in legislation in an operational context. The tests in Sections 12 and 14 of the 1986 Act as currently drafted necessarily require the exercise of judgment based on the circumstances of a particular protest, and the amendments to the 1986 Act do not change that. To assist them in this, the police receive extensive training in public order delivered by the College of Policing.
Many noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the right reverend Prelates the Bishops of Blackburn, Manchester and Gloucester, expressed concerns about the provisions in Part 4 relating to unauthorised encampments. I must assure the House that this is not an anti-Traveller measure and it should not be portrayed as such. Those who cause harm are a small number, who often give an unfair and negative image of the vast majority of Travellers, who are completely law-abiding. The measures allow police to tackle unauthorised encampments where they cause significant damage, disruption and distress to communities and landowners. It has to be considered that it must be time-consuming and often costly for landowners to have unauthorised encampments removed or indeed to have to clean up after them. It is only right that the Government seek to protect law-abiding citizens who are adversely affected by some unauthorised encampments, a point well made by my noble friend Lord Goschen.
On Wales, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, that we have engaged extensively with the Welsh Government on this and other provisions in the Bill.
Another major topic of discussion this evening has been the serious violence duty. My noble friend Lady Bertin sought reassurance that the serious violence duty will cover domestic abuse and sexual violence. My noble friend Lord Polak, among others, also spoke on this issue. We have intentionally refrained from including a list of crime types or prioritising one type of victim over another in the legislation. This is to allow local strategies to take account of the most prevalent forms of serious violence in the locality and the impact on all potential victims. Different forms of serious violence will vary between geographical areas, and we want to enable partners to adapt and respond to new and emerging forms of serious violence as they arise and are identified. That is why we have built in flexibility for specified authorities to include in their strategy actions that focus on any form of serious violence should it be prevalent in a local area. This could include, for example, domestic abuse or sexual violence, or other forms of violence against women and girls. What we do not want to do through legislation is to restrict things from being in scope.
On the concerns about longer sentences, the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord German and Lord Hendy, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and my noble friend Lord Attlee expressed concern that this legislation will lead to further increases in the prison population. We are committed to a sentencing framework that takes account of the true nature of crimes and targets specific groups of offenders accordingly. The proposals aimed at serious offenders do just that—they are highly targeted interventions for the most serious and most dangerous offenders, and those of most public concern. However, at the other end of the scale, the Bill also looks to divert offenders away from a life of crime and support them into rehabilitation.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and others raised the issue of female offenders. We are actively looking to target female offenders through our problem-solving courts pilot, aiming to reduce the volume and frequency of reoffending, increase health and well-being and improve the maintenance of familial relationships compared to standard court processes and disposals for vulnerable female offenders. We intend to pilot these measures in four to five courts, at least one of which is anticipated to focus on piloting problem-solving measures for female offenders who meet the eligibility criteria. The Government remain fully committed to delivering the female offender strategy, which sets out a very ambitious programme of work to address the specific needs of female offenders.
The noble Lords, Lord Dubs, Lord Rooker and Lord Pannick, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester raised the issue of the sentencing of primary carers. The case law in this area makes it clear that the court must perform a balancing exercise between the legitimate aims to be served by sentencing and the effect that a sentence has on the family life of others, particularly children. The effect of a sentence on others may be capable of tipping the scales so that a custodial sentence which would otherwise be proportionate becomes disproportionate. However, there will be cases where the seriousness of the offending is such that, despite the existence of dependants, a custodial sentence is warranted. In such cases, it will still be open to the court to find that the effect of a sentence on others is such as to provide grounds for mitigating the length of a custodial sentence.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked about the review of sentencing in cases of domestic homicides. I am happy to report that this work is now well under way and the first stage has been completed. He was right to identify the appointment of Clare Wade QC as an independent expert to lead the second stage of the review. The terms of reference of the review have now been finalised following a period of consultation with her, and we will publish them shortly. Ms Wade will examine the findings from the initial stage of the review and then produce a report for Ministers which will consider whether the law could better protect the public and ensure that the sentences reflect the severity of these awful crimes.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Sater, asked about the use of audio and video links in criminal proceedings and how it will be implemented to ensure quality and that trials remain fair. The use of live links will continue to be subject to judicial discretion, and they will be used only where the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice, having considered any representations from parties to the proceedings. We recognise that children have specific needs; the courts have a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of children. They will need to be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for a child to participate by live link, having considered any representation from parties and the relevant youth offending team.
My noble friend Lord Lexden spoke about the historic disregards and pardons for what were historically same-sex offences but are offences no longer. I have to ’fess up: I thought this was dealt with in the Armed Forces Bill, and it is not. I will immediately get on to this. I feel quite ashamed that I thought it was being dealt with, so I apologise to my noble friend.
My noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton and the noble Lord, Lord Best, suggested that the Bill might be used to repeal the Vagrancy Act 1824. The Government are very clear that no one should be criminalised simply for having nowhere to live. We agree that the time has come to reconsider the Vagrancy Act. It is complex, it might not be a question of simply repealing the 1824 Act and putting nothing in its place, but we reserve judgment on that. We also need to consider the devolution implication, given that it extends to Wales. I can assure noble Lords that we are on the case, and I am sure the House will hold me to account for those words.
The IPP is something that noble Lords, particularly noble and learned Lords, are concerned about. The noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and my noble friend Lord Garnier argued that the Bill should address the issue of offenders still subject to the IPP sentences. We acknowledge that there are concerns about the IPP sentence, but our number one priority is to protect the public. We must not forget that many of these prisoners pose a high risk, and that the measures are working, but I acknowledge the point that the noble and learned Lords have made.
The noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, argued for the introduction of a new offence of assaulting a retail worker. Were the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, here, he would be arguing for it as well. I share their concerns about the unacceptable increase, during the pandemic, of assaults on shop workers. There is already a wide range of offences which criminalise disorderly and violent behaviour that would apply in cases of violence towards people whose work brings them into contact with members of the public. These offences cover the full spectrum of unacceptable behaviour, from using abusive language to the most serious and violent offences. None the less, the Government have agreed to actively consider whether legislative change is necessary and to bring forward any proposal if it is.
A number of noble Lords, including my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Garnier, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred to the reports published in the last few days by the DPRRC. I am very grateful to that committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights for their careful scrutiny of the Bill. We will consider, very carefully, each of their conclusions and recommendations, and respond fully in due course.
A couple of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned the extraction of information from electronic devices. We agree that there is a need for strong privacy safeguards when dealing with people’s sensitive personal information. We owe it to vulnerable victims and witnesses to get these provisions right. I assure noble Lords that we are continuing to explore how they might be strengthened.
I know that I have not been able to respond to all the points raised by noble Lords during the course of the debate. I will look at Hansard; I can already think of things that I have not had a chance to respond to tonight.
I will finish by reiterating what I said in my opening speech. This is a multifaceted Bill. We want to keep the public safe and I know that together, as the House of Lords, we will make this Bill better as we work on it in the coming weeks. I commend the Bill to the House.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in an incredibly thoughtful debate this afternoon. I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to his first Committee and the tone in which he opened this debate. I also pay tribute to his father. I jolly well hope that he is sitting at home watching this afternoon. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, for setting out their amendments to the first clause of the Bill, which relates to the police covenant.
I echo other noble Lords’ comments on PC Harper and Sergeant Matt Ratana, who gave their lives protecting the general public. To echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, there is no doubt that our brave police encounter some of the most challenging circumstances on a daily basis, often operating in some of the most difficult and traumatic situations imaginable. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for outlining, albeit in very graphic detail, some of the experiences he has had to endure during his policing career. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for bringing to this House a unique experience as Parliament’s only PCC, and I wish him well in his retirement.
What we have talked about this afternoon is what makes the police covenant so important, with its central tenet the health and well-being of members and former members of the police workforce, their physical protection, and support for their families. It is a priority for the Government, and I am very pleased that we have brought this forward.
We recognise the very positive intention behind Amendments 1, 3 and 4, and I could not disagree what most noble Lords have said. However, what I would say is that they are not necessary, on the basis that consideration of mental health, including having regard to programmes offering advice on assessment and treatment, the impact of trauma and support and the training for health and resilience, are already well within scope of Clause 1, under the banner of health and well-being.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me to outline what the provision includes, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Harris and Lady Brinton, talked about PTSD, which affects an awful lot of police officers, both when serving and after their career. I shall outline some of those things. First, we will ensure that occupational health standards are embedded in all forces, holding chiefs to account for providing the right quality and investment in their workforce. The National Police Wellbeing Service has been working hard to embed occupational health standards in forces, including for mental health. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, who said that people should receive the right support that they need at the right time. That is absolutely central to providing effective mental health services.
The other thing that will be contained is consideration of a new chief medical officer for policing in England and Wales, and a review of what a good support model for families looks like, drawing on established good practice and research from other sectors and international partners. Once agreed, forces will be required to implement locally, bespoke to their local infrastructure, development of training for GPs around the role of the police, similar to military veterans GP training, and the development of pre-deployment mental health support provided to the police workforce, particularly in light of the Covid-19 pandemic and the effect that this will have had on the police workforce, some of whom I have already spoken to.
There was quite a lot of talk about the interface between the Armed Forces and the police covenant, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester clearly made the distinction between the two forces, which are very different in terms of the demands on them. The work under the police covenant will recognise the specific issues that affect those working or who have worked in policing—to answer the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, it will include those who have retired—as a result of their role, and will seek to provide support to them and their families in addressing these issues. The police covenant and the legislation underpinning it have been drafted to ensure that they reflect the specific, unique needs of our police as they currently stand.
The heading is deliberately broad to allow the Secretary of State to consider the issues as they arise. We consciously framed the provisions in this way to enable a flexible approach to ensure that the issues that matter most to members and former members of the police can be taken into account and addressed in the annual report as they arise. This flexibility will allow the police covenant to evolve to respond to the most pertinent needs of current and former members of the police workforce in a timely manner. What we do not want to do is create a hierarchy of issues by explicitly listing specific issues in the Bill, where they will fall within those broader priorities.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak to Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and of which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is a co-signatory. It is an important amendment. I was particularly moved by the comments made by the noble Baroness, reminding us that of course it is from a police officer’s point of view but that this is also about a complainant’s point of view. It is from both sides that this debate has taken place.
