Grand Committee
National Security and Investment Bill
Tuesday 9th March 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, the hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear a face covering except when seated at their desk, to speak sitting down, and to wipe down their desk, chair and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded, or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group, I invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister, using the Grand Committee address. I will call Members to speak in order of request.
The groupings are binding. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only. I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content” an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content” a clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the Question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on the group.
Clause 6: Notifiable acquisitions
Amendment 15
Lord Vaizey of Didcot
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 15 and other subsequent amendments seek to bring in an exemption from the mandatory filing requirement for acquisitions and investments by entities that are ultimately controlled by UK nationals or nationals from certain countries allied to the UK. It is important to stress that this is to exempt companies from the mandatory filing requirement, not from having to file at all.
The Bill currently provides that the mandatory filing requirement applies equally to all investors, despite the fact that the Government have acknowledged that UK investors are inherently less likely to give rise to national security concerns. A more targeted and proportionate approach, which would better reflect where national security risks are most likely to lie, would be to exempt from the mandatory filing requirement acquisitions and investments by UK nationals or entities that are ultimately controlled by UK nationals.
In addition, investors from countries which are closely allied to the UK, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, plus any other country subsequently specified by the Secretary of State, should also be exempt from mandatory filing requirements for the reasons I have already stated. That is the thinking behind my Amendment 95, which is included in this group. To the extent that national security risks arise in relation to any such transaction, the Secretary of State would still retain the power to call in a qualifying transaction for review. As I say, the exemption would relate solely to the mandatory filing requirements.
Amending the Bill in this way would also better align the UK’s regime with those of other countries, such as the US and Australia, which I have already mentioned. I can understand why the Government may wish to appear agnostic when it comes to providing exemptions to UK nationals and friendly countries. While there is no doubt that, for example, investments from China in sensitive sectors would come under close scrutiny under the new regime—no one should pretend otherwise—it is important to bear in mind that only four of the 12 national security interventions under the existing regimes have involved Chinese investments.
It is important for me to acknowledge that the Government have intervened in eight transactions that involved investors from countries that have historically been allies, such as the US, Canada, Italy and Germany; they extracted undertakings from those investors to protect UK national security interests. A consistent theme in those interventions, in addition to the usual concerns about access to sensitive data, has been the Government’s interest in ensuring continuity of supply to critical services to government and to maintain strategic capabilities. Such concerns, I acknowledge, are effectively nationality-agnostic, because they go to ensuring that critical capabilities, skills and manufacturing are maintained in the UK and not moved abroad. As a result, it is likely that in particularly sensitive sectors we will see the Government calling in transactions involving investors from so-called friendly countries and imposing remedies under the new regime. The Government can, via regulation, exempt certain acquirers from notification requirements but no investors or classes of investor are currently exempt. Nevertheless, these interventions happened before the Bill was introduced, so I do not believe that they undermine my point—namely, that friendly countries and UK investors should be exempt from the mandatory filing requirement, which will not exist until the Bill is passed.
I looked at the evidence given to the Bill Committee in the other place and was particularly struck by two interventions from witnesses. One was from Dr Ashley Lenihan from the London School of Economics, who said that for the legislation to cover domestic investors would be “truly rare” in comparison to similar legislation in other countries and, importantly, that the inclusion of domestic investors will
“lead to a much larger volume of mandatory notifications than most other national security FDI regimes”.—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 33.]
This brings out the point that was a theme of our debate on our first day in Committee and at Second Reading, which is that the Government have wildly underestimated the number of notifications they expect to get. As I say, I think we are all united in wanting to see this legislation passed, but we all want to see it passed in a form that is workable, does not overwhelm the new unit that the Government are setting up and does not put off investors by placing too onerous burdens on them.
In addition, other evidence given to the Bill Committee in the other place in the same session included that of Michael Leiter, a lawyer from Skadden Arps, a US law firm. He said that including domestic investors “is probably not wise”. He went on:
“I think trying to take a slightly smaller bite of the apple and not including current UK businesses in the scheme would be well advised.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 42.]
So I pray in aid those two experts in making the point that this amendment in no way undermines the regime that the Government propose to bring in, but it does make it a slightly more practical approach as this legislation beds down. Indeed, Mr Leiter pointed out later that the Bill can still catch transactions in which the ultimate actor may be foreign, because the unit that the Government are setting up can still look at the ultimate parent or, indeed, at a follow-on transaction.
I understand why the Government may want the legislation to pass in its current form—to have a belt-and-braces approach and to avoid people trying to hide behind a UK investor or a friendly foreign investor—but in my view the Government will still have powers to call in such transactions if they believe that this is the case. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, for introducing his amendments and explaining some issues that I agree with, such as whether the Government are trying to make a failsafe, will it catch too many people and whether there will be too much to do. Although I understand that there may be different levels of concern, depending on the relationship with the country of the acquirer, I do not fully support the amendments in this group.
Where there are already sensitive industries, especially related to defence, who owns them matters in the sense of whether they are fit and proper for that kind of industry. Those considerations can apply within the UK as well as outside so, at some point, they have to be looked at. The question is whether they should be within the same regime or left to other operations that, the Government have considered, do not necessarily pick up everything.
My experience suggests that, in most instances, companies already used to dealing with sensitive matters would already be alert to what might not be desirable, and that it would either not happen or not happen often, but that does not mean that there should be no way of acting when it does. Therefore, they should all be included within this generic framework.
The Bill will apply to more companies or interests than companies used to dealing with sensitive matters, as I have just called them. Quite a lot still looks speculative, so I wonder whether there is, or in due course might be, further subdivision where certain geographies and industries might have different thresholds, depending on how likely they are to be particularly sensitive.
There will certainly be instances where the ownership interests of Five Eyes countries or other allies are of less or maybe no concern, but that may not always be the case if the security of supply or knowledge base is threatened. There are examples in the defence industry where, following takeovers by US corporations, research has been closed down, leaving only certification, assembly or supply of parts as the UK activity. This has led to a serious loss of forward vision and an undermining of the knowledge base, as well as other issues, such as access to technology. Sometimes that might be accepted, but not always.
It is one thing to recognise that we do not—indeed cannot—stand alone on defence issues, but quite another to accept, always and without review, what might be serious diminution or removal of all active participation. Therefore, although I expect the results of reviews to be different for different categories of acquirer, I do not see how there can be any blanket exclusion at the initial filtering stage. I am very interested in how different thresholds may play a part in reducing the number of transactions that would have to be filtered.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, my first instinct was to say that the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Vaizey are obviously correct. I am sure that the majority of cases that would threaten our national security will involve foreign actors and, like him, I am concerned about the volumes of notifiable transactions.
However, I think that there might be circumstances in which the powers in the Bill could appropriately be used in respect of wholly UK companies. In that respect, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. For example, large company A may have a monopoly or near monopoly in providing something critical to our security. Tiny company B may have developed a new technology, which not only achieves a better result in the light of emerging risks, but at a fraction of the price. If company A acquires control of company B, it can kill the new technology and keep its monopoly profits on its old products. Sometimes, large companies acquire smaller ones to avoid disruption to lucrative markets, rather than to exploit their innovations. I do not think it would apply often, but it is a good reason not to restrict the Secretary of State’s powers in the Bill.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and to agree with her. The point she made—that competition can be a security issue as well as a trust issue—was one I was going to make myself. I was thinking in particular of the concentration of media ownership and the impact that can have on national security.
As the Committee may have guessed, I am speaking in this group, respectfully but strongly, against the inclusion of any of these amendments in the Bill. If we included these amendments, we would be heading down the road of the Dangerous Dogs Act, generally acknowledged as one of the worst pieces of legislation passed through your Lordships' House. It penalised and gave a death sentence to dogs identified as belonging to certain breeds, which completely misidentified the problem, which was not canine genetics but human owners.
The idea that where giant multinational companies are based—those are the kind we will be talking about in many cases—can give any evidence of their loyalties is a great stretch. I was in the Chamber yesterday, speaking about the stance taken by HSBC in backing the Government in Beijing against the interests of the UK, the joint declaration, the rights of the people of Hong Kong and the rule of law.
I want to note concerns about Amendments 95 and 96, which identify a number of countries—Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US—to be automatically excluded. That is a large assumption, and we can probably all think of case studies—maybe different ones—where individual owners of companies from those countries can be of great concern. It is not a measure of risk. I cannot help noticing certain characteristics shared by those countries that the proposer might like to consider and how the grouping of those countries might play in terms of the UK’s international reputation.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, when we discussed the second group, I said that when we are looking at the national security risk, the purposes of the Bill are to define the relevant entities and assets; the extent of control, which is significant for these purposes; and the nature of the acquirer of those entities and assets. I think the third is proving among the most difficult. This group seeks to define that person by reference to their nationality. This is a substantial change to the nature of the legislation, since the purpose of the legislation is to address national security risks; it is not to screen foreign investment in the United Kingdom. The analogies with other regimes—for example, with the European Union’s regulations—do not stretch far because they are concerned with foreign investment.
This group has strayed considerably beyond areas of national security and into the area of what is termed “open strategic autonomy”. I am not sure how open it will prove to be, but it is potentially protectionist by nature. It strikes me that we should really aim to focus on national security, which is the purpose of the Bill, and in the Bill’s broader economic aspects, we should continue to adhere to the principle of non-discrimination. If we include UK domestic actors in the potential definitions of acquirers who raise national security issues, we will be non-discriminatory in our effects, and it is important that we should aim at that. In practice, where national security is concerned, we know that not all foreigners are hostile, and not all those who are hostile are foreigners. So, I am afraid I am not persuaded.
There is also an issue here about authorised countries, which is linked to this but could be separated, although it is not for these purposes at the moment. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has since last year, I think, had excepted states. Interestingly, they are Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The list does not include New Zealand for reasons no doubt well known to the United States Administration but not to me, so I am not entirely sure why my noble friend included New Zealand. The criteria appear to be related to the intelligence-sharing arrangements and the extent of defence integration between those countries’ industries and the United States.
Even where the United States’ excepted states are concerned, this is only temporary. There has to be a determination in the early part of next year of whether we have sufficient investment screening arrangements to give the United States assurance to maintain our excepted state position, which I think the Bill will allow us to do. That will be useful to United Kingdom investors into what are known as TID businesses in the United States—those dealing with sensitive technologies, infrastructure and data.
I say to my noble friend that I am not persuaded by this group of amendments, nor yet by the authorised country issue. I suspect the latter issue is one that it might be useful to come back to and think about under what circumstances we differentiate between people from countries that have comparable investment screening regimes in practice.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, has withdrawn so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, the Bill currently provides that the mandatory filing requirement applies equally to all investors, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey said. This is despite the Government stating quite rightly that domestic investors are inherently less likely to pose a national security risk. The Bill is ultimately about managing risk, so we need to ensure that the notifications that the ISU receives are the right sample. Exempting UK nationals from this process would be a far from proportionate approach. Since we are in the business of managing risk in a proportionate manner, we should consider whether investors from specific allies—Australia, Canada, the US and New Zealand have been suggested—should be exempt since, again, the evidence strongly suggests that such investments are less likely to pose a national security risk, although I will come on to one caveat at the end of my remarks.
This aspect would also align more closely with some of our competitor jurisdictions. In any event, since national security is always paramount, it is worth noting that these amendments concern only the mandatory filing requirement. The Secretary of State would remain fully empowered to call in such transactions for review even if they concerned our citizens or allies or were below the threshold for control. That is an important distinction. I hope it means that lots of potential acquisitions by UK players will not get covered by notifiable regulations if we approve these amendments.
I am sure that the legislation is not meant to cover the situation where someone starts a business with a great idea and, say, £1,000. That business might touch on a number of sectors including, say, defence. We know that the sector definitions are very widely drawn. This entrepreneur then goes to some family and friends to seek funding, which might be through an EIS or, even better, an SEIS or possibly an EIS fund. The family and friends are all local. I know one investor who has only ever invested—with great success—in businesses run by someone he has personally met in his local pub. Such investors are vital to the UK economy and, in my opinion, do not carry a risk to security any greater than the person who started the business. As we currently have no size threshold at all, they would be caught by the Bill. It would be a great shame if they decided that they did not want to wait the 30 days or more for the Secretary of State to opine.
We all know the purpose of the Bill and it is not to restrict UK investors investing in UK companies. If we go down the route of exempting UK companies, we need to look more carefully at the definition of a UK company, which Amendment 96 seeks to do. I recognise that this is difficult. For example, many companies have private equity investment in them. They are clearly UK companies with a UK HQ, UK board and UK business but because the general partner investor may be based in, say, Guernsey, for the limited partners requirement—and the limited partner is almost certainly based abroad—they would need to be treated as a UK company to ensure a level playing field.
My noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, have made some valid points. It is indeed true, for example, that many companies which are essentially Chinese are listed on NASDAQ. Would we call them American or Chinese? There has to be some very careful examination.
My last concern, which I mentioned in respect of Amendment 95, is to stop shell companies being created in countries such as Australia. Under these amendments, a shell company could buy a UK tech business and be sold immediately thereafter to a non-friendly company. Undertakings would therefore have to be put in to protect against that situation.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I agree with the analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, that Her Majesty’s Government have underestimated the potential workload that this unit will get, but I am not convinced that his solution to reducing that workload is the right one. We have heard many speeches but I would single out those of my noble friend Lady Bowles, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, as reasons why we should not be separating out one set of companies due to their nationality. The noble Lord made the point clearly that the criterion should be: is it or is it not a national security risk, rather than, does it or does it not come from Hampshire or New Hampshire? That should be the rule running through this.
The noble Lord, Lord Leigh, when moving into caveat territory, started to explain why singling out foreign companies becomes an extraordinarily difficult thing to do. First, what is one, and is it a shell company? Is it listed on NASDAQ but actually resident in Beijing? Those kinds of complications start to point to the Government’s analysis that all companies are in. Clearly, it will be easier for the company whose owner your friend meets in a pub to get through the process and not be called in, compared with one that hails from the Far East, for example. Surely, the process should be the efficiency with which the unit can deal with and dismiss issues quickly, rather than accidentally filtering out things that we should not.
On the concept that, “Our friends are our friends, so we include them as ourselves”, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made the wider point about access to the technology. Access can be cut off by our friends as much as by ourselves or, indeed, by external companies. I am sorry, but I am going to repeat the example I gave at Second Reading. A British company with a US-based subsidiary took the technology to the United States, started to produce it and made one small amendment to that technology. The use and sale of the technology back to the UK was then blocked by the Department of Defense under export controls, because it considered it to then be United States strategic technology. I am sure that such things happen all the time—this example is just one that I happen to know about.
Regional agnosticism, the gospel according to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is the sensible approach here, and I hope that the Minister can explain his views on this issue.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, we have some sympathy with the intention here, which is to seek clarification about whether certain investors or countries should be more or less encouraged to invest here, although this may not be exactly the right way to achieve that. Such clarification is clearly needed and is sought in a different way by Amendment 91, which we will reach next week, I think, and which stands in the name of my noble friend Lord West.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this very useful short debate. I welcome the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Vaizey. Taken together, as numerous speakers have said, his amendments would exempt UK investors and investors from other particular countries from the Bill’s mandatory notification regime. As it stands, both the mandatory and the voluntary notification regimes provided for by the Bill are both actor and nationality-agnostic. The mandatory notification regime is based on the risks posed by acquisitions of target entities due to those entities’ activities, rather than the risks posed by the acquirers. The risks posed by acquirers are then considered on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of State as part of the particular national security assessment.
My noble friend is right to suggest that, in many cases, acquisitions by UK nationals and UK-based companies, or those based in like-minded countries, are less likely to give rise to national security concerns, even in relatively sensitive sectors. Such acquirers, if their proposed acquisitions do not give rise to national security risks, will find their acquisitions cleared to proceed by the Secretary of State, following assessment or following call-in, should that be necessary, for further review.
However, an acquirer’s nationality cannot tell the Secretary of State everything he needs to know about that acquirer’s intent. For example, it is possible that a UK acquirer may be paid by a hostile actor or otherwise have strong links to hostile actors based outside the UK. A similar rationale follows for the amendment’s reference to other like-minded countries. So, excluding purely on the basis of nationality could create a loophole to exploit.
The particular approach of the amendments in this group also raises some practical challenges. For instance, the references to nationality appear not to deal with the issue of dual nationality; nor is a change of nationality covered. Key considerations in designing this regime have included ensuring that it is not discriminatory, and that it upholds our World Trade Organization and other international obligations in this regard. It is not clear that these amendments would achieve this.
None the less, we wish to consider over time how we might temper and adjust the regime to take account of areas of lower risk. Under Clause 6, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the ability to make exemptions from the mandatory notification regime based on the “characteristics” of the acquirer. This may include nationality if this is judged appropriate and the various issues that I have highlighted can be resolved.
We will of course monitor closely how the regime works in practice to determine through detailed further work and carefully assess whether any such exemptions should be introduced. Any such regulations would be subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative procedure.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the impact of nationality on the regime with my noble friends and to set out our thinking in more detail. However, for the reasons I have given, I cannot accept my noble friend’s amendments. Before I conclude, I can confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Government will engage with a number of stakeholders on the voluntary and mandatory notification forms. Therefore, given the points I have made, I wonder whether my noble friend will consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his response. Never have I seen so many noble Lords and noble Baronesses arraign so uniformly against an amendment, so the mood of the Grand Committee is clearly against me. In fact, through the powers of my advocacy I think that I even persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to move from being a supporter to an opposer of my amendments, if I followed her speech correctly.
I am not sure that the issue of media ownership threw much light on the power of my amendments. However distasteful we might find the antics of media owners in this country, the British ones are just as guilty as any foreign ones of potentially challenging our democracy.
My noble friend Lord Lansley was correct to say that I included New Zealand along the lines of the Five Eyes, although I notice that he said that the US regime could be helpful to UK businesses if the UK was exempt from the equivalent provisions in the US. That was the purpose of my amendment.
Fundamentally, the point I was trying to make with these amendments, which did not really shine through, is that I seek not to hide any transactions from the national security regime but simply to avoid an overwhelming number of mandatory notifications for the department. Of all the speeches that I heard, the Minister’s was the most supportive. I noted his very welcome comments that the door remains ajar, as the regime develops, to put in place provisions to ease the bureaucracy and the number of mandatory notifications.
Finally, I was inspired by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley’s speech to potentially draft a new amendment as we progress—perhaps the pub amendment, whereby the only transactions that can be notified in a mandatory fashion to the Government are those that can fit into my noble friend’s local pub. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 15A. I should inform the Grand Committee that if Amendment 15A is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 16 and 17.
Amendment 15A
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
Amendment 15A would delete Clause 6(2)(b), because otherwise that paragraph means that someone increasing their interest in a qualifying entity from under 15% to over 15% would then turn it into a notifiable acquisition.
This amendment asks a simple but significant question: why has 15% been chosen and what is the rationale for it? The people we spoke to were a bit bemused by the figure. I think someone mentioned in Committee last week that 15% appeared somewhere else, but those we spoke to across a range of areas could not find, and did not know, where that 15% came from. There is obviously no particular evidence behind it. I am not sure whether it appears elsewhere in legislation, but I am sure the Minister will know the answer and outline the thinking behind that figure.
Not just for pubs but for other early stage start-ups and developments, this could certainly be an impediment to an investment just at the point when it is needed. For these small start-ups there seems to be a more or less continuous need for money, but drip by drip as things develop. It is on a continual basis rather than a great big one-off deal; the more the work begins to show potential, the more extra money is needed. Any concern about suddenly hitting 15% in the case of a small company, particularly a new one, just when it needs the money could jeopardise access to funds when they are most needed.
I am not even absolutely certain about the purpose of Clause 6(2)(b), but, again, I am sure the Minister will elucidate in his reply. Clause 8(2) already describes shareholding thresholds for qualifying entities of a specialist description, where the figures of 25%, 50% and 75% are used, and Clause 8(5) does the same with voting rights. So the references in Clause 6(2)(b) to a 15% threshold for
“a qualifying entity of a specified description”
appear to go over very similar ground, unless the intention is to have two different classes of qualifying entities of a specified description, with the higher-risk one subject to the additional 15% level. If that is the case, it seems to add an extra level of complexity to the legislation. Dropping the 15% level could remove the regulatory burden from at least some fundraising that needs to go on. It might be questionable anyway how much control a shareholding of below a quarter would achieve.
Amendment 29A would delete Clause 8(8), which again is a bit unclear. Perhaps the Minister will be able to spell it out a bit more. It concerns the fourth listed case of a person gaining
“control of a qualifying entity”
as described earlier in Clause 8(1). However, Clause 8(8) is not part of the mandatory regime in the earlier Clause 6, which we are now looking at, because in Clause 8 only cases one to three are cross-referenced with reference to subsections (2), (5) and (6). It does not include subsection (8), so a bit more explanation would be good.
Clause 8(8) is perhaps there to allow for a broad range of call-ins than those covered by the mandatory notification regime, but the imprecision of the language is difficult. It talks of where it
“enables the person materially to influence the policy of the entity”.
As that is fairly broad, it could lead to a lot of excess voluntary reporting and it is hard to know what it means in practice. “Influence” is hard enough to define. Maybe “materially to influence” meets a legal threshold of which I am unaware, but it is quite difficult for a researcher or company to know what that means.
It is true that the CMA uses some of that language when we are talking about much bigger operations. However, it is probably not a phrase that is particularly familiar to most businesses or, indeed, to academia. As I said, it could lead to a lot of extra voluntary notification by parties in an attempt to get certainty. As we have heard, we are worried about too many voluntary notifications clogging up the system.
The reason why 25% in Amendment 17 was chosen might need some spelling out. It may well be correct, but it would be useful to know the thinking behind it.
I beg to move.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 17, which is in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her comments in respect of her amendment, which might actually be a better amendment than mine but none the less would achieve much the same thing. She probably does it in a more elegant way, but the purpose of my amendment is to understand the logic here and to persuade my noble friend the Minister that he should revert to 25% throughout.
The mandatory notification obligation in Clause 6(2)(b), which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, wants to delete, is triggered as a result of acquiring over 15% of shareholding or voting rights. In paragraph 52 and elsewhere, the White Paper specifies 25% but forecasts 15% for notifiable acquisitions. Accordingly, it is not, and is not intended to be, consistent with Clause 8, as the noble Baroness said, but that leads us into problems. Let us try to walk through this. It is complicated.
As I read it, Clause 6 is there so that the Secretary of State is given a mandatory notification for them to consider whether a trigger event has happened. Let us look at what a trigger event is, then. For that, we have to rely on Clause 8 to see under what definitions a people has gained control. Clause 8 lists four situations, three of which are where the shareholding is 25% or more. That is fine, but that clearly does not apply in a 15% situation. So you have to rely on the fourth situation, which is set out in Clause 8(8), which bites because it is the scenario where there is the ability, alone or with others,
“materially to influence the policy of the entity.”
Therefore, if an investor goes from, say, 14% to 20%, a lot of work has to be undertaken to see whether that person can materially influence the policy. If the threshold was 25%, there would be no need to do this. So given that it is most unlikely that a sub-25% shareholder can materially alter the policy—more importantly, this will be hard to determine in practice, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said—are we not creating an unnecessary problem for ourselves? What does “materially influence the policy” mean anyway? Which policy? All policies? Dividend policy? Maybe. Hiring and firing policy? Most unlikely. Again, this will lead to consternation and commercial agreements on shareholders’ rights having to be implemented, which will be hard to negotiate because, when you enter this sort of area, there will be uncertainty over whether you can materially alter policy.
In my plea for certainty and clarity, can we make it 25% throughout? The risk of a 15% shareholder throwing their weight around to demand that action be taken to change a policy that would be against our national interest is somewhat remote. I suggest that, with a 15% threshold, there will be significantly more cases to consider, the overwhelming majority of which will not have national security implications. The current filing threshold of 15% is significantly below the thresholds used in a number of other major foreign direct investment regimes. France’s is 25%, which the amendment proposes, and Canada’s is 33.3%. I note that my noble friend Lord Vaizey is not due to speak on this group, unfortunately, but if he did I am sure that he would continue to encourage the Minister to look to Canada rather than France, which is perhaps a natural progression.
I am aware that some countries have a 15% threshold, but they are not jurisdictions seen as international business headquarters or centres of international business in the same way as we are, and we have to remember that there is a difference. Considering the volume of transactions, it will even, I suggest, lead to transactions that pose a national risk being overlooked because of the volume generated by this very low, 15% threshold.
While we are on this clause, can the Minister help me with Clause 6(3), which is relevant to the clause we are debating? It states:
“But a notifiable acquisition does not take place if complying with the requirement to give a mandatory notice under section 14(1) in relation to the gaining of control, or the acquisition of the right or interest, would be impossible for the person within subsection (2).”
What does “would be impossible” mean? I have asked around, and no one I have asked can be sure. Is this when a public company’s shareholder trips over 15%? What does “complying … would be impossible” mean? Could we all argue that it is impossible, give all sorts of reasons unspecified and that is the end of it? If much, much better brains than mine cannot understand the clause, it must need amending. I cannot amend it because I do not know what it is trying to achieve, but it cannot be good law to have clauses which are not immediately intelligible to, if not the layman, then the reasonably well-informed reader.
The whole of Clause 6 is difficult. It talks about regulations we have not seen and then gives power for those regulations to be amended at will under subsection (5). I think subsection (5) is where a white list is introduced in the regulations, but it, and subsection (6) allow carte blanche and, accordingly, more uncertainty. Can the Minister commit to look at Clause 6 again, specifically with the amendment I have tabled and with the amendment that he can see I will perhaps have to table on Report? Amendment 94, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which we discussed the other day, would have helped. Can the Minister give some assurances that parliamentary scrutiny will be given to these regulations?
Amendment 17 looks to strike a more proportionate balance between protecting national security and reducing unnecessary burdens on investors. We want to be seen as an investment-friendly country.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for introducing their amendments and exploring the reasoning behind them, which I have found helpful. I put my name down to speak to Amendment 17, which was signed by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, for whom I am broadly substituting because he is regrettably unavailable until later today. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I was wondering why the Government chose 15% as the threshold above which a notification would become mandatory.
On the previous group, I wondered whether we could have different thresholds for different reasons. That would not be without precedent. For example, Australia has different percentage thresholds for lesser and more sensitive assets and different business value thresholds depending on the country of the acquirer. However, here we have 15%, which might be a number above which you fear an activist shareholder, but why?
In the UK, shareholders get some additional rights at 5%: they can go to court to prevent the conversion of a public company to a private company; they can call a general meeting; they can require the circulation of a written resolution to shareholders in a private company; or they can require the passing of a resolution at an annual general meeting of a public company. At 10%, you can call a poll vote on a resolution. At more than 10%, in a private company, you can prevent a meeting being held at short notice. At 15%, you can apply to the court to cancel a variation of class rights, provided that the shareholders have not consented to or voted in favour of the variation. Getting to 25% is significant, because it gives the right to prevent the passing of a special resolution, which could affect various articles and other things. I cannot see that preventing a change in class rights, assuming that a court would agree, is significant. I am slightly bemused about where that 15% number was plucked from.
We get to the point about whether fear of an activist shareholder is what this is all about. We hear of the insistence on having a director, when there is a certain quantity of shares, but they have to be able to control all the other directors, which does not always happen. It brings to the fore a thought about who owns the other shares, which would have to be taken into account in any assessments. Conditions might then be put on a company in respect of what happens to other shareholders to allow a transaction to pass.
As the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, explained, this makes something more complicated for reasons that do not yet seem clear. There are surely other inherent safeguards that would do the job. From that point of view, I support Amendment 17 signed by my noble friend but, as has been explained, there are other ways in which it could be achieved.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the effect of amendments in this group may be to restrict the Government’s ability of to act where de facto control is the result of an acquisition. We should not underestimate the ingenuity that could be deployed to achieve de facto control or make it easier for people to escape the Bill where there are substantive concerns. For that reason, I do not believe that we should tie the Government’s hands in this way.
I put my name down to speak on this group, in particular on my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley’s Amendment 17, which increases the voting rights threshold for notification from 15% to 25%, and I support the probing Amendment 15A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which removes the reference to the voting rights test.
While a shareholding needs to be 25% to be certain of stopping a special resolution—the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, referred to that a moment ago—in practical terms that assumes that all other voting rights would be exercised and in the opposite direction. The de facto ability to stop a special resolution kicks in at much lower levels. I am interested to hear what the Minister says about the rationale for 15%.
For many years, I was a director of the Reuters Founders Share Company, which was set up to hold a form of golden share in Reuters to protect the independence and integrity of the Reuters news service and to prevent it falling under the control of any faction. There is a long history to that, which I will not go into. The trigger point for the ability to use the golden share was set at 15%, for the very reasons I have just given. It is the level at which the influence of a shareholding bloc can be significant. In the history of Reuters Founders Share Company, deployment of the 15% was needed on one occasion. For that reason, I am inclined to support the Bill’s cautious approach in this area.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I want to say a word on this group, because I am particularly interested in Amendment 29A, which would remove Clause 8(8). This is of interest, not least because of the question of how to define “material influence”, which we will come to later.
Listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I understand what she has done; she is testing the question why material influence is there if it is one of the ways in which control of an entity can be established under Clause 8. Currently, it is not referenced in Clause 6(2)(a) as one of the cases by which that control leads to a notifiable acquisition.
Instead, taking subsection (8) out of Clause 8 and putting it into Clause 6(2)(a) would in effect be saying that a notifiable acquisition takes place when a person gains control of an entity. Clause 8 explains how you gain control of an entity. It can be by acquiring various voting shares, as defined, or by exercising material influence over the entity. That has been left out, so putting it into subsection (2)(a)—that is not precisely what we are proposing here, but I am speculating slightly—would be a much cleaner option. It would enable one to do what my noble friend Lord Leigh is proposing, which is to take the 15% out. The 15% is there only because there are conceivably circumstances in which a 15% or more voting share constitutes material influence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, we know that, because the Competition and Markets Authority has on occasion determined such things. It did so on BskyB v ITV, which concerned a 17.9% shareholding, and it did so in the case, which it none the less cleared, of RWE’s stake in E.ON at 16.67%.
We know that voting shares of between 15% and 25% can represent a material influence, but that is not the issue. The point is not about the voting share: 25% is, generally speaking, the voting share that gives rise to an issue of control, but about the need to say, “Material influence is what we are talking about, so why don’t we use that?” Why introduce this potentially rarely used 15% threshold instead?
My contribution is to ask Ministers if they will go away and look at whether it would be cleaner and simpler for Clause 6 to say simply, “A notifiable acquisition takes place when a person gains control of a qualifying entity of a specified description”, and Clause 8 goes on to explain what “control” means.
Lord Fox (LD)
Were my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones here he would pick up his fishing rod again and say that this is a question of mesh size. But, actually, the issues raised by your Lordships should tell the Government that there is work to be done on redrafting subsections in Clauses 6 and 8 to try to clarify. Whatever we come up with, we need clarity, because there seems to be some dissonance in how this is read and regarded.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked the right question at the beginning of her speech, which was: what is the rationale behind the 15%? My noble friend Lady Bowles set out the sliding scale of different accountabilities and rights that come with different levels of ownership and said that there was some logical mismatch with the 15%. The Minister has taken refuge in the past in the policies of the other European Union countries, and the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, can happily put his mind at rest that France uses 25%, so clearly, if it is good enough for France, it will be good enough for the Minister.
On a more serious note, the issue of material control is interesting. We have seen so-called shareholder activists reversing into companies with far less shareholding than 15% and making material changes to the strategy of businesses. So what is material and what is a change? The point that my noble friend Lady Bowles brought up about the nature of the other shareholders cannot be left out.
Tracker funds tend not to be active in the way a long or a short fund tends to be, and clearly shares get loaned in situations of activity. All these add up to the mess which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, described well: who is in control of the business, and what is material control? To some extent, the difference between 25% and 15% is less important than where the control lies. That is harder to enumerate, and difficult for the market to understand, but it is clear that the way this stands in the Bill will not work. I hope the Government can sit down with their lawyers and drafters and come up with something that we can look at next time which takes on board the good advice the Minister has received from your Lordships.
Lord Callanan (Con)
First, I extend my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh for the amendments in this grouping. Let me start by addressing Amendments 15A and 17, which concern the scope of the mandatory notification regime.
Clause 6 sets out the circumstances where a notifiable acquisition takes place for the purposes of the Bill. Noble Lords will see in subsection (2) that the types of acquisition covered by mandatory notification are not simply the full list of trigger events in Clause 8. Rather, notifiable acquisitions are objective circumstances based primarily on an acquisition taking a party’s holding of share or votes to or past a particular numerical threshold. The amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would remove subsection (2)(b) to remove the lowest of the numerical thresholds: 15%. My noble friend’s amendment seeks to amend Clause 8(2)(b).
Let me make three points about these amendments, which I trust will address the concerns which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh raised in their opening comments. First, acquisitions that take a party’s shares or voting rights in a specified entity to 15% or more, not exceeding 25%, are notifiable even though they are not, by themselves, trigger events that may be called in by the Secretary of State for scrutiny under the Bill. We have, nevertheless, required such acquisitions to be notified, because increases in shares or voting rights to 15% or more may realistically result in the acquirer having material influence, and therefore control, over the policy of the entity, and that would constitute a trigger event.
The notification requirement is thus intended to ensure that the Secretary of State is made aware of the proposed acquisition and can take steps to determine whether material influence will in fact be required. The 15% threshold is broadly consistent with the UK’s merger framework. As the Competition and Markets Authority notes in its merger guidance, although there is no presumption of material influence below 25%, shareholdings of 15% or more may be examined to see whether the holder might be able materially to influence the company’s policy. We think that this strikes the right balance by requiring parties to focus only on a numerical threshold, while still allowing the Secretary of State to be notified about, and then call in if the legal test is met, more subjective acquisitions of control in the most sensitive sectors.
Secondly, my noble friend made an important point: the investment security unit will be required to process notifications for acquisitions of 15%. We expect that, as with acquisitions across the regime, the vast majority will quickly be cleared to proceed. It is vital that the statutory timescales set out in the Bill for processing such notifications are met to maintain business and investor confidence; the Government will resource the investment security unit accordingly to do just that.
I understand that my noble friend has a particular interest in what “material influence over the policy of an entity” relates to. I assure him that material influence is an existing concept under the Enterprise Act 2002. The Competition and Markets Authority sets out what it considers constitutes material influence in its mergers guidance. The Secretary of State intends to apply this in so far as it is possible in the context of this new regime for the purposes of determining whether control has been, or is to be, gained over a qualifying entity. For the avoidance of doubt, the Government have no plans to publish their own separate guidance on material influence.
My noble friend also queried the reference in subsection (3) to excluding acquisitions that are “impossible” to notify from constituting notifiable acquisitions. Let me explain the reasons for this. The Government recognise that there may be circumstances where it is impossible to notify and obtain clearance from the Secretary of State for an acquisition before it takes place. They could include lack of awareness on the part of the acquirer that they were about to acquire control, or where it was otherwise impossible to notify in the time available before the acquisition took place.
Let me give an example. A beneficiary to a will may have no prior knowledge that that they stand to inherit a stake in a business that would ordinarily be a “notifiable acquisition” and will automatically do so on the execution of the will. The Bill does not exhaustively define the circumstances that are “impossible”. I have given one example around inheritance; others might include bankruptcy, intestacy and by operation of law, but these examples are indicative.
The third point I should make, specifically about my noble friend’s amendment, is that, as currently drafted, it would not simply remove the 15% threshold but replace it with a reference to 25%. On this point, I hope he will recognise that subsection (2)(a) of the clause already provides for this—or, to be specific, very close to this effect—as it draws on the existing numerical trigger event thresholds in Clause 8, which start at acquisitions taking a person’s holding past 25%. As such, the amendment would duplicate those existing provisions and would in fact result in a requirement to notify when acquiring specifically 25% and then again if moving beyond 25% in future. I trust he will agree that we should avoid this, I am sure, unintentional effect.
Amendment 19A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, seeks to prevent notifiable acquisition regulations being used to bring asset acquisitions in scope of the mandatory notification regime. Let me start by setting out why it is important that the delegated powers in Clause 6 are not constrained in this way before I address the amendment itself.
The noble Baroness will accept, I am sure, that the future is uncertain, that the threats we face as a nation inevitably change over time and that the ways in which hostile actors seek to bring us harm are constantly evolving. That is precisely why the Bill extends the new investment screening regime’s coverage to acquisitions of individual assets, not just acquisitions of control over entities. We cannot, and should not, rule out the possibility that changes to the scope of the mandatory notification regime may be required, based on the types of acquisition and not just the sectors in which they take place.
None the less, the noble Baroness has spoken powerfully on a couple of occasions about the concerns of the Wellcome Trust and others, so let me say this categorically: the Government have no current plans to bring assets in scope of the mandatory notification regime, and neither subsections (5)(a) nor (6) require them to do so; they merely allow for that possibility, subject to the restrictions in subsection (7). Were we or a future Government to do so, it is clear that such a move would constitute a major change to the regime. It is difficult to conceive of many instances where consultation with relevant stakeholders would not be a practical necessity for a change such as this.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
I have received a request from the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Lord.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his very considered comments, in particular his explanation of Clause 6(3). I think it allows a coach and horses to be driven through most of this legislation if someone can claim an impossibility. The examples he gave were excellent but there will be many other examples where people can claim an impossible circumstance. We will come on later to talk about, for example, the position of administrators and liquidators, and I can think of many others as well. I would have thought Clause 6(3) needed refinement.
Both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, mentioned “materially control” as opposed to “materially influence”. There is a difference and this is not about materially controlling but about materially influencing. Regarding Clause 8(8), I accept that there are definitions elsewhere of materially influencing the policy. However, I remain of the view that it is not possible below 15%, or indeed below 25%, to materially influence the policy as far as national security is concerned. Therefore, I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister has a chance to reflect on this specifically before Report.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I will take that as a comment and not as a question. I continue to look at all aspects of the Bill to see how they can be improved.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
The Minister referred to the meeting that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, very kindly held yesterday with the Wellcome Trust, and I very much welcome the reassurances that he has read into the record today. The shorthand for this is the nervousness in academia of bringing in assets—IP, information, ideas and software—rather than just entities. That was what we discussed at the meeting yesterday, and the Minister has now read into the record the reassurances he gave there, for which we thank him.
I thought that the suggestion—I was going to call it a wheeze—of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, was rather crafty: if that is what you mean, why do you not say it upfront? However, from what the Minister said, there seems to be a difference between the objective and the subjective criteria. I do not know whether that is why the Government want them in different clauses, but there is a problem with the subjectivity of this phrase. It is not simply, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, just said, about material influence rather than material control, but also the policy, and it is hard to define what that means. It seems to me a very subjective test for the big change made in Clause 6. I remain unconvinced that we have got it clear enough.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for explaining where the 15% figure, to which the Minister referred again, comes from. The CMA uses it when talking about mergers, but we are talking here about big companies, not small ones. However, because there is no threshold, much smaller companies will be covered by this. It may be absolutely important for the takeover of very large companies whether competition is taken out of the market. The Minister knows that, as a consumer champion, I am always very happy for the CMA to look at the impact on competition. However, I have my doubts whether a regime defined for competition in consumer goods and access should be lifted and shifted—the Minister said that there will not be separate guidance—into something that will sometimes affect small start-ups and new developments.
I certainly know more about the subject than I did 43 minutes ago, for which I thank all those who have spoken on the amendment. As has been said, I hope that the Minister and his draftspeople will look at whether this is clear enough, necessary and appropriate for the sorts of investments we are dealing with. When the Minister gives a bequest in a will as the reason for including a particular provision in the Bill, that feels like clutching at straws to me. I hope there are better arguments than that, but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 20.
Clause 7: Qualifying entities and assets
Amendment 20
Lord Leigh of Hurley
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendment to page 5, line 20 in the name of Lord Leigh of Hurley, seek to introduce value thresholds for qualifying entities and assets (subject to anti-avoidance provisions to prevent the circumvention of the Act), which would bring the NSI regime in line with other leading foreign investment regimes that have de minimis financial thresholds for notification.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, the Bill is probably more important than many people have realised. I suspect it is not by coincidence that, as I was pleasantly surprised to read in my Sunday papers—on the front page of the business news, no less—it has finally attracted attention from the business community. It has, to be honest, been a bit slow in picking up the significance and importance of this Bill. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, will be speaking to this group of amendments, representing as he does the most important business representative body.
There are significant concerns. Amendment 20 would achieve consistency with other regimes which have de minimis thresholds for notification. A key concern is not to dampen innovation in the UK, where vast VC investment is essential to the growth of businesses, particularly in the tech sector, where we have been spectacularly successful. The cost of investment is high for people watching every penny in a start-up. These are the most mobile entrepreneurs, of course. People just graduating or completing a PhD can choose pretty much any country in the world to start their business. They often start their business knowing it will need a lot of capital to be attractive, and possibly hoping it will be sold to realise capital gain. So, impediments will be a deterrent, particularly for small businesses.
Equally, investors in small businesses want to be sure they can obtain a clean and simple exit. I know that tech businesses can go for astonishingly high valuations and revenue multiples, much to the horror of people like me and, I suspect, other noble Lords in this Committee, who were brought up to regard post-tax profits multiples of seven as perfectly respectable, and are astonished to see revenue multiples of seven on transactions. What we might regard as a small business can have a huge valuation. I hope the Minister finds an acceptable number for a de minimis threshold and, as a result, cuts out a lot of red tape for small businesses, which are looking for government to honour their commitment in these happy post-Brexit days to less red tape for business people—particularly from this Government. Introducing the value thresholds of £10 million in annual turnover in the UK for qualifying entities and £10 million gross value for qualifying assets, subject to anti-avoidance provisions, is a proportionate approach. But, obviously, we look to the Minister to suggest another number if he thinks that is appropriate.
Amendment 52A, which is also in my name, is extremely important. It introduces a fast-track process for transactions that clearly might not raise national security concerns, but which none the less need to be notified due to their targeted activities being in a specified sector. The Bill currently envisages that the ISU will reach an initial decision on whether to clear a notified transaction or call it in for a detailed assessment within 30 working days of accepting the notification as complete. A number of parties who contributed to the public consultation were worried that the ISU would not be able to manage even the modest expected flow of transactions. If a 30-day period is granted and then an extension, which it is within its power to do, one can easily see this becoming the norm. Frankly, this will be far too long. As Ministers know, most things in life, but transactions in particular, have a momentum, and imposing a delay of 30-plus working days could lead to huge uncertainty and worry. People will be aware that the transaction is taking place, and they will be worried about their jobs in case the transaction does not happen. Employers will be nervous, because they will know that this is the point at which their employees are most vulnerable to being poached or headhunted. This long freeze on activity could be a disaster, to the point where business owners become reluctant to take in investment for this very reason, which would be a great shame.
To minimise the deterrent effect of the new regime on foreign investment into the UK, this amendment would introduce a fast-track procedure for non-problematic transactions, enabling the acquirer to request a review period of 10 working days, instead of 30, combined with reduced information requirements for the notification. The use of a fast-track initial review procedure would not prevent the Secretary of State referring a transaction for an in-depth assessment, if considered necessary. The timetable for such subsequent review would not be affected.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to follow my noble friend Lord Leigh. I am sure he is being modest; I would think that tomorrow evening is all sold out. But I agree with him; nobody seems to know anything about the Bill, which is very surprising, given that we are approaching the point at which the trigger events will be in scope and have been for three months. Knowledge about the Bill is woefully deficient. This impels us to crack on, because we have to get this into law quickly, as the period when these trigger events have been taking place, when people do not realise that they are notifiable or that a call-in notice may be issued, is extending every day.
With that said, I will be quick. I forbear to comment on the other amendments and refer just to Amendment 25, which is in my name. It has the effect of adding
“(but are not limited to)”
to Clause 7(5) to find out why it is there. We have the statement under Clause 3, the purpose of which, among other things, is to set out what the qualifying assets are, so we know that. Clause 7(4)(c) tells us that qualifying assets include
“ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value”,
which is so broad as to be almost meaningless. It is all-encompassing. Then Clause 7(5) lists a lot of things, but I do not know whether it is exhaustive, as it says they are examples. What I want to know from the Minister is why we are including examples if the list is not exhaustive. If it is not an exhaustive list, why are we not saying
“(but are not limited to)”
to ensure that people realise that it is not an exhaustive list? That is often done in legislation and for good reasons. It is just a drafting practice.
Equally, however, why does this bit of the Bill not refer back to the statement under Clause 3? That would make life a lot simpler: qualifying assets are in these categories and, to see more, look to the statement. Frankly, we will not know until we finally see the statement produced—I know we have seen drafts—whether something is or is not a qualifying asset.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, on his amendments. I think he will cause quite a stir when he gives his annual lecture. I will speak first to Amendments 20 and 24. I refer to my interests in the register.
Amendments 20 and 24 take account of the fact that the Bill as drafted does not include any de minimis thresholds for qualifying entities and assets, in stark contrast to other leading foreign investment regimes. The point behind these amendments is to ensure that mandatory notification requirements involving businesses have a de minimis threshold. Not having one would be disproportionate, given the likely cost of making mandatory filings and the relatively low risk of any national security issue arising in the context of such transactions. It would also act as a significant disincentive to global investors and the start-up and early stage businesses that they fund, which may simply relocate to a jurisdiction that takes a more benign approach. As the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, said, this risks seriously dampening innovation in the UK, particularly in the continued development of the technology sector and start-ups, which rely heavily on venture capital investment.
Introducing value thresholds of £10 million annual turnover in the UK for qualifying entities and £10 million gross value for qualifying assets, subject to anti-avoidance provisions to prevent the circumvention of the Act, would ensure a much more proportionate approach. Value thresholds are also used in a number of other leading foreign investment regimes. For example, Australia and Canada use a tiered threshold system based on the identity of the investor and the nature of the business, and, in the case of Australia, the level of control acquired.
The noble Lord, Lord Leigh, also explained the other amendments that he and I put forward in this group, Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A, which would introduce another red tape busting proposal: a fast-track process for non-problematic transactions. The Bill currently envisages that the investment security unit will reach an initial decision as to whether to clear a notified transaction or to call it in for a detailed assessment within 30 working days of acceptance of the notification as complete. As the noble Lord explained, a significant number of transactions will fall within the scope of the mandatory notification requirements due to the target’s activities being in a specified sector—we have seen those in the document published last week—but which clearly do not raise national security concerns. To minimise the deterrent effect of the new regime on foreign investment into the UK, these amendments would introduce a fast-track procedure for such non-problematic transactions, enabling the acquirer to request a review period, as the noble Lord again explained, within a period of 10 workings days instead of 30, combined with reduced information requirements for the notification.
I have mentioned Australia and Canada; if the Minister would prefer it, I can refer in this case to a special accelerated procedure recently introduced in France for certain transactions. The use of a fast-track initial review procedure would not prevent the Secretary of State referring a transaction for in-depth assessment, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, cogently explained, if this was considered necessary and the timetable for such subsequent review would not be affected.
I very much hope that, as I said, these two red tape busting amendments will be very carefully considered by the Government. Otherwise, we seriously risk the Bill’s impact being disproportionate and having a chilling effect on investment.