Sometimes you look at an amendment and wonder whether it is as important as some others. Listening to the moving opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and others, I have been struck that this is a crucial amendment and a crucial discussion which is of huge significance to the police, communities and our country, particularly in light of issues that have arisen over the last few months. However, investigations that are delayed and drag on without resolution are completely unacceptable for the complainant and the officer in question.
I was completely unaware and absolutely astonished to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, from his experience as a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, that officers under investigation have been waiting for 10 years. Whatever the rights and wrongs of what happened and whether they were guilty or innocent, that cannot be right. This has got to be looked at by the Minister who now has responsibility for this, wherever you come from in the debate. I am sorry if other noble Lords knew this, and that I was the only person here who was unaware of it. I knew that there were delays, but frankly, that is astonishing. We have just had a significant and important debate on protecting the mental health of our officers. One can only imagine the mental health implications for people under investigation but also, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, reminded us, for people who have made the complaints. It does not serve justice for anybody.
There is some suggestion about delays in driving cases, but if she knows, can the Minister tell the Committee whether there is a particular delay in one area or a general problem across investigations? The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned firearms, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned some other examples, but is there a particular problem which emerges when a complaint is made in a particular area? There have been many references to certain offences not being taken seriously even when complaints were made, but it would be interesting for the Minister to come back to us on that.
I think that, at its heart, this amendment is saying that if we do not get this right, public confidence is undermined and eroded, and it is of no benefit to any of us not to be confident in the system. We must believe that the investigations which take place are fair, operate in a timely manner and are done with that integrity which people can understand and believe. We all accept that. Nobody here would disagree that this is the process which must happen and should be in place. However, as we have heard, that is not happening. Therefore, the amendment rightly asks us whether the answer is to set a time limit, to lay out a process that is better and more effective. The key question for the Minister is: what plans are there to review and update the disciplinary process, to restore public confidence and to reassure all of us that, at the end of the day, not only those who are complained against can feel confident but those who are making the complaint? That is the resolution that we all want from this important amendment.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, set out, this amendment seeks to further improve the timeliness of disciplinary and misconduct proceedings against police officers. It seeks to do this by amending existing regulations governing complaint and misconduct investigations by the IOPC, as well as those conducted by force professional standards departments. In substance, they seek to introduce a new system of separate independent adjudicators with powers to close down investigations which have taken longer than 12 months, where they decide that there is no “good and sufficient” reason for delay.
Again, with this amendment, I agree with the thrust of what the noble Lord and others said, namely that disciplinary and misconduct investigations should be conducted and completed in a timely fashion, for the reasons set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Hogan-Howe. Like the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, when I heard “10 years” I was utterly shocked. However, this amendment comes at a time when investigation timescales are already reducing and when the Government have worked hard to reduce bureaucracy in the system and not add to it.
Under the IOPC’s predecessor, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, investigations would on average take 11 months. Since 2018, under the IOPC, that has fallen by almost 30% to just eight months. The IOPC has closed more than 90% of its cases in under 12 months and is making strong progress on the number of cases that it closes in under nine months and even in under six months. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is in nobody’s interest for investigations to drag on for long periods unnecessarily. We recognise the impact that this can have on everyone concerned.
It might be helpful in terms of explaining the trajectory that the Government introduced a package of reforms in February last year to the police complaints and disciplinary systems. It included new provisions to improve timeliness, with an expectation that investigations will normally be completed within 12 months. If not, the investigating body must provide a written explanation of any delays and steps to bring the investigation to a conclusion. The Government expect the IOPC to go further, and it now has targets in its business plans to complete many of those investigations in under nine and six months, as I said.
There are a number of reasons why cases might take too long, including the complexity of a case, the time- scale being impacted by parallel criminal investigations, and delays in obtaining expert evidence or post-mortem reports. It might be further complicated by delays in obtaining accounts from key police witnesses and subjects. That said, it is not acceptable for investigations to go on for too long, but the trajectory of timescales is certainly downwards.
The noble Lord’s amendment would introduce an additional layer of cost and bureaucracy. It would also risk creating perverse incentives for investigators to rush to meet deadlines at the expense of the quality of an investigation, particularly in those complex cases or if historic matters are at stake.
If an investigation into police wrongdoing was terminated without being concluded and that officer might have had a case to answer for gross misconduct—I can think of very recent cases which are relevant here—this would significantly undermine public confidence and potentially the course of justice. I am sure that is not the intention of noble Lords.
The amendment also risks undermining the independence of the police disciplinary system, blurring the lines between when legally qualified persons are appointed to this role and when the same person is appointed as a legally qualified chair of a misconduct hearing. These individuals would be selected from the same pool. That fundamentally changes the role of a legally qualified chair and jeopardises the independence of their position and the disciplinary system.
In conclusion, the Government have already taken steps to reduce investigation timescales and we will be monitoring the timeliness of investigations, drawing on new data collection requirements that we introduced as part of recent reforms. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support for speedy justice. Obviously, this impacts the complainant as well as the officers.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. It seems very strange standing here and talking about a former commissioner in that way, but I am in police mode at the moment, I think. He made a very important point about firearms officers who volunteer to take on this enormous responsibility and are then treated so badly by the system.
The Police Federation—I am grateful for its support of these amendments—accepts that there will be delays if a criminal investigation is involved. However, there are still significant delays even after the criminal matters have been dealt with, as I outlined in the examples I gave.
I thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for his promise to come back all guns blazing, as it were, if I bring the amendment back on Report.
It is interesting that there is a parallel with the Armed Forces again. I spoke to a former soldier who was resigning from the police service and asked him why. He said that he was leaving because, in the Armed Forces, when something goes wrong, the most senior officer involved takes responsibility and faces a court martial, while in the police service, the responsibility is pushed down to the lowest-possible level, to alleviate the responsibility of senior officers. That is an aspect of the culture of the police service; I agree with that officer’s conclusions.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, talked about public confidence. If there is no confidence in the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the police complaints system, this will be partly due to the undue delays. Complainants are beginning to think “What are they trying to cover up? Why is it taking so long?”. It is essential that these things are dealt with in a timely manner.
I thank the Minister for her support in principle, but the examples I gave were not complex cases; they were simple, but they still took years. They did not involve expert witnesses, yet there were still delays. These are recent cases from last year.
I am sorry but I do not accept the Minister’s assertion that this amendment would result in a rush to complete investigations. These completely independent people would assess whether there were justified reasons for investigations going on as long as they had. Clearly, if these investigations were not being dealt with in a timely manner, they would have something to worry about. This is about picking up those cases in which there is unnecessary and unreasonable delay. Of course, the same chair would not adjudicate over whether an investigation was going on too long and then chair the discipline investigation.
We are on to something here and I am very grateful to the Police Federation for bringing it to my attention. We may well need to discuss this further on Report, but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I begin by placing on the record my apologies for not being in my place at Second Reading for personal family reasons. I also place on record my thanks to many noble Lords for their kind and supportive words and messages; I am very grateful.
Turning to the substance of the matter before the Committee today, Clause 2 of the Bill proposes an increase in the maximum penalty for the offence of common assault and battery when that offence is committed against an emergency worker. The definition —this is important—of “emergency worker” is set out in Section 3 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018. The pandemic has reminded us, if we needed reminding, that the vital front-line role that our emergency workers play, and indeed always have played, is of immense importance to our society. But we have recently seen an increasing number of assaults being committed against emergency workers in the course of their duties. This will simply not be tolerated.
Last summer, we delivered on our manifesto commitment to consult on this issue. We found that the large majority of respondents supported our proposal to double the maximum penalty to two years. This will ensure that the law provides our police and other emergency workers with sufficient protection to carry out their duties and will enable the courts to pass sentences that reflect the severity with which we view these offences. This measure builds on previous legislation introduced by the Government back in 2018. We have enhanced already the protection of emergency workers where more serious assaults such as ABH and GBH are committed—I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made this point. These more serious offences obviously carry higher maximum penalties than common assault. Where such offences are committed against an emergency worker acting in the course of their duties, this is regarded as an aggravating feature of the offence, warranting a higher sentence.
Let me deal first with the amendment from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester. I am grateful to her for tabling the amendment, and to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham for acting as her spokesman this afternoon—I was going to say, “as the Aaron to her Moses”, if I may put it in those terms. The purpose of her amendment is to broaden the definition of “emergency worker” to encompass all staff in custodial institutions. The Committee will be aware that all prison officers, prisoner custody officers and those who exercise functions associated with these professions are already included in the existing definition of “emergency worker” from the 2018 legislation.
The problem is that broadening the definition of “emergency worker” can have unintended consequences. The broader definition would capture anyone employed or engaged to carry out functions in a custodial institution, which can extend to prisoners who undertake jobs within the institution. The amendment would then place this group of convicted prisoners on the same statutory footing as prison officers, constables and NHS staff. That would be unacceptable.
By means of increasing the maximum penalty for the assault of an emergency worker, we want to protect those who protect others. That is why it is right that emergency workers are on a different statutory footing. Clause 2, therefore, does not seek to amend the underlying definition of “emergency worker” that was accepted by Parliament when passing the 2018 legislation. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, given the work of the Bar Council in this area, but it is right, I suggest, that we acknowledge the special position of emergency workers, as Parliament did back in 2018.
Of course, that is not to say that any form of violence in custodial institutions is acceptable; it plainly is not. We want to make sure that our prisons are safe for all staff, as well as all prisoners. Picking up on the point from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede—
I have a pertinent question. I am troubled by the rather lame excuse that the noble Lord offers from the Dispatch Box about the “unintended consequences”. Surely it would be very simple to put in place an exemption that barred prisoners from benefiting from that clause. I cannot understand why the noble Lord is so resistant to this particular move; there must be a workable way round it. I have been a Home Office Minister and have had lame excuses written for me—this sounds like one of those.
I am afraid that the noble Lord appears to have missed the point of principle that I made before making what he characterises as a lame excuse, but which I thought was in fact rather a good point. The point of principle is that we have a definition of “emergency worker”, which Parliament accepted back in 2018. It is a good working definition, and we shall stick with it; that is a point of principle. The point on this amendment was that it goes too far because it has those unintended consequences. The noble Lord should not lose sight of my first point by concentrating only on the second, which he regards as lame and which I regard, from a legal perspective, as quite a nice point—I do urge upon him the point of principle as well.
I was coming to the point that we value prison officers. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, laid down the gauntlet and asked that we do so from the Dispatch Box. Of course we do. Our position on this amendment has nothing to do with not valuing prison officers or the work that anybody does in prison.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham asked what we were doing to protect prison staff. Those who carry out corresponding functions to prison officers and prison custody officers are already included in the definition of an emergency worker. Offences against those people will be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing guidelines. That is what I wanted to say in response to that amendment.
I am sorry—I thought very carefully about whether I should intervene. I was genuinely so taken aback by the Minister’s reference to prisoners being included that I nearly leapt up immediately. The question was then asked, but I have tried to replay it in my head. I absolutely understand that the Minister meant no offence but, out of context, I fear how it might be understood by those workers, such as chaplains, tutors and so on. By, in a sense, lumping them together with prisoners who have been employed, it could easily be misheard outside this House. I know that was not the Minister’s intention, but I ask him to put on the record that it was not what he meant.
I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to do that. As I am sure everybody recognises, that was not the point I was making. I appreciate that it was regarded as lame by some people, but the point that I sought to make was that the distinction and purpose of the amendment was to expand the definition from prison officers to other people working in prison. My point was that from the way in which it is drafted—and I appreciate that it could be redrafted—it could and would be read so broadly as to include prisoners who were doing jobs in prison. It was certainly not what I was saying to place prisoners doing jobs in prison with chaplains and others who are working in prison. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for giving me the opportunity to make that clear, if it was not already.
I seek one matter of clarification, although I should not need to. Is there no way, apart from raising the maximum sentence by legislation, by which government could bring to the attention of the prosecuting authorities, sentencing courts and so forth the aggravating features that cover all these amendments? There are the emergency workers in the first place, and the nauseating offence of potting, which I confess not to have heard of before, and assaults on prison officers. There are those who find themselves, in the ordinary course of their employment, exposed in these highly vulnerable circumstances to miscreance of an obvious character. Is there no governmental input to the Sentencing Council? Can the Government not influence those sorts of bodies to isolate the fact that these are manifestly aggravating circumstances, which should go to raise not only the likely sanction being imposed but the likelihood of prosecution?
As the noble and learned Lord knows far better than I do, one has to distinguish between aggravating and mitigating factors and the likelihood of prosecution. With regard to the Sentencing Council, I am confident that it already has that point on board. The question before the Committee is that of maximum sentence rather than aggravating or mitigating factors. I have also said—and, I hope, explained—that there is clear guidance in place to make sure that, when these offences are committed, they are dealt with either through the courts or through prison adjudication.
I just want to take the Minister back to the comments made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham on the definition of prisoners as workers. I cannot think of any other legislation where a prisoner enjoys the same rights as a worker. There are many rights that workers enjoy in this country, but none of them that I am aware of apply to prisoners. There must be a way around this, perhaps by a government amendment or some sort of redrafting, that would allow the suggestion made to be incorporated.
I think I made it clear earlier that I was making two points in response to this amendment. The point that we are focused on at the moment is whether we could have more—and I say this respectfully—felicitous drafting than the drafting of the amendment that we currently have. I have accepted in principle that one could, and I made that clear in my previous answer and my answer to the right reverend Prelate. However, I do not want us to lose sight of my first response, on the point of principle: we have a definition in the 2018 Act of “emergency worker”, and that was regarded in 2018 as suitable and fit for purpose. It treated that definition as a separate status and a distinct group, and the Government’s position is that definition was good in 2018 and remains so now.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. On Amendment 11 from the right reverend Prelate, I am aware of the problem that he describes, but I did not make my new offence cover other Prison Service staff. I deliberately excluded probation officers just for reasons of simplicity, but if I managed to make my potting amendment find favour with the House, I would have to decide who was to be protected by it.
I am slightly disappointed by my noble friend’s response, because I thought that I was offering him the best thing since sliced bread, but he turned me down. The problem for the Minister running the Prison Service is that he cannot direct the police force to investigate these issues and, as he carefully explained to the Committee, he cannot direct the Crown Prosecution Service to pay greater attention to these offences either. My noble friend has no tools to protect prison officers—so I suspect that the Prison Officers’ Association will be a little bit disappointed with his approach.
I think we identified the underlying issue, which is the probability of being prosecuted for these sorts of these offences, and we need to have another look at that. I shall, of course, withdraw my amendment, subject to the usual caveats and discussions with the Opposition Front Bench.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, there are a number of general points I need to make about the new legal duties to support a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence. I will try to make them in the appropriate group of amendments, but I hope the Committee will accept that there is a great deal of overlap.
The overwhelming response of the non-governmental organisations I have met with which have concerns about this part of the Bill is that, as drafted, it is actually about forcing agencies to support a police-led enforcement approach to serious violence—not a public health approach, or even a multiagency approach, to preventing and tackling serious violence. The Government’s own consultation on this issue gave three options: a new legal duty on specific organisations to effectively share information with the police; a new legal duty to revise community safety partnerships, the existing and well-established mechanism where local authorities and police forces work together to prevent and tackle crime, and where the local police chief and local authority chief executive are equal partners in doing whatever each partner and others can do to reduce crime and disorder; and a voluntary non-legislative approach. There was more support for a legislative approach than a voluntary one, but more respondents favoured enhancing community safety partnerships—40%—compared with a new legal duty to provide information to the police—37%—and, tellingly, the police supported equally options one and two.
Even the police, the sector most likely to benefit from a police-led enforcement approach, were ambivalent as to whether it should be a truly multiagency approach by enhancing community safety partnerships or a police-led enforcement approach. So why did the Government opt for the latter and not the former? A police-led enforcement approach was the Government’s preferred option from the beginning. These amendments, which we support, are the first manifestation of challenging that police-led enforcement approach, in that the legal duty does not sufficiently recognise that many young people, particularly those involved in county lines, are victims of criminal exploitation rather than free-acting criminals. Henry Blake is a former youth worker who draws on his personal experiences of working with at-risk young people in his powerful film, “County Lines”—a drama about one young man who is drawn into county lines drug dealing. I would highly recommend this film to any noble Lord who is unaware of the realities of county lines.
Many young people lacking family support and living in poverty find themselves groomed by adults who appear to show them the love and concern they desperately seek, and who treat them to meals in burger restaurants and buy them new trainers—something their often lone parent cannot afford. They promise them money, not just so they can afford the latest designer clothing that they need if they are not to be bullied by gangs, who see those who do not wear designer labels—even Nike and Adidas—as targets. It is not just so they can go to McDonald’s whenever they want, but so that they can help their mum put food on the table and make sure their younger sister has decent clothes to wear. I hope noble Lords can see how easily vulnerable young people are drawn into criminality, not just for pecuniary advantage but for the sense of belonging and the sense that someone is at last paying them some attention. For many, it is as much an emotional need as a financial one.
Of course, the reality is very different. The adults exploiting these young people take the vast majority of the profits of the drug dealing in which they are involving these young people whom they have groomed, and the youngsters take all the risks, often ending in violence from rival drug dealers. These young people are victims of criminal exploitation, and each one of us is to blame—not them. It is our fault that their single mothers have to do three minimum wage jobs to pay the rent and put food on the table and so, through no fault of their own, can rarely be there for their kids as most wish they could be. It is our fault that too many people do not have a decent place to live, because they cannot afford private rents for an appropriately sized home in a good state of repair, and that there is a shocking shortage of social housing and much of what exists is in an appalling state of repair. It is our fault that, as the cost of living spirals upwards, we take away £20 a week in universal credit from those most in need. The Government’s response is to force other agencies to divulge information that makes it easier for them to prosecute these victims of criminal exploitation.
That is why the Bill needs to radically change from a police-led enforcement approach to preventing and tackling serious violence to a truly public health and multiagency approach, starting with—although this is only the beginning of the changes needed—putting the safeguarding of children involved in serious violence in the Bill. That must include, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggests in his Amendment 50, and as both Barnardo’s and the Children’s Society have suggested, including a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation in the meaning of exploitation in Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, suggests in her Amendment 52, training for police officers in particular, to ensure that they are aware of child criminal exploitation and actively seeking evidence of such exploitation.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for setting out the case for these amendments. I wholeheartedly agree that nothing is more important than safeguarding children at risk of harm. That is why we introduced reforms to safeguarding in 2017, which led to the establishment of multiagency safeguarding arrangements in 2019. The statutory safeguarding partners responsible for safeguarding—that is, local authorities, clinical commissioning groups and chief officers of police—are also named as specified authorities under the serious violence duty, so I would argue that it is truly a multiagency approach. This demonstrates the importance of safeguarding in protecting children and young people from involvement in serious violence. We expect that existing work to safeguard vulnerable children will link very closely with local efforts to prevent and reduce serious violence. Therefore, we do not believe that it is necessary to include a separate safeguarding requirement in this part of the Bill, and it would not be possible to do so without duplicating existing safeguarding legislation.
On Amendment 25, which would require specified authorities to prepare and implement an early help strategy, the noble Lord is absolutely right to highlight the importance of prevention and early intervention and this, of course, is the key aim of the serious violence duty. We recognise that early intervention and prevention are essential to reducing serious violence. The duty requires partners to work collaboratively to develop a strategy to reduce serious violence in their local area. We expect partners to work with upstream organisations, such as education providers and children’s social care, when developing this strategy to ensure that it covers actions that relate to early help and considers risks that occur before a young person becomes involved in serious violence. This ensures that any strategy will include early help for this cohort. We believe that it would be less effective to separate this out into an additional strategy.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for raising the issue of medical confidentiality. She said the amendments provide that in exercising the serious violence duty, an authority or individual could not share or be required to share any information that would breach doctor-patient confidentiality as set out in the General Medical Council ethical guidance on confidentiality. One of the amendments would also remove clinical commissioning groups and local health boards from the list of authorities that are subject to the serious violence duty under Part 2 on the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crime.
As has been said, Clause 9 gives the Secretary of State the power to authorise by regulations the disclosure of information by or to a prescribed person, a specified authority or local policing body, an education authority, a prison authority and a youth custody authority. While the Bill states in Clause 9 that such regulations
“must provide that they do not authorise a disclosure of information that … would contravene the data protection legislation”,
that does not relate to a breach of any obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure in respect of which the requirement is only that the regulations “may” provide that such a disclosure does not result in a breach.