Lord Bilimoria (CB) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 20 and 24 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh. The CBI, of which I am president, supports the principle of the legislation in the Bill in protecting national security, which will always be top priority. However, the current drafting makes the practical application of the Bill difficult for business and could lead to additional burdens and complexity at a micro level and be an unintended deterrent to investment at a macro level.
With no set de minimis thresholds for transactions caught by the legislation, there is a risk that a high volume of notifications will inadvertently represent relatively low-risk activity caught by this maximalist approach from legal teams and counsel. On top of that is the extraterritorial nature of the provisions in the Bill. Many transactions involving target suppliers supplying goods and services outside the nation will be caught in the notification requirements. Given this backdrop of a maximalist approach, there is real concern in business that the Government’s capacity to process the projected number of notifications while the regulations are in their infancy will be a problem.
According to the CFIUS annual report, in the United States in 2019, 231 notices were filed for screening, with 113 resulting in investigation. The Government currently estimate, and I wonder whether the Minister can confirm, that there will be 1,800 annual notifications. However, there is concern that the true estimate could be up to 10,000. We should not have the unintended consequence, mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Clement-Jones, of deterring foreign investment just when the UK needs to increase its attractiveness to it. We are just coming through the pandemic, we have had Brexit, and we are establishing ourselves as an independent trading nation—global Britain. We are the second or third largest recipient of inward investment in the world, and a magnet for it. We are a gateway to Europe when it comes to investment, and we need to continue to be so.
Amendments 20 and 24, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh,
“seek to introduce value thresholds for qualifying entities and assets (subject to anti-avoidance provisions to prevent the circumvention of the Act), which would bring the NSI regime in line with other leading foreign investment regimes that have de minimis financial thresholds for notification.”
Such thresholds provide a critical floor to the regime, ensuring that higher-value, higher-interest transactions, entities and assets are predominantly in focus. Of course the Government should consider national security threats of all sizes. However, in order to provide officials with sufficient breathing space to make a success of the predicted number of notifications, which I spoke about earlier, this threshold should be applied.
Importantly, this amendment would concurrently bring the planned regime in line with other leading foreign investment regimes, as we have heard from other speakers. International comparisons and their consequential impact on the UK’s attractiveness as a location for inward investment should be a continual focus for government when implementing this regime.
Before I come to what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, mentioned, I should say that the Bill represents a significant expansion of the UK’s FDI. Since the Enterprise Act intervention regime was introduced in 2002, nearly 20 years ago, there have been just 12 interventions on the basis of national security. It appears that this new regime will see a large increase in the government’s workload and, as the noble Lord said, a much stricter regime than those brought in by other countries, including the USA, Australia, Japan and many countries in Europe.
We must not jeopardise, at any cost, our attraction for inward investment. Of course, national security is important, but we have to be a magnet for inward investment and the Bill must not prevent that happening.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, who spoke with such passion and, obviously, such knowledge.
I am delighted to support Amendments 20 and 24 and the later amendments in the names of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I share the concern of my noble friend Lord Leigh that there appears to be little knowledge of this Bill in the wider business community, but I reassure noble Lords that the law societies of England and Scotland are well aware of this Bill and have raised a number of issues, including the ones we will come on to in Amendment 21 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson.
The Bill as it currently stands leaves a number of loopholes and is loose in its drafting, so Amendments 20 and 24, in seeking to set a de minimis rule, are welcome indeed. They would assist the Government for the reasons the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, set out. I welcome the fact that my noble friend Lord Grimstone will respond to this group of amendments and I look forward to what he has to say, but the Government have set themselves a very difficult task. We wish to keep, and possibly increase, the level of foreign investment into this country. It was always one of our greatest achievements while members of the European Union that we attracted more foreign investment than any other EU country. There was a lot of envy of us because of that, because we were, dare I say, a light-touch regime, but there was a regulation in place and it worked effectively.
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, touched on the sensitive issue of the level of referrals or own-initiative investigations which the Government, under the Bill as it currently stands, might bring upon themselves. I wish the department well in that regard. Surely it must be of interest to rule out some that, due to the level of investment, do not attract sufficient concern. If the Government are seeking to maintain a balance, which they have successfully kept to date, between encouraging a high level of foreign inward investment and meeting the national security concerns as set out in the Bill, the terms of Amendments 20 and 24, in particular setting the level of investment as an annual turnover of less than £10 million in particular, would not jeopardise national security concerns.
I also support the later amendments in this group in the names of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, which seek to set out an accelerated procedure. It cannot be in the Government’s interest to jeopardise what would be a legitimate investment if the procedure was fairly straightforward and could not be met under the terms set out in those amendments. These two sets of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley would improve the Bill, maintain a flow of foreign inward investment and not unnecessarily jeopardise our national security. I support them, and I look forward to hearing what my noble friend Lord Grimstone says in summing up.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support the amendments in this group, which seek to set up a fast-track process. Anything that can make the processes more friendly to help non-problematic business transactions is welcome. I am very worried about the impact that this Bill, which I support in principle, will have on the UK’s reputation as a good place to invest, and I echo what other noble Lords have already said today. That is why we have to work to make the operation of the Bill as painless as possible for transactions that fundamentally do not raise concerns.
I am less sure about the other amendments in this group. I understand the desire to protect SMEs and start-ups from the full force of the Bill. I do not believe that national security risks can be sized by reference to a point in time, monetary value of current assets or turnover of a business. So I do not support Amendments 20 and 24 in the name of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley.
Similarly, I am not convinced about restricting qualifying assets outside the UK to those in connection with activities carried out in the UK, as envisaged by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts in Amendment 26. I do see a need to be able to focus on supply chains as well as on activities carried out in the UK, and I would not want to deprive the Government of the ability to do that if genuine national security issues arose.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, is correct to say that the Bill is far more important than the outside world seems to realise. When I have been speaking externally, I have been trying to remind people of the Bill’s existence and the need for them to read it. Perhaps we should adopt the policy of the Ancient Mariner and stop in one in three in the street and tell them about it because it does not seem that the message is getting through. Perhaps we will just have to work on their behalf.
A strong case has been made by the proponents of Amendments 20 and 24. When the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, speaks on a number of different issues, he often talks about flexibility and keeping options open. This seems another example of where the Government are seeking to keep their options open and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, set out, there might or might not be good reason for that. When I sat on your Lordships’ Science and Technology Committee, it held an inquiry into the challenge of scale-up and the need for patient capital and for money to come in. It is very clear that the United Kingdom has a way to travel in getting the sort of funding that we are talking about for these scale-up situations. I am interested to hear from the Minister what sensitivity studies have been done on this. How much work has been done in talking to the investment and venture capital community about how it views it? Perhaps the Minister could write to us with the evidence has been received about its reception and the Government’s impression of it. I am persuaded that there is an issue. The question is how big an issue it is, given that we have a suboptimal venture capital regime in this country for this sort of scale-up. How badly and to what extent would damage be wrought?
I read Amendment 25 differently from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. I read the words “examples include” to mean that that is not exclusive and I think the noble Lord has what he wants without having to put the words in. Perhaps the Minister can clarify that.
I find myself in complete agreement with Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A. If these transactions are not supposed to be impacted by this, let us get them out of the system as quickly as possible. The doctrine expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the workability of the regime, the amount of friction it introduces and our responsibility to remove that friction wherever possible is completely correct, so those four amendments deserve noble Lords’ complete support.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bilimoria, for the opening amendments in this group, which give rise to various considerations. We recognise the caveat in Amendments 20 and 24 to mitigate the impact of hostile actors going to complex lengths to hide their interests in a qualifying asset or entity. It is also understandable to set de minimis thresholds. Having the powers in the definition still requires a thought process to initiate using them. There have been several instances in which hostile actors have behaved entirely transparently that have not been identified and prevented. Indeed, mitigating actions may have been rejected even by the Government.
One needs only to recall the debate over the growing dependency of many nations on China and the resultant rejection of identifying potential harm that could result. It could be raised here regarding dependency on research skills and partnerships in the technology fields, with security implications. Indeed, the Government’s assessment of risk can be mysterious. In relation to the Bill, perhaps what we need to see are the ways in which the Government will actively identify evolving and growing risks, whether or not they hide behind complex organisations or a complex process of additionality. Has the Minister considered this and when a risk may change its colours?
To the proponents of the £10 million threshold in the amendments, is there some logic or any evidence that this is indeed the correct level, other than that other jurisdictions may have chosen it? The valuation of some of these types of asset is hard to quantify and the value of a database code or algorithm will be considered much greater once in the hands of a hostile intent. The intention not to overburden SMEs with the bureaucracy of this regime is worthy and commendable, but may not be easily carried out. How many SMEs would be excluded as a consequence and would it also benefit the department not to have to devote resources to excessive screenings of transactions?
Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A, also thoughtfully proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Clement-Jones, are for the fast-track procedure for notifications. Has such a procedure been considered by the Government? It has yet to be identified how the regime proposed by the Bill will deal with so-called everyday transactions in the business community and the amount of resources that will need to be committed to so-called evidently non-controversial activity. Would this allow the possibility of experience gained through the Bill to mature into a more workable format?
In the drafting of the procedure, care would need to be taken regarding the person being given the ability to give the relevant notice. In one interpretation it could be the company initiating such a request, not only the person acting on behalf of the Secretary of State. That would result in everyone requesting a fast-track procedure. The Minister’s remarks will be interesting in this respect. Overall, it would be perhaps best to ensure that the regime is set up in the first instance in the Bill to be properly resourced and to have properly identified targets for all its notifications.
The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Department for International Trade (Lord Grimstone of Boscobel) (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley for his Amendments 20 and 24, my noble friend Lord Lansley for his Amendment 25, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his Amendment 26 and my noble friend Lord Leigh and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their package of Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A. I will take them sequentially.
I completely agree with my noble friend Lord Leigh and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that we must be careful to do nothing that diminishes the entrepreneurial or innovative spirit in our country or to diminish the attractiveness of this country for investment. You might imagine that, as the UK’s Minister for Investment, I am especially concerned about the latter point. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I have spoken to many investors and VCs and, once the rationale and the processes of the Bill are explained to people, I have been very reassured by the reception that the Bill has had. The key point one has to explain is that the investment screening unit will be a rational unit that will seek to minimise time spent and maximise efficiency wherever it can.
With the permission of my noble friend Lord Leigh, I will address his Amendments 20 and 24 together, given that both relate to introducing de minimis thresholds into the regime. Clause 7 defines the meaning of “qualifying entity” and “qualifying asset” for the purposes of the Bill. These definitions underpin reasonable and proportionate powers for the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control of qualifying entities and assets where that raises national security risks.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who contributed to this group. We did not quite get unanimity, but we got close to it from those who spoke. The second-biggest accolade of my life has to be the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, calling my arguments “cogent”, so I am grateful to him for that.
It is noticeable that the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria—I know that he speaks on behalf of himself—spoke as president of the CBI. It is regarded by some as the advocate for large businesses, but he recognises that small businesses may struggle with this Bill. Although I take the point of my noble friend Lady Noakes that a very small business could be subject to a national security risk, I have to say to the Minister that there must be some level below which this Bill should not apply. He suggested that the Government start with £1 million as a stopgap, but I started with £10 million. What do you say?
I also take his points that revenue and gross asset definitions are difficult sometimes, but there are other ways—for example, just looking at the amount invested in a project or business. If it is less than £0.5 million, would we really think that there is a national security risk from someone taking a 15% stake? Perhaps we could have another look at that.
I thank the Minister again for his comments on the working days needed. I am sure that he is sincere in his view that this will be a deadline but we have seen circumstances where the deadline becomes the norm, and 30 working days with a possible extension of another 40 is a long time. The takeover panel gives rulings within an hour. I would have thought that the Secretary of State might allow himself to be stretched to having the option of allowing a reply within 10 working days in certain circumstances where it is apparent that an urgent matter needs to be resolved for all sorts of extremely important reasons, as we discussed earlier. It could be an opportunity for the Secretary of State to agree to a sticker of 10 working days, as it were, going on a particular case because of a threat to employment, a threat to a business’s viability or certain other criteria.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 21.
Amendment 21
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that only those entities that carry on activities in the UK are qualifying entities.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 21 I will speak also to Amendments 27 and 32.
The first two of those amendments would amend Clause 7, which is entitled “Qualifying entities and assets”. Amendment 32 is a consequential amendment to Clause 9. As has been the case with all the amendments I have tabled, they are designed to give greater clarity to the detail of the proposed regime and maintain the delicate balance between national security and investor rights, which we have all talked about at some length.
I add to noble Lords’ views that the level of knowledge about the provisions of this Bill is pretty low. Last week, I was in the north of England at a conference involving a number of senior professional firms. I do not think that they had hoisted in the reduction in thresholds. They still thought that it was a regime that would apply primarily to large companies. When I raised the point made by my noble friend Lord Lansley—that the regime began to come into force on 12 November last year—they looked fairly astonished.
Turning to the amendments, as before, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his support and to the Law Society for its help in drafting them. First, I will speak to Amendment 21. Under Clause 7(3), an overseas entity is a qualifying entity if, among other things, it
“carries on activities in the United Kingdom”.
It would be useful if we could have some guidance on the meaning of “qualifying entity” under the provisions of this Bill. There is a useful definition in the Bribery Act; it may be possible to bring that across to give clarity to this Bill as well.
Clause 7(3)(b) also provides that an overseas entity that supplies goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom would be a qualifying entity. Other major jurisdictions do not apply their national security laws to investments in foreign entities. The argument is that the Bill should only treat overseas entities that carry on activities in the United Kingdom as qualifying entities, rather than include entities that simply export to the United Kingdom. To achieve this, Clause 7(3)(b) should be removed.
Amendments 27 and 32 would replace Clause 7(6)(a) and (b) with new wording. The background to this is as follows. Clause 7(4)(c) and Clause 7(6)(b) together provide that non-tangible assets, such as ideas, information or techniques, are qualifying assets if used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom. This provision could inadvertently cover UK businesses that buy, procure or use technological products or services supplied by third-party providers. Under this scenario, a UK company that buys in foreign artificial intelligence technology to help to deliver its business objectives could be covered, as could a UK company that uses foreign computer software in, for example, building and maintaining a database.
The situation I just described could be further complicated if a UK business plans to purchase another UK company covered by that scenario. Although it is a UK to UK transaction, under the nexus set out in Clause 7 these types of deals will be covered and caught under the new regime. Solicitors will have a duty to flag that up as a risk when advising corporate clients, which means that many more companies are likely to seek a voluntary judgment from the Secretary of State for reasons of certainty. This is likely to significantly increase the number of applications for a judgment made to the Secretary of State, and so is likely to slow down business. On the other hand, if a deal goes ahead and the ruling is made after it is completed, it could have significant consequences for the organisations in cost and outcomes.
This possible application of the regime to acquisitions by domestic acquirers is unusual compared to other jurisdictions where Governments have taken national security powers. Concerns relating to national security and domestic investments are likely to be able to be dealt with much more expeditiously under existing regulations—for example, confiscation proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act or the director disqualification regime. Amendments 27 and 32 would give effect to this simplification. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I start with an apology to the Minister. Amendment 26 in the previous group was a rogue and should have been deleted, because Amendment 27, introduced so well by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, superseded it. The PBO produced a much better format, so Amendment 26 was left like an orphan in a previous group, but it has been extremely helpful in getting a foretaste of the Minister’s arguments in this group, so I apologise to him, but there is nothing like hearing a good argument twice, and no doubt we will be all that wiser for it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has introduced the amendments so well, he has made it clear that they are intended to do two things: to ensure that qualifying assets are only assets used in connection with activities carried on in the UK, but not the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK; and, secondly, to prevent “in connection with” being interpreted in a way that treats all assets within the relevant supply chain as being within scope, even if owned and controlled by unconnected third parties, which may have no visibility of the activities of businesses further down the supply chain.
As drafted, the territorial scope of the Government’s call-in power is extremely broad, extending to non-UK entities that supply goods or services to persons in the UK, and assets situated outside the UK that are used in connection with activities carried on in the UK or the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK. This extraterritorial application is out of line with the approach taken in most other foreign investment regimes, which focus only on acquisitions of corporate entities registered in the relevant jurisdiction. It is also unnecessary. There are a number of other more appropriate ways to protect against a threat to the UK’s national security in connection with a transaction involving a non-UK registered company or assets that are not located in the UK, such as export/import controls, the network and information systems regime for critical infrastructure and other licensing requirements relating specifically to national security. From a practical perspective, it may also be difficult in many cases for an acquirer to analyse fully all aspects of the supply chain in order to self-assess the risk of a particular transaction being called in for review.
Furthermore, referring to supplies of goods or services captures all aspects of the supply chain, however minor. It is difficult for an acquirer of a business fully to analyse the supply chain, and including this as part of a mandatory regime with criminal sanctions is disproportionate. The proposed requirement for control by the person exercising the relevant activities is necessary to prevent “in connection with” being interpreted in a way that treats all assets in the relevant supply chain as being in scope, even if owned and controlled by unconnected third parties that may have no visibility of the activities of businesses further down the supply chain.
There are other more appropriate ways to protect against a threat to the UK’s national security in connection with a transaction involving a non-UK registered company or assets that are not located in the UK. As I said, most other foreign investment regimes have managed to crack that issue. I very much hope that the Government will think again.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to support this small group of amendments. I will speak in particular to Amendment 21 for the reasons my noble friend Lord Hodgson so eloquently and effectively set out.
I am very well aware of the concerns raised by the Law Society of England, as set out by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones, as to the extraterritorial aspects of the application of Clause 7(3) as drafted. It raises a number of practical problems as to how it will be applied. In the view of the Law Society of England, it is potentially inappropriate in its wording.
I am grateful to my noble friend for stepping up to the plate and tabling these amendments. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on them, the reason being that, in the definition of qualifying entities and assets currently given under Clause 7(3), an overseas entity is a qualifying entity if, among other things, it “carries on activities” in the UK. The Law Society would very much like to see further guidance on the meaning of this term, as is the case under the Bribery Act and the Modern Slavery Act. It begs the question as to why the Government have not felt able or willing to bring forward such a definition as part of the Bill. My noble friend must understand that it will be up to the practitioners to apply this wording. The courts could have to interpret it as well.
Clause 7(3)(b) also provides that an overseas entity that
“supplies goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom”
would be a qualifying entity. For reasons of international comity, other major jurisdictions do not apply their national security laws to investments in foreign entities. In accordance with this, I support the Law Society’s conclusion that the Bill should treat only overseas entities that carry on activities in the UK as qualifying entities, rather than including entities that simply export to the UK.
In my view, Clause 7(3)(b) should be removed entirely or the wording proposed by my noble friend Lord Hodgson, which I prefer, adopted. I find the Bill unacceptable as it currently stands. I hope my noble friend the Minister will understand that we are not the ones who will have to apply this. Practitioners have raised these concerns with us for very legitimate reasons.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, cleared up the position of Amendment 26 in the previous group, because I struggled, when I came to this group, to work out what else there was to say. I put my name down anyway to see what would emerge from previous speakers.
I said on the previous group that I had concerns about confining the Government’s powers to exclude those outside the UK that provide goods or services to the UK, because I believe that the Government should have as wide a definition as possible. I absolutely believe in making the processes of the Bill move as smoothly as possible and I do not want to add to what I believe will be the big burden of voluntary notifications. But, when it comes to defining where the Government could act, we need to be broad in our approach. If there is one such potential acquisition only, I would still say that it is worth having the power to go there, because these are serious issues about the national security of our land.
Lord Fox (LD)
This follows on quite well. Throughout this debate and lots of debates about Bills, we hear your Lordships use the phrase “unintended consequences”. Actually, giving the department credit, I assume that this is an intended rather than an unintended consequence, so I would like the Minister to explain exactly what it is seeking to achieve or prevent happening. What past examples would have been arrested, had this law been available then? Being a practical person, that would help me and others to understand what the Government are getting at.
This clearly does not have extraterritorial reach, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones said. It seeks to deal with all activities when it might be better to separate and segment them. I take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes; it would help us if we understood what the Government are getting at with this wording.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for his three amendments in this group and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding his name to the first, Amendment 21. He has an alternative to Amendment 27, Amendment 26, which was in the previous group, but both amend activities in general, so that they are more specifically attached to the person controlling those activities. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has recognised his amendment as “rogue”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, queries the extension of Clause 7(3)(b) to suppliers of
“goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom”,
and asks for an explanation. Have there been previous incidents and what specific goods or services were involved, with what implications?
Clause 7(6) specifies land as well as “moveable property” and, in relation to Amendment 27 of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, gives rise to my reflections on the question of land and its use. While clearly an asset, the distinction is not made between the Bill’s application to ownership of land, in the sense of control, and any lease of its use, whereby a person other than the owner could be said to be in control. The Bill merely has the words “used in connection” to activities. Is this distinction relevant and what proof would be needed to clarify which person is in control of land?
One of the key sentences in the Government’s Statement of Policy Intent is in the section on acquirers:
“Clearly, national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers are hostile to the UK’s national security, or when they owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”
Land, and the use of it in such a context, is made relevant as a qualifying asset. Yes, an operation needs to operate somewhere and will require land. Does this require any further reflection with regard to the workings of the regime? Can land in a particular country be considered a particular threat?
Amendment 32, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, to Clause 9, regarding control of assets, returns us to Clause 7(6). The Minister may wish merely to identify the strategic risk attaching to land in particular locations only.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I welcome these amendments from my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which concern the extraterritorial application of the call-in power. Amendment 21 seeks to ensure that where an entity is formed or recognised under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, it will be a qualifying entity only if it carries on activities in the UK but not where it supplies goods or services to persons in the UK, as the clause currently provides.
I am afraid that I was slightly unclear on the precise intent of Amendments 27 and 32 so, for the benefit of the Committee, I am interpreting them as seeking to remove the provision currently in Clause 7(6)(b): that an asset situated outside the UK or the territorial sea is a qualifying asset if it is used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK. This would mean that an asset situated outside the UK or the territorial sea is a qualifying asset only if it is used in connection with certain activities carried on in the UK.
It is important that entities formed or recognised outside the UK which provide goods or services to persons in the UK are captured through the Bill as their acquisition may give rise to national security risks to the UK. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, asked for some examples, and I am happy to provide them. For example, a foreign-registered company that does not carry on activities in the UK may still provide essential goods or services to parts of our critical national infrastructure. If a hostile party were to acquire control over that supplier, it could use that control to degrade our infrastructure. To take another example, imagine an overseas supplier of machinery or compounds to a UK-based entity producing cutting-edge advanced materials for our military. Control over that supplier could provide a hostile party with an insight into certain military capabilities or a means to sabotage the work of the UK entity to harm our military. As my noble friend Lady Noakes recognised, this could have a severe effect on national security.
Similarly, it is important that land and moveable property assets situated outside the UK or the territorial sea and intellectual property assets used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK are also captured as their acquisition can give rise to national security risks to the UK. For example, as I have said previously, the acquisition of a wind farm situated outside the UK and its territorial sea that provides critical energy supplies to UK industry and consumers may give rise to national security risks, even though it is not strictly used in connection with activities in the UK. If the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would like to hear this example a third time, he only has to lay a further amendment.
Of course, any extraterritorial use of the powers under this Bill should be proportionate as well as meeting the other tests in the Bill. That is why the Bill explicitly sets out a UK nexus requirement that means that the Secretary of State may intervene to assess an acquisition overseas only where it has a clear connection to the UK. Remedies may be imposed at the end of an assessment only if the Secretary of State reasonably considers that they are necessary and proportionate for the purpose of safeguarding the UK’s national security. As such, the extent of an acquisition’s connection to the UK will be a clear factor in that decision.
The Bill also explicitly limits the application of remedies to persons outside the UK to those who have a clear connection to the UK—for example, UK nationals or companies, or those who carry on business in the UK.
I am conscious that I may not have answered fully the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. If I reflect, after looking at Hansard, that I have not, I may write to him. I understand, taking these amendments as a group, the desire to probe the Government in this area, but I hope that, with this explanation, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Lord Fox (LD)
I am probably being extremely stupid here, so please forgive me. In the first example of a foreign business supplying a critical operation in this country, I understand that that would be a problem were it taken over by a hostile nation. Let us imagine that a Belgian company, or perhaps a Canadian one, is being taken over by a company or a regime that we consider hostile. What is the Secretary of State’s next move in stopping it happening? I do not understand what the Secretary of State’s remit is over that Belgian or Canadian company, other than to suggest to the recipient of the supplies in this country that they have to change their supplier.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for that question. I assure him that it is not stupid. I think the answer is in what I said towards the end of my speech. The Bill explicitly limits the application of remedies to persons outside the UK to those who have a clear connection with the UK, for example, UK nationals or companies, or those who carry on business in the UK. That provides the nexus back to the UK, which I think the noble Lord was searching for.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I was extremely relieved to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that Amendment 26 was a rogue amendment. He and I had both put our names to it originally and I withdrew mine. When I found that he had left his there, I thought he had seen some angle and I was going to be blown apart and take a torpedo amidships. I am grateful to hear that it was a rogue amendment.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the examples. I am still reaching for the implications of the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I am not yet convinced that the qualifying entity idea has been probed enough, given that it has proved effective in the Bribery Act and has a similar purpose there. I will read what he has to say, think about it and maybe bring this back for a further discussion. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 22.
Amendment 22
Lord Vaizey of Didcot
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted that it will be my noble friend Lady Bloomfield answering for the Government on this occasion. Almost every amendment that I have put forward has had a substitute Minister step in and I am flattered that every member of the team wants to have a go at one of my amendments. I will be as brief as possible because it is important that we make as much progress as possible on the Bill. I hope that all the noble Lords and Baronesses who are no doubt lined up to rubbish my amendment will do so as briefly as possible.
Amendment 22 is about land. The Government have stated they expect to use their call-in powers in relation to acquisitions of land only where the land is being acquired proximate to a “sensitive site.” However, there is currently no definition of what is meant by “proximate”—near—in this context, and the location of sensitive sites will not necessarily be public. Given that the onus will be on acquirers to assess the risk of an acquisition of land being called in for review, the Bill should expressly specify that land will be regarded as a qualifying asset only if it is located within one mile of a sensitive site. No doubt we can debate that distance as we progress.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to have the chance to speak briefly to Amendment 38. This group is linked, in so far as we are all addressing issues relating to limitations on the interpretation of the “qualifying asset” in Clause 7. Amendment 38 in my name is particularly directed towards the issue of such assets in Clause 7(4)(c)—ideas and related intangible assets—where they are licensed. In particular, Amendment 38 seeks to regard such assets, which are licensed on a non-permanent basis, and where ownership of the asset is not transferred to somebody else in any permanent or substantive form, as not being controlled. This relates to the set of exceptions in Clause 11, which sets out those circumstances in which assets are not to be regarded as controlled.
We need to do that because Clause 9, “Control of assets”, is very widely drawn—deliberately, I am sure, and probably rightly so. It says that control of a qualifying asset can result in the person being able to use the asset. Of course, if an asset is licensed to somebody for their use, they could be said to be controlling it. But anybody licensing it to them will be doing so with restrictions and provisions. To that extent, they are not controlling it; the person who has licensed it to them is controlling it. So we have an issue not only of definitions but of scope.
The definition of control should not extend to where somebody had something licensed with restrictions imposed upon it. The definition of using the assets is probably, in that sense, too wide to be applied in this case to those kinds of innovative assets. To whom is this important? It is very important to those whose job it is to bring forward innovation and to license their intellectual property, and to do so in circumstances where they continue to control its use and exploitation. We do not want the routine use and exploitation of assets or intellectual property to be seriously impeded every time it is licensed or for this to be regarded as potentially the control of a qualifying asset and hence notifiable. Amendment 38 gives us an opportunity to set proper limitations on the use of licensing for assets on a temporary basis.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, my reason for speaking in this group relates to licences. I generally support the thrust of Amendment 23, if there can be appropriate definitions, but I was not quite sure whether I agreed with Amendment 38. I disagreed with the explanatory statement of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, because whether or not the licenser maintains control depends on quite a lot of things.
An IP licenser may be able to impose conditions when a licence is first granted, but what happens after that and how much control there is over future events is up to whatever is agreed in the licence. If the price and conditions are right, it could be a fully assignable licence; it could be assignable with or without consent of the IP owner; it could be exclusive, so that the IP owner no longer has any rights to use it themselves or to license others; or it could be a sole licence that also effectively restricts supply under the IP. A licence can therefore be for something that is relevant to national security and have both ownership and security of supply implications.
In paragraph (c) of Amendment 38—the substantive economic ownership point—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is trying to exclude the exclusive licences that are assignable because, as he would say, economic control had been obtained. I am not sure whether that is the right way to define it, but I understand the sense of what he is trying to do. However, I wonder whether that also captures what could be restriction of supply issues. Those can also happen through licences that would not necessarily mean economic control.
The whole matter of licences is quite interesting, but they can be unique—I used to do them for a living, so I should know. We therefore have to be careful about clarifying, perhaps in a more substantive way, the things that one wants to exclude from review. I think it is necessary to exclude some, because I am absolutely certain that you would get an even bigger deluge if you did not. It may be that things that count as ordinary licences, where there are many licensees—rather like in the other amendment—and no security of supply issues, can be treated the same as any product for sale. However, wherever there is a sole or exclusive licence in particular, it would be necessary just to have a look to make sure there was nothing that you might want to do something about. There could quite possibly be something if it was in a relevant technology area. However, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has drawn an interesting point to our attention.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, as has been mentioned, the amendments in this group have a common factor very much along the lines of what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said: that it is really important to look at the nature of qualifying entities and assets under Clause 7 with a keen eye. I think that the debate will continue beyond Committee.
One has to make choices here where one thinks it is appropriate to go for a change. I would give this a score of one out of three. I put my name to Amendment 23 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, because the argument there is very straightforward. As he said, it is about “business as usual” procurement and the purchasing of things such as software licences and standard equipment, so that, even if it might technically be caught by the sectors, it is not captured in the definition of a qualifying asset. This is so that, again, we do not have a vast quantity of referral requirements for what are essentially day-to-day transactions, which could be a massive burden on business. The noble Lord made the argument extremely well there.
I am much more nervous about the proposition of taking land out of this, particularly when it comes to reversing the requirement: that is, you publish the sensitive sites and then say whether the transaction is caught because it is next door to that site. The way in which the qualifying entities and assets clause is currently set out, with sensitive sites not being published, is probably a rather safer way of dealing with national security, but that is a purely personal view. I hope that we keep things that way round.
It was a great pleasure to hear what my noble friend Lady Bowles had to say about the third proposition, given her experience and expertise in the whole area of intellectual property. That was exactly my reaction: that licences are animals that can vary in many different ways. As she said, they can be exclusive or non-exclusive, long-term or short-term. I agree that they are not as easy to define as an asset transfer, such as an assignment of copyright or other forms of intellectual property. Nevertheless, in substance, they can mean the transfer for quite a period of time—indeed, the wholesale transfer of knowhow—just as much as an assignment can. One therefore needs to be somewhat wary.
Then you start getting into paragraph (c), as proposed by Amendment 38, which says that
“substantive economic ownership of the asset has not been transferred”.
That is virtually impossible to define for this particular purpose. I am wholly sympathetic to the idea of screening and filtering in a way that cuts back red tape, but at the same time one must recognise that intellectual property is one of the most sensitive aspects that needs to be caught by this Bill. That is the future. Intangible assets are the real Crown jewels of national economies. We must be very careful about that.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
The amendments in this group split into two: Amendments 22 and 28, and Amendments 23 and 38. Amendments 22 and 28, drawn to our attention by the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, continue reflections on the term “land” through consideration not only of any strategic placement in its own right but in relation to proximity to a sensitive site, as provided for under the US security regime. Here in the UK, Amendment 28 has it as
“any site identified as such by the Secretary of State and published”.
What that proximity is and whether it might need to be adjacent are further considerations.
Amendment 23 seeks to ensure that a disproportionate burden is not placed on businesses generally, although I am not sure whether the drafting of the amendment—
“which are not generally and widely available on the commercial market”—
is quite right. More normal “business as usual” procurement, such as the purchasing of software licences and standard network equipment, does not need to be captured in the definition of a qualifying asset. Procurement is not mentioned in the impact assessment. Certainly there needs to be a balance between protecting procurement contracts and not overburdening “business as usual” procurement. How many notifications does the Minister expect to see arising from procurement, however it may be interpreted?
The data infrastructure section of the consultation document and the Government’s report published last week state that one option for mitigating risk includes producing procurement guidance for data infrastructure operators. Will the Government publish this before Report? Does the Committee need to ask what procurement guidance for other sectors needs to be included, most notably defence?
Amendment 38, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seeks to carve out from the regime
“Intellectual Property (IP) licences that do not transfer ownership of the asset to the licensee … as the licensor can impose restrictions on the use of the IP.”
It identifies that clarity is needed on how hostile actors may seek to circumvent the provisions of the Bill to acquire important IP or influence the company’s assets that they seek to acquire. This is a difficult area of increasing sophistication. In the Commons deliberations, Charles Parton of the Royal United Services Institute—RUSI—commented:
“On the question of intellectual property rights, China has a very rigorous campaign to get hold of our IP.”
David Petrie from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales remarked:
“It is possible to gain access to intellectual property through means other than ownership, so … that is something that the unit is going to have to assess on a case-by-case basis.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; cols. 12-55.]
I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, but it is not clear how permanent transfers might be defined so as to be workable and worth while, as explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
I thank my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Vaizey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for these amendments. They seek to clarify and reduce the scope of the regime in relation to asset acquisitions. The Government expect that the majority of trigger events of national security interest will be traditional mergers and acquisitions, but the Secretary of State must also be able to intervene in the rare circumstances where acquisitions of individual assets, rather than entities, may raise national security risks. The Bill as drafted provides that land, tangible moveable property and intellectual property fall within scope of the regime as qualifying assets; this has a degree of extraterritorial application.
Amendments 22 and 28 seek to restrict the inclusion of land as a qualifying asset only to land located within one mile of a sensitive site, and to require the Government to create an online checking service to identify land that is regarded as sensitive. Amendment 23 seeks to exclude “business as usual” procurement, such as the purchasing of software licences or standard network equipment, from the definition of a qualifying asset. Amendment 38 aims to ensure that intellectual property licences that do not permanently transfer ownership of the IP to the licensee are not treated as an acquisition of control over that IP.
I will first turn to Amendments 22 and 28. In limited cases, the acquisition of land can give rise to national security concerns, in particular, but not limited to, proximity risks. The UK Government do not publish the location of the sites in the UK that they consider sensitive from a national security perspective. To do so would give rise to risks to national security: it would serve as a directory for hostile actors who wish to acquire land proximate to sensitive sites, as well as actors who wish to harm us in other ways. Acquisitions of land and other assets that do not pose a national security risk can be pursued with no expectation of being called in. Parties who are unsure or believe that the land in question may be proximate to a site where the Secretary of State is likely to have concerns can voluntarily notify and receive clearance if no national security risks arise.
Risks to national security can also arise from acquisitions of control over land more than one mile from a sensitive site. Indeed, the US regime under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, to which my noble friend referred and to which the amendment alludes, includes a limit of more than one mile for some sites. For example, if we are concerned about a hostile party having a good line of sight to a sensitive site, a plot of land sitting atop a hill more than a mile away might still present an excellent view and the associated security risks. Although most land-based risks are expected to relate to proximity to sensitive sites, not all will. In particular, the Secretary of State will be entitled to take into account the intended use of the land, which may be divorced from any proximity concerns.
I will now turn to Amendment 23. Noble Lords are right to argue that, in most cases, there is unlikely to be a risk to national security from the acquisition of control over intellectual property that is generally and widely available on the commercial market, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out. As set out in the draft statement provided for in Clause 3, which was published alongside the Bill, the Secretary of State expects to intervene only very rarely in acquisitions of any assets. The draft statement lists intellectual property in relation to which the Secretary of State expects acquisitions to be more likely to give rise to national security risks, although this does not include intellectual property that is easily available.
Turning to the detail of the amendment, there is no generally recognised definition of an asset being
“generally and widely available on the commercial market”.
For example, it does not specify where or to whom the asset should be available. It may be that certain intellectual property is in general widely available but is not generally or widely available to certain parties. We may wish to ensure that those parties continue to struggle to access that intellectual property.
I now turn to Amendment 38. As currently drafted, an acquisition of control over intellectual property does not require the acquirer to gain ownership of that IP. This is because acquisitions of control over intellectual property, where the asset is being licensed on a non-permanent basis, can still give rise to national security concerns. Such an exemption could allow hostile parties to use licensing arrangements to avoid the regime, for example by leasing intellectual property for an arbitrarily long period of time rather than buying it.
Temporary access to sensitive intellectual property may, for example, also allow a hostile party to copy and transfer abroad parts of it. Of course, the licensor may have some level of control over the use of its intellectual property, and any assessment of a possible risk to national security would take this into account. However, in the same way that there is no guarantee that a party selling sensitive intellectual property would ensure that the sale does not give rise to national security risks, there is also no guarantee that a party licensing intellectual property would do so.
By way of conclusion, I appreciate that these amendments are motivated by a desire to limit how assets are covered by the regime without adversely affecting the Secretary of State’s ability to protect national security. They would effectively limit the scope, but they would also inadvertently expose our national security to additional risk, which I have confidence is not the aim of my noble friend. In answer to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, about how many notifications we expect to arise from procurements, the number is expected to be very low, and we will indeed publish guidance on those procurements.
For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I will call the noble Baroness first.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
I have one comment and one question. My comment is that I understand everything the Minister said and I broadly agree, but I think the Government underestimate the amount of licensing they might find has to be reported, because licensing is the new sale. That is the way everything is going: there is no outright purchase of anything any more; everything is licensed, whether the programmes you use on your computer or anything else. Indeed, accounting standards even drive towards that kind of model because in some instances it becomes increasingly difficult to fit true sales into the new IFRS. I cite IFRS 15 as an example.
I meant to ask my question, but I spoke a bit too spontaneously to remember it. I am interested in follow-on activities. If, for example, you have a clearance on an investment into, say, some university research but that also encompasses a right to have a licence, would that licence to the same organisation automatically be cleared if the investment has been cleared or would you have to go round the loop again? You could apply the same to any assignment of a licence: if it is assigned to an essentially similar kind of business and a previous notification has not resulted in a clearing, can you be confident that you do not have to notify again on the basis of such a previous clearance?
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
The noble Baroness makes some very good points—I am conscious of her much greater knowledge of this area than I have—particularly the point she makes about licensing being the new sale. I am pretty confident that we have taken these points into consideration. On her specific point about whether investments would be cleared, the true answer is that every notification would be counted separately.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I bow to my noble friend’s much superior knowledge on intellectual property issues. I entirely agree with her. That is a good reason for keeping provisions about intellectual property broadly speaking as they are. My noble friend pointed out to me that nowadays even Rolls-Royce engines are licensed as opposed to sold, because so much data is given off by their operation. That is proprietary in itself. So it is very difficult to distinguish between an outright sale and a licence in commercial life.
I wanted to come back because I did not think that the Minister was quite positive enough on Amendment 23 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey. I laughed out loud; that particular response was like an episode of “Yes Minister” because it tried to draw distinctions that were not particularly helpful in the circumstances. Somebody was being extremely clever when they put the paragraph together, but I do not think it pushes back the argument why that day-to-day type of software —that sort of absolutely bog-standard commercial licence equipment—should be captured in the definition of a qualifying asset. I will look very carefully at that very well-crafted paragraph again before Report.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
I am grateful for those comments. They will be noted.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, I would never put my noble friend the Minister in the same paragraph as “Yes Minister”. She is a far classier act than that and a wonderful and effective force in your Lordships’ House. But, in a hesitant fashion, I will say that, when listening to the Government’s response, my concerns continued to grow. It seems that their position, which is perhaps understandable, is that they have crafted a Bill that covers every conceivable transaction. Then they will see how it works in practice, over the next couple of years, and gradually narrow it down. That was the tone of the response that I got from my noble friend Lord Callanan. When my noble friend Lady Bloomfield was responding, I began to wonder whether the sale of an iPhone to a Chinese government official in a phone shop in Westfield in Shepherd’s Bush would count as a transaction.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment tightens the scope of the trigger event so that it does not capture minority investor veto rights that would not give rise to national security concerns.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 29, I shall speak also to Amendment 72. They take us back to some of the issues touched on in our earlier debate on the group beginning with Amendment 15A, and the way that control is exercised in companies and what it means. These two amendments are designed to tease out and provide clarity and protection for third-party investors, who may find that they have invested in a company that, in turn, has been caught up in the provisions of the Bill. I seek the Government’s explanation for how this will work.
Amendment 29 amends Clause 8, “Control of entities”. There is concern about the clause arising from the wide definition of control contained in subsection (6). The real background is as follows. Investments in unquoted companies are normally governed by an investment agreement. When all goes well and the investment performs as expected, the investment agreement remains in a drawer and is never looked at but, sadly, not all investments perform as hoped, and not all directors and managers behave impeccably. Investors need protection against egregious behaviour by company managements.
What form could such behaviours take? It could be a proposal to make an acquisition—not one involving national security issues—the size of which would put the original company at risk if it were to go wrong. It could be a decision to spend a large sum of capital on a scheme that is ill thought out and ill considered, potentially putting the entire venture at risk. It might be a decision by the management to award themselves large salary increases. It might be a decision to recruit to a senior position in the company someone who has a public reputation that is not impeccable or who is perhaps related to one of the existing management team. For obvious reasons, investors need special protection against such behaviours and, as a last resort, the power to block them. It is not clear whether the existence of such blocking powers could bring the company within the control of entities provisions of Clause 8.
These protections for investors have nothing to do with national security; they are concerned with corporate governance and behaviour. An inability to allow those protections will surely be a significant disincentive to third-party investors, so Amendment 29 provides clarity that such protections will not be caught by the Bill. The arguments I have just rehearsed lie behind Amendment 72, which amends Clause 26—“Final orders and final notifications”. It seeks to make it clear that any unwinding or divestment order made by the Secretary of State in no way undermines investor rights of the sort I have been describing. I beg to move.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I shall refer only to Amendment 30, in my name, in this group. Earlier, we discussed the question of material influence. At this point in Clause 8, the fourth case to which we referred—the control of an entity—is, under subsections (8) and (9), effectively material influence. Looking at this, I could not understand why this bit of Clause 8 did not simply replicate Section 29 of the Enterprise Act, which is concerned with obtaining control by stages. I will not read the whole thing, but it is essentially about where a transaction or, in this case, a series of transactions—I will come back to that point—can be treated as occurring simultaneously, but which enables a person
“directly or indirectly to control or materially to influence the policy”
of the enterprise, or enables that
“person or group of persons to do so to a greater degree”.
We have here different language, and I would like the Minister to kindly explain how it works. I can see that it will be a person together with others, because of course it brings in holding an interest or a right by virtue of Schedule 1—working together with others—so that might be sufficient to say “directly or indirectly”. So, that might be covered by a common purpose, the connected arrangements and so on. But subsection (9), as it qualifies subsection (8), appears to suggest that if somebody already exercises a material influence over an entity, the fact that they increase their material influence by stages is not defined as control, unless it is one of the other cases set out in the clause. I think that is a gap. I think it ought to be included, and the clause ought to be constructed in a manner similar to the way in which the Enterprise Act enables control to be acquired by stages. I am not particularly asking for my drafting to be incorporated, but I invite Ministers to see whether it will be simpler to take out subsections (8) and (9) and insert something drawn from and similar to Section 29 of the Enterprise Act when we come back to this at Report.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it follows from the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who introduced Amendments 29 and 72 so well, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, who has taken us very carefully through subsection (8), that Clause 8 is a strange beast. It is a mixture of the absolutely specific and then the rather vague in its different cases, which contrast extraordinarily. I have signed Amendment 29, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which tries to deal with the vagueness in subsection (6) because the scope of that trigger event—the third case—is very broad and unclear, as he described.
It is not clear precisely what resolutions govern
“the affairs of the entity”
as set out in subsection (6). It could potentially capture typical minority investor veto rights or negative protections, which would not give rise to national security concerns. The amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and supported by me, would narrow the scope, while ensuring that where a person can pass or block resolutions that cover matters akin to those covered by, say, ordinary and special resolutions under the Companies Act 2006, the ability to secure or prevent those resolutions would still be caught—even where the thresholds for passing those resolutions differ from the thresholds for passing ordinary and special resolutions under the Companies Act.
If shareholders of an overseas company can amend the company’s constitution, or wind up the company by passing a resolution with a threshold of 60% of the votes, any shareholder that increases their shareholding from less than 60% to 60% or more will be caught by the third case, if this amendment is accepted. At the moment, that subsection really repays some attention and I very much hope that the Minister will reply positively on this.
Amendment 72, also put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and explained clearly by him, would
“give investors certainty that any divestment or unwinding order will not render their contractual arrangements unenforceable”,
so they could contractually anticipate the consequences of an unwinding order. That is extremely important. If you cannot do that and everything is void, then you cannot make arrangements that stick after the voidness.
A long time ago when I knew some law, I think we talked about severable contracts. One would find that part of a contract was void but provisions that applied to circumstances in which the contract was void, or voided, would still subsist. It is important that those provisions continue after the voiding decision has been made and I very much hope that the Bill can be amended accordingly; otherwise, many companies trying to anticipate its impact will be absolutely confounded. They will have no way through what will be, in any event, a pretty difficult commercial situation.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I put my name down to speak in this group to support my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 97, which he has not spoken to. I shall speak to it in this group anyway in case he had no further intention of speaking to it when it comes up later as we go through the amendments on the Marshalled List.
Amendment 97 would remove former spouses from the list of connected persons who are defined in Schedule 1. I was fairly sure that this was a novel and unwelcome addition to the normal scope of connected persons found in legislation. In my view, it is not a common-sense interpretation of what a connected person is. For example, if I had had a brief marriage in my youth, Schedule 1 would continue to count my long-gone husband as a connected person of mine for ever, which is just not sensible. It also includes former cohabitees, so the possibilities of connected persons seem to be endless.
My view of the definition of connected persons was compatible with tax law, company law and even money laundering rules, but I discovered that this wider definition, extending to former spouses, is in the Insolvency Act 1986, which was a surprise to me. That definition was later picked up by the Pensions Regulator. The fact that precedents have somehow managed to find their way into the statute book or into regulations does not make it right, and I will support my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 97 if he chooses to propose it at some stage in the future.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, it would seem, when looking at Clause 29 and listening to the reasoned arguments of the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Clement-Jones, that the Government would be hard put not to agree with the objectives they set out for this amendment, so I suppose we have to listen to the Minister to hear why the Government think that the Bill already does the things which this amendment seeks to achieve, unless the Minister wants to explain why those objectives are wrong. There is a similar argument to be made about Amendment 72, which is more complex. Again, why would the Government not wish to achieve what this amendment is seeking to achieve? If they do, it is not clear in the Bill.
I dubbed Amendment 97 the Gilbert and Sullivan amendment, because you have the cousins, the sisters and the aunts all lining up in the connected parties list, or perhaps not. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would probably have made a fabulous argument, but in his stead the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, makes very good points.