Clause 15 on the disclosure of information provides for the disclosure of information but states:
“A disclosure of information authorised by this section does not breach … any obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure”.
Yet, as has been said on more than one occasion today, it is the common-law duty of confidentiality that helps to uphold the trust of patients in health services, which can be extremely hard to gain and extremely easy to lose.
Clause 16, on the supply of information to local policing bodies, states:
“A local policing body may … request any person listed … to supply it with such information as may be specified in the request”,
but
“a person who is requested to supply information … must comply with the request”
and:
“A disclosure of information … does not breach … any obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure”.
That sounds more like a demand than a request. The only caveat is that compliance with the request for information does not require a disclosure of information that would contravene the data protection legislation, although even then
“in determining whether a disclosure would do so, the duty imposed by that subsection is to be taken into account”.
The subsection in question is the one that the person so requested to supply information must comply with the request.
Could the Minister give a couple of examples of what that means in practical terms? What do the words
“in determining whether a disclosure would do so, the duty imposed by that subsection is to be taken into account”
actually mean in hard, practical terms?
Maybe I am wrong, but Clause 16 appears to legally require clinical commissioning groups and local health boards to provide confidential health information to the police, and Clauses 9 and 15 would grant CCGs and LHPs permission to share confidential health information with a wider list of recipients such as councils and educational authorities, as well as the police. Perhaps the Minister will put our minds at rest on this, but on the face of it this appears to introduce a mandatory blanket obligation for clinical commissioning groups and local health boards to share confidential health information with the police, replacing, as has been said, the existing system, which allows healthcare professionals to disclose confidential information on public interest grounds on a case-by-case basis if it is necessary for the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crime or where there is an imminent risk of serious harm to an individual.
I hope the Minister, speaking on behalf of the Government, can address in her response the concerns that have been raised, and say what safeguards would prevent confidential medical information being inappropriately made available under the Bill, beyond the existing criteria, guidance and procedures for such disclosure in relation to public interest grounds. If the Government are saying—I am not entirely clear whether they are or not—that the present arrangements are not properly working or are no longer appropriate in today’s world, perhaps there is a need for further discussions by the Government on this aspect of the Bill to make sure that we get any change in the law right and maintain what has been referred to in today’s debate as “the right balance”.
We need to know far more about the real reasons for the change the Government are proposing, what its implications are and how it will be interpreted and applied under the terms of the Bill. I, too, hope the Minister will agree to further discussions on this issue in view of the concerns that have been raised and which are certainly worthy of a full and detailed response with examples.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate; it has been incredibly informative. On the last point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about further discussions, and as requested by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I am very happy to convene a meeting. On that note, officials have met the GMC to discuss the data-sharing clauses. They have agreed to support the drafting of the statutory guidance and officials have also offered to meet the BMA, but a date has not been fixed. I would like to schedule the meeting that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness request, and it would be great if they would join it.
On the first point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about a police-led approach, in the serious violence duty draft guidance it is writ really quite large that this is not led by one agency or another but is a shared endeavour towards a public health approach. There are two pages on that, and I think the noble Lord might find that really helpful. At this point, I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for both giving the benefit of his experience and bringing balance to the debate; “balance” seems to be a word quite often used in this debate.
Information sharing between relevant agencies is absolutely essential to the discharge of the serious violence duty. The issue before us is how such information sharing, particularly when it relates to personal data of identifiable persons, is properly regulated, and the scope of any restrictions on data sharing. I recognise that there are concerns, particularly in respect of patient information, and that we need to examine them carefully, but I am also concerned that at least some of these amendments seek to significantly weaken the provisions in Chapter 1 of Part 2. Amendment 54 is a case in point. It would have the effect of removing specified health authorities—clinical commissioning groups or CCGs in England and local health boards in Wales—from Schedule 1 and consequently remove the requirement for such authorities to participate in the preparation and development of local serious violence strategies.
I know that noble Lords would agree that the health sector has a very important contribution to make to local partnership working to prevent and reduce serious violence. The provision of local health data will be necessary to take a comprehensive view of the levels of violence being brought to the attention of services in a local area. Local health services may also be involved in the implementation of local strategies, for example where health-related support services are to be commissioned for those at risk of or involved in serious violence. I therefore do not think that it is appropriate to remove specified health authorities from this part of the Bill.
On the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, I would like to be clear that the information-sharing provisions under the serious violence duty do not place any mandatory requirements directly on GPs, doctors or other practitioners to disclose information that they hold. The power to disclose information in Clause 15 applies to information held by CCGs in England and local health boards in Wales, as they are specified authorities. Local policing bodies can request information under Clause 16 from CCGs in England and local health boards in Wales only when it relates to them, their functions, or functions they have contracted out, and only where that information is for the purposes of enabling or assisting the local policing body to exercise its functions under Clause 13 of the Bill. I think that was the point that the noble Lord, Lord Patel, referred to, unless I am wrong.
Confidential patient information can already be lawfully disclosed in the public interest where that information can be used to prevent, detect or prosecute a serious crime. However, such decisions about whether disclosures of confidential patient data are justified must always be made on a case-by-case basis, in line with data protection legislation, which is also the case for the serious violence duty provisions.
On the common-law duty of confidentiality, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about balance was really pertinently made. So many crimes that we can all think of, particularly against children—he mentioned a case that involved children—could have been avoided had practitioners shared relevant information. Existing statutory guidance on the Care Act 2014 already signals specific circumstances where the common-law duty of confidentiality and data protection legislation would not be contravened by the sharing of personal data—for example, where there is an overriding public interest.
Confidentiality can be overridden if there is a necessity—namely, abuse or neglect. Ordinarily, consent should be obtained but, where this is not possible, practitioners must consider whether there is an overriding public interest that would justify information sharing—namely, risk of serious harm. Again, that point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Patel. Confidential patient information can already be lawfully disclosed in the public interest where that information can be used to prevent, detect or prosecute a serious crime. However, such decisions about whether disclosures of confidential patient data are justified must always be made on that case-by-case basis.
I hope that I have provided some reassurance on this matter. As I indicated at the start, I know that there are particular sensitivities about sharing patient information, but, having heard the concerns, I will reflect carefully on this debate and convene the meeting that noble Lords requested ahead of Report. I hope that, with that, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Forgive me, but before the Minister sits down, can I ask her to reflect and, if she wants to come back, to address the issue of who decides? I am very grateful for her assurance about intention and that there is no attempt to go further than classical practice has gone, which is a public interest exception to general patient confidentiality. But if, for example, under the new provisions, there were to be a dispute between, say, the police and the relevant health authority and/or the relevant health authority and the individual practitioner, who would decide? That is of course crucial in relation to patient-doctor trust.
The decision may be challenged, but the person who decides would be the person who holds the data.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanations and for the promise of further meetings. It might help those further meetings if I raise the issues I have now. I am concerned at her saying that approaches cannot be made directly to medical practitioners but only through these other bodies. If the result was the same—that confidential medical information about individuals was divulged—that is not much of a reassurance. I am grateful for the information that officials met with the GMC and that it agreed to help with statutory guidance. Perhaps the Minister can meet with the GMC and it can help with amending the Bill.
The Minister said that the issue with some of the amendments is that they weaken the duties in the Bill. That is the whole purpose of the amendments. Regarding the draft guidance and its emphasis on a public health approach, that is not what is on the face of the Bill. The perception of all those I have spoken to—we will come to this issue when considering further groups—is that this is all about providing information to the police. To be fair, the Minister said so in her response. The belief among many authorities is that this is all about providing information to the police and is not a two-way process.
The Minister talked about the Care Act and said that there is already a duty to pass over confidential medical information if there is an overriding public interest. Where in the Bill does it say that there must be an overriding public interest before information is passed over?
The detection and prevention of serious violence would be the relevant part, which also reads across to the Care Act 2014. There would have to be a public interest assessment and as I said, there is no mandation. But the body or doctor in question would, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, have to balance the importance of the prevention, detection, and reduction of serious violence with the disclosure of that information.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on these amendments, especially those who are doctors—the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar—and those who are lawyers. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, rightly pointed out the balance of decision-making that every doctor must strike. I too made that point in referring to the excellent GMC guidance on confidentiality and good practice in handling patient information. I apologise if my point was not clear. It is not that doctors do not have to navigate the boundaries of confidentiality, because they do and I am quite sure there are times when they can be improved, as I said. As my noble friend Lord Paddick and others have said, this Bill contains powers that appear to override these responsibilities, demanding that CCGs and health boards in Wales pass on personal medical information; however, the doctor who logged that data is unable to take part in any decision about it being passed on.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained the concerns of those of us who have signed these amendments about these duties, which clearly override a doctor’s choice in making such a decision. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, said that circumstances are vital, since under this Bill he, as a doctor, would not necessarily be consulted by the CCG in question before it passed on any sensitive data to the policing body. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for Amendment 48, the wording of which I will look at before any amendment is brought back.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others talked about where the boundaries lie. We have heard repeatedly about the boundaries, but I want to pick up on my noble friend Lord Paddick’s question to the Minister. He asked her to point out to us exactly where in the Bill it sets the parameters for the GMC guidance and everything else we have discussed. I cannot find it, and nor can the GMC, the BMA and others who have briefed us. That is why we have tabled these amendments. We want this to be made clear. In a perfect world the data would be pseudonymised or anonymised, but we recognise that for some of these clauses that is inappropriate. Therefore, the doctor who has taken that medical information must be involved in any decisions.
I thank the Minister for the offer of a meeting and absolutely appreciate that this will happen. We understand that information will need to be shared between bodies—that is not the object of our amendment. We agree that the major issue is whether that information is identifiable and whether the doctor who made the original decision to record it is part of any decision about its being passed on. I completely understand the Minister’s concerns about Amendment 54. However, the question of the balance of the information being passed on—in this case, personal, confidential and identifiable medical data—clearly must be worked out more explicitly to give the registration bodies, doctors and nurses confidence that their use of the data will not be abused by others who may not have the full information required to address those difficult boundary issues. The doctor must have a say in any data being passed on.
I look forward to getting answers to my many questions in due course, so that we can all gauge who is making the decisions about the data being passed on and what level of information can remain confidential. I thank the Minister for her answers. I expect to return to this issue on Report and look forward to action in the meantime, such as meetings at which we can find those answers. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham for setting out the case for these amendments. I fully agree with him that local authorities and housing associations are able to make a significant contribution to local efforts to prevent and reduce serious violence.
In light of the fact that local authorities have responsibility for delivering services such as housing and community safety in local areas, we expect that such services will be a crucial part of the contribution that they make to the partnership arrangements, as they participate in the preparation and implementation of the serious violence strategy. We believe that they are therefore well placed to provide that strategic overview of, and information about, housing issues in the local area.
The statutory guidance for the serious violence duty, which has been published in draft and to which we have referred a few times this evening, highlights such duties and emphasises their relevance, as part of the work to meet the requirements of the serious violence duty. We do not think that it is necessary to explicitly state in the Bill that local authorities must have due regard to their housing duties as they fulfil the requirements of this duty because there will be a requirement for them to have due regard to the statutory guidance in any case.
Furthermore, current legislation already provides for those in most need to be prioritised for social housing, and statutory guidance makes it clear that local authorities should consider giving priority to those who require urgent rehousing as a result of domestic abuse and other types of violence. We will continue to work with the relevant sectors to ensure that the statutory guidance is clear on this point, ahead of a public consultation following Royal Assent and prior to the serious violence duty provisions coming into effect.
But, of course, we must do all that we can to identify and provide support to the individuals who are most at risk of involvement in serious violence, including those occupying social housing or who may be at risk of homelessness. But including registered providers of social housing within the provisions for the serious violence duty will not be necessary to achieve this.
As part of the work to prevent and reduce serious violence, specified authorities in a local area will be required to work together to identify the kinds and causes of serious violence and, in doing so, establish the groups of individuals who are most at risk in a local area.
Legislation already sets out that, when a local housing authority makes such a request, a private registered provider of social housing or a registered social landlord shall co-operate to such extent as is reasonable in the circumstances in offering accommodation to people with priority under the authority’s allocation scheme. This includes properties provided to those in priority need, including those with urgent housing needs, as a result of violence or threats of violence. Statutory guidance on allocations issues earlier this year, to which local authorities may pay due regard, makes this clear. It is also worth noting that the Tenancy Standard, issued by the Regulator of Social Housing, contains specific provision to ensure that private registered providers of social housing co-operate with local authorities’ strategic housing function.
Those who are at risk of violence should already receive support, if they need social housing and/or homelessness assistance, but local authorities must be able to respond to their strategic housing function and individual needs on a case-by-case basis. There is a risk that these amendments would inadvertently undermine the work of specified authorities to establish the most prevalent crime types and cohorts most at risk by mandating that a particular group falls under this category.
Furthermore, we must make sure that the duties placed on registered providers and local housing authorities are proportionate, bearing in mind both their size—there are, after all, 1,400 private registered providers of social housing in England, some of which are very small, and 165 local authorities that are social landlords—and the extent of their direct levers to deal with serious violence. They may therefore have limited direct capabilities, if any, to help to identify or prevent serious violence in the area. This is particularly true of small communities with reduced capacity and resources. The duties would therefore impose a material and unresourced burden.
We must also bear in mind the risk that social tenants may be inadvertently stigmatised as at risk of serious violence. Stigma was a key theme to emerge from the social housing Green Paper consultation exercise, and we must therefore be particularly careful not to further this perception and feeling.
I turn to Amendment 51. It is vital that all victims of serious violence who need to leave their home in order to escape violence are supported to access safe and secure alternative accommodation. It may be helpful for noble Lords if I explain how the existing provisions in homelessness legislation apply in relation to victims of violence.
A household is considered to be homeless if it would not be reasonable for them to continue to occupy their accommodation. Section 177 of the Housing Act is clear that it is not reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation if it is probable that this will lead to domestic abuse or other violence against that person or another member of their household. This means that victims of violence or of threats of violence that are likely to be carried out, who need to move because it is not safe for them to remain where they are currently living, are able to access support from council homelessness services. Furthermore, if a housing authority has a reason to believe that a person is homeless, eligible for assistance and has a priority need, Section 188(1) of the Housing Act requires the housing authority to provide interim accommodation while it carries out further investigations.
If homelessness is not successfully prevented or relieved, a housing authority will owe the main housing duty to applicants who are eligible, have a priority need for accommodation and are not homeless intentionally. Households containing dependent children have priority need, as in the examples raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, relating to gang-related violence, which was mentioned also by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
In addition, a person might be assessed as having priority need if they are considered significantly more vulnerable than an ordinary person would be if they became homeless as a result of ceasing to occupy accommodation by reason of violence from another person or threats of violence that are likely to be carried out. Homelessness legislation therefore already makes provision for victims of serious violence to receive support to access alternative accommodation.
Many local housing authorities already work with the police and other partners to reduce the risk of serious violence, including through the provision of alternative accommodation. Where this works well, it is clear that it is very important that services such as youth offending teams, educational authorities and the National Probation Service work together locally to provide support for the household and the victim of violence. Housing alone without that support is clearly not a sustainable option. The new serious violence duty will facilitate this and is intended to generate better partnership working locally to further protect this cohort.
The draft guidance is clear that local authorities are responsible for the delivery of a range of vital services for people and businesses in a local area, including but not limited to children’s and adult’s social care, schools, housing and planning, youth services and community safety, so they will have an essential role to play in partnership arrangements. The inclusion of this detail in the guidance for the new duty, alongside the existing homelessness legislation and guidance, is the most effective way of supporting victims of serious and gang-related violence to relocate and start afresh.
While it is so important that those at risk of serious violence who are homeless or are at risk of homelessness are supported to find an accommodation solution that meets their needs and reflects their individual circumstances, we do not think it is right to extend automatic priority need to other victims of serious violence that is not domestic abuse. While the violence or threat of violence may be present in their community, it does not usually take place in the home itself.
We think that the current legislative framework and accompanying statutory homelessness code of guidance, combined with the statutory guidance on social housing allocations, strikes the right balance as it considers the vulnerability of the applicant on a case-by-case basis and is the most appropriate means of determining priority for accommodation secured by the local authority. This approach ensures sufficient provision for homeless victims of serious violence who are vulnerable as a result of that violence, while also ensuring that finite resources, including temporary accommodation, are prioritised effectively and accommodation is there for those most in need.
The second part of Amendment 51 seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to
“issue a code of practice”
covering Section 177 of the Housing Act. I say to my noble friend at this point that the statutory homelessness code of guidance already provides such guidance for housing authorities when a person at risk of violence or the threat of violence approaches a local authority in housing need. The statutory guidance on social housing allocations also makes it clear that local housing authorities should consider giving preference to such persons.
My Lords, can I ask the Minister to clarify something? I think the noble Baroness said that this additional duty was not necessary, as it was with domestic violence, because the violence does not happen in the home. In the example I gave, where a drug dealer owed money harasses and threatens a family to get their money back, surely you could say that that violence is happening on the doorstep, or perhaps inside the home if the drug dealer breaks the door down. Surely there is a need in those circumstances for that family to be rehoused to reduce serious violence and get them out of the way in a similar way to a victim of domestic violence.
I think what I said to the House was that households containing dependent children have a priority need and that a person may be assessed as having priority need if they were considered to be significantly more vulnerable than an ordinary person would be if they became homeless as a result of ceasing to occupy accommodation by reason of violence from another person or threats of violence that are likely to be carried out. In terms of domestic abuse, it is widely acknowledged that domestic abuse crimes are committed inside the home, out of the view of the public, by household members. The changes made to the Domestic Abuse Act to extend priority need to people who are homeless as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse reflected that.
The Minister is setting great store by the guidance that is going to come forward. Can I ask her for reassurance that there will be adequate opportunity for those working on the ground to put across the point of view of the reality of dealing with families in some of the most distressing circumstances we could possibly imagine?
Certainly, I completely concur with the noble Baroness and there will be ample opportunity to look at the draft guidance as well.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have taken part in this debate, beginning with my co-pilot, the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, who made the point that this is all about prevention and early intervention, and housing is absolutely crucial if we are to achieve that. She mentioned the broad support for this group of amendments from organisations such as Shelter and Crisis and made the point that this is simply building on existing provisions and extending what is already the case for domestic violence to gang-related violence—I will come back to that point in a moment. The thrust of the amendment to which she spoke was to embed best practice in statutory guidance; she mentioned the tragic case of the child Chris.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who referred to the work of Mr Houlder on knife crime—the scourge of many housing estates—and also referred to the Edlington case, which he mentioned in an earlier debate. That underlined the point that there can sometimes be fatal consequences if there is inadequate consultation between the housing authorities and police authorities—a point that was underlined later in the debate by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for her support; she made the point that there is a potential resource implication behind these amendments if they are to be fully effective. Again, the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, as a police and crime commissioner was of real value to the debate; he emphasised the importance of strengthening the link between housing and the police.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who expressed concern that the Bill was too focused on a police-led initiative. The impact of these amendments will be to broaden the base by including housing; other amendments later on will also help broaden the base. He was anxious that this should not be entirely police-led.
I am grateful to the Minister for a thoughtful, sympathetic and comprehensive response to the debate, informed by her experience as a council leader in the north-west but also by her time as a Minister in what was then the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, now the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities—he said with some hesitation. She made the point that she expected housing authorities to participate—they were well placed to do so—and referred on many occasions to statutory guidance. The concern that I have, and some other noble Lords may have, is that there is a gap between statutory guidance and what actually happens on the ground; hence the case for legislation to make it clear that this is not just guidance, there is an obligation so to do.
I recall listening to exactly the same arguments we have heard this evening in resisting what became the Domestic Abuse Act, which gave a statutory right to be rehoused to those suffering from domestic violence. Previously, the argument was, “There are adequate powers for local authorities to do this under the housing legislation.” However, we have now taken the step forward and put it in the Domestic Abuse Act, and this will build on that precedent and extend it to gang violence. I am concerned by the gap between theory and practice, and this would embed best practice in legislation.