Coming back to the substantive point about Clause 8, we have had a long debate on the group beginning with Amendment 15A, and a smaller, shorter debate that has focused on similar issues. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones called Clause 8 a hybrid, being both specific and broad. I hope the Minister and the Bill team will take from this that there is work to be done on this clause. It is quite clear from the debate we have had that tightening and clarifying are required to take the Bill into Report. Otherwise, I suspect there will be a lot of recalls coming from the sort of debate we have seen, particularly in the Amendment 15A group, but also, to some extent, from this one.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I am still slightly reeling from having to find names of people long since in my past, but maybe Hansard can piece things together.
We have heard today, both in this group and in others, and in the representations that we have all seen, that there are considerable investor concerns about bits of the Bill, some of which Amendments 29 and 72 in particular seek to address. It is important to recognise, although it has been made clear by people in Committee, that the Bill marks a radical transformation of national security screening for mergers and acquisitions. It is a new and different regime, so it is essential that the Government not only maintain business confidence but gain more confidence from businesses and the investors in them. That was why, on the first day of Committee, we set out why we thought we needed a definition of national security to provide clarity for businesses and investors and to build trust in the regime.
However, as has been said in this group, one of the things that would help that confidence is better drafting. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, is right when he says that more work is needed. I know it is the second day back at school, but it feels as if the homework has been self-marked and now needs a slightly more thorough look. As everyone has said, it is not that anyone has objections to the purpose of the Bill; the concerns are about the wording and perhaps the breadth of its scope.
Clause 8 defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity, thus constituting a trigger event that may be subject to assessment under the regime. This is clearly a key part that must be got right. Amendment 29 would narrow the third circumstance to make sure that it does not capture minority investor veto rights, as has already been mentioned. Perhaps the Minister could clarify whether it is expected that minority investment veto rights would be captured.
The group of amendments raises some broad questions about the number of cases in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity. We are interested in why other cases are not included. We do not necessarily want them included but want to work out the limits that brought certain things to be put in the Bill. It is quite interesting to know what is not there. For example, is an acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security not a concern? It is not mentioned. Neither is a person who becomes a major debt holder and could therefore gain influence over the entity’s operation and policy. Is that not of interest? It is not that I want to include them, but I am really interested in how the definitions were put together. Maybe the Government, either in writing afterwards because it may be more detailed, or in answer today could spell out why these particular cases were selected and the sort of advice that was taken in the selection process.
Amendment 97, which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has discussed, raises the question of why a former partner should remain a person of concern. Probably all of us here have had difficulties with being a politically exposed person, a PEP. We have found it very difficult sometimes just to open or become a signatory to a charity’s accounts because of being a PEP. A number of difficulties were had, but I think they have been got over now after some work in this House. It really did affect those of us who have step-children and former partners and siblings we never see, and things like that.
This issue needs a little more clarification and protection, if you like. No investor or anybody involved in this wants to get caught up by something which they could not have thought at the time was of any interest. I understand that it might look suspicious if somebody divorced their partner two days before to get rid of some assets, but this is a very wide net. Perhaps the Minister can explain why this clause is needed and needs to be drawn quite as widely. This is a net that would catch whales, never mind tiddlers.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I begin by briefly extending my thanks to my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Lansley for tabling the amendments in this group relating to the circumstances determining the control of entities in the Bill, as well as arrangements and the impact of final orders on contracts.
I am conscious of the complexity of some of the matters that we are debating. If I am not able to explain or elucidate these points fully in my comments, I will of course write to noble Lords. I will also be happy to discuss them with noble Lords outside the Committee. Some of these things are quite difficult to get straight across a table like this.
I will start by addressing my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s Amendment 29. For the purposes of the Bill, Clause 8 sets out the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity. It explains the four ways in which control can be gained. Subsection (6) sets out the third trigger event:
“The third case is where the acquisition is of voting rights in the entity that (whether alone or together with other voting rights held by the person) enable the person to secure or prevent the passage of any class of resolution governing the affairs of the entity.”
I think that there is broad support for that concept. However, Amendment 29 seeks to narrow this so that only acquisitions of such voting rights over matters that are equivalent to those which require the passing of ordinary or special resolutions under the Companies Act 2006 would be a trigger event.
I sincerely pay tribute to my noble friend for seeking to ensure that the regime is as reasonable and proportionate as possible. I believe that his intent is very much to seek to exclude acquisitions of minority veto rights from constituting trigger events. However, the Government consider that the Bill already achieves this goal to some extent as subsection (6), which my noble friend seeks to amend, is of course subject to the qualifying provision in subsection (7), which explains how references to voting rights in an entity apply to different sorts of entity.
In the case of an entity that has a share capital, this means voting rights conferred on shareholders to vote at general meetings of the entity on all or substantially all matters. In the case of an entity that does not have a share capital—this is where some complexity arises—this means the voting rights conferred on members to vote at general meetings of the entity on all or substantially all matters. The important words in both cases are
“all or substantially all matters.”
I therefore suggest, with deference to my noble friend, that minority veto rights would be captured by subsection (6) only where such voting rights provide the holder with a right to vote on all or substantially all matters, which perhaps takes it rather beyond the worry that some people had about these minority rights being constrained.
I hope that this puts the mind of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, at rest but, again, if a further discussion is needed to clarify how this works, I would be very happy to hold one. I also hope that the Committee agrees that it is only right that minority veto rights, in circumstances where they really are broad enough to cover all or substantially all matters, should be in scope of the Bill. For all intents and purposes, they are the same as majority rights if they are able to do that.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for Amendment 30 in respect of Clause 8 and the definition of control of entities for the purposes of the Bill. This clause reflects the fact that there are ways of obtaining control over an entity other than just acquiring shares or voting rights at significant thresholds. As part of the new regime—I say without excuse that we have made this embracing because of the importance of national security—the Secretary of State must be able to scrutinise lower stakes of shares and votes or other rights or interests acquired by a person that allow them materially to influence the policy of the entity. This is consistent with the UK’s merger framework, and businesses and investors alike have welcomed our adoption of the familiar material influence concept that they have been accustomed to under the Enterprise Act 2002.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Fox. I first call the noble Lord, Lord Lansley.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, first, I express my warm thanks to my noble friend Lady Noakes, who happily introduced Amendment 97 far better than I would have. I had neglected to notice that we had reached Schedule 1, since we had not even reached the clause that introduced it. Not noticing that was entirely my fault.
If I may, I will go away and read what my noble friend said about Amendment 98, because it is purely a matter of trying to get the drafting right. He may well be correct on that.
On the other two amendments, I kindly ask my noble friend to reflect. The issue about former spouses reflects what is said in Section 127 of the Enterprise Act 2002, but this includes cohabitees, who are not in Section 127, which was subsequently amended to include civil partners. “Associated persons” has turned into “connected persons” and has broadened in ways that nobody told us was a policy.
My other point about the Enterprise Act is that I do not understand what my noble friend is saying. Earlier, he told us that the Government would not issue new guidance about material influence, because the CMA has issued guidance. I have read the CMA’s guidance and it clearly includes reference to obtaining control by stages. Obtaining control by stages, in Section 29 of the Enterprise Act 2002, includes a reference to that
“person or group of persons … materially to influence the policy of … the enterprise … to a greater degree”.
I have not invented this; it is in the Enterprise Act 2002 now. If my noble friend proposes to use the CMA’s guidance and says that everybody is happy that we are using an established understanding of what material influence is, I suggest we go away and look at whether we can use the language and guidance of the Enterprise Act to make it consistent with the practice that people have understood for the best part of 20 years.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank my noble friend very much for those comments. I will reflect on them and communicate with him.
Lord Fox (LD)
This covers similar territory to Amendment 30 and the answer that we were given to it. I will read that carefully, as some of the answers are complex, as the Minister himself said. I ask that the Minister reads his answer carefully because, knowing what he knows from his previous life, there will come a realisation that we are not quite where we should be on this.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for that. I commit to reading the questions and answers carefully to make sure that they match up with each other as far as possible.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
[Inaudible.] I am always slightly nervous when I hear Ministers talk about creating bespoke regimes because it brings to mind the gaps we might inadvertently allow to appear. The length the Minister has had to take to try to explain the way Clause 8 will work—I thank him very much for doing so—indicates that we need to look again at its practical implications. In essence, we are trying to decide whether the shoe pinches and whether it pinches in an unhelpful way. I am not sure that the “substantially all” get-out clause will always work, because in some cases investors will have very substantial rights or protection that might affect substantially all the activities of the company. But that is something one needs to take advice on. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for the trouble and time he has taken to answer the debate. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie
“(10) For the purposes of this section, acquiring a right or interest in, or in relation to, an entity by way of security does not constitute obtaining control over the entity, and any such rights or interests held by way of security do not constitute any of the cases described in this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that transactions are only caught where the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity and would exempt securities or other situations where no effective control is obtained.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 31 and 33, which relate to the continuing debate on Clause 8 and Clause 9 on the control of assets. The effect of Amendment 31 would be to ensure that an event is triggered only where the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity, and it would exempt securities and other situations where no effective control is obtained.
The definition of “control” in Clause 8(1), as has already been said, is framed very widely. It refers to 25%, 50% and 75% shareholding or voting thresholds, which correspond to those applied in the context of the people with significant control regime. Clause 8 also includes provisions adapting the above scenarios to cater for entities that do not have a share capital, such as partnerships.
This should be read alongside Schedule 1, which I suspect the Minister might allude to, which provides for particular cases in which a person is to be treated, for the purposes of the Bill, as holding an interest or right. In particular, paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 states:
“Rights attached to shares held by way of security provided by a person are to be treated as held by that person … where apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in accordance with that person’s instructions, and … where the shares are held in connection with the granting of loans as part of normal business activities and apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in that person’s interests.”
However, this clarification does not fully account for the situation where a lender becomes the registered holder of shares in security, as is the case with the legal mortgage over shares under the law in England and Wales, or a shares pledge under the law of Scotland.
Where the shares in an entity are transferred in security to a lender, the lender may find first that they have gained control of the entity under scenario one, notwithstanding the fact that under the terms of the security actual control remains with the security provider, for example, through the voting rights being exercisable only in accordance with the security provider’s instructions, as envisaged by paragraph 7 in Schedule 1 and that secondly, they would have triggered the second limb of the notifiable acquisition test.
As paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 refers only to:
“Rights attached to shares held by way of security,”
arguably it covers only the rights attaching to shares and not the ownership of the shares themselves—in other words, the rights rather than the ownership. As a legal mortgage over shares is unusual in England and Wales, but a shares pledge is the only way to obtain fixed security over shares under Scots law, this issue disproportionately affects Scots law fixed security over shares; that is, fixed security over shares in Scottish companies. As I have said in previous interventions on this Bill, the importance of the financial services sector and therefore the law of Scotland requires this to be addressed.
Effectively, we are talking about a situation where, for example, a bank providing a loan to a business takes security over shares unrelated to that business. In that context, the bank neither seeks nor exercises control of the shares; similarly if a parent company for example gives security to its bank over the shares of a wholly-owned trading subsidiary. In this case, the parent company retains direct day-to-day control, which would pass to the bank only in the case of default. Yet, as drafted, there is a risk that taking a fixed security over Scottish shares could trigger the provision, which would be highly disadvantageous to the Scottish economy specifically.
Given that a notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void, the Law Society of Scotland argues that paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 should be extended to cater for the situation where shares are held in security by a lender. Paragraph 7 should similarly be extended to carve out security over qualifying assets since the security could be read as giving the security holder rights equivalent to those set out in Section 9. It would be helpful to include an express carve-out that nothing here is triggered simply by the act of holding any asset in security.
The society recognises what the Government are trying to achieve and addresses the situation where the borrower defaults and the terms of the security usually dictate that the asset will be sold. The transaction will therefore form a trigger event in the same way as any other transfer. I guess in rare circumstances, the holder of the security—that is, the lender—might seek to appropriate the asset. However, such appropriation could be caught within the meaning of a trigger event and if it were determined that the lender in question was not a suitable person to acquire ownership and control of the entity, the society considers that it would be possible for the conditions attached to the transfer to stipulate that the new owner would be obliged to sell their shares. They would thus be compensated for the value of their shares and any national security risk would be avoided.
I turn to Amendment 33, which has a similar purpose addressed to assets—namely, to ensure that transactions constitute a trigger event only where the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity and to exempt securities or other situations where no effective control is obtained. Where a lender holds as asset in security that lender may find that it has gained control of that asset, notwithstanding that under the terms of the security actual control remains with the security provider where they are in possession of the security. The second limb of the notifiable acquisition test may be triggered even when no effective control has passed.
Under Scots law, fixed security over incorporeal moveable property, which in English law is intangible property, can be achieved only be transferring the asset to the creditor. This includes, among other things, shares, insurance policies, contractual rights and intellectual property. For those assets where a real right of security can be treated without the transfer of ownership, such as land, a new real right is still being created in favour of the creditor. This right contains certain inherent negative controls—for example, a prohibition on sale—and certain positive controls: often the borrower must insure the property. I think we all know that this is common practice in mortgage arrangements and, as drafted, there is a risk that taking a fixed security over a Scottish asset could trigger this provision and this also would be highly disadvantageous to the Scottish economy.
Taking this into account, it would also be helpful to include an express carve-out, where nothing is triggered by the act of holding any asset. As stated in relation to the previous amendment, provision can be put in place to ensure that the Government’s interests are protected in the event of a default or the transfer of the assets, if triggered in the normal way. As already stated in the context of Amendment 31, such appropriation would be caught within the meaning of the trigger event. Conditions could attach to the transfer to stipulate that the new owner would be obliged to sell the asset; they would be compensated and national security risk avoided.
It appears that the Law Society of Scotland has identified practical issues for financial transactions under Scots law, which these amendments seek to address while fully recognising the Government’s national security objectives. It is a Scots law difference which could affect Scottish banks and Scottish mortgages but does not appear to have been considered in the Bill’s drafting. I hope that the Minister will be able to take this away and confirm whether the Bill needs to be changed in this way to ensure that the Scottish economy does not suffer what could be significant disadvantage as a result. I beg to move.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I have tabled two amendments in this group, Amendments 34 and 35, which I shall now address. Again, they seek to provide clarity on the detailed operation of the Bill. As before, I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the Law Society.
Amendment 34 proposes a clarifying change to Clause 10(2)(b). It is argued that the existing wording of the clause means that any changes of ownership within the group of a company falling into one of the relevant sectors will require a notification. For example, an ultimate parent company might hold an interest in one such company through a wholly-owned subsidiary and, as a result of a decision to reorganise the group, it is decided that the parent should hold the interest directly. The holding company has the shares transferred to it. Any such holdings which are acquired after the commencement date, when the Bill becomes an Act, will have been through the security screening process, so there is surely no need for further consideration of what is essentially a paper transaction.
That leaves us with the question of how to deal with similar intragroup transfers where the initial investment was made before the commencement date. In such cases, of course, no screening will have taken place. Amendment 34 would require such changes to go through the standard notification and approval process.
Amendment 35 again seeks to provide clarity about how the Bill will operate in practice. Applying the current drafting of Clause 10 to a group which has multiple separate entities appears to require each of them to make a separate notification of a potential trigger event. That surely cannot be a sensible approach and, if followed, is likely greatly to increase the bureaucratic burden of form-filling and checking, and be a strain on the ISU. Amendment 35 establishes that, in the case of a corporate group, only one trigger event would arise and only one such notification would therefore be required.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
I speak in support of Amendments 31 and 33. As I have the same brief, I do not intend to speak for long but I support all the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie. I also state that I am a non-practising advocate of the Scottish Bar and a member of the Faculty of Advocates. If my noble friend the Minister is not minded to support the amendments, may I suggest that he meet the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and me—if the noble Lord, as the author of the amendments, is agreeable—and, I hope, representatives from the Law Society of Scotland?
I honestly believe that this is a potential unintended consequence of the Bill, which could seriously disadvantage not just the Scottish legal profession but, more importantly, the financial service sector and financial investment sector in Scotland, which, as the noble Lord said, is sizeable in its contribution to the economy and employment. I endorse everything that he said and congratulate the Law Society of Scotland on bringing this to our attention. My understanding is that if the Bill is enacted as drafted, it could have grievous consequences for Scots law, Scottish practitioners and the financial sector. It behoves the Government to look favourably on the amendments. If not, I hope we can have the earliest possible meeting to discuss these matters in more depth.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am not going to speak for any length on Amendments 31 and 33. I just hope that the Minister has a battery of Scots lawyers advising on these amendments because it sounds as if they could be of huge significance and the issues under Scots law may well have been ignored in the drafting of the Bill. I am looking forward to hearing the Minister’s response, no doubt on advice.
I support, in particular, Amendments 34 and 35, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which he introduced so well. The common factor is that the existing wording of Clause 10(2) appears to catch intragroup investments where an ultimate parent company holds an interest indirectly through a wholly-owned subsidiary and decides to transfer the interest to itself so that it is held directly. Such transactions do not raise new or additional national risks as there is no change in the substantive control. For mandatory filings, as he also described, the initial acquisition will already have been notified and reviewed. Proposed Amendment 34 therefore makes sure that only those transactions where the initial investment took place before the commencement date are caught; they will thus not have been reviewed. Without this provision, each entity within a corporate group would need to make a separate notification for a single trigger event.
Amendment 35 deals with cases where corporate group companies comprise multiple, separate entities because Clause 10, as drafted, also appears to require each entity within the corporate group to make a separate notification for a single trigger event that takes place relating to the group.
These are well-crafted amendments and were well described by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who, as he said, is supported by the Law Society. We have a Law Society group of amendments here relating to England, Wales and Scotland. I am sure that the Minister will have huge pleasure in responding on this group.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I have no new information to bring to the Committee. As we have heard, a number of transactions appear likely to be caught under the Bill which are probably outwith the intention of the authors of the Bill. I think the Minister has to explain why these provisions are in it, rather than noble Lords who tabled amendments having to explain why the provisions should be taken out. We look forward to his explanation of that and, perhaps, his reassurance to the Committee that the Bill is really fit for purpose across the whole of the UK, including for the Scottish legal system.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, with thanks to all noble Lords who have spoken with such knowledge and eloquence on the amendments tabled, I will begin by speaking to Amendments 31 and 33 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering. The noble Lord, supported by my noble friend, clearly raises important questions on the juxtaposition of Scottish law with the powers that we are looking at in this group.
I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for having supported this and, if I may, rather than attempting to deal with these points on the hoof I will take them away. I commit to being in communication with noble Lords as to what needs to be done, if anything, in relation to them. More generally, perhaps putting the important Scottish points on one side for the moment, I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Bill has to work for every part of the United Kingdom.
These amendments concern Clauses 8 and 9 and the circumstances where acquisitions of control of entities and assets take place for the purposes of the Bill. They seek, I believe, to ensure that rights or interests in, or in relation to, entities and assets held by way of security are exempt from the regime, on the understandable basis that lending and debt arrangements do not give rise to control. Let me agree right away with the thrust of the concern expressed by the noble Lord and my noble friend. The Government do not consider that the provision of loans and finance is automatically a national security issue. Indeed, it is part of a healthy business ecosystem which enables businesses to flourish and grow in this country. Lenders need confidence that they can see a return on ordinary debt arrangements to provide that service, which is of course vital to the proper functioning of the economy. But we must recognise that there are, in a small number of cases, national security risks that can be posed through debt. I will come to this in a moment.
Access to finance is crucial for so many businesses and, to grow and succeed, they will often take out loans secured against the very businesses and assets they have fought so hard to build. That is why the Bill allows the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control that take place when lenders exercise their rights over the collateral. The important point is that it is not where the lenders have hypothetical rights but where they exercise their rights over the collateral. This approach is needed because it will prevent hostile actors artificially structuring acquisitions in the form of loans which, following a swift and convenient default—let us put it that way—might otherwise allow them to evade scrutiny. This is a proportionate approach, and one that I am confident will keep finance flowing into UK companies and infrastructure while ensuring that our national security can be protected.
Amendments 34 and 35 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson relate to Clause 10, which, in combination with Schedule 1, sets out various ways in which rights or interests are to be treated, for the purposes of the Bill, as held or acquired. These include indirect holdings whereby, for example, a person holds an interest or right indirectly if that person has a majority stake in an entity that is part of a chain of entities, each of which holds a majority stake in the entity immediately below it, the last company in the chain of which holds the interest or right. That example is relevant because Amendment 34 seeks to ensure that intragroup investments are not covered by Clause 10 and, as a result, Schedule 1 as well.
My interpretation is that my noble friend wishes to prevent internal reorganisations within the same corporate chain of entities from resulting in trigger events by virtue of Schedule 1. I confirm to the Committee that, in the vast majority of cases, that will not have an impact but, depending on the facts of the case, internal reorganisations may be in scope of the Bill. That is because there may be rare cases in which internal reorganisations pose national security risks. That may be true even if the ultimate beneficial owner is the same before and after the trigger event: for example, if there are concerns about changes to the level of control acquired by other links in the chain as a result of the internal reorganisation.
Clause 10(2)(b), which the amendment seeks to amend, is therefore important, because it makes it clear that in circumstances where a person is already treated as holding an interest or right, when something happens that would be regarded as the acquisition of that interest or right by the same person, then it is treated as such.
This means, for example, that an ultimate beneficial owner at the top of a corporate chain transferring existing majority holdings held by entities lower down in the chain to those above them could be a trigger event if it can be regarded as an acquisition by virtue of Schedule 1.
Amendment 35 would insert a new subsection into Clause 10 to provide that only one trigger event arises where more than one person is treated as acquiring an interest or right due to the provisions of Schedule 1. I can clearly see that my noble friend is seeking to help the Government by looking to ensure that the investment security unit is not deluged by duplicate notifications by corporate chains each time a new acquisition is made by an entity towards the bottom of the chain.
I can assure him that we are carefully designing the notification process and forms so that, wherever possible in situations such as these, a single notification providing all the details of the entities in the same corporate structure can be considered together. That is different from his amendment, which would seek to provide in the Bill that only one trigger event takes place. I am afraid that the Government consider that this would introduce ambiguity into the Bill, as it would not make it clear which trigger event is the one which takes place, and which should be discounted.
Hostile actors could try to exploit such a provision to avoid scrutiny by using shell companies at the bottom of long and complex corporate chains to acquire sensitive entities and assets. If only one trigger event is considered to take place by virtue of Schedule 1, the entity immediately above it in the chain could notify the acquisition, while not necessarily disclosing the control acquired by more troubling persons higher up the chain. In these circumstances, the amendment would mean that these could not be treated as separate trigger events, whereas surely they should be.
With the arguments I have outlined and my undertaking to write to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh about the important Scottish matters they raised, I ask that the noble Lord agrees to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and my noble friend Lord Bruce will respond very positively to the Minister’s offer on Amendments 31 and 33.
I must say that on Amendments 34 and 35 the Government are really tying themselves in knots in the way that the mesh—to come back to the Minister’s splendid fishing analogy—is woven in this Bill. This is catching minnows—it is catching transactions such as these intragroup transactions. I will read very carefully what the Minister has to say, but, given the number of fish caught by this that will have to be continuously thrown back in the sea after a period—as we have discussed, one that could be unduly protracted—this really is a catch-all Bill the longer we talk about and debate it. I do not think any of us is particularly comfortable with that in this Committee; we have to find a way of making it more proportionate. That will be the key task of the House as the Bill goes forward.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that comment. Let me take it on the chin and, if I can, answer it.
Some of the hostile actors that we are trying to prevent acquiring sensitive matter are extremely sophisticated and wily. It is not appropriate to go into details, but we know this. We know that they are absolutely capable of structuring transactions to find the most minute loopholes and acquire control of assets that affect our national security. I think we all accept the premise that national security is paramount, and to protect ourselves against these threats we have to have these complex arrangements.
I completely understand noble Lords’ points that some of the things we are describing are complex almost to the point of absurdity. However, they have to be if we are to protect ourselves against these hostile actors. This is key and something that we will have to keep coming back to. It is why it will be so incumbent on the investment security unit to act sensibly and pragmatically. When things have to be notified to catch the important fish—in the noble Lord’s analogy—they will have to be dealt with quickly and moved out; otherwise, we risk circumventing the very thing that we are trying to avoid with this Bill, which is threats to our national security.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
I thank the Minister for his response. Given the detail of the response to the other amendments, I might have hoped that the department would be able to give us a little more detail on Amendments 31 and 33, but I genuinely accept his offer to write. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for her support and suggest that the Minister takes up her offer, on behalf of us both as well as the Law Society of Scotland, to meet to try to find a way through this, because there are clearly some practical concerns about the impact of the Bill as it stands.
These amendments do not seek to undermine the Bill in any way. The concern is that the Bill unintentionally undermines the good working of the legal and financial services sector in Scotland, and it is clear that the Bill needs to take that into account. I accept and appreciate the sincerity of the Minister’s offer, but I suggest that a meeting that includes the Law Society of Scotland would be a more practical way forward than just an exchange of letters. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lansley (Con)
“( ) For the purposes of this Act a person is not to be regarded as gaining control of a qualifying asset to the extent that the use of a qualifying asset is conducted wholly within the activity of a United Kingdom-based higher education or research institution.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would provide a “safe harbour” in relation to assets wholly controlled within UK higher education and research institutes.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, we come to a group that contains just one amendment in my name, Amendment 36, which touches on the issue of higher education. We will, at a later stage, deal with the question of the time taken to review notifications. That is a pretty central issue for higher education, but I do not propose to talk about that in this group.
Judging from the earlier discussion between the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about the meeting to discuss research and higher education interests, I am sure that this is well known to Ministers. The purpose of Amendment 36 is to create a safe harbour for activity undertaken by and maintained within British universities and research institutes. I can perfectly well see the objection to a safe harbour for this activity. It was well illustrated by a report published by my noble friend Lord Johnson of Marylebone and looking at the extent to which there were, in his instance, Chinese interests in university research in this country. Something like 30% of all principal research activity in higher education has Chinese interest somewhere in it.
The point is this: Clause 9, which we have just agreed, extends as structured to the right to use qualifying assets. The breadth of qualifying assets, when one considers them alongside the right to use them, brings in the Lambert report principles, which universities use for research activity. They extend the right to use to their financial, or mostly industrial, sponsors, so a large number of research activities in universities might be the subject of notifications.
I will shorten this debate by saying that, if one does not go down the route of a safe harbour for universities, we need a very positive approach to Amendment 88, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which says that universities need specific, detailed guidance about the circumstances in which they need to make notifications. Otherwise, the number of notifications will be very large and there will be a substantial diversion of activity of the investment security unit away from areas where the risks are greatest to volume activity, where risks are lower.
I know that universities have plenty of experience—I will come on to in the next group of amendments—of working with the Export Control Joint Unit. If they have a similar relationship with and understanding of the requirements when notification is appropriate and when they can avoid voluntary notifications in large numbers, higher education will be able to live with this regime far better than they fear at the moment.
I move Amendment 36, but I encourage the Minister to respond positively to Amendment 88.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, this amendment seeks to ensure that research and development partnerships, such as those that are widely formed between companies and universities to create intellectual property and therefore qualifying assets, are not required to provide notification of the creation of these partnerships. If these partnerships lead to the creation of a qualifying asset, the trigger event should be determined to be the point of creation of the qualifying asset. It would minimise the notification burden on business and industry, and avoid discouraging these important relationships. This is the theme of many of my amendments.
To give your Lordships some background, UK companies are major funders of research and development at British universities across the world. They enter into hundreds, if not thousands, of research agreements every year. Those agreements can be a simple, straightforward funding of a PhD student or major multilateral projects valued at many millions of pounds. Business enterprise R&D represents something like two-thirds of the total, according to the latest figures from the Office for National Statistics. The biggest sectors for business enterprise R&D overlap significantly with the 17 sectors identified in the Bill. For example, computer programming is almost £2 billion, aerospace is almost £2 billion and software development is £1.5 billion.
This business investment, allied with our world-class universities, means that the UK is obviously at the forefront of many of these technologies, from quantum technology to artificial intelligence. The purpose of the research is, of course, to create new technology and new intellectual property that can be used by those British companies to grow British businesses, but at the beginning of any partnership the creation of intellectual property is simply an aspiration. It is certainly not guaranteed.
These projects risk being caught by the same minimal risk issue flagged in other debates on the Bill where companies seek pre-emptively to notify where there is a risk of a trigger event because there is a lack of clarity on this issue. All the amendment seeks to do is to postpone the need to consider notification until such time as the research has been successful, in effect by creating a qualifying asset.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am very pleased to have put my name to all three amendments in this group. Rather like the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, I think that we have to find a way to deal with research and development partnerships in higher education. These are various alternative ways to do that, but whichever one is chosen we must find a constructive way. Having a debate and discussion at this stage is really important.
Although the Bill does not directly reference universities and a great deal depends on the Secretary of State and his statement saying how he will define and use the powers, given the width of the sectors it is clear that there is an intention to catch those partnerships entered into by universities. The Bill’s scope is so wide that it means universities could have to refer a significant proportion of their routine business collaborations for screening.
A key concern is that it is unclear which types of asset transaction should be referred for screening. The proposed definition of assets that should be referred to BEIS is very broad and could cover a significant proportion of what universities might consider run-of-the-mill engagement with businesses, including contract research, consultancy work and collaborative R&D. Elements of the Bill, while introducing measures to protect national security, could have unintended consequences for future investment in UK R&D and could cause BEIS to be overloaded with referrals from the university sector.
Up to 95% of Russell group research contracts grant external partners some form of intellectual property and could therefore be captured by the voluntary regime, given the current broad definition of assets. With uncertainty over definitions, universities will be forced to adopt a cautious approach and therefore will expect to refer a significant proportion of the partnerships that I have mentioned: their contract research, consultancy, and collaborative research projects, including those conducted with British businesses. This will add to lead-in times and create red tape for universities and businesses. That surely cannot be for the benefit of R&D in our universities.
As chair of the governing body of a research-intensive university, I can testify to the fact that protecting sensitive research from hostile foreign actors is now a priority for universities. Universities dedicate significant resource to complying with export control legislation and are now working to implement recommendations arising from last year’s guidance from Universities UK, Managing Risks in Internationalisation. As a result, enhanced due diligence processes have run in parallel to concerted efforts to secure R&D investment from domestic and international businesses. This includes due diligence on risk assessment, international research partnerships, policies and contractual agreements to protect intellectual property and dual-use technologies and export control legislation.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, although I spoke at Second Reading and have lent my name to later amendments, supporting my noble friend Lord West and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, I have to say that most of the content is way over my pay grade. I have learned an awful lot as I have listened to the debate this afternoon.
My position on the Bill is the same as on the CHIS Bill: I am with the Government. I realise that higher education is large and varied but I am not prepared to give it the blind support that I have done in the past. As such, I do not support Amendment 36.
I want to raise three aspects: pay, academic freedom and security, as it is tied to the Bill. The pay of vice-chancellors is out of control and, like the Army, where no general gets the sack for failure, no vice-chancellor walks the plank. That is due to poor governance, so it is not down to a single person. Many salaries are well north of £250,000 a year—some are £500,000 a year—with whopping increases into five figures annually, on top of which there are vast expenses and, sometimes, free accommodation. In the meantime, the so-called world-beaters screw down the staff on flimsy contracts, with pensions constantly under attack. The treatment of students during the pandemic has been appalling, in some cases. It reminds me of what I read about the Victorian mill owners’ treatment of their workers—but the students are the payees, not the employees. The leadership is not world-class, except as in snouts and troughs.
Then we see the negative aspects of academic freedom —that is, its decline—becoming the norm. The Civitas report makes for very disturbing reading. The study of campus censorship over the three years between 2017 and 2020 is grim. It covered all 137 registered universities and 22 variables were assessed. Noble Lords will be pleased to learn that I do not intend to detail them, but the key finding was that only 19 of the 137 universities were considered “the most friendly”. Seventy—that is 51% of them—were not performing well and were classed as “moderately restrictive”, leaving 48 universities, including some of the highest-ranked ones, performing badly on free speech. They were classed as the most restrictive. It would take too long to list them so I shall give just seven examples: St Andrews, Cambridge, Oxford, Liverpool, Exeter, UCL and Imperial College, London. There are more. There is a very strong correlation of them with the high pay of vice-chancellors. The Russell group of world-class universities did not come out very well either: 42% were recorded as “most restrictive”; 54% were “moderately restrictive”; and only one registered Russell group university came out with a “most friendly” score.
Before I come to my final point, it is worth pointing out that your Lordships’ House does not hear much about this aspect of education. The last time I checked, which was about three years ago, there were over 40 university chancellors in your Lordships’ House. That speaks volume.
My final point on why Amendment 36 should not be accepted by the Government is that too many universities are almost subsidiaries of the Chinese Communist Party Ltd. Tom Tugendhat, the chair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, has called for a clamp-down on British university research relationships with China to stop the flow of intelligence secrets. Bloomberg has reported that UK intelligence agencies are concerned about these links and the passing of sensitive information about defence technology from the UK to China. Too much Chinese money is going into UK universities. It is alleged that at least 20 British universities have relationships with 29 Chinese universities with strong ties to the Chinese military, as well as some of China’s largest weapons producers.
Earlier today came the report from the Policy Institute, The China Question. I have not had time to read it all, so I will make just two or three points. In 1990, there were 100 co-authored papers between Chinese and UK universities. By 2000, it was 750. In 2019, there were over 16,000. The report, which I have only glanced at, points out the reliance on significant tuition fee income by UK universities from China, which is used to cross-subsidise research. This creates a strategic dependency and potential vulnerability. We are not managing the risks associated with this aspect of our education and Chinese influence.
In short, it is a sorry tale from higher education. While I support my noble friend Lady Hayter’s Amendment 88, the Government should reject Amendment 36 out of hand.
Lord Fox (LD)
I remind the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that this is a particular Bill designed to do a particular thing. It is not a higher education Bill. While he may feel strongly about many of the issues, I will not comment on them, because they do not fall into the remit of the Bill. I point out that I am also not a university vice-chancellor.
The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, set out the danger, and this was supported by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. If this Bill is used to police these issues, the deluge that will fall on the agency will be huge. We are back to the point that my noble friend made on the previous group: we are creating a Bill that does everything, then the Government will gradually calibrate what they do and do not need to do. That is not the best legislative approach.
There are issues with the research relationships that universities may have, but this Bill is not the policing agency that we should be using for them. I do not 100% agree about the outset of a relationship, as set out by the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, in his and my noble friend’s amendment. Sometimes that has to be looked at, as well as the outcome of that relationship, but I do not think this Bill is the place to do it.
To steal a word that was used earlier and use it differently, we are also looking at the nexus between this and export control. Universities seem much more comfortable with export control, and if there is an issue with universities it could be addressed through the increased and more rigorous use of these measures, not through this Bill.
I return to the point which I asked the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, about last time and which I put to ask the Minister now, what are we seeking to stop? In other words, in putting this Bill together, how many partnership agreements does the Bill team imagine would have been stopped by this process? What sort of things are the Government seeking to arrest, stop or cancel compared to that which the export control regime would be doing anyway?
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, as the Minister knows and as has been said, there is considerable concern in the higher education and research sector about the potential impact of the Bill on research partnerships. We agree with the intention of Amendment 40, which is, as we have heard, to provide clarity for the sector. Indeed, it reflects a recommendation from the Russell group which said that a key concern is that it is unclear which type of asset transactions should be referred for screening. That will cause problems for the group as well as to the unit, which could have simply too many referrals. Amendment 40 is also to ensure that research and development partnerships, such as those between commercial organisations and universities to create new intellectual property and potentially qualifying assets, are not required to provide notification of the creation of such partnerships.
Amendment 88 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, reflects similar concerns. I hope it takes an approach that the Government are able to accept. It would require the Government to publish specific guidance for the HE and research sector, including a clear explanation of asset transactions indicating how contract research, consultancy work and collaborative research and development are affected and how the provisions apply to strategic security partnerships and domestic partners. The amendment also requires—and this is key—the Government to consult the higher education and research sector in a meaningful way in advance of the guidance so that the published guidance reflects what is workable for both sides, particularly in relation to that definition of assets which otherwise could lead to great uncertainty. The amendment therefore is about developing guidance and promoting good practice in that it should be done in co-operation with the sector. I thank my noble friend Lord Rooker and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for their support for this approach. The wording of my amendment may not be perfect, and we could perhaps tweak that on Report, but it will be important to have this in the Bill.
Perhaps the Minister who is about to reply—or may be doing that next week—would indicate the Government’s acceptance of this need for guidance as well as the way of getting it. As the Russell group says, without clear guidance a significant proportion of universities’ routine engagement with British business could be inadvertently captured by the Bill. We are all in favour of that engagement between universities and business. We want to make sure it happens. Any hiccups could delay time-sensitive research deals if the unit was preoccupied with this.
Universities want to help make this Bill work. They acknowledge that there are risks. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I think that the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Rooker about the amount of collaboration with certain countries is key and we must face up to it. I think that the leaders of the universities are aware of that. They want to be part of the solution, so I hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 88.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
Let us try to get this done in five minutes.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Vaizey for tabling these amendments. I will begin with Amendments 36 and 88, which concern the Bill’s effect on higher education. Amendment 36 seeks to exempt from the regime the use of qualifying assets where that use is conducted wholly within the activity of a UK-based higher education or research institution. Amendment 88 seeks to introduce guidance to explain some of the Bill’s provisions in relation to higher education.
First, I intend to provide some general assurance to the Committee about the asset powers under the Bill. There are no asset transactions that must be notified to the Secretary of State as assets are not subject to the mandatory notifiable acquisitions regime. To quote the statement published on introduction, interventions in asset transactions by the Secretary of State are expected only in
“the headline sectors in which national security risks are more likely to arise than in the wider economy”.
The draft statement states more broadly:
“The Secretary of State expects to intervene very rarely in asset transactions.”
In relation to higher education, I assure the Committee that we do not generally expect the acquisition of qualifying assets for exclusive use by UK-based research or higher education institutions to give rise to national security concerns.
Indeed, to go further, the use of assets where there is no acquisition of a right or interest resulting in control over a qualifying asset would not even constitute a trigger event, although my understanding is that Amendment 36 seeks to go wider than this. We do, however, expect national security risks to arise in the higher education and research sectors sometimes. For example, hostile actors could seek to set up a UK-based research organisation and acquire sensitive assets through this vehicle, or enter into some form of agreement with one and gain control over sensitive assets that way. Exempting such acquisitions from the regime would therefore create a notable gap in the Secretary of State’s ability to safeguard national security.
Turning to the likelihood of the Secretary of State calling in acquisitions related to contract research, consultancy work and collaborative research and development, and the request for guidance, I point the noble Baroness to the three levels of risk set out in the draft statement. The intention of the statement is to provide guidance on the expected use of the call-in power by the Secretary of State. The three levels of risk in the statement give a hierarchy of how likely the Secretary of State is to call in an acquisition. The most likely areas of concern are “core areas”, “core activities” and “the wider economy”. Acquisitions in “core areas” are likely to be of most interest to the Secretary of State. “Core activities” are likely to fall within the “core areas” but may also fall outside them. This covers the sectors proposed to be set out in regulations under Clause 6. The Government have consulted on the definitions of the sectors to be covered by Clause 6 and published their response at the beginning of this Committee. “The wider economy” concerns everything else. The Secretary of State considers these areas unlikely to pose risks to national security. Therefore, they are unlikely to be called in under the NSI regime. I am confident that higher education and research institutions will be able to assess their activities and decide in which of these three areas of risk they fall.
I want to take a moment to assure the Committee that BEIS consulted Universities UK, the University Alliance and the Russell group on the national security and investment White Paper, published on 24 July 2018. They were very helpful. Of course, since the introduction of the Bill, as my noble friend Lord Lansley noted, BEIS has continued to engage with a number of research and academic institutions, including the Russell group. The Government very much appreciate the Russell group’s ideas on inclusion for guidance.
Turning to strategic security partnerships and domestic partners, the Bill deals only with acquisitions of control over qualifying entities and assets; it does not regulate these strategic security partnerships specifically. Any acquisitions of control made by such a partnership will be subject to the Bill in the same way as any other qualifying acquisition—namely, the Secretary of State’s likely interest in them is illustrated in the draft statement under Clause 3.
I now turn to Amendment 40 in the names of my noble friend Lord Vaizey and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This amendment concerns Clause 12, which provides supplementary provisions about trigger events, including details about when they take place. The amendment seeks to make it clear that, in relation to the creation or potential creation of a new qualifying asset, a trigger event can take place only upon the creation of that asset.
The Government also consider that acquisitions of control over qualifying assets can take place only from the point of their creation, whether in tangible or intangible form. I reassure the noble Lords that the Bill as drafted provides for that. They will, however, be aware that the Secretary of State’s call-in power applies both to trigger events which have taken place and to those which are “in progress or contemplation”. The point at which a trigger event is in progress or contemplation will clearly depend on the facts of the case, but it could include circumstances where research and development partnerships are agreed, and it is abundantly clear what assets are to be developed and what control the funder will be acquiring over them.
We think that this is the right approach, as the primary focus of this regime is acquisitions of control over existing entities and assets. We cannot hope to know the future and how technology and national security risks might develop in every circumstance, so it is right that control of new assets can occur only once they have been created.
With the arguments I have outlined against the amendments in this group, I ask that noble Lords agree not to press them.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
Before I call the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, to respond, I need to make the Committee aware of the Procedure Committee’s guidance about five hours of sitting, which expired five minutes ago. I do not want to put pressure on the noble Lord to respond on a very detailed debate, but if his response is brief we can probably include it. If not, it might be that the Whip needs to consider moving an adjournment.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I can be brief. I do not think my noble friend really replied to Amendment 88, so I think that we will return to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the reference to Article 9 of the Export Control Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/3231) which was revoked by regulation 4(7) of the Export Control (Amendment)(EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/137).
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
That concludes the Committee’s work this afternoon. I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the Room. I thank very much the broadcasting team and the support team for their assistance.
House of Lords
Arrangement of Business
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)
My Lords, the Hybrid Sitting of the House will now begin. Some Members are here in the Chamber, while others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I ask all Members to respect social distancing. If the capacity of the Chamber is exceeded, I will immediately adjourn the House. Oral Questions will now commence. Please can those asking supplementary questions keep them no longer than 30 seconds and confined to two points. I ask that Ministers’ answers are also brief.
Unemployment: Over-50s
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Haskel
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to address the number of unemployed people over the age of 50.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Stedman-Scott) (Con)
Our Plan for Jobs package provides funding to ensure that more people, including those aged 50 and over, get tailored Jobcentre Plus support to help them find work and build the skills that they need to get into work. As part of the Jobcentre Plus offer for over-50s, we are also providing dedicated support through 50-plus champions and mentoring circles to ensure that they fully benefit from the Plan for Jobs package and existing Jobcentre Plus support.
Lord Haskel (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the Government’s schemes, though, just do not seem to work. One scheme had the worst outturn, with just one in five being successful. In the past 12 months, the number of unemployed over-50s has gone up by a third, which is significantly more than any other group. This is partly because many employers prefer more technologically skilled younger people, who may come cheaper, perhaps with government money. This over-50s group requires specific, updated back-to-work support using their knowledge and experience. Will the Government be much more specific and give them that support?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
I would like to speak to the noble Lord outside the Chamber about the statistics that he raises because they do not resonate with those that I have. I can only say to him that the support that over-50s are getting through the Jobcentre Plus network builds on their existing skills base and is doing everything possible to get them back into the labour market.
Baroness Pitkeathley (Lab) [V]
I am sure that the Minister will know that one in five people over 50 provide unpaid care to a family member or friend. These caring responsibilities have a significant impact on their ability to work, leaving many outside the labour market. Of course, the pandemic has exacerbated this situation. What support can the Government provide to help older carers return to work and juggle work with their caring responsibilities, on which social care so much depends?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
To help and support carers to remain in work or return to work, we have been working with employer organisations, the CIPD, the British Chambers of Commerce and LEPs to host a series of webinars, with content delivered by the business champion for older workers. We absolutely agree with the noble Baroness about the role that carers play. We want flexibility from employers, flexibility in hours and flexibility in the roles that those people can provide.
Baroness Janke (LD) [V]
My Lords, older workers have valuable experience and life skills but are twice as likely as younger workers to be out of work for 12 months or more. What opportunities for financially supported training and education will the Government make available to this age group to enable them to develop their skills and, if necessary, change their career paths?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
Again, the noble Baroness makes an important point about the value that older workers can add to the workforce. The UK Government are investing £2.5 billion in the national skills fund to aid the lifetime skills guarantee. This is a great opportunity for older workers.
Baroness Redfern (Con) [V]
My Lords, the fact is that many people need to work for longer, but workers aged 50-plus still face barriers to accessing work and training. What extra government support is there particularly for smaller and medium-sized businesses to help them to offer employment to older people who are disabled?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
I am pleased to report that the Government have appointed Andy Briggs as business champion for older workers to spearhead the Government’s work to support employers to retain, retrain and recruit older workers, including the disabled.
Baroness Meacher (CB) [V]
My Lords, as the Minister well knows, the over-50s who have lost their jobs during the pandemic are at a serious risk of long-term unemployment, at huge cost to themselves but also to the taxpayer. Have the Government considered creating an over-50s Kickstart scheme—it is an excellent scheme for young people—encouraging employers to create jobs but also providing retraining for older workers who might well benefit from it?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
That is a great idea. I will take it back to the department because I can promise the whole House that our Secretary of State and our team are looking at innovative ways to get people back into work.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab) [V]
My Lords, to build on that, the pandemic has certainly caused job losses for older people and led to people retiring early, or indeed delaying retirement. That hurts those individuals and their families, but it also affects the labour supply and the pensions landscape. It is a big public policy issue. Have Ministers considered developing a focused strategy, with ring-fenced funding and targeted interventions, and perhaps adapted conditionality for older workers?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
In respect of conditionality and targeted support, the work that we are doing through the work coaches is tailored and individual. We are using the conditionality rules as compassionately and sensibly as we can.
Lord Taylor of Goss Moor (LD) [V]
My Lords, as has been indicated, over-50s are twice as likely as the rest of the population to stay unemployed, once unemployed, for more than two years. The truth is, of course, that many never get back into work, partly because there is a sense that taking on an older employee is less valuable, despite their skills and experience. Given that during the pandemic we have seen a much greater increase proportionately in unemployment among the over-50s, there is clearly a risk that many of these people will never return to work. I support the suggestion of the equivalent to the Kickstart programme for over-50s, because we know that the longer you are unemployed at over 50, the more likely it is that you will never return to work.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
As I said, I thought that the idea of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, was excellent. I can only concur with the noble Lord that we should explore that.
Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP) [V]
My Lords, the pandemic has been particularly difficult for older people in terms of job losses. Even in normal times, far too many are out of work well before retirement age. We must do more to acknowledge the contribution to society and the economy of people of all ages, so what more can the Government do to cut out age bias in recruitment and training and to get companies to recognise the importance of age inclusivity?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
This will be part of the important work of the over-50s champion appointed by the Government, Andy Briggs. I reiterate that older workers have skills and experience that employers are looking for. It is up to us to work with employers to encourage and influence them to secure vacancies for older workers.