Having said that, as I said, my noble friend gave a thorough response which I want to reflect on, together with the contributions of other noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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My Lords, I have surprised myself, because I did not intend to speak on this group, but I find myself needing to speak in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. Generally speaking, I am not a great fan of machinery of government changes, new quangos or even of new, multiple statutory duties, but if we are taking the trouble to legislate on something as serious as serious violence, we need to think about transparency, accountability, enforcement and resourcing. Talk is cheap, and legislation is a little more expensive—but the colleagues in that Box do not get paid so much. These principles have been the undercurrent of the debate on this group.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, spoke eloquently on the part of the Delegated Powers Committee, and I did not disagree with a word, save to say that I was once a lawyer in the department advising him, and we are not going to blame the officials. My recollection was that Home Office lawyers were actually terrified of the Delegated Powers Committee; it was sometimes Ministers who were a little more blasé. However, every substantive point the noble Lord made was important. There is no point having guidance if it is not to be published—unless it is guidance to the security agencies. More generally, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, nailed it, as did my noble friend Lord Coaker. We all care about these issues. I worked on the Crime and Disorder Act when it was a Bill all those years ago, but we have heard the figures.
If it is worth legislating in this area at all, it is worth looking at how the legislation is to be enforced and resourced. That cannot be done in secret and we cannot just have directions from central government to starving local authorities; it must be public, it must be accountable, so I speak in support.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have set out the case for the various amendments in this group. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out that certain crimes are up, and he is absolutely right. He asked, rightly, how these strategies will be different. They will work only if they can measurably show something at the end. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, gave us some of the solutions: first, agencies working together in a multiagency approach, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, says. Sharing data trends is one of the suggestions in the draft guidance: sharing those trends, where the hotspots are and where agencies can have a better focus on the needs of certain areas. Local needs assessment is going to be crucial, but the monitoring and reviewing against those three measures that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and, indeed, the Government set out will be the ultimate measure of success or otherwise. He is right to point out that successive Governments have had successive strategies to try to deal with these things—that is because it is just not that easy. If it were, someone would have worked it out by now. I think that is at the heart of what we are talking about this evening.
My Lords, I will be relatively brief, for two reasons. The first is the time. The second is that many of these issues were raised in our earlier debate on medical confidentiality.
The amendments in my name in this group would remove provisions in a number of clauses in this chapter of the Bill, allowing for obligations of confidence and restrictions on the disclosure of data to be breached. They target the same provisions that have already been raised by noble Lords in this debate. At this stage, the intention of my amendments is to probe the intended effect of these powers.
As we have heard, the Bill provides:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations authorise the disclosure of information”
between authorities involved in the serious violence duty. Clause 9(4) provides that those regulations
“may provide that a disclosure under the regulations does not breach … any obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure, or … any other restriction on the disclosure of information”.
Subsection (5) goes on to qualify this somewhat, stating that the regulations must
“not authorise a disclosure of information that … would contravene the data protection legislation”.
However, it then provides that,
“in determining whether a disclosure would do so, any power conferred by the regulations is to be taken into account”.
What restrictions do the Government envisage being breached under the provision for “any other restriction” in Clause 9? What restrictions do they mean? Do these provisions differ from what is in place for existing duties that require joined-up working? The Bill states that the one restriction the regulations are not intended to breach is data protection legislation but, as I have said, it then seems to suggest that this will be qualified by the powers under the Bill. Can the Government expand on that in their response? In what way should
“any power conferred by the regulations”
be taken into account? Can the Minister give some examples?
The sharing of information and the prevention of silo working are, as has been said, vital for tackling crime and for safeguarding purposes. We have heard in previous groups, not least from my noble friend Lady Blake of Leeds on housing provision, what can happen when services are not able to work together to put necessary or urgent support in place. However, the wording in the Bill has given rise to considerable concern in organisations working on these issues, as has been said already. I will not repeat the points already raised but will touch briefly on a few issues before I conclude.
First, one of the key concerns that has been raised by organisations, and which was raised again during the debate this evening, is the erosion of trust that is risked if people feel that private information about them may be passed on in unexpected ways. In particular, there is a risk of young people feeling they cannot build the relationships of trust with social workers, teachers or service providers which are absolutely irreplaceable for preventing violence and keeping those young people safe. Do the Government recognise that risk that breaches of trust risk make it harder to achieve the aim of reducing violence? Who makes the decision about when it is or is not in a young person’s best interest that information is shared, an issue which my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti raised in an earlier debate?
Secondly, later in the Bill, we will spend time debating provisions to protect the privacy of victims of crime. This section explicitly defines
“becoming involved in serious violence”
as including victims of crime. How will these data-sharing provisions impact the victim of crime?
Finally, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and the Information Commissioner’s Office have both reported significant problems with the Met’s gangs violence matrix, an existing tool to identify and risk assess individuals involved with gangs. The key issues included the disproportionate inclusion of young black males on the matrix, and data protection, including serious data breaches. What proactive learning has been undertaken from the experience of the gangs violence matrix to prevent the same problems arising again under the provisions of this Bill?
I said I would be brief; I hope I have achieved that. Like other noble Lords, I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
I thank the noble Lord for his brevity and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and other noble Lords for setting out the case for these amendments. The noble Baroness put forward Amendments 34 and 60 which seek to avoid possible conflicts with competing duties. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, the arguments put forward in this debate are very similar to those discussed in relation to earlier amendments.
To engender an effective multiagency approach to preventing and reducing serious violence, we need all the relevant parts of the system taking equal responsibility and playing their part. The specified authorities for the serious violence duty, being the police, local authorities, probation, youth offending teams and fire and rescue authorities, clinical commissioning groups in England and local health boards in Wales, have been intentionally chosen because of the direct link between the work they already do and the need to prevent and reduce serious violence. Therefore, I do not feel it is necessary or correct to provide such authorities with the opportunity to be exempted from the serious violence duty, as we expect that it would complement the existing duties of such authorities rather than conflict with them.
I understand that there are wider concerns that this duty may breach other duties of the specified authorities, such as duties of confidence, the point most frequently mentioned, and I will come to address those shortly. However, I think that Amendment 34 would unhelpfully weaken the impact of the serious violence duty.
Similarly, in relation to Amendment 60 to Clause 14, we have intentionally required the initial collaboration between specified authorities and education, prison and youth custody authorities as part of the preparation of the local strategy in order to ascertain whether any such institution ought to be involved in the implementation of the strategy or, indeed, need not be involved, as the case may be. This is a crucial step in ensuring that the institutions which are affected by serious violence will be drawn into the work of the local partnership without placing unnecessary burdens on those which may not. Therefore, I do not think that such authorities should be able to opt out of this consultation, given that it would ultimately be in their interests to engage with the specified authorities at this stage in order to ascertain whether their future engagement in the strategy’s implementation will be required.
I understand Amendment 35 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to be a probing amendment about the relationship between the serious violence duty and the work of crime and disorder partnerships. I agree that crime and disorder reduction partnerships can and do play a vital role in ensuring community safety and reducing violent crime locally, but I do not think that they are or should be the only partnership model responsible for doing so. Again, the draft guidance makes it very clear in that context. The geographical reach of such partnerships might mean that they are not the optimum partnership model in all areas, which is why we have intentionally built in flexibility to allow local areas to choose the most appropriate multiagency structure to deliver this duty. However, I recognise that they have a key contribution to make to local efforts. That is why, in addition to creating a new duty, we will be amending the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to include a requirement for crime and disorder reduction partnerships to have in place a strategy for preventing and reducing serious violence. Such a strategy would in any case meet the requirements of the serious violence duty if all relevant partners specified in the Bill are involved in its development and implementation.
The other amendments in this group bring us back to information-sharing. It might assist the Committee if I recap why we have included provision for the disclosures of information. The serious violence duty proposes to permit authorities to share data, intelligence and knowledge in order to generate an evidence-based analysis of the problem in their local areas. In combining relevant data sets, the specified authorities, local policing bodies and educational, prison and youth custody authorities within an area will be able to create a shared evidence base, upon which they can develop an effective and targeted strategic response with bespoke local solutions. Each of the authorities specified in the legislation has a crucial role to play, and it is vital that authorities are able to share their data to determine what is causing serious violence in their local areas. For example, information-sharing can contribute to local efforts by allowing authorities to identify patterns and trends, geographical hotspots and the most vulnerable victims. This data should be regularly reviewed by authorities to determine the effectiveness of the interventions they put in place at a local level.
I shall explain what we mean by information-sharing in this context. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked a pertinent question. Clause 15 will create a new information-sharing gateway for specified authorities, local policing bodies and education, prison and youth custody authorities to disclose information to each other for the purposes of reducing and preventing serious violence. I must be clear that this clause will permit, but not mandate, authorities to disclose information to each other. It simply ensures that there is a legislative basis in place to enable information to be shared between all authorities exercising functions under Chapter 1 of Part 2. However, the clause ensures that any disclosures must be made in compliance with data protection legislation and cannot be made if certain prohibitions on disclosure set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 apply.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked for examples of data types that may be shared by partners. To be fair, he asked me that under a previous group as well and I completely forgot to answer him, so I hope to combine the two answers in one at this point. Examples include hospital data on knife injuries, the number of exclusions and truancies in local schools, police recorded crime, local crime data, emergency call data, anonymised prison data, areas of high social services interventions, and intelligence on threats such as county lines, including the activity of serious organised crime gangs in drugs markets. I hope the noble Lord finds that information helpful.
I thank the noble Baroness for her explanation. I did not quite understand when she seemed to suggest that this was all facilitation and to enable different authorities to share information—and that there was no compulsion to do so. Could she therefore explain Clause 17, where it says that,
“if the Secretary of State is satisfied that … a specified authority has failed to discharge a duty imposed on it by section 7, 13(6), 14(3) or 16(4), or … an educational authority, prison authority or youth custody authority has failed to discharge a duty imposed on it by section 14(3), (4) or (5)(b) or 16(4)”,
then
“The Secretary of State may give directions to the authority for the purpose of securing compliance with the duty”
and can enforce that requirement by a mandatory order? In what way is that voluntarily facilitating the exchange of information? Clause 17 is all about the Secretary of State forcing authorities to share information.
My Lords, the hour is late. Might the noble Lord permit me to discuss, perhaps in the next few days, the seeming contradiction between those two things?
My Lords, as the Minister says, the hour is indeed late. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Moylan, in particular for their support, and other noble Lords for their speeches. I was going to make a rather similar point to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, because the Minister made this provision sound very amenable and voluntary—“Don’t worry about it. There is no problem with trust. It is all just about general information.” That is not my reading of these clauses at all.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made one issue very clear, but there are actually various bits of these clauses that build that general picture of anything but voluntary disclosure. There is a lot about modifying data protection and so on.
I hope that, one way or another, we can have a discussion with the Minister before Report because, otherwise, I fear that we will have to bring these amendments, or something like them, back. We would much prefer to sort this out, if we possibly can. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My Lords, I assure noble Lords that I will not be getting into a debate about the number of police forces we should have, but I will say two things on that: first, consistency is key; secondly, good leadership is crucial. That said, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Bertin, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, for setting out the case for these amendments, which have, quite rightly, attracted a wide-ranging debate about the scope of the serious violence duty. I am also pleased about the gender balance of the tablers of the amendments, and I join my noble friend Lady Bertin in paying tribute to the DA Commissioner and join the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in paying tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, with whom I have worked on many occasions on stalking.
I will start by addressing Amendments 55 and 56. The Government remain absolutely focused on tackling violence against women and girls. There is no place in society for these abhorrent crimes. That is why in July we published a new cross-government Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls strategy, which includes a range of actions to help ensure that more perpetrators are brought to justice and face the full force of the law and that we improve support to victims and survivors and work ultimately to prevent these crimes, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, and send a message of clear expectation, as the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Rosser, pointed out.
The strategy builds on our existing work, as my noble friend Lady Bertin said, including the new legislation that we have brought forward, which includes specific offences of forced marriage, upskirting, and the disclosure of private sexual photographs. The Domestic Abuse Act, which secured Royal Assent in April and which I am very proud to have taken part in and led through your Lordships’ House, will strengthen our response to domestic abuse at all levels. The Act includes a new duty for local authorities in England to ensure the provision of support for victims of abuse, both adults and children, in refuges and other safe accommodation.
Amendment 55 seeks to make it clear on the face of the Bill that domestic abuse, domestic homicide and sexual violence are included within the meaning of “violence”. We recognise the importance of multiagency working to address these crimes, as my noble friend has stressed, and I assure noble Lords that the draft statutory guidance for the serious violence duty, published in May this year, does already make it clear that specified authorities will be permitted to include in their strategy those actions which focus on any form of serious violence which is of particular concern in a local area.
I note the point that noble Lords have made that domestic violence is prevalent in every area, but it could include domestic violence, alcohol-related violence, sexual exploitation, or modern slavery. Ultimately, the specified authorities are best placed to determine what the specific priorities are for that area based on the local evidence. However, all that said, I can see value in the intention of this amendment, to expressly provide on the face of the Bill—and avoid any doubt—that domestic abuse, including domestic homicide, and sexual offences, falls within the definition of “violence” that specified authorities should follow when considering what amounts to serious violence and making that evidence-based determination as to what the specific priorities should be for their area.
Regarding the specific addition of “stalking”, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for drawing attention to this important issue. I recognise that there are other forms of crime which disproportionately affect women and girls which local areas may want to consider for the purpose of the duty, and the draft statutory guidance highlights that they may wish to do this. However, we might risk creating confusion if we specified too many crime types under the meaning of “violence”, and we must consider carefully where to draw the line. I discussed this with the domestic abuse commissioner the other day and she agrees that the definition of “domestic abuse” should be broad enough to draw attention to this issue where it takes place in a domestic abuse context. In addition, while many stalking offences do take place in a domestic abuse context or ultimately involve violent behaviour, that cannot be said for all, and so I am not convinced that an express reference is appropriate.
In any event, we remain completely focused on our efforts to tackle these crimes. The Home Secretary will chair a new violence against women and girls task force to drive cross-government activity and help maintain public confidence in policing. We are funding the first full-time national policing lead in this area, Deputy Chief Constable Maggie Blyth, as I mentioned during the Urgent Question yesterday, and later this year we will publish a new domestic abuse strategy.
Having listened to the debate, I am in no doubt about where the whole Committee stands on this issue. We can all agree in this place that we need to do much more to tackle violence against women and girls. The multi-pronged strategy we published in the summer is directed to that end. We intend to build on that further, having listened to the views of the Committee. The Government agree that part of the response must include the police, local authorities, health bodies and the other agencies to whom the serious violence duty applies, working together to prevent and reduce domestic abuse and sexual violence in their area. Therefore, I agree with the aim of my noble friend’s amendment and will work with her ahead of Report to agree how we might best reflect this.
Amendments 57 and 58 would require violence to be defined as serious in a local area should it result either in injury requiring emergency hospital treatment or in harm constituting grievous bodily harm. I agree that such consequences are clear indicators of the seriousness of the violence in question, but we want to consider further any implications of adding such specific language to the definition of serious violence in the Bill.
The Bill already specifies certain factors that specified authorities must consider when determining what constitutes serious violence for their local area: the maximum penalty that could be imposed for any offence involved in the violence; the impact of the violence on any victim; the prevalence of the violence in the area; and the impact of the violence on the community in the area. We expect the specified authorities to use the evidence gathered from their strategic needs assessment to answer these questions and set the priority areas for their local strategies accordingly. We think that current drafting ensures that specified authorities consider the most harmful types of violence, including those resulting in acute physical injury, as part of their local strategies. However, we recognise the need to further consider the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe.
Finally, Amendments 57A and 59A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raise another important issue. It is true that serious violence is often not contained by local borders and, owing to electronic communication, perpetrators of violence are able to have an extended impact in areas far across the country and beyond. We fully recognise this, and it is why Clause 8 permits specified and relevant authorities to work across local government boundaries with other authorities and, in doing so, to collaborate on strategies that cover areas greater than those where they primarily provide services. This could include collaboration with authorities in neighbouring areas or further afield. We have also included advice within the draft statutory guidance to this effect. For this reason, we do not think these amendments are necessary.
The Government have been clear that internet companies must go further and faster to tackle illegal content online. It is already an offence to incite, assist or encourage violence online, and we will continue to work with the police to support proactive action against and to address illegal material posted and offences perpetrated online.
In conclusion, I assure noble Lords that I will reflect very carefully on this debate and, in particular, on the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Bertin and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I will continue to work with them to find an agreed way forward ahead of the next stage. On that basis, I hope my noble friend will withdraw her amendment, on the clear understanding that we will return to these issues on Report.
My Lords, first, I thank everyone for their powerful collection of persuasive speeches supporting the amendment in my name, for which I am hugely grateful. The House is at its best when it comes together on an issue that bridges the political divide and about which we all feel strongly. I am grateful to noble Lords for that. I thank the Minister for her support and what she just said in response, in particular to my amendment. She always gives a huge amount of time and she is such a diligent Minister. The Government are lucky to have her. I think I speak for the whole Committee when I say that she works incredibly hard and cares so much. I am grateful and I thank her.
I consider myself lobbied by my noble friend Lady Newlove, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Royall—who is of course absent—and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. My noble friend knows that I agree with every word she said on stalking. I cannot promise that I will change the amendment, but I promise that I will go to bat and lobby as hard as possible, because there is a huge problem here. Some 1.5 million people are being stalked a year, and less than 2,000 people are ever brought to justice. There is a massive problem here and, for too long, it has not been taken seriously enough. I want to work more on that, and I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for saying that she will look at these amendments and that we can discuss this further before Report.
It is very difficult for me to respond to amendments that are not in my name, and I will probably not do justice to them, but I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, for laying his amendments—he had hugely persuasive arguments—and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for the amount of work she does on these issues. She is absolutely right that social media companies need to be kept in check. I could not disagree with the points that she made.
That is where I will leave it, but I am grateful and look forward to Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 59 to Clause 13 is a drafting amendment. Clause 13 concerns the involvement of local policing bodies in local serious violence strategies. This amendment simply clarifies that references in Clause 13(2) to “the police area” are to the police area of the local policing body mentioned at the beginning of that provision. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has given notice of a stand part debate on Clause 13 so, if it please the Committee, I will hear from him, but, for now, I beg to move.
My Lords, with apologies for rising at this late stage, I lay my cards on the table and say that I have never been the greatest fan of legislating to require public officials to work together and creating byzantine edifices of legislative partnerships. However, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has a point. If this is to stand, we need to understand whether “may” means “may” or “may” means “must” or whether “may” will become “must” because of regulations that will be made under what Clause 13(4), as it is now, will eventually become. That is just good law-making.
Unlike my wonderful noble friend Lord Bach, I have not been a great enthusiast for police and crime commissioners. I have to be clear about that. I always thought that it would lead to a politicisation of the police and, I am sorry to say that in many cases I feel that that has been the case. I will not dwell on the very crass remarks made by a particular commissioner in the wake of the Sarah Everard case. I am not a fan of that particular politicised mechanism for holding the police to account.
We will no doubt come to this in later clauses, but of course we must have a public health or more holistic approach to tackling—dare I say it—the causes of crime, as well as crime. But setting the policing bit and the Home Office above the other parts of the partnership, with the powers to mandate and the money and so on, is a journey we began with the Crime and Disorder Act, probably 23-odd years ago, when I had the privilege of sitting over there, in the Box. It is a journey that we still seem to be on. I am sorry to say that the poor old Home Office is often the dustbin department, picking up problems in society when it is almost too late. A lot of the deep-seated causes of crime come from other places and need to be tackled; yes, by preventive action—many noble Lords have made that point—but such preventive action belongs in education, in health and in tackling poverty and inequality. We all know this—I am preaching to the choir—but to set up an edifice whereby the senior partner, with all the powers to mandate and all the money to donate, is the policing bit, the security bit, the interior bit and the Home Office bit, is something we need to explore further, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, intends, during the scrutiny of these clauses.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Clause 13 provides a power for a local policing body—namely, a PCC, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, or the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a police authority—to assist authorities in meeting the requirements of the serious violence duty. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was absolutely correct, as was the noble Lord, Lord Bach—as I always say, we are immensely lucky to have Parliament’s only PCC in our place; the benefit of his experience is incredibly useful.