Baroness Fookes (Con)
My Lords, I spoke only this morning to four distinguished horticulturalists who said that they would warmly welcome people aged over 50 coming into that sector. They, too, mentioned a modified Kickstart scheme, so may I add to the pleas already made?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
Kickstart for older workers: message received and understood. The UK Government are investing £2.5 billion in the national skills fund to aid the lifetime guarantee, we have a free online skills toolkit and the Chancellor’s announcement in July of his Plan for Jobs included an extra £17 million to support 32,000 more vocational training places.
Baroness Wheatcroft (CB) [V]
My Lords, a snapshot by the Institute for Fiscal Studies last year showed that one in four people on furlough were over 50. My concern is that many of those people will not go back into employment again—as we have heard, over-50s are harder to employ. Could we not profitably use the time when people are on furlough to retrain them for the jobs that will be available when we come out of the pandemic properly?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
I am pleased to be able to confirm to the House that, where an employee is on furlough, they can take part in training, volunteer for another employer or organisation or work for another employer if contractually allowed.
Lord Young of Norwood Green (Lab) [V]
My Lords, what efforts are the job coaches and service centres making to assess the current skills of over-50s and to ensure the necessary retraining to enable re-employment? I hope that the House will recognise the enormous efforts being made by job coaches and service centre staff. The system might need some improvement, so the Kickstart idea is a good example.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
I think that I have already covered the issue of reskilling and training. The key to getting people back to work is to have the work coach make an assessment and build an action plan that gets people back to work, along with the efforts that we are making to influence employers. I am grateful to the noble Lord, as will be the whole DWP staff, for his endorsement of their excellent and committed work.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)
My Lords, all supplementary questions have been asked and we now move to the next Question.
World Health Organization: Pandemics
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Crisp
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to strengthen the role of the World Health Organization to support the management of future pandemics.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord Bethell) (Con)
My Lords, the UK is a strong supporter of the WHO and an advocate of reform to ensure that it further strengthens its ability to respond effectively to health emergencies. The UK is taking a leading role on reform through our seat at the WHO Executive Board and our G7 presidency. We are working with international partners to push for a stronger early warning system, reduced risk of zoonotic diseases through better surveillance and improved compliance with international health regulations.
Lord Crisp (CB) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted that the UK Government are providing support to the World Health Organization, contributing to COVAX and taking this very important role of reform. Further to the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response report, which talked about the World Health Organization being
“underpowered to do the job expected of it”,
will the Government ensure that this is discussed at G7 and that the world will commit to doing whatever it takes to ensure that the WHO is able to respond even more effectively to pandemics in the future?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the Government are extremely committed to pandemic preparedness. We support the principle of a pandemic preparedness treaty, and we have laid out at UNGA a very clear programme for enhancing global pandemic preparedness. We look forward to the publication of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response report shortly, and I reassure the noble Lord that this is top of the agenda at our G7.
Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con) [V]
Does the Minister agree that the WHO could support the management of future pandemics now by organising a worldwide vaccine passport? People are very keen to travel, and this would help the travel industry and could act as an incentive to those who are reluctant to take the vaccine.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I share the noble Lord’s passion for international travel. Like him, I cannot wait for global travel to restart. I also see the connection between the promise of a vaccine certificate of some kind and taking up the vaccine itself. Plans for vaccine certificates for global travel are emerging as we speak. We have a Cabinet Office programme which is co-ordinating across government initiatives on vaccine certification, and a review is in progress which will pronounce shortly.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]
[Inaudible]—excellent record in research, are the Government able to work through the WHO to promote research into recyclable PPE to avoid the environmental hazard of an enormous pile-up of plastics and discarded PPE? Can the Government work on a public education programme of basic hygiene, with clean water and soap available across the world, so that the very basic principles of hygiene can be maintained?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the environmental consequences of the pandemic are indeed severe, as the noble Baroness rightly points out. We are working with colleagues in Defra to try to figure out answers to this tricky problem of the legacy of all this PPE. With regards to hygiene education around the world, we have a number of programmes in place, through ODA and our various international development plans, and hygiene is very much at the centre of those.
Lord Judd (Lab) [V]
My Lords, has the pandemic not brought home almost more powerfully than ever before the total interdependence of the global community? Therefore, are the international institutions such as the WHO and other specialised UN agencies the only way that we can have a sane future for society as a whole? We cannot forge that on our own as an island. We played a distinguished part in the role of developing organisations such as the WHO in the past. Can the noble Lord reassure us that it is not just a matter of saying that we have priorities and commitments but of ensuring that the whole culture of government looks towards strengthening international institutions such as the WHO?
Lord Bethell (Con)
I completely agree with the noble Lord. A multilateral approach is at the heart of our response to the pandemic, and I agree that we are not safe here in the UK until the whole world has addressed the question of the pandemic.
Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]
My Lords, the World Health Organization recommends regular handwashing as a critical preventive measure against Covid-19, but 3 billion people worldwide lack access to soap and water at home. The UK’s Hygiene and Behaviour Change Coalition responded to the onset of the pandemic with a £100 million commitment to reach a billion people, but this project is now ending. It is wonderful to have the Government’s support for this project, but will they put their money where their mouth is and continue to fund this vital project?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her tribute to the Hygiene and Behaviour Change Coalition. I cannot offer guarantees from the Dispatch Box on its future funding, but I will inquire about the matter. As the noble Baroness suggests, it sounds like a fascinating and important project.
Viscount Ridley (Con) [V]
My Lords, after last month’s embarrassing Potemkin investigation of Wuhan, will my noble friend the Minister ask the WHO to insist that the Chinese Government release the genome sequences of eight bat viruses of the so-called 7896 clade held in the Wuhan Institute of Virology database that are known to be very closely related to SARS-CoV-2 and may hold critical clues, but which they refuse to release?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, we are extremely hopeful for the IPPPR process, and we have supported the team in its desire to get to the bottom of its investigations. I do not know the specifics of the bat viruses to which my noble friend refers, but I reassure him that the British Government are leaning on the WHO as hard as we possibly can to make the most of this important investigation.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
Given the cuts to the aid budget which have been announced, and given that experience shows that the world’s reaction to pandemics is to panic and then forget—which Covid-19 has cruelly exposed—can the Minister expand on how HMG are going to support the World Health Organization to address the immediate urgent work to fight the pandemic and to build for the future the firepower and structure to better handle an issue of global magnitude under the Government’s current budget constraints?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the financial support of the WHO from the Government is generous, and so is our support of COVAX. When it comes to the WHO, we are looking for stronger horizon scanning and early warning, higher-quality technical guidance that is tailored to different countries and resource settings, and greater co-ordination of governance and activity across the animal, human and environmental interface. This is a really clear manifesto. The Prime Minister has laid it out clearly, and we are using the G7 process to ensure that there is support for it across the G7 countries.
The Earl of Sandwich (CB) [V]
My Lords, do the Government fully recognise that most of the poorest countries, even states such as Vietnam, are still coping without any vaccinations? Does the Minister agree that much more attention must be paid to the support of local health services in the least developed countries? They are easily bypassed when there are major international health campaigns.
Lord Bethell (Con)
The noble Earl refers to the important role that the WHO plays. Of course, we are all frustrated sometimes with our multilateral organisations, but the noble Earl quite rightly alludes to the dependence that many countries have on the advice, counsel and practical support that organisations such as the WHO provide. That is why we want the WHO to step up to its responsibilities, why we have instituted a major reform programme recommendation, and why we are extremely hopeful that the WHO steps up.
Lord Mann (Non-Afl)
Will the WHO have a specific input and a direct voice in the G7 deliberations?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the WHO is not a sitting member of the G7, but we have a representative attending our health track in Oxford, and we have been in dialogue with them directly with our agenda on the G7.
Baroness Browning (Con) [V]
The WHO website officially states that, on 30 January, it declared a public health emergency of international concern. It claims that not many countries took much notice and that it was not until it used the word “pandemic”, on 11 March, five weeks later, that people sat up and took notice. This is clearly unsatisfactory. Will my noble friend do all that he can, as I hope he will, to ensure that the system of notification is improved at the earliest opportunity?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend is right in her chronology, but we want the WHO to continue to learn lessons on how to improve its response to global health emergencies in the early stage. The delay in that global response is something that the WHO needs to learn from.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)
My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed. We now come to the third Oral Question. I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, intends to ask this Question on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Nye.
Women’s Equality
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Nye
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to increase women’s equality globally.
Baroness Crawley (Lab) [V]
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Nye, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in her name on the Order Paper.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)
My Lords, promoting gender equality remains a priority for the Government, including breaking down barriers to girls fulfilling their right to 12 years of quality education. Our leadership on gender equality is even more vital as we work globally to build back better and more inclusively after Covid-19. This year, we are putting gender equality at the heart of our G7 presidency, co-leading the Generation Equality Action Coalition on Gender-Based Violence, hosting the Global Partnership for Education and recognising the importance of gender to be effective in the fight against climate change.
Baroness Crawley (Lab [V])
I thank the Minister for his Answer. However, following the merger of DfID with the FCO, what responsibilities has the FCDO taken forward in standing up for women’s sexual and reproductive rights globally? He will know that in countries such as Nigeria and Brazil having an abortion can carry a heavy jail sentence. Closer to home, in Poland, recent rulings mean much suffering for thousands of women. How is the FCDO challenging such countries through diplomatic, economic and aid channels?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, when others on the world stage challenged the need for action on women’s sexual and reproductive health, the United Kingdom has been proud to defend comprehensive sexual and reproductive health rights, including at the UN Security Council, covering issues such as family planning. These are fundamental to empowerment and the health of girls and women. For example, between 2019 and 2020 alone, UK aid helped over 25 million women and girls access and use modern methods of contraception.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, the Department for International Development had an impressive track record in promoting gender equality globally, thanks in part to its ground-breaking strategic vision for gender equality. Can my noble friend the Minister tell me if the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is committed to that strategic vision and, if not, how will it ensure that supporting women and girls is at the heart of what it does?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I can assure my noble friend that the FCDO has fully committed to retain and build on the strategic vision, using all our diplomatic and development levers. The strategic vision continues to reflect and respond to the UK Government’s ambitions on issues of gender equality, and this will not change. The challenges of advancing girls’ education, sexual reproductive health and women’s political empowerment remain central to our planning.
Lord Singh of Wimbledon (CB) [V]
My Lords, a TUC report on the disproportionate hardship of childcare, home-schooling and often unsociable working hours endured by women in this country during lockdown shows that we have far to go in ensuring fairness to women here. Looking further afield, does the Minister agree that for real progress on equality to be made there is now an urgent need to place negative attitudes to women embedded in religious texts into the very different context of today’s times?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I totally agree with the noble Lord. Those who seek to marginalise women using erroneous interpretations of religious texts or, indeed, other reasons are totally and utterly wrong. We should stand up against the exclusion of women anytime, anywhere.
Baroness Gale (Lab) [V]
Is the Minister aware that the Commission on the Status of Women’s conference will commence on 15 March with the themes of women’s full participation in decision-making in public life, the elimination of violence, achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls? What role are the Government playing in this important global conference and how are they working with the global community to achieve gender equality—goal 5 of the sustainable development goals?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, we are fully engaged in the multilateral sphere, including with the conference that the noble Baroness mentioned. Specifically through our G7 presidency, we have the three pillars of educating girls, empowering women and ending violence against women and girls, which will also ensure the focus of the G7 countries on this important agenda.
Baroness Northover (LD)
My Lords, there can scarcely be anything more important than ensuring that women and girls globally have access to family planning. The noble Lord has said that the UK is a “proud” champion of this. Does he recognise that this will ring hollow if later he has to go beyond saying that no decisions have been made on the budget and then implement swingeing cuts, as in aid to Yemen, as the Government balance the books on the backs of the poor, as Mark Lowcock put it?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, on the issue of the budget, we are genuinely at the moment going through a review, so I cannot make any commitment and it would not be appropriate to do so. However, as I have said, this issue remains an important priority and the legacy of our work in this area is clear.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, malnutrition disproportionately affects girls and, as a result of Covid-19, rates of malnutrition around the world are soaring. Not only does that prevent girls reaching their full potential in school and as adults but it can be fatal, and can often lead to childbirth complications. Can the Minister assure us that, despite the aid cuts, he will continue to prioritise nutrition and take urgent steps to address the global rise in malnutrition among women and girls?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord that I very much share his view on the issue of nutrition, which he rightly articulated. While we invest in empowerment and education, it is important that all girls everywhere receive the care they need, as well as the food they need, to ensure that they can lead productive lives for themselves and their countries.
Baroness Hodgson of Abinger (Con) [V]
My Lords, the Covid-19 pandemic is threatening to turn back the clock on gender equality globally. Nowhere is this worse than in conflict countries. How can we ensure that more funds reach women at the grass roots who are trying to survive and raise their children in those shocking and dangerous situations?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, again, I agree with my noble friend. The Covid-19 pandemic has provided an opportunity to those who wish to suppress girls’ and women’s rights as a means to justify what they are doing. This is totally and utterly wrong, and UK development programming will continue to focus on important priorities such as supporting women’s meaningful participation, girls’ education and—as I said earlier, and as I am sure my noble friend will acknowledge and welcome—protecting girls and women from widespread gender-based violence.
Lord Loomba (CB) [V]
The empowerment of women and gender equality requires strategic interventions at all levels of programming and policymaking. Those levels include reproductive health and economic, educational and political empowerment. Unfortunately, the UK economy has been hit badly by the Covid-19 pandemic and our foreign aid has been reduced accordingly. Can the Minister say if the G7 countries should create a gender equality fund that could be used in developing countries in south Asia, Africa and South America to educate and empower women? This would support SDG 5 and increase gender equality globally.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I have noted the suggestion made by the noble Lord and we will put it to the Gender Equality Advisory Council, which will be headed within the G7 mechanism by my right honourable friend Liz Truss.
Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]
My Lords, is the Minister considering, as an important step towards equality between women and men, the United Kingdom following Uruguay, Namibia, Fiji and Argentina in ratifying International Labour Organization Convention No. 190, which was adopted by the ILO on 21 June 2019? The convention is directed against violence and harassment at work, particularly gender-based violence and harassment, and stresses the importance of a work culture based on mutual respect and the dignity of a human being.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I may write to the noble Lord on this.
Lord Jones of Cheltenham (LD) [V]
How do the Government plan to use their time as president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions to promote the global disarmament agenda, thereby helping nations to provide education for girls?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, we continue to champion the cause of education for girls both in conflict zones and around the world. That will continue to be a priority for the FCDO.
The Lord Bishop of Gloucester [V]
I understand that the Government are investing over £67 million in the What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls programme. What plans do they have to follow the lead set by Australia in developing a national primary prevention framework to tackle the root causes of bias and discrimination against women and girls?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, we have a range of programmes and projects that cover issues of discrimination against women and girls from an early age, including discrimination against their entry into education and their progress into employment. Of course, in conflict-related zones specifically, our initiatives such as the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative reflect the Government’s priorities in this agenda.
Tigray Conflict: Axum
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Alton of Liverpool
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of reports of a massacre at Axum in Tigray, which Amnesty International said may amount to crimes against humanity.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I declare my interest as a vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Eritrea.
The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)
My Lords, we believe that the allegations about human rights violations in the Amnesty report are credible. Over recent weeks, multiple reports, including from Human Rights Watch and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, have begun to document the scale of possible abuses and human rights violations in Tigray. Since the conflict started, the UK has called consistently for an end to the fighting, and I reiterate those calls today, as well as the need for urgent independent investigations into the atrocities in Tigray in order to end impunity.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. With vast numbers of Tigrayans having been displaced and 4 million now facing a manmade famine, reports from Amnesty and Human Rights Watch underline the allegations of crimes against humanity at Axum and allegations of an unfolding genocide. What are we doing to hold those responsible for this to account, including Nobel laureates? Why did we not jointly table last week a resolution with Ireland to the United Nations Security Council, despite China and Russia threatening to block it, along with supporting the international calls there for an immediate withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Tigray? Surely this is a prerequisite to ending the depredations in Tigray.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that the situation in Tigray is dire. Since the conflict began, the UN Security Council has now discussed Ethiopia on four occasions. During the most recent discussions on 4 March, to which he referred, there was a clear consensus that the situation in Ethiopia, particularly the humanitarian situation, was of deep concern. It is regrettable, as he has pointed out, that certain members of the UN Security Council are continuing to block further discussion, and indeed public discussion, in the current sessions. However, we continue to press for actions in this respect.
Lord Triesman (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I welcome what the Minister has said, but obviously there is more to do. Those of us who were involved in trying to negotiate peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea a decade ago are dismayed by the fact that they are now united, but in the suppression of Tigray. Crimes of concern to humanity are being committed every day and it is no accident that there are highly organised and disciplined militaries on both sides. Can the Minister add to his comments about approaches to the United Nations and tell us what we are doing with the African Union, which can often be a very significant force for installing peace? Can he also comment specifically on the fact that many of the leading Tigrayans who have served in the Ethiopian Government have been absolutely vital to the UK’s interests in securing peace in Somalia and the northern Kenyan regions? They are eager to be in places where they no longer fear for their lives. They want to continue with their education and are keen to continue with their charitable work—
The Earl of Courtown (Con)
My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord would curtail his questions and let the Minister answer now.
Lord Triesman (Lab)
I wonder if the Minister would meet me to discuss this.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, on the noble Lord’s first question, there are currently no concerted efforts at dialogue between the conflict parties. Regrettably, while I agree with him that the efforts of the AU are important, they have not picked up yet again. We will continue to call for Eritrean troops to leave, and to work with the AU as well as other partners to ensure peace in Tigray.
The Duke of Montrose (Con) [V]
My Lords, I strongly endorse the comments of the two previous noble Lords. In view of the more than three months of communications blackout, along with continuing reports of the killing and rape of civilians, the destruction of harvests and medical facilities, widespread looting and starvation, do Her Majesty’s Government agree that what has taken place in Axum is almost certainly being repeated across Tigray and that there is enough evidence to suspect that ethnic cleansing is taking place in the province? In the light of the adoption by the UK of the responsibility to protect commitment of the 2005 UN World Summit, including paragraphs 138 and 139, what further steps do Her Majesty’s Government plan to take to secure the protection of the Tigrayan population?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, the situation in Tigray is both challenging and dire, as I have just said. Our most recent efforts have included the formation of a joint humanitarian political team from the British embassy, which on 4 and 5 March visited Mekelle, the capital city of Tigray. The team met the provisional administration of Tigray and humanitarian agencies. Our efforts are both political and humanitarian in this respect.
Lord Chidgey (LD) [V]
The reports that several hundred civilians have been massacred in Axum have been confirmed by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, contrary to the claims of its own Government. However, within the unfettered access that we apparently now have been granted in the region, will the Government press for evidence of the deliberate destruction of crops and intentional starvation? Will this be a test case for the UN special envoy for famine prevention and humanitarian affairs? Finally, what support are the Government giving Ireland, our closest neighbour in this context and a newly elected member of the UN Security Council, in its campaign to raise the situation in Tigray at the council’s meetings?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, on the noble Lord’s final point, we continue to work with Ireland and indeed, on 15 February, the Foreign Secretary spoke with the Irish Foreign Minister. On the issue of unfettered access, unfortunately, while commitments have been made, that is not the case. Access to Tigray remains very challenging even for humanitarian agencies.
Baroness Kennedy of Cradley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the 24 Hours for Tigray global lobby started at noon today and either is hearing or is about to hear from young women discussing the trauma of rape being used as a weapon of war. Given the statements in the Amnesty International report about the extent of this war crime, and with International Women’s Day very much in everyone’s mind, what assurances can the noble Lord provide that the many reports about the alleged rape of women in Tigray as part of the war will be taken up and that there will be justice for them?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, as the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative, I say that this remains a key priority. We are deeply concerned about the credible reports. I was pleased to see the statement from SRSG Pramila Patten showing that teams are already working on the ground collecting evidence to ensure that those who have committed these crimes do not escape punishment.
Lord Grade of Yarmouth (Con) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interest as a founder and current trustee of the Band Aid/Live Aid Trust—hence my interest in the subject. This is clearly a human tragedy. These territories have long been troubled by famine, war, et cetera. What action are the Government considering taking—for example, targeted sanctions, including economic sanctions? There is a lot of talk and discussion, but very little action. Also, does it make complete sense to cut the 0.7% spend on development in the middle of the pandemic, a time when the chair of the G7 should be setting an example? This might help in the region.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, the Government’s response to my noble friend’s second question is already well documented, but I agree that we must ensure change on the ground. He mentioned sanctions and I assure him that we will consider the full range of policy tools at our disposal.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister said that we must stop people acting with impunity in violating human rights. How are we responding to the call by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for an objective independent assessment? Also, how are we working with our allies on the dire humanitarian situation in terms of opening up corridors and getting aid into this very difficult area?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, there is a lot of work being done on the second question that the noble Lord raises, about opening up corridors, but, as I have already said, while declarations have been made, most recently by the Deputy Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the Human Rights Council, including his acceptance that there must be international investigations into allegations, we are yet to see this in practical terms. However, we are working very closely at the HRC, including with the office of the High Commissioner.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, does the Minister share my feeling that these dreadful events at Axum are reminiscent of medieval barbarism, involving as they do the deliberate destruction of crops and the pillaging of the hospital and the pharmacy? What international assistance is available to assist this community to rebuild itself?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, the first step, as I am sure the noble Lord agrees, is to help the thousands of internally displaced people. Getting humanitarian access to them in terms of medical supplies and food remains a key priority. I agree that we should then look at medium-term planning, but that cannot come until there is peace in Tigray. On the issue of crops being destroyed, I also know full well that there are also historic sites. The Axum site was an ancient historic city, rich in traditions of faith and in churches that allegedly have also been plundered. So there is a lot to do on the ground, but the priority must be access to Tigray to ensure that civilians get the support that they urgently need.
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)
My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed.
Arrangement of Business
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
My Lords, the Hybrid Sitting of the House will now resume. I ask Members to respect social distancing.
NHS: Pay
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the assumption set out in the NHS Long Term Plan Implementation Framework, published in June 2019, of a 2.1 per cent pay rise for National Health Service staff in the 2021/22 financial year, what plans they have to review their submission to the NHS Pay Review Body.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord Bethell) (Con)
My Lords, our written evidence to the independent pay review body set out what is affordable. We have increased the size of the NHS workforce over the last decade and have committed a record-setting additional £33.9 billion by 2024-5 for the NHS to meet the rising demand for services. With strides being made in recruitment and retention, an enormous effort is under way to make the NHS a more inclusive and enjoyable place to work, with excellent well-being support for all staff.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the Government say that they cannot afford to give nurses a decent pay rise, yet they have managed to squander billions of pounds on management consultants, fly-by-night companies and friends of Ministers. The long-term plan built in a 2.1% pay rise for NHS staff next year; it was factored into the funding settlement and enshrined in legislation. It is one thing for the PM to be filmed applauding his appreciation for NHS staff, but no amount of clapping will help pay for rising living costs. Does the Minister agree that the Government should reverse this evidence and give staff in the NHS the increase they deserve?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I start by saying how much nursing staff and all healthcare staff are appreciated, not only by the Government but by the entire public. Of course we stand by that appreciation, and there is no way that the Government have anything less than the most enormous amount of appreciation for all those who have committed so much during Covid. On test and trace, I remind the noble Lord that that is an essential service which delivers value for money and, of course, pay increases are recurring and last for a long time. However, the evidence to the pay review body is clear: affordability is a key challenge for the whole country and we wait for the pay body to review that evidence.
Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]
My Lords, last year, at the height of the first lockdown, we on these Benches argued that all NHS and social care staff should receive a one-off payment from the Government as thanks from a grateful nation for their tireless dedication and sacrifice. Not only have they not received this but the Government are now reneging on this year’s pay rise as set out in the NHS 10-year plan. What on earth do the Government plan to do to retain and recruit staff after letting them down so badly?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I am not sure that retention is necessarily the challenge that the noble Baroness suggests. There has in fact been a 26% increase in acceptances to nursing and midwifery courses when compared to last year, and 1,290 more applications were made in 2020 compared to 2019. The truth is that nursing is a challenging job but one that many people want to take up. There is a long queue of people who want these positions because they are rewarding in many different ways. We appreciate the contribution made by nurses and the whole healthcare sector, but there is no disguising the fact that these are attractive jobs, which many people wish to take up.
Lord Balfe (Con)
Does the Minister accept that it was not a 2.1% increase but a 2.1% addition to the bill, which included a number of emoluments that are added each year? It was not 2.1% for everybody; it was a whole package. The Government need to get their case across a bit better, particularly with what the Minister just said about recruitment. I suggest that the Government pay attention to getting their case across. As the Minister said, nursing, with its lifetime pension, is a very attractive proposition at the moment.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the percentages are unbelievably complicated. It is difficult to stand by one single number to represent pay that goes to hundreds of thousands of different nurses under different circumstances. However, I agree completely with my noble friend. What is at stake here is not just one pay rise in one year but the entire package of circumstances in which nurses do their job. We are determined to ensure that that workplace package is as good as it can possibly be. We acknowledge that there are cultural challenges of working in the NHS, which we are fighting hard to improve. We recognise that training opportunities for nurses should be better and we are working hard to improve those. We recognise that nurses have little capacity for holidays, which is why we are recruiting a very large number of new nurses. It is the entire package that we are focused on, which is why we have put forward the affordability argument as we have.
Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab)
My Lords, Ministers have time and again stated that supporting our nurses is a top priority but, as unions have pointed out, an offer that amounts to £3.50 per week looks more like a kick in the teeth than a top priority. I am sure there is one thing we can all agree on: nurses and other healthcare professionals have had to work in some of the most difficult, demanding and dangerous circumstances, and they have done so with astonishing care, compassion and commitment. The Government have got this badly wrong, and I urge them to reconsider their meagre, miserly, measly 1%.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I reject the rhetoric of the noble Lord. We absolutely do support nurses, which is why we are focused on recruitment, training, culture and opportunities. It is not right to think that one pay rise represents the entire and sum contribution to the welfare of nurses. That is the response we get from nurses themselves, what the public understand, and what the Government’s guidelines are about.
Lord Willis of Knaresborough (LD) [V]
My Lords, could you imagine any employer, other than those of the sweatshops of the Far East, seeing their workers perform heroics to save the business and, in the process, the lives of millions of their clients, only to be rewarded by having their wages actually cut? Does the Minister agree with the Health Minister Nadine Dorries, who expressed surprise at the generosity of the Government’s offer, or with the view that a good employer would first offer a substantial bonus to its staff before taking time to negotiate a fair and sensible pay award? If we can pay a bonus to local publicans for sourcing easily obtainable files, surely a bonus to those who have saved our lives should be a no-brainer for this Government.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord on the point about heroics—we appreciate those—but I do not agree that this represents a pay cut. On the broad thrust of the noble Lord’s point, I gently remind him that millions of people are out of work off the back of this pandemic. Lots of people have had an extremely tough time and face a period of unemployment. Nurses are well paid for the job, which is a secure job, and they have other benefits. There are many people in this country who look upon professional jobs in the NHS with some envy; we should not forget that some public sector jobs are, in fact, extremely well-paid.
The Lord Bishop of Worcester
My Lords, I appreciate the immense, unprecedented and unforeseen pressure that the Government are under as they struggle with the devastating effects of the pandemic on public finances. At the same time, as has been noted, we all want to recognise the huge debt of gratitude that we owe to nurses and other health workers. Recognising that would best be done by a pay increase. We are told that a 1% increase is all that can be afforded. Can the Minister comment on whether he thinks tackling the estimated £2 billion lost annually through inefficiencies related to unnecessary A&E attendance and GP consultations might give more wriggle room?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I completely endorse the right reverend Prelate’s point about the heroics of—and the debt that we owe—nurses, but I just cannot agree with him that the best way of recognising the contribution of nurses is to give them a pay increase. That simply is not my experience of workplace engagement. Yes, pay rises are important and a recognition of work done, but there are other, much more important reasons why people work. They work for the status of that role, for the opportunities that it gives them in their life, for the security that it gives them and for the collaboration of working with fellow members of staff. There is a whole package of reasons why people do the work that they do. We live in extremely economically challenging times. It is right that the advice given to the pay review body looks at the entire package, not just at the pay increase.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
The Minister is quite right: it is not just about the 1% rise. A newly qualified nurse will earn £21,000 in 12 months; that is their starting salary. The consultants building the track and trace system, at £7,000 an hour, earn more than that amount in under four hours. Perhaps that will help the Minister understand why so many people are outraged at the proposed 1% so-called pay rise. Will he explain to the House what values and priorities he holds that lead him to believe that the Government’s decision is an acceptable one?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness makes some vivid comparisons on completely incomparable pay differentials. The values that we have are absolutely aligned with public service values. We are determined to create a workplace that is just, fair and equitable. We are committed to giving people a fair reward for the work that they do and to giving people decent job prospects within that role. Those are the values that people go to work for and are motivated by. We need to put together a package that works across the piece and is not narrowly focused on one particular material point, such as pay. I stand by what I said previously: the package of measures that was put in our evidence to the pay review body sees all those values in the round.
Baroness Jolly (LD) [V]
My Lords, for the last 10 years NHS pay has lagged behind inflation. Year on year, health professionals have had less to spend than they had the previous year, and the 1% pay rise does not help as inflation removes any increase. Apart from the moral case put by noble Lords, this is not good economics. If people are paid more, they spend more by putting cash back into the economy. Will the Minister ask the Chancellor to look at this again?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I am at a slight disadvantage because I am not quite sure that I can substantiate the noble Baroness’s view that pay has lagged behind inflation. Her economics lesson is extremely interesting but not one that the Chancellor is necessarily persuaded by. Where she is entirely right is that pay is an important aspect of any recruitment campaign by the NHS, and that is why we have put recruitment at the heart of our commitment to it. That is why we are recruiting 50,000 nurses and making a very large number of GP appointments. We are seeing huge gains in achieving those targets, which reflects the fact that there is not a massive or structural misalignment in our pay arrangements.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the Government paid consultants up to £7,000 a day for advice on test and trace but nurses risking their lives are offered less than £1 a day. Does the Minister agree that this contempt for nurses is disgraceful because a higher award can easily be funded? For example, taxing capital gains in the same way as earned income can generate additional tax revenues of £14 billion a year.
Lord Bethell (Con)
I am grateful for the economics lesson from the noble Lord. I will take those recommendations and pass them on to colleagues at the Treasury.
Lord Scriven (LD) [V]
My Lords, the £37 billion found for the predominantly private sector-led test and trace system equates to spending more than £1 million every day for the next 100 years. How does the Minister reconcile that with the statement that the Government cannot find the money to fund more than a 1% pay increase for front-line NHS staff?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the test and trace system is part of an essential response to a virus pandemic that has shaken the world, and the costs of that pandemic are enormous. I regret them very much and wish with all my heart that we did not have to spend this money on our pandemic response, but there is no other way of cutting the chains of transmission and responding effectively to this awful disease. The ongoing pay arrangements for nurses and doctors are commitments that we will live with for years to come, and there is a difference between the two.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I should declare that my wife works in the NHS. Does the Minister agree with his ministerial colleague Nadine Dorries that the 1% settlement is generous because it is better than a pay freeze? Nurses get maybe 70p a day while billions are wasted on crony contracts and £200,000 is being spent on titivating a Downing Street living room, replacing decorations that are barely three years old. Does the Minister—or the Chancellor, for that matter—have any idea what living on £25,000 a year is really like?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I cannot hide from the noble Lord the fact that across the public sector there is a pay freeze. The only area that that does not apply to is the NHS, a point that I think my colleague made very thoughtfully. I remind the noble Lord that many in the private sector have lost their jobs and prospects altogether and that there is a massive economic challenge on the horizon. We fool ourselves if we close our eyes to that and regard the public sector as somehow sacrosanct and immune to the larger economic challenge.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
With apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, I am afraid the time allowed for this Question has now elapsed. I am going to take a moment or two to allow people who want to escape from the Chamber to do so, and we will resume in a moment or two.
Women’s Health Strategy
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, we welcome this Statement, made yesterday on International Women’s Day. We believe that the six pillars it outlines are important signals of the need to take women’s health very seriously. It is welcome that the Government want to understand the plight of women throughout the country. However, although the Statement says that this strategy is the first of its kind, that is not the case. For example, when the Government launched the women’s mental health task force in 2017, the Minister responsible for mental health at the time, the honourable Member for Thurrock, Jackie Doyle-Price, said:
“This report is a call to action for all providers, commissioners and practitioners across the health care system to drive forward the ethos of trauma- and gender-informed mental health care.”
That is absolutely right, but we have to ask: why are the Government asking exactly the same questions four years later? The three matters that I want to raise with the Minister are: the questions that arise out of the effect of Covid on women’s health and well-being; the troubling matter of breast cancer and sexual health; and the implementation of the recommendations of the Cumberlege report.
Analysis of Covid-19 data from around the world suggests that men make up a higher share than women of reported hospitalisations, intensive care admissions and deaths, but the impacts of the pandemic extend far beyond health outcomes for people who have been infected with the Covid virus. There have also been significant economic impacts from measures adopted to control the spread of the virus, and those have affected women in specific ways. For example, what support can be offered to a woman who experiences baby loss without her partner by her side?
The Statement is right to highlight the fact that black women are four times more likely to die in pregnancy or childbirth. I welcome the launch of the forum but the Government have known about these inequalities for many years. Now we need to see some actual investment and action.
Covid-19 has worsened the mental health crisis among young women in the UK. Before the pandemic, young women aged 16 to 30 had the worst mental health of any age and gender group in the population. In the last 12 months those in this same group have experienced a bigger fall in their mental health than any other. The mental health of teenage girls and young women is now a very serious health issue. This will need some investment and attention in the call for evidence launched yesterday.
I turn to the issue of working mothers and the increase in the burden of care. The Government were quite rightly criticised for their sexist “Stay at home” advert depicting women doing schooling and housework. I am very glad it was withdrawn at short order. But this is the reality of the lockdown in many households with young children. The pandemic has revealed stubbornly persistent gender stereotyping in the division of domestic labour. It has shown that men and women are not equal when it comes to unpaid childcare and housework.
Before the pandemic, women did more than 60% of home childcare. When schools and childcare closed during the first lockdown, they took on roughly the same share of the massively increased burden of additional care. Evidence from the ONS indicates that women have taken on even more of the burden of home-schooling during the 2021 lockdown. Two-thirds of mothers, compared with half of fathers, report that they have personally home-schooled their children. Half of those who have done home-schooling report that this has negatively affected their mental health and well-being.
Looking at older women, before the pandemic, those aged 70 and above enjoyed a relatively high level of mental health compared to the population as a whole. But they have experienced one of the biggest falls, far greater than that of older men. An important factor is of course that older women are likely to experience a higher level of bereavement, since older men have a higher risk of death from Covid-19. We have seen a higher level of grief following deaths, with the inability to say goodbye to loved ones. The cost of grief has received relatively little attention from economists, with some notable exceptions, but it is a very important factor in the mental health of older women in our society. The cost of grief needs to be factored into this inquiry.
Women are still being misdiagnosed in 2021, with male bodies being seen as the default body. There is a huge historical data gap in understanding women’s health needs. It is shocking that women are 50% more likely to be misdiagnosed following a heart attack, simply because their symptoms differ from those of men. The research of the government commission needs to bridge that divide.
I turn to breast cancer specifically. Almost 11,000 women in the UK could be living with undiagnosed breast cancer because of the Covid-19 pandemic, according to new analysis by Breast Cancer Now. It says that 10,700 fewer people were diagnosed with breast cancer between March and December than one would have expected. That data has to be factored into this commission of inquiry.
I turn now to women’s sexual health. Jo’s Cervical Cancer Trust said that
“600,000 tests failed to go ahead in the UK last April and May … in addition to a backlog of 1.5 million appointments missed annually.”
Thousands of IVF cycles were cancelled or postponed in the early stages of the pandemic, with many clinics then facing a backlog of patients. Again, this needs to be factored into this research.
One of the most potent symbols of how the health service fails women is that identified in the report of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, First Do No Harm. It shows decades of women being ignored and dismissed by the medical profession and all of those in it. The report talked of the
“disjointed, siloed, unresponsive and defensive”
health service not adequately recognising the needs of women over decades. Surely the best way to mark International Women’s Day would be to commit to implementing all the recommendations in that report, would it not?
Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]
My Lords, the warm words in this Statement regarding women’s health inequalities are certainly a start, but there is so much to do. Many of us in your Lordships’ House have been working on the Domestic Abuse Bill, where looking at access to health and mental health support for victims—the vast majority of whom are women—has exposed that there is a major problem.
Mental health has been brought into sharp relief, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has already said. But we know that it has been underfunded, and services pre- pandemic were already at breaking point. The pandemic has really exposed these shortcomings. What are the Government going to do to provide that parity of mental health services they committed to in 2015, which women in particular are finding difficult to access?
The Statement talks about women’s experiences of specific services. For pregnancy and maternity support, the pandemic exposed that, for far too long, pregnant women have been isolated and their partners not permitted to be with them. My own niece had a baby during lockdown and was not particularly well. When she went in for her weekly tests, not knowing whether she would have to stay in until the birth, her husband was not allowed into the hospital with her until she was actually in the delivery suite. That caused tension for far too long.
We have also seen that the vital role of health visitors and community nurses, which has been curtailed somewhat, is absolutely evident when they are not there. Community services for young mothers are really important, and I hope the Government will look at that.
The Statement talks a lot about endometriosis. I was diagnosed with endometriosis well over 40 years ago. I am pleased to say that treatment in hospitals has advanced considerably since those days. But what seems not to have changed is diagnosis and referral. I ask the Minister this: what support is there to train all GPs, primary care nurses and employers to recognise when women have these problems? They should not be dismissed as “a bit of a bother” because all women have a problem at that time of the month. It is not just an information issue for women themselves to recognise it. We need the professionals and the business community to understand that endometriosis is a very serious illness.
The Statement notes that
“77% of the NHS workforce and 82% of the social care workforce are women”.
They are absolutely on the front line but too often have been let down. Despite that enormous ratio of women in the workforce, there are still pay gaps—certainly at a higher level. It would be interesting to see the publication of the percentage of male and female staff at each level and for all trusts and CCGs to publish their pay gaps on an annual basis, as we ask large companies to.
We also know that a higher percentage of BAME women were at risk of serious Covid and death. This was particularly amplified for our front-line NHS and social care staff.
I echo the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about caring responsibilities. It is not just about care for children who are home from school. The pandemic has brought into sharp relief the unpaid carers of adult family members. I would like to make a call out, and I hope the Minister will support me: when it is time for every one of us to fill in our census form in 10 days’ time, please will unpaid carers tick the box saying that they are carers? We need to know how many people out there are doing this. We know that the majority of them are women.
The Statement talks about issues facing women with disabilities. Yesterday, it was wonderful to see a series of tweets from disabled women about their lived experiences in our society. Some of it, especially on access to health services, was pretty depressing too.
Women with learning difficulties are also often at the end of the queue for health treatments. Ciara Lawrence, who is a Mencap ambassador, is an absolute shining example of how women with learning difficulties can get access to those services. She went for her cervical smear test a year ago. Since then, she has not only been promoting it among other young women with learning difficulties but is teaching the NHS how to work with women with learning difficulties to encourage and support them to have their tests. Women with learning difficulties also say that access to family planning services can often be harder too. Will the Government make sure that these issues for this group of disabled women are addressed?
The paper refers briefly to LBGT women, who also face particular difficulties in accessing services throughout their adult lives. What will the Government do to reach both these groups? I note that, towards its end, the Statement talks formally about working with women’s organisations, but so much will be missed if women who also have other protected characteristics—and their organisations—are not specifically asked.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord Bethell) (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Brinton, have both made their points incredibly well, and I will not argue the toss about any of them. I completely acknowledge that Covid has hit women harder than men, for all the reasons that the noble Baronesses have given—I could have listed even more. Women who have worked from home have undoubtedly shouldered more of the burden and done more of the teaching, and that has led to adverse mental health outcomes. Those outcomes are a real struggle for a health system to cope with when it is trying to deal with social distancing. We have done our best, using telemedicine to try to bridge the gap, but there is a shortfall and we will have to work extremely hard to catch up. I know from my own experience the challenge that young girls in particular have felt during Covid, and the statistics confirm that.
I agree with the observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about IVF—it has been extremely tough. It has been hard for the HFEA to restart clinics, and there are women for whom the clock is ticking who have no other options. We have worked really hard to try to meet the practicalities of that service but there has been bad news for some people. That is felt very hard indeed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, spoke very movingly about pregnant women whose partners had not been able to be there for the scan. There are sometimes good reasons for that because the scanning equipment may be in the basement of airless diagnostics rooms where social distancing is not possible and the risk assessment is very tough. That does not detract from the fact that that has massive and distressing mental health consequences.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, mentioned baby loss. There are many aspects to this. Bluntly, deaths during Covid hit all of us hard but women in particular. The noble Baroness spoke movingly of making grief an aspect of health planning; that is a good point, well made.
I completely accept the point made by both noble Baronesses that this plays into a long-term problem—it is not isolated or new. The review by my noble friend Lady Cumberlege paints a very clear picture of a defensive and siloed system that does not always do well for women; the culture is not always right and the practicalities do not always suit women’s lives and women’s bodies. The clinical trials regime has too often suited men. I will not defend every point that the noble Baronesses have made but I pay tribute to those who ran the clinical trials for the vaccines and did an enormously good job of recruiting women and getting a gender balance in those very important trials.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is, however, also right about data: too often it is skewed towards men. She mentioned in particular data about LGBT and disabled people and the importance of the census, which I completely endorse. But I know from my own work in the data area that too often our data is skewed away from those who belong to gender, disability or ethnicity minorities. The critical example—the one that is quite rightly often cited—is heart attacks, where the male symptoms are cited and the female symptoms are not. That is such a graphic and good example.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is right to raise pay gaps and representation, as is the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, to cite the treatments for breast and cervical cancers, which have not always met the need.
I will not defend each and every one of these points. I would like to convey, however, the strong sense that we are trying to get one thing right in particular: listening. Anyone who reads the Cumberlege report, or speaks to my noble friend, will be struck by the really powerful testimony of patient groups who said that what agitated them most—more than almost anything else—was the feeling that they were not listened to. That has many effects, but two in particular. One is that we do not hear the symptoms and diagnostics: we get the health recommendations wrong because we were not listening. The emotional consequences of illness are, therefore, amplified. People feel frustrated and agitated because they can tell that they are not being listened to. We are absolutely determined to get that right.
This is a big exercise—bigger than the mental health exercise, because we have opened it up to the general public. We have had a phenomenal response, even in the day that it has been open, with more than 2,000 responses from the general public—a figure that I expect to grow dramatically.
We want to ensure that this exercise rights the wrongs because we really listen to women: we give them a platform and an opportunity to be heard and our response will be judged by whether we have truly listened to what we have been told.
I urge all noble Peers to put their evidence before the commission. We want a really good response that is truly diverse. There is always an anxiety in these situations that the groups with the loudest voice will predominate, but we are determined to make this evidence-gathering as diverse as possible. So I call on all in the Chamber to submit their evidence and encourage and enable those who have something to say to use this opportunity with vigour.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to the 20 minutes allocated for Back-Bench questions. There are 13 questioners and only 20 minutes, so pith is the order of the day.
Lord Farmer (Con)
My Lords, I have constantly argued against the lack of emphasis on prevention in the Domestic Abuse Bill and have been assured that the domestic abuse strategy and guidance will fill that gap. Domestic abuse disproportionately affects women’s mental and physical ill health, so will the new women’s health strategy prioritise its primary prevention, rather than, as usual, simply addressing its terrible harms?
Lord Bethell (Con)
I pay tribute to my noble friend for his campaigning on this important cause. It is not the specific focus of the health strategy but it will play a part in it, and I encourage my noble friend to submit the characteristically detailed evidence, for which he is so well known, to this important evidence-gathering process.
Lord Kakkar (CB) [V]
My Lords, I draw attention to my declared interests. In taking forward an initiative for clinical research as part of their G7 health agenda, how do Her Majesty’s Government propose to ensure alignment of the clinical research regulatory framework so that the approval of innovative devices and therapies is predicated on clinical trial and registry methodologies with appropriate representation of women, including those from ethnic minorities?
Lord Bethell (Con)
The noble Lord makes a really good point. I am not sure whether we have considered the gender aspect of the clinical trials work programme in our G7 agenda. It has been very much about pandemic-preparedness and ensuring that next time we are able to share clinical trial information. Of course, we pat ourselves on the back for our own vaccine clinical trials in the UK, which, I think, have met a new standard for gender representation. He makes a good point, however, about making that case in our G7 work programme, and I will take it back to the department for further consideration.
Baroness Andrews (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the consultation and hearing women speak for themselves. It is very encouraging that there has been such an immediate and very positive reaction. We have known for a very long time that health inequalities affect women specifically and disproportionately, and we can take action without necessarily waiting for the consultation—for example, the 2018 BMA report on women’s health showed that even women’s life expectancy had deteriorated, and it recommended changes in medical training and education. As the Minister says, getting this consultation right is a big challenge, but can he assure me that, however challenging it is, the findings will be heard, followed up, acted on and invested in?
Lord Bethell (Con)
I reassure the noble Baroness that we are committed to getting this right. The Minister of State and Secretary of State are both very committed to this agenda, and the whole healthcare system has tuned in to the importance of getting this right. I pay tribute to some of the fantastic women whom I have worked with during the pandemic at the highest levels of the healthcare system. I will not do a rolling name check now, but I reassure the noble Baroness that there are some phenomenal female leaders at the top of the NHS, social care and science, who will, I am sure, personally drive this agenda forward.
Baroness Jolly (LD) [V]
My Lords, the Statement yesterday addressed “taboos and stigmas” around areas of women’s health, and the greatest of these must be FGM, which was not mentioned yesterday. In the year to March 2020, there were over 6,500 women and girls in whom FGM was identified: that is over 15 women a day that we know about. How do these girls and women fit into the national strategy?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, we are of course drafting the national strategy, and we are collecting evidence on what its priorities should be. Undoubtedly, FGM should be in there; it is the most horrific crime, and it still touches far too many girls’ and women’s lives. I would like to see this country rid of it forever as soon as possible, and I encourage the noble Baroness to submit evidence on that point so that we can move clearly on it.
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth (Con) [V]
My Lords, the Statement rightly identifies the concern of mental health. Given the particular challenges experienced by women in the pandemic, from domestic abuse and disproportionate job losses to increased caring responsibilities, I ask my noble friend to give special focus to this area of research. I also applaud addressing the need for proper representation in the research programme of women from ethnic minorities, including from the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities .
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend touches on two very important points. He is entirely right that mental health has previously been underrepresented in the strategies of our healthcare. I hear loud and clear noble Lords who repeatedly make the case for a greater focus on mental health, and I take that message back to the department as much as I can. I reassure him that mental health will be very much a priority in this area. The two facts—that it is often women who are connected with mental health issues and that it is women who are often overlooked—are probably connected. It is extremely challenging for us to get women from ethnic minorities, for instance those from a Gypsy or Roma background—that is such a good example—fully engaged in our healthcare strategy. If the noble Lord has any suggestions or recommendations for how we can better engage with them, I invite him to submit evidence to the consultation.