Local policing bodies have an important part to play in convening partner agencies. PCCs and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, as elected local policing bodies, are the voice of the local community in relation to policing and crime. This is reflected in their current functions in relation to community safety partnerships. Local policing bodies are responsible for the totality of policing in their force area—the noble Lord, Lord Bach, pointed out some of the things that they get involved with—as well as for services for victims of crime. They will therefore have shared objectives in relation to the prevention and reduction of serious violence. That is why this clause provides local policing bodies with a discretionary role in supporting specified authorities with the preparation and implementation of their strategies, as well as monitoring their effectiveness and impact on local serious violence levels. I underline that the PCC role is discretionary and that it cannot be mandated through regulations.
The PCC, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the Common Council of the City of London will not be subject to the serious violence duty as specified authorities. However, as with the existing functions of these local policing bodies in relation to community safety partnerships, they may choose to collaborate with local partnerships. They may also take a convening role to support effective multiagency working.
Regulations made by the Secretary of State may provide further detail on the ways in which local policing bodies may assist specified authorities, including convening and chairing meetings, requiring certain persons to attend such meetings and providing funding to a specified authority to support the implementation of the local serious violence strategy. They will also have a power to require information for this purpose, as set out in Clause 16. In undertaking their monitoring functions, local policing bodies may report their findings to the Secretary of State to ensure compliance with the duty.
Specified authorities will have a duty to co-operate with local policing bodies when requested to do so. However, we have made clear in the draft support guidance the need for the relevant local policing body to consider the proportionality of additional requests and anticipated costs to specified authorities before making any such requests.
The overall objective is to provide additional support and leadership, if and when required, and not to place additional burdens on those authorities subject to the duty. The approach is very similar to arrangements in place for CSPs. There has been a mutual duty on PCCs and CSPs to reduce offending since the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. I am sure noble Lords will agree that, to engender an effective multiagency approach to preventing and reducing serious violence, we must ensure that all relevant parts of the system play their part and have sufficient support in place to enable them to do so. We believe that local policing bodies, including PCCs, are best placed to provide that support. I take also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about funding.
I have just a couple of questions. First, what aspects of Clause 13 are local policing bodies currently not allowed to do that the clause allows them to do? Secondly—and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for articulating what is in the guidance—my understanding is that crime and disorder partnerships could be the mechanism chosen to deliver on the serious violence duties in a particular area, or it could be a different mechanism, and the police and crime commissioner might want to be part of that or might not. That does not appear to provide the clarity of leadership and accountability necessary to deliver a serious violence strategy. Perhaps the Minister can explain how this all works.
My Lords, I shall try to. At the moment, PCCs and other local policing bodies have the powers to work with the specified authorities to support multiagency working. The serious violence duty is a new duty, and the legislation clarifies how it will fit together. PCCs are the elected bodies; they work with local forces. The multiagency working can be through the CSPs, or there is flexibility around how the local partnerships are constituted. Because it is a new duty, it is definitely worth clarifying in legislation how it might work out.
My Lords, we expect that the duty will provide the right legal basis for improved multiagency working and draw in the correct set of partners to prevent and reduce serious violence effectively. We think it is right, however, to ensure that there are means of securing compliance should a specified authority refuse to play their part—in other words, in adherence of the duty. So we have included provision within Clause 17 for the Secretary of State to issue a direction to secure compliance, should a specific authority, educational institution, prison or youth custody authority fail to meet the requirements of the duty. For publicly managed probation service providers, prisons, young offender institutions, secure training centres or secure colleges, existing mechanisms can be utilised through the relevant Secretary of State to ensure compliance with the duty.
As a result of the amendment to this clause just agreed by the Committee, the Secretary of State must now obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers before issuing a direction to a devolved Welsh authority, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said.
I now take the opportunity to address concerns that were raised previously by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick —it was only on Monday night, but it seems quite a long time ago. Let me be clear: a direction can be issued only to certain specified or relevant authorities and not to individual front-line professionals or practitioners. In addition, directions can be issued only in respect of certain duties, as listed in Clause 17(1). On information sharing, no directions can be issued in relation to the exercise of the powers in Clause 15 or any regulations made under Clause 9, which enable but do not mandate information sharing. I hope that answers the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
Directions can be made by the Secretary of State in relation to a failure to discharge the mandatory duty in Clause 16 to share information with a local policing body. As I have said previously, the purpose of Clause 16 is to enable the local policing body—that is, the PCC and their equivalents—to request information in order to assist the specified authorities and monitor the effectiveness of local strategies. To reiterate—this may assist the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—this power would not enable the Secretary of State to directly compel an individual doctor, teacher or social worker to disclose personal information. Additionally, any direction given to an authority cannot require a disclosure which would be in breach of the data protection legislation. If an authority refused to comply with the direction due to concerns that doing so would breach the data protection legislation, the Secretary of State could apply for a mandatory order and the court would then determine the question. I hope that this clarification is helpful.
I assure the Committee that, in any case, we expect these powers to be seldom used and utilised only where all other means of securing compliance have been exhausted. I am sure noble Lords would agree that, in order for this duty to be effective, a system needs to be in place to ensure that authorities comply with the legal regulations we are proposing to help prevent and reduce serious violence.
A direction by the Secretary of State may require the authority in question to undertake specific actions in order to comply under the duty, and directions may be enforced by a mandatory order granted on application to the Administrative Court in England and Wales. Further detail on this process will be set out in statutory guidance, which will be subject to a public consultation following Royal Assent. I commend Clause 17 to the Committee.
Can the Minister explain subsection (5), which sets out that
“the governor of a prison, young offender institution or secure training centre”
is not covered by these provisions?
My Lords, the direction power is not available in relation to probation services provided by the Secretary of State or publicly run prisons, youth offender institutions, secure training centres or secure colleges. As I said earlier, existing mechanisms will be available to ensure that they are meeting the requirements of the duty. In addition, as I have already outlined, the Secretary of State must also obtain consent from Welsh Ministers before exercising the direction power in relation to a devolved Welsh authority.
Before the Minister sits down, I have one further question about the protection on data protection. My understanding is that, essentially, it works by limiting the control and transfer of data to the purposes for which the data is held. However, if this legislation changes those purposes to include, for example, the serious violence duty, data protection will not help any more because there will be a purpose that overrides the existing primary purpose. Perhaps during the next few hours—or years—of this Committee, we could get some advice from our friends in the Box.
The noble Baroness is absolutely right about data protection but there are exemptions. One is the detection, prevention and reduction of crime.
I am grateful to the Minister. I think I need to read what she said and compare it with what is in other clauses in the Bill because, although it is difficult to hold everything in one’s head, I am not sure that everything she said is consistent with what is in the Bill.
However, there are two specific questions that the Minister did not answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked what the sanction would be for failure to comply. Is it right that a mandatory order is an order of the Administrative Court to comply with a legal duty, and therefore failure to comply with a mandatory order would be in contempt of court? The second question, which I asked, was: can the Minister give examples of where public authorities involved in preventing and tackling serious violence have obstructed the efforts to achieve those objectives? If not, why is the clause necessary? I do not expect the Minister to have examples at her fingertips but perhaps she could write.
I thank the Minister for her response on Clause 17. However, I wish to express a bit of concern. Although she assured the Committee that an individual doctor or youth worker would not be required to provide information, nevertheless an authority might well provide information, without consulting the individual doctor or youth worker, that would identify individuals who were receiving services in that authority. After the Minister’s response, I am not at all clear that we can be completely sure that this will not happen; I believe that there should be some wording in these clauses to specify that information from authorities about individuals would not be accepted if they provided it. This is an incredibly dangerous situation if individuals find that their authority has been divulging information to the police; it could destroy the efficacy of our public services—it is that serious.
I am not trying to be awkward; I just feel that we need some assurances in these clauses that individuals will not need to be concerned about the disclosure of information about them. Various subsections in Clauses 15 and 16 and so on indicate that, in looking at data protection, you must take account of the regulations in this Act. It is quite complex but it is not reassuring, if I may say so.
My Lords, I am keen for this not to be left hanging in uncertainty. Perhaps a bit of further explanation will be helpful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
This is a backstop power that will be used rarely. However, if needed, it could be utilised; for example, where one of the specified authorities fails to participate in the preparation of the local strategy. If a direction was issued and the authority still refused to comply—that was the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—on the basis that it believed that doing so would breach data protection legislation, the Secretary of State would need to apply for a mandatory order and the court would ultimately decide, but I do not think that there is any question of breaching data protection legislation.
My Lords, before the noble Baroness withdraws her objection to the clause standing part, I remind noble Lords that we are in Committee and can speak as many times as we like.
My Lords, that was quick for a Committee debate. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the power to issue guidance in relation to the serious violence duty. I am sure we all agree that legislation works far better, in practice, when it is implemented alongside clear guidance. In the case of the serious violence duty, we want to ensure that the guidance is clear on the expectations of all specified authorities, that it provides sufficient advice in meeting them and that it highlights best practice from across England and Wales. It is also crucial that such guidance is developed in collaboration with and with input from those who will be subject to the legislation and those who represent them to ensure that it is fit for purpose.
That is why, prior to the implementation of Chapter 1 of Part 2, we will publicly consult on the guidance to support the duty. As a first step, we have published the guidance in draft to assist the scrutiny of these provisions. I have a copy of it here. We welcome feedback on the draft and will take that into account when preparing an updated draft for consultation following Royal Assent to the Bill.
Clause 18 already expressly requires consultation with Welsh Ministers, as the noble Lord said, in so far as the guidance relates to the exercise of functions under this chapter by a devolved Welsh authority. But we are committed to going further and, as part of the public consultation on the statutory guidance, we intend to invite views from key representative bodies and other relevant persons, such as the Children’s Commissioner and the domestic abuse commissioner. Given this commitment, I do not think it would be appropriate, at this point, to include a broader duty to consult in the Bill.
The stated aim of Amendment 73 is to enable the guidance to be scrutinised by Parliament. In principle, I have no difficulty with that at all; it is open to Parliament to scrutinise guidance at any time. However, the effect of this amendment, when read with the provisions in Clause 21, would be to make the guidance subject to the affirmative procedure. I am not persuaded that this level of scrutiny is necessary—and nor, for that matter, was the DPRRC, which recommended that the negative procedure should apply in this case. We are carefully considering that committee’s report and will respond ahead of the next stage. In light of the commitments I have given, would the noble Lord be happy to withdraw his amendment?
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, but it was actually me who proposed these amendments.
I do apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.