Baroness Blackstone (Ind Lab)
My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as chair of the trustees of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. I warmly welcome this Statement, but we know that women’s healthcare is too often fragmented and unco-ordinated. So how will the Government ensure that their different strands of work on women’s health—this strategy, the sexual health strategy and the violence against women and girls strategy—are all properly aligned and based on a life course approach to women’s health, avoiding the creation of even more fragmentation for women?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, the question of fragmentation does not affect women alone; it is a problem across the healthcare system. However, the noble Baroness is entirely right: some of the conditions that afflict women in particular are not properly prioritised, and, therefore, the pathways connected with them are not as developed as they should be. That is the kind of challenge that we wish to address. However, the overall macro point is this question of listening: have we really listened to women—their symptoms, needs and health priorities—or are we behind the curve on that? I suspect that, too often, the health priorities that women would like to see emphasised simply have not been heard by the system.
Lord Wigley (PC) [V]
My Lords, I draw attention to my registered interest as a vice president of Mencap. In presenting this Statement to the House of Commons yesterday, the Minister stressed that the inquiry that the Government is initiating will specifically include disabled women and those with mental health issues—something that I greatly welcome. Will the Minister confirm that this group will also specifically include, in their own right, women who have learning disabilities, because they are disproportionately vulnerable to illnesses that have no relationship to their disabilities, which places them in potential double jeopardy and needs to be addressed in its own right?
Lord Bethell (Con)
Yes, I can reassure the noble Lord that the call for evidence is open to everyone aged 16 and over, which, of course, includes people with disabilities and learning disabilities. The online survey within the call for evidence specifically mentions disabilities throughout, and I reassure the noble Lord that the evidence that we gather with regard to disabilities and learning disabilities will be considered extremely carefully to inform the priorities, content and actions of the strategy.
Lord Lucas (Con) [V]
My Lords, should we be looking at leveraging the great success that we have had in developing online medicine during the pandemic to provide women with unmediated, immediate and direct access to specialist services on chronic issues such as menstruation, menopause problems and so on? After all, this is a structure that we have used successfully for many decades for eyes and teeth, and it is one that might also suit the trans community.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, as Minister for Innovation I favour using technology and the latest techniques wherever possible to provide options and choices for all patients, including women, to address their conditions. With women, the delicate question of their bodies, and the different functioning of their bodies to men’s, is one that the health system has to reconcile itself to. I do not regard technology as a panacea to that central challenge; in fact, I think that many of the issues that women face will require face-to-face consultations, and we remain committed to ensuring that that is an option for everyone.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I will not ask the Minister whether he has read Invisible Women by Caroline Criado Perez—or the medical chapter at least—but, if he has not, I would recommend it. One of the things that it highlights is how many widely and long-used drugs have never been tested for any sex and gender variations in responses. Do the Government have a systematic programme for checking that all drugs have been so appropriately assessed—so that, when the results of this call for evidence are received and acted on, appropriate treatments are available to the newly enlightened medical systems?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I have previously referred to the challenge of gender-comprehensive clinical trials. There is growing evidence that drug prescriptions should be personalised a great deal more than they are, right across the board—not just on a gender basis but on genomic, ethnic, age and weight bases as well. The noble Baroness makes an extremely good point on this. I cannot guarantee that we will retrospectively conduct gender-specific clinical trials on the full library of medicines in the medicine cabinet, but we are keen to aspire to ensuring a future commitment to gender-specific clinical trials going forwards.
Baroness Stroud (Con) [V]
My Lords, in the ministerial foreword to the Women’s Health Strategy, the issue of data gaps has been highlighted. One such data gap I would like the Government to look at is the way in which abortion complication data is gathered. The Minister in the other place confirmed in a recent Written Answer that the only method the department uses to gather this data is via HSA4 forms. Between April and June 2020, from the 23,000 at-home abortions, these forms reported just a single complication, yet FOI requests to just six hospitals during the same period suggested that women were presenting due to complications at a rate five times higher than that reported by the Department of Health and Social Care. Moreover, there were 36 999 calls due to at-home abortion complications every month to the ambulance service. As part of the Women’s Health Strategy, will this gap be addressed, and does the Minister agree that the number of women who present to hospitals due to incomplete abortions requiring surgery or retained products of conception should be collected centrally?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My noble friend makes her case extremely powerfully, and the numbers she cites are extremely persuasive. I do not have a full brief on the treatment of abortion complication statistics at my fingertips, but she alludes to exactly the kind of data gaps that we wish to address in this consultation period and in the emerging strategy. If she would like to submit the evidence she has just described, we will definitely take it on board and use it as part of our strategy-drafting exercise.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, participants in clinical trials for breast and ovarian cancer not only take the medication as part of those clinical trials, whether they are double-blind or whatever, but give information about their genomic background and their ongoing assessments. Would it be possible, subject to their permission, to use that information from women as part of the strategy for updating and improving women’s health?
Lord Bethell (Con)
The noble Baroness is way ahead of me on that extremely specific point. I would be very happy to understand it more clearly, and if she could write to me with the details, I would be happy to take it on board.
Baroness Warsi (Con) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the Statement and particularly its commitment to ensure that all women’s voices are heard in setting out the health strategy, so can my noble friend confirm what platforms will be used to publicise the call for evidence and what languages it will be promoted in? Particularly in communities where the spoken word is more popular than the writing down of experiences, what efforts will be made to allow women to contribute to this call for evidence via face-to-face interviews, albeit virtually?
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, we are largely inviting written submissions from individuals and organisations with expertise in women’s health. It is envisaged that this could largely be done either by individual researchers, royal colleges, think tanks and third sector organisations, as well as the general public. There is an online platform and the online survey accommodates screen reader support, allowing for questions and answers be rendered in other formats, such as spoken language or Braille output. I accept the thrust of my noble friend’s point that we need to do enough to reach ethnic minorities and those from hard-to-reach populations, who should have a voice in this kind of exercise. Let me take that point back to the department and I will write to her accordingly.
Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the Statement and I welcome what the Minister said earlier in response to a question about FGM. I know from the work done in Birmingham hospitals that the problem is probably much wider than any of us appreciate. At the end of this consultation, if the Minister finds that, in some areas where we asked for data, the data was not forthcoming, but we know we ought to seek more data and more information, will he undertake to do so to identify problems where part of the problem is that they are still very much hidden?
Lord Bethell (Con)
This debate is, unfortunately, not the place for me to be able to make that sort of commitment, but I completely take on board the point that the noble Baroness makes. There are hidden crimes in our communities and we cannot sit back and wait for them to present themselves; we have to go and find the evidence in order to meet the challenge. I am sorry to repeat this point, but I invite the noble Baroness to make this point in her evidence to the consultation. It is exactly that kind of insight that we are seeking to elicit, and the strategy is exactly the right platform for us to be able to make those kinds of points.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Noble Lords have taken my call for pith to heart so, now that all questions have been asked, we will take a brief pause to allow the Room to reassemble itself ready for the next business.
Non-Domestic Rating (Lists) (No. 2) Bill
Tuesday 9th March 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Non-Domestic Rating (Lists) Act 2021 View all Non-Domestic Rating (Lists) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 146-R-I Marshalled list for Report - (24 Feb 2021)
The Minister of State, Home Office and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Lord Greenhalgh) (Con)
My Lords, in moving this Motion, I express my thanks to noble Lords for their helpful insights and support throughout the proceedings. I especially thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Pinnock, Lady Bakewell and Lady Thornhill, and the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy, Lord Addington, Lord Shipley, Lord Stunell, Lord Moynihan, Lord Bourne and Lord Thurlow. I also thank the Local Government Association and the Valuation Office Agency for engaging with my officials during the passage of the Bill and, indeed, even before it was introduced in the other place.
Every revaluation requires the co-operation of all stakeholders involved in business rates. I thank the Rating Surveyors’ Association, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and the Institute of Revenues, Rating and Valuation. Their expertise and support have been, and will continue to be, a central part of the revaluation process. Finally, I thank my department’s Bill team—Nick Cooper, Rhys Tomlinson, Nick Pellegrini, Tom Adams and Lee Davies, as well as Sam Loxton in my own private office—for their support throughout this process. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
The Question is that this Bill do now pass. As many as are of that opinion shall say “content”.
I am sorry—I am being too quick this time. I call the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Greenhalgh, for his engagement on the Bill. As always, he was very generous with his time and I have enjoyed working with him. Also, through him, I thank all the officials in his department. Again, they were generous with their time and open in engaging with me.
This is a very small, one-clause Bill, but it raises very important issues and the debates we had were much wider than the one clause itself. We all love our high streets. We love the pubs, cafés and shops we go to and I hope the Minister will take away all the issues we raised in the discussion of the Bill and look at them because, yes, it is great that we can have online deliveries, but getting a box to your front door is not quite the same as going out on a Saturday morning to your favourite café and reading the paper, meeting your friends at the shops and so forth. We have to protect our high streets and all the shops that we all love.
I know that the noble Lord agrees with me on those matters, but we need to make sure that, in the period ahead, we are looking at ways to support our high streets. Yes, they have to evolve, but, equally, we have to make sure that they are still there, delivering for our communities. Our communities thrive only when we can meet each other, and being on a high street and visiting your favourite café or pub to meet your friends is the way it works. However, on that basis, I thank the noble Lord and his officials again for their engagement on the Bill.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
I call the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock. I am back on form now.
Baroness Pinnock (LD) [V]
My Lords, I give my thanks also to the Minister and his officials for the time that was offered for helpful briefings at each stage of the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, it is a very simple Bill just to change the date of revaluations, which start in April this year but come into effect in 2023.
One issue raised during the Bill which we need to keep a watchful brief on is that, because the revaluation is starting this April, with the huge upheaval in market rents due to the pandemic it will be difficult to make assessments of rental value, which could affect the outcome of when businesses start paying in 2023. I hope the Minister can confirm that he will inform the House of any difficulties that arise from the timings of the revaluation.
The other issue discussed during the passage of the Bill, on which there was broad agreement on all sides of the House, was the strategic one about the future of the business rates system. Evidence was provided during all stages of the Bill demonstrating that retailers on the high street were at a huge disadvantage in business rates charged compared to those retailers which were online only. The differential is very large; a small shop in a small town may have a rental value at least five times that of a large online retailer in an out-of-town warehouse.
There is wide concern about the future of our high streets. The vast majority of people want to see the high street retained as a community focus, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has just described. One policy lever available to the Government to provide stimulus to the high street is a fundamental reform of the business rates system. It cannot for ever be put on the “too difficult” pile that the Government must have. Can the Minister provide the House with any timetable for the long-awaited reform of business rates? That would provide some hope to retailers on our high streets that change will come.
With those questions and comments, I look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say.
Lord Thurlow (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a privilege to be asked to make the concluding remarks from the Cross Benches as we complete the passage of this Bill. I congratulate the Minister on steering it through, notwithstanding unsuccessful attempts—certainly from me—to divert the debate down other routes and related avenues. However, it is fair to say that we have been debating this in something of a straitjacket; those of us interested in non-domestic rates had nowhere to turn, try as we might—indeed, try as we did—to draw the failings of the NDR system to the Minister’s attention. He was perfectly within his rights to wear his benign smile throughout—and a tremendous smile it is. Why a straitjacket? Because it is a two-clause Bill, strictly focused on timing alone, to which there were only two amendments; I am aware of the frustrations of at least one other Peer who wished to table one and was unable to do so within the scope of the straitjacket. I congratulate the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Moynihan, on successfully navigating these restrictions and tabling their well-founded amendments, both of which I was happy to support.
There are important implications in changing the dates for compiling the lists to two years’ time; I do not disagree with the principle, but I am concerned that the valuation date for determining rateable value, as we have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, is within weeks. Without rehearsing the valuable and revealing contributions at earlier stages, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that retail and office markets are in crisis. Retail values are in freefall and office values are in pandemic-related confusion as businesses reassess their space occupancy needs. How on earth can the Valuation Office Agency determine rental value in these conditions? I wish it well.
There will inevitably be dramatic reductions in rateable values and a corresponding fall in local authority revenues. Unless the rate poundage is increased, when rates paid could exceed rent, that would be a lightning rod to disaster and a knife to the heart of the small business retail sector in that retail economy. Will the Chancellor continue to support the sector, or could we expect those who do not pay enough to compensate for those who pay too much? I am afraid that, regrettably, the Amazons of this world that do not pay enough will not make up the shortfall.
To conclude, I say to the Minister that I see some light in this dark place I describe. At every stage of the debate in this House, we have had reference to the fundamental review already mentioned. This is the real opportunity to introduce fairness across the landscape of NDR—sadly delayed but vital and urgent. I very much look forward to its publication and the chance for us all to consider it in the shape of a new Bill, no doubt steered by the Minister and his generous smile. I hope, for the sake of the smaller business sector, that it does not arrive too late.
Lord Greenhalgh (Con)
My Lords, this has indeed been a very narrow Bill but a very broad discussion. I thank noble Lords for the many points that have been raised during its passage, particularly in considering how we can support our town centres, especially our high streets, that give such a high quality of life to the residents of our towns and cities.
I point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, that we are very clear that we will ensure that we keep a close eye on the impact of timings as this exercise is carried out and that we intend to look at the future of business rates. However, that is predicated on the fundamental review of business rates taking place later this year. I also assure the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, that, as far as is practical, local authorities’ finance will be protected via the business rates retention scheme and other measures to ensure that there should be no material impact on local authority finances.
A number of issues have been raised, and it has been an important Bill.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
A bit of a longer debate than I anticipated, but a worthy one none the less.
Arrangement of Business
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
My Lords, the Hybrid Sitting of the House will now resume. I ask all Members to respect social distancing.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group, I invite Members, including Members in the Chamber, to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister. I will call Members to speak in the order of request. The groupings are binding. A participant who might wish to press an amendment other than the lead amendment in the group to a Division must give notice in debate or by emailing the clerk. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments, and when putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Chamber only. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the Question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on the group. We will now begin.
Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill
Tuesday 9th March 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill 2019-21 View all Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 147-II(Rev) Revised Second marshalled list for Committee - (9 Mar 2021)
Baroness Massey of Darwen
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the presumption against prosecution only applies after 10 years (instead of 5 years).
Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 1, 2, 9 and 13 in this group. The thrust of these amendments is to provide that the presumption against prosecution applies only after 10 years instead of five years.
First, I thank the Minister for her explanatory letter, which touches on issues raised by these amendments and, of course on the whole Bill. It was a very clear letter, and I know that she is committed to working collaboratively and will be sensitive to concerns, so I look forward to productive sessions.
My noble friend Lord Dubs and I will speak from the perspective of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which last year carried out an inquiry on the Bill and produced a report in October. These amendments today address specific issues but it is worth saying that the committee, informed by expert opinion, had many overarching concerns about the Bill and seeks reassurances. We felt that the Bill creates problems for compatibility with the UK’s international legal obligations and simultaneously does not resolve any of the concerns that are supposedly the rationale for the Bill—that is, repeated MoD investigations.
The committee came to the conclusion that Clauses 1 to 7 could lead to impunity, violate the right to a remedy for genuine victims and undermine the UK’s international obligations to prosecute international crimes. These issues are covered in chapter 3 of the JCHR report. Of course, other noble Lords will speak on these clauses shortly. The Government argue that the Bill merely introduces a presumption against prosecution rather than a statute of limitation. However, there may be difficulties in bringing a prosecution after only five years. The prosecutor must only prosecute in exceptional circumstances; the prosecutor then needs to give “particular weight” to the adverse, or likely adverse effect on the person of conditions suffered during the demands of operations overseas. There may be a situation where a person has been previously investigated and there is no new compelling evidence. Another hurdle is that the consent of the Attorney-General is required.
The Law Society in its written evidence to the committee concluded that the presumption against prosecution creates a “quasi-statute of limitation” which is “unprecedented” in the criminal law and presents a “significant barrier to justice”. As the JCHR report points out, the MoD consultation in 2019 proposed a presumption against prosecution after 10 years; in the Bill, that has been halved to five years. That is a very short time in the circumstances of overseas armed conflict. There are many other practical reasons why a prosecution may not be possible in this time due to the protracted nature of the conflict, unlawful detention of the victim or persistent physical or mental distress. The British Red Cross has pointed out that safe access to evidence in such scenarios is difficult to obtain. Paragraph 64 of our report states:
“At a minimum the presumption against prosecution should be amended so that it does not apply to torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.”
The Minister discusses many of these concerns in her letter and points out that most claims by service personnel are brought within the six-year date of knowledge timeframe. That does not satisfy the concerns of the JCHR, or indeed those of other organisations such as the UN Commission on Human Rights. Other amendments in this group oppose the question that Clauses 1 to 7 stand part of the Bill. The amendments I present here are less drastic but, taken together, they would ensure that the “presumption against prosecution” does not apply until 10 years instead of five years after the day on which the alleged conduct took place. I beg to move.
Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Massey, as a fellow member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I appreciate that this House has a wealth of military experience. I am humbled by the knowledge that there is such experience in the House, and I fully respect the Members who have served so gallantly and at senior levels. I cannot match that, but I did once pay a very brief visit to Afghanistan, to Camp Bastion and Kandahar, during difficult times there, and saw for myself for just a few days the conditions there during a tense period. It hardly qualifies me to be an expert, but it means that I have some strong visual impressions of what the situation there was like.
My noble friend Lady Massey has already spoken to amendments that would have the effect that the presumption against prosecution would apply after 10 years instead of five. My amendment would remove the presumption against prosecution altogether, as recommended by the recent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, although I am bound to say that many of the arguments used in relation to five or 10 years would also apply to removing the presumption altogether.
The Service Prosecuting Authority has been in charge of the prosecution process, and there is no suggestion of excessive or unjustified prosecutions. Indeed, there are already some safeguards. The Service Prosecuting Authority would bring a prosecution only, first, where there was sufficient evidence that the accused committed the offence and, secondly, where the prosecution was in the public interest. These seem to be pretty good safeguards and would prevent vexatious or unfounded prosecutions.
As they stand, Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill would contravene the United Kingdom’s international obligations under international humanitarian law, specifically the law of armed conflict. They could also contravene the United Nations Convention against Torture. There would be the risk of prosecution of our armed forces under the laws of another state and, above all, the risk of prosecution under the terms of the International Criminal Court. That court has the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide perpetrated by UK personnel if the UK is “unwilling or unable” to do so. It would be hazardous in the extreme to pass a Bill with measures in it that would run the risk of our service men and women being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court.
The reputation of our Armed Forces has traditionally been second to none. I am concerned that, all over the world, people are looking at this legislation and wondering whether there is not some constraint on the reputation of our Armed Forces or, indeed, whether that reputation might not suffer through this legislation. I very much hope that, when we come to it, we shall be able to amend the Bill so as to strengthen the position of our Armed Forces, either by getting rid of Clauses 1 to 7 altogether or at least increasing the time period from five to 10 years. I am happy to be a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and our report has set a very good basis for the debate that is to follow.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]
My Lords, I wish to discuss only the question of whether it should be five or 10 years. It has to be remembered that this is in relation to a prosecution, so the only outcome of this is a criminal sanction. It does not of itself do any good to anyone else but, of course, gives a feeling of justice when the sanction is in accordance with what the people who have complained have suffered. Against this, it has to be remembered that the strain that comes with waiting under a dark shadow of a possible prosecution is quite considerable.
I have two experiences that I remember very well in relation to the feeling of strain associated with the possibility of a prosecution. The first was shortly after I became Lord Chancellor, when there was a huge allegation of fraud in relation to a company group. The number of people in the prosecution was quite large. The learned judge who presided decided that the case was too big to be dealt with by a single jury, and therefore decided that a good part of the case should be postponed until the first part had been tried. I received a considerable number of complaints that the pressure of waiting—it was not five years, but it was quite a long time—was sufficient to make it very difficult for people who were ultimately found innocent. The delay is something that has to be taken into account as an addition to the strain on the people involved.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I hope that his concern about delay will be addressed in Amendment 4, to which I commend him, when we come to it.
I was talking to a cousin of mine at the weekend, a retired Army major, about his evacuation as a boy to Devon in the spring of 1944. The fields were crammed with soldiers, he said, until, on one day, they all vanished. I have my own memories of the Royal Welch Fusiliers exercising in the fields around my home before departing as suddenly, some to lose their lives on the beaches of Normandy. We owe the military an enormous debt. In this House, there will be few who did not lose close family members in the conflicts of the 20th century for the defence of our country and for the freedom of Europe and of Asia.
Today, I think there is great sensitivity for the welfare of our Armed Forces and their families, when we have committed our young men to risk their lives in overseas operations when the lifeblood of our country is not at risk at all—where the overseas operations have been for contestable political reasons and no longer, even as in our dubious past, for conquest and empire.
The military depends on discipline and the obeying of lawful orders within a framework of law. When we come later in the year to debate the new Armed Forces Bill, it may surprise many to discover that it is essentially concerned with discipline and military justice. The reason is that it is discipline and the law which enforces it which bind the Armed Forces into an effective arm of the state.
In my professional career, I never prosecuted at court martial. I was always on the defence side, in one instance for an officer but mainly for ordinary soldiers. The stated policy for this Bill, as set out in the Explanatory Notes, is to protect sailors, soldiers and airmen against historic investigations and prosecutions deriving from them. I do not believe that a presumption against prosecution is a protection; I believe that it weakens the bonds of discipline.
What the progenitors of this policy have failed to recognise are the protections which already exist. A soldier is trained to kill and to maim and given the means of so doing. His protection is that he does not commit a criminal offence in the use of violence if he acts in accordance with lawful orders—the lawful commands of his superiors. If he acts without or against those orders, by raping a woman or by shooting a defenceless civilian or a wounded or captured enemy, it surely must be public policy that, if proved, he is to be punished for it. He is also criminally and personally responsible, even if he is acting in obeying an unlawful order; for example, to torture a prisoner for information. But even in that case there is a system of justice, which we have developed over centuries, which is specifically designed to protect him.
He will know that the decision to prosecute will rest in the hands of an independent Director of Service Prosecutions. All the successive holders of that office will have to have demonstrated—to use the words of the Explanatory Notes—
“proper regard to the challenging context”
and the mitigating factors specified in the Bill. It is the DSP who is charged with considering the service interest and the public interest.
Further, a defendant soldier will not appear before the ordinary civilian jury, far removed from the stresses and strains of the battlefield, but before a panel of responsible and experienced officers and warrant officers who will have personal knowledge of the exigencies of the service and will take those matters into account. The soldiers who were engaged in the torture of Baha Mousa and those detained with him were acting under the unlawful orders of the corporal in charge. He pleaded guilty to a war crime, but they were all acquitted of murder or neglect of duty. A civil jury might have taken a different view.
Of course, the Government say that, if there is evidence of serious criminal acts, the presumption does not prevent a prosecution entirely, nor does the requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General—I shall say more on those topics later in this Committee. So what is the presumption and the seriousness of a crime which will rebut it? Is it a presumption against prosecution for stealing the mess funds in Iraq 10 years ago or, as in the current trial at Bulford, for claiming school fees as legitimate expenses? Of course not. If, as the former Judge Advocate-General, Jeff Blackett, has publicly stated, there have been only eight trials of serious crime in relation to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which of these would this presumption have operated to prevent a prosecution? Would it have been in the case of Sergeant Blackman, who only subsequent to his court marital admitted on appeal having deliberately shot under stress a captured and wounded man? Would it have prevented the prosecution of the eight soldiers and three officers in the Baha Mousa case? If it would, there are a number of consequences.
First, the use of the presumption would be a violation of the spirit of the laws of this country which maintain coherence and discipline in our Armed Forces. There is nothing in the statute law since 1661 or in the Articles of War which followed which talks about a presumption against prosecution. The law and the values it represents protect our military, and those who speak of the dangers of “lawfare” know not of what they speak.
Secondly, it would violate the laws of war which exist internationally to temper the brutality and the devastation which are the inevitable consequences of armed conflict.
Thirdly, it would invite the investigation and punishment of British soldiers by the International Criminal Court. That court has, by treaty, investigatory powers and jurisdiction for criminal offences committed by the British Armed Forces. I suspect that its prosecutors are eager to demonstrate that the values and standards which are the core reason for the court’s existence are not designed simply for Slavic generals or African despots but are universal. Picture Parliament Square if a British squaddie or officer stands trial in The Hague. This Prime Minister would undoubtedly break the treaty.
Fourthly, it inhibits investigations. That is the barely concealed motivation for the triple lock in the Bill. I challenge the Minister to deny it. I shall discuss the difficulties of investigating overseas actions later but, with limited resources, why would an investigator undertake an expensive and time-consuming investigation if his report had to mount the hurdles of a presumption against acting on his report by the prosecutors and the fiat of the Attorney-General?
Fifthly—and we shall discuss this in the context of derogation from the Human Rights Act—it is a signal to an enemy or an insurgent that they need show no restraint in torturing or killing captured British soldiers in precisely the same way. Show me the Minister of Defence who is prepared to dispatch troops who are exposed, by the very legislation that we are considering today, to retaliatory risks such as these.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, I have some significant concerns over the Bill, but I confess that I am puzzled by Amendment 1 and those other amendments directly associated with it.
A proposal to extend the timescale for the application of the provisions within Part 1 of the Bill from five years to 10 years must surely be based on some perceived shortcoming associated with the lesser period that would be remedied by the substitution of the longer one, but what is that relative shortcoming? I start by accepting the Government’s assertion that there is no significant legal watershed involved in the proposed limitation. After that period, prosecutors will need to take account of the various considerations set out in the Bill but, as was generally conceded at Second Reading, a competent prosecutor would take account of those considerations even if the case arose before the expiry of the five-year period.
If this be so, arguments that defendants would try to defeat investigations by delaying them beyond the five-year period, or that those who had been rendered physically or mentally unable to begin such proceedings until after the expiry of that period would be denied justice, must surely rest on the presumption that the prosecuting authority is incompetent or biased. In that case, no proceedings would be safe, whenever initiated.
Similarly, the argument that the Attorney-General would act politically—for which I read “improperly”—regarding his or her responsibilities calls into question an important part of our entire legal structure. That would raise serious constitutional issues that went well beyond the scope of this Bill. It has also been suggested that it might be difficult to gather adequate evidence within a five-year period, particularly if the relevant conflict was still ongoing. That may well be true, but it might also be difficult to gather satisfactory evidence after the passage of many years. There is a need for balance here.
All this raises the question of whether there is any substantive benefit to be gained by defining a time period at all. The Government say that there is value in codifying the requirement in the way that they propose. If that is the case, why not codify it so that it applies to all potential prosecutions, no matter what timescale is involved? However, that is not what this amendment seeks to achieve, and it is to this amendment that I speak. Assuming that there must be a timescale, a five-year period is a reasonable span to choose in preference to any other. The Government’s position appears to be that one of the main purposes of the Bill is to reassure serving personnel that they will have a significantly reduced risk of being left exposed to prolonged, repeated, and mischievous accusations. If so, a period of 10 years would go a long way towards defeating that purpose. Although 10 years may not be for ever, it will seem like it to those who undergo such risks. I very much doubt that they would take any real comfort from such a provision.
Amendment 1 may be a way of neutering Part 1 to such an extent as to render it largely meaningless. If so, surely the various questions on clause stand part in the group are a better way of achieving this, although that would be to reject a Bill that has already been passed by the other place. Some might in this instance wish that we could, but they must consider whether we should.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. Part 1 of the Bill creates a presumption against prosecution after five years, and factors are spelled out in the Bill which require consideration before any later prosecution. I would have thought that those factors would in any event form part of any decision on whether to prosecute, but I have no difficulty with them being put on the face of the Bill. What is important to stress is that this part of the Bill does not give impunity to our Armed Forces, nor does it explicitly deal with the real problem that has faced them, particularly after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—namely, investigations and reinvestigations many years after the events.
This group seeks, among other things, to remove Part 1 from the Bill entirely, whereas the amendments in groups 2 and 3 at least attempt to amend and not wreck this part of the Bill. The reasons given for this drastic approach are the effect on our international reputation and, in particular, the risk that the International Criminal Court will or might become involved in circumstances where prosecutions would normally be left to our authorities. I am not at all convinced about the reality of this risk. Is it really suggested that if genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, as defined by Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome statute, were discovered five years after the original offences, they would not result in a prosecution? Nothing in this Bill would prevent one.
I hope that noble Lords who seek the removal of this part of the Bill have read the evidence that Major Bob Campbell gave to the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons. He said of the Bill that the principle of attempting to improve the lot of veterans and service personnel was welcomed, and that
“if the Bill were to be squashed it would send a very depressing message to the veterans community—probably one that has been felt quite harshly by the Northern Ireland veterans—that we are not important enough to get any type of assistance when facing legal assault.”
Major Bob Campbell was investigated and reinvestigated 11 times in relation to the same incident over 17 years. His view was that if the Bill had been enforced, his torment would at least have ended in 2009. Whether or not he is right about that, it is important to pay attention to his answers. When asked about the danger of the ICC becoming involved, he told the Committee that he had been repeatedly informed that if IHAT—which noble Lords will know about—was in anyway interfered with, the International Criminal Court would “swoop in” and
“clamp us in leg irons and we would all be off to the Hague.”
About ICC involvement, Major Campbell said:
“I decided to test that theory, and I wrote to the chief prosecutor of the ICC, Ms Bensouda, asking in exasperation whether I, SO71 and SO72 could surrender ourselves to the ICC rather than go through several more appalling years at the hands of the Ministry of Defence. Ms Bensouda responded that our allegation does not fall within her remit, because her job is not to prosecute individual soldiers; her job is to prosecute commanders and policy makers for the most grave crimes. In her orbit, manslaughter, which is what I was accused of, is not a war crime. It is a domestic crime—a regular crime, as opposed to what she would normally deal with. I reported that rejection to the Ministry of Defence, which continued to repeat that the ICC would fall in.
The second point I would make is what would be so terrible about the ICC being involved? We kept getting told that the ICC has a bit of scrutiny over IHAT and is keeping a very close eye on it. Personally, I do not have a problem with that. Like I said, the ICC was not going to ruin our careers, the ICC was not going to harass our families, and the ICC was not going to go and bully soldiers who had left the Army for a witness statement—not even a suspect’s. The ICC would conduct itself professionally, and it would have no incentive—no financial incentive—to drag things out for years, like Red Snapper, which provided most of the detectives to IHAT, did. Finally, the ICC would probably not use the investigative technique that IHAT used, which was to pay Phil Shiner’s gofer to be the go-between between them and witnesses because IHAT was too scared to go to Iraq.”
He continued:
“So regarding the whole spectre of the ICC, first, I do not find it remotely as scary as people make it out to be and, secondly, it is completely false, because I attempted, with my two soldiers, to surrender ourselves in order to spare us another several years of the MOD fannying about, and the offer was refused. So to answer your question, I do not see that as an issue at all.
What I would say, though, is that I think I understand why the Government would be reluctant for the ICC to be involved, because the scrutiny would not be on Tommy Atkins; the scrutiny would be on General Atkins and Minister Atkins.”—[Official Report, Commons, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Committee, 6/10/20; cols. 27-28.]
This part of the Bill is not a panacea. It does not of itself prevent investigations or reinvestigations, but it is something which will be welcomed by our own forces. I respectfully suggest that the spectre of the ICC as a reason for wrecking this part of the Bill is unsound. I invite noble Lords who have quite rightly emphasised their respect for our Armed Forces to look soldiers like Major Bob Campbell in the eye and say to them that these provisions are entirely inappropriate and would damage our international reputation. I strongly oppose all these amendments.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I support Amendments 1 and 2. As I did not take part at Second Reading, I must resist the temptation to cover a whole range of subjects in my contribution to this debate.
As an old Defence Minister, and, indeed, an old soldier who served in Germany as an infantry subaltern and was involved in courts martial there, I broadly welcome the aims of the Bill to introduce a measure of protection against unfounded claims against military personnel, some of which go back many years. I deprecate the cottage industry in the growth of claims.
Let me say immediately that when there is wrongdoing, no person is above the law. Torture is a typical example where we should never propose exemption. I have argued before at the annual conferences of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Cape Town and, more recently, in St Petersburg to persuade all countries to accept the need to ensure that there is no exemption for this offence.
As a law officer, I played a very small part in encouraging the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under Robin Cook to create the International Criminal Court. As John Healey MP said in the other place on Third Reading of the Bill, the risks of
“British troops being dragged before”—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/20; col. 277.]
the ICC are there. There may be an argument about this, but that is what he said and we should always bear it in mind. Perhaps the Minister could give an assurance on that very point of what—if any—the dangers are of going before the ICC.
The wise words of Professor Michael Clarke, the former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute, on the dangers of an idea gaining
“international traction that the UK operates a ‘quasi-statute of limitations’”,
and hence might be in danger of being indicted before the International Criminal Court, should always be borne in mind. They need rebuttal, and they need clarification.
When the Government launched their consultation on the changes to the legal protection for our Armed Forces serving overseas, the consultation included proposals to create a statutory presumption for alleged criminal offences which occurred more than 10 years ago. I repeat: 10 years was the issue that went out for consultation.
The Bill is a major departure from the norms of our international obligations
“under international humanitarian law … international human rights law and international criminal law.”
These are not my words; they are the words of Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights. They are words that we should bear in mind and rebut if it is possible to do so.
That is the background, and hence it is a basic requirement that any provisions in the Bill need thorough justification. Therefore, I support Amendments 1 and 2 to change the presumption against prosecution from five to 10 years. My question, very simply, is: what is the Government’s justification for the change from 10 years in the consultation document to five years? I would like an answer before the end of this debate.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, before I start my remarks about the Bill, I would like to say that nothing I say over the next few days in any way impugns the integrity of the Minister. I have every respect for her, but I think that the Bill is a terrible piece of legislation—worse than terrible. It is actually quite shocking. It is the international version of the “spy cops” Bill, which granted broad legal immunity to state agents who commit criminal acts. How can that be right?
It is one of those Bills that I think is so bad that we need to scrap it entirely. That is why I am joining the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Massey and Lady Smith of Newnham, to oppose the question that Clauses 1 to 7 stand part of the Bill. If a “delete-all” amendment were in order, I would do that instead. I hope that we can build an alliance to oppose the Bill’s Third Reading.
It struck me listening to noble Lords who have spoken already that the support for the Bill is actually based on fake news. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has written to our Joint Committee on Human Rights, chaired by Harriet Harman. In a letter, she says that the number of vexatious claims has been “exaggerated”—by our Government, obviously—to justify the proposed legislation. We do not have a whole heap of vexatious, baseless claims, which is what the Government seem to be suggesting.
The Bill clashes with the whole point of our justice system. I know that there are noble Lords in this Chamber who know a lot more about the law than I do, and I am sure they know that that is true. The whole point of our justice system is that the guilty are found guilty and the innocent are found innocent—that is obviously what we have to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, mentioned the strain of all these vexatious claims, but in fact they do not exist, so the argument for the Bill is extremely weak.
I consulted two ex-generals and an ex-admiral of my acquaintance about the Bill, and they all had severe qualms. They all felt that this could backfire quite seriously on our service personnel and that it would make things worse. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, demolished the argument for the Bill, but he said as well that service personnel could be brought to the ICC, which would be much worse than being dealt with here.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes (Con) [V]
My Lords, my father-in-law fought in the desert with the Australian infantry, as part of the Commonwealth forces, during the Second World War. He spoke of some of the horrors he saw, and also of the support that he and his fellow servicemen and their families received on their return home, and over the years, from the Australian charity Legacy, where he himself did a great deal to help widows and orphans of those who had given their lives.
I know that much has changed since the Second World War, I hope for the better, in the treatment of service men and women, with recognition of post-traumatic stress disorder and the examination of alleged crimes and, where appropriate, prosecutions. However, when we ask our service men and women to put their lives on the line on a daily basis for the good of their country, we need to give them certainty as to when they can look forward to the future rather than back at the past.
I speak in favour of retaining the five-year limitation on bringing a prosecution, with the exceptions envisaged by this Bill, rather than the longer 10-year limitation being proposed by these amendments. Over time, memories and recall fade; it is only fair, for the sake of all involved, that any investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution, is brought when these memories are still clear and accurate and evidence is available. We should not forget that, even if an investigation does not result in a prosecution, it can take its toll on the mental health of the people involved and their families. To prolong this for up to 10 years after an event is just too long.
The Minister has previously said that this is not about reducing access to justice. I paraphrase her comments and support them. This is about giving certainty and finality and preventing injustice when, due to the amount of time that had elapsed, adjudicating would otherwise be on unreliable and incomplete evidence. Although my name is on the list, I do not propose to speak again later in this debate.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to address this fundamental part of the debate on Part 1 of the Bill. Before I begin, I want to say that, if I do not impugn the motives of Members of your Lordships’ House, I hope that that will be a reciprocal courtesy. I shall not be asking any noble Lords, let alone Ministers or their noble friends on their Benches, to look any victims of war in the eye. I would happily look Major Bob Campbell, or any other brave serviceperson, in the eye, in trying to address the problems that the Government say they are trying to address through this Bill, and in making the best analysis and argument that I can about this very important legislation. The rule of law is too precious for us to be impugning each other’s motives, patriotism, or support for either service personnel or the victims of war. It is not service personnel who make sometimes ill-judged decisions to go to war, and it is not Ministers and politicians who put themselves in harm’s way. I hope that we can continue with a slightly better-tempered debate than to accuse some of us, by implication, of being somehow unsupportive of ordinary servicemen and women.
This is about the rule of law, which is supposed to apply to everyone—although, granted, some people are dealing with particular difficulties. The difficulty that the Government say they are addressing here is that of servicepeople who have been put into sometimes unlawful and certainly very controversial and difficult conflict situations, and then been subject to repeat, lengthy and shoddy investigations, which have caused great anxiety to them and little resolution for the public or, indeed, alleged victims overseas. If that is the problem to be addressed, surely the solution would be to address shoddy, lengthy and repeated investigations, rather than to create a “triple lock” on prosecutions.
It would be better to address the actual problem being suggested to improve investigations, making them more independent, swifter and more robust, so that everyone has confidence in them. The beauty of attacking the actual problem, as posited by the Government, is that it would serve the rule of law rather than undermine it, which would be completely uncontroversial. No victim of an alleged war crime could complain about swifter, more independent and more robust investigations. Improving the investigation system would also, I have no doubt, give greater comfort to the military. Not to do that and, instead, to do what Part 1 of this Bill does—to create shields, locks and triple locks on prosecutions—would quite obviously be in contravention of the rule of law that our brave service men and women seek to serve, not just domestically but all over the world, and perhaps more so, I fear, in the context of modern warfare. That will often involve covert, secret operations that the wider public might not know about for a long time, and alleged crimes may not come to light for a long time. As has been said by other noble Lords, witnesses or, indeed, victims may well be incarcerated for much longer than the five years, or even the 10 years posited in the draft Bill and in amendments. There are people still in Guantanamo to this day. I am sad to say that we are heading for a very grim anniversary in the autumn, of 20 years since the atrocity of 9/11. Part 1 seems completely the wrong way to address the problem that the Government themselves have posited.
I turn to the observations made by noble and noble and learned Lords that, whether it is five years or 10 years, it is a long period to be worried about the risk of prosecution. That, of course, is true of anyone. If five years is an adequate period to justify the first part of a triple lock on prosecuting grave crimes, we would have a presumptive statute of limitations such as that for domestic crimes, but we do not. We believe that that would be anathema to justice because serious crimes such as unlawful killing and so on should not be subject to a statute of limitations, even a presumptive one. It is not considered good enough for British justice here at home, but it is being suggested that such a statute of limitations is good enough overseas.
Of course this sets a dangerous precedent. I would be grateful to hear the supporters of Part 1 say whether they would honestly be happy with a replica of this legislation, in particular this part, to be enacted in other countries around the world—including in those jurisdictions with which we have been at war or with which we have difficult and potentially hostile relations at the moment. Would we be happy with a replica of this being provided in countries that we are worried about in relation to human rights abuses?
The rule of law is about where we try to set a standard across the world, and our Armed Forces are all about a pride in setting that standard. On the argument that there is nothing to fear from the ICC, it is quite right that there should be nothing or little to fear from it at the moment because of the law in this jurisdiction as it stands and because of the respect in which it is held worldwide. But if we continue to chip away at it by limiting its reach through the creation of a triple lock, I fear that people will be subject to greater ICC interference. It is all very well for noble Lords to say, “Nothing to hide, nothing to fear; let the ICC do its worst,” but I do not believe that that would be the argument in reality if that outcome were to present itself.
I urge noble Lords to think again about Part 1, and urge the Government to consider making investigations swifter and more robust and not to keep chipping away at the law which is supposed to apply to all, with support and respect for the circumstances of police officers, prison personnel, doctors and teachers—all sorts of people find themselves the subject of false allegations through no fault of their own because of the nature of their work. Members of the Armed Forces have a special difficulty, but that should be tackled at the investigations end, where the problem lies, not by creating a presumption against prosecution after what is a very short period in relation to the commission of alleged grave crimes overseas.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Like she does, I believe that Part 1 of the Bill should be cancelled because it creates a lock on prosecutions. I therefore support the amendments and the proposals to cancel Clauses 1 to 7.
Coming from Northern Ireland, I have denounced on every occasion the mayhem and the murder of members of the Armed Forces who were killed in the most indiscriminate way. They were human beings and they had families, and the way that they were treated by members of the paramilitary organisations was wrong, unacceptable and totally unwarranted, and did not contribute one iota to a political settlement. I want to set that out very clearly. But, like the Equality and Human Rights Commission does, I believe that the provisions in these clauses as they stand do not fulfil the requirements of honouring human rights requirements.
I honestly believe that none of us should be above the law, so I support the position taken by the noble Baronesses, Lady Massey of Darwen, Lady Smith of Newnham, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who have given notice of their intention to oppose Clauses 1 to 7 standing part of the Bill. By removing these clauses, we would take away the presumption against prosecution. At the very least, I support Amendments 1 to 9 and 13. They would help redress the balance currently in the Bill, which favours the accused, in order to ensure fairness and equality before the law for both claimants and defendants.
Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. I start by declaring my interest as a member of the Army Reserve and, indeed, my morning job as the deputy director of joint warfare at UK Strategic Command. Listening to this debate, I have been struck by how clear the point of law seems to be, particularly for noble and learned Lords, from the comfort and security of this Chamber or, perhaps, one’s home. My mind turns to members of the Royal Anglian Regiment who are currently on patrol in Mali, fighting against al-Shabaab and trying to defend what we believe in. I have no doubt that they are equally clear about what is right and wrong.
It always amazes me how members of our Armed Forces, despite the circumstances in which they often find themselves, have applied what is right and wrong under the most difficult circumstances and their judgment is normally sound. However, they will be less interested in the detailed points of law than in knowing that their relationship with Parliament is one of trust and support. As I listened to this debate, I am genuinely concerned that we are beginning not to see the wood for the trees in relation to why we are bringing the Bill forward. It was done partly at the request of our Armed Forces who, in recent years, after a series of vexatious claims, simply want to know that Parliament and the Government have their back.
I have the utmost respect for noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have brought forward these amendments, which in the main come from a genuine concern that the Bill may disrespect international law or organisations such as the ICC. I understand, but I am concerned. Rather like the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, I do not understand these early amendments, because they seem to go to the heart of what we are seeking to achieve, and the principles of what the Bill is for, in the triple lock. I find that frustrating, because nothing in the Bill ultimately will prevent, in the case of new evidence, a serviceman being brought to justice. No one is trying to say that members of our Armed Forces should be above the law. That is not the purpose of the Bill.
Some noble Lords simply do not like the Bill and want it gone. To be fair to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, she was clear in her comments and I absolutely respect her. In many ways, it reminds me of exactly why I joined the military 32 years ago—to ensure that she has the right to stand there and make these points. What I find frustrating, though, is that when some seem to be seeking, effectively, to wreck the Bill through these amendments, in the same breath we hear platitudes about the brave members of our Armed Forces. We should be supporting them.
I, for one, am not saying that the Bill is perfect; it is anything but. I have proposed my own amendment to try to improve the Bill. Later this afternoon, I will be commenting on some amendments that try sensibly to improve the Bill. However, I do not want to lose the purpose of what we are doing, because your Lordships’ House will not do itself any favours with members of our Armed Forces if we seek to undermine the general direction of the Bill and what it aims to do.
I turn in particular to the first set of amendments and the movement from five years to 10 years. I have concerns about that, not least because, in response to the public consultation, there were concerns about a 10-year timeframe. That is a long time and, particularly in the heat of battle, memories can fade and evidence can deteriorate. Given that we are seeking to create certainty and reassurance, a period of five years better achieves that objective. Ultimately, any timeframe will probably be viewed as arbitrary.
Perhaps to reassure myself, I considered how two of the most recent unfortunate cases would be impacted. The trial following the tragic death of Baha Mousa, the Iraqi man who died in British custody in September 2003, was in 2006, just three years later. Equally, I was involved as a Minister in the case of Sergeant Blackman when it came up again two or three years ago. It involved the killing of a Taliban prisoner in 2011 and the trial took place in 2013, well within a relatively short period. In both circumstances, the evidence came out after the event.
Ultimately, nothing changes if new evidence comes to light, which is why the amendment moving the timescale from five to 10 years is unnecessary. Indeed, it goes to the heart of what the Bill is trying to achieve. We should not be treating members of our Armed Forces like fools. They are anything but fools. If we are seeking to put the Bill through Parliament in an effort to support them, let us do just that. Of course there are areas in which the Bill can be improved, but I am not sure that these amendments do that.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the well-made points made by the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, and I certainly take them on board. I am going to speak briefly to the opening amendments and the general feel of the Bill. I do so having also taken on board the wise words of my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup. I look forward to hearing more about his reservations on the Bill.
I was enormously impressed by what we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Their words are, I contend, in the interests of our armed services, given that clarity on the fairness that these matters require helps to give confidence that proceedings involving service personnel are thorough. We desire them to be thorough and universally admired. If they are, that only helps our service personnel. I look forward to hearing other speakers and the reply of the Minister to those concerns.
I turn to a slightly wider landscape. We hear virtually every week in your Lordships’ House about disturbing events in, for example, Myanmar, Hong Kong and China, as well as, even nearer to home, the recent case of the American woman claiming diplomatic immunity after her tragic road crash. There were the cases of the assassination of Mr Khashoggi, the poisonings in Salisbury, Sergei Magnitsky and the current detention of Mr Navalny. The point that I am making is that in all those cases it takes time for the facts to emerge, even to be dug up. The case of Baha Mousa could easily have taken six years, but I salute the efforts that were made. I am afraid that the facts often take longer than five years to emerge. Still more importantly, I contend that our remonstrations about these cases is all the stronger if the way in which we deal with our own employees is as beyond reproach as possible. That is why I worry that five years is too short and why I have real concerns over the presumptions against prosecutions contained in the Bill.
Finally, I stress that I accept that the terrible things that happen in the heat of battle are quite different from the premeditated use of torture. It is that matter which particularly concerns me and to which I shall return when we reach Amendment 14.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is conventional to say what a pleasure it is to speak after whichever noble Lord has preceded one. On this occasion, it genuinely is a pleasure to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, because I tended to agree with most of what he said. I am winding up on this group of amendments very much from the same place as when I was winding up at the end of Second Reading from the Liberal Democrat Benches.
On this occasion, my name is attached to some of the amendments, but I will none the less restate, for the avoidance of any doubt before I get into their substance, that I am not proposing that we throw out the Bill. The amendments to which my name is attached are intended for debate in Committee. I support the amendment to change the timescale from five to 10 years, but I am not necessarily at the point of suggesting that, when we get to Report and voting, certain clauses should not stand part of the Bill. Nor am I going to support, much to her disappointment, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and say that I shall vote against the whole Bill at Third Reading. That, to the best of my knowledge, is not the Liberal Democrat party line. We have not said that we will vote against the whole Bill. Rather, there are aspects of the Bill which we and many other noble Lords right across the Chamber argued at Second Reading were flawed and which need to be addressed in amendments in Committee that presumably will be voted on on Report.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
The debate has been very impressive. I take this opportunity to make special mention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon. I was Solicitor-General when he was the Attorney-General. As he pointed out, he served in the Armed Forces and was an incredibly effective Attorney-General, and he proved to me that as the Attorney-General you can ensure that the law is complied with in circumstances where you have a profound understanding of the pressures on the military.
There are, in effect, two proposals before the House in this group of amendments. One is to extend the period of presumption from five to 10 years. The other is to get rid of the presumption altogether. This part of the Bill deals only with criminal offences. I think that everybody in the House is of a like mind in the following two respects.
First, Members of the House have no desire whatever to authorise in any way members of our Armed Forces committing very serious crimes, such as crimes against the United Nations convention against torture or any other sorts of war crimes, or murder or manslaughter.
Secondly, and separately, everybody in the House understands the oppression of there being what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti described as shoddy, lengthy and repeat investigations. Nobody wants our Armed Forces to have to go through shoddy, lengthy and repeat investigations. What I think everybody wants is that there should be timely, effective and thorough investigations, and that when the timely, effective and thorough investigation is completed, the soldier or other military personnel can be confident that that is the end of it.
That is not the position at the moment. The proposal for a presumption against prosecution after five or 10 years does not deal with that problem. The best way to deal with the problem is to have effective investigations and, after the investigation is over, for there to be a limitation in some way on any further investigation unless compelling evidence comes to light that justifies reopening an investigation which the military personnel who is the subject of the investigation can otherwise be entitled to assume is at an end.
I have no idea why the Government are going about trying to deliver on what everybody thinks is a laudable aim—namely, to protect military personnel from shoddy, repeat and inadequate investigations—by this presumption. There appears to be agreement among those who would know that the proposal that is being advanced by the Government does not deal with the problem. Johnny Mercer, in Committee in the other place, said:
“I want to reassure Members that the presumption measure is not an attempt to cover up past events as it does not prevent an investigation to credible allegations of wrongdoing in the past, and neither does it prevent the independent prosecutor from determining that a case should go forward to prosecution.”—[Official Report, Commons, 14/10/20; col. 154.]
Judge Blackett, who used to be the Advocate-General—the chief judge in the military justice system—said:
“a presumption against prosecution would not stop the knock on the door and the investigation. That is the whole point. The presumption against prosecution does not stop the investigation; the investigation happens.”
The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, said that we should not be too legalistic about this. I think he meant that we have to produce a solution to the problem. I completely agree. Later amendments in the group make it clear that there should be reinvestigation only where there is compelling evidence. Some of the amendments suggest, for example, that a judge would have to authorise further investigations to give the protection that is required and, in the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, to take away the dark shadow of prosecution.
I am very interested in these amendments. I am very keen to deliver on the purpose of the Bill, as is everybody else. I do not believe that the five-year presumption does that, and I would be very interested to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, respond to the points made by Johnny Mercer and Judge Blackett as to the fact that the Bill does not deliver on its purpose.
Three other points militate against either the five-year presumption or any presumption at all. First, this will create a special category of defence. It will in effect lead to there being a special category of criminal offences for which there is a presumption against prosecution. John Healey in another place put it very well when he said:
“Let us just step back a moment from the technical detail. This is the Government of Great Britain bringing in a legal presumption against prosecution for torture, for war crimes and for crimes against humanity. This is the Government of Great Britain saying sexual crimes are so serious they will be excluded from this presumption, but placing crimes outlawed by the Geneva convention on a less serious level and downgrading our unequivocal commitment to upholding international law that we in Britain ourselves, after the Second World War, helped to establish.”—[Official Report, Commons, 23/9/20; cols. 997-98.]
We should not be doing what John Healey described. We should be doing what the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, hopes we should be doing. Let us do it in a direct and effective way rather than in this oblique, obscure and ineffective way.
The second reason why the presumption does not work is that it may be illegal. I would very much like to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has to say about the points made in the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ ninth report of this Session, which says that it offends against Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations Convention against Torture, the Rome Statute, and customary international law. The report is basically saying that, if you could have a presumption against prosecution where there is evidence that would justify a prosecution and the public interest favours it, why is that not contrary to the five commitments that the country has made legally?
The third point is the involvement of the International Criminal Court. We as a country ought to be prosecuting these offences, not the ICC. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, will know that the ICC’s chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said last week in a letter to the British Government that the presumption against prosecution could
“render such cases admissible before the ICC.”
How have the Government reached such a different conclusion to that of the ICC’s chief prosecutor? Does the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, believe that the ICC has misunderstood the Bill? Is she confident that the consequence of the Bill will not be to replace one uncertainty with another, namely that our military personnel may well face long investigations and then long prosecutions in the ICC, which nobody wants? I believe it is incredibly important that our justice system and in particular our military justice system produces an answer to the problem that this part of the Bill seeks to address, but I am anxious that it will be ineffective in doing that, it will send out a signal that we are not complying with international law, and it will lead to more prosecutions in the ICC.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and all other noble Lords for their contributions to a wide-ranging and—I certainly accept—thought-provoking discussion this afternoon. I have listened to the debate closely. We have covered extensive territory across the principles of the Bill. Before I turn to the individual amendments in the first group, I will address the range of Clauses 1 to 7 of Part 1, which a number of your Lordships would wish to remove. It may be helpful if I clarify the Government’s intent in proposing these provisions, and perhaps I should restate why there is a Bill at all.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received two requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Naseby and Lord West of Spithead. I will call them in that order, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Naseby.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I spoke at Second Reading, where I said that our Foreign Office should release
“dispatches from our observers who watch war anywhere around the world.”—[Official Report, 20/1/21; col. 1231.]
I realise that Part 1 is absolutely the key issue of the Bill. I ask my noble friend on the Front Bench whether she will confirm that, when the Bill becomes an Act, in whatever form, it will be drawn to the attention of the United Nations, particularly the UNHRC in Geneva and the International Criminal Court, as well as all other relevant official bodies involved with alleged war crimes, wherever they may be?
I ask this because of current evidence that the UNHRC has not been fully briefed by Her Majesty’s Government concerning British military attaché evidence taken in 2009 in relation to the war in Sri Lanka. Therefore, there is a lack of evidence in the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Sri Lanka, dated 12 January 2021. I thank the Minister for listening to this important but rather unusual dimension.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I thank my noble friend for his contribution. I am not terribly well equipped to deal with the specific aspect of his comment and inquiry in relation to Sri Lanka and the apparent lack of evidence that he argues is the case in relation to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. I can certainly undertake to investigate that, and it may be a matter to which my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon might wish to respond.
As for drawing the attention of international bodies to the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill when enacted, I think—from the responses that we are aware of—that it has already attracted widespread comment from international organisations. I am sure that, as part of their public affairs monitoring, they all take account of legislation coming out of various countries. However, the noble Lord makes an interesting point, and I shall reflect upon it.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, taken together, many of the amendments that we have just discussed certainly seem aimed at emasculating and, indeed, wrecking the Bill. I have no doubt whatever that the Bill is necessary: it lances a long-standing boil and fulfils a promise to our military. The issue has proved too difficult to tackle, time and again, and it is about time that it was tackled. The Bill must go forward.
We need the Bill so much, and I think the amendments we have discussed should go. There are a number of amendments that will resolve the wrinkles, but is it not the case that we will touch on some of the things already discussed in later amendments, when there will be a chance to correct them?
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for his very candid assessment of both the situation that we seek to address and how the Bill seeks to do so. In my role as Minister for Defence in this House, I have certainly pledged to engage with your Lordships; it has been my pleasure to engage with a considerable number of you.
In my remarks on Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill, I indicated that I am aware of the profound concerns of many Members of this House. I say to the noble Lord, Lord West, that it is my desire to continue my engagement. I shall listen very closely to the contributions during the rest of the debate on the groups of amendments that we are scheduled to deal with today. It is not a cosmetic interest; I understand the depth of concern, and, in reflecting on all the contributions, I shall consider whether some avenues are available to me to try to assuage some of these concerns.
Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]
My Lords, this has been an extraordinarily rich and challenging beginning to our consideration of the Bill. I thank the Minister, for whom I have the greatest respect—I know that she is concerned about all these issues—for her detailed response. However, there are some things that are still unclear and about which I have doubts, and I shall come on to those in a moment.
We have had a particularly enlightened debate, with huge depths of knowledge from the perspectives of law, military engagement and political practice. I totally respect all of that and listened to it with great interest. The bottom line is that we want to make things better for our Armed Forces, which do have our respect. I do not think that the Bill has all the answers. Many noble Lords—too many to name—have demonstrated that. We have heard about the challenging aspects of investigations, in the risk to the Armed Forces and legal structures, and much has been covered in this one debate. I wonder what else is to come.
I have been waiting for the Minister to answer all the many excellent points made by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The noble Baroness has been very eloquent, but I am left with some queries. I shall read the noble Lord’s questions and the Minister’s answers again carefully, but I am not totally convinced, for example, by her arguments about the proposals for public consultation. I really do not understand the reasoning behind that—and there are other aspects, too. The debate has left us all with much to ponder and decisions to take about future action. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 3. Anyone wishing to press this, or anything else in this group, to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 2: Presumption against prosecution
Amendment 3
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“Ability to conduct a fair trial
The principle referred to in section 1(1) is that a relevant prosecutor making a decision to which that section applies may determine that proceedings should be brought against the person for the offence, or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued, only if the prosecutor has reasonable grounds for believing that the fair trial of the person has not been materially prejudiced by the time elapsed since the alleged conduct took place.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement on a prosecutor deciding whether to bring or continue a prosecution to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, in this group I shall address Amendments 3, 5, 6, 17 and 28. This group seeks, in a variety of ways, to deal with a problem that the Minister identified in her helpful concluding remarks on the last group—namely, stopping the endless shoddy reinvestigations, because that is the real problem.
Since the year 2000 there have been 27 prosecutions in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Ministry of Defence gave evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which led to its ninth report, dealing with this Bill. The Bill team co-ordinator—I think that was his exact title—Mr Damian Parmenter, did not identify as the problem that the wrong decisions had been made in relation to prosecutions. He identified that the problem was with the reinvestigations, as did Mr Mercer in the other place and Judge Blackett. We need to address the issue directly, not indirectly. The question that I had asked and was waiting most keenly to be answered by the Minister was how the Bill dealt with this presumption—and answer came there none from the Minister, I would submit. If the issue is not the decision about prosecution but the endless process of investigation, this Bill does not deal with it.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 6. Its purpose is simple—that the decision that the prosecutor makes takes into account the quality, thoroughness, independence and accountability of the investigation. It may be said—as appears from the Minister’s letter—that these matters are being looked at by Sir Richard Henriques in the review that he is conducting. No doubt the detail of all this can be gone into at that time—for example, how independence is to be safeguarded and accountability achieved. No doubt we will need to look at the position in other states. All that is for the future.
However, this Bill is being brought forward now. One matter that must be addressed now is that prosecutors, in deciding whether to continue, have to take into account the quality of the investigation in the respects I have set out in the amendment. I have put this forward based on my own experience of three cases that came before me when I was a judge. In the military context—and the civilian context is exactly the same—they pointed to the importance of thorough, well-resourced investigations.
The first case related to the deaths of 24 people in what is now Malaysia during the communist insurgency in 1948, which came back to the courts in 2011. That very unhappy series of events came back because the initial investigation was not thorough, a subsequent investigation was stopped before it was completed and, by the time the matter came before the courts, there was clear evidence that the original explanation of what had happened—namely, that these persons killed had been shot trying to escape—had been given by soldiers on instructions and that 24 people were killed in cold blood.
The second illustration relates to invents in Iraq and what happened in numerous cases, the most significant of which is the death of Baha Mousa. That is a paradigm example of how a poor investigation can be so terrible that it sometimes takes a very long time to see what went wrong.
The third and perhaps more surprising example is the conviction of Sergeant Blackman for shooting a member of the Taliban. When it originally came before the court martial, there had not been a sufficiently proper investigation of the circumstances, the stresses he underwent and his perception of the support he got from his command. That came out only afterwards and was one of the matters that, as appears from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, led to his conviction being reduced to manslaughter.
The thoroughness and independence of the investigation are critical in any decision to prosecute. A similar reflection can be obtained from ordinary cases; where things have gone wrong or there is a problem, it is the investigation. It is important that an investigation is fair—that is why it is listed—and thorough. And it should be fair in both senses: to the accused and to those who say a crime has been committed.
Independence is of equal importance. Any detailed consideration of the Malay case to which I referred and of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Blackman case shows how independence and accountability are also important. Therefore, what must be taken into account as a matter of principle—not of detail, that is for later—are these matters relating to the investigation. It may be said, “Well, things have got a lot better”. However, we all know that even the most well-organised body can make mistakes in the conduct of an investigation, and accountability and independence need to be of a very high level in certain types of case.
I am putting forward this amendment to show that this nation has regard to the covenant and the support it is necessary to give to our Armed Forces, but also to show that we must be seen to do justice, because the doing of justice is equally important. The quality, thoroughness, independence and accountability of the original investigation, if there has been one, or of the more recent one, should be at the forefront of the prosecutor’s decision.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
My Lords, as I said in my comments on the first group of amendments, the vagaries of parliamentary procedure mean that in some ways the groups of amendments are being debated in a less than helpful order. I hope that this group of amendments and the suite of proposals will reassure the noble Lords, Lord West of Spithead and Lord Lancaster, and others who had any concerns that perhaps supporters of the first group might be seeking to eviscerate the Bill in its entirety.
This suite of amendments is intended to be constructive. I will speak predominantly to Amendment 17, in the name of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and myself, and Amendment 28. They are both about investigations. If the purpose of the Bill is to stop unnecessary investigations and investigations being brought many years later, these two amendments in particular seek in clear and specific ways to give substance to the Government’s stated aims.
Amendment 17 gives a very clear outline of what could be done in terms of investigations: how they should be taken forward and, after they are completed, moved to prosecution. We have not heard huge numbers of veterans saying they have been prosecuted many times, but we have heard concerns about people being investigated and never getting closure. Amendment 17 gives a very clear outline of how investigations could be dealt with.
Amendment 28, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, puts limitations on reinvestigation. That surely goes to the heart of what the Government say that they wish to do. If the Government really wish to have the best legislation to serve their own stated aims and fulfil the needs and expectations of current service personnel and veterans, could they please consider these amendments?
In your Lordships’ House, the Minister often feels the need to say that, however laudable the goals of the amendments are, they do not quite fit the approach that the Government want to take. If the Minister does not feel able to support the detail of the amendments, might she consider coming back with some government proposals on how investigations and reinvestigations could be dealt with in a way that would enable the Bill to do what it says on the tin?
Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to contribute to this group. I am particularly grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for the clarity with which he introduced these amendments.
I turn first to Amendment 3, which effectively seeks to remove Clause 2. That clause, the “presumption against prosecution”, is very powerful. I of course accept that this may not have the legal force it implies to some laymen, not least because of the other measures in the Bill, but it does indicate a very clear change of direction. If one of the aims of this Bill is to offer reassurance to our service personnel and veterans, this is a very powerful clause.
Amendment 3 seeks to delete this clause and effectively replace it with a guarantee of a fair trial. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, this would happen as a matter of course. I have never met a service man or woman whose concern has been that they will not receive a fair trial in the United Kingdom. So, on the face of it, it does not seem to be a particularly good trade. Removing a presumption against prosecution from Clause 2 and replacing it with a fair trial does not send a particularly powerful message—but I do understand why it is being proposed.
Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton. He brings a valuable perspective to our deliberations. I welcome his contribution and agree with some of it, as will become apparent.
My position on this Bill is essentially that so clearly set out by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton in his speech on the previous group. I agree with him that this group contains a range of amendments that are aimed at the true source of the problem that the Government have in their sights. I agree with the points that he made, so there will be little point in repeating them. However, to repeat what I said at Second Reading,
“the Bill does not resolve the problem of repeated and prolonged investigations because the Government have chosen to frame the issue as a legal problem, when the truth is that it is a problem about the timeliness and quality of investigations.”—[Official Report, 20/1/21; col. 1207.]
I begin the meat of my contribution with reference to the letter that we received last week from the Minister—for whom I share the regard expressed by others in this debate; I thank her for the letter—seven paragraphs of which sought to persuade us that this Bill would not be improved by specifically addressing investigations and implied that doing so might be counterproductive and unhelpful. The letter even employed the word “danger”; I infer from that that she thought it might be dangerous too. Expecting that the content of her letter will serve as a template for her response to this set of amendments, I want to test its argument.
As we have heard, few criminal prosecutions arising from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or from recent overseas operations have in fact been brought against service personnel. None, as far as I am aware, is in the pipeline or anticipated. I encourage the noble Baroness to point to any criminal case that should not have been pursued, if she can identify one, as I suspect she can. Given that context, it is heroic on the Government’s part—to say the least—to attempt to justify the need for legislation against the legal process of prosecution when no history of unjustified prosecutions exists.
This is the more so because, when Ministers are asked what justifies this legislation, their consistent response is to point to a cycle of unjustified investigations into unjustified allegations against soldiers. This Bill will not stop that. In her letter of 26 February, the noble Baroness wisely does not claim that it will. Rather, while expressly accepting the need for continued improvement in investigations—I accept that significant improvements have been made—she sets out an argument for how the Bill might eventually improve them, to encourage those of us who are more inclined to argue for investigation legislation and prosecution legislation. This seems a rather odd argument, so I quote it. She says that
“while the Bill does not contain measures that would have a direct impact on the conduct of investigations … we have included measures in the Bill that may have an indirect impact.”
Surely it is better to legislate for steps that will directly impact the problem than to hope that, indirectly or incidentally, measures in the Bill, while not solving the problem, might in the course of time dilute it.
While I have great respect for the noble Baroness, as I have said, I regret that the paragraphs headed “criminal measures and investigations” in her letter do not provide a justification for this legislation, devoid as it is of any overt attempt to address the real problem. It is no answer to this criticism that, for further improvements to the investigative and prosecutorial process, we should wait for the outcome of the review by Sir Richard Henriques to
“complement this Bill in further reducing the uncertainty for Service personnel about investigations.”
In any case, is there not already a service report from last February, elements of which could have been included here and are not?
Further, it is difficult to be persuaded given what the Minister Johnny Mercer said in a Guardian podcast in 2019. This is not just any Minister—he is responsible for the passage of this Bill. Comprehensively, he set out the problems in that podcast, saying that
“one of the biggest problems … was the military’s inability to investigate itself … and the standard of those investigations … If those investigations were done properly … we probably wouldn’t be here today.”
When the noble Baroness responds, could she address the content of that podcast? At Second Reading I sought to tempt her to do so, but she did not. Can she explain why an explanation of the cause of the problem that was good enough for Johnny Mercer in 2019 should be ignored by your Lordships’ House today, and can she justify those seven paragraphs of her letter?
Also, the failings and imposition of shoddy further investigations on earlier investigations were not brought about in many circumstances by those set out in the letter from the noble Baroness; they were brought about by the arguments put forward in litigation that had its roots in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it was successfully argued that insufficient inquiries had been made into credible allegations of abuse at the relevant time. Had there been competent criminal inquiries within a reasonable period of time of the allegations, it surely would have been much more likely that the victims would have received justice and those who had been unfairly accused would have been fully exonerated within a reasonable period of the allegations.
This is a view held by many current and former members of the Armed Forces and one of the many reasons, as I understand it, why Judge Advocate-General Jeff Blackett has expressed serious concerns about the Bill. The Director of Service Prosecutions, essentially agreeing with the 2019 version of Johnny Mercer’s analysis, recognised that it is the lack of prompt investigations at the time that lies at the heart of the issue.
If the Government are not going to engage with the real problem when it is obvious and identified by a diverse group of people with expertise and experience in this area, it is the duty of your Lordships’ House to amend the Bill to do just that. That is what these amendments seek to do: they are designed to ensure prompt, independent investigations into criminal allegations. Their absence from the Bill is fatal to its purpose. The acceptance of these amendments is in the interests of victims and of our military. The experience that too many of them have gone through compels us to put in place a system where complaints are investigated properly and dealt with within a reasonable amount of time. That ought to be our priority.
Lord Boyce (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Browne, on this because I agree with the thrust of his comments. The Bill sets out to make statutory provision about legal proceedings for our Armed Forces when they are or have been engaged in overseas operations, which, of course, is a very laudable aim. However, the Bill’s significant emphasis on the presumption against prosecution as a way of relieving some of the stress of legal proceedings is misplaced. It is the investigation and then the reinvestigation process that so wears people down. A prosecution may even be a form of relief when it comes.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I am sorry to interrupt the noble and gallant Lord, but we cannot hear him very well. We shall come back to him later in the debate.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
Lord Boyce, we will come back to you later. I now call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]
My Lords, I spent four years at an earlier stage in my career as a prosecutor in Scotland. I was one of the Lord Advocate’s relatively small team of Crown counsel, known as his advocate deputes. For much of that time, the Lord Advocate was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. It is a real pleasure to see him taking part in our proceedings this afternoon. It was part of my job to take decisions under his authority as to whether or not a prosecution should be brought, and to conduct the prosecution if it was decided that it should proceed. I therefore have some insight into how these decisions are taken.
Of course, there are differences between my job then and what we are contemplating now. I was working in Scotland, under its own system of criminal law, about 40 years ago. While nothing much was actually written down then, there were some well-understood principles to guide us. Much of this was based on the fact that we were acting in the public interest. We had to balance the interests of justice against the accused’s right to a fair trial. Within those broad concepts, there was room for a variety of other factors that we would take into account, guided by common sense and what we had learned by experience.
That having been said, I acknowledge that in today’s world there is the need for a more formalised system of rules. That helps to achieve consistency in decision-making, and it helps to reassure the public that these important decisions are soundly based. In the context of this Bill, I acknowledge that “the public” must include service personnel serving or who have served in operations overseas. After all, reassurance to them is what this Bill is all about.
That brings me to Amendment 3, and afterwards to Amendments 5, 6 and 28. The wording of Amendment 3 does not come as any surprise to me. It relates to the ability to conduct a fair trial, and makes a proposition that hardly needs to be said. As the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, said, this principle applies as a matter of course. I cannot imagine that the proposition would have escaped my attention had I been responsible for taking these decisions, but of course the real point of Amendment 3 is to challenge the presumption and replace it with something else which has equivalent force, removing the hard edge of presumption.
On the whole, I am uneasy about a presumption that applies after a particular time limit. Cases vary and the facts differ from case to case; what might be absolutely right in one case could be very unfortunate in another. There is a real difference, however, between the presumption in Clause 3, which uses the word “exceptional”, and the word “materially”, which is the key word in the amendment. It is a much softer alternative. I am uneasy as to whether it really is an adequate replacement for the presumption if the aim is to get rid of the presumption and replace it with something of equal force.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will not seek to replicate the eloquence and experience of noble and noble and learned Lords, including noble friends who have spoken before me. Instead, I will take on the challenge of addressing the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, directly, because he is the person with whom I most disagree. From his comments in the previous group, I think he is particularly concerned about lawyers in this context. Perhaps he shares some of the concerns of his colleagues in the other place about warfare and a lack of warmth and respect for our Armed Forces.
I would like to reply to him in the following way in case it helps us develop some common ground in scrutinising this legislation. For pretty much the whole of my career as a human rights lawyer and campaigner, I have been accused—I would say falsely—of being soft on crime, soft on those suspected of crime and soft on those accused of crime. I would say that I am not soft: I just believe that people should be protected from false accusations and charges by due process, and that a miscarriage of justice—a wrongful conviction —delivers more, not fewer, victims. That has been my view, whether the person accused is in civilian life or in uniform, so I have not given up—nor have other lawyers in this debate or in the country at large—on the jealous protection of due process just because the people who are accused may be members of our military.
The concerns expressed by everyone on this group of amendments, and many on the earlier group, are about this part of the Bill addressing prosecutions—which have not been a problem—instead of investigations. That is why the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, wished that we could have got to the meat—the heart—of the debate sooner, but that is not in the natural order of things. Legislators, as opposed to Governments, are not in a position to do what is really required, which is to redesign and devote investment to a robust investigative system that is suitably independent, swift and resourced. Instead, we have these amendments, which probe what fair and robust investigations would look like to safeguard —I stress, safeguard—military personnel from the concerns that they have expressed over many years from the shadow that hangs over them. That is why the amendments are well put, if only in the first instance as probing.
The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, said that he did not really see the value of Amendment 3, in the name of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford—who spoke so ably earlier on—because it would replace Clause 2, which is about prosecutions being “exceptional”, with a new, perhaps more convoluted form of words, which he might think is trees and not wood, about the dangers of being “materially prejudiced” by the passage of time. “Exceptional” is not desperately helpful as a new test when prosecutions have been so truly exceptional up to now. Prosecutions have not been a problem. No one is suggesting that lots of vexatious prosecutions have been a problem but merely that people have been worried about them because of shoddy, lengthy and delayed investigations. The status quo is for prosecutions to be quite exceptional. We are not seeing very much by way of guidance to prosecutors in the current Clause 2, which says that such prosecutions, as part of a triple lock, should be exceptional.
Further, we still have a Human Rights Act, and this legislation has to be predicated on the fact that that will continue—certainly, CHIS legislation was tightly predicated on that proposition. There has been case law during the tenure of the Human Rights Act showing that, if it is necessary to do so to comply with human rights, “exceptional” can be read as something that is much more routine. If, as some of us believe, this legislation, unamended, would give rise to violations of victims’ human rights, “exceptional” in the current Clause 2 would have to be construed by courts as something that is quite possibly less than exceptional and therefore not the position that the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, would like. Amendment 3 as proposed by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is much more precise about what is sought to be avoided in the interests of the accused, which is a test that they not be materially prejudiced by the time elapsed. We are supposedly here to reassure armed personnel, who we know are very concerned about time elapsing, and their chances of a fair trial being prejudiced by that, because of the shoddy, delayed and repeat investigations that we have seen.
If I were serving in the military, I would take much greater comfort from protections in relation to these investigations in general, but, if we are going to look at provisions of this kind—which I do not support, because I do not support the presumption against prosecution—this concept of being materially prejudiced by the passage of time, through no fault of my own, should give far greater comfort to me as an accused than would the word “exceptional”, which could become devoid of content.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, when the Minister introduced this Bill at Second Reading, she said that she detected broad sympathy with its objectives. If she meant the objective of protecting our veterans against repeated and delayed reinvestigations for which there is no new or compelling reason, I am quite sure she was right. The noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, mentioned Major Bob Campbell, as has the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, today. Major Campbell was investigated multiple times over 17 years in relation to the death of an Iraqi teenager—eight times according to the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, and 11 times according to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—before being finally exonerated last year by an inquiry led by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hallett.
That multiplicity of investigations is something that surely no noble Lord would wish to defend, although the fact that the ICC prosecutor looked carefully at the case and decided not to proceed only because there had been a thorough investigation by the state should be a warning against any complacency that we can weaken our standards of investigation while still keeping the ICC at bay.
Amendment 28 seeks to attack the problem of multiple investigations directly by injecting an element of independent quality control into the investigations process. It would require further investigations to be conditional on compelling new evidence emerging and on an allocated judge advocate considering the totality of the evidence to be sufficiently strong. Like the Henriques review, which I welcome, Amendment 28 has the advantage of straightforwardly addressing the issue of repeated inconclusive investigations. I would, however, voice two reservations, with ICC-proofing in mind. First, is a judge advocate a sufficiently independent figure to apply the filter? Secondly, a high bar is set by the requirement of “compelling new evidence”, a bar which one would not normally expect to be surmounted without the conclusion of precisely the further investigation for which this test would be a precondition. Perhaps I might suggest “there is a compelling reason” as more realistic wording for proposed new subsection (2)(a).
Amendment 17 seeks to address slow investigations. Proposed new subsections (3) and (5) would put some time limits into the process. That, again, strikes me as a solution which, whether appropriate or not in all its detail, is at least directed to a real problem. Let us take the case of Baha Mousa, who died in British custody in 2003 after being hooded, deprived of food and water, and beaten, sustaining at least 93 injuries. The first round of prosecutions, to which the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, referred earlier, was characterised by a closing of ranks and achieved only a single conviction, in 2007, on a guilty plea by a corporal to a charge of inhumane conduct. There followed a three-year public inquiry, led by Sir William Gage, which in its three-volume report of September 2011 made detailed findings about the circumstances of Baha Mousa’s death and identified 19 soldiers directly involved in his abuse. The Iraq Historical Allegations Team was tasked in May 2012 to review that report with a view to assessing whether more could be done to bring those responsible to justice.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I believe that we are trying to reconnect with the noble Lord, Lord Boyce.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
The noble Lord should now continue and we will see how well we can hear him.
Lord Boyce (CB) [V]
My Lords, this Bill sets out to make better provision on legal proceedings for our Armed Forces when they are, or have been, engaged in overseas operations. This is a very laudable aim, but the Bill’s significant emphasis on presumption against prosecution as a way of relieving some of the stress of legal proceedings is misplaced. It is the investigation and reinvestigation process that so wears people down, and prosecution, when it comes, may even be a form of relief. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, alluded to this matter of waiting in the last group of amendments.
Anyway, we should bear in mind that, even when the presumption is in place, there is no total lifting of the threat of prosecution after five years. As the Minister has told us, this can still happen if the Attorney-General sees fit. Furthermore, there could be the spectre of an even longer investigative process if the case falls into the hands of the ICC. I know that the matter of the ICC has been well covered this afternoon, and that the Minister has sought to reassure us on this point, but I am afraid that I am not convinced. Nor it seems is the ICC, which apparently remains unconvinced by any assurances that the Government may have tried to make in defence of the Bill.
This is by the way, because, as I have mentioned, it is the investigation process that needs primarily to be addressed: to be sharpened up to ensure that it is not a fishing expedition, that there is value in pursuing the matter under consideration, that it is constrained in length, and that reinvestigations are launched only after the most careful judicial oversight. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has captured all this rather well, as indeed have other noble Lords. It is for these reasons and others that I support Amendments 5 and 28, to which I have put my name, and, indeed, other amendments in this group. I concur with much of what other noble Lords have eloquently said on the matter of investigations; I will spare your Lordships a repeat of all that has gone before in this group.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the problem of investigations—as well as of late and inadequate investigations—should be addressed and the process sharpened up. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, told us this a moment ago and I thoroughly agree with him. The problems have been very clearly outlined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I echo the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who emphasised that justice must be done based on thorough and prompt investigation. The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, is sure that investigations have improved in recent years; I hope that that is true.
I stress first of all the inherent difficulties of investigations into alleged conduct arising out of overseas operations. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, believes that they should be timely and of quality—of course they should. In the United Kingdom, most crimes are investigated by one or more of the 45 or so police forces within their area of operations. Local police forces can readily pull in extra investigatory resources, including scientific investigations, if they need them.
By contrast, investigations by the military police may occur anywhere in the world. Co-operation by the civilian population or even the civilian police cannot be guaranteed. There are usually significant linguistic and cultural problems in the collection of statements from witnesses. It may be that a complainant—a foreign national—has his own axe to grind. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, reminded me, with the Baha Mousa case, of another problem, where the judge said in his closing remarks that there had been a closing of ranks; that is a problem with the natural desire of soldiers to support each other.
There can be security problems. When in 2005 it was decided that an inspection of a dusty Iraq village was desirable, a whole company or more of 200 soldiers was deployed to provide protection for the dozen or so sheepish lawyers who attended. I was not one of them: the MoD was not prepared to insure the silks in the case. There is no immediate access to the support that a civilian police force in this country might expect. It follows that delays are inherent and inevitable, but they are not desirable. Yet we can read the whole of this Bill and find nothing which deals with the essential preliminary to any prosecution: a thorough, prompt investigation.
This group of amendments suggests various pathways to ensuring that the length and efficiency of an investigation is controlled. Amendment 17, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Smith, sets out a practical route for putting the investigation under the control of the Director of Service Prosecutions. An investigator must, within six months of the complaint, provide a preliminary report to the DSP of the progress of his investigation. As may well happen informally in any event, the DSP may give guidance on the lines of inquiry which would be appropriate.
In my amendment, if, on an assessment of all the papers, the DSP sees no future in the investigation, he would have the power to terminate it then and there. If he orders the investigation to continue, there would be regular reporting to him of the progress of the inquiry, again with the possibility of him calling a halt. I have discussed this with the former Judge Advocate-General, Judge Blackett. He is of the view that control of the investigation is highly desirable but that the power to stop an investigation should rest with a designated judge, not with the DSP. A moment ago, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, suggested that this might not be satisfactory and that a more independent person should be involved in supervising an investigation. I am not really worried about what way one approaches it, but there should be control of an investigation to ensure that it is proceeding at a proper pace and in a proper direction. I think there was a modicum of support for that amendment even from the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton. Since the DSP has the undoubted power to decide not to prosecute on the conclusion of an investigation, I do not see any problem with the DSP controlling the steps leading up to the final report.
I have also added my name to Amendment 3 on the basis that, at the very least, in deciding whether to prosecute, the DSP should have in the forefront of his mind whether a fair trial has been materially prejudiced by delay or by the quality of the investigation. I have in the past made submissions in court that a fair trial is impossible through delay, pre-trial publicity or matters of that sort, but never with success. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, criticised Amendment 3 as too soft. I do not think so, if it is given a statutory formulation. It would be given weight as an important consideration for the DSP at the time of his decision whether to commence proceedings at all. I submitted earlier this afternoon that a presumption against prosecution is not the way forward. Whether a fair trial is possible should be an important consideration before the prosecution commences.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, once again we have all been struck by the quality of the debate, which has penetrated issues that are legitimately at the heart of the Bill. Noble Lords who have raised issues related to the Bill are rightly seeking clarification and reassurance about what different components of the Bill mean, and particularly where the whole issue of investigations lies in relation to it.
I will begin with Amendment 3, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The Government’s intention with the measures that we have introduced in Part 1 of the Bill is to provide demonstrable reassurance to our service personnel and veterans. It is not only a worthy aspiration but a necessary one. It is a demonstrable reassurance in relation to the threat of legal proceedings arising from alleged events occurring many years earlier on operations overseas. This has meant balancing the need to introduce protective measures for service personnel and veterans and remaining compliant with our domestic and international obligations.
On the one hand, the measures set a high threshold for a prosecutor to determine that a case should be prosecuted, as well as ensuring that the adverse impact of overseas operations will be given particular weight in favour of the serviceperson or veteran; on the other hand, as I have previously said, the measures do not and cannot act as an amnesty or statute of limitations, do not fetter the prosecutor’s discretion in making a decision to prosecute, and are compliant with international law. I believe that we have achieved this balance, this equilibrium, in the combination of Clause 2, the presumption, and Clause 3, the matters to be given particular weight. We are providing the additional protection that our service personnel and veterans so greatly deserve, while ensuring that in exceptional circumstances individuals can still be prosecuted for alleged offences.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am obliged for the detailed and very careful reply that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave, and I am particularly grateful to her for overriding instructions—that is the wrong word—given to her by the Government Whips. I am also appreciative of the very rich debate we have just had. I will draw attention to three particular interventions. First, my noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton expressed the view that everybody subsequently expressed, including the Minister, that it is the lengthy investigations that we are trying to deal with here. Secondly, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, made the point that the real evil here is investigation and reinvestigation; and, thirdly, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, “Look, this presumption that the Government are relying on about exceptionality will not provide much protection when you see the low numbers of prosecutions that have been given.”
I earnestly ask the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, to consider carefully the points that have been made in the course of this debate by everybody. I am increasingly concerned about the presumption. It does not do the trick, because it does not provide the reassurance that is required. It raises very problematic questions of international law, it does not deal with very many cases, and it risks bringing in the ICC. So it will not give the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, are looking for. There were signs that the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, in supporting Amendment 28, might be beginning to support some of the proposals that we are making.
So I earnestly ask the noble Baroness to think again about this, because we are united in what we are trying to achieve, and the presumption in Clause 2 does not do it. Of course I beg leave to withdraw my amendment, but we will certainly return to these issues on Report, because this is the heart of the Bill.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We come to the group beginning with Amendment 4. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 3: Matters to be given particular weight
Amendment 4
Baroness Massey of Darwen
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the other amendments to Clause 3 in the name of Baroness Massey would delete the requirement to give “particular weight” in any prosecution decision after 5 years to a person having an impaired ability to exercise self-control or to exercise sound judgement whilst being deployed on operations overseas.
Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]
My Lords, again I am speaking as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the amendments are again based on the views of expert witnesses who contributed to its report. I shall speak to Amendments 4, 7 and 8. They relate to Clause 3 and would delete the requirement to give “particular weight” in any prosecution decision after five years to a person having an impaired ability to exercise self-control or to exercise sound judgment while being deployed on operations overseas. The amendments would omit Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). Their concern is similar to concerns in Clause 11 in relation to limitations on bringing proceedings under the Human Rights Act.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights report on the Bill explains in chapter 3 that:
“In domestic law the prosecution would take into account a person’s mental health as part of the decision as to whether a prosecution is in the public interest—and this is a factor that would currently already apply to prosecutions of members of the Armed Forces. Moreover, a person who is not fit to plead at the time of trial would not be assessed for the … mental element … of an offence. A defendant could raise a plea of insanity as a defence if at the time of the offence their mental condition was so impaired that they were unable to understand the act they were doing or that it was wrong.”
Paragraph 77 of the report states:
“The MoD should not be sending Armed Forces personnel on deployment who are unable to make ‘sound judgements’, who cannot ‘exercise self-control’ or whose mental health is so severely affected that the MoD does not consider that they should be responsible for their criminal actions. Moreover, if a member of the Armed Forces becomes unable to make ‘sound judgements’, can no longer ‘exercise self-control’ or where there are significant concerns about their mental health, then there should be adequate systems in place to relieve that person of their operational duties, remove them from the conflict situation (where appropriate) and give them the support that they need.”
The Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed concern at paragraph 76 that,
“the Bill does not provide any incentives for the military hierarchy to ensure that members of the Armed Forces who are mentally unfit to be deployed get removed from operational duties and given the support that they need. Instead it includes an impediment to prosecuting a person whose judgement may be impaired, who lacks adequate self-control or whose mental health may have been affected”.
Service personnel are trained to deal with complex situations, and there are undoubtedly high-stress situations in combat. Due account must be taken of these complexities as part of any decision on whether to bring a prosecution. However, it should not be part of a statutory barrier to bringing prosecutions when they are in the public interest.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights does not consider that there is any solid basis for including additional requirements that could risk granting de facto impunity to those who have committed crimes on the grounds that the perpetrator lacked sound judgment or could not exercise self-control beyond the threshold already established in criminal law. For that reason, the committee recommends deleting Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]
My Lords, the question is when this condition intervenes. It would be one thing to send a person over to a foreign assignment with that condition at that time, but there must be a risk that the impetus of foreign work in certain conditions would bring about these conditions in the person in question. There is therefore a real question as to whether or not the matter of the investigation discloses that the person in question became subject to that condition as a result of his being in the operation abroad. It does not necessarily mean that a person is sent into the work with that kind of condition. I would have thought that that distinction was quite important since the idea of the clause seems to be that they look to see whether or not the conditions under which the military man or woman has been working have produced these results, so far as their mental health is concerned.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, in principle I am quite concerned about overprescribing matters to be taken into account, because I would want all prosecutors in relation to all suspects to have a very broad discretion to take into account all sorts of adverse factors in fairness to a potential accused. None the less the Minister, who is the most gifted and reasonable advocate, says that part of the purpose of the Bill is reassurance—presumably even if that is a psychological comfort rather than an actual legal one, because I am sure that all relevant factors are currently available.
The Minister also talks about balance and equilibrium. In that spirit I am concerned, given that it is said that prosecution after five years is now going to be wholly exceptional, that no factors are listed in the Bill that militate towards that exceptional prosecution. Why not? Surely that would be the balanced thing to do in the spirit of equilibrium. Why is there no mention here of issues such as covert operations, witnesses and indeed victims of war crimes potentially having been incarcerated, or the crime being particularly undetectable because of collusion by people within an operational cohort or even at a higher level? It seems strange as a matter of good law to have put in the factors that militate against prosecution, which we are told is to be exceptional, as two parts of the triple lock, but to have given no guidance at all as to the exceptional circumstances. With that in mind, I can only agree with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is such an important committee for both Houses in performing their role in relation to human rights, and with the remarks of my noble friend Lady Massey.
Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)
I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness. I am grateful to her for, dare I say, reaching out during the last group of amendments and attempting to reach some common ground. I think we are seeking to achieve similar things, albeit coming from very different perspectives, since I was a practitioner, as it were, in the past. I looked very carefully at the amendment and, for fear of being damned with faint praise by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, there are aspects that I absolutely understand.
As ever, though, the problem has just been hit on the head by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, and that is the application. It is one thing to say that people who are suffering should not be put into a war zone, and that is absolutely right. However, the application matters when you are already in a war zone—a distant FOB—and within a small group with no ability to blow a whistle and stop the war in order to be withdrawn from the situation, along with the gradual deterioration of the condition over a period of time. This will not necessarily be seen by those around you because they are suffering similar things. It is not quite as easy to put into practical application during operations, which is why we need to be careful.
When I was training to become a bomb disposal officer, I knew absolutely what I was letting myself in for. Having served on operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, most recently in Afghanistan while I was a Member of Parliament, it is not always possible to see these deteriorations. It is important to realise that a medical or psychiatric condition may or may not be recognised at the time. Prosecutors are already required to have regard to any significant mental or physical ill-health or disability as in some circumstances this may mean that it is less likely that a prosecution is required. Clause 3 simply seeks to ensure that such considerations are put on to a statutory footing within the unique context of an overseas operation.
I recognise that I come at this from a different angle and I can see the precise way in which noble and noble and learned Lords are looking at the Bill, but I will go back to the comments I made earlier. This is also about sending a message. By putting this on to a statutory footing in the Bill, it will send a clear message to members of our Armed Forces that the Government and Parliament understand that we are asking them to do extraordinary things in extraordinary circumstances. This would be a recognition of that.
Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I also speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights which produced the report on this Bill, and it is what is in that report which will influence the brief comments that I shall make. I support what my noble friend Lady Massey has said.
I accept fully that it is most unlikely that the Armed Forces would send someone abroad who was not capable of making sound judgments. The issue, as evidenced by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, just now and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is whether people in a war zone, in very difficult and dangerous circumstances, might develop a condition where their judgment was not as sound as when they were sent there. However, my understanding is that soundness of judgment is something that underlies all prosecutorial decisions in the criminal law of this country anyway, so I am not clear as to why we should treat soldiers differently from the way that the law normally works.
I can do no better than to quote from paragraph 79 of the JCHR report:
“The mental health of a defendant is already borne in mind as part of the prosecutorial decision as to whether it is in the public interest to bring a prosecution. We do not consider that there is any solid basis for including an additional requirement that could risk granting de facto impunity to those who have committed crimes on the grounds that the perpetrator lacked sound judgement, or could not exercise self-control, beyond the threshold already established in criminal law. For this reason, we would recommend deleting clause 3(2)(a), 3(3) and 3(4).”
The key words in this are
“beyond the threshold already established in criminal law.”
If we believe that the threshold in our criminal law is adequate, we do not need this extra provision. That is the basis on which I will support what my noble friend Lady Massey said at the beginning of this debate.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we stand foursquare behind our troops and we want to work with the Government to build the broadest consensus possible on the Bill—tailored to supporting our Armed Forces members and safeguarding human rights. The amendments in this group aim to probe an understanding of what particular weight a prosecutor must give when considering a prosecutorial decision related to alleged conduct during overseas operations. As we have heard, Amendment 4 would remove the requirement on a prosecutor to consider the adverse effect on the person of the conditions they were exposed to. Amendment 7 would remove the requirement on the prosecutor to consider any exceptional demands and stresses, while Amendment 8 would remove the definition of any adverse effects, including making sound judgments or considering mental health.
The amendments are based on concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights which stated:
“We do not consider that there is any solid basis for including additional requirements that could risk granting de facto impunity.”
If mental health is already considered by prosecutors, as indicated by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, why do the Government believe it necessary to include it in this Bill? As the Minister will see, these requirements have not been considered by prosecutors before. Also, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer asked in the previous group, why have the Government not included a requirement for prosecutors to give weight to the quality and duration of relevant investigations? The Armed Forces Judge Advocate, General Jeff Blackett, has said:
“Clause 3 is engaged after five years. It seems bizarre to me that in deciding whether to prosecute, you have a post-five-year test, but not a pre-five-year test.”
Why have the Government drafted Clause 3 in this way? What independent legal advice was given in relation to the drafting of the clause? Vexatious claims are a serious problem, but we fear that the focus on a presumption against prosecution misses the point: it is the current cycle of investigations. We can see that from how the Government have failed to give particular weight to the quality and duration of the investigations in this clause.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, once again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and all other contributors to the debate for a fertile discussion. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I shall probably repeat some of the themes to which I have already referred.
In relation to these amendments, I would comment that we ask a huge amount of our service personnel. We send them to undertake high-threat, high-risk operations in defence of our country and its people. They do their duty in the clear knowledge that they may be injured, maimed or even killed. That is the unique nature of their job and is what sets them apart from the rest of us. The Government believe therefore that it is absolutely right and reasonable to require that in return we ensure that a prosecutor, when coming to a decision to prosecute, must give particular weight to the unique circumstances of overseas operations and the adverse impact that these may have on a service person’s capacity to make sound judgments and on their mental health at the time of an alleged offence. This will be in addition to considering the existing evidential sufficiency and public interest test.
Let me make it clear that this is intended not to excuse bad behaviour by service personnel but to ensure that prosecutors give full recognition to the significant difference in the circumstances surrounding an alleged offence committed on operations overseas as compared, for example, with situations where the alleged criminal conduct occurs in a domestic, civilian setting.
Although differing views to the attitude of the Government have perhaps been expressed in the debate, as far as I could ascertain, contributors acknowledged that the conditions referred to in the Bill could indeed be personal impairments that might attach to Armed Forces personnel in the course of their operations overseas. That is why the prosecutor must consider the presumption against prosecution in Clause 2 and determine whether the case meets the exceptional threshold. The prosecutor must also, as required by Clause 3, give particular weight to matters that may effectively tip the balance in favour of not prosecuting.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the mover, the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen.
Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab)
My Lords, again I thank the Minister for her concern and detailed response. Many wise comments and questions have been made. I appreciate what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is saying about lack of sound judgment developing under stress in adverse conditions in conflict situations. The point that I wanted to make was that I agreed that that would happen, but part of what I was saying was that people needed support to come to terms with that, which could take a very long time.
My noble friends Lord Dubs and Lord Tunnicliffe gave a response. The question that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked on why Clause 3 has been drafted in this way is important. In response to the Minister’s final comments, I should like to read what she said. It is difficult to be persuaded that prosecutors would find it difficult to understand the condition and environment in which service personnel are working. It is fairly obvious to most people that those circumstances are difficult. However, I should like to read what she said, and read the full debate, and discuss with colleagues what action we want to take next. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 10. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 10
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“(3A) Where the consent of the Attorney General is sought under subsection (2) or (3), the Attorney General must prepare a report containing his or her reasons for granting or withholding consent, as the case may be, with reference to sections 1 to 3 of this Act, and must lay a copy of this report before each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Attorney General to lay out their evidence and assessment as to why they granted or refused consent to prosecute.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
There are three amendments in this group, Amendments 10, 11 and 12, which deal with the question of the need for the consent of the Attorney-General before a prosecution covered by the presumption goes ahead. This is an important but quite short series of issues; in effect, the Bill is adding in the consent of the Attorney-General as the third part of the triple lock, before prosecution is brought against military personnel in respect of overseas operations. Therefore, the consent will be required only when a prosecutor has decided that a case where over five years have gone by is exceptional, and the Attorney-General’s consent, or lack of it, will be of real significance only when he or she does not give it.
The consequences of the Attorney-General not giving consent are, in my view, threefold. First, it may well give rise to suggestions that the issue has been politicised. Secondly, the Attorney-General is very frequently involved in making or overriding decisions made in relation to operations overseas. For example, the Attorney-General will often give instruction and advice in relation to conditions of detention. It is worth reading the evidence given by Nicholas Mercer to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, where he described the involvement of the Attorney General’s Office in decisions that he had been involved in as a lawyer when, in foreign theatres of war, the use of force was involved. As such, my second point is that the Attorney-General may well have been involved in decisions that affect that theatre of war. From my own experience as Solicitor-General, I can tell you that that was indeed the case.
My third point is that, if the Attorney-General is going to override the prosecutor’s view that a prosecution should be brought, he will inevitably be increasing the risk that the matter is referred to or taken up by the ICC—because it will see a case where the prosecutor thinks that the prosecution has an over-50% chance of success and the public interest allows it, yet the Attorney-General has not allowed it to go ahead. Fourthly, if the Attorney-General is overriding the view of the prosecutor, which is the only time when this would be significant, questions will arise as to whether that puts the United Kingdom in breach of a whole range of international obligations—the Geneva convention, the United Nations Convention against Torture, Articles 2 and 3 of the human rights convention and the Rome convention, which is the International Criminal Court statute, in effect.
As such, our amendments first require the Attorney-General to give “reasons” as to whether he is giving or withholding consent, and laying them before Parliament. Secondly, Amendment 11 proposes that he must consider whether refusing consent will
“increase the likelihood of the International Criminal Court exercising its own competence”.
Thirdly, Amendment 12 proposes that he must consider whether his refusing consent would constitute a “breach of international law”. These amendments are laid by way of probing. We have real concerns about this provision and that it will not provide added protection but will instead give rise to very significant legal risks. I beg to move.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, these amendments seek to make the Attorney-General and the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland more accountable in relation to what we might call “late prosecutions”, and in particular more accountable to Parliament. The obligation in Amendment 10 provides for a report to Parliament in the event of either the granting or withholding of consent for such a prosecution. I accept what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said—that there may be more interest in circumstances where the Attorney-General does not consent to a prosecution.
Amendment 11 provides that the Attorney-General should give consent if there is an increased likelihood of ICC involvement. In Amendment 12 he or she must give consent if not doing so would lead to a breach of international law. Normally, advice from law officers to the Government is not disclosed to Parliament—nor even is the fact that advice has been sought—so to some extent these amendments are a bit of a novelty.
I have considered a number of lawyers’ views about whether the courts, as opposed to Parliament, could be involved in reviewing a decision by the Attorney-General either to consent to a prosecution or not to consent. The balance of view seems to be a cautious yes, although the courts would be expected to exercise a so-called “light-touch review”. In other words, it is unlikely that the courts would quash a decision of this sort.
I was most interested to hear what the noble and learned Lord said about these amendments because, on reading them, I was not quite sure what would be in the report proposed for receipt by Parliament. What would the law officer have to say? Would he or she simply cite public interest, gravity of offences and reasonable prospect of conviction in the event of a decision to prosecute, and presumably the opposite in the event of a decision not to prosecute? I suppose there might be some reference to the length of time between the acts concerned and the decision to prosecute. Of course, he or she would not be expected to give detailed reasons on the strengths of a particular witness or worries about one aspect of the evidence, or something of that sort. I am not sure what Parliament is going to do with that information, but I accept that accountability to Parliament is generally desirable.
As to the obligation under Amendment 11 in relation to the ICC, my understanding of the ICC—and I have attended one of its conferences in Rome—is that it is a court devoted to the macro rather than the micro, as I said when referring to the evidence of Major Campbell. It is also concerned mostly with offences at a high level.
Such prosecutions are often quasi-political—and I do not mean that in a pejorative sense. I recall that the perceived political element of the court was such that a number of countries walked out of the conference in Rome in the first few minutes as a protest at the alleged political element. Of course, the Rome statute is one to which the United States of America is not a signatory.
In one sense, the failure to prosecute or a decision not to prosecute by the Attorney-General must mean that there is an increased likelihood of ICC involvement, although I am not sure how that can be assessed. I entirely support our involvement with the ICC, but there are often complex reasons, including the availability of resources, which determine whether or not there are prosecutions. Our general support for the ICC as an institution should not be diluted in any way, but I am not sure that fear of ICC involvement should mean that the Attorney-General cannot come to the conclusion he or she thinks appropriate in these circumstances.
Similarly, the question of a putative breach of international law seems to me to be rather superfluous. There is an obligation, as I understand it, on the part of the law officers, as Ministers, to comply with the Ministerial Code. That obligation includes an obligation to obey the law, including international law. I do not want to revisit the difficult territory covered by the internal market Bill, but my understanding of the Ministerial Code, and I am on record as saying as much in your Lordships’ House, is that the obligation includes international as well as domestic law—although sometimes international law may not be as easily ascertainable—so I am not currently aware of the need for this extra obligation.
I acknowledge that these amendments are essentially probing, so that Parliament can understand better the process by which the Attorney-General would be involved in so-called late prosecutions. I share the interest of the noble and learned Lord in how the process might work generally, but I am not for the moment persuaded that any of these amendments is either appropriate or necessary.
Finally, I am uneasy about the alleged political component of the Attorney-General’s involvement. I think the role of the Attorney-General in this sort of circumstance is pre-eminently not a political one, but it is ironic that the involvement of Parliament in some way that is envisaged by these amendments could, in fact, run the risk of some important boundaries being crossed.
The Deputy Chairman of Committee (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, has withdrawn from this group, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, that was quite interesting, actually, because of course these amendments are trying to create some sort of accountability for the Attorney-General. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, was going to say something about the Attorney-General being rather more political than in the past, because of course the office of Attorney-General has been sadly undermined in recent years, particularly last year with the Attorney-General’s quick defence of Dominic Cummings’ unlawful behaviour. That was, I fear, just one example, and the fact that she then so quickly rowed back from her position to a position of it being only her political decision and not a legal opinion shows how easy it is for an Attorney-General to step over that increasingly faint line. In that, I think that she mistakenly excused illegality in the name of political expediency. We, of course, cannot become complicit in that, so I was extremely pleased to sign the shadow Attorney-General’s Amendments 10, 11 and 12.
I am concerned that this triple lock in the Bill can actually lock justice out. Even if the power of justice is strong enough to overcome the first two locks, we have to trust the Attorney-General to make the right decision on the third lock, which of course would be very difficult. The Attorney-General therefore has to publish their reasons when making decisions, because these decisions should be made according to normal standards of administrative propriety and should rightly be subject to judicial review. Where the reasons for the decisions are irrational, unlawful or irrelevant, they should be able to be overturned. Where the decision is purely politically motivated and has no foundation in facts, the law or the interests of justice, equally it should be overturned. These amendments are essential to ensure that this is the case.
Such important decisions as those envisaged in the Bill must never be made on a whim or be purely political. Justice has to be done and be seen to be done. I would just like to add that various noble Lords have suggested that some things are impossible to understand if you have not experienced warfare or action of that kind. Of course, that is absolutely true, but we are not talking about a lack of sympathy for service personnel; we are talking about criminal acts. That is the basis of what this law is about; it is not to do with whether we have sympathy or not, it is about criminal acts, and it is important to remember that.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and to the noble Baronesses, Lady D’Souza and Lady Jones, from whom we have just heard, for tabling these amendments. They have cemented in my mind concerns that I expressed at Second Reading about the role of the Attorney-General as the third lock in the architecture of this Bill.
In response to comments made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about how, if it is such a problem, we have a problem with the role of the Attorney-General in the constitution per se, I would say not quite. We know that the Attorney-General wears different hats—sometimes legal adviser to the Government and sometimes to Parliament—and sometimes acts in a separate role in relation to the public interest. Those hats are capable of being worn at different times. No doubt it takes a bit of skill to get the balance right, but in normal, civilian prosecutions, I suggest that an Attorney-General is very unlikely to have been giving legal advice on, for example, the investigative process; they would be very unlikely to have given advice directly to the police on the search that gave rise to the prosecution.
This is not the case in war and conflict, where the Attorney-General, as legal adviser to the Government, has undoubtedly been involved in the rules of engagement; they have quite possibly given very detailed advice on those rules and, as my noble and learned friend said, on matters concerning detention and so on. To make potentially the same person who advised on the legality of an operation the third lock on whether alleged criminality should be prosecuted seems to me unlikely to give confidence—the word “reassurance” has been used a lot—to anybody, whether that be civilian members of the public or military personnel. After all, this could be an Attorney-General who advised on the operation or one from a party that was very much opposed to the operation before it came into government. I have real concerns about the politicising of these prosecutions. One has only to think about the controversies in recent conflicts around the world to see that potential damage to public confidence, including among members of the Armed Forces on the front line and their families.
If the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will forgive me a quick word, there was a little having of cake and eating it in his remarks. He referred—I do not think as a criticism—to the ICC as quasi-political. Given these various hats, someone might well say that of the senior law officer involved in these matters who sits in or comes to Cabinet, including war Cabinets. In terms of accountability, to give this role to the Attorney-General is to give it to a political person who is appointed directly by the Prime Minister—quite possibly, as I say, the Prime Minister who authorised an operation—and for that all to be in the shadows. The Attorney-General’s original advice on the legality of the conflict and perhaps specific operations is currently in the shadows and now the Attorney-General’s veto of the independent prosecutor’s decision will quite possibly be in the shadows as well. That is highly problematic.
I am grateful for these amendments, which I think are probing. In any event, I think the Attorney-General should not be involved in this way at all. It seriously risks politicising already very delicate matters.
Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)
It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. I am particularly interested in her point about the Attorney-General not only offering advice on the potential conflict but being put in this position as well.
These amendments firmly caught my eye. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, outlined in his opening comments some of the challenges of overseas operations in a military context and politicisation—although in my mind all conflicts are political in one form or another. I immediately looked to see what historical examples there were of advice being published by the Attorney-General. There are not many. If we were to continue the theme of overseas operations and look back to probably the most controversial one of recent years—from 2003—the Attorney-General’s advice was certainly not published for that. Nor, I understand—though I am happy to be corrected—was it even given to Cabinet at the time. It is worth remembering how times change. There now seems to be an eagerness to publish the advice of the Attorney-General that was not there in 2003.
My instinct is that giving reasons goes against the grain of the constitutional principle regarding law officers’ advice: law officers do not confirm the facts or publish their legal advice or principles. I think that that is an important principle that enables frank advice to be given. If we accept that, an exception would create a slippery slope that could extend to other areas. There is also the reality that the sorts of information that the reasoning would be based on could have security implications, so should not be disclosed and would largely have to be omitted anyway. Lastly—I am no expert and this is a genuine question for noble and learned Lords in the House—I think that a judicial review, based on ordinary public law grounds, would surely be a sufficient check on decisions such as these.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the role of the Attorney-General in giving consent to a prosecution has been much discussed in the past. Following on from the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, I note that the Law Commission reported in 1998, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, when she was Attorney-General, conducted a consultation following the controversy over the legality of the Iraq war. The precise result of that consultation is not clear. I am interested in the suggestion made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the role requires a fresh review; I agree with that.
In the context of this Bill, it is a simple question: in what circumstances is it appropriate for the Attorney-General to second-guess the decision of either the Director of Public Prosecutions or, in this proposal, the Director of Service Prosecutions? The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, also made an important point by referring to the conflict of interest that would arise if the Attorney-General has advised on the conduct or legality of an operation, or on the treatment of prisoners, and the issue is, for example, the way in which prisoners have been treated.
I remember that Lieutenant-Colonel Nick Mercer, when he was the senior legal adviser to the group in Iraq, advised that the way in which prisoners who had been taken were being treated—they were made to kneel with a sack over their head and their hands bound behind their back—was a breach of the European convention. He was howled down by the Ministry of Defence for voicing such an outrageous view—one that was subsequently upheld in the European Court of Human Rights.
If the presumption against prosecution survives, the DSP starts with a curb on his discretion, as we have discussed. If he thinks that the circumstances of a case oblige him to ignore the presumption against prosecution, his decision will be based on his judgment, first, whether there is sufficient evidence on a balance of probabilities to result in a conviction and, secondly, whether it is in the public or service interest to prosecute. If Amendment 3 were to be successful in any form, he would also have to take an overall decision on whether the possibility of a fair trial had been compromised by delay.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, this has been perhaps a narrower debate in relation to interesting legal issues but none the less, once again, productive and fertile. I realise that these amendments are the product of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thoroton, who has applied his considerable legal gifts to their drafting.
As has been explained, Amendments 10, 11 and 12 to Clause 5 seek to place a requirement on the Attorney-General to report to Parliament with the reasons for granting or withholding consent. The requirement in Clause 5 is that the consent of the Attorney-General for England and Wales, or the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland, has to be given before a case of an alleged offence committed by a serviceperson more than five years earlier on an overseas operation can proceed to prosecution. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked what the Attorney-General was doing in this Bill. We have introduced the consent function because it is important for service personnel and veterans to be confident that their case will be considered with care at the highest levels of our justice system.
The Attorney-General is left to discharge that obligation independently. As the Committee is aware, requiring the consent of the Attorney-General for a prosecution is not unusual. She already has numerous other consent functions, including for the institution of all prosecutions for war crimes offences under the International Criminal Court Act 2001—nor does it mean that the Government have any role to play in a decision on consent. It is a constitutional principle that, when taking a decision on whether to consent to a prosecution, the Attorney-General acts quasi-judicially and independently of government, applying the well-established prosecution principles of evidential sufficiency and public interest. I seem to remember that on Second Reading my noble friend Lord Faulks articulated that position very eloquently, and I think that it is generally understood.
We feel that it is not appropriate for the Attorney-General to comment on any individual or ongoing investigation or prosecution. I am aware of no statutory requirement anywhere else for the Attorney-General to report in relation to individual casework decisions. We do not believe, therefore, that it would be appropriate to introduce such a requirement in the Bill. As I have said elsewhere, preserving the independence and discretion of the prosecutor is vital to the Part 1 measures. Without this, we cannot ensure that cases are treated fairly, nor can we prevent the ICC from stepping in. Adding a measure to the Bill that would require the Attorney-General to make a public statement before Parliament about specific prosecutions would quite simply interfere with that discretion. That would be an unusual and, I suggest, unwise innovation. Interestingly, critics of the Bill have expressed concern that giving the Attorney-General a role in Part 1 risks introducing politics into what should be a criminal justice process. Indeed, the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Chakrabarti, voiced these concerns. We do not agree that this is true for the Bill as drafted, but I pose the question: surely these amendments risk that precise outcome. Certainly my noble friend Lord Faulks confirmed that apprehension.
Amendments 11 and 12 would require the Attorney-General to make a prediction about whether the International Criminal Court will exercise its competence in a particular case, make a judgment about whether a prosecution would
“lead to a breach of international law”,
and then compel her to act in a certain way. I think that even the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, would agree that both these amendments would be an unprecedented extension of the normal consent function that the Attorney-General has in relation to the prosecution of offences. The International Criminal Court is an independent body, and it would be inappropriate for the Attorney-General to speculate about or pre-empt decisions that the International Criminal Court might make. Again, my noble friend Lord Faulks commented on that. The phrase “international law” is included in Amendment 12 but is undefined. It is not clear which international laws the amendment is attempting to incorporate into the Bill.
In my opinion, we should allow the evidence that has been produced to the prosecutor, and the public interest, to speak for itself in each individual case, considered by an independent prosecutor, using their discretion. We should not force the Attorney-General to potentially compromise his or her independence in a particular case by adjudicating on these other matters. For that reason, I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am obliged to everyone who participated in the debate and to the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for the care with which she answered the questions raised.
As the debate went on, I became increasingly concerned about the involvement of the Attorney-General. I am a very strong believer in the necessity for a Minister in the Government who has functions to protect the rule of law in the way in which the Attorney-General does in the Government of the United Kingdom and the Lord Advocate does in the Government of Scotland. In relation to the criminal justice system, including for the military, it is critical that the Attorney-General is, and is seen to be, politically independent of the Government in a way in which the current Attorney-General, Suella Braverman, did not seem to be in relation to the Dominic Cummings question. There are also questions over the Lord Advocate in Scotland in relation to the redaction of Mr Salmond’s evidence to the constitutional committee.
What is being proposed here is, in effect, a circumstance in which the Attorney-General will override the view of a prosecutor. If the Attorney-General agrees with the prosecutor on bringing a prosecution, and the decision will only come to the Attorney-General once a decision has been made to prosecute, he or she will be overriding that decision. If the provision is to remain in the Bill, only if the Attorney-General or the Advocate-General explains why he or she is doing that will there be a sense that politics has not intervened. Only if he or she gives reasons that stand up to scrutiny will a sense of political involvement be removed.
I completely accept that my proposal is novel and would not constitute formal advice, and I accept the point made by a number of noble Lords that it would break with precedent. However, it is so important to preserve the evident independence of the Attorney-General. I agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said to the Joint Committee on Human Rights that in performing this function, the Attorney-General would be acting entirely independently of government. If he or she says no to a prosecution that a professional prosecutor has said should go ahead, they should explain.
I will of course think carefully about what noble Lords have said in this debate but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 14. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 6: “Relevant offence”
Amendment 14
“( ) An offence is not a relevant offence if it amounts to—(a) torture, within the meaning of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture); or(b) genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime as defined in section 50 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (meaning of “genocide”, “crime against humanity” and “war crime”).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the presumption against prosecution does not apply to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or torture.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the amendment stands in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, and my noble friend Lord West. It provides that the presumption against prosecution does not apply to war crimes, crimes against humanity or torture.
I am an instinctive supporter of our Armed Forces and the civilians who support them. I always was, but as Secretary of State for Defence and then Secretary-General of NATO, and with the heavy responsibilities that both posts impose, my regard and admiration grew and was magnified. In those posts, it is a huge responsibility to bear in the duty of care, not only to the staff who work for and to oneself but in carrying responsibility for the safety and security of those who we and they seek to protect. In the light of those factors and the fact that I have had personally to make the decision to deploy forces into danger overseas, I was almost automatically in favour of legislation that would have prevented vexatious investigations and prosecutions that make life a misery for so many of those we send to defend the country’s interest.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]
My Lords, I support Amendment 14 for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, has given. But I also wish to speak to Amendment 36 in my name, which would add torture to the list of statutory offences in Schedule 1, and to Amendments 37 to 45 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which broaden the list of exceptions to include genocide and crimes in breach of the Geneva conventions.
In effect, what we are seeking to do is to provide the Government with an alternative to the approach taken by Amendment 14, which would place these exclusions in the body of the Bill—and in that way be more secure—and not in the schedule. For what it is worth, I should explain that I got in first with my Amendment 36, but I certainly do not claim primacy for my approach. I was seeking to fit in with the structure of the Bill, and it did not occur to me to deal with these issues in the rather more skilful way proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson.
My particular interest, for the reasons mentioned at Second Reading, is to ensure that torture is not a relevant offence for the purposes of the Bill. It is all very well—if I may say so with great respect—for the Minister to say that the Government take that offence very seriously. But the case for excluding it is compelling—as indeed it is for the other offences on this list. The risk, if this is not done, of our armed personnel being prosecuted in the ICC has been addressed by others, including the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. However, I wish to emphasise the nature and strength of our international obligations and the importance of adhering to them and of our being seen to do so.
The torture convention stands out as an instrument which places torture carried out by public officials or others acting in an official capacity, such as those in our armed services, at the very top of crimes abhorred by the international community. Of course, the same could be said of genocide, although the rather primitive genocide convention lacks the teeth that the torture convention provides. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, as the senior Law Lord presiding over the Appellate Committee of this House, said in one of his judgments that the nature of the prohibition of torture requires the states that are parties to the convention, as we are,
“to do more than just eschew the practice of torture.”
Condemnation carries with it the obligation to punish acts of torture wherever and whenever the perpetrator is found within our territory. There is no time limit on this obligation. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, said earlier today, there is no exemption for this offence.
The idea that there should be a presumption against prosecution, making it exceptional for proceedings to be brought, as Clause 2 provides, simply cannot be reconciled with our obligations under Articles 4 and 5 of the convention to establish jurisdiction over and punish the torturer. These obligations are not qualified. They are not in any way reduced or softened by the passage of time. The plain and simple breach of the convention, which that provision amounts to unless torture is excluded from its reach, would be very regrettable, to say the least. It is certainly not the example we should be setting for other signatories of the convention which may be less concerned to uphold it than we are or have legal systems less strong than ours. We should uphold the convention, not undermine it, as the Bill seeks to do. I am sorry to put it that way, but, quite frankly, that is what is happening here.
There is another point, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. One of the innovations in the torture convention was the concept of universal jurisdiction. All states that signed that convention have a duty to establish jurisdiction over an offender. We recognised our obligation to do this in the case of Senator Pinochet. We will be doing members of our armed services a great disservice if, by declining to prosecute them here by applying this presumption, we expose them to the risk of being prosecuted by other contracting states anywhere in the world that are more alert to their obligations under the convention than we would be. Let us avoid that risk, as the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, seeks to do.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, I support this amendment, to which I have added my name. It is always a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, not least as, like him, I had the privilege of serving as an advocate depute, as Crown counsel, under the authority of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern.
As others have done, I begin by saying that the Armed Forces have my unequivocal support and admiration, not least because they often put themselves at risk of their lives in the interests of this country. More particularly, in recent months they have demonstrated precisely the flexibility and capability that have enabled us to deal with the problems caused by the coronavirus.
I can be brief because I shall speak only to Amendment 14. In doing so, I accept and adopt the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, authoritative as it was because of his previous responsibilities as Secretary of State for Defence and Secretary-General of NATO. It is clear that the purpose of this amendment is simple: to remove the presumption against prosecution for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture. I accept that the Bill does not prevent prosecution, but I believe that a presumption against it is misconceived.
In support of that, I pray in aid the executive summary of the Bill produced by the authoritative Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law on 19 January 2021. I begin with a direct quote. It says that
“murder, torture and other grave war crimes face substantial legal barriers before there can be a prosecution. ... The Bill undermines our obligations under the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Convention Against Torture.”
Further, it says that the Bill weakens the United Kingdom’s reputation for decisive action against war crimes and increases the likelihood that British soldiers may be prosecuted in the International Criminal Court. We heard, in the introduction by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, of this amendment, the particular interest that the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is taking in this legislation.
I have great difficulty in understanding the Government’s position on this matter. I have tried. I listened to and, indeed, read again the speech of the noble Baroness at Second Reading. She was kind enough to extend the opportunity to me and others to discuss particular issues connected with the Bill. I have read, too, the letter that the Government produced.
Respectfully, one difficulty is the fact that there is opposition such as I have described. I have no recollection, in the proceedings on the Bill so far, of any noble Lord speaking enthusiastically in support of the provisions that we seek to remove. That opposition consists, for example, of the Joint Committee on Human Rights—as the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, has just told us—General Sir Nick Parker, Elizabeth Wilmshurst and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank. I would add to that panoply the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, because, in the latter part of his speech on the first group that we discussed today, quoting the perceptive remarks of Mr John Healey, Member of Parliament, in the other place, he made the case against the Government’s provisions as eloquently as I have heard. If this were a piece of civil litigation, it would be easy to argue that all the authorities favour the amendment. I favour the amendment for this reason: it is necessary for both reputation and regulation, and I shall vote for it.
The Lord Bishop of Leeds [V]
My Lords, I understand the stated rationale for this Bill and I state at the outset that I have enormous respect for the noble Baroness the Minister, but I am struggling. I am not a lawyer, but I would like to focus on a couple of specific questions. I understand the difficulty with vexatious and untimely litigation, which is a curse, but legitimate litigation, however inconvenient, is surely the blessing of a free and civilised society that honours international law and a rules-based system in more than words.
The basic reason why I speak in support of Amendment 14 is that I fear the law of predictable or conscious consequences more than the law of unintended consequences. I ask the Minister to explain clearly this anomaly, which I cannot get my head around: this Bill, as currently drafted, will make it possible for an incident of torture or murder not to be prosecuted while a sexual offence committed in the same incident would be subject to prosecution. That suggests to me either that the reference to sexual offences is arbitrary or that torture and crimes against humanity and so on should also be admitted in the same category.
I understand the assertion that the Bill does not prevent prosecution, but we are dealing with law, not just with assertions of what may or may not be possible—it is what is written in the body of the Bill. I have said that I am not a lawyer, but I support the Armed Forces—my first career was at GCHQ in Cheltenham, providing direct support to our forces, not least during the Falklands conflict—and, despite not being a lawyer, I know that torture is absolutely forbidden in both domestic and international law and that no bars to prosecution are possible.
As Field Marshall Lord Guthrie pointed out more than once, these restrictions in the Bill cannot stand unchallenged. He said:
“By introducing a statutory presumption against prosecution and statutes of limitations, this bill undermines the absolute and non-derogable nature of the prohibition of torture and violates human rights law as well as international criminal and humanitarian law.”
Making torture an excluded offence under the Bill would, I think, have the double benefit of first, avoiding what Lord Guthrie rightly called the “de facto criminalisation” of the offence and, secondly, keeping the UK in line with the rules-based international order that we claim to uphold.
Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are similarly forbidden in law. Amending the law as proposed in the triple lock would make the UK the only country in the world to have deliberately legislated to restrict the Geneva conventions. Where does this place us in a world to which we claim to be an example of law and civility? Most oddly to my mind, however, as a signatory to the 1998 Rome statute, which enables the International Criminal Court to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes when a Government are unable or unwilling to do so, the Bill will make it possible for British soldiers to be prosecuted in the Hague—that is, before a foreign court. Really?
I strongly support the amendment not just because of the legal questions, but because there is a strong moral case for it. I recognise that the last time I made a moral argument in this House during the internal market Bill, it was dismissed by another Minister with the words, “We will not be listening to moral strictures,” but there is a moral case here. The church that I represent stands with victims of torture, and I think that our nation has done hitherto and should continue to do so. Our reputation as a country that is committed to the rules-based international order matters more than I think we sometimes realise. This amendment would further incentivise the UK to maintain the highest standards on the battlefield. It is this that differentiates the civilised from the uncivilised in combat.
If the Government will not accept the amendment, I would be grateful if they could explain rationally, legally and consistently, and perhaps even morally, why these anomalies are acceptable.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow a West Country SIGINTer. I will speak to Amendment 14 in support of my noble friend Lord Robertson and the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. It is extraordinary that the presumption against prosecution applies to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture. These crimes have a special place in the rubric of human rights unacceptability. In its current form, this legislation would seem to decriminalise such crimes by members of the Armed Forces if they are reported after five years. This cannot be the intention and serves the interests of no one. Indeed, in their attempt to protect the military, the Government will in fact damage our Armed Forces and cause our international standing serious harm, as has been said by all of the previous speakers.
If the Government say that the threat is more apparent than real because this will not happen, that will not wash, as the very strong perception remains, and that in itself can be damaging. As has been said before, there are a number of things about this Bill where the perception is almost more important than the fact. There should be no doubt in people’s minds about the commitment of the UK Armed Forces to adherence to international law in relation to war crimes. If their enemies believe they are not, they will feel that they have a right to be unconstrained in their behaviour against our people.
The Government initially seemed to understand that it is in the interests of all for allegations of torture to be investigated fully whenever they might arise. I have to say that I do not understand why they have changed their position. If war crimes are excluded from this, as has been said by a number of speakers, there is also an increased likelihood of UK service personnel being brought before the ICC. In debate on the International Criminal Court of 2001, it was made very clear that accusations of crimes mentioned would be tried by British courts, and we put huge effort into making sure that would be the case. It would be a disgrace if inadvertently, by reducing the scope for prosecutions in this country, we were to increase the scope for prosecutions in the Hague and possibly, as has been said, elsewhere in the world. That does not help our servicemen and women. I believe strongly that this amendment would ensure that that will not happen and I will vote for it.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB) [V]
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord West, I speak to Amendment 14. I strongly support this amendment. Torture, genocide and other crimes identified in the laws of conflict should never be subject to doubt that they are not fundamental to the way in which our Armed Forces are expected to operate, no matter how stressful or dangerous the situation they are exposed to on operations overseas. A dangerous ICC charge of not upholding such international law could arise.
Government reasoning for not including torture and war crimes, as is done for sexual crimes, seems to be that there might be some discernible range of tortures or crimes in the Geneva conventions which could be taken into account by the prosecuting authority—bearing in mind the stresses of active overseas operations—before reaching a decision to prosecute. If that is the case, surely it could be applied to consideration of a discernible range of sexual crimes, which the Bill seeks to eliminate from any consideration. Whether it is sexual crimes or torture, degrees of criminality surely can arise. If so, that should not be some explanation, reason or excuse for not prosecuting; neither should be singled out for different treatment. Torture and war crimes should be grouped with those of sex and treated as crimes always to be prosecuted.
Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I support Amendment 14 and have considerable sympathy for the other amendments in this group, so I will speak generally about these issues. Like all the previous speakers on this group, I believe that this Bill, as presently drafted, undermines our obligations under the Geneva conventions and the UN Convention against Torture, which explicitly require that serious international crimes, such as torture, genocide and crimes against humanity, are investigated and prosecuted. I am deeply concerned about this Bill because it promotes the growing, dangerous idea that the UK can simply set aside international obligations in law. Its entry into force will be yet more evidence of what Theresa May called the abandonment of the UK’s moral leadership on the world stage, and will add to the risk of more prolonged investigations of our Armed Forces, not fewer.
The Government have excluded a number of sexual offences listed in Schedule 1 from the scope of the Bill. During the Bill’s passage through the other place, the Government were asked on several occasions to explain why crimes such as torture and genocide remain within scope of the Bill, while offences of a sexual nature are excluded. In response, the Secretary of State and the Minister for Defence People and Veterans argued that violent and lethal acts are sometimes justified during combat, and these activities can expose service personnel to allegations of torture or other war crimes, whereas sexual violence can never be justified. The Minister repeated that explanation and expanded upon it at Second Reading.
I struggle to understand this explanation or to grasp why this distinction has been made. The best I can do is to summarise it in this way: the argument seems to be that the very nature of war or conflict justifies special rules to protect those engaged in conflict from allegations that they have breached the laws designed, sometimes solely but at least in part, to prevent just war and conflict from being used as an excuse for the perpetration of the most egregious crimes. This argument simply cannot be allowed to prevail.
The use of torture, like sexual offences, can never be justified. The legal definition of torture describes it in terms of the “intentional” or “deliberate” infliction of severe pain or suffering. In short, these acts are clearly distinct from legitimate use of force during combat. It is surely our duty to ensure that no British service personnel will be engaged in a situation which would put them at risk of credibly being accused of conduct meeting any of the relevant definitions of torture, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.
In the event of a rare, credible allegation of such behaviour being levelled at British service personnel, they should be effectively investigated and, where there is sufficient reliable and credible evidence, prosecuted. That is my understanding of our obligations and what we should be seeking to support with no conditionality.
Ministers who deny that the triple lock will weaken our stance on such crimes dismiss these arguments with the rhetorical equivalent of a wave of the hand, even though a large and diverse coalition of military, legal and other experts have sustained their view that it will do exactly that. As your Lordships’ House has heard from every previous speaker, they can explain comprehensively why that is the case.
I have one final point and I make no apology that it is a point which has already been made by every one of the preceding speakers. What is effectively a de facto statute of limitations on the prosecution of crimes makes it much more likely that British soldiers will be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court, which acts only where countries are unwilling to prosecute their own citizens. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, explained very clearly at Second Reading and repeated today that this not only makes investigation and possible prosecution by the ICC more likely, but also subjects them to the possibility of such investigations and prosecutions by any number of other jurisdictions.
There are three very specific public warnings of the risks of investigation and possible prosecution by the ICC. In addition to the letter to Ben Wallace, which has been referred to on a number of occasions, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court warned that if a proposed presumption against prosecution were introduced, it
“would need to consider its potential impact on the ability of the UK authorities to investigate and/or prosecute crimes allegedly committed by members of the British armed forces … against the standards of inactivity and genuineness set out in article 17 of the Statute.”
The Office of the Prosecutor also stated in the final report Situation in Iraq/UK published in December 2020, that it will continue to monitor the development of the Overseas Operations Bill and its impact, and may revisit its decision not to take action against the UK for war crimes committed in Iraq in the light of new facts or evidence. The increased risk of investigation or prosecution by the ICC also applies in respect of other past and future overseas operations.
We should all, Government and Parliament, remember that we have a solemn commitment to our Armed Forces given on ratification of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court, that no member would ever be at risk of appearing in The Hague. If this Bill in its present form becomes an Act of Parliament, it will be a deliberate breach of this commitment and the ultimate irony is that it will expose our armed forces in the future to long and possibly repeated investigations.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB) [V]
My Lords, the Minister, who has dealt with our concerns so graciously all afternoon, will probably realise that we now come to the winter of our discontent. It is here that I hope—if I may say so, with great respect—that she will consider even more carefully what is being said.
I support Amendments 14 and 36 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. He made the point—we hear it quite often in your Lordships’ House—that an undertaking from the Government to take seriously—to say that it is the intention of the Government—is not in itself a sufficient replacement for statute where something as vitally important as this is concerned.
Torture does not work—you hear what you want to hear—but it is also abhorrent, and, as the right reverend Prelate just said, it is immoral and uncivilised. We need for that reason to set an example which will protect our service men and women from possible torture if captured. I hope the noble Lord, Lord West, will forgive me if I quote a little further from what he has written:
“What is quite clear, and it was inculcated in us from day one of warfare training, is that ‘there are no circumstances in which torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever be justified’; it’s a principle that all members of our military must, and do, abide. We must be wary of creating a perception and certainly not a reality that this is not the case.”
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I do not know whether I am proud to speak in support of my noble friend Lord Robertson of Port Ellen and all the other moving speeches that I have heard or devastated that I feel that I need to. The arguments are clear and compelling and have been made from across your Lordships’ House. I need not repeat them save to remind the Minister that the warning from the chief ICC prosecutor is a very serious matter indeed and not something that any of us can be proud of. I therefore note in particular the speeches of my noble friends Lord Robertson and Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Defence Secretaries and one is a former Secretary-General of NATO. I have not always agreed with them on every matter of human rights disputes but the Minister and all your Lordships will know that their comments would not have been made lightly.
It was also important that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, reminded us of the universal jurisdiction over torture. I must therefore support not just Amendment 14 from my noble friend Lord Robertson but all noble Lords who are attempting to limit the reach of the Bill and prevent the presumption applying to war crimes, genocide, torture and crimes against humanity.
I say without hesitation to noble Lords who are not speaking in this group and who perhaps spoke in the past about what members of our Armed Forces would expect and whether we should feel comfortable looking them in the eye, that I have never met a member of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces who has attempted to justify any of those grave offences—quite the opposite. So much of their honour and their vocation is about believing in the rule of law and human rights internationally and putting their lives on the line so that grave offences of that kind are defeated elsewhere in the world and ruled out.
I return to the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds about sexual abuse. The Minister said very clearly on an earlier group that sexual offences had been singled out in the Bill because, in her words, the Government wanted to be clear that that kind of behaviour is never acceptable. Clearly, as a matter of domestic and international law, the offences touched on in this group—war crimes, genocide, torture and crimes against humanity—are never acceptable either. So there is a complete illogic about including sexual offences but not these other very grave matters.
The Minister will say that this is not a statute of limitation, it is just presumptive. I am afraid that that will not wash with large numbers of the public nor, crucially, elsewhere in the world, including, it would seem, with the chief prosecutor of the ICC. Furthermore, even if it were impossible for these offences ever to be perpetrated by Her Majesty’s forces in future, we have been told repeatedly that this is as much about reassurance and the signals that we send as it is about the letter of the law. Well, reassurance is a two-way street. It is of course about protection for our Armed Forces, but it is also about sending signals, not just to our Armed Forces but to our allies and friends—and to our enemies, including enemies who, I am sorry to say, might at some point in future have members of Her Majesty’s forces in their custody. That is perhaps the moment when these grave crimes become a matter of even closer concern than they are the rest of the time.
I say to the Minister, for whom I have a great deal of respect—I think she is a very gifted advocate but also a reasonable person, and one of the most decent members of the Government—and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, as a law officer, who I think may be in his place, that this group of amendments, perhaps more than any other, should be responded to at the close of this evening’s debate with at least an offer to consider them. It would be unconscionable for something like this group not to be reflected in the legislation when it passes. And the legislation will pass, because of the Government’s mandate and majority. The Minister will remind us at various stages that the Bill was a manifesto commitment, but it was not ever a manifesto commitment to open the door, send a signal or give reassurance in relation to war crimes, genocide, torture and crimes against humanity.
People deserve advocates—even alleged wrongdoings deserve the most gifted and fearless advocates, and everyone should be so lucky as to have such a gifted advocate as the Minister—but we do not deserve the rotten law that is about to be made, exposing our Armed Forces, and humans all over the world, to lines that should never be crossed.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, the debate on Amendment 14 will now resume. I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Robertson and Lord Browne of Ladyton, and my noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem have made powerful speeches with which I totally agree. I will confine myself to looking more closely at the nature of the offences we are discussing.
The United Nations convention on genocide of December 1948 came about as the result of campaigning by Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term in 1943 after witnessing the horrors of the Holocaust, in which every member of his family except his brother was killed.
Article II of the convention defines genocide as an act
“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.
The acts include
“Killing … Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group … Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.
No one in this country has ever been accused of genocide.
It is different with war crimes. I watched a corporal in the British Army plead guilty to a war crime in the Baha Mousa case, namely torture. He was acquitted of murder and received a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.
War crimes are defined as grave breaches of the Geneva conventions—
“acts against persons or property protected under the provisions”
of those conventions. They include wilful killing, torture, wilfully causing great suffering, unlawful deportation, the taking of hostages and other acts. To suggest that, where there is evidence sufficient to found a conviction on any of these matters, a prosecution could be avoided by a presumption against prosecution, is grotesque: “rotten law”, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said a moment ago, and I totally agree with her.
The thought that, if the DSP had decided there was sufficient evidence that a prosecution was in the public and the service interest, the Attorney-General could nevertheless block a prosecution, holding their hands up and saying that it was not a political decision, is equally demeaning. As the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, put it, it is a disgrace that it should be included in a Bill to be passed by Her Majesty in Parliament.
The picture is that there is somebody in government who has decided as a matter of policy that he or she could not block the prosecution of sexual offences with a presumption of prosecution. Why? What is the justification for selecting that category of offences when we have the types of offences not excluded? It is an arbitrary choice, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds put it. Why is there this anomaly? I look forward to the Minister’s reply. It is a mistake, is it not? I certainly hope so.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, the purpose of these amendments is familiar by now: to ensure that our service personnel are protected from the risk of prosecution in the International Criminal Court. To anyone who believes that this risk is illusory or negligible, I recommend not only the legal opinions variously expressed by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope, by former Judge Advocate Blackett and by the Joint Committee on Human rights, but the 184-page final report of the outgoing prosecutor of the ICC, dated 9 December 2020 and entitled Situation in Iraq/UK.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, has already mentioned this report, so I will refer to only two things in it: the conclusion that there was a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes including torture were perpetrated by British forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009, and the last words of its final page, an ominous warning that the prosecutor’s office would in the future consider
“the impact of any new legislation on the ability of the competent domestic authorities to consider new allegations arising from the conduct of UK armed forces in Iraq”.
The prosecutor’s words are reinforced by the recent letter referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and echo the Australian Brereton report of November 2020—which I mentioned at Second Reading—which pointedly observed of this Bill:
“There is a large question as to whether such a law would meet the requirements of Article 17 of the Treaty of Rome.”
Of the approaches we are offered in this group, I prefer Amendment 14, on two grounds: first, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope has pointed out, because of its less vulnerable position in the body of the Bill; and, secondly, because Article 14, if I am not mistaken, maps more precisely on to the jurisdiction of the ICC. It applies to war crimes as broadly defined in Section 50 of the ICC Act 2001 and Articles 5 and 8.2 of the Rome statute.
Amendment 39, by contrast, would exclude from the presumption against prosecution only war crimes falling within Article 8.2(a) of the Rome statute: grave breaches of the Geneva conventions. That would leave within the scope of the presumption against prosecution the 26 categories of war crimes in international armed conflict that are listed in Article 8.2(b). Therefore, under Amendment 39 there would appear to be at least some risk of ICC intervention in any case that could be brought within those categories.
That was the dry contribution of just another lawyer to a debate that has seen the case for these amendments advanced with astonishing force on the very highest military, legal and political authority. The contrary case seems to be made only weakly in the Minister’s letter of the other day. Like other noble Lords, I admire the Minister greatly, and for that very reason permit myself to wonder whether the Government will really persist in opposing these amendments.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, it is very unusual for a Green to be among the majority. I will take great delight in that.
I cannot compete with the erudition and rationale of noble Lords who have spoken already, but I will draw attention to the fact that the Government are trying to create this triple lock against prosecution as a safe harbour for military criminals—regardless of how serious their crime—and then, out of nowhere, the Bill says, “Ah, well, these protections apply to any crime, but not sexual offences.” I am fascinated to find out the real reason for excluding sexual offences in this way. Five years after their offence, a murderer, a torturer and a thief all get protected, but an accused sexual offender gets prosecuted regardless. Even if the murderer, torturer or thief actually did it, they can get off, but an innocent person accused vexatiously of sexual offences would be prosecuted. It really does not make sense to make this exception of one category of offences.
It is not just rape; the list in Schedule 1 includes things such as
“possession of extreme pornographic images”,
“outraging public decency” and any offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, such as Section 71, which criminalises sexual activity in a public lavatory. A soldier could have consensual sex in a public toilet, kill their partner and face the outrageous prospect under this Bill of being prosecuted only for having sex in the toilet—they might be protected from the murder charge.
Likewise, the Bill singles out slavery, but only slavery for sexual exploitation—take as many slaves as you like, after five years you will probably get away with it, but you might get prosecuted for any slaves who are sexually exploited.
It staggers me that the Government have chosen this specific exemption to their messy triple lock. Of course I support it, but we must have those other exemptions as well. I ask those noble Lords who have spoken so strongly on this issue: where were they during the spy-cops Bill, when we heard criminals—police spies and police agents—being given immunity from all these crimes? In any case, it all loops back to the obvious conclusion that this Bill is ridiculous. It creates obvious and unacceptable injustice and needs to be scrapped entirely.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 14 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Robertson, Lord Alton, Lord West and Lord Campbell, and Amendment 36 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. In doing so, I apologise for not having spoken on Second Reading, due to an inadvertent mistake over timing.
I back the amendments not out of any objection to the Bill as a whole. The Bill’s objectives are laudable ones of giving protection to our service personnel against vexatious inquiries and prosecutions. However, the Bill as drafted actually increases those risks rather than reduces them. I oppose these defects, which the amendments seek to remedy on the grounds of both practicality and principle. The practical problem is a very obvious one. While the Bill places limitations in time in our domestic law on the pursuit of inquiries and prosecutions, it does not and cannot impose such limitations with respect to our international obligations under the Rome statute, which established the International Criminal Court and which Parliament ratified and gave effect to before its entry into force. The Rome statute, in whose negotiation we participated fully—I was myself involved to a modest extent when I was the UK’s Permanent Representative to the UN in 1995—contains no such limitations with respect to the crimes identified in the statute. The risk is therefore, as many other noble Lords have said, that our service personnel could be prosecuted in the International Criminal Court even though we had declined, under the provisions of this Bill, to take any action.
That is no theoretical risk. Quite recently, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court decided not to pursue cases against our personnel on the explicit grounds that we had domestic legislation to deal with the alleged offences and had demonstrated our willingness to use it. This could therefore be a case, I fear, of being out of the frying pan and into the fire if we do not take steps to remove from the scope of the Bill the extraordinarily serious offences set out in the Rome statute.
The argument of principle in favour of these amendments leads on from the practical argument. The International Criminal Court is an important part of that rules-based international system which the Government have argued, quite correctly in my view, that it is in our national interest to sustain. In recent years, the Government have done a good job in doing precisely that against the intemperate onslaughts of the Trump Administration against the International Criminal Court. Here, however, we are being asked to legislate in a way that could put us in contradiction with our obligations under the Rome statute. That clearly is not a sensible or principled thing to do. At worst, it could lead to British service personnel being prosecuted unnecessarily in the ICC, which would inevitably lead to an outcry in this country, possibly challenging the basis of our membership. Less dramatically, it will be seen by the critics and opponents of the International Criminal Court around the world—in places like Russia and China, and the US in some parts of the body politic—as a weakening of our support of the court and as undermining its authority. For both the reasons of practicality and principle, I hope that the Government will, before we get to Report, reconsider these flawed aspects of the Bill and remedy them.
Baroness Blower (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to listen and to speak, however briefly, on Amendment 14, which is clearly the vehicle for correcting one of the significant flaws of the Bill. I acknowledge that I have no military experience and but limited knowledge of the law in comparison to many noble Lords in this House.
As other Members of the Committee have said, this amendment is necessary as it provides that the presumption against prosecution will not apply to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or torture. As others have said in this debate, it would restore our obligations under the Geneva conventions, the UN Convention against Torture and the Rome statute to investigate and prosecute grave breaches of humanitarian law.
I am indebted to the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, on whose material I have drawn to make these few remarks. It says that,
“although rare, abuses by the military do happen”,
and that
“The UK has a long and proud reputation of decisive action against war crimes … We do not protect British troops … by hiding from the truth or acting with impunity.”
On Second Reading I quoted Martin Luther King Jr, who famously said that
“the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice”.
Sally Yates, the US Deputy Attorney-General appointed by President Barack Obama in 2015, added a caveat to this quote, saying that it does not get there on its own. That is why we have international and humanitarian law.
This amendment would correct what is clearly a flaw in this Bill as originally drafted. I cannot possibly rise to the erudition of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, or my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. But I insist that it must be seen in the Bill that there can be no presumption against war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or torture in terms of prosecution. For this reason, I fully support this amendment.
I ask the Minister, who is clearly much admired in your Lordships’ House, to outline once more why she feels that such a presumption is appropriate and why it does not send a very bad signal that undermines the trusted nature of our legal system and our international reputation. As has been said by so many Members of the Committee, it has the potential to open our military personnel up to proceedings in the International Criminal Court—which is absolutely not where we wish to be.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
My Lords, unlike the first group of amendments, this group—particularly Amendment 14—has very broad support across your Lordships’ House. That is scarcely surprising because one of the very clear omissions from the Bill was precisely the group of crimes so eloquently outlined in the opening remarks by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen.
It is clearly right that one of the exemptions from the presumption is sexual violence—that is fine—but it is a glaring omission to leave other war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture and genocide off the face of the Bill. Indeed, it has been raised at every stage of the Bill. It was raised on Second Reading in the other place and many times on Second Reading in your Lordships’ House. I have only one question to ask the Minister: how can she and the Government justify this omission?
As Members across the Committee have said, it is so important for the reputation of our country that we abide by the rule of law and the conventions which we have signed up to and have so often led. As a country, we pride ourselves on supporting certain values, including opposing torture, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is inconceivable that we should say that this is anything that the Armed Forces or we as a country should condone.
My only sense from the Minister, in private meetings and her response to the debate at Second Reading regarding having sexual offences going against presumption but not other war crimes, was that there would never be a case on the battlefield when use of sexual violence was sanctioned. That seems to suggest that genocide, torture or other war crimes could be sanctioned. Surely that is not what the Minister meant or what the Government mean. Were there ever to be a case of torture or genocide—God forbid—surely we should be leading the way in ensuring that it is investigated and prosecuted. The reason it is so important to have this in the Bill is precisely to demonstrate our commitment to upholding human rights and not falling down any cracks.
I am absolutely sure that nobody would willingly commit any of these crimes, and I do not think that very many cases would ever even be investigated, but the amendments need to be in the Bill to ensure that we are not resiling from the conventions that we have signed up to. The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, who I do not think has participated on this group of amendments, earlier prayed in aid Major Bob Campbell, who had said that he would not be taken to the ICC, and it might have been better to be in front of the ICC than subject to protracted and repeated investigations. The reason that service men and women and veterans from the United Kingdom have not been taken to the ICC is precisely because of our respect for international law.
Why are the Government creating a piece of legislation that leaves such a large hole and potentially damages our reputation? It would be much better to amend the Bill, to have it include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture, and ensure that if anyone were accused of such a crime, it would be investigated and prosecuted if necessary and there would not then be a stain. A great problem is the sense that there is a shadow hanging over somebody and the feeling of “If only it hadn’t been for that presumption” or “Because of that presumption, we are now being taken to the Hague”. Surely that is not a position the Government want to leave anybody in.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, this has been an incredibly instructive debate. Every single speaker has spoken in favour of Amendment 14 in a debate that has lasted an hour, and they could not have been more diverse in their experience: lawyers, military people, senior politicians. We have had the whole range, and they have all spoken in favour of Amendment 14.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, predictably this debate surrounding Clause 6 and Schedule 1 has given rise to the passionate, informed and powerful advance of arguments, which I was expecting. I have listened to the sentiment and emotion that have accompanied the articulation of the arguments and I would have to be completely mute not to hear the force of those emotions. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, indicated, the Minister has come to her winter of discontent—an apt description because the debate around this part of the Bill has encapsulated the major areas of anxiety and concern.
As I set out earlier, Clause 6 details those offences that are excluded from the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. Those are set out in Schedule 1, including offences committed against a member of the regular or reserve forces. All the excluded offences listed in the schedule are sexual offences. I shall come to that in a moment; a number of questions have been posed about it but it reflects the Government’s strong stated belief that the use of sexual violence or sexual exploitation during overseas operations is never acceptable in any circumstance.
The exclusion of sexual offences from Part 1 does not mean that we will not continue to take other offences such as war crimes and torture extremely seriously. I realise that some may dismiss these as mere words and feel unconvinced. I should say that the presumption against prosecution still allows the prosecutor to continue to take decisions to prosecute those offences, and the severity of the crime and the circumstances in which it was allegedly committed will always be factors in their considerations.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked why we have not excluded torture offences from Part 1 measures and why we have excluded sexual offences. In the course of their duties on overseas operations, we expect our service personnel to undertake activities which are intrinsically violent in nature. They fight, they use force, they may use lethality, and they may detain. All these activities are predictable in an overseas operation. What is not predictable, and has no place in an overseas operation, is committing a sexual offence. However, the other activities to which I referred can expose service personnel to the possibility that their actions may result in allegations of, for example, torture. If the prosecutor, having received the results of an investigation, considers that there is no case, he will not prosecute, but if he considers that there is a stateable case, Part 1 of the Bill will not prevent prosecution of torture. That is why we have made the distinction between the two different characters of crime: one that you would never expect to find in an overseas operation, and one that could arise because of action that may have been taken in good faith by Armed Forces personnel believing that it was legitimate and proportionate.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, on the strong emotions which this part of the Bill has elicited, I am aware that certain interpretations have arisen, with the suggestion that the continuing commitment to upholding international humanitarian and human rights law, including the United Nations convention against torture, is somehow undermined by the Bill. I submit that this is a misconception, which I am happy to address and correct.
The UK does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture for any purpose, and we remain committed to maintaining our leading role in the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is worth remembering that, whenever a prosecutor currently makes a decision to prosecute an offence, including offences under the International Criminal Court Act, they must consider the public interest factors in the prosecutor’s full code test, in addition to making a judgment about the strength of the available evidence.
The public interest factors include the severity of the offence, the level of culpability of the suspect, the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim, and the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence. There is no suggestion when exercising this existing discretion that our prosecutors are not acting in compliance with international law, and we consider that the same is true when they will, in future, be required to take into account the measures in Part 1 of the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and other noble Lords raised the matter of the International Criminal Court and the recent letter, which I have read in detail. It is interesting that the letter postulates that where the effect of applying a statutory presumption be to impede further investigations—the Bill does not do this—or to impede prosecution of crimes, because such allegations would not overcome the statutory presumption, the ICC would want to monitor what was happening. This is a perfectly legitimate position for the ICC to adopt. Given that this was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Robertson, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, Lord West and Lord Browne of Ladyton, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, it might be helpful to note here the relationship between the UK and the International Criminal Court. Some of your Lordships may be unaware of what the current relationship is, which suggests to me that something arising out of the blue would, frankly, be beyond credibility.
In accordance with International Criminal Court procedures, a preliminary examination would first need to be initiated by the Office of the Prosecutor to decide whether to take that step. In practice, in the event that the OTP was to raise issues with us about a possible investigation, that would trigger a long and very detailed preliminary examination of the situation, within which we would be consulted at each step of the way, for the OTP to determine whether it was necessary to open any investigation. That means that we would have many opportunities to prevent UK service personnel from being prosecuted at the ICC. We would be able to show that the UK national system was both willing and able to conduct investigations and prosecutions, thus rendering unnecessary the ICC’s jurisdiction over UK service personnel. I offer that additional information in the hope that it will provide some reassurance that these activities are not all operating in silos. There is a co-operative and positive relationship with the ICC.
Amendment 14, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, seeks to add wording to Clause 6(3) to explicitly exclude further offences from being a “relevant offence” under Part 1. These are torture, under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime under the International Criminal Court Act 2001.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, made a very powerful submission in support of Amendments 36 to 45, which in combination would have a similar effect by ensuring that torture offences contained in Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, under the law of England and Wales, and the offences of genocide, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva convention contained within the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it applies in England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, were listed as excluded offences in Schedule 1. These amendments would amount to a comprehensive list of very serious offences to be excluded from the application of the measures in Part 1. The noble and learned Lord advanced his case cogently and with purpose, as one would expect, and others did likewise in their support of the amendments.
I am fully aware of the deep concerns that have been expressed that the Bill does not exclude these offences, and I have already set out the Government’s reasoning for excluding only sexual offences from the coverage of Part 1. I believe the perception has arisen that the absence of crimes from Schedule 1 has been equated with the non-prosecution of such serious crimes because it is assumed that the Bill will bar such prosecutions. However, I reiterate that the severity of an alleged offence will continue to be an extremely important factor for a prosecutor in determining whether or not to prosecute.
I realise that my response may be regarded by your Lordships as inadequate, so I will endeavour to provide some concluding thoughts. I have argued that the measures in Part 1 will require a prosecutor to give additional consideration to some specific matters—most importantly, the unique context of overseas operations. However, quite rightly, these measures will not prevent the prosecutor determining, having considered all the circumstances of the case, that it is appropriate to prosecute. The presumption in Clause 2 may be rebutted where it is appropriate for the prosecutor to do so.
The Bill as drafted ensures that the Part 1 measures will apply to a wide range of offences. That is to provide reassurance to our service personnel that the operational context will be taken into account, so far as it reduces a person’s culpability in the circumstances of allegations of criminal offences on historical overseas operations. I believe that we can take this approach in the knowledge that the prosecutor retains their discretion to make the appropriate decision on a case-by-case basis, including in respect of the most serious offences.
The Government have felt that, with the exception of sexual offences, all other crimes should be covered by the measures in Part 1. However, I am in no doubt as to the strength of feeling expressed by the Committee, which was neatly encapsulated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, because I did not find too many supporters speaking up for my side of the argument. I undertake to consider with care the arguments that have been advanced and to explore if there is any way by which we can assuage your Lordships’ concerns. I hope that, in these circumstances, that will persuade the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, to withdraw his amendment and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, not to move his.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)
I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead. I will call them in turn: first, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)
Excuse me, Lady Chakrabarti, the Minister has not completed her speech.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I apologise for the confusion.
There was a further amendment: Amendment 15. It deals with Clause 6(6), which is the delegated power provision. That provision is there to ensure that the Government are able to respond to new developments and fresh concerns that may emerge in relation to potential offences in future overseas operations without the need to seek primary legislation every time a change is required.
Legislation that confers such a power to amend the list in the schedule to an Act is not unusual. Schedule 1 lists the offences excluded from the requirements set out in Clauses 2, 3 and 5, and the power is limited to amending this list of offences, so it has a very narrow scope. It is also not unusual that any exercise of the power to amend the schedule to an Act be subject to the affirmative procedure before any regulations can be made.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Tunnicliffe, have been supportive of this amendment. Its aim seems to be to further narrow the scope of the power in response to the concerns raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
I believe, however, that the concern over the power contained in Clause 6(6) has possibly arisen from the wider concerns regarding the requirements set out in Clauses 2, 3 and 5. I have tried to allay these concerns, and I have detected a growing acceptance that the Bill does not represent an absolute bar to future prosecutions of serious crimes. The delegated power will allow future Governments to adapt Part 1 of the Bill according to the lessons they may learn from overseas operations in future. To limit the scope so that offences can only be added to Schedule 1, as the amendment would wish, could have an impact on the Government’s ability to implement the lessons learned and adapt to what is likely to be an evolving operational landscape.
The power already has a very narrow scope and its use will still require the express approval of both Houses of Parliament. In these circumstances, I urge noble Lords to not move this amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for what I can call only a predictably clear and gracious response. Because the Minister has agreed to reflect on this evening’s debate and consult her colleagues thereafter, I will just press her for a moment longer on the distinction between sexual offences and torture in particular, not with a view to further back and forth this evening but in the hope that it might influence her discussions with her colleagues.
The last 20 years have taught us that when torture is practised as a weapon of war, sexual torture is often one facet of that torture. It is not a nice thing to discuss. The other side of the coin is that of false allegations and clouds hanging over innocent and brave members of Her Majesty’s forces. Our Armed Forces, when overseas, can be as easily subject to false allegations of sexual offences as to false allegations of torture or any of the other offences that are not barred from the presumption against prosecution in the Bill.
If this is not about false allegations, there must be, as I understand the rationale, some kind of thinking, perhaps at the Ministry of Defence or elsewhere, that because our Armed Forces are engaged in violence, there is some kind of fine line, or borderline, between the violence in which we understand they are engaged and torture. If that is the case, I find it very troubling indeed. Are we back in the Bush White House? Are we back with the legal advice that it is not torture when it is enhanced interrogation, for example?
It seems to me that international law and our own ethical and legal norms are very clear on the distinction between the kind of violence that is sadly necessary in war situations and genocide, crimes against humanity and torture. There is not a borderline against torture, and that tacit acceptance of a grey area is just the kind of thinking that got people into such difficulties on both sides of the Atlantic over the last 20 years. So I humbly ask the Minister, in the spirit of genuinely trying to improve this, to examine that distinction between sex and torture, and sexual torture and other forms of torture, in particular, when she goes back to her colleagues in the department and elsewhere.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)
Does the Minister wish to respond?
Baroness Goldie (Con)
Yes. I listened very carefully to what the noble Baroness said, and I undertake to look at her contribution in detail.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for a very clear exposition of how one can get around some of these difficulties. I am delighted that she is going take this back and look at it, but I ask her to ask her officials: what are the benefits for the UK of excluding these from the list? What are we gaining by that? I used to find quite often, when I was standing at the Dispatch Box for three years, that when I prodded in that way, I would find that there were no benefits, but that they were defending their position wonderfully. I am not asking for an answer now, but can she prod that to see what benefits we actually get by not having those listed?
Baroness Goldie (Con)
Again, I undertake to look carefully at the noble Lord’s remarks.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for her gracious reply and for her willingness to take this matter away and reflect on this and other debates. I am glad that she recognises that, among the 800-odd Members of the House of Lords, the Government could not mobilise one single Member of the House to come and defend the position on this amendment. I am not surprised, and I can see the difficulty that she has in putting forward the argument.
I listened to see whether I could be persuaded by what she said—after all, some of the officials who used to work for me may still be there and producing the rationale for her this evening. However, to say simply that there is no bar to prosecution for war crimes, torture and crimes against humanity is to state only the technical argument. The fact is that the Bill gives a presumption against prosecution for war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture, and that is what is going to be noticed, not the technical argument that there is no actual bar. There are barriers or, as the chief prosecutor of the ICC said, conditions laid down which will be well noticed.
Perhaps I may also say that when the Minister goes back to the Ministry of Defence and faces those who want to take a stand here, it might be worth avoiding the mistake that we make all too often in foreign relations, which is mirror imaging—looking at an issue through our eyes. In this case, if those who want to take a hard line would look at this issue through the eyes of the torturers, the war criminals and those who would perpetrate torture and crimes against humanity and see what sort of signal they are getting from the United Kingdom and its legal system, that would paint a different picture from the rather Panglossian view that just been put forward.
I feel strongly about this, more strongly than I have felt about many other things, because I feel for my country. I feel for its reputation and the credibility of our standing in the world and our reputation for adhering to agreements that we have come to. So all of us hope that the Minister will go away, think and expect others in the department and the Government to think again. On that basis, I am willing to withdraw the amendment, but I have no doubt that we will come back to the issue at later stages of the Bill.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)
We come now to the group beginning with Amendment 16. Anyone wishing to press this amendment or anything else in the group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 16
“Compliance with the Belfast Agreement 1998
Nothing in this Part is to be construed in any manner that is non-compliant with the Belfast Agreement 1998.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendments to page 8, line 12 and page 26, line 16 in the name of Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick, ensure that the bill cannot be interpreted in a way that undermines the Belfast Agreement 1998’s requirement for the Government to complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights, with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 16 I will speak also to Amendments 25, 33 and 69 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain. The purpose of these amendments is to ensure adherence to the Good Friday agreement, as there is a fear among human rights organisations that this legislation could undermine the very essence of the agreement, which is central to the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland and relations within the island of Ireland and between Ireland and Britain. The major fear centres on the fact that the overseas operations Bill would limit direct access to the Northern Ireland courts and remedies for breaches of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to proceedings in connection with overseas operations. I have been contacted by the Committee on the Administration of Justice in Northern Ireland and Rights and Security International. They feel strongly about these issues.
Amendments 16, 25 and 33 have been tabled to ensure that the Bill cannot be interpreted in a way that undermines the requirement in the 1998 Belfast agreement for the Government to complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights, with direct access to the courts and remedies for breach of the convention. On a similar basis, Amendment 69 has been interpreted in a way that underlines the requirement in the 1998 Belfast agreement that, again, the Government should complete the incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights, with direct access to the courts and remedies for breach of the convention. It is important to emphasise that the Belfast/Good Friday agreement provided that—I shall quote directly:
“The British Government shall complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights with direct access to the courts and remedies for breach of the Convention.”
There is a fear that, as currently drafted, the Bill risks undermining the provision in a number of ways, hence the necessity for these amendments. I hope that the Minister will see their benefit and will consider accepting them tonight.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am pleased, as always, to speak after the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, in support of her amendment, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and my noble friend Lord Hain, who is of course a former Northern Ireland Secretary.
I need not repeat the point about the importance of the Belfast agreement—it is well known to everyone in your Lordships’ House—or explain the matters that the noble Baroness in self-deprecating fashion referred to as “technical”. These are not of course just technical matters, because the Belfast agreement is an international treaty. However, I will pre-empt any doubts that some sceptics may have about the importance of these rather neat amendments.
The Belfast agreement is not just about what happens in Northern Ireland but about the law and the values in relation to all communities in Northern Ireland and indeed on the island of Ireland. That is why it is so important that, even though the Bill is about overseas operations—not about operations in Northern Ireland itself—it is about the law and the values as they apply to people who may seek redress in the Northern Ireland courts, even if it is in relation to overseas operations in which they served or potentially argued they were otherwise victims.
I urge noble Lords to take these amendments extremely seriously, not least in the context of the group we have just heard about. The Minister and I may disagree about such things as whether I am right or wrong in my plain view that many aspects of the Bill violate the ECHR, but at least these amendments would allow where possible any wriggle room to be used for interpretation so that we do not fall foul of that precious agreement that has been so vital to maintaining relative peace for such a long time.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]
My Lords, these amendments are designed on the assumption that provisions in the Bill might be contrary to the human rights convention and, of course, the Human Rights Act. I regard it as 110% essential that the Belfast agreement is fully respected and implemented. I have therefore supported this amendment on the view that, since a question has been raised about it, it is right that it should be thoroughly checked and that, if necessary, these amendments should be inserted to make sure. I have my doubts as to whether it is necessary but I am all in favour of it being checked in detail by those who drafted the Bill, to make sure that, whatever happens, the Belfast agreement is not damaged in any way by the provisions in the Bill.
Baroness Suttie (LD) [V]
This has been an interesting and important short debate. It has previously been made clear that the Bill does not deal with matters relating to Northern Ireland, but I trust that in her concluding remarks the Minister will none the less give full responses to the many important issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, this evening. I believe that it is equally important that the Minister acknowledges that these amendments stem from several very real fears and anxieties.
The first of these fears is that, in their actions and behaviour over recent months, the Government have given cause for concern that they are seeking to water down or reinterpret the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. In her response to these amendments, I hope that the Minister can give some firm reassurances this evening that this is not the case. The second anxiety at the heart of these amendments is that it is somewhat unclear that the Government remain fully committed to the balanced and well-considered approach to legacy issues as set out in the Stormont House agreement. Given that it is now well over a year since New Decade, New Approach was published, can the Minister update the Committee this evening on the Government’s approach to legacy issues in Northern Ireland?
Given that the Minister is not from the Northern Ireland Office, I suspect that she may not be able to give a full response to my question on legacy, so I would be extremely grateful if it would be possible to receive a letter setting down in detail the answer to that question and arrange a meeting to discuss these matters on legacy in more detail.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the Good Friday agreement is central to the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland. We all have a vital role to play in safeguarding the Good Friday agreement and building on its promise, and we must ensure that this Bill, or any other Bill, protects it. However, the Government have demonstrated a reckless approach to the Good Friday agreement. We need only to consider their actions with the internal market Act, which threatened the agreement and resulted in resounding international criticism, including from the new President of the United States.
The Good Friday agreement is one of Labour’s proudest achievements in office. The courage of the people and communities in Northern Ireland made peace happen and has allowed an entire generation to grow up free from conflict. We must build on it, not weaken its foundations. The amendments in this group aim to ensure that the Bill cannot be interpreted in a way that undermines the Good Friday agreement’s requirements for the Government to complete incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern Ireland law.
Rights and Security International has said that the Bill risks undermining the agreement as the presumption against prosecution
“extends to criminal offences which are also considered violations of the ECHR, such as torture … Under the ECHR, there is a procedural obligation to … prosecute and punish”
these acts, and the Good Friday agreement
“requires that this procedural obligation be incorporated in the law of Northern Ireland.”
Does the Bill make it harder for breaches of the ECHR to be prosecuted? Rights and Security International has also said that the six-year longstop impacts on
“the Good Friday Agreement’s requirement that the UK ensure direct access to the courts”.
Have the Government received independent legal advice on the impact of the Bill on the Good Friday agreement or carried out their own impact assessment of the Bill on the agreement?
When considering Northern Ireland, we must also remember that the Bill does not cover operations in Northern Ireland as originally promised. Last month, the Leader of the House in the other place said that
“the Government will introduce separate legislation to address the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland in the coming months in a way that focuses on reconciliation, delivers for victims and ends the cycle of reinvestigations into the troubles in Northern Ireland”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/2/21; col. 496.]
However, it is now exactly a year since the Northern Ireland Secretary made a statement promising the same. What is causing the delay? When will it be published? The Good Friday agreement must endure, must be strengthened and must continue to guarantee peace. Whether it is in this Bill or any other, the aims must be supported, not undermined.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, Lady Suttie and Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for their contributions. These amendments seek to ensure that the Bill cannot be interpreted in a way that undermines the Belfast agreement. As they all indicated, the Belfast agreement was, of course, an incredible achievement, and the Government remain fully committed to the agreement and the constitutional principles it upholds, including the institutions it established and the rights it protects. The agreement has been the foundation for political progress, peace and stability in Northern Ireland over the last 22 years, and it will be protected going forward.
I listened with interest and care to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and I reassure him that nothing in the Bill could be interpreted as undermining the commitments contained in the Belfast agreement, and nothing that would diminish the essence of the protections that the Human Rights Act currently offers to the people of Northern Ireland. My noble and learned friend may be aware that the UK has already fulfilled the commitment under the agreement to incorporation by enacting the Human Rights Act 1998, which provides for direct access to the domestic courts to vindicate convention rights, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which provides that the Northern Ireland Assembly can legislate only in a way that is compatible with convention rights and that Northern Ireland Ministers must act compatibly with the convention rights. I would say that the measures in this Bill are considered to be compatible with the convention rights.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I thank all who participated in this short but timely and important debate: the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Suttie, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the Minister.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, underlined the importance of an international treaty, the importance of the Belfast agreement in terms of the laws and values relating to communities in Northern Ireland, and the need for the courts in relation to overseas operations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, wanted to make sure that the Belfast agreement was respected in the Bill, and the Minister seemed to indicate that that was the case, although I have certain doubts and I want to reflect further on this.
The noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, raised important issues about the need for a balanced approach to the agreement. The fact that the Belfast/Good Friday agreement was balanced allowed people in Northern Ireland to enjoy relative peace, which needs to be built on, and provided for those political institutions, which are thankfully working. She and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, raised very important issues to do with legacy matters.
The Secretary of State in the other place made a Statement on 18 March 2020 that basically said that the Government were abandoning the Stormont House agreement in favour of other issues. We have never seen that legislation, but I urge the Minister and her colleagues in the Northern Ireland Office to adhere to the Stormont House agreement because it gives the best resolution for legacy issues in Northern Ireland.
In her very gracious comments, the Minister said that the Government were fully committed to the Belfast agreement. Like the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, I question that because we saw attempts to unravel it through the passage of the UK internal markets Act and we have seen further attempts to unravel the Northern Ireland protocol and undermine the agreement by others in the Government. I simply ask at this stage that those issues be properly dealt with through the UK-EU mechanisms already available and not through unilateral approaches. I take the basis from the Good Friday agreement itself; the principles of consent and agreement are vital for everything.
The Minister said that nothing in the Bill would diminish human rights in relation to overseas operations. Quite frankly, I would like to go away and reflect on that before considering whether to bring back amendments on Report. I remind the Committee that the commitment to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights is not qualified by events in Northern Ireland, hence the need for these amendments. Again, I emphasise that it is important that the Bill as drafted would limit direct access to the Northern Ireland courts and remedies for breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to proceedings in connection with overseas operations.
In view of that and of the fact that the Minister in her albeit gracious comments has not adequately addressed the issue, while I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 16 this evening, I will further reflect on bringing my amendments back on Report.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to Amendment 18. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 18
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“Time limit for commencing proceedings for minor offences
After section 60 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 insert—“60A Time limit for minor offences(1) A person may not be charged in respect of a minor offence carried out in the course of overseas operations after the end of six months beginning with the day on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) In this section—“minor offence” means—(a) any offence committed by a member of a regular or reserve force which would be in the jurisdiction of the Service Civilian Court if committed by a civilian; (b) any offence capable of being dealt with at a summary hearing under section 53 or 54;“overseas operations” has the meaning given in section 1(6) of the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021.””
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, this is a self-contained point rather outside the mainstream of the other issues that we have been dealing with, but an important amendment trying to provide a degree of certainty to military personnel engaged in overseas operations. The amendment seeks to provide that, where a minor offence is committed that would be triable within the Armed Forces criminal justice system, there should be a six-month time limit from the date the offence is committed for bringing proceedings. So, after six months have elapsed from the date of the offence, if no proceedings have been brought it cannot be prosecuted. This provision mirrors Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 and reflects the sensible proposition that, in relation to minor offences, you should know where you stand.
I am not sure whether the drafting has precisely achieved this; I would be interested in the Minister’s views on whether we need to make any changes. However, I am absolutely sure that the principle is sound: in relation to minor offences, there should be a shortish time limit of six months, so that the system is not cluttered up with old offences of a certain lack of severity. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, whose name is next on the list, has withdrawn so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have little to say in respect of this amendment. I believe that summary offences should be dealt with summarily, and that is what this amendment seeks to achieve.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, it is interesting that we conclude our consideration of Part 1 of the Bill with a genuinely interesting proposition from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, so neatly encapsulated by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
The amendment seeks to introduce, via a new section to be inserted in the Armed Forces Act 2006, a six-month limitation period between an offence being committed or discovered and any proceedings being brought, where certain conditions are satisfied. As I understand the proposal, the amendment would create a six-month limitation period for all offences capable of being dealt with at a summary hearing under Section 53 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. It is worth observing that this category of offence includes a large number of matters that are specific to a military context.
Section 53 covers, for example, the offence of being absent without leave, under Section 9 of the Armed Forces Act 2006; the offence of disobedience to lawful commands, under Section 12; the offence of contravention of standing orders, under Section 13; and the offence of disclosure of information useful to an enemy, under Section 17. These, and many more offences like them, are vital to maintaining discipline and operational effectiveness in the Armed Forces. The amendment proposes that none of these should be capable of leading to punishment after six months. With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, I think that that is unwise.
During any investigation, it is not always clear at the outset what the charge will be, but this is made harder for investigations on overseas operations, particularly where the injured person or witness is a local national. As I have already set out in response to other investigation-related amendments, investigations on overseas operations are subject to greater complexity than those conducted back in the UK, and delays can occur. However, placing what is actually quite a short time limit on investigations is unhelpful. In my view, we should not be seeking to do anything that would fetter the investigative decision-making of the service police. A time limit in these circumstances would do just that.
Even the most minor offences take on a greater significance in an operational environment and, if we reflect on some of the offences to which I have just referred, I think your Lordships would understand the import of that. A minor offence is not necessarily a simple matter that can be dealt with quickly by a commanding officer, and minor offences committed against local nationals can have a disproportionate effect in an operational setting.
I think that this amendment is modelled upon the provisions that exist in relation to summary-only matters in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which is why I find it problematic. The Magistrates’ Courts Act codifies the procedures applicable in the magistrates’ courts of England and Wales. This legislation is not written to accommodate the extraordinary demands made of a system operating in an operational context where, as I have already said, delays can sometimes occur as a result. Applying civilian timescales to an operational context is therefore not appropriate.
I appreciate that the amendment has been offered in good spirit by the noble and learned Lord. I thank him for the breadth of thought in investigating that aspect, but I urge him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to the Minister for her very careful reply. I understood her to make two particular points: first, that six months may be too short, particularly in an overseas operational environment and, secondly, that it may not be appropriate in dealing with certain sorts of military offences, for example, disobedience to orders, particularly in an overseas context.
I hear what the noble Baroness has said and I will think very carefully about two things. First, does one need a longer period and, secondly, should one exclude certain specifically military offences? However, if it were possible, I would be keen to find a way forward on this because although the points she makes have some degree of validity, I also think that for comparatively minor offences it is disproportionate for military personnel still to be investigated for some months or even years after the comparatively minor offence has been allegedly committed. Of course I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 19. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 8: Restrictions on time limits to bring actions: England and Wales
Amendment 19
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that a court can disapply the civil longstop if the same equipment or cause of negligence results in injury or death in overseas operations as in the UK.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
We move on to a different part of the Bill, which seeks to impose more rigorous time limits for bringing civil actions, whether in accordance with the ordinary law of tort or contract, or under the Human Rights Act. Although I am slightly oversimplifying, the Bill essentially seeks to impose a six-year unextendable deadline for bringing civil claims in respect of the conduct of the military, except where knowledge occurs after the six years, in which case there is a further 12-month extension. This is in contradistinction to the normal position whereby a claim would be brought not arising out of overseas operations where the court would have an ability to extend the time for bringing a claim if it were equitable to do so.
In these amendments, we focus on two particular circumstances. First, where a claim is being brought by someone within the military against, in effect, the Government for a breach of human rights or a tortious claim, we take the view that we should not be providing additional limitation hurdles in respect of military personnel bringing claims against the MoD—for example, for the negligent provision of defective equipment. I should be interested to hear why the Government think that there should be such a limitation. As a subgroup, primarily dealing with military personnel but able to deal with others also, if, in relation to an identical claim that had occurred in the UK, somebody could bring a claim and have the limitation period extended if it were equitable to do so, we cannot see any reason why in identical circumstances such a claim could not also be brought, even though the circumstances or damage arose in the course of overseas operations.
For example, if the Ministry of Defence provided defective equipment to a soldier and, as a result, the soldier suffered serious injury in an exercise on Salisbury Plain, why should a soldier who suffers precisely the same injury while on an overseas operation because of the negligent provision of defective equipment by the Ministry of Defence have a shorter and harsher limitation period than the soldier who was injured in precisely the same circumstances for precisely the same reasons in an exercise on Salisbury Plain? For example, they were both injured not necessarily because of the activities of enemy insurgents against them but because all the forms of transport provided were defective in a way that was the fault of the Ministry of Defence. The injury would have occurred whether one was driving along a road in Wiltshire or a road in Iraq or Afghanistan. It is unfair that there should be different limitations for precisely the same sorts of injury.
Two questions arise on this group of amendments. First, why should there be different limitation periods for the military bringing claims against the Ministry of Defence? Secondly and separately, even if there is a reason for that, why should there be a different limitation period for precisely the same injury, the only difference being that it was caused in the course of overseas operations rather than at home, for example? We are aware of the problems that have arisen in relation to many claims being brought—and many failing—arising out of overseas operations. We are all aware of those circumstances, but we are very concerned that, in trying to deal with that multiplicity of claims, the Government are unfairly depriving military personnel of their legitimate right to protect their rights against the Ministry of Defence.
It is very important that the limitation period be fair for claims by military personnel because, for a whole variety of reasons that those engaged in the military will be aware of, there may be very good reasons why a member of the military takes a long time to discover either that they could bring a claim or that they are in an emotional or mental position to bring a claim because of their experiences. We think these provisions are very detrimental and unfair to military personnel and require amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
My Lords, at this time of the evening it would be very easy simply to agree with everything the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has just said and be happy to move on, but that would do a disservice to our service men and women and veterans, because the points these amendments speak to and the words the noble and learned Lord has just uttered are extremely important. It is surely appropriate that we treat our service personnel and veterans with respect, and that they should not be disadvantaged because they have been service men and women.
Clearly, incidents and dangers can happen in the field of battle that will not be legislated for in a conventional civilian sense, but there might be other issues—hearing loss, for example—associated with having been in the Armed Forces which become clear only later. It seems very strange, as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, that people should have different rights according to whether the problems arose while based in the UK or on overseas operations. Can the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, who appears to have taken over from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, say what work the Government have done in looking at the potential ramifications of this limitation?
This Bill has been put forward by the Government as something supposed to help our service men and women, but this limitation seems to limit their rights. I know the Minister will have been told that it is very important that cases are brought swiftly and issues are dealt with promptly, that it is in everybody’s interest to do so and that delaying things is in no one’s. But neither is curtailing people’s rights.
The Royal British Legion sent a briefing picking up in particular on the Armed Forces covenant, quoting the point:
“Those who serve in the Armed Forces, whether Regular or Reserve, those who have served in the past and their families, should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services … In accessing services, former members of the Armed Forces should expect the same level of support as any other citizen in society.”
Assuming that Her Majesty’s Government still support the Armed Forces covenant, can the Minister explain how the proposals in Part 2 of the Bill live up to its commitments? Can he tell us what additional thoughts the Government might be willing to have on looking again at this limitation?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, has withdrawn from the debate, so I call the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 29 in support of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Boyce and Lord Stirrup. The de facto six-year time limit for claims being brought against Ministers and the MoD arising from active service abroad seems at first sight far from protecting our people, but rather reducing the rights of individual service personnel. Those injured as a result of negligence during overseas operations, unlike in the UK, will have less protection under the law. Veterans and service charities, as was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, are very worried and have been taking quite a lot of notice of this. The British Legion and other charities are very concerned.
To keep this short, it seems that the Bill seeks to protect the MoD from claims by our servicemen, rather than trying to look after them. Again, I am absolutely sure that that is not the intention, and this amendment tries to rectify that problem.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB) [V]
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 29 and I support this important safeguard for service personnel. As has been mentioned, not all disabilities are immediately self-evident. Medical advances and associating clinical problems with mental or slowly developing illnesses are helping to explain and track the trigger to events not just in the recent past, but over periods measured in years, not months. Should a claim be considered, it should not be dismissed on some arbitrary timeline. Justice for service personnel, both serving and veterans, demands that their interests should be protected.
The changes made in the past decade, replacing the tried and tested Pensions Appeal Tribunal, which had its origins in 1919, with new arrangements, have been the cause of much anxiety at times. Indeed, I put down an annulment Motion to a major tribunal revamp in 2008 that sought to disband the Pensions Appeal Tribunal of England and Wales and move all its military pension and disability work into a civilian social entitlement chamber. This was widely condemned by those with experience of this type of work, by the Royal British Legion and other charities which help with the preparation and submission of such claims. My Motion was debated and, happily, the Government then agreed that the Pensions Appeal Tribunal work should be given its own separate chamber in the restructured tribunals.
So it is not only that claims by service personnel and veterans should not be arbitrarily time-limited: as important is that the tribunal arrangement in place to deal with claims is respected and trusted, as was the former Pensions Appeal Tribunal, with its long experience and proven track record in this field. I hope the Government will acknowledge the importance of that, as well as Amendment 29.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, the scheme of this part of the legislation creates a long stop of six years, subject to date of knowledge provisions which provide for an additional one year. It also specifies certain additional factors to be taken into account under the provisions of Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.
Lord Boyce (CB) [V]
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 29 and the subject of a six-year time limit being imposed by the Bill on those who have been engaged on overseas operations in their ability to bring any grievance against the MoD. This would have the perverse effect of limiting individual service personnel’s rights by restricting their access to legal remedies for harms caused by their employers, while it would not apply to their counterparts not engaged on overseas arrangements. Surely it must be beyond argument that such a situation should not be allowed, and I thus support Amendment 29.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is next on the list, has withdrawn, so I call the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 29, to which I have attached my name. Its purpose is to ensure that service personnel are not debarred by time from pursuing claims against the Government for harm suffered on overseas operations. Of course, the purpose of the Bill is to provide reassurance to those very personnel that they will be to some degree protected against malicious proceedings, so it seems rather perverse that the Bill should also seek to prevent them gaining redress for harm that they themselves suffered. The Government have asserted that such an outcome is not their intention, and of course I accept that. However, the question is not the present Government’s intention but the potential consequences of the Bill as worded. It seems that one consequence might well be to deprive a number of serving personnel or veterans of their right to pursue a claim against the Government.
Part of the Government’s response to this concern is to stress the small numbers involved. They say that some 94% of service personnel and veterans who brought claims relating to events in Iraq and Afghanistan did so within six years. Are we then to assume that, had the proposed timescale been applied to them, the Government believe that it would have been acceptable for the other 6% to lose the opportunity to pursue their cases? The Government also say that the vast majority of cases relate to events in the UK, not to overseas operations. That may be so, but to argue that only a small number of service personnel would suffer injustice does not seem a respectable position for a Government to take at any time, let alone in a Bill that is supposed to provide support and reassurance to those people.
This timescale is very different from the one proposed in Part 1. The latter, as I observed earlier, does not introduce a significant legal watershed. Complaints can still be brought to prosecution, subject to certain tests that ought to be applied with or without the Bill. The time limit placed upon complaints brought by service personnel or veterans is of a very different character. It is not a high bar—it is an impassable wall. In support of this absolute limit the Government have prayed in aid statements from the courts about the need for limitation periods in civil litigation to ensure legal certainty and finality and to avoid the need to adjudicate on events so far past that memories and evidence become too unreliable. Of course I see the sense in that, but why six years? Upon what empirical data is such a time period based?
I listened very carefully to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, but since the expiry of the proposed time limit would have such dramatic legal consequences, there seems to be a powerful argument for a much longer period in this case. That which is proposed in the current Bill is too short, too disadvantageous to serving personnel and veterans, and should be reconsidered.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, like my noble friend Lady Smith and others, I am concerned that there should not be a different principle of limitation for service personnel for injuries received as the result of overseas operations as opposed to those injured while they are serving in the United Kingdom. However, I want to also speak up for the civilians in the country where the overseas operations took place.
I am not naive about this. I very much recall a court martial in Colchester, in 2005, for which a lady was brought from Iraq with a complaint that a British soldier had stripped her naked in the street and had caused her huge embarrassment. She went into the witness box, took the oath on the Koran and then turned to the judge and said, “Now I have taken the oath on the Koran, I have to tell the truth. I made it all up.” There were many complaints that were made up at that time.
At the time of the Baha Mousa trial, Mr Phil Shiner was wandering around trying to infiltrate our discussions, and he always had someone taking a note of the evidence as it emerged, which he subsequently misapplied. I am very glad that he was struck off by the Law Society.
That, however, should not prevent, in an appropriate case, a claim for damages going forward if it is equitable to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, expressed with considerable authority the complexity of this area of law and the difficulties that exist in any event—never mind in overseas operations.
There are valid claims. I put in a Written Question on 2 June last year. The Answer told me that, since 2003, there have been
“1,330 claims for damages relating to alleged misconduct … The claims … focus predominately on alleged unlawful detention but many incorporate allegations of mistreatment”.
The Ministry of Defence has paid out £32 million in respect of these allegations, and says that it does not pay out without consideration and finding the claim valid. It meets the bill, which does not fall on the soldier in question.
The practice of the court is not to extend to extend limitation periods easily, and that is a particular concern where valid claims are coming forward. When the court considers whether to extend the limitation period, it investigates all the circumstances. It is very difficult for a poor person in a foreign country to bring a case, and as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, pointed out, it is not easy to extend the limitation period. Date of knowledge is frequently an issue. Sometimes it almost seems as if when a court hears an application for an extended limitation period it will be granted on the nod. But that is not the case: it is a difficult thing to argue. I am, therefore, in favour of these amendments, and I look forward to seeing how they appear on Report.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, I begin by addressing Amendment 29, which seeks to carve out claims from service personnel and veterans from the limitation longstops in the Bill. I have to be clear from the outset: such a carve-out would amount to an unjustifiable difference in treatment between different categories of claimants and would therefore be likely to be incompatible with the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.
A carve-out would also have very limited practical impact. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, anticipated the statistic that I am about to quote. Analysis of previous claims has indicated that the vast majority of claims—around 94% of relevant claims brought by service personnel or veterans in connection with overseas operations—have been brought within six years, which is the period of the longstop.
In answer to the noble and gallant Lord, it must be the case that many of the remaining 6% will come under the state of knowledge provisions, whereby the period of limitation will commence at the point at which the individual has become aware of their condition. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, adverted to this in her submission when she spoke about hearing loss, a condition that might well become manifest outwith the period of six years from the point at which it had been incurred or commenced. The same might equally be said for post-traumatic stress disorder.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, my noble friend Lord West of Spithead, the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Craig of Radley, Lord Stirrup and Lord Boyce, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, all of whom supported this amendment. I am also struck by the fact that I am supported much more by the military than I am by the lawyers on this amendment, which suggests that it must be right.
I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for his detailed reply. In relation to carving out the military claims against the Ministry of Defence, as proposed in Amendment 29, I understood his answer to be that it is discriminatory. I find that hard to believe because the effect of the Bill is to treat soldiers on overseas operations as different from other soldiers. Therefore, it is simply a question of judgment as to which sub-category is acceptable and which is not. He then said that the other reason for resisting it was because it would not affect very many people. That is not much of an answer—do the right thing; do not deprive people of a claim that they would otherwise have.
Ultimately—and this is no criticism of the Minister—his answers were unconvincing because the purpose of this part of the Bill is not to stop military personnel bringing claims; it is to stop claims, of the sort identified by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, brought by non-military personnel. Whether one thinks that that is right or wrong, it is clear that the Government did not intend this effect on military personnel. They should be consistent in the way they deal with it and reassure military personnel by getting rid of this distinction.
Amendment 19 and the ones associated with it would provide that if the same thing were to happen on Salisbury Plain, soldiers should have a claim, whether it was brought in relation to overseas operations or not. There is absolutely no reason that that should not be given effect to. The alleged suggestion that it might be difficult to work out, with no examples given, was—with respect—rather unconvincing. Of course I will withdraw my amendment, but I think I will return to this on Report.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, finally, we come to Amendment 20. Anyone wishing to press this to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Clause 11: Court’s discretion to extend time in certain Human Rights Act proceedings
Amendment 20
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
This amendment deals with the factors that the court must have regard to when it considers whether or not to extend a limitation period under the Human Rights Act. The new Clause 7A(2) that the Bill would insert into the Human Rights Act states:
“The court or tribunal must have particular regard to ... the effect of the delay in bringing proceedings on the cogency of evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the parties”.
More detail is then given before it says that the court or tribunal must also have regard to
“the likely impact of the proceedings on the mental health of any witness or potential witness who is ... a member of Her Majesty’s forces.”
Those factors would, no doubt, be considered in the ordinary course of the exercise of the discretion, irrespective of whether they were put into the Bill.
The wording in the Bill is “particular regard to”. Is it intended that these particular factors should be the main ones that the court has regard to, or is it intended to change the law in any way, in relation to the exercise of the discretion? I do not dispute that the factors that are set out would be relevant, but I think the drafting is unfortunate, and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s explanation of how he thinks it is intended that the exercise of the discretion will work.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I will be brief. I am conscious that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, does not have much regard to what lawyers say on this Bill, so I will bear that in mind as well. I understand the amendment, but there is a query in my mind as to whether he would prefer a “must not have regard”, or the omission of “particular” so that the clause simply has “the court or tribunal must have regard to”.
I have some sympathy for “must have regard to” rather than “particular regard”, because I accept from the noble and learned Lord that there is a possible suggestion that this would be the trump card rather than one of the factors. But it is appropriate that those matters should be specifically drawn to the attention of a court by the Bill, given its overall philosophy. It is probable that those matters would be taken into account. The law of limitation in relation to the Human Rights Act is still developing. It is rather unclear, but this seems to me to be consistent with the philosophy of the Bill, so I do not agree with the total removal of these provisions as the amendment suggests.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
My Lords, not being a lawyer, I shall take the approach taken by the lawyers and be very brief in my comments. I have the same question as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer: what is the purpose of “particular regard” in this respect? There is a time limitation already. Is the “particular regard” intended to truncate the ability to bring proceedings even further, so that if there is a suggestion that somebody’s memory has been impeded by overseas action, it makes it even less likely that proceedings can be brought?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I am again grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. The Bill introduces three factors that the courts must consider and pay particular regard to when deciding whether to allow Human Rights Act claims connected with overseas operations to proceed after the one-year primary limitation period has expired. We feel that these factors are an important part of the Bill, because they ensure that the unique operational context in which the relevant events occurred is taken into account by the courts when considering limitation arguments in claims connected with overseas operations.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, pointed out very early in his submission, the courts will do this already; the courts will have regard to these things. Part of their consideration of whether to allow a claim to proceed beyond the primary limitation period includes assessing whether the claim is, in the language of statute,
“equitable having regard to all the circumstances”.
But our position is that putting these three factors on the face of the Bill will provide a guarantee for service personnel and veterans that appropriate consideration will always be given by the courts—whether that is for Human Rights Act claims or for personal injury and death claims—to these significant points, which are different from those which would apply in peacetime.
We believe that in situations where claims are connected with overseas operations, the courts should pay particular regard to the reality of these operations: the fact that opportunities to make detailed records at the time may have been limited; that increased reliance may have to be placed on the memories of the service personnel involved; and that, as some personnel may suffer from mental ill-health as a result of their service, there is a human cost to them in so contributing.
This is what the additional factors that the Bill introduces seek to do. They consider the extent to which an assessment of the claim will depend on the memories of service personnel and veterans; the impact of the operational context on their ability to recall the specific incident; and the likely impact of the proceedings on their mental health. We believe that it is right that the operational context is at the forefront of the mind of the court when considering whether to allow claims beyond the primary limitation period. Noble Lords will know that we are also introducing these factors for personal injury and death claims, and we must ensure that Human Rights Act claims connected with overseas operations are treated in the same manner.
Particular emphasis was placed on the word “particular” in the course of this short debate. I undertake, in light of the submissions made in the time available, to consider the terms of the drafting and to weigh the suggestions made by noble Lords in relation to that particular adjective in the context of the provision. I will look at any connotations that might flow from it and might be adverse to the intention of the Bill. At this stage, however, I urge that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for taking part in the debate. May I specifically exclude the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, from the lawyers to whom I do not pay regard. The House pays great regard to what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has to say on every topic. I express my gratitude to the Minister for answering, as ever, with great care and regard to the questions that were asked.
What was in my mind in advancing this amendment was having some indication as to the extent to which the Government intend to change the approach that would otherwise be applied by the court. In particular, would these factors referred to in proposed new subsection (2) be intended, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, to trump other factors? I will very carefully study what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, said, but I do not think that he quite answered that. It may be that the way forward in relation to this is to have a further discussion with the noble and learned Lord to see whether he can give further assurance, either in correspondence placed in the Library of the House, or maybe on Report, if we cannot reach agreement on this. I am grateful to him for the answer that he gave. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